mr. locke's reply to the right reverend the lord bishop of worcester's answer to his second letter wherein, besides other incident matters, what his lordship has said concerning certainty by reason, certainty by ideas, and certainty of faith, the resurrection of the same body, the immateriality of the soul, the inconsistency of mr. locke's notions with the articles of the christian faith and their tendency to sceptism [sic], is examined. locke, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing l estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) mr. locke's reply to the right reverend the lord bishop of worcester's answer to his second letter wherein, besides other incident matters, what his lordship has said concerning certainty by reason, certainty by ideas, and certainty of faith, the resurrection of the same body, the immateriality of the soul, the inconsistency of mr. locke's notions with the articles of the christian faith and their tendency to sceptism [sic], is examined. locke, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by h.c. for a. and j. churchill ... and c. castle .., london : mdcxcix [ ] errata sheet following p. . reproduction of original in the harvard university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng locke, john, - . -- essay concerning human understanding. stillingfleet, edward, - . -- discourse in vindication of the doctrine of the trinity. trinity -- controversial literature. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion m r. locke's reply to the right reverend the lord bishop of worcester's answer to his second letter : wherein , besides other incident matters , what his lordship has said concerning certainty by reason , certainty by ideas , and certainty of faith. the resurrection of the same body . the immateriality of the soul. the inconsistency of mr. locke's notions with the articles of the christian faith , and their tendency to sceptism , is examined . london : printed by h. c. for a. and i. churchill , at the black swan in pater-noster-row ; and e. castle , next scotland-yard by whitehall , mdcxcix . my lord , your lordship , in the beginning of the last letter you honoured me with , seems so uneasie and displeased at my having said too much already in the question between us , that i think i may conclude , you would be well enough pleas'd if i should say no more ; and you would dispense with me for not keeping my promise i made you * to answer the other parts of your first letter . if this proceeds from any tenderness in your lordship for my reputation , that you would not have me expose my self by an overflow of words , in many places void of clearness , coherence and argument , and that therefore might have been spared ; i must acknowledge it is a piece of great charity , and such wherein you will have a lasting advantage over me , since good manners will not permit me to return you the like . or should i in the ebullition of thoughts , which in me your lordship finds as impetuous as the springs of modena mentioned by ramazzini , be in danger to forget my self , and to think , i had some right to return the general complaint of length and intricacy without force , yet you have secured your self from the suspition of any such trash on your side , by making * cobwebs the easie product of those who write out of their own thoughts , which it might be a crime in me to impute to your lordship . if this complaint of yours be not a charitable warning to me , i cannot well guess at the design of it ; for i would not think that in a controversie , which you , my lord , have dragg'd me into , you would assume it as a priviledge due to your self to be as copious as you please , and say what you think fit , and expect i should reply only so , and so much , as would just suit your good liking , and serve to set the cause right on that side which your lordship contends for . my lord , i shall always acknowledge the great distance that is between your lordship and my self , and pay that deference that is due to your dignity and person . but controversie , though it excludes not good manners , will not be managed with all that submission which one is ready to pay in other cases . truth , which is inflexible , has here its interest , which must not be given up in a complement . plato and aristotle , and other great names must give way , rather than make us renounce truth , or the friendship we have for her . this possibly your lordship will allow , for it is not spun out of my own thoughts ; i have the authority of others for it : and i think it was in print before i was born . but you will say however , i am too long in my replies . it is not impossible but it may be so . but with all due respect to your lordship's authority ( the greatness whereof i shall always readily acknowledge ) i must crave leave to say , that in this case you are by no means a proper judge . we are now , as well your lordship as my self , before a tribunal to which you have appealed , and before which you have brought me : 't is the publick must be judge , whether your lordship has enlarged too far in accusing me , or i in defending my self . common justice makes great allowance to a man pleading in his own defence , and a little length ( if he should be guilty of it ) finds excuse in the compassion of by-standers , when they see a man causelesly attacked , after a new way , by a potent adversary ; and under various pretences , occasions sought , and words wrested to his disadvantage . this , my lord , you must give me leave to think to be my case , whilst this strange way your lordship has brought me into this controversie ; your gradual accusations of my book , and the different causes your lordship has assigned of them ; together with quotations out of it , which i cannot find there , and other things i have complained of ( to some of which your lordship has not vouchsafed any answer ) shall remain unaccounted for , as i humbly conceive they do . i confess my answers are long , and i wish they could have been shorter . but the difficulty i have to find out , and set before others your lordship's meaning , that they may see what i am answering to ; and so be able to judge of the pertinency of what i say , has unavoidably enlarged them . whether this be wholly owing to my dulness , or whether a little perplexedness both as to grammar and coherence , caused by those numbers of thoughts , whether of your own or others , that crowd from all parts to be set down , when you write , may not be allow'd to have some share in it , i shall not presume to say . i am at the mercy of your lordship and my other readers in the point , and know not how to avoid a fault that has no remedy . your lordship says , * the world soon grows weary of controversies , especially when they are about personal matters , which made your lordship wonder that one who understands the world so well , should spend above . pages in renewing and enlarging a complaint wholly concerning himself . to which give me leave to say , that if your lordship had so much considered the world , and what it is not much pleased with , when you published your discourse in vindication of the trinity , perhaps your lordship had not so personally concerned me in that controversie , as it appears now you have , and continue still to do . your lordship wonders * that i spend above pages in renewing and enlarging my complaint concerning my self . your wonder , i humbly conceive , will not be so great , when you recollect , that your answer to my complaint , and the satisfaction you proposed to give me and others in that personal matter , began the first letter you honoured me with , and ended in the th page of it , where you said , you suppose the reason of your mentioning my words so often was now no longer a riddle to me ; and so you proceeded to other particulars of my vindication . if therefore i have spent pages of my answer in shewing that what you offered in pages for my satisfaction was none , but that the riddle was a riddle still ; the disproportion in the number of pages is not so great as to be the subject of much wonder ; especially to those who consider that in what you call personal matter i was shewing , that my essay , having in it nothing contrary to the doctrin of the trinity , was yet brought into that dispute ; and that therefore i had reason to complain of it , and of the manner of its being brought in : and if you had pleas'd not to have moved other questions , nor brought other charges against my book till this , which was the occasion and subject of my first letter , had been cleared , by making out that the passages , you had in your vindication of the doctrin of the trinity quoted out of my book , had something in them against the doctrin of the trinity , and so were with just reason brought by you , as they were , into that dispute : there had been no other but that personal matter , as you call it , between us . in the examination of those pages meant , as you said , for my satisfaction , and of other parts of your letter , i found ( contrary to what i expected ) matter of renewing and enlarging my complaint , and this i took notice of and set down in my reply , which it seems i should not have done ; the knowledge of the world should have taught me better : and i should have taken that for satisfaction , which you were pleased to give , in which i could not find any , nor , as i believe , any intelligent or impartial reader . so that your lordship's care of the world , that it should not grow weary of this controversie , and the fault you find of my mis-imploying fifty pages of my letter , reduces it self at last in effect to no more but this , that your lordship should have a liberty to say what you please , pay me in what coin you think fit ; my part should be to be satisfied with it , rest content and say nothing . this indeed might be a way not to weary the world , and to save pages of clean paper ; and put such an end to the controversie , as your lordship would not dislike . i learn from your lordship , * that it is the first part of wisdom , in some mens opinions , not to begin in such disputes : what the knowledge of the world ( which is a sort of wisdom ) should in your lordship's opinion make a man do , when one of your lordship's character begins with him , is very plain : he is not to reply , so far as he judges his defence and the matter requires , but as your lordship is pleased to allow ; which some may think no better than if one might not reply at all . after having thus rebuked me for having been too copious in my reply , in the next words your lordship instructs me what i should have answer'd , * that i should have clear'd my self by declaring to the world , that i owned the doctrin of the trinity as it has been received in the christian church . this , as i take it , is a meer personal matter of the same woof with a spanish sant benito , and , as it seems to me , designed to sit close to me . what must i do now , my lord ? must i silently put on and wear this badge of your lordship's favour , and as one well understanding the world say not a word of it , because the world soon grows weary of personal matters ? if in gratitude for this personal favour i ought to be silent , yet i am forced to tell you , that in what you require of me here , you possibly have cut out too much work for a poor ordinary layman , for whom it is too hard to know , how a doctrin so disputed has been received in the christian church , and who might have thought it enough to own it as delivered in the scriptures . your lordship herein lays upon me what i cannot do , without owning to know what i am sure i do not know . for how the doctrin of the trinity has been always received in the christian church , i confess my self ignorant . i have not had time to examine the history of it , and to read those controversies that have been writ about it : and to own a doctrin as received by others , when i do not know how those others received it , is perhaps a short way to orthodoxy , that may satisfie some men : but he that takes this way to give satisfaction , in my opinion makes a little bold with truth ; and it may be questioned whether such a profession be pleasing to that god who requires truth in the inward parts , however acceptable it may in any man be to his diocesan . i presume your lordship , in your discourse in vindication of the doctrin of the trinity , intends to give it us as it has been received in the christian church . and i think your words , * viz. it is the sense of the christian church which you are bound to defend , and no particular opinions of your own , authorize one to think so . but if i am to own it as your lordship has there delivered it , i must own what i do not understand : for i confess your exposition of the sense of the church , wholly transcends my capacity . if you require me to own it with an implicit faith , i shall pay that deference as soon to your lordship's exposition of the doctrin of the church , as any ones . but if i must understand and know what i own , it is my misfortune , and i cannot deny it , that i am as far from owning what you in that discourse deliver , as i can be from professing the most unintelligible thing that ever i read , to be the doctrin that i own . whether i make more use of my poor understanding in the case , than you are willing to allow every one of your readers , i cannot tell ; but such an understanding as god has given me is the best i have , and that which i must use in the apprehending what others say , before i can own the truth of it ; and for this there is no help that i know . that which keeps me a little in countenance , is , that , if i mistake not , men of no mean parts , even divines of the church of england , and those of neither the lowest reputation nor rank , find their understandings fail them on this occasion ; and stick not to own , that they understand not your lordship in that discourse , and particularly that your th chapter is unintelligible to them as well as me ; whether the fault be in their and my understandings , the world must be judge . but this is only by the by , for this is not the answer i here intend your lordship . your lordship tells me , that to clear my self i should have owned to the world the doctrin of the trinity as it has been received , &c. answer , i know not whether in a dispute managed after a new way , wherein one man is argued against , and another man's words all along quoted , it may not also be a good as well as a new rule for the answerer to reply to what was never objected , and clear himself from what was never laid to his charge . if this be not so , and that this new way of attacking requires not this new way of defence , your lordship's prescription to me here , what i should have done , will , amongst the most intelligent and impartial readers , pass for a strange rule in controversie , and such as the learnedst of them will not be able to find in all antiquity ; and therefore must be imputed to something else than your lordship's great learning . did your lordship in the discourse of the vindication of the trinity , wherein you first fell upon my book , or in your letter ; ( my answer to which , you are here correcting ) did your lordship , i say , any where object to me , that i did not own the doctrin of the trinity , as it has been received in the christian church , & c ? if you did , the objection was so secret , so hidden , so artificial , that your words declared quite the contrary . in the vindication of the doctrin of the trinity , your lordship says , * that my notions were borrowed to serve other purposes [ whereby , if i understand you right , you meant against the doctrin of the trinity ] than i intended them ; which you repeat again † for my satisfaction , and insist * upon for my vindication . you having so solemnly more than once professed to clear me and my intentions from all suspition of having any part in that controversie , as appears farther in the close of your first letter , † where all you charge on me , is the ill use , that others had , or might make of my notions , how could i suppose such an objection made by your lordship , which you declare against , without accusing your lordship of manifest prevarication ? if your lordship had any thing upon your mind , any secret aims , which you did not think fit to own , but yet would have me divine and answer to , as if i knew them , this i confess is too much for me , who look no farther into mens thoughts , than as they appear in their books . where you have given your thoughts vent in your words , i have not , i think , omitted to take notice of them , not wholly passing by those insinuations , which have been drop'd from your lordship's pen ; which from another , who had not professed so much personal respect , would have shewn no exceeding good disposition of mind towards me . when your lordship shall go on to accuse me of not believing the doctrin of the trinity , as received in the christian church , or any other doctrin you shall think fit , i shall answer as i would to an inquisitor . for tho your lordship tells me , † that i need not he afraid of the inquisition , or that you intended to charge me with heresie in denying the trinity ; yet he that shall consider your lordship's proceeding with me from the beginning , as far as it is hitherto gone , may have reason to think , that the methods and management of that holy office are not wholly unknown to your lordship , nor have scaped your great reading . your proceedings with me have had these steps , . several passages of my essay of humane vnderstanding , and some of them relating barely to the being of a god , and other matters wholly remote from any question about the trinity , were brought into the vindication of the doctrin of the trinity , and there argued against as containing the errors of those and them , which those and them are not known to this day . . in your lordship's answer to my first letter , when that was given as the great reason why my essay was brought into that controversie , ( viz. ) because in it certainty was founded upon clear and distinct ideas , was found to fail , and was only a supposition of your own ; other accusations were sought out against it in relation to the doctrin of the trinity . viz. that * it might be of dangerous consequence , to that doctrin , to introduce the new term of ideas , and to place certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas . what are become of these charges , we shall see in the progress of this letter , when we come to consider what your lordship has reply'd to my answer upon these points . . these accusations not having , it seems , weight enough to effect what you intended , my book has been rumaged again to find new and more important faults in it ; and now at last at the third effort † my notions of ideas are found inconsistent with the articles of the christian faith. this indeed , carries some sound in it , and may be thought worthy the name and pains of so great a man and zealous a father of the church as your lordship . that i may not be too bold in affirming a thing i was not privy to , give me leave , my lord , to tell your lordship why i presume my book has upon this occasion been look'd over again , to see what could be found in it capable to bear a deeper accusation , that might look like something in a title-page . your lordship , by your station in the church , and the zeal you have shewn in defending its articles , could not be supposed , when you first brought my book into this controversie , to have omitted these great enormities , that it now stands accused of , and to have cited it for smaller mistakes , some whereof were not found , but only imagin'd to be , in it ; if you had then known these great faults , which you now charge it with , to have been in it . if your lordship had been apprised of its being guilty of such dangerous errors , you would not certainly have pass'd them by : and therefore i think one may reasonably conclude , that my essay was new looked into on purpose . your lordship says , * that what you have done herein you thought it your duty to do , not with respect to your self , but to some of the mysteries of our faith , which you do not charge me with opposing , but by laying such foundations as do tend to the overthrow of them . it cannot be doubted but your duty would have made you at the first warn the world , that my notions were inconsistent with the articles of the christian faith , if your lordship had then known it . though the excessive respect and tenderness you express towards me personally in the immediately preceding words , would be enough utterly to confound me , were i not a little acquainted with your lordship's civilities in this kind . for you tell me , * that these things laid together made your lordship think it necessary to do that which you was unwilling to do till i had driven you to it , which was to shew the reason you had , why you looked on my notion of ideas and of certainty by them , as inconsistent with it self , and with some important articles of the christian faith. what must i think now , my lord , of these words ? must i take them as a meer complement , which is never to be interpreted rigorously , according to the precise meaning of the words ? or must i believe that your unwillingness , to do so hard a thing to me , restrained your duty , and you could not prevail on your self ( how much soever the mysteries of faith were in danger to be overthrown ) to get out these harsh words , viz. that my notions were inconsistent with the articles of the christian faith , till your third onset , after i had forced you to your duty by two replies of mine ? it will not become me , my lord , to make my self a complement from your words , which you did not intend me in them . but on the other side , i would not willingly neglect to acknowledge any civility from your lordship in the full extent of it . the business is a little nice , because what is contain'd in those two passages , * cannot by a less skilful hand than yours be well put together , though they immediately follow one another . this , i am sure , falls out very untowardly , that your lordship should drive me , ( who had much rather have been otherwise imployed ) to drive your lordship to do that which you were unwilling to do . the world sees how much i was driven : for what censures , what imputations must my book have lain under , if i had not cleared it from those accusations your lordship brought against it ; when i am charged now with evasions , for not clearing my self from an accusation which you never brought against me ? but if it be an evasion , not to answer to an objection that has not been made , what is it i beseech you , my lord , to make no reply to objections that have been made ? of which i promise to give your lordship a list , whenever you shall please to call for it . i forbear it now for fear that if i should say all that i might upon this new accusation , it would be more than would suit with your lordship's liking ; and you should complain again that you have opened a passage which brings to your mind ramazzini and his springs of modena . but your lordship need not be afraid of being overwhelmed with the ebullition of my thoughts , nor much trouble your self to find a way to give check to it : meer ebullition of thoughts never overwhelms or sinks any one but the author himself ; but if it carries truth with it , that i confess has force , and it may be troublesome to those that stand in its way . your lordship says , you see how dangerous it is to give occasion to one of such a fruitful invention as i am , to write . i am obliged to your lordship , that you think my invention worth concerning your self about , though it be so unlucky as to have your lordship and me always differ about the measure of its fertility . in your first answer * you thought i too much extended the fertility of my invention , and ascribed to it what it had no title to : and here i think you make the fertility of my invention greater than it is . for in what i have answered to your lordship , there seems to me no need at all of a fertil invention . 't is true it has been hard for me to find out whom you writ against , or what you meant in many places . as soon as that was found the answer lay always so obvious , and so easie , that there needed no labour of invention to discover what one should reply . the things themselves ( where there were any ) strip'd of the ornaments of scholastick language , and the less obvious ways of learned writings , seemed to me to carry their answers visibly with them . this permit me , my lord , to say , that however fertil my invention is , it has not in all this controversie produced one fiction or wrong quotation . but before i leave the answer you dictate , permit me to observe that i am so unfortunate to be blamed * for owning what i was not accused to disown ; and here for not owning what i was never charged to disown . the like misfortune have my poor writings . they offend your lordship in some places , because they are new , and in others , because they are not new . your next words which are a new charge , i shall pass over till i come to your proof of them , and proceed to the next paragraph . your lordship tells me , * you shall wave all unnecessary repetitions , and come immediately to the matter of my complaint , as it is renewed in my second letter . what your lordship means by unnecessary repetitions here , seems to be of a piece with your blaming me in the foregoing page , for having said too much in my own defence ; and this taken altogether , confirms my opinion , that , in your thoughts , it would have been better i should have replyed nothing at all . for you having set down here near twenty lines as a necessary repetition out of your former letter , your lordship omits my answer to them as wholly unnecessary to be seen ; and consequently you must think was at first unnecessary to have been said . for when the same words are necessary to be repeated again , if the same reply which was made to them be not thought fit to be repeated too , it is plainly judged to be nothing to the purpose , and should have been spared at first . 't is true , your lordship has set down some few expressions taken out of several parts of my reply ; but in what manner the reader cannot clearly see , without going back to the original of this matter . he must therefore pardon me the trouble of a deduction , which cannot be avoided , where controversie is managed at this rate ; which necessitates , and so excuses length of the answer . my book was brought into the trinitarian controversie by these steps . your lordship says , that . the vnitarians have not explained the nature and bounds of reason . . the author of christianity not mysterious , to make amends for this , has offer'd an account of reason . . his doctrin concerning reason , supposes that we must have clear and distinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of in our mind . . your lordship calls this a new way of reasoning . . this gentleman of this new way of reasoning in his first chapter says something , which has a conformity with some of the notions in my book . but it is to be observed he speaks them as his own thoughts and not upon my authority , nor with taking any notice of me . . by vertue of this he is presently entituled to i know not how much of my book ; and divers passages of my essay are quoted , and attributed to him under the title of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning , ( for he is by this time turned into a troop ) and certain unknown ( if they are not all contained in this one author's doublet ) they and these are made by your lordship to lay about them shrewdly for several pages together in your lordship's vindication of the doctrin of the trinity , &c. with passages taken out of my book , which your lordship was at the pains to quote as theirs , i. e. certain unknown anti-trinitarians . of this your lordship's way , strange and new to me , of dealing with my book i took notice . * to which your lordship tells me here † you replyed in these following words which your lordship has set down as no unnecessary repetition . your words are : it was because the person who opposed the mysteries of christianity went upon my grounds , and made use of my words ; although your lordship declared withal , that they were used to other purposes than i intended them ; and your lordship confessed that the reason why you quoted my words so much , was , because your lordship found my notions as to certainty by ideas , was the main foundation on which the author of christianity not mysterious went ; and that he had nothing that looked like reason if that principle were removed , which made your lordship so much endeavour to shew , that it would not hold ; and so you supposed the reason why your lordship so often mentioned my words , was no longer a riddle to me . and to this repetition your lordship subjoins , † that i set down these passages in my second letter , but with these words annexed , that all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing of this matter . answer . i say so indeed in the place quoted by your lordship , and if i had said no more , your lordship had done me justice in setting down barely these words as my reply , which being set down when your lordship was in the way of repeating your own words with no sparing hand , as we shall see by and by , these few of mine set down thus without the least intimation , that i had said any thing more , cannot but leave the reader under an opinion , that this was my whole reply . but if your lordship will please to turn to that place of my second letter , * out of which you take these words , i presume you will find that i not only said , but proved , that what you had said in the words above repeated , to clear the riddle in your lordship's way of writing , did nothing towards it . that which was the riddle to me , was , that your lordship writ against others , and yet quoted only my words , and that you pinn'd my words , which you argued against , upon a certain sort of these and them that no where appeared or were to be found ; and by this way brought my book into the controversie . to this your lordship says , you told me it was because the person who opposed the mysteries of christianity , went upon my grounds and made use of my words . answer . he that will be at the pains to compare this , which you call a repetition here , with the place you quote for it , viz. . answ. p. . will , i humbly conceive , find it a new sort of repetition ; unless the setting down of words and expressions not to be found in it , be the repetition of any passage . but for a repetition , let us take it of what your lordship had said before . the reason , and the only reason there * given why you quoted my words after the manner you did , was , because you found my notions as to certainty by ideas , was the main foundation which the author of christianity not mysterious went upon . these are the words in your lordship's first letter , and this the only reason there given , though it hath grown a little by repetition . and to this my reply † was . that i thought your lordship had found , that that which the author of christianity not mysterious went upon , and for which he was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning , opposite to the doctrin of the trinity was , that he made or supposed clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty : but that was not my notion as to certainty by ideas , &c. which reply , my lord , did not barely say , but shew'd the reason why i said , that what your lordship had offered as the reason of your manner of proceeding , did nothing towards the clearing of it : unless it could clear the matter to say you joined me with the author of christianity not mysterious , who goes upon a different notion of certainty from mine ; because he goes upon the same with me . for he ( as your lordship supposes ) making certainty to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct ideas ; and i on the contrary making it consist in the perception of the agreement of disagreement of such ideas as we have , whether they be perfectly in all their parts clear and distinct or no. it is impossible he should go upon my grounds , whilst they are so different , or that his going upon my grounds should be the reason of your lordship's joining me with him . and now i leave your lordship to judge , how you had cleared this matter , and whether , what i had answer'd did not prove , that what you said did nothing towards the clearing of it ? this one thing methinks your lordship has made very clear , that you thought it necessary to find some way to bring in my book , where you were arguing against that author , that he might be the person , and mine the words you would argue against together . but 't is as clear that the particular matter which your lordship made use of to this purpose , happen'd to be somewhat unluckily chosen . for your lordship having † accused him of supposing clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty , which you declared * to be the opinion you opposed , and for that opinion having made him a gentleman of a new way of reasoning , your lordship imagined that was the notion of certainty i went on . but it falling out otherwise , and i denying it to be mine , the imaginary tie between that author and me , was unexpectedly dissolved ; and there was no appearance of reason for bringing passages out of my book , and arguing against them as your lordship did , as if they were that author 's . to justifie this , ( since my notion of certainty could not be brought to agree with what he was charged with , as opposite to the doctrin of the trinity ) he at any rate must be brought to agree with me , and to go upon my notion of certainty . pardon me my lord , that i say at any rate . the reason i have to think so , is this . either that author does make clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty , and so does not go upon my notion of certainty : and then your assigning his going upon my notion of certainty , as the reason for your joyning us as you did , shews no more but a willingness in your lordship to have us joyn'd . or he does not lay all certainty only in clear and distinct ideas , and so possibly for ought i know may go upon my notion of certainty . but then my lord , the reason of your first bringing him and me into this dispute , will appear to have been none . all your arguing against the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning , will be found to be against no body , since there is no body to be found that lays all foundation of certainty only in clear and distinct ideas ; no body to be found that holds the opinion that your lordship opposes . having thus given you an account of some part of my reply ( to what your lordship really answer'd in that th page of your first letter ) to shew that my reply contained something more than these words here * set down by your lordship . viz. that all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing this matter . i come now to those parts of your repetition , as your lordship is pleased to call it , wherein there is nothing repeated . your lordship says , * that you told me the reason why i was brought into the controversie after the manner i had complained of , was because the person who opposed the mysteries of christianity , went upon my grounds ; and for this you quote the th page of your first letter . but having turned to that place , and finding there these words . that you found my notions as to certainty by ideas , was the main foundation which that author went upon : which are far from being repeated in the words set down here , unless grounds in general be the same with notions as to certainty by ideas . i beg leave to consider what you here say as new to me , and not repeated . your lordship says , that you brought me into the controversie as you did , because that author went upon my grounds . 't is possible he did , or did not : but it cannot appear that he did go upon my grounds , till those grounds are assigned , and the places both out of him and me produced to shew , that we agree in the same grounds and go both upon them ; when this is done there will be room to consider whether it be so or no. in the mean time you having brought me into the controversie , for his going upon this particular ground , supposed to be mine , that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty . it can do nothing towards the clearing this , to say in general , as your lordship does , * that he went upon my grounds , because though he should agree with me in several other things , but differ from me in this one notion of certainty , there could be no reason for your dealing with me as you have done . that notion of certainty , being your very exception against his account of reason ; and the sole occasion you took of bringing in passages out of my book ; and the very foundation of arguing against them . your lordship farther says here , * in this repetition which you did not say before in the place refer'd to as repeated , that he made use of my words . i think he did of words something like mine . but as i humbly conceive also , he made use of them , as his own , and not as my words ; for i do not remember that he quotes me for them . this i am sure , that in the words quoted out of him by your lordship , upon which my book is brought in , there is not one syllable of certainty by ideas . no doubt whatever he or i or any one have said , if your lordship disapproves of it , you have a right to question him that said it . but i do not see how this gives your lordship any right to entitle any body to what he does not say , whoever else says it . the author of christianity not mysterious , says in his book something suitable to what i had said in mine ; borrowed or not borrowed from mine , i leave your lordship to determine for him . but i doe not see what ground that gives your lordship to concern me in the controversie you have with him , for things i say which he does not ; and which i say to a different purpose from his . let that author and i agree in this one notion of certainty as much as you please , what reason i beseech your lordship could this be , to quote my words as his , who never used them ; and to purposes , as you say more than once , to which i never intended them ? this was that which i complained was a riddle to me . and since your lordship can give no other reason for it , than those we have hitherto seen , i think it is sufficiently unridled , and you are in the right when you say , you think it is no longer a riddle to me . i easily grant my little reading may not have instructed me , what has been , or what may be done , in the several ways of writing and managing of controversie , which like war always produces new stratagems : only i beg my ignorance may be my apology , for saying , that this appears a new way of writing to me , and this is the first time i ever met with it . but let the ten lines which your lordship has set down out of him * be if you please , supposed to be precisely my words , and that he quoted my book for them . i not see how even this entitles him to any more of my book than he has quoted . or how any words of mine in other parts of my book , can be ascribed to him , or argued against as his , or rather , as i know not whose , which was the thing i complained of ; for the these and they , those passages of my book were ascribed to , could not be that author , for he used them not : nor the author of the essay of humane vnderstanding for he was not argued against , but was discharged from the controversie under debate . so that neither he nor i being the they and those , that so often occur , and deserved so much pains from your lordship , i could not but complain of this to me incomprehensible way of bringing my book into that controversie . another part of your lordship's repetition , † which i humbly conceive , is no repetition ; because this also i find not in that passage quoted for it , is this , that your lordship confessed that the reason why you quoted my words so much . my lord , i do not remember any need your lordship had to give a reason why you quoted my words so much , because i do not remember , that i made that the matter of my complaint . that which i complained of , was not the quantity of what was quoted out of my book , but the manner of quoting it , * viz. that i was so every where joined with others , under the comprehensive words they and them , though my book alone were every where quoted , that the world would be apt to think , i was the person who argued against the trinity : and again , † that which i complained of , was , that i was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning , without being guilty of what made them so , and so was brought into a chapter wherein i thought my self not concerned ; which was managed so , that my book was all along quoted , and others argued against ; others were entitled to what i said , and i to what others said , without knowing why or how : nay , i told your lordship in that very reply , * that if your lordship had directly questioned any of my opinions , i should not have complained . thus your lordship sees my complaint was not of the largeness , but of the manner of your quotations . but of that in all these many pages imployed by your lordship for my satisfaction , you , as i remember , have not been pleased to offer any reason , nor can i hither to find it any way cleared : when i do , i shall readily acknowledge your great mastery in this as in all other ways of writing . i have in the foregoing pages , for the clearing this matter , been obliged to take notice of them and those , as directly signifying no body . whether your lordship will excuse me for so doing i know not , since i perceive such slight words as them and those are not to be minded in your lordship's writings : your lordship has a priviledge to use such trifling particles without taking any great care what or whom they refer to . to shew the reader that i do not talk without book in the case , i shall set down your lordship 's own words , * what a hard fate doth that man lie under , that falls into the hands of a severe critick ! he must have a care of his but , and for , and them , and it. for the least ambiguity in any of these , will fill up pages in an answer , and make a book look considerable for the bulk of it . and what must a man do , who is to answer all such objections about the use of particles ? i humbly conceive 't is not without reason , that your lordship here claims an exemption from having a care of your but , and your for , and your them , and other particles . the sequel of your letter will shew , that 't is a priviledge your lordship makes great use of , and therefore have reason to be tender of it , and to cry out against those unmannerly criticks , who question it . upon this consideration , i cannot but look on it as a misfortune to me , that it should fall in my way to displease your lordship , by disturbing you in the quiet , and perhaps antient possession of so convenient a priviledge . but how great soever the advantages of it may be to a writer , i upon experience find it is very troublesome and perplexing to a reader , who is concern'd to understand what is written , that he may answer to it . but to return to the place we were upon . your lordship goes on and says , * whether it doth or no , i. e. whether what your lordship had said does clear this matter or no , you are content to leave it to any indifferent reader ; and there it must rest at last although i should write volumes about it . upon the reading of these last words of your lordship's , i thought you had quite done with this personal matter , so apt , as you say , to weary the world. but whether it be that your lordship is not much satisfied in the handling of it , or in the letting it alone ; whether your lordship meant by these last words , that what i write about it is volumes , i. e. too much , as your lordship has told me in the first page ; but what your lordship says about it is but necessary ; whether these or any other be the cause of it , personal matter , as it seems , is very importunate , and troublesome to your lordship , as it is to the world : you turn it going in the end of one paragraph , and personal matter thrusts it self in again in the beginning of the next , whether of it self , without your lordship's notice or consent , i examine not . but thus stand the immediate following words wherein you lordship asks me , * but for what cause do i continue so unsatisfied ? to which you make me give this answer , that the cause why i continue so unsatisfied , is , that the author mentioned , went upon this ground , that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty , but that is not my notion as to certainty by ideas ; which is , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , such as we have , whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct or no ; and that i have no notions of certainty more than this one . these words which your lordship has set down for mine , i have printed in a distinct character , that the reader may take particular notice of them ; not that there is any thing very remarkable in this passage it self , but because it makes the business of the fourscore following pages . for the three several answers that your lordship says you have given to it , and that which you call your defence of them , reach , as i take it , to the page . but another particular reason why this answer which your lordship has made for me to a question of your own putting , is distinguished by a particular character , is to save frequent repetitions of it , that the reader by having recourse to it , may see whether those things , which your lordship says of it , be so or no , and judge whether i am in the wrong , when i assure him , that i cannot find them to be as you say . only before i come to what your lordship positively says of this which you call my answer , i crave leave to observe that it supposes i continue unsatisfied : to which i reply , that i no where say that i continue unsatisfied : i may say , that what is offer'd for satisfaction , gives none to me or any body else ; and yet i as well as other people , may be satisfied concerning the matter . i now come to what your lordship says positively of it . . you say that i tell you , that the cause why i continued unsatisfied , is , that the author mentioned , went upon this ground , that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty ; but that is not my notion of certainty by ideas , &c. to which i crave leave to reply , that neither in the th page of my second letter which your lordship quotes for it , nor any where else did i tell your lordship any such thing . neither could i assign , that authors going upon that ground , there mentioned as any cause of dissatisfaction to me , because i know not that he went upon this ground , that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty ; for i have met with nothing produced by your lordship out of him , to prove that he did so . and if it be true , that he goes upon grounds of certainty that are not mine , i know no body that ought to be dissatisfied with it but your lordship , who have taken so much pains to make his grounds mine , and my grounds his , and to entitle us both to what each has said apart . . your lordship says , this is no more than what i had said before in my former letter . answ. for this i appeal to the th , or rather ( as i think you writ ) th page quoted for it by your lordship ; where any one must have very good eyes , to find all that is set down here in this answer , ( as you a little lower call it ) which you have been pleased to put into my mouth . for neither in the one nor the other of those pages , is there any such answer of mine . indeed , in the th page there are these words , that certainty , in my opinion , lies in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , such as they are , and not always in having perfectly clear and distinct ideas . but these words there , are not given as answer to this question , why do i continue so unsatisfied ? and the remarkable answer above set down , is as i take it , more than these words , as much more in proportion as your lordship 's whole letter is , more than the half of it . . your lordship says of the remarkable answer above set down , that you took particular notice of it . to which i crave leave to reply , that your lordship no where before took notice of this answer , as you call it : for it was no where before extant , though it be true , some part of the words of it were . but some part of the words of this answer ( which too were never given as an answer to the question propos'd ) can never be this answer , it self . . your lordship farther says , that you gave three several answers to it . to which i must crave leave further to reply , that never an one of the three answers which you here say you gave to this my answer , were given to this answer which in the words above set down , you made me give to your question , why i continued so unsatisfied ? to justifie this my reply , there needs no more but to set down these your lordship's three answers , and to turn to the places where you say you gave them . the first of your three answers is this , * that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas , bid much fairer for certainty than i do , ( according to this answer ) and speak more agreeably to my original grounds of certainty . the place you quote for this , is ans. p. . but in that place it is not given as an answer to my saying , that the cause why i continue unsatisfied , is , that the author mentioned , went upon this ground , that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty , but , &c. and if it be given for answer to it here , it seems a very strange one . for i am supposed to say , that the cause why i continue unsatisfied , is , that the author mentioned , went upon a ground different from mine ; and to satisfie me i am told , his way is better than mine , which cannot but be thought an answer very likely to satisfie me . your second answer , which you say you gave to that remarkable passage above set down is this , * that it is very possible the author of christianity not mysterious , might mistake or misapply my notions ; but there is too much reason to believe he thought them the same , and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given me this occasion for the explaining my meaning , and for the vindication of my self in the matters i apprehend he had charged me with ; and for this you quote your first letter , p. . but neither are these words in that place an answer to my saying , that the cause why i continued dissatisfied , is , that that author went upon this ground , that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty , but , &c. your third answer , which you say you gave to that passage above set down , is , * that my own grounds of certainty tend to scepticism ; and that in an age wherein the mysteries of faith are too much exposed by the promoters of scepticism and infidelity , it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new methods of certainty , as are apt to leave mens minds more doubtful than before : for this you refer the reader to your first letter . † but i must crave leave also to observe , that these words are not all to be found in that place ; and those of them which are there , are by no means an answer to my saying , that the cause why i continue unsatisfied , is , &c. what the words which your lordship has here set down as your three answers , are brought in for in those three places quoted by your lordship , any one that will consult them may see , it would hold me too long in personal matter to explain that here ; and therefore for your lordship's satisfaction i pass by those particulars . but this i crave leave to be positive in , that in neither of them , they are given in reply to that , which is above set down , as my answer to your lordship's question , for what cause do i continue so unsatisfied ? tho' your lordship here says , † that to this answer they were given as a reply , and it was it you had taken notice of , and given these three several replies to . as answers therefore to what you make me say here , viz. that the cause of my continuing unsatisfied , is , that the author mentioned , went upon a ground of certainty that is none of mine ; i cannot consider them . for to this neither of them is given as an answer , tho' this and it in ordinary construction , make them have that reference . but these are some of your priviledged particles , and may be applied how and to what you please . but though neither of these passages be any manner of answer to what your lordship calls them answers to , yet your laying such stress on them , that well nigh half your letter , as i take it , is spent in the defence of them ; 't is fit i consider what you say under each of them . i say , as i take it , near half your letter is in defence of these three passages . one reason why i speak so doubtfully , is , that though you say here , * that you will lay them together and defend them , and that in effect all that is said to the th page is ranged under these three heads ; yet they being brought in as answers to what i am made to say is the cause why i continued unsatisfied ; i should scarce think your lordship should spend so many pages in this personal matter , after you had but two or three pages before so openly blamed me for spending a less number of pages in my answer concerning personal matters , what your lordship had in your letter concerning them . another reason why i speak so doubtfully , is because i do not see how these three passages need so long or any defences where they are not attacked ; or if they be attacked , methinks the defences of them should have been applied to the answers i had made to them ; or if i have made none , and they be of such moment that they require answers , your lordship's minding me that they did so , would either by my continued silence have left to your lordship all that you can pretend to for my granting them , or else my answers to them have given your lordship an occasion to defend them , and perhaps to have defended them otherwise than you have done . this is certain , that these defences had come time enough when they had been attack'd , and then it would have been seen whether what was said , did defend them or no. the truth is , my lord , if you will give me leave to speak my thoughts freely , when i consider these three , as you call them , answers , how they themselves are brought in , and what relation that which is brought under each of them has to them , and to the matter in question ; methinks they look rather like texts chosen to be discoursed on , than as answers to be defended in a controversie . for the connection of that which in train is tacked on to them , is such that makes me see i am wholly mistaken in what i thought the established rule of controversie . this was also another reason why i said you spent , as i take it , near half of your letter in defence of them . for when i consider how one thing hangs on to another , under the d answer , from page , where it is brought in to p. . where i think that which you call your defending it ends , 't is a hard matter by the relation and dependency of the parts of that discourse ( contained in those pages ) one on another , to tell where it ends . but to consider the passages themselves , and the defense of them . that which you call your first answer , and which you say you will defend , is in these words , † those who offer at clear and distinct ideas , bid much fairer for certainty than i do , ( according to this answer ) and speak more agreeably to my original grounds of certainty . these words being brought in at first as a reply to what was called my answer , but was not my answer , as may be seen , lett. . p. . i took no notice of them in my second letter , as being nothing at all to the point in hand , and therefore what need they have of a farther defence , when nothing is objected to them , i do not see . to what purpose is it to spend seven or eight pages to shew , that anothers notion about certainty , is better than mine ; when that tends not to shew how your saying , that the certainty of my proof of a god , is not placed upon any clear and distinct ideas , but upon the force of reason distinct from it , concerns me , which was the thing there to be shewn ; as is visible to any one who will vouchsafe to look into that th page of my first letter . and indeed , why should your lordship trouble your self to prove , which of two different ways of certainty by ideas is the best , when you have so ill an opinion of the whole way of certainty by ideas , that you accuse it of tendency to scepticism ? but it seems your lordship is resolved to have all the faults in my book clear'd or corrected , and so you go on to defend these words . that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas , bid much fairer for certainty than i do . i could have wished that your lordship had pleased a little to explain them , before you had defended them ; for they are not , to me , without some obscurity . however , to guess as well as i can , i think the proposition that you intend here , is this , that those who place certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of only clear and distinct ideas , are more in the right than i am , who place it in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , such as we have though they be not in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct . whether your lordship has proved this , or no , will be seen when we come to consider what you have said in the defence of it . in the mean time , i have no reason to be sorry , to hear your lordship say so ; because this supposes , that certainty can be attained by the perception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct ideas . for if certainty cannot be attained by the perception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct ideas : how can they be more in the right , who place certainty in one sort of ideas , that it cannot be had in ; than those who place it in another sort of ideas , that it cannot be had in ? i shall proceed now to examine what your lordship has said in defence of the proposition you have here set down , to defend : which , you may be sure i shall do , with all the favourableness that truth will allow , since if your lordship makes it out to be true , it puts an end to the dispute you have had with me . for it confutes that main proposition , which you have so much contended for , that to lay all foundation of certainty , as to matters of faith , upon clear and distinct ideas , does certainly overthrow all mysteries of faith : unless you will say , that mysteries of faith cannot consist with what you have proved to be true . to prove that they are more in the right than i , who place certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct ideas only , your lordship says , * that it is a wonderful thing , in point of reason , for me to pretend to certainty by ideas , and not allow these ideas to be clear and distinct . this my lord looks as if i placed certainty only in obscure and confused ideas , and did not allow it might be had by clear and distinct ones . but i have declared my self so clearly and so fully to the contrary , that i doubt not , but your lordship would think i deserved to be ask'd , whether this were fair and ingenuous dealing , to represent this matter , as this expression does : but the instances are so many , how apt my unlearned way of writing is to mislead your lordship , and that always on the side least favourable to my sense , that if i should cry out as often as i think i meet with occasion for it ; your lordship would have reason to be uneasie at the ebullition and inlarging of my complaints . your lordship farther asks , † how can i clearly perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas , if i have not clear and distinct ideas ? for how is it possible for a mans mind to know whether they agree or disagree , if there be some parts of those ideas , we have only general and confused ideas of . i would rather read these later words , if your lordship please if there be some parts of those ideas that are only general and confused , for parts of ideas that we have only general and confused ideas of , is not very clear and intelligible to me . taking then your lordship's question as cleared of this obscurity , it will stand thus . how is it possible for a man's mind to know , whether ideas agree or disagree , if there be some parts of those ideas obscure and confused ? in answer to which , i crave leave to ask . is it possible for a man's mind to perceive , whether ideas agree or disagree , if no parts of those ideas be obscure and confused , and by that perception to attain certainty ? if your lordship says , no. how do you hereby prove , that they who place certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of only clear and distinct ideas , are more in the right than i ? for they who place certainty , where it is impossible to be had , can in that be no more in the right , than he who places it in any other impossibility . if you say , yes , certainty may be attained by the perception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct ideas , you give up the main question : you grant the proposition , which you declare you chiefly oppose ; and so all this great dispute with me is at an end . your lordship may take which of these two you please , if the former , the proposition here to be proved , is given up , if the latter , the whole controversie is given up , one of them 't is plain you must say . this and what your lordship says farther on this point , seems to me , to prove nothing , but that you suppose , that either there are no such thing as obscure and confused ideas ; and then , with submission , the distinction between clear and obscure , distinct and confused is useless , and 't is in vain to talk of clear and obscure , distinct and confused ideas , in opposition to one another : or else your lordship supposes , that an obscure and confused idea , is wholly undistinguishable from all other ideas , and so in effect is all other ideas : for if an obscure and confused idea , be not one and the same with all other ideas , as it is impossible for it to be , then the obscure and confused idea may and will be so far different from some other ideas , that it may be perceived whether it agrees or disagrees with them or no. for every idea in the mind , clear or obscure , distinct or confused , is but that one idea , that it is , and not another idea , that it is not ; and the mind perceives it to be the idea , that it is , and not another idea that it is different from . what therefore i mean by obscure and confused ideas , i have at large shewn * and shall not trouble your lordship with a repetition of here . for that there are such obscure and confused ideas , i suppose the instances your lordship gives here † evince ; to which i shall add this one more . suppose you should in the twilight , or in a thick mist , see two things standing upright , near the size and shape of an ordinary man ; but in so dim a light , or at such a distance , that they appeared very much alike , and you could not perceive them to be what they really were , the one a statue , the other a man , would not these two be obscure and confused ideas ? and yet could not your lordship be certain of the truth of this proposition concerning either of them , that it was something , or did exist , and that by perceiving the agreement of that idea ( as obscure and confused as it was ) with that of existence as exprest in that proposition ? this my lord , is just the case of substance , upon which you raised this argument , concerning obscure and confused ideas ; which this instance shews may have propositions made about them , of whose truth we may be certain . hence i crave liberty to conclude , that i am nearer the truth than those who say , that certainty is founded only in clear and distinct ideas , if any body does say so . for no such saying of any one of those , with whom your lordship joined me , for so saying , is , that i remember , yet produced ; though this be that for which they and those , whoever they be , had from your lordship † the title of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning : and this be the opinion which your lordship declares * you oppose , as certainly overthrowing all mysteries of faith , and excluding the notion of substance out of rational discourse ; which terrible tarmagant proposition , viz. that certainty is founded only in clear and distinct ideas , which has made such a noise , and been the cause of the spending above ten times fifty pages , and given occasion to very large ebullition of thoughts ; appears not by any thing that has been yet produced , to be any where in their writings , with whom upon this score you have had so warm a controversie , but only in your lordship's imagination , and what you have at least for this once , writ out of your own thoughts . but if this paragraph contain so little in defence of the proposition , which your lordship in the beginning of it , set down on purpose to defend ; what follows is visibly more remote from it . but since your lordship has been pleased to tack it on here , though without applying of it any way , that i see , to the defence of the proposition to be defended , which is already got clean out of sight , i am taught , that 't is fit i consider it here in this , which your lordship has thought the proper place for it . in the next paragraph , * your lordship is pleased to take notice of this part of my complaint , viz. that i say more than twice or ten times , that you blame those who place certainty in clear and distinct ideas ; but i do not , and yet you bring me in amongst them . and for this , your lordship quotes seventeen several pages of my second letter . whoever will give himself the trouble to turn to those pages , will see how far i am in those places , from barely saying , that you blame those who place certainty , &c. and what reason you had to point to so many places for my so saying , as a repetition of my complaint . and i believe they will find the proposition about placing certainty only in clear and distinct ideas , is mentioned in them upon several occasions , and to different purposes as the argument required . be that as it will , this is a part of my complaint , and you do me a favour , that after having , as you say , met with it in so many places , you are pleased at last to take notice of it , and promise me a full answer to it . the first part of which full answer , is in these words * that you do not deny but the first occasion of your lordship's charge , was in the supposition , that clear and distinct ideas were necessary , in order to any certainty in our minds . and that the only way to attain this certainty , was by comparing these ideas together . my lord , though i have faithfully set down these words out of your d answer , † yet i must own i have printed them in something a different character from that which they stand in your letter . for your lordship has published this sentence so , as if the supposition that clear and distinct ideas , were necessary in order to any certainty in our minds , were my supposition ; whereas i must crave leave to let my reader know , that that supposition is purely your lordship's , for you neither in your defence of the trinity , nor in your first answer , produce any thing to prove , that that was either an assertion or supposition of mine : but your lordship was pleased to suppose it for me . as to the latter words , and that the only way to attain this certainty , was by comparing these ideas together . if your lordship means by these ideas , ideas in general ; then i acknowledge these to be my words , or to my sense ; but then they are not any supposition in my book , though they are made part of the supposition here ; but their sense is expressed in my essay at large in more places than one . but if by these ideas , your lordship means only clear and distinct ideas , i crave leave to deny , that to be my sense or any supposition of mine . your lordship goes on , † but to prove this . prove what , i beseech you my lord ? that certainty was to be attained by comparing ideas , was a supposition of mine ? to prove that there needed no words or principles of mine to be produced , unless your lordship would prove that which was never denied . but if it were to prove this , viz. that it was a supposition of mine , that clear and distinct ideas were necessary to certainty , and that to prove this to be a supposition of mine , * my words were produced , and my principles of certainty laid down and none else ; i answer , i do not remember any words or principles of mine produced to shew any ground for such a supposition , that i placed certainty only in clear and distinct ideas ; and if there had been any such produced , your lordship would have done me and the reader a favour , to have marked the pages wherein one might have found them produced , unless your lordship thinks you make amends for quoting so many pages of my second letter , which might have been spared , by neglecting wholly to quote any of your own where it needed . when your lordship shall please to direct me to those places where such words and principles of mine were produced to prove such a supposition , i shall readily turn to them , to see how far they do really give ground for it . but my bad memory not suggesting to me any thing like it , your lordship , i hope , will pardon me if i do not turn over your defence of the trinity and your first letter , to see whether you have any such proofs which you your self seem so much to doubt or think so meanly of , that you do not so much as point out the places where they are to be found ; though we have in this very page so eminent an example , that you are not sparing of your pains in this kind , where you have the least thought that it might serve your lordship to the meanest purpose . but though you produced no words or principles of mine to prove this a supposition of mine , yet in your next words , here your lordship produces a reason why you your self supposed it . for you say , * you could not imagine that i could place certainty in the agreement or disagreement of ideas , and not suppose those ideas to be clear and distinct ; so that at last the satisfaction you give me , why my book was brought into a controversie , wherein it was not concerned , is that your lordship imagined i supposed in it , what i did not suppose in it . and here i crave leave to ask , whether the reader may not well suppose that you had a great mind to bring my book into that controversie , when the only handle you could find for it , was an imagination of a supposition to be in it , which in truth was not there . your lordship adds , † that i finding my self joined in such company which i did not desire to be seen in , i rather chose to distinguish my self from them , by denying clear and distinct ideas to be necessary to certainty . if it might be permitted to another to guess at your thoughts , as well as you do at mine , he perhaps would turn it thus , that your lordship finding no readier way , as you thought , to set a mark upon my book , than by bringing several passages of it into a controversie concerning the trinity wherein they had nothing to do ; and speaking of them under the name of those and them , as if your adversaries in that dispute had made use of those passages against the trinity , when no one opposer of the doctrin of the trinity , that i know , or that you have produced , ever made use of one of them ; you thought fit to jumble my book with other peoples opinions after a new way never used by any other writer that i ever heard of . if any one will consider what your lordship has said for my satisfaction , ( wherein you have , as i humbly conceive i have shewn , produced nothing but imaginations of imaginations , and suppositions of suppositions ) he will , i conclude , without straining of his thoughts , be carried to this conjecture . but conjectures apart , your lordship says , * that i finding my self joined in such company which i did not desire to be seen in , i rather chose to distinguish my self . if keeping to my book can be called distinguishing my self . you say , i rather chose . rather ! than what , my lord , i beseech you ? your learned way of writing , i find is every where beyond my capacity ; and unless i will guess at your meaning ( which is not very safe ) beyond what i can certainly understand by your words , i often know not what to answer to . 't is certain , you mean here , that i prefer'd distinguishing my self from them i found my self joined with to something ; but to what you do not say . if you mean to owning that for my notion of certainty , which is not my notion of certainty ; this is true , i did and shall always rather choose to distinguish my self from any them , than own that for my notion which is not my notion : if you mean that i prefer'd my distinguishing my self from them to my being joined with them , you make me choose where there neither is nor can be any choice . for what is wholly out of one's power , leaves no room for choice : and i think , i should be laughed at , if i should say , i rather choose to distinguish my self from the papists , than that it should rain . for it is no more in my choice not to be joined , as your lordship has been pleased to join me , with the unknown they and them , than it is in my power that it should not rain . 't is like you will say here again , this is a nice criticism ; i grant , my lord , it is about words and expressions : but since i cannot know your meaning but by your words and expressions , if this defect in my understanding very frequently overtake me in your writings to and concerning me , 't is troublesome , i confess ; but what must i do ? must i play at blind man's-buff ? catch at what i do not see ? answer to i know not what ; to no meaning , i. e. to nothing ? or must i presume to know your meaning when i do not ? for example , suppose i should presume it to be your meaning here , that i found my self joined in company by your lordship , with the author of christianity not mysterious , by your lordship's imputing the same notions of certainty to us both ; that i did not desire to be seen in his company , i. e. to be thought to be of his opinion in other things : and therefore i choose rather to distinguish my self from him , by denying clear and distinct ideas to be necessary to certainty , than to be so joined with him . if i should presume this to be the sense of these your words here , and that by the doubtful signification of the expression of being joined in company and seen in comany , used equivocally , your lordship should mean , that because i was said to be of his opinion in one thing , i was to be thought to be of his opinion in all things , and therefore disowned to be of his opinion in that , wherein i was of his opinion ; because i would not be thought of his opinion all through , would not your lordship be displeased with me for supposing you to have such a meaning as this , and ask me again , whether i could think you a man of so little sense to talk thus ? and yet my lord , this is the best i can make of these words , which seem to me rather to discover a secret in your way of dealing with me , than any thing in me , that i am ashamed of . for i am not , nor ever shall be ashamed to own any opinion i have , because another man holds the same ; and so far as that brings me into his company , i shall not be troubled to be seen in it . but i shall never think , that that entitles me to any other of his opinions , or makes me of his company in any other sense , how much soever that be the design : for your lordship has used no small art and pains to make me of his and the unitarians company in all that they say , only because that author has ten lines in the beginning of his book , which agrees with something i have said in mine , from whence we become companions , so universally united in opinion , that they must be entitled to all that i say , and i to all that they say . my lord , when i writ my book , i could not design to distinguish my self from the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning , who were not then in being , nor are , that i see , yet : since i find nothing produced out of the vnitarians , nor the author of christianity not mysterious , to shew , that they make clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty . and all that i have done since , has been to shew , that you had no reason to join my book with men ( let them be what they or those you please ) who founded certainty only upon clear and distinct ideas , when my book did not found it only upon clear and distinct ideas . and i cannot tell why the appealing to my book now should be called a choosing rather to distinguish my self . my reader must pardon me here for this uncouth phrase of joining my book with men. for as your lordship order'd the matter ( pardon me if i say in your new way of writing ) so it was , if your own word may be taken in the case : for , to give me satisfaction , you insist upon this , that you did not join me with those gentlemen in their opinions , but tell me they used my notions to other purposes than i intended them ; and so thee was no need for me to distinguish my self from them , when your lordship had done it for me , as you plead all along . though here you are pleased to tell me , that i was joined with them , and that i found my self joined in such company as i did not desire to be seen in . my lord , i could find my self joined in no company upon this occasion , but what you joined me in . and therefore i beg leave to ask your lordship , did you join me in company with those , in whose company you here say , i do not desire to be seen ? if you own that you did , how must i understand that passage where you say , * that you must do that right to the ingenious author of the essay of humane vnderstanding , from whence these notions were borrowed , to serve other purposes than he intended them ; which you repeat again † as matter of satisfaction to me , and as a proof of the care you took not to be misunderstood . if you did join me with them , what is become of all the satisfaction in the point , which your lordship has been at so much pains about ? and if you did not join me with them , you could not think i found my self joined with them , or chose to distinguish my self from men i was never joined with . for my book was innocent of what made them gentlemen of the new way of reasoning . there seems to me something very delicate in this matter . i should be supposed joined to them , and your lordship should not be supposed to have joined me to them , upon so slight or no occasion ; and yet all this comes solely from your lordship . how to do this to your satisfaction , i confess my self to be too dull : and therefore i have been at the pains to examine how far i have this obligation to your lordship ; and how far you would be pleased to own it , that the world might understand your lordship's , to me , incomprehensible way of writing on this occasion . for if you had a mind by a new and very dexterous way , becoming the learning and caution of a great man , to bring me into such company , which you think i did not desire to be seen in : i thought such a pattern set by such an hand as your lordship's , ought not to be lost by being passed over too slightly . besides , i hope , that you will not take it amiss , that i was willing to see , what obligation i had to your lordship in the favour your designed me . but i crave leave to assure your lordship , i shall never be ashamed to own any opinion i have , because another man ( of whom perhaps your lordship or others have no very good thoughts ) is of it , nor be unwilling to be so far seen in his company : though i shall always think i have a right to demand , and shall desire to be satisfied , why any one makes to himself , or takes an occasion from thence , in manner that favours not too much of charity to extend this society to those opinions of that man , with which i have nothing to do , that the world may see the justice and good will of such endeavours , and judge whether such arts savour not a little of the spirit of the inquisition . for if i mistake not , 't is the method of that holy office , and the way of those rever'd guardians of what they call the christian faith , to raise reports or start occasions of suspition concerning the orthodoxy of any one they have no very good will towards ; and require him to clear himself , guilding all this with the care of religion , and the profession of respect and tenderness to the person himself , even when they deliver him up to be burnt by the secular power . i shall not my lord say , that you have had any ill will to me , for i never deserved any from you . but i shall be better able to answer those , who are apt to think the method you have taken , has some conformitie , so far as it has gon ; with what protestants complain of in the inquisition , when you shall have cleared this matter a little otherwise , and assigned a more sufficient reason , for bringing me into the party of those that oppose the doctrin of the trinity , than only because , the author of christianity not mysterious , has in the beginning of his book , half a score lines which you guess he borrowed out of mine . for that in truth is all the matter of fact , upon which all this dust is raised ; and the matter so advanced by degrees , that now i am told , i should have cleared my self , by owning the doctrin of the trinity : as if i had been ever accused of disowning it . but that which shews no small skill in this management , is , that i am called upon to clear my self , by the very same person who raising the whole dispute , has himself over and over again cleared me ; and upon that grounds the satisfaction he pretends to give to me and others , in answer to my complaint of his having without any reason at all , brought my book into the controversie concerning the trinity . but to go on . if the preceding part of this paragraph , had nothing in it of defence of this proposition , that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas , bid much fairer for certainty than i do , &c. it is certain , that what follows , is altogether as remote from any such defence . your lordship says , * that certainty by sense , certainty by reason , and certainty by remembrance , are to be distinguished from the certainty under debate , and to be shut out from it : and upon this you spend the th , th and th pages . supposing it so , how does this at all tend to the defence of this proposition , that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas , bid much fairer for certainty than i do ? for whether certainty by sense , by reason and by remembrance , be or be not comprehended in the certainty under debate , this proposition , that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas , bid much fairer for certainty than i do , will not at all be confirmed , or invalidated thereby . the proving therefore , that certainty by sense , by reason , and by remembrance , is to be excluded from the certainty under debate , serving nothing to the defence of the proposition to be defended , and so having nothing to do here , let us now consider it as a proposition , that your lordship has a mind to prove , as serving to some other great purpose of your own , or perhaps , in some other view against my book ; for you seem to lay no small stress upon it , by your way of introducing it . for you very solemnly set your self to prove , * that the certainty under debate , is the certainty of knowledge , and that a proposition whose ideas are to be compared as to their agreement or disagreement , is the proper object of this certainty . from whence your lordship infers , † that therefore this certainty is to be distinguished from a certainty by sense , by reason and by remembrance . but by what logick this is infer'd , is not easy to me to discover . for if a proposition , whose ideas are to be compared as to their agreement or disagreement , be the proper object of the certainty under debate ; if propositions whose certainty we arrive at by sense , reason or remembrance be of ideas , which may be compared , as to their agreement or disagreement , then they cannot be excluded from that certainty , which is to be had by so comparing those ideas : unless they must be shut out for the very same reason , that others are taken in . . then as to certainty by sense or propositions of that kind . the object of the certainty under debate , your lordship owns , is a proposition whose ideas are to be compared as to their agreement or disagreement . the agreement or disagreement of the ideas of a proposition to be compared , may be examined and perceived by sense , and is certainty by sense : and therefore how this certainty is to be distinguished and shut out from that , which consists in the perceiving the agreement or disagreement of the ideas of any proposition , will not be easy to shew ; unless one certainty is distinguished from another , by having that , which makes the other to be certainty , viz. the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas , as expressed in that proposition , v. g. may i not be certain , that a ball of ivory that lies before my eyes is not square ? and is it not my sense of seeing , that makes me perceive the disagreement of that square figure , to that round matter , which are the ideas expressed in that proposition ? how then is certainty by sense excluded or distinguished from , that knowledge which consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas ? . your lordship distinguishes the certainty which consists in the perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas , as expressed in any proposition from certainty by reason . * to have made good this distinction , i humbly conceive , you would have done well to have shewed that the agreement or disagreement of two ideas could not be perceived by the intervention of a third , which i , and as i guess other people call reasoning , or knowing by reason . as for example , cannot the sides of a given triangle , be known to be equal by the intervention of two circles , whereof one of these sides is a common radius ? to which 't is like your lordship will answer , what i find you do here , † about the knowledge of the existence of substance , by the intervention of the existence of modes , that you grant one may come to certainty of knowledge in the case ; but not a certainty by ideas , but by a consequence of reason deduced from the ideas we have by our senses . this , my lord , you have said , and thus you have more than once opposed reason and ideas as inconsistent , which i should be very glad to see proved once , after these several occasions i have given your lordship , by excepting against that supposition . but since the word idea has the ill luck to be so constantly opposed by your lordship to reason , permit me if you please instead of it , to put what i mean by it , viz. the immediate objects of the mind in thinking ( for that is it which i would signifie by the word ideas ) and then let us see how your answer will run . you grant that from the sensible modes of bodies , we may come to a certain knowledge , that there are bodily substances ; but this you say is not a certainty by the immediate objects of the mind in thinking , but by a consequence of reason deduced from the immediate objects of the mind in thinking , which we have by our senses . when you can prove that we can have a certainty , by a consequence of reason ; which certainty shall not also be by the immediate objects of the mind in using its reason , you may say such certainty is not by ideas but by consequence of reason . but that i believe will not be , till you can shew , that the mind can think , or reason , or know , without immediate objects of thinking , reasoning , or knowing , all which objects , as your lordship knows , i call ideas . you subjoin , * and this can never prove that we have certainty by ideas , where the ideas themselves are not clear and distinct . the question is not , whether we can have certainty by ideas that are not clear and distinct ? or whether my words ( if by the particle this , you mean my words set down in the foregoing page ) prove any such thing , which i humbly conceive they do not . but whether certainty by reason , be excluded from the certainty under debate , which i humbly conceive you have not from my words or any other way proved . . the third sort of propositions that your lordship excludes , are those whose certainty we know by remembrance , but in these two the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in them is perceived ; not always indeed , as it was at first by an actual view of the connection of all the intermediate ideas , whereby the agreement or disagreement of those in the proposition was at first perceived , but by other intermediate ideas , that shew the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in the proposition , whose certainty we remember . as in the instance you here make use of , viz. that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones . the certainty of which proposition we know by remembrance , though the demonstration hath sliped out of our minds ; but we know it in a different way from what your lordship supposes . the agreement of the two ideas , as joined in that proposition is perceived , but it is by the intervention of other ideas than those which at first produced that perception . i remember , i. e. i know ( for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge ) that i was once certain of the truth of this proposition , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones . the immutability of the same relations between the same immutable things , is now the idea that shews me , that if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones , they will always be equal to two right ones ; and hence i come to be certain , that what was once true in the case is always true ; what ideas once agreed , will always agree ; and consequently what i once knew to be true , i shall always know to be true as long as i can remember that i once knew it . your lordship says , * that the debate between us is about certainty of knowledge , with regard to some proposition whose ideas are to be compared as to their agreement or disagreement : out of this debate you say , certainty by sense , by reason and by remembrance , is to be excluded . i desire you then , my lord , to tell what sort of propositions will be within the debate , and to name me one of them ; if propositions , whose certainty we know by sense , reason , or remembrance , are excluded ? however , from what you have said concerning them , your lordship in the next paragraph concludes them out of the question ; your words are , these things then being out of the question . out of what question , i beseech you , my lord ? the question here , and that of your own proposing to be defended in the affirmative is this , whether those who offer at clear and distinct ideas , bid much fairer for certainty than i do ? and how certainty by sense , by reason , and by remembrance comes to have any particular exception in reference to this question , 't is my misfortune not to be able to find . but your lordship leaving the examination of the question under debate , by a new state of the question , would pin upon me what i never said . your words are , * these things then being put out of the question which belong not to it . the question truly stated is , whether we can attain to any certainty of knowledge as to the truth of a proposition in the way of ideas , where the ideas themselves , by which we came to that certainty , be not clear and distinct ? with submission , my lord , that which i say in the point , is , that we may be certain of the truth of a proposition concerning an idea which is not in all its parts clear and distinct ; and therefore if your lordship will have any question with me concerning this matter , the question truly stated is , whether we can frame any proposition concerning a thing whereof we have but an obscure and confused idea , of whose truth we can be certain ? that this is the question , you will easily agree , when you will give your self the trouble to look back to the rise of it . your lordship having found out a strange sort of men † who had broached a doctrin which supposed that we must have clear and distinct ideas of what ever we pretend to a certainty of in our minds , was pleased for this to call them the gentlemen of a new way of reasoning , and to make me one of them . i answer'd , that i placed not certainty only in clear and distinct ideas , and so ought not to have been made one of them , being not guilty of what made a gentleman of this new way of reasoning . 't is pretended still , that i am guilty ; and indeavour'd to be prov'd . to know now whether i am or no , it must be consider'd what you lay to their charge , as the consequence of that opinion ; and that is , that upon this ground we cannot come to any certainty that there is such a thing as substance . this appears by more places than one . your lordship asks , * how is it possible that we may be certain that there are both bodily and spiritual substances , if our reason depend upon clear and distinct ideas ? and again , † how come we to be certain that there are spiritual substances in the world , since we can have no clear and distinct ideas concerning them ? and your lordship having set down some words out of my book , as if they were inconsistent with my principle of certainty founded only in clear and distinct ideas , you say , * from whence it follows that we may be certain of the being of a spiritual substance , though we have no clear and distinct ideas of it . other places might be produced , but these are enough to shew , that those who held clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty , were accused to extend it thus far , that where any idea was obscure and confused , there no proposition could be made concerning it , of whose truth we could be certain , v. g. we could not be certain that there was in the world such a thing as substance , because we had but an obscure and confus'd idea of it . in this sense therefore i denyed that clear and distinct ideas were necessary to certainty , v. g. i denyed it to be my doctrin , that where an idea was obscure and confus'd , there no proposition could be made concerning it , of whose truth we could be certain . for i held we might be certain of the truth of this proposition , that there was substance in the world , though we have but an obscure and confus'd idea of substance : and your lordship endeavoured to prove we could not , as may be seen at large in that th chapter of your vindication , &c. from all which it is evident , that the question between us truly stated is this , whether we can attain certainty of the truth of a proposition concerning any thing whereof we have but an obscure and confus'd idea ? this being the question , the first thing you say , * is , that des cartes was of your opinion against me . answ. if the question were to be decided by authority , i had rather it should be by your lordship 's than des cartes's : and therefore i should excuse my self to you , as not having needed , that you should have added his authority to yours , to shame me into a submission ; or that you should have been at the pains to have transcribed so much out of him , for my sake , were it fit for me to hinder the display of the riches of your lordship's universal reading ; wherein , i doubt not , but i should take pleasure my self , if i had it to shew . i come therefore to what i think your lordship principally aimed at ; which , as i humbly conceive , was to shew out of my book , that i founded certainty only on clear and distinct ideas . and yet , as you say , * i have complained of your lordship in near twenty places of my second letter , for charging this upon me . by this the world will judge of the iustice of my complaints , and the consistency of my notion of ideas . answ. what consistency of my notion of ideas has to do here , i know not ; for i do not remember , that i made any complaint concerning that . but supposing my complaints were ill grounded in this one case concerning certainty ; yet , they might be reasonable in other points ; and therefore , with submission , i humbly conceive the inference was a little too large , to conclude from this particular against my complaints in general . in the next place i answer , that supposing the places which your lordship brings out of my book did prove what they do not , viz. that i founded certainty only in clear and distinct ideas , yet my complaints in the case are very just . for your lordship at first brought me into the controversie , and made me one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning , for founding all certainty on clear and distinct ideas , only upon a bare supposition that i did so , which i think your lordship confesses in these words ; † where you say , that you do not deny but the first occasion of your charge , was the supposition that clear and distinct ideas were necessary in order to any certainty in our minds ; and that the only way to attain this certainty , was the comparing these , i. e. clear and distinct ideas together ; but to prove this , my words , your lordship says , were produced , and my principles of certainty laid down and none else . answer . 't is strange , that when my principles of certainty were laid down , this ( if i held it ) was not found amongst them : having looked therefore , i do not find in that place , that any words or principles of mine were produced to prove that i held , that the only way to attain certainty , was by comparing only clear and distinct ideas ; so that all that then made me one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning , was only your supposing that i supposed that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty . and therefore i had then and have still , reason to complain , that your lordship brought me into this controversie upon so slight grounds , which i humbly conceive will always shew it to have proceeded not so much from any thing you had then found in my book , as from a great willingness in your lordship at any rate to do it ; and of this the passages which you have here now produced out of my essay are an evident proof . for if your lordship had then known any thing that seemed so much to your purpose , when you produced , as you say , my words and my principles to prove , that i held clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty , it cannot be believed that you would have omitted these passages , either then or in your answer to my first letter , and defer'd them to this your answer to my second . these passages therefore now quoted here by your lordship , give me leave , my lord , to suppose have been by a new and diligent search found out , and are now at last brought post factum to give some colour to your way of proceeding with me , though these passages being , as i suppose , then unknown to you ; they could not be the ground of making me one of those who place certainty only in clear and distinct ideas . let us come to the passages themselves , and see what help they afford you . the first words you set down out of my essay † are these , the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know . from these words , that which i infer in that place , is , that therefore the mind is bound in such cases , to give up its assent to an unerring testimony . but your lordship from them infers here , * therefore i make clear ideas necessary to certainty ; or therefore by considering the immediate objects of the mind in thinking , we cannot be certain that substance ( whereof we have an obscure and confus'd idea ) doth exist . i shall leave your lordship to make good this consequence when you think fit , and proceed to the next passage you alledge , which you say * proves it more plainly . i believe it will be thought it should be proved more plainly , or else it will not be proved at all . this plainer proof is out of b. . ch. . sect. . in these words , that which is requisite to make our knowledge certain , is the clearness of our ideas . ans. the certainty here spoken of , is the certainty of general propositions in morality , and not of the particular existence of any thing ; and therefore tends not at all to any such position as this , that we cannot be certain of the existence of any particular sort of being , though we have but an obscure and confus'd idea of it . though it does affirm , that we cannot have any certain perception of the relations of general moral ideas ( wherein consists the certainty of general moral propositions ) any farther than those ideas are clear in our minds . and that this is so , i refer my reader to that chapter for satisfaction . the third place produced * by your lordship , out of b. . ch. . sect. . is , for it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas , where they are only imperfect , confused or obscure ; we cannot expect to have certain perfect or clear knowledge . to understand these words aright , we must see in what place they stand , and that is in a chapter of the improvement of our knowledge , and therein are brought as a reason to shew how necessary it is for the enlarging of our knowledge , to get and setle in our minds as far as we can , clear distinct and constant ideas of those things we would consider and know . the reason whereof there given , is this , that as far as they are only imperfect , confused and obscure ; we cannot expect to have certain , perfect or clear knowledge , i. e. that our knowledge will not be clear and certain so far as the idea is imperfect and obscure . which will not at all reach your lordship's purpose , who would argue , that because i say our idea of substance is obscure and confused , therefore upon my grounds , we cannot know that such a thing as substance exists ; because i placed certainty only in clear and distinct ideas . now to this i answer'd , that i did not place all certainty only on clear and distinct ideas , in such a sense as that , and therefore to avoid being mistaken , i said , † that my notion of certainty by ideas , is , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; such as we have , whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct or no , viz. if they are clear and distinct enough to be capable of having their agreement or disagreement with any other idea perceived , so far they are capable of affording us knowledge , though at the same time they are so obscure and confused , as that there are other ideas , with which we can by no means so compare them , as to perceive their agreement or disagreement with them . this was the clearness and distinctness which i denyed to be necessary to certainty . if your lordship would have done me the honour to have consider'd what i understood by obscure and confused ideas , and what every one must understand by them , who thinks clearly and distinctly concerning them , i am apt to imagine you would have spared your self the trouble of raising this question , and omitted these quotations out of my book , as not serving to your lordship's purpose . the fourth passage which you seem to lay most stress on , proves as little to your purpose as either of the former three . the words * are these . but obscure and confused ideas , can never produce any clear and certain knowledge . because as far as any ideas are confused or obscure , the mind can never perceive clearly whether they agree or no. the latter part of these words , are a plain interpretation of the former , and shew their meaning to be this , viz. our obscure and confused ideas , as they stand in contra-distinction to clear and distinct , have all of them something in them , whereby they are kept from being wholly imperceptible and perfectly confounded with all other ideas , and so their agreement or disagreement with at least some other ideas , may be perceived , and thereby produce certainty , though they are obscure and confused ideas . but so far as they are obscure and confused , so that their agreement or disagreement cannot be perceived , so far they cannot produce certainty , v. g. the idea of substance is clear and distinct enough to have its agreement with that of actual existence perceived : but yet it is so far obscure and confused , that there be a great many other ideas , with which , by reason of its obscurity and confusedness , we cannot compare it so , as to produce such a perception : and in all those cases we necessarily come short of certainty . and that this was so , and that i meant so , i humbly conceive , you could not but have seen , if you had given your self the trouble to reflect on that passage which you quoted , viz. * that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , such as we have , whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct or no. to which , what your lordship has here brought out of the second book of my essay , is no manner of contradiction ; unless it be a contradiction to say , that an idea which cannot be well compared with some ideas , from which it is not clearly and sufficiently distinguishable , is yet capable of having its agreement or disagreement perceived with some other idea , with which it is not so confounded , but that it may be compared . and therefore i had , and have still reason to complain of your lordship , for charging that upon me , which i never said nor meant . to make this yet more visible , give me leave to make use of an instance in the object of the eyes in seeing , from whence the metaphor of obscure and confused is transfer'd to ideas the objects of the mind in thinking . there is no object which the eye sees , that can be said to be perfectly obscure , for then it would not be seen at all ; nor perfectly confused ; for then it could not be distinguished from any other , no not from a clearer . for example , one sees in the dusk something of that shape and size , that a man in that degree of light and distance would appear . this is not so obscure that he sees nothing , nor so confused that he cannot distinguish it from a steeple or a star ; but is so obscure , that he cannot thought it be a statue distinguish it from a man , and therefore in regard of a man , it can produce no clear and distinct knowledge ; but yet as obscure and confused an idea as it is , this hinders not , but there may many propositions be made concerning it , as particularly that it exists , of the truth of which we may be certain . and that without any contradiction to what i say in my essay , viz. that obscure and confused ideas can never produce any clear and certain knowledge . because as far as they are confused or obscure , the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or no. this reason that i there give , plainly limiting it only to knowledge , where the obscurity and confusion is such , that it hinders the perception of agreement or disagreement , which is not so great in any obscure and confused idea , but that there is some other ideas , with which it may be perceived to agree or disagree , and there 't is capable to produce certainty in us . and thus i am come to the end of your defence of your first answer , as you call it , and desire the reader to consider , how much in the eight pages imploy'd in it , is said to defend this proposition , that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas , bid much fairer for certainty than i do ? but your lordship having under this head taken occasion to examine my making clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty ; i crave leave to consider here , what you say of it in another place . i find one argument more to prove , that i place certainty only in clear and distinct ideas . your lordship tells me , † and bids me observe my own words , that i positively say , that the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know . so that , says your lordship , it is plain here , that i place certainty in evident knowledge , or in clear and distinct ideas , and yet my great complaint of your lordship was , that you charged this upon me , and now you find it in my own words . answer , i do observe my own words , but do not find in them , or in clear and distinct ideas , though your lordship has set these down as my words . i there indeed say , the mind is not certain of what it does not evidently know . whereby i place certainty , as your lordship says , only in evident knowledge , but evident knowledge may be had in the clear and evident perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; though some of them should not be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct , as is evident in this proposition , that substance does exist . but you give not off this matter so . for these words of mine above quoted * by your lordship , viz. it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas , where they are imperfect , confused or obscure , we cannot expect to have certain , perfect or clear knowledge your lordship has here † up again : and thereupon charge it on me as a contradiction , that confessing our ideas to be imperfect , confused and obscure , i say , i do not yet place certainty in clear and distinct ideas . answer , the reason is plain , for i do not say that all our ideas are imperfect , confused and obscure ; nor that obscure and confused ideas are in all their parts so obscure and confused , that no agreement or disagreement between them and any other idea can be perceived , and therefore my confession of imperfect , obscure and confused ideas , takes not away all knowledge , even concerning those very ideas . but , says your lordship , can certainty be had with imperfect and obscure ideas , and yet no certainty be had by them ? add if you please , my lord , [ by those parts of them which are obscure and confused . ] and then the question will be right put , and have this easie answer . yes , my lords , and that without any contradiction , because an idea that is not in all its parts perfectly clear and distinct , and is therefore an obscure and confused idea ; may yet with those ideas , with which , by any obscurity it has , it is not confounded , be capable to produce knowledge by the perception of its agreement or disagreement with them . and yet it will hold true , that in that part wherein it is imperfect , obscure and confused , we cannot expect to have certain , perfect or clear knowledge . for example , he that has the idea of a leopard , as only of a spotted animal , must be confessed to have but a very imperfect , obscure and confused idea of that species of animals ; and yet this obscure and confused idea , is capable by a perception of the agreement or disagreement of the clear part of it , viz. that of animal , with several other ideas to produce certainty : though as far as the obscure part of it confounds it with the idea of a lynx , or other spotted animal it can , joyn'd with them , in many propositions , produce no knowledge . this might easily be understood to be my meaning by these words , which your lordship quotes * out of my essay , viz. that our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas , its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception , and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves . upon which your lordship asks , * how is it possible for the mind to have a clear perception of the agreement of ideas , if the ideas themselves be not clear and distinct ? answer , just as the eyes can have a clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of the clear and distinct parts of a writing , with the clear parts of another ; though one , or both of them , be so obscure and blur'd in other parts , that the eye cannot perceive any agreement or disagreement they have one with another . and i am sorry that these words of mine † my notion of certainty by ideas , is , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , such as we have , whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct or no , were not plain enough to make your lordship understand my meaning , and save you all this new , and as it seems to me , needless trouble . in your th page , your lordship comes to your second of the three answers which you say * you had given and would lay together and defend . you say † ( ) you answer'd , that it is very possible the author of christianity not mysterious , might mistake or misapply my notions ; but there is too much reason to believe , he thought them the same ; and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given me this occasion for the explaining my meaning , and for the vindication of my self in the matters i apprehend he had charged me with . these words your lordship quotes out of the th page of your first letter . but as i have already observed they are not there given as an answer to this that you make me here say ; and therefore to what purpose you repeat them here is not easie to discern , unless it can be thought that an unsatisfactory answer in one place can become satisfactory by being repeated in another , where it is , as i humbly conceive , less to the purpose , and no answer at all . it was there indeed given as an answer to my saying , that i did not place certainty in clear and distinct ideas , which i said to shew that you had no reason to bring me into the controversie , because the author of christianity not mysterious placed certainty in clear and distinct ideas . to satisfie me for your doing so , your lordship answers , that it was very possible that author might mistake or misapply my notions . a reason indeed , that will equally justifie your bringing my book into any controversie : for there is no author so infallible , write he in what controversie he pleases , but 't is possible he may mistake , or misapply my notions . that was the force of this your lordship's answer in that place of your first letter , but what it serves for in this place of your second letter i have not wit enough to see . the remainder of it i have answer'd in the th and th pages of my second letter , and therefore cannot but wonder to see it repeated here again without any notice taken of what i said in answer to it , though you set it down here again , as you say , p. . on purpose to defend . but all the defence made , is only to that part of my reply which you set down * as a fresh complaint that i make in these words , this can be no reason why i should be joined with a man that had misapplied my notions , and that no man hath so much mistaken and misapplied my notions as your lordship ; and therefore i ought rather to be joined with your lordship . and then you , with some warmth , subjoin ; but is this fair and ingenuous dealing , to represent this matter so , as if your lordship had joined us together , because he had misunderstood and misapplied my notions ? can i think your lordship a man of so little sense to make that the reason of it ? no ; sir , says your lordship , it was because he assigned no other grounds but mine , and that in my own words ; however , now i would divert the meaning of them another way . my lord , i did set down your words at large in my second letter , and therefore do not see how i could be liable to any charge of unfair or disingenuous dealing in representing the matter ; which i am sure you will allow as a proof of my not misrepresenting , since i find you use it your self * as a sure fence against any such accusation ; where you tell me , that you have set down my own words at large , that i may not complain that your lordship misrepresents my sense . the same answer i must desire my reader to apply for me to your d and th pages , where your lordship makes complaints of the like kind with this here . the reasons you give for joining me with the author of christianity not mysterious , are put down verbatim as you gave them ; and if they did not give me that satisfaction they were designed for , am i to be blamed that i did not find them better than they were ? you joined me with that author because he placed certainty only in clear and distinct ideas . i told your lordship i did not do so , and therefore that could be no reason for your joining me with him . you answer , 't was possible he might mistake or misapply my notions . so that our agreeing in the notion of certainty ( the pretended reason for which we were joined ) failing , all the reason which is left and which you offer in this answer for your joining of us , is the possibility of his mistaking my notions . and i think it a very natural inference , that if the meer possibility of any ones mistaking me , be a reason for my being joined with him : any ones actual mistaking me , is a stronger reason why i should be joined with him . but if such an inference shews ( more than you would have it ) the satisfactoriness and force of your answer , i hope you will not be angry with me , if i cannot change the nature of things . your lordship indeed adds in that place , * that there is too much reason to believe that the author thought his notions and mine the same . answ. when your lordship shall produce that reason , it will be seen whether it were too much or too little . till it is produced , there appears no reason , at all ; and such concealed reason , though it may be too much , can be supposed , i think , to give very little satisfaction to me or any body else in the case . but to make good what you have said in your answer , your lordship here † replies , that you did not join us together , because he had misunderstood and misapplied my notions . answ. neither did i say , that therefore you did join us . but this i crave leave to say , that all the reason you there gave for your joining us together , was the possibility of his mistaking and misapplying my notions . but your lordship now tells * me , no , sir , this was not the reason of your joining us ; but it was because he assigned no other grounds but mine , and in my own words . answ. my lord , i do not remember that in that place you give this as a reason for your joining of us ; and i could not answer in that place to what you did not there say , but to what you there did say . now your lordship does say it it here , here i shall take the liberty to answer it . the reason you now give for your joining me with that author , is because he assigned no other grounds but mine , which however tenderly expressed , is to be understood , i suppose , that he did assign my grounds . of what , i beseech your lordship , did he assign my grounds and in my words ? if it were not my grounds of certainty , it could be no manner of reason for your joining me with him ; because the only reason why at first you made him ( and me with him ) a gentleman of the new way of reasoning , was his supposing clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty , which was the opinion that you declared you opposed . now my lord , if you can shew where that author has in my words assigned my grounds of certainty , there will be some grounds for what you say here . but till your lordship does that , it will be pretty hard to believe that to be the ground of your joining us together ; which being no where to be found can scarce be thought the true reason of your doing it . your lordship adds , * however , now i would divert the meaning of them [ i. e. those my words ] an other way . answ. when ever you are pleased to set down those words of mine wherein that author assigns my grounds of certainty , it will be seen how i now divert their meaning another way ; till then they must remain with several other of your lordship's invisible them , which are no where to be found . but to your asking me , † whether i can think your lordship a man of that little sense ? i crave leave to reply , that i hope it must not be concluded , that as often as in your way of writing i meet with any thing that does not seem to me satisfactory , and i endeavour to shew that it does not prove , what it is made use of for , that i presently think your lordship a man of little sense . this would be a very hard rule in defending ones self ; especially for me against so great and learned a man , whose reasons and meaning it is not , i find , always easie for so mean a capacity as mine to reach ; and therefore i have taken great care to set down your words in most places , to secure my self from the imputation of misrepresenting your sense , and to leave it fairly before the reader to judge , whether i mistake it , and how far i am to be blamed if i do . and i would have set down your whole letter page by page as i answered it , would not that have made my book too big . if i must write under this fear , that you apprehend i think meanly of you , as often as i think any reason you make use of is not satisfactory in the point it is brought for , the causes of uneasiness would return too often ; and it would be better once for all , to conclude your lordship infallible , and acquiesce in whatever you say , than in every page to be so rude as to tell your lordship , i think you have little sense , if that be the interpretation of my endeavouring to shew , that your reasons come short any where . my lord , when you did me the honour to answer my first letter ( which i thought might have passed for a submissive complaint of what i did not well understand , rather than a dispute with your lordship ) you were pleased to insert into it direct accusations against my book , which looked as if you had a mind to enter into a direct controversie with me . this condescention in your lordship , has made me think my self under the protection of the laws of controversie , which allow a free examining and shewing the weakness of the reasons brought by the other side , without any offence . if this be not permitted me , i must confess , i have been mistaken , and have been guilty in answering you any thing at all : for how to answer without answering , i confess , i do not know . i wish you had never writ any thing that i was particularly concerned to examine ; and what i have been concerned to examine , i wish it had given me no occasion for any other answer , but an admiration of the manner and justness of your corrections , and an acknowledgment of an increase of that great opinion , which i had of your lordship before . but i hope it is not expected from me in this debate , that i should admit as good and conclusive all that drops from your pen , for fear of causing so much displeasure as you seem here to have upon this occasion , or for fear you should object to me the presumption of thinking you had but little sense , as often as i endeavoured to shew , that what you say is of little force . when those words and grounds of mine are produced , that the author of christianity not mysterious , assigned , which your lordship thinks a sufficient reason for your joining me with him , in opposing the doctrin of the trinity ; i shall consider them , and endeavour to give you satisfaction about them as well i have already concerning those ten lines , which you have more than once quoted out of him , as taken out of my book , and which is all that your lordship has produced out of him of that kind ; in all which there is not one syllable of clear and distinct ideas , or of certainty founded in them . in the mean time , in answer to your other question , * but is this fair and ingenuous dealing ? i refer my reader to p. - of my second letter , where he may see at large all this whole matter , and all the unfairness and disingenuity of it , which i submit to him , to judge whether for any fault of that kind , it ought to have drawn on me the marks of so much displeasure . your lordship goes on here , * and tells me , that although you were willing to allow me all reasonable occasions for my own vindication , as appears by your words ; yet you were sensible enough that i had given too just an occasion to apply them in that manner as appears by the next page . what was it , i beseech you my lord , that i was to vindicate my self from , and what was those them i had given too just an occasion to apply in that manner , and what was that manner they were applied in , and what was the occasion they were so applied ? for i can find none of all these in that next page to which your lordship refers me ; when those are set down , the world will be the better able to judge of the reason you had to join me after the manner you did : however , saying , my lord , without proveing , i humbly conceive , is but saying , and in such personal matter so turned , shews more the disposition of the speaker , than any ground for what is said . your lordship as a proof of your great care of me , tells me † at the top of that page , that you had said so much that nothing could be said more for my vindication : and before you come to the bottom of it , you labour to persuade the world , that i have need to vindicate my self . another possibly , who could find in his heart to say two such things , would have taken care they should not have stood in the same page , where the juxta-position might enlighten them too much , and surprize the sight . but possibly your lordship is so well satisfied of the worlds readiness to believe your professions of good will to me , as a mark whereof you tell me here of your willingness to allow me all reasonable occasions to vindicate my self , that no body can see any thing but kindness in whatever you say , though it appears in so different shapes . in the following words , your lordship accuses me of too nice a piece of criticism ; and tells me it looks like chicaning . answ. i did not expect in a controversie begun and managed as this which your lordship has been pleased to have with me , to be accused of chicaning without great provocation ; because the mentioning that word might perhaps raise in the reader 's minds some odd thoughts which were better spared . but this accusation made me look back into the places you quoted in the margent , and there find the matter to stand thus : to a pretty large quotation set down out of the postscript to my first letter , you subjoin , * which words seem to express so much of a christian spirit and temper , that your lordship cannot believe i intended to give any advantage to the enemies of the christian faith ; but whether there hath not been too just occasion for them to apply them in that manner , is a thing very fit for me to consider . in my answer † i take notice that the term them , in this passage of your lordship's can in the ordinary construction of our language be applied to nothing but which words in the beginning of that passage , i. e. to my words immediately preceding . this your lordship calls chicaning ; and gives this reason for it , * viz. because any one that reads without a design to cavil , would easily interpret ihem of my words and notions about which the debate was . answ. that any one that reads that passage with or without design to cavil , could hardly make it intelligible without interpreting them so , i readily grant ; but that it is easie for me or any body , to interpret any ones meaning contrary to the necessary construction and plain import of the words , that i crave leave to deny . i am sure it is not chicaning to presume , that so great an author as your lordship , writes according to the rules of grammar , and as an other man writes , who understands our language and would be understood ; to do the contrary , would be a presumption liable to blame , and might deserve the name of chicaning and cavil . and that in this case it was not easie to avoid the interpreting the term them as i did ; the reason you give why i should have done it , is a farther proof . your lordship , to shew it was easie , says the postscript , comes in but as a parenthesis : now i challenge any one living , to shew me where in that place the parenthesis must begin , and where end , which can make them applicable to any thing , but the words of my postscript . i have tried with more care and pains than is usually required of a reader in such cases , and cannot i must own find where to make a breach in the thread of your discourse , with the imaginary parenthesis , which your lordship mentions , and was not i suppose omitted by the printer for want of marks to print it . and if this , which you give as the key , that opens to the interpretation that i should have made , be so hard to be found , the interpretation it self could not be so very easie as you speak of . but to avoid all blame for understanding that passage as i did , and to secure my self from being suspected to seek a subterfuge in the natural import of your words , against what might be conjectur'd to be your sense , i added . † but if by any new way of construction , unintelligible to me , the word them here shall be applied to any passages of my essay of humane vnderstanding ; i must humbly crave leave to observe this one thing , in the whole course of what your lordship had designed for my satisfaction , that tho' my complaint be of your lordship's manner of applying , what i had publish'd in my essay , so as to interest me in a controversie , wherein i medled not ; yet your lordship all along tells me of others , that have misapplied i know not what words in my book , after i know not what manner . now as to this matter , i beseech your lordship to believe that when any one , in such a manner applies my words contrary to what i intended them , so as to make them opposite to the doctrin of the trinity ; and me a party in that controversie against the trinity , as your lordship knows i complain your lordship has done , i shall complain of them too ; and consider , as well as i can , what satisfaction they give me and others in it . this passage of mine your lordship here * represents thus , viz. that i say , that if by an unintelligible new way of construction , the word them be applied to any passages in my book : what then ? why then , whoever they are , i intend to complain of them too . but , says your lordship , the words just before tell me who they are , viz. the enemies of the christian faith. and then your lordship asks , whether this be all that i intend , viz. only to complain of them for making me a party in the controversie against the trinity ? my lord , were i given to chicaning , as you call my being stop'd by faults of grammar that disturb the sense , and make the discourse incoherent and unintelligible , if we are to take it from the words as they are , i should not want matter enough for such an exercise of my pen : as for example here again * , where your lordship makes me say , that if the word them be applied to any passages in my book , then whoever they are , i intend to complain , &c. these being set down for my words , i would be very glad to be able to put them into a grammatical construction , and make to my self an intelligible sense of them . but they being not a word that i have an absolute power over , to place where and for what i will , i confess i cannot do it . for the term they in the words here , as your lordship has set them down , having nothing that it can refer to but passages , or them which stands for words , it must be a very suddain metamorphosis that must change them into persons , for 't is for persons that the word they stands here ; and yet i crave leave to say , that as far as i understand english , they is a word cannot be used without reference to something mentioned before . your lordship tells me the words just before tell me who they are . the words just mentioned before are these , if by an unintelligible new way of construction the word them be applied to any passage of my book , for 't is to some words before indeed , but before in the same contexture of discourse , that the word they must refer to make it any where intelligible . but here are no persons mentioned in the words just before , though your lordship tells me the words just before shew who they are , but this just before , where the persons are mentioned whom your lordship intends by they here , is so far off that pages of your lordships second letter , pages of my second letter , and above pages of your lordships first letter come between : so that one must read above pages from the enemies of the christian faith , in the th page of your first letter , before one can come to the they which refers to them here in the th page of your lordship's second letter . my lord , 't is my misfortune that i cannot pretend to any figure amongst the men of learning ; but i would not for that reason be render'd so despicable , that i could not write ordinary sense in my own language : i must beg leave therefore to inform my reader , that what your lordship has set down here as mine , is neither my words , nor my sense . for , . i say not , if by any unintelligible new way of construction ; but i say , if by any new way of construction unintelligible to me : which are far different expressions . for that may be very intelligible to others , which may be unintelligible to me . and indeed my lord , there are so many passages in your writings in this controversie with me , which for their construction , as well as otherwise , are so unintelligible to me , that if i should be so unmannerly , as to measure your understanding by mine , i should not know what to think of them . in those cases therefore , i presume not to go beyond my own capacity : i tell your lordship often ( which i hope modesty will permit ) what my weak understanding will not reach ; but i am far from saying it is therefore absolutely unintelligible . i leave to others the benefit of their better judgments , to be enlightened by your lordship , where i am not . . the use your lordship here makes of these words , but if by any new way of construction unintelligible to me , the word them be applied to any passages in my book : is not the principal nor the only ( as your lordship makes it ) use for which i said them . but this ; that if your lordship by them in that place , were to be understood to mean , that there were others that misapplied passages of my book ; this was no satisfaction for what your lordship had done in that kind . though this i observed was your way of defence ; that when i complained of what your lordship had done , you told me , that others had done so too : as if that could be any manner of satisfaction . i added in the close , * that when any one , in such a manner applies my words contrary to what i intended them , so as to make them opposite to the doctrin of the trinity , and me a party in that controversie against the trinity , as your lordship knows i complain your lordship has done , i shall complain of them too ; and consider as well as i can , what satisfaction they give me and others in it . of this any one of mine , your lordship makes your forementioned they , whether with any advantage of sense or clearness to my words , the reader must judge . however this latter part of that passage , with the particular turn your lordship gives to it , is what your words would perswade your reader is all that i say here : would not your lordship upon such an occasion from me , cry out again , is this fair and ingenuous dealing ? and would not you think you had reason to do so ? but let us see what we must guess your lordship makes me say , and your exceptions to it . your lordship makes me say , whoever they are , who misapply my words , as i complain your lordship has done ( for these words must be supplied to make the sentence to me intelligible ) i intend to complain of them too : and then you find fault with me for using the indefinite word whoever , and as a reproof for the unreasonableness of it , you say ; but the words just before tell me who they are . but my words are not whoever they are . but my words are , when any one in such a manner applies my words contrary to what i intended them , &c. your lordship would here have me understand , that there are those that have done it , and rebukes me that i speak as if i knew not any one , that had done it , and that i may not plead ignorance , you say your words just before , told me who they were , viz. the enemies of the christian faith. what must i do now , to keep my word and satisfie your lordship ? must i complain of the enemies of the christian faith in general , that they have applied my words as aforesaid , and then consider as well as i can , what satisfaction they give me and others in it ? for that was all i promised to do . but this would be strange to complain of the enemies of the christian faith , for doing , what 't is very likely they never all did , and what i do not know that any one of them has done . or must i to content your lordship , read over all the writings of the enemies of the christian faith , to see whether any one of them has applied my words , i. e. in such a manner as i complained your lordship has done , that if they have , i may complain of them too ? this truly my lord , is more than i have time for ; and if it were worth while , when it is done , i perceive i should not content your lordship in it . for you ask me here , is this all i intend , only to complain of them for making me a party in the controversie against the trinity ? no my lord , this is not all . i promised too , to consider as well as i can what satisfaction ( if they offer any ) they give me and others for so doing . and why should not this content your lordship in reference to others as well as it does in reference to your self ? i have but one measure for your lordship and others . when others treat me after the manner you have done , why should it not be enough to answer them after the same manner i have done your lordship ? but perhaps your lordship has some dextrous meaning under this , which i am not quick sighted enough to perceive , and so do not reply right , as you would have me . i must beg my readers pardon as well as your lordships , for using so many words about passages , that seem not in themselves of that importance . i confess , that in themselves they are not : but yet 't is my misfortune , that in this controversie , your way of writing and representing my sense forces me to it . your lordship's name in writing is established above controle , and therefore 't would be ill breeding in one , who barely reads what you write , not to take every thing for perfect in its kind , which your lordship says . clearness and force and consistence are to be presumed always , whatever your lordship's words be : and there is no other remedy for an answerer , who finds it difficult any where to come at your meaning or argument , but to make his excuse for it , in laying the particulars before the reader , that he may be judge where the fault lies ; especially where any matter of fact is contested , deductions from the first rise , are often necessary , which cannot be made in few words , nor without several repetitions : an inconvenience possibly fitter to be endured , than that your lordship , in the run of your learned notions , should be shackled with the ordinary and strict rules of language , and in the delivery of your sublimer speculations , be tied down to the mean and contemptible rudiments of grammar : though your being above these and freed from a servile observance in the use of trivial particles , whereon the connection of discourse chiefly depends , cannot but cause great difficulties to the reader . and however it may be an ease to any great man , to find himself above the ordinary rules of writing , he who is bound to follow the connection and find out his meaning , will have his task much encreased by it . i am very sensible how much this has swelled these papers already , and yet i do not see , how any thing less than what i have said could clear those passages , which we have hitherto examined ; and set them in their due light. your next words are these , * but whether i have not made my self too much a party in it , [ i. e. the controversie against the trinity ] will appear before we have done . this is an item for me , which your lordship seems so very fond of , and so careful to inculcate , wherever you bring in any words it can be tacked to , that if one can avoid thinking it to be the main end of your writing , one cannot yet but see , that it could not be so much in the thoughts and words of a great man , who is above such personal matters , and which he knows the world soon grows weary of , unless it had some very particular business there . whether it be the author that has prejudiced you against his book , or the book prejudiced you against the author , so it is i perceive , that both i , and my essay are fallen under your displeasure . i am not unacquainted what great stress is often laid upon invidious names by skilful disputants to supply the want of better arguments . but give me leave , my lord , to say , that 't is too late for me now to begin to value those marks of good will , or a good cause ; and therefore i shall say nothing more to them , as fitter to be left to the examination of the thoughts within your own breast , from what sourse such reasonings spring , and whither they tend . i am going , my lord , to a tribunal that has a right to judge of thoughts , and being secure that i there shall be found of no party but that of truth ( for which there is required nothing but the receiving truth in the love of it ) i matter not much of what party any one shall , as may best serve his turn , denominate me here . your lordship's is not the first pen from which i have receiv'd such strokes as these without any great harm : i never found freedom of stile did me any hurt with those who knew me , and if those who know me not will take up borrowed prejudices , it will be more to their own harm than mine : so that in this , i shall give your lordship little other trouble , but my thanks sometimes , where i find you skilfully and industriously recommending me to the world under the character you have chosen for me . only give me leave to say . that if the essay i shall leave behind me hath no other fault to sink it but heresie and inconsistency with the articles of the christian faith , i am apt to think it will last in the world , and do service to truth , even the truths of religion , notwithstanding that imputation laid on it by so mighty a hand as your lordships's . in your two next paragraphs * your lordship accuses me of cavilling in the d and th pages of my second letter , whither for shortness i refer my reader . i shall only add , that though in the debate about mysteries of faith , your adversaries as you say are not heathens ; yet any one among us , whom your lordship should speak of as not owning the scripture to be the foundation and rule of faith , would i presume be thought to receive from you a character very little different from that of a heathen . which being a part of your complement to me , will i humbly conceive excuse what i there said , from being a cavilling exception . hitherto your lordship , notwithstanding that you understood the world so well , has imploied your pen in personal matters , how unacceptable soever to the world you declare it to be ; how must i behave my self in the case ? if i answer nothing , my silence is so apt to be interpreted guilt or concession , that even the deferring my answer to some points , or not giving it in the proper place is reflected on as no small trangression ; whereof there are two examples in the two following pages . * and if i do answer so at large , as your way of writing requires , and as the matter deserves , i recall to your memory the springs of modena , by the ebullition of my thoughts . 't is hard , my lord , between these two to manage ones self to your good likeing : however , i shall endeavour to collect the force of your reasonings , where-ever i can find it , as short as i can , and apply my answers to that , though with the omission of a great many incidents deserving to be taken notice of : if my flowness , not able to keep pace every where with your uncommon flights , shall have missed any argument , whereon you lay any stress ; if you please to point it out to me , i shall not fail to endeavour to give you satisfaction therein . in the next paragraph * your lordship says , those who are not sparing of writing about articles of faith , and among them take great care to avoid some which have been always esteemed fundamental , &c. this seems also to contain something personal in it . but how far i am concerned in it i shall know , when you shall be pleased to tell me who those are , and then it will be time enough for me to answer . this is what your lordship has brought in under your second answer in these four pages as a defence of it , and how much of it is a defence of that second answer , let the reader judge . i am now come † to the ( d ) of those answers , which you said , p. . you would lay together and defend . and it is this : that my grounds of certainty tend to scepticism , and that in an age wherein the mysteries of faith are too much exposed by the promoters of scepticism and infidelity ; it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new methods of certainty as are apt to leave mens minds more doubtful than before . this is what you set down here to be defended , the defence follows , wherein your lordship tells me that i say , these words contain a farther accusation of my book , which shall be consider'd in its due place . but this is the proper place of considering it : for your lordship said , that hereby i have given too just occasion to the enemies of the christian faith , to make use of my words and notions , as was evidently proved from my own concessions . and if this be so , however you were willing to have had me explained my self to the general satisfaction ; yet , since i decline it , you do insist upon it , that i cannot clear my self from laying that foundation , which the author of christianity not mysterious built upon . in which i crave leave to acquaint your lordship with what i do not understand . first , i do not understand what is meant by this is the proper place ; for in ordinary construction , these words seem to denote this th page of your lordship's second letter , which you were then writing , tho' the sense would make me think the th page of my second letter which you were then answering should be meant . this perhaps your lordship may think a nice piece of criticism ; but till it be cleared , i cannot tell what to say in my excuse . for 't is likely your lordship would again ask me , whether i could think you a man of so little sense , if i should understand these words to mean the th page of your second letter , which no body can conceive your lordship should think a proper place for me to consider and answer what you had writ in your first ? 't would be as hard to understand this is , to mean a place in my former letter , which was past and done ; but 't is no wonder for me to be mistaken in your priviledge word this . besides , there is this farther difficulty to understand this is the proper place , of the th page of my former letter , because i do not see why the d page of that letter , where i did consider and answer it , was not as proper place of considering it as the th , where i give a reason why i defend it . farther , if i understood what you meant here by this is the proper place , i should possibly apprehend better the force of your argument subjoined to prove this whatever it be , to be the proper place ; the causal particle for , which introduces the following words , making them a reason of those preceding . but in the present obscurity of this matter , i confess i do not see how your having said that i gave occasion to the enemies of the christian faith , &c. proves any thing concerning the proper place at all . another thing that i do not understand in this defence , is your inference in the next period , where you tell me , if this be so , you insist upon it that i should clear my self . for i do not see how your having said what you there said ( for that is it which this here , if it be not within priviledge , must signifie ) can be a reason for your insisting on my clearing my self of any thing , though i allow this to be your lordship's ordinary way of proceding to insist upon your suggestions and suppositions in one place , as if they were foundations to build what you pleased on in another . thus then stands your defence , my grounds of certainty tend to scepticism , and to start new methods of certainty is of dangerous consequence . because i did not consider this your accusation in the proper place of considering it . this is the proper place of considering it . because your lordship said i had given too just occasion to the enemies of the christian faith to make use of my words and notions ; and because your lordship said so , therefore you insist upon it that i clear my self , &c. this appears to me , to be the connection and force of your defence hitherto . if i am mistaken in it , your lordship's words are set down , the reader must judge whether the construction of the words do not make it so . but before i leave them , there are some things that i crave permission to represent to your lordship more particularly . . that to the accusation of scepticism , i have answer'd in another , and as i think , a proper place . . that the accusation of dangerous consequence i have consider'd and answer'd in my former letter * ; but that being it seems not the proper place of considering it , you have not in this your defence thought fit to take any notice of it . . that your lordship has not any where proved , that my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas is apt to leave mens minds more doubtful than they were before , which is what your accusation supposes . . that you set down those words of mine , these words contain a farther accusation of my book , which shall be consider'd in its due place , as all the answer which i gave to that new accusation , except what you take notice of out of my th page ; and take no notice of what i say from page to . where i consider'd it as i promised , and as i thought fully answer'd it . . that the too just occasion , you say , i have given to the enemies of the christian faith to make use of my words and notions , wants to be proved . . that what use the enemies of the christian faith have made of my words and notions , is no where shewn though often talked of . . that if the enemies of the christian faith have made use of my words and notions , yet that , as i have shewn † , is no proof , that they are of dangerous consequence . much less is it a proof , that this proposition , certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , is of dangerous consequence . for some words or notions in a book , that are of dangerous consequence , do not make all the propositions of that book to be of dangerous consequence . . that your lordship tells me , you were willing to have had me explained my self to the general satisfaction , which is what in the place * from which the former words are taken , you expressed thus , that my answer did not come fully up in all things to that which you coùld wish . to which i have given an answer ; † and methinks your defence here should have been applied to that , and not the same thing ( which has been answer'd ) set down again as part of your defence . but pray , my lord , give me leave to ask , is not this meant for a personal matter , which though the world , as you say , is soon weary of , your lordship , it seems is not ? . that you say , you insist upon it that i cannot clear my self from laying that foundation which the author of christianity not mysterious built upon . certainly this personal matter is of some very great consequence , that your lordship , who understands the world so well , insists so much upon it . but if it be true , that he built upon my foundation ; and it be of such moment to your lordships business in the present controversie , methinks without so much intricacy it should not be hard to shew it : it is but proving what foundation of certainty ( for 't is of that all this dispute is ) he went upon , which , as i humbly conceive , your lordship has not done ; and then shewing that to be my foundation of certainty , and the business is ended . but instead of this your lordship says , that his account of reason supposes clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty ; that he imagined he built upon my grounds ; that he thought his and my notions of certainty to be the same ; that there has been too iust occasion given , for the enemies of the christian faith to apply my words in i know not what manner . these and the like arguments to prove that he goes upon my grounds your lordship has used ; but they are , i confess , too subtile and too fine for me to feel the force of them , in a matter of fact wherein it was so easie to produce both his and my grounds out of our books ( without all this talk about suppositions and imaginations , and occasions so far remote from any direct proof ) if it were a matter of that consequence to be so insisted upon as your lordship professedly does . your lordship has spent a great many pages to tie me to that author ; and you still insist upon it , that i cannot clear my self from laying that foundation which the author of christianity not mysterious built upon . what this great concern in a matter of so little moment means , i leave the reader to guess : for , i beseech your lordship , of what great consequence is it to the world ? what great interest has any truth of religion in this , that i and another man ( be he who he will ) make use of the same grounds to different purposes ? this i am sure , it tends not to the clearing , or confirming any one material truth in the world. if the foundation i have laid be true , i shall neither disown nor dislike it , whatever this or any other author shall build upon it ; because , as your lordship knows , ill things may be built upon a good foundation , and yet the foundation never the worse for it . and therefore if that , or any other author hath built upon my foundation , i see nothing in it , that i ought to be concerned to clear my self from . if you can shew that my foundation is false , or shew me a better foundation of certainty than mine , i promise you immediately to renounce and relinquish mine with thanks to your lordship : but till you can prove , that he that first invented syllogisme as a rule of right reasoning , or first laid down this principle , that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be , is answerable for all those opinions , which have been endeavoured to be proved by mode and figure ; or have been built upon that maxim , i shall not think my self concerned , whatever any one shall build upon this foundation of mine , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas as they are expressed in any proposition ; much less shall i think my self concerned , for what you shall please to suppose ( for that , with submission , is all you have done hitherto ) any one has built upon it , though he were never so opposite to your lordship in any of the opinions he should build on it . in that case , if he should prove troublesome to your lordship with any argument pretended to be built upon my foundation , i humbly conceive you have no other remedy , but to shew either the foundation false , and in that case i confess my self concerned ; or his deduction from it wrong , and that i shall not be at all concerned in . but if instead of this , your lordship shall find no other way to subvert this foundation of certainty , but by saying , the enemies of the christian faith build on it , because you suppose one author builds on it ; this i fear , my lords , will very little advantage the cause you defend , whilst it so visibly strengthens , and gives credit to your adversaries , rather than weakens any foundation they go upon . for the vnitarians i imagine , will be apt to smile , at such a way of arguing , viz. that they go on this ground , because the author of christianity not mysterious goes upon it , or is supposed by your lordship to go upon it ; and by-standers will do little less than smile , to find my book brought into the socinian controversie , and the ground of certainty laid down in my essay condemned , only because that author is supposed by your lordship to build upon it . for this in short is the case , and this the way your lordship has used in answering objections against the trinity in point of reason . i know your lordship cannot be suspected of writing booty : but i fear , such a way of arguing in so great a man as your lordship , will in an age wherein the mysteries of faith are too much exposed , give too just an occasion to the enemies , and also to the friends of the christian faith , to suspect that there is a great failure some where . but to pass by that . this i am sure is personal matter , which the world perhaps will think it need not have been troubled with . your defence of your third answer goes on , and to prove , that the author of christianity not mysterious built upon my foundation , you tell me , * that my ground of certainty is the agreement or disagreement of the ideas , as expressed in any proposition . which are my own words . from hence you urged , that let the proposition come to us any way , either by humane or divine authority , if our certainty depend upon this , we can be no more certain , than we have clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas contained in it . and from hence the author of christianity not mysterious , thought he had reason to reject all mysteries of faith , which are contained in propositions , upon my grounds of certainty . since this personal matter appears of such weight to your lordship , that it needs to be farther prosecuted ; and you think this your argument to prove , that that author built upon my foundation , worth the repeating here again ; i am oblieged to enter again , so far into this personal matter , as to examine this passage which i formerly passed by as of no moment . for it is easy to shew , that what you say , visibly proves not , that he built upon my foundation ; and next 't is evident , that if it were proved , that he did so , yet this is no proof , that my method of certainty is of dangerous consequence , which is what was to be defended . as to the first of these , your lordship would prove , that the author of christianity not mysterious built upon my ground , and how do you prove it ? viz. because he thought he had reason to reject all mysteries of faith , which are contained in propositions upon my ground . how does it appear , that he rejected them upon my grounds ? does he any where say so ? no! that is not offered , there is no need of such an evidence of matter of fact , in a case which is only of matter of fact. but he thought he had reason to reject them upon my grounds of certainty . how does it appear that he thought so ? very plainly . because , let the proposition come to us by humane or divine authority , if our certainty depend upon the perception of the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in it , we can be no more certain than we have clear perception of that agreement . the consequence i grant is good , that if certainty , i. e. knowledge , consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , then we can certainly know the truth of no proposition further than we perceive that agreement or disagreement . but how does it follow from thence , that he thought he had reason upon my grounds to reject any proposition , that contained a mystery of faith : or , as your lordship expresses it , all mysteries of faith which are contained in propositions ? whether your lordship by the word rejecting accuses him of not knowing , or of not believing some proposition , that contains an article of faith ; or what he has done or not done i concern not my self ; that which i deny is the consequence above mentioned , which i submit to your lordship to be proved . and when you have proved it , and shewn your self to be so familiar with the thoughts of that author , as to be able to be positive , what he thought , without his telling you , it will remain farther to be proved , that because he thought so , therefore he built right upon my foundation , for otherwise no prejudice will come to my foundation by any ill use he made of it ; nor will it be made good , that my method or way of certainty , is of dangerous consequence , which is what your lordship is here to defend . methinks your lordship's argument here is all one with this . aristotle's ground of certainty ( except of first principles ) lies in this , that those things which agree in a third agree themselves . we can be certain of no proposition ( excepting first principles ) coming to us either by divine or humane authority , if our certainty depend upon this , farther than there is such an agreement . therefore the author of christianity not mysterious thought he had reason to reject all mysteries of faith , which are contained in propositions upon aristotle's grounds . this consequence as strange as it is , is just the same with what is in your lordship 's repeated argument against me . for let aristotle's ground of certainty be this , that i have named , or what it will , how does it follow , that because my ground of certainty is placed in the agreement or disagreement of ideas , therefore the author of christianity not mysterious rejected any proposition more upon my grounds than aristotle's ? and will not aristotle by your lordship's way of arguing here , from the use any one may make or think he makes of it , be guilty also of starting a method of certainty of dangerous consequence , whether his method be true or false , if that or any other author whose writings you dislike , thought he built upon it , or be supposed by your lordship to think so . but , as i humbly conceive , propositions , speculative propositions such as mine is , about which all this stir is made , are to be judg'd of by their truth or falshood , and not by the use any one shall make of them ; much less by the persons who are supposed to build on them . and therefore it may be justly wonder'd , since you say it is dangerous , why you never proved or attempted to prove it to be false . but you complain here again , that i answer'd not a word to this in the proper place . my lord , if i offended your lordship , by passing it by , because i thought there was no argument in it : i hope i have now given you some sort of satisfaction , by shewing there is no argument in it ; and letting you see , that your consequence here could not be infer'd from your antecedent . if you think it may , i desire you to try it in a syllogism . for whatever you are pleased to say in another place † my way of certainty by ideas will admit of antecedents and consequents and of syllogism as the proper form to try whether the inference be right or no. i shall set down your following words , that the reader may see your lordship's manner of reasoning concerning this matter in its full force and consistency , and try it in a syllogism if he pleases . your words are * , by this it evidently appears , that although your lordship was willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own sense ; yet you by no means thought , that my words were wholy misunderstood or misapplied by that author : but rather that he saw into the true consequence of them , as they lie in my book . and what answer do i give to this ? not a word in the proper place for it . you tell me , you were willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own sense . if your lordship had been conscious to your self , that you had herein meant me any kindness , i think i may presume , you would not have minded me here again of a favour , which you had told me of but in the preceding page , and to make it an obligation , need not have been more than once talked of ; unless your lordship thought the obligation was such , that it would hardly be seen , unless i were told of it in words at length , and in more places than one . for what favour i beseech you , my lord , is it , to allow me to do that , which needed not your allowance to be done , and i could have done ( if it had been necessary ) of my self without being blamed for taking that liberty ? whatsoever therefore your meaning was in these words , i cannot think you took this way to make me sensible of your kindness . your lordship says , you were willing to allow me to interpret my own sense . what you were willing to allow me to do , i have done . my sense is , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; and my sense therein i have interpreted to be the agreement or disagreement , not only of perfectly clear and distinct ideas , but such ideas , as we have , whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct or no. farther in answer to your objection , that it might be of dangerous consequence : i so explained my sense , as to shew , that certainty in that sense was not , nor could be of dangerous consequence . this , which was the point in question between us , your lordship might have found at large explain'd in d and ten or twelve following pages of my second letter , if you had been pleased to have taken notice of them . but it seems you were more willing to tell me , that though you were willing to allow me all ways of interpreting my own sense , yet you by no means thought , that my words were wholy misunderstood or misapply'd by that author , but rather that he saw into the true consequence of them as they lie in my book . i shall here set down your lordship's words * where to give me and others satisfaction ) you say , you took care to prevent being misunderstood , which will best appear by your own words , viz. that you must doe that right to the ingenious author of the essay of humane vnderstanding , from whom these notions are borrowed to serve other purposes than he intended them . it was too plain , that the bold writer against the mysteries of our faith took his notions and expressions from thence , and what could be said more for my vindication , than that he turned them to other purposes than the author intended them ? this you endeavour to prove , p. - and then conclude † by which it is sufficiently proved , that you had reason to say , that my notion was carried beyond my intention . these words out of your first letter , i shall leave here , set by those out of your second , that you may at your leisure , if you think fit ( for it will not become me to tell your lordship that i am willing to allow it ) explain your self to the general satisfaction , that it may be known which of them is now your sense ; for they are , i suppose , too much to be together any ones sense at the same time . my intention being thus so well vindicated by your lordship , that you think * nothing could be said more for my vindication , the misunderstanding or not misunderstanding of my book , by that or any other author , is what i shall not wast my time about . if your lordship thinks he saw into the true consequence of this position of mine , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas ( for 't is from the inference , that you suppose he makes from that my definition of knowledge , that you are here proving it to be of dangerous consequence ) he is beholding to your lordship for your good opinion of his quick sight : i take no part in that , one way or other . what consequences your lordship's quick sight ( which must be allowed to have out-done , what you suppose of that gentleman's ) has found and charged on that notion as dangerous , i shall endeavour to give you satisfaction in . you farther add , † that though i answer'd not a word in the proper place , yet afterwards , let. . p. . ( for you would omit nothing , that may seem to help my cause ) i offer something towards an answer . i shall be at a loss hereafter , what to do with the d and following pages to the th , since what is said in those pages of my second letter , goes for nothing , because it is not in its proper place . though if any one will give himself the trouble to look into my second letter , he will find , that the argument i was upon in the th page , obliged me to defer , what i had farther to say to your new accusation . but that i re-assumed it in the d , and answer'd it in that and the following pages . but supposing every writer had not that exactness of method , which shew'd , by the natural and visible connection of the parts of his discourse , that every thing was laid in its proper place , is it a sufficient answer not to take any notice of it ? the reason why i put this question is , because if this be a rule in controversie , i humbly conceive , i might have passed over the greatest part of what your lordship has said to me , because the disposition it has under numerical figures , is so far from giving me a view of the orderly connection of the parts of your discourse , that i have often been tempted to suspect the negligence of the printer for misplacing your lordship's numbers , since so ranked as they are , they do to me , who am confounded by them , lose all order and connection quite . the next thing in the defence , which you go on with , is an exception to my use of the word certainty . in the close of the answer i had made in the pages you pass over * i add , that , though the laws of disputation allow bare denial , as a sufficient answer to sayings without any offer of a proof ; yet my lord , to shew how willing i am to give your lordship all satisfaction , in what you apprehend may be of dangerous consequence in my book , as to that article , i shall not stand still sullenly , and put your lordship upon the difficulty of shewing wherein that danger lies ; but shall on the other side endeavour to shew your lordship , that that definition of mine , whether true or false , right or wrong , can be of no dangerous consequence to that article of faith. the reason which i shall offer for it is this ; because it can be of no consequence to it at all . . and the reason of it was clear from what i had said before † that knowing and believing were two different acts of the mind . and that my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , i. e. that my definition of knowledge , one of those acts of the mind , would not at all alter or shake the definition of faith , which was another act of the mind distinct from it . and therefore i added , * that the certainty of faith ( if your lordship thinks fit to call it so ) has nothing to do with the certainty of knowledge . and to talk of the certainty of faith , seems all one to me , as to talk of the knowledge of believing ; a way of speaking not easy to me to understand . these and other words to this purpose in the following paragraphs , your lordship lays hold on , and sets down , as liable to no small exception : though as you tell † me the main strength of my defence lies in it . let what strength you please lie in it , my defence was strong enough without it . for to your bare saying , my method of certainty might be of dangerous consequence to any article of the christian faith , without proving it , it was a defence strong enough barely to deny , and put you upon shewing wherein that danger lies , which therefore , this main strength of my defence , as you call it , apart , i insist on . but as to your exception to what i said on this occasion , it consists in this , that there is a certainty of faith , and therefore you set down my saying . that to talk of the certainty of faith , seems all one as to talk of the knowledge of believing . as that which shews the inconsistency of my notion of ideas , with the articles of the christian faith. these are your words here , * and yet you tell me , † that it is not my way of ideas , but my way of certainty by ideas , that your lordship is unsatisfied about . what must i do now in the case , when your words are expresly , that my notion of ideas have an inconsistency with the articles of the christian faith : must i presume that your lordship means my notion of certainty ? all that i can do , is to search out your meaning the best i can , and then shew where i apprehend it not conclusive . but this uncertainty in most places , what you mean , makes me so much work , that a great deal is omitted , and yet my answer is too long . your lordship asks in the next paragraph , * how comes the certainty of faith so hard a point with me ? answ. i suppose you ask this question more to give others hard thoughts of my opinion of faith , than to be informed your self . for you cannot be ignorant that all along in my essay i use certainty for knowledge ; so that for you to ask me , how comes the certainty of faith to become so hard a point with me ? is the same thing , as for you to ask , how comes the knowledge of faith , or if you please , the knowledge of believing to be so hard a point with me ? a question which i suppose you will think needs no answer , let your meaning in that doubtful phrase be what it will. i used in my book the term certainty for knowledge so generally , that no body that has read my book , though much less attentively than your lordship , can doubt of it . that i used it in that sense there , i shall refer my reader but to two places * amongst many to convince him . this i am sure , your lordship could not be ignorant , that by certainty i mean knowledge , since i have so used it in my letters to you , instances whereof are not a few ; some of them may be found in the places marked in the margent † : and in my second letter , what i say in the leaf immediately preceding that which you quote upon this occasion , would have put it past a possibility for any one to make shew of a doubt of it , had not that been amongst those pages of my answer , which for its being out of its proper place , it seems you were resolved not to take notice of ; and therefore i hope it will not be besides my purpose here to mind you of it again . after having said something to shew why i used certainty and knowledge for the same thing , i added , * that your lordship could not but take notice of this in the th § . of ch. . of my th book , it being a passage you had quoted , and runs thus ; where-ever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our idaas , there is certain knowledge ; and where-ever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things , there is certain real knowledge ; of which having given the marks , i think i have shewn wherein certainty , real certainty consists . and i farther add in the immediately following words , † that my definition of knowledge in the beginning of the th book of my essay stands thus , knowledge seems to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement , or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas . which is the very definition of certainty , that your lordship is here contesting . since then you could not but know that in this discourse , certainty with me stood for , or was the same thing with knowledge , may not one justly wonder how you come to ask me such a question as this , how comes the knowledge of believing to become so hard a point with me ? for that was in effect the question that you asked , when you put in the term certainty , since you knew as undoubtedly , that i meant knowledge by certainty , as that i meant believing by faith , i. e. you could doubt of neither . and that you did not doubt of it , is plain from what you say in the next page , where you endeavour to prove this an improper way of speaking . whether it be a proper way of speaking , i allow to be a fair question . but when you knew what i meant , though i expressed it improperly , to put questions in a word of mine , used in a sense different from mine , which could not but be apt to insinuate to the reader , that my notion of certainty derogated from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or full assurance of faith , as the scripture calls it , is what i guess in another , would make your lordship ask again , is this fair and ingenuous dealing ? my lord , my bible expresses * the highest degree of faith , which the apostle recommended to believers in his time by full assurance . but assurance of faith , though it be what assurance soever , will by no means down with your lordship in my writing . you say * i allow assurance of faith , god forbid i should do otherwise ; but then you ask , why not certainty as well as assurance ? my lord , i think it may be a reason not misbecoming a poor lay-man , and such as he might presume would satisfie a bishop of the church of england , that he found his bible to speak so . i find my bible speaks of the assurance of faith , but no ●here , that i can remember , of the certainty of faith , though in many places it speaks of the certainty of knowledge , and therefore i speak so too ; and shall not i think be condemned for keeping close to the expressions of our bible , though the scripture language , as it is , does not so well serve your lordship's turn in the present case . when i shall see in an authentick translation of our bible , the phrase chang'd , it will then be time enough for me to change it too , and call it not the assurance but certainty of faith : but till then i shall not be ashamed of it , notwithstanding you reproach me with it , by terming it † the assurance of faith as i call it ; when you might as well have term'd it the assurance of faith , as our bibles call it . it being plain , that by certainty i meant knowledge , and by faith the act of believing , that these words * where you ask , how comes the certainty of faith so hard a point with me ? and where you tell me , † i will allow no certainty of faith , may make no wrong impression in mens minds , who may be apt to understand them of the object , and not meerly of the act of believing . i crave leave to say with mr. chillingworth , ‖ that i do heartily acknowledge and believe the articles of our faith to be in themselves truths as certain and infallible as the very common principles of geometry or metaphysicks . but that there is not required of us a knowledge of them and an adherence to them as certain , as that of sense or science ; and that for this reason , ( amongst others given both by mr. chillingworth and mr. hooker ) viz. that faith is not knowledge , no more than three is four , but eminently contained in it : so that he that knows , believes and something more ; but he that believes many times does not ; nay , if he doth barely and meerly believe , he doth never know . these are mr. chillingworth's own words . * that this assurance of faith may approach very near to certainty , and not come short of it in a sure and steady influence on the mind , i have so plainly declar'd , * that no body , i think , can question it . in my chapter of reason , which has receiv'd the honour of your lordship's animadversions , i say of some propositions wherein knowledge [ i. e. in my sense ] certainty fails us , that their probability is so clear and strong , that assent as necessarily follows it , as knowledge does demonstration . does your lordship ascribe any greater certainty than this to an article of meer faith ? if you do not ? we are it seems agreed in the thing ; and so all , that you have so emphatically said about it , is but to correct a mistake of mine in the english tongue , if it prove to be one : a weighty point , and well worth your lordship's bestowing so many pages upon . i say meer faith , because though a man may be a christian , who meerly believes that there is a god , yet that is not an article of meer faith , because it may be demonstrated that there is a god , and so may certainly be known . your lordship goes on to ask , † have not all mankind who have talked of matters of faith , allowed a certainty of faith as well as a certainty of knowledge ? to answer a question concerning what all mankind who have talked of faith have done , may be within the reach of your great learning : as for me , my reading reaches not so far . the apostles and the evangelists , i can answer , have talked of matters of faith , but i do not find in my bible , that they have any where spoke ( for 't is of speaking here the question is ) of the certainty of faith ; and what they allow , which they do not speak of , i cannot tell . i say in my bible , meaning the english translation used in our church ; though what all mankind , who speak not of faith in english , can do towards the deciding of this question i do not see , it being about the signification of an english word . and whether in propriety of speech it can be applied to faith , can only be decided by those who understand english , which all mankind who have talked of of matters of faith , i humbly conceive did not . to prove that certainty in english , may be applied to faith , you say , * that among the romans it was opposed to doubting , and for that you bring this latin sentence , nil tam certum est quam quod de dubio certum . answ. certum , among the romans , might be opposed to doubting , and yet not be applied to faith , because knowledge , as well as believing , is opposed to doubting ; and therefore unless it had pleased your lordship to have quoted the author out of which this latin sentence is taken , one cannot tell whether certum be not in it spoken of a thing known , and not of a thing believed ; though if it were so , i humbly conceive it would not prove what you say , viz. that it , i. e. the word certainty ( for to that it must refer here , or to nothing that i understand ) was among the romans applied to faith ; for as i take it , they never used the english word certainty ; and though it be true , that the english word certainty be taken from the latin word certus , yet that therefore certainty in english is used exactly in the same sense , that certus is in latin , that i think you will not say ; for then certainty in english must signifie purpose and resolution of mind , for to that certus is applied in latin. you are pleased here † to tell me , that in my former letter i said , that if we knew the original of words , we should be much helped to the ideas they were first applied to , and made to stand for . i grant it true , nor shall i unsay it here . for i said not , that a word , that had its original in one language , kept always exactly the same signification in another language , into which it was from thence transplanted . but if you will give me leave to remind you of it , i remember that you , my lord , say * in the same place , that little weight is to be laid upon a bare grammatical etymology , when a word is used in another sense by the best authors . and i think you could not have brought a more proper instance to verifie that saying , than that which you produce here . but pray , my lord , why so far about ? why are we sent to the antient romans ? why must we consult ( which is no easie task ) all mankind , who have talked of faith , to know whether certainty be properly used for faith or no , when to determine it between your lordship and me , there is so sure a remedy , and so near at hand ? it is but for you to say wherein certainty consists . this , when i gently offer'd to your lordship in my first letter , you interpreted it † to be a design to draw you out of your way . i am sorry , my lord , you should think it out of your way to put an end , a short end to a controversie , which you think of such moment : methinks it should not be out of your way , with one blow , finally to overthrow an assertion , which you think to be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith , which your lordship has endeavoured to defend . i proposed the same again * where i say , for this there is a very easie remedy : it is but for your lordship to set aside this definition of knowledge , by giving us a better , and this danger is over . but you choose rather to have a controversie with my book , for having it in it , and to put me upon the defence of it . this is so express , that your taking no notice of it , puts me at a loss what to think . to say that a man so great in letters , does not know wherein certainty consists , is a greater presumption than i will be guilty of ; and yet to think that you do know and will not tell , is yet harder . who can think , or will dare to say , that your lordship so much concerned for the articles of faith , and engaged in this dispute with me , by your duty , for the preservation of them , should choose to keep up a controversie with me rather than remove that danger , which my wrong notion of certainty threatens to the articles of faith ? for , my lord , since the question is moved , and it is brought by your lordship to a publick dispute , wherein certainty consists , a great many knowing no better , may take up with what i have said ; and rather than have no notion of certainty at all , will stick by mine , till a better be shew'd them . and if mine tends to scepticism , as you say , and you will not furnish them with one that does not , what is it but to give way to scepticism , and let it quietly prevail on men as either having my notion of certainty , or none at all ? your lordship indeed says something in excuse in your th page , which that my answer may be in the proper place , shall be consider'd when we come there . your lordship declares , * that you are utterly against any private mints of words . i know not what the publick may do for your particular satisfaction in the case ; but till publick mints of words are erected , i know no remedy for it , but that you must patiently suffer this matter to go on in the same course , that i think it has gone in ever since language has been in use . here in this island , as far as my knowledge reaches , i do not find , that ever since the saxons time , in all the alterations that have been made in our language , that any one word or phrase has had its authority from the great seal , or passed by act of parliament . when the dazling metaphor of the mint and new mill'd words , &c. ( which mightily , as it seems , delighted your lordship when you were writing that paragraph ) will give you leave to consider this matter plainly as it is , you will find , that the coining of mony in publickly authoriz'd mints , affords no manner of argument against private mens medling in the introducing new , or changing the signification of old words ; every one of which alterations always has its rise from some private mint . the case in short is this , mony by vertue of the stamp , received in the publick mint , which vouches its intrinsick worth , has authority to pass . this use of the publick stamp would be lost , if private men were suffer'd to offer mony stamp'd by themselves : on the contrary , words are offer'd to the publick by every private man , coined in his private mint , as he pleases ; but 't is the receiving of them by others , their very passing , that gives them their authority and currancy , and not the mint they come out of . horace , i think , has given a true account of this matter , † in a country very jealous of any usurpation upon the publick authority . multa renascentur quae jam cecidere cadentque quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula , si volet usus , quem penes arbitrium & jus & norma loquendi . but yet whatever change is made in the signification or credit of any word by publick use , this change has always its beginning in some private mint ; so horace tells us it was in the roman language quite down to his time . — ego cur acquirere pauca si possum invideor ? quum lingua catonis & enni sermonem patrium ditaverit , & nova rerum nomina protulerit ? licuit semperque licebit signatum praesente nota procudere nomen . here we see horace expresly says , that private mints of words were always licensed , and , with horace i humbly conceive so they will always continue , how utterly soever your lordship may be against them . and therefore he that offers to the publick new mill'd words from his own private mint , is not always in that so bold an invader of the publick authority , as you would make him . this i say not to excuse my self in the present case , for i deny , that i have at all changed the signification of the word certainty . and therefore if you had pleased you might , my lord , have spared your saying on this occasion , * that it seems our old words must not now pass in the current sense . and those persons assume too much authority to themselves , who will not suffer common words to pass in their general acceptation , and other things to the same purpose in this paragraph , till you had proved , that in strict propriety of speech it could be said , that a man was certain of that which he did not know but only believed . if you had had time in the heat of dispute to have made a little reflection on the use of the english word certainty in strict speaking , perhaps your lordship would not have been so forward to have made my using it , only for precise knowledge , so enormous an impropriety ; at least you would not have accused it of weakening the credibility of any article of faith. 't is true indeed , people commonly say , they are certain of what they barely believe , without doubting . but 't is as true , that they as commonly say , that they know it too . but no body from thence concludes , that believing is knowing . as little can they conclude from the like vulgar way of speaking , that believing is certainty . all that is meant thereby is no more but this , that the full assurance of their faith , as steadily determins their assent to the imbracing of that truth , as if they actually knew it . but however , such phrases as these are used to shew the steadiness and assurance of their faith , who thus speak ; yet they alter not the propriety of our language , which i think appropriates certainty only to knowledge , when in strict and philosophical discourse it is , upon that account , contradistinguished to faith , as in this case here your lordship knows it is , whereof there is an express evidence in my first letter , † where i say , that i speak of belief , and your lordship of certainty , and that i meant belief and not certainty . your lordship says , certainty is common to both knowledge and faith , unless i think it impossible to be certain upon any testimony whatsoever . i think it is possible to be certain upon the testimony of god ( for that i suppose you mean ) where i know that it is the testimony of god , because in such a case , that testimony is capable not only to make me believe , but if i consider it right , to make me know the thing to be so ; and so i may be certain . for the veracity of god is as capable of making me know a proposition to be true , as any other way of proof can be , and therefore i do not in such a case , barely believe , but know such a proposition to be true , and attain certainty . the sum of your accusation is drawn up * thus , that i have appropriated certainty to the perception of the agreement of disagreement of ideas in any proposition ; and now i find this will not hold as to articles of faith ; and therefore i will allow no certainty of faith ; which you think is not for the advantage of my cause . the truth of matter of fact is in short this . that i have placed knowledge in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas . this definition of knowledge your lordship said might be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith , which you have endeavoured to defend . this i denied , and gave this reason for it , † viz. that a definition of knowledge , whether a good or bad , true or false definition , could not be of ill or any consequence to an article of faith. because a definition of knowledge , which was one act of the mind , did not at all concern faith , which was another act of the mind quite distinct from it . to this then , which was the proposition in question between us , your lordship , i humbly conceive should have answered . but instead of that , your lordship by the use of the word certainty in a sense , that i used it not ( for you knew i used it only for knowledge ) would represent me as having strange notions of faith. whether this be for the advantage of your cause , your lordship will do well to consider . upon such a use of the word certainty in a different sense from what i use it in , the force of all your lordship says , † under your first head contained in the two or three next paragraphs , depends , as i think , for i must own ( pardon my dulness ) that i do not clearly comprehend the force of what your lordship there says : and it will take up too many pages , to examin it period by period . in short therefore , i take your lordship's meaning * to be this , that there are some articles of faith , viz. the fundamental principles of natural religion , which mankind may attain to a certainty in by reason without revelation ; which because a man that proceeds upon my grounds , cannot attain to certainty in by reason , their credibility to him , when they are considered as purely matters of faith will be weakened . those which your lordship instances in are the being of a god , providence , and the rewards and punishments of a future state. this is the way , as i humbly conceive , your lordship takes here to prove my grounds of certainty ( for so you call my definition of knowledge ) to be of dangerous consequence to the articles of faith. to avoid ambiguity and confusion in the examining this argument of your lordship's , the best way , i humbly conceive will be , to lay by the term certainty , which your lordship and i using in different senses , is the less fit to make what we say to one another clearly understood ; and instead thereof , to use the term knowledge , which with me , your lordship knows , is equivalent . your lordship's proposition then as far as it has any opposition to me , is this , that if knowledge be supposed to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , a man cannot attain to the knowledge , that these propositions , viz. that there is a god , a providence , and rewards and punishments in a future state , are true ; and therefore the credibility of these articles , consider'd purely as matters of faith , will be weakened to him . wherein there are these things to be proved by your lordship . . that upon my grounds of knowledge i. e. upon a supposition , that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of either of those propositions , viz. that there is a god , providence , and rewards and punishments in a future state. . your lordship is to prove , that the not knowing the truth of any proposition , lessens the credibility of it ; which in short , amounts to this , that want of knowledge lessens faith in any proposition proposed . this is the proposition to be proved , if your lordship uses certainty in the sense i use it , i. e. for knowledge , in which only use of it will it here bear upon me . but since i find your lordship in these two or three paragraphs , to use the word certainty in so uncertain a sense , as sometimes to signifie knowledge by it , and sometimes believing in general , i. e. any degree of believing , give me leave to add that if your lordship means by these words , * let us suppose a person by natural reason to attain to a certainty as to the being of a god , &c. i. e. attain to a belief that there is a god , &c. or the souls immortality . i say if you take certainty in such a sense , then it will be incumbent upon your lordship to prove , that if a man finds the natural reason whereupon he entertained the belief of a god or of the immortality of the soul uncertain , that will weaken the credibility of those fundamental articles , as matters of faith , or which is in effect the same . that the weakness of the credibility of any article of faith from reason , weakens the credibility of it from revelation . for 't is this which these following words of yours † import . for before there was a natural credibility in them on the account of reason , but by going on wrong grounds of certainty all that is lost . to prove the first of these propositions , viz. that upon the supposition that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement of ideas , we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of this proposition , that there is a god. your lordship urges , that i have said , that no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self , which argument reduced to form , will stand thus . if it be true , as i say , that no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self , then upon the supposition that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of this proposition , that there is a god : which argument so manifestly proves not , that there needs no more to be said to it , than to desire , that consequence to be proved . again , as to the immortality of the soul your lordship urges * , that i have said , that i cannot know but that matter may think ; therefore upon my ground of knowledge , i. e. upon a supposition that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , there is an end of the souls immortality . this consequence i must also desire your lordship to prove . only i crave leave by the by to point out some things in these paragraphs too remarkable to be passed over without any notice . one is , that you suppose † a man is made certain upon my general grounds of certainty , i. e. knows by the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , that there is a god , and yet upon a farther examination of my method he finds that the way of ideas will not do . here my lord , if by my grounds of certainty , my method , and my way of ideas , you mean one and the same thing , then your words will have a consistency and tend to the same point . but then i must beg your lordship to consider , that your supposition carries a contradiction in it , viz. that your lordship supposes , that by my grounds , my method , and my way of certainty , a man is made certain and not made certain , that there is a god. if your lordship means here by my grounds of certainty , my method , and my way of ideas different things ( as it seems to me you do ) then , whatever your lordship may suppose here , it makes nothing to the point in hand , which is to shew , that by this my ground of certainty , viz. that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , a man first attains to a knowledge , that there is a god , and afterwards by the same grounds of certainty he comes to lose the knowledge , that there is a god ; which to me seems little less than a contradiction . 't is likely your lordship will say you mean no such thing , for you alledge this proposition , that no idea proves the existence of any thing without it self , and give that as an instance , that my way of ideas will not do , i. e. will not prove the being of a god. 't is true your lordship does so . but withal my lord , 't is as true , that this proposition , supposing it to be mine ( for it is not here set down in my words ) contains not my method , or way , or notion of certainty ; though 't is in that sense alone , that it can here be useful to your lordship to call it my method , or the way by ideas . your lordship undertakes to shew , that my defining knowledge to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , weakens the credibility of this fundamental article of faith , that there is a god , what is your lordship's proof of it ? just this . the saying that no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self , will not do : ergo , the saying , that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , weakens the credibility of this fundamental article . this my lord , seems to me no proof , and all that i can find , that is offered to make it a proof , is only your calling these propositions my general grounds of certainty , my method of proceeding , the way of ideas , and my own principles in point of reason , as if that made these two propositions the same thing , and whatsoever were a consequence of one , may be charged as a consequence of the other ; though it be visible , that though the latter of these be never so false , or never so far from being a proof of a god , yet it will by no means thence follow , that the former of them , viz. that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , weakens the credibility of that fundamental article . but 't is but for your lordship to call them both the way of ideas , and that is enough . that i may not be accused by your lordship for unfair or disingenuous dealing for representing this matter so , i shall here set down your lordship's words at large . let us now suppose a person by natural reason to attain to a certainty , as to the being of god , and immortality of the soul ; and he proceeds upon j. l's general grounds of certainty , from the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; and so from the ideas of god and the soul , he is made certain of these two points before mention'd . but let us again suppose that such a person upon a farther examination of j. l's method of proceeding finds , that the way of ideas in these cases will not do ; for no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self , no more than the picture of a man proves his being , or the visions of a dream make a true history , ( which are j. l's . own expressions ) and for the soul he cannot be certain , but that matter may think , ( as j. l. affirms ) and then what becomes of the soul's immateriality . ( and consequently immortality ) from its operations ? but for all this , says j. l. his assurance of faith remains firm on its own basis. now you appeal to any man of sense , whether the finding of vncertainty of his own principles , which he went upon in point of reason , doth not weaken the credibility of these fundamental articles when they are consider'd purely as matters of faith ? for before there was a natural credibility in them on the account of reason ; but by going on wrong grounds of certainty , all that is lost ; and instead of being certain , he is more doubtful than ever . these are your lordship 's own words ; and now i appeal to any man of sense , whether they contain any other argument against my placing of certainty as i do , but this , viz. a man mistakes and thinks that this proposition , no idea , proves the existence of the thing without it self , shews , that in the way of ideas one cannot prove a god , ergo , this proposition , certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , weakens the credibility of this fundament article , that there is a god. and so of the immortality of the soul , because i say , i know not but matter may think : your lordship would infer , ergo , my definition of certainty weakens the credibility of the revelation of the souls immortality . your lordship is pleased here , to call this proposition , that knowledge or certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , my general grounds of certainty , as if i had some more particular grounds of certainty . whereas i have no other ground or notion of certainty , but this one alone ; all my notion of certainty is contained in that one particular proposition ; but perhaps your lordship did it , that you might make the proposition , above quoted , viz. no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self under the title you give it of the way of ideas , pass for one of my particular grounds of certainty ; whereas it is no more any ground of certainty of mine , or definition of knowledge , than any other proposition in my book . another thing very remarkable in what your lordship here says , is , that you make the failing to attain knowledge by any way of certainty in some particular instances , to be the finding the uncertainty of the way it self , which is all one as to say , that if a man misses by algebra , the certain knowledge of some propositions in mathematicks , therefore he finds the way or principles of algebra to be uncertain or false . this is your lordship's way of reasoning here : your lordship quotes out of me , that i say no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self . and that i say , that one cannot be certain that matter cannot think ; from whence your lordship argues , that he who says so , cannot attain to certainty that there is a god , or that the soul is immortal ; and thereupon your lordship concludes , * he finds the uncertainty of the principles he went upon , in point of reason , i. e. that he finds this principle or ground of certainty he went upon in reasoning , viz. that certainty or knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , to be uncertain . for if your lordship means here by principles he went upon in point of reason any thing else , but that definition of knowledge , which your lordship calls my way , method , grounds , &c. of certainty , which i and others , to the endangering some articles of faith , go upon ; i crave leave to say , it concerns nothing at all the argument your lordship is upon , which is to prove , that the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas may be of dangerous consequence to any article of faith. your lordship in the next place † says , before we can believe any thing upon the account of revelation , we must suppose there is a god. what use does your lordship make of this ? your lordship thus argues ; but by my way of certainty , a man is made uncertain whether there be a god or no. for that to me is the meaning of those words , * how can his faith stand firm as to divine revelation , when he is made uncertain by his own way , whether there be a god or no ? or they can to me mean nothing to the question in hand . what is the conclusion from hence ? this it must be , or nothing to the purpose , ergo , my defini-nition of knowledge , or which is the same thing , my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , leaves not the articles of faith the same credibility they had before . to excuse my dulness in not being able to comprehend this consequence , pray , my lord , consider , that your lordship says , † before we can believe any thing upon the account of revelation , it must be supposed that there is a god. but cannot he who places certainty in the perception of the agreement and disagreement of ideas , supposes there is a god ? but your lordship means by suppose , that one must be certain that there is a god. let it be so , and let it be your lordship's priviledge in controversie to use one word for another , though of a different signification , as i think to suppose and be certain are . cannot one that places certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , be certain there is a god ? i can assure you , my lord , i am certain there is a god ; and yet i own , that i place certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas : nay , i dare venture to say to your lordship , that i have proved there is a god , and see no inconsistency at all between these two propositions , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement of disagreement of ideas ; and that it is certain there is a god. so that this my notion of certainty , this definition of knowledge , for any thing your lordship has said to the contrary , leaves to this fundamental article the same credibility , and the same certainty it had before . your lordship says farther , * to suppose divine revelation , we must be certain that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world. here again , my lord , your way of writing makes work for my ignorance , and before i can either admit or deny this proposition , or judge what force it has to prove the proposition in question , i must distinguish it into these different senses , which i think your lordship's way of speaking may comprehend . for your lordship may mean it thus ; to suppose divine revelation , we must be certain , i. e. we must believe that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world. or your lordship may mean thus ; we must be certain , i. e. we must know that there is something above matter or motion in the world. in the next place your lordship may mean by something above matter and motion , either simply an intelligent being ; for knowledge , without determining what being it is in , is a principle above matter and motion . or your lordship may mean an immaterial intelligent being ; so that this undetermined way of expressing , includes at least four distinct propositions , whereof some are true , and others not so . for . my lord , if your lordship means , that to suppose a divine revelation , a man must be certain , i. e. must certainly know that there is an intelligent being in the world , and that that intelligent being is immaterial from whence that revelation comes ; i deny it . for a man may suppose revelation upon the belief of an intelligent being , from whence it comes , without being able to make out to himself , by a scientifical reasoning , that there is such a being . a proof whereof i humbly conceive are the anthropomorphites among the christians heretofore , who nevertheless rejected not the revelation of the new testament ; and he that will talk with illiterate people in this age , will , i doubt not , find many who believe the bible to be the word of god , though they imagine god himself in the shape of an old man sitting in heaven , which they could not do , if they knew , i. e. had examined and understood any demonstration whereby he is proved to be immaterial , without which they cannot know it . . if your lordship means , that to suppose a divine revelation , it is necessary to know , that there is simply an intelligent being ; this also i deny . for to suppose a divine revelation , is not necessary that a man should know that there is such an intelligent being in the world : i say , know , i. e. from things , that he does know , demonstratively deduce the proof of such a being ; it is enough for the receiving divine revelation to believe , that there is such a being , without having by demonstration attained to the knowledge , that there is a god. every one that believes right , does not always reason exactly , especially in abstract metaphysical speculations ; and if no body can believe the bible to be of divine revelation , but he that clearly comprehends the whole deduction , and sees the evidence of the demonstration wherein the existence of an intelligent being , on whose will all other beings depend , is scientifically proved , there are i fear but few christians among illiterate people , to look no farther . he that believes there is a god , though he does no more than believe it , and has not attained to the certainty of knowledge , i. e. does not see the evident demonstration of it , has ground enough to admit of divine revelation . the apostle tells us , that he that will come to god , must believe that he is ; but i do not remember the scripture any where says , that he must know that he is . . in the next place , if your lordship means , that to suppose divine revelation , a man must be certain , i. e. explicitly believe , that there is a perfectly immaterial being , i shall leave it to your lordship's consideration , whether it may not be ground enough for the supposition of a revelation to believe , that there is an all-knowing , unerring being , who can neither deceive nor be deceived , without a man 's precisely determining in his thoughts , whether that unerring , omniscient being be immaterial or no. 't is past all doubt , that every one that examins and reasons right , may come to a certainty , that god is perfectly immaterial . but it may be a question , whether every one who believes a revelation to be from god , may have enter'd into the disquisition of the immateriality of his being ? whether , i say , every ignorant day labourer , who believes the bible to be the word of god , has in his mind consider'd materiality and immateriality , and does explicitly believe god to be immaterial , i shall leave to your lordship to determine , if you think fit more expresly than your words do here . . if your lordship means , that to suppose a divine revelation , a man must becertain , i. e. believe that there is a supreme intelligent being , from whom it comes , who can neither deceive nor be deceived . i grant it to be true . these being the several propositions , either of which may be meant in your lordship 's so general , and to me doubtful , way of expressing ▪ your self to avoid the length , which a particular answer to each of them would run me into , i will venture ( and it is a venture to answer to an ambiguous proposition in one sense , when the author has the liberty of saying he meant it in another , a great convenience of general loose and doubtful expressions ) i will , i say , venture to answer to it in the sense i guess most suited to your lordship's purpose ; and see what your lordship proves by it . i will therefore suppose your lordship's reasoning to be this ; that to suppose divine revelation , a man must be certain , i. e. believe that there is a principle above matter and motion , i. e. an immaterial intelligent being in the world. let it be so ; what does your lordship infer ? therefore upon the principles of certainty by ideas , he [ i. e. he that places certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , ] cannot be certain of [ i. e. believe ] this ] . this consequence seems a little strange , but your lordship proves it thus ; because he does not know but matter may think : which argument put into form , will stand thus ; if one who places certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of idea , does not know but matter may think ; then whoever places certainty so , cannot believe there is an immaterial intelligent being in the world. but there is one who placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , does not know but matter may think : ergo , whoever places certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , cannot believe that there is an intelligent immaterial being . this argumentation is so defective in every part of it , that for fear i should be thought to make an argument for your lordship in requital for the answer your lordship made for me , i must desire the reader to consider ; your lordship says , we must be certain he cannot be certain , because he doth not know , : which in short , is we cannot because he cannot , and he cannot because he doth not . this consider'd , will justifie the syllogism i have made to contain your lordship's argument in its full force . i come therefore to the syllogism it self , and there first i deny the minor which is this : there is one who placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , doth not know but matter may think . i begin with this , because this is the foundation of all your lordship's argument ; and therefore i desire your lordship would produce any one who placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , does not know but matter may think . the reason why i press this , is because i suppose your lordship means me here , and would have it thought that i say , i do not know but that matter may think : but that i do not say so ; nor any thing else from whence may be infer'd what your lordship adds in the annexed words , † if they can be infer'd from it , and consequently all revelation may be nothing but the effects of an exalted fancy , or the heats of a disorder'd imagination , as spinosa affirm'd . on the contrary , i do say , * it is impossible to conceive that matter , either with or without motion , could have originally in and from it self perception and knowledge . and having in that chapter establish'd this truth , that there is an eternal immaterial knowing being , i think no body but your lordship could have imputed to me the doubting , that there was such a being , because i say in another place , † and to another purpose , it is impossible for us by the contemplation of our own ideas , without revelation , to discover , whether omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed , a power to perceive and think , or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed , a thinking immaterial substance : it being in respect of our notions , not much more remote from our comprehensions to conceive , that god can , if he pleases , superadd to our idea of matter a faculty of thinking , than that he should superadd to it another substance , with a faculty of thinking . from my saying thus , that god ( whom i have proved to be an immaterial being ) by his omnipotency , may , for ought we know , superadd to some parts of matter a faculty of thinking , it requires some skill for any one to represent me as your lordship does here , as one ignorant or doubtful whether matter may not think ; to that degree , that i am not certain , or i do not believe that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world and consequently all revelation may be nothing but the effects of an exalted fancy or the heats of a disordered imagination , as spinosa affirm'd . for thus i , or some body else ( whom i desire your lordship to produce ) stands painted in this your lordship's argument from the supposition of a divine revelation , which your lordship brings here to prove , that the defining of knowledge , as i do , to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , weakens the credibility of the articles of the christian faith. but if your lordship thinks it so dangerous a position to say , it is not much harder for us to conceive , that god can , if he pleases , superadd to matter a faculty of thinking , than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking . ( which is the utmost i have said concerning the faculty of thinking in matter . ) i humbly conceive it would be more to your purpose to prove , that the infinite , omnipotent creator of all things , out of nothing , cannot , if he pleases , superadd to some parcels of matter , disposed as he sees fit , a faculty of thinking , which the rest of matter has not ; rather than to represent me , with that candour your lordship does , as one , who so far makes matter a thinking thing , as thereby to question the being of a principle above matter and motion in the world , and consequently to take away all revelation , which how natural and genuine a representation it is of my sense , expressed in the passages of my essay , which i have above set down , i humbly submit to the reader 's judgment and your lordship's zeal for truth to determine ; and shall not stay to examin whether man may not have an exalted phancy ▪ and the heats of a disorder'd imagination , equally overthrowing divine revelation , tho' the power of thinking be placed only in an immaterial substance : i come now to the sequel of your major , which is this : if one who places certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , does not know but matter may think ; then whoever places certainty so , cannot believe there is an immaterial intelligent being in the world. the consequence here , is from does not to cannot , which i cannot but wonder to find in an argument of your lordships . for he that does not to day believe or know , that matter cannot be so ordered by god's omnipotency as to think ( if that subverts the belief of an immaterial intelligent being in the world ) may know or believe it to morrow , or if he should never know or believe it , yet others who define knowledge as he does , may know or believe it . unless your lordship can prove , that it is impossible for any one , who defines knowledge , to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , to know or believe , that matter cannot think . but this , as i remember , your lordship has not any where attempted to prove . and yet without this , your lordship's way of reasoning is no more , than to argue , that one cannot do a thing because another does not do it . and yet upon this strange consequence is built all that your lordship brings here to prove , that my definition of knowledge , weakens the credibility of articles of faith , v. g. it weakens the credibility of this fundamental article of faith , that there is a god! how so ? because i who have so defined knowledge , say in my essay , * that the knowledge of the existence of any other thing [ but of god ] we can have only by sensation . for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory , nor of any other existence but that of god , with the existence of any particular man ; no particular man can know the existence of any other being , but only when by actual operating upon him , it makes it self perceived by him . for the having the idea of any thing in our mind , no more proves the existence of that thing , than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world , or the visions of a dream , make thereby a true history . for so are the words of my book , and not as your lordship has been pleased to set them down here ; † and they were well chosen by your lordship , to shew , that the way of ideas would not do . i. e. in my way by ideas , i cannot prove there is a god. but supposing i had said in that place , or any other , that which would hinder the proof of a god , as i have not , might i not see my error , and alter or renounce that opinion without changing my definition of knowledge ? or could not another man who defined knowledge , as i do , avoid thinking as your lordship says , i say , that no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self , and so able , notwithstanding my saying so , to prove that there is a god ? again , your lordship argues that my definition of knowledge , weakens the credibility of the articles of faith : because it takes away revelation ; and your proof of that is , because i do not know whether matter may not think . the same sort of argumentation your lordship goes on with in the next page , * where you say , again , before there can be any such thing as assurance of faith upon divine revelation , there must be a certainty as to sense and tradition ; for there can be no revelation pretended now , without immediate inspiration ; and the basis of our faith is a revelation contained in an antient book , whereof the parts were delivered at distant times , but conveyed down to us by an universal tradition . but now , what if my grounds of certainty can give us no assurance as to these things ? your lordship says you do not mean , that they cannot demonstrate matters of fact , which it were most unreasonable to expect , but that these grounds of certainty make all things uncertain ; for your lordship thinks you have proved , that this way of ideas cannot give a satisfactory account , as to the existence of the plainest objects of the sense ; because reason cannot perceive the connection between the objects and the ideas . how then can we arrive to any certainty in perceiving those objects by their ideas ? all the force of which argument lies in this , that i have said ( or am supposed to have said , or to hold , for that i ever said so , i do not remember ) that reason cannot perceive the connection between the objects and the ideas : ergo , whoever holds that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , cannot have any assurance of faith upon divine revelation . my lord , let that proposition , viz. that reason cannot perceive the connection between the objects and the ideas , be mine as much as your lordship pleases , and let it be as inconsistent as you please , with the assurance of faith upon divine revelation ; how will it follow from thence , that the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , is the cause , that there cannot be any such thing as the assurance of faith upon divine revelation to any body ? though i who hold knowledge to consist in the perception of the agreement and disagreement of ideas , have the misfortune to run into this error , viz. that reason cannot perceive the connection between the objects and the ideas , which is inconsistent with the assurance of faith upon divine revelation , yet it is not necessary that all others who with me hold , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , should also hold , that reason cannot perceive the connection between the objects and the ideas , or that i my self should always hold it : unless your lordship will say , that whoever places certainty , as i do , in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , must necessarily hold all the errors that i do , which are inconsistent with or weaken the belief of any article of faith ; and hold them incorrigibly . which has as much consequence as if i should argue , that because your lordship who lives at worcester does sometime mistake in quoting me , therefore no body who lives at worcester can quote my words right , or your lordship can never mend your wrong quotations . for , my lord , the holding certainty to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , is no more a necessary cause of holding those erroneous propositions , which your lordship imputes to me , as weakening the credibility of the mentioned articles of faith , than the place of your lordship's dwelling is a necessary cause of wrong quoting . i shall not here go about to trouble your lordship with divining again , what may be your lordship's precise meaning in several of the propositions contained in the passage above set down , especially that remarkably ambiguous and to me obscure one , viz. there must be a certainty as to sense and tradition . i fear i have wasted too much of your lordship's , and my reader 's time in that imployment already , and there would be no end , if i should endeavour to explain whatever i am at a loss about , the determined sense of , in any of your lordship's expressions . only i will crave leave to beg my reader to observe , that in this first head , * which we are upon , your lordship has used the terms certain and certainty near twenty times , but without determining in any of them , whether you mean knowledge , or the full assurance of faith , or any degree of believing ; though it be evident , that in these pages your lordship uses certainty for all these three . which ambiguous use of the main word in that discourse , cannot but render your lordship's sense clear and perspicuous , and your argument very cogent ; and no doubt will do so to any one , who will be but at the pains to reduce that one word to a clear determined sense all through these few paragraphs . your lordship says , † have not all mankind who have talked of matters of faith allowed a certainty of faith , as well as a certainty of knowledge ? answ. but did ever any one of all that mankind allow it as a tolerable way of speaking , that believing in general ( for which your lordship has used it ) which contains in it the lowest degree of faith , should be called certainty ? could he who said , i believe lord , help my vnbelief , or any one who is weak in faith , or of little faith , be properly be said to be certain , or de dubio certus of what he believes , but with a weak degree of assent ? i shall not question what your lordship 's great learning may authorize : but i imagine every one hath not skill , or will not assume the liberty to speak so . if a witness before a judge asked upon his oath , whether he were certain of such a thing , should answer yes , he was certain ; and upon farther demand , should give this account of his certainty , that he believed it ; would he not make the court and auditors believe strangely of him ? for to say that a man is certain , when he barely believes , and that perhaps with no great assurance of faith , is to say that he is certain , where he owns an vncertainty . for he that says he barely believes , acknowledges that he assents to a proposition as true , upon bare probability . and where any one assents thus to any proposition , his assent excludes not a possibility that it may be otherwise ; and wherein any one's judgment there is a possibility to be otherwise , there one cannot deny but there is some uncertainty ; and the less cogent the probabilities appear , upon which he assents , the greater the uncertainty . so that all barely probable proofs , which procure assent , always containing some visible possibility that it may be otherwise ( or else it would be demonstration ) and consequently the weaker the probability appears , the weaker the assent , and the more the uncertainty : it thence follows , that where there is such a mixture of uncertainty , there a man is so far uncertain ; and therefore to say , that a man is certain where he barely believes or assents but weakly , though he does believe , seems to me to say , that he is certain and uncertain together . but though bare belief always include some degrees of uncertainty , yet it does not therefore necessarily include any degree of wavering , the evidently strong probability may as steadily determine the man to assent to the truth , or make him take the proposition for true , and act accordingly , as knowledge makes him see or be certain that it is true . and he that doth so , as to truths reveal'd in the scripture , will shew his faith by his works ; and has , for ought i can see , all the faith necessary to a christian , and requir'd to salvation . my lord , when i consider the length of my answer here , to these few pages of your lordship's , i cannot but bemoan my own dulness , and own my unfitness to deal with so learned an adversary as your lordship in controversie : for i know not how to answer but to a proposition of a determin'd sense . whilst it is vague and uncertain in a general or equivocal use of any of the terms , i cannot tell what to say to it . i know not but such comprehensive ways of expressing ones self , may do well enough in declamation ; but in reasoning , there can be no judgment made till one can get to some positive determined sense of the speaker . if your lordship had pleased to have condescended so far to my low capacity , as to have delivered your meaning , here determined , to any one of the senses above set down , or any other , that you may have in these words , i gather'd them from ; it would have saved me a great deal of writing , and your lordship loss of time in reading . i should not say this here to your lordship , were it only in this one place that i find this inconvenience . it is every where in all your lordship's reasonings , that my want of understanding causes me this difficulty , and against my will multiplies the words of my answer . for notwithstanding all that great deal that i have already said to these few pages of your lordship's ; yet my defence is not clear , and set in its due light , unless i shew in particular of every one of those propositions ( some whereof i admit as true , others i deny as not so ) that it will not prove what is to be proved , viz. that my placing of knowledge in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , lessens the credibility of any article of faith , which it had before . your lordship having done with the fundamental articles of natural religion , you come in the next place to those of revelation , to enquire , as your lordship says , † whether those who embrace the articles of faith , in the way of ideas , can retain their certainty of those articles , when these ideas are quitted . what this enquiry is i know not very well , because i neither understand what it is to imbrace articles of faith in the way of ideas , nor know what your lordship means by retaining their certainty of those articles , when these ideas are quitted . but 't is no strange thing for my short sight , not always distinctly to discern your lordship's meaning : yet here i presume to know that this is the thing to be proved , viz. that my definition of knowledge does not leave to the articles of the christian faith , the same credibility they had before . the articles your lordship instances in are , . the resurrection of the dead . and here your lordship proceeds just in the same method of arguing , as you did in the former ; your lordship brings several passages concerning identity out of my essay , which you suppose inconsistent with the belief of the resurrection of the same body ; and this is your argument to prove that my defining of knowledge to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , alters the foundations of this article of faith , and leaves it not the same credibility it had before . now , my lord , granting all that your lordship has here * quoted out of my chapter of identity and diversity , to be as false as your lordship pleases , and as inconsistent as your lordship would have it , with the article of the resurrection from the dead ; nay , granting all the rest of my whole essay to be false , how will it follow from thence , that the placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , weakens the credibility of this article of faith , that the dead shall rise ? let it be , that i who place certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas am guilty of errors , that weaken the credibility of this article of faith , others who place certainty in the same perception , may not run into those errors , and so not have their belief of this article at all shaken . your lordship therefore , by all the long discourse you have made here against my notion of personal identity , to prove that it weakens the credibility of the resurrection of the dead ; should you have proved it never so clearly , has not , i humbly conceive , said therein any one word towards the proving , that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of this article of faith. for this , my lord , is the proposition to be proved , as your lordship cannot but remember , if you please to recollect , what is said in your st and following pages , and what in the th page of my second letter , quoted by your lordship , it was designed as an answer to . and so i proceed to the next articles of faith your lordship instances in . your lordship says , * . the next articles of faith which my notion of ideas is inconsistent with , are no less than those of the trinity and the incarnation of our saviour . where i must humbly crave leave to observe to your lordship , that in this second head here , your lordship has changed the question from my notion of certainty , to my notion of ideas . for the question , as i have often had occasion to observe to your lordship , is , whether my notion of certainty , i. e. my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , alters the foundation , and lessens the credibility of any article of faith ? this being the question between your lordship and me , ought i humbly conceive , most especially to have been kept close to in this article of the trinity ; because 't was upon the account of my notion of certainty as prejudicial to the doctrine of the trinity , that my book was first brought into this dispute . but your lordship offers nothing , that i can find , to prove , that my definition of knowledge or certainty , does any way lessen the credibility of either of the articles here mentioned , unless your insisting upon some supposed errors of mine about nature and person , must be taken for proofs of this proposition , that my definition of certainty lessens the credibility of the articles of the trinity , and our saviour's incarnation . and then the answer i have already given to the same way of argumentation used by your lordship , concerning the articles of a god , revelation , and the resurrection , i think may suffice . having , as i beg leave to think , shewn that your lordship has not in the least proved this proposition , that the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , weakens the credibility of any one article of faith , which was your former accusation against this ( as your lordship is pleased to call it ) new method of certainty , of so dangerous consequence to that article of faith which your lordship has endeavoured to defend ; and all that your terrible representation of it being , as i humbly conceive , come to just nothing . i come now to vindicate my book from your new accusation in your last letter , and to shew that you no more prove the passages you alledge out of my essay to have any inconsistency with the articles of christian faith you oppose them to , than you have proved by them , that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of any of those articles . . the article of christian faith your lordship begins with , is that of the resurrection of the dead ; and concerning that you say , † the reason of believing the resurrection of the same body upon my grounds , is from the idea of identity . answ. give me leave , my lord , to say that the reason of believing any article of the christian faith ( such as your lordship is here speaking of ) to me and upon my grounds , is its being a part of divine revelation : upon this ground i believed it before i either writ that chapter of identity and diversity , and before i ever thought of those propositions which your lordship quotes out of that chapter , and upon the same ground i believe it still ; and not from my idea of identity . this saying of your lordship 's therefore , being a proposition neither self-evident , nor allowed by me to be true , remains to be proved . so that your foundation failing all your large superstructure built thereon , comes to nothing . but my lord , before we go any farther , i crave leave humbly to represent to your lordship , that i thought you undertook to make out that my notion of ideas was inconsistent with the articles of the christian faith. but that which your lordship instances in here is not , that i yet know , an article of the christian faith. the resurrection of the dead , i acknowledge to be an article of the christian faith : but that the resurrection of the same body , in your lordship's sense of the same body , is an article of the christian faith , is what i confess , i do not yet know . in the new testament ( wherein , i think , are contained all the articles of the christian faith ) i find our saviour and the apostles to preach the resurrection of the dead , and the resurrection from the dead in many places : but i do not remember any place , where the resurrection of the same body , is so much as mentioned . nay , which is very remarkable in the case , i do not remember in any place of the new testament ( where the general resurrection at the last day is spoken of ) any such expression as the resurrection of the body , much less of the same body . i say the general resurrection at the last day : because where the resurrection of some particular persons presently upon our saviour's resurrection is mentioned , the words are , * the graves were opened and many bodies of saints , which slept , arose and came out of the graves after his resurrection , and went into the holy city , and appeared to many : of which peculiar way of speaking of this resurrection , the passage it self gives a reason in these words , appeared to many , i. e. those who slept , appeared , so as to be known to be risen . but this could not be known , unless they brought with them the evidence , that they were those who had been dead , whereof there were these two proofs , their graves were opened , and their bodies not only gone out of them , but appeared to be the same to those who had known them formerly alive , and knew them to be dead and buried . for if they had been those who had been dead so long , that all who knew them once alive , were now gone , those to whom they appeared might have known them to be men ; but could not have known they were risen from the dead : because they never knew they had been dead . all that by their appearing they could have known , was that they were so many living strangers , of whose resurrection they knew nothing . 't was necessary therefore , that they should come in such bodies , as might in make and size , &c. appear to be the same they had before , that they might be known to those of their acquaintance , whom they appeared to . and it is probable they were such as were newly dead , whose bodies were not yet dissolved and dissipated , and therefore 't is particularly said here ( differently from what is said of the general resurrection ) that their bodies arose : because they were the same , that were then lying in their graves , the moment before they rose . but your lordship endeavours to prove it must be the same body : and let us grant , that your lordship , nay and others too , think you have proved it must be the same body , will you therefore say , that he holds what is inconsistent with an article of faith , who having never seen this your lordship's interpretation of the scripture , nor your reasons for the same body , in your sense of same body ; or , if he has seen them , yet not understanding them , or not perceiving the force of them , believes what the scripture proposes to him , viz. that at the last day , the dead shall be raised , without determining whether it shall be with the very same bodies or no ? i know your lordship pretends not to erect your particular interpretations of scripture , into articles of faith ; and if you do not , he that believes the dead shall be raised , believes that article of faith , which the scripture proposes : and cannot be accused of holding any thing inconsistent with it , if it should happen , that what he holds is inconsistent with another proposition , viz. that the dead shall be raised with the same bodies , in you lordship's sense , which i do not find proposed in holy writ as an article of faith. but your lordship argues , it must be the same body which as you explain same body † is not the same individual particles of matter , which were united at the point of death . nor the same particles of matter , that the sinner had at the time of the commission of his sins . but that it must be the same material substance which was vitally united to the soul here , i. e. as i understand it , the same individual particles of matter , which were , sometime or other during his life here , vitally united to his soul. your first argument to prove , that it must be the same body in this sense of the same body , is taken † from these words of our saviour . * all that are in the graves shall hear his voice , and shall come forth . from whence your lordship argues , that these words , all that are in their graves , relates to no other substance , than what was united to the soul in life ; because a different substance cannot be said to be in the graves , and to come out of them . which words of your lordships , if they prove any thing , prove , that the soul too is lodg'd in the grave , and raised out of it at the last day . for your lordship says , can a different substance be said to be in their graves and come out of them ? so that according to this interpretation of these words of our saviour ; no other substance being raised , but what hears his voice , and no other substance hearing his voice , but what being called comes out of the grave , and no other substance coming out of the grave , but what was in the grave , any one must conclude , that the soul , unless it be in the grave , will make no part of the person that is raised , unless , as your lordship argues against me , † you can make it out , that a substance which never was in the grave may come out of it , or that the soul is no substance . but setting aside the substance of the soul , another thing that will make any one doubt , whether this your interpretation of our saviour's words be necessarily to be received as their true sense , is , that it will not be very easily reconciled to your saying , * you do not mean by the same body , the same individual particles which were united at the point of death . and yet by this interpretation of our saviour's words , you can mean no other particles , but such as were united at the point of death : because you mean no other substance , but what comes out of the grave , and no substance , no particles come out you say , but what were in the grave , and i think your lordship will not say that the particles that were seperate from the body by perspiration , before the point of death , were laid up in the grave . but your lordship , i find , has an answer to this , † viz. that by comparing this with other places you find , that the words , [ of our saviour above quoted ] are to be understood of the substance of the body , to which the soul was united , and not to ( i suppose your lordship writ of ) those individual particles , i. e. those individual particles that are in the grave , at the resurrection . for so they must be read to make your lordship's sense entire , and to the purpose of your answer here : and then methinks this last sense of our saviour's words given by your lordship , wholly overturns the sense which you have given of them above , where from those words you press the belief of the resurrection of the same body , by this strong argument , that a substance could not upon hearing the voice of christ , come out of the grave , which was never in the grave . there ( as far as i can understand your words ) your lordship argues , that our saviour's words must be understood of the particles in the grave , unless , as your lordship says , one can make it out that a substance which never was in the grave , may come out of it . and here your lordship expresly says , that our saviour's words are to be understood of the substance of that body , to which the soul was [ at any time ] united , and not to those individual particles that are in the grave . which put together seems to me to say , that our saviour's words are to be understood of those particles only that are in the grave , and not of those particles only which are in the grave , but of others also which have at any time been vitally united to the soul , but never were in the grave . the next text your lordship brings to make the resurrection of the same body , in your sense , an article of faith , are these words of st. paul , * for we must all appear before the iudgment seat of christ , that every one may receive the things done in his body , according to that he hath done , whether it be good or bad . to which your lordship subjoins † this question . can these words be understood of any other material substance , but that body in which these things were done ? answ. a man may suspend his determining the meaning of the apostle to be , that a sinner shall suffer for his sins in the very same body , wherein he committed them : because st. paul does not say he shall have the very same body , when he suffers , that he had when he sinn'd . the apostle says , indeed done in his body . the body he had , and did things in at five or fifteen , was no doubt his body , as much as that , which he did things in at fifty was his body , though his body were not the very same body at those different ages : and so will the body , which he shall have after the resurrection , be his body , though it be not the very same with that , which he had at five or fifteen or fifty . he that at threescore is broke on the wheel , for a murder he committed at twenty , is punished for what he did in his body , though the body he has , i. e. his body at threescore , be not the same , i. e. made up of the same individual particles of matter , that that body was , which he had forty years before . when your lordship has resolved with your self , what that same immutable he is , which at the last judgment shall receive the things done in his body , your lordship will easily see , that the body he had , when an embryo in the womb , when a child playing in coats , when a man marrying a wife , and when bed-rid dying of a consumption , and at last , which he shall have after the resurrection , are each of them his body , though neither of them be the same body , the one with the other . but farther to your lordship's question , can these words be understood of any other material substance , but that body in which these things were done ? i answer , these words of st. paul may be understood of another material substance , than that body in which these things were done , because your lordship teaches me , and gives me a strong reason so to understand them . your lordship says , † that you do not say the same particles of matter , which the sinner had at the very time of the commission of his sins , shall be raised at the last day . and your lordship gives this reason for it . * for then a long sinner must have a vast body , considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration . now , my lord , if the apostle's words , as your lordship would argue , cannot be understood of any other material substance , but that body , in which these things were done , and no body upon the removal or change of some of the particles , that at any time makes it up is the same material substance , or the same body ; it will , i think , thence follow , that either the sinner must have all the same individual particles vitally united to his soul , when he is raised , that he had vitally united to his soul , when he sin'd : or else st. paul's words here cannot be understood to mean the same body in which the things were done . for if there were other particles of matter in the body , wherein the thing was done , than in that which is raised , that which is raised cannot be the same body in which they were done : unless that alone , which has just all the same individual particles when any action is done , being the same body wherein it was done , that also , which has not the same individual particles wherein that action was done , can be the same body wherein it was done , which is in effect to make the same body sometimes to be the same , and sometimes not the same . your lordship thinks it suffices to make the same body to have not all ; but no other particles of matter , but such as were sometime or other vitally united to the soul before : but such a body made up of part of the particles sometime or other vitally united to the soul , is no more the same body wherein the actions were done in the distant parts of the long sinner's life , than that is the same body in which a quarter or half or three quarters , of the same particles , that made it up , are wanting . for example , a sinner has acted here in his body an hundred years ; he is raised at the last day , but with what body ? the same says your lordship , that he acted in , because st. paul says he must receive the things done in his body ? what therefore must his body at the resurrection consist of ? must it consist of all the particles of matter , that have ever been vitally united to his soul ? for they , in succession , have all of them made up his body , wherein he did these things : no , says your lordship , † that would make his body too vast ; it suffices to make the same body in which the things were done , that it consists of some of the particles , and no other but such as were sometime during his life , vitally united to his soul. but according to this account , his body at the resurrection , being , as your lordship seems to limit it , near the same size it was in some part of his life , it will be no more the same body in which the things were done in the distant parts of his life , than that is the same body , in which half or three quarters or more of the individual matter that made it then up , is now wanting . for example , let his body at years old consist of a million of parts ; five hundred thousand at least of those parts will be different from those which made up his body at years , and at an hundred . so that to take the numerical particles , that made up his body at , or any other season of his life ; or to gather them promiscuously out of those which at different times have successively been vitally united to his soul , they will no more make the same body , which was his , wherein some of his actions were done , than that is the same body , which has but half the same particles : and yet all your lordship's argument here for the same body , is because st. paul says it must be his body in which these things were done ; which it could not be , if any other substance were joined to it , i. e. if any other particles of matter made up the body , which were not vitally united to the soul , when the action was done . again , your lordship says , * that you do not say the same individual particles [ shall make up the body at the resurrection ] which were united at the point of death , for there must be a great alteration in them of a lingring disease , as if a fat man falls into a consumption . because 't is likely your lordship thinks these particles of a decrepit , wasted , withered body would be too few , or unfit to make such a plump , strong , vigorous , well-siz'd body , as it has pleased your lordship to proportion out in your thoughts to men at the resurrection ; and therefore some small portion of the particles formerly united vitally to that man's soul , shall be re-assumed to make up his body to the bulk your lordship judges convenient ; but the greatest part of them shall be left out to avoid the making his body more vast than your lordship thinks will be fit , as appears by these your lordship's words immediately following , viz. † that you do not say the same particles the sinner had at the very time of commission of his sins , for then a long sinner must have a vast body . but then pray , my lord , what must an embryo do , who dying within a few hours after his body was vitally united to his soul , has no particles of matter , which were formerly vitally united to it , to make up his body of that size and proportion which your lordship seems to require in bodies at the resurrection ? or must we believe he shall remain content with that small pittance of matter , and that yet imperfect body to eternity ; because it is an article of faith to believe the resurrection of the very same body ? i. e. made up of only such particles , as have been vitally united to the soul. for if it be so , as your lordship says , * that life is the result of the vnion of soul and body , it will follow that the body of an embryo dying in the womb may be very little , not the thousandth part of any ordinary man. for since from the first conception and beginning of formation it has life , and life is the result of the vnion of the soul with the body ; an embryo , that shall die either by the untimely death of the mother , or by any other accident presently after it has life , must according to your lordship's doctrin remain a man not an inch long to eternity ; because there are not particles of matter , formerly united to his soul , to make him bigger ; and no other can be made use of to that purpose : though what greater congruity the soul hath with any particles of matter , which were once vitally united to it , but are now so no longer ; than it hath with particles of matter , which it was never united to , would be hard to determine , if that should be demanded . by these , and not a few other the like consequences , one may see what service they do to religion , and the christian doctrin , who raise questions , and make articles of faith about the resurrection of the same body , where the scripture says nothing of the same body ; or if it does , it is with no small reprimand † to those who make such an enquiry . but some man will say , how are the dead raised up ? and with what body do they come ? thou fool , that which thou sowest is not quickned except it die and that which thou sowest , thou sowest not that body that shall be , but bare grain , it may chance of wheat or of some other grain . but god giveth it a body as it hath pleased him . words i should think sufficient to deterr us from determining any thing for or against the same body being raised at the last day . it suffices , that all the dead shall be raised , and every one appear and answer for the things done in this life , and receive according to the things he hath done in his body , whether good or bad . he that believes this , and has said nothing inconsistent herewith , i presume may , and must be acquitted from being guilty of any thing inconsistent with the article of the resurrection of the dead . but your lordship to prove the resurrection of the same body to be an article of faith , farther asks , * how could it be said , if any other substance be joined to the soul at the resurrection , as its body , that they were the things done in or by the body ? answ. just as it may be said of a man at an hundred years old , that hath then an other substance joined to his soul , than he had at twenty , that the murder or drunkenness he was guilty of at twenty , were things done in the body : how by the body comes in here , i do not see . your lordship adds , and st. paul 's dispute about the manner of raising the body might soon have ended , if there were no necessity of the same body . answ. when i understand what argument there is in these words to prove the resurrection of the same body , without the mixture of one new atom of matter , i shall know what to say to it . in the mean time this i understand , that st. paul would have put as short an end to all disputes about this matter , if he had said , that there was a necessity of the same body , or that it should be the same body . the next text of scripture you bring for the same body , is , * if there be no resurrection of the dead , then is not christ raised . from which your lordship argues , † it seems then other bodies are to be raised as his was . i grant other dead , as certainly raised as christ was ; for else his resurrection would be of no use to mankind . but i do not see how it follows , that they shall be raised with the same body , as christ was raised with the same body , as your lordship infers in these words annexed ; and can there be any doubt , whether his body was the same material substance , which was united to his soul before ? i answer , none at all ; nor that it had just the same undistinguish'd lineaments and marks , yea , and the same wounds that it had at the time of his death . if therefore your lordship will argue from others bodies being raised as his was , that they must keep proportion with his in sameness ; then we must believe , that every man shall be raised with the same lineaments and other notes of distinction he had at the time of his death , even with his wounds yet open , if he had any , because our saviour was so raised , which seems to me scarce reconcilable with what your lordship says * of a fat man falling into a consumption , and dying . but whether it will consist or no with your lordship's meaning in that place , this to me seems a consequence that will need to be better proved , viz. that our bodies must be raised the same just as our saviours was : because st. paul says , if there be no resurrection of the dead , then is not christ risen . for it may be a good consequence christ is risen , and therefore there shall be a resurrection of the dead , and yet this may not be a good consequence , christ was raised with the same body he had at his death , therefore all men shall be raised with the same body they had at their death , contrary to what your lordship says concerning a fat man dying of a consumption . but the case i think far different betwixt our saviour , and those to be raised at the last day . . his body saw not corruption , and therefore to give him another body , new molded mixed with other particles , which were not contained in it as it lay in the grave , whole and entire as it was laid there , had been to destroy his body to frame him a new one without any need . but why with the remaining particles of a man's body long since dissolved and molder'd into dust and atoms ( whereof possibly a great part may have undergone variety of changes , and entred into other concretions even in the bodies of other men ) other new particles of matter mixed with them , may not serve to make his body again , as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the old , did in the compass of his life make his body , i think no reason can be given . this may serve to shew , why though the materials of our saviour's body , were not changed at his resurrection : yet it does not follow , but that the body of a man dead and rotten in his grave , or burnt , may at the last day have several new particles in it , and that without any inconvenience . since whatever matter is vitally united to his soul , is his body , as much as is that , which was united to it when he was born , or in any other part of his life . . in the next place , the size , shape , figure and lineaments of our saviour's body , even to his wounds into which doubting thomas put his fingers and his hand , were to be kept in the raised body of our saviour , the same they were at his death , to be a conviction to his disciples , to whom he shew'd himself , and who were to be witnesses of his resurrection , that their master , the very same man , was crucified , dead and buried , and raised again ; and therefore he was handled by them , and eat before them after he was risen , to give them in all points full satisfaction , that it was really he , the same , and not another , nor a specter or apparition of him : though i do not think your lordship will thence argue , that because others are to be raised as he was , therefore it is necessary to believe , that because he eat after his resurrection , others at the last day , shall eat and drink after they are raised from the dead , which seems to me as good an argument , as because his undissolved body was raised out of the grave , just as it there lay intire , without the mixture of any new particles ; therefore the corrupted and consumed bodies of the dead at the resurrection , shall be new framed only out of those scatter'd particles , which were once vitally united to their souls , without the least mixture of any one single atom of new matter . but at the last day , when all men are raised , there will be no need to be assured of any one particular man's resurrection . 't is enough that every one shall appear before the judgement-seat of christ , to receive according to what he had done in his former life ; but in what sort of body he shall appear , or of what particles made up the scripture , having said nothing , but that it shall be a spiritual body raised in incorruption , it is not for me to determine . your lordship asks , * were they [ who saw our saviour after his resurrection ] witnesses only of some material substance then united to his soul ? in answer , i beg your lordship to consider , whether you suppose our saviour was to be known to be the same man ( to the witnesses that were to see him , and testifie his resurrection ) by his soul , that could neither be seen , nor known to be the same ; or by his body , that could be seen , and by the discernible structure and marks of it , be known to be the same ? when your lordship has resolved that ; all that you say in that page , will answer it self . but because one man cannot know another to be the same , but by the outward visible lineaments , and sensible marks he has been wont to be known and distinguished by ; will your lordship therefore argue , that the great judge , at the last day , who gives to each man , whom he raises , his new body , shall not be able to know , who is who , unless he give to every one of them a body , just of the same figure , size and features , and made up of the very same individual particles he had in his former life ? whether such a way of arguing for the resurrection of the same body , to be an article of faith , contributes much to the strengthening the credibility of the article of the resurrection of the dead , i shall leave to the judgment of others . farther , for the proving the resurrection of the same body , to be an article of faith , your lordship says , † but the apostle insists upon the resurrection of christ , not meerly as an argument of the possibility of ours , but of the certainty of it ; * because he rose , as the first-fruits ; christ the first fruits , afterwards they that are christs at his coming . answ. no doubt the resurrection of christ , is a proof of the certainty of our resurrection . but is it therefore a proof of the resurrection of the same body , consisting of the same individual particles which concurr'd to the making up of our body here , without the mixture of any one other particle of matter ? i confess i see no such consequence . but your lordship goes on , † st. paul was aware of the objections in mens minds , about the resurrection of the same body ; and it is of great consequence as to this article , to shew upon what grounds he proceeds . but some man will say , how are the dead raised up , and with what body do they come ? first he shews , that the seminal parts of plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary providence of god , in the manner of their vegetation . answ. i do not perfectly understand , what it is for the seminal parts of plants to be wonderfully improved by the ordinary providence of god , in the manner of their vegetation : or else perhaps i should better see , how this here tends to the proof of the resurrection of the same body , in your lordship's sense . it continues , † they sow bare grain of wheat , or of some other grain , but god giveth it a body , as it hath pleased him , and to every seed his own body . here , says your lordship , is an identity of the material substance supposed . it may be so . but to me a diversity of the material substance , i. e. of the component particles is here supposed , or in direct words said . for the words of st. paul taken all together , run thus , * that which thou sowest , thou sowest not that body which shall be , but bare grain , and so on , as your lordship has set down the remainder of them . from which words of st. paul , the natural argument seems to me to stand thus . if the body that is put in the earth in sowing , is not that body which shall be , then the body that is put in the grave , is not that , i. e. the same , body that shall be . but your lordship proves it to be the same body , by these three greek words of the text , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which your lordship interprets thus , † that proper body which belongs to it . answ. indeed by those greek words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether our translators have rightly render'd them his own body , or your lordship more rightly , that proper body which belongs to it , i formerly understood no more but this , that in the production of wheat and other grain from seed , god continued every species distinct , so that from grains of wheat sown , root , stalk , blade , ear and grains of wheat were produced , and not those of barly ; and so of the rest , which i took to be the meaning of to every seed his own body . no says your lordship , these words prove , that to every plant of wheat , and to every grain of wheat produced in it is given , the proper body that belongs to it , is ▪ the same body , with the grain that was sown . answ. this , i confess , i do not understand : because i do not understand how one individual grain can be the same , with twenty , fifty , or an hundred individual grains , for such sometimes is the increase . but your lordship proves it . for says your lordship , * every seed having that body in little , which is afterwards so much inlarged ; and in grain the seed is corrupted before its germination ; but it hath its proper organical parts , which make it the same body , with that which it grows up to . for although grain be not divided into lobes as other seeds are , yet it hath been found , by the most accurate observations , that upon separating the membranes these seminal parts are discerned in them ; which afterwards grow up to that body which we call corn. in which words i crave leave to observe , that your lordship supposes , that a body may be enlarged by the addition of a hundred or a thousand times as much in bulk as its own matter , and yet continue the same body , which i confess , i cannot understand . but in the next place , if that could be so ; and that the plant in its full growth at harvest , increased by a thousand or a million of times as much new matter added to it , as it had , when it lay in little concealed in the grain that was sown , was the very same body : yet i do not think , that your lordship will say , that every minute insensible and inconceivably small grain of the hundred grains , contained in that little organized senimal plant , is every one of them the very same , with that grain which contains that whole little senimal plant , and all those invisible grains in it . for then it will follow , that one grain is the same with an hundred , and an hundred distinct grains the same with one : which i shall be able to assent to , when i can conceive , that all the wheat in the world is but one grain . for i beseech you , my lord , consider what it is st. paul here speaks of ! it is plain he speaks of that which is sown and dies , i. e. the grain , that the husbandman takes out of his barn to sow in his field . and of this grain , st. paul says , that it is not that body that shall be . these two , viz. that which is sown , and that body that shall be , are all the bodies that st. paul here speaks of , to represent the agreement or difference of mens bodies after the resurrection , with those they had before they died . now i crave leave to ask your lordship , which of these two is that little invisible seminal plant , which your lordship here speaks of ? does your lordship mean by it the grain that is sown ? but that is not what st. paul speaks of , he could not mean this embryonated little plant , for he could not denote it by these words , that which thou sowest , for that he says must die : but this little embryonated plant , contained in the seed that is sown , dies not : or does your lordship mean by it , the body that shall be ? but neither by these words , the body that shall be , can st. paul be supposed to denote this insensible little embryonated plant ; for that is already in being contained in the seed that is sown , and therefore could not be spoke of , under the name of the body that shall be , and therefore , i confess , i cannot see of what use it is to your lordship to introduce here this third body , which st. paul mentions not ; and to make that the same or not the same with any other , when those which st. paul speaks of , are , as i humbly conceive , these two visible sensible bodies , the grain sown , and the corn grown up to ear , with neither of which this insensible embryonated plant can be the same body , unless an insensible body can be the same body with a sensible body , and a little body can be the same body with one ten thousand or an hundred thousand times as big as its self . so that yet i confess i see not the resurrection of the same body proved from these words of st. paul , to be an article of faith. your lordship goes on , * st. paul indeed saith , that we sow not that body that shall be ; but he speaks not of the identity but the perfection of it . here my understanding fails me again . for i cannot understand st. paul to say , that the same identical sensible grain of wheat , which was sown at seed-time , is the very same with every grain of wheat in the ear at harvest , that sprang from it : yet so i must understand it to make it prove , that the same sensible body , that is laid in the grave , shall be the very same with that , which shall be raised at the resurrection . for i do not know of any seminal body in little , contained in the dead carcass of any man or woman , which , as your lordship says , in seeds , having its proper organical parts , shall afterwards be enlarged , and at the resurrection grow up into the same man. for i never thought of any seed or seminal parts , either of plant or animal so wonderfully improved by the providence of god , whereby the same plant or animal should beget it self ; nor ever heard , that it was by divine providence designed to produce the same individual , but for the producing of future and distinct individuals , for the continuation of the same species . your lordship's next words are , * and although there be such a difference from the grain it self , when it comes up to be perfect corn , with root , stalk , blade , and ear , that it may be said to outward appearance not to be the same body ; yet with regard to the seminal and organical parts , it is as much the same as a man grown up , is the same with the embryo in the womb. answ. it does not appear by any thing i can find in the text , that st. paul here compared the body , produced with the seminal and organical parts , contained in the grain it sprang from , but with the whole sensible grain that was sown . microscopes had not then discovered the little embryo plant in the seed , and supposing it should have been reavealed to st. paul ( though in the scripture we find little revelation of natural philosophy ) yet an argument taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the corinthians , whom he writ to , could be of no manner of use to them ; nor serve at all either to instruct or convince them . but granting that those st. paul writ to , knew it as well as mr. lewenhooke ; yet your lordship thereby proves not the raising of the same body : your lordship says it is as much the same [ i crave leave to add body ] as a man grown up is the same . ( same , what i beseech your lordship ? ) with the embryo in the womb. for that the body of the embryo in the womb , and body of the man grown up , is the same body , i think no one will say ; unless he can perswade himself that a body that is not the hundredth part of an other , is the same with that other , which i think no one will do , till having renounced this dangerous way by ideas of thinking and reasoning , he has learnt to say that a part and the whole are the same . your lordship goes on , * and although many arguments may be used to prove , that a man is not the same , because life which depends upon the course of the blood , and the manner of respiration , and nutrition is so different in both states ; yet that man would be thought ridiculous that should seriously affirm , that it was not the same man. and your lordship says , i grant that the variation of great parcels of matter in plants , alters not the identity : and that the organization of the parts in one coherent body , partaking of one common life , makes the identity of a plant. answ. my lord , i think the question is not about the same man but the same body . for tho' i do say , * ( somewhat differently from what your lordship sets down as my words here ) that that which has such an organization , as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment , so as to continue and frame the wood , bark and leaves , &c. of a plant , in which consists the vegetable life , continues to be the same plant , as long as it partakes of the same life , though that life be communicated to new particles of matter , vitally united to the living plant. yet i do not remember , that i any where say , that a plant , which was once no bigger than an oaten straw , and afterwards grows to be above a fathom about , is the same body , though it be still the same plant. the well known tree in epping forest called the king's oak , which , from not weighing an ounce at first , grew to have many tuns of timber in it , was all along the fame oak , the very same plant ; but no body , i think , will say it was the same body when it weighed a tun , as it was when it weighed but an ounce , unless he has a mind to signalize himself by saying , that that is the same body , which has a thousand particles of different matter in it , for one particle that is the same ; which is no better than to say , that a thousand different particles are but one and the same particle , and one and the same particle is a thousand different particles ; a thousand times a greater absurdity , than to say half is the whole , or the whole is the same with the half , which will be improved ten thousand times yet farther , if a man shall say ( as your lordship seems to me to argue here ) that that great oak is the very same body , with the acorn it sprang from , because there was in that acorn an oak in little , which was afterwards ( as your lordship expresses it ) so much enlarged , as to make that mighty tree . for this embryo , if i may so call it , or oak in little , being not the hundredth , or perhaps the thousandth part of the acorn , and the acorn being not the thousandth part of the grown oak , 't will be very extraordinary to prove the acorn and the grown oak to be the same body , by a way wherein it cannot be pretended , that above one particle of an hundred thousand or a million , is the same in the one body , that was in the other . from which way of reasoning , it will follow that a nurse and her sucking-child have the same body ; and be past doubt , that a mother and her infant have the same body . but this is a way of certainty found out to establish the articles of faith , and to overturn the new method of certainty that your lordship says i have started , which is apt to leave mens minds more doubtful than before . and now i desire your lordship to consider of what use it is to you in the present case to quote out of my essay these words , that partaking of one common life , makes the identity of a plant , since the question is not about the identity of a plant , but about the identity of a body . it being a very different thing to be the same plant , and to be the same body . for that which makes the same plant , does not make the same body ; the one being the partaking in the same continued vegetable life , the other the consisting of the same numerical particles of matter . and therefore your lordship's inference from my words above quoted , in these which you subjoin , * seems to me a very strange one , viz. so that in things capable of any sort of life , the identity is consistent with a continued succession of parts ; and so the wheat grown up is the same body with the grain that was sown . for i believe if my words , from which you infer , and so the wheat grown up is the same body with the grain that was sown , were put into a syllogism , this would hardly be brought to be the conclusion . but your lordship goes on with consequence upon consequence , though i have not eyes acute enough every where to see the connection , till you bring it to the resurrection of the same body . the connection of your lordship's words * are as followeth ; and thus the alteration of the parts of the body at the resurrection is consistent with its identity , if its organization and life be the same ; and this is a real identity of the body which depends not upon consciousness . from whence it follows , that to make the same body , no more is requir'd but restoring life to the organiz'd parts of it . if the question were about raising the same plant , i do not say but there might be some appearance for making such inference from my words as this , whence it follows , that to make the same plant , no more is required , but to restore life to the organized parts of it . but this deduction wherein from those words of mine that speak only of the identity of a plant , your lordship infers there is no more required to make the the same body than to make the same plant , being too subtle for me , i leave to my reader to find out . your lordship goes on and says , * that i grant likewise , that the identity of the same man consists in a participation of the same continued life , by constantly fleeting particles of matter in succession , vitally united to the same organized body . answ. i speak in these words of the identity of the same man , and your lordship thence roundly concludes ; so that there is no difficulty of the sameness of the body . but your lordship knows that i do not take these two sounds man and body , to stand for the same thing ; nor the identity of the man to be the same with the identity of the body . but let us read out your lordship's words , † so that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the body , if life were continued ; and if by divine power life be restored to that material substance which was before united by a re-union of the soul to it , there is no reason to deny the identity of the body . not from the consciousness of the soul , but from that life which is the result of the union of the soul and body . if i understand your lordship right , you in these words from the passages above quoted out of my book argue , that from those words of mine it will follow , that it is or may be the same body , that is raised at the resurrection . if so , my lord , your lordship has then proved , that my book is not inconsistent with , but conformable to this article of the resurrection of the same body , which your lordship contends for , and will have to be an article of faith : for though i do by no means deny that the same bodies shall be raised at the last day , yet i see nothing your lordship has said to prove it to be an article of faith. but your lordship goes on with your proofs and says , * but st. paul still supposes that it must be that material substance to which the soul was before united . for saith he , it is sown in corruption , it is raised in incorruption ; it is sown in dishonour , it is raised in glory ; it is sown in weakness , it is raised in power ; it is sown a natural body , it is raised a spiritual body . can such a material substance which was never united to the body , be said to be sown in corruption , and weakness , and dishonour ? either therefore he must speak of the same body , or his meaning cannot be comprehended . i answer , can such a material substance which was never laid in the grave , be said to be sown , & c ? for your lordship says , † you do not say the same individual particles , which were united at the point of death , shall be raised at the last day ; and no other particles are laid in the grave , but such as are united at the point of death , either therefore your lordship must speak of an other body different from that which was sown , which shall be raised , or else your meaning , i think , cannot be comprehended . but whatever be your meaning , your lordship proves it to be st. paul's meaning , that the same body shall be raised which was sown , in these following words , * for what does all this relate to a conscious principle ? answ. the scripture being express , that the same persons should be raised and appear before the judgment seat of christ , that every one may receive according to what he had done in his body ; it was very well suited to common apprehensions , ( which refined not about particles that had been vitally united to the soul ) to speak of the body which each one was to have after the resurrection , as he would be apt to speak of it himself . for it being his body both before and after the resurrection , every one ordinarily speaks of his body as the same , though in a strict and philosophical sense , as your lordship speaks , it be not the very same . thus it is no impropriety of speech to say , this body of mine , which was formerly strong and plump , is now weak and wasted , though in such a sense a you are speaking in here , it be not the same body , revelation declares nothing any where concerning the same body , in your lordship's sense of the same body , which appears not to have been then thought of . the apostle directly proposes nothing for or against the same body , as necessary to be believed : that which he is plain and direct in , is his opposing and condemning such curious questions about the body , which could serve only to perplex , not to confirm what was material and necessary for them to believe , viz. a day of judgment and retribution to men in a future state , and therefore 't is no wonder that mentioning their bodies he should use a way of speaking suited to vulgar notions , from which it would be hard positively to conclude any thing for the determining of this question ( especially against expressions in the same discourse that plainly incline to the other side ) in a matter , which as it appears , the apostle thought not necessary to determin . and the spirit of god thought not fit to gratifie any ones curiosity in . but your lordship says , † the apostle speaks plainly of that body which was once quickened , and afterwards falls to corruption , and is to be restor'd with more noble qualities . i wish your lordship had quoted the words of st. paul , wherein he speaks plainly of that numerical body that was once quickened , they would presently decide this question . but your lordship proves it by these following words of st. paul. for this corruption must put on incorruption , and this mortal must put on immortality , to which your lordship adds , that you do not see how he could more expresly affirm the identity of this corruptible body , with that after the resurrection . how expressly it is affirmed by the apostle , shall be consider'd by and by . in the mean time it is past doubt that your lordship best knows what you do or do not see . but this i will be bold to say , that if st. paul had any where in this chapter ( where there are so many occasions for it , if it had been necessary to have been believed ) but said in express words , that the same bodies should be raised , every one else who thinks of it , will see he had more expresly affirmed the identity of the bodies which men now have , with those they shall have after the resurrection the remainder of your lordship's period * is . and that without any respect to the principle of self-consciousness . answ. these words , i doubt not , have some meaning , but i must own , i know not what ; either towards the proof of the resurrection of the same body , or to shew , that any thing i have said concerning self-consciousness , is inconsistent : for i do not remember that i have any where said , that the identity of body consisted in self-consciousness . from your preceding words , your lordship concludes thus . † and so if the scripture be the sole foundation of our faith , this is an article of it . my lord , to make the conclusion unquestionable , i humbly conceive , the words must run thus . and so if the scripture and your lordship's interpretation of it , be the sole foundation of our faith ; the resurrection of the same body is an article of it . for with submission , your lordship has neither produced express words of scripture for it , nor so proved , that to be the meaning of any of those words of scripture which you have produced for it , that a man who reads and sincerely endeavours to understand the scripture , cannot but find himself obliged to believe , as expresly that the same bodies of the dead , in your lordship's sense , shall be raised , as that the dead shall be raised . and i crave leave to give your lordship this one reason for it . he who reads with attention this discourse of st. paul , * where he discourses of the resurrection , will see , that he plainly distinguishes between the dead that shall be raised , and the bodies of the dead . for it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the nominative cases to † 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all along , and not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bodies , which one may with reason think would somewhere or other have been expressed , if all this had been said , to propose it as an article of faith , that the very same bodies should be raised . the same manner of speaking the spirit of god observes all through the new testament , where it is said , * raise the dead , quicken or make alive the dead , the resurrection of the deads nay , these very words of our saviour † , urged by your lordship , for the resurrection of the same body , run thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 would a well-meaning searcher of the scriptures be apt to think , that if the thing here intended by our saviour were to teach , and propose it as an article of faith , necessary to be believed by every one , that the very same bodies of the dead should be raised , would not , i say , any one be apt to think , that if our saviour meant so , the words should rather have been , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. all the bodies that are in the graves , rather than all who are in the graves ; which must denote persons , and not precisely bodies ? another evidence , that st. paul makes a distinction between the dead and the bodies of the dead , so that the dead cannot be taken in this , cor. ch. . to stand precisely for the bodies of the dead , are these words of the apostle , † but some men will say , how are the dead raised , and with what bodies do they come ? which words dead and they , if supposed to stand precisely for the bodies of the dead , the question will run thus . how are the dead bodies raised , and with what bodies do the dead bodies come ? which seems to have no very agreeable sense . this therefore being so , that the spirit of god keeps so expresly to this phrase , or form of speaking in the new testament , of raising , quickening , rising , resurrection , &c. of the dead , where the resurrection at the last day is spoken of ; and that the body is not mentioned , but in answer to this question , with what bodies shall those dead , who are raised come ? so that by the dead cannot precisely be meant the dead bodies : i do not see but a good christian , who reads the scripture , with an intention to believe all , that is there revealed to him concerning the resurrection , may acquit himself of his duty therein , without entring into the enquiry whether the dead shall have the very same bodies or no , which sort of enquiry the apostle , by the appellation he bestows here on him that makes it , seems not much to incourage . nor , if he shall think himself bound to determine concerning the identity of the bodies of the dead raised at the last day , will he , by the remainder of st. paul's answer , find the determination of the apostle , to be much in favour of the very same body , unless the being told , that the body sown is not that body that shall be ? that the body raised is as different from that which was laid down , as the flesh of man is from the flesh of beasts , fishes and birds , or as the sun , moon and stars are different one from another , or as different as a corruptible , weak , natural , mortal body , is from an incorruptible , powerful , spiritual , immortal body ; and lastly , as different as a body , that is flesh and blood is from a body , that is not flesh and blood. for flesh and blood cannot , says st. paul , in this very place * inherit the kingdom of god ; unless , i say , all this , which is contained in st. paul's words , can be supposed to be the way to deliver this as an article of faith , which is required to be believed by every one , viz. that the dead should be raised with the very same bodies , that they had before in this life ; which article proposed in these or the like plain and express words could have left no room for doubt , in the meanest capacities ; nor for contest in the most perverse minds . your lordship adds , in the next words . † and so it hath been always understood by the christian church , viz. that the resurrection of the same body , in your lordship's sense of same body , is an article of faith. answ. what the christian church has always understood is beyond my knowledge . but for those who coming short of your lordship's great learning , cannot gather their articles of faith from the understanding of all the whole christian church , ever since the preaching of the gospel ( who make the far greater part of christians , i think i may say , nine hundred ninety and nine of a thousand ) but are forced to have recourse to the scripture to find them there , i do not see , that they will easily find there this proposed as an article of faith , that there shall be a resurrection of the same body ; but that there shall be a resurrection of the dead , without explicitly determining , that they shall be raised with bodies made up wholly of the same particles which were once vitally united to their souls , in their former life ; without the mixture of any one other particle of matter , which is that which your lordship means by the same body . but supposing your lordship to have demonstrated this to be an article of faith , though i crave leave to own , that i do not see , that all that your lordship has said here , makes it so much as probable ; what is all this to me ? yes says your lordship in the following words , * my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with it , for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul , not to be necessary to the doctrin of the resurrection . but any material substance united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body . this is an argument of your lordship's , which i am obliged to answer to . but is it not fit i should first understand it , before i answer it ? now here i do not well know , what it is to make a thing not to be necessary to the doctrin of the resurrection . but to help my self out the best i can , with a guess , i will conjecture ( which in disputing with learned men , is not very safe ) your lordship's meaning is , that my idea of perpersonal identity makes it not necessary , that for the raising the same person the body should be the same . your lordship's next word is but , to which i am ready to reply , but what ? what does my idea of personal identity do ? for ▪ something of that kind the adversative particle but should in the ordinary construction of our language , introduce to make the proposition clear and intelligible : but here is no such thing , but is one of your lordship's priviledged particles , which i must not medle with , for fear your lordship complain of me again , as so severe a critick , that for the least ambiguity in any particle , fill up pages in my answer , to make my book look considerable for the bulk of it . but since this proposition here , my idea of personal identity makes the same body which was here united to the soul , not necessary to the doctrin of the resurrection . but any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body , is brought to prove my idea of personal identity inconsistent with the article of the resurrection ; i must make it out in some direct sense or other , that i may see whether it be both true and conclusive . i therefore venture to read it thus , my idea of personal identity makes the same body which was here united to the soul , not to be necessary at the resurrection ; but allows , that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness , makes the same body , ergo , my idea of personal identity , is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection of the same body . if this be your lordship's sense in this passage , as i here have guessed it to be , or else i know not what it is . i answer , . that my idea of personal identity does not allow that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body . i say no such thing in my book , nor any thing from whence it may be infer'd ; and your lordship would have done me a favour to have set down the words where i say so , or those from which you infer so , and shew'd how it follows from any thing i have said . . granting that it were a consequence from my idea of personal identity , that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body ; this would not prove that my idea of personal identity was inconsistent with this proposition , that the same body shall be raised ; but on the contrary , affirms it : since if i affirm , as i do , that the same persons shall be raised , and it be a consequence of my idea of personal identity , that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body ; it follows , that if the same person be raised , the same body must be raised ; and so i have herein not only said nothing inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body , but have said more for it than your lordship . for there can be nothing plainer , than that in the scripture it is reaveled , that the same persons shall be raised , and appear before the judgment seat of christ , to answer for what they have done in their bodies . if therefore whatever matter be joined to the same principle of consciousness make the same body ; it is demonstration , that if the same persons are raised , they have the same bodies . how then your lordship makes this an inconsistency with the resurrection , is beyond my conception . yes , says your lordship , it is inconsistent with it , for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul , not to be necessary . . i answer therefore thirdly , that this is the first time i ever learnt , that not necessary was the same with inconsistent . i say that a body made up of the same numerical parts of matter , is not necessary to the making of the same person ; from whence it will indeed follow , that to the resurrection of the same person , the same numerical particles of matter are not required . what does your lordship infer from hence ? to wit , this . therefore he who thinks that the same particles of matter are not necessary to the making of the same person , cannot believe , that the same persons shall be raised with bodies made of the very same particles of matter , if god should reveal , that it shall be so , viz. that the same persons shall be raised with the same bodies they had before . which is all one as to say , that he who thought the blowing of rams horns , was not necessary in it self to the falling down of the walls of iericho , could not believe , that they should fall upon the blowing of rams horns , when god had declared it should be so . your lordship says , my idea of personal identity , is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection ; the reason you ground it on is this , because it makes not the same body necessary to the making the same person . let us grant your lordship's consequence to be good , what will follow from it ? no less than this , that your lordship's notion ( for i dare not say your lordship has any so dangerous things as ideas ) of personal identity , is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection . the demonstration of it is thus ; your lordship says , * it is not necessary that the body , to be raised at the last day , should consist of the same particles of matter , which were united at the point of death ; for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingring disease , as if a fat man falls into a consumption : you do not say the same particles which the sinner had at the very time of commission of his sins ; for then a long sinner must have a vast body , considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration . and again , here your lordship says , * you allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several changes of matter . from which words it is evident , that your lordship supposes a person in this world may be continued and preserved the same in a body not consisting of the same individual particles of matter ; and hence it demonstratively follows , that let your lordship's notion of personal identity be what it will , it makes the same body not to be necessary to the same person ; and therefore it is by your lordship's rule inconsistent with the article of the resurrection . when your lordship shall think fit to clear your own notion of personal identity from this inconsistency with the article of the resurrection , i do not doubt but my idea of personal identity , will be thereby cleared too . till then , all inconsistency with that article which your lordship has here charged on mine , will unavoidably fall upon your lordship 's too . but for the clearing of both , give me leave to say , my lord , that whatsoever is not necessary , does not thereby become inconsistent . it is not necessary to the same person , that his body should always consist of the same numerical particles ; this is demonstration , because the particles of the bodies of the same persons in this life change every moment , and your lordship cannot deny it ; and yet this makes it not inconsistent with god's preserving , if he thinks fit , to the same persons , bodies consisting of the same numerical particles always from the resurrection to eternity . and so likewise though i say any thing that supposes it not necessary , that the same numerical particles , which were vitally united to the soul in this life , should be reunited to it at the resurrection , and constitute the body it shall then have ; yet it is not inconsistent with this , that god may , if he pleases , give to every one a body consisting only of such particles as were before vitally united to his soul. and thus i think , i have cleared my book from all that inconsistency which your lordship charges on it , and would perswade the world it has with the article of the resurrection of the dead . only before i leave it , i will set down the remainder of what your lordship says upon this head , that though i see not the coherence nor tendency of it , nor the force of any argument in it against me ; yet nothing may be omitted that your lordship has thought fit to entertain your reader with on this new point , nor any one have reason to suspect , that i have passed by any word of your lordship's ( on this now first introduced subject ) wherein he might find your lordship had proved what you had promised in your title-page . your remaining words are these ; † the dispute is not how far personal identity in it self may consist in the very same material substance ; for we allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several changes of matter ; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital vnion between the soul and body and the life which is consequent upon it ; and therefore in the resurrection , the same material substance must be re-united , or else it cannot be called a resurrection , but a renovation , i. e. it may be a new life , but not a raising the body from the dead . i confess , i do not see how what is here ushered in by the words and therefore , is a consequence from the preceding words ; but as to the propriety of the name , i think it will not be much questioned , that if the same man rise who was dead , it may very properly be called the resurrection of the dead ; which is the language of the scripture . i must not part with this article of the resurrection , without returning my thanks to your lordship for making me * take notice of a fault in my essay . when i write that book , i took it for granted , as i doubt not but many others have done , that the scripture had mention'd in express terms , the resurrection of the body . but upon the occasion your lordship has given me in your last letter to look a little more narrowly into what revelation has declar'd concerning the resurrection , and finding no such express words in the scripture , as that the body shall rise or be raised , or the resurrection of the body . i shall in the next edition of it change these words of my book , † the dead bodies of men shall rise . into these of the scripture , the dead shall rise . not that i question , that the dead shall be raised with bodies : but in matters of revelation , i think it not only safest , but our duty , as far as any one delivers it for revelation , to keep close to the words of the scripture ; unless he will assume to himself the authority of one inspired , or make himself wiser than the holy spirit himself . if i had spoke of the resurrection in precisely scripture terms , i had avoided giving your lordship the occasion of making here † such a verbal reflection on my words ; what not if there be an idea of identity as to the body ? i come now to your lordship's second head of accusation ; your lordship says , * . the next articles of faith which my notion of ideas is inconsistent with , are no less than those of the trinity and the incarnation of our saviour . but all the proof of inconsistency your lordship here brings , being drawn from my notions of nature and person , whereof so much has been said already , the swelling my answer into too great a volume , will excuse me from setting down at large all that you have said hereupon , so particularly , as i have done in the precedent article of the resurrection which is wholly new . your lordship's way of proving , † that my ideas of nature and person cannot consist , with the articles of the trinity and incarnation , is , as far as i can understand it , this , that , i say , we have no simple ideas , but by sensation and reflection . but , says your lordship , * we cannot have any simple ideas of nature and person , by sensation and reflection , ergo , we can come to no certainty about the distinction of nature and person in my way of ideas . answ. if your lordship had concluded from thence , that therefore in my way of ideas , we can have no ideas at all of nature and person , it would have had some appearance of a consequence : but as it is , it seems to me such an argument as this ; no simple colours in sir godfry kneller's way of painting come into his exact and lively pictures but by his pencil , but no simple colours of a ship and a man come into his pictures by his pencil , ergo , we can come to no certainty about the distinction of a ship and a man in sir godfry kneller's way of painting . your lordship says , † it is not possible for us to have any simple ideas of nature and person by sensation and reflection , and i say so too ; as impossible as it is to have a true picture of a rainbow in one simple colour , which consists in the arangement of many colours . the ideas signified by the sounds nature and person , are each of them complex ideas ; and therefore it is as impossible to have a simple idea of either of them , as to have a multitude in one , or a composition in a simple . but if your lordship means , that by sensation and reflection we cannot have the simple ideas of which the complex ones of nature and person are compounded ; that i must crave leave to dissent from , till your lordship can produce a definition ( in intelligible words ) of either of nature or person , in which all that is contained cannot ultimately be resolved into simple ideas of sensation and reflection . your lordship's definition of person , * is , that it is a compleat intelligent substance with a peculiar manner of subsistence . and my definition of person , which your lordship † quotes out of my essay , is , that person stands for a thinking intelligent being , that has reason and reflection , and can consider it self as it self , the same thinking thing in different times and places . when your lordship shall shew any repugnancy in this my idea ( which i denote by the sound person ) to the incarnation of our saviour , with which your lordship's notion of person may not be equally charged ; i shall give your lordship an answer to it . this i say in answer to these words , * which is repugnant to the article of the incarnation of our saviour : for the preceding reasoning to which they refer , i must own i do not understand . the word person naturally signifies nothing , that you allow ; your lordship , in your definition of it , makes it stand for a general abstract idea . person then in your lordship , is liable to the same default which you lay on it in me , † viz. that it is no more than a notion in the mind . the same will be so of the word nature , whenever your lordship pleases to define it ; without which you can have no notion of it . and then the consequence which you there * draw from their being no more than notions of the mind , will hold as much in respect of your lordship's notion of nature and person as of mine , viz. that one nature and three persons can be no more . this i crave leave to say in answer to all that your lordship has been pleased to urge from page to these words of your lordship's , p. . general terms ( as nature and person are in their ordinary use in our language ) are the signs of general ideas , and general ideas exist only in the mind ; but particular things ( which are the foundations of these general ideas , if they are abstracted as they should be ) do , or may exist conformable to those general ideas , and so fall under those general names ; as he that writes this paper is a person to him , i. e. may be denominated a person by him to whose abstract idea of person he bears a conformity ; just as what i here write , is to him a book or a letter , to whose abstract idea of a book or a letter it agrees . this is what i have said concerning this matter all along , and what , i humbly conceive , will serve for an answer to those words of your lordship , where you say , † you affirm that those who make nature and person to be only abstract and complex ideas , can neither defend nor reasonably believe the doctrin of the trinity , and to all that you say , p. — . only give me leave to wish , that what your lordship , out of a mistake of what i say concerning the ideas of nature and person , has urged , as you pretend , against them , do not furnish your adversaries in that dispute , with such arguments against you as your lordship will not easily answer . your lordship * sets down these words of mine , person in it self signifies nothing ; but as soon as the common use of any language has appropriated it to any idea , then that is the true idea of a person ; which words your lordship interprets thus : i. e. men may call a person what they please , for there is nothing but common use required to it : they may call a horse or a tree , or a stone , a person if they think fit . answ. men , before common use had appropriated this name to that complex idea which they now signifie by the sound person , might have denoted it by the sound stone , and vice versa : but can your lordship thence argue , as you do here , men are at the same liberty in a country where those words are already in common use ? there he that will speak properly , and so as to be understood , must appropriate each sound used in that language to an idea in his mind ( which to himself is defining the word ) which is in some degree conformable to the idea that others apply it to . your lordship in the next paragraph † sets down my definition of the word person , viz. that person stands for a thinking intelligent being that hath reason and reflection , and can consider it self as it self , the same thinking being in different times and places ; and then asks many questions upon it . i shall set down your lordship's definition of person ; which is this , * a person is a compleat intelligent substance with a peculiar manner of subsistence , and then crave leave to ask your lordship the same questions concerning it , which your lordship here asks me † concerning mine ; how comes person to stand for this and nothing else ? from whence comes compleat substance , or peculiar manner of subsistence to make up the idea of a person ? whether it be true or false , i am not now to enquire ; but how it comes into this idea of a person ? has common use of our language appropriated it to this sense ? if not , this seems to be a meer arbitrary idea ; and may as well be denied as affirmed . and what a fine pass are we come to , in your lordship's way , if a meer arbitrary idea must be taken into the only true method of certainty ? — but if this be the true idea of a person , then there can be no vnion of two natures in one person . for if a compleat intelligent substance be the idea of a person ; and the divine and humane natures be compleat intelligent substances , then the doctrin of the vnion of two natures and one person is quite sunk ; for here must be two persons in this way of your lordship's . again , if this be the idea of a person , then where there are three persons there must be three distinct compleat intelligent substances ; and so there cannot be three persons in the same individual essence . and thus both these doctrins of the trinity and incarnation are past recovery gon , if this way of your lordship's hold . these , my lord , are your lordship's very words ; what force there is in them i will not enquire , but i must beseech your lordship to take them as objections i make against your notion of person , to shew the danger of it , and the inconsistency it has with the doctrin of the trinity and incarnation of our saviour ; and when your lordship has removed the objections that are in them , against your own definition of person , mine also by the very same answers will be cleared . your lordship's argument in the following words * to page . seems to me ( as far as i can collect ) to lie thus : your lordship tells me , † that i say , that in propositions whose certainty is built on clear and perfect ideas and evident deductions of reason , there no proposition can be received for divine revelation which contradicts them . this proposition not serving your lordship's turn so well , for the conclusion you designed to draw from it , your lordship is pleased to enlarge it . for you ask , * but suppose i have ideas sufficient for certainty , what is to be done then ? from which words and your following discourse , if i can understand it , it seems to me , that your lordship supposes it reasonable for me to hold , that where-ever we are any how certain of any propositions , whether their certainty be built on clear and perfect ideas or no , there no proposition can be received for divine revelation , which contradicts them . and thence your lordship concludes , * that because i say we may make some propositions , of whose truth we may be certain concerning things , whereof we have not ideas in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct ; therefore my notion of certainty by ideas must overthrow the credibility of a matter of faith in all such propositions , which are offered to be believed on the account of divine revelation . a conclusion which i am so unfortunate as not to find how it follows from your lordship's premisses , because i cannot any way bring them into mode and figure with such a conclusion . but this being no strange thing to me in my want of skill in your lordship's way of writing , i in the mean time crave leave to ask , whether there be any propositons your lordship can be certain of , that are not divinely revealed ? and here i will presume that your lordship is not so sceptical , but that you can allow certainty attainable in many things by your natural faculties . give me leave then to ask your lordship , whether , where there be propositions of whose truth you have certain knowledge , you can receive any proposition for divine revelation which contradicts that certainty ? whether that certainty be built upon the agreement of ideas , such as we have , or on whatever else your lordship builds it ? if you cannot , as i presume your lordship will say you cannot , i make bold to return you your lordship's questions here to me , in your own words ; let us now suppose that you are to judge of a proposition delivered as a matter of faith , where you have a certainty by reason from your grounds such as they are ? can you , my lord , assent to this as a matter of faith , when you are already certain of the contrary by your way ? how is this possible ? can you believe that to be true , which you are certain is not true ? suppose it be , that there are two natures in one person , the question is , whether you can assent to this as a matter of faith ? hf you should say , where there are only probabilities on the other side , i grant that you then allow revelation is to prevail . but when you say you have certainty by ideas , or without ideas to the contrary , i do not see how it is possible for you to assent to a matter of faith as true , when you are certain from your method that it is not true . for how can you believe against certainty — because the mind is actually determined by certainty . and so your lordship's notion of certainty by ideas , or without ideas , be it what it will , must overthrow the credibility of a matter of faith in all such propositions , which are offered to be believed on the account of divine revelation . this argumentation and conclusion is good against your lordship , if it be good against me . for certainty is certainty , and he that is certain is certain , and cannot assent to that as true , which he is certain is not true , whether he supposes certainty to consist in the preception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , such as a man has , or in any thing else . for whether those who have attained certainty , not by the way of ideas , can believe against certainty any more than those who have attained certainty by ideas , we shall then see , when your lordship shall be pleased to shew the world your way to certainty without ideas . indeed if what your lordship insinuates in the beginning of this passage , which we are now upon be true , your lordship is safer ( in your way without ideas , i. e. without immediate objects of the mind in thinking , if there be any such way ) as to the understanding divine revelation right , than those who make use of ideas : but yet you are still as far as they , from assenting to that as true , which you are certain is not true . your lordship's words are : * so great a difference is there between forming ideas first , and then judging of revelation by them , and the believing of revelation on its proper grounds , and the interpreting the sense of it by the due measures of reason . if it be the priviledge of those alone who renounce ideas , i. e. the immediate objects of the mind in thinking , to believe revelation on its proper grounds , and the interpreting the sense of it , by the due measures of reason ; i shall not think it strange , that any one who undertakes to interpret the sense of revelation , should renounce ideas , i. e. that he who would think right of the meaning of any text of scripture should renounce , and lay by all immediate objects of the mind in thinking . but perhaps your lordship does not here extend this difference of believing revelation on its proper grounds , and not on its proper grounds to all those , who are not , and all those who are for ideas . but your lordship makes this comparison here , only between your lordship and me , who you think am guilty of forming ideas first , and then judging of revelation by them . answ. if so , then this lays the blame not on my doctrin of ideas , but on my particular ill use of them . that then which your lordship would insinuate of me here , as a dangerous way to mistaking the sense of the scripture , is , that i form ideas first , and then judge of revelation by them , i. e. in plain english , that i get to my self , the best i can , the signification of the words , wherein the revelation is delivered ; and so endeavour to understand the sense of the revelation delivered in them . and pray , my lord , does your lordship do otherwise ? does the believing of revelation upon its proper grounds , and the due measures of reason , teach you to judge of revelation , before you understand the words it is deliver'd in ? i. e. before you have formed the ideas in your mind , as well as you can , which those words stand for ? if the due measures of reason teach your lordship this , i beg the favour of your lordship to tell me those due measures of reason , that i may leave those undue measures of reason , which i have hitherto followed in the interpreting the sense of the scripture , whose sense it seems i should have interpreted first , and understood the signification of the words afterwards . my lord , i read the revelation of the holy scripture with a full assurance , that all it delivers is true : and though this be a submission to the writings of those inspired authors , which i neither have , nor can have , for those of any other men : yet i use ( and know not how to help it , till your lordship shew me a better method in those due measures of reason , which you mention ) the same way to interpret to my self the sense of that book , that i do of any other . first i endeavour to understand the words and phrases of the language i read it in , i. e. to form ideas they stand for . if your lordship means any thing else by forming ideas first , i confess , i understand it not . and if there be any word or expression , which in that author , or in that place of that author , seems to have a peculiar meaning , i. e. to stand for an idea , which is different from that , which the common use of that language has made it a sign of , that idea also , i endeavour to form in my mind , by comparing this author with himself , and observing the design of his discourse , that so , as far as i can , by a sincere endeavour , i may have the same ideas , in every place when i read the words , which the author had when he writ them . but here , my lord , i take care not to take those for words of divine revelation , which are not the words of inspired writers : nor think my self concerned with that submission to receive the expressions of fallible men , and to labour to find out their meaning , or as your lordship phrases it , interpret their sense , as if they were the expressions of the spirit of god , by the mouths or pens of men inspired and guided by that infallible spirit . this , my lord , is the method i use in interpreting the sense of the revelation of the scriptures ; if your lordship knows that i do otherwise , i desire you to convince me of it : and if your lordship does otherwise , i desire you to shew me wherein your method differs from mine , that i may reform upon so good a pattern : for as for what you accuse me of , in the following words , it is that , which either has no fault in it , or if it have , your lordship , i humbly conceive , is as guilty as i. your words † are , i may pretend what i please , that i hold the assurance of faith , and the certainty by ideas , to go upon very different grounds ; but when a proposition is offered me out of scripture to be believed , and i doubt about the sense of it , is not recourse to be made to my ideas ? give me leave my lord , with all submission , to return your lordship the same words . your lordship may pretend what you please , that you hold the assurance of faith , and the certainty of knowledge to stand upon different grounds ( for i presume your lordship will not say , that believing and knowing stand upon the same grounds , for that would i think be to say , that probability and demonstration are the same thing ) but when a proposition is offered you out of scripture , to be believed , and you doubt about the sense of it , is not recourse to be made to your notions ? what , my lord , is the difference here between your lordship's and my way in the case ? i must have recourse to my ideas , and your lordship must have recourse to your notions . for i think you cannot believe a proposition contrary to your own notions ; for then you would have the same and different notions , at the same time . so that all the difference between your lordship and me , is , that we do both the same thing , only your lordship shews a great dislike to my using the term idea . but the instance your lordship here gives , is beyond my comprehension . your say , * a proposition is offered me out of scripture to be believed , and i doubt about the sense of it — as in the present case , whether there can be three persons in one nature , or two natures and one person . my lord , my bible is faulty again , for i do not remember , that i ever read in it either of these propositions , in these precise words , there are three persons in one nature , or , there are two natures and one person . when your lordship shall shew me a bible wherein they are so set down , i shall then think them a good instance of propositions offered me out of scripture , till then , whoever shall say , that they are propositions in the scripture , when there are no such words so put together , to be found in holy writ , seems to me to make a new scripture in words and propositions , that the holy ghost dictated not . i do not here question their truth , nor deny that they may be drawn from the scripture : but i deny , that these very propositions are in express words in my bible . for that is the only thing i deny here , if your lordship can shew them me in yours , i beg you to do it . in the mean time , taking them to be as true as if they were the very words of divine revelation ; the question then is , how must we interpret the sense of them ? for supposing them to be divine revelation , to ask as your lordship here does , what resolution i , or any one can come to about their possibility , seems to me to involve a contradiction in it . for , whoever admits a proposition to be of divine revelation , supposes it not only to be possible , but true . your lordship's question then can mean only this ; what sense can i upon my principles , come to of either of these propositions , but in the way of ideas ? and i crave leave to ask your lordship , what sense of them can your lordship upon your principles come to , but in the way of notions ? which in plain english , amounts to no more than this , that your lordship must understand them according to the sense you have of those terms they are made up of ; and i according to the sense i have of those terms . nor can it be otherwise , unless your lorship can take a term in any proposition to have one sense , and yet understand it in another : and thus we see , that in effect , men have differently understood and interpreted the sense of these propositions . whether they used the way of ideas or not , i. e. whether they called what any word stood for notion , or sense , or meaning , or idea . i think my self obliged to return your lordship my thanks , for the news you write me here , † of one who has found a secret way how the same body may be in distant places at once . it making no part , that i can see , of the reasoning your lordship was then upon , i can take it only for a piece of news : and the favour was the greater , that your lordship was pleased to stop your self in the midst of so serious an argument as the articles of the trinity and incarnation , to tell it me . and methinks 't is pity , that that author had not used some of the words of my book , which might have served to have tied him and me together . for his secret about a body in two places at once , which he does keep up ; and my secret about certainty , which your lordship thinks had been better kept up too , being all your words , bring me into his company but very untowardly . if your lordship would be pleased to shew , that my secret about certainty ( as you think fit to call it ) is false or erroneous , the world would see a good reason , why you should think it better kept up ; till then perhaps they may be apt to suspect , that the fault is not so much in my published secret about certainty , as somewhere else . but since your lordship thinks it had been better kept up ; i promise that as soon as you shall do me the favour to make publick a better notion of certainty than mine , i will by a publick retractation call in mine : which i hope your lordship will do , for i dare say , no body will think it good or friendly advice to your lordship , if you have such a secret , that you should keep it up . your lordship with some emphasis , * bids me observe my own words , that i here positively say , that the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know : so that it is plain here , that i place certainty only in evident knowledge , or in clear and distinct ideas ; and yet my great complaint of your lordship , was , that you charged this upon me , and now your lordship finds it in my own words . answ. my own words in that place , are , the mind in not certain of what it doth not evidently know ; but in them or that passage as set down by your lordship , there is not the least mention of clear and distinct ideas , and therefore i should wonder to hear your lordship so solemnly call them my own words , when they are but what your lordship would have to be a consequence of my words , were it not , as i humbly conceive , a way not unfrequent with your lordship to speak of that , which you think a consequence from any thing said , as if it were the very thing said . it rests therefore upon your lordship to prove that evident knowledge can be only where the ideas concerning which it is , are perfectly clear and distinct . i am certain , that i have evident knowledge , that the substance of my body and soul exists , though i am as certain that i have but a very obscure and confused idea of any substance at all : so that my complaint of your lordship upon that account , remains very well founded , notwithstanding any thing you alledge here . your lordship summing up the force of what you have said add * that you have pleaded ( . ) that my method of certainty shakes the belief of revelation in general ( . ) that is shakes the belief of particular propositions or articles of faith , which depend upon the sense of words contained in scripture . that your lordship has pleaded , i grant , but with submission i deny , that you have proved . ( . ) that my definition of knowledge , which is that which your lordship calls my method of certainty , shakes the belief of revelation in general . for all that your lordship offers for proof of it , is only the alledging some other passages out of my book quite different from that my definition of knowledge , which you endeavour to shew do shake the belief of revelation in general . but indeed have not , nor , i humbly conceive , cannot shew , that they do any ways shake the belief of revelation in general . but if they did , it does not at all follow from thence , that my definition of knowledge , i. e. my method of certainty at all shakes the belief of revelation in general , which was what your lordship undertook to prove . ( . ) as to the shaking the belief of particular propositions or articles of faith , which depend , as you here say , † upon the sense of words ; i think i have sufficiently cleared my self from that charge , as will yet be more evident from what your lordship here farther urges . your lordship says , my placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , shakes the foundations of the articles of faith [ above mentioned ] which depend upon the sense of words contained in the scripture : and the reason your lordship gives for it , is this ; because i do not say we are to believe all that we find there expressed . my lord , upon reading these words , i consulted the errata , to see whether the printer had injured you : for i could not easily believe that your lordship should reason after a fashon , that would justifie such a conclusion as this , viz. your lordship in your letter to me , does not say that we are to believe all that we find expressed in scripture ? therefore your notion of certainty shakes the belief of this article of faith , that jesus christ descended into hell. this i think will scarce hold for a good consequence , till the not saying any truth , be the denying of it , and then if my not saying in my book , that we are to believe all there expressed , be to deny , that we are to believe all that we find there expressed ; i fear many of your lordship's books will be found to shake the belief of several or all the articles of our faith. but supposing this consequence to be good , viz. i do not say therefore i deny , and thereby i shake the belief of some articles of faith ; how does this prove , that my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , shakes any article of faith , unless my saying , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , in the page of my essay , be a proof , that i do not say in any other part of that book , that we are to believe all that we find expressed in scripture but perhaps the remaining words of the period will help us out in your lordship's argument , which all together stands thus , * because i do not say we are to believe all that we find there expressed ; but [ i do say ] in case we have any clear and distinct ideas , which limit the sense another way , than the words seem to carry it , we are to judge that to be the true sense . my lord , i do not remember where i say , what in the latter part of this period your lordship makes me say : and your lordship would have done me a favour to have quoted the place . indeed i do say in the chapter your lordship seems to be upon , that no proposition can be received for divine revelation , or obtain the assent due to all such , if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge . this is what i there say , and all that i there say : which in effect is this , that no proposition can be received for divine revelation , which is contradictory to a self-evident proposition , and if that be it , which your lordship makes me say here in the foregoing words , i agree to it , and would be glad to know whether your lordship differs in opinion from me in it . but this not answering your purpose , your lordship would in the following words of this paragraph , † change self-evident proposition into a proposition we have attained certainty of , though by imperfect ideas : in which sense the proposition your lordship argues from as mine , will stand thus , that no proposition can be received for divine revelation , or obtain the assent due to all such , if it be contradictory to any proposition , of whose truth we are by any way certain . and then i desire your lordship to name the two contradictory propositions , the one of divine revelation , i do not assent to ; the other , that i have attained to a certainty of by my imperfect ideas , which makes me reject or not assent to that of divine revelation . the very setting down of these two contradictory propositions , will be demonstration against me , and if your lordship cannot ( as i humbly conceive you cannot ) name any two such propositions , 't is an evidence , that all this dust , that is raised , is only a great deal of talk about what your lordship cannot prove . for that your lordship has not yet proved any such thing , i am humbly of opinion , i have already shewn . your lordship's discourse of des cartes in the following pages , * is , i think , as far as i am concerned in it , to shew , that certainty cannot be had by ideas : because des cartes using the term idea missed of it . answ. the question between your lordship and me not being about des cartes's but my notion of certainty , your lordship will put an end to my notion of certainty by ideas , whenever your lordship shall prove , that certainty cannot be attained any way by the immediate objects of the mind in thinking , i. e. by ideas ; or that certainty does not consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; or lastly , when your lordship shall shew us , what else certainty does consist in . when your lordship shall do either of these three , i promise your lordship to renounce my notion , or way , or method , or grounds ( or whatever else your lordship has been pleased to call it ) of certainty by ideas . the next paragraph † is to shew the inclination your lordship has to favour me in the words it may be . i shall be always sorry to have mistaken any ones , especially your lordship's inclination to favour me : but since the press has published this to the world , the world must now be judge of your lordship's inclination to favour me . the three or four following pages * are to shew , that your lordship's exception against ideas was not against the term ideas , and that i mistook you in it . answ. my lord , i must own that there are very few pages of your letters , when i come to examine what is the precise meaning of your words , either as making distinct propositions , or a continued discourse , wherein i do not think my self in danger to be mistaken ; but whether in the present case , one much more learned than i , would not have understood your lordship as i did , must be left to those who will be at the pains to consider your words † and my reply to them . your lordship saying , as i have stated my notion of ideas , it may be of dangerous consequence ; seemed to me to say no more , but that my book in general might be of dangerous consequence . this seeming too general an accusation , i endeavoured to find what it was more particularly in it , which your lordship thought might be of dangerous consequence : and the first thing i thought you excepted against , was the use of the term idea . but your lordship tells me here , * i was mistaken , it was not the term idea you excepted against , but the way of certainty by ideas . to excuse my mistake , i have this to say for my self , that reading in your first letter † these express words ; when new terms are made use of by ill men to promote scepticism and insidelity , and to overthrow the mysteries of our faith , we have then reason to enquire into them , and to examine the foundation and tendency of them ; it could not be very strange , if i understood them to refer to terms ; but it seems i was mistaken , and should have understood by them my way of certainty by ideas , and should have read your lordship's words thus ; when new terms are made use of by ill men to promote scepticism and infidelity and to overthrow the mysteries of faith , we have then reason to enquire into them , i. e. mr. l.'s definition of knowledge ( for that is my way of certainty by ideas ) and then to examine the foundation and tendency of them , i. e. this proposition , viz. that knowledge or certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas . them , in your lordship's words , as i thought ( for i am scarce ever sure , what your lordship means by them ) necessarily refering to what ill men made use for the promoting of scepticism and infidelity , i thought it had refered to terms . why so ? says your lordship , your quarrel , you say , was not with the term ideas . but that which you insisted upon was the way of certainty by ideas , and the new terms as imploied to that purpose ; and therefore 't is that which your lordship must be understood to mean by what ill men make use of , &c. now i appeal to my reader , whether i may not be excused , if i took them rather to refer to terms , a word in the plural number preceding in the same period , than to way of certainty by ideas , which is of the singular number , and neither preceding , no nor so much as expressed in the same sentence ? and if by my ignorance in the use of the pronoun them , 't is my misfortune to be often at a loss in the understanding of your lordship's writings , i hope i shall be excused . another excuse for my understanding , that one of the things in my book which your lordship thought might be of dangerous consequence , was the term idea , may be found in these words of your lordship , * but what need all this great noise about ideas and certainty , true and real certainty by ideas : if after all , it comes only to this , that our ideas only present to us such things from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things ? but the world hath been strangely amuzed with ideas of late ; and we have been told , that strange things might be done by the help of ideas , and yet these ideas at last come to be common notions of things , which we must make use of in our reasoning . i shall offer one passage more † for my excuse , out of the same page . i had said in my chapter about the existence of god , i thought it most proper to express my self in the most usual and familiar way , by common words and expressions . your lordship wishes i had done so quite through my book ; for then i had never given that occasion to the enemies of our faith , to take up my new way of ideas , as an effectual battery ( as they imagin'd ) against the mysteries of the christian faith. but i might have enjoyed the satisfaction of my ideas long enough , before your lordship had taken notice of them , unless you had found them employ'd in doing mischief . thus this passage stands in your lordship's former letter , though here † your lordship gives us but a part off it , and that part your lordship breaks of into two , and gives us inverted and in other words . perhaps those who observe this , and better understand the arts of controversie than i do , may find some skill in it . but your lordship * breaks off the former passage at these words , strange things might be done by the help of ideas ; and then adding these new ones , i. e. as to matter of certainty , leaves out those which contain your wish , that i had expressed my self in the most usual way by common words and expressions quite through my book , as i had done in my chapter of the existence of a god ; for then , says your lordship , * i had not given that occasion to the enemies of our faith to take up my new way of ideas as an effectual battery , &c. which wish of your lordship's is , that i had all along left out the term idea , as is plain from my words , which you refer to in your wish , as they stand in my first letter , † viz. i thought it most proper to express my self in the most usual and familiar way — by common words , and known ways of expression ; and therefore , as i think , i have scarce used the word idea in that whole chapter . now i must again appeal to my reader , whether your lordship having so plainly wished that i had used common words and expressions in opposition to the term idea , i am not excusable if i took you to mean that term ? though your lordship leaves out the wish , and instead of it puts in , i. e. as a matter of certainty ; words which were not in your former letter , though it be for mistaking you in my answer to that letter , that you here blame me . i must own , my lord , my dulness will be very apt to mistake you in expressions seemingly so plain as these , till i can presume my self quick-sighted enough to understand mens meaning in their writings not by their expressions ; which i confess i am not , and is an art i find my self too old now to learn. but bare mistake is not all ; your lordship † accuses me also of unfairness and disingenuity in understanding these words of yours , the world has been strangely amuzed with ideas , and yet these ideas at last come to be only common notions of things , as if in them your lordship owned ideas to be only common notions of things . to this , my lord , i must humbly crave leave to answer , that there was no vnfairness or disingenuity in my saying your lordship owned ideas for such , because i understood you to speak in that place in your own sense ; and thereby to shew that the new term idea need not be introduced , when it signified only the common notions of things , i. e. signified no more than notion doth , which is a more usual word . this i took to be your meaning in that place ; and whether i or any one might not so understand it , without deserving to be told , * that this is a way of turning things upon your lordship which you did not expect from me , or such a solemn appeal as this , iudge now how fair and ingenuous this answer is , i leave to any one , who will but do me the favour to cast his eye on the passage above quoted , as it stands in your lordship 's own words in your first letter * for i humbly beg leave to say , that i cannot but wonder to find , that when your lordship is charging me with want of fairness and ingenuity , you should leave out in the quoting of your own words , those which served most to justifie the sense i had taken them in , and put others in the stead of them . in your first letter † they stand thus : but the world hath been strangely amuzed with ideas of late , and we have been told that strange things might be done by the help of ideas ; and yet these ideas at last come to be only common notions of things which we must make use of in our reasoning , and so on to the end of what is above set down ; all which i quoted * to secure my self from being suspected to turn things upon your lordship in a sense which your words ( that the reader had before him ) would not bear : and in your second letter , * in the place now under consideration , they stand thus : but the world hath been strangely amuzed with ideas of late , and we have been told that strange things may be done with ideas , i. e. as to matter of certainty , and there your lordship ends . will your lordship give me leave now to use your own words , iudge now how fair and ingenuous this is : words which i should not use , but that i find them used by your lordship in this very passage , and upon this very occasion . i grant my self a mortal man very liable to mistakes , especially in your writings : but that in my mistakes , i am guilty of any vnfairness or disingenuity , your lordship will , i humbly conceive , pardon me , if i think it will pass for want of fairness and ingenuity in any one , without clear evidence to accuse me : to avoid any such suspicion in my first letter , i set down every word contained in those pages of your book which i was concerned in ; and in my second , i set down most of the passages of your lordship's first answer that i replied to . but because the doing it all along in this , would , i find , too much increase the bulk of my book ; i earnestly beg every one , who will think this my reply worth his perusal , to lay your lordship's letter before him , that he may see whether in these pages , i direct my answer to , without setting them down at large , there be any thing material unanswered , or vnfairly or disingenuously represented . your lordship , in the next words , * gives a reason why i ought to have understood your words , as a consequence of my assertion , and not as your own sense , viz. because you all along distinguish the way of reason , by deducing one thing from another , from my way of certainty in the agreement or disagreement of ideas . answer . i know your lordship does all along talk of reason , and my way be ideas , as distinct or opposite : but this is the thing i have and do complain of , that your lordship does speak of them as distinct , without shewing wherein they are different , since the perception of the agreement of disagreement of ideas , which is my way of certainty , is also the way of reason : for the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , is either by an immediate comparison of two ideas , as in self-evident propositions ; which way of knowledge of truth , is the way of reason , or by the intervention of intermediate ideas , i. e. by the deduction of one thing from another , which is also the way of reason , as i have shewn * ; where i answer to your speaking of certainty placed in good and sound reason , and not in ideas ; in which place , as in several others , your lordship opposes ideas and reason , which your lordship calls here distinguishing them : but to continue to speak frequently of two things as different , or of two ways as opposite , without ever shewing any difference or opposition in them , after it has been pressed for , is a way of ingenuity which your lordship will pardon to my ignorance , if i have not formerly been acquainted with ; and therefore , when you shall have shewn , that reasoning about ideas or by ideas , is not the same way of reasoning , as that about or by notions or conceptions , and that what i mean by ideas is not the same that your lordship means by notions , you will have some reason to blame me for mistaking you in the passages above quoted . * for if your lordship , in those words , does not except against the term ideas , but allows it to have the same signification with notions , or conceptions , or apprehensions ; then your lordship's words will run thus , but what need all this great noise about notions or conceptions , or apprehensions ? and the world has been strangely amuzed with notions , or conceptions , or apprehensions of late ; which , whether it be that which your lordship will own to be your meaning , i must leave to your consideration . your lordship proceeds * to examine my new method of certainty , as you are pleased to call it , to my asking whether there be any other , or older method of certainty , your lordship answers , † that is not the point ; but whether mine be any at all ? which your lordship denies . answer . i grant , to him that barely denies it to be any at all , it is not the point , whether there be any older ; but to him that calls it a new method , i humbly conceive it will not be thought wholly besides the point , to shew an older , at least , that it ought to have prevented these following words of your lordship's , viz. that your lordship did never pretend to inform the world of new methods ; which being in answer to my desire , that you would be pleased to shew me an older , or another method , plainly imply , that your lordship supposes , that whoever will inform the world of another method of certainty than mine , can do it only by informing them of a new one . but since this is the answer your lordship pleases to make to my request , i crave leave to consider it a little . your lordship having pronounced concerning my definition of knowledge , which you call my method of certainty , that it might be of dangerous consequence to an article of the christian faith , i desired * you to shew in what certainty lies ; and desired it of your lordship by these pressing considerations , that it would secure that article of faith against any dangerous consequence from my way , and be a great service to truth in general . to which your lordship replies here , † that you did never pretend to inform the world of new methods ; and therefore , are not bound to go any farther than what you found fault with , which was my new method . answer . my lord , i did not desire any new method of you . i observed your lordship , in more places than one , reflected on me for writing out of my own thoughts ; and therefore i could not expect from your lordship what you so much condemn in another . besides , one of the faults you found with my method , was , that it was new : and therefore , if your lordship will look again into that passage , † where i desire you to set the world right in a thing of that great consequence , as it is to know wherein certainty consists ; you will not find , that i mention any thing of a new method of certainty ; my words were another , whether old or new was indifferent . in truth , all that i requested , was only such a method of certainty , as your lordship approved of , and was secure in ; and therefore i do not see how your not pretending to inform the world in any new methods , can be any way alledg'd as a reason , for refusing so useful and so charitable a thing . your lordship farther adds , * that you are not bound to go any farther , than what you found fauls with . answer . i suppose your lordship means , that you are not bound by the law of disputation ; nor are you , as i humbly conceive , by this law forbid : or if you were , the law of the schools could not dispense with the eternal divine law of charity . the law of disputing , whence had it it s so mighty a sanction ? it is at best but the law of wrangling , if it shut out the great ends of information and instruction ; and serves only to flatter a little guilty vanity , in a victory over an adversary less skilful in this art of fencing . who can believe , that upon so slight an account , your lordship should neglect your design of writing against me ? the great motives of your concern for an article of the christian faith , and of that duty , which you profess has made you do what you have done , will be believed to work more uniformly in your lordship , than to let a father of the church , and a teacher in israel , not tell one who asks him which is the right and safe way , if he knows it . no , no , my lord , a character so much to the prejudice of your charity , no-body will receive of your lordship , no , not from your self : whatever your lordship may say , the world will believe , that you would have given a better method of certainty , if you had had one ; when thereby , you would have secured men from the danger of running into errors in articles of faith , and effectually have recalled them from my way of certainty , which leads , as your lordship says , to scepticism and infidelity : for to turn men from a way they are in , the bare telling them it is dangerous , puts but a short stop to their going on in it : there is nothing effectual to set them a going right , but to shew them which is the safe and sure way ; a piece of humanity , which when asked , no body , as far as he knows , refuses another ; and this i have earnestly asked of your lordship . your lordship * represents to me the vnsatisfactoriness and inconsistency of my way of certainty , by telling me , that it seems still a strange thing to you , that i should talk so much of a new method of certainty by ideas ; and yet allow , as i do , such a want of ideas , so much imperfection in them , and such a want of connection between our ideas , and the things themselves . answer . this objection being so visibly against the extent of our knowledge , and not the certainty of it by ideas , would need no other answer but this , that it proved nothing to the point ; which was to shew , that my way by ideas , was no way to certainty at all ; not to true certainty , which is a term your lordship uses here † which i shall be able to conceive what you mean by , when you shall be pleased to tell me what false certainty is . but because what you say here , is in short what you ground your charge of scepticism on , in your former letter , i shall here , according to my promise , consider what your lordship says there , and hope you will allow this to be no unfit place . your charge of scepticism , in your former letter , † is as followeth . your lordship's first argument consists in these propositions , viz. . that i say , p. , that knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas . . that i go about to prove , that there are very many more beings , of which we have no ideas , than those of which we have ; from whence , your lordship draws this conclusion , that we are excluded from attaining any knowledge , as to the far greatest part of the vniverse . which i agree to : but with submission , this is not the proposition to be proved , but this , viz. that my way by ideas , or my way of certainty by ideas ; for to that your lordship reduces it , i. e. my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , leads to scepticism . farther , from my saying , that the intellectual world is greater and more beautiful certainly than the material , your lordship argues , † that if certainty may be had by general reasons without particular ideas in one , it may also in other cases . answer . it may no doubt : but this is nothing against any thing i have said ; for i have neither said , nor suppose , that certainty by general reasons , or any reasons can be had without ideas ; no more than i say , or suppose , that we can reason without thinking , or think without immediate objects of our minds in thinking , i. e. think without ideas . but your lordship asks , whence comes this certainty ( for i say certainly ) where there be no particular ideas , if knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas ? i answer , we have ideas as far as we are certain , and beyond that we have neither certainty , no nor probability ; every thing which we either know or believe , is some proposition . now no proposition can be framed as the object of our knowledge or assent , wherein two ideas are not joined to , or separated from one another . as for example , when i affirm that something exists in the world , whereof i have no idea , existence is affirmed of something , some being : and i have as clear an idea of existence and something , the two things joined in that proposition , as i have of them in this proposition , something exists in the world , whereof i have an idea . when therefore i affirm , that the intellectual world is greater , and more beautiful , than the material : whether i should know the truth of this proposition , either by divine revelation , or should assert it as highly probable ( which is all i do in that chapter , † out of which this instance is brought ) it means no more but this , viz. that there are more , and more beautiful beings , whereof we have no ideas , than there are of which we have ideas ; of which beings , whereof we have no ideas , we can for want of ideas , have no farther knowledge , but that such beings do exist . if your lordship shall now ask me how i know there are such beings ; i answer , that in that chapter † of the extent of our knowledge , i do not say i know , but i endeavour to shew , that it is most highly probable : but yet a man is capable of knowing it to be true , because he is capable of having it revealed to him by god , that this proposition is true , viz. that in the works of god there are more and more beautiful beings , whereof we have no ideas , than there are whereof we have ideas . if god instead of shewing the very things to st. paul , had only revealed to him , that this proposition was true , viz. that there were things in heaven which neither eye had seen , nor ear had heard , nor had entred into the heart of man to conceive , would he not have known the truth of that proposition of whose terms he had ideas , viz. of beings , whereof he had no other ideas , but barely as something , and of existence , though in the want of other ideas of them he could attain no other knowledge of them , but barely that they existed ? so that in what i have there said , there is no contradiction nor shadow of a contradiction , to my placing knowledge in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas . but if i should any where mistake , and say any thing inconsistent with that way of certainty of mine ; how i beseech your lordship , could you conclude from thence , that the placing knowledge in the perception of the agreement of disagreement of ideas , tends to scepticism ? that which is the proposition here to be proved , would remain still unproved : for i might say things inconsistent with this proposition , that knowledge consists in the perception of the connection and agreement , or disagreement and repugnancy of our ideas ; and yet that proposition be true , and very far from tending to scepticism , unless your lordship will argue , that every proposition that is inconsistent with what a man any where says , tends to scepticism ; and then i should be tempted to infer , that many propositions in the letters your lordship has honoured me with , will tend to scepticism . your lordship's second argument is † from my saying , we have no ideas of the mechanical affections , of the minute particles of bodies , which hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies ; from whence your lordship concludes , that since we can attain to no science , as to bodies or spirits , our knowledge must be confin'd to a very narrow compass . i grant it ; but i crave leave to mind your lordship again , that this is not the proposition to be proved : a little knowledge is still knowledge , and not scepticism . but let me have affirm'd our knowledge to be comparatively very little , how , i beseech your lordship , does that any way prove , that this proposition , knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas , any way tends to scepticism ? which was the proposition to be proved . but the inference your lordship shuts up this head with * in these words ; so that all certainty is given up in the way of knowledge , as to the visible and invisible world , or at least the greatest part of them ; shewing in the first part of it what your lordship should have inferred , and was willing to infer , does at last by these words in the close , or at least the greatest part of them , i guess come just to nothing ; i say , i guess ; for what them , by grammatical construction is to be referred to , seems not clear to me . your third argument * being just of the same kind with the former , only to shew , that i reduce our knowledge to a very narrow compass , in respect of the whole extent of beings is already answered . in the fourth place , your lordship sets down some words of mine concerning reasoning and demonstration ; and then concludes , † but if there be no way of coming to demonstration but this , i doubt we must be content without it . which being nothing but a declaration of your doubt , is , i grant , a very short way of proving any proposition ; and i shall leave to your lordship the satisfaction you have in such a proof , since i think it will scarce convince others . in the last place your lordship argues , * that because i say , that the idea in the mind proves not the existence of that thing whereof it is an idea ; therefore we cannot know the actual existence of any thing by our senses ; because we know nothing , but by the perceived agreement of ideas . but if you had been pleased to have consider'd my answer there to the scepticks , whose cause you here seem , with no small vigour , to manage , you would , i humbly conceive , have found , that you mistake one thing for another , viz. the idea that has by a former sensation been lodged in the mind , for actually receiving any idea , i. e. actual sensation , which i think i need not go about to prove , are two distinct things , after what you have here quoted out of my book . now the two ideas , that in this case are perceived to agree , and do thereby produce knowledge , are the idea of actual sensation ( which is an action whereof i have a clear and distinct idea ) and the idea of actual existence of something without me that causes that sensation . and what other certainty your lordship has by your senses of the existing of any thing without you , but the perceived connection of those two ideas , i would gladly know . when you have destroyed this certainty , which i conceive is the utmost , as to this matter , which our infinitely wise and bountiful maker has made us capable of in this state , your lordship will have well assisted the scepticks in carrying their arguments against certainty by sense , beyond what they could have expected . i cannot but fear , my lord , that what you have said here in favour of scepticism , against certainty by sense , ( for it is not at all against me , till you shew we can have no idea of actual sensation ) without the proper antidote annexed in shewing wherein that certainty consists ( if the account i give be not true ) after you have so strenuously endeavoured to destroy , what i have said for it , will , by your authority , have laid no small foundation of scepticism , which they will not fail to lay hold of , with advantage to their cause , who have any disposition that way . for i desire any one to read this your fifth argument , and then judge which of us two is a promoter of scepticism : i who have endeavoured , and , as i think , proved certainty by our senses ; or your lordship , who has ( in your thoughts at least ) destroyed these proofs , without giving us any other to supply their place . all your other arguments amount to no more but this , that i have given instances to shew , that the extent of our knowledge , in comparison of the whole extent of being is very little and narrow ; which when your lordship writ your vindication of the doctrin of the trinity , † were very fair and ingenuous confessions of the shortness of humane vnderstanding , with respect to the nature and manner of such things , which we are most certain of the being of , by constant and undoubted experience : though since you have shewed your dislike of them in more places than one , particularly , p. . ‖ ; and again more at large , p. . † ; and at last you have thought fit to represent them as arguments for scepticism . and thus i have acquitted my self , i hope to your lordship's satisfaction , of my promise to answer your accusation of a tendency to scepticism . but to return to your second letter where i left off . in the following pages * you have another argument to prove my way of certainty to be none , but to lead to scepticism ; which after a serious perusal of it , seems to me to amount to no more but this , that des cartes and i go both in the way of ideas ; and we differ , ergo , the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , is no way of certainty , but leads to scepticism , which is a consequence i cannot admit : and i think is no better than this ; your lordship and i differ , and yet we go both in the way of ideas , ergo , the placing of knowledge in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , is no way of certainty at all , but leads to scepticism . your lordship will perhaps think i say more than i can justifie , when i say , your lordship goes in the way of ideas ; for you will tell me , you do not place certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas . answer . no more does des cartes ; and therefore in that respect , he and i went no more in the same way of ideas , than your lordship and i do : from whence it follows , that how much soever he and i may differ in other points , our difference is no more an argument against this proposition , that knowledge or certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , than your lordship's and my difference in any other point , is an argument against the truth of that my definition of knowledge ; or that it tends to scepticism . but you will say , that des cartes built his system of philosophy upon ideas ; and so i say does your lordship too , and every one else as much as he , that has any system of that or any other part of knowledge . for ideas are nothing but the immediate objects of our minds in thinking ; and your lordship , i conclude , in building your system of any part of knowledge thinks on something ; and therefore you can no more build , or have any system of knowledge without ideas , than you can think without some immediate objects of thinking . indeed , you do not so often use the word ideas as des cartes or i have done ; but using the things signified by that term as much as either of us ( unless you can think without an immediate object of thinking ) yours also is the way of ideas , as much as his or mine . your condemning the way of ideas , in those general terms , which one meets with so often in your writings on this occasion , amounts at last to no more , but an exception against a poor sound of three syllables , though your lordship thinks fit not to own , that you have any exception to it . if besides this , these ten or twelve pages have any other argument in them , which i have not seen , i humbly desire you would be pleased to put it into a syllogism to convince my reader , that i have silently passed by an argument of importance ; and then i promise an answer to it : and the same request and promise i make to your lordship , in reference to all other passages in your letter , wherein you think there is any thing of moment unanswered . your lordship comes * to answer what was in my former letter , to shew , that what you had said concerning nature and person , was to me and several others , whom i had talked with about it , hard to be understood . to this purpose , the next pages † are chiefly imploy'd to shew , what aristotle and others have said about 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and natura , a greek and a latin word , neither of which is the english word nature , nor can concern it at all till it be proved , that nature in english has in the propriety of our tongue , precisely the same signification that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 had among the greeks , and natura among the romans . for would it not be pretty harsh to an english ear , to say with aristotle , * that nature is a corporeal substance , or a corporeal substance is nature ? to instance but in this one among those many various senses , which your lordship proves he used the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in : or with anaximander , † that nature is matter , or matter nature : or with sextus empericus , ‖ that nature is a principle of life , or a principle of life is nature . so that though the philosophers of old of all kinds , did understand the sense of the terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and natura , in the languages of their countries , yet it does not follow , what you would here † conclude from thence , that they understood the proper signification of the term nature in english . nor has an english man any more need to consult those grecians in their use of the sound 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to know what nature signifies in english ; than those grecians had need to consult our writings , or bring instances of the use of the word nature in english authors , to justifie their using of the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in any sense they had used it in in greek . the like may be said of what is brought * out of the greek christian writers ; for i think an english man could be scarce justified in saying in english , that the angels were natures , because theodoret and st. basil calls them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . indeed your lordship † brings a proof from an authority that is proper in the case , and would go a great way in it , for it is of an english man , who writing of nature , gives an account of the signification of the word nature in english. but the mischief is , that among eight significations of the word nature , which he gives , that is not to be found , which you quote him for , and had need of . for he says not that nature in english is used for substance ; which is the sense your lordship has used it in and would justifie by the authority of that ingenious and honourable person ; and to make it out you tell us , mr. boyle says the word essence is of great affinity to nature , if not of an adequate import , to which your lordship adds , but the real essence of a thing is a substance . so that in fine , the authority of this excellent person and philosopher amounts to thus much , that he says that nature and essence are two terms that have a great affinity , and you say , that nature and substance are two terms that have a great affinity . for the learned mr. boyle says no such thing , nor can it appear , that he ever thought so , till it can be shewn , that he has said that essence and substance have the same signification . i humbly conceive , it would have been a strange way in any body but your lordship , to have quoted an author for saying that nature and substance had the same signification , when one of those terms , viz. substance , he does not upon that occasion so much as name . but your lordship has this priviledge , it seems to speak of your inferences as if they were other mens words , whereof i think i have given several instances , i am sure i have given one ; where you * seem to speak of clear and distinct ideas as my words , when they are only your words there infer'd from my words evident knowledge ; and other the like instances might be produced , were there any need . had your lordship produced mr. boyle's testimony , that nature in our tongue had the same signification with substance , i should presently have submitted to so great an authority , and taken it for proper english , and a clear way of expressing ones self , to use nature and substance promiscuously one for another . but since i think there is no instance of any one who ever did so , and therefore it must be a new , and consequently no very clear way of speaking ; give me leave , my lord , to wonder , why in all this dispute about the term nature , upon the clear and right understanding whereof , you lay so much stress , you have not been pleased to define it ; which would put an end to all disputes about the meaning of it , and leave no doubtfulness , no obscurity in your use of it , nor any room for any dispute what you mean by it . this would have saved many pages of paper , though perhaps it would have made us lose your learned account of what the ancients have said concerning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the several acceptations they used it in . all the other authors greek and latin your lordship has quoted , may , for ought i know , have used the terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and natura , properly in their languages ; and have discoursed very clearly and intelligibly about what those terms in their countries signified . but how that proves , there was no difficulties in the sense or construction in that discourse of yours , concerning nature , which i , and those i consulted upon it , did not understand , is hard to see . your lordship's discourse was obscure and too difficult then for me , and so i must own it is still . whether my friend be any better enlightened by what you have said to him here , out of so many ancient authors , i am too remote from him at the writing of this to know , and so shall not trouble your lordship with any conversation , which perhaps when we meet again we may have upon it . the next passage of your vindication , which was complained of to be very hard to be understood , was this , where you say , * that you grant that by sensation and reflection , we come to know the powers and properties of things ; but our reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these ; because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves . so that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason , and not to meer ideas . to rectifie the mistake had been made in my first letter p. . in taking reason here to mean the faculty of reason , you tell me † i might easily have seen , that by reason your lordship understood principles of reason allowed by mankind . to which it was replied , ‖ that then this passage of yours , must be read thus , viz. that your lordship grants that by sensation and reflection we come to know the properties of things ; but our reason , i. e. the principles of reason allowed by mankind are satisfied that there must be something beyond these ; because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves . so that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason , i. e. to the principles of reason allowed by mankind , and not to meer . ideas , which made it seem more unintelligible than it was before . to the complaint was made of the unintelligibleness of this passage in this last sense given by your lordship , you answer nothing . so that we [ i. e. my friends whom i consulted and i ] are still excusable if not understanding what is signified by these expressions . the principles of reason allowed by mankind are satisfied , and , the nature of things properly belongs to the principles of reason allowed by mankind , we see not the connection of the propositions here tied together by the words so that , which was the thing complained of in these words , viz. * that the inference here , both for its connection and expression seemed hard to be understood ; and more to the same purpose , which your lordship takes no notice of . indeed your lordship repeats these words of mine , that in both senses of the word reason , either taken for a faculty , or for the principles of reason allowed by mankind ; reason and ideas may consist together ; and then subjoins , † that this leads your lordship to the examination of that which may be of some use , viz. to shew the difference of my method of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainty by reason . which how it any way justifies your opposing ideas and reason , as you here , and elsewhere often do ; or shews , that ideas are inconsistent with the principles of reason allowed by mankind , i leave to the reader to judge . your lordship for the clearing of what you had said , in your vindication , &c. from obscurity and unintelligibleness , which were complained of in it ; is to prove , that ideas are inconsistent with the principles of reason allowed by mankind ; and in answer to this , you say , you will shew the difference of my method of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainly by reason . my lord , as i remember , the expression in question , was not , that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason , and not to my method of certainty by ideas : but this , that the nature of things belongs to our reason , and not to meer ideas . so that the thing you were here to shew , was , that reason , i. e. the principles of reason allowed by mankind , and ideas , and not the principles of reason , and my method of certainty by ideas , cannot consist together : for the principles of reason allowed by mankind , and ideas , may consist together ; though perhaps , my method of certainty by ideas , should prove inconsistent with those principles : so that if all that you say , from this to the page , i. e. forty eight pages were as clear demonstration , as i humbly conceive it is the contrary ; yet it does nothing to clear the passage in hand , but leaves that part of your discourse , concerning nature , lying still under the objection was made against it , as much , as if you had not said one word . but since , i am not unwilling that my method of certainty should be examin'd ; and i should be glad ( if there be any faults in it ) to learn the defects of that my definition of knowledge , from so great a master as your lordship ; i will consider what you here say , to shew the difference of my method of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainty by reason . your lordship says , † that the way of certainty by reason lies in two things . . the certainty of principles . . the certainty of deductions . i grant , that a part of that which is called certainty by reason , lies in the certainty of principles ; which principles , i presume , your lordship and i are agreed , are several propositions . if then these principles are propositions , to shew the difference between your lordship's way of certainty by reason , and my way of certainty by ideas ; i think it is visible , that you ought to shew wherein the certainty of those propositions consists in your way by reason , different from that wherein i make it consist in my way by ideas . as for example , your lordship and i are agreed , that this proposition , whatsoever is is , is a principle of reason , or a maxim. now my way of certainty by ideas , is , that the certainty of this proposition consists in this , that there is a perceivable connection or agreement , between the idea of being and the idea of being , or between the idea of existence and the idea of existence , as is expressed in that proposition . but now in your way of reason , pray , wherein does the certainty of this proposition consist ? if it be in any thing different from that perceivable agreement of the ideas , affirm'd of one another in it , i beseech your lordship to tell it me ; if not , i beg leave to conclude , that your way of certainty by reason , and my way of certainty by ideas , in this case are just the same . but instead of saying any thing , to shew wherein the certainty of principles is different in the way of reason , from the certainty of principles in the way of ideas , upon my friends shewing , that you had no ground to say as you did ; that i had no idea of reason , as it stands for principles of reason , your lordship takes occasion ( as what will not , in a skillful hand , serve to introduce any thing one has a mind to ) to tell me , † what ideas i have of them must appear from my book ; and you do there find a chapter of self-evident propositions and maxims , which you cannot but think extraordinary for the design of it , which is thus summed in the conclusion , † viz. that it was to shew , that these maxims as they are of little use , where we have clear and distinct ideas , so they are of dangerous use , where our ideas are not clear and distinct . and is not this a fair way to convince your lordship , that my way of ideas is very consistent with the certainty of reason , when the way of reason bath been always supposed to proceed upon general principles , and i assert them to be useless and dangerous ? in which words i crave leave to observe , . that the pronoun them here , seems to have reference to self-evident propositions , to maxims , and to principles , as terms used by your lordship and me ; though it be certain , that you and i use them in a far different sense : for , if i mistake not , you use them all three promiscuously one for another ; whereas 't is plain , that in that chapter , † out of which you bring your quotations here , i distinguish self-evident propositions from those , which i there mention under the name of maxims , which are principally these two , whatsoever is is , and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be . farther , it is plain , out of the same place , that by maxims i there mean general propositions , which are so universally received under the name of maxims or axioms , that they are looked upon as innate ; the two chief whereof , principally there meant , are those above-mentioned : but what the propositions are which you comprehend under maxims , or principles of reason , cannot be determined , since your lordship neither defines , nor enumerates them ; and so 't is impossible , precisely , to know what you mean by them here : and that which makes me more at a loss , is , that in this argument , * you set down for principles or maxims , propositions that are not so much as self-evident , viz. this , that the essential properties of a man , are to reason and discourse , &c. . i crave leave to observe , that you tell me , that in my book you find a chapter of self-evident propositions and maxims , whereas i find no such chapter in my book : i have in it indeed , a chapter of maxims , but never an one entitled , of self-evident propositions and maxims . this 't is possible your lordship will call a nice criticism ; but yet it is such an one , as is very necessary in the cafe : for in that chapter i , as is before observed , expresly distinguish self-evident propositions from the received maxims or axioms , which i there speak of : whereas it seems to me , to be your design ( in joining them in a title of a chapter , contrary to what i had done ) to have it thought , that i treated of them as one and the same thing ; and so all that i said there , of the uselessness of some few general propositions , under the title of received maxims , might be applied to all self-evident propositions , the quite contrary whereof was the design of that chapter . for that which i endeavour to shew there , is , that all our knowledge is not built on those few received general propositions , which are ordinarily called maxims or axioms ; but that there are a great many truths may be known without them : but that there is any knowledge without self-evident propositions , i am so far from denying , that i am accused by your lordship for requiring in demonstration , more such than you think are necessary . this seems , i say , to be your design ; and i wish your lordship , by entitling my chapter as i my self did , and not as it would best serve your turn , had not made it necessary for me to make this nice criticism . this is certain , that without thus confounding maxims and self-evident propositions , what you here say , would not so much , as in appearance , concern me : for , . i crave leave to observe , that all the argument your lordship uses here against me to prove , that my way of certainty by ideas , is inconsistent with the way of certainty by reason , which lies in the certainty of principles , is this , that the way of reason hath been alway supposed to proceed upon general principles , and i assert them to be useless and dangerous . be pleased , my lord , to define or enumerate your general principles , and then we shall see whether i assert them to be useless and dangerous , and whether they , who supposed the way of reason , was to proceed upon general principles , differ'd from me ; and if they did differ , whether theirs was more the way of reason than mine : but to talk thus of general principles , which have always been supposed the way of reason , without telling so much as which , or what they are , is not so much as by authority to shew , that my way of certainty by ideas , is inconsistent with the way of certainty by reason : much less is it in reality to prove it . because admitting i had said any thing contrary to what , as you say , has been always supposed , its being supposed , proves it not to be true ; because we know that several things have been for many ages generally supposed , which at last , upon examination , have been found not to be true . what hath been always supposed , is fit only for your lordship 's great reading to declare : but such arguments , i confess , are wholly lost upon me , who have not time or occasion to examine what has always been supposed ; especially in those questions which concern truths , that are to be known from the nature of things . because , i think , they cannot be established by majority of votes , not easie to be collected , nor if they were collected , can convey certainty till it can be supposed , that the greater part of mankind are always in the right . in matters of fact , i own we must govern our selves by the testimonies of others ; but in matters of speculation to suppose on , as others have supposed before us , is supposed by many to be only a way to learned ignorance , which enables to talk much and know but little . the truths , which the penetration and labours of others before us have discovered and made out , i own , we are infinitely indebted to them for ; and some of them are of that consequence , that we cannot acknowledge too much , the advantages we receive from those great masters in knowledge : but where they only supposed , they left it to us to search , and advance farther . and in those things , i think , it becomes our industry to employ it self , for the improvement of the knowledge , and adding to the stock of discoveries left us by our inquisitive and thinking predecessors . . one thing more i crave leave to observe , viz. that to these words , these maxims , as they are of little use where we have clear and distinct ideas , so they are of dangerous use where our ideas are not clear and distinct , quoted out of my essay , you subjoin , * and is not this a fair way to convince your lordship , that my way of ideas is very consistent with the certainty of reason ? answer . my lord , my essay and those words in it , were writ many years before i dreamt , that you or any body else would ever question the consistency of my way of certainty by ideas , with the way of certainty by reason ; and so could not be intended to convince your lordship in this point : and since you first said , that these two ways are inconsistent , i never brought those words to convince you , that my way is consistent with the certainty of reasons : and therefore why you ask , whether that be a fair way to convince you , which was never made use of as any way to convince you of any such thing , is hard to imagin . but your lordship goes on in the following words , with the like kind of argument , † where you tell me , that i say , * that my first design is to prove , that the consideration of those general maxims adds nothing to the evidence or certainty of knowledge ; which says your lordship , overthrows all that which hath been accounted science and demonstration , and must lay the foundation of scepticism ; because our true grounds of certainty depend upon some general principle of reason . to make this plain , you say , you will put a case grounded upon my words ; which are , that i have discoursed with very rational men , who have actually deny'd that they are men. these words j. s. understands as spoken of themselves , and charges them with very ill consequences ; but you think they are capable of an other meaning : however , says your lordship , let us put the case , that men did in earnest question , whether they were men or not ; and then you do not see , if i set aside general maxims , how i can convince them , that they are men. for the way your lordship looks on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary sceptical men , is by general maxims and principles of reason . answer . i can neither in that paragraph nor chapter , find that i say , that my first design is to prove , that these general maxims [ i. e. those which your lordship calls general principles of reason ] add nothing to the evidence and certainty of knowledge in general : for so these words must be understood to make good the consequence which your lordship charges on them , viz. that they overthrow all that has been accounted science and demonstration , and lay the foundations of scepticism . what my design in that place is , is evident from these words in the foregoing paragraph , † let us consider whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions , which are received for maxims , and have the dignity of axioms allowed ; and here 't is plain , that several other truths , not allowed to be axioms , partake equally with them in this self-evidence ; which shews that my design there was to evince , that there were truths that are not called maxims , that are as self-evident as those received maxims . pursuant to this design , i say , * that the consideration of these axioms [ i. e. whatsoever is , is ; and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ] can add nothing to the evidence and certainty of its [ i. e. the minds ] knowledge [ i. e. of the truth of more particular propositions concerning identity ] . these are my words in that place , and that the sense of them is according to the limitation annexed to them ; between those crotchets i refer my reader to that fourth section , where he will find that all that i say amounts to no more but what is expressed in these words , in the close of it ; i appeal to every one 's own mind , whether this proposition , a circle is a circle , be not as self-evident a proposition , as that consisting of more general terms , whatsoever is , is : and again , whether this proposition , blue is not red , be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of , as soon as it understands the words , than it does of that axiom , it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ? and so of all the like . and now i ask your lordship , whether you do affirm of this , that it overthrows all that which hath been counted science and demonstration , and must lay the foundation of scepticism ? if you do , i shall desire you to prove it ; if you do not , i must desire you to consider how fairly my sense has been represented . but supposing you had represented my sense right , and that the little or dangerous use which i there limit to certain maxims , had been meant of all principles of reason in general , in your sense , what had this been , my lord , to the question under debate ? your lordship undertakes to shew , that your way of certainty by reason is different from my way of certainty by ideas . to do this , you say in the preceding page , * that certainty by reason , lies . in certainty of principles , . in certainty of deductions . the first of these you are upon here , and if in order to what you had undertaken , your lordship had shewn , that in your way by reason , those principles were certain ; but in my way by ideas , we could not attain to any certainty concerning them . this , indeed , had been to shew a difference between my way of certainty , which you call the way by ideas ; and yours , which you call the way by reason , in this part of certainty , that lies in the certainty of principles . i have said in the words quoted by your lordship , that the consideration of those two maxims , what is , is ; and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be , are not of use to add any thing to the evidence or certainty of our knowledge of the truth of identical predications ; but i never said those maxims were in the least uncertain ; i may perhaps think otherwise of their use , than your lordship does , but i think no otherwise of their truth and certainty than you do ; they are left in their full force and certainty for your use , if you can make any better use of them , than what i think can be made : so that in respect of the allowed certainty of those principles , my way differs not at all from your lordship's . pray , my lord , look over that chapter again , and see whether i bring their truth and certainty any more into question , than you your self do ; and 't is about their certainty , and not use , that the question here is between your lordship and me : we both agree , that they are both undoubtedly certain ; all then that you bring in the following pages about their use , is nothing to the present question about the certainty of principles , which your lordship is upon in this place ; and you will prove , that your way of certainty by reason , is different from my way of certainty by ideas ; when you can shew , that you are certain of the truth of those , or any other maxims any otherwise , than by the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas as expressed in them . but your lordship passing by that wholly , endeavours to prove , that my saying , that the consideration of those two general maxims can add nothing to the evidence and certainty of knowledge in identical predications ( for that is all that i there say ) overthrows all that has been accounted science and demonstration , and must lay the foundation of scepticism , and 't is by a very remarkable proof , viz. because our true grounds of certainty depend upon some general principles of reason ; which is the very thing i there not only deny , but have disproved ; and therefore should not , i humbly conceive , have been rested on as a proof of any thing else , till my arguments against it had been answered . but instead of that , your lordship says , * you will put a case that shall make it plain , which is the business of the six following pages , which are spent in this case . the case is founded upon a supposition , which you seem willing to have thought that you borrowed either from i. s. or from me : whereas , truly that supposition is neither that gentleman 's nor mine , but purely your lordship 's own . for however grosly mr. i. s. has mistaken ( which he has since acknowledg'd in print ) the obvious sense of those words of my essay * on which you say you ground your case ; yet , i must do him right herein , that he himself supposed not , that any man in his wits , ever in earnest questioned whether he himself were a man or no ; though by a mistake ( which i cannot but wonder at , in one so much exercised in controversie as mr. i. s. ) he charged me with saying it . your lordship indeed says , † that you think my words there may have an other meaning : would you thereby insinuate , that you think it possible they should have that meaning which i. s. once gave them ? if you do not , my lord , mr. i. s. and his understanding them so , is in vain brought in here to countenance your making such a supposition . if you do think those words of my essay capable of such a meaning as i. s. gave them , there will appear a strange harmony between your lordship's and mr. i. s.'s understanding , when he mistakes what is said in my book : whether it will continue now mr. i. s. takes me right , i know not ; but let us come to the case as you put it . your words * are , let us put the case , that men did in earnest question whether they were men or not . your lordship says , you do not then see , if i set aside general maxims , how i can convince them that they are men. answer . and do you , my lord , see that with maxims , you can convince them of that or any thing else ? i confess , whatever you should do , i should think it scarce worth while to reason with them about any thing . i believe you are the first that ever supposed a man so much besides himself , as to question whether he were a man or no , and yet so rational , as to be thought capable of being convinced of that or any thing by discourse of reason . this , methinks , is little different from supposing a man in and out of his wits at the same time . but let us suppose your lordship so lucky with your maxims , that you do convince a man ( that doubts of it ) that he is a man ; what proof , i beseech you , my lord , is that of this proposition , that our true grounds of certainty depend upon some general principles of reason ? on the contrary , suppose it should happen , as is the more likely , that your setting upon him with your maxims cannot convince him ; are we not by this your case to take this for a proof , that general principles of reason are not the grounds of certainty ? for 't is upon the success , or not success of your endeavours , to convince such a man with maxims , that your lordship puts the proof of this proposition , that our true grounds of certainty depend upon general principles of reason : the issue whereof must remain in suspense , till you have found such a man to bring it to tryal ; and so the proof is far enough off , unless you think the case so plain , that every one sees such a man will be presently convinced by your maxims , though i should think it probable that most people may think he will not . your lordship adds , † for the way you look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary sceptical men , is by general maxims and principles of reason . answer . this indeed , is a reason why your lordship should use maxims when you have to do with such extraordinary sceptical men ; because you look on it as the likeliest way to prevail . but pray , my lord , is your looking on it as the best way to prevail on such extraordinary sceptical men , any proof , that our true grounds of certainty depend upon some general principles of reason ; for 't was to make this plain that this case was put ? farther , my lord , give me leave to ask , what have we here to do with the ways of convincing others of what they do not know , or assent to ? your lordship and i are not as , i think , disputing of the methods of perswading others of what they are ignorant of , and do not yet assent to ; but our debate here , is about the ground of certainty in what they do know , and assent to . however , you go on * to set down several maxims which you look on as most apt to prevail upon your extraordinary sceptical man , to convince him that he exists , and that he is a man. the maxims are , † that nothing can have no operations . that all different sorts of being are distinguished by essential properties . that the essential properties of a man , are to reason , discourse , &c. that these properties cannot subsist by themselves , without a real substance . i will not question whether a man cannot know , that he exists ; or be certain ( for 't is of knowledge and certainty the question here is ) that he is a man , without the help of these maxims . i will only crave leave to ask , how you know that these are maxims ? for methinks this , that the esential properties of a man are reason , discourse , &c. an imperfect proposition , with and so forth at the end of it , is a pretty sort of maxim. that therefore which i desire to be informed here , is , how your lordship knows these , or any other propositions to be maxims ; and how propositions , that are maxims , are to be distinguished from propositions that are not maxims ? and the reason why i insist upon it , is this : because this , and this only , would shew , whether what i have said in my chapter about maxims , overthrows all that has been accounted science and demonstration , and lays the foundation of scepticism . but i fear my request , that you would be pleased to tell me , what you mean by maxims , that i may know , what propositions , according to your lordship , are , and what are not maxims , will not easily be granted me : because it would presently put an end to all that you impute to me , as said , in that chapter against maxims , in a sense , that i use not the word there . your lordship * makes me , out of my book , answer to the use you make of the four above-mentioned propositions , which you call maxims , as if i were declared of an opinion , that maxims could not be of any use in arguing with others : which methinks you should not have done , if you had considered my chapter of maxims , which you so often quote , for i there say , † maxims are useful to stop the mouths of wranglers — to shew , that wrong opinions lead to absurdities , &c. your lordship nevertheless , * goes on to prove , that without the help of these principles or maxims , i cannot prove to any , that doubt it , that they are men in my way of ideas . answ. i beseech you , my lord , to give me leave to mind you again , that the question is not , what i can prove ; but whether in my way by ideas , i cannot without the help of these principles know , that i am a man ; and be certain of the truth of that , and several other propositions : i say of several other propositions . for i do not think you in your way of certainty by reason , pretend to be certain of all truths ; or to be able to prove ( to those who doubt ) all propositions , or so much as be able to convince every one of the truth of every proposition , that you your self are certain of . there be many propositions in mr. newton's excellent book , which there are thousands of people , and those a little more rational , than such as should deny themselves to be men ; whom mr. newton himself would not be able , with or without the use of maxims used in mathematicks , to convince of the truth of : and yet this would be no argument against his method of certainty , whereby he came to the knowledge , that they are true. what therefore you can conclude , as to my way of certainty , from a supposition of my not being able in my way by ideas , to convince those who doubt of it , that they are men , i do not see . but your lordship is resolved to prove that i cannot , and so you go on . . your lordship says , † that i suppose that we must have a clear and distinct idea of that we are certain of ; and this you prove out of my chapter of maxims , where i say , that every one knows the ideas that he has , and that distinctly and unconfusedly one from another . answ. i suspected all along , that you mistook what i meant by confused ideas . if your lordship pleases to turn to my chapter of distinct and confused ideas , * you will there find , that an idea , which is distinguished in the mind from all others , may yet be confused : the confusion being made by a careless application of distinct names to ideas , that are not sufficiently distinct . which having explained at large , in that chapter , i shall not need here again to repeat . only permit me to set down an instance . he that has the idea of the liquor that circulating through the heart of a sheep , keeps that animal alive , and he that has the idea of the liquor that circulates through the heart of a lobster , has two different ideas ; as distinct as an idea of an aqueous pellucid cold liquor , is from the idea of a red opaque hot liquor , but yet these two may be confounded by giving the name blood to this vital circulating liquor of a lobster . this being considered will shew , how what i have said there , may consist with my saying , that to certainty ideas are not required , that are in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct : because certainty being spoken there of the knowledge of the truth of any proposition , and propositions being made in words , it may be true , that notwithstanding all the ideas we have in our minds , are , as far as we have them there , clear and distinct ; yet those which we would suppose the terms in the proposition to stand for , may not be clear and distinct either . . by making the term stand for an uncertain idea , which we have not yet precisely determined in our minds , whereby it comes to stand sometimes for one idea , sometimes for another . which , though when we reflect on them , they are distinct in our minds , yet by this use of a name undetermined in its signification , come to be confounded . or , . by supposing the name to stand for something more than really is in the idea in our minds , which we make it a sign of , v. g. let us suppose , that a man many years since , when he was young , eat a fruit , whose shape , size , consistency and colour , he has a perfect remembrance of ; but the particular tast he has forgot , and only remembers , that it very much delighted him . this complex idea , as far as it is in his mind , 't is evident , is there ; and as far as he perceives it , when he reflects on it , is in all its parts clear and distinct ; but when he calls it a pine-apple , and will suppose , that name stands for the same precise complex idea , for which another man ( who newly eat of that fruit , and has the idea of the tast of it also fresh in his mind ) uses it , or for which he himself used it , when he had the tast fresh in his memory , 't is plain his complex idea in that part , which consists in the tast , is very obscure . to apply this to what your lordship here * makes me suppose , i answer , . i do not suppose , that to certainty it is requisite , that an idea should be in all its parts clear and distinct . i can be certain , that a pine-apple is not an artichoak , though my idea , which i suppose that name to stand for , be in me obscure and confused , in regard of its tast. . i do not deny , but on the contrary , i affirm , that i can have a clear and distinct idea of a man , ( i. e. the idea i give the name man to , may be clear and distinct ) though it should be true , that men are not yet agreed on the determined idea , that the name man shall stand for . whatever confusion there may be in the idea , to which that name is indeterminately apply'd ; i do allow and affirm , that every one if he pleases , may have a clear and distinct idea of a man to himself , i. e. which he makes the word man stand for : which , if he makes known to others in his discourse with them about man , all verbal dispute will cease , and he cannot be mistaken , when he uses the term man. and if this were but done with most of the glittering terms brandised in disputes , it would often be seen how little some men have to say , who with equivocal words and expressions , make no small noise in controversie . your lordship concludes this part , by saying , * thus you have shew'd how inconsistent my way of ideas is with true certainty , and of what use and necessity these general principles of reason are . answ. by the laws of disputation , which in another place , you express such a regard to , one is bound not to change the terms of the question . this i crave leave humbly to offer to your lordship , because , as far as i have looked into controversie , i do not remember to have met with any one so apt , shall i say , to forget or change the question as your lordship . this , my lord , i should not venture to say , but upon very good grounds , which i shall be ready to give you an account of , whenever you shall demand it of me . one example of it we have here , † you say , you have shew'd how inconsistent my way of ideas is with true certainty ; and of what use and necessity these general principles of reason are . my lord , if you please to look back to the th page , you will see , what you there promised , was , to shew the difference of my method of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainty by reason : and particularly in the pages between that and this , the certainty of principles , which you say , is one of those two things , wherein the way of certainty by reason lies . instead of that , your lordship concludes here , that you have shew'd two things . . how inconsistent my way of ideas is with true certainty . whereas it should be to shew the inconsistency or difference of my method of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainty by reason : which are two very different propositions . and before you undertake to shew , that my method of certainty , is inconsistent with true certainty ; it will be necessary for you to define , and tell us wherein true certainty consists , which your lordship hitherto has shewn no great forwardness to do . . another thing which you say , you have done , is , that you have shewn of what use and necessity these general principles of reason are . answ. whether by these general principles you mean those propositions , which you set down , p. . and call there maxims , or any other propositions , which you have not any where set down , i cannot tell . but whatsoever they are , that you mean here by these , i know not how the usefulness of these your general principles , be they what they will , came to be a question , between your lordship and me here . if you have a mind to shew any mistakes of mine in my chapter of maxims , which you say , you think extraordinary for the design of it , i shall not be unwilling to be rectified ; but that the usefulness of principles , is not what is here under debate between us , i , with submission , affirm . that which your lordship is here to prove , is , that the certainty of principles , which is the way of certainty by reason , is different from my way of certainty by ideas . upon the whole , i crave leave to say in your words , that thus i have , i humbly conceive , made it appear , that you have not shewed any difference , much less any inconsistency of my method of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainty by reason , in that first part , which you assign of certainty by reason , viz. certainty of principles . i come now to the second part , which you assign * of certainty by reason , viz. certainty of deductions . i only crave leave first to set down these words in the latter end of your discourse , which we have been considering , where your lordship says , you begin to think j. s. was in the right , when he made me say , that i had discoursed with very rational men who denyed themselves to be men answ. i do not know what may be done by those who have such a command over the pronouns they and them , as to put they themselves for they . i shall therefore desire my reader to turn to that passage of my book , and see , whether he too can be so lucky as your lordship , and can with you begin to think , that by these words , † who have actually denyed , that they , i. e. infants and changelings are men. i meant , who actually denyed , that they themselves were men. your lordship , to prove my method of certainty by ideas , to be different from , and inconsistent with your second part of the certainty by reason , which you say , lies in the certainty of deductions , begins thus : * that you come now to the certainty of reason , in making deductions ; and here you shall briefly lay down the grounds of certainty , which the ancient philosophers went upon , and then compare my way of ideas with them . to which , give me leave , my lord , to reply . ( . ) that , i humbly conceive , it should have been grounds of certainty [ in making deductions ] which the ancient philosophers went upon , or else they will be nothing to the proposition , which your lordship has undertaken here to prove . now of the certainty in making deductions , i see none of the ancients produced by your lordship , who say any thing to shew , wherein it consists , but aristotle . who , as you say , † in his method of infering one thing from another , went upon this common principle of reason , that what things agree in a third , agree among themselves . and it so falls out , that so far as he goes towards the shewing , wherein the certainty of deductions consists , he and i agree , as is evident by what i say in my essay * . and if aristotle had gon any farther to shew , how we are certain , that those two things agree with a third , he would have placed that certainty in the perception of that agreement , as i have done , and then he and i should have perfectly agreed . i presume to say , if aristotle had gon farther in this matter , he would have placed our knowledge or certainty of the agreement of any two things in the perception of their agreement . and let not any one from hence think , i attribute too much to my self , in saying , that that accute and judicious philosopher , if he had gone farther in that matter , would have done as i have done . for if he omitted it , i imagin it was not , that he did not see it , but that it was so obvious and evident , that it appear'd superfluous to name it . for who can doubt that the knowledge or being certain , that any two things agree , consists in the perception of their agreement ? what else can it possibly consist in ? it is so obvious , that it would be a little extraordinary to think , that he that went so far could miss it . and i should wonder , if any one should allow the certainty of deduction , to consist in the agreement of two things in a third , and yet should deny that the knowledge or certainty of that agreement , consisted in the perception of it . ( . ) in the next place , my lord , supposing my method of certainty , in making deductions , were different from those of the ancients ; this , at best , would be only , that which i call , * argumentum ad verecundiam ; which proves not on which side reason is , though i in modesty should answer nothing to their authorities . ( . ) the ancients , as it seems by your lordship , not agreeing one among another , about the grounds of certainty ; what can their authorities signifie in the case ? or , how will it appear , that i differ from reason , in differing from any of them , more than that they differ from reason , in differing one from another ? and therefore , after all the different authorities , produced by you , out of your great treasure of reading , the matter will at last reduce it self to this point , that your lordship should tell us , wherein the certainty of reason , in making deductions consists ; and then shew , wherein my method of making deductions , differs from it : which whether you have done or no , we shall see in what follows . your lordship closes your very learned , and to other purposes very useful , account of the opinions of the ancients , concerning certainty , with these words ; that thus you have , in as few words as you could , laid together those old methods of certainty , which have obtained greatest reputation in the world. whereupon i must crave leave to mind you again , that the proposition , you are here upon , and have undertaken to prove in this place , is concerning the certainty of deductions , and not concerning certainty in general . i say not this , that i am willing to decline the examination of my method of certainty in general , any way , or in any place : but i say it to observe , that in discourses of this nature , the laws of disputation have wisely ordered the proposition under debate , to be kept to , and that in the same terms to avoid wandring , obscurity and confusion . i therefore proceed now to consider what use your lordship makes of the ancients , against my way of certainty in general . since you think fit to make no use of them , as to the certainty of reason , in making deductions , though it is under this your second branch of certainty by reason , that you bring them in . your first objection here , * is that old one again , that my way of certainty by ideas is new . answer . your calling of it new. does not prove it to be different from that of reason : but your lordship proves it to be new † . because here [ i. e. in my way ] we have no general principles . answer . i do , as your lordship knows , own the truth and certainty of the received general maxim● ▪ and i contend for the usefulness and necessity of self-evident propositions in all certainty , whether of intuition or demonstration . what therefore those general principles are , which you have not in my way of certainty by ideas , which your lordship has in your way of certainty by reason , i beseech you to tell , and thereby to make good this assertion against me . . your lordship says , * that here [ i. e. in my way ] we have no antecedents and consequents , no syllogistical methods of demonstration . answer . if your lordship here means , that there be no antecedents and consequents in my book , or that i speak not , or allow not of syllogism as a form of argumentation , that has its use , i humbly conceive the contrary is plain . but if by here we have no antecedents and consequents , no syllogistical methods of demonstration , you mean , that i do not place certainty , in having antecedents and consequents , or in making of syllogisms , i grant i do not ; i have said syllogisms instead of your words , syllogistical methods of demonstration ; which examined , amount here to no more than syllogisms : for syllogistical methods are nothing but mode & figure , i. e. syllogisms ; and the rules of syllogisms are the same , whether the syllogisms be used in demonstration or in probability . but 't was convenient for you to say , syllogistical methods of demonstration , if you would have it thought , that certainty is placed in it : for to have named bare syllogism , without annexing demonstration to it , would have spoiled all , since every one who knows what syllogism is , knows it may as well be used in topical or fallacious arguments , as in demonstration . your lordship charges me then , that in my way by ideas , i do not place certainty , in having antecedents and consequents . and pray , my lord , do you in your way by reason do so ? if you do , this is certain , that every body has , or may have certainty in every thing he disourses about : for every one , in any discourse he makes has , or may , if he pleases , have antecedents and consequents . again , your lordship charges me , that i do not place certainty in syllogism . i crave leave to ask again ; and does your lordship ? and is this the difference between your way of certainty by reason , and my way of certainty by ideas ? why else is it objected to me , that i do not , if your lordship does not place certainty in syllogism ? and if you do , i know nothing so requisite , as that you should advise all people , women and all , to betake themselves immediately to the universities , and to the learning of logick ; to put themselves out of the dangerous state of scepticism : for there young lads , by being taught syllogism , arrive at certainty ; whereas , without mode and figure , the world is in perfect ignorance and uncertainty , and is sure of nothing . the merchant cannot be certain that his account is right cast up , nor the lady that her coach is not a wheel-barrow , nor her dairy-maid , that one and one pound of butter are two pounds of butter , and two and two four ; and all for want of mode and figure : nay , according to this rule , whoever lived before aristotle , or him , whoever it was , that first introduced syllogism , could not be certain of any thing ; no , not that there was a god , which will be the present state of the far greatest part of mankind ( to pass by whole nations of the east , as china , and indostan , &c. ) even in the christian world , who to this day have not the syllogistical methods of demonstration , and so cannot be certain of any thing . . your lordship farther says , that in my way of certainty by ideas we have no criterion . answer . to perceive the agreement or disagreement of two ideas , and not to perceive the agreement or disagreement of two ideas , is , i think , a criterion to distinguish what a man is certain of , from what he is not certain of . has your lordship any other or better criterion to distinguish certainty from uncertainty ? if you have , i repeat again my earnest request , that you would be pleased to do that right to your way of certainty by reason , as not to conceal it . if your lordship has not , why is the want of a criterion , when i have so plain a one , objected to my way of certainty , and my way so often accused of a tendency to scepticism and infidelity , when you your self have not a better ? and i think i may take the liberty to say , if yours be not the same , you have not one so good . perhaps your lordship will censure me here , and think it is more than becomes me , to press you so hard concerning your own way ; and to ask , whether your way of certainty lies in having antecedents and consequents , and syllogisms ; and whether it has any other or better criterion , than what i have given : your lordship will possibly think it enough , that you have laid down the grounds of certainty which the ancient grecians went upon . my lord , if you think so , i must be satisfied with it : though perhaps others will think it strange , that in a dispute about a method of certainty , which for its supposed coming short of certainty , you charge with a tendency to scepticism and infidelity ; you should produce only the different opinions of other men , concerning certainty , to make good this charge , without declaring any of those different opinions or grounds of certainty to be true or false : and some may be apt to suspect that you your self are not yet resolved wherein to place it . but , my lord , i know too well , what your distance above me requires of me , to say any such thing to your lordship . your own opinions are to your self , and your not discovering them , must pass for a sufficient reason for your not discovering them ; and if you think fit to over-lay a poor insant modern notion with the great and weighty names of pythagoras , plato , aristotle , plutarch , and the like ; and heaps of quotations out of the ancients , who is not presently to think it dead , and that there is an end of it ? especially , when it will have too much envy for any one to open his mouth in defence of a notion , which is declared by your lordship to be different , from what those great men , whose words are to be taken without any more ado , and who are not to be thought ignorant or mistaken in any thing . though i crave leave to say , that however infallible oracles they were , to take things barely upon their , or any man's authority , is barely to believe , but not to know or be certain . thus your lordship has sufficiently proved my way of certainty by ideas to be inconsistent with the way of certainty by reason , by proving it new ; which you prove only by saying , that it is so wholly new , that here we have no general principles ; no criterion ; no antecedents and consequents ; no syllogistical methods of demonstration : and yet we are told of a better way of certainty to be attained meerly by the help of ideas ; add if your lordship pleases , signified by words , which put into propositions , whereof some are general principles , some are or may be antecedents , and some consequents , and some put together in mode and figure , syllogistical methods of demonstration : for , pray my lord , may not words that stand for ideas , be put into propositions as well as any other ? and may not those propositions , wherein the terms stand for ideas , be as well put into antecedents and consequents , or syllogisms , and make maxims as well as any other propositions , whose terms stand not for ideas , if your lordship can find any such ? and if thus ideas can be brought into maxims , antecedents and consequents , and syllogistical methods of demonstration , what inconsistency has the way of certainty by ideas , with those ways of certainty by reason ; if at last your lordship will say , that certainty consists in propositions put together as antecedents and consequents , and in mode and figure ? for as for principles or maxims , we shall know whether your principles or maxims are a way to certainty , when you shall please to tell us , what it is , that to your lordship , makes a maxim or principle , and distinguishes it from other propositions ; and whether it be any thing but an immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of the ideas , as expressed in that proposition . to conclude , by all that your lordship has alledged out of the ancients , you have not , as i humbly conceive , proved that my way of certainty is new , or that they had any way of certainty different from mine ; much less have you proved that my way of certainty by ideas is inconsistent with the way of certainty by reason , which was the proposition to be proved . your lordship having thought it enough against my way of certainty by ideas , thus to prove its newness , you betake your self presently to your old topick of obscure and confused ideas : and asks , * but how comes there to be such a way of certainty by ideas , and yet the ideas themselves are so uncertain and obscure ? answer . no idea , as it is in the mind , is uncertain ; though to those who use names uncertainly , it may be uncertain what idea that name stands for . and as to obscure and confused ideas , no idea is so obscure in all its parts or so confounded with all other ideas but that one , who in a proposition , joins it with another in that part which is clear and distinct , may perceive its agreement or disagreement , as expressed in that proposition : though when names are used for ideas , which are in some part obscure or confounded with ideas , there can be no propositions made which can produce certainty concerning that , wherein the idea is obscure and confused . and therefore to your lordship's question , † how is it possible for us to have a clear perception of the agreement of ideas , if the ideas themselves be not clear and distinct ? i answer , very well ; because an obscure or confused idea , i. e. that is not perfectly clear and distinct in all its parts , may be compared with another in that part of it , which is clear and distinct ; which will , i humbly conceive , remove all those difficulties , inconsistencies and contradictions , which your lordship seems to be troubled with , from my words quoted in those two pages . * your lordship having , as it seems , quite forgot that you were to shew wherein the certainty of deductions , in the way of ideas , was inconsistent with the certainty of deductions , in the way of reason , brings here † a new charge upon my way of certainty , viz. that i have no criterion to distinguish false and doubtful ideas , from true and certain . your lordship says * the academicks went upon ideas , or representations of things to their minds ; and pray , my lord , does not your lordship do so too ? or has mr. i. s. so won upon your lordship , by his solid philosophy against the fancies of the ideists , that you begin to think him in the right in this too ; where he says , that notions are the materials of our knowledge ; and that a notion is the very thing it self existing in the vnderstanding ? for since i make no doubut , but that , in all your lordship's knowledge , you will allow , that you have some immediate objects of your thoughts , which are the materials of that knowledge , about which it is employed , those immediate objects , if they are not as mr. i. s. says , the very things themselves , must be ideas . not thinking your lordship therefore yet so perfect a convert of mr. i. s.'s , that you are perswaded , that as often as you think of your cathedral church , or of des cartes's vortices , that the very cathedral church at worcester , or the motion of those vortices , it self exists in your vnderstanding , when one of them never existed but in that one place at worcester , and the other never existed any where in rerum natura . i conclude , your lordship has immediate objects of your mind , which are not the very things themselves existing in your understanding ; which if with the academicks you will please to call representations , as i suppose you will , rather than with me ideas , it will make no difference . this being so , i must then make the same objection against your way of certainty by reason , that your lordship does against my way of certainty by ideas ( for upon the comparison of these two we now are ) and then i return your words here * again , viz. that you have no criterion to distinguish false and doubtful representations , from true and certain ; how then can any man be secure , that he is not imposed upon in your lordship's way of representations ? your lordship says , † i tell you of a way of certainty by ideas , and never offer any such method for examining them as the academicks required for their probability . answer . i was not , i confess , so well acquainted with what the academicks went upon for the criterion of a greater probability , as your lordship is ; or if i had , i writing , as your lordship knows , out of my own thoughts , could not well transcribe out of them . but that you should tell me , i never offer any criterion to distinguish false from true ideas , i cannot but wonder ; and therefore crave leave to beg your lordship to look again into b. . c. . of my essay ; and there , i perswade my self , you will find a criterion , whereby true and false ideas may be distinguished . your lordship brings for instance * the idea of solidity ; but what it is an instance of , i confess , i do not see : your lordship charges † on my way of certainty , that i have no criterion to distinguish false and doubtful ideas from true and certain ; which is followed * by an account you give , how the academicks examined their ideas or representations ; before they allowed them to prevail on them to give an assent , as to a greater probability . and then you tell me , † that i never offer any such method for examining them , as the academicks required for their probability ; to which your lordship subjoins these words , as for instance my first idea , which i go upon of solidity . would not one now expect , that this should be an instance to make good your lordship's charge , that i had no criterion to distinguish , whether my idea of solidity were false and doubtful , or true and certain . to shew that i have no such criterion , your lordship asks me two questions , the first * is , how my idea of solidity comes to be clear and distinct ? i will suppose for once , that i know not how it comes to be clear and distinct : how will this prove , that i have no criterion to know whether it be true or false ? for the question here is not about knowing how an idea comes to be clear and distinct ; but how i shall know whether it be true or false . but your lordship's following words seem to aim at a farther objection ; your words altogether are , how this idea [ i. e. my idea of solidity , which consists in repletion of space , with an exclusion of all other solid substances ] comes to be clear and distinct to me , when others who go in the same way of ideas , have quite an other idea of it ? my lord , i desire your lordship to name who those others are , who go in the same way of ideas with me , who have quite another idea of this my idea than i have ; for to this idea i could be sure that it , in any other writer but your lordship must here refer : but my lord , it is one of your priviledged particles , and i have nothing to say to it . but let it be so , that others have quite an other idea of it than i ; how does that prove , that i have no criterion to distinguish whether my idea of solidity be true or no ? your lordship farther adds , † that those others think that they have as plain and distinct an idea that extension and body are the same : and then your lordship asks , now what criterion is there to come to a certainty in this matter ? answer . in what matter , i beseech your lordship , if it be whether my idea of solidity be a true idea , which is the matter here in question ? in this matter i have given a criterion to know , in my essay , * if it be to decide the question , whether the word body more properly stands for the simple idea of space or for the complex idea of space and solidity together ; that is not the question here , nor can there be any other criterion to decide it by , but the propriety of our language . but your lordship adds , † ideas can have no way of certainty in themselves , if it be possible for even philosophical and rational men to fall into such contrary ideas about the same thing ; and both sides think their ideas to be clear and distinct . if this were so , i do not see how this would any way prove , that i had no criterion whereby it might be discerned , whether my idea of solidity were true or no , which was to be proved . but at last , this which your lordship calls contrary ideas about the same thing , is nothing but a difference about a name . for i think no body will say , that the idea of extension , and the idea of solidity are the same ideas : all the difference then between those philosophical and rational men , which your lordship mentions here , is no more but this , whether the simple idea of pure extension shall be called body , or whether the complex ideas of extension and solidity joined together , shall be called body ; which will be no more than a bare verbal dispute to any one , who does not take sounds for things , and make the word body something more than a sign of what the speaker would signifie by it . but what the speaker makes the term body stand for , cannot be precisely known till he has determined it in his own mind , and made it known to another ; and then there can between them be no longer a dispute about the signification of the word , v. g. if one of those philosophical rational men tells your lordship , that he makes the term body to stand precisely for the simple idea of pure extension , your lordship or he can be in no doubt or uncertainty concerning this thing ; but whenever he uses the word body , your lordship must suppose in his mind the simple idea of extension , as the thing he means by body . if on the other side another of those philosophical rational men shall tell your lordship , that he makes the term body to stand precisely for a complex idea made up of the simple ideas of extension and solidity joyned together ; your lordship or he , can be in no doubt or uncertainty concerning this thing : but whenever he uses the word body , your lordship must think on , and allow the idea belonging to it , to be that complex one . as your lordship can allow this different use of the term body in these different men , without changing any idea , or any thing in your own mind , but the application of the same term to different ideas , which changes neither the truth nor certainty of any of your lordship's ideas , from what it was before : so those two philosophical rational men , may , in discourse one with another , agree to use that term body , for either of those two ideas , which they please , without at all making their ideas , on either side , false or uncertain . but if they will contest which of these ideas the sound body ought to stand for , 't is visible their difference is not about any reality of things ; but the propriety of speech , and their dispute pute and doubt is only about the signification of a word . your lordship's second question * is , whether by this idea of solidity , we may come to know , what it is . answ. i must ask you here again , what you mean by it ? if your lordship by it means solidity , then your question runs thus : whether by this [ i. e. my ] idea of solidity , we may come to know what solidity is ? answ. without doubt , if your lordship means by the term solidity , what i mean by the term solidity ; for then i have told you what it is in the chapter above cited by your lordship : if you mean any thing else by the term solidity , when your lordship will please to tell me what you mean by it , i will tell your lordship what solidity is . this , i humbly conceive , you will find your self obliged to do , if what i have said of solidity , does not satisfie you what it is . for you will not think it reasonable , i should tell your lordship what a thing is when expressed by you in a term , which i do not know what your lordship means by , nor what you make it stand for . but your lordship asks , † wherein it consists ; if you mean wherein the idea of it consists , that i have already told your lordship , in the chapter of my essay above-mentioned . if your lordship means what is the real internal constitution , that physically makes solidity in things . if i answer i do not know , that will no more make my idea of solidity not to be true or certain ( if your lordship thinks certainty may be attributed to single ideas ) than the not knowing the physical constitution , whereby the parts of bodies are so framed as to cohere , makes my idea of cohesion not true or certain . to my saying in my essay , * that if any one ask me what this solidity is , i send him to his senses to inform him . your lordship replies , * you thought the design of my book would have sent him to his ideas for certainty ; and are we , says your lordship , sent back again from our ideas to our senses ? answ. i cannot help it , if your lordship mistakes the design of my book : for what concerns certainty , i. e. the knowledge of the truth of propositions , my book sends every one to his ideas : but for the getting of simple ideas of sensation , my book sends him only to his senses . but your lordship uses certainty here , in a sense i never used it , nor do understand it in ; for what the certainty of any simple idea is , i confess i do not know ; and shall be glad you would tell me , what you mean by it . however , in this sense you ask me , † and that as if your question carried a demonstration of my contradicting my self . and are we sent back again , from our ideas to our senses ? answ. my lord , every one is sent to his senses to get the simple ideas of sensation , because they are no other way to be got . your lordship presses on with this farther question , * what do these ideas signify then ? i. e. if a man be sent to his senses for the idea of solidity ? i answer , to shew him the certainty of propositions , wherein the agreement or disagreement of ideas is perceived , which is the certainty i speak of , and no other : but what the certainty is , which your lordship speaks of in this and the following page , * i confess i do not understand . for , your lordship adds , † that i say farther , that if this be not a sufficient explication of solidity , i promise to tell any one what it is , when he tells me , what thinking is ; or explains to me , what extension and motion are . are we not now in the true way to certainty , when such things as these are given over , of which we have the clearest evidence by sensation and reflection ? for here i make it as impossible to come to certain , clear and distinct notions of these things , as to discourse into a blind man , the ideas of light and colours . is not this a rare way of certainty ? answ. what things , my lord , i beseech you , are those which you here tell me , are given over , of which we have the clearest evidence by sensation or reflection ? 't is likely you will tell me they are extension and motion . but , my lord , i crave the liberty to say , that when you have consider'd again , you will be satisfied , there are no things given over in the case , but only the names extension and motion ; and concerning them too , nothing is given over , but a power of defining them . when you will be pleased to lay by a little the warmth of those questions of triumph , which i meet with in this passage , and tell me what things your lordship makes these names extension and motion to stand for , you perhaps will not find , that i make it impossible for those , who have their senses , to get the simple ideas , signified by these names , very clear and distinct by their senses : though i do say , that these , as well as all other names of simple ideas , cannot be defined ; nor any simple ideas be brought into our minds by words , any more , than the ideas of light and colours can be discoursed into a blind man , which is all i do say in those words of mine , which your lordship quotes , as such , wherein i have given over things , whereof we have the clearest evidence : and so from my being of opinion , that the names of simple ideas cannot be defined , nor those ideas got by any words whatsoever , which is all that i there say . your lordship very pathetically expresses your self , as if in my way , all were gone ; certainty were lost ; and if my method should be allowed , there is an end of all knowledge in the world. the reason your lordship gives * against my way of certainty is , that i here make it as impossible to come to certain clear and distinct notions of these things [ i. e. extension and motion ] as to discourse into a blind man the idea of light and colours . answ. what clear and distinct notions or ideas are , i do understand : but what your lordship means by certain notions , speaking here , as you do , of simple ideas , i must own , i do not understand . that for the attaining those simple ideas i send men to their senses , i shall think i am in the right , till i hear from your lordship better arguments to convince me of my mistake , than these . † are we not now in the true way to certainty ? is not this a rare way of certainty ? and if your lordship has a better way to get clear and distinct simple ideas , than by the senses , you will oblige me , and i think the world too , by a discovery of it . till then , i shall continue in the same mind i was of , when i writ that passage , * viz. that words can do nothing towards it , and that for the reason , which i there promised , and is to be found , essay b. . c. . § . &c. and therefore to your lordship's saying , † that thus you have shewed , that i have no security against false and uncertain ideas , no criterion to judge them by , i think i may securely reply , that with submission , thus shewing it , is no shewing it at all ; nor will ever shew , that i have no such criterion , even when we shall add your lordship's farther inference , * now here again our ideas deceive us . which supposing it a good inference from these words of mine , that most of our simple ideas are not the likenesses of things without us , yet it seems to me , to come in here , a little out of season : because the proposition to be proved is , as i humbly conceive , not that our ideas deceive us , but that i have not a criterion to distinguish true from false ideas . if it be brought to prove , that i have no criterion , i have this to say , that i neither well understand , what it is for our ideas to deceive us in the way of certainty : nor , in the best sense , that i can give it , do i see how it proves , that i have no criterion ; nor lastly , how it follows from my saying , that most of our simple ideas are not resemblances . your lordship seems by the following words * to mean , that in this way by ideas , which are confessed not to be resemblances , men are hindred , and cannot go far in the knowledge of what they desire to know of the nature of those objects , of which we have the ideas in our minds . if this should be so , what is this i beseech your lordship to your shewing that i have no criterion ? but that this is a fault in the way by ideas , i shall be convinced , when your lordship shall be pleased to shew me , how in your way of certainty by reason , we can know more of the nature of things without us ; or of that which causes these ideas or perceptions in us ? but , i humbly conceive , 't is no objection to the way of ideas , if any one will deceive himself , and expect certainty by ideas , in things where certainty is not to be had ; because he is told how knowledge or certainty is got by ideas , as far as men attain to it . and since your lordship is here comparing the ways of certainty by ideas and by reason , as two different and incosistent ways , i humbly crave leave to add , that when you can shew me any one proposition , which you have attained to a certainty of , in your way of certainty by reason , which i cannot attain to a certainty of in my way of certainty by ideas , i will acknowledge my essay to be guilty of whatever your lordship pleases . your lordship concludes . * so that these ideas are really nothing but names , if they be not representations . answ. this does not yet shew , that i have no criterion to distinguish true from false ideas , the thing that your lordship is thus shewing . for i may have a criterion to distinguish true from false ideas , though that criterion concern not names at all . for your lordship in this proposition , allowing none to be ideas , but what are representations ; the other , which you say , are nothing but names , are not concerned in the criterion , that is , to distinguish true from false ideas : because it relates to nothing but ideas , and the distinguishing of them one from another : unless true and false ideas can be any thing but ideas , i. e. ideas and not ideas at the same time . but farther , i crave leave to answer , that your lordship's proposition , viz. that these ideas are really nothing but names , if they be not the representations of things : seems to me no consequence from my words , to which it is subjoyned , though introduced with so that : for methinks it carries something like a contradiction in it , i say , most of our simple ideas of sensation , are not the likeness of something without us . your lordship infers , if so , these ideas are really nothing but names ; which , as it seems to me , is as much as to say , these ideas , that are ideas , are not ideas , but names only . methinks they might be allowed to be ideas , and that is all they pretend to be , though they do not resemble that which produces them . i cannot help thinking a son something really more than a bare name , though he has not the luck to resemble his father , who begot him : and the black and blue which i see , i cannot conclude but to be something besides the words black and blue ( wherever your lordship shall place that something , either in my perception only , or in my skin ) though it resemble not at all the stone , that with a knock produced it . should your lordship put your two hands , whereof one is hot and the other cold , into luke-warm water ; it would be hard to think , that the idea of heat produced in you by one of your hands ; and the idea of cold by the other , were the likenesses and very resemblances of something in the same water : since the same water could not be capable of having at the same time such real contrarieties . wherefore since , as 't is evident , they cannot be representations of any thing in the water , it follows by your lordship's doctrin here , that if you should declare what you feel , viz. that you feel heat and cold in that water , viz. heat by one hand , and cold by the other , you mean nothing by heat and cold ; heat and cold in the case are nothing but names ; and your lordship in truth , feels nothing but these two names . your lordship in the next place * proceeds to examine my way of demonstration . whether you do this to shew , that i have no criterion , whereby to distinguish true from false ideas ; or to shew , that my way of certainty by ideas , is inconsistent with the certainty of deductions by reason ; for these were the things you seemed to me to have undertaken to shew , and therefore to be upon in this place , does not appear : but this appears by the words wherewith you introduce † this examen , that it is to avoid doing me wrong . your lordship , as if you had been sensible , that your former discourse had led you towards doing me wrong , breaks it off of a suddain , and begins this new one of demonstration , by telling me , you will do me no wrong . can it be thought now , that you forget this promise , before you get half through your examen ? or is a mis-citing my words , and misrepresenting my sense no wrong ? your lordship in this very examen , sets down a long quotation out of my essay , and in the close you tell me . * these are my own words which your lordship has set down at large , that i may not complain that you misrepresent my sense . this one would think guaranty enough in a less man than your lordship : and yet , my lord , i must crave leave to complain , that not only my sense , but my very words are in that quotation misrepresented . to shew that my complaint is not groundless , give me leave , my lord , to set down my words as i read them in that place of my book † which your lordship quotes for them ; and as i find them here in your second letter . * if we add all the self-evident propositions , may be made about all our distinct ideas , principles will be almost infinite , at least innumerable , which men arrive to the knowledge of at different ages ; and a great many of these innate principles they never come to know all their lives . but whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later , this is true of them , that they are all known by their native evidence , are wholly independent , receive no light nor are capable of any proof , one from another , &c. by their standing thus together , the reader will without any pains see whether those your lordship has set down in your letter are my own words ; and whether in that place , which speaks only of self-evident propositions or principles , i have any thing in words or in sense like this , that our particular distinct ideas are known by their native evidence , &c. though your lordship closes the quotation with that solemn declaration above mention'd , that they are my own words , which you have set down at large that i may not complain you misrepresent my sense . and yet nothing can more misrepresent my sense than they do , applying all that to particular ideas , which i speak there only of self-evident propositions or principles ; and that so plainly , that i think , i may venture any one's mistaking it in my own words : and upon this misrepresentation of my sense , your lordship raises a discourse , and manages a dispute for , i think , a dozen pages * following , against my placing demonstration on self-evident ideas ; though self-evident ideas are things wholly unknown to me , and are no where in my book , nor were ever in my thoughts . but let us come to your exceptions against my way of demonstration , which your lordship is pleased to call † demonstration without principles . answer . if you mean by principles self-evident propositions , then you know my demonstration is not without principles , in that sense of the term principles : for your lordship in the next page * blames my way , because i suppose every intermediate idea in demonstration to have a self-evident connection with the other idea ; for two such ideas as have a self-evident connection , joined together in a proposition , make a self-evident proposition . if your lordship means by principles , those which in the place † there quoted by your lordship ; i mean , viz. whatever is , is ; and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ; and such other general propositions , as are received under the name of maxims ; i grant , that i do say , that they are not absolutely requisite in every demonstration : and i think , i have shewn , that there be demonstrations , which may be made without them ; though i do not , that i remember , say , that they are excluded , and cannot be made use of in demonstration . your lordship's first argument * against my way of demonstration is , that it must suppose self-evidence must be in the ideas of my mind ; and that every intermediate idea , which i take to demonstrate any thing by , must have a self-evident connection with the others . answer . taking self-evidence in the ideas of the mind , to mean in the perceived agreement or disagreement of ideas in the mind ; i grant , i do not only suppose , but say so . to prove it not to be so in demonstration , your lordship says , † that it is such a way of demonstration , as the old philosophers never thought of . answer . no body , i think , will question , that your lordship is very well read in the old philosophers : but he that will answer for what the old philosophers ▪ ever did , or did not think of , must not only understand their extant writings better than any man ever did ; but must have ways to know their thoughts , that other men have not . for all of them thought more than they writ ; some of them writ not at all , and others writ a great deal more than ever came to us . but if it should happen that any of them placed the proof of any proposition in the agreement of two things in a third , as i think some of them did , than it will , i humbly conceive appear , that they did think of my way of demonstration ; unless your lordship can shew , that they could see that two things agreed in a third , without perceiving their agreement with that third ; and if they did in every syllogism of a demonstration perceive that agreement , then there was a self-evident connection , which is that which your lordship says they never thought of . but supposing they never thought of it , must we put out our eyes , and not see whatever they overlooked ? are all the discoveries made by galileo , my lord bacon , mr. boyle , and mr. newton , &c. to be rejected as false , because they teach us what the old philosophers never thought of ? mistake me not , my lord , in thinking that i have the vanity here to rank my self , on this occasion , with these great discoverers of truth , and advancers of knowledge . on the contrary , i contend , that my way of certainty , my way of demonstration , which your lordship so often condemns for its newness , is not new ; but is the very same that has always been used , both by ancients and moderns : i am only considering here your lordship's argument , of never having been thought of by the old philosophers ; which is an argument that will make nothing for or against the truth of any proposition advanced by a modern writer , till your lordship has proved , that those old philosophers ( let the happy age of old philosophers determine where your lordship pleases ) did discover all truth , or that they had the sole priviledge to search after it , and besides them no body was to study nature , no body was to think or reason for himself ; but every one was to be barely a reading philosopher , with an implicit faith. your objection in the next words , * that then every demonstration carries its own light with it , shews that your way by reason is what i do not understand . for this i thought heretofore , was the property of demonstration , and not a proof that it was not a demonstration , that it carried its own light with it : but yet though in every demonstration , there is a self-evident connection of the ideas , by which it is made ; yet that it does not follow from thence , as your lordship here objects , that then every demonstration would be as clear and unquestionable as that two and two make four , your lordship may see in the same chapter , † and the reason of it . you seem in the following words to allow , that there is such a connection of the intermediate ideas in mathematical demonstrations : but say , * you should be glad to see any demonstration ( not about figures and numbers ) of this kind . and if that be a good argument against it , i crave leave to use it too on my side ; and to say , that i would be glad to see any demonstration ( not about figures and numbers ) not of this kind , i. e. wherein there is not a self-evident connection of all the intermediate ideas . if you have any such , i earnestly beg your lordship to favour me with it ; for i crave liberty to say , that the reason , and form , and way of evidence , in demonstration , where-ever there is demonstration , is always the same . but you say , † this is a quite different case from mine : i suppose your lordship means by this , mathematical demonstration , the thing mention'd in the preceding period . and then your sense will run thus , mathematical demonstrations , wherein certainty is to be had by the intuition of the self-evident connection of all the intermediate ideas , are different from that demonstration which i am there treating of . if you mean not so , i must own , i know not what you mean by saying , this is a quite different case from mine . and if your lordship does mean so , i do not see how it can be so as you say , your words taken all together run thus , † my principal ground is from mathematical demonstrations , and my examples are brought from them . but this is quite a different case from mine , i. e. i am speaking in that chapter of my essay concerning demonstration in general , and the certainty we have by it : the examples i use are brought from mathematicks , and yet you say , mathematical demonstrations are quite a different case from mine . if i here misunderstand your lordship 's this , i must beg your pardon for it ; it is one of your priviledg'd particles , and i am not master of it . misrepresent your sense i cannot , for your very words are set down , and let the reader judge . but your lordship gives a reason for what you had said in these words subjoined , * where you say , i grant that those ideas on which mathematical demonstrations proceed are wholly in the mind , and do not relate to the existence of things ; but our debate goes upon a certainty of knowledge of things as really existing . in which words there are these things remarkable . . that your lordship's exception here is against what i have said concerning demonstration in my essay , and not against any thing i have said in either of my letters to your lordship . if therefore your lordship and i have , since in our letters , had any debate about the certainty of the knowledge of things as really existing , that which was writ before that debate , could have no relation to it , nor be limitted by it . if therefore your lordship makes any exception ( as you do ) to my way of demonstration , as proposed in my essay , you must , as i humbly conceive , take it as deliver'd there , comprehending mathematical demonstrations , which cannot be excluded , because your lordship says , our debate now goes upon a certainty of the knowledge of things as really existing , supposing mathematical demonstrations , did not afford a certainty of knowledge of things as really existing . . but in the next place , mathematical demonstrations do afford a certainty of the knowledge of things as really existing , as much as any other demonstrations whatsoever ; and therefore they afford your lordship no ground upon that account to separate them , as you do here , from demonstrations in other subjects . your lordship indeed thinks i have given you sufficient grounds to charge me with the contrary : for you say , * i grant that those ideas on which mathematical demonstrations proceed are wholly in the mind ; this indeed i grant , and do not relate to the existence of things ; but these later words i do not remember , that i any where say . and i wish you had quoted the place where i grant any such thing ; i am sure it is not in that place , where it is likeliest to be found , i mean where i examine , whether the knowledge we have of mathematical truths , be the knowledge of things as really existing : there , † i say ( and i think i have proved ) that it is , though it consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , that are only in the mind : because it takes in all those things really existing , which answer those ideas . upon which ground it was , that i there * affirmed moral knowledge , also capable of certainty . and pray , my lord , what other way can your lordship proceed , in any demonstration you would make , about any other thing but figures and numbers , but the same that you do in demonstrations about figures and numbers ? if you would demonstrate any thing concerning man or murder , must you not first settle in your mind the idea or notion you have of that animal or that action , and then shew what you would demonstrate necessarily to belong to that idea in your mind , and to things existing only as they correspond with , and answer that idea in your mind ? how else you can make any general proposition , that shall contain the knowledge of things as really existing , i that am ignorant , should be glad to learn , when your lordship shall do me the favour to shew me any such . in the mean time there is no reason why you should except demonstrations about figures and numbers , from demonstrations about other subjects , upon the account that i grant , that those ideas on which mathematical demonstrations proceed , are wholly in the mind , when i say the same of all other demonstrations . for the ideas that other demonstrations proceed on , are wholly in the mind : and no demonstration whatsoever concerns things as really existing any farther , than as they correspond with , and answer those ideas in the mind , which the demonstration proceeds on . this distinction therefore here of your lordship's , between mathematical and other demonstrations , having no foundation , your inference founded on it falls with it , viz. * so that although we should grant all , that i say about the intuition of ideas in mathematical demonstrations , yet it comes not at all to my business , unless i can prove , that we have as clear and distinct ideas of beings , as we have of numbers and figures . though how beings here and numbers and figures come to be opposed against one another , i shall not be able to conceive , till i am better instructed , than hitherto i am , that numbers and figures are no beings ; and that the mathematicians and philosophers , old ones and all , have , in all the pains taken about them ; imploy'd their thoughts about nothing . and i would be glad to know what those things are , which your lordship says our debate goes upon here as really existing , that are beings more then numbers and figures . your lordship's next exception against my way of demonstration is , * that in it i am inconsistent with my self . for proof of it , you say i design to prove demonstrations without general principles ; and yet every one knows that general principles are supposed in mathematicks . answ. every one may know that general principles are supposed in mathematicks without knowing , or ever being able to know , that i who say also that mathematicians do often make use of them , am inconsistent with my self , though i also say , that a demonstration about numbers and figures may be made without them . to prove me inconsistent with my self , you add : † and that person would be thought ridiculous , who should go about to prove , that general principles are of little , or of dangerous use in mathematical demonstrations . answ. a man may make other ridiculous faults in writing , besides inconsistency , and there are instances enough of it : but by good luck i am in this place clear of what would be thought ridiculous , which yet is no proof of inconsistency . for i never went about to prove , that general principles are of little or dangerous use in mathematical demonstrations . to prove me inconsistent with my self , your lordship uses * one argument more , and that is , that i confess that the way of demonstration in morality , is from principles , as those of mathematicks by necessary consequences . answ. with submission , my lord , i do not say in the place quoted by your lordship , † that the way of demonstration in morality is from principles , as those of the mathematicks by necessary consequences . but this is that which i say . that i doubt not but in morality from principles , as incontestable as those of the mathematicks by necessary consequences , the measures of right and wrong might be made out . which words , i humbly conceive , have no inconsistency with my saying , there may be demonstrations without the help of maxims : whatever inconsistency the words which you here set down for mine , may have with it . my lord , the words you bring out of my book , are so often different , from those i read in the places which you refer to , that i am sometimes ready to think , you have got some strange copy of it , whereof i know nothing , since it so seldom agrees with mine . pardon me , my lord , if with some care i examin the objection of inconsistency with my self , that if i find any , i may retract one part or the other of it . humane frailty i grant , and variety of thoughts in long discourses , may make a man unwittingly advance inconsistencies . this may consist with ingenuity , and deserve to be excused . but for any one to persist in it , when it is shewed him , is to give himself the lye , which cannot but stick closer to him in the sense of all rational men , than if he received it from another . i own , i have said , in my essay , that there be demonstrations , which may be made without those general maxims , that i there treated of . but i cannot recollect , that i ever said , that those general maxims could not be made use of in demonstration : for they are no more shut out of my way of demonstration , than any other self-evident propositions . and therefore there is no inconsistency in those two propositions , which are mine , viz. some demonstrations may be made without the help of those general maxims . and morality , i doubt not , may be demonstrated from principles , whatever inconsistency may be in these two following propositions , which are your lordship's , * and not mine , viz. the way of demonstration in morality is from principles , and general maxims are not the way to proceed on in demonstration , as to other parts of knowledge . for to admit self-evident propositions , which is what i mean by principles , in the place of my essay , † which your lordship quotes for the first of my inconsistent propositions , and to say ( as i do in the other place quoted by your lordship ) * that those magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge has no manner of inconsistency . for though i think them not necessary to every demonstration , so neither do i exclude them any more , than other self-evident propositions out of any demonstration , wherein any one should make use of them . the next objection † against my way of demonstration , from my placing demonstration on the self evidence of ideas , having been already answer'd , i shall need to say nothing in defence of it ; or in answer to any thing raised against it , in your twelve or thirteen following pages upon that topick . but that your lordship may not think , i do not pay a due respect to all that you say , i shall not wholly pass those pages over in silence . . your lordship says , † that i confess that some of the most obvious ideas are far from being self-evident . answ. supposing i did say so , how , i beseech your lordship , does it prove , that it is impossible to come to a demonstration about real beings , in this way of intuition by ideas ? which is the proposition you promise * to make appear , and you bring this as the first reason to make it appear . for should i confess a thousand times over , that some of the most obvious ideas , are far from being self-evident : and should i , which i do not , make self-evident ideas necessary to demonstration , how will it thence follow , that it is impossible to come to a demonstration , & c ? since though i should confess some of the most obvious ideas not to be self-evident ; yet my confession being but of some , it will not follow from my confession , but that there may be also some self-evident ; and so still it might be possible to come to demonstration by intuition , because some in my use of the word never signifies all . in the next place , give me leave to ask , where it is that i confess , that some ideas are not self-evident ? nay , where it is , that i once mention any such thing as a self-evident idea ? for self-evident is an epithite , that i do not remember i ever gave to any idea ; or thought belonged at all to ideas . in all the places you have produced out of my essay , concerning matter , motion , time , duration and light ; which are those ideas your lordship is pleased to instance in , to prove , that i have confessed it of some , i crave leave humbly to offer it to your lordship , that there is not any such confession . however you go on to prove it . the proposition then to be proved , is , that i confess , that these are far from being self-evident ideas . 't is necessary to set it down and carry it in our minds , for the proposition to be proved , is , i find , a very slippery thing , and apt to slide out of the way . your lordship's proof is , * that according to me , we can have no intuition of these things which are so obvious to us , and consequently we can have no self-evident ideas of them . the force of which proof , i confess , i do not understand . we have no intuition of the obvious thing matter , and the obvious thing motion , ergo , we have no self-evident ideas of them . granting that they are obvious things , and that obvious as they are , we have as you express it , no intuition of them , it will not follow from thence , that we have no intuition of the ideas we signify by the names matter and motion , and so have no self-evident ideas of them . for whoever has in his mind an idea , which he makes the name matter or motion stand for , has no doubt that idea there , and sees or has in your phrase an intuition of it there , and so has a self-evident idea of it , if intuition , according to your lordship , makes a self-evident idea ( for of self-evident ideas , as i have before remarked , i have said nothing nor made any such distinction as self-evident and not self-evident ideas ) and if intuition of an idea does not make a self-evident idea , the want of it is in vain brought here to prove the idea of matter or motion not self-evident . but your lordship proceeds to instances , and your first instance is in matter ; and here for fear of mistaking , let us remember what the proposition to be proved is , viz. that according to me , we have no intuition , as you call it , of the idea of matter . your lordship begins and tells me , * that i give this account of the idea of matter , that it consists in a solid substance , every where the same . whereupon you tell me , † you would be glad to come to a certain knowledge of these two things ; first , the manner of the cohesion of the parts of matter , and ‖ the demonstration of the divisibility of it in the way of ideas . answer . it happened just as i feared , the proposition to be proved is slip'd already quite out of sight : you own that i say matter is a solid substance , every where the same . this idea , which is the idea i signifie by the word matter , i have in my mind , and have an intuition of it there : how then does this prove , that according to me , there can be no intuition of the idea of matter ? leaving therefore this proposition , which was to be proved , you bring † places out of my book to shew , that we do not know wherein the union and cohesion of the parts of matter consists ; and that the divisibility of matter involves us in difficulties , neither of which either is , or proves , that , according to me , we cannot have an intuition of the idea of matter , which was the proposition to be proved , and seems quite forgotten during the three following pages , wholly imploied upon this instance of matter . you ask indeed , * whether i can imagine , that we have intuition into the idea of matter ? but those words seem to me to signifie quite another thing , than having an intuition of the idea of matter , as appears by your explication of them in these words subjoined , † or that it is possible to come to a demonstration about it , by the help of any intervening ideas ; whereby it seems to me plain , that by intuition into it , your lordship means demonstration about it , i. e. some knowledge concerning matter , and not a bare view or intuition of the idea you have of it : and that your lordship speaks of knowledge concerning some affection of matter in this , and the following question ; and not of the bare intuition of the idea of matter , is farther evident from the introduction of your two questions , † wherein you say , there are two things concerning matter , that you would be glad to come to a certain knowledge of . so that all that can follow , or in your sense of them does follow from my words quoted by you , is , that i own , that the cohesion of its parts is an affection of matter , that is hard to be explained ; but from them it can neither be infer'd , nor does your lordship attempt to infer , that any one cannot view or have an intuition of the idea he has in his own mind , which he signifies to others by the word matter ; and that you did not make any such inference from them is farther plain , by your asking , in the place above quoted , not only whether i can imagine , that it is possible to come to a demonstration about it ? but your lordship also adds , by the help of any intervening ideas ? for i do not think you demand a demonstration by the help of intervening ideas , to make you to see , i. e. have an intuition of your own idea of matter . it would mis-become me to understand your lordship in so strange a sense ; for then you might have just occasion to ask me again , whether i could think you a man of so little sense ? i therefore suppose , as your words import , that you demand a demonstration by the help of intervening ideas to shew you , how the parts of that thing , which you represent to your self by that idea , to which you give the name matter , cohere together ; which is nothing to the question of the intuition of the idea , though to cover the change of the question , as dextrously as might be , intuition of the idea , is changed into intuition into the idea ; as if there were no difference between looking upon a watch , and looking into a watch , i. e. between the idea , that taken from an obvious view , i signifie by the name watch , and have in my mind when i use the word watch ; and the being able to resolve any question that may be proposed to me , concerning the inward make and contrivance of a watch. the idea which taken from the outward visible parts , i give the name watch to , the idea i perceive or have an intuition of , in my mind equally , whether or no i know any thing more of a watch , than what is represented in that idea . upon this change of the question , all that follows to the bottom of the next page * being to shew , that from what i say it follows , that there be many difficulties concerning matter , which i cannot resolve ; many questions concerning it , which i think cannot be demonstratively decided ; and not to shew , that any one cannot perceive , or have an intuition , as you call it , of his own idea of matter : i think i need not trouble your lordship with an answer to it . in this one instance of matter , you have been pleased to ask me two hard questions . to shorten your trouble concerning this business of intuition of ideas , will you , my lord , give me leave to ask you this one easie question concerning all your four instances , matter , motion , duration , and light , viz. what you mean by these four words ? that your lordship may not suspect it to be either captious or impertinent , i will tell you the use i shall make of it : if your lordship tell me what you mean by these names , i shall presently reply , that there then are the ideas that you have of them in your mind ; and 't is plain you see or have an intuition of them , as they are in your mind , or as i should have expressed it , perceive them as they are there ; because you can tell them to an other . and so it is with every one , who can tell what he means by those words ; and therefore to all such ( amongst which i crave leave to be one ) there can be no doubt of the intuition of those ideas . but if your lordship will not tell me what you mean by these terms , i fear you will be thought to use very hard measure in disputing , by demanding to be satisfied concerning questions put in terms , which you your self cannot tell the meaning of . this consider'd will perhaps serve to shew , that all that you say in the following paragraphs , to n. . p. . contains nothing against intuition of ideas , which is what you are upon , though it be no notion of mine ; much less does it contain any thing against my way of demonstration by ideas ; which is the point under proof . for . what your lordship has said about the idea of matter , hath been considered already . . from motion , which is your second instance , your argument stands thus , * that because i say , the definitions i meet with of motion are insignificant , therefore the idea fails us . this seems to me a strange consequence ; and all one , as to say , that a deaf and dumb man , because he could not understand the words used in the definitions , that are given of motion , therefore he could not have the idea of motion , or the idea of motion failed him . and yet this consequence , as foreign as it is to that antecedent , is forced from it , to no purpose : the proposition to be inser'd being this , that then we can have no intuition of the idea of motion . . as to time , though the intuition of the idea of time be not my way of speaking , yet what your lordship here infers from my words , granting it to be a right inference , with submission , proves nothing against the intuition of that idea . the proposition to be proved , is , that we can have no intuition of the idea of time ; and the proposition which from my words you infer , † is , that we have not the knowledge of the idea of time by intuition , but by rational deduction ; what can be more remote than these two propositions ? the one of them signifying ( if it signifies any thing ) the view the mind has of it ; the other , as i guess , the original and rise of it . for what it is to have the knowledge of an idea , not by intuition , but by deduction of reason , i confess , i do not well understand ; only i am sure , in terms it is not the same with having the intuition of an idea : but if changing of terms were not some mens priviledge , perhaps so much controversie would not be written . the meaning of either of these propositions , i concern not my self about ; for neither of them is mine . i only here shew , that you do not prove the proposition , that you your self framed , and undertook to prove . since , my lord , you are so favourable to me , as to seem willing to correct whatever you can find any way amiss in my essay : therefore i shall endeavour to satisfie you concerning the rise of our idea of duration from the succession of ideas in our minds . against this , though it be nothing to the matter in hand , you object , that * some people reckoned succession of time right by knots , and notches , and figures , without ever thinking of ideas . answer . 't is certain , that men , who wanted better ways , might by knots or notches , keep accounts of the numbers of certain stated lengths of time , as well as of the numbers of men in their country , or of any other numbers ; and that too without ever considering the immediate objects of their thoughts under the name of ideas : but that they should count time without ever thinking of something , is very hard to me to conceive ; and the things they thought on , or were present in their minds , when they thought , are what i call ideas ; thus much in answer to what your lordship says . but to any one , that shall put the objection stronger , and say , many have had the idea of time , who never reflected on the constant train of ideas , succeeding one another in their minds , whilst waking , i grant it ; but add , that want of reflection makes not any thing cease to be : if it did , many mens actions would have no cause , nor rise , nor manner ; because many men never reflect so far on their own actions , as to consider what they are bottomed on , or how they are performed . a man may measure duration by motion , of which he has no other idea , but of a constant succession of ideas in train ; and yet never reflect on that succession of ideas in his mind . a man may guess at the length of his stay by himself in the dark ; here is no succession to measure by , but that of his own thoughts ; and without some succession , i think there is no measure of duration . but though in this case , he measures the length of the duration by the train of his ideas , yet he may never reflect on that , but conclude he does it he knows not how . you add , † but besides , such arbitrary measures of time , what need any recourse to ideas , when the returns of days , and months , and years , by the planetary motions , are so easie and so universal ? * such here , as i suppose , refers to the knots , and notches , and figures before mentioned : if it does not , i know not what it refers to ; and if it does , it makes those knots and notches measures of time , which i humbly conceive they were not , but only arbitrary ways of recording ( as all other ways of recording are ) certain numbers of known lenghts of time : for tho' any one sets down by arbitrary marks , as notches on a stick , or strokes of chalk on a trenchard , or figures on paper , the number of yards of cloth , or pints of milk that are delivered to a customer ; yet , i suppose , no body thinks , that the cloth or milk were measured by those notches , strokes of chalk or figures , which therefore are by no means the arbitrary measures of those things . but what this is against , i confess i do not see : this i am sure , it is not against any thing i have said . for , as i remember , i have said ( though not the planetary motions yet ) that the motions of the sun and the moon , are the best measures of time. but if you mean , that the idea of duration is rather taken from the planetary motions , than from the succession of ideas in our minds , i crave leave to doubt of that : because motion no other way discovers it self to us , but by a succession of ideas . your next argument against my thinking the idea of time to be derived from the train of ideas , succeeding one another in our minds , is , that your lordship * thinks the contrary . this , i must own , is an argument by way of authority , and i humbly submit to it , though i think such arguments produce no certainty , either in my way of certainty by ideas , or in your way of certainty by reason . . as to your fourth instance , you having set down † my exceptions to the peripatetick and cartesian definitions of light you subjoin this question . and is this a self-evident idea of light ? i beg leave to answer in the same way by a question , and whoever said or thought , that it was , or meant that it should be ? he must have a strange notion of self-evident ideas , let them be what they will ( for i know them not ) who can think , that the shewing others definitions of light to be unintelligible , is a self-evident idea of light. but farther , my lord , what i beseech you has a self-evident idea of light to do here ? i thought in this your instance of light , you were making good what you undertook * to prove from my self that we can have no intuition of light. but because that perhaps would have sounded pretty odly , you thought fit ( which i with all submission crave leave sometimes to take notice of ) to change the question ; but the misfortune is , that put as it is , not concerning our intuition , but the self-evidence of the idea of light , the one is no better proved than the other : and yet your lordship concludes this your first head according to your usual form . † thus we have seen what account the author of the essay himself has given of these self-evident ideas , which are the ground-work of demonstration . with submission , my lord , he must have good eyes , who has seen an account i have given in my essay of self-evident ideas , when neither in all that your lordship has quoted out of it , no nor in my whole essay , self-evident ideas are so much as once mentioned . and where the account i have given of a thing , which i never thought upon , is to be seen , i cannot imagine . what your lordship farther tells me concerning them , viz. that self-evident ideas are the ground-work of demonstration , i also assure you is perfect news to me , which i never met with any where , but in your lordship . though if i had made them the ground-work of demonstration , as you say , i think they might remain so , notwithstanding any thing your lordship has produced to the contrary . we are now come to your second head , † where i expected to have found this consequence made good . that there may be contradictory opinions about ideas , which i account most clear and distinct , ergo , it is impossible to come to a demonstration about real beings in the way of intuition of ideas . for this you told me * was your second reason to prove this proposition . this consequence your lordship , it seems , looks upon as so clear , that it needs no proof ; i can find none here † where you take it up again . to prove something , you say , suppose an idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinct , and others should think the contrary to be so ? in obedience to your lordship i do suppose it . but , when it is supposed , will that make good the above-mentioned consequence ? you your self , my lord , do not so much as pretend it ; but in this question subjoined , ‖ what hopes of demonstration by clear and distinct ideas then ? infer a quite different proposition . for , it is impossible to come to a demonstration about real beings in the way of intuition of ideas . and , there is no hopes of demonstration by clear and distinct ideas , appear to me two very different propositions . there appears something to me yet more incomprehensible in your way of manageing this argument here . your reason is , as we have seen in these words , there may be contradictory opinions about some ideas , that i account most clear and distinct : and your instance of it is in these words , suppose an idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinct , and others should think the contrary to be so . answ. so they may without having any contradictory opinions about any idea , that i account most clear and distinct . a man may think his idea of heat to be clear and distinct , and another may think his idea of cold ( which i take to be the contrary idea to that of heat ) to be clear and distinct , and be both in the right , without the least appearance of any contradictory opinions . all therefore , that your lordship says , in the remaining part of this* paragraph , having nothing in it of contradictory opinions about ideas that i think most clear , serves not at all to make good your second reason . the truth is , all that you say here concerning des cartes's idea of space , and another man's idea of space amounts to no more but this , that different men may signifie different ideas by the same name ; and will never fix on me , what your lordship would perswade the world i say , that both parts of a contradiction may be true . though i do say , that in such a loose use of the terms body and vacuum it may be demonstrated , both that there is , and is not a vacuum : which is a contradiction in words , and is apt to impose , as if it were so in sense , on those who mistake words for things , who are a kind of reasoners , whereof i perceive there is a greater number than i thought there had been . all that i have said in that place quoted by your lordship , † is nothing , but to shew the danger of relying upon maxims , without a careful guard upon the use of words , without which they will serve to make demonstrations on both sides . that this is so , i dare appeal to any reader , should your lordship press me again , as you do here , with all the force of these words , * say you so ? what! demonstrations on both sides ? and in the way of ideas too ? this is extraordinary indeed . that all the opposition between des cartes and those others , is only about the naming of ideas , i think may be made appear from these words of your lordship in the next paragraph , † in the ideas of space and body , the question supposed is whether they be the same or no. that this is a question only about names , and not about ideas themselves , is evident from hence , that no body can doubt whether the single idea of pure distance , and the two ideas of distance and solidity are one and the same idea or different ideas , any more than he can doubt , whether one and two are different . the question then in the case , is not whether extension considered separately by it self , or extension and solidity together be the same idea or no ; but whether the simple idea of extension alone shall be called body , or the complex idea of solidity and extension together , shall be called body . for that these ideas themselves are different , i think i need not go about to prove to any one , who ever thought of emptiness or fulness ; for whether in the fact , the bottle in a man's hand be empty or no , or can by him be emptied or no , this , i think , is plain , that his idea of fulness , and his idea of emptiness are not the same . this the very dispute concerning a vacuum supposes ; for if mens idea of pure space were not different from their idea of solidity and space together , they could never so far separate them in their thoughts , as to make a question , whether they did always exist together , any more than they could question , whether the same thing existed with it self . motion cannot be separated in existence from space : and yet no body ever took the idea of space and the idea of motion to be the same . solidity likewise cannot exist without space ; but will any one from thence say , the idea of solidity and the idea of space are one and the same ? your lordship's third reason to prove , that it is impossible to come to a demonstration about real beings in this way of intuition of ideas , is , * that granting the ideas to be true , there is no self-evidence of the connection of them which is necessary to make a demonstration . this , i must own , is to me as incomprehensible a consequence as the former : as also is that which your lordship says † to make it out , which i shall set down in your own words , that its force may be left entire to the reader ; but granting the ideas to be true , yet when their connection is not self-evident , then an intermediate idea must compleat the demonstration : but how doth it appear , that this middle idea is self-evidently connected with them ? for 't is said , if that intermediate idea be non known by intuition , that must need a proof ; and so there can be no demonstration ; which your lordship is very apt to believe in this way of ideas ; unless ideas get more light by being put between two others . whatever there be in these words to prove the proposition in question , i leave the reader to find out ; but that he may not be led into a mistake , that there is any thing in my words , that may be serviceable to it , i must crave leave to acquaint him , that these words set down by your lordship , as out of my essay , * are not to be found in that place , nor any where in my book , or any thing to this purpose , that the intermediate idea is to be known by intuition ; but this , that there must be an intuitive knowledge or perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate idea with those , whose agreement or disagreement by its intervention it demonstrates . leaving therefore all that your lordship brings out of gassendus , the cartesians , morinus , and bernier , in their argument from motion , for or against a vacuum , as not being at all concerned in it ; i shall only crave leave to observe , that you seem to make use here of the same way of argumentation , which i think i may call your main , if not only one , it occurs so often , viz. that when i have said any thing to shew , wherein certainty or demonstration , &c. consists , you think it sufficiently overthrown , if you can produce any instance out of my book , of any thing advanced by me , which comes short of certainty or demonstration : whereas , my lord , i humbly conceive , it is no proof against my notion of certainty , or my way of demonstration , that i cannot attain to them in all cases . i only tell wherein they consist , where-ever they are ; but if i miss of either of them , either by reason of the nature of the subject , or by inadvertency in my way of proof , that is no objection to the truth of my notions of them : for i never undertook that my way of certainty or demonstration , if it ought to be called my way , should make me or any one omniscient or infallible . that which makes it necessary for me here again to take notice of this your way of reasoning , is the question wherewith you wind up the account you have given of the dispute of the parties above named about a vacuum , † and is it possible to imagin , that there should be a self-evident connection in the case ? answer . it concerns not me to examine , whether , or on which side , in that dispute , such a self evident connection is , or is not possible . but this i take the liberty to say , that where-ever it is not , there is no demonstration , whether it be the cartesians or the gassendists that failed in this point . and i humbly conceive , that to conclude from any one's failing in this , or any other case , of a self-evident connection in each step of his proof , that therefore it is not necessary in demonstration , is a conclusion without grounds , and a way of arguing that proves nothing . in the next paragraph * you come to wind up the argument , which you have been so long upon , viz. to make good what you undertook , † i e. to shew the difference of my method of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainty by reason . in answer to my saying , i can find no opposition between them ; which opposition , according to the account you give of it , after forty pages spent in it , amounts at last to this : ( . ) that * i affirm , that general principles and maxims of reason , are of little or no use ; and your lordship says , they are of very great use , and the only proper foundations of certainty . to which i crave leave to say , that if by principles and maxims , your lordship means all self-evident propositions , our ways are even in this part the same ; for as you know , may lord , i make self-evident propositions necessary to certainty , and found all certainty only in them . if by principles and maxims , you mean a select number of self-evident propositions , distinguished from the rest by the name maxims , which is the sense in which i use the term maxims in my essay ; then to bring it to a decision , which of us two , in this point , is in the right , it will be necessary for your lordship to give a list of those maxims ; and then to shew , that a man can be certain of no truth , without the help of those maxims . for to affirm maxims to be the only foundations of certainty , and yet not to tell , which are those maxims ; or how they may be known , is , i humbly conceive , so far from laying any sure grounds of certainty , that it leaves even the very foundations of it uncertain . when your lordship has thus setled the grounds of your way of certainty by reason , one may be able to examine , whether it be truly the way of reason , and how far my way of certainty by ideas differs from it . the second difference that you assign * between my way of certainty by ideas , and yours by reason , is , that i say , that demonstration is by way of intuition of ideas , and that reason is only the faculty imploy'd in discovering and comparing ideas with themselves , or with others intervening ; and that this is the only way of certainty . whereas your lordship affirms , and , as you say , have proved , that there can be no demonstration by intuition of ideas ; but that all the certainty we can attain to , is from general principles of reason , and necessary deductions made from them . answ. i have said , that demonstration consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate idea with those , whose agreement or disagreement it is to shew , in each step of the demonstration : and if you will say this is different from the way of demonstration by reason , it will then be to the point above-mentioned , which you have been so long upon . if this be your meaning here , it seems pretty strangely expressed , and remains to be proved : but if any thing else be your meaning , that meaning not being the proposition to be proved , it matters not whether you have proved it or no. your lordship farther says here , * that all the certainty we can attain to , is from general principles of reason , and necessary deductions made from them . this , you say , you have proved . what has been proved ; is to be seen in what has been already consider'd . but if your proof , that all the certainty we can attain to , is from general principles of reason , and necessary deductions made from them , were as clear and cogent , as it seems to me the contrary , this will not reach to the point in debate , till your lordship has proved , that this is opposite to my way of certainty by ideas . 't is strange ( and perhaps to some-may be matter of thought ) that in an argument , wherein you lay so much stress on maxims , general principles of reason , and necessary deductions from them , you should never once tell us , what , in your account , a maxim or general principle of reason is , nor the marks it is to be known by ; nor offer to shew what a necessary deduction , is , nor how it is to be made , or may be known . for i have seen men please themselves with deductions upon deductions ; and spin consequences , it matter'd not whether out of their own or other men's thoughts , which , when looked into , were visibly nothing but meer ropes of sand. 't is true , your lordship says , † you now come to certainty of reason by deductions . but when all that truly learned discourse , which follows , is read over and over again , i would be glad to be told , what it is your lordship calls a necessary deduction ; and by what criterion you distinguish it from such deductions , as come short of certainty , or even of truth it self . i confess i have read over those pages more than once , and can find no such criterion laid down in them , by your lordship ; though a criterion be there much talked of . but whether it be my want of capacity for your way of writing , that makes me not find any light given by your lordship into this matter : or whether in truth you have not shewed , wherein , what you call a necessary deduction consists , and how it may be known from what is not so ▪ the reader must judge . this i crave leave to say , that when you have shewn what general principles of reason and necessary deductions are , the world will then see , and not till then , whether this your way of certainty by reason , from general principles and necessary deductions made from them , be opposite to , or so much as different from , my way of certainty by ideas , which was the thing to be shewn . in the paragraph * under consideration , you blame me , that in my chapter concerning reason , i have treated it only as a faculty , and not in the other senses , which i there give of that word . this exception to my book , is , i suppose , only from your lordship's general care of letting nothing pass in my essay , which you think needs an amendment . for any particular reason , that brings it in here , or ties it on to this part of your discourse , i confess i do not see . however , to this i answer . . the understanding as a faculty , being the subject of my essay , it carried me to treat directly of reason no otherwise than as a faculty . but yet reason as standing for true and clear principles , and also as standing for clear and fair deductions , from those principles i have not wholly omitted ; as is manifest from what i have said of self-evident propositions , intuitive knowledge and demonstration , in other parts of my essay . so that your question , * why in a chapter of reason are the other two senses of the word neglected ? blaming me for no other fault , that i am really guilty of , but want of order , and not putting every thing in its proper place ; does not appear to be of so mighty weight , but that i should have thought it might have been left to the little niblers in controversie , without being made use of by so great a man as your lordship . but the putting things out of their proper place , being that , which your lordship thinks fit to except against in my writings , it so falls out , that to this too , i can plead not guilty . for in that very chapter † of reason , i have not omitted to treat of principles and deductions ; and what i have said there , i presume is enough to let others see , that i have not neglected to declare my poor sense about self-evident propositions ; and the cogency and evidence of demonstrative or probable deductions of reason . though what i have said there , not being back'd with authorities , nor warranted by the names of ancient philosophers , was not worth your lordship's taking notice of . i have , i confess , been so unwary to write out of my own thoughts , which your lordship has , more than once , with some sort of reprimand taken notice of . i own it , your lordship is much in the right : the safer way is , never to declare ones own sense in any material point . if i had fill'd my book with quotations and collections , of other mens opinions , it had shewn much more learning , and had much more security in it ; and i my self had been safe from the attacks of the men of arms , in the common-wealth of letters : but in writing my book , i had no thoughts of war , my eye was fixed only on truth , and that with so sincere and unbiassed an endeavour , that i thought , i should not have incur'd much blame , even where i had missed it . this i perceive , too late , was the wrong way : i should have kept my self still safe upon the reserve . had i learnt this wisdom of thrase in terence , and resolved with my self , hic ego ero post principia , perhaps i might have deserv'd the commendation was given him : illuc est sapere ut hos instruxit ipsus sibi cavit loco : but i deserved to be soundly corrected , for not having profited by reading , so much as this comes to . but to return to your accusation here , which altogether stands thus : * why in a chapter of reason are the other two senses neglected ? we might have expected here full , satisfaction as to the principles of reason , as distinct from the faculty , but the author of the essay wholly avoids it . what i guess these words accuse me to have avoided , i think i have shewn already , that i did not avoid . before you conclude , you say , † you must observe that i prove , that demonstration must be by intuition , in an extraordinary manner from the sense of the word . he that will be at the pains to read that paragraph , * which you quote for it , will see , that i do not prove that it must be by intuition , because , it is called demonstration ; but that it is called demonstration , because it is by intuition , and as to the propriety of it , what your lordship says in the following words , * it would be most proper for ocular demonstration or by the finger , will not hinder it from being proper also in mental demonstration , as long as the perception of the mind , is properly expressed by seeing . against my observing that the notation of the word imported shewing or making to see , your lordship farther says , † demonstration among some philosophers , signified only the conclusion of an argument , whereby we are brought from something we did perceive , to something we did not ; which seems to me to agree , with what i say in the case , viz. that by the agreement of ideas , which we do perceive , we are brought to perceive the agreement of ideas , which before we did not perceive . to which no doubt will be answered , as in a like case , * not by a way of intuition , but by a deduction of reason , i. e. we perceive not in a way that affords us intuition or a sight , but by deductions of reason , wherein we see nothing . whereas , my lord , i humbly conceive , that the force of a deduction of reason consists in this , that in each step of it , we see , what a connection it has , , i. e. have an intuition of the certain agreement or disagreement of the ideas , as in demonstration ; or an intuition or perception , that they have a probable or not so much as a probable connection , as in other deductions of reason . you farther overthrow * the necessity of intuitive knowledge , in every step of a demonstration , by the authority of aristotle , who says , things that are self-evident , cannot be demonstrated . and so say i too , in several places of my essay † when your lordship can shew any inconsistency between these two propositions , viz. that intuitive knowledge is necessary in each step of a demonstration ; and things that are self-evident cannot be demonstrated ; then i shall own you have overthrown the necessity of intuition in every step of a demonstration by reason , as well as by aristotle's authority . in the remainder of this paragraph , * i meet with nothing but your lordship finding fault with some , who , in this age , have made use of mathematical demonstrations in natural philosophy . your lordship 's two reasons against this way of advancing knowledge upon the sure grounds of mathematical demonstration , are these . ( . ) * that des cartes a mathematical man , has been guilty of mistakes in his system . answer , when mathematical men will build systems upon fancy , and not upon demonstration ; they are as liable to mistakes as others . and that des cartes was not led into his mistakes by mathematical demonstrations , but for want of them , i think has been demonstrated † by some of those mathematicians , who seem to be meant here . ( . ) your second argument against accommodating mathematicks to the nature of material things , is , * that mathematicians cannot be certain of the manner and degrees of force given to bodies , so far distant as the fixed stars ; nor of the laws of motion in other systems . a very good argument why they should not proceed demonstratively in this our system upon laws of motion , observed to be established here . a reason that may perswade us to put out our eyes , for fear they should mislead us in what we do see , because there be things out of our sight . 't is great pity aristotle had not understood mathematicks as well as mr. newton , and made use of it in natural philosophy , with as good success . his example had then authorized the accommodating of it to material things : but 't is not to be ventured , by a man of this age , to go out of the method , which aristotle has prescribed , and which your lordship out of him , has set down in the following pages , † as that which should be kept to : for it is a dangerous presumption to go out of a tract chalked out by that supposed dictator in the common wealth of letters , though it led him to the eternity of the world. i say not this , that i do not think him a very great man ; he made himself so , by not keeping precisely to beaten tracts , which servile subjection of the mind , if we may take my lord bacon's word for it , kept the little knowledge the world had , from growing greater for more than a few ages . that the breaking loose from it in this age is a fault , is not directly said ; but there is enough said to shew , there is no great approbation of such a liberty . mathematicks in gross , 't is plain , are a grievance in natural philosophy , and with reason : for mathematical proofs , like diamonds , are hard as well as clear , and will be touched with nothing but strict reasoning ; mathematical proofs are out of the reach of topical arguments , and are not to be attacked by the equivocal use of words or declamation , that make so great a part of other discourses ; nay , even of controversies . how well you have proved my way by ideas guilty of any tendency to scepticism , the reader will see ; but this i will crave leave to say , that the secluding mathematical reasoning from philosophy , and instead thereof reducing it to aristotelian rules and sayings , will not be thought to be much in favour of knowledge against scepticism . your lordship indeed says , * you did not by any means take off from the laudable endeavours of those , who have gone about to reduce natural speculations , to mathematical certainty . what can we understand by this , but your lordship 's great complaisance and moderation ? who notwithstanding you spend four pages , to shew that the endeavours of mathematical men , to accommodate the principles of that science , to the nature of material things , has been the occasion of great mistakes in the philosophy of this age ; and that therefore aristotle's method is to be followed : yet you make this complement to the mathematicians , that you leave them to their liberty to go on , if they please , in their laudable endeavours to reduce natural speculation , to mathematical certainty . and thus we are come to the end of your lordship's clearing this passage ; that you grant that by sensation and reflection , we come to know the powers and properties of things ; but our reason [ i. e. the principles of reason agreed on by mankind ] is satisfied , that there must be something beyond these ; because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves : so that the nature of things properly belongs to reason [ i. e. the principles of reason agreed on by mankind ] and not to meer ideas . which if any one be so lucky as to understand by these your lordship's fifty pages spent upon it , better than my friend did , when he confessed himself gravelled by it , as it stands here recited , he ought to enjoy the advantage of his happy genius , whilst i miss that satisfaction by the dulness of mine ; which hinders me also from seeing how the opposition , the way of certainty by ideas , and the way of certainty by reason comes in the explication of this passage , or at least if it does belong to it ; yet i must own , what is a greater misfortune , that i do not see , what the opposition or difference is , which your lordship has so much talked of between the way of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainty by reason . for my excuse , i think others will be as much in the dark as i , since you no where tell , wherein you your self , my lord , place certainty . so that to talk of a difference between certainty by ideas , and certainty that is not by ideas , without declaring in what that other certainty consists , is like to have no better success , than might be expected from one who would compare two things together , the one whereof is not known . you now return to your discourse of nature and person , and tell † me , that to what you said about the general nature in distinct individuals , i object these three things ; . that i cannot put together one and the same . this i own to be my objection ; and consequently there is no foundation for the distinction of nature and person . this , with submission , i deny to be any objection of mine , either in the place * quoted by your lordship , or any where else . there may be foundation enough for distinction , as there is of these two , and yet they may be treated of in a way so obscure , so confused , or perhaps so sublime , that an ordinary capacity may not from thence get , as your lordship expresses it , clear and distinct apprehensions of them . this was that which my friend and i complained of in that place , want of clearness in your lordship's discourse , not of want of distinction in the things themselves . ( . ) that what your lordship said about common nature , and particular substance in individuals , was wholly unintelligible to me and my friends . to which , my lord , you may add if you please , that it is still so to me . ( . ) that i said , that to speak truly and precisely of this matter as in reality it is , there is no such thing as one and the same common nature in several individuals , for all that in truth is in them , is particular and nothing but particular , &c. answer . this was said , to shew how unapt these expressions , the same common nature in several individuals , and several individuals being in the same common nature , were to give true and clear notions of nature . to this your lordship answers , * that other , and those very rational men have spoken so : to which i shall say no more , but that it is an argument , with which any thing may be defended ; and all the iargon of the schools be justified , but i presume not strong enough to bring it back again , let men never so rational make use of it . your lordship adds , † but now it seems , nothing is intelligible but what suits with the new way of ideas . my lord , the new way of ideas , and the old way of speaking intelligibly was always , and ever will be the same . and if i may take the liberty to declare my sense of it , herein it consists ; ( . ) that a man use no words but such as he makes the signs of certain determined objects of his mind in thinking , which he can make known to another . ( . ) next , that he use the same word steadily for the sign of the same immediate object of his mind in thinking . ( . ) that he join those words together in propositions , according to the grammatical rules of that language he speaks in . ( . ) that he unite those sentences in a coherent discourse . thus and thus only i humbly conceive any one may preserve himself from the confines and suspicion of iargon , whether he pleases to call those immediate objects of his mind , which his words do , or should stand for , ideas or no. you again * accuse the way of ideas , to make a common nature , no more than a common name . that , my lord , is not my way by ideas . when your lordship shews me , where i have said so , i promise your lordship to strike it out : and the like i promise , when you shew me where i presume that we are not to judge of things by the general principles of reason , which you call * my fundamental mistake . these principles of reason , you say , † must be the standard to mankind . if they are of such consequence , would it not have been convenient , we should have been instructed something more particularly about them , than by barely being told their name , that we might be able to know what are , and what are not principles of reason ? but be they what they will , because they must be the standard to mankind , your lordship says , * you shall in this debate proceed upon the following principles to make it appear , that the difference between nature and person is not imaginary and fictitious , but grounded upon the real nature of things . with submission , my lord , you need not be at the pains to draw up your great artillery of so many maxims , where you meet with no opposition . the thing in debate , whether in this debate or no , i know not ; but what led into this debate , was about these expressions , one common nature in several individuals , and several individuals in one common nature ; and the question i thought , was , whether a general or common nature could be in particulars , i. e. exist in individuals ? but since your lordship turns your artillery against those who deny , that there is any foundation of distinction between nature and person : i am out of gun-shot ; for i am none of those , who ever said , or thought there was no foundation of distinction between nature and person . the maxims you lay down in the following paragraph † are to make me understand how one and the same , and distinct may consist ; i confess , i do not see how your lordship's words there at all make it out . this , indeed , i do understand , that several particular beings may have a conformity in them to one general abstract idea , which may , if you please , be called their general or common nature : but how that idea or general nature can be the same and distinct , is still past my comprehension . to my saying , that your lordship had not told me what nature is , i am told , * that if i had a mind to understand you , i could not but see , that by nature you meant the subject of essential properties . a lady asking a learned physician what the spleen was , received this answer , that it was the receptacle of the melancholy humour : she had a mind to understand what the spleen was ; but by this definition of it , found her self not much enlightned ; and therefore went on to ask , what the melancholy humour was ; and by the doctor 's answer , found that the spleen and the melancholy humour , had a relation one to another ; but what the spleen was she knew not one jot better than she did , before he told her any thing about it . my lord , relative definitions of terms , that are not relative , usually do no more than lead us in a circuit to the same place from whence we set out ; and there leave us in the same ignorance we were in at first . so i fear it would fall out with me here , if i , willing as i am to understand what your lordship means by nature , should go on to ask what you mean by essential properties . the three or four next pages * i hope your lordship does not think contain any serious answer to what my friend said † concerning peter , iames and iohn ; and as for the pleasantry of your country-man , i shall not pretend to meddle with that , since your lordship , who knows better than any body his way of chopping of logick , was fain to give it off , because it was growing too rough . what work such a dangerous chopper of logick would make , with an argument , that supposed the names peter , iames and iohn , to stand for men ; and then without scruple affirm'd , that the nature of man was in them , if he were let loose upon it , who can tell ? especially if he might have the liberty strenuously to use the phrase for his life , and to observe what a turn the chiming of words without determined ideas annexed to them , give to the vnderstanding , when they are gone deep into a man's head , and pass there for things . to shew that the common or general nature of man , could not be in peter or iames , i alledg'd , that whatever existed ( as whatever was in peter or iames did ) was particular , and that it confounded my understanding , to make a general a particular . in answer , your lordship tells me , * that to make me understand this , you had told me in your answer to my first letter . that we are to consider beings as god had order'd them in their several sorts and ranks , &c. and thereupon you ask me , † why it was not answer'd in the proper place for it ? answ. i own i am not always so fortunate , as to say things in that , which your lordship thinks the proper place ; but having been rebuked for repetitions , i thought your lordship could not be ignorant , that i had consider'd beings as god had order'd them in their several sorts and ranks , &c. since you could not but have read these words of mine , † i would not here be thought to forget , much less to deny , that nature in the production of things , makes several of them alike . there is nothing more obvious , especially in the races of animals , and all things propagated by seed , &c. and i have expressed my sense in this point , so fully here , and in other places , particularly b. . c. . that i dare leave it to my reader , without any farther explication . your lordship farther asks , † is not that a real nature , which is the subject of real properties ? and is not the nature really in those who have the essential properties ? i answer to both those questions yes , such as is the reality of the subject , such is the reality of its properties ; the abstract general idea , is really in the mind of him that has it , and the properties that it has are really and inseperably annexed to it ; let this reality be whatever your lordship pleases : but this will never prove , that this general nature exists in peter or iames. those properties , with submission , do not , as your lordship supposes , exist in peter and iames : those qualities indeed may exist in them , which your lordship calls properties : but they are not properties in either of them , but are properties only of that specifick abstract nature , which peter and iames , for their supposed conformity to it , are ranked under . for example , rationality as much a property as it is of a man , is no property of peter he was rational a good part of his life , could write and read , and was a sharp fellow at a bargain : but about thirty , a knock so altered him , that for these twenty years past , he has been able to do none of these things , there is to this day , not so much appearance of reason in him , as in his horse or monkey : and yet he is peter still . your lordship asks , * is not that a real nature , that is the subject of real properties ? and is not that nature really in those who have the same essential properties ? give me leave , i beseech you , to ask , are not those distinct real natures , that are the subjects of distinct essential properties ? for example , the nature of an animal , is the subject of essential properties of an animal , with the exclusion of those of a man or a horse ; for else the nature of an animal , and the nature of a man , and the nature of a horse , would be the same : and so , wherever the subject of the essential properties of an animal is , there also would be the subject of the essential properties of a man , and of a horse , and so , in effect , whatever is an animal , would be a man : the real nature of an animal , and the real nature of a man , being the same . to avoid this , there is no other way ( if this reality your lordship builds so much on , be any thing beyond the reality of two abstract distinct ideas in the mind ) but that there be one real nature of an animal , the subject of the essential properties of an animal ; and another real nature of a man , the subject of the essential properties of a man : both which real natures must be in peter , to make him a man. so that every individual man or beast , must according to this account , have two real natures in him , to make him what he is : nay , if this be so , two will not serve the turn . bucephalus must have the real nature of ens or being , and the real nature of body , and the real nature of vivens , and the real nature of animal , and the real nature of a horse , i. e five distinct real natures in him , to make him bucephalus : for these are all really distinct common natures , whereof one is not the subject of precisely the same essential properties as the other . this , though very hard to my understanding , must be really so , if every distinct , common or general nature , be a real being , that really exists any where , but in the understanding . common nature , taken in my way of ideas , your lordship truly says , * will not make me understand such a common nature as you speak of , which subsists in several individuals , because i can have no ideas of real substances , but such as are particular ; all others are only abstract ideas , and made only by the act of the mind . but what your lordship farther promises there , i find , to my sorrow , does not hold , viz. that in your lordship's way ( as far as you have discover'd it ) which you call the way of reason , i may come to a better understanding of this matter . your lordship in the next paragraph † declares your self really ashamed to be put to explain these things , that which you had said being so very plain and easy : and yet i am not ashamed to own , that for my life , i cannot understand them , as they are now farther explained . your lordship thinks it proved , that every common nature is a real being : let it be so , that it is the subject of real properties ; and that thereby it is demonstrated to be a real being , this makes it harder for me to conceive , that this common nature of a man , which is a real being , and but one , should yet be really in peter , in iames and in iohn . had amphitruo been able to conceive this , he had not been so much puzzel'd , or thought sosia to talk idle , when he told him , domi ego sum in quam et apud te adsum sosia idem . for the common nature of man , is a real being as your lordship says , and sosia is no more : and he that can conceive any one and the same real being , to be in divers places at once , can have no difficulty to conceive it of another real being : and so sosia may at the same time be at home , and with his master abroad . and amphitruo might have been ashamed to demand the explication of so plain a matter ; or at least , if he had stuck a little at here and there too , ought he not to have been satisfied , as soon as sosia had told him , i am another distinct i here , from the same i that i am there ? which no doubt sosia could have made out ; let your lordship's countryman chop logick with him , and try whether he cannot . countryman . but how is it possible sosia , that thou the real same , as thou sayst , should'st be at home , and here too ? sosia , very easily , because i am really the same , and yet distinct . countrym . how can this be ? sosia , by a trick that i have . countrym. canst thou teach me the trick ? sosia . yes , 't is but for thee to get a particular subsistence proper to thy real self at home , and another particular subsistence proper to thy same real self abroad , and the business is done , thou wilt then easily be the same real thing , and distinct from thy self ; and thou mayst be in as many places together , as thou canst get particular subsistences , and be still the same one real being . countrym. but what is that particular subsistence ? sosia , hold ye , hold ye friend , that 's the secret , i thought once , it was particular existence , but that i find is an ineffectual drug , and will not do : every one fees it will not make the same real being distinct from it self , nor bring it into two different places at once , and therefore it is laid aside , and subsistence is taken to do the feat . countrym. existence my boy 's school master made me understand , the other day , when my gray mare fol'd . for he told me that a horse , that never was before , began than to exist ; and when the poor fole died , he told me the same horse ceased to exist . sosia , but did he tell thee what became of the real common nature of an horse , that was in it , when the fole died ? countrym. no. but this i know , that my real horse was really destroy'd . sosia , there 's now thy ignorance , so much of thy horse as had a real existence , was really destroy'd , that 's true : but there was something in thy horse , which having a real particular subsistence was not destroy'd ; nay , and the best part of thy horse too , for it was that , which had in it all those properties , that made thy horse better than a broom-stick . countrym. thou tellst me wonders of this same subsistence , what i pray thee is it ? sosia . i beg your pardon for that , it is the very philosopher's stone , those who are adepti , and can do strange things with it , are wiser than to tell what it is . countrym. where may it be bought then ? sosia . that i know not : but i will tell thee where thou mayst meet with it . countryman , where ? sosia , in some of the shady thickets of the schoolmen , and 't is worth the looking after . for if particular subsistence has such a power over a real being , as to make one and the same real being to be distinct and in divers places at once , it may perhaps be able to give thee an account what becomes of that real nature of thy horse after thy horse is dead , and if thou canst but find , whether that retires , who knows but thou mayst get as useful a thing as thy horse again ? since to that real nature of thy horse , insepeparably adheres the shape and motion and other properties of thy horse . i hope , my lord , your country-man will not be displeased to have met with sosia to chop logick with , who , i think , has made it as intelligible , how his real self might be the same and distinct , and be really in distinct places at once , by the help of a particular subsistence proper to him in each place , as it is intelligible how any real being under the name of a common nature , or under any other name bestowed upon it , may be the same and distinct ; and really be in diverse places at once , by the help of a particular subsistence proper to each of those distinct sames . at least , if i may answer for my self , i understand one as well as the other : and if my head be turned from common sense ( as i find your lordship very apt to think ) so that it is † great news to you that i understand any thing : if in my way of ideas i cannot understand words , that appear to me either to stand for no ideas ; or to be so joined , that they put inconsistent ideas together , i think your lordship uses me right to turn me off for desperate , and leave me , as you do , to the * reader 's vnderstanding . to your lordship 's many questions concerning men and drills , in the paragraph * where you begin to explain what my friend and i found difficult in your discourse concerning person ; i answer , that these two names , man and drill , are perfectly arbitrary , whether founded on real distinct properties or no ; so perfectly arbitrary , that if men had pleased , drill might have stood for what man now does , and vice versa . i answer farther , that these two names stand for two abstract ideas , which are ( to those who know what they mean by these two names ) the distinct essences of two distinct kinds ; and as particular existences , or things existing are found by men ( who know what they mean by these names ) to agree to either of those ideas , which these names stand for ; these names respectively are applied to those particular things , and the things said to be of that kind . this i have so fully and at large explained in my essay , that i should have thought it needless to have said any thing again of it here , had it not been to shew my readiness to answer any questions you shall be pleased to ask concerning any thing i have writ , which your lordship either finds difficult , or has forgot . in the next place , your lordship comes to dear what you had said in answer to this question put by your self , † what is this distinction of peter , iames and iohn , founded upon ? to which you answered , * that they may be distinguished from each other by our senses , as to difference of features , distance of place , &c. but that is not all ; for supposing there was no external difference , yet there is a difference between them , as several individuals in the same common nature . these words , when my friend and i came to consider , we owned , as your lordship here * takes notice , that we could understand no more by them but this , that the ground of distinction between several individuals , in the same common nature , is , that they are several individuals in the same common nature . hereupon your lordship tells me , * the question now is , what this distinction is founded upon ? whether on our observing the difference of features , distance of place , &c. or on some antecedent ground . pursuant hereunto , as if this were the question , you in the next paragraph † ( as far as i can understand it ) make the ground of the distinction between these individuals or the principium individuationis , to be the vnion of the soul and body . but with submission , my lord , the question is , whether i and my friend were to blame , because when your lordship , in the words above cited , having removed all other grounds of distinction , said there was yet a difference between peter and james , as several individuals in the same common nature , we could understand no more by it , but this , that the ground of distinction between several individuals in the same common nature , is , that they are seral individuals in the same common nature ? let the ground that your lordship now assigns of the distinction of individuals be what it will , or let what you say be as clear as you please , viz. that the ground of their distinction is in the vnion of soul and body ; it will , i humbly conceive , be nevertheless true , that what you said before might amount to no more but this , that the ground of the distinction between several individuals in the same common nature , is , that they are several individuals in the same common nature ; and therefore we might not be to blame for so understanding it . for the words , which our understandings were then imploied about , were those which you had there said , and not those which you would say five months after : though i must own , that those which your lordship here * says concerning the distinction of individuals , leave it as much in the dark to me as what you said before . but perhaps i do not understand your lordship's words right , because i conceive that the principium individuationis is the same in all the several species of creatures , men as well as others ; and therefore if the vnion of soul and body be that which distinguishes two individuals in the humane species one from another , i know not how two cheries or two atoms of matter can be distinct individuals ; since i think there is in them no vnion of a soul and body . and upon this ground it will be very hard to tell , what made the soul and the body , individuals ( as certainly they were ) before their union . but i shall leave what your lordship says concerning this matter to the examination of those , whose health and leisure allows them more time than i have for this weighty question , wherein the distinction of two men or two cheries consists , for fear i should make your lordship's country-man a little wonder again to find a grave philosopher make a serious question of it . to your next paragraph † i answer , that if the true idea of a person , or the true signification of the word person lies in this , that supposing there was no other difference in the several individuals of the same kind ; yet there is a difference between them as several individuals in the same common nature , it will follow from hence , that the name person will agree to bucephalus and podargus , as well as to alexander and hector . but whether this consequence will agree , with what your lordship says concerning person in another place , i am not concerned ; i am only answerable for this consequence . your lordship is pleased here , * to call my endeavour to find out the meaning of your words , as you had put them together , trifling exceptions : to which i must say , that i am heartily sorry , that either my understanding , or your lordship's way of writing obliges me so often to such trifling . i cannot , as i have said , answer to what i do not understand ; and i hope here my trifling , in searching out your lordship's meaning , was not much out of the way , because i think every one will see by the steps i took , that the sense i found out by it , was that which your words implied ; and your lordship does not disown it , but only replys , that i should not have drawn that which was the natural consequence from it , because that consequence would not well consist with what you had said in another place . what your lordship adds farther † to clear your saying , that an individual intelligent substance is rather supposed to the making of a person , than the proper definition of it , though in your definition of person , you put a compleat intelligent substance , must have its effect upon others understandings : i must suffer under the short sightedness of my own , who neither understood it as it stood in your first answer , nor do i now as it is explained in your second . your lordship being here , as you say , * come to the end of this debate , i should here have ended too ; and it was time , my letter being grown already to too great a bulk . but i being ingaged by promise , to answer some things in your first letter , which in my reply to it , i had omitted , i now come to them , and shall endeavour to give your lordship satisfaction in those points ; tho to make room for them , i leave out a great deal that i had writ in answer to this your lordship's second letter . and if after all , my answer seems too long , i must beg your lordship , and my reader , to excuse it , and impute it to those occasions of length , which i have mentioned in more places than one , as they have occurred . the original and main question between your lordship , and me , being , whether there were any thing in my essay , repugnant to the doctrin of the trinity ; i endeavoured , by examining the grounds and manner of your lordship's bringing my book into that controversie , to bring that question to a decision . and therefore in my answer to your lordship's first letter , i insisted particularly on what had a relation to that point . this method your lordship in your second letter censured , as if it contained only personal matters , which were fit to be laid aside . and by mixing new matter , and charging my book with new accusations , before the first was made out , avoided the decision of what was in debate between us ; a strong presumption to me , that your lordship had little to say , to support what began the controversy , which you were so willing to have me let fall ; whilest on the other side , my silence to other points , which i had promised an answer to , was often reflected on , and i rebuked , for not answering in the proper place . your lordship's calling upon me on this occasion shall not be lost ; 't is fit your expectation should be satisfied , and your objections considered ; which for the reasons above mentioned , were not examined in my former answer . and which , whether true or false , as i humbly conceive , make nothing for or against the doctrin of the trinity . i shall therefore consider them barely as so many philosophical questions , and endeavour to shew your lordship where , and upon what grounds 't is i stick ; and what it is , that hinders me from the satisfaction it would be to me , to be in every one of them of your mind . your lordship tells me , * whether i do own substance or not , is not the point before us ; but whether by vertue of these principles , i can come to any certainty of reason about it ? and your lordship says , the very places i produce do prove the contrary ; which you shall therefore set down in my own words , both as to corporeal and spiritual substances . here again my lord , i must beg your pardon , that i do not distinctly comprehend your meaning in these words , viz. that by vertue of these principles one cannot come to certainty of reason about substance : for it is not very clear to me , whether your lordship means , that we cannot come to certainty , that there is such a thing in the world as substance ; or , whether we cannot make any other proposition about substance , of which we can be certain ; or whether we cannot by my principles , establish any idea of substance of which we can be certain . for to come to certainty of reason , about substance may signifie either of these , which are far different propositions : and i shall waste your lordship's time , my readers , and my own ( neither of which would i willingly do ) by taking it in one sense , when you mean it in an other , lest i should meet with some such reproof as this : that i misrepresent your meaning , or might have understood it if i had a mind to it , &c. and therefore cannot but wish , that you had so far condescended to the slowness of my apprehension , as to give me your sense to determined , that i might not trouble you with answers to what was not your precise meaning . to avoid it in the present case , and to find in what sense i was here to take these words , come to no certainty of reason about substance , i looked into what followed , and when i came to the th page , i thought i had there got a clear explication of your lordship's meaning , and that by no certainty of reason about substance , your lordship here meant no certain idea of substance . your lordship's words are * i do not charge them , ( i. e. me as one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning ) with discarding the notion of substance , because they have but an imperfect idea of it ; but because upon those principles , there can be no certain idea at all of it . here i thought my self sure , and that these words plainly interpreted the meaning of your proposition , p. . to be , that upon my principles there can be no certain idea at all of substance . but before i came to the end of that paragraph , i found my self at a loss again , for that paragraph goes on in these words , * whereas your lordship asserts it to be one of the most natural and certain ideas in our minds , because it is a repugnance to our first conception of things , that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves , and therefore you said the rational idea of substance is one of the first ideas in our minds ; and however imperfect and obscure our notion be , yet we are as certain that substances are and must be as that there are any beings in the world. here the certainty which your words seem to mean , is certainty of the being of substance . in this sense therefore i shall take it , till your lordship shall determine it otherwise . and the reason why i take it so is , because what your lordship goes on to say , * seems to me to look most that way . the proposition then that your lordship undertakes to prove is this ; that by vertue of my principles we cannot come to any certainty of reason , that there is any such thing as substance . and your lordship tells me , * that the very places i produce do prove the contrary , which you therefore will set down in my own words , both as to corporeal and spiritual substances . the first your lordship brings * are these words of mine : when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances , as horse , stone , &c. tho' the idea we have of either of them , be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities , which we use to find united in the thing called horse or stone ; yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone ; nor one in another , we suppose them existing in , and supported by some common subject , which support we denote by the name substance ; tho' it be certain we have no clear and distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support . and again , the same happens concerning the operations of the mind , viz. thinking , reasoning , fearing , &c. which we considering not to subsist of themselves , nor apprehending how they can belong to body , or be produced by it , we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance , which we call spirit , whereby yet it is evident that having no other idea or notion of matter , but something wherein those many sensible qualities , which affect our senses do subsist ; by supposing a substance , wherein thinking , knowing , doubting , and a power of moving , &c. do subsist . we have as clear a notion of the nature or substance of spirit , as we have of body ; the one being supposed to be ( without knowing what it is ) the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without ; and the other supposed , ( with a like ignorance of what it is ) to be the substratum to those operations which we experiment in our selves . but how these words prove that , upon my principles we cannot come to any certainty of reason that there is any such thing as substance in the world ; i confess i do not see , nor has your lordship , as i humbly , conceive shewn . and i think it would be a hard matter from these words of mine to make a syllogism , whose conclusion should be , ergo , from my principles we cannot come to any certainty of reason , that there is any substance in the world. your lordship indeed tells me * that i say , that these and the like fashions of speaking , that the substance is always supposed something . and grant that i say over and over that substance is supposed ; but that your lordship says , is not what you looked for , but something in the way of certainty by reason . what your lordship looks for , is not , i find , always easy for me to guess . but what i brought that , and some other passages to the same purpose for , out of my essay , that i think they prove , viz. that i did not discard nor almost discard substance out of the reasonable part of the world. for he that supposes in every species of material beings , substance to be always something , doth not discard or almost discard it out of the world , or deny any such thing to be . the passages alledged i think prove this , which was all i brought them for . and if they should happen to prove no more , i think , you can hardly infer from thence , that therefore upon my principles , we can come to no certainty , that there is any such thing as substance in the world. your lordship goes on * to insist mightily upon my supposing ; and to these words of mine , we cannot conceive how these sensible qualities should subsist alone ; and therefore we suppose a substance to support them . your lordship replies , it is but supposing still ; because we cannot conceive it otherwise : but what certainty follows from not being barely able to conceive ? answer . the same certainty that follows from the repugnancy to our first conceptions of things , upon which † your lordship grounds the relative idea of substance . your words are , it is a mere effect of reason , because it is a repugnancy to our first conceptions of things , that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves . your lordship then , if i understand your reasoning here , concludes , that there is substance , because it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things ( for whether that repugnancy be to our first or second conceptions , i think that 's all one ) that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves ; and i conclude the same thing , because we cannot conceive how sensible qualities should subsist by themselves . now what the difference of certainty is from a repugnancy to our conceptions , and from our not being able to conceive ; i confess , my lord , i am not acute enough to discern . and therefore it seems to me , that i have laid down the same certainty of the being of substance , that your lordship has done . your lordship adds , * are there not multitudes of things which we are not able to conceive ; and yet it would not be allowed us to suppose what we think fit upon that account ? answer . your lordship's is certainly a very just rule ; 't is pity it does not reach the case . but because it is not allowed us to suppose what we think fit in things , which we are not able to conceive ; it does not therefore follow , that we may not with certainty suppose or infer , that which is a natural and undeniable consequence of such an inability to conceive , as i call it , or repugnancy to our conception , as you call it . we cannot conceive the foundation of harlem church to stand upon nothing ; but because it is not allowed us to suppose what we think fit , viz. that it is laid upon a rock of diamond , or supported by fairies ; yet i think all the world will allow the infallible certainty of this supposition , from thence , that it rests upon something . this i take to be the present case ; and therefore your next words , i think , do less concern mr. l. than my lord b. of w. i shall set them down , that the reader may apply them to which of the two he thinks they most belong . they are , † i could hardly conceive that mr. l. would have brought such evidence as this against himself ; but i must suppose some unknown substratum in this case . for these words , that your lordship has last quoted of mine , do not only not prove , that upon my principles we cannot come to any certainty , that there is any such thing as substance in the world ; but prove the contrary , that there must certainly be substance in the world , and upon the very same grounds , that your lordship takes it to be certain . your next paragraph , * which is to the same purpose , i have read more than once , and can never forbear , as often as i read it , to wish my self young again ; or that a liveliness of fancy suitable to that age , would teach me to sport with words for the diversion of my readers . this i find your lordship thinks so necessary to the quickning of controversie , that you will not trust the debate to the greatness of your learning , nor the gravity of your subject without it , whatever authority the dignity of your character might give to what your lordship says ; for you † having quoted these words of mine ; as long as there is any simple idea , or sensible quality left , according to my way of arguing , substance cannot be discarded , because all simple ideas , all sensible qualities carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist in , and a substance wherein they inhere . you add , what is the meaning of carrying with them a supposition of a substratum and a substance ? have these simple ideas the notion of a substance in them ? no , but they carry it with them : how so ? do sensible qualities carry a corporeal substance along with them ? then a corporeal substance must be intromitted by the senses together with them : no , but they carry the supposition with them ; and truly that is burden enough for them . but which may do they carry it ? it seems its only , because we cannot conceive it otherwise : what is this conceiving ? it may be said it is an act of the mind , not built on simple ideas , but lies in the comparing the ideas of accident and substance together ; and from thence finding that an accident must carry substance along with it : but this will not clear it ; for the ideas of accidents are simple ideas , and carry nothing along with them , but the impression made by sensible objects . in this passage , i conclude , your lordship had some regard to the entertainment of that part of your readers , who would be thought men , as well by being risible as rational creatures . for i cannot imagine you meant this for an argument ; if you did , i have this plain simple answer , that by carrying with them a supposition , i mean , according to the ordinary import of the phrase , that sensible qualities imply a substratum to exist in . and if your lordship please to change one of these equivalent expressions into the other , all the argument here , i think , will be at an end : what will become of the sport and smiling , i will not answer . hitherto , i do not see any thing in my words brought by your lordship that proves , that upon my principles we can come to no certainty of reason , that there is substance in the world , but the contrary . your lordship's next words * are to tell the world that my simile about the elephant and tortoise , is to ridicule the notion of substance , and the europaean philosophers for asserting it . but if your lordship please to turn again to my essay , * you will find those passages were not intended to ridicule the notion of substance , or those who asserted it , whatever that it signifies . but to shew , that though substance did support accidents , yet philosophers , who had found such a support necessary , had no more a clear idea of what , that support was , than the indian had of that , which supported his tortoise , tho' sure he was , it was something . had your pen which † quoted so much of the nineteenth sect. of the thirteenth chap. of my second book , but set down the remaining line and an half of that paragraph , you would by these words which follow there ; so that of substance we have no idea of what it is , but only a confused obscure one of what it does , have put it past doubt , what i meant . but your lordship was pleased to take only those , which you thought would serve best to your purpose ; and i crave leave to add now these remaining ones to shew my reader , what was mine . 't is to the same purpose i use the same illustration again in that other place , * which you are pleased to cite likewise , which your lordship says you did , only to shew , that it was a deliberate and ( as i thought ) lucky similitude . it was upon serious consideration i own , that i entertained the opinion , that we had no clear and distinct idea of substance . but as to that similitude , i do not remember that it was much deliberated on : such unaccurate writers as i am , who aim at nothing but plainness , do not much study similes : and for the fault of repetition you have been pleased to pardon it . but supposing you had proved , that that simile was to ridicule the notion of substance , published in the writings of some europaean philosophers ; it will by no means follow from thence , that upon my principles we cannot come to any certainty of reason , that there is any such thing as substance in the world. men's notions of a thing may be laughed at by those , whose principles establish the certainty of the thing it self ; and one may laugh at aristotle's notion of an orb of fire under the sphere of the moon , without principles that will make him uncertain whether there be any such thing as fire . my simile did perhaps serve to shew , that there were philosophers , whose knowledge was not so clear , nor so great as they pretended . if your lordship thereupon thought , that the vanity of such a pretension had something ridiculous in it , i shall not contest your judgment in the case : for , as humane nature is framed , 't is not impossible , that whoever is discovered to pretend to know more than really he does , will be in danger to be laughed at . in the next paragraph , † your lordship bestows the epithite of dull on burgersdicius and sanderson and the tribe of logicians . i will not question your right to call any body dull whom you please . but if your lordship does it to insinuate , that i did so ; i hope i may be allowed to say thus much in my own defence , that i am neither so stupid , or ill-natured to discredit those whom i quote for being of the same opinion with me . and he that will look into the eleventh and twelfth pages of my reply , which your lordship refers to , will find , that i am very far from calling them dull , or speaking diminishingly of them . but if i had been so ill-bred or foolish as to have called them dull ; i do not see how that does at all serve to prove this proposition ; that upon my principles we can come to no certainty of reason , that there is any such thing as substance any more than what follows in the next paragraph * . your lordship in it asks me , as if it were of some great importance to the proposition to be proved , whether there be no difference between the bare being of a thing , and its subsistence by its self . i answer , yes , there is a difference as i understand those terms , and then i beseech your lordship to make use of it to prove the proposition before us . but because you seem by this question to conclude , that the idea of a thing that subsists by its self , is a clear and distinct idea of substance ; i beg leave to ask , is the idea of the manner of subsistence of a thing , the idea of the thing it self ? if it be not , we may have a clear and distinct idea of the manner , and yet have none but a very obscure and confused one of the thing . for example , i tell your lordship , that i know a thing , that cannot subsist without a support , and i know another thing that does subsist without a support , and say no more of them , can you by having the clear and distinct ideas of having a support , and not having a support , say , that you have a clear and distinct idea of the thing , that i know which has , and of the thing , that i know which has not a support ? if your lordship can , i beseech you to give me the clear and distinct ideas of these , which i only call by the general name things , that have or have not supports ; for such there are , and such i shall give your lordship clear and distinct ideas of , when you shall please to call upon me for them , though i think your lordship will scarce find them by the general and confused idea of thing , nor in the clearer and more distinct idea of having or not having a support . to shew a blind man that he has no clear and distinct idea of scarlet , i tell him , that his notion of it , that it is a thing or being , does not prove he has any clear or distinct idea of it ; but barely that he takes it to be something , he knows not what . he replies , that he knows more than that , v. g. he knows that it subsists or inheres in another thing , and is there no difference , says he in your lordship's words , between the bare being of a thing and its subsistence in another ? yes say i to him , a great deal , they are very different ideas . but for all that , you have noclear and distinct idea of scarlet , not such a one as i have who see and know it , and have another kind of idea of it besides that of inherence . your lordship has the idea of subsisting by it self , and therefore you conclude you have a clear and distinct idea of the thing , that subsists by it self , which methinks is all one , as if your countryman should say , he hath an idea of a cedar of lebanon , that it is a tree of a nature , to need no prop to lean on for its support , therefore he hath a clear and distinct idea of a cedar of lebanon : which clear and distinct idea , when he comes to examin , is nothing but a general one of a tree with which his indetermined idea of a cedar is confounded . just so is the idea of substance , which however called clear and distinct is confounded with the general indetermined idea of something . but suppose that the manner of subsisting by it self , give us a clear and distinct idea of substance , how does that prove , that upon my principles we can come to no certainty of reason , that there is any such thing as substance in the world ? which is the proposition to be proved . in what follows , † your lordship says , you do not charge any one with discarding the notion of substance , because he has but an imperfect idea of it : but because upon those principles there can be no certain idea at all of it . your lordship says , here , those principles and in other places these principles , without particularly setting them down , that i know : i am sure without laying down propositions , that are mine , and proving , that those granted , we cannot come to any certainty , that there is any such thing as substance , which is the thing to be proved , your lordship proves nothing in the case against me . what therefore the certain idea , which i do not understand , or idea of substance has to do here , is not easy to see . for that which i am charged with , is the discarding substance . but the discarding substance . is not the discarding the notion of substance . mr. newton has discarded des cartes's vortices , i. e. laid down principles from which he proves there is no such thing ; but he has not thereby discarded the notion or idea of those vortices , for that he had when he confuted their being , and every one who now reads and understands him , will have . but , as i have already observed , your lordship here , i know not upon what ground , nor with what intention , confounds the idea of substance and substance it self ; for to the words above set down , your lordship subjoins , † that you assert it to be one of the most natural and certain ideas in our minds , because it is a repugnance to our first conception of things , that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves ; and therefore your lordship said , the rational idea of substance is one of the first ideas in our minds , and however imperfect and obscure our notion be , yet we are as certain that substances are and must be , as that there are any beings in the world. herein i tell your lordship that i agree with you , and therefore i hope this is no objection against the trinity . your lordship says , you never thought it was , but to lay all foundations of certainty as to matters of faith , upon clear and distinct ideas , which was the opinion you opposed , does certainly overthrow all mysteries of faith , and excludes the notion of substance out of rational discourse , which your lordship affirms to have been your meaning . how these words , as to matters of faith , came in , or what they had to do against me in an answer only to me , i do not see : neither will i here examin what it is to be one of the most natural and certain ideas in our minds . but be it what it will , this i am sure , that neither that , nor any thing else contained in this paragraph , any way proves , that upon my principles we cannot come to any certainty , that there is any such thing as substance in the world. which was the proposition to be proved . in the next place then , i crave leave to consider , how that is proved , which though nothing to the proposition to be proved , is yet what you here assert , viz. that the idea of substannce is one of the most natural and certain ideas in our minds : your proof of it is this , because it is a repugnancy to our first conception of things , that modes and accidents should subsist by themselves , and therefore the rational idea of substance is one of the first ideas in our minds . from whence i grant it to be a good consequence , that to those who find this repugnance , the idea of a support is very necessary , or if you please to call it so , very rational . but a clear and distinct idea of the thing it self , which is the support will not thence be proved to be one of the first ideas in our minds ; or that any such idea is ever there at all . he that is satisfied that pendennis castle , if it were not supported , would fall into the sea , must think of a support , that sustains it : but whether the thing that it rests on be timber , or brick , or stone , he has by his bare idea of the necessity of some support that props it up , no clear and distinct idea at all . in this paragraph you farther say , that the laying all foundation of certainty as to matters of faith on clear and distinct ideas , does certainly exclude the notion of substance out of rational discourse . answ. this is a proposition that will need a proof : because every body at first sight will think it hard to be proved . for it is obvious , that let certainty in matters of faith , or any matters whatsoever , be laid on what it will , it excludes not the notion of substance certainly out of rational discourse , unless it be certainly true , that we can rationally discourse of nothing , but what we certainly know . but whether it be a proposition easy or not easy to be proved , this is certain , that it concerns not me , for i lay not all foundation of certainty as to matters of faith , upon clear and distinct ideas ; and therefore , if it does discard substance out of the reasonable part of the world , as your lordship phrases it above , or excludes the notion of substance out of rational discourse : whatever havock it makes of substance , or its idea , no one jot of the mischief is to be laid at my door , because that is no principle of mine . your lordship ends this paragraph with telling me , * that i at length apprehend your lordships meaning . i wish heartily that i did , because it would be much more for your ease as well as my own . for in this case of substance , i find it not easy to know your meaning , or what it is i am blamed for . for in the beginning of this dispute , † it is the being of substance . and here again , * it is substance it self , is discarded . and in this very paragraph , † writ as it seems , to explain your self , so that in the close of it you tell me that at length i apprehend your meaning to be that the notion of substance is excluded out of rational discourse , the explication is such , that it renders your lordship's meaning to me more obscure and uncertain , than it was before . for in the same paragraph your lordship says , that upon my principles there can be no certain idea at all of substance ; and also that however imperfect and obscure our notions be , yet we are as certain that substances are and must be , as that there are any beings in the world. so that supposing i did know ( as i do not ) what your lordship means by certain idea of substance , yet i must own still , that what your meaning is by discarding of substance , whether it be the idea of substance , or the being of substance i doe not know . but that , i think , need not much trouble me , since your lordship does not , that i see , shew how any position or principle of mine overthrows either substance it self , or the idea of it , or excludes either of them out of rational discourse . in your next paragraph , † you say , i declare , p. . that if any one assert that we can have no ideas but from sensation and reflection it is not my opinion . my lord , i have looked over that th page , and find no such words of mine there . but refer my reader to that and the following pages , for my opinion concerning ideas from sensation and reflection , how far they are the foundation and materials of all our knowledge : and this i do , because to those words , which your lordship has set down as mine , out of the th page , but are not there , you subjoin , * that you are very glad of it , and will do me all the right you can in this matter , which seems to imply , that it is a matter of great consequence , and therefore i desire my meaning may be taken in my own words , as they are set down at large * the promise your lordship makes me , of doing me all the right you can , i return my humble thanks for , because it is a piece of justice so seldom done in controversie . and because i suppose you have here made me this promise , to authorise me to mind you of it , if at any time your haste should make you mistake my words or meaning : to have ones words exactly quoted , and their meaning interpreted by the plain and visible design of the author in his whole discourse being a right , which every writer has a just claim to , and such as a lover of truth will be very wary of violating . an instance of some sort of intrenchment on this i humbly conceive there is in the next page but one , † where you interpret my words , as if i excused a mistake i had made , by calling it a slip of my pen ; whereas my lord , i do not own any slip of my pen in that place , but say that the meaning of my expression there is to be interpreted by other places , and particularly by those , where i treat professedly of that subject : and that in such cases , where an expression is only incident to the matter in hand , and may seem not exactly to quadrate with the author's sense , where he designedly treats of that subject , it ought rather to be interpreted as a slip of his pen , than as his meaning . i should not have taken so particular a notice of this , but that you by having up these words with an air that makes me sensible how wary i ought to be , shew what use would be made of it , if ever i had pleaded the slip of my pen. in the following pages , * i find a discourse drawn up under several ranks of numbers to prove , as i guess , this proposition , † that in my way of ideas we cannot come to any certainty as to the nature of substance . i shall be in a condition to answer to this accusation , when i shall be told what particular proposition , as to the nature of substance , it is , which in my way of ideas we cannot come to any certainty of . because probably it may be such a proposition concerning the nature of substance , as i shall readily own , that in my way of ideas we can come to no certainty of ; and yet i think the way of ideas not at all to be blamed , till there can be shewn an other way , different from that of ideas , whereby we may come to a certainty of it . for 't was never pretended , that by ideas we could come to certainty concerning every proposition , that could be made concerning substance or any thing else . besides the doubtfulness visible in the phrase it self , there is another reason that hinders me from understanding precisely what is meant by these words to come to a certainty as to the nature of substance , viz. because your lordship * makes nature and substance to be the same , so that to come to a certainty as to the nature of substance is , in your lordship's sense of nature , to come to a certainty as to the substace of substance , which i own i do not clearly understand . an other thing that hinders me from giving particular answers to the arguments , that may be supposed to be contained in so many pages is , that i do not see , how what is discoursed in those thirteen or fourteen pages is brought to prove this proposition , that in my way of ideas we cannot come to any certainty as to the nature of substance ; and it would require too many words to examine every one of those heads , period by period , to see what they prove ; when you your self do not apply them to the direct probation of any proposition that i understand . indeed you wind up this discourse with these words , * that you leave the reader to judge whether this be a tolerable account of the idea of substance by sensation and reflection . answ. that which your lordshp has given in the precedent pages , i think is not a very tolerable account of my idea of substance , since the account you give over and over again * of my idea of substance is , that it is nothing but a complex idea of accidents . this is your account of my idea of substance , which you insist so much on , and which you say † you took out of those places , i my self produced in my first letter . but if you had been pleased to have set down this one , which is to be found there † amongst the rest produced by me out of b. ch . . sect. . of my essay , viz. that the ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas , as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves , in which the supposed or confused idea of substance is always the first and chief . this , would have been a full answer to all that i think you have under that variety of heads , objected against my idea of substance . but your lordship in your representation of my idea of substance , thought fit to leave this passage out ; though you are pleased to set down several others produced both before and after it in my first letter , which i think gives me a right humbly to return your lordship your own words , and now i freely leave the reader to judge whether this , which your lordship has given , be a tolerable account of my idea of substance . the next point to be considered , is concerning the immateriality of the soul ; whereof there is a great deal said . † the original of this controversie , i shall set down in your lordship 's own words : * you say , the only reason you had to engage in this matter , was this bold assertion ; that the ideas we have by sensation or reflection are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning , and that our certainty lies in perceiving the agreement and disagreement of ideas , as expressed in any proposition : which last , you say , are my own words . to overthrow this bold assertion , you urge * my acknowledgment , † that upon my principles it cannot be demonstratively proved , that the soul is immaterial tho' it be in the highest degree probable . and then ask * is not this the giving up the cause of certainty ? answer : just as much the giving up the cause of certainty on my side , as it is on your lordship's . who tho' you will not please to tell wherein you place certainty , yet it is to be supposed you do place certainty in something or other . now let it be what you will , that you place certainty in , i take the liberty to say , that you cannot certainly prove i. e. demonstrate , that the soul of man is immaterial ; i am sure you have not so much as offered at any such proof , and therefore you give up the cause of certainty upon your principles . because if the not being able to demonstrate , that the soul is immaterial upon his principles , who declares , wherein he thinks certainty consists , be the giving up the cause of certainty ; the not being able to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul upon his principles , who does not tell wherein certainty consists , is no less a giving up of the cause of certainty . the only odds between these two is more art and reserve in the one than the other . and therefore my lord , you must either upon your principles of certainty demonstrate that the soul is immaterial , or you must allow me to say , that you too give up the cause of certainty , and your principles tend to scepticism as much as mine . which of these two your lordship shall please to do , will to me be advantagious ; for by the one i shall get a demonstration of the souls immateriality , ( of which i shall be very glad ) and that upon principles , which reaching farther than mine , i shall imbrace , as better than mine , and become your lordship's professed convert . till then i shall rest satisfied , that my principles be they as weak and fallible as your lordship please , are no more guilty of any such tendency , than theirs , who talking more of certainty cannot attain to it in cases , where they condemn the way of ideas for coming short of it . you a little lower in the same page , † set down these as my words , that i never offered it as a way of certainty , where we cannot reach certainty . i have already told you that i have been sometimes in doubt what copy you had got of my essay : because i often found your quotations out of it , did not agree with what i read in mine : but by this instance here , and some others , i know not what to think , since in my letter , which i did my self the honour to send your lordship , i am sure the words are not as they are here set down . for i say , not that i offered the way of certainty there spoken of which looks as if it were a new way of certainty , that i pretended to teach the world perhaps the difference , in these from my words is not so great , that upon an other occasion i should take notice of it . but it being to lead people into an opinion , that i spoke of the way of certainty by ideas , as something new , which i pretended to teach the world , i think it worth while to set down my words themselves , which i think are so penn'd , as to shew a great cantion in me to avoid such an opinion . my words * are , i think it is a way to bring us to a certainty in those things , which i have offered as certain , but i never thought it a way to certainty , where we cannot reach certainty . what use your lordship makes of the term offered , applied to what i applied it not , is to be seen in your next words , which you subjoin to those which you set down for mine . † but did you not offer to put us into a way of certainty ? and what is that but to attain certainty in such things where we could not otherwise do it ? answ. if this your way of reasoning here , carries certainty in it , i humbly conceive in your way of certainty by reason , certainty may be attained , where it could not otherwise be had . i only beg you my lord , to shew me the place , where i so offer to put you in a way of certainty different from what had formerly been the way of certainty , that men by it might attain to certainty in things , which they could not before my book was writ . no body who reads my essay with that indifferency , which is proper to a lover of truth , can avoid seeing , that what i say of certainty was not to teach the wrold a new way of certainty ( though that be one great objection of yours against my book ) but to endeavour to shew , wherein the old and only way of certainty consists ; what was the occasion and design of my book may be seen plainly enough in the epistle to the reader , without any need that any thing more should be said of it . and i am too sensible of my own weakness not to profess , as i do * , that i pretend not to teach , but to enquire . i cannot but wonder what service you , my lord , who are a teacher of authority , mean to truth or certainty , by condemning the way of certainty by ideas : because i own by it i cannot demonstrate , that the soul is immaterial . may it not be worth your considering , what advantage this will be to scepticism , when upon the same grounds , you words here * shall be turned upon you ; and it shall be asked , what a strange way of certainty is this , [ your lordship's way by reason ] if it fails us in some of the first foundations of the real knowledge of our selves ? to avoid this , you undertake * to prove from my own principles , that we may be certain . that the first eternal thinking being or omnipotent spirit cannot , if he would , give to certain systems of created sensible matter , put together as he sees fit , some degrees of sense , perception and thought : for this , my lord , is my proposition , † and this the utmost that i have said concerning the power of thinking in matter . your first argument † i take to be this that according to me , the knowledge we have being by our ideas , and our idea of matter in general being a solid substance , and our idea of body a solid extended figured substance ; if i admit matter to be capable of thinking , i confound the idea of matter with the idea of a spirit : to which i answer , no , no more than i confound the idea of matter with the idea of an horse , when i say that matter in general is a solid extended substance ; and that an horse is a material animal , or an extended solid substance with sense and spontaneous motion . the idea of matter is an extended solid substance ; where-ever there is such a substance , there is matter ; and the essence of matter , whatever other qualities not contained in that essence , it shall please god to superadd to it . for example , god creates an extended solid substance , without the superadding any thing else to it , and so we may consider it at rest : to some parts of it he superadds , motion , but it has still the essence of matter : other parts of it he frames into plants , with all the excellencies of vegetation , life and beauty , which is to he found in a rose or a peach-tree , &c. above the essence of matter in general , but it is still but matter : to other parts he adds sense and spontaneous motion , and those other properties that are to be found in an elephant . hitherto 't is not doubted but the power of god may go , and that the properties of a rose , a peach or an elephant , superadded to matter , change not the properties of matter ; but matter is in these things matter still . but if one venture to go one step further and say , god may give to matter , thought , reason and volition , as well as sense and spontaneous motion , there are men ready presently to limit the power of the omnipotent creator , and tell us , he cannot do it ; because it destroys the essence , or changes the essential properties of matter . to make good which assertion they have no more to say , but that thought and reason are not included in the essence of matter . i grant it ; but whatever excellency , not contained in its essence , be superadded to matter , it does not destroy the essence of matter , if it leaves it an extended solid substance ; where-ever that is , there is the essence of matter ; and if every thing of greater perfection , superadded to such a substance , destroys the essence of matter , what will become of the essence of matter in a plant , or an animal , whose properties far exceed those of a meer extended solid substance ? but 't is farther urged , that we cannot conceive how matter can think . i grant it ; but to argue from thence , that god therefore cannot give to matter a faculty of thinking , is to say god's omnipotency is limited to a narrow compass , because man's understanding is so ; and brings down god's infinite power to the size of our capacities . if god can give no power to any parts of matter , but what men can account for from the essence of matter in general : if all such qualities and properties must destroy the essence or change the essential properties of matter , which are to our conceptions above it , and we cannot conceive to be the natural consequence of that essence ; it is plain , that the essence of matter is destroyed and its essential properties changed in most of the sensible parts of this our system : for 't is visible , that all the planets have revolutions about certain remote centers , which i would have any one explain , or make conceiveable by the bare essence or natural powers depending on the essence of matter in general , without something added to that essence , which we cannot conceive ; for the moving of matter in a crooked line , or the attraction of matter by matter , is all that can be said in the case ; either of which , it is above our reach to derive from the essence of matter or body in general ; though one of these two must unavoidably be allowed to be superadded in this instance to the essence of matter in general . the omnipotent creator advised not with us in the making of the world , and his ways are not the less excellent , because they are past our finding out . in the next place , the vegetable part of the creation is not doubted to be wholly material ; and yet he that will look into it will observe excellencies and operations in this part of matter , which he will not find contained in the essence of matter in general , nor be able to conceive how they can be produced by it . and will he therefore say , that the essence of matter is destroyed in them , because they have properties and operations not contained in the essential properties of matter as matter , nor explicable by the essence of matter in general ? let us advance one step farther , and we shall in the animal world meet with yet greater perfections and properties no ways explicable by the essence of matter in general . if the omnipotent creator had not superadded to the earth , which produced the irrational animals , qualities far surpassing those of the dull dead earth , out of which they were made , life , sense , and spontaneous motion , nobler qualities than were before in it , it had still remained rude senseless matter ; and if to the individuals of each species , he had not superadded a power of propagation , the species had perished with those individuals : but by these essences or properties of each species , superadded to the matter which they were made of , the essence or properties of matter in general were not destroyed or changed , any more than any thing that was in the individuals before , was destroyed or changed by the power of generation , superadded to them by the first benediction of the almighty . in all such cases , the superinducement of greater perfections and nobler qualities , destroys nothing of the essence or perfections that were there before ; unless there can be shewed a manifest repugnancy between them ; but all the proof offered for that , is only , that we cannot conceive how matter , without such superadded perfections , can produce such effects ; which is , in truth , no more than to say , matter in general , or every part of matter , as matter has them not ; but is no reason to prove , that god , if he pleases , cannot superadd them to some parts of matter , unless it can be proved to be a contradiction , that god should give to some parts of matter , qualities and perfections , which matter in general has not ; though we cannot conceive how matter is invested with them , or how it operates by vertue of those new endowments . nor is it to be wonder'd that we cannot , whilst we limit all its operations to those qualities it had before , and would explain them , by the known properties of matter in general , without any such superinduced perfections . for if this be a right rule of reasoning to deny a thing to be , because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be : i shall desire them who use it , to stick to this rule , and see what work it will make both in divinity , as well as philosophy ; and whether they can advance any thing more in favour of scepticism ? for to keep within the present subject of the power of thinking and self-motion , bestow'd by omnipotent power on some parts of matter : the objection to this is , i cannot conceive how matter should think : what is the consequence ? ergo , god cannot give it a power to think . let this stand for a good reason , and then proceed in other cases by the same . you cannot conceive how matter can attract matter at any distance , muchless at the distance of miles ; ergo , god cannot give it such a power ; you cannot conceive how matter should feel , or move it self , or affect an immaterial being , or be moved by it : ergo , god cannot give it such powers , which is in effect to deny gravity and the revolution of the planets about the sun ; to make brutes meer machins without sense or spontaneous motion , and to allow man neither sense nor voluntary motion . let us apply this rule one degree farther . you cannot conceive how an extended solid substance should think , therefore god cannot make it think : can you conceive how your own soul , or any substance thinks ? you find indeed , that you do think , and so do i ; but i want to be told how the action of thinking is performed : this , i confess , is beyond my conception ; and i would be glad any one , who conceives it , would explain it to me . god , i find , has given me this faculty ; and since i cannot but be convinced of his power in this instance , which though i every moment experiment in my self , yet i cannot conceive the manner of ; what would it be less than an insolent absurdity , to deny his power in other like cases only for this reason , because i cannot conceive the manner how ? to explain this matter a little farther . god has created a substance ; let it be , for example , a solid extended substance ; is god bound to give it , besides being , a power of action ? that , i think , no body will say : he therefore may leave it in a state of inactivity , and it will be nevertheless a substance ; for action is not necessary to the being of any substance , that god does create : god has likewise created and made to exist , de novo , an immaterial substance , which will not lose its being of a substance , though god should bestow on it nothing more but this bare being , without giving it any activity at all . here are now two distinct substances , the one material the other immaterial , both in a state of perfect inactivity . now i ask , what power god can give to one of these substances ( supposing them to retain the same distinct natures , that they had as substances in their state of inactivity ) which he cannot give to the other ? in that state , 't is plain , neither of them thinks ; for thinking being an action , it cannot be denied , that god can put an end to any action of any created substance , without anihilating of the substance whereof it is an action ; and if it be so , he can also create or give existence to such a substance , without giving that substance any action at all . by the same reason it is plain , that neither of them can move it self : now i would ask , why omnipotency cannot give to either of these substances , which are equally in a state of perfect inactivity , the same power , that it can give to the other ? let it be for example , that of spontaneous or self-motion , which is a power that 't is supposed god can give to an unsolid substance , but denyed that he can give to solid a substance . if it be asked , why they limit the omnipotency of god , in reference to the one rather than the other of these substances ; all that can be said to it , is , that they cannot conceive , how the solid substance should ever be able to move it self . and as little , say i , are they able to conceive how a created unsolid substance should move it self : but there may be something in an immaterial substance , that you do not know . i grant it ; and in a material one too : for example , gravitation of matter towards matter , and in the several proportions observable , inevitably shews , that there is something in matter that we do not understand , unless we can conceive self-motion in matter ; or an inexplicable and inconceivable attraction in matter , at immense and almost incomprehensible distances : it must therefore be confessed , that there is something in solid , as well as unsolid substances , that we do not understand . but this we know , that they may each of them have their distinct beings , without any activity superadded to them , unless you will deny , that god can take from any being its power of acting , which 't is probable will be thought too presumptuous for any one to do ; and i say , it is as hard to conceive self-motion in a created immaterial as in a material being , consider it how you will : and therefore this is no reason to deny omnipotency to be able to give a power of self-motion to a material substance , if he pleases , as well as to an immaterial ; since neither of them can have it from themselves , nor can we conceive how it can be in either of them . the same is visible in the other operation of thinking ; both these substances may be made , and exist without thought ; neither of them has , or can have the power of thinking from it self : god may give it to either of them according to the good pleasure of his omnipoteney ; and in which ever of them it is , it is equally beyond our capacity to conceive , how either of those substances thinks . but for that reason , to deny that god , who had power enough to give them both a being out of nothing , can by the same omnipotency , give them what other powers and perfections he pleases , has no better a foundation than to deny his power of creation , because we cannot conceive how it is performed ; and there at last this way of reasoning must terminate . that omnipotency cannot make a substance to be solid and not solid at the same time , i think , with due reverence , we may say ; but that a solid substance may not have qualities , perfections and powers , which have no natural or visibly necessary connection with solidity and extension , is too much for us ( who are but of yesterday , and know nothing ) to be positive in . if god cannot join things together by connections inconceiveable to us , we must deny even the consistency , and being of matter it self ; since every particle of it having some bulk , has its parts connected by ways inconceiveable to us . so that all the difficulties , that are raised against the thinking of matter from our ignorance or narrow conceptions , stand not at all in the way of the power of god , if he pleases to ordain it so ; nor proves any thing against his having actually endued some parcels of matter , so disposed as he thinks fit , with a faculty of thinking , till it can be shewn , that it contains a contradiction to suppose it . though to me sensation be comprehended under thinking in general , yet in the foregoing discourse , i have spoke of sense in brutes , as distinct from thinking . because your lordship , as i remember , speaks of sense in brutes . but here i take liberty to observe , that if your lordship allows brutes to have sensation , it will follow , either that god can and doth give to some parcels of matter a power of perception and thinking ; or that all animals have immaterial and consequently , according to your lordship , immortal souls , as well as men ; and to say that fleas and mites , &c. have immortal souls as well as men , will possibly be looked on , as going a great way to serve an hypothesis , and as it would not very well agree , with what your lordship says , answ. p. . to the words of solomon , quoted out of eccles. c. . i have been pretty large in making this matter plain , that they who are so forward to bestow hard censures or names on the opinions of those , who differ from them , may consider whether sometimes they are not more due to their own : and that they may be perswaded a little to temper that heat , which supposing the truth in their current opinions , gives them ( as they think ) a right to lay what imputations they please on those who would fairly examin the grounds they stand upon . for talking with a supposition and insinuations , that truth and knowledge , nay and religion too , stands and falls with their systems ; is at best but an imperious way of begging the question , and assuming to themselves under the pretence of zeal for the cause of god , a title to infallibility . it is very becoming that mens zeal for truth , should go as far as their proofs , but not go for proofs themselves . he that attacks received opinions , with any thing but fair arguments , may , i own , be justly suspected not to mean well ; nor to be led by the love of truth ; but the same may be said of him too , who so defends them . an error is not the better for being common , nor truth the worse for having lain neglected : and if it were put to the vote any where in the world , i doubt , as things are managed , whether truth would have the majority , at least , whilst the authority of men , and not the examination of things must be its measure . the imputation of scepticism and those broad insinuations , to render what i have writ suspected , so frequent as if that were the great business of all this pains you have been at about me , has made me say thus much my lord , rather as my sense of the way to establish truth in its full force and beauty , than that i think the world will need to have any thing said to it , to make it distinguish between your lordship's and my design in writing , which therefore i securely leave to the judgment of the reader , and return to the argument in hand . what i have above said , i take to be a full answer to all that your lordship would infer from my idea of matter , of liberty , and of identity , and from the power of abstracting . you ask , * how can my idea of liberty agree with the idea that bodies can operate only by motion and impulse ? answ. by the omnipotency of god , who can make all things agree , that involve not a contradiction . 't is true , i say , † that bodies operate by impulse and nothing else . and so i thought when i writ it and yet can conceive no other way of their operation . but i am since convinced by the judicious mr. newton's incomparable book , that 't is too bold a presumption to limit god's power in this point , by my narrow conceptions . the gravitation of matter towards matter , by ways unconceivable to me , is not only a demonstration that god can , if he pleases , put into bodies , powers , and ways of operation , above what can be derived from our idea of body , or can be explained by what we know of matter , but also an unquestionable and every where visible instance , that he has done so and therefore in the next edition of my book , i shall take care to have that passage rectified . as to self-consciousness , your lordship asks , † what is there like self-consciousness in matter ? nothing at all in matter as matter . but that god cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of thinking , and with it self-consciousness will never be proved by asking , * how is it possible to apprehend that meer body should perceive that it doth perceive ? the weakness of our apprehension i grant in the case : i confess as much as you please , that we cannot conceive how a solid , no nor how an unsolid created substance thinks ; but this weakness of our apprehensions , reaches not the power of god , whose weakness is stronger than any thing in men. your argument from abstraction , we have in this question , * if it may be in the power of matter to think , how comes it to be so impossible for such organized bodies as the brutes have , to enlarge their ideas by abstraction ? answ. this seems to suppose , that i place thinking within the natural power of matter . if that be your meaning , my lord , i neither say , nor suppose , that all matter has naturally in it a faculty of thinking , but the direct contrary . but if you mean that certain parcels of matter , ordered by the divine power , as seems fit to him , may be made capable of receiving from his omnipotency the faculty of thinking ; that indeed i say , and that being granted , the answer to your question is easie , since if omnipotency can give thought to any solid substance , it is not hard to conceive , that god may give that faculty in an higher or lower degree , as it pleases him , who knows what disposition of the subject is suited to such a particular way or degree of thinking . another argument to prove , that god cannot endue any parcel of matter with the faculty of thinking , is taken from those words of mine , * where i shew , by what connection of ideas we may come to know , that god is an immaterial substance . they are these , the idea of an eternal actual , knowing being , with the idea of immateriality , by the intervention of the idea of matter , and of its actual division , divisibility and want of perception , &c. from whence your lordship thus argues , † here the want of perception is owned to be so essential to matter , that god is therefore concluded to be immaterial . ans. perception and knowledge in that one eternal being , where it has its sourse , 't is visible must be essentially inseparable from it ; therefore the actual want of perception in so great part of the particular parcels of matter is a demonstration , that the first being , from whom perception and knowledge is inseparable , is not matter : how far this makes the want of perception an essential property of matter i will not dispute ; it suffices that it shews , that perception is not an essential property of matter ; and therefore matter cannot be that eternal original being , to which perception and knowledge is essential . matter , i say , naturally is without perception : ergo , says your lordship , want of perception is an essential property of matter , and god doth not change the essential properties of things , their nature remaining . from whence you infer , that god cannot bestow on any parcel of matter ( the nature of matter remaining ) a faculty of thinking . if the rules of logick since my days be not changed , i may safely deny this consequence . for an argument that runs thus , god does not ; ergo , he cannot , i was taught when i came first to the university , would not hold . for i never said god did . but * that i see no contradiction in it , that he should , if he pleased , give to some systems of sensless matter , a faculty of thinking , and i know no body , before des cartes , that ever pretended to shew that there was any contradiction in it so that at worst , my not being able to see in matter any such incapacity , as makes it impossible for omnipotency to bestow on it a faculty of thinking , makes me opposite only to the cartesians . for as far as i have seen or heard , the fathers of the christian church never pretended to domonstrate that matter , was incapable to receive a power of sensation , perception and thinking , from the hand of the omnipotent creator . let us therefore , if you please , suppose the form of your argumentation right , and that your lordship means , god cannot : and then if your argument be good , it proves , that god could not give to baalam's ass a power to speak to his master as he did , for the want of rational discourse , being natural to that species , 't is but for your lordship to call it an essential property , and then god cannot change the essential properties of things , their nature remaining : whereby it is proved , that god cannot with all his omnipotency , give to an ass a power to speak as balaam's did . you say , † my lord , you do not set bound's to god's omnipotency . for he may if he please change a body into an immaterial substance , i. e. take away from a substance the solidity which it had before , and which made it matter , and then give it a faculty of thinking , which it had not before , and which makes it a spirit , the same substance remaining . for if the same substance remains not , body is not changed into an immaterial substance . but the solid substance and all belonging to it is annihilated , and an immaterial substance created , which is not change of one thing into another , but the destroying of one , and making another de novo . in this change therefore of a body or material substance into an immaterial , let us observe those distinct considerations . first , you say , god may if he pleases take away from a solid substance solidity , which is that which makes it a material substance or body ; and may make it an immaterial substance , i. e. a substance without solidity . but this privation of one quality gives it not another ; the bare taking away a lower or less noble quality does not give it an higher or nobler ; that must be the gift of god. for the bare privation of one , and a meaner quality , cannot be the position of an higher and better : unless any one will say , that cogitation , or the power of thinking results from the nature of substance it self , which if it do , then where ever there is substance , there must be cogitation or a power of thinking . here then , upon your lordship 's own principles is an immaterial sub●ance without the faculty of thinking . in the next place , you will not deny , but god may give to this substance thus deprived of solidity a faculty of thinking ; for you suppose it made capable of that by being made immaterial , whereby you allow , that the same numerical substance may be sometimes wholly incogitative or without a power of thinking , and at other times perfectly cogitative , or indued with a power of thinking . further , you will not deny , but god can give it solidity and make it material again . for i conclude it will not be denied , that god can make it again , what it was before . now i crave leave to ask your lordship , why god having given to this substance the faculty of thinking after solidity was taken from it , cannot restore to it solidity again , without taking away the faculty of thinking . when you have resolved this my lord , you will have proved it impossible for god's omnipotence to give to a solid substance a faculty of thinking ; but till then , not having proved it impossible , and yet denying that god can do it , is to deny that he can do , what is in it self possible ; which as i humbly conceive is visibly to set bound's to god's omnipotency , tho' you say here , † you do not set bound's to god's omnipotency . if i should imitate your lordship's way of writing , i should not omit to bring in epicurus here , and take notice that this was his way , deum verbis ponere , re tollere . and then add , that i am certain you do not think he promoted the great ends of religion and morality . for 't is with such candid and kind insinuations as these , that you bring in both hobbes , † and spinosa , ‖ into your discourse here about god's being able , if he please , to give to some parcels of matter ordered as he thinks fit , a faculty of thinking . neither of those authors having as appears by any passages you bring out of them said any thing to this question , nor having , as it seems , any other business here , but by their names skilfully to give that character to my book , with which you would recommend it to the world. i pretend not to enquire what measure of zeal , nor for what , guides your lordships pen in such a way of writing , as yours has all along been with me : only i cannot but consider , what reputation it would give to the writings of the fathers of the church , if they should think truth required , or religion allowed them to imitate such patterns . but god be thanked there be those amongst them who do not admire such ways of managing the cause of truth or religion . they being sensible , that if every one , who believes or can pretend he has truth on his side , is thereby authorized without proof , to insinuate , what ever may serve to prejudice mens minds against the other side , there will be great ravage made on charity and practice , without any gain to truth or knowledge . and that the liberties frequently taken by disputants to do so , may have been the cause that the world in all ages has received so much harm , and so little advantage from controversies in religion . these are the arguments which your lordship has brought to confute one saying in my book , by other passages in it , which therefore being all but argumenta ad hominem , if they did prove what they do not , are of no other use , than to gain a victory over me , a thing methinks so much beneath your lordship , that it does not deserve one of your pages . the question is , whether god can if he pleases , bestow on any parcel of matter ordered as he thinks fit , a faculty of perception and thinking . you say , * you look upon a mistake herein to be of dangerous consequence , as to the great ends of religion and morality . if this be so , my lord , i think one may well wonder , why your lordship has brought no arguments to establish the truth it self , which you look on to be of such dangerous consequence to be mistaken in ; but have spent so many pages only in a personal matter in endeavouring to shew , that i had inconsistencies in my book , which if any such thing had been shewed , the question would be still as far from being decided , and the danger of mistaking about it as little prevented , as if nothing of all this had been said . if therefore your lordship's care of the great ends of religion and morality have made you think it necessary to clear this question , the world has reason to conclude there is little to be said against that proposition , which is to be found in my book concerning the possibility , that some parcels of matter might be so ordered by omnipotence , as to be endued with a faculty of thinking , if god so pleased , since your lordship's concern for the promoting the great ends of religion and morality , has not enabled you to produce one argument against a proposition , that you think of so dangerous consequence to them . and here i crave leave to observe , that though in your title page you promise to prove , that my notion of ideas is inconsistent with it self , ( which if it were , it could hardly be proved to be inconsistent with any thing else , ) and with the articles of the christian faith ; yet your attempts all along have been to prove me in some passages of my book inconsistent with my self , without having shewn any proposition in my book inconsistent with any article of the christian faith. i think , your lordship has indeed made use of one argument of your own : but it is such an one , that i confess i do not see how it is apt much to promote religion , especially the christian religion founded on revelation . i shall set down your lordship's words , that they may be considered , you say : * that you are of opinion , that the great ends of religion and morality are best secured by the proofs of the immortality of the soul from its nature and properties ; and which you think proves is immaterial . your lordship does not question whether god can give immortality to a material substance ; but you say , it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality , if it depend wholly upon god's giving that , which of its own nature it is not capable of , &c. so likewise you say , † if a man cannot be certain , but that matter may think ( as i affirm ) then what becomes of the soul's immateriality ( and consequently immortality ) from its operations ? but for all this , say i , his assurance of faith remains on its own basis. now you appeal to any man of sense , whether the finding the uncertainty of his own principles which he went upon in point of reason , doth not weaken the credibility of these fundamental articles , when they are considered purely at matters of faith ? for before there was a natural credibility in them on the account of reason ; but by going on wrong grounds of certainty , all that is lost ; and instead of being certain , he is more doubtful than ever ▪ and if the evidence of faith falls so much short of that of reason , it must needs have less effect upon men's minds , when the subserviency of reason is taken away ▪ as it must be when the grounds of certainty by reason are vanished . i● it at all probable , that he who finds his reason deceive him in such fundamental points , should have his faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of revelation ? for in matters of revelation , there must be some antecedent principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the account of it . more to the same purpose we have some pages farther , where from some of my words your lordship says , * you cannot but observe , that we have no certainty upon my grounds , that self-consciousness depends upon an individual immaterial substance , and consequently that a material substance may , according to my principles , have self-consciousness in it ; at least that i am not certain of the contrary . whereupon your lordship bids me consider , whether this doth not a little affect the whole article of the resurrection ? what does all this tend to ? but to make the world believe , that i have lessened the credibility of the immortality of the soul and the resurrection , by saying , that though it be most highly probable , that the soul is immaterial , yet upon my principles it cannot be demonstrated ; because it is not impossible to god's omnipotency , if he pleases to bestow upon some parcels of matter disposed as he sees fit , a faculty of thinking . this your accusation of my lessening the credibility of these articles of faith is founded on this , that the article of the immortality of the soul abates of its credibility , if it be allowed , that its immateriality ( which is the supposed proof from reason and philosophy of its immortality ) cannot be demonstrated from natural reason : which argument of your lordship's bottoms , as i humbly conceive , on this , that divine revelation abates of its credibility in all those articles it proposes porportionably as humane reason fails to support the testimony of god. and all that your lordship in those passages has said , when examined , will i suppose be found to import thus much , viz. does god promise any thing to mankind to be believed ? it is very fit and credible to be believed , if reason can demonstrate it to be true . but if humane reason comes short in the case , and cannot make it out , its credibility is thereby lessened ; which is in effect to say , that the veracity of god is not a firm and sure foundation of faith to rely upon , without the concurrent testimony of reason , i. e. with reverence be it spoken , god is not to be believed on his own word , unless what he reveals be in it self credible , and might be believed without him . if this be a way to promote religion , the christian religion in all its articles , i am not sorry , that it is not a way to be found in any of my writings , for i imagine any thing like this would , ( and i should think deserv'd ) to have other titles than bare scepticism bestowed upon it , and would have raised no small out-cry against any one , who is not to be supposed to be in the right in all that he says , and so may securely say what he pleases . such as i , the prophanum vulgus , who take too much upon us , if we would examine , have nothing to do but to hearken and believe , though what he said should subvert the very foundations of the christian faith. what i have above observed , is so visibly contained in your lordship's argument , that when i met with it in your answer to my first letter , it seemed so strange from a man of your lordship's character , and in a dispute in defence of the doctrin of the trinity , that i could hardly perswade my self , but it was a slip of your pen : but when i found it in your second letter * made use of again , and seriously enlarged as an argument of weight to be insisted upon , i was convinced , that it was a principle , that you heartily imbraced , how little favourable soever it was to the articles of the christian religion , and particularly those which you undertook to defend . i desire my reader to peruse the passages as they stand in your letters themselves , and see whether what you say in them does not amount to this , that a revelation from god is more or less credible according as it has a stronger or weaker confirmation from humane reason . for , . your lordship says , † you do not question whether god can give immortality to a material substance ; but you say it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality , if it depends wholly upon god's giving that which of its own nature it is not capable of . to which i reply , any ones not being able to demonstrate the soul to be immaterial , takes off not very much , nor at all from the evidence of its immortality , if god has revealed , that it shall be immortal , because the veracity of god is a demonstration of the truth of what he has revealed , and the want of an other demonstration of a proposition , that is demonstratively true , takes not off from the evidence of it . for where there is a clear demonstration , there is as much evidence as any truth can have ▪ that is not self-evident . god has revealed that the souls of men shall live for ever . but says , your lordship from this evidence it takes off very much if it depends wholly upon god's giving that , which of its own nature it is not capable of . i. e. the revelation and testimony of god loses much of its evidence , if this depends wholly upon the good pleasure of god , and cannot be demonstratively made out by natural reason , that the soul is immaterial , and consequently in its own nature immortal . for that is all that here is or can be meant by these words , which of its own nature it is not capable of , to make them to the purpose . for the whole of your lordship's discourse here , is to prove , that the soul cannot be material , because then the evidence of its being immortal would be very much lessened . which is to say , that 't is not as credible upon divine revelation , that a material substance should be immortal , as an immaterial ; or which is all one , that god is not equally to be believed , when he declares , that a material substance shall be immortal , as when he declares , that an immaterial shall be so , because the immortality of a material substance , cannot be demonstrated from natural reason . let us try this rule of your lordship 's a little farther . god hath revealed , that the bodies men shall have after the resurrection , as well as their souls , shall live to eternity . does your lordship believe the eternal life of the one of these , more than of the other , because you think you can prove it of one of them by natural reason , and of the other not ? or can any one who admits of divine revelation in the case , doubt of one of them more than the other ? or think this proposition less credible , the bodies of men , after the resurrection , shall live for ever ; than this , that the souls of men shall ▪ after the resurrection , live for ever ? for that he must do , if he thinks either of them is less credible than the other . if this be so , reason is to be consulted , how far god is to be believed , and the credit of divine testimony , must receive its force from the evidence of reason ; which is evidently to take away the credibility of divine revelation , in all supernatural truths , wherein the evidence of reason fails . and how much such a principle as this tends to the support of the doctrin of the trinity , or the promoting the christian religion , i shall leave it to your lordship to consider . i am not so well read in hobbes or spinoza , as to be able to say , what were their opinions in this matter . but possibly there be those , who will think your lordship's authority of more use to them in the case , than those justly decried names : and be glad to find your lordship a patron of the oracles of reason , so little to the advantage of the oracles of divine revelation . this at least , i think , may be subjoined to the words at the bottom of the next page , † that those who have gone about to lessen the credibility of articles of faith , which evidently they do , who say they are less credible , because they cannot be made out demonstratively by natural reason , have not been thought to secure several of the articles of the christian faith , especially those of the trinity , inoarnation , and resurrection of the body , which are those upon the account of which i am brought by your lordship into this dispute . i shall not trouble the reader with your lordship's endeavours in the following words , to prove , that if the soul be not an immaterial substance , it can be nothing but life ; your very first words visibly confuting all that you alledge to that purpose . they are , * if the soul be immaterial substance , it is really nothing but life ; which is to say , that if the soul be really a substance , it is not really a substance , but really nothing else but an affection of a substance ; for the life , whether of a material or immaterial substance , is not the substance it self , but an affection of it . . you say , * although we think the separate state of the soul after death , is sufficiently revealed in the scripture ; yet it creates a great difficulty in understanding it , if the soul be nothing but life , or a material substance , which must be dissolved when life is ended . for if the soul be a material substance , it must be made up , as others are , of the cohesion of solid and separate parts , how minute and invisible soever they be . and what is it which should keep them together , when life is gone ? so that it is no easie matter to give an account , how the soul should be capable of immortality , unless it be an immaterial substance ; and then we know the solution and texture of bodies cannot reach the soul , being of a different nature . let it be as hard a matter , as it will , to give an account what it is , that should keep the parts of a material soul together , after it is separated from the body ; yet it will be always as easie to give an account of it , as to give an account what it is which shall keep together a material and immaterial substance . and yet the difficulty that there is to give an account of that , i hope does not , with your lordship , weaken the credibility of the inseparable union of soul and body to eternity : and i perswade my self , that the men of sense , to whom your lordship appeals in the case , do not find their belief of this fundamental point , much weakened by that difficulty . i thought heretofore ( and by your lordship's permission , would think so still ) that the union of parts of matter , one with another , is as much in the hands of god , as the union of a material and immaterial substance ; and that it does not take off very much , or at all , from the evidence of immortality , which depends on that union , that it is no easie matter to give an account what it is that should keep them together : though its depending wholly upon the gift and good pleasure of god , where the manner creates great difficulty in the understanding , and our reason cannot discover in the nature of things , how it is , be that which your lordship so positively says lessens the credibility of the fundamental articles of the resurrection and immortality . but , my lord , to remove this objection a little , and to shew of how small force it is even with your self ; give me leave to presume , that your lordship as firmly believes the immortality of the body after the resurrection , as any other article of faith : if so , then it being no easie matter to give an account , what it is that shall keep together the parts of a material soul , to one that belives it is material , can no more weaken the credibility of its immortality , than the like difficulty weakens the credibility of the immortality of the body . for when your lordship shall find it an easie matter to give an account , what it is besides the good pleasure of god , which shall keep together the parts of our material bodies to eternity , or even soul and body ; i doubt not but any one , who shall think the soul material , will also find it as easie to give an account , what it is that shall keep those parts of matter also together to eternity . were it not that the warmth of controversie is apt to make men so far forget , as to take up those principles themselves ( when they will serve their turn ) which they have highly condemned in others , i should wonder to find your lordship to argue , that because it is a difficulty to understand what should keep together the minute parts of a material soul , when life is gone ; and because it is not an easie matter to give an account how the soul should be capable of immortality , unless it be an immaterial substance : therefore it is not so credible as if it were easie to give an account by natural reason , how it could be . for to this it is , that all this your discourse tends as is evident by what is already set down out of page ; and will be more fully made out by what your lordship says in other places , though there needs no such proofs , since it would all be nothing against me in any other sense . i thought your lordship had in other places asserted , and insisted on this truth , that no part of divine revelation was the less to be believed , because the thing it self oreated great difficulty in the understanding , and the manner of it was hard to be explained ; and it was no easie matter to give an account how it was . this , as i take it , your lordship condemned in others , as a very unreaonable principle , and such as would subvert all the articles of the christian religion , that were mere matters of faith , as i think it will : and is it possible , that you should make use of it here your self , against the article of life and immortality , that christ hath brought to light through the gospel ; and neither was , nor could be made out by natural reason without revelation ? but you will say , you speak only of the soul ; and your words are , that it is no easie matter to give an account how the soul should be capable of immortality , unless it be an immaterial substance . i grant it ; but crave leave to say , that there is not any one of those difficulties , that are , or can be raised about the manner how a material soul can be immortal , which do not as well reach the immortality of the body . but if it were not so , i am sure this principle of your lordship's would reach other articles of faith , wherein our natural reason finds it not so easy to give an account how those mysteries are : and which therefore , according to your principles , must be less credible , than other articles , that create less difficulty to the vnderstanding . for your lordship says , * that you appeal to any man of sense , whether to a man who thought by his principles , he could from natural grounds demonstrate the immortality of the soul , the finding the uncertainty of those principles he went upon in point of reason , i. e. the finding he could not certainly prove it by natural reason , doth not weaken the credibility of that fundamental article , when it is considered purely as a matter of faith ? which in effect , i humbly conceive , amounts to this , that a proposition divinely revealed , that cannot be proved by natural reason , is less credible than one that can : which seems to me to come very little short of this , with due reverence be it spoken , that god is less to be believed when he affirms a proposition , that cannot be proved by natural reason , than when he proposes what can be proved by it . the direct contrary to which is my opinion , though you endeavour to make good , by these following words . † if the evidence of faith falls so much short of that of reason , it must needs have less effect upon men's minds , when the subserviency of reason is taken away ; as it must be when the grounds of certainty by reason are vanished . is it at all probable , that he who finds his reason deceive him in such fundamental points , should have his faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of revelation ? than which i think there are hardly plainer words to be found out to declare , that the credibility of god's testimony depends on the natural evidence or probability of the things we receive from revelation ▪ and rises and falls with it : and that the truths of god , or the articles of meer faith , lose so much of their credibility , as they want proof from reason : which if true , revelation may come to have no credibility at all . for if in this present case , the credibility of this proposition , the souls of men shall five for ever , revealed in the scripture , be lessened by confessing it cannot be demonstratively proved from reason ; though it be asserted to be most highly probable : must not by the same rule its credibility dwindle away to nothing , if natural reason should not be able to make it out to be so much as probable ; or should place the probability from natural principles on the other side ? for if meer want of demonstration lessens the credibility of any proposition divinely revealed , must not want of probability , or contrary probability from natural reason , quite take away its credibility ? here at last it must end , if in any one case the veracity of god , and the credibility of the truths we receive from him by revelation , be subjected to the verdicts of humane reason , and be allowed to receive any accession or diminution from other proofs , or want of other proofs of its certainty or probability . if this be your lordship's way to promote religion or defend its articles , i know not what argument the greatest enemies of it could use more effectual for the subversion of those you have undertaken to defend , this being to resolve all revelation perfectly and purely into natural reason , to bound its credibility by that , and leave no room for faith in other things , than what can be accounted for by natural reason without revelation . your lordship † insists much upon it , as if i had contradicted what i had said in my essay , * by saying , that upon my principles it cannot be demonstratively proved , that it is an immaterial substance in us that thinks , however probable it be . he that will be at the pains to read that chapter of mine , and consider it , will find , that my business there was to shew , that it was no harder to conceive an immaterial than a material substance ; and that from the ideas of thought , and a power of moving of matter , which we experienced in out selves ( ideas originally not belonging to matter as matter ) there was no more difficulty to conclude there was an immaterial substance in us , than that we had material parts . these ideas of thinking , and power of moving of matter , i in another place shew'd did demonstratively lead us to the certain knowledge of the existence of an immaterial thinking being , in whom we have the idea of spirit in the strictest sense ; in which sense i also applyed it to the soul , in that d chapter of my essay , the easily conceivable possibility , nay great probability , that that thinking substance in us is immaterial , giving me sufficient ground for it : in which sense i shall think i may safely attribute it to the thinking substance in us , till your lordship shall have better proved from my words , that it is impossible it should be immaterial . for i only say , that it is possible , i. e. involves no contradiction , that god the omnipotent immaterial spirit should , if he pleases , give to some parcels of matter , disposed as he thinks fit , a power of thinking and moving : which parcels of matter so endued with a power of thinking and motion , might properly be called spirits , in contradistinction to unthinking matter . in all which , i presume , there is no manner of contradiction . i justified my use of the word spirit in that sense from the authorities of cicero and virgil , applying the latin word spiritus , from whence spirit is derived , to the soul as a thinking thing , without excluding materiality out of it . to which your lordship replies , * that cicero , in his tusculan questions , supposes the soul not to be a finer sort of body , but of a different nature from the body . — that he calls the body the prison of the soul. — and says , that a wise man's business is to draw off his soul from his body . and then your lordship concludes , as is usual , with a question , is it possible now to think so great a man look'd on the soul but as a modification of the body , which must be at an end with life ? answ. no ; it is impossible that a man of so good sense as tully , when he uses the word corpus or body for the gross and visible parts of a man , which he acknowledges to be mortal , should look on the soul to be a modification of that body ; in a discourse wherein he was endeavouring to persuade another , that it was immortal . it is to be acknowledge'd that truly great men , such as he was , are not wont so manifestly to contradict themselves . he had therefore no thought concerning the modification of the body of man in the case : he was not such a trifler as to examin , whether the modification of the body of a man was immortal , when that body it self was mortal : and therefore that which he reports as dicoearchus's opinion , he dismisses in the beginning without any more ado , c. . but cicero's was a direct , plain and sensible enquiry , viz. what the soul was , to see whether from thence he could discover its immortality ? but in all that discourse in his first book of tusculan questions , where he lays out so much of his reading and reason , there is not one syllable shewing the least thought , that the soul was an immaterial substance ; but many things directly to the contrary . indeed ( . ) he shuts out the body taken , in the sense he uses * corpus all-a-long , for the sensible organical parts of a man ; and is positive that is not the soul : and body in this sense , taken for the humane body , he calls the prison of the soul ; and says a wise man , instancing in socrates and cato , is glad of a fair opportunity to get out of it . but he no where says any such thing of matter : he calls not matter in general the prison of the soul , nor talks a word of being separate from it . . he concludes , that the soul is not like other things here below , made up of a composition of the elements , c. . . he excludes the two gross elements earth and water , from being the soul , c. . so far he is clear and positive : but beyond this he is uncertain ; beyond this he could not get . for in some places he speaks doubtfully , whether the soul be not air , or fire . anima sit animus ignisve nescio , c. . and therefore he agrees with panoetius , that , if it be at all elementary , it is , as he calls it , inflammata anima , inflamed air ; and for this he gives several reasons , c. , . and though he thinks it to be of a peculiar nature of its own , yet he is so far from thinking it immaterial , that he says , c. . that the admitting it to be of an aereal or igneous nature , would not be inconsistent with any thing he had said . that which he seems most to incline to is , that the soul was not at all elementary , but was of the same substance with the heavens ; which aristotle , to distinguish from the four elements and the changeable bodies here below , which he supposed made up of them , called quinta essentia . that this was tully's opinion is plain from these words , ergo , animus qui ut ego dico , divinus est , ut euripides audet dicere deus ; & quidem si deus , aut anima aut ignis est , idem est animus hominis . nam ut illa natura coelestis & terra vacat & humore ; sic utriusque harum rerum humanus animus est expers . sin autem est quinta quaedam natura ab aristotele inducta ; primum haec & deorum est & animorum . hanc nos sententiam secuti , his ipsis verbis in consolatione haec expressimus , c. . and then he goes on c. . to repeat those his own words , which your lordship has quoted out of him , wherein he had affirmed , in his treatise de consolatione , the soul not to have its original from the earth , or to be mixed or made of any thing earthly ; but had said , singularis est igitur , quaedam natura & vis animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis : whereby , he tells us , lie meant nothing but aristotle's quinta essentia ; which being unmixed , being that of which the gods and souls consisted , he calls it divinum coeleste , and concludes it eternal , it being as he speaks , sejuncta ab omni mortali concretione . from which it is clear , that in all his enquiry about the substance of the soul , his thoughts went not beyond the four elements , or aristotle's quinta essentia to look for it . in all which there is nothing of immateriality , but quite the contrary . he was willing to believe ( as good and wise men have always been ) that the soul was immortal ; but for that 't is plain he never thought of its immateriality , but as the eastern people do who believe the soul to be immortal , but have nevertheless no thought , no conception of its immateriality . it is remarkable what a very considerable and judicious author † says in the case . no opinion , says he , has been so universally received as that of the immortality of the soul : but its immateriality is a truth the knowledge whereof has not spread so far . and indeed it is extremely difficult to let into the mind of a siamite , the idea of a pure spirit . this the missionaries , who have been longest among them , are positive in . all the pagans of the east do truly believe , that there remains something of a man after his death , which subsists independently and separately from his body . but they give extension and figure to that which remains , and attribute to it all the same members , all the same substances , both solid and liquid , which our bodies are composed of . they only suppose that the souls are of a matter subtil enough to escape being seen or handled . — such were the shades and the manes of the greeks and the romans . and 't is by these figures of the souls , answerable to those of the bodies , that virgil supposed eneas knew palinurus , dido and anchises , in the other world. this gentleman was not a man that travelled into those parts for his pleasure , and to have the opportunity to tell strange stories , collected by chance , when he return'd : but one chosen on purpose ( and he seems well chosen for the purpose ) to inquire into the singularities of siam . and he has so well acquitted himself of the commission , which his epistle dedicatory tells us he had , to inform himself exactly of what was most remarkable there , that had we but such an account of other countries of the east , as he has given us of this kingdom , which he was an envoy to , we should be much better acquainted than we are , with the manners , notions and religions of that part of the world , inhabited by civiliz'd nations , who want neither good sense nor acuteness of reason , though not cast into the mould of the logick and philosophy of our schools . but to return to cicero . 't is plain , that in his enquiries about the soul his thoughts went not at all beyond matter . this the expressions , that drop from him in several places of this book , evidently shew . for example , that the souls of excellent men and women ascended into heaven ; of others that they remained here on earth , c. . that the soul is hot and warms the body : that at its leaving the body it penetrates and divides , and breaks through our thick , cloudy , moist air : that it stops in the region of fire , and ascends no farther , the equality of warmth and weight making that its proper place , where it is nourished and sustained with the same things , wherewith the stars are nourished and sustained , and that by the convenience of its . neighbourhood it shall there have a clearer view and fuller knowledge of the heavenly bodies , c. . that the soul also from this height shall have a pleasant and fairer prospect of the globe of the earth , the disposition of whose parts will then lie before it in one view , c. . that it is hard to determin what conformation , size and place , the soul has in the body : that it is too subtil to be seen : that it is in the human body as in a house or a vessel , or a receptacle , c. . all which are expressions that sufficiently evidence , that he who used them had not in his mind separated materiality from the idea of the soul. it may perhaps be replied , that a great part of this , which we find in chap. . is said upon the principles of those who would have the soul to be anima inflammata , inflamed air. i grant it . but it is also to be observed , that in this th and the two following chapters he does not only not deny , but even admits , that so material a thing as infiamed air may think . the truth of the case in short is this ; cicero was willing to believe the soul immortal , but when he sought in the nature of the soul it self something to establish this his belief into a certainty of it , he found himself at a loss . he confessed he knew not what the soul was ; but the not knowing what it was , he argues , c. . was no reason to conclude it was not . and thereupon he proceeds to the repetition of what he had said in his th book de repub. concerning the soul. the argument , which borrowed from plato he there makes use of , if it have any force in it , not only proves the soul to be immortal , but more than , i think , your lordship will allow to be true : for it proves it to be eternal , and without beginning , as well as without end , neque nata certa est , & aeterna est , says he . indeed from the faculties of the soul he concludes right , that it is of divine original : but as to the substance of the soul , he at the end of this discourse concerning its faculties , c. . as well as at the beginning of it , c. . is not ashamed to own his ignorance , what it is ; anima sit animus , ignisve , nescio ; nec me pudet ut istos , fateri nescive quod nesciam . illud , si ulla alia de re obscura affirmare possum , sive anima , sive ignis sit animus , eum jurarem esse divinam , c. . so that all the certainty he could attain to about the soul , was , that he was confident there was something divine in it , i. e. there were faculties in the soul that could not result from the nature of matter , but must have their original from a divine power ; but yet those qualities , as divine as they were , he acknowledg'd might be placed in breath or fire , which i think your lordship will not deny to be material substances . so that all those divine qualities , which he so much and so justly extols in the soul , led him not , as appears , so much as to any the least thought of immateriality . this is demonstration , that he built them not upon an exclusion of materiality out of the soul ; for he avowedly professes he does not know but breath of fire might be this thinking thing in us : and in all his considerations about the substance of the soul it self , he stuck in air or fire , or aristotle's quinta essentia ; for beyond those 't is evident he went not . but with all his proofs out of plato , to whose authority he defers so much , with all the arguments his vast reading and great parts could furnish him with for the immortality of the soul , he was so little satisfied , so far from being certain , so far from any thought that he had , or could prove it , that he over and over again professes his ignorance and doubt of it . in the beginnig he enumerates the several opinions of the philosophers , which he had well studied , about it : and then full of uncertainty says , harum sententiarum quae vera sit , deus aliquis viderit , quae veri simillima magna quaestio , c. . and towards the latter end having gone them all over again , and one after another examin'd them , he professes himself still at a loss , not knowing on which to pitch , nor what to determin . mentis acies , says he , seipsam intuens nonnunquam hebescit , ob eamque causam contemplandi diligentiam omittimus . itaque disbitans , circuspectans , haesitans , mulia adversa revertens tanquam in rate in mari immenso , nostra vehitur or atio , c. . and to conclude this argument , when the person he introduces as discoursing with him , tells him he is resolved to keep firm to the belief of immortality , tully answers , c. . laudo id quidem , etsi nihil animis oportet considere ; movemur enim saepe aliquo acute concluso , labamus , mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus ; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas . so unmoveable is that truth delivered by the spirit of truth , that though the light of nature gave some obscure glimmering , some uncertain hopes of a future state ; yet human reason could attain to no clearness , no certainty about it , but that it was jesus christ alone who had brought life and immortality to light , through the gospel . * tho' we are now told , that to own the inability of natural reason to bring immortality to light , or which passes for the same , to own principles upon which the immateriality of the soul ( and as 't is urged consequently its immortality ) cannot be demonstratively proved does lessen the belief of this article of revelation , which jesus christ alone has brought to light , and which consequently the scripture assures us is established and made certain only by revelation . this would not perhaps have seemed strange from those who are justly complained of , for slighting the revelation of the gospel , and therefore would not be much regarded , if they should contradict so plain a text of scripture in favour of their all-sufficient reason : but what use the promoters of scepticism and infidelity , in an age so much suspected by your lordship , may make of what comes from one of your great authority and learning , may deserve your consideration . and thus my lord , i hope , i have satisfied you concerning cicero's opinion about the soul in his first book of tusculan questions ; which , though i easily believe , as your lordship says , you are no stranger to , yet i humbly conceive you have not shewn ( and upon a careful perusal of that treatise again i think i may boldly say you cannot shew ) one word in it , that expresses any thing like a notion in tully of the souls immateriality , or its being an immaterial substance . from what you bring out of virgil your lordship * concludes , that he no more than cicero does me any kindness in this matter , being both assertors of the souls immortality . my lord , were not the question of the souls immateriality , according to custom , changed here into that of its immortality , which i am no less an assertor of than either of them , cicero and virgil , do me all the kindness i desired of them in this matter ; and that was to shew , that they attributed the word spiritus to the soul of man , without any thought of its immateriality ; and this the verses you your self bring out of virgil , † et cum frigida mors animae deduxerit artus omnibus umbra locis adero , dabis improbe poenas . confirm , as well as those i quoted out of his th book ; and for this monsieur de la loubere shall be my witness in the words above set down out of him ; where he shews , that there be those amongst the heathens of our days , as well as virgil and others amongst the ancient greeks and romans , who thought the souls or ghosts of men departed , did not die with the body , without thinking them to be perfectly immaterial ; the latter being much more incomprehensible to them than the former . your lordship's † answer concerning what is said , eccles. . turns wholly upon solomon's taking the soul to be immortal , which was not what i questioned : all that i quoted that place for , was to shew , that spirit in english might properly be applyed to the soul , without any notion of its immateriality , as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was by solomon , which whether he thought the souls of men to be immaterial , does little appear in that passage , where he speaks of the souls of men and beasts together , as he does . but farther , what i contended for , is evident from that place , in that the word spirit is there applyed , by our translators , to the souls of beasts , which your lordship i think does not rank amongst the immaterial , and consequently immortal spirits , though they have sense and spontaneous motion . but you say , † if the soul be not of it self a free thinking substance , you do not see what foundation there is in nature for a day of iudgment . answer . though the heathen world did not of old , nor do to this day , see a foundation in nature for a day of iudgment : yet in revelation , if that will fatisfie your lordship , every one may see a foundation for a day of iudgment , because god has positively declared it ; tho' god has not by that revelation taught us , what the substance of the soul is ; nor has any where said , that the soul of it self is a free agent . whatsoever any created substance is , it is not of it self , but is by the good pleasure of its creator : whatever degrees of perfection it has , it has from the bountiful hand of its maker . for it is true , in a natural , as well as a spiritual sense , what st. paul says , * not that we are sufficient of our celbes to think any thing as of our selves , but our sufficiency is of god. but your lordship , as i guess , by your following words , would argue , that a material substance cannot be a free agent ; whereby i suppose you only mean , that you cannot see or conceive how a solid substance should begin , stop , or change its own motion . to which give me leave to answer , that when you can make it conceivable , how any created , finite , dependent substance can move it self , or alter or stop its own motion , which it must to be a free agent ; i suppose you will find it no harder for god to bestow this power on a solid , than an unsolid created substance . tully , in the place above quoted , † could not conceive this power to be in any thing , but what was from eternity ; cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse quod seipsum moveat quis est qui hane naturam animis esse tributa● neget ? but though you cannot see how any created substance , solid or not solid , can be a free agent ( pardon me , my lord , if i put in both , till your lordship please to explain it of either , and shew the manner how either of them can , of it self , move it self or any thing else ) yet i do not think , you will so far deny men to be free agents , from the difficulty there is to see how they are free agents , as to doubt , whether there be foundation enough for a day of iudgment . it is not for me to judge how far your lordship's speculations reach : but finding in my self nothing to be truer than what the wise solomon tells me , * as thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit , nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child ; even so thou knowest not the works of god who maketh all things . i gratefully receive and rejoyce in the light of revelation , which fets me at rest in many things ; the manner whereof my poor reason can by no means make out to me : omnipotency , i know , can do any thing that contains in it no contradiction ; so that i readily believe whatever god has declared , though my reason find difficulties in it , which it cannot master . as in the present case , god having revealed , that there shall be a day of judgment , i think that foundation enough , to conclude men are free enough to be made answerable for their actions , and to receive according to what they have done , though how man is a free agent surpass my explication or comprehension . in answer to the place i brought out of st. luke , * your lordship asks , † whether , from these words of our saviour , it follows , that a spirit is only an appearance . i answer . no , nor do i know who drew such an inference from them : but it follows , that in apparitions there is something that appears , and that that which appears is not wholly immaterial ; and ye this was properly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and was often looked upon by those , who called it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in greek , and now call it spirit in english , to be the ghost or soul of one departed , which i humbly conceive justifies my use of the word spirit , for a thinking , voluntary agent , whether material or immaterial . your lordship says , † that i grant , that it cannot , upon these principles , be demonstrated , that the spiritual substance in us is immaterial : from whence you conclude , that then my grounds of certainty from ideas , are plainly given up . this being a way of arguing , that you often make use of , i have often had occasion to consider it , and cannot after all see the force of this argument . i acknowledge , that this or that proposition cannot upon my principles be demonstrated , ergo , i grant this proposition to be false , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas . for that is my ground of certainty , and till that be given up , my grounds of certainty are not given up . you farther tell me , * that i say , the souls immateriality may be proved probable to the highest degree ; to which your lordship replies . that is not the point : for it is not probability but certainty , that you are promised in this way of ideas , and that the foundation of our knowledge and real certainty lies in them , and is it dwindled into a probability at last ? this is also what your lordship has been pleased to object to me more than once , that i promised certainty . i would be glad to know in what words this promise is made , and where it stands , for i love to be a man of my word . i have indeed told wherein i think certainty , real certainty does consist , as far as any one attains it : and i do not yet , from any thing your lordship has said against it , find any reason to change my opinion therein : but i do not remember , that i promised certainty in this question , concerning the souls immateriality , or in any of those propositions , wherein you thinking i come short of certainty , infer from thence , that my way of certainty by ideas is given up . and i am so far from promising certainty in all things , that i am accused by your lordship of scepticism , for setting too narrow bounds to our knowledge and certainty . why therefore your lordship asks me , and is the certainty [ of the souls being immaterial ] dwindled into a probability at last ? will be hard to see a reason for , till you can shew , that i promised to demonstrate , that it is immaterial ; or that others upon their principles without ideas , being able to demonstrate it immaterial , it comes to dwindle into bare probability , upon my principles by ideas . one thing more i am obliged to take notice of . i had said , † that the belief of god being the foundation of all religion and genuine morality , i thought no arguments , that are made use of to work the persuasion of a god into men's minds , should be invalidated , which i grant is of ill consequence . to which words of mine i find , according to your particular favour to me , this reply , * that here i must give your lordship leave to ask me , what i think of the universal consent of mankind , as to the being of god ? hath not this been made use of , as an argument , not only by christians , but by the wisest and greatest men among the heathens ? and what then would i think of one who should go about to invalidate this argument ? and that by proving , that it bath been discovered in these latter ages by navigation , that there are whole nations at the bay of soldania , in brasil , in the caribbe-islands and paraquaria , among whom there was found no notion of a god. and even the author of the essay of hum ane vnderstanding hath done this . to this your question , my lord , i answer , that i think that the universal consent of mankind , as to the being of a god , amounts to thus much , that the vastly greater majority of mankind , have , in all ages of the world , actually believed a god ; that the majority of the remaining part have not actually disbelieved it , and consequently those who have actually opposed the belief of a god , have truly been very few . so that comparing those that have actually disbelieved with those who have actually believed a god , their number is so inconsiderable , that in respect of this incomparably greater majority of those who have owned the belief of a god , it may be said to be the universal consent of mankind . this is all the universal consent which truth of matter of fact will allow , and therefore all that can be made use of to prove a god. but if any one would extend it farther , and speak deceitfully for god : if this universality should be urged in a strict sense , not for much the majority , but for a general consent of every one , even to a man in all ages and countries ; this would make it either no argument , or a perfectly useless and unnecessary one . for if any one deny a god , such a perfect universality of consent is destroy'd ; and if no body does deny a god , what need of arguments to convince atheists ? i would crave leave to ask your lordship , were there ever in the world any atheist or no ? if there were not , what need is there of raising a question about the being of a god , when no body questions it ? what need of provisional arguments against a fault , from which mankind are so wholly free ; and which by an universal consent , they may be presumed to be secure from ? if you say ( as i doubt not but you will ) that there have been atheists in the world , then your lordship's universal consent reduces it self to only a great majority , and then make that majority as great as you will , what i have said in the place quoted by your lordship , leaves it in its full force , and i have not said one word , that does in the least invalidate this argument for a god. the argument i was upon there , was to shew , that the idea of god was not innate ; and to my purpose it was sufficient if there were but a less number found in the world , who had no idea of god , than your lordship will allow there have been of professed atheists ; for whatsoever is innate must be universal in the strictest sense : one exception is a sufficient proof against it . so that all that i said , and which was quite to another purpose , did not at all tend , nor can be made use of to invalidate the argument for a deity , grounded on such an universal consent as your lordship , and all that build on it , must own , which is only a very disproportioned majority : such an universal consent my argument there neither affirm snor requires to be less , than you will be pleased to allow it . your lordship therefore might without any prejudice to those declarations of good will and favour you have for the author of the essay of humane vnderstanding , have spared the mentioning his quoting authors that are in print , for matters of fact , to quite another purpose , as going about to invalidate the argument , for a deity from the universal consent of mankind , since he leaves that universal consent as entire , and as large as you your self do , or can own , or suppose it . but here i have no reason to be sorry that your lordship has given me this occasion for the vindication of this passage of my book , if there should be any one besides your lordship who should so far mistake it , as to think it in the least invalidates the argument for a god , from the universal consent of mankind . but because you question the credibility of those authors i have quoted , which you say in the next paragraph , * were very ill-chosen : i will crave leave to say , that he whom i relied on for his testimony concerning the hotentots of soldania , was no less a man , than an ambassador from the king of england to the great mogul . of whose relation monsieur thevenot , no ill judge in the case , had so great an esteem , that he was at the pains to translate it into french , and publish it in his ( which is counted no unjudicious ) collection of travels . but to intercede with your lordship for a little more favourable allowance of credit to sir thomas roe's relation , coore , an inhabitant of the country who could speak english , assured * mr. terry , that they of soldania had no god. but if he too have the ill luck to find no credit with you , i hope you will be a little more favourable to a divine of the church of england now living , and admit of his testimony in confirmation of sir tho. roe's . this worthy gentleman , in the relation of his voyage to suratt , printed but two years since , speaking of the same people , has these words , † they are sunk even below idolatry , are destitute of both priest and temple , and saving a little shew of rejoycing , which is made at the full and new moon , have lost all kind of religious devotion . nature has so richly provided for their convenience in this life , that they have drowned all sense of the god of it , and are grown quite careless of the next . but to provide against the clearest evidence of atheism in these people , you say , * that the account given of them makes them not fit to be a standard for the sense of mankind . this , i think , may pass for nothing , till some body be found , that makes them to be a standard for the sense of mankind : all the use i made of them was to shew , that there were men in the world , that had no innate idea of a god. but to keep something like an argument going ( for what will not that do ? ) you go near denying those cafers to be men , what else do these words signifie ? † a people so strangely bereft of common sense , that they can hardly be reckon'd among mankind , as appears by the best accounts of the cafers of soldania , &c. i hope if any of them were called peter , iames , or iohn , it would be past scruple that they were men , however courvee , wewena , and cousheda , and those others who had names , that had no place in your nomenclator , would hardly pass muster with your lordship . my lord , i should not mention this , but that what you your self say here may be a motive to you to consider , that what you have laid such stress on concerning the general nature of man , as a real being and the subject of properties , amounts to nothing for the distinguishing of species , since you your self own that there may be individuals wherein there is a common nature with a particular subsistence proper to each of them , whereby you are so little able to know of which of the ranks or sorts they are , into which you say , * god has order'd beings , and which he hath distinguished by essential properties , that you are in doubt whether they ought to be reckon'd among mankind or no. give me leave now to think , my lord , that i have given an answer to all , that is any way material in either of the letters you have honoured me with . if there be any argument which you think of weight , that you find omitted , upon the least intimation from your lordship where it is , i promise to consider it , and to endeavour to give you satisfaction concerning it , either by owning my conviction , or shewing what hinders it . this respect i shall think due from me to your lordship : though i know better to imploy the little time my business and health afford me , than to trouble my self with the little cavillers , who may either be set on , or be forward ( in hope to recommend themselves ) to meddle in this controversie . before i conclude , 't is fit i take notice of the obligation i have to you , for the pains you have been at about my essay , which i conclude could not have been any way so effectually recommended to the world , as by your manner of writing against it . and since your lordship 's sharp sight , so carefully employ'd for its correction , has , as i humbly conceive , found no faults in it , which your lordships great endeavours this way have made out to be really there , i hope i may presume it will pass the better in the world , and the judgment of all considering men , and make it for the future stand better even in your lordship's opinion . i beg your lordship's pardon for this long trouble , and am , my lord , your lordships most humble , and most obedient servant , john locke . oates , may , . errata . p. . read separate up , the scripture having seminal   seminal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if fashion using dele . infidelity , said say , us . epithet dele the idea * p. . mr. in the margent opposition of the   comes in in the   passage : peter . in - reason about my dele as what substance , but   these make it good divinum , coeleste certe   nescire anima seduxerit hanc   tributam yet notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * d letter , p. . * p . * p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . * vindic. p. . † ans. p. . * b . p. , , , , . † ans. p. , . † p. . * ans. p. . † ans. title . page . * p. . * p. . * p. . p. . * p. . * st answ. p. . * p. . vindic. p. . ibid. ib. p. . ib. p . vindic. p. . * letter p. . † p. . † p. . * letter p. . &c. * answ. p. . † let. p. . † vindic. p. . * answ. p. . * . p . * p. . * pag. . * pag . * vindic. p. . † p. . * let. p. . † ib. p. . * let. p. * p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. and . * essay b. . c. . † p. . † vindic. p. . . * answ. p. . * p. . * pag. . † p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * vindic. p. . † ans. p. . * p. . * p. . & . † p ▪ . , . * p. . † p. . * p. . p. . * p. . * p. . † vindic. p. . * vindic. p. . † ib. * vindic. p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . † b. . c. . §. . * p. . * p. . * p. . † answ. p. . * essay b. . c. . §. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † let. p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . * answ. p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † ans. p. . p. . p. . * ans. p. . † let. p. . * pag. . † letter p. . * p. . * p. . * letter p. . * p. . * p. , , * , . * p. . † p. . * let. p. - . . † d letter p. & . * st ans. p. . † d let. p. - . vindic. p. . answ. p. . ib. p. . * p. . . † p. . * p. . * answ. p. . † answ. p. . * ans. p. . † p. . * letter p. . † letter p. . * letter p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * l ▪ . c. . § . & c. . § . † let p. , , , , , , , , , , . * d let. p. . † p. . * heb. . . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . ‖ c. § . * c. . § . * essay b. . c. . § . † p. . * p. . † p. . * vindic. p. . † st ans. p. . * d let. p. . * p. . † de arte poet. * p. , & . † p. . p. . * p. . † let. p. - . † p. . — . * p. , . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . p. . * p. . † p : , . * p. . † ibid. * p. . p. . p. . † p. . * b. . c. . § . † b. . c. . § . * b. . c. . § . † p. . * p. . * p. - . † p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * mat. , . † p. . . † p. . * john . . † p. . * p. . † p. . * cor. . . † p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † cor. , &c. * p. . * cor. . . † p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * cor : . , . † p. . † p. . * v. . † p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . * essay b. . c. . § . * p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * cor. . † v. . , , . , , . * mat. . . mark . . john . . acts . rom. . cor. . thes. . , . † john . , . † v. . * v. . † p. . * p. . p. . * p. — . * p. . † p. . * p. . † essay b. . c. . § . † p. . * p. . † p. , . * p. . † p. . * vindic. p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * ibid. † p. . * p. . † p. . * vindic. p. . † p. . * p. — . † p. . * p. . * p. . p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. - . † p. - . * p. - . † answ. p. . * p. . † answ. p. . * answ. p. , . † answ. p. . † p. , . * p. . * answ. p. . † let. p. . † p. . * p. . * answ. p. , . † answ. p. . * let. p. . * p. . * p. . * let. p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * let. p. , . † p. . † let. p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . † i answ. p. . — . † i answ. p. . † essay b. . c. . † essay b. . c. . † answ. p. , . * answ. p. . * i answ. p. . † i answ. p. . * i answ. p. - . † vindic p. . ‖ i answ. p. . † ib. p. - . * p. - . * p. . † p. - . * p. & . † p. . ‖ p. . † p. . * p. . . † p. . * p. . * vindic. p. . † i answ : p. . ‖ let. p. . . * letter p. . † p. . † p. . † p. . † b. . c. §. . † essay b. . c. . * p. . * p. . † p. - . * essay b. . c. . sect. . † sect. . * sect. . * p. . * p. . * b. . c. . sect. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. & . † p. . * p. . † essay b. . c. . ● . . * p. . † p. . * essay b. . c. . § . , . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † essay b. . c. . § . * p. . † p. . * b. . c. . § . & c. . § . * essay b. c. . . sect. . p. . * p. . † ib. * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. , . † p. . * p. . solid philosophy , p. , & . * p. , . † p. , . * p. . † p. . * p. & . † p. . * p. . † p. . * b. . c. . † p. . * p. . b. . c. . † p. . * b. . c. . § . * p. . † p. . * ibid. * . . † p. . * p. . † p. . * essay b. . c. . § & . † p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † essay b. . c. . sect. . * d ans. p. . that it is true of our particular distinct ideas . that they are all known by their native evidence , are wholly independent , receive no light , nor are capable of any proof , one from another , &c. * - . † p. . * p. . † essay b. . c. . sect. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † essay b. . c. . § , , . * p. . † p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † essay b. . c. . § . * § . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † b. . c. . § . * p. . & . † b. . c. . § . * b. . c. . § . † p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . ‖ p. . † p. - . * p. . † p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . ‖ ibid. † essay b. . c. . sect. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * b. . c. . § . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † § . , , , , , , . * p. . † p. . * essay b. . c. . § . * p. . † p. . * p. . † b. . c. . § & . and elsewhere . b. . c. . * p. - . * p. . † newton phil. natur . principia mathemat . . . sect. . * p. . † - . * p. . † p. . * d let. p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . † p. . * p. . * p. - . † d let. p. - . * p. . † p. . † essay 〈…〉 † p. . * p. . * p. . † p. . † p. . * p. . * p. , & . † vindie . p. . * ibid. * p. . * p. . † p. . * p. - . † p. - . * p. . † p. . * p. . * ans. p. . * . ans. p. . * ans. p. . * ans. p. . . * ans. p. . * ans. p. . * ans. p. . * answ. p. . † answ. p. . * answ. p. . † answ. p. . * answ. p. . † answ. p. . * answ. p. , . * b. . c. . § . † answ. p. . * b. . c. . § . † answ. p. . * answ. p. . † answ. p. . † answ. p. . . * answ. p. . † vir dic . p. . * p. . † p. . . † answ. p. . * answ. p. . * let. p. - . † answ. p. . * answ. p. - . † answ. p. . * p & . * answ. p. . * answ. p. , , , , , , , , , , . † answ. p. . † let. p. . † answ. p. - . * answ. p. . * answ. p. . † let. p. . * ib. † answ. p. . * let. p. . † answ. p. . * essay b. . c. . §. . * answ. p. . * answ. p. . † essay b. . c. . sect. . † answ. p. - . * ans. p. . † essay b. . c. . § . † answ. p. . * ib. * answ. p. . * let. p. . † ans. p. . * b. . c. . § . † ans. p. . † ans. p. . † ans. p. . ‖ ib. p. . * ans. p. . * ans. p. . . † ans. p. . * ib p. . * ans. p. , & . † answ. p. . † answ. p. . * answ. p. . * answ. p. . * answ. p. . † answ. p. . † answ. p. - . * b. . c. . * answ. p. - . * ch. , , , , &c. † loubere du reyaume de siam , t. . c. . § . * tim. . . * answ. p. , . † aeneids . . † answ. p. - . † answ. p. . * cor. . . † tusculan quaestion , l. . c. . * eccl. . . * c. . v. . † ans. p. . † ans. p. . * ib. † let. p. . * ans. p. . * answ. p. . * terry's voyage , p. . & . † mr. ovington , p. . * answ. p. . † ibid. * p. . an apology for writing against socinians, in defence of the doctrines of the holy trinity and incarnation in answer to a late earnest and compassionate suit for forbearance to the learned writers of some controversies at present / by william sherlock ... sherlock, william, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) an apology for writing against socinians, in defence of the doctrines of the holy trinity and incarnation in answer to a late earnest and compassionate suit for forbearance to the learned writers of some controversies at present / by william sherlock ... sherlock, william, ?- . [ ], p. printed for will. rogers ..., london : . marginal notes. advertisement: prelim. p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity. incarnation. socinianism. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the dean of st. paul's apology for writing against socinians , &c. imprimatur , geo. royse , r. r mo . in christo patri ac dom. dom. johan . archiep. cant. à sacris domest . jan. . / . an apology for writing against socinians , in defence of the doctrines of the holy trinity and incarnation in answer to a late earnest and compassionate suit for forbearance to the learned writers of some controversies at present . by william sherlock , d. d. dean of st. paul's , master of the temple , and chaplain in ordinary to their majesties . london : printed for will. rogers , at the sun over-against st. dunstan's church in fleet street . . an apology for writing against socinians , &c. after a long silence , and patient expectation what the learned writers of some controversies at present ( as a late author calls them ) would bring forth , i intend by the assistance of the holy trinity , and the incarnate jesus , whose blessing i most earnestly implore , to resume the defence of the catholick faith ; which i shall publish in some few short treatises , as i can find leisure for it , that i may not discourage my readers by too voluminous a work. but before i venture to dispute these matters any farther , it is necessary to make some apology for disputing ; which is thought very unchristian and uncharitable , and of dangerous consequence , especially when we undertake the defence of the fundamentals of our faith , against the rude and insolent assaults of hereticks . sometime since , a melancholy stander-by would be a stander-by no longer , but interposed an earnest and compassionate suit for forbearance , to the learned writers of some controversies at present . these learned writers of controversy , are the socinians , who ridiculed without any learning or common sense , the athanasian creed , and the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation : the forbearance he desires , is , that no body should write against them ; though dr. wallis and my self are more immediately concerned in this suit. who this melancholy stander-by is , i shall not enquire , for my controversy is not with men , but with doctrines ; and i know by experience , that common fame is not always to be trusted , much less suspicions ; but if he be a divine of the church of england , it seems very strange , that he should profess himself a stander-by , when the fundamentals of the christian faith are in question ; and a melancholy stander-by to see some others undertake the defence of it . i confess i am always very jealous of men , who are so very tender on the wrong side ; for observe it when you will , their tenderness is always owing to their inclination . but to defend our selves , let us briefly consider what he says . he thinks , the open dissentions of its professors a great blemish to the reformation : that is , that it is a great blemish for any men openly to defend the true faith , which others openly oppose , or secretly undermine ; but certainly it would be a greater blemish to the reformation , to have old heresies revived , and the true ancient catholick faith scorned , and no body appear in the defence of it . but we know his mind , that it is for the honour of the reformation not to dispute , though it be for the most important truths . surely our reformers were not so much against disputing . but if these dissentions be so great a blemish to the reformation , whose fault is it ? theirs who dissent from the truth , or theirs who defend it ? this is a very plain case ; for no body would oppose the truth , if no body taught it : the urging too strict an union in matters of faith , begets dissentions : that is , to require an open and undisguised profession of our baptismal faith in father , son , and holy ghost , as the terms of christian communion , is the criminal cause of our dissentions . well : what shall we do then ? renounce the faith of the trinity , for the sake of peace ? this he dares not say , for that would pull off his disguise ; but christianity must be left in that latitude and simplicity wherein it was delivered by our lord and his apostles . this had been a good proposal , would he have told us what this latitude and simplicity is ; for i am for no other faith than what christ and his apostles taught : but i would gladly know what he means by the latitude of faith : for if the christian faith be such a broad faith , must we not believe the whole breadth of it ? or has christ and his apostles left it at liberty to believe what we like , and to let the rest alone ? to believe that father , son , and holy ghost are one supreme eternal god ; or to believe that the eather alone is the true god , the son a mere man , and the holy ghost nothing but a divine inspiration ? to believe that the eternal word was made flesh ; or that christ was no more than a man , who had no being before he was born of the virgin mary ? he can mean nothing else by this latitude of faith , but that christ and his apostles have left these matters so ambiguous and undetermined , that we may believe what we please ; and then indeed those do very ill , who dispute these matters : but this is such a breadth as has no depth ; for such a faith as this can have no foundation . can we certainly learn from scripture , whether christ be a god incarnate , or a mere man ? if we cannot , why should we believe either ? if we can , then one is true , and the other false ; and then there is no latitude in faith , unless christ and his apostles have left it indifferent , whether we believe what is true , or what is false ; what they have taught us , or what we like better our selves . in the same manner he leaves us to guess what he means by the simplicity of the faith. he is very angry with the school-doctors , as worse enemies to christianity , than either heathen philosophers , or persecuting emperors . pray what hurt have they done ? i suppose he means the corruption of christianity with those barbarous terms of person , nature , essence , subsistence , consubstantiality , &c. which will not suffer hereticks to lye concealed under scripture-phrases : but why must the schoolmen bear all the blame of this ? why does he not accuse the ancient fathers and councils , from whom the schoolmen learnt these terms ? why does he let st. austin escape , from whom the master of the sentences borrowed most of his distinctions and subtilties ? but suppose these unlucky wits had used some new terms , have they taught any new faith about the trinity in unity , which the catholick church did not teach ? and if they have only guarded the christian faith with a hedge of thorns , which disguised hereticks cannot break through , is this to wound christianity in its very vitals ? no , no : they will only prick the fingers of hereticks , and secure christianity from being wounded ; and this is one great cause why some men are so angry with the school-doctors ; tho the more general cause is , because they have not industry enough to read or understand them . he says , the first reformers complained of this , and desired a purer and more spiritual sort of divinity . what ? with respect to the doctrine of the trinity and incarnation ? what purer reformers were these ? i 'm sure not our english reformers , whom he censures for retaining scholastick cramping terms in their publick prayers : he means the beginning of our litany : o god the father of heaven : o god the son , redeemer of the world : o god the holy ghost , proceeding from the father and the son : o holy , blessed , and glorious trinity , three persons and one god : these are his scholastick , cramping terms , which he would fling out of our liturgy , when the season of such blessed alterations comes . i hope those excellent persons among us , who , i doubt not , for better reasons did not long since think of some alterations , will consider what a foul imputation this is upon such a design , when such a person shall publickly declare , that they ought to alter and reform the doctrine of the trinity out of our prayers . but the whole mystery of this latitude and simplicity of faith which he pleads for , is that plausible project ( which has been so much talked of of late : ) to confine our selves to scripture terms and phrases ; to use none but scripture words in our creeds and prayers , without any explication in what sense those words are to be understood : as he tells us , certainly we may worship god right well , yea , most acceptably , in words of his own stamp and coinage . now at the first proposal few men would suspect , that there should be any hurt in this ; though it would make one suspect some secret in it , to consider that hereticks were the first proposers of it , and that orthodox christians rejected it . the arians objected this against the homoousion , or the son 's being of the same substance with the father , that it was an unscriptural word ; but the nicene fathers did not think this a good reason to lay it aside : for what reason can there be to reject any words , which we can prove to express the true sense of scripture , though they are not found there ? for must we believe the words or the sense of scripture ? and what reason then can any man have to reject the words , though they be no scripture-words , if he believes the sense contained in them to be the sense of scripture ? the homoiousion , or that the son had a nature like the father's , tho not the same , was no more a scripture-word , than the homoousion ; and yet the arians did not dislike that , because it was no scripture-word ; nor are the socinians angry at any man who says , that christ is but a meer man , who had no being before he was born of the virgin mary ; tho these words are no where in scripture : and is it not strange , that a man who heartily believes , or at least pretends to believe , that father , son , and holy ghost are one eternal god , should be angry with a trinity in unity , or three persons and one god , which do as aptly express the faith which he professes , as any words he can think of ? it is very odd to be zealous for scripture-words without the scripture sense . if the scripture have any determined sense , then that which is the true sense of scripture , is the true faith ; and if we must contend earnestly for the true faith , we must contend for the true sense of scripture , and not merely for its words ; and when hereticks have used their utmost art to make the words of scripture signifie what they please , is it not necessary to fix their true sense , and to express that sense in such other words as hereticks cannot pervert ? there are but few words in common speech , but what are sometimes differently used , in a proper or metaphorical , a large or a limited sense ; and all wise and honest men easily understand from the circumstances of the place , in what sense they are used ; but if men be perverse , they may expound words properly when they are used metaphorically , or metaphorically when they are used properly ; and there is no confuting them from the bare signification of the word , because it may be , and oftentimes is used both ways ; and therefore in such cases we must consider the circumstances of the text , and compare it with parallel texts , to find out in what sense the word is there used ; and when we have found it , it is reasonable and necessary to express the true christian faith , not merely in scripture words , which are abused and perverted by hereticks , but in such other words , if we can find any such , as express the true sense in which the scripture-words are used , and in which all christians must understand them , who will retain the purity of the christian faith. we do not hereby alter the christian faith , nor require them to believe any thing more than what the scripture teaches , tho we require them to profess their faith in other words , which are not indeed in scripture , but express the true and determined sense of scripture words . and this is all the latitude of faith which this stander-by so tragically complains we have destroyed , viz. that we have brought the scripture words to a fixt and determined sense , that hereticks can no longer conceal themselves in a latitude of expression , nor spread their heresies in scripture words , with a traditionary sense and comment of their own . i would ask any man who talks at this rate about a latitude of faith , whether there be any more than one true christian faith ? and whether christ and his apostles intended to teach any more ? or whether they did not intend , that all christians should be obliged to believe this one faith ? if this be granted , there can be no more latitude in the faith , than there is in a unit ; and if they taught but one faith , they must intend that their words should signifie but that one faith ; and then there can be no intentional latitude in their words neither ; and what crime then is the church guilty of , if she teach the true christian faith , that she teaches it in such words as have no latitude , no ambiguity of sense , which hereticks may deny if they please , but which they can't corrupt in favour of their heresies , as they do scripture words ? it is an amazing thing to me , that any man who has any zeal , any concernment for the true christian faith , who does not think it perfectly indifferent what we believe , or whether we believe any thing or not , should judge it for the advantage of christianity , and a proper expedient for the peace of the church , for all men to agree in the same scripture words , and understand them in what sense they please ; tho one believes christ to be the eternal son of god , and another to be but a mere man ; which it seems has no great hurt in it , if they do but agree in the same words : but if the faith be so indifferent , i cannot imagine why we should quarrel about words ; the fairer and honester proposal is , that every man should believe as he pleases , and no man concern himself to confute heresies , or to divide the church with disputes ; which is the true latitude our author seems to aim at ; and then he may believe as he pleases too . but pray , why should we not write against the socinians ? especially when they are the aggressors , and without any provocation publish and disperse the most impudent and scandalous libels against the christian faith. he will give us some very wise reasons for this by and by , when he comes to be plain and succinct ; in the mean time we must take such as we can meet with . he is afraid pe●●le should lose all reverence for the litany , should ▪ we go on to vindicate the doctrine of the trinity in unity : i should not easily have apprehended this , and possibly some of the common people might have been as dull as my self , had he not taken care before he parted , for fear no body else should observe it , to teach people to ridicule the trinity in their prayers . dr. wallis would not undertake to say what a divine person signifies , as distinguished from nature and essence , only says , a person is somewhat , but the true notion of a person he does not know : this author commends this as ever held to by all learned trinitarians ; for indeed all the doctor meant by his somewhat is , that three persons signify three real subsistences , and are real things , not a sabellian trinity of mere names . and yet in the very next page he teaches his readers to ridicule the litany with the doctors somewhats : o holy , blessed , and glorious trinity , three somewhats , and one god , have mercy on us , &c. was there ever any thing more senseless , or more prophane ! that because the doctor would not undertake to define a person , but only asserted in general , that a divine person was somewhat , or some real being , in opposition to a mere nominal difference and distinction ; therefore in our prayers we may as well call the three divine persons , father , son ; and holy ghost , three somewhats . nobis non licet esse tam disertis . i am sure he has reason heartily to pray , that these three somewhats , as he prophanely calls them , would have mercy on him . in the next place he says , he is well assured , that the late ( socinian ) pam●●lets would have died away , or have been now in few mens hands , had not divers persons taken on them the labour to confute them . but did his socinian friends , who were such busie factors for the cause , tell him so ? did they print them , that no body might read them ? were they not dispersed in every corner , and boasted of in every coffee-house , before any answer appeared ? however , were it so ; is there no regard to be had to hereticks themselves ? and is it not better that such pamphlets should be in an hundred hands with an answer , than in five hands without one ? i should think it at any time a good reward for all the labour of confuting , to rescue or preserve a very few from such fatal errors ; which i doubt not but is a very acceptable service to that merciful shepherd , who was so careful to seek one lost and straggling sheep . heresies and vices dye by being neglected , just as weeds do ; for we know the parable , that the devil sows his tares , while men sleep . but this is no new charge ; the good bishop of alexandria met with the same censures for his zeal against arius ; for it seems that heresie would have died too , if it had not been opposed . i doubt this author judges of other mens zeal for heresy , by his own zeal for the truth , which wants a little rubbing and chafing to bring it to life ; but heresy is all flame and spirit , will blow and kindle it self , if it be not quenched . but yet if what he says be true , that by our unskilful way of confuting heresie , we run into those very absurdities which our adversaries would reduce us to ; this i confess is a very great fault , and when he shews me any of those absurdities , i will thankfully correct them ; for all the obloquies in the world will never make me blush to recant an error : but before he pretends to that , i must desire him , that he would first read my book , which i know some men censure without reading it . such general accusations are very spiteful , and commonly have a mixture of spite both against the cause , and against the person . his next argument is very observable : we must not dispute now against socinians , because these controversies about the trinity have been above thirteen hundred years ago determined by two general councils ( the nicene , and first constantinopolitan ) , which are owned by our church , and their creeds received into our liturgy . ergo , we must not defend this faith against hereticks , because it is the faith of two general councils which are owned by our church . did athanasius think this a good argument against writing and disputing against the arians , after the council of nice had condemned arius and his doctrines ? did st. basil , gregory nazianzen , nyssen , st. chrysostom , st. jerom , st. austin , think this a good argument , who wrote so largely against these heresies , which former councils had condemned ? but this author thinks the best way is to let the matter stand upon this bottom of authority ; that is , let hereticks ridicule our faith as much as they please , we must make them no other answer , but that this is the faith of the nicene and constantinopolitan councils , and the faith of the church of england . and can he intend this for any more than a jest , when he knows how socinians despise the determinations of councils , and particularly with what scorn they treat the nicene fathers ? is this an age to resolve our faith into church authority ? or would he himself believe such absurd doctrines as they represent the trinity in unity to be , merely upon church authority ? for my part i declare i would not . i greatly value the authority of those ancient councils , as credible witnesses of the traditionary sense of the church before those controversies were started ; but were not these doctrines taught in scripture , were they manifestly repugnant to the plain and evident principles of reason , all the councils in the world should never reconcile me to them , no more than they should to the doctrine of transubstantion . and therefore methinks he might have at least allowed us to have challenged the scriptures as well as general councils on our side ; and to have vindicated our faith from all pretended absurdities and contradictions to reason . but would any man of common sense , who had not intended to expose the faith of the holy trinity , have told the world at this time of day , that we have no other safe and sure bottom for our faith , but only the authority of general councils ? nay , that the council of nice it self , on whose authority we must rest , had little else themselves for their determinations but only authority , that it was authority chiefly carried the point . and thus for fear we should have believed too much upon the authority of councils , which is the only bottom he will allow our faith , he gives them a secret stab himself , and makes their authority ridiculous . that the several bishops declared , what faith had been taught and received in their churches is true ; that this authority chiefly carried the point , is false : athanasius grew famous in the council for his learned and subtile disputations , which confounded the arians ; and what arguments he chiefly relied on , we may see in his works : and whoever does but look into the fathers , who wrote against the arians in those days , will find , that their faith was resolved into scripture and reason , and not meerly or chiefly into authority . and thus he comes to be plain and succinct , and tells us , that of all controversies we can touch upon at present , this of the trinity is the most unreasonable , the most dangerous , and so the most unseasonable . it is the most unreasonable : . because it is on all hands confess'd , the deity is infinite , unsearchable , incomprehensible ; and yet every one who pretends to write plainer than another on this controversy , professes to make all comprehensible and easy . i perceive he is well versed in mr. hobbs's divinity ; though i can discover no marks of his skill in fathers and councils . for this was mr. hobb's reason , why we should not pretend to know any thing of god , nor inquire after his attributes , because he has but one attribute , which is , that he is incomprehensible ; and as this author argues , it is a small favour to request of persons of learning , that they should be consistent with , and not contradict themselves : that is , that they would not pretend to know any thing of god , whom they acknowledge to be incomprehensible , which is to pretend to know , what they confess cannot be known . now i desire to know , whether we may dispute about the being and nature of god , and his essential attributes and perfections ; and vindicate the notion of a deity from those impossibilities , inconsistencies , absurdities , which some atheistical philosophers charge on it , notwithstanding that we confess god to be incomprehensible ? and if the incomprehensibility of the divine nature does not signifie , that we can know nothing of god , and must inquire nothing about him ▪ ; the trinity of divine persons is as proper an object of our faith , and modest inquiries , as the unity of the divine essence , for they are both incomprehensible . and to say , that every one who pretends to write plainer than another on this controversy , professes to make all comprehensible and easy , may with equal truth and authority be charg'd on all those who undertake to vindicate the notion and idea of a god , or to explain any of the divine attributes and perfections . a finite mind cannot comprehend what is infinite ; but yet one man may have a truer and more perfect notion of the nature and attributes of god than another : god is incomprehensible in heaven as well as on earth , and yet angels and glorified spirits know god after another manner than we do . there must be infinite degrees of knowledge , when the object is infinite ; and every new degree is more perfect than that below it ; and yet no creature can attain the highest degree of all , which is a perfect comprehension : so that the knowledge of god may increase every day , and men may write plainer about these matters every day , without pretending to make all that is in god , even a trinity in unity , comprehensible and easy . this is a spiteful and scandalous imputation , and is intended to represent all those who undertake to write about the trinity , and to vindicate the primitive faith of the church from the scorn and contempt of hereticks , as a company of vain-conceited , presuming , but ignorant scriblers ; who pretend to make the incomprehensible nature of god , comprehensible and easy . but the comfort is , we have so good company , that we are able to bear this charge without blushing ; even general councils , and those great lights of the church , athanasius , st. hillary , st. basil , the gregories , st. chrysostom , st. austin , and many others , besides all those who in all succeeding ages to this day , have with equal zeal and learning defended the same cause ; and yet never profess'd to make all comprehensible and easy . all that any man pretends to in vindicating the doctrine of the trinity , is to prove that this faith is taught in scripture , and that it contains no such absurdities and contradictions , as should force a wise man to reject it , and either to reject the scriptures for its sake , or to put some strained and unnatural senses on scripture to reconcile it to the principles of reason ; and this , i hope , may be done by those , who yet acknowledge the divine nature , and the trinity in unity to be incomprehensible . but here he had a very fair opportunity , had he thought fit to take it , to correct the insolence and presumption of his learned writers of controversy ; who will not allow the divine nature to be incomprehensible , and will not believe god himself concerning his own nature , beyond what their reason can conceive and comprehend : who deny prescience for the same reason , that they deny the trinity , because they can't conceive it , nor reconcile it with the liberty of human actions ; and for the same reason may deny all the attributes of god , which have something in them beyond what we can conceive : especially an eternity without begining , and without succession , which is chargeable with more absurdities and contradictions , than the trinity it self : for a duration , which can't be measured ; and an eternal duration , which can be measured ; and a succession without a beginning , a second or third without a first , are unconceivable to us , and look like very plain and irreconci●●ble contradictions . this is the true use of the incomprehensibility of the divine nature ; not to stop all enquiries after god , nor to discourage our studies of the divine nature and perfections : for we may know a great deal , and may every day increase our knowledge of what is incomprehensible , thô we cannot know it all ; but to check the presumption of some vain pretenders to reason , who will not own a god , nor believe any thing of god , which their reason cannot comprehend ; which must not only make them hereticks , but , if pursued to its just consequences , must make them atheists , or make such a god , as no body will own , or worship , but themselves , a god adequate and commensurate to their understandings , which must be a little , finite , comprehensible god. in the next place , to prove how unreasonable it is to dispute in vindication of the trinity , he observes again , that this matter has been sufficiently determined by due authority : but having answered this once , i see no need to answer it again . to back this he adds , that the present issue shews ▪ that in this world it never will be better understood : for it seems , as he says , the master of the sentences , and some modern writers , have made very sad work of it . and yet he does not seem to be very intimately acquainted with the master of the sentences , nor some of these modern writers . but all that he means is , that no body can say any thing to the purpose for so absurd a doctrine , as a trinity in unity ; and therefore he plainly adds , the more men draw the disputacious saw , the more perplexed and intricate the question is ; and therefore the only secure way is , to leave off disputing for the trinity and let socinians dispute against it by themselves . but such stuff as this , deserves another sort of answer than i can give it . but he concludes this argument of unreasonableness very remarkably . and lastly , hereby our church at present , and the common christianity ( it may be feared ) will be more and more daily exposed to atheistical men ; for this being but the result of the former particulars , and such kind of men daily growing upon us , it cannot be believed , they can over-look the advantages which is so often given them . the sum of which is , that to vindicate the doctrine of the trinity against socinians , will make men atheists . this is a very bold stroke for a christian , and a divine , and i shall beg leave to expostulate this matter a little freely with him . st , i desire to know , whether he thinks the doctrine of the trinity to be defensible or not ? if it be not defensible , why does he believe it ? why should we not rather openly and plainly reject the doctrine of the trinity , which would be a more effectual way to put a stop to atheism , than to profess to believe it , but not to defend it ? if it be defensible , and there be no fault in the doctrine , but that some men have defended it ill , would it not much more have become him to have defended it better , than only to quarrel with those who have defended it , as well as they could ? dly , why does he not tell the socinians , what injury they do to common christianity , by ridiculing the faith of the holy trinity , and exposing it to the scorn of atheists ? does he think that they are no christians , and ought not to be concerned for common christianity ? or does he think , that atheists will like the doctrine of the trinity ever the better , for its being despised by socinians as an absurd contradictory faith , without having any defence made by trinitarians ? or does he think , that the defences made by trinitarians expose the faith more than the objections of socinians ? i wish i knew his mind , and then i could tell what to say to him . dly , how are atheists concerned in the disputes of the trinity ? or how are we concerned to avoid scandalizing atheists , who believe that there is no god at all ? must we be afraid of defending the faith of the trinity , lest atheists should mock at it , who already mock at the being of a god ? what shall we have left of christianity , if we must either cast away , or not defend every thing , which atheists will mock at ? surely he has a very contemptible opinion of the doctrine of the trinity , that he thinks all the defences that are , or can be made for it , so ridiculous , that they are enough to make men atheists . but i can tell him a secret , which possibly he may be privy to , though in great modesty he conceals his knowledge , viz. that atheists and deists , men who are for no religion , or at least not for the christian religion , are of late very zealous socinians ; and they are certainly in the right of it : for run down the doctrine of the trinity and incarnation , and there is an end of the christian religion , and with that an end of all revealed religion ; and as for natural religion , they can make and believe as much , or as little of it as they please . and this is one reason , and i am sure a better than any he has given against it , why we are , and ought to be so zealous at this time in opposing socinianism , because it is the common banner under which all the enemies of religion and christianity unite . this makes that little contemptible party think themselves considerable , that all the atheists and infidels , and licentious wits of the town , are their converts ; who promise themselves a glorious triumph over christianity , and particularly over the church of england , by decrying and scorning the catholick faith of the trinity and incarnation . ii. thus much for the unreasonableness of this controversie about the holy trinity ; in the next place he tells us the danger of it : and he has thought of such an argument to evince the danger of disputing for the holy trinity , as , i believe , was never dreamt of before ; and that is , that it is one of the fundamentals of christian religion ; now to litigate touching a fundamental , is to turn it into a controversie ; that is , to unsettle , at least endanger the unsettling the whole superstructure . now i am perfectly of his mind , that it is a dangerous thing to unsettle foundations ; but is it a dangerous thing too , to endeavour to preserve and defend foundations , when hereticks unsettle them , and turn them into dispute and controversie ? let us put the being of god , instead of the holy trinity , and see how he will like his argument himself . the being of a god is the foundation of all religion , and therefore it is dangerous to dispute with atheists about the being of god , because this is to turn a fundamental into a controversie , that is , to unsettle , or to endanger the unsetling the whole superstructure : and thus we must not dispute against atheists , no more than against socinians : and what is it then we must dispute for ? what else is worth disputing ? what else can we dispute for , when foundations are overturned ? what is the meaning of that apostolical precept , to contend earnestly for the faith ? jud. . what faith must we contend for , if not for fundamentals ? what faith is that which can subsist without a foundation ? but i would desire this author to tell me , whether we must believe fundamentals with , or without reason ? whether we must take fundamentals for granted , and receive them with an implicite faith , or know for what reason we believe them ? if our religion must not be built without a foundation , like a castle in the air , it is certain , that the fundamentals of our faith ought to have a very sure foundation , and therefore we are more concerned to understand and vindicate the reasons of our faith , with respect to fundamentals , than to dispute any less matters in religion , for the roof must tumble , if the foundation fail . what shall christians do then , when atheists , infidels , and hereticks , strike at the very foundations of their faith ? ought not they to satisfie themselves , that there is no force in the objections , which are made against the faith ? or must they confirm themselves with an obstinate resolution , to believe on without troubling themselves about objections , in defiance of all the power and evidence of reason ? this is not to believe like men ; christianity had never prevailed against paganism and judaism upon these terms ; for they had possession , authority , and prescription on their side , which is the only reason and security he gives us for the faith of the trinity , that the established church is in possession of it . if private christians then must endeavour to satisfie themselves in the reasons of their faith , when fundamentals are called in question , is it not the duty of christian bishops and pastors to defend the faith , and to defend the flock of christ from those grievous wolves st. paul prophesied of ? is not this their proper work and business ? and when the faith is publickly opposed and scorned in printed libels , ought it not to be as publickly defended ? when hereticks dispute against the faith , must we be afraid of disputing for it , for fear of making a controversie of fundamentals ? thanks be to god , our excellent primate is above this fear , and has now in the press a defence of that faith , which this writer would perswade all men to betray by silence ; and i hope so great an example may at least prevail with him , to let us dispute on without any more earnest and compassionate suits . iii. his last argument is , the unseasonableness of this controversie . he says , all controversies are now unseasonable ; and i say a little more , that they are always so ; for there is no juncture seasonable to broach heresies , and to oppose the truth : but if hereticks will dispute against the truth unseasonably ; there is no time unseasonable to defend fundamental truths . but why is it so unseasonable in this juncture ? because under god , nothing but an union of councils , and joyning hands and hearts , can preserve the reformation , and scarce any thing more credit and justifie it , than an union in doctrinals . to begin with the last first : is the union in doctrinals ever the greater , that socinians boldly and publickly affront the faith of the church , and no body appears to defend it ? will the world think that we are all of a mind , because there is disputing only on one side ? then they will think us all socinians , as some forreigners begin already to suspect , which will be a very scandalous union , and divide us from all other reformed churches . let union be never so desirable , we cannot , we must not unite in heresie ; those break the union , who depart from the faith , not those who defend it . when heresies are broached , the best way to preserve the unity of the church , is to oppose and confute , and shame heresie and hereticks , which will preserve the body of christians from being infected by heresie , and the fewer there are , who forsake the faith , the greater unity there is in the church . but nothing but union of counsels , and joyning hands and hearts , can preserve the reformation . must we then turn all socinians , to preserve the reformation ? must we renounce christianity , to keep out popery ? this stander-by is misinformed , for socinianism is no part of the reformation ; and so inconsiderable and abhorred a party , when they stand by themselves , that all parties who own any religion , will joyn counsels , and hands and hearts to renounce them . but what he would insinuate is , that we shall never joyn against a common enemy , whose successes would endanger the reformation , while there are any religious disputes among us . i hope he is mistaken , or else we shall certainly be conquered by france , for twenty such compassionate suits as this , will never make us all of a mind ; and whether we dispute or not , if we differ as much as if we did dispute , and are as zealous for the interest of a party , the case is the same . but he has unwarily confess'd a great truth , which all governments ought to consider , that every schisin in the church , is a new party and faction in the state , which are always troublesome to government when it wants their help . but these disputes about the trinity make sport for papists . it must be disputing against the trinity then ; not disputing for it ; for they are very orthodox in this point ; and never admitted any man to their communion who disowned this faith , or declared , that he thought it at any time unreasonable , dangerous , or unseasonable to dispute for it , when it was violently opposed . i doubt this protestant church-man has made more sport for papists , than all our other disputes ; for it is a new thing for such men to plead for socinians , but no new thing to dispute against them ; and new sports are always most entertaining . but he has himself started an objection , which if he could well answer , i could forgive him all the rest . but it will be said , what shall we do ? shall we tamely by a base silence give up the point . this is the objection , and he answers , there is no danger of it , the established church is in possession of it , and dispute will only increase the disturbance . but is there no danger that the church may be flung out of possession , and lose the faith , if she don't defend it ? no , the adversaries to the received doctrine ( why not to the true faith ? ) cannot alter our articles of religion ; but if they can make converts , and increase their party , they may in time change our articles , and then we shall hear no more of compassionate suits for forbearance . but they can dispute everlastingly ; and let them dispute on , we fear them not . but they are men subtil , sober , industrious ; many of them very vertuous , and ( as all must say ) setting aside their opinions , devout , pious , and charitable . i perceive he is very intimately acquainted with them , though st. paul commands all christians , to mark those which cause divisions and offences contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned , and avoid them , rom. . but let them be never so good men , as some of the heathen philosophers were , must we therefore tamely suffer them to pervert the faith ? but they are very zealous , and the presses are open , and they will never be silent . they are zealous against the truth , and therefore we must not be zealous for it ; they will write and print , and speak against the truth , and will never be silent ; and therefore we must be silent , and neither write , nor say any thing for the truth . was there ever such a reason thought of as this ? well! how long must we be silent ? neglect them till a fit time and place : but why is not this as fit a time , as ever we shall have , to prevent their sowing tares , or to pluck them up before they have taken too deep root ? can there be a fitter time to oppose heresies , and to defend the true christian faith , then when hereticks are very bold and busie in spreading their heresies , and opposing the faith ? but when this fit time is come ( for i know not what he means by a fit place ) what shall we do then ? will he then give us leave to write and dispute against such hereticks ? this he will not say ; but then let that be done , which shall be judged most christian and most wholesome . but what is that ? will it ever be most christian and most wholesome , to dispute for the faith against heresie ? if ever it will be so , why is it not so now ? if this never will be christian and wholesome , what else is to be done to hereticks in fit time and place , unless he intends to physick ' em ? and it seems he has a dose ready prepared , to lay all these controversies to an eternal sleep ; and it is , what he calls a negative belief , a pretty contradiction , but never the less proper cure for heresie . the project is this , as far as i can understand him , that the socinians shall not be required to own the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation , but shall so far agree , as not to contradict them , nor teach contrary to them : now i should like this very well , that they would not oppose the received doctrine of the church , but i believe he knows some little clattering tongues , which all the opiates he has , can never lay asleep ; and had he remembred what he had just before said concerning their zeal , and their eternal disputing , and that they will never be silent , he would never have proposed so impracticable a thing , as the imposing silence on them ; which makes me suspect , that he intends something more than what he says , and therefore to prevent mistakes , i must ask him a question or two . . whether he will allow us , who , as he grants , are in possession of this faith of the trinity and incarnation , to keep possession of it , and teach , explain , and confirm it to our people : we will answer none of their books , if they won't write them ; but if he expects that we should say nothing of , or for the trinity , as he would have them say nothing against it , we must beg his pardon ; we do not think the doctrine of the trinity and incarnation to be of so little concernment , as to be parted with , or buried in silence . we believe christian religion to be built on this faith , and therefore think ourselves as much bound to preach it , as to preach the gospel ; and if they will oppose the faith , as long as we preach it , we can have no truce with them . dly , i hope he does not propose this negative belief , as he calls it , as a term of communion ; that tho' we know they deny the trinity and the incarnation , yet if they will agree not publickly to oppose and contradict this faith , we shall receive them to our communion , and fling the worship of the holy trinity , and of a god incarnate , out of our liturgies for their sake . i grant there may be such things , as articles of peace , when men joyn in the same communion , notwithstanding some less material differences , while the substantials of faith and worship are secure , and oblige themselves not to disturb the peace of the church with less disputes ; but to make the essentials of faith and worship meer articles of peace , to receive those to our communion , who deny the very object of our worship , is as senceless , and as great a contradiction to the nature and end of christian communion , as it would be to receive heathens , jews , mahometans into the christian church , by vertue of this negative belief . this i know he will not allow ; for he says , we are agreed in the other parts of our common christianity : whereas it is absolutely impossible , that we should agree in any thing , which is pure christianity , while we differ in the fundamental doctrines of the trinity and incarnation , the owning or denying of which makes an essential difference in religion . it alters the object of our worship , as much as the worship of one and of three persons in the godhead , and as much as the worship of a god incarnate , and of a deified meer man , differ . it alters the way of our salvation , as much as faith in the blood and sacrifice of the son of god , to expiate our sins , differs from believing a great and excellent prophet , and obeying his laws . it alters the motives and principles of our obedience , as much as the love of god , in giving his son , differs from his goodness in sending an excellent man to be our prophet and saviour ; as much as the love , humility , and condescension of the eternal son of god , in becoming man , and in dying as a sacrifice for our sins , differs from the love of a meer man , in preaching the gospel , and bearing testimony to it by his own blood. it changes the hopes and reliances of sinners , as much as the security of a meritorious sacrifice offered by the eternal son of god for the expiation of our sins , differs from the promises of an extraordinary man sent as a prophet from god ; and as much as the intercession of a high priest , who is the eternal son of god , and intercedes in the merits of his own blood , differs from the intercession of a meer , though of an excellent man , who has made no atonement for our sins , and has no other interest in god , than what an innocent and obedient man can pretend to . it were easie to enlarge on this argument ; but i have directed in the margin , where the reader may see it discoursed at large . now if this author , for these reasons , will allow us to instruct our people in the doctrine of the trinity and incarnation , and not desire us to receive socinians into our communion , he will do good service , if he can bring them to his negative belief , and perswade them to be silent ; if he can't , we will try to make them so in time , if they have wit enough to understand , when it is fit to be quiet . in the next place he takes sanctuary in the act of parliament in favour of dissenters , which he conceives has done very much , if not full enough . but had he considered , how severe this act is upon his beloved socinians , he might much better have let it alone . for no dissenters have any benefit by that act , who do not renounce socinianism : but he pretends to give account of acts of parliament , as he does of other books , without seeing them . but we may see what a hearty good will he has to the cause : if the act has excepted socinians , it is more than he knew , and more than he wished ; for he hoped it had not been done , and endeavoured to perswade the world , that all the bishops of england had allowed it ; for he cannot believe , that the body of the bishops disallowed , or did not with good liking consent to the act , viz. to give liberty to socinians , as he supposed . this is such a scandalous representation of the bishops of england , as i 'm sure , they don't deserve , and which in due time they may resent . and here , without any provocation , he sets up the authority of bishops , against the lower house of convocation , who never differed upon this point , and i hope never will , nor will ever be tempted by such a forward undertaker , to dispute the bounds of their authority , but content themselves with the ancient constitution of the church of england . but if he understands the practice of the primitive and truly apostolick church , which he threatens these unruly presbyters with , no better than he does k. edw. vi.'s reformation , which he supposes to be made by the body of the bishops , in opposition to the presbyters ( or else i know not how he applies it ) he is capable of doing no great good nor hurt . only i can tell him one thing , that had he fallen into the hands of k. edw.'s reforming bishops , they would have reformed him out of the church , or have taught him another sort of compassionate suit than this . he concludes with a heavy charge upon myself , and dr. wallis , ( for he mentions none else ) as if we had receded from the doctrine taught even in our own church , about the holy trinity . do we then deny , that there are three persons and one god ? no , our business is to prove it , and explain and vindicate it ? but he thinks we explain it otherwise , than it has been formerly explained . and yet that very account he gives us of it , out of mr. hooker , is owned by myself , and particularly explained by my hypothesis . he has given us no just occasion to vindicate ourselves , because he has not vouchsafed to tell us , why he dislikes either of us . he has cited some broken passages out of my vindication , about three eternal minds , which are essentially one eternal mind . and what is the hurt of this ? is not every divine person who is god , a mind , and an eternal mind ? is not the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the eternal and uncreated word and wisdom of god , an eternal and uncreated mind ? is not the substantial word and wisdom of god a mind ? is not the eternal spirit , which searcheth the deep things of god , as the spirit of a man knoweth the things of a man , a mind ? and if i can give any possible account , how three eternal minds should be essentially one , does not this at least prove , that there may be three divine persons , in the unity of the divine essence ? and should i have been mistaken in this account , as i believe i am not , must i therefore be charged with receding from the doctrine of the church of england ? as for dr. wallis , he has nothing to say against him , but his calling the divine persons somewhats , with which he has very profanely ridiculed the litany , which i gave an account before . and now can any man tell , what opinion this melancholy stander-by has of the doctrines of the trinity , and incarnation ? he dares not speak out , but gives very broad signs , what he would be at . he discourages all men from defending these doctrines , declares , that all new attempts cannot satisfie the old difficulties , which he declares to be unsatisfiable , and unsoluble : that when we have moved every stone , authority must define it . and yet this authority extends no farther than to a negative belief ▪ which , he says , is all that can reasonably be required of men , of such mysteries as they cannot understand : and thus far he professes himself bound by our church articles for peace sake . and this is his faith of the trinity , not to believe it , but only not to oppose it . he complains of the scholastick cramping terms of three persons , and one god , and thinks the unity of three persons in one essence , to be only a more orthodox phrase ; so that he leaves us no words to express this doctrine by , and therefore it is time to say nothing about it . it is a controversie which exposes our liturgy , and is not only unprofitable , but corruptive of , and prejudicial and injurious to our common devotion : so dangerous is it to pray to the holy , blessed , and glorious trinity , three persons and one god. but then on the other hand , he carefully practises that forbearance , which he perswades others to , towards his learned writers of the socinian controversies , tho' they were the assailants : never perswades them to forbear exposing and ridiculing the faith of the church , which would have provoked his indignation , had he any reverence for the holy trinity , and a god incarnate ; but only thinks by the charm of a negative faith , that they may be required quietly to acquiesce in the publick determinations . he tells us over and over , how unseasonable and dangerous it is to meddle with such high matters , or to offer at any explication of what is incomprehensible ; but it is no fault in them , to talk of absurdities and contradictions in what they do not understand : nay , he all along insinuates , that these absurdities and contradictions , which they charge upon the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation , are unsatisfiable , and unsoluble ▪ he bestows high encomiums upon these enemies of the faith , but speaks with wonderful contempt of those who defend it , as far as he dares ; the fathers and councils are out of his reach , but the master of the sentences , and the school-men , and all modern undertakers , must feel his displeasure : to defend the trinity exposes our liturgy , and corrupts our common devotion ; but to ridicule it , makes them very pious and devout men. god preserve his church from wolves in sheeps clothing . and now having vindicated our ancient rights and liberties , which the church always challenged , of defending the truly catholick and apostolick faith , from the assaults of hereticks , i shall apply myself , as i have leisure , to the defence of my vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever-blessed trinity , and the incarnation of the son of god. the end . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e earnest suit , p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. ▪ page . page . page . page . page . see the vindication of the defence of dr. stillingfleet's unreasonableness of separation , pag. , &c. page . page . page . page . page . page . page . page , . the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation compared as to scripture, reason, and tradition. the first part in a new dialogue between a protestant and a papist : wherein an answer is given to the late proofs of the antiquity of transubstantiation in the books called consensus veterum and nubes testium, &c. stillingfleet, edward, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation compared as to scripture, reason, and tradition. the first part in a new dialogue between a protestant and a papist : wherein an answer is given to the late proofs of the antiquity of transubstantiation in the books called consensus veterum and nubes testium, &c. stillingfleet, edward, - . the second edition. , [ ] p. printed for w. rogers ..., london : . written by edward stillingfleet. cf. wing. advertisement on p. 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-- consensus veterum. transubstantiation -- early works to . trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - jonathan blaney sampled and proofread - jonathan blaney text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation compared , as to scripture , reason , and tradition . in a new dialogue between a protestant and a papist . the first part . wherein an answer is given to the late proofs of the antiquity of transubstantiation , in the books called consensus veterum , and nubes testium , &c. the second edition . imprimatur . ex aedib . lambeth . jan. . . guil. needham rr. in christo pat. ac d. d. wilhelmo archiep. cant. à sacris . london , printed for w. rogers at the sun over against st. dunstan's church in fleet-street . m dc lxxx viii . the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation compared , as to scripture , reason , and tradition . in a new dialogue between a protestant and a papist . pr. i remember your last words at parting were , farewel ; and god give his holy spirit to instruct you . which have run much in my mind : for if the holy spirit instruct us , what need is there of an infallible church ? i hope those were not only words of course with you . pa. no ; but i meant that the holy spirit should instruct you about the authority of the church . pr. was this indeed your meaning ? then you would have me believe the church infallible , because the holy spirit which is infallible will instruct me about it , if i seek his directions . p. yes . pr. but then i have no reason to believe it ; for the holy spirit after my seeking his instructions , teaches me otherwise . and if the holy spirit is infallible which way soever it teaches , then i am infallibly sure there is no such thing as infallibility in what you call the catholick church . p. come , come ; you make too much of a sudden expression at parting ; i pray let us return to our main business , which is to shew , that there is the same ground from scripture , reason , and tradition , to believe transubstantiation , as there is to believe the trinity . and this i affirm again , after reading the answers to the former dialogue ; and i now come somewhat better prepared to make it out . pr. so you had need . and i hope i shall be able not only to defend the contrary , but to make it evident to you , that there is a mighty difference in these two doctrines , as to scripture , reason , and tradition . but i pray keep close to the point : for i hate impertinent trifling in a debate of such consequence . p. i must confess , i over-shot my self a little in the former dialogue , when i offer'd to prove the doctrine of the trinity unreasonable and absurd : for no church can make such a doctrine , which is unreasonable and absurd in it self , not to be so to me ; no church can make three and one to be the same , if they be repugnant in themselves . but my meaning was , that mens disputes about these things will never be ended , till they submit to the authority of the church . pr. and then they may believe three , or three hundred persons in the trinity , as the church pleases . is that your meaning ? p. no. but i said to my carnal reason it would appear so ; but not to my reason as under the conduct of an infallible guide . pr. then an infallible guide can make three hundred to be but three ; which is a notable trick of infallibility . p. no ; i tell you i meant only that we are not to follow carnal reason , but the church's authority , i. e. we are not to search into mysteries above reason , but only believe what the church delivers . and i intend now to argue the point somewhat closely with you . do you believe that there are any mysteries in the christian doctrine above reason , or not ? if not , you must reject the trinity ; if you do , then you have no ground for rejecting transubstantiation , because it is above reason . pr. you clearly mistake us ; and i perceive were very little acquainted with our doctrine : for we do not reject any doctrine concerning god , meerly because it is above our reason , when it is otherwise clearly proved from scripture . for then we own our selves bound to submit in matters of divine revelation concerning an infinite being , though they be above our capacity to comprehend them . but in matters of a finite nature , which are far more easie for us to conceive , and which depend upon the evidence of sense , we may justly reject any doctrine which overthrows that evidence , and is not barely above our reason , but repugnant to it . p. i do not well understand you . pr. so i believe ; but i will endeavour to help your understanding a little . and i pray consider these things : . that there is a great difference in our conceptions of finite and infinite beings . for , whatsoever is infinite , is thereby owned to be above our comprehension , otherwise it would not be infinite . the attributes of god which are essential to him , as his wisdom , goodness and power , must be understood by us , so far as to form a true notion of that being which is infinite ; but then the infinity of these attributes is above our reach . and so his infinite duration , which we call eternity ; his infinite presence which we call his immensity ; the infinite extent of his knowledg , as to future contingencies ; all these must be confessed to be mysteries , not above our reason , but above our capacity . for we have great reason to own them , but we have not faculties to comprehend them . we cannot believe a god , unless we hold him to be infinite in all perfections : and if he be infinite , he must be incomprehensible ; so that religion must be overthrown , if something incomprehensible be not allowed . and as to finite beings , so far as they run into what we call infinite , they are so far out of our reach ; as appears by the insuperable difficulties about the infinite divisibility of quantity . . that we have certain notions of some things in the visible world ; both that they are , and that they have some attributes essential to them . we daily converse with things visible and corporeal ; and if we do not conceive something true and certain in our minds about them , we live in a dream and have only phantasms and illusions about us . if we are certain that there are real bodies , and not meer appearances , there must be some certain way of conveying such impressions to our minds , from whence they may conclude , this is a horse , and this a man , and this is flesh , and this blood , and this is wood , and this stone ; otherwise all certainty is gone , and we must turn meer scepticks . . that in examining the sense of scripture we may make use of those certain notions of visible things which god and nature have planted in us ; otherwise we are not dealt with as reasonable creatures . and therefore we must use those faculties god hath given us , in reading and comparing scriptures , and examining the sense that is offered by such notions which are agreeable to the nature of things . as for instance , the scripture frequently attributes eyes and ears and hands to the almighty : must we presently believe god to have an human shape because of this ? no ; we compare these with the necessary attributes of god , and from thence see a necessity of interpreting these expressions in a sense agreeable to the divine nature . so if other expressions of scripture seem to affirm that of a body which is inconsistent with the nature of it ; as , that it is not visible , or may be in many places at once , there is some reason for me to understand them in a sense agreeable to the essential properties of a body . . there is a difference between our not apprehending the manner how a thing is , and the apprehending the impossibility of the thing it self . and this is the meaning of the distinction of things above our reason , and contrary to our reason . if the question be , how the same individual nature can be communicated to three distinct persons ? we may justly answer , we cannot apprehend the manner of it , no more than we can the divine immensity , or an infinite amplitude without extension . but if any go about to prove there is an impossibility in the thing , he must prove that the divine nature can communicate it self no otherwise than a finite individual nature can : for all acknowledg the same common nature may be communicated to three persons , and so the whole controversie rests on this single point as to reason ; whether the divine nature and persons are to be judged and measured as human nature and persons are . and in this , i think we have the advantage in point of reason of the anti-trinitarians themselves , although they pretend never so much to it . p. good night , sir ; i perceive you are in for an hour ; and i have not so much time to spare , to hear such long preachments . for my part , talk of sense and reason as long as you will , i am for the catholick church . pr. and truly , she is mightily obliged to you for oppoposing her authority to sense and reason . p. call it what you will , i am for the churches authority ; and the talk of sense and reason is but canting without that . pr. the matter is then come to a fine pass ; i thought canting had rather been that which was spoken against sense or reason . but i pray , sir , what say you to what i have been discoursing ? p. to tell you truth , i did not mind it ; for as soon as i heard whither you were going , i clapt fast hold of the church , as a man would do of a mast in a storm , and resolved not to let go my hold . pr. what! altho you should sink together with it . p. if i do , the church must answer for it ; for i must sink or swim with it . pr. what comfort will that be to you , when you are called to an account for your self ? but if you stick here , it is to no purpose to talk any more with you . p. i think so too . but now we are in , methinks we should not give over thus ; especially since i began this dialogue about the trinity and transubstantiation . pr. if you do , we know the reason of it . but i am resolved to push this matter now as far as it will go ; and either to convince you of your mistake , or at least to make you give it over wholly . p. but if i must go on in my parallel , i will proceed in my own way . i mentioned three things , scripture , reason , and tradition . and i will begin with tradition . pr. this is somewhat an uncouth method ; but i must be content to follow your conduct . p. no , sir , the method is very natural ; for in mysteries above reason , the safest way is to trust tradition . and none can give so good account of that as the church . pr. take your own way : but i perceive tradition with you is the sense of the present church ; which is as hard to conceive , as that a nunc stans should be an eternal succession . p. as to comparing tradition , i say , that the mystery of the trinity was questioned in the very infancy of the church , and the arians prevail'd much against it in the beginning of the fourth age ; but transubstantiation lay unquestion'd and quiet for a long time ; and when it came into debate , there was no such opposition as that of arius , to call in question the authority of its tradition ; the church received it unanimously , and in that sense continued till rash reason attempted to fathom the unlimited miracles and mysteries of god. pr. i stand amazed at the boldness of this assertion : but i find your present writers are very little vers'd in antiquity ; which makes them offer things concerning the ancient church , especially as to transubstantiation , which those who had been modest and learned , would have been ashamed of . p. i hope i may make use of them to justify my self , tho you slight them , i mean the consensus veterum , the nubes testium , and the single sheet about transubstantiation . pr. take them all , and as many more as you please , i am sure you can never prove transubstantiation to have been , and the trinity not to have been the constant belief of the primitive church . p. let me manage my own argument first . pr. all the reason in the world. p. my argument is , that the doctrine of the trinity met with far more opposition than transubstantiation did . pr. good reason for it , because it was never heard of then . you may as well say , the tradition of the circulation of the blood lay very quiet , from the days of hippocrates to the time of parisanus . who was there that opposed things before they were thought of ? p. that is your great mistake ; for transubstantiation was very well known , but they did not happen to speak so much of it , because it was not opposed . pr. but how is it possible for you to know it was so well known , if they spake not of it ? p. i did not say , they did not speak of it , but not so much , or not half so express ; because it is not customary for men to argue unquestionable truths . pr. but still how shall it be known that the church received this doctrine unanimously , if they do not speak expresly of it ? but since you offer at no proof of your assertion , i will make a fair offer to you , and undertake to prove , that the fathers spake expresly against it . p. how is that ? expresly against it ? god forbid . pr. make of it what you please , and answer what you can : i begin with my proofs . p. nay , then , we are in for all night . i am now full of business , and cannot hearken to tedious proofs out of the fathers , which have been canvassed a hundred times . pr. i will be as short as i can ; and i promise you not to transcribe any that have hitherto written , nor to urge you with any spurious writer , or lame citation at second or third hand ; and i shall produce nothing but what i have read , considered , and weighed in the authors themselves . p. since it must be so ; let me hear your doubty arguments , which i cannot as well turn against the trinity ; for that is my point . pr. i leave you to try your skill upon them . the first shall be from the proofs of the truth of christ's incarnation ; and i hope this will not hold against the trinity . and those arguments which they brought to prove christ incarnate , do overthrow transubstantiation effectually . so that either we must make the fathers to reason very ill against hereticks ; or , if their arguments be good , it was impossible they should believe transubstantiation . for can you suppose that any can believe it , who should not barely assert , but make the force of an argument to lie in this , that the substance of the bread doth not remain after consecration ? and this i now prove , not from any slight inconsiderable authors , but from some of the greatest men in the church in their time . i begin with st. chrysostom , whose epistle to coesarius is at last brought to light by a learned person of the roman communion ; who makes no question of the sincerity of it , and faith , the latin translation which only he could find entire , was about five hundred years old ; but he hath so confirm'd it by the greek fragments of it , quoted by ancient greek authors , that there can be no suspicion left concerning it . p. what means all this ado before you come to the point ? pr. because this epistle hath been formerly so confidently denied to be st. chrysostom's ; and such care was lately taken to suppress it . p. but what will you do with it now you have it ? pr. i will tell you presently . this epistle was written by him for the satisfaction of caesarius a monk , who was in danger of being seduced by the apollinarists . p. what have we to do with the apollinarists ? do you think all hard words are akin , and so the affinity rises between apollinarists and transubstantiation ? pr. you shall find it comes nearer the matter than you imagined . for those hereticks denied the truth of the human nature of christ after the union , and said that the properties of it did then belong to the divine nature ; as appears by that very epistle . p. and what of all this ? do we deny the truth of christ's human nature ? pr. no ; but i pray observe the force of his parallel . he is proving that each nature in christ contains its properties ; for , saith he , as before consecration we call it bread , but after it by divine grace sanctifying it through the prayer of the priest , it is no longer called bread , but the body of our lord , altho the nature of bread remains in it ; and it doth not become two bodies , but one body of christ ; so here the divine nature being joyned to the human , they both make one son , and one person . p. and what do you infer from hence ? pr. nothing more , but that the nature of bread doth as certainly remain after consecration , as the nature of christ doth after the union . p. hold a little . for the author of the single sheet , saith , that the fathers by nature and substance do often mean no more than the natural qualities , or visible appearances of things . and why may not st. chrysostom mean so here ? pr. i say , it is impossible he should . for all the dispute was about the substance , and not about the qualities , as appears by that very epistle ; for those hereticks granted , that christ had all the properties of a body left still ; they do not deny that christ could suffer , but they said , the properties of a body after the union belonged to the divine nature , the human nature being swallowed up by the union . and therefore st. chrysostom , by nature , must understand substance , and not qualities ; or else he doth by no means prove that which he aimed at . so that st. chrysostom doth manifestly assert the substance of the bread to remain after consecration . p. but doth not st. chrysostom suppose then , that upon consecration , the bread is united to the divinity , as the human nature is to the divine ; else what parallel could he make ? pr. i will deal freely with you by declaring , that not st. chrysostom only , but many others of the fathers , did own the bread after consecration to be made the real body of christ ; but not in your sense , by changing the substance of the elements into that body of christ which is in heaven ; but by a mystical union , caused by the holy spirit , whereby the bread becomes the body of christ , as that was which was conceived in the womb of the blessed virgin. but this is quite another thing from transubstantiation ; and the church of england owns , that after consecration , the bread and wine are the body and blood of christ. p. but altho this be not transubstantiation , it may be something as hard to believe or understand . pr. by no means . for all the difficulties relating to the taking away the substance of the bread , and the properties of christ's body , are removed by this hypothesis . p. let us then keep to our point : but methinks this is but a slender appearance yet ; st. chrysostom stands alone for all that i see . pr. have but a little patience , and you shall see more of his mind presently . but i must first tell you , that the eutychians afterwards were condemned in the council of chalcedon for following this doctrine of apollinaris ; and that council defines , that the differences of the two natures in christ were not destroyed by the union ; but that their properties were preserved distinct and concur to one person . and against these , the other fathers disputed just as st. chrysostom had done before against the apollinarists . theodoret brings the same instance , and he affirms expresly , that the nature of the elements is not changed , that they do not lose their proper nature , but remain in their former substance , figure and form , and may be seen and touched as before . still this is not to prove any accidental qualities , but the very substance of christ's body to remain . p. but was not theodoret a man of suspected faith in ●he church ? and therefore no great matter can be made of his testimony . pr. yield it then to us ; and see if we do not clear theodoret ; but your own learned men never question him , as to this matter ( at least ) and the ancient church hath vindicated his reputation . and he saith no more than st. chrysostom before him , and others of great esteem ●fter him . p. who were they ? pr. what say you to a pope , whom you account head of the church ? pope gelasius writing against the same hereticks , produces the same example ; and he expresly saith , the substance of the bread and wine doth not cease . p. i thought i should find you tripping . here you put a fob-head of the church upon us . for the author of the single sheet saith , this was another gelasius , as is prov'd at large by bellarmin . pr. in truth , i am ashamed of the ignorance of such small authors , who will be medling with things they understand not . for this writer , since bellarmin's time , hath been evidently proved from testimonies of antiquity , such as fulgentius and john the second , to have been pope gelasius , and that by some of the most learned persons of the roman communion , such as cardinal du perron , petavius , sirmondus , and others . p. have you any more that talk at this rate ? pr. yes . what think you of a patriarch of antioch , who useth the same similitude for the same purpose ; and he affirms , that the sensible substance still continues in the eucharist , tho it hath divine grace joyned with it ? and i pray , now tell me seriously , did the tradition of transubstantiation lie unquestion'd and quiet all this while ? when we have three patriarchs , of constantinople , rome , and antioch , expresly against it ; and one of them owned by your selves , to be head of the church ; and held by many to be infallible , especially when he teaches the church ; which he doth , if ever , when he declares against hereticks . p. i know not what to say , unless by nature and substance they meant qualities and properties . pr. i have evidently proved that could not be their meaning . p. but i am told monsieur arnaud in his elaborate defence against claude goes that way , and he saith , the eutychians and apollinarists did not absolutely deny any substance to remain in christ's body , but not so as to be endued with such properties as ours have . pr. i grant this is the main of his defence ; but i confess , monsieur arnaud hath not so much authority with me , as a general council which declared the contrary ; viz. that the eutychians were condemned for not holding two substances or natures in christ after the union . and domnus antiochenus , who first laid open the eutychian heresie , saith , it lay in making a mixture and confusion of both natures in christ , and so making the divinity passible ; and to the same purpose others . there were some who charged both apollinaris and eutyches with holding , that christ brought his body from heaven , and that it was not con-substantial with ours ; but apollinaris himself , in the fragments preserved by leontius , not only denies it , but pronounces an anathema against those that hold it . and vitalis of antioch , a great disciple of his , in discourse with epiphanius , utterly denied a coelestial body in christ. vincentius lerinensis saith , his heresie lay in denying two distinct substances in christ. st. augustin saith , he held but one substance after the union ; so that he must deny any substance of a body to remain after the union , which he asserted to be wholly swallowed up , and the properties to continue : which was another kind of transubstantiation ; for no more of the substance of christ's body was supposed to remain after the union , than there is supposed to be in the elements after consecration . but in both cases the properties and qualities were the same still . and it is observable , that in the acts of the council of chalcedon , eutyches rejected it , as a calumny cast upon him , that he should hold that christ brought a body from heaven . but the eutychian doctrine lay in taking away the substance of the body , and making the divinity the sole substance , but with the accidents and properties of the body . and for this they produced the words of saint john , the word was made flesh ; which they urged with the same confidence that you now do , this is my body . and when they were urged with difficulties , they made the very same recourse to god's omnipotency , and the letter of scripture , and made the same declamations against the use of reason that you do ; and withal , they would not have the human nature to be annihilated , but to be changed into the divine ; just as your authors do about the substance of the bread. so that it is hard to imagin a more exact parallel to transubstantiation than there is in this doctrine ; and consequently there can be no more evident proof of it , than the fathers making use of the instance of the eucharist , to shew , tha● as the substance of bread doth remain after consecration ; so the substance of christ's body doth continue after the union . and when the fathers from the remaining properties do prove the substance to remain , they overthrow the possibility of transubstantiation . for , if they might be without the substance , their whole argument loses its force , and proves just nothing . p. but all this proves nothing as to the faith of the church ; being only arguments used by divines in the heat of disputes . pr. do you then in earnest give up the fathers as disputants to us ; but retain them as believers to your selves ? but how should we know their faith but by their works ? p. i perceive you have a mind to be pleasant ; but my meaning was , that in disputes men may easily over-shoot themselves , and use ineffectual arguments . pr. but is it possible to suppose they should draw arguments from something against the faith of the church . as for instance ; suppose now we are disputing about tran substantiation , you should bring an argument from the human nature of christ , and say , that as in the hypostatical union the substance is changed , and nothing but the accidents remain ; so it is in the elements upon consecration . do you think i should not presently deny your example , and say , your very supposition is heretical ? so no doubt would the eutychians have done in case the faith of the church had then been , that the substance of the elements was changed after consecration . and the eutychians were the most sottish disputants in the world , if they had not brought the doctrine of transubstantiation to prove their heresy . p. methink you are very long upon this argument ; when shall we have done at this rate ? pr. i take this for your best answer ; and so i proceed to a second argument , which i am sure will not hold against the trinity ; and that is from the natural and unseparable properties of christ's body ; which are utterly inconsistent with the belief of transubstantiation . and the force of the argument in general lies in this , that the fathers did attribute such things to the body of christ , which render it uncapable of being present in such a manner in the sacrament as transubstantiation supposes . and no men who understand themselves , will assert that at one time , which they must be bound to deny at another ; but they will be sure to make an exception or limitation , which may reconcile both together . as if you should say , that the body of christ cannot be in more places than one at once , upon the doctrine of st. thomas ; ye would presently add , with regard to the sacrament , i. e. not in regard of its natural presence , but in a sacramental it may : so , if the fathers had an opinion like yours as to the body of christ , they would have a reserve , or exception , as to the sacrament . but it appears by their writings , that they attribute such properties in general to the body of christ , as overthrow any such presence , without exceptions or limitations . but that is not all : for i shall now prove , . that they do attribute circumscription to christ's body in heaven , so as to exclude the possibility of its being upon earth . . that they deny any such thing , as the supernatural existence of a body after the manner of a spirit . p. what do you mean ? i am quite tired already ; and now you are turning up the other glass . pr. since you will be dabling in these controversies , you must not think to escape so easily . i have been not a little offended at the insolence of some late pamphlets upon this argument ; and now i come to close reasoning , you would fain be gone . p. i am in a little haste at present ; i pray come quickly to the point . pr. as soon as you please . what think you , if a man now should bring an argument to prove a matter of faith from hence , that christ's body could not be in heaven and earth at once , would this argument hold good ? yet thus vigilius tapsitanus argues against those who denied two natures in christ ; for , saith he , the body of christ when it was on earth , was not in heaven ; and now it is in heaven , it is not upon earth ; and it is so far from being so , that we expect him to come from heaven in his flesh , whom we believe to be now present on earth by his divinity . how can this hold , if the body of christ can be in heaven and earth at the same time ? p. he speaks this of the natural presence of christ's body , and not of the sacramental . pr. the argument is not drawn from the manner of the presence , but from the nature of a body , that it could not be in heaven and earth at the same time . and so st. augustin said , that christ was every where present as god ; but confined to a certain place in heaven according to the measure of his true body . p. this is only to disprove the ubiquity of christ's body ; and not his being in several places at the same time . pr. then you yield it to be repugnant to the nature of a body to be every where present . p. yes . pr. but what if there be as great a repugnancy from st. augustin's argument , for a body to be present in several places at once ? p. i see no such thing . pr. no ? his argument is from the confinement of a true body to a certain place . and if it be in many places at once , it is as far from being confined , as if it took up all places . and there are some greater difficulties as to a body's being distant from it self , than in asserting its ubiquity . p. i perceive you are inclined to be a lutheran . pr. no such matter . for i think the essential properties of a finite and infinite being are incommunicable to each other , and i look on ubiquity as one of them . p. then the same argument will not hold as to presence in several places , for this is no infinite perfection . pr. you run from one argument to another . for these are two distinct ways of arguing ; and the argument from the repugnancy of it to the nature of a body , doth as well hold against ubiquity , as that it is a divine perfection . and st. augustin in that excellent epistle doth argue from the essential properties and dimensions of bodies , and the difference of the presence of a spirit , and a body . i pray read and consider that epistle , and you will think it impossible st. augustin should believe transubstantiation . p. st. augustin was a great disputant , and such are wont while they are eager upon one point , to forget another . but st. augustin elsewhere doth assert the presence of christ's real body in the sacrament . pr. then the plain consequence is , that he contradicted himself . p. but he doth not speak of a sacramental presence . pr. what again ? but st. augustin makes this an essential difference between a divine and corporal presence ; that the one doth not fill places by its dimensions as the other doth ; so that bodies cannot be in distant places at once . what think you of this ? p. i pray go on . pr. what think you of the manichees doctrine , who held that christ was in the sun and moon when he suffered on the cross ? was this possible or not ? p. what would you draw from hence ? pr. nothing more , but that st. augustin disproved it , because his body could not be at the same time in the sun and moon , and upon earth ? p. as to the ordinary course of nature , st. augustin's argument holds , but not as to the miraculous power of god. pr. there is a difference between the ordinary course of nature , and the unchangeable order of nature . p. let me hear this again ; for it is new doctrine to us . pr. that 's strange ! those things are by the ordinary course of nature , which cannot be changed but by divine power ; but imply no repugnancy for god to alter that course ; but those are by the unchangeable order of nature , which cannot be done without overthrowing the very nature of the things ; and such things are impossible in themselves , and therefore god himself cannot do them . p. it seems then you set bounds to god's omnipotency . pr. doth not the scripture say , there are some things impossible for god to do ? p. yes ; such as are repugnant to his own perfections ; as it is impossible for god to lye . pr. but are there no other things impossible to be done ? what think you of making the time past not to be past ? p. that is impossible in it self . pr. but is it not impossible for the same body to be in two different times ? p. yes . pr. why not then in two or more different places ; since a body is as certainly confined , as to place , as it is to time ? p. you are run now into the point of reason , when we were upon st. augustin's testimony . pr. but i say , st. augustin went upon this ground , that it was repugnant to the nature of a body to be in more places than one at the same time . and so likewise cassian proves , that when christ was upon earth he could not be in heaven , but in regard of his divinity . is there not the same repugnancy for a body in heaven to be upon earth , as for a body upon earth to be in heaven ? p. these are new questions , which i have not met with in our writers , and therefore i shall take time to answer them . but all these testimonies proceed upon a body considered under the nature of a body ; but in the sacrament we consider christ's body as present after the manner of a spirit . pr. that was the next thing i promised to prove from the fathers , that they knew of no such thing , and therefore could not believe your doctrine . have you observed what the fathers say about the difference of body and spirit ? p. not i ; but i have read our authors , who produce them for our doctrine . pr. that is the perpetual fault of your writers , to attend more to the sound of their words , than to the force of their reasonings . they bring places out of popular discourses intended to heighten the peoples devotion , and never compare them with those principles which they assert , when they come to reasoning ; which would plainly shew their other expressions are to be understood in a mystical and figurative sense . but i pray tell me , do you think the fathers had no distinct notion of a body and spirit , and the essential properties of both ? p. yes doubtless . pr. suppose then they made those to lye in such things as are inconsistent with the presence of christ's body in the sacrament after the manner of a spirit ; do you think then they could hold it to be so present ? and if they did not , they could not believe transubstantiation . p. very true . pr. what think you then of st. augustin , who makes it impossible for a body to be without its dimensions and extension of parts ? but you assert a body may be without them ; or else it cannot be after the manner of a spirit , as you say it is in the sacrament . p. i pray shew that st. augustin made it inconsistent with the nature of a body to be otherwise . pr. he saith , that all bodies how gross or subtle soever they be , can never be all every where ( i. e. cannot be indivisibly present after the manner of a spirit ) but must be extended according to their several parts , and whether great or little , must take up a space , and so fill the place , that it cannot be all in any one part. is this possible to be reconciled with your notion of a body being present after the manner of a spirit ? p. to be present after the manner of a spirit , is with us , to be so present , as not to be extended , and to be whole in every part . pr. but this st. augustin saith , no body can be ; and not only there , but elsewhere he saith , take away dimensions from bodies , and they are no longer bodies . and that a greater part takes up a greater space , and a lesser a less ; and must be always less in the part than in the whole . p. but he speaks of extension in it self , and not with respect to place . pr. that is of extension that is not extended ; for if it be , it must have respect to place ; but nothing can be plainer , than that st. augustin doth speak with respect to place . and he elsewhere saith , that every body must have place , and be extended in it . p. but he doth not speak this of the sacrament . pr. but he speaks it of all bodies wheresoever present ; and he doth not except the sacrament , which he would certainly have done , if he had believed as you do concerning it . p. st. augustin might have particular opinions in this , as he had in other things . pr. so far from it , that i shall make it appear , that this was the general sense of the fathers . st. gregory nazianzen saith , that the nature of bodies requires , that they have figure and shape , and may be touched , and seen , and circumscribed . st. cyril of alexandria saith , that if god himself were a body , he must be liable to the properties of bodies , and he must be in a place , as bodies are . and all those fathers , who prove , that god cannot be a body , do it from such arguments as shew , that they knew nothing of a bodies being after the manner of a spirit : for then the force of their arguments is lost , which are taken from the essential properties of a body , such as extension , divisibility , and circumscription . but if a body may be without these , then god may be a body after the manner of a spirit ; and so the spirituality of the divine nature will be taken away . p. i never heard these arguments before , and must take some time to consider . pr. the sooner the better ; and i am sure if you do , you will repent being a new convert . but i have yet something to add to this argument ; viz. that those who have stated the difference between body and spirit , have made extension , and taking up a place , and divisibility , necessary to the very being of a body ; and that what is not circumscribed , is incorporeal . p. methinks your arguments run out to a great length . i pray bring them into a less compass . pr. i proceed to a third argument from the fathers , which will not take up much time ; and that is , that the fathers knew nothing of the subsistence of accidents without their substance , without which transubstantiation cannot be maintained : and therefore in the roman schools , the possibility of accidents subsisting without their subjects , is defended . but on the contrary , maximus , one of the eldest of the fathers , who lived in the second century , affirms it to be of the essence of accidents to be in their substance . st. basil saith , nature doth not bear a distinction between body and figure , altho reason makes one . isidore p●lusiota , saith , that quality cannot be without substance . gregory nyssen , that figure cannot be without body , and that a body cannot be conceived without qualities : and that if we take away colour , and quantity , and resistance , the whole notion of a body is destroy'd . take away space from bodies , saith st. augustin , and they can be no where ; and if they can be no where , they cannot be : and so he saith , if we take away bodies from their qualities . and in plain terms , that no qualities , as colours , or form , can remain without their subject . and that no accidents can be without their subject , is in general affirmed by isidore hispalensis , boethius , damascen , and others , who give an account of the philosophy of the ancients . p. all this proceeds upon the old philosophy of accidents : what if there be none at all ? pr. what then makes the same impression on our senses when the substance is gone , as when it was there ? is there a perpetual miracle to deceive our senses ? but it is impossible to maintain transubstantiation , as it is defined in the church of rome , without accidents : they may hold some other doctrine in the place of it , but they cannot hold that . and that other doctrine will be as impossible to be understood . for if once we suppose the body of christ to be in the sacrament , in place of the substance of the bread , which appears to our senses to be bread still : then suppose there be no accidents , the body of a man must make the same impression on our senses , which the substance of bread doth , which is so horrible an absurdity , that the philosophy of accidents cannot imply any greater than it . so that the new transubstantiators had as good return to the old mumpsimus of accidents . p. i suppose you have now done with this argument . pr. no : i have something farther to say about it , which is , that the fathers do not only assert , that accidents cannot be without their subject , but they confute hereticks on that supposition ; which shew'd their assurance of the truth of it . irenoeus overthrows the valentinian conjugations , because truth can no more be without a subject , than water without moisture , or fire without heat , or a stone without hardness ; which are so joined together , that they cannot be separated . methodius confutes origen's fancy about the soul having the shape of a body without the substance , because the shape and the body cannot be separated from each other . st. augustin proves the immortality of the soul from hence , because meer accidents can never be separated from the body , so as the mind is by abstraction . and in another place he asserts it to be a monstrous absurd doctrine , to suppose that , whose nature is to be in a subject , to be capable of subsisting without it . claudianus mamertus proves , that the soul could not be in the body as its subject ; for then it could not subsist when the body is destroy'd . p. i hope you have now done with this third argument . pr. yes ; and i shall wait your own time for an answer . i go on to a fourth : and that is from the evidence of sense asserted and allowed by the fathers , with respect to the body of christ. p. i expected this before now . for , as the author of the single sheet observes : this is the cock-argument of one of the lights of your church ; and it so far resembles the light , that like it , it makes a glaring shew , but go to grasp it , and you find nothing in your hand . pr. then it 's plain our senses are deceived . p. not as to transubstantiation : for he believes more of his senses than we do : for his eyes tell him there is the colour of bread , and he assents to them ; his tongue , that it has the taste of bread , and he agrees to it : and so for his smelling and feeling : but then he hath a notable fetch in his conclusion : viz. that his ears tell him from the words spoken by christ himself , that it is the body of christ , and he believes these too . is not here one sense more than you believe ? and yet you would persuade the world , that we do not believe our senses . pr. this is admirable stuff ; but it must be tenderly dealt with . for i pray what doth he mean when he saith , he believes from christ's own words , that it is the body of christ ? what is this it ? is it the accidents he speaks of before ? are those accidents then the body of christ ? is it the substance of bread ? but that is not discerned by the senses , he saith : and if it were , will he say , that the substance of bread is the body of christ ? if neither of these , then his believing it is the body of christ , signifies nothing ; for there can be no sense of it . p. however , he shews , that we who believe transubstantiation , do not renounce our senses , as you commonly reproach us : for we believe all that our senses represent to us , which is only the outward appearance . for , as he well observes , if your eyes see the substance of things , they are most extraordinary ones , and better than ours . for our parts , we see no farther than the colour or figure , &c. of things which are only accidents , and the entire object of that sense . pr. is there no difference between the perception of sense , and the evidence of sense ? we grant , that the perception of our senses goes no farther than to the outward accidents ; but that perception affords such an evidence by which the mind doth pass judgment upon the thing represented by the outward sense . i pray tell me , have you any certainty there is such a thing as a material substance in the world ? p. yes . pr. whence comes the certainty of the substance , since your senses cannot discover it ? do we live among nothing but accidents ? or can we know nothing beyond them ? p. i grant we may know in general that there are such things as substances in the world. pr. but can we not know the difference of one substance from another , by our senses ? as for instance , can we not know a man from a horse , or an elephant from a mouse , or a piece of bread from a church ? or do we only know . there are such and such accidents belong to every one of these ; but our senses are not so extraprdinary to discover the substances under them ? i pray answer me one question , did you ever keep lent ? p. what a strange question is this ? did you not tell me , you would avoid impertinencies ? pr. this is none , i assure you . p. then i answer , i think my self obliged to keep it . pr. then you thought your self bound to abstain from flesh , and to eat fish. p. what of all that ? pr. was it the substance of flesh you abstained from , or only the accidents of it ? p. the substance ? pr. and did you know the difference between the substance of flesh and fish by your tast ? p. yes . pr. then you have an extraordinary tast , which goes to the very substance ? p. but this is off from our business , which was about the fathers , and not our own judgment about the evidence of sense . pr. i am ready for you upon that argument . and i only desire to know whether you think the evidence of sense sufficient , as to the true body of christ , where it is supposed to be present ? p. by no means ; for then we could not believe it to be present , where we cannot perceive it . pr. but the fathers did assert the evidence of sense to be sufficient , as to the true body of christ ; so irenoeus , tertullian , epiphanius , hilary , and st. augustin . i will produce their words at length , if you desire them . p. it will be but lost labour , since we deny not , as cardinal bellarmin well saith , the evidence of sense to be a good positive evidence , but not a negative , i. e. that it is a body , which is handled , and felt , and seen ; but not , that it is no body which is not . pr. very well ! and i pray then what becomes of your single sheet man , who so confidently denies sense to be good positive evidence as to a real body ; but only as to the outward appearance ? p. you mistake him ; for he saith , we are to believe our senses , where they are not indisposed , and no divine revelation intervenes , which we believe there doth in this case ; and therefore , unless the fathers speak of the sacrament , we have no reason to regard their testimonies in this matter . but we have stronger evidence against you from the fathers , for they say we are not to rely on the evidence of sense , as to the sacrament . so st. cyril , st. chrysostom , and st. ambrose . pr. i am glad you offer any thing which deserves to be considered . but have you already forgot bellarmin's rule , that sense may be a good positive evidence , but not a negative , i. e. it may discover what is present as a body , but not what is not , and cannot be so present , viz. the invisible grace which goes along with it ; and as to this the fathers might well say , we are not to trust our sense . p. this is making an interpretation for them . pr. no such matter . it is the proper and genuine sense of their words ; as will appear from hence . ( . ) they assert the very same , as to the chrism and baptism , which they do as to the eucharist . ( . ) that which they say , our senses cannot reach , is something of a spiritual nature , and not a body . and here the case is extremely different from the judgment of sense , as to a material substance . and if you please , i will evidently prove from the fathers , that that wherein they excluded the judgment of sense in the eucharist , was something wholly spiritual and immaterial . p. no , no , we have been long enough upon the fathers , unless their evidence were more certain one way or other . for my part , i believe on the account of divine revelation in this matter , this is my body ; here i stick , and the fathers agreed with us herein , that christ's words are not to be taken in a figurative sense . pr. the contrary hath been so plainly proved in a late excellent discourse of transubstantiation , that i wonder none of your party have yet undertaken to answer it ; but they write on , as if no such treatise had appear'd : i shall therefore wave all the proofs that are there produced , till some tolerable answer be given to them . p. methinks you have taken a great liberty of talking about the fathers , as tho they were all on your side ; but our late authors assure us to the contrary ; and i hope i may now make use of them , to shew that transubstantiation was the faith of the ancient church . pr. with all my heart , i even long to hear what they can say in a matter , i think , so clear on our side . p. well , sir , i begin with the consensus veterum , written by one that professed himself a minister of the church of england . pr. make what you can of him , now you have him ; but i will meddle with no personal things , i desire to hear his arguments . p. what say you to r. selomo , interpreting the . psal. v. . of wafers in the days of the messias ; to r. moses haddarsan , on gen. . . and on psal. . , to r. cahana , on gen. . . who was long before the nativity of christ ; r. johai , on numb . . . and to r. judas , who was many years before christ came . pr. can you hold your countenance when you repeat these things ? but any thing must pass from a new convert . what think you of r. cahana , and r. judas , who lived so long before our saviour , when we know that the jews have no writings preserved near to our saviour's time , besides the bible , and some say the paraphrasts upon it . i would have been glad to have seen these testimonies taken from their original authors , and not from galatinus , who is known to have been a notorious plagiary , as to the main of his book , and of little or no credit as to the rest . but it is ridieulous to produce the testimonies of jewish rabbins for transubstantiation , when it is so well known that it is one of their greatest objections against christianity , as taught in the roman church , as may be seen in joseph albo , and others . but what is all this to the testimony of the christian fathers ? p. will not you let a man shew a little jewish learning upon occasion ? but if you have a mind to the fathers , you shall have enough of them ; for i have a large catalogue of them to produce , from the consensus veterum , nubes testium , and the single sheet , which generally agree . pr. with coccius or bellarmin , you mean ; but before you produce them , i pray tell me what you intend to prove by them ? p. the doctrine of our church . pr. as to what ? p. what have we been about all this while ? pr. transubstantiation . will you prove that ? p. why do you suspect me before i begin ? pr. i have some reason for it . let us first agree what we mean by it . do you mean the same which the church of rome doth by it , in the council of trent ? p. what can we mean else ? pr. let us first see what that is . the council of trent declares , that the same body of christ , which is in heaven , is really , truly and substantially present in the eucharist after consecration , under the species of bread and wine . and the roman catechism saith , it is the very body which was born of the virgin , and sits at the right hand of god. ( . ) that the bread and wine after consecration , lose their proper substances , and are changed into that very substance of the body of christ. and an anathema is denounced against those who affirm the contrary . now if you please , proceed to your proofs . p. i begin with the ancient liturgies of st. peter , st. james , and st. matthew . pr. are you in earnest ? p. why ; what is the matter ? pr. do not you know , that these are rejected as supposititious , by your own writers ? and a very late and learned dr. of the sorbon , hath given full and clear evidences of it . p. suppose they are , yet they may be of antiquity enough , to give some competent testimony as to tradition . pr. no such matter : for he proves st. peter 's liturgy , to be later than the sacramentary of st. gregory ; and so can prove nothing for the first years ; and the aethiopick liturgy , or st. matthew's , he shews to be very late . that of st. james , he thinks to have been some time before the five general councils ; but by no means to have been st. james's . p. what think you of the acts of st. andrew , and what he saith therein , about eating the flesh of christ ? pr. i think he saith nothing to the purpose . but i am ashamed to find one , who hath so long been a minister in this church , so extreamly ignorant , as to bring these for good authorities , which are rejected with scorn by all men of learning and ingenuity among you . p. i am afraid you grow angry . pr. i confess , ignorance and confidence together , are very provoking things ; especially , when a man in years pretends to leave our church on such pitiful grounds . p. but he doth produce better authorities . pr. if he doth , they are not to his purpose . p. that must be tried ; what say you to ignatius ? i hope you allow his epistles ? pr. i see no reason to the contrary . but what saith he ? p. he saith , that some hereticks then would not receive the eucharist and oblations , because they will not confess the eucharist to be the flesh of our saviour christ. and this is produced by both authors . pr. the persons ignatius speaks of , were such as denied christ to have any true body , and therefore did forbear the eucharist , because it was said to be his body . and in what ever sense it were taken , it still supposed that which they denied , viz. that he had a true body : for , if it were figuratively understood , it was as contrary to their doctrine , as if it were literally . for a figure must relate to a real body , as tertullian argued in this case . and ignatius in the same epistle , mentions the trial christ made of his true body , by the senses of his disciples , take hold of me , and handle me , and see , for i am no incorporeal doemon ; and immediately they touched him , and were convinced . which happen'd but a few days after christ had said , this is my body ; and our saviour gave a rule for judging a true body , from an appearance , or spiritual substance ; a spirit hath not flesh and bones , as ye see me have . therefore it is very improbable that ignatius so soon after , should assert that christ's true and real body was in the eucharist , where it could be neither seen nor felt : for then he must overthrow the force of his former argument . and to what purpose did christ say , that a spirit had not flesh and bones , as they saw him to have ; if a body of christ might be so much after the manner of a spirit , as tho it had flesh and bones , yet they could not possibly be discerned ? but after all , suppose ignatius doth speak of the substance of christ's flesh , as present in the eucharist ; yet he saith not a word of the changing of the substance of the bread into the substance of christ's body ; which was the thing to be proved . p. but justin martyr doth speak of the change , and his words are produced by all three . and they are thus rendred in the single sheet . for we do not receive this as common bread , or common drink , but as by the word of god , jesus christ our redeemer being made man , had both flesh and blood for our salvation ; so also , we are taught that this food , by which our blood and flesh are by a change nourished , being consecrated by the power of the word , is the flesh and blood of jesus christ incarnate : what say you to this ? pr. i desire you to consider these things . ( . ) that justin martyr doth not say , that the bread and wine are by consecration changed into the individual flesh and blood , in which christ was incarnate ; but that , as by the power of the word , christ once had a body in the womb of the virgin ; so by the power of the same word , upon consecration , the bread and wine do become the flesh and blood of christ incarnate ; so that he must mean a parallel , and not the same individual body , i. e. that as the body in the womb became the body of christ by the power of the holy spirit ; so the holy spirit after consecration , makes the elements to become the flesh and blood of christ , not by an hypostatical union , but by divine influence , as the church is the body of christ. and this was the true notion of the ancient church , as to this matter , and the expressions in the greek liturgies to this day confirm the same . ( . ) he doth not in the least imply that the elements by this change do lose their substance ; for he mentions the nourishment of our bodies by it ; but he affirms , that notwithstanding their substance remain , yet the divine spirit of christ , by its operation , doth make them become his body . for we must observe , that he attributes the body in the womb , and on the altar , to the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or divine word . for he did not think hypostatical union necessary , to make the elements become the body of christ , but a divine energy was sufficient , as the bodies assumed by angels are their bodies , tho there be no such vital union , as there is between the soul and body of a man. p. i go on to irenoeus , from whom two places are produced , one by the consensus veterum , where he saith , that which is bread from the earth , perceiving the call of god , now is not common bread , but the eucharist , consisting of two things , one earthly , and the other spiritual . pr. very well ! then there is an earthly , as well as a spiritual thing in the eucharist , i. e. a bodily substance , and divine grace . p. no ; he saith , the earthly is the accidents . pr. doth irenoeus say so ? p. no ; but he means so . pr. there is not a word to that purpose in irenoeus ; and therefore this is downright prevarication . i grant irenoeus doth suppose a change made by divine grace ; but not by destroying the elements , but by super-adding divine grace to them ; and so the bread becomes the body of christ , and the wine his blood. p. the other place in irenoeus is , where he saith , that as the bread receiving the word of god , is made the eucharist , which is the body and blood of christ , so also our bodies being nourished by it , and laid in the earth , and there dissolved , will arise at their time , &c. pr. what do you prove from this place ? p. that the same divine power is seen in making the eucharist the body and blood of christ , which is to be in the resurrection of the body . pr. but doth this prove , that the substance of the bread is changed into the substance of christ's body ? p. why not ? pr. i will give you a plain argument against it ; for he saith , our bodies are nourished by the body and blood of christ. do you think that irenoeus believed the substance of christ's body was turned into the substance of our bodies , in order to their nourishment ? no ; he explained himself just before in the same place ; de calice qui est sanguis ejus , nutritur ; & de pane qui est corpus ejus ; augetur : so that he attributes the nourishment to the bread and wine ; and therefore must suppose the substance of them to remain , since it is impossible a substantial nourishment should be made by meer accidents . and withal , observe , he saith expresly , that the bread is the body of christ ; which your best writers ( such as bellarmin , suarez and vasquez ) say , is inconsistent with transubstantiation . p. my next author is tertullian , who is produced by the consensus veterum , and the single sheet , but omitted by the nubes testium ; but the other proves , that bread which was the figure of christ's body in the old testament , now in the new , is changed into the real and true body of christ. pr. this is a bold attempt upon tertullian , to prove , that by the figure of christ's body , he means his true and real body . for his words are , acceptum panem & distributum discipulis corpus illum suum fecit , hoc est corpus meum dicendo , id est , figura corporis mei . he took the bread , and gave it to his disciples , and made it his body , saying , this is my body ; i. e. this is the figure of my body . how can those men want proofs , that can draw transubstantiation from these words , which are so plain against it ? p. you are mistaken ; tertullian by figure meant , it was a figure in the old testament , but it was now his real body . pr. you put very odd figures upon tertullian : i appeal to any reasonable man , whether by the latter words he doth not explain the former ? for he puts the sense upon corpus meum , by adding dicendo to them ; i. e. this is the meaning of that speech , when he calleth the bread his body . p. doth not tertullian say , that it had not been the figure , unless it had been the truth ? pr. this is again perverting his words , which are , figuratum non fuisset nisi veritatis esset corpus ; i. e. there had been no place for a figure of christ's body , unless christ had a true body . for he was proving against marcion , that christ had a true body ; and among other arguments he produces this from the figure of his body , which he not only mentions here , but in other places ; where he saith , that christ gave the figure of his body to the bread ; which cannot relate to any figure of the old testament . p. but doth not tertullian say afterwards , that the bread was the figure of christ's body in the old testament ? pr. what then ? he had two designs against marcion ; one to prove , that christ had a true body , which he doth here from the figure of his body : and the other , that there was a correspondency of both testaments : and for that purpose he shews , that the bread in jeremiah , was the figure of christ's body . p. but the author of the single sheet , cites another place of tertullian , where he saith , that our flesh feeds on the body and blood of christ , that our soul may be filled with god. pr. by the body and blood of christ , he means there , the elements , with divine grace going along with them ; as appears by his design , which is , to shew how the body and soul are joyned together in sacramental rites . the flesh is washed , and the soul is cleansed ; the flesh is anointed , and the soul consecrated ; the flesh is signed , and the soul confirmed ; the flesh hath hands laid upon it , and the soul enlighten'd ; the flesh feeds on the body and blood of christ , that the soul may be filled with god. now unless tertullian meant the elements , the parallel doth not proceed ; for all the rest are spoken of the external symbols ; and so this doth not at all contradict what he saith elsewhere , no more than the passage in the second book aduxorem doth . for there he speaks of christ , with respect to the invisible grace , as he doth here , as to the outward symbols . p. clemens alexandrinus saith , that melchisedeck gave bread and wine in figure of the eucharist . pr. and what then ? what is this to transubstantiation ? p. origen saith , when you eat and drink the body and blood of our lord , then our lord enters under your roof , &c. pr. are you sure that origen said this ? but suppose he did , must he enter with his flesh and bones , and not much rather by a peculiar presence of his grace ? for is it not origen who so carefully distinguishes the typical and symbolical body of christ , from the divine word , and so expresly mentions the material part of the elements after consecration , which pass into the draught , &c. is all this meant of the accidents only ? p. what say you to st. cyprian de coena domini ? pr. i beg your pardon , sir ; this is now known and acknowledged to be a late author , in comparison , and cannot come within your years ; and therefore is not ancient enough to be considered . p. but in his genuine writings he speaks of those who offer'd violence to the body and blood of our lord in the eucharist . pr. and i pray what follows ? that the substance of the elements is gone : where lies the consequence ? but st. cyprian saith , the bread was his body , and the wine his blood ; therefore their substance must remain . p. what say you to eusebius emesenus ? pr. that he is not within our compass ; and withal , that he is a known counterfeit . p. i perceive you are hard to please . pr. you say very true , as to supposititious writers . p. i hope you have more reverence for the council of nice . pr. but where doth that speak of transubstantiation ? p. it calls the eucharist the body of christ. pr. and so doth the church of england ; therefore that holds transubstantiation . i pray bring no more such testimonies , which prove nothing but what we hold . p. i perceive you have a mind to cut me short . pr. not in the least , where you offer any thing to the purpose . but i pray spare those who only affirm , that the eucharist is the body and blood of christ after consecration . for i acknowledg it was the language of the church , especially in the fourth century , when the names of the elements were hardly mention'd to the catechumens ; and all the discourses of the fathers to them , tended to heighten the devotion and esteem of the eucharist . by which observation you may easily understand the meaning of the eloquent writers of that age , who speak with so much mystery and obscurity about it . if you have any that go beyond lofty expressions , and rhetorical flights , i pray produce them . p. i perceive you are afraid of s. greg. nazianzen , and s. basil , but especially s. chrysostom , you fence so much beforehand against eloquent men. pr. as to the other two , there is nothing material alledged by any to this purpose ; but s. chrysostom , i confess , doth speak very lofty things concerning the sacrament in his popular discourses , but yet nothing that doth prove transubstantiation . p. what think you of his homilies , and . on s. mat. . homily on s. john . homily on st to the corinth . the homilies on philogonius and the cross ? are there not strange things in them concerning the eucharist ? about eating christ , and seeing him lie before them slain on the altar ; about touching his body there , and the holy spirit , with an innumerable host , hovering over what is there proposed , with much more to that purpose . pr. you need not to recite more ; for i yield that st. chrysostom delighted in the highest flights of his eloquence , on this subject , in his homilies ; and he tells for what reason , to excite the reverence and devotion of the people . but yet himself doth afford us a sufficient key to these expressions , if we attend to these things concerning his manner of speaking : ( . ) that he affirms those things which no side can allow to be literally understood . as when he so often speaks of our seeing and touching christ upon the altar , which is inconsistent with the doctrine of transubstantiation : for christ is utterly invisible on the altar , even by divine power , saith suarez . he is invisible in the sacrament . saith bellarmin ; and he saith also , that he cannot be touched . what then is to be said to such expressions of s. chrysostom ? behold thou seest him , thou touchest him , thou eatest him . it is not his sacrament only which is offer'd us to touch , but himself . what if you do not hear his voice , do you not see him lying before you ? behold christ lying before you slain . christ lies on the holy table , as a sacrifice slain for us . thou swearest upon the holy table where christ lies slain . when thou seest our lord lying on the table , and the priest praying and the by-standers purpled with his blood. see the love of christ ; he doth not only suffer himself to be seen by those who desire it , but to be touched and eaten , and our teeth to be fixed in his flesh. now these expressions are on all sides granted to be literally absurd and impossible ; and therefore we must say of him as bonaventure once said of s. augustin , plus dicit sanctus & minus vult intelligi ; we must make great allowance for such expressions , or you must hold a capernaitical sense . and it is denied by your selves , that christ is actually slain upon the altar ; and therefore you yield , that such expressions are to be figuratively understood . ( . ) that he le ts fall many things in such discourses which do give light to the rest : as , ( . ) that flesh is improperly taken when applied to the eucharist . ( . ) he calls the sacrament the mystical body and blood of christ. ( . ) that the eating of christ's flesh is not to be understood literally , but spiritually . ( . ) he opposes christ's sacramental presence , and real corporal presence to each other . ( . ) he still exhorts the communicants to look upwards towards heaven . and now if you lay these things together , this eloquent father will not , with all his flights , come near to transubstantiation . p. no! in one place he asserts the substance of the elements to be lost . pr. thanks to the latin translators , for the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as the criticks observe , doth not signify to destroy , but to refine , and purify a substance . but i do not rely upon this ; for the plain answer is , that s. chrysostom doth not there speak of the elements upon consecration , but what becomes of them , after they are taken down into the stomach . st. chrysostom thought it would lessen the peoples reverence and devotion , if they passed into the draught , as origen affirmed ; and therefore he started another opinion ; viz. that as wax , when it is melted in the fire , throws off no superfluities , but it passes indiscernably away ; so the elements , or mysteries , as he calls them , pass imperceptibly into the substance of the body , and so are consumed together with it . therefore , saith he , approach with reverence , not supposing that you receive the divine body from a man , but as with tongs of fire from the seraphims : which the author of the consensus veterum translates , but fire from the tongues of seraphims . s. chrysostom's words are , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : and the sense is , that the divine body ( i. e. the eucharist , after consecration , being by the divine spirit made the divine body , as in st. chrysostom's liturgy , there is a particular prayer for the holy ghost to come , and so make the bread to be the divine body , or the holy body of christ ) , is to be taken , not with our mouths , which can only receive the elements , but after a divine manner , as with tongs of fire from seraphims ; by which he expresses the spiritual acts of faith and devotion , as most agreeable to that divine spirit which makes the elements to become the holy body of christ. but that st. chrysostom did truly and firmly believe the substance of the bread to remain after consecration , i have already proved from his epistle to coesarius . p. i pray let us not go backward , having so much ground to run over still . pr. i am content , if you will produce only those who speak of the change of substance , and not such as only mention the body and blood of christ after consecration , which i have already told you , was the language of the church ; and therefore all those testimonies are of no force in this matter . p. then i must quit the greatest part of what remains , as optatus , gaudentius , s. jerom , and others ; but i have some still left which will set you hard . what say you then to gregory nyssen , who saith , the sanctified bread is changed into the body of the word of god. and he takes off your answer of a mystical body ; for he puts the question , how the same body can daily be distributed to the faithful throughout the world , it remaining whole and entire in it self ? pr. gregory nyssen was a man of fancy , and he shewed it in that catechetical discourse : however , fronto ducoeus thought it a notable place to prove transubstantiation , which i wonder at , if he attended to the design of it ; which was to shew , that as our bodies , by eating , became subject to corruption , so by eating they become capable of immortality ; and this he saith , must be by receiving an immortal body into our b dies , such as the body of christ was : but then , saith he , how could that body , which is to remain whole in it self , be distributed to all the faithful over the whole earth ? he answers , by saying , that our bodies do consist of bread and wine , which are their proper nourishment ; and christ's body being like ours , that was so too ; which by the uni●n with the word of god , was changed into a divine dignity . but what is this to the eucharist , you may say ? he goes on therefore , so i believe the sanctified bread , by the power of the word of god , to be changed into the body of god the word . not into that individual body , but after the same manner , by a presence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or god the word in it ; and that this was his meaning , doth evidently appear by what follows . for , saith he , that body , viz. to which , he was incarnate , was sanctified by the inhabitation of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , dwelling in the flesh ; therefore , as the bread was then changed into a divine dignity in the body , so it is now ; and the bread is changed into the body of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( not of jesus christ ) as it was said by the word , this is my body . and so by receiving this divine body into our bodies , they are made capable of immortality . and this is the true account of gregory nyssen's meaning , which if it prove any thing , proves an impanation , rather than transubstantiation . p. but hilary's testimony cannot be so avoided ; who saith , that we as truly eat christ's flesh in the sacrament , as he was truly incarnate ; and that we are to judg of this ; not by carnal reason , but by the words of christ , who said , my flesh is meat indeed , and my blood is drink indeed . pr. i do not deny this to be hilary's sense . but yet this proves nothing like to transubstantiation . for it amounts to no more than a real presence of the body of christ in the sacrament ; and you can make no argument from hence , unless you can prove that the body of christ cannot be present , unless the substance of the bread be destroy'd , which is more than can be done , or than hilary imagined . all that he aimed at , was to prove a real union between christ and his people , that christ was in them more than by meer consent ; and to prove this , he lays hold of those words of our saviour , my flesh is meat indeed , &c. but the substantial change of the bread into the substance of christ's body , signifies nothing to his purpose ; and bellarmin never so much as mentions hilary in his proofs of transubstantiation , but only for the real presence . but i must add something more , viz. that hilary was one of the first who drew any argument from the literal sense of john . i do not say , who did by way of accommodation , apply them to the sacrament , which others might do before him . but yet , there are some of the eldest fathers , who do wholly exclude a literal sense , as tertullian look'd on it , as an absurdity that christ should be thought truly to give his flesh to eat . quasi vere carnem suam illis edendam determinasset . and origen saith , it is a killing letter , if those words be literally understood . but this is to run into another debate , whereas our business is about transubstantiation . if you have any more , let us now examine their testimonies . p. what say you then to st. ambrose , who speaks home to the business , for he makes the change to be above nature , and into the body of christ , born of the virgin ? there are long citations out of him , but in these words lies the whole strength of them . pr. i answer , several things for clearing of his meaning . ( . ) that st. ambrose doth parallel the change in the eucharist , with that in baptism ; and to prove regeneration therein , he argues from the miraculous conception of christ in the womb of the virgin ; but in baptism no body supposes the substance of the water to be taken away ; and therefore it cannot hold as to the other , from the supernatural change ; which may be only with respect to such a divine influence , which it had not before consecration . ( . ) he doth purposely talk obscurely and mystically about this matter , as the fathers were wont to do to those , who were to be admitted to these mysteries . sometimes one would think he meant that the elements are changed into christ's individual body born of the virgin : and yet presently after , he distinguishes between the true flesh of christ , which was crucified and buried , and the sacrament of his flesh. if this were the same , what need any distinction ? and that this sacramentum carnis , is meant of the eucharist , is plain by what follows ; for he cites christ's words , this is my body . ( . ) he best explains his own meaning , when he saith , not long after , that the body of christ in the sacrament , is a spiritual body , or a body produced by the divine spirit ; and so he parallels it with that spiritual food , which the israelites did eat in the wilderness : and no man will say , that the substance of the manna was then lost . and since your authors make the same st. ambrose , to have written the book de sacramentis , there is a notable passage therein , which helps to explain this ; for there he saith expresly , non iste panis est qui vadit in corpus , sed ille panis vitoe eternoe qui animoe nostroe substantiam fulcit . it is not the bread which passes into the body , but the bread of eternal life , which strengthens the substance of our soul. where he not only calls it bread after consecration , which goes to our nourishment ; but he distinguishes it from the bread of eternal life , which supports the soul , which must be understood of divine grace , and not of any bodily substance . p. i perceive you will not leave us one father of the whole number . pr. not one . and i hope this gives an incomparable advantage to the doctrine of the trinity in point of tradition , above transubstantiation : when i have not only proved , that the greatest of the fathers expresly denied it , but that there is not one in the whole number who affirmed it . for altho there were some difference in the way of explaining how the eucharist was the body and blood of christ ; yet not one of them hitherto produced , doth give any countenance to your doctrine of transubstantiation , which the council of trent declared to have been the constant belief of the church in all ages ; which is so far from being true , that there is as little ground to believe that , as transubstantiation it self . and so much as to this debate , concerning the comparing the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation , in point of tradition ; if you have any thing to say further , as to scripture and reason , i shall be ready to give you satisfaction the next opportunity . finis . books lately printed for w. rogers . the doctrines and practices of the church of rome , truly represented ; in answer to a book , intituled , a papist misrepresented , and represented , &c. quarto . third edition . an answer to a discourse , intituled , papists protesting against protestant popery ; being a vindication of papists not misrepresented by protestants to . second edition . an answer to the amicable accommodation of the differences between the representer and the answerer . quarto . a view of the whole controversie , between the representer and the answerer ; with an answer to the representer's last reply . to . the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation compared as to scripture , reason , and tradition ; in a new dialogue between a protestant and a papist , the first part ; wherein an answer is given to the late proofs of the antiquity of transubstantiation , in the books called , consensus veterum , and nubes testium , &c. quarto . the doctrine of the trinity , and transubstantiation , compared as to scripture , reason , and tradition , in a new dialogue between a protestant and a papist , the second part ; wherein the doctrine of the trinity is shewed to be agreeable to scripture and reason , and transubstantiation repugnant to both . quarto . a discourse concerning the nature of idolatry ; in which the bishop of oxford's true and only notion of idolatry is considered and confuted . to . the absolute impossibility of transubstantiation demonstrated . to . a letter to the superiours , ( whether bishops or priests ) which approve or license the popish books in england , particularly to those of the jesuits order , concerning lewis sabran a jesuit . a preservative against popery ; being some plain directions to unlearned protestants , how to dispute with romish priests . the first part. the fourth edition . the second part of the preservative against popery ; shewing how contrary popery is to the true ends of the christian religion . fitted for the instruction of unlearned protestants . the second edition . a vindication of both parts of the preservative against popery ; in answer to the cavils of lewis sabran , jesuit . a discourse concerning the nature , unity aed communion of the catholick church ; wherein most of the controversies relating to the church , are briefly and plainly stated . the first part. to . these four last by william sherlock , d. d. master of the temple . imprimatur , guil. needham rr. in christo p. ac d. d. wilhelmo archiep. cant. a sac. dom. ex aedib . lambeth , feb. . . the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation compared , as to scripture , reason , and tradition , in a new dialogue between a protestant and a papist . the second part . wherein the doctrine of the trinity is shewed to be agreeable to scripture and reason , and transubstantiation repugnant to both . london : printed for william rogers at the sun in fleet-street , over against st. dunstan's church . mdc lxxx vii . the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation compared , &c. pr. i hope you are now at leisure to proceed with your parallel between the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation , as to scripture and reason . p. yes , and am resolved to make good all that i have said , as to both those . pr. and if you do , i will yield the cause . p. i begin with scripture . and the whole dispute as to both , depends on this : whether the scripture is to be understood literally or figuratively . if literally , then transubstantiation stands upon equal terms with the trinity ; if figuratively , then the trinity can no more be proved from scripture , than transubstantiation . pr. as tho there might not be reason for a figurative sense in one place , and a literal in another . p. it seems then , you resolve it into reason . pr. and i pray , into what would you resolve it ? into no reason ? p. into the authority of the church . pr. without any reason ? p. no : there may be reason for that authority , but not for the thing which i believe upon it . pr. then you believe the doctrine of the trinity , meerly , because the church tells you it is the literal sense of scripture which you are to follow . but suppose a man sees no reason for this authority of your church ; ( as for my part , i do not ) have you no reason to convince such a one that he ought to believe the trinity ? p. not i. for i think men are bound to believe as the church teaches them , and for that reason . pr. what is it , i pray , to believe ? p. to believe , is to give our assent to what god reveals . pr. and hath god revealed the doctrine of the trinity to the church in this age ? p. no ; it was revealed long ago . pr. how doth it appear ? p. by the scripture sensed by the church . pr. but whence come you to know that the church is to give the sense of the scriptures ? is it from the scripture , or not ? p. from the scripture doubtless , or else we could not believe upon the churches testimony . pr. but suppose the question be , about the sense of these places which relate to the churches authority , how can a man come to the certain sense of them ? p. hold a little , i see whither you are leading me ; you would sain draw me into a snare , and have me say , i believe the sense of scripture from the authority of the church , and the authority of the church from the sense of scripture . pr. do you not say so in plain terms ? p. give me leave to answer for my self . i say in the case of the churches authority , i believe the sense of scripture without relying on the churches authority . pr. and why not as well in any other ? why not as to the trinity , which to my understanding , is much plainer there , than the churches authority ? p. that is strange : is not the church often spoken of in scripture ? tell the church . upon this rock will i build my church , &c. pr. but we are not about the word church , which is no doubt there , but the infallible authority of the church ; and whether that be more clear in the scripture than the doctrine of the trinity . p. i see you have a mind to change your discourse , and to run off from the trinity to the churches authority in matters of faith ; which is a beaten subject . pr. your church doth not tell you so ; and therefore you may upon your own grounds be deceived ; and i assure you that you are so ; for i intended only to shew you , that for points of faith we must examine and compare scripture our selves , and our faith must rest on divine revelation therein contained . p. then you think the trinity can be proved from scripture ? pr. or else i should never believe it . p. but those places of scripture you go upon , may bear a figurative sense , as john . . i and my father are one ; and john . . and those three are one ; and if they do so , you can never prove the trinity from them . pr. i say therefore , that the doctrine of the trinity doth not depend merely on these places , but on very many others , which help to the true sense of these ; but transu●stantiation depends upon one single expression , this is my body , which relates to a figurative thing in the sacrament ; and which hath other expressions joined with it , which are owned to be figurative ; this cup is the new testament in my blood ; and which in the literal sense cannot prove transubstantiation , as your own writers confess , and which is disproved by those places of scripture , which assert the bread and the fruit of the vine to remain after consecration . p. shew the literal sense as to the trinity to be necessary ; for i perceive you would fain go off again . pr. will you promise to hold close to the argument your self ? p. you need not fear me . pr. i pray tell me , were there not false religions in the world when christ came into it to plant the true religion ? p. yes ; but how far is this from the business ? pr. have a little patience ; did not christ design by his doctrine to root out those false religions ? p. that is evident from scripture and church history . pr. then christs religion and theirs were inconsistent . p. and what then ? pr. wherein did this inconsistency lie ? p. the gentiles worshipped false gods instead of the true one. pr. then the christian religion teaches the worship of the true god instead of the false ones . p. who doubts of that ? pr. then it cannot teach the worship of a false god instead of the true one. p. a false god is one that is set up in opposition to the true god , as the gods of the heathens were . pr. is it lawful by the christian doctrine to give proper divine worship to a creature ? p. i think not ; for christ said , thou shalt worship the lord thy god , and him only shalt thou serve : which our church understands of proper divine worship . pr. but the scripture requires proper divine worship to be given to christ ; which is to require proper divine worship to be given to a creature , if christ be not true god by nature . p. may not god communicate his own worship to him ? pr. but god hath said , he will not give his glory to another , isa. . . and the reason is considerable , which is there given ; i am the lord , that is my name ; which shews that none but the true jehovah is capable of divine worship : for adoration is done to god only on the account of his incommunicable perfections , and therefore the reason of divine worship cannot reach to any creature . p. not without gods will and pleasure . but may not god advance a mere creature to that dignity , as to require divine worship to be given to him by his fellow-creatures ? pr. wherein lies the nature of that which you call proper divine worship ? p. in a due esteem of god in our minds , as the first cause and last end of his creatures , and such acts as are agreeable thereto . pr. then proper divine worship doth suppose an esteem of god as infinitely above his creatures ; and how then is it possible for us to give the same worship to god , and to a creature ? for if the distance be infinite between god and his creatures , and we must judg of things as they are , then we must in our minds suppose a creature to be infinitely distant srom god ; and if we do so , how is it possible to give the same divine worship in this sense to god , and to any creature ? p. and what now would you infer from hence ? pr. do not you see already ? viz. that god cannot be supposed to allow divine worship to be given to christ , if he were a mere creature ; and therefore since such divine worship is required by the christian doctrine , it follows , that those expressions which speak of his being one with the father , cannot be figuratively understood . p. but where is it , that such divine worship is required to be given to christ in scripture ? for , according to my principles , the church is to set the bounds and measures of divine worship , and to declare what worship is due to god ; what to christ ; what to saints and angels ; what to men upon earth ; what to images , sacraments , &c. and if we depart from this rule , i know not where we shall fix . pr. i pray tell me , doth the difference between god and his creatures , depend on the will of the church ? p. no. pr. is it then in the churches power to give that to a creature , which belongs only to god ? p. i think not . pr. who then is to be judg what belongs to god , and what not ? god or the church ? p. god himself , if he pleases . pr. then our business is to search what his will and pleasure is in this matter , by reading the scriptures , wherein his will is contained : and there we find it expressed , that all men should h●nour the son , even as they honour the father , john . . let all the angels of god worship him , heb. . . blessing , and honour , and glory , and power be unto him that sitteth on the throne , and to the lamb for ever and ever , revel . . . that at the name of jesus every knee should bow , of things in heaven , and things in earth , &c. phil. . . if it were gods great design , by the christian doctrine , to restore in the world a due sense of the infinite distance between god and his creatures ; could any thing be more repugnant to it , than in the same doctrine to advance a creature to a participation of the same divine honour with himself ? so that in plain truth , the idolatry of the world lay only in a bad choice of the creatures they were to worship , and not in giving proper divine worship to a creature ; for that christianity it self not only allows , but requires , on supposition that christ were god merely by office , and was originally a creature , as we are . but i pray observe the force of the apostles argument , speaking of the gentile idolatry ; he saith it lay in this , that they did service unto them , which by nature are no gods , gal. . . p. you know , i must now personate the anti-trinitarian ; and he answers , that by nature no more is implied , than truly and really , i. e. god did not advance those creatures among the gentiles to that worship and honour , which he hath done christ. pr. then you make it lawful by the gospel to believe christ to be a mere creature , and at the same time to give him divine worship , which supposes him not to be a creature ; and so you must believe him to be a creature , and not to be a creature , at the same time . p. how do you make that appear ? pr. from your own words ; for you say , proper divine worship lies in a due esteem of god in our minds , as the first cause and last end , and in actions agreeable thereto ; then to give divine worship to god , we must believe him to be above all creatures as to his nature and being ; and theresore to give christ divine worship , must imply our believing him not to be a creature , and to be a creature at the same time . p. but the meaning of divine worship here must not then relate to acts of the mind , but to outward acts of adoration in the church . pr. were the gentiles guilty of idolatry in that respect , or not ? p. yes ; but not those , whom god requires to worship in such a manner . pr. then the sin of gentile-idolatry lay only in giving divine worship to a creature without gods command ; which lessens it to that degree , as to make will-worship and idolatry the same ; and to blame the apostles , for making such a dreadful sin of it , and disswading christians so much from returning to the practice of it : for they had the priviledg of giving divine worship to a creature by gods command , which others were damned for doing without a command ; which makes the christian religion not to appear so reasonable , as the anti-trinitarians contend it is . but here are four foul mistakes in point of reason , which they are guilty of . ( . ) in making the sin of idolatry so arbitrary a thing ; which depends not on the nature of the object which is worshipped , but on the will and pleasure of god. ( . ) in making the gentiles guilty of a great sin , meerly in wanting a divine command , which was out of their power . ( . ) in making the christian religion to set up the worship of a creature , when its design was to root out idolatry . ( . ) in making a fictitious god , or a creature to be advanced to the throne of god. which i think is far more contradictious to reason , than a trinity of persons in the unity of the same nature . for nothing can be more absurd than to make that to be god , which wants all the essential attributes and perfections of god ; as every creature must do : such as self-existence , eternity , independency , immensity , omnipotency , &c. what a contradiction is it , to suppose a weak , impotent , depending , confined , created god ? and such every creature must be in its nature , or else it is no creature . i do not at all wonder to find the socinians after this , to lessen the natural knowledg of god , and his infinite perfections , both as to power and knowledg ; for it was their concernment to bring the notion of god as low as possible , that a creature might be in the nearer capacity of being made god. but those who consider and know what god is , and what he must be , if he be god , will find far greater difficulty in making man to be god , than in believing god to be made man. for this implies no greater difficulty , than meerly as to our conception , how an infinite being can be so united to a finite , as to become one person ; which implies no repugnancy , but only some thing above our capacity to comprehend . and we confess our selves puzled in the manner of conceiving how a finite spitit , which can pass through a body , can be so united to it , as to make a man by that union ; yet we all acknowledg the truth of this . but to suppose a creature capable of being made god , is to overthrow the essential difference between god and his creatures , and the infinite distance between them . which is of very pernicious consequence , as to the great ends of the christian religion , which were to reform the world , and to restore the distinction between god and his creatures ; which by the prevalency of idolatry was almost lost in the world : the supreme god being hardly discerned in such a croud of created and fictitious gods. and this very argument is enough to turn my stomack against socinianism or arianism . p. i had thought all men of sense among you , had been socinians ; i have often heard them charged with being so . pr. you see how grosly you are deceived , notwithstanding your pretence to infallibility . i do not pretend to any deep reach , but i see reason enough to be no socinian . p. let us return to our matter in hand . what say you to those texts which are said to be inconsistent with the literal sense of those before mention'd , which relate to the unity between father and son ? pr. what texts do you mean ? p. what say you to joh. . from the . to the ? pr. i wonder what it is produced for . p. it is said , joh. . . i and my father are one ; now it is highly unreasonable to interpret these words literally , because of those which follow . pr. how doth that appear ? for v. . it is said , that the jews took up stones to stone him : which shews , that they look'd on him as speaking blasphemy . but what blasphemy was it for christ to declare an unity of consent between him and his father ; which in truth is nothing , but doing his father's will ? therefore it is plain that the jews did apprehend more in those words of our saviour . and they explain themselves , v. . what they understood by them , because that thou being a man , makest thy self god. which shews that they thought not an unity of consent , but of nature , was meant . p. but christ's answer shews , that he speaks only of a god by office , and not by nature , v. . jesus answered them , is it not written in your law , i said ye are gods ? pr. i pray go on , and see how christ argues , v. , . if he called them gods , unto whom the word of god came , and the scripture cannot be broken ; say ye of him , whom the father hath sent into the world , thou blasphemest , because i said i am the son of god ? p. this only shews that christ had greater reason to be called god , but not that he was so by nature . pr. i pray go on still , v. , . if i do not the works of my father , believe me not . but if i do , tho ye believe not me , believe the works , that ye may know and believe that the father is in me , and i in him . p. is it not said elsewhere , that he that keepeth his commandments dwelleth in him , and he in him ? joh. . . would you hence infer an unity of nature between christ and believers ? pr. i do not lay the weight on the phrase , but as it is the conclusion of the dispute between christ and the jews . and it ought to be observed , that this was the end of the third conference between christ and the jews upon this argument . the first was john . and then from christ's saying , the father worketh hitherto , and i work , v. . the jews infer'd v. . that he made himself equal with god. in the second conference , john . he said , before abraham was , i am , v. . and then the jews took up stones to cast at him . after this followed this third conference , john. . and this runs again into the same point , that he being a man , made himself god. and these conferences were all publick , in or near the temple , and this last was in solomons porch , john . . a place of great resort , and near the place where the sanhedrim sate , who were the judges in the case of blasphemy . now the force of my argument from hence , lies in these things : ( . ) that christ certainly knew , that the jews did think by his discourse , that he made himself equal with god. . that if it were not true , it was notorious blasphemy , and so esteemed by the jews . . that such a mistake ought to have been presently corrected , and in the plainest manner ; as we find it was done by st. paul , when the men of lystra said , the gods are come down to us in the likeness of men ; for he ran in presently among them , and said , we are men of like passions with you , acts . , . it is impossible for me to think , that if christ had known himself to be a meer man , he would have suffered the jews to have run away with such a mistake as this , without giving them the clearest and plainest information ; whereas in all his answers he vindicates himself , and endeavours rather to fasten those impressions upon them , as appears by this conclusion of the last conference , that ye may know and believe , that the father is in me , and i in him . doth this look like correcting a dangerous mistake in the jews ? and is it not rather a justification of that sense , which they took his words in ? and in the first conference , john . our saviour is so far from doing as st. paul did , that he challenges divine honour as due to himself , that all men should honour the son , as they honour the father , v. . from whence it follows , that christ must be charged as one , who being a meer man , did affect divine honour ; or else , that being god as well as man , he looked on it as justly due to him . i pray tell me what sense do your friends the socinians make of those words of st. paul , phil. . , . who being in the form of god , thought it not robbery to be equal with god , but made himself of no reputation , &c. p. the sense they give , is this , that he did not make a shew or ostentation of his own greatness , but studiously concealed it , and therein shewed his great humility . pr. but is there any greatness like that of divine honour ? and yet this he challenged to himself . p. but he knew what the father designed him for , and so spake those things by way of prediction . pr. he knew no creature could deserve divine worship , and he deliver'd that as part of his own doctrine ; and therefore those words , where he is said , to make himself equal with god , must be understood of nature , and not of office. p. but st. john . . saith , that christ prayed to his father , for his disciples , that they may be one , as we are one ; and that is not by unity of nature . pr. i grant it . but our saviour there speaks of a true , but a lower kind of unity ; or else the socinians must think every believer as capable of divine honour , as christ himself , if they take those words strictly , that they may be one , as we are one . p. st. paul saith , he that planteth , and he that watereth , is one , cor. . . pr. who doubts but there are other sorts of unities , besides that of nature ? but , doth this prove that there is no unity of nature between the father and the son ? if we have no better arguments against transubstantiation , we will give over disputing . p. i know you have other arguments for the trinity , but they prove as little without the authority of the church ; as from those places where christ is called god , as joh. . , . rom. . , &c. pr. and i think the argument from those places , very good and strong , especially from john . , , . and it seems directly contrary to the whole design of scripture to call any one god over all , blessed for evermore , as christ is called , rom. . . but he that is god by natuce . p. how do you prove that john . . relates to any thing beyond the beginning of the gospel , and that christ the word , was before john the baptists preaching ? pr. i desire any one to read the text impartially , and he will find the socinian sense to be unnatural , forced , obscure and jejune , proving a thing of no moment at that time ; but the sense we give , to be strong , weighty , consistent , and of very great consequence at that time , when the cerinthians denied the divinity of christ. the sentences are short , the words lofty and significant , the manner of beginning unusual ; so that any one would expect some great and extraordinary matter to be said in these few verses ; but what a frustration were this , if after all , they intended no more , than that altho john baptist preached in publick before christ , yet that christ was in being before that ? which is a sense so mean , so remote from the occasion of his writing , as it is deliver'd by the ancients , that nothing but a miserable necessity could make men of wit and subtilty to put such a sense upon st. john's words . p. but they deny there was any such occasion of st. john's writing , as the cerinthians heresy at that time . pr. i know socinus doth so ; but he might as well have denied that there was any such person as cerinthus . and i think the cerinthian heresy not only to have been the occasion of st. john's writing , but that the understanding of it , gives the greatest and truest light to the words of the evangelist , shewing the force and importance of them . p. wherein i pray , did that heresy consist ? pr. i shall not meddle with other parts of it , but only what relates to the present subject ; and that lay in these things . ( . ) that there was a supreme and unknown father , who was before the beginning , and therefore they called him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , who was the fountain of all emanations . iren. l. . c. . . ( . ) that the world was not made by him , but by a power at a distance from him , called demiurgus , iren. l. . c. . and in the egyptian school where cerinthus was educated , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 word , was one of the intermediate emanations between the father , and the demiurgus , iren. l. . c. . ( . ) that this world was in a state of darkness and confusion , as to the supreme father of all ; only some few had some beams of light from him , by which they knew him . ( . ) that jesus was a mere man , born as other men are , of joseph and mary , but of extraordinary goodness , wisdom , and sanctity . ( . ) that the supreme father at his baptism did send down a divine power upon him , in the shape of a dove , which enabled him to declare the unknown father , and to work miracles , which returned to its own 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or fulness above , when jesus suffer'd . this is a short scheme of that heresy , as delivered by the ancient fathers . and now let any one compare st. johns words with it ; and he will find his design was to countermine this heresy by two things . ( . ) that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 word , was eternal . for the cerinthians said , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was not in the beginning , but made a great space of time between the eternal being of the father , and the emanation of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , wherein he was in perfect silence , as irenoeus expresses it ( l. . c. . ) and so in the beginning , doth imply the eternity of the word . but that is not all , for he saith , it was with god , and was god , and was the demiurgus , or the maker of the world , and the revealer of god to mankind , joh. . , , , , , , . and so there was no place for those several emanations between god and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and demiurgus , as the cerinthians said . ( . ) that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or word , was incarnate , which he affirms , v. . and the word was made flesh , and dwelt among us , &c. and was the only begotten son of the father ; and so he not only cuts off the other emanations , but declares that jesus was far from being a mere man. and to this purpose he brings in the testimony of john baptist , v. . and applies what he had said to the person of jesus christ , v. . now this being st. johns design , his words afford a demonstration to us of the union of the divine and human nature in christ , when he saith , the word was made flesh. p. but doth not the scripture in other places imply that there is a subordination in christ to his father , which is not consistent with such an equality of nature ; see heb. . , . cor. . , . — . , . rev. . . pr. the first place is a proof for the divinity of christ ; for the words are ; but unto the son , he saith , thy throne , o god , is for ever and ever , &c. it is true , in the next verse , it is said with respect to his office , therefore god , even thy god hath anointed thee , &c. but we do not deny that christ was anointed as mediator , and in that respect , god was his god ; but doth this prove that he that is mediator , cannot have a divine nature in conjunction with the human ? the second place , i suppose , is mistaken , cor. . not . and . but verse , but unto us , there is but one god the father , of whom are all things , and we in him ; and one lord jesus christ , by whom are all things , and we by him . and this is one of the strongest holds of the socinians . but two considerations will take off the seeming force of it . ( . ) that the apostle in his disputes with the gentile idolaters , concerning whom he speaks , v. , . doth utterly deny any divinity in the beings they worshipped instead of god , when he saith , an idol is nothing in the world , and that there is none other god but one . he knew very well that they worshipped many , v. . as there be gods many , and lords many among them ; but unto us ( christians ) there is but one god , and one lord : i. e. we have but one supreme god , to whom we give divine worship ; and instead of the multitude of mediators , we have but one mediator ; and so his design is in opposition to their many gods , to assert the unity of the divine nature , ( not so as to exclude a distinction of persons , but thereby to exclude other gods as the proper object of worship ) , and the unity of a mediator , in opposition to their many lords . ( . ) that if this place excludes christ from the unity of nature with god , it doth exclude him from being the object of divine worship ; for it saith , that there is no other god , but one ; therefore no creature can be made god : and to us there is but one god , the father ; therefore the son cannot be god. if therefore the name lord be taken in opposition to god , then christ cannot be god in any sense ; for we must have but one god : but the plain meaning of the apostle was , that by one lord he meant one mediator , by whom alone we have , in this new frame of things by the gospel , access unto god the father . the third place , cor. . , . speaks plainly of christs kingdom , as mediator . the fourth place , rev. . . where christ speaks several times of my god , proves no more than his words on the cross , my god , my god , why hast thou forsaken me : for surely christ might own a particular relation to god , and interest in him , as he was in human nature , without overthrowing the divine nature in him . p. but he owns , that though he is to be our judg , he knows not the time , mark . . which seems inconsistent with the divine nature , which knoweth all things . pr. the son there spoken of , was christ , as endued with a human soul , when he was upon earth ; which could not understand a secret so much out of the reach of mans understanding , without immediate revelation . but it was not necessary by virtue of the union of both natures , that the divine nature should communicate to the human soul of christ all divine mysteries : but as the human body was notwithstanding subject to passions and infirmities incident to it , so the human soul might continue ignorant of the day of judgment in this state ; both to let us know how great that secret is , and that christ had the proper capacity of a human soul , which could not extend to such things without divine revelation . p. there is one argument more , which seems to prove christs divinity , and doth not ; viz. the making of all things visible and invisible , being attributed to him , john . . heb. . . col. . , , , . pr. now i confess this doth more than seem to me to be a very strong argument ; and that for this reason , the apostle saith , the invisible things of him from the creation of the world , are clearly seen , being understood by the things which are made , even his eternal power and godhead , rom. . . was this argument of the apostle good or not ? p. no doubt it was . pr. then the creation of the world is an invincible proof of the true god. p. what follows ? pr. then if the making of all things be attributed to christ , he must be true god ; but this is plain in the new testament , in which the making of all things is as clearly attributed to the son , as it is to the father ; all things saith st. john , were made by him , and without him was not any thing made , that was made , john . . for by him were all things created , saith st. paul , that are in heaven , and that are in earth , visible and invisible , whether they be thrones , or dominions , or principalities , or powers , all things were created by him , and for him , col. . . thou , lord , in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth , and the heavens are the work of thy hands , heb. . . now compare these expressions with those wherein the creation is attributed to the father , the world is said to be made by bim , rom. . . that he hath created all things , rev. . . that of him , and for him , and to him , are all things , rom. . . and let any impartial mind discern the difference . therefore we have as much reason from scripture to believe christ to be god , as we have from the creation of things to believe a god. p. but you do not take notice of the different expressions in scripture , concerning the father and the son ; all things are said to be of the father , and by the son , cor. . . and that the father created all things by jesus christ , eph. . . which proves no more , than that the son was gods instrument in the creation . pr. what do you mean by gods instrument in the creation ? do you think one creature can create another ? how then can the creation prove an infinite power ? if you believe the instrument uncreated , then you must assert him to be true god by nature ; and then we have all we desire . p. but the socinians do not like this answer of the arians , and therefore they interpret these places , of the state of things under the gospel , and not of the creation of the world. pr. they have not one jot mended the matter ; for , ( . ) where the new creation is spoken of , some circumstances are added , which limit the sense to it , as when st. paul saith , we are created in christ jesus unto good works that we shoul walk in them . eph. . . vvho could possibly understand this of the old creation ? and so , if any man be in christ jesus , he is a new creature , cor. . . but in the other places the same expressions are used , which are attributed to the old creation , without limitation from circumstances , or from the context and occasion of them . ( . ) there are some things said to be created by christ jesus , which cannot relate to the new creation ; for by him were all things created , that are in heaven , and that are in earth , visible and invisible , whether they be thrones , or dominions , or principalities or powers . col. . . how are these created by preaching the gospel , when they are uncapable of the proper means of it , which are the doctrine of the remission of sins upon repentance , and the renewing and sanctifiing grace of god ? p. but st. paul doth not mention the heaven and earth , but only intellectual beings , angels , and men , and therefore he speaks of the new creation . pr. a mighty argument indeed ! do not all things comprehend the heaven and earth ? and the particular enumeration of angels by several denominations , shews that he speaks of another creation distinct from that by the gospel preached to the vvorld ; for the apostles were christs instruments in this new creation , which they could not be to the invisible powers above . p. we have now gone through the true and only grounds of the doctrine of the trinity . pr. you are extreamly mistaken . for we have other grounds besides these , although these may be sufficient . p. name one more . pr. i will name several , which you cannot disallow . p. what are they ? pr. the several heads of arguments made use of by cardinal bellarmin , to prove the divinity of christ : who alone is a convincing evidence of the vast disparity between the proofs of this doctrine , and of transubstantiation from scripture . for , . he proves christ's divinity from those places of the old testament , which are expounded in the new ; being in the old testament , spoken of the true god ; and in the new applied to christ. as numb . . , . compared with cor. . . exod. . . with jude . psal. . . with eph. . , . psal. . . & . , . with heb. . , , . isa. . , . with john . . and revel . . . isa. . . with luke . . and rom. . . isa. . . with mat. . . mark . . luke . . john . . — isa. . . with rom. . . — isa. . . with revel . . , . mal. . . with mat. . . . from the places of the old testament , which attribute to christ those things which belong to god ; as power and adoration , psal. . , , . being the first and last , isa. . . , . working miracles , isa. . . being the god of israel , isa. . , . the only god , isa. . , . the lord of hosts , zach. . , , , . jehovah , zach. . . pouring out of the spirit , zach. . . . from the places of the new testament , which attribute divinity to christ. as when he is called , the son of the living god , mat. . . the only begotten son of god , john . . his own son , rom. . . his true son , joh. . . his dear son , col. . . his son above all others , heb. . . the express image of his person , heb. . . making himself equal with god , john . . being one with the father , joh. . . lord and god , john . . god blessed for ever , rom. . . who thought it no robbery to be equal with god , phil. . . one with the father and spirit , john . . the true god , john . . . from the proper names of god , isa. . . john . . acts . . rom. . . revel . . . john . . the name jehov●● , jer. . , . isa. . . the lord , by which the lxx render jehovah , mat. . . joh. . . the most high , psal. . . a name above every name , phil. . . the invisible one , tim. . , & . . the god of glory , act. . . cor. . . psal. . , , . king of kings and lord of lords , tim. . . revel . . . & . . the one lord , cor. . . the true god , john . . the only lord , jud. . the great god and our saviour , titus . . . from the proper attributes of god ; as eternity , prov. . , . mic. , . joh. . , — . . immensity , john . . mat. . . omnipotency , rev. . . — . . — . . wisdom , colos. . . joh. . . majesty and adoration , heb. . . mal. . . invocation , joh. . . acts . . & . . cor. . . cor. . . joh. . . from the proper works of god : as not only creation , ( of which already ) but conservation , heb. . . colos. . . salvation , matth. . . foretelling future events , joh. . . pet. . . rev. . . working miracles by his own power , mark. . . and giving power to others to work them , mat. . . what think you now of the proofs of the trinity in scripture ? do you think bellarmin could produce any thing like this for transubstantiation ? no ; so far from it , that where he sets himself in a whole chapter to prove it from scripture , he produces a first without a second . the first argument , saith he , is taken from christ's words , this is my body . very well ! but where is the second ? for no more could be produced , but this one single passage , about which he spends his whole chapter , and then betakes himself presently to the fathers . p. but one plain and clear place is sufficient , if we be certain of the sense of that one ; for we are as much bound to believe god when we are sure he speaks it once , as an hundred times . pr. we have been all this while comparing these two doctrines as to scripture , and now you see the disproportion so very great , as to number and variety , you say , one is as good as an hundred ; but that one had need to be wonderfully clear , which this is very far from , since many of your own writers do confess transubstantiation cannot be drawn from it ; as bellarmin himself owns , and he affirms it not to be improbable , that no place of scripture is so clear and express for transubstantiation , but learned and acute men may doubt whether it can be drawn from it , setting aside the churches declaration . but neither bellarmin , nor any one who attends to the force of the former proofs of the divinity of christ , can say , that any reasonable man can doubt of it ; and that he must at last resolve all into the church's authority . p. have not learned and acute men doubted of the divinity of christ , as of transubstantiation ? and therefore in that respect they are both alike . pr. we do not insist upon men's bare doubting , but on the reason of their doubting . and when but one single place is produced , which is yeilded not to be sufficient of it self to prove the doctrine ; there is much more cause of doubting , than where such multitudes of places are produced ; and no doubt is made by those who favour transubstantiation , but that they do fully prove the divinity of christ. p. it seems then we must come to reason at last . and for my part , i must tell you , i i think that parallel much the easiest . for , that three distinct persons should be in one individual nature , and that the most pure and simple being , seems to me to be more absurd than transubstantiation . pr. let us set aside the comparing absurdities at present , and only examin in point of reason , the great absurdity of three persons being in one individual divine nature . p. i did hardly believe you would have the courage to defend the doctrine of the trinity in point of reason ; but i see you are a bold man , and will venture farther than wiser men. pr. it may be others have not had the leisure or curiosity to examine a mystery believed to be so much out of the reach of our understanding ; or have confounded themselves and others so much with school-●erms , as to leave the matter rather more obscure than it was before . but i shall endeavour to make things as clear as they will bear . and that which i insist upon is , that the absurdities are not to appearance so great as those of transubstantiation . and therefore i desire you to produce those which appear the most dreadful . p. i shall reduce all to these two , which comprehend the rest . . how there can be three persons and but one god. . how these can agree in a third , and not agree among themselves . for the first , it seems very absurd , that there should be three persons really distinct , whereof every one is god , and yet there should not be three gods ; for nothing is more contradictions than to make three not to be three , or three to be but one . pr. i hope now you will give me leave to make an answer to your difficulty , as distinct as possible . we do not say , that three persons are but one person , or that one nature is three natures ; but that there are three persons in one nature . if therefore one individual nature be communicable to three persons , there is no appearance of absurdity in this doctrine . and on the other side , it will be impossible there should be three gods , where there is one and the same individual nature ; for three gods must have three several divine natures , since it is the divine essence which makes a god. but to make this more plain , do you make any difference between nature and person ? p. yes . pr. wherein lies it ? p. excuse me , sir , for you have undertaken to explain these things . pr. i will begin with person . which name was originally taken among the romans from some remarkable distinction of one from another ; either by some outward appearance , as a vizard or habit , or some particular quality or disposition . and from hence it came to be applied to those inward properties , whereby one intelligent being is distinguished from another ; and from those properties , to the person who had them . thus person is used even by tully himself , at least twenty times in his books of rhetorick : and the old civil law speaks of personal rights and personal actions . so that the criticks , such as valla , and others , had no cause to find fault with boethius , for applying the notion of a person , to an intelligent being subsisting by it self , ( and so the soul is no person in men , but the man consisting of soul and body ) having some incommunicable properties belonging to him . therefore i cannot but wonder at the niceness of some late men , who would have the names of person , and hypostasis , and trinity , to be laid aside ; since themselves confess boëthius his definition of a person to be true enough ; but they say , it belongs to the creatures , and not to god , for it would make three gods. which is to suppose , without proving it , that the divine nature can communicate it self after no other manner than a created nature can . this is now to be more strictly enquired into . and it is very well observed by boëthius , de trin. l. . principium pluralitatis alteritas est : that diversity is the reason of plurality : and therefore in the trinity , so far as they are different , they are three , i. e. in regard of personal properties and relations ; but so far as they agree , they are but o n e , that is , as to the divine nature . it is very true , that according to arithmetick , three cannot be one , nor one three ; but we must distinguish between the bare numeration , and the things numbred . the repetition of three units , certainly makes three distinct numbers ; but it doth not make three persons to be three natures . and therefore as to the things themselves , we must go from the bare numbers to consider their nature . where-ever there is a real distinction , we may multiply the number , tho the subject be but one. as suppose we say the soul hath three faculties , understanding , will and memory ; we may , without the least absurdity say , there are three and one ; and those three not confounded with each other , and yet there is but one soul. p. but the socinians object , that there is a difference between three properties , and three distinct persons ; because a person is an individual being ; and so three persons must be three individual beings ; and therefore as there is but one divine being , there can be but one person . pr. this is the main strength of the cause ; to which i answer , that altho a person be an individual being , yet it implies two things in it ; ( . ) something common with others of the same nature ; as three men have one and the same nature , tho they be three persons . ( . ) something peculiar and incommunicate to any other ; so that john cannot be peter , nor peter , james . p. but what is it which makes one not to be the other , when they have the same common nature ? pr. you ask a hard question , viz. about the principle of individuation ; but if it be so hard to resolve it , as to created beings , there is certainly far less reason for us to be unsatisfied , if it appear difficult to clear the difference of nature and person in an infinite being . yet all mankind are agreed in the thing , viz. that there is a community of the same nature , and a real distinction of persons among men , tho they cannot tell what that is which discriminates the humane nature in john , from the same humane nature in peter and james . and it is observable , that as beings arise in perfection above each other , it is still so much harder to assign that which is called the principle of individuation . in gross and material beings we can discern a number of accidents , or peculiar modes and properties , which distinguish them from each other ; but it is much harder to assign it in spiritual and intellectual beings , whose natures and differences lie not so open to our understandings . if so be then it appears more difficult in an infinite and incomprehensible being , what cause have we to wonder at it ? but we must always make a difference between what we have reason to believe , and what we have a power to conceive . altho we have all the reason in the world to believe that there is a god , i. e. a being infinite in all perfections ; yet we must yield that his essential attributes are above our comprehension . as for instance ; ( . ) we must believe god to be eternal , or we cannot believe him to be god. for , if he once were not , it is impossible he should ever be . and therefore we conclude necessary existence to be an essential attribute of the divine nature . but then , how to conceive that a being should be from it self , is at least as hard , as how one and the same individual nature should be communicated to three distinct persons ; nay , it is somewhat harder , since we see something like this in other beings ; but we can see no manner of resemblance of a thing that hath its being wholly from it self . ( . ) we must allow god to be omnipresent , or else we must suppose him so confined and limited to a certain place , as to be excluded from any other ; and if he can act in all places , he must either be present in them , or his power must be larger than his being , which is infinite ; but after this , we have not a power to conceive how a being should be present in the whole world , and not to be extended ; and if it be extended , how it should be uncapable of being divided into parts ; which is certainly repugnant to the divine nature . i therefore produce these two instances , to let the antitrinitarians see , that what they object in point of reason as to the incomprehensibility of the mystery of the trinity , will in consequence overthrow the divine nature . but as there is the highest reason to believe there is a god , tho we cannot comprehend his perfections ; so there may be great reason to believe the doctrine of the trinity , tho we cannot comprehend the manner of it . p. i had thought you intended to explain the mystery of it , and now you tell us it is incomprehensible . pr. it is a good step to our believing it , to make it plain , that the difficulty of our conception ought not to hinder our faith. and i have made some advance towards the explication of it , by shewing , that since mankind are agreed about the difference between nature and person , the whole difficulty comes to this , that the same common nature in mankind makes three persons ; but that it is the same individual nature in all the persons of the trinity . and now let us consider the infinite perfection and simplicity of the divine nature ; and we shall think it unreasonable that it should be so bounded as to the manner of its communication , as the nature of man is . every individual man hath not only individual properties , but an individual nature , i. e. the common nature of man , limited by some unaccountable principle , that doth make him different from all other men having the same nature with himself . the difficulty then doth not lie in a community of nature , and a distinction of persons , for that is granted among men , but in the unity of nature with the difference of persons . and supposing the divine nature to be infinite in its perfection , i do not see how it is capable of being bounded , as the common nature of man in individuals is ; and if it be not capable of being bounded and limited , it must diffuse it self into all the persons in the same individual manner ; and so this doctrine of the trinity is not repugnant to reason . p. but what say you to the athanasian creed ; is not that repugnant to humane reason ? pr. i think not ; but that it is a just explication of the doctrine of the trinity rightly understood . p. i see now you are upon hard points , you will stick at nothing , and transubstantiation it self will down with you anon . pr. i doubt that ; but at present we are upon the athanasian creed . and i desire but one principle to clear it , which follows from what is said already , viz. that what is affirmed of the divine nature , as such , must be common to all three persons ; but whatever is affirmed of the several persons , as such , must be peculiar to themselves . now this is a clear principle of reason , and hath no appearance of absurdity in it . and from hence the athanasian creed will easily be cleared . for eternity , incomprehensibility , omnipotency , belonging to the divine nature , as such , we ought to say , that they are not three eternals , three incomprehensibles , three almighties , but one eternal , one incomprehensible , one almighty . because the attributes belonging to the persons , by reason of the divine nature , and the attributes being really the same with it , the nature is the proper subject of them ; which being but one , we are not to distinguish them as to essential attributes , but only as to personal relations and properties . p. but if the three persons be coëternal , how is it possible to conceive there should not be three eternals ? pr. this seems the hardest expression in the whole creed ; but it is to be interpreted by the scope and design of it : which is , that the essential attributes are not to be distinguished , though the persons be . and so eternity is not taken as a personal attribute , but as essential ; and so they are not three eternals , but one eternal . and the great design of the creed was , to shew , that the christian church did not believe such a trinity as consisted of three persons , unequal and different in nature , and substance , and duration . p. but what say you to the damning all those who do not believe it , in the beginning and end of it ? pr. this is off from our business . but to let you see i will not avoid the difficulties you offer , i will give an answer even to this . the meaning is not , that every one is damned who doth not conceive aright of the difference of nature and person in the trinity , or of the essential and personal attributes ; but that those who set up in opposition to it the worship of a meer creature as god , or the worship of more gods than one , or who wilfully reject this article of the christian faith , when it is duly proposed to them , are guilty of a damning sin. for even the disbelief of christianity it self , is not supposed to be the cause of mens damnation , but where the doctrine of the gospel hath been proposed in a way of credibility . if when this doctrine of the trinity is proposed to mens minds , they will not consider it , nor weigh the arguments on both sides impartially , but with scorn and contempt reject it , and endeavour to bring reproach upon christianity for the sake of it , and disturb the peace of the church about it ; such cannot be said to receive or believe it faithfully , and by such sins they do run the hazard of perishing everlastingly . p. i see you have a mind to smooth every thing relating to the trinity , i wish you would do the same about transubstantiation . but yet you have not answer'd the other great difficulty in point of reason , viz. that those things which agree or disagree in a third , must agree or disagree one with the other . and therefore if the father be god , the son god , and the holy ghost god ; then the father must be son and holy ghost , and the son and holy ghost must be the father . if not , then they are really the same , and really distinct ; the same as to essence , distinct as to persons ; and so they are the same , and not the same , which is a contradiction . pr. and now i think you have drawn out the most refined spirits of socinianism , to make the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation parallel , because you say , it implies a contradiction ; which is the nearest parallel you have yet offered at . but this terrible argument is grounded on the same supposition , viz. that the divine essence is no more capable of communicating it self to three distinct persons , than any created being is . the reason of that axiom being , that created things , by reason of their finite nature , cannot diffuse or communicate themselves to more than one ; and therefore those which agree in a third , must agree together ; but supposing it possible that the same finite nature could extend it self to several individuals , it would be presently answered , the axiom did hold only , where they did adequately and reciprocally agree , and not where they did agree only in essence , but differ'd in the manner of subsistence . for where a different manner of subsistence is supposed possible , in the same individual nature , the agreement in that cannot take away that difference which is consistent with it ; which we attribute to the unlimitedness and perfection of the divine nature . p. but you can bring no other instance but the thing in question ; and therefore this is a petitio principii , or taking that for granted which is in dispute . pr. i do not think it to be so , where the reason is assigned from the peculiar properties of the divine nature , to which there can be no parallel . and i think it very unreasonable in the socinians , to send us to created beings for the rules and measures of our judgment concerning a being acknowledged to be infinite . p. are not the divine persons infinite , as well as the divine nature ? and therefore as created persons do take in the whole nature , so infinite persons will do the infinite nature . pr. no question , but the persons are infinite in regard of the nature which is so ; but if an infinite nature be communicable to more persons than one , every such person cannot appropriate the whole nature to it self . p. if the difference be on the account of infinity , then there must be an infinite number of persons in the divine essence . pr. i answer , that infiniteness of number is no perfection ; and as to the number of persons , we follow not our own conjectures , nor the authority of the church ; but divine revelation , which hath assured us , that there is but one god , and yet there are three that are one . which depends not meerly on the place of st. john , but the form of baptism is remarkable to this purpose , which joyns together the father , the son , and the holy ghost ; without any other distinction besides that of order and relation . and it is against the fundamental design of christianity , to joyn any created beings together with god in so solemn an act of religion . and st. paul joyns them together in his benediction : the grace of our lord jesus christ , and the love of god , and the communion of the holy ghost be with you all . amen . cor. . . from whence the christian church hath always believed a trinity of persons in the unity of the divine nature . p. you have taken a great deal of pains to clear the doctrine of the trinity from any absurdity in point of reason , why should you not do as much now as to transubstantiation ? pr. in plain truth , because i cannot ; for here lies a vast difference between them . in the trinity we consider'd an infinite being , to which no bounds can be set without destroying its nature ; but in transubstantiation , we suppose a true finite body , which hath its natural bounds and limits to one certain place , and yet you will and must suppose this body to be equally present in many thousand distant places at the same time ; which implies so great a repugnancy to the very nature of a body , that i can by no means give my assent to it . p. alas ! is this it which chokes your reason , so that you cannot swallow the doctrine of the church in this matter ? you do not consider , that tho we allow nothing infinite in the body it self ; yet we suppose an infinite power to be imploy'd about it : and an infinite power may produce things above our comprehensions , about bodies in themselves finite . pr. this is the utmost your cause will bear ; but i pray tell me , is there any such thing as a repugnancy in the nature of things or not ? i. e. are there not some things which are endued with such properties , that if you alter them , you destroy their very nature ; as , to suppose an indivisible line , a triangle without lines , a body without dimensions ? p. hold a little ; a body must have dimensions belonging to it , but it is not necessary it should have those dimensions where-ever it is present . for it may be present in one place as a body , and in another after the manner of a spirit . pr. you might as well have said , a body may be consider'd two ways ; as it is a body , and as it is not a body : for there can be no body , where there are no dimensions proper to it . p. see how you are mistaken ; for it is 〈…〉 the dimensions which seem to hinder a body being in 〈◊〉 places at once , but its unity ; as bellarmin well observe● . pr. i say both of them 〈◊〉 . for 〈◊〉 body can no more be without it● dimensions , than a line without divisibility . p. i grant , that naturally it cannot , but by divine power it may . pr. will you make the power of god to change the essential properties of things , while the things themselves remain in their true nature ? you may as well say , that naturally man is a reasonable creature ; but by divine power he may be a true man , and yet want the faculty of reasoning : that naturally two and two make four , but god can make two and two to be joyned together in a supernatural manner , so as that four shall not result from them ; that tho , naturally speaking , white-washing a wall makes it look white , yet by an extraordinary power , there may be the presence of all things which make a wall white , yet it shall not do so ; just so it is to make a body present , and yet to have no dimensions of a body . is there any real difference between the nature of a body and spirit ? wherein lies it ? is it not as repugnant for a body to be after the manner of a spirit , as for a body and spirit to be the same ? p. all this proceeds upon not considering the difference between the essential extension of a body , and that which is quantitative , and hath relation to place . pr. the essential extension of a body without quantity , is non-sense , and a contradiction . for it is to make a body extended and not extended , at the same time . i pray tell me what you mean by a body , as it is opposed to a spirit ? p. i mean as all mankind do , such a substance which consists of parts extended and divisible . pr. then being extended and divisible , are the natural and essential properties of a body . and therefore , to suppose a body not to be extended and divisible , is to suppose it not to be a body , which is a plain contradiction . p. you are to distinguish between the intrinsecal quantity , which is an inseparable property of a body , and the extrinsecal relation it hath to a place . pr. intrinsecal quantity without relation to place , is intrinsecal non-sense . for , how is it possible for extended parts to have no relation to place ? p. by relation to place , i mean , when the parts of a body answer to the parts of a place : but by intrinsecal quantity , i mean , that there is the real order and proportion of parts in the body it self , but it doth not fill up the place . pr. then you do suppose the body of christ in the eucharist , to have all the distinct parts of a body , with their due order and proportion , but to be in the sacrament after an indivisible manner . p. why not ? pr. do you think it possible for the real and entire body of a man to be crouded into the compass of a wafer , with all the difference of its parts , so that no true part of the body be missing ? p. yes , by divine power . pr. do you think a far less thing possible than that , viz. that a man's head , and shoulders , and arms , should be contained entire and distinct under the nail of his little finger ? p. why not ? pr. then why may not the greatest body be within the least ? why may not an elephant be caught in a mouse-trap , and a rhinoceros be put into a snuff-box ? for either there is a repugnancy in the nature of the thing , for a greater body to be within a less , or there is not ; if not , then these mentioned instances are possible ; if there be , then the supposition of divine power can give no relief , unless you suppose , that god can do things repugnant in themselves , i. e. that he can do things which cannot be done . but i pray tell me , if the very body of christ be by transubstantiation in the wafer , with all its parts in their due order , then the head must be distant from the feet , and all other organs in their proper places ; but this cannot possibly be supposed , where there is no measure of distance as place is , and the whole body is in a point . p. i say again , there is the just order of parts considered in themselves , but not with respect to place . pr. then it is impossible there should be any distance ; without which it is impossible there should be the order of parts in a human body . thus , there is a repugnancy in the very supposition of christ's body being in the wafer , tho there were but one single wafer ; but when to this we add , that it is equally thus present in thousands of wafers at what distance of place soever , the absurdities do increase and multiply so fast upon us , that it is hardly possible to imagin any thing concerning a body , which doth imply more than this doth . as that one and the same body should be indivisibly present in many places , where it must be divided from it self , by so many bodies interposing : so that it is impossible to apprehend how two bodies can be divided from one another more effectually , than such a body must be from it self , if it be present in many places at once . p. i pray stop here ; for reckon up as many absurdities as you will , they are all but the effects of carnal reason , and we must captivate our understanding to the obedience of faith. pr. then it is to no purpose to argue any farther , on the point of reason ; and i thought you designed this for one part of your parallel . p. so i did ; and i still say , there are things as hard to make out about the trinity , which you have not yet taken notice of . pr. i pray let us hear them , that we may put an end to this discourse . p. what say you then to one and the same nature being in three distinct persons , which bellarmin saith , is more wonderful , than that one body should be in many places ; because the nature is identified with the persons , but the body is not so with the places in which it is present . if therefore the same nature be not divided from it self in the persons of the trinity , how much more easily may one body be present in several places , and not be divided from it self ? pr. it is strange neither bellarmin nor you should discern the difference . for the reason why a body must be divided from it self , being in several places , is , because it is finite ; and there being no penetration of dimensions in bodies , the interposing of other bodies must needs divide the same body in distant places ; but the reason why the same divine nature may be in several persons , is , because it is infinite ; and therefore nothing can bound or discontinue it . p. you have talked much of contradictions ; is there any greater about transubstantiation , than that of eternal generation of the son in the mystery of the trinity ? for , if it be not proper generation , then you cannot infer from it , that the son is of the same substance with the father ; if it be , then it must be a proceeding from not being to being , and so an eternal generation is a contradiction . pr. it is a rule in common reason , that all attributes must be understood according to the nature of the subjects . and therefore , if the subject here spoken of , be of such a nature , as to be uncapable of proceeding from not being to being , then whatever is affirmed of it , must be so understood , as not to destroy its nature . the term of generation alone is not , it may be , sufficient to prove the son co-essential with the father , because it might have been used improperly and metaphorically . but when from the scripture , it otherwise appears that the son of god being the word , was in the beginning with god , and was god , john . . and we soon after find him called the only begotten of the father , ver. . and the only begotten son , ver. . we have reason to infer from hence his eternal generation . which must not be understood in such a mean sense as is agreeable to creatures , but as it is consistent with the essential attributes of god , of which necessary existence is one . so that by eternal generation , no more can be meant , than such an emanation of the son from the father , as doth suppose them to have the same nature and co-existence : which is best represented by the rays of the sun coming from the fountain of light , if they were permanent , and not successive . p. what say you then to the mystery of the incarnation ? is it not more wonderful , as bellarmin observes , that there should be one hypostasis in two natures , than one body in two places ? since the union is greater between the hypostasis and the natures , than between the body and the places it is in ; the one being intrinsecal and substantial , the other extrinsecal and accidental . and that hypostasis is the same with the divine nature , and yet is most closely united with the human nature , which is so different from the divine ; so that it is incomprehensible by us , how in that union the natures are not confounded , or the hypostasis divided . pr. suppose now we grant all this , that there is an incomprehensible mystery in the incarnation , what follows from thence ? have i not hitherto owned , that there must be something incomprehensible by us , in what relates to the divine nature ? and it is the less wonder it is so in the incarnation , wherein an union is implied between an infinite and finite nature ; when the union of the soul and body , though both finite , is above our comprehension , though we our selves consist of souls and bodies so united ? but what consequence is it , if we are not able to explain this , that then we must admit that the same body may be not meerly in two , but in ten thousand places at the the same time ? i. e. if we cannot explain the hypostatical union , then all manner of absurdities must go down with us , that relate to things of a very different nature from it . p. i am glad to find you are set at last , and that now you have a difficulty before you which you can never get through . pr. be not too confident ; i have only hitherto denied the consequence as to the difficulties of transubstantiation . but it is possible , that setting aside the confusion of school-terms , i may be able to give a far more intelligible and reasonable account of the incarnation it self , than you can ever do of transubstantiation . p. first shew that it is possible , and then explain the manner of it . pr. but let us in the first place agree what we mean by it . p. by the incarnation , i mean , the union of the divine and humane nature , so as to make one person in christ. pr. if this be not possible , it must either be , . because two natures different from each other , cannot be united to make one person : the contrary whereof appears in the union of soul and body to the person of a man. or , . because it is impossible that an infinite nature should be united to a finite . p. how can there be an union possible , between two beings infinitely distant from each other ? pr. not in that respect wherein the distance is infinite ; but if there be nothing destructive to either nature in such an union , and the infinite nature do condescend to it , why may it not be so united to an intelligent finite being , as to make one person together with it ? for in respect of union , the distance is not so great between finite and infinite , as between body and spirit . p. the distance is infinite in one case , but not in the other . pr. i do not speak of them , with respect to perfections , but to union ; and an infinite distance in that must imply an absolute repugnancy , which you can never prove : for , since body and spirit may be united to make one person , an infinite spirit may be united to a finite nature . p. but the manner of the hypostatical union is impossible to be conceived . pr. let the thing be granted possible , and the difficulty of conceiving the manner may be as great in the union of soul and body . will you undertake to explain that to me ? and yet i hope you believe it . but , let us hear your difficulties again , which you object from bellarmine . p. that there should be but one hypostasis in two natures ; and that in the union the natures should not be confounded , nor the hypostasis divided . pr. all these difficulties arise from the sense of the word hypostasis . which originally signifies a real being , and not such which depends only on fancy and imagination ; from thence its signification was enlarged , not only to things real , ( in opposition to meer appearances , and creatures of the mind ) but to such a thing which did subsist of it self , and had not its subsistence in another , as accidents had . so that an hypostasis was a real substance which had subsistence in it self . but such are of two kinds , as the greek fathers observe . ( . ) such as are real substances in themselves , but yet are capable of being joined with another , to make up a person ; thus the soul and body have two different hypostases , and make up but one person of a man. ( . ) it is taken , for a compleat individual subsistence , which is not joined with any other as a part ; and so hypostasis is the same with a person , which is nothing else but a compleat , intelligent , individual hypostasis . and in this sense there can be but one hypostasis in christ , i. e. one person , tho there be two natures . p. but our divines say , that the humane nature after the union hath no hypostasis , it being swallowed up by the divine . pr. i know they do ; but if they mean that the humane nature , after the union , loses that subsistence which is proper to the humane nature , it is impossible for them to avoid the eutychian heresy , condemned by the council of chalcedon ; but if they mean no more than that there is a true nature , but no person , save only that which results from both natures ; they then agree with the sense of the church , which condemned the eutychians . for as much as the heresies of nestorius and eutyches differ'd in themselves , they were both built on the same ground , viz. that there could be no true nature , but there must be a person ; and that two natures could not make one person . from whence nestorius asserted there were two persons in christ ; and eutyches denied that there were two natures . p. what doth all this signify , but that the authority of the church must determine whether there be two natures , or two persons in christ ? pr. it seems then , the whole business wherein the general councils were so warmly concerned , was only to make an ecclesiastical dictionary , and to appoint what words are to be used , and what not . do you think then , there were no such real heresies as nestorianism and eutychianism , but only they happened to take the words nature and person in another sense than the church would have men use them ? p. i trust the church for all these things . pr. then if the church would have you affirm two persons and one nature , or two natures and one person , it were all one to you . p. why not ? since the church must determine . pr. what if you had been to dispute with nestorius and eutyches ? p. i would have told them , they must submit to the church about the use of words . pr. and they would have laughed at you for your pains : for the controversy was really about the truth of christ's incarnation , ( as the fathers proved , and the councils determined ) which in consequence was rejected by both of them ; as i will evidently prove , if you have any longer patience . p. i beg your pardon , sir , i have heard enough of all conscience already . pr. i think so too , to make you ashamed of your parallel between the doctrine of the trinity , and transubstantiation . and methinks , for the sake of our common christianity , you should no more venture upon such bold and unreasonable comparisons . do you in earnest think , it is all one , whether men do believe a god , or providence , or heaven , or hell , or the trinity and incarnation of christ , if they do not believe transubstantiation ? we have heard much of late about old and new popery ; but if this be the way of representing new popery , by exposing the common articles of faith ; it will set the minds of all good christians farther from it than ever . for upon the very same grounds , we may expect another parallel between the belief of a god and transubstantiation ; the effect of which will be , the exposing of all religion . this is a very destructive and mischievous method of proceeding ; but our comfort is , that it is very unreasonable ; as i hope , hath fully appeared by this discourse . finis . errata omitted in the former dialogue . page . line , dele not . . l. , dele not . . marg. l. . read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . in this dialogue . page . line . read viz. the sacrament . . l. . for done , r. due . . l. . for fictitious , r. factitious . . l. . r. doubted as well . books printed for william rogers . the doctrines and practices of the church of rome truly represented ; in answer to a book intituled , a papist mis-represented and represented , &c. quarto . an answer to a discourse intituled , papists protesting against protestant popery ; being a vindication of papists not misrepresented by protestants : and containing a particular examination of monsieur de meaux , late bishop of condom , his exposition of the doctrine of the church of rome , in the articles of invocation of saints , and the worship of images , occasioned by that discourse . quarto . an answer to the amicable accommodation of the difference between the representer and answerer . quarto . a view of the whole controversy between the representer and the answerer , with an answer to the representer's last reply ; in which are laid open some of the methods by which protestants are misrepresented by papists . quarto . a discourse against transubstantiation , in octavo . price d. sermons and discourses , some of which never before printed ; the third volume . by the reverend dr. tillotson dean of canterbury . . a manuel for a christian soldier . written by erasmus , and translated into english. twelves . the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation , compared as to scripture , reason , and tradition . in a new dialogue between a protestant and a papist . the first part. wherein an answer is given to the late proofs of the antiquity of transubstantiation , in the books called consensus veterum , & nubes testium , &c. quarto . the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation compared , as to scripture , reason , and tradition . in a new dialogue between a protestant and a papist . the second part. wherein the doctrine of the trinity is shewed to be agreeable to scripture and reason , and transubstantiation repugnant to both . quarto . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e sicut enim antequam sanctificatur panis , panem nominamus , divinâ autem illum sanctificante grati● , mediante sacerdote , liberatus est quidem ab appellatione panis , dignus autem habitus est dominici corporis appellatione , etiamsi natura panis in ipso permansit , & non duo corpora , sed unum corpus filii praedicatur , sic & hic divina 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in graec. exemplar . ep bigot . ) id est inundante corporis natura unum filium , unam personam utraque haec fecerunt . papist misrepresented , and represented , part. ch . . p. . concil . chalced . act. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . dial. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . dial. . certè sacramenta quae sumimus corporis & sanguinis domini divina res est , propter quod & per eadem divinae efficimur consortes naturae , & tamen esse non desinit substantia vel natura panis & vini . gelas. in biblioth . patr. to. . pag. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ephraem . antioch . ap . phot. cod. . tom. . . . c. , , , , , . ap. facund . . . c. . ap. canis . antiq . lection . to. . p. , , . epiph. haer . . vincent . common . aug. de haeres . c. . concil . chal. . ced . act. . theodor. dial. . & . nam quando in terra fuit , non erat ubique in coelo . et nunc quia in coelo est , non est ubique in terra , & in tantum non est , ut secundum ipsam ( carnem ) christum spectemus esse venturum de coelo● quem secundum verbum nobiscum esse credimus in terra . cont. eutych . l. . n. . et ubique totum praesentem esse non dubites tanquam deum — & in loco aliquo coeli propter veri corporis modum . ad dardan . non enim corpora sunt quorum amplior sit in tribus quam in singulis magnitudo , nec loca suis molibus tenent , ut distantibus spatiis simul esse non possint . ad dardan . secundum praesentiam verò coporalem simul & in sole & in luna & in cruce esse non posset . c. faust. l. . c. . et cum in terra loquitur in coelo utique nisi per dei infinitatem esse non possit . de incarn . l. . c. . sive ista crassiora , sivesubtiliora , sed tamen corpora , quorum nullum potest esse ubique totum , quoniam per innumerabiles partes aliud alibi habeat necesse est . et quantumcunque sit corpus , seu quantulumcunque corpusculum , loci occupet spatium , eundemque locum sic impleat , ut in nullâ ejus parte sit totum . ad volusian , quanquam si hoc demas corporibus , quantum mea opinio est , neque sentiri possunt , neque omnino corpora esse rectè existimarem . de quant . animae , c. . quod per loci spatium aliqua longitudine , latitudine , altitudine ita sistitur vel movetur , ut majore sui parte majorem locum occupet , & breviore breviorem , minusque sit in parte quam in toto . ad hieron . ep. . non omnino potest esse aliquod corpus , sive coeleste , sive terrestre , sive aereum , sive humidum , quod non minus sit in parte quam in toto , neque ullo modo possit in loco hujus partis simul habere aliam partem , sed aliud hic , aliud alibi habens per quaelibet spatia locorum distantia & dividua , vel potius ut ita dicam , sectili more distenditur . c. epist. manich. c. . omne corpus locale est , & omne locale corpus est . . quaest. c. . corpus quodlibet per localia spatia porrectum est . . quaest. c. . orat. . & in ep ad cledon . dial. . de trin. claud. mamert . de statu animae , l. . c. , , . l. . c. . apud euseb. de praep. evangel . l. . c. . basil. epist. . isidor . epist. l. . ep. . greg. nyssen . in hexaem . p. de hom. opificio . c. . aug. ep. ad dardanum . cont . julian . l. . c. . isid. origin . l. . c. . boeth . de praedic . damascen dial. c. . alcuin . dial. c. , . iren. l. . c. . apud . phot. cod. . aug. de immort . anim. c. . soliloq . l. . c. . de statu animo . l. . c. . iren. l. . . . . tertul. decarne christi , c. . advers . marc. l. . c. . l . c. , . epiphan . haer . , . hilar. in psal. . aug. c. faust. l. . c. . l. . c. . . quaest. c. . serm. . de euch. l. . c. . cyril . mystag . , & , . catech. . chrysost. in matt. hom . ambros. de his qui initiantur , c. . consensus veterum , p. , , . consens . vet. p. . nouvelle biblioth . des antienes ecclesiastiques par ellies du pin. . p. . p. . consens . p. . consens . veter p. . nubes testium , p. . tertull. c. marcion . l. , c. . apol. . p. . iren. l. . c. . iren. l. . c. . con. marcion . l. . c. . con. marcion . l. . c. . l. . c. . de resur . c. . strom. . hom. . in divers . loc . comment . in matth. . cypr. de lapsis . epist. . n. . nubes testium . p. . &c. consens . vet. p. , &c. disp. . sect. de euch. l. . c. . hom. . in mat. hom. . in mat. in heb. hom. . in rom. hom. . ad pop. antioch . hom. . de sacerd. l. . in joh. hom. . hom. in gal. c. . hom. de resur . to. . hom. . in joh. hom. . in . ep. ad corinth . hom. . in . ad corinth . hom. . in hebr. hom. de poenit . to. . p. . eucholog . p. . greg. nyssen . orat. catech. . nubes testium , p. . tertul de resur . carn . c. . orig. hom . . in levit. ambros. de his qui initiantur , c. . c. . de sacram. l. . c. . notes for div a -e rom. . , , . cor. . , . joh. . . bell. de christo . l. . c. , &c. bell. de euch. l. . c . cap. . a brief state of the socinian controversy concerning a trinity in unity by isaac barrow ... barrow, isaac, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing b estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a brief state of the socinian controversy concerning a trinity in unity by isaac barrow ... barrow, isaac, - . p. printed for brabazon aylmer ..., london : . reproduction of original in british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng socinianism -- history -- sources. trinity. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion advertisement . a defence of the blessed trinity . by isaac barrow . d. d. price twelve pence . a brief state of the socinian controversy . concerning a trinity in unity . by isaac barrow , d. d. late master of trinity-college , in cambridge . london , printed for brabazon aylmer , at the three pigeons against the royal-exchange in cornhill , . price two pence . a brief state of the socinian controversy . * the sacred trinity may be considered , either as it is in it self , wrapt up in unexplicable folds of mystery ; or , as it hath discovered it self , operating in wonderful methods of grace towards us . as it is in it self , 't is an object too bright and dazling for our weak eye to fasten upon ; an abyss too deep for our short reason to fathom . i can only say , that we are so bound to mind it , as to exercise our faith , and express our humility , in willingly believing , in submissively adoring those high mysteries , which are revealed in the holy oracles concerning it ; by that spirit it self , which searcheth the depths of god , and by that only son of god , who residing in his father's bosom , hath thence brought them forth , and expounded them to us , so far as was fit for our capacity and use . and the lectures so read by the eternal wisdom of god , the propositions uttered by the mouth of truth it self , we are obliged with a docile ear , and a credulous heart , to entertain . that there is one divine nature or essence , common unto three persons , incomprehensibly vnited , and ineffably distinguished ; united in essential attributes , distinguished by peculiar idioms and relations ; all equally infinite in every divine perfection , each different from other in order and manner of subsistence ; that there is a mutual inexistence of one in all , and all in one ; a communication without any deprivation or diminution in the communicant ; an eternal generation , and an eternal procession without precedence or succession , without proper causality or dependence : a father imparting his own , and the son receiving his father's life , and a spirit issuing from both , without any division or multiplication of essence ; these are notions which may well puzzle our reason , in conceiving how they agree , but should not stagger our faith , in assenting that they are true . upon which we should meditate , not with hope to comprehend , but with disposition to admire , veiling our faces in the presence , and prostrating our reason at the feet of wisdom so far transcending us . there be those , who because they cannot untie , dare to cut in sunder these sacred knots . who , because they cannot fully conceive it , dare flatly to deny them . who , instead of confessing their own infirmity , do charge the plain doctrines and assertions of holy scripture with impossibility . others seem to think , they can demonstrate these mysteries by arguments grounded upon principles of natural light , and express it by similitudes derived from common experience . to repress the presumption of the former , and to restrain the curiosity of the latter ; the following consideration ( improved by your thoughts ) may perhaps somewhat conduce . we may consider , that our reason is no competent or capable iudge coneerning propositions of this nature . 't is not sufficient , nor was ever designed to sound such depths ; to descry the radical principles of all being ; to reach the extream possibilities of things . such an intellectual capacity is vouchsafed to us , as doth suit to our degree ( the lowest rank of intelligent creatures ) as becometh our station in this inferior part of the world ; as may qualify us to discharge the petty businesses committed to our management , and the facile duties incumbent on us . but to know , what god is ; how he subsisteth ; what he can ; what he should do ; by our natural perspicacity , or by any means we can use , farther than he pleaseth to reveal , doth not suit to the meanness of our condition , or the narrowness of our capacity . these really are the most elevated sublimities , and the abstrusest subtilties that are , or can be in the nature of things . he that can penetrate them , may erect his tribunal any where in the world , and pretend justly that nothing in heaven or earth is exempted from his judgment . but in truth , how unfit our reason is to exercise such universal jurisdiction , we may discern by comparing it to our sense . it is obvious , that many beasts do ( by advantage of a finer sense ) see , hear , smell things imperceptible to us . and were it not very unreasonable to conclude , that such things do not exist , or are in themselves altogether insensible , because they do not all appear to us ? is it not evident , that we ought to impute their imperceptibility ( respecting us ) to the defect of our sense , to its dulness and grossness , in regard to the subtilty of those objects ? even so may propositions in themselves , and in regard to the capacity of higher understandings ; ( for there are gradual differences in understanding , as well as in sense ) be true and very intelligible , which to our inferiour reason seem unintelligible , or repugnant to the prenotions , with which our soul is imbued : and our not discerning those truths , may argue the blindness and weakness of our understanding , not any fault or inconsistency in the things themselves . nor should it cause us any wise to distrust them , if they come recommended to our belief by competent authority . it cannot be reasonable out of principles drawn from ordinary experience , about these most low and imperfect things to collect ; that there can be no other kind of vnions , of distinctions , of generations , of processions , than such as our own gross sense doth represent to us . reason it self more forcibly doth oblige us to think , that to sublimer beings there do pertain modes of existence and action , vnions and distinctions , influences and emanations of a more high and perfect kind : such as our course apprehension cannot adequate , nor our rude language express : which we perhaps , have no faculty subtile enough to conceive distinctly , nor can attain any congruous principles , from which to discourse solidly about them . no words , perhaps , which we do use to signify our conceptions about these material and inferiour things , will perfectly and adequately suit to a mystery , so much remote from the common objects of our knowledge , so far transcending our capacity . shall we then , who cannot pierce into the nature of a peble ; that cannot apprehend how a mushroom doth grow ; that are baffled in our philosophy about a gnat or a worm , debate and decide ( beyond what is taught us from above ) concerning the precise manner of divine essence , subsistence , or generation ? i do ( saith st. chrysostom ) eat meats , but how they are divided into phlegm , into blood , into iuice , into choler , i am ignorant . these things which every day we see and taste , we do not know ; and are we curious about the essence of god ? wherefore do we stretch our judgment beyond its limits , unto things so infinitely exceeding it ? why do we suffer our reason to be pragmatical , unjustly invading the office not belonging thereto ; intruding into things which it hath not seen , col. ii . . nor can comprehend ; those secret things , which belong to the lord our god , deut. xxix . . and the comprehension whereof he hath reserved unto himself ? these considerations may suffice in some manner , to shew , that st. chrysostom had reason to exclaim so much against the madness , as he styleth , it , of those , who are busily curious in speculation about the essence of god ; daring to subject divine mysteries to their own ratiocinations . that st. basil's advice was wholsom , not to be meddlesom about things , about which holy scripture is silent . that † another ancient writer did say no less prettily , than truly , that in these matters curiositas reum facit , non peritum ; we may easilier incur blame , than attain skill by nice enquiry into them . that many of the fathers do with great wisdom dislike and dissuade the searching 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the manner of things being true or possible , as a suspicious mark , or a dangerous motive of infidelity . that st. paul's rules , rom. xii . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to be wise so as withal to be sober , and modest ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not to conceit any thing without warrant of scripture , cor. iv . . are in this case most especially to be heeded . that , according to st. peter's admonition , we should as new-born babes ( unprepossess'd with any notions or fancies of our own ) long for , and greedily suck in the sincere milk of the word ; not diluting it with baser liquors of humane device . that where god doth interpose his definitive sentence , our reason hath nothing to do but to attend and submit . no right to vote , no licence to debate the matter . it s duty is to listen and approve whatever god speaketh , to read and subscribe to whatever he writeth . at least in any case it should be mute , or ready to follow job , saying , behold , i am vile , what shall i answer thee ? i will lay my hand upon my mouth , job xl . . in fine ; the testimony of god , with a sufficient clearness represented to the capacity of an honest and docile mind ( void of all partial respects , and clear from all sorts of prejudice ; loving truth , and forward to entertain it ; abhorring to wrest or wrack things , to use any fraud or violence upon any principle , or ground of truth ) the testimony of god , i say , so revealed , whatever exception , our shallow reason can thrust in , should absolutely convince our judgment , and constrain our faith. if the holy scripture teacheth us plainly , and frequently doth inculcate upon us ( that which also the uniform course of nature , and the peaceable government of the world doth also speak ) that there is but one true god. if it as manifestly doth ascribe to the three persons of the blessed trinity , the same august names , the same peculiar characters , the same divine attributes ( essential to the deity ) the same superlatively admirable operations of creation and providence : if it also doth prescribe to them , the same supreme honours , services , praises and acknowledgments to be paid unto them all ; this may be abundantly enough to satisfy our minds , to stop our mouths , to smother all doubt and dispute about this high and holy mystery . it was exceeding goodness in god , that he would condescend so far to instruct us ; to disclose so noble a truth unto us ; to enrich our minds with that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that most excellent knowledge of himself . and it would be no small ingratitude and unworthiness in us , any wise to suspect his word , or pervert his meaning ; any wise to subject his venerable oracles to our rude canvasses and cavils . in fine ; the proper employment of our mind about these mysteries , is not to search and speculate about them , to discourse flippantly and boldly about them ; but with a pious credulity to embrace them , with all humble respect to adore them . finis . books printed for brabazon aylmer , in cornhil . a seasonable vindication of the b. trinity . being an answer to this question , why do you believe the doctrin of the trinity ? collected from the works of the most reverend dr. john tillotson , late lord archbishop of canterbury , and the right reverend dr. edward stillingfleet , now lord bishop of worcester . price d . a method of daily devotion . a method of devotion for the lord's-day . likewise several small books against debauchery , profaness , blasphemy , cursing , and swearing , &c. price two pence each , and something cheaper to them that give away numbers . all these by dr. ashton . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * v. defence of the b. trinity , p. . p. . id. on the creed , p. . v. defence of the b. trinity , p. . p. . † zeno veronens . pet. ii . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a letter to the author of a book, entitled, considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity elys, edmund, ca. -ca. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing e estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a letter to the author of a book, entitled, considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity elys, edmund, ca. -ca. . p. s.n., [london : ] caption title. signed: edm. elys. dated: june , . imprint suggested by wing. imperfect: tightly bound with some loss of print. reproduction of original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng nye, stephen, ?- . -- considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a letter to the author of a book entitled , considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity . sir , i have a long time desir'd to have some conference with you , or any other of the writing disputants of your perswasion , but i could never yet obtain that satisfaction . i shall here reflect upon two passages in the letter annext to your con●●rations , &c. the author of the snare broken ( which publisht ) is a person , who for his learning , and virtue serves the high esteem , and love of all men. that ●●pression of his , which your friend has thought fit to ●…lect , as that which deserves his publick reprehension , ●●th clearly represent the deep judgement , together ●ith the christian candor , and modesty of the author . 〈◊〉 does indeed ( not as your friend says , in vain , but 〈◊〉 very good purpose ) perswade men to lay aside their philosophy , and wholly to betake themselves to a scriptural consideration of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by which says your frie●● ( with what ingenuity let the world judge ) i understa●● they must take the words of scripture without und●●standing them , or reconciling them to other scripture or even the current of scripture , or common reaso● do they think that scripture is to be interpreted co●●trary to it self ? or that divine wisdom has made 〈◊〉 belief of contradictions necessary to salvation . ans●● 't is manifest that by philosophy my friend understand an artificial way of thinking , and discoursing , that h●● no dependence upon the holy scriptures . but i sha●● take the boldness to say that few , or none in this ag● who undertake to interpret the scriptures , argue mo●● rationally about the sense of them than he does . i cha●lenge you to shew wherein he has interpreted scriptur● contrary to it self ; or given any man cause to questio● whether he think that divine wisdom has made th● belief of contradictions necessary to salvation . 〈◊〉 the same letter are these very scoptical words , the● can love the father with all their hearts , and strengths and two persons distinct from him with the same all they can give all to one , and all to another , and all to third , and never question the possibility of it : as 〈◊〉 there were a trinity in unity in every man , that 〈◊〉 own heart were three hearts to be bestowed all , a● entirely upon each of three objects , and yet be but o● heart still . answ . we assert that the father , t●● son , and the holy ghost are not three objects , b● one object of our love , or worship , t●● worship which the almighty , the fountain of all goo●ness , the one being absolutely infinite , requires of us , is nothing else ( as to t●● internal act ) but love absolute or vltimate , such lo● as excludes all other affections , but what may be ex●●●is'd in subordination , and subserviency to it : so that all ●e loves , or other affections in our hearts , which are consistent with the true love of god , proceed from 〈◊〉 , and tend to the continual encrease , and improvement of it , and are indeed resolv'd into it , and become ●s it were a part of it . for this is the love of god that we ●eep his commandments , joh. . . to love our neigh●our according to the will of god , is indeed to love god. i beseech our almighty and most merciful father in the name of the blessed jesvs to shed abroad his love in your heart by the holy ghost , and shall ever remain the most ardent lover of immortal souls . edm. elys . totness in devon. june , . polemica christiana, or, an earnest contending for the faith which was once deliver'd unto the saints in i. a letter to the author of the dialogue, &c., ii. a vindication of the doctrine of mr. richard hooker, against the mis-representation of an anti-trinitarion, in a pamphlet entitled, considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity, iii. reflections upon some passages in a book entitled, the history of religion, iv. a vindication of vincentius lirinensis, from the unjust reproach cast on him, by an anonymous writer, in a book entitled, animadversions on mr. hill's book / by edmund elys ... elys, edmund, ca. -ca. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) polemica christiana, or, an earnest contending for the faith which was once deliver'd unto the saints in i. a letter to the author of the dialogue, &c., ii. a vindication of the doctrine of mr. richard hooker, against the mis-representation of an anti-trinitarion, in a pamphlet entitled, considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity, iii. reflections upon some passages in a book entitled, the history of religion, iv. a vindication of vincentius lirinensis, from the unjust reproach cast on him, by an anonymous writer, in a book entitled, animadversions on mr. hill's book / by edmund elys ... elys, edmund, ca. -ca. . [ ], p. [s.n.], [london] printed : . place of imprint suggested by wing. reproduction of original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng hooker, richard, or - . howard, robert, -- sir, - . -- history of religion. allix, pierre, - . -- animadversions on mr. hill's book. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - ali jakobson sampled and proofread - ali jakobson text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion polemica christiana : or , an earnest contending for the faith , which was once deliver'd unto the saints . in i. a letter to the author of the dialogue , &c. ii. a vindication of the doctrine of mr. richard hooker , against the mis-representation of an anti-trinitarian , in a pamphlet entitled , " considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity . iii. reflections upon some passages in a book entitled , " the history of religion . iv. a vindication of vincentivs lirinensis , from the unjust reproach cast on him , by an anonymous writer , in a book entitled , " animadversions on mr. hill's book . by edmund elys , sometime fellow of baliol colledge in oxford . magna est veritas , & praevalebit . printed in the year , . to the author of the dialogue , &c. sir , i entreat you , by the common principles of humanity , that you would seriously peruse what i have here written , considering that within a short time both you , and i shall be call'd out of this world , to give account of all our doings , to the maker of all things , and judge of all men. since you profess , you believe all the sayings of our blessed saviour , i pray consider these sacred words , mat. . . blessed are the pure in heart , for they shall see god. i suppose you will not deny , but that purity of heart consists in the true love of god , and our neighbour . it seems to me , that you are guilty of great irreverence towards the divine majesty , in that you throw out such words as these at every turn : good god! but good god then , &c. bless me ! again and again . you shew your self to be most barbarously vncharitable , in reviling priests of all sorts . in plain terms , say you , the priests of all sorts hope insensibly to raise themselves a dominion over us . the priests of all ages have rather strove , as a faction of men , to raise themselves great , than to seek through self-denial , and humility for the truly glorious and incorruptible crown . answ . those holy men in the four first general councils ( the arians themselves speak well of the priests in former ages ) were such glorious examples of true vertue and godliness , that whosoever is throughly acquainted with church-history , and has read the writings of the ancient fathers , that assented to the doctrines explicated , and defended in those councils , he cannot but reflect upon the reproach you cast upon the priests of all ages , with the greatest abhorrency , and detestation . this black turbulency of spirit is not like to compose a clear confutation of any error , nor can it consist with a clear speculation of any sanctifying truth : but , i must confess , it is very suitable to your impious boasting , in calling what you write in your second sheet , a clear confutation of the trinity . before we reflect upon your argumentations here ( which can hardly be found in the croud of such a multitude of invectives , and vain boastings ) we shall consider some passages in your dialogue . quest . are there no texts in the gospel , where christ himself preacht up the father to be the one , and only god , exclusive of all others , as well as of himself , pray repeat them , if there be . answ . mark . , &c. and jesus answered him , the first of all the commandments is , hear o israel , the lord thy god is one lord , &c. these words do no more exclude our saviour from being the one god , than from being the one lord : neither does his being the one lord exclude the father from being the one lord. but say you in your clear confutation , to say of three persons each severally god , that they are one god , is as much a contradiction , as to say , three men are one. answ . this saying of yours is as manifestly false , as it is to say , there is no difference between an infinite , and a finite nature , or essence . i shall here recite some of the words of my brief animadversion on the naked gospel . is there any thing more reasonable , than to conceive , that in god , the one infinite essence , there may be a certain trinity , which cannot in any wise appertain to any three persons of a finite nature ? can there ever be a more impious absurdity than this , to deny the truth of that which the almighty , and incomprehensible god , father , son , and holy ghost , in whose name we are baptized , has reveal'd unto us concerning himself , because we cannot find any thing like it , even amongst the best of his creatures ? to say , that we ought not to believe any thing , but what our reason can fathom , or comprehend , is in effect to say , we ought not to believe there is a god , it being essential to the deity to be infinitely beyond the comprehension of our reason . in your dialogue you say , that our saviour is called alpha , and omega , rev. . . in opposition to i am in god for pure and simple being . i beseech you , as you believe there is a god , and that these words which you recite , were written by divine inspiration , consider what i say : alpha , and omega , the first , and the last , is that which is beyond al● bounds , absolutely infinite , the one pure and simple being . 't is manifest therefore , that the word , which from everlasting was god , which is alpha and omega , the first , and the last , has the same eternal essence with god the father . quest . but pray , what authority have you to call the son a god-angel , as you do ? you us'd to say , that there is a text , where the son as god , is said to have the angels for his fellows ; if there be such , pray let us see it , to satisfy us in what you do . answ . heb. . . being made so much better than the angels , as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they . , for unto which of the angels said he at any time , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee ? and again , i will be to him a father , and he shall be to me a son ? , and again , when he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world , he faith , and let all the angels of god worship him . , and of the angels he saith , who maketh his angels spirits , and his ministers a flame of fire . , but unto the son he saith , thy throne , o god , is for ever and ever ; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of thy kingdom : , thou hast loved righteousness , and hated iniquity ; therefore god , even thy god , hath anointed thee with the oyl of gladness above thy fellows . answ . 't is evident , that by fellows we are not to understand angels , but men : for verily he took not on him the nature of angels , but he took on him the seed of abraham . wherefore in all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren , that he might be a merciful , and faithful high-priest , in things pertaining to god , to make reconciliation for the sins of the people , heb. . , . i desire any man that understands the greek tongue to compare these words , heb. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , with those , heb. . . and let him tell me , if there can be greater evidence for any assertion concerning the meaning of any word , or phrase than we have for this , that by fellows we are not to understand angels , but men. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . in your clear confutation ( as you call it ) you have these words : a trinity supposes three persons in god : and why but three ? surely all between one , and infinite's imperfect ; if divers personality were a perfection in god , therefore infinity should be the number . answ . the divine infinity is absolute infinity ; and 't is the grossest nonsense to say , that number can be absolutely infinite , since it has a beginning . we believe that the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god ; and yet they are not three gods , but one god , because the onely wise god himself in the holy scriptures has reveal'd it unto us . our trinitarians would tell us , say you , that god is the most pure and simple being ; and yet again they can say , that he is three persons , and has three wills , and three understandings , &c. answ . nothing can be more false than to say , that we hold that god has three wills , &c. we grant , that it implies a contradiction to say , there are not three natures numerically distinct , where there are three wills , and three vnderstandings , as in three men we affirm , that the father , the son , and the holy ghost , as they have one divine nature , have but one will , and one understanding : but god the son , as he has two natures , the divine , and humane , has two wills , &c. but his humane will is most perfectly united to the divine will in all things : it was so in all his sufferings , which were the objects of his aversion , being consider'd as in themselves , but of his volition , being consider'd as the effects of the divine will. this calls me to an animadversion on those words , which i tremble to recite . i am confident , no truly learned sincere christian , that was to write in confutation of the religion of the turks , would pour out such contumelious speeches against mahomet , and his followers , as you do against the blessed jesus , our lord , and our god , and against us , his followers , your present mystery-men , and metaphysical mad-men . sometimes , say you , by a kind of ventriloquy they make christ , as god , to be able to tell us all things , but by , and by again , as man , they attribute ignorance to him . so sometimes again , they make him omnipotent , and yet by , and by again hocus pocus , we must have an angel to comfort him against his sufferings . good god! shall we never be deliver'd from these labyrinths . answ . we do not attribute ignorance to christ , as the word ignorance signifies imperfection , viz. any want of knowledge , but as it signifies simply , not knowing all things . such ignorance the most perfect finite understanding must be subject unto : and christ's understanding , as man , is finite . upon supposition that he subjected himself to sufferings , where 's the absurdity that he should be comforted ( by an angel ) in that nature , in which he suffered ? but , say you , what! did only the man dye ? was only the man tempted ? christ then was but inhabited by the god-head ; and when the man was in his streights , god left him to comfort himself , but where is the room for the merit● , and sufferings of the god-head then ? answ . god the son assum'd , or united to himself the humane nature , that so he might be capable of suffering , to demonstrate that the holy one hates sin , with an infinite hatred , and loves men , tho' sinners , with an infinite love. in which demonstration of the divine justice , and mercy towards men , is implied the greatest efficacy , that can be to bring sinners to repentance . so that the onely cause that any sinner does not repent , is the perverseness of his own will , in that he shuts his eyes against this demonstration , and so rejects the offer of the onely effectual remedy for all his diseases . i beseech almighty god by the death and passion of the holy jesus , who together with the father , and the holy ghost is worshipped , and glorified , to have mercy upon you , to give you true repentance , and his holy spirit , that you may be reconcil'd unto god , before you shall go from hence , and be no more seen . if you , or any of your companions have a mind to dispute with me in private , if you will send me any letters by the post , i promise you , that by the help of god , i shall return an answer to every letter i shall receive from any of you : and that i shall never publish any of your letters without your consent , but i will not promise not to publish mine own . i am your servant , and the servant of all men , for christ's sake , edmund elys . totness in devon. may st . . a vindication of the doctrine of mr. richard hooker , &c. this anti-trinitarian tells the world , and that truly , that mr. hooker saith , that the substance of god with this property to be of none , doth make the person of the father ; the very self-same substance in number with this property , to be of the father , maketh the person of the son ; the same substance having added to it the property of proceeding from the other two , maketh the person of the holy ghost . so that in every person there is imply'd both the substance of god , which is one , and also that property which causeth the same person really and truly to differ from the other two. on these words of the excellent mr. hooker , this disputer maketh this animadversion . now to be of none , to be of the father , and to proceed from both , are but other words for this sense , to beget , to be begotten , and to proceed . but that father of modern o●thodoxy , peter lombard , denies that these before-mention'd are properties in the substance of god , or that they can belong to it : he saith , essentia n●● est generans , nec generata , nec procedens , i. e. the substance of god neither begets , nor is begotten , nor proceeds . 't is impossible to make this consist with mr. hooker , who expresly ascribeth those properties to the divine substance , or essence , and saith that being in the divine substance they make it to be three persons . to this i answer , that mr. hooker does not contradict peter lombard : for 't is evident his meaning is this , that the divine substance , or essence , as in the father , is of none , as in the son , is of the father , as in the holy ghost , is of the father , and of the son. the property belongs to the person , and not to the essence , as communicable to three persons . in every person , says mr. hooker , there is implied both the substance of god , which is one ; and also that property , which causeth the same person really and truly to differ from the other two. it is a most palpable falshood which this man delivers in these words : here is the same substance unbegotten , and begotten . answ . the person of the son is begotten , in that he hath his substance , or essence of , or from the father ; he would seem to obviate this answer in these words : they will say , mr. hooker doth not affirm , that the self-same substance is begotten , and unbegotten ; this indeed were a slat contradiction : but he saith , that as 't is in the father , 't is unbegotten , as in the son , 't is begotten answ . this is a most notorious falshood : mr. hooker does not assert , that the essence , as in the son , is begotten , but that the person of the son is begotten , in that he hath his essence of , or from the father . let us now consider what a fast friend this disputer is to the phanaticks , i. e. the despisers of the liturgy of the church of england , which mr. hooker has so judiciously and irrefragably defended . what shall we do here , says he , shall we say reverend hooker has mistaken , and mis-led his sons ( who are all the church of england ) into an error concerning the trinity ? hath he ascrib'd to the divine essence properties which he calleth persons , that are not in it ? to give up hooker , is to dishonour the church of england it self ; to part with father hooker , is to endangerthe very surplice , and even the cross in baptism , nay that book of books , the common-prayer . if mr. hooker could err about the trinity , what will the phanaticks and trimmers say ? will not they be apt to pretend too , he may have erred in his profound dissertations , and discourses for the rites and discipline of the church . now i appeal to any person of common ingenuity in the whole world to judge , whether i had not just cause to publish that paper entitled , an earnest call to those non-conformists , who really believe the doctrine of the holy blessed , and glorious trinity , to come into the communion of the church of england , that by their constant regular confession of the christian faith , they may confound the devices of those gain-sayers , whom by their separation they have so much encourag'd . i cannot imagine how 't is possible , that any nonconformist , that has the least spark of grace , that has in any measure the true love of the holy jesvs in his heart , should not be inclin'd to the communion of the church of england , upon the reading of these words of the most judicious and heavenly-minded mr. r. hooker , in the fifth book of ecclesiastical polity . the very creed of athanasius , and that sacred hymn of glory ( the gloria patri ) than which nothing doth sound more heavenly in the ears of faithful men , are now reckoned as superfluities , which we must in any case pare away , lest we cloy god with too much service . is there in that confession of faith any thing , which doth not at all times edify , and instruct the attentive reader ? or is our faith in the blessed trinity a matter needless to be so oftentimes mention'd and open'd in the principal part of that duty which we owe to god , our publick prayer ? hath the church of christ from the first beginning by a secret universal instinct of god's good spirit always tied it self to end neither sermon , nor almost any speech , which hath concern'd matters of god without some special words of honour , and glory to that trinity , which we all adore ; and is the like conclusion of psalms become now at the length an eye-sore , or a gauling to their ears that hear it ? against which poison ( arianism ) if we think that the church at this day needeth not those ancient preservatives , which ages before us were so glad to use , we deceive our selves greatly . the weeds of heresy being grown to such ripeness , as that was , do even in the cutting down scatter oftentimes those seeds , which for a while lay unseen , and buried in the earth , but afterwards freshly spring up again , no less pervicacious than at the first . i shall not at this time recite any more of the words of this most pious and learned man , but only these ( with which i find my own heart most zealously affected : ) wisdom , to the end she might save many , built her house of that nature , which is common unto all , she made not this , or that man her habitation , but dwelt in vs . the good lord give grace to thee , and me , dear reader , to hold the mystery of this faith , in a pure conscience . amen . reflections upon some passages in a book entitled , the history of religion . it is to me most evident and unquestionable , that this gentleman's design is this , in the crowd of his invectives against what he calls priest-craft of heathens , and papists , closely and subtlely to convey into the mind of the reader a contempt of the authority of the church of england , in enjoyning all those that will be of her communion , to make profession of believing the doctrine of the holy trinity , exprest in those forms of sound words , which we commonly call the creed of st. athanasius , and the nicene creed . he tells us plainly , p. . that the council of nice it self shew'd a spirit of contention , rather than of peace , and charity . truly this man shews himself to be a person of very ill quality , in using such vile artifices to delude the reader , as to endeavour to make him conceit , that st. hilary , and st. gregory nazianzen did not approve that most orthodox council . having thus revil'd those most orthodox fathers of the council of nice , affirming that they were led by a spirit of contention . hilary , says he , bishop of poictiers describes this , saying , we decree every year of the lord a new creed concerning god , nay every change of the moon our faith is alter'd , &c. answ . 't is evident to every man that knows any thing of ecclesiastical history , that st. hilary speaks against those creeds that were made in opposition to the council of nice , and that he would not allow the arians to have the name of christians : christianus sum , says he , non arianus , lib. ad constantinum augustum . those other words of his , which i shall here recite will most certainly put this gentleman to a blush , if it be possible for him to blush at any thing . deus alius , quam qui est ex deo nullus est . — hoc fidei nostrae secundum evangelicam , & apostolicam doctrinam principale : dominum nostrum jesum christum jesum christum deum , & dei filium a patre nec honoris confessione , nec virtutis potestate , nec substantiae diversitate , nec intervallo temporis separari . gregory nazianzen , says this gentleman , was so full of detestation at these quarrels of christians , that at last he resolv'd never more to come into an assembly of bishops , because saith he , i have never seen a good and happy end of any council . answ . whatever st. gregory nazianzen said of any other councils , most certainly no man ever had a greater esteem of the orthodoxy of the council of nice , than this blessed man abundantly declares in his writings , particularly in his most admirable oration , in laudem magni athanasii . our historian is not asham'd to own as great a respect for the arians , as for the christians , calling the former one part of the christian church . p. , it was still , says he , one part of the christian church that vex'd the other . p. , he hath these words : from the two great springs , athanasius , and arius the church over-flow'd with divisions , &c. answ . nothing can be more false , and more impudently slanderous than to say , that athanasius was the spring , or cause of those divisions , for he stedfastly adher'd to the faith , which was once deliver'd unto the saints . this gentleman tells us , p. . that a man must be his own expositor , minister , bishop ▪ and council . answ . this is contrary to the common sense of all sincere christians , who abhor all self-conceit , or what arises from their own minds , as dis-united from the minds of other christians : they know , and are assur'd , that no man knows any thing as he ought to know , but as he is in the communion of saints . their principal way of attaining to more knowledge of what they ought to do , is the doing of what they know already : and they know they ought to shew all meekness to all men , and that they ought to behave themselves lowly , and reverently towards any council , professing to suit their determinations to the holy scriptures . any man that will but peruse the first chapter of the learned animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book , will clearly perceive the folly and madness of this man 's cavilling about mystery . such as are assertors of mystery , says he , p. . choose rather to search into some dark places of st. john's gospel , or st. paul's epistles , to fetch out from thence a wonderful divinity , than to attend to the general , the plain , and easily intelligible current of the gospels , and epistles . to fetch from thence a wonderful divinity ! what wou'd the man be at ? would he have a divinity that is not wonderful , or incomprehensible ? we have seen what mad work has been made ( by his fellow-champions against mystery ) of what he calls , the general , the plain , and easily intelligible current of the gospels , and epistles , upon conceit that all those places of scripture , where our blessed saviour is spoken of as man , are so many proofs that he is not god. let us now consider this historian's attempt to make people to have but light thoughts of the doctrine of the trinity , upon account of the difference betwixt dr. sherlock , and the excellent animadverter . history of religion , pag. . we have even at this present , an unlucky instance of the strange differences among learned men . dr. sherlock writes a book in answer to certain brief notes on the creed of athanasius : he says his undertaking is to vindicate the athanasian creed , and the doctrine of a trinity in unity ; which ( he says ) he has now made as clear , and easy as the notion of one god. but another , and a very learned person too , in his animadversions upon that book of dr. sherlock , calls the explication of the trinity advanc'd in dr. sherlock's book , a silly , a contradictory , and an heretical notion ; wholly of his own invention , and a stab to the heart of the doctrine of the church of england : he charges another book of dr. sherlock's , being a discourse of the knowledge of christ , with vile and scandalous reflections upon god's justice ; and says moreover , that it may deserve to pass for a blasphemous libel . pag. . what measures , or opinions then can the unlearned take from their ( disputing ) leaders ? guides that cannot forbear to impose faith in dark , and unnecessary points , and yet rate their imaginations at the value of holy scripture , even while they dis-agree among themselves in the very points , which they would enjoin others to believe . i shall say nothing here of dr. sherlock's opinion of the doctrine of the trinity , having said enough of it elsewhere : but i must aver to all the world , that this person of quality deals most ingentilely , and dis-ingenuously with the learned animadverter , in endeavouring to perswade the reader to conceit , that this worthy person wou'd enjoin him to believe any thing concerning the holy trinity , but what every man , that professeth himself to be a member of the church of england ( if he do not swerve from all the principles of common honesty ) does really believe . the animadverter does not desire , that any man should assent to what he says against dr. sherlock , in the vindication of the catholick faith , any farther than as he may be convinc'd by the force of his arguments . here i think it my duty to wipe off one of the foulest aspersions that have been cast upon the animadverter , viz. that he is the first man amongst all the sons of the church of england , that ever shewed such a dislike to dr. sherlock's book entitled , a discourse of the knowledge of jesus christ , as if he did it meerly out of spight , having no rational inducement thereunto . i am certain that about eight years since , there was sent to dr. sherlock , from a divine of the church of england ( whom the worst of his enemies will acknowledge to be far enough from any priest-craft ) a large letter , containing a refutation of several of the gross , and most detestable errors in that book . some part of that letter i shall here recite . abraham's faith was not a faith in christ , say you : but the holy apostle says expresly , that the gospel was preached unto abraham . now if abraham believ'd the gospel preached unto him , did he not believe in christ ? the words of our saviour , which you recite , do most evidently prove , that abraham's faith was faith in christ : joh. . . your father abraham rejoiced to see my day , &c. st. chrysostome was not of your mind ; his words on this text are these : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the same truth is attested by st. ambrose : hunc vidit abraham in isto sacrificio . hujus passionem aspexit : et ideo ipse dominus ait de eo , abraham diem meum vidit , & gavisus est . let us now return to our historian : 't is very observable , says he , p. . that for real heresies of the flesh there are no inquisitions set up , nor any particular persecutions ; not for drunkenness , or whoredom , or other vices : they increase as much by temptation and example , as those sort of vices can ; and yet were never made objects of the ( pretended ) pious zeal , or of any persecution . i cannot give a softer term to this , than that of a notorious lye : for can any english man , that knows any thing of the proceedings of our ecclesiastical courts be ignorant of this : that at the bishop's visitation all parsons , vicars , and curates ; at the arch-deacon's visitation , the church-wardens are bound to present drunkards , common swearers , fornicators , adulterers , &c. the most reverend arch-bishop laud never shew'd himself more zealous in any thing , than in the prosecution of a great lady , for living in adultery . i shall here relate the whole story as i find it in cyprianus anglicus , p. . the lady purbeck , wife of sir john villers , viscount purbeck , the elder brother by the same venter to the duke of buckingham , had been brought into the high commission , anno . for living openly in adultery with sir john howard , one of the younger sons of thomas , the first earl of suffolk of that family , sentenc'd among other things to do penance at st. paul's cross , she escap'd her keepers , took sanctuary in the savoy , and was from thence convey'd away by the french ambassador . the duke being dead , all further prosecution against her dyed also with him ; which notwithstanding the proud woman being more terrified with the fear of the the shame , than the sence of the sin , vented her malice and displeasure against the arch-bishop ( who had been very severe against her at the time of her tryal ) when he was come unto his greatness , spending her tongue upon him in words so full of deep disgrace , and reproach unto him ; that he could do no less than cause her to be laid in the gate-house : but being not long after deliver'd thence by the practice of howard aforemention'd , howard was seiz'd upon , and laid up in her place ; which punishment , tho' it was the least that could be lookt for , he so highly stomach'd , that as soon as the arch-bishop was impeach'd by the house of commons , and committed to custody by the lords ( which happened on friday decemb. . . ) he petition'd for relief against the arch-bishop , and some others of the high commissioners , by whom the warrant had been sign'd . the lords upon the reading of it , impos'd a fine of l. on the arch-bishop , and a piece upon lamb , and duck , and prest it with such cruel rigour , that they forced him to sell his plate to make payment of it , the fine being set on monday of december , and order'd to be paid on wednesday after . let any sincere christian in any part of the world that has ever heard this story be judge , whether this most reverend prelate were not persecuted for righteousness sake . most certainly the wrath of god shall burn throughout all generations against the posterity of his persecutors , if they approve the murther , which their fore-fathers committed , and against all others , who shall ever undertake to vindicate that diabolical false pretence of justice . i pray god that all the enemies of truth , and goodness , particularly the anti-trinitarians , may know and feel the power and efficacy of these sacred words , matth. . . whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken , but on whomsoever it shall fall it will grind him to powder . a vindication of vincentius lirinensis , &c. i am so sensible of the orthodoxy of vincentius lirinensis , in matters of the greatest importance to all mankind , that i think it my duty to exhort all young students in divinity , to the diligent perusal of that excellent book entitled , vincentii lirinensis commonitorium : and to declare to all the world my abhorrency of the unjust reproach that an anonymous writer hath endeavour'd to fix upon this most zealous assertor of the doctrine of the h. b. and glorious trinity , even in these days , in which we have heard even from those men , who wou'd retain the name of christians , such horrid blasphemies , and open detestations of the onely true god , in whose name we are baptized , the father , the son , and the holy ghost . animadversions , &c. pag. . mr. hill makes a strange use of the maxim of vincentius lirinensis , quod ubique , quod semper , quod ad omnibus , &c. that priest was a semipilagian , that is , he thought that a man could believe by his own strength , and that afterward god gave him grace to execute his good and pious resolutions , he introduced this maxim meerly in opposition to st. augustine , &c. answ . vincentius lirinensis was so far from being tainted with the pelagian heresy , that he condemn'd pelagius , as a most detestable heretick , or wrester of the holy scriptures , as he did arius , macedonius , nestorius , &c. he shews us the best way that can ever be to preserve our souls , by the grace of god , from the contagion of any heresy whatsoever . sive ego , says he , sive quis alius vellet exurgentium haereticorum fraudes deprehendere , laqueosque vitare , & in fide sana sanus atque integer permanere , duplici modo munire fidem suam , domino adjuvante deberet . primo scilicet divinae legis auctoritate ; tum deinde ecclesiae catholicae traditione . hic forsitan requirat aliquis : cum sit perfectus scripturarum canon , sibique ad omnia satis superque sufficiat , quid opus est ut ei ecclesiasticae intelligentiae jungatur auctoritas ? quia scilicet scripturam sacram pro ipsa sua altitudine non uno eodemque sensu universi accipiunt ; sed ejusdem eloquia aliter , atque aliter alius atque alius interpretatur , &c. 't is evident that by divina lex he understands the holy scriptures . by making the tradition of the church , subordinate to the holy scriptures he plainly declares , that ever since the new testament was written , it has been the duty of all ministers of the gospel to confirm , or prove the truth of their oral discourses , by shewing their conformity to the writings of the holy apostles . 't is evident that by the tradition of the church we are to understand a summary , or breviary of the fundamental points , or articles of the christian religion , which the holy apostles , and their successors throughout all ages have delivered to the world by word of mouth in their preaching , and catechizing , injoyning all christians in all parts of the earth to ponder them in their hearts , and to be always mindful of them : this summary , or breviary of the prime articles of the christian religion is contain'd in that form of sound words , which we call the apostles creed : and this is that tradition , or faith , ( once deliver'd to the saints ) which st. irenaeus speaks so much of , which i doubt not but all learned men will acknowledge , when they shall duly consider those words of that blessed saint , which i shall here recite , d. irenaei adversus haereses , lib. . cap. . ecclesia , quanquam per universum orbem terrarum usque ad fines terrae dispersa , ab apostolis , & eorum discipulis fidem accepit , quae est in unum deum omnipotentem , qui fecit coelum , & terram , & maria , & omnia quae in eis sunt : et in unum christum jesum , filium dei , incarnatum pro nostra salute : et in spiritum sanctum , qui per prophetas praedicavit dispensationis mysteria , & adventus , & ex virgine nativitatem , & passionem , & resurrectionem ex mortuis , & in carne ad coelos assumptionem dilecti christi jesu domini nostri , & ipsius ex coelis in gloria patris adventum ad instauranda omnia , & excitandam omnem totius humani generis carnem : cui christo jesu domino nostro , & deo , & salvatori , & regi , juxta voluntatem patris invisibilis , omne genu flectatur coelestium , & terrestrium , & infernorum ; & omnis lingua confiteatur ipsi , & judicium justum in omnibus faciat : & spiritualia quidem nequitiei , & impios , ac injustos ; & iniquos ac blasphemos homines in ignem aeternum mittat : justis vero , & sanctis , & qui mandata ipsius servarunt , & in dilectione ipsius permanserunt , partim ab initio , partim ex paenitentia vitam largitus incorruptibilitatem donet , & gloriam aeternam tribuat . cap. . hanc praedicationem , & hanc fidem ecclesia , velut dixi , adepta , quanquam per totum mundum dispersa , diligenter conservat , quasi unam domum inhabitans : & similiter his credit , velut unam animam , & idem cor habens , & consone haec praedicat , & docet , ac tradit , velut uno ore praedita . nam linguae in mundo dissimiles sunt , verum virtus traditionis una & eadem est . et neque in germaniis fundatae & ecclesiae aliter credunt , aut aliter tradunt , neque in hispaniis , neque in celtis , neque in oriente , neque in aegypto , neque in lybia , neque hae , quae in medio mundo constitutae sunt . sed quemadmodum sol creatura dei in toto mundo unus , & idem est : sic etiam praedicatio veritatis ubique lucet , & illuminat omnes homines ad cognitionem veritatis venire volentes . et neque qui valde potens est in dicendo ex ecclesiae praefectis , alia ab his dicet . nemo enim est super magistrum : neque debilis in dicendo hanc traditionem imminuet . quum enim una & eadem fides sit , neque is qui multum de ipsa dicere potest , plus quam oportet dicit : neque qui parum , ipsam imminuit . this is the tradition of the church , or the catholick faith , which vincentius lirinensis directs us unto in these words : in ipsa catholica ecclesia magnopere curandum est , ut id teneamus , quod ubique , quod semper , quod ad omnibus creditum est . and now i appeal to any man of common ingenuity to judge what censure this anonymus's assertion deserves , that vincentius lirinensis introduced this maxim , quod ubique , &c. meerly in opposition to saint augustine . i pray god to incline the heart of this man , and of all others that please themselves with their extraordinary fluency of plausible expressions , to consider that they shall give account in the day of judgment of every idle word . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a letter to a friend , concerning the publication of the short letter to j. h. a non-conformist preacher in exeter . sir , i give you many thanks for acquainting me , that some ingenious persons are dissatisfied , that i should put so high a value upon those few lines which i wrote to j. h. as to publish them in my scripta polemica . i confess i did it rather out of a fulness of thought , that this is a most important truth , than any probable grounds that it would be consider'd by many readers , viz. that j. h. in refusing to answer such a serious and equitable request hath plainly discover'd his hypocrisy , and consequently render'd himself less capable of deceiving those people , who shall ever make any just reflection on it . i did most earnestly entreat him , even by the profession he makes ( in common with all those that pretend to be ministers of the gospel ) of desiring the propagation of the belief of all sanctifying truth , that if he thought there was any error in the printed paper i sent him , he would endeavour to convince me of it . in that paper ( entitled , " animadversions upon some passages in a book entituled , the true nature of a gospel-church , and its government ) are these words : it is most evident , that those men are guilty of most abominable iniquity , who endeavour to seduce any people from the communion of the church of england , in which the fundamental articles of the christian religion are so clearly , and fully exprest , and those most important expressions so frequently repeated , that persons of the lowest intellectuals , who do not rebel against the light , in frequenting our religious assemblies may more easily attain to the knowledge of all things that are necessary to their salvation , than by hearing , or reading the best sermons , that have been , or shall be preacht by any of the non-conformists to the end of the world : which assertation is as evident , as it is , that any illiterate persons may more easily meditate on truths plainly exprest , and frequently suggested to their remembrance , than collect the same truths out of divers large discourses , if they were therein imply'd : so that it can hardly be imagined , how any man can be in any thing more serviceable to the destroyer of souls , than by teaching people to despise our catechism , and common-prayer . it is now manifest , and shall be so to all posterity , that the multitude of these despisers have encouraged the profest enemies of the god-head of our blessed saviour , to publish their blasphemies . arise , o god , plead thine own cause : remember how the foolish man blasphemeth thee daily . dear sir , i doubt not but you will join with me in this my daily prayer , that by the inspiration of the spirit of truth the hearts of all learned men , that are assur'd of the divine right of episcopacy , may be effectually inclin'd to endeavour to the utmost of their several capacities to convince all persons that believe their souls to be immortal , of the truth of this strange assertion , that the want of a due regard to the authority of bishops has been one of the greatest causes of all the prodigious disorders and calamities in the christian world. oremus invicem ut salvemur . your affectionate friend , and servant , e. e. postscript . the paper i mention was published by richard baldwin at the oxford-arms in warwick-lane , . mr. wood takes notice of these animadversions , &c. in his athenae oxonienses , vol. . p. . tritheism charged upon dr. sherlock's new notion of the trinity and the charge made good in an answer to the defense of the said notion against the animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book, entituled, a vindication of the holy and ever-blessed trinity, &c. / by a divine of the church of england. south, robert, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) tritheism charged upon dr. sherlock's new notion of the trinity and the charge made good in an answer to the defense of the said notion against the animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book, entituled, a vindication of the holy and ever-blessed trinity, &c. / by a divine of the church of england. south, robert, - . [ ], p. printed for john whitlock ..., london : . written by robert south. cf. dnb. errata: p. [ ] reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng sherlock, william, ?- . -- vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion tritheism charged upon d r sherlock's new notion of the trinity . and the charge made good , in an answer to the defense of the said notion against the animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book , entituled , a vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity , &c. by a divine of the church of england . london , printed for iohn whitlock , near stationers-hall , mdcxcv . to all professors of divinity in the two universities of this kingdom . reverend and learned sirs , since the work , i here present you with , needs so great a patronage , it were to be wished , that it could bring something with it , besides the cause defended by it , worthy of such patrons , as i address it to . but , as much below you , as i know it to be , i could think of none , to whom i could so properly apply my self , as those , whose eminent stations in our vniversities have made them the fittest , as well as ablest to countenance a defense of so high a point , and so vital a part of our religion . our church's enemies of late seem to have diverted their main attacks from her out-works in matters of discipline and ceremony ; and now , it is no less than her very capitol which they invade ; her palladium ( if i may allude to such expressions ) which they would rob her of ; even the prime , the grand , and distinguishing article of our christianity , the article of the blessed trinity it self ; without the belief of which , i dare aver , that a man can no more be a christian , than he can , without a rational soul , be a man. and this is now the point so fiercely laid at , and assaulted both by socinianism on the one hand , and by tritheism or rather paganism on the other . for , as the former would run it down by stripping the godhead of a ternary of persons , so the other would as effectually , but more scandalously overthrow it by introducing a trinity of gods ; as they inevitably do , who assert the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ; which i positively affirm , is equivalent to the asserting the said three persons to be three gods. and i doubt not of your learned concurrence with me , and abettment of me in this affirmation . and i do moreover refer it to your profound , and known learning , to consider and to judge , whether ever the catholick church explained the trinity by self-consciousness , as that [ wherein ] the personality , personal unity , and distinction of each of the divine persons does properly and formally consist : and by mutual consciousness , as that [ wherein ] consists the essential unity of the said persons , and [ whereby ] they are all three essentially one god : together with several other such like terms set down in the collection immediately subjoined to this epistle : and lastly , whether the primitive church having decreed , and denounced an anathema to all vsers of any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in these mysteries , the church of england , and the nurseries thereof , the universities , ought to suffer the greatest mystery of our christian faith to be perplexed , confounded , and even ridiculed by this man 's pretending to explain it by such odd , vncouth , as well as new expressions ; which were never entertained as terms of any note or vse even in philosophy , till des cartes and his followers introduced them ; and that without the least thought ( that appears ) of applying them to the trinity . i desire , i say , all our learned divines seriously to consider , what this must tend to , and will , in all likelihood , end in . the arguments which this daring innovator ( whom i write against ) pretends to support his tritheism , and innovations by , are but slight and trivial ; or rather indeed bare bold assertions without arguments : and those also ( in the opinion of most ) so throughly broken , and confuted already , that what they need more , is rather a discountenance , than a confutation . nor indeed is there any thing formidable in the whole book , ( which i have here answered ) but that one word appearing in the front of it , viz. [ licensed ] : and that i must confess looks very formidably and threatningly , both upon our church and religion : and it cannot but go to the heart of every well-wisher to both , to consider what advantage our watchful enemies the papists will be sure to make of it ; who in such cases never fail to take whatsoever is given them . and now , reverend sirs , what can my design be in thus applying my self to you ? surely it is not so to offer you my poor iudgment , as at all to prescribe to yours . no ; i understand you and my self too well , to be guilty of so sottish a presumption ; nor is it to put you upon writing books against this innovator ; for that i think extreamly below you . but since the world has heard of such a thing , as the decretum oxoniense ( and that so justly to the credit of that vniversity ; ) if now , both our vniversities would concur in passing their theological censure upon such propositions as have of late so much impugned our faith , and disgraced our church ; as that of oxford had passed before upon such doctrines , as undermined and struck at our civil government , ( as i think all christians should be at least as zealous for the former , as for the latter ) it could not but highly vindicate the honour of the church of england , the orthodoxy of our clergy , and of our two great seminaries of learning ; which , i assure you , many foreigners ( how undeservedly soever ) begin to be something suspicious of , and dissatisfied about , by reason of some late books published amongst us , and not yet answered by us . and for what concerns this author's first discourse concerning the trinity , i have been assured from a very authentick hand , corresponding with several persons of note for learning in germany , that it had given no small offence to the divines abroad ; and particularly , that those learned gentlemen at lipsick ( who write the transactions ) would have censured the new , heterodox notions , and equally new , and unjustifiable expositions of scripture ( which it is full of , and those not wholly unreflected upon by them neither , ) at much another rate , than they have done in the remarks of the year . p. . but that out of a peculiar respect to the church of england , they forbore , in expectation that some divine of her own communion would undertake the confutation of it . and therefore since those animadversions upon it , came out so opportunely , as an answer to so just an expectation , as well as to so ill a book ; which had both given such offence to foreign churches , and brought such scandal upon our own , i hope this defence of them will find an acceptance worthy of those great injured truths asserted in that discourse , and re-asserted in this . for , high time certainly it is , for all who heartily espouse the concerns of our excellent church ( so practised upon on all hands ) now , if ever , to appear for her ; considering , that from a new christianity ( the grand project of some of late ) the natural and next step is to none . and so , reverend sirs , to create you no further trouble , having with all the respect and reverence due to such great and renowned bodies , given you an account of the occasion of this address to you , as a thing well deserving your most serious thoughts , and representing the cause of our venerable , old religion now at stake , ( as in truth it is ) i humbly leave the whole matter before you , and remain ( as by duty , and inclination equally bound , ) honoured sirs , your most faithful , and devoted servant , a. a. a collection of several choice , new theological terms made use of in two books ; one entituled , a vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity , &c. the other , a defense of dr. sherlock 's notion of the trinity , &c. and first introduced by the said doctor , for giving the church a better explication and a clearer notion of a trinity in unity than it has had for above sixteen hundred years before . which collection is as follows . self-consciousness , vind. p. . l. . mutual consciousness , vind. p. . l. . natural self-consciousness , def. p. . l. . natural mutual consciousness , def. p. . l. . intimate conscious knowledge , vind. p. . l. . conscious life , def. p. . l. . self conscious principle , def. p. . l. . natural principle of mutual consciousness , def. p. . l. . conscious union , def. p. . l. . natural unity of mutual consciousness , def. p. . l. . communion of mutual consciousness , def. p. . l. . self-conscious love , and self-conscious complacency , def. p. . l. , & . intellectual sensation , def. p. . l. . self-sensation , def. p. . l. . conscious sensation , def. p. . l. . self conscious sensation , def. p. . l. . natural self conscious sensation , def. p. . l. . natural mutual conscious sensation , def. p. . l. . feeling each other's knowledge , vind. p. . l. . self-consciousness between the father and the son , vind. p. . l. . the son 's feeling the father's will and wisdom in himself , vind. p. . l. . the son , the self conscious image of his father's will and knowledge , vind. p. . at the end . continuity of sensation , def. p. . l. , . three distinct infinite minds , vind. p. . l. . one individual nature subsisting thrice , not by multiplying but only by repeating it self , def. p. . l. , . the divine nature repeated in its image without multiplication , def. p. . l. . the same substance repeated in three distinct subsistences , def. p. . l. . the same individual nature repeated in its living image , def. p. . l. . one eternal infinite mind repeated in three subsistences , def. p. . l. , &c. which terms ( with some others like-them ) are to be substituted in the room of nature , essence , substance , subsistence , suppositum , person , hypostasis , and relation . all which ( though constantly used hitherto both by fathers and councils ) yet serving only ( as this author affirms ) to pervert and confound mens notions and discourses about the divine nature and persons , ought utterly to be exploded and laid aside , as meer gibberish and gipsie cant ; especially by such as account all greek and latin so too . several new , heterodox , and extraordinary propositions , partly in divinity , and partly in philosophy , extracted out of the two forementioned books . . the three divine persons are three distinct infinite minds or spirits ; and not to hold so , is both heresie and non-sense , vind. p. . l. . . unless every person of the blessed trinity , considered as a distinct person , be allowed to be a distinct infinite eternal mind , we shall have nothing left us but a trinity of meer modes , names , and postures , defen . pag. . lin . . & pag. . lin . . . that which makes a spirit ( whether finite or infinite ) and consequently each of the divine persons ( which according to this author are three distinct infinite spirits ) one with it self , and distinct from all others , is self-consciousness , and nothing else . vind. p. . lin . . p. . lin . . & . & . lin . , &c. . a natural self-consciousness makes a natural person , def. p. . lin . . . if the formal reason of personality be that which makes a mind or person ( which with this author are always terms convertible ) one with it self , and distinguishes it from all others , then self-consciousness is the formal reason of personality , def. p. . l. , , , &c. . mutual consciousness is that which formally unites the divine persons in nature or essence , and makes them all essentially and numerically one god , vind. p. . l. , , . and p. ▪ l. ▪ and elsewhere frequently . . there is no other mutual in-being or in-dwelling of the father in the son , and of the son in the father ( called by the fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) conceivable or possible , but by mutual consciousness , def. p. . l. , , &c. . the son and the holy ghost are in the father as in their cause , vind. p. . l. . which term divines generally decline the use of , using the word [ principle ] instead thereof . however this overthrows the foregoing proposition , viz. that the son can be no otherwise in the father , than by mutual consciousness . . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used , ( with reference to the divine persons ) by the nicene fathers , is not sufficient to prove a numerical vnity of nature or essence in the said persons , def. p. . l. , , &c. . the unity of the divine nature in the three divine persons is partly specifick , partly numerical , def. p. . l. . . it is impossible to conceive a more close and intimate union in nature than mutual consciousness , def. p. . l. . whereas an vnion in one numerical essence or nature is and must be ( in the very conception or notion of it ) greater and more intimate , as being the ground , the reason , and foundation of the other . . the very nature and subsistence of the father , son , and holy ghost is wholly relative , def. p. . l. . and for their subsistence , i grant it to be so ; but if their nature be wholly relative too , i am sure there is nothing absolute belonging to the deity . . the case of a man and his living image ( though even by this author 's own confession a meer fiction or supposition ) is a plain account of the essential vnity between god the father and god the son , def. p. . l. . that is to say , in a romance we have a clear explication of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the first and second person of the trinity . and in two , who are actually separate and loco-distant from one another , we have a plain account of the union of two , who both in their essence and persons are actually and absolutely inseparable . . if the three divine persons be considered as three infinite minds , distinguished from each other by a self-consciousness of their own , and essentially united to each other by a mutual consciousness ( which is the only way of distinguishing and uniting minds ) then a trinity in unity is a very plain and intelligible notion , vind. p. . l. . from whence follows another proposition , viz. the . that the divine persons have no other distinction but what they have by self-consciousness , and no other vnion but what they have by mutual consciousness . and consequently , that the trinity thus stated , really amounts to no more than a council or cabal of gods ; and that it is in no degree so much prophaneness , for the socinians to call it so , as for this man , by his three distinct infinite minds , to make it so . . the three divine persons in the godhead are not only modally distinguished , vind. p. . l. last but generally all the divines in christendom hold them to be so distinguished , and no otherwise . . there are no modes , no more than there are qualities and accidents in the deity , vind. p. . l. first . . persons distinct , yet not separate , but essentially one by mutual consciousness , do not act upon each other , def. p. . l. . . the divine nature or essence is not a single or singular nature , def. p. . l. . . it is absurd to say , that the one divine nature of the father , the son , and holy ghost is incarnate , and yet none but the son incarnate , def. p. . l. last and p. . l. first . . one single essence can subsist but once , or have but one subsistence , def. p. . l. . and p. . l. . and yet ( for all this ) it follows . . one eternal infinite mind is [ repeated ] in three subsistences , def. p. . l. . . there is no distinction between the divine essence and a divine person , def. p. . l. . and yet all divines speak of the divine essence as communicable or common to the persons ; and account of the former as absolute , and of the latter as relative ; and that surely ●mports distinction . . the divine essence makes the person , ibid. . the divine essence must be acknowledged to be a person , def. p. . l. . . no man has an idea of an intelligent nature or essence distinguished from a person , def. p. . l. . . [ infinite mind ] and [ infinite intelligent person ] are terms as equipollent and convertible as [ god ] and [ infinite mind ] def. p. . l. , &c. . there are in god acts of sensation , of a different kind and species from acts of knowledge : and self-consciousness and mutual consciousness are of the former sort , def. p. . l. , &c. . it is the soul only that can be happy or miserable , rewarded or punished in or out of the body , def. . l. . and if so ; what need ( say i ) can there be of a resurrection ? such doctrines certainly ( back'd with licence and authority ) may come to something in time . . we can frame no idea of substance , but what we have from matter , vind. p. . l. first . . we cannot imagine how any substance should be without a beginning , vind. p. . l. . and if that be true , then i affirm that nothing can be imagined to be so . . the nature of a spirit consists in vital internal sensation , def. p. . l. . . the unity of a spirit consists in continuity of sensation , def. ibid. . one numerical nature , whether finite or infinite , may be repeated without being multiplied : of the first whereof he often gives us an instance in a man and his living image , def. p. . l. . and of the other in the divine nature , it self , def. p. . l. first . . a man and his living image are two distinct men , though the image is not another man , def. p. . l. , & . . an image is wholly and entirely the same with the prototype , def. p. . l. . . the soul is the person , and the body only the organ or instrument of it , def. p. . l. . p. . l. . and p. . l. . . the whole entire personality is in the soul , def. p. . l. . . the soul is the person ▪ and the body is taken into the unity of the said person , def. p. . l. . . the soul is not properly part of the person , def : p. . l. . . the body is not a part of the person , def. p. . l. . . the soul is a complete being , def. p. . l. . . the soul may be a complete and perfect person , and yet not a perfect man , def. p. . l. ▪ whereas a person implies all the essential perfections of a man , and something more . . a man with a body blind , deaf , and lame , is not a perfect man , [ viz. upon a natural and essential account , not so . ] def. p. . l. . . all union between natures is a natural union , def. p. . l. . . the soul is as much the same with or without the body , as the body with or without its cloaths , def. p. . l. . . unless there be two personalities as well as two natures ( viz. soul and body ) the two natures cannot be two parts of one human personality , as they are parts of a man , def. . l. . now , what gross ignorance is this ! for an human personality , no less than a particular humanity , essentially and metaphysically implies and connotes parts ▪ though only the person and man himself in the concrete is actually and physically compounded of them . to which i add , that two personalities can never be two parts of any essential compound whatsoever , but two natures may , and in the present instance certainly are . see this further explained , p. , . these propositions ( with several others like them ) are his new dogmata in divinity and philosophy : which as they are most absurd and false in themselves , so the consequences of many of them , with reference to the incarnation of our blessed saviour , i leave to the thinking and judicious reader himself to draw out , and to the church ●o● judge of . and possibly some time or other , foreigners also may be presented with a view of them , in a language , which they understand better than they do ours . the contents humbly presented to the reader 's perusal before he proceeds to read the following book . an account of the civil language bestowed by the defender upon the animadverter , and animadversions pag. , the objection about the word [ mystery ] proved only the blunder of the objector . the defender wearies the reader with a nauseous repetition of his old confuted hypothesis , without any new argument to enforce it he begins it with a gross vntruth , , he adds another as gross , , &c. he does not ( as he falsly affirms ) concur perfectly with the school-men in stating the unity of the godhead the vnconceivableness of the mystery of the trinity , never accounted by the christian church any objection against it at all the fathers way of explaining the trinity wrongfully slighted and reflected upon by this author , , there is no such thing as spiritual sensation ; it being no better than a contradiction in adjecto , , &c. the nature of a spirit proved not to consist in vital internal sensation , , the trinity in vnity , not explicable by sensation and continuity of sensation , no man's feeling himself a distinct person , can be the reason of his being so , the defender's complement to the animadverter returned mutual consciousness can never make three distinct spirits essentially one , mutual consciousness ( according to this author's principles ) must consist of three distinct acts , his profane assertion concerning the trinity each of the divine persons , as a distinct person , is not a distinct infinite mind ; with a refutation of his argument brought to prove it so , , , his absurd assertions concerning the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the divine persons , , his vain endeavour to justifie his hypothesis of three distinct infinite minds , from the allusions used by the fathers about the trinity , an extraordinary discovery made by this author of resemblance without likeness , his gross mistakes and precarious assertions concerning the sence and use of the term [ person ] from p. , to his ridiculous pleading [ theological use ] for the word [ minds ] as importing the same with [ persons ] , while none can be proved to use it so but himself , and some few hereticks besides , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sufficient proof of a numerical vnity of nature or essence in the divine persons all specifick vnity of nature ( or any thing analogous to it ) in the divine persons proved absurd , and impossible , the divine nature proved against this author to be a single or singular nature , together with a refutation of some other of his false and heretical assertions , from p. , to the vnity of the divine nature in the three persons proved not to be ( as this defender would have it ) partly specifical , and partly numerical , the testimony of victorinus afer of little or no authority with reference to the doctrine of the trinity , two other of this defender's scandalous assertions refuted , his romance of a man and his living image , so absurdly and profanely brought by him as an explication of the essential union of the divine persons , examined and exploded , from p. , to his gross ignorance of the sence and import of the term emanation the proper and true sence of it explained ibid. an account both of the nature of an image in general , and of an image by reflexion in particular , the animadverter's objection , that dr. sherlock has stated a trinity in vnity so , as utterly to overthrow the mysteriousness of it , enforced and made good , the mysteriousness of the same denied also by le-clerk in his theological epistles under the name of liberius de sancto amore : where the reader may find the materials of this author 's new hypothesis ; and where this author himself may be supposed also to have found them before ; from p. , to the school-terms defended , and the vse of them asserted against this illiterate innovator , the term [ formal reason of a thing ] further explained and insisted upon , the true state of the point in dispute between dr. sherlock and the animadverter , fully and particularly represented , from p. , to his blunder about convertibility and proprium quarto modo , , &c. his flying from the act of self-consciousness to the principle thereof , proved a meer shift and an utter change of the question , , &c. the animadverter's first argument , proving self-consciousness neither act nor principle to be the formal reason of personality in created beings , enforced , from p. , to the second argument vindicated ; and the defects of the boetian definition of a person noted , from p. , to the third argument for the same confirmed also , , &c. the dispute concerning the personality of the soul both in and out of the body , resumed and carried on against this author and all his h●terodox , vnphilosophical assertions concerning it , throughly canvased and confuted , from p. , to every man constituted such ( according to this author 's avowed principles ) not by an essential composition , but by an hypostatick union of the soul with the body , from p. , to the defender's pretended answer to the fourth chapter of the animadversions , proving self-consciousness not to be the formal reason of personality in the divine persons , examined , and the several arguments , there produced against it , made good , from p. , to he manifestly gives up the point in dispute between him and his adversary , and that in several places , viz. , . item , . and . and , &c. his blasphemy the animadverter's arguments brought to prove , that mutual consciousness cannot be that which makes ( as this author affirms ) the three divine persons essentially one god , in like manner confirmed and enforced , from p. , to , &c. his shifting pretence , that by mutual consciousness he means the principle , not the act thereof , irrefragably overthrown from his own repeated expressions and assertions p. , to the thing it self effectually disprov'd by reason and argument p. , to how the divine knowledge is diversify'd , the communion of the divine persons with one-another asserted and prov'd not to be formally the same with the union of the said persons , a downright , shameless , unconscionable lye affirmed by this defender , , his silly cavils about [ union of nature ] and about [ personality ] answer'd , , no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or mutual indwelling of minds in one another this author 's great ignorance in exploding all priority and posteriority from our conceptions and discourses of god , expos'd and laid open , and the necessity of admitting the same , unanswerably prov'd against him p. , to his pretence of not disputing about the essences of things shewn impertinent to the purpose he alledges it for ; and withal , grosly contradictious to what he himself had positively affirmed elsewhere , how knowledge , and how all arts and sciences are distinguish'd and denominated from their respective objects , ( which this author is utterly ignorant of , ) shewn and explained , sensation in god , as wholly differing ( according to this author , ) in kind from the divine knowledge , disproved and exploded p. , to his scandalous falsification in quite changing the state of the present question , contrary to his own positive , frequent , and express assertions throughout the vindication , &c. p. , to the same made yet more manifest , by collating what he says here , with what he had affirmed there , ibid. the true state of the question substituted in the room of the preceding false one , his vain endeavour to rescue his hypothesis of three distinct infinite minds or spirits from the charge of tritheism , his assertion of the equipollency of the terms [ infinite mind ] and [ infinite intelligent person ] proved intolerably false , and absurd , , , &c. the difference between [ three infinite persons ] and [ three infinite minds ] a syllogism very learnedly form'd by this defender for his old friends the socinians , with two terms and no more , the nature , import , and force of the equipollency of terms declar'd , , , the assertion of [ three distinct infinite minds ] inevitably inferrs a plurality of gods ; but the assertion of [ three distinct infinite persons ] does not so ; and the reason of the difference plainly shown , , , , &c. the defender confuted by his own express concession , his new-coin'd , and never before heard of ▪ expression , viz. that the divine nature is [ repeated ] in three subsistences ought by no means to be endur'd , but utterly rejected ; ( as absurd both in philosophy and theology ) , item , &c. this defender manifestly ignorant what the true definition of substance is , his equally gross and ridiculous ignorance , in supposing a res cogitans to be a different thing from a substantia cogitans or intelligens , naturae rationalis individua substantia , an essential predicate indeed , but not the definition of a person the three divine persons proved not to be three distinct substances , but three distinct minds proved necessarily to be so , proved , that the fathers , by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as apply'd to the divine persons , never meant to conclude a specifick , but only a numerical vnity of nature or substance belonging to them , by shewing how far they argued against the arians from the said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the ancients never admitted three individual substances in the godhead , proved from the latine churche's refusing ( for a long time ) the use of the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this author 's fulsome ignorance in supposing a numerical difference not to be an essential difference it is impossible for three minds to exist in one infinite mind or substance , so as thereby to become essentially one it is impossible for any two or more substances to be absolutely inseparable ; which is another demonstration , that the three divine persons cannot be three distinct substances , minds , or spirits ibid. the animadverter's argument against three substances in the godhead asserted and confirmed , the defender's scandalous assertion concerning the divine essence and a divine person examin'd and overthrown , p. , to a notable passage out of faustinus , against the admission of three individual substances in the godhead , the animadverter's third argument against the three divine persons being three distinct minds , vindicated ; and the force of it prov'd to be founded not in the meer opposition of the numeral terms [ one ] and [ three ] , but in the peculiar nature and condition of the subject which they are here apply'd to , , three infinite minds can no more be essentially one infinite mind , than three persons can upon any account whatsoever be naturally one person for three to be one , and one to be three , in respect of one and the same kind of unity or diversity , is impossible , ibid. a ridiculous cavil of the defender , proceeding from his gross ignorance of the sence and vse of the word [ attribute ] as apply'd to god. the defender's perpetual blunder , in concluding each of the divine persons to be a distinct infinite mind , because [ infinite mind ] belongs distinctly to each of them p. , to to assert the three divine persons to be three infinite minds utterly irreconcilable to the form of the athanasian creed , ibid. the same individual divine nature belongs in common to all the divine persons ; but upon the same account on which it is common to them all , it does not belong distinctly to each or any of them , a notable passage out of a latin tract inserted into athanasius's works expresly denying the three divine persons to be three spirits , the blasphemy charged upon the passages extracted out of dr. sherlock's book of the knowledge of jesus , by the animadverter in his preface , still insisted upon , and the charge made good against him , , good and charitable advice given to this author , , a summary account of the several ways and shifts made use of by the defender throughout this whole defence , p. , to some instances of the extraordinary vertues of mr. dean's [ meaning ] , shewing of what singular use it is to him upon more occasions than one p. , to the complaint made by some against the animadverter , as if he had treated mr. dean ( forsooth ) with too much sharpness , shewn to be partial and unreasonable , and consequently not worth regarding , , the animadverter's resolution how to deal with him for the future his scurrility towards the animadverter , in six several instances , laid open and remarked upon : such as , for example , his traducing him as , one who can only make a shift to read and to transcribe ; and as one who must be taught to construe the fathers ; calling him withal grinning dog , &c. p. , to a brief vindication of the animadverter against the objections and unprovok'd spight of the socinian considerer , p. , to a memorable saying of a certain dean to a poor widow , desiring to renew her lease with him , dr. sherlock , and not the animadverter , a favourite of the socinians , , , , &c. a remark or two upon the little oxford-excommunicate , lately expell'd from exeter college , this new hypothesis sufficiently debated and confuted already , and the truth asserted against it by argument ; and consequently the exertion of the episcopal censure and authority the fittest way to deal both with that and its author for the future , the whole closed up with a remarkable expression apply'd to the present subject . some errata of the press . in the table of new heterod . propositions page the last lin . . for of judge of r. to judge of , p. . l. . for intire read entire , p. . l. . for th r. th , p. . l. . for singulur r. singular , p. . l. . dele e. p. . l. . for effential r. essential , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for coutradicting r. contradicting , p. . l. . for in●inite r. infinite , p. . l. . for thnig r. thing , p. . l. . for consist ▪ r. consist ? p. . l. . for substancs r. substance , p. . l. . for is evident r. is as evident , p. . l. . for . r. . where adimadverter occurrs , r. animadverter . for and indeed , r. or rather indeed , p. . last line but two . tritheism charged , &c. as it may justly be accounted a needless , so it is certainly a nauseous task to attempt the confutation of a book more than sufficiently confuted already , by the very book , which it was wrote against . for so much i dare , and shall averr , that there is not one passage in all this defence of dr. sherlock's notion of the trinity , ( as it is called ) carrying with it so much as the face of an argument , ( as none carries with it any more ) but what may be fully , throughly , and with advantage answered out of the animadversions . nevertheless the expectation of the world may possibly claim an answer , though such a pamphlet can neither require nor deserve one . and were not the world so severe an exactor in such cases , this pittiful piece should for me lie unanswered , and despised for ever ; so little do i think it for the credit of any one to fight with a shaddow , or a vizard , or to combat an adversary , who is better a great deal at hiding than at defending himself . the animadverter from the very first declared , that in this controversie he would concern himself with none but the author himself , whom he first wrote against ; nor with him neither , but in case of a iust and scholastick reply made to his whole discourse . and now , how this puny thing , called a defence , comes up to the first of these qualifications , viz. the iustness or commensuration of it to the book it pretends to answer , will be quickly se●n : for if we measure that book by all the particulars contained in it , it answers not so much as the fortieth part of it ; and if we measure it by the number of chapters , it catches indeed or rather snapps at several parts of three chapters , ( far from examining the whole even of these three ) but as for the other nine chapters , and the whole preface , they are entirely pass'd over by it , not only not answered , but ( upon the matter ) scarce so much as touch'd . so that by a new and rare metonymy of the fourth or fifth , and in some respect of the fortieth part for the whole , this doughty piece must be called an answer to the animadversions . for if the reader will needs have such an answer , he must seek for it in the title-page , for in the book it self he shall never find it . and then , in the next place , for what concerns the scholastick character of the same , that will eminently appear from those choice and scholastick terms , which it is all along embellished and set off with . such as are these , that follow , with reference to the animadverter himself , viz. ingenious blunderer , trifling author , wandring wit , wrangling wit , leviathan , one whose risibility will prove him a man , though he is seldom in so good a humour as to laugh without grinning , which belongs to another species , viz. a dog. a notable man , and one that can make a shift to read , and to transcribe . and then for the animadversions , they are characteriz'd by senseless mistakes , school-terms instead of sence , gypsy-cant , perfect gibberish , ignorance and raving , an hundred absurdities and fooleries , huffing , swaggering and scolding , a great scolding book , want of sence , &c. with several more of the like gravel-lane elegancies ; and all of them such peculiar strictures of this author's genius , that he might very well spare his name , where he had made himself so well known by his mark. for all the foregoing oyster-wive-kennel-rhetorick , seems so naturally to flow from him who had been so long rector of st. botolph's ( with the well-spoken billingsgate under his cure ) that ( as much a teacher as he was ) it may well be questioned , whether he has learned more from his parish , or his parish from him . but after all , may i not ask him this short question ? where is the wit and smartness of thought ? where are the peculiar graces , and lucky hits of fancy , that should recommend the foregoing expressions to the learned and ingenious ? no , nothing of all this is to be found in this man's words or way of speaking . but all savour of the porter , the car-man , and the water-man , and a pleasant scene it must needs be to the reader , to see the master of the temple thus laying about him in the language of the stairs . but what men draw in from their education , generally sticks by them for term of life , and it is not to be expected , that a mouth so long accustomed to throw dirt , should ever leave it off , till it comes to be stopped with it . leaving therefore his ill language , and worse breeding to himself and others like him , i shall now address my self to an examination of the wonderful work he has presented the world with . and in this i shall begin with the concluding passage of it , ( especially since it relates to that which lyes first in the animadversions . ) and that is a master-piece of critical learning indeed ; viz. his charging the animadverter with a blunder for deriving a mystery from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for says he very learnedly , a mystery is a thing , and therefore how can it be derived from a word ? and now is any man alive able to stand his ground against such an over-bearing objection ? nevertheless , to answer it as calmly as may be ; does the animadverter indeed absolutely , and in terminis say , that a mystery is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & c ? or rather does not the defender quote the animadverter as the devil quoted scripture , with the principal words left out , which should govern the whole sentence ? for if we consult the animadversions , the words are not , a mystery is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. but a mystery ( according to the common signification of the word ) is derived so or so . and will this man of criticism deny that there may be a verbal as well as a real consideration of a thing , or that a mystery , or any other thing whatsoever , may not be considered and treated of according to it's name as well as according to it's nature , and that these are two distinct considerations of almost every thing that falls under discourse , and so distinct , that one may pass upon a thing without the other ? let him deny this if he can , and shew some other reason besides his own spight and ignorance for such a partial , malicious half-quotation of the animadverters words . but perhaps he has here a quarrel at the particle [ a ] and instead of [ a mystery ] would have it only [ mystery ] . but if this should pervert the meaning of the sentence in english , i suppose it will equally pervert the same in latine too ; since what is sence or nonsence in one language must be equally so in another . and therefore we will try how the matter is like to prove , according to this method . for i think it may be no less a charity to this author sometimes to turn english for him into latine , than what was before shewn him by the animadverter , in now and then turning a piece of latine for him into english. now the words in the animadverter being these . a mystery , according to the common signification of the word , is derived either from the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. must in latine run thus . mysterium secundùm vulgariter receptum vocis hujusce usum derivatur vel à graeco vocabulo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. now let this ▪ aristarchus declare , whether there is any failure either of sence or propriety in the sentence thus translated , and where it is . and if this be a true and proper translation , then i am sure that what appears so in latine must be equally so in english. but why should i spend words in disputing a thing so obvious to any man of sence ? for will any one living , who is so , deny it to be a most pertinent and proper way to give an account of things by the signification of the words which they are couched under ? and withall , to prove and make good that signification yet further , by its derivation from another and more remote word ? what judgment the reader will pass upon this man's temper and abilities for this objection , i know not ; but for my own part , i protest i can hardly think him well in his wits , that he should offer such stuff to publick view , which one grain of sence would convince him deserves rather to be hooted at than replyed to . but this is not all ; for we have him again at his old blunder about the anti-nicene fathers , p. . l. . though he had been so deservedly corrected and exposed for it before . but whosoever , or whatsoever these anti-nicene fathers were , i find it past my skill to perswade the world that the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the latine ante , signify the same thing ; though to this author , i confess they may , to whom hebrew , greek and latine come all alike . and again , in a greek quotation , p. . ( in which sort of quotations he never fails to shew his parts ) we have these words . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , instead of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. which indeed is but a false concord ; and that , we know , ought to pass but for a ●light thing in a grammarian above ordinances . so that we see here that the trade of blunders , solecisms , and false syntax ( as dead as all other trading is ) continues as quick and full upon this author's hands as ever . and the truth is , i have had such experience of him , and know him by so true a measure , that wheresoever there is any thing of grammar in the case , i never expect any other or better from him : and i heartily pitty all greek or latine that falls under his hands . and so i pass from his critical to his polemical atchievements ; not doubting but i shall find him so extremely like himself in both , that neither shall the critick have any cause to laugh at the disputant , nor the disputant to reproach the critick . now his whole work consists of these two parts . i. first , a general scheme or draught of his hypothesis . ii. secondly , an answer ( as he calls it ) to the animadverter's arguments . i. as to the first of which , since it is not brought by way of reply to the animadversions , it might justly be slighted , and , according to all the laws of disputation , passed over without the least notice taken of it : and so much the more , because it is little else but a dull tedious crambe recocta of his self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness served up again and again , and obtruded upon the reader ad nauseam usque : as if the bare repetition of his baffled notions were enough to recover and set them upon their leggs again . nevertheless , that he may not think tautology a thing of such virtue , as to be able to re-settle his broken hypothesis upon any firmer ground than it stood on before ; what has been here offered by him , by way of after-game in his forlorn defence of it , shall be duly and fairly examined . and here , to shew the world that he can write with as little regard to truth , as sense of shame , he begins his discourse with a very gross falshood , viz. that all that he affirmed in his vindication , &c. concerning a trinity in vnity , was , that it is a possible and intelligible notion , and no other in sence and substance than what the ancient fathers made use of to represent this great mystery by , though expressed in other terms , &c. p. . l. . now the first part of this assertion i affirm in the face of the world to be scandalously false . for he has not only asserted his notion of a trinity in vnity ( the only thing here in debate ) to be possible and intelligible ; but also plain and easie , and such as solves all doubts and difficulties , and ●lears off all seeming contradictions about it . these are his words , vindicat . pref. p. . l. . b. p. , , & . and i do here demand of him , whether they are so or no ? if they are not , let him declare me an impudent falsificator ; and if they are , let him , or any of his friends of the tritheistical tribe , prove , that barely possible and intelligible ( which is all that he here pretends to ) signifie the same with plain and easie , and solving all doubts and difficulties about the trinity , ( which are the very words of his vindication ) if they can . as for the next thing asserted by him , and that with every whit as great a falshood as the former , viz. that his doctrine is the same with that of the fathers , though expressed in other words . he ought ( as he has been several times urged and required ) to have given the world a solid reason , why the fathers meaning should not be rather gathered from their own than from his words ? and why , if they had the same meaning with him , they did not express it in the same words ; the words being so easie , and obvious at hand to be made use of , and the fathers withal so great masters of philosophy , rhetorick , and expression ? and i defie any man of sense alive to give a satisfactory answer to these queries ; but not one tittle does this author answer to these , or to all that have been alledged or argued at large , against this his confident bold-begging asseveration in the th , th , and th chapters of the animadversions . in the next place , with the same assurance and untruth , he tells us , that the substance of the article of the trinity is not concerned in his hypothesis , defen . p. . and that there is no innovation made by it in the faith , nor any alteration of the least term in it , p. . which ( as i said ) is a very confident assertion , and it were well if the truth of it could support the confidence . for notorious it is , that this man has advanced not only such terms but notions too , in his explication of the trinity , as the catholick church never yet made use of , and such as the generality of our own church do at this day condemn as novel and heretical . and then , can this man say , that he has innovated nothing upon the substance of this article , which certainly does not consist meerly in the words of it ? suppose an arian should come and brazen it out , and pretend orthodoxy as to the trinity , by saying , that he owns three persons and one god ; as in a certain sence of his own , he may , and no doubt , upon occasion , would : shall this profession now warrant him orthodox in this article , when if he should be put to it , to explain this profession , he would never acknowledge those three persons to be that one god ? it is therefore mere trifling to alledge the verbal profession of a form , where it is evident that a man maintains such doctrines as utterly overthrow the sence of that form. for whosoever holds any proposition inconsistent with , or subversive of another proposition held by him , can no more be said truly to own that other proposition , than if he actually and in terminis denied it ; since surely there may be a real and vertual , as well as a verbal and express denial of things . but this author thinks it an abundant proof of his orthodoxy in the point before us , that he pleads his entire acknowledgment of the athanasian creed in all the parts and expressions of it . but by his favour i must tell him , that neither is this sufficient , unless he could prove that he cannot contradict himself . forasmuch as a man ( he himself especially ) may make a verbal profession even of that creed also , and yet own and maintain assertions directly contrary to , and inconsistent with the sence and design of it . now the design of this creed is to assert such a perfect vnity in the divine nature or essence , and every essential attribute of it , as shall exclude all multiplication of each , notwithstanding the plurality and incommunicable distinction of the divine persons . this , i say , is the design of the athanasian creed , and does our author's hypothesis fall in and agree with it ? if so , let us make trial of it , by casting the principal part of his hypothesis into the athanasian form , thus . the father is [ infinite spirit ] , the son is [ infinite spirit ] , and the holy ghost is [ infinite spirit ] and yet they are not three infinite spirits , but one infinite spirit . so runs the athanasian form ; but then the illative proposition , viz. that they are not three infinite spirits , is a direct contradiction to this author's hypothesis , who positively affirms , that the three divine persons are three infinite spirits ; and i as positively affirm , that three infinite spirits are three gods. and this , i suppose , makes an alteration in this article with a vengeance , an alteration in the very substance of it , if a total subversion can with any propriety of speech be called an alteration . but this author defends not himself only by his acknowledgment of the athanasian creed , but also by alledging his perfect concurrence with the school-men , viz. that he asserts the vnity of the godhead in as high terms as ever the schools did , even a natural numerical vnity thereof , p. . lin . . but does not this man in his vindication , p. . lin . . tell us , that the fathers ( and gregory nyssen in particular ) asserted a specifick vnity of the divine nature , and meant no other by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , than an vnion in such an one , and that for so holding , none ought to quarrel or find fault with them , forasmuch as they asserted also a numerical vnity of the said nature ? and therefore if this author did indeed hold the vnity of the godhead , in as high terms as the schools did , i would know , what should make him talk thus of a specifick vnity of the deity in the forecited place , and not only there , but of something analogous to this specifick vnity , even in this defence also , p. . l. . for i am sure the schools allow of no such thing . nor is this all , but he also advances an absurdity so peculiarly his own , ( how falsly soever he may charge the fathers ) that none , who had but drank in the first elements of logick and philosophy , ever held , or , i believe , so much as dreamed of before ; viz. such an vnity in the divine nature , as is partly specifical , and partly numerical ; that is to say , partly vniversal , and partly particular , p. . l. . a thing so monstrously illogical and contradictious , that to mention it is to confute it . so that the reader may here see how grosly he is like to be imposed upon ; if he takes this author's word for a just and true account of his hypothesis . but he is now entring upon his grand project ( and a great one it is undoubtedly ) viz. to give the world a fuller , a clearer , and a more intelligible notion of a trinity in unity , than all the fathers and the catholick church ever had of it for above sixteen hundred years before . and , as a preparation to this , he tells us , pag. . lin . . that the great objection all along against the article of the trinity has been the unconceivableness of it : and therefore , no doubt , there must needs be the highest reason and necessity in the world for the churches admitting this man 's new explication of it , as the only sure expedient to remove this mighty objection , and so to render a trinity in unity for ever after plain , easie , and intelligible . but i must remind this author , by the way , that the catholick church , having ever looked upon this as the greatest of mysteries , never made the unconceivableness of it any objection against it at all : and she had been very inconsistent with her self , if she had . but he tells us here , that the fathers indeed endeavour'd to help our conceptions and imaginations of this mysterious union by some sensible images , such as the union of the sun , its light , and splendour , of a fountain and its streams , and of a tree and its branches ; p. . l. . adding very gravely , that every one knows this , who has looked into the fathers , ( as no doubt mr. dean has , and so have most book-sellers too ) . but he proceeds and tells us , that these material images might serve to render the notion of a trinity in unity possible and credible , p. . and if they did so much , i affirm , that they did that , which the catholick church ( being otherwise certain of the article it self from the scripture ) then fully acquiesced in , without venturing or proceeding any further . and where then , i pray , was the defect of these material images and resemblances , as they were used and applied by the fathers ? why , our author in the next words tells us , that the defect of them was in this , that they could not help us to conceive what kind of union it is that is between the divine persons , p. . l. . but this i deny , as utterly false . for first , this mysterious union of the divine persons , which the fathers endeavoured to give the world some resemblance of , was , as to the kind of it , an union in nature , essence , or substance ; and that in opposition to an union by bare consent , or any other union whatsoever , less than that in nature or essence . so that the kind of union is here assigned . and then , as for what he says of the inability of these resemblances to help us to conceive of this kind of vnion ; if he means , that they could not help us to any conception of it at all , this also is false ; for so farr as the resemblance reach'd , the conception formed thereupon might reach too ; the first indeed was but imperfect , and consequently the other could be but proportionable . but if he means , that the said resemblances could not help us to a full and perfect conception of this union , i must tell him , that neither did the fathers then pretend to it , nor the church to this day need it . and i demand of him whether he , or any man living , can frame in his mind such a conception of it ? or can inform us how , and by what particular way this substantial union passes through all the divine persons so , that with full reserve of their personal incommunicable distinctions they shall yet become one , in , and by one and the same numerical divine nature , common to them all ? no ; the learnedest doctors of the christian church have always looked upon this as a mystery beyond their reach ; and though they were sufficiently satisfied of the possibility and credibility of the thing it self by the forementioned resemblances , and ( which was a much greater conviction ) stood assured of the truth of it by divine revelation , yet as to a full and comprehensive knowledge of the matter of the article , they ever accounted it above their conceptions or explications , and revered it with a distance sutable to such apprehensions . this i say was the judgment and discreet conduct of the catholick church about this important point of faith. but this author , it seems , is of another mind , and having took up a quite different design is resolved upon a very different method ; and accordingly he here declares , that the dean ( that is himself ) is certainly in the right ( as he always is , if you will take his own word for it ) in searching for some image or resemblance of this mysterious vnion in the unity of a spirit ; giving us this reason for it , that god is a spirit , and that a mind or spirit is the truest image of god that is in nature , page . lin . . and this may be allowed him for a good reason , provided it be joined with another , without which it is no reason at all ; and that is , that he himself knows , or ( in the language of des cartes from whom he is now borrowing ) has a clear and distinct perception , what a spirit , and what the unity of a spirit is , and wherein it consists ; for otherwise he goes about to explain one unknown thing by another , which is equally unknown it self . which kind of method , i must tell him , the fathers in the resemblances they gave of a trinity ( and which he so much slights ) were too good disputants to make use of . and therefore 't is to be hoped , that this author both has himself , and will impart to us , such a clear and distinct notion of a spirit , and of the unity of a spirit , as may be fit to found such an explication of the trinity upon , as he has promised to oblige the world with . and this we must expect to find ( if we find it at all ) in the following propositions , viz. that we know nothing of a spirit , nor of the unity of a spirit neither , but what we feel in our selves , p. . at the end . and this we are to look upon as the corner-stone in the new structure he intends us of a cartesian trinity . after which he advances two other propositions , p. . . that the very nature of a spirit consists in internal or vital sensation . . that the vnity of a spirit consists in the continuity of its sensation . both which propositions must be examined . and here in the first place , i deny that there is any such thing as sensation , whether internal or external , belonging to spirits not vitally united to organized bodies . for sensation is properly the perception of a sensible object by a sensible species of it imprinted upon and received into the proper organ by which each sensitive faculty operates and exerts it self . this , i say , is sensation , and accordingly , as it is external or internal , so it has external or internal organs allotted to it ; but still both of them corporeal . and therefore for this man to talk of spiritual sensation is non-sense and a contradiction in the terms , and consequently not to be allowed . it is true indeed that the word [ sence ] with the derivatives of it [ sensible ] [ sentiment ] and the like , do often signify intellectually , as [ sic sentio ] is as much as sic judico , sic existimo . and [ this is my sence of such a thing ] is all one as to say [ this is my opinion of it ] and accordingly so far it may and does agree to spirits ( though yet i cannot remember that i ever read the term [ sensation ] signifying intellectually but amongst the cartesians . ) but the question here is not about the word [ sence ] so taken , viz. in a large , popular , and improper signification ; but , as this author still takes it , strictly , properly , and philosophically , and as contra-distinct to knowledge , and as he speaks of it , defen . p. . lin . . where he says , that he who cannot distinguish between intellectual sence and knowledge , is as unfit to meddle in this controversy , as a blind man is to dispute of colours . i say , in this sence , and as thus taken by this author , i absolutely deny that there is any such thing as sensation belonging to separate spirits . for all cognitive or perceptive acts , that a spirit is capable of , are acts of cogitation or intellection , direct or reflex . and i do here further affirm , that nothing can be alledged as perceivable by this supposed sensation , which a spirit does not fully perceive by the said acts of cogitation or intellection . so that if there really were such a thing as this sensation , it could be of no use at all to a spirit to perceive any thing by , whether without or within it self . and therefore i would have this author take notice , that i both deny the thing , and challenge him in his next defence to prove , by argument , that there are in spirits , not vitally united to bodies , any such things as acts of spiritual sensation , distinct from acts of cogitation or intellection . for all sensation , in the very essential notion of it , imports a dependance upon matter : and it is not this author 's getting a cartesian mis-applied word by the end that can over-rule the sense , which both philosophers and divines have universally hitherto understood , and used it in . in the d. place , i affirm it to be the greatest absurdity and paradox in the world to hold , that the nature of any thing consists in any act proceeding from that thing ; and consequently i deny that the nature of a spirit does or can consist in sensation , ( allowing the word here for disputation sake ) . forasmuch as this sensation ( still supposing such a thing in a spirit ) must proceed and flow from the nature of that spirit ; and , upon that account being postnate to it , cannot be that wherein the said nature does consist . this i know to be in effect the same argument with the first , brought by the animadverter to prove it impossible for self-consciousness to be that wherein the personality of created beings doth consist . and so long as the being or entity of the agent must in order of nature precede its action , i affirm the argument to be unanswerable , and am not ashamed again and again to own it for a demonstration . nevertheless , since this author , to evade the force of the forementioned argument , shamefully changes the terms of it , by putting the principle instead of the act it self , pag. . it is not impossible but that ( in his next defence ) he may do the same here , and tell us , that by sensation he means not the act but the principle of sensation ; that is to say , that he means that by it , which the word never did , or can properly signify . in short therefore , i demand of this man , whether this term [ sensation ] so often used by him signifies the act , or the principle of action . if he owns it to signify the act ( as all men of sence and philosophy know it does ) then i affirm , that it cannot signify the principle of action but by a metonymy of the effect for the cause : and i do affirm further , that ( since in declaring the strict and philosophical truth of things , tropes and metonymies are by no means to be allowed of ) no man's after-meaning ought in dispute to be admitted in bar of the confutation of his express words . for if this should take place , there could be no discoursing ad idem , and consequently no argumentation in any case . and yet this is this author 's constant way ( and that even to the degree of impudence ) that being baffled in his words he still takes sanctuary in his meaning , which practice we shall have frequent occasion to expose him for . but however to cut off all subterfuge from this shifter , if we here admit sensation to be taken for the principle of sensation , it is certain , that this principle must be the essence of the spirit which this sensation is said to belong to ; ( the essence of every thing being the proper productive principle of all the operations of that thing ; ) but then we must observe also , that the essence of every thing sustains the office of a double principle . first of an internal principle giving being to the thing of which it is the essence ; and secondly of an efficient principle of all the actions or operations belonging to that thing ; and it discharges the office of the former antecedently in nature to that of the latter : so that the same essence is a principle of being before it is a principle of action , even with reference to the same agent ; and consequently as it is a principle of action it is not properly and formally a principle of being . and this argument with any one acquainted with the true principles of philosophy ( of which this author understands not one tittle ) quite overthrows that assertion of his , viz. that the very nature of a spirit consists in sensation , and that whether we take it for the act , or principle of sensation ; and plucks it up by the very roots . but i shall refer the reader , for his further satisfaction , to my vindication of the forementioned argument , where i shall more fully canvas and confute this pittiful shift ; not being willing to anticipate that here , which will come in more directly and naturally in another place . thirdly , as i have shewn , that the nature of a spirit cannot consist in sensation , so i affirm , that neither can the vnity of a spirit consist in the fame . for unity being the first transcendental mode or affection of being , and so in reality the same with it , and consequently in order of nature preceding all acts flowing from it , can never consist in any such act or number of acts whatsoever . these arguments i know are wholly metaphysical ; but the dispute being about spirits , as to the nature , unity , and actings of them ( things essentially abstracted from matter ) the very condition of the subject neither affords not admits of any other . well ; but notwithstanding what has been argued against bare sensation , may not the unity of a spirit consist in continuity of sensation ? for this is it , which this author here expresly asserts , p. . in answer to which i must demand of him , whether he has a clear and distinct knowledge what this continuity of sensation is , and wherein it does consist ? if he has such a knowledge of it , why then does he usher it in with those terms of doubting and uncertainty ( as i may so speak ) for [ so speaks , and so says ] must not be admitted in giving a philosophical state and account of things . but if on the other side this author has not a distinct knowledge of continuity of sensation ( as it is manifest from his inability clearly to express it , that he has not ) then let us consider what an explication of an unity in trinity he is like to give us from a thing which he neither distinctly knows , nor can clearly express . for if he could do the former , what reason can there be why he should not be able to do the latter ? now his method in explaining the trinity ( which he promises us such great things from ) is this . he first tells us , that he is certainly in the right in seeking for an image of the mysterious vnity of the divine persons in the vnity of a spirit , p. . l. . and in the next place he tells us , that we can know nothing of the vnity of a spirit but what we feel in our selves . and here in the last place he tells us , that all that we feel in our selves is this continuity of sensation : but what this is he does not express , and gives us but too much reason from his own words to conclude that he cannot . so that here we have an explication of unity in trinity by continuity of sensation , but who shall explain to us this explication it self ? for admit that the unity of a created spirit ●arries in it the nearest resemblance to the unity of the godhead in the three persons , yet how can this unity of a created spirit be explain'd by continuity of sensation , when the very terms of this explication import a direct contradiction to the nature of the thing pretended to be explained by them ? for i defy all mankind to form in their minds such a conception of continuity as does not essentially imply in it connexion of parts ; and where there are parts there must be extension , and consequently divisibility : so that the sum of all is this , that the mysterious unity of the trinity is explained to us by the vnity of a spirit ; and the vnity of a spirit which can have neither parts , extension , nor divisibility , is explained to us by something which necessarily implies them all . for in giving an account of the nature of a thing by continuity , nothing but a real continuity , a continuity properly so called can take place . and it will be in vain here for this author to plead that we know not the nature of a spirit . for this he had told us before ( in the th , and th pages of his vindication ) and that therefore not being able to express it adequately , we must be contented to express it as well as we can , viz. [ by so speaks , and so says , and by continuity where there can be no parts ] ; for such a plea , though admitted , would manifestly give up his cause , by shewing that he had undertook to explain the vnity in trinity by such an vnity as he himself can neither conceive nor express . we have seen therefore what these two propositions , viz. that the very nature of a spirit consists in internal sensation ; and the vnity of a spirit in continuity of sensation ; amount to : but let us now see how he proves them ; for , i fansie , the world will hardly take them upon his bare 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and here , supposing that i need not tell the reader , that this author , by sensation , and continuity of sensation , means self-consciousness ; we shall find that his argument runs thus . so far as a man feels himself , or is self-conscious , so far he is one ●●tire person . for it is a self-evident proposition , that in an intelligent self-conscious being , [ self ] can reach no further than he feels himself . and i would desire any thinking man to tell me , how he knows himself to be a distinct and separate person from all other men , but only by this , that he feels his own thoughts , volitions , passions , &c. but feels nothing of all this in other men , p. . l. . but what wretched inconsequences are these ? self can reach or exist no further than a man feels himself , and therefore a man's feeling himself and his existence is that wherein self and the existence of self does consist : it follows indeed from hence , that his feeling is the measure of his existence . so that one cannot extend beyond the other , but that does not therefore place his existence in his feeling that he does exist . a particular determined portion of matter cannot reach or exist beyond the quantity that bounds or determines it ; but does the existence and being of that matter therefore consist in this quantity ? the body of a man cannot extend further than its just stature , but does the body therefore consist in its stature ? again , a man cannot ( as this author-says ) know himself to be a separate distinct person from all other men , but by self-consciousness and internal sensation , and therefore , forsooth , these are and must be the things wherein his being a distinct person does consist . and let any one alive shew that this argument proves any more if he can . but this man confounds the principle of knowledge with the principle of being all along . whereas the point here is , whether the vnity and distinction of a spirit consists in internal sensation as the formal reason of it , not whether internal sensation be that , whereby alone a spirit can know it self to be one with it self , and distinct from all others ? for though this latter be granted to this author as often as he pleases ; yet the former will be as stiffly denied him . i find and feel my self to be one man , and to be distinct and separate from all others ; but does this therefore make me to be so ? or does my being so consist in my feeling my self to be so ? one would think that a man should be ashamed to argue at this rate ; especially having been baffled in it more than once . but it is a custom , which he is grown old in , to be baffled and to talk on , and it is too late to cure him of it now . in the mean time there are some other choice things , which deserve our consideration , and particularly this : so far ( says he ) as a man feels himself , or is self-conscious , he is one entire person , where this self-conscious sensation ends he becomes a distinct and separate person , p. . l. . but is it possible for the mind of man to imagine any one to be an entire person , and consequently one in himself , and yet nor distinct from all others besides ? when the very essential notion of vnity connotes distinction too ; and when according to all the rules of philosophy , that which is the principle of constitution to any thing , is the principle also of distinction to the same . every thing being distinguished from all other things by what it is in it self . continuity of sensation ( he says ) makes a man one in himself , and the ending , or ne plus ultrà of that sensation makes him a distinct person . and yet he appeals to every thinking man whether he knows himself to be a distinct person any other way than by this self-conscious sensation . whereas he had said but just before , that it is the ending of this self-conscious sensation which makes him a distinct person : and if so , can he then know himself to be a distinct and separate person by that which must be at an end before he can be a distinct person ? certainly a grosser and more fullsome contradiction scarce ever dropped from the tongue or pen of man : and if this be not non-sence in the highest , and gibberish truly so called , i dare averr , that bedlam affords none . but his complement to the animadverter must not be passed over so ; for whose instruction , ( forsooth ) he says , he was so large in his discourse about sensation and self-consciousness , p. . for since he is so very kind , he must give me leave to be as charitable in my admonitions , as he was liberal in his instructions ; and accordingly to advise him for the future to keep his instructions to himself , and what he can spare , to bestow upon his boys , that so they may not at their father's age come to need such correction as their father has had . and whereas he says , the animadverter understood not one word of his hypothesis , i must here tell him in the animadverter's name , that he accounts it no disparagement at all to any man of sence not to understand him , who speaks none . but he proceeds , and to shew us how methodical he is in his absurdities , he tells us , that the dean ( as certainly no man living was ever so much a dean in his own eyes ) having observed , that the vnity of a single spirit consists in such a natural self-conscious sensation , this led him on to that other notion of mutual consciousness which may be between three distinct spirits , and make them naturally one ( as much as three can be one ) . p. . l. . and that in good earnest is a limitation with a witness ; a limitation amounting to an utter negation of the thing , which it is applyed to : it being impossible for three distinct absolute beings ( which three distinct spirits certainly are ) to be one by one numerical nature belonging in common to them . but besides , observe the fallacy couched under this ambiguous parenthesis ( as much as three can be one ) for by [ three ] here he may either mean three spirits , or three persons : and he imposes grosly upon his reader , and begs the question besides , if he supposes that three divine persons cannot be more united than three spirits ; or that mutual consciousness is the greatest union that three persons are capable of . both which are utterly false , and the very things now under dispute . and we shall presently shew the vast disparity between persons and spirits , with reference to the union , which each of them may admit . but our author goes on thus . if ( says he ) a natural self-conscious sensation makes a spirit one with it self , why should not a mutual conscious sensation vnite three into one ? for if natural vnity extends as far as conscious sensation , then if conscious sensation extends to three , why should not these three be acknowledged to be naturally one ? p. . l. . to which i answer first , that it has been already shewn , that although this conscious sensation be that whereby a spirit knows it self to be one and distinct from all others , yet it is not that which makes it so ( and the supposing of this is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which runs through this man's whole hypothesis ) and consequently , whatsoever is argued from this supposition , towards the proving the same of mutual consciousness with reference to three spirits , which had been asserted of self-consciousness with reference to one , must fall to the ground with it . but secondly , because he asks a reason why mutual consciousness may not give natural unity to three spirits , as well as self-consciousness does to one ? ( though the former is the greater absurdity of the two ) yet since both assertions are equally false , i shall give this one reason against both , viz. because consciousness or sensation is not properly nature but an affection of nature , or an act springing from it ; and therefore unity of consciousness or sensation cannot be properly vnity of nature , nor consequently can it constitute the subject it belongs to , naturally one. and whereas , according to his sophistical way , he calls it a natural self-conscious sensation , p. . l. . if by natural he means that wherein nature does consist , or which gives being and vnity to a thing , in that sence , ( as it has been proved all along ) self-consciousness cannot be termed natural : but if by natural he means that which proceeds from nature that is true , but comes not up to his purpose . well ; but supposing that consciousness or sensation were indeed the nature of the thing conscious , or ( in other words ) that , wherein the being of the said thing did consist , and consequently that unity of consciousness were unity of nature too ( as it is certain that neither of them are ) yet for that very cause i deny that this consciousness , and unity of consciousness can belong in common to three distinct absolute beings . for as much as every absolute being is constituted such by a particular , proper , and distinct nature of it's own , belonging to it and included in it , and distinguishing it from every other absolute being besides ; and therefore it is impossible for any particular nature numerically one , to be in any more absolute beings , than in one alone . in three several persons indeed , whose several personalities , and personal distinctions consist properly in three distinct relations , nothing hinders but that the same numerical nature ( if infinite ) may be in them all ; for as much as the same numerical nature may sustain all these three distinct relations . and herein consists the great disparity between spirits which are absolute beings , and the divine persons which are not so ; and this is true reason and consequence , and proof against all that this novellist can alledge against it . but after all , in the third and last place , the very ground upon which this man builds from first to last , in proving that mutual-consciousness or sensation gives natural vnity to three distinct spirits , is false , and sinks under him . for he supposes all along , that this mutual-consciousness is one numerical natural act , which upon his principle , viz. [ that the three divine persons are three infinite spirits . ] i utterly deny ; and on the contrary affirm it to be only a complex and collective unity consisting of and containing in it three distinct acts of consciousness , whereof one belongs to each of his three spirits , and is that whereby each spirit knows or feels ( let him call it which he will ) all that is in , or is known or felt by the other two spirits . this i affirm , and challenge this author , when he enters upon this dispute again , to disprove . for whatsoever is the act of an absolute , distinct being , must it self be as distinct as that being is . and so his principal notion of three distinct spirits being naturally one , by one mutual consciousness extending to them all , falls to nothing . for surely three distinct consciousnesses , or acts of consciousness ( which this mutual consciousness consists of ) can never make three spirits naturally one ; since these three acts are not naturally but only collectively one themselves ; and accordingly under that unity and no other can they be expressed by that one denomination [ mutual consciousness . ] but he proceeds , and to shew the world what an iron-necessity , or rather what a cruel bondage one imperious absurdity will bring the maintainer of it under ; he tells us in the th page , that it was this , ( viz. his notion of self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness ) that forced the dean ( as no absurdity affects mr. dean's priviledge of standing alone by it self ) to speak of the three infinite and eternal persons in the godhead , under the character of three infinite and eternal minds . for this conscious sensation , whether self-consciousness or mutual-consciousness , can belong only to minds . which latter i here absolutely deny ; and in this one word [ minds ] plurally used by him he manifestly begs the question again , and supposes the chief thing to be proved , viz. that there is a plurality of infinite minds to which this self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness must belong : for what [ minds ] else can he here mean ? not finite or created minds , for he himself in the th page of his vindication , denies that this mutual-consciousness can belong to any created minds or spirits . so that it is evident , that he here speaks of infinite minds , ( which ( as i said ) being the thing chiefly disputed , ought to have been proved by him before presumed : ) and consequently that he speaks also of such a self-consciousness and such a mutual-consciousness as import infinite knowledge ; and since they do so , i deny that they can belong to any more [ minds ] than one , i say , than to one eternal infinite mind , which is god blessed for ever . for being acts of knowledge they follow and flow from the divine essence and nature common to the three persons ; and are no more than the divine omniscience terminating upon all and each of the persons , as so many particular objects contained within its adequate object , which is all things knowable . admitting therefore that this self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness ( being nothing else but the divine omniscience thus diversly terminated ) may inferr a plurality of persons knowable in the godhead , yet i utterly deny that they do or can inferr in it a plurality of minds : forasmuch as the said acts belong to the three divine persons ( as has been just now observed ) by vertue of that one infinite mind , from which they flow , and which is numerically one and the same in all three . but this author is now upon an higher strain , and resolving ( under the protection of a licence ) to open himself farther than before , tells us in plain terms , that if every person in the trinity , considered as a distinct person , be not a distinct infinite and eternal mind , there is ( he confesses ) an end of his notion , p. . and i think it had been well for the church and himself too , if it had never had a beginning . but then he adds ( with unsufferable presumption and equal falshood ) , that with that there will be an end of a trinity of persons also , and that we shall have nothing left but a trinity of modes , postures , and names , not in the vnity of the godhead , but in the vnity of one person , who is the whole deity . these are his detestably heretical and senseless words . in answer to which i demand of this confident man , how he dares , in defiance of the doctrine of the catholick church , place a trinity of modes , postures , and names upon the same level , as if they all indifferently amounted but to the same thing ? whereas names are certainly of arbitrary imposition , whether god or man imposes them ; and postures none ascribe to god but that silly sort of men , the anthropomorphites . but as for modes , they result eternally and necessarily from the divine nature , and eternally and inseparably remain in it , and withal import such distinct relations as can never coincide in one and the same person : and how then can this ignorant man talk of the vnity of one person who is the whole deity or godhead , when these three relations can never concur in such an vnity of person , but all of them may and do concur in the vnity of the godhead ? in a word , i do here ask this bold man , whether he will venture to affirm , that the divine nature , determined or modified by such a certain subsistence or subsisting relation is a meer mode or no ? and i do here leave it to his second thoughts , whether he will venture to say so . and if not , why does he here against his conscience reproach the doctrine of the catholick church ( for so it is ) as if it established a trinity of meer modes ? which it is so far from , that i do here affirm against this author , and others who speak like him upon this subject , that according to the sence of the catholick church , the three divine persons are three distinct relative modes of subsistence , or three subsisting relations of one and the same infinite divine nature included in all and each of them ; or again , they are the divine nature it self subsisting with three distinct relations . this , i say , i affirm , and doubt not but that to all men of sence it confutes the three divine persons being three meer modes , and shews , withal , what an irrational blasphemous cavil it is to call them so . for certainly a mode in concretion with the essence , cannot with the least pretence of reason be called a meer mode . and this i do again avouch for the doctrine of the catholick church concerning the trinity ; and do over and over challenge this pert novellist to disprove it if he can . but in the next place he is for confirming his tr●●●theistical assertion with this invincible argument ( as he thinks , poor man ! ) p. , . if ( says he ) every distinct person in the godhead considered as distinct , be not an infinite and eternal mind , as it must be , if every distinct person be god ( unless any thing else than an infinite mind can be god ) then , though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them three eternal minds , yet there is no heresy in it , nor any intended by it . in answer to which i must tell him , that i shall not much concern my self about what he intends ( it being his old way , when he is pressed with his words , to fly to his intentions ) but shall only consider what his words express or infer : and whether they carry any heresy in them or no , shall appear presently . and in order to this , i must remind him of these two things . first , that [ god ] and [ infinite eternal mind ] are terms perfectly equipollent . and secondly , that in terms equipollent , putting one in the room of the other , you may argue with the same consequence from one , that you can from the other . according to which rule we will try the force of his argument , by proposing it with the bare change of one of the forementioned terms for the other , thus. if every distinct person in the godhead , considered as distinct be [ god ] as it must be if every distinct person be an infinite and eternal mind [ unless any thing else than [ god ] can be an [ infinite mind ] then though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them three gods , yet there is no heresy in it ; nor ( in spight of his words ) any intended by it . now let this author consider how he will allow of this conclusion ; for if his own conclusion holds good , this is certainly good also ; since the validity of the consequence is the same in both ; the matter of the argument being the same , and the form of it the same too . there must be therefore a gross fallacy in the argument it self , and it lies in the homonomy of the term [ as distinct ] . for the english particle [ as ] , and the latine [ quà or quatenus ] , thus applied has two significations . . the first importing any qualification specifying , affecting , or any way denominating the subject : and so [ a person as distinct ] , signifies no more than [ a person who is distinct , or a person under this qualification or denomination ] : . but , secondly , the other signification of the particle [ as ] is causal , and imports a causal connexion of the term to which it is joined , with some predicate or attribute belonging to the subject ; and so [ a person as distinct ] , signifies as much as [ a person because distinct , or by reason of his distinction ] . and this makes an attribute to be necessarily and universally predicated of its subject ; so that if the subject be multiplied , the thing predicated of it must be multiplied too ; but in the former signification of the particle [ as ] it is not so ; for as much as the predication imported thereby is only accidental , and has no causal , necessary , nor universal connexion with it's subject . accordingly in the causal sence of the term [ as distinct ] i must tell him , that no person in the godhead [ as distinct ] is an infinite eternal mind ; that is to say , this attribute belongs not formally to his distinction ; and that his distinction is not the cause or reason that it is affirmed of him . for it is an attribute springing from the divine nature , which is in the person , and not from his personality or personal distinction ; for as much as that does not properly and formally make him to be god , nor is that wherein his godhead does precisely consist , though by reason of the persons including in him the nature , it does indeed imply and suppose him to be god. and thus all the ancient orthodox divines and doctors of the church distinguish in each person two things , though intimately and inseparably united , viz. the godhead or divine nature , and the personal distinguishing relation , so that what agrees to the person upon one account , does not properly belong to him upon the other ; and consequently to make the personal distinction the proper reason of any essential predication , is utterly false and illogical . and accordingly to say , that [ infinite , eternal mind ] , which is an essential attribute of the divine nature as such , belongs to any one person , by reason of his personal distinction , is false ; forasmuch as this would inferr it to belong to that person only , since his personal distinction belongs only to himself . it belongs indeed to him , though distinct , but not because distinct : but wholly because of his divine nature , which belonging equally to all the divine persons , all the essential attributes of the said nature must equally belong to all the three persons too . from all which it follows , that since [ infinite eternal mind ] is an attribute not springing from personal distinction even in distinct persons , nor agreeing to the said persons ▪ upon that account , but springing wholly from that one divine nature which is common to them all ; it can never inferr , the three persons , though distinct , to be three infinite eternal minds ; since , as i shew before , the connexion between [ a distinct person ] as the subject , and between [ infinite mind ] as the predicate , not being causal , the multiplication of the subject can never inferr the multiplication of the predicate . and this i affirm to be a full and true account of this matter , and a clear solution of the fallacy which this man 's whole argument depended upon ; and consequently that his tritheistical hypothesis , that the three distinct divine persons must be therefore three distinct infinite minds or spirits , is , even by his own confession , ( would he stand to it ) at an end . and the truth is , there is nothing in his whole book but pittiful wretched fallacy join'd with gross ignorance of the subject he writes of , from first to last . and yet , after all this , he makes his hypothesis the only rule to understand most of the scriptures by , which represent to us the vnion between the father and the son : and particularly that about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , expressed iohn . v. . by the son 's being in the father , and the father in the son. for ( says he ) that the father should be in the son , and the son in the father , so as perfectly to comprehend and be comprehended , with several like expressions , is made very possible and intelligible by a mutual conscious sensation , but nothing else will afford us any conception of it , def. p. . to which i answer , what if it does not ? and what christian is concern'd to have any such conception ? for did the catholick church ever pretend to any beyond the bare knowledge of the signification and sense of the terms in which it was revealed ? and did not the bare revelation of it sufficiently make out the possibility of it to us , without any further explication ? what does this profane man mean thus to state the very possibility of a thing expresly reveal'd in scripture , upon his new-found exposition of it ; so that , unless this be admitted , we must ( even in spight of revelation ) look upon it as impossible ? good god! whither are we running ? but to shew moreover , that his exposition is as forced as new , our saviour expresses this circumincession by words importing mutual inexistence : but , says this man , ( a man made , it seems , to correct revelation it self , by putting it into properer words . ) that such a mutual inexistence cannot be conceived possible , unless we understand it of mutual consciousness ; that is , of quite another thing from what the words signifie : for certain it is , that mutual inexistence is not mutual consciousness , nor can mutual consciousness be mutual inexistence . but , in short , will this man say , that the mutual inexistence of the father and the son ( understood according to the very letter ) implies in it a contradiction ? i question whether he will dare say so , whatsoever the thing asserted by him may inferr : for as for that pittiful objection , against the same thing 's comprehending another thing and being comprehended by it , &c. it is a meer toy , founded only in that old maxime , omne continens est majus contento , drawn off from material quantitative beings , and so not applicable to immaterial and spiritual ; as has been fully shewn in the th chapter of the animadversions , p. , and . but if this author will not venture to say , that such a mutual inexistence ( understood according to the letter ) implies in it a contradiction , then let him give the church a satisfactory reason , why our saviour's words should not be understood in their own natural , proper sence , but in this man 's new sence , which is both improper and figurative , and never heard of before . but with a bold front he says , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here spoken of is not otherwise possible and intelligible , ( which two words he is perpetually jumbling together , as if there might not be many things possible , and yet by humane reason not intelligible ) . but i must here tell him ( what i dare say he knew not before ) viz. that it is one thing positively to apprehend and know a thing not to be possible ( which i defie him to prove this mutual inexistence ( even understood literally ) not to be ) ; and another thing not to apprehend or know , how or by what way a thing is possible . and this latter i affirm ought never to supersede our assent to any thing , if revealed to us ; nor to make us doubt of the revelation , nor are we at all concerned about any further explication of the thing so revealed , nor whether we ever know any more of it or no ; and this is my opinion may serve an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - man ( which is but another word for a theological quack ) a great deal of trouble . but so far is this man's mutual-consciousness from being the only thing that can render this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intelligible , that unless a mutual inexistence be presupposed , no such thing as a mutual-consciousness can here take place ; since it is essentially founded in that . for surely father and son must exist mutually in one another , before they can know or be conscious to themselves that they do so . but this point of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 has been so fully debated , and so throughly cleared in the animadversions , both in the seventh chapter from page , to the . inclusively , and in the ninth chapter from page , to . that there needed not to have been so much as one word said of it here . but , as i hinted before , though this writer be confuted never so often , he takes no notice of it ; but still keeps on writing , and ( for ought i see ) will never hold his hand , till the bookseller holds his . in the next place , he seems to fall a pitch lower than usual , and to be upon the complaining strain , as that men are spightful , and will not treat mr. dean and his absurdities , according to their dignity : nor allow him such fair quarter as other writers ( he says ) have met with in the same cause . adding withal , that it is not to be expected , that in a matter of so high in nature , we should have such a comprehension of it , as to leave no difficulties unexplained . which i confess would be a fair allegation from another man ; but not from him . for has he not declared , that his notion of a trinity solves all doubts and difficulties about it ? see his vindication , p. . l. . and . l. last , and where all difficulties are solved , can there remain any vnexplained ? now i ask this man , are the words here quoted by me his , or are they not ? if they are his , then let all mankind judge whether this man has not eaten shame and drunk after it ( as the word is ) ; who can , without the least sence of it , so grosly contradict himself in the face of the world. but however let us hear what he says . and here we have him alledging the fathers setting forth the trinity by the sun , and its light and splendor , by a tree and it's branches , a fountain and it's streams , or a mathematical cube : and then bringing up the rear of all with these questions . are not these accounts ( says he ) much more chargeable with tritheism , or sabellianism , than the account he gives of them by three minds or spirits ? for are not the sun and its light and splendor , as much three , but not so much one as three conscious minds ? p. . to which i answer peremptorily , that the sun and its light and splendor ( not being three distinct supposita ) are much more one , than three distinct minds or spirits ( which are three supposita ) can possibly be ; and cannot be more three , than three distinct minds or spirits necessarily and essentially are . but i would have the reader here observe , what a wretched sophism he is now trumping upon him , by arguing ab imparibus tanquam paribus . for is an account of a thing by way of allusion , and an account analogous to a definition , all one ? is a similitude or bare resemblance of a thing , and a proper representation or description of the nature of that thing the same ? is there not a wide difference between shewing what a thing is like , and what it really and properly is ? and to demonstrate that the fathers applyed the fore-alleged instances of resemblance to the trinity in a quite different way from what this author here does , when he represents the three divine persons as three infinite minds , can he shew us , that the fathers ever positively affirmed or predicated any of the said resemblances used by them , of the three divine persons so , as to say , father , son , and holy ghost , are sun , light , and splendor ? but this author categorically affirms , that father , son and holy ghost , are three distinct minds or spirits ; and will he call this a bare resemblance , and no more ? nay ; does he not give this as their true and proper denomination , joining them together and affirming one of the other by a strict , and logical predication ? and must this pass for a meer resemblance too ? wherefore i would have his ignorance take notice for the future , that an allusion to a thing per modum similitudinis , and a proper account of it , quoad rei veritatem , and dogmatically representing the nature of the said thing , do vastly differ , and consequently , that to argue from one to the other can be fit for none but him , whose known talent it is only to shift and to shuffle , and instead of answering his adversary , to put a trick upon his reader . but he tells us , that he is now for discoursing something in general concerning a trinity in vnity , and concerning the words whereby to express it . and here , as a foretast of the rest , it is something pleasant to see how he expresses himself page . lines , . where , having said , that a trinity in vnity is such a distinction and such an vnion ( and why not unity ? ) as is peculiar to the godhead . he adds , that there are some faint resemblances of it in nature , yet nature has nothing like it . now i would have this acute author tell me , how there can be resemblances without likeness , or likeness without resemblance ? for i never knew two things resemble one another , but they were like one another too : resemblance being nothing else but the agreement of two or more things in any one qualification : and it is that agreement which renders and denominates them properly like . but if this man means by likeness an entire universal agreement in all respects , i must take the boldness to tell him that he speaks nonsence . forasmuch as to be properly like a thing , and to be an absolute exact copy of a thing , wholly differ : there being a rule in logick , ( which i can assure him is as little a friend to him , as he can be to that ) that omne simile est dissimile ; that is , that all likeness , in the very essence of it , imports a disagreement , in some respects , as well as it denotes an agreement in others . after which horrible thick-piece of nonsence it might justly be expected , that i should sprinkle this rude author with some of those rhetorical flowers which he had so liberally bestowed upon the animadverter ; such as ingenious blunderer , and one without sence or reason , &c. but i shall only admire him under the character which he has so modestly assumed to himself , pag. . of being ( forsooth ) an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - man ; since if ever he could pretend to that title , it must be here : for surely to find out a resemblance where there is no likeness must be an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 worthy of the greatest and most celebrated invention . otherwise to give it its due character , it is a confounded , shameless , nonsensical contradiction , and it is hard to imagine what it is like , unless it be this author's case of non-resistance , set off with horse and armes , as a comment upon the text , or a gloss upon the case . and now in accounting for the words by which the trinity is expressed ( according to his usual way of complementing the fathers ) he tells us , page . line , . that they in their disputes upon this subject wanted words adequately to express their sence . which i for my part can see no reason to grant him : for though their sence and conceptions fell exceedingly short of the sublimity of that subject ( as when a finite reason discourses of an infinite being , it cannot but do ) yet it is wholly gratìs dictum , that the fathers wanted words fully and adequately to express their own sence and conception of it ▪ for surely , so far as any one conceives of a thing , if he has a command of the language he makes use of ( as the fathers plentifully had ) he may express himself proportionably to what he conceives . but not to insist any further upon this . we have our author in the next place upon no small tryal of his skill , and that in such an instance as ( he well knows ) will very nearly affect his whole hypothesis . for finding the world not very ready to digest his scandalous notion of three distinct infinite minds or spirits , he would fain slide it out of their sight by casting a mist before their eyes ; and that is by offering to perswade the world , that the word [ mind ] may be as well applyed to the three in the godhead as the word [ person ] . to which purpose he tells us page line . that the word [ person ] signifies not only distinct but also separate subsistence , and was first used to signify separately subsisting beings , such as men and angels , and from thence was applyed by theological use to signify also persons having only a distinct subsistence , as these in the blessed trinity have no more . thus says he. in answer to which , and in direct contradiction to what he has here affirmed , i deny that the term [ person ] does , or ever did signify separate subsistence , but only complete subsistence . for though in its original use it signified indeed separately subsisting persons , such as men and angels ; yet i deny that it signified them under the particular notion , or formality of separate , or properly denoted their separation , but only their completeness . and this is undeniably proved from the received definition of a person , that it is an intelligent completely subsisting nature , or an intelligent nature with , or under a complete subsistence . so that an intelligent nature is one part of the definition , and the complete subsistence of it the other ; which making up the whole of it , it is manifest that it is indifferent to signify all intelligent natures thus completely subsisting , whether they be separate or only distinct ; and that without any regard either to their separation or bare distinction ; forasmuch as neither of these make any part of the definition of a person , as has been shewn : and therefore though i grant that the word [ person ] was first applied to signifie separate subsistences , and afterwards used to signify the subsistences of the godhead which were only distinct but not separate , yet i deny , that it did this by a translation of the word from one sence or signification to another , but only by enlarging and extending the use of it ( mark that ) to more things , than it was actually applyed to at first ; yet still so , that it was applyed with the same ▪ propriety to them all , and without the least change of its original signification . from all which i inferr , that the word [ person ] is a common term equally drawn off from , and equally predicable of [ persons ] under both these ways of subsistence , viz. separate and barely distinct. but before i proceed further , i shall from the foregoing particulars remark these two things . first , that this author , by asserting the word [ person ] to signifie originally , not only distinct but ( what is more ) separate subsistence , has given the socinians that advantage , which the contrary notion of it quite cuts them off from : for most of their arguments against a trinity of persons in the godhead are drawn from a supposal , that the very notion of a person imports and signifies a separately subsisting being ; and if this author asserts the same too , he fairly plays so much of the game into their hands ; and he must not think to resume it at his pleasure , and to beat them off from the true and proper signification of the term ( as he makes it ) without being told by them , that it is wholly precarious for him so to do , and a meer petitio principii . but , secondly , i must tell him also , ( which yet can be no news to any one ) that he does by the same very grosly contradict himself : for having in the th . page said , that the term [ person ] signifies not only a distinct , but something more , viz. a separate subsistence : afterwards in the th page , he says , that the word [ person ] is properly enough applied to the three divine persons : because all that is essential to the notion of a person belongs to each of them , though they do not subsist sepa●ately : which is a manifest contradiction to what he had said before in the th page . for if a person signifies ( as he there affirms ) not only a distinct , but also a separate subsistence ; then how can the word [ person ] be properly applied to these three subsistences , which are distinct but not separate ? or how can he truly affirm , that all that is essential to the notion of a person , belongs to each of them , if a [ person ] signifies ( as he said before ) not only a distinct , but a separate subsistence ) ? for whatsoever is included in the proper signification of it , must needs be essentially included in the notion of it too . but let him go on : for while he is contradicting himself , he is in his element ; and it would be as unkind , as difficult , to offer to take him out of it . but he proceeds ; and with great confidence , and without the least pretence of proof , tells us , that it has by vse obtained , that the term [ persons ] signifies such as have a separate subsistence , and the term [ subsistences ] such as have only a distinct subsistence , as those of the trinity have , and no more . to which i answer positively , that no such distinguishing vse has ever yet obtained ; but that the use of both terms is , and all along has been promiscuous ; the persons of the trinity having for these or centuries at least , been as often and commonly expressed by the term [ persons ] as by the term [ subsistences ] , if not much oftner . and therefore this difference of the signification of these terms is perfectly arbitrary , and of this man 's own invention ; as he who takes upon him to make divinity may as well take upon him to make distinctions too . and therefore whereas he would make the word [ person ] signifie one sort of persons , and the word [ subsistence ] signifie another sort ; i do again tell him here , that [ person ] is a common word to both , and in this mystery differs no more from [ subsistence ] than two synonymous words differ from one another : and i challenge him to produce out of the writers of the church any thing so much as tending to a proof , that it is otherwise . but he now comes ( as he says ) to apply this discourse of his about persons and subsistences to his own hypothesis about minds or spirits ; and that in these words ; what i have said of the word [ person ] is with equal reason applicable to the word [ mind ] . the animadverter ( he says ) objects against the dean , that a mind or spirit is an absolute being , nature and substance . and i grant it is so in the common vse of the word , as applied to created minds and spirits , but so is a person also as much as mind . p. . l. . but stay here , good sir , stay a little . for this i utterly deny , having before demonstratively shewn , that though the word [ person ] in the original use of it . was actually applied to beings of an absolute and separate subsistence , ( such as angels and men ) , yet that even then they never signified them under the proper formality of absolute and separate , but only of complete subsistences ; and by consequence equally agreed to all complete subsistences , whether separate and absolute , or only distinct and relative , as the divine persons are ; so that here is not only the vse of the word [ person ] , but also the definition of it ; making it equally applicable to both these sorts of subsistence , viz. absolute and relative . but , on the other side , i would fain know of this author , whether the definition of a mind or spirit , can agree to any but to an absolute being , nature or substance ? and if it can agree to none else , how it can be applied to a subsistence perfectly relative , ( as all the divine subsistences are ) so as in its original and properest signification to signifie that too ? which yet ( as i have shewn ) the definition of a [ person ] properly does . well , but admitting ( though not granting ) that the term [ mind or spirit ] may be drawn off from its proper and received signification and definition , so , that three minds or spirits may signifie three distinct relative subsistences of one and the same infinite and eternal mind or spirit included in all or each of them : i say , if the term [ three minds ] may be brought to this signification , it must have been by a long received custome , which this man calls theological vse : and then i require this author to shew us such a theological use of this word [ mind ] ; that is , a concurrence of all divines for several ages throughout the catholick church expressing the three divine subsistences or persons of the godhead by three distinct infinite minds ▪ that is to say , three relatives by three absolutes . the term [ persons ] indeed has been applied to these three subsistences ; and that both from the original signification and definition of the word , as also from the constant use of it by the church for many centuries ; but the term [ infinite minds ] was never plurally applied to them upon either of these accounts by any orthodox divine or writer ; unless this particular author's making use of it in his pretended vindication of the doctrine of the trinity , &c. can be called the theological vse of the word : for i suppose , that neither are all divines included in him , nor is he to be thought equivalent to them all , whatsoever he may think himself . nevertheless for his own and the worlds satisfaction , i shall shew him what theological use of the word [ three minds or spirits ] instead of [ three divine persons ] i meet with . and first of all theodoret in his first book haereticarum fabularum , and the chapter tells us of a certain sect called the peratae , who held in the divine nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : so that here is one theological use of the word [ minds or spirits ] thus applyed , for him . and valentinus gentilis held in the godhead three eternal spirits or minds ; of which one was called by him the essentiator , and the other two the essentiati . ( in which i cannot see what he differs from this author . ) so that here is another theological vse of this word for him . and thirdly his friend stephanus curcellaeus , in his treatise de trinitate , frequently calls the divine person tres aeternos spiritus , asserting a specifick vnity between them ( which this author also would fain be at ) and denying a numerical . so that here is a third theological use of the same word to comfort and encourage him . and i wish him all the credit and satisfaction that such theological company can give him . in the mean time , whereas he tells the world in the close of this paragraph , that when the dean ( as he calls him ) speaks of three distinct infinite minds which are essentially and inseparably one , he could [ mean ] nothing more ( where he gives us meaning against words again ) than three distinct intelligent but not separate subsistences , p. . l. . i must tell him in answer to this , that if he here speaks of three distinct minds as essentially one by one and the same numerical essence ( which is the only essential vnity here spoken of with reference to the trinity ) it is an intolerable contradiction : forasmuch as each mind or spirit being one , by a particular essence of it's own constituting it such a particular mind or spirit , three distinct minds or spirits can never be essentially one , by one numerical essence belonging to them all ; which yet the three persons in the blessed trinity are and must be . and whereas he says , that by three minds he means three intelligent subsistences . i ask him whether these three subsistences are relative or absolute . if he says relative , i do here tell him , that then they are not three minds ( a mind being defined an intelligent immaterial substance ; ) which imports nothing relative in it at all . but if he says , that these subsistences are absolute , i then affirm , that they are not the three persons in the trinity ; which , as such , both are and of necessity must be relative . so that it is evident , that this man knows not which way to turn himself , nor how to speak of the subject he is treating of , with any consistency with common sence . and this makes his boldness the more unpardonable in saying , that he needs ask no other pardon for affirming the three divine persons to be three infinite minds , but for the use of a word which the schools had not consecrated , p. . l. . in answer to which , since he here charges the non-using of it only upon the schools , i challenge him to shew me any other writers of the church , accounted orthodox , who have made use of it ; or affirmed the three divine persons to be three distinct minds or spirits . let him , i say , assign them , if he can . and if he cannot , the using of the word thus applyed , must even by his own confession , p. . l. . be an unusual way of speaking at least ; that is to say , a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and if it were no more than so , let him shew ●ow he is able to justifie the use of that , which a general council had denounced an anathema to the users of , in these high points about the trinity and incarnation . but this is not all , for i come upon him yet further , and demand of him , how he will answer to the church , not only his presuming to introduce such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in treating of this high mystery , and that in the room of the anciently received terms ; but his venturing to do this , when he himself confesses and declares , as he does in the ● th page . lin . . that there could not have been more proper terms used by the church to express a trinity in vnity by , than those ancient ones made use of all along about it : viz. than three subsistences in one individual nature , which ( he says ) differ nothing from each other but in their different manner of subsistence . these are his words . and when the impartial reader has perused them , and compared them with what is cited out of his vindication concerning this very term [ subsistence and subsistences ] amongst others set down in the second chapter of the animadversions , and the and th pages : i suppose he will find it high time to bless himself . for i here challenge this shameless man to reconcile , or do any thing like reconciling , what he says here , to what he has said there , if he can . and yet as great a perversion , as a word mis-applied and forced from its true signification must inevitably cause in so nice , as well as great , a point as this is , it is not however barely this author 's not hereafter using this term [ three minds as equipollent to three persons ] that will justifie him , if he still retains the sence of it ; and therefore i must here tell him , that if he holds the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite absolute beings , three distinct infinite spirits , three distinct infinite substances , ( as substance stands contradistinct to subsistence ) ; let him abandon and lay aside the use of the word [ minds ] never so much , he is yet a tritheist , and a real assertor of three gods. but after all , the judicious reader may here observe , what a pleasant manager of controversie this man is . for he first asserted , the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds or spirits , affirming withal , in most impudent manner , that to hold otherwise was heresie and nonsence ; see his vindicat. p. . lin . . but when the world cried out of this scandalous tritheism , and the animadverter , even in the judgment of the animadverter's spightfullest enemies , had throughly confuted it : and , on the contrary , maintained , that the three divine persons are three distinct subsistences of one and the same infinite eternal mind , included in , or belonging to all and each of them ; why then , this man ( according to his excellent and known talent of tacking about ) fairly comes over to his adversary so far as to proclaim shamelesly to the world , that though he spoke indeed of [ minds ] , yet he meant only [ subsistences ] ; whereas it is impossible that minds should be subsistences , or subsistences minds . such a felicity is it for a man , whose [ word ] is so apt to throw him into a plunge , to have a trusty [ meaning ] still ready at hand , to fetch him out again . but if this be to defend an hypothesis , then the way to carry a cause is to give it up , and the surest conquest , to quit the field . in the next place , he passes from the distinction of the divine persons to the unity and identity of their divine nature . and here ( according to his constant custom of charging the fathers with some defect or other in expressing themselves ) he tells us , that they were at a greater loss for words to express this latter by , than the former , p. . l. . there being but one word to do it , viz. the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and this too of it self not sufficient . concerning which i must tell him in the first place , that the truth receives no prejudice at all from there being no other [ one word ] to express this unity or identity of the godhead in the divine persons by ; since ( god be thanked ) there are several very significant words and ways to explain this [ one word ] by . but the main question is , whether the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be sufficient to express this or no ? and here i must tell this presuming man who denies it to be so , first , that the nicene fathers and the catholick church with them then thought it so . and secondly , that the nature of the thing necessarily proves it so . and in order to this i would have him take notice , that the sence of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to be measured by the proper condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which it relates to , and therefore , though the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may in it self be indifferent to signify either a specifick or numerical agreement in nature , ( according as the nature is to which it refers ) yet when the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is joined with an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importing such an essential unity in it as renders it uncapable of all multiplication , ( as an eus summà perfectum , or an infinite nature in the very notion of it must be ) there the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must of necessity signify an agreement in a numerical unity and identity of nature , and no other : for still the condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to measure the sence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and accordingly i do affirm against this man , that there is no such thing as specifick vnity or identity , or any thing like it , or analogous to it belonging to the divine nature ; but only a numerical vnity and no more . which being the highest and perfectest sort of vnity , is above , and instead of all other unities whatsoever . and the reason of this is , because all specifick vnity of nature is founded in the imperfection and defect of the said nature , as rendring it capable of multiplication ; which is certainly a defect ; and let him take this rule with him for once , which i defy him to overthrow , viz. that in naturam non multiplicabilem non cadit vnitas specifica : for as much as specifick vnity is but one common conception of the mind gathered from the agreement it finds in a plurality of particular natures amongst themselves ; as every created individual has it's particular distinct nature to it self , and not a part of a common nature shared amongst all the individuals . but will this man affirm , that there are three particular divine natures out of which the mind may form such a specifick vnity as we have been speaking of ? let him therefore either renounce his very share in common sence and reason , or disclaim this abominable absurdity of a specifick vnity in the divine nature , or of any thing so much as like it , or analogous to it , or ( in his own words , p. . ) that perfectly answers it . and whereas he alleges the fathers explaining the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by examples of a specifick vnity in created beings , i tell him that the fathers used not these examples as instances for representation of the like vnity amongst the divine persons ; but as a ground for arguing aà minore ad majus against the arians , who would not allow so much as a specifick vnity of nature between the father and the son : whereupon the fathers thus argued against them , if you will allow the generation of a son in the divine nature , certainly it ought to be more perfect , or at least as perfect as that which we observe in men : and since the perfection of generation in them , is for a father to produce his like , shall men generate others of the same nature with themselves , and shall god generate one of quite another nature from his own , as a finite nature must necessarily be ? this was the force of their argument , and it was directed against the arians ; but never were these explications alledged as adequate representations of the same unity of nature in the divine persons , that was in men. but ( as it was intimated before in the animadversions ) no doubt this author has been all along pursuing this tritheistical whimsey of a specifick vnity , only in order to the providing an unity of nature for his three infinite minds or spirits : which ( by all the wit of men and angels ) can never be proved capable of any greater vnity than specifick . but this point about a specifick vnity of the godhead has been so throughly debated , and the impossibility of it so clearly demonstrated by the animadverter , chap. . from the to the page , that this man should have done well to have answer'd what was to be found there before he troubled the reader with the same old baffled story again . i conclude therefore against this author , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applyed to the divine persons , does fully and sufficiently express the numerical vnity and identity of the divine nature belonging to them , without importing any thing of specifick vnity in the same , or any thing so much as analogous to it . after he has done with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he excepts against the terms [ single and singular ] as applied to the divine nature : but he first draws them off from their proper and received signification , according to which all divines , whether schoolmen or others , have in treating of the divine nature , generally used them , expressing the said nature by no word more commonly than by singularis essentia , & singularis natura . and does this man now think to take this word by a wrong , exotick signification ( of which more presently ) and in the strength of that to run down and casheir the true and genuine sence of it ? which , besides the confusion it must needs bring upon all discourses about the godhead , and the divine persons , will not fail also to give mighty scandal to all sober and learned men , both papists and protestants , who are concerned to have these weighty points , not only truly stated , but also warily treated of . for my own part i must declare , that i never met with stranger and more untheological assertions , than what this author has concerning the application of the terms [ single and singular ] to the divine nature ; and yet the true sence of them lies pain and obvious almost in all scholastick writers . so that whatsoever is signified by hoc unum , individuum , and numericè unum , the same also is signified by singulare ; they being all but synonymous words to express that greatest and perfectest vnity which we call numerical ; and it will be hard to assign where we may properly apply any one of them , and not as properly apply the other . so that if this author would but have understood these and the like terms in the same sence in which both philosophers and divines use them , he could never have abused the subject he wrote upon , nor exposed himself with such false and scandalous assertions as these that follow . . that the vnity of nature between the eternal father and son is such an vnity as is both specifick and numerical . . that the divine nature is not a single or singular nature , p. . lin . . . that upon supposal of the singleness or singularity of the divine nature , the whole divine nature cannot be incarnate in the incarnation of the son , without the incarnation of the whole trinity thereby , p. . lin . . . that one single nature can subsist but once , or have but one subsistence , p. . lin . . all which four propositions i find in the compass of less than three whole pages , viz. , , . and they are of that vile import , that i defie either arian or socinian to speak more against the vnity of the three divine persons in one and the same infinite divine nature , than this man in some of the forementioned propositions has done . but i shall consider them particularly , though they are much fitter for the publick censure of the church , than for any private man's confutation . and first for the . first proposition , viz , that the vnity of nature between the eternal father and son is such an vnity as is both specifical and numerical . this is fully and plainly asserted by this author , ( though not in these very words ) as the reader will find in the th page and th line of this defence . where speaking of the vnity of nature between the eternal father and son , he affirms , that there must be that in it that perfectly answers that specifick sameness of nature that is between father and son in humane persons ; of which , but four or five lines before , he had given an instance in abraham and isaac ; and withal , that it must not only perfectly answer , but much out do it too . but now , on the one hand , nothing can perfectly answer one instance of specifick unity or sameness , but another instance of the same kind ; forasmuch as two kinds or sorts of unity can never perfectly answer one another ; nor , on the other hand , can any sort of unity out do a specifick vnity but a numerical ; for no one specifick vnity can do more towards the uniting the things it belongs to , than another ; there being but one and the same formal effect common to all specifick vnities , which is to render and denominate their respective subjects specifically one and no more . this , i say , is all that a specifick vnity can do , and if more be done , it must be by a numerical . but again , in the th line of the same page , he tells us to the same purpose , that the vnity or sameness of nature between the father , son and holy ghost , is not a meer specifick sameness ; which words must imply and inferr , that it is a specifick sameness , though he affirms it to be also something more . to which passages we may add two more altogether as full for this complex sort of vnity , viz. one in page . line . and the other , p. . l. . of his vindication . from all which it is manifest , that this author holds such an vnity or sameness of nature in the divine persons , as is both specifick and numerical ; which i affirm to be as gross an absurdity as the reason of man can well imagine . for a specifick and a numerical unity are not two degrees of one kind , but two several kinds of unities . two unities differing toto genere ; and consequently such as cannot possibly coincide into any one unity which shall comprehend and partake of both . for a numerical vnity is the unity of one individual nature or being and no more , and a specifical vnity is the unity of several particular individual natures or beings : and therefore unless the same thing can both be one individual and no more , and be several particular individuals too , for any one to assert the same vnity to be both specifical and numerical , ( as this author undeniably does ) is a monstrous contradiction . but this has been so fully laid open already ( as to that part of it especially , which concerns a specifick unity in the divine nature ) ; that to say any more of it would be but a needless repetition : and so i proceed to the . second proposition , viz. that the divine nature is not a single or singular nature , def. p. . l. . which i , on the contrary , positively assert it to be , upon these following considerations . first , that the divine nature is either a singular , or an vniversal nature ; but not an vniversal , and therefore a singular . the consequence is manifest , because singular and universal adequately divide being ; and therefore there can be nothing but what must fall under one of the members of the division : and then , that the divine nature cannot be vniversal , is as evident ; because if so , it must be drawn off from several particular natures ; but there are not several particular divine natures for it to be abstracted or drawn off from . add to this , that the denial of the singularity of the divine nature would overthrow its very existence , for nothing exists but singulars . secondly , individuality and singularity of nature are the same thing , both of them importing the greatest and perfectest degree of unity , which is numerical ; and consequently since this very author affirms the individuality of the divine nature , p. . line . the singularity of it must be granted too . thirdly , this man all along supposes singleness or singularity essentially to imply in it subsistence , but this is a gross mistake ; for neither does it imply it in the essential notion , nor yet in the real existence of the thing . not in the first , for the singularity of a thing belongs to its essence , even as prescinding and abstracting from its subsistence , as something posterior to it ; and therefore it does not essentially imply it . and accordingly , when we consider the divine nature abstracted from its respective subsistences , ( which we may and often do ) we still consider it as one numerical individual substance , that is to say , in its highest unity and singularity ; and therefore the essential notion of singularity does not imply subsistence in it . nor , in the next place , does it necessarily imply the same , as it actually exists : for the second person of the trinity assumed the humane nature without its proper subsistence , but not without its proper singularity . for it was one numerical individual single humane nature which he took upon him ; so that upon this account also singularity does not necessarily inferr subsistence . but here i think fit to observe , that the word single or singular ( which are here the same ; there being but one latine word singulare for both ) may be taken in two very different sences . first , in its strict and most proper sence ; for numerical or individual unity of nature . or , secondly , in a larger and less proper sence , for that which has but one subsistence only ; and this is not so properly called single , as solitary , and by no means applicable to the divine nature , which has not only one , but three subsistences belonging to it . this was the sence in which the sabellians used the word , or rather which they put upon it , contending for , and allowing only a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , such a divine nature as was capable but of one subsistence and no more . but such a singleness in the divine nature the catholick church neither knew nor owned , and yet still maintained the individuality and numerical vnity , and consequently the true and proper singularity of the same . and will this man now , from the improper signification of the word [ single or singular ] , as applied by the sabellians to the divine nature , deny the divine nature to be a single or singular nature , according to the true , proper and generally received sence of singularity , which , both with logicians and philosophers , is so perfectly the same with numerical unity , that it is impossible for any thing to be numerically one and not singular too ? but how positively soever he denies the singleness or singularity of the divine nature here , he asserts it as positively ( and that as the universal concurring sence of all the fathers ) in his vindication , p. . line . where he roundly tells us , that all the fathers assert the singularity of the godhead , or numerical unity of the divine essence , and that the three divine persons are united in this one numerical essence , which ( according to the fathers ) he calls the singularity of the godhead . this , i say , he expresly says in the place alledged ; and i desire him to reconcile it to what he says every whit as expresly , in page . line . of this defence , viz. that the divine nature is one individual nature , but not one single or singular nature : and again , that one single nature can be but one person , whether in god , or man ; and yet further , p. . line . that it is demonstrable that one single nature can have but one subsistence . so that if he will abide by what he says in this defence , he absolutely casheirs whatsoever he himself had elsewhere owned to be the sence and language of all the fathers ; and ( he might have added ) of the schoolmen , and all other divines besides ; nor is this all , but he utterly overthrows also a trinity of persons by averring it demonstrable , that there can be no plurality of subsistences in one single or singular nature ; and if no plurality of subsistences , then i am sure no plurality of persons neither . but ( thanks be to god ) though he uses this big word demonstrable , yet what he calls demonstration , others account not so much as a probable proof , where he is the demonstrator : and let none wonder that he can so scandalously contradict himself in two books , who so often does it in the space of two lines . but , methinks , what he alleges out of victorinus afer , for disproving the singularity of the divine nature in three persons , comes something with the latest , viz. those notable words of his , non oportet , nec fas est dicere , vnam esse substantiam , tres esse personas , p. . l. . in opposition to which one forlorn testimony it were easy to allege forty fathers at least constantly expressing the trinity by vna substantia , and tres personae ; but that i think it very needless to assign who does so , when it is hard to assign who does not . and therefore as for his thus recurring to victorinus afer ; i must take the boldness to tell him , that this is not so much a quoting as a weeding of antiquity ; since surely a more incompetent authority in the present subject could not well be found ; as the circumstances of the man might easily evince . for this victorinus was old before he became a christian ; and when , upon his becoming so , he betook himself to write upon some articles of the christian faith , he did it so perplexedly and obscurely , and very often so dangerously and unjustifiably , as to his way of expressing himself , that the learned dr. cave ( but with a modesty equal to his learning ) gives this character of him in his historia literar . p. . non videtur ubique fidei dogmata satìs accuratè percepisse , saltem non satìs feliciter expressisse . so that for ought i see , this defender might as well have quoted the epistolae obscurorum virorum , or even himself for the elegancies of the latine tongue , as victorinus afer for an authentick director , how we ought to conceive , or to express our selves about the article of the trinity ; but to conclude this head ; what design this man could have in thus stripping the divine nature of it's singularity by making a difference between this , and it's individuality ( unless he thinks hereby the better to introduce his tritheism , and , in time , to give another sence even of individuality too ) i cannot imagine . but i doubt not but his not duly stateing & distinguishing the terms used in disputation , will quickly drive him headlong into the grossest heresies . and so i pass to . his third proposition , which runs thus , that upon supposal of the singleness or singularity of the divine nature , the whole divine nature cannot be incarnate in the incarnation of the son , but the whole trinity must thereby be incarnate too . now this blessed proposition is borrowed from the socinians also ; and is as arrant socinianism as any part of that whole heresy . but the answer to it is this , that in the incarnation of the second person , the whole divine nature is incarnate , but not wholly ; that is to say , non-quoad omnem suum subsistendi modum , not in respect of all its modes or ways of subsisting , but only of one alone , viz. that founded in filiation , and proper only to the second person of the trinity ; and therefore since the godhead is not incarnate under that proper mode of subsisting , which it has in the father , nor under that other which it has in the holy ghost ; the incarnation of the whole divine nature in the son does not infer the incarnation of the whole trinity , since the said nature is not hereby incarnate as to those other two modes of subsistence , which it has respectively in those other two persons . and this passage i recommend to the reader 's observation , as one notable instance of those intolerable heterodoxies which this man 's denying all modes in the divine nature , will and must inevitably plunge him into . . as for his fourth and last proposition , viz. that one single nature can subsist but once , or have but one subsistence . this is so beyond all bounds of shame , scandalous and heretical , and so absolutely destroys three personal subsistences in one single divine nature , that i shall say nothing in answer to it ( having sufficiently overthrown it by what was said before ) but only set down the doctrine held by all catholick divines , and writers in direct opposition to it . viz. that one and the same numerical , individual , single divine nature has three distinct persons , or subsistences so belonging to it , that it exists in common in them all , and severally in each of them . this i affirm to be the catholick doctrine , and shall say no more to the fore-recited shameful proposition , but leave both it and it's author to be argued down by that authority which is much abler and fitter to deal with such persons and doctrines , than any disputant can be . in the mean time , if these villanous heterodoxies should ( as was hinted before in the animadversions , chap. . ) chance to cross the water , with what tragical out cryes and clamorous reflexions upon our church would both papists and protestants from all parts eccho them back to us again ? only our poor church has this one small happiness amongst her many unhappinesses at present , that many of those who receive her revenues , and wear her honors , and ( in requital of both , invade her doctrines ) yet ( thanks be to god ) neither do nor can carry her disgrace further than the reach of their native tongue . but our innovator rests not in his former explications of the trinity , but offers us another and a plainer , and that is by a man and his living image , ( if any one could tell where to find it ) . however the notion of it is , as the rest were ▪ perfectly his own ; and ( if possible ) extreamly more absurd . and to lay it before the reader it is thus : he considers a man seeing himself represented by reflexion from a glass , or some such body , ( for it is an image by reflexion only which he here professes to speak of ) . now , says he , let us suppose this to be a living image , and that such an one as should exactly answer it's prototype , not only in its external features , colours , and postures , but also in the internal acts of the soul ; such as knowledge , volition , ioy , grief , &c. so that as the man himself knew , or willed any thing , the image likewise should exactly know and will the same . this supposed , he tells us further , that this image would be another person from the prototype , but not another man ; forasmuch as he supposes the prototype and the image to have the same numerical humane nature in them both , and that so , as to perform all the acts of a man both in the one , and in the other . this is the account he gives us of this living image , in order to his explication of the trinity by it . and i shall bring it under a particular examination . but before i do so , i require this author to tell me , whether , in pag. . of this defence , he does not profess to lay the foundation of his new hypothesis in giving an account of the mysterious vnion of the divine persons by the unity of a spirit ? and whether he does not withal declare himself certainly in the right , in pitching upon that as the best way of explaining the said union ; and not the best only , but indeed the only fit and proper way of doing it ? forasmuch as in the strength of it he does with great contempt reject all the material , sensible representations which the fathers were wont to set forth this mystery by ; making it his business to substitute his own account of this mysterious union of the persons from the unity of a spirit , as the only thing that could make it intelligible : this is certainly so , as appears from the fore-cited place ; and since it cannot be denied , i desire this author , in the next place , to inform me how the explication of this mysterious union by a man and his living image , is explaining it by the unity of a spirit : and whether the man , or his image , or both , be spirits , and the resemblance between them be this unity of a spirit , which he spoke of in the place alleaged ? and if they are not , i demand with what face he can reiect the material representations made by the fathers of this mysterious union , and give the world another of his own from an instance altogether as gross and material , but withal impossible and unintelligible ; as shall appear in the process of what we have to say upon it ? but all this author's writings are such perfect antipodes to themselves , that no man who knows him , will expect to find him consistent with himself in any thing . but to proceed , i come now to examine , whether this notion of a man and his living image has in it such a peculiar fitness ( as this author pretends ) to represent and explain to us the mystery of the trinity ; and in order to it i shall lay down this assertion , viz. that a notion supposing a thing impossible , and implying in it a contradiction to , and inconsistency with it self , can never explain any , and much less the highest mystery of our religion . in order to the proving of which i shall consider three things . . what an image in the proper signification of the word is . . what an image by reflexion is . . what is to be understood by an impossible supposition . . as to the first of which ; an image , according to the general nature of it , is such a likeness of a thing as both represents it , and proceeds from it ; and that , either as from a principal efficient producing it , or as from a causa exempla●is , at least , according to which it is produced . which i add because of artificial images , formed according to , and so proceeding from that idea or pattern in the mind of the artificer , drawn from the thing , which the image designed by him is to represent . so that an image , whether natural or artificial , essentially implies these two things as the general conditions of it , viz. a representation of , and a production either by , or from the thing represented by it . . secondly , an image by reflexion is , when the visible species flowing from any thing , and striking upon some such body as glass , water , or polish'd metal , are return'd back from thence , and thereby represent the body which they originally flow'd from . and such an image this author here speaks of ; for he says , it is a man's image by reflexion . . in the third place , an impossible supposition may be said to be so in a double respect . first , in respect of all natural , second causes , as exceeding all the force and vertue of such causes , to effect the thing so supposed . and i deny not , but that the supposition of a thing impossible in this sense , may have its use sometimes to give us some light into , and explication of other things . secondly , a thing may be said to be impossible in respect of a contradiction involved in it ; so that no power whatsoever can effect it . and the supposition of such impossibles i affirm to be of no use for the explication of any thing whatsoever . forasmuch as the mind of man can have no formed conception of them ; and yet , whatsoever helps it to the knowledge of another thing , must do it by being first known it self . which things premised , let us now see what this author holds and asserts concerning this living image set up by him , that we may hereby find whether it involves in it any contradiction or no ; and it will appear , that he asserts these three things concerning it . . that this living image by reflexion has its whole and sole dependence upon the prototype . . that there is one and the same numerical humane nature , both in the prototype and the image . . that the prototype and the image are two distinct persons . these things , i say , he asserts of his living image ; concerning which i remark as follows . . that to assert an image by reflexion to have its sole and total dependence upon the prototype , ( as this author says it has ) while it has an equally necessary and essential dependence upon the body , which it is reflected from , is a contradiction . . to assert , that one and the same particular humane nature subsists in two particular persons locally distant from one another , ( as the prototype and the image are ) is a contradiction . . to assert , that an image by reflexion ( which is a being uncapable of subsisting by it self ) is a completely subsisting person , endued with an humane nature , and consequently consisting of an humane soul and body , is a contradiction : and again , for it to be an humane person , endued with an humane nature , ( as this author asserts it is ) and yet not to consist of such a soul and body , is another contradiction . these absurdities , and innumerable more derivable from them , are all involved in this author's notion of a living image by reflexion , having the same numerical humane nature with the man himself , and having its sole dependence upon him , and yet being a separate person from him . but not to insist upon these absurdities at present , ( which common sence and reason must needs abhor , and fly from ) yet since this notion is designed to explain and represent to us the vnion ( or rather unity ) of the father and the son in one and the same divine nature , surely there ought at least to be no gross disparity between this living image and the thing intended to be explained by it , especially as to those particulars wherein the resemblance must and ought to consist . but whether this be so or no , will appear from the following comparison . as first , there is a mutually necessary existence , both of the father and the son , so that the father can be no more without the son , than the son without the father ; the relation being inseparable . but it is not so in the man and his image ; for the man may cease to be a prototype , and subsist without the image , though the image cannot subsist without the man. secondly , the son has an entire total dependance upon the father . but so has not the image upon the prototype , as depending as much on the body from which it is reflected , as it does or can upon the man whom it represents , and perhaps more . thirdly , the father and the son are mutually in one another , and that by an intimate inexistence , as the words of our saviour expresly prove , iohn . . but the prototype , and the image cannot be in one another , as being locally distant from each other . fourthly , the person of the father , and of the son are only distinct , but otherwise inseparably united ; but the prototype and the image are so divided , as to subsist in an actual separation from one another ; the place and vbi of the one , ( as we observed ) being not the place or vbi of the other . and now , to sum up and draw the foregoing particulars together . let us on the one side suppose two persons , viz. the eternal father and son ; and these first , by a mutual necessity coexisting ; and then one of them , viz. the son , having his sole and total dependance upon the other ; and thirdly , both of them mutually inexisting in one another ; and lastly , only distinct in their subsistence , but by no means separate or divided . let all this , i say , be supposed on the part of the eternal father and son ; and on the other side , let us suppose two other persons , viz. the prototype and his living image , and these , without any necessary coexistence with one another ; and the latter not having it 's sole dependance upon the former , and both of them such as cannot mutually exist in one another , and withal are not only distinct in their respective subsistences , but also actually separate and locally divided from each other . now , i say , when we have collated all these disparities together , must not that comparison ( think we ) give us a blessed edifying , representation of the unity of the eternal father , and son in the same numerical divine nature , when one side of the comparison is so far from being an explication of , that it is a direct , irreconcileable contradiction to , the other ? but as we first waved the consideration of those monstrous absurdities that were involved in this notion of a man and his living image , with reference to the eternal father and son ; so let us at present wave the forementioned gross disparities between them also , yet still this notion is utterly unfit to give us any explication of the trinity , as being every whit as difficult , if not more difficult for the mind of man to conceive , than the trinity it self . for the grand difficulty here , is to conceive how one and the same infinite nature can be in several distinct , though intimately vnited persons ; and the thing , which this author would explain this by , is a man and his image , where he supposes one and the same numerically subsisting human nature to be in two locally distinct , and separately subsisting persons . but now in this case , is it not much more conceivable , that an infinite nature ( whose boundless perfection reaches to more ways of subsisting than one ) should subsist in several persons , and those only distinct ; than that a particular finite nature ( which can have but one subsistence ) should subsist in two persons , and those also locally distant , and separate from one another ? i appeal , i say , to any man of judgment alive , whether this be not the greater and more inexplicable difficulty of the two ? for the mind of man finds an utter contradiction in making a finite being exist at on●e in two distant places or vbi's ; but in the former , though it finds an insuperable difficulty , yet it can allege no contradiction . and therefore i say again , that it is in the highest degree senceless and irrational to assign that as an explication of a thing , which is more difficult , perplexed and inconceivable , than the thing it self which it pretends to explain . which yet is the case here of a man and his living image , as the notion of it has been stated and applied to the present subject . so that this wonderful 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a clearer idea of the trinity , than ever the world had before , has these three excellent qualifications to recommend it . . that it supposes and builds upon several things utterly contradictious and impossible . . that it makes one thing the representation of another , between which yet ( as to the very particulars wherein the resemblance should be ) there is the highest and utmost disparity . and thirdly and lastly , that it offers to explain a thing difficult , obscure , and by human reason not comprehensible , by another thing which is ten times more so . so that if this must be the lot of the church of england to sit down , and see her most holy religion practised upon by such wretched innovations , as can tend only to ridicule and expose the chief articles of it to the scorn of arians , and socinians , and all this , under pretence of explaining them ; i can but say , god deliver our poor church from such explainers , and our creed from such explications . and , as i heartily commiserate the vnhappy state of that , so i really pity this bold man himself , that he should be thus suffered to go on venting his scandalous heterodoxies , without finding either friends to counsel , or superiors to controll him . nevertheless should we , with a non obstante to what has been said , comply with this man 's absurd notion so far , as to allow his prototype and his living image to bear such a peculiar resemblance to the eternal father and son , ( as he pretends , but can never prove them to do ) yet how does this any way explain , or give us ( as he calls it ) any idea of the trinity ? for are the father and the son the trinity without the holy ghost ? and how does this prototype and living image set forth to us the procession of the holy ghost from both of them , when it makes no mention of any third person at all ? the son indeed issues from the father in the way of knowledge , by a reflex act thereof , expressing his infinite nature and perfections ; whereupon , as it is the property both of knowledge , and of an image to represent some thing , so if this prototype and living image can be of any use , to help our notions of the eternal generation , it must be by its representing quality . but now the holy ghost issues from the father and son , per modum voluntatis , by an eternal incomprehensible act of love streaming from them both ; and the property of love , we know , is not to represent ( as knowledge does ) but to unite to the object known . and here , i pray , what does the living image do towards the setting forth of this ? why our author indeed makes the prototype one person , and his living image another ; but do these two by an act of love , or any other act proceeding jointly from both , produce a third person ? if not , what idea of a trinity can be drawn from these two ? but if this author will say , ( as he says things no less absurd ) that the prototype and his living image do produce some certain third person distinct from both of them , and so answering to the holy ghost in the trinity ; i desire him to tell the world , what kind of thing this third person is , and by what name it is to be called , and expressed ; for i never yet heard or read of any such , nor am i so much an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - man , as to fetch it from my own invention . but , besides all the foregoing absurdities , it is worth observing , what a notable cast of his ignorance he gives us about emanation , def. p. . l. . and , in order to it , i think fit to shew , what an emanation and a cause by emanation is . now a cause or principle by 〈◊〉 emanation is that which produces its effect or term , without any intervening action really distinct from either the agent or effect . and accordingly , that is properly called an emanation , or an effect by emanation , ( for the word here signifies passively ) which issues immediately , naturally and necessarily ( unless hinder'd by a supernatural power ) from the substance of its productive principle : concerning which , we are to observe also , that though a cause or principle by emanation , in a large sence , is reckoned an efficient cause , and reduced to it , yet in the strictest and properest sense of an efficient cause , it is not so ; as not producing its effect by an action or efficiency properly so called , but only by resultance or efflux , ( which are the best words which philosophers have to express the peculiar causality of it by ) . and now to explain what i have said , by instances . all properties are said to be emanations or effects resulting from their forms . and all accidents immediately affecting and issuing from their subjects are emanations . and all sensible and intelligible species , flowing from the things which they represent , are emanations . and the light issuing from the sun is an emanation . to all which we may add , the substantial derivative modes belonging to the divine nature . which being premised , let us see what propositions this man advances upon this subject . as first , that an image is not an emanation but a reflexion : which is manifestly oppositum in apposito . for an image by reflexion in things material is both ; viz. an emanation from the prototype or exemplar , from which the species sensibiles issue or proceed ; and a reflexion from that ( whether medium or object ) upon which they terminate , and from which , by repercussion , they are return'd back again . secondly , he tells us , that the son and the holy ghost are not emanations from the father . but on the contrary , i affirm , that the son is an emanation from the father , and the holy ghost from both. for though generation expresses the particular way of the son 's issuing from the father , and procession the particular way of the holy ghost's issuing both from father and son , yet emanation is here a general word properly applicable to , and expressive of both of them . and accordingly aquinas affirms , that the son proceeds from the father , not as an effect from a cause . ( viz. an efficient cause properly so called ) but by way of intellectual emanation : affirming withal , that this is the catholick faith. and one of higher note in the church than aquinas , even the great athanasius himself owns and commends the doctrine of dionysius , concerning the eternal generation of the son ; for that , in his explaining of it , and speaking of the father as a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or mind , and of the son as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or word of that mind , he expresly calls the latter an emanation from the former , in those words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies properly emanatio , aut effluviam , which all know are terms synonymous , athanas. tom. . p. . edit . colon. it is true indeed , that in the son 's issuing from the father , and the holy ghost's issuing from both , there is , besides the terminus producens , and the terminus productus , assigned also an act or action , viz. generation with reference to the son , and spiration to the holy ghost ; yet because these are not actions or efficiencies properly so called , viz. distinct entities from the terminus producens , and productus , but really identified with both , therefore the production both of son and holy ghost are truly and properly to be reckoned emanations . thirdly , the defender affirms , than an emanation is of the same substance , viz. specifically the same with that from which it proceeds ; of which i desire him to shew me so much as one instance in the whole world , if he can . fourthly , that an emanation multiplies natures and substances , as being individually distinct from that , from which it issues ; which yet in the son 's issuing from the father , and the holy ghost's issuing from both , is certainly false ; for though these emanations multiply persons ▪ yet they do not multiply substances . nor are these two propositions , viz. the third and fourth , less false with reference to those other forementioned emanations or emanative effects , set down by us : for , since none of them all are substances , they can neither be said to be substances specifically the same with , nor substances individually distinct from those several substances from which they flow . fifthly , and lastly , he tells us , that when the fathers call the holy spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it is not in the sence of emanation , but of mysterious procession . to which i answer as before , that he here opposes things fairly subordinate ; viz. a general term to a particular . for procession is really and truly an emanation ; though every emanation ( it being a more general word ) is not a procession : and therefore , for this man to say , ( as he here does ) that the holy ghost is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not by emanation but by procession ; is just as if one should say of peter , that he is not a living creature , but a man. from all which it follows , that this author is grosly ignorant of the true philosophical sence of the term emanation ; sometimes applying it to one thing , and sometimes denying it of another ; but both at a venture , and just as people use to play at blind-man's buff. in fine , i conclude from what has been discoursed upon this whole matter , that this autor's fiction of a man and his living image ought not to be admitted or endured , as at all explicatory of the trinity , but to be rejected as a most senseless , self-repugnant , absurd notion , as he has started it , and fit only to abuse the minds of men with wrong and perverse apprehensions of this great mystery . the scriptures indeed call the eternal son the image of the father , coloss. . . and speak also of adam's begetting a son after his own likeness , genes . . . but both these places import a quite different sort of image from the living image insisted upon by this author . for the ratio imaginis in both these consist not barely in representation and production , but in such a peculiar sort of production , as is by generation : for the holy spirit has all the natural e●●ential perfections of the father and the son , and consequently a substantial likeness to both ; and is withal produced by them , and proceeds from them : but because this is not by a generative production , ( which is the proper , natural way of conveying substantial likeness ) therefore the latine fathers never give the title of image to the holy ghost ; though some of the greek fathers indeed upon the forementioned account , sometimes in a less proper and strict sence , do ) . from which it follows , that since the son 's being the image of the father , consist not barely in his representing him , or being produced by him , but in his being produced by way of generation , nothing can truly and strictly represent how he is the image of his father , but a begotten image , an image intellectually begotten ; and begotten not only in the likeness of a specifick nature ▪ but of the same numerical nature with him , who begot it . and since none of all these conditions do or can possibly agree to this author 's living image with reference to its prototype , it follows , that it can never be a true and proper representation of the eternal image of the father ; as being upon all accounts wholly of another kind , and therefore unspeakably dishonourable in its application to the son of god. the fathers indeed sometimes set forth the substantial likeness between the eternal father and the son , by a man's seeing himself in a glass ▪ but never did they intend this for a true and proper representation of , but only for a popular allusion to the mystery they were treating of ▪ nor , as sufficient to afford arguments to prove any thing strictly and logically conce●ning it , ( whereas this author frequently argues , and that in the strictest way he can , from this case of a man and his living image ) but only as instances fit enough to found similitudes , resemblances , and illustrations upon ; further than which , they would never go . and this i think most worthy of our particular observation concerning those great men , as to the case before us , viz. that in all their attempts to give the world some small , dim resemblance of the trinity , they still drew their allusions from things that had a real existence in nature , and were obvious to sence , ( as unequal as they well knew them to the great subject they applied them to . ) but never did they venture to express or describe it by impossible suppositions , and schemes of things that never were nor could be , nor by bold fictions and chimera's formed wholly in their own brain : no , this province was wholly reserved for this author , the great corrector and chastiser of all that ever wrote before him : and especially ( as in duty bound ) of the fathers . for as to his notion of a man and his living image , it is manifest , that he does not offer it as a bare resemblance of the trinity , and no more , but rather as a parallel instance , or , at least , very near one , and such as gives us a true and proper representation of this mystery ; which , i must tell him , is much more than a faint resemblance of it , or a meer allusion to it . for in several places of this book of his , he cites it and refers to it , as a rule whereby to speak and conceive rightly of the trinity ; and not only so , but also as a medium whereby to argue concerning it ; particularly p. . l. . p. . l. . p. . l. , & . and to shew us yet further , of what use and vertue this extraordinary notion is , he tells us , that this gives us ●n account also of the modi subsistendi , viz. of the real subsistence of the same individual nature in three , after a different manner , def. p. . l. . and a more useful piece of instruction for our better understanding of the trinity , no doubt , there cannot be . but then are not these modi subsistenti , modes ? and has not this man several times , both in his vindication and in this his defence , utterly denied all modes in god , putting them in the same rank with accidents , and equally exploding both , with reference to the deity ? let him deny this , if he can ; and if he cannot , let the reader take notice what a kind of disputant this is , who having first denied , that there are any modes in god , is now for offering us an account or explication what these modes are . but this being only an absurdity and a contradiction , is in this author not much to be regarded . but that which is infinitely more unjustifiable , is his audacious obstruding the same romance of a man and his living image , as the best key for the interpretation of scripture , and that in the most important points of religion , with great prophaneness calling this figment of his own making . the plain account of the essential vnity between god the father , and god the son , p. . l. . which words are so derogatory to the sacred and mysterious vnity here spoken of , that , i dar● say , no church in christendom would have endured them but this . for they manifestly contain in them these two scandalous propositions . first , that a plain account may be given by us of the most mysterious , incomprehensible , and unaccountable thing , that god ever proposed to the belief of men ; as the numerical essential vnity ( which is the unity here spoken of ) between the eternal father and the son confessedly is . secondly , that a meer figment , a romance , and an impossible supossition of what never was , nor is , not can be , viz. a man and his living image , is a most proper ( if not absolutely the best ) way , to give this plain account of the said vnity by . these propositions , i say , ( which are evidently contained in his forecited assertion ) are intolerable . and i do here aver , that they are these daring offers to give the world plain accounts , clear ideas , new representations , and further explications of the trinity , ( unknown to the church heretofore ) which have not only driven this unhappy man upon an hypothesis , which is downright tritheism , but have also terribly shaken the whole belief of this article in some mens minds , and quite extinguish'd , and cast it out of others . but such effects must be expected from heresy , when it can walk about and face the world with a licence in the front of it . but after all these high pretences ; does any one by this new piece of imagery , and this man's discourse upon it , find the trinity more explained to him than before ? or rather does not the whole discourse seem wrote in the s●raphick way and style of iacob behmen or george fox ? it being nothing from first to last but a meer iargon of unaccountable , incoherent , obscure , dark stuff , and nothing so fit as a dark room to speak it in . how it may pass the world , i know not , but , i fancy , not so currently as some imagined : and therefore if i might advise the profound author of it ( since he has the gazette so much at his service ) he should , upon publication of the next auction for pictures , take care to get his living image into the collection . and now , in his conclusion of the account given by him of his hypothesis , he endeavours to remove a great objection against it : for both the antapologist and the animadverter had charged him for stating the notion of a trinity in unity so , as utterly to take away the mysteriousness of it ; which charge he would here ward off ; and he attempts to do it , by taking shelter in the ambiguity of the term intelligible ; which may be either taken at large for that which may in any degree be understood ; and so , none doubts , but god or the divine nature may be in some respects intelligible ; and yet , for all that , remain upon many other accounts vnconceivable . or , secondly , intelligible may be taken for that which may be fully and perfectly understood ; and whatsoever is so , i am sure , can have nothing vnconceivable in it , unless conceiving be one thing , and understanding another . now i affirm , that where we may form a notion of a thing not only true , but also plain and easy , and withal , such as solves all doubts and difficulties about it , and clears off all seeming contradictions to it , that thing is fully and perfectly intelligible , and consequently can upon no account be reckon'd vnconceivable . and such a notion of the trinity , has this author in his vindication , &c. forty times told us , that his hypothesis affords , and therefore according to the said hypothesis , a trinity in vnity can have nothing mysterious or vnconceivable in it . as for the instance he brings of god's eternity ; which ( as he says ) must be owned to have a great deal in it vnconceivable by our reason , and yet to be intelligible enough so far as that notion of it reaches , viz. that it is a duration without beginning or end , p. . l. . i say this comes not up to his case . since he neither does nor can pretend , that this account or description of eternity makes the notion of it so plain and easy as to solve all doubts and difficulties about it , and clear off all seeming contradictions to it ( which yet he affirms that his notion of a trinity does ) . for if there could be such a notion of eternity as should do all this , i affirm , that even that high attribute of god could have nothing vnconceivable remaining in it . let him therefore leave off such sophistical trifling with his reader ; since , for an object to be in some degree intelligible , is one thing , and to be so intelligible as to be plain and easy with all doubts and difficulties about it solved , and all seeming contradictions cleared off , is quite another . the former indeed may consist with the mysteriousness of the said object upon several other accounts , but this latter neither does nor can upon any account whatsoever . so that if this man would but keep to the question , and abide by his own positive repeated assertions ( which he is perpetually shifting and flying from ) the charge of his making the trinity no mystery at all , stands as full and clear against him , as that two contradictory propositions can never in their full latitude be verified of one and the same subject . but since a plain and easy notion of a trinity in vnity , and such as solves all doubts and difficulties about it , must needs found very oddly in the ears of all sober christians , who have hitherto accounted it incomprehensible in the very notion of it , i cannot see how this author will relieve himself , but by finding some theological vse of the word mystery , that may over-rule the common and received sence of it . and here to help him in such a strait for once , i will refer him to a choice author called liberius de sancto amore ( but his true name is le clerk ) who in his first theological epistle entituled de vnione hypostaticâ duarum christi naturarum , affirms , that a mystery , and particularly that of the union of two natures in the person of christ ( as it has been all along accounted ) has nothing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( i.e. ) incomprehensible in it . mysterium magnum est , non quòd sit in se 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sed quia de eo sinè revelatione novi testamenti nunquam homines cogitâssent , p. . again in this third epistle bearing this title , in quâ s. trinitatis mysterium explicatur , after he had congratulated the present age , that amongst the many advantages accrewing to it from the cartesian philosophers , they had made those things plain , easy and obvious to the world , which our ancestors had represented as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( i.e. ) unsearchable and unintelligible : he proceeds to these passages with reference to the trinity , mysterium illu● quod hactenus theologis omnibus crucem fixit , facile explicatu esse , modò recta ineatur via , contendimus , p. . and that he himself took this right way of explaining it , he all along supposes . and again , p. . horum alterutrum fuisse oportet , vel s. trinitatis mysterium facile tum conceptu fuisse ( scil . temporibus apostolorum ) vel nullum tale mysterium , quale hodie creditur , ab apostolis fuisse praedicatum . again , p. . he tells his friend ( and that with equal impudence and falshood ) that upon the principles of the reformed churches , necesse est fatearis , nihil esse in hoc negotio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , idque clarâ , nisi fallor , explicatione verum esse non frustra tibi ostendemus . and again , p. . incomprehensibilis non aliâ de causa habita est s. trinitas , quàm quia hactenus theologorum omnium scopulus fuit , non quòd in se capi non possit , &c. so that we have here furnished our author with some theological vse of that expression ( thanks to le clerk for it ) that the notion of a trinity is a plain and easy notion , and contians a full solutionn of all doubts and difficulties belonging to it . but then we are to take notice withal , that we must not think to attain to such a notion of it but conditionally , viz. by following the explications he gives us in his forementioned epistle , de vnione hypostaticâ , &c. nor can we ( as he tells us ) make use of the notions there laid down by him , to any purpose , without a previous and thorough knowledge of the cartesian method . p. . ( as indeed nothing can be so kindly as a new philosophy to graft a new divinity upon ) . well then , in this his first epistle he asserts ( as he does likewise in the two next , ) that the three divine persons are tres distinctae cogitationes , or distincti modi cogitandi , or distinctae series cogitationum , in one and the same divine essence or nature , sustaining the said three cogitations or modes , or series of cogitation . he defines also cogitation to be quicquid in mente nostrâ fit cujus conscii sumus , p. . which manifestly implies and amounts to self-consciousness . from which particulars so prepared , it is not unlikely but that our author , according to the old rule of inventis addendi , might carry the notion something further , and improve the three cogitationes into three spiritus aut mentes cogitantes ( substantia cogitans being the definition which le clerk gives of a spirit , p. . ) so that as le clerk had provided three distinct cogitations or self-consciousnesses , our author might very easily find out three distinct minds or spirits for them to belong to : especially since le clerk had also marked him out a way to vnite those three spirits again in that proposition laid down by him , p. . spiritus per solam cogitationem vniri possunt , which might naturally enough lead our author to some acquaintance with mutual consciousness too . and then for three distinct infinite spirits , which make the third part of his hypothesis , though le clerk ( as we have observed ) says nothing of them here , yet in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or metaphysicks , he speaks of the three divine persons , as of three infinite minds united . which opinion ( he says ) is platonick and intelligible ; and prefers it before that of one infinite mind extended to three distinct cogitations , or distinguished by three self-consciousnesses . which he says ( as this author says also ) was taught by the fathers , though they knew not how to express . it intelligibly : and indeed is the same which he himself pretends to hold in these theological epistles . so that , although , i readily own the difference of these two men's hypotheses , according to the different molds they have cast them into , yet since le clerk has furnished out three self-consciousnesses , and found out a way of vniting spirits by mutual consciousness , and lastly preferred the platonick opinion of three infinite vnited spirits or minds , i cannot for my life perswade my self , but that this author took his hints and rise from le clerk , and by a very little adding and changing made a shift to patch up an hypothesis of his own , out of le clerk's materials ; no other objection appearing to me against it but that le clerk's book was wrote in latine . but i leave it to the learned and impartial reader to judge of this . as for the book here spoken of , it is a small octavo printed at saumur in france ( though expressed in the title page by irenopolis ) . anno domini . and very narrowly escaped being burnt there also for the heresy contained in it ; some good friends of his ( it seems ) then in power , stopping the sentence , and so preventing the disgrace . as no doubt this author also has found several good friends of the same sort , who have stepped in between his writings and the catching element : though many worthy and wise men are still of opinion , that the flame which these wretched papers have already kindled in our poor church , will hardly go out , till the church has paid its debt by kindling another upon them. and thus i have examined and gone over the first general part of his book , giving us the same account again ( which his vindication had given us before ) of his dull , heavy hypothesis . heavy indeed in it self , but made ten times more so by the repetition . and so i pass to the other general part of his work containing his pretended answers to the animadverter's arguments . but before i enter upon this , i have something to account with him first , concerning the use of the school-terms in general ; and secondly concerning one more particularly used in the animadversions . . as to the first of these , which this author with so much insolence and ignorance , professedly explodes , it is known , that they have been , and are universally received , owned , and made use of in all matters of scholastick debate , and argumentation by men of learning all the world over . for besides , that there is no art , science or profession whatsoever , but what has its peculiar words and terms appropriate to it , whereby the skilful in the said art express their notions , and conceptions of the things belonging to it , i would fain have this opiniator tell me , whether the community of the world , and philosophers consider the ●am● things after the same manner ? and if they do 〈◊〉 whether they can or ought to speak of them in the same manner or no ? men in common converse apprehend things only in their gross bulk , as they incur into their senses ; but as long a reason and the mind of man refines upon the reports as sence ( which is the proper business of philosophy ) it will form to it self several distinct conceptions of the same things , which the generality of men take no notice of ; and accordingly it must either find , or make different terms , or words to express these different conceptions by : and this , great sir , by your leave , gave rise to philosophical terms , which so much offend you . and moreover , as long as there is ambiguity in words founded upon one and the same word 's signifying several things , it will be impossible to discourse exactly and scientifically of the nature of things , without distinguishing and sorting out these significations : and this was the occasion and ground of philosophical distinctions . and , now let this man ( to make his ignorance of these terms and distinctions seem the result of his judgment and his choice ) laugh at all this if he pleases , ( for ridet saepe , qui ridendus est ) but , for all that , the sober and learned part of the world will not be put off so . there is an admirable discourse in the ninth book of politian's epistles , wrote by picus mirandula , in defence of the schoolmen , and their terms , to his friend hermolaus barbarus ; who being ignorant of them ( as this man and his followers are ) very ridiculously despised and scoffed at them , as they likewise do . and the whole epistle is wrote with so much strength of reason , such a felicity , and true stroke of wit , joined with an equal elegancy of style , that ( were it not wrote in latine ) i would desire this despiser of the schools to try his skill in answering it . matters therefore standing thus , all the question now will be , whether such as albertus magnus , thomas aquinas , scotus , and durandus amongst the ancienter , and suarez , estius , and valentia amongst the later schoolmen , or such punyes as this author ( of whose learned accomplishments we have so fair a specimen in the ninth and tenth chapters of the animadversions ) be the fitter persons to prescribe proper terms , rules , and ways of expression to treat of philosophical and theological matters by ? and more particularly , whether essence , substance , modes of being , person , subsistence , relation and the like ; or spiritual sensation ( which is a contradiction in the terms ) or conscious sensation ( which is as much as knowing knowledge ) or self-conscious sensation , and mutual conscious sensation , and natural self-conscious sensation , and natural mutual conscious sensation , together with self-consciousness , and mutual consciousness , and continuity of sensation . i say , whether these latter ( which are the arrantest cant , gibberish , and behmenistical nonsence that ever the christian church and religion were abused with ) or the former terms used by the school-men , and all other divines for several ages , be the fitter and more significant to treat of the divine nature and persons by . i say again , let christendom and the whole world ( except a few novellists ) be judges of this . i do not deny , nor does any one else that i know , but that there is some refuse in this sort of writers : and that was all that the r. r. antapologist reflected upon in his answer to this author 's illiterate apology . so that he need not , poor man , be so much at a loss to guess how this matter about the schoolmen will be accorded ( as he says ) between the antapologist , and the animadverter . for both of them profess themselves much more at a loss how to reconcile this man to himself ; and withal know very well how to distinguish between what is useful and valuable in the writings of the schoolmen , and what is useless and superfluous : but own themselves utterly unable , in the writings of this author , to find or make any such distinction . now after this account of the school-terms in general , i come in the second place to give some account also of that particular term [ the formal reason of a thing ] frequently made use of in the animadversions ; which , though sufficiently explained in the second chapter of them , i shall however take into some further consideration ; since this author would fain avoid any argument couched under it , by pleading that the term it self is none of his . which indeed is readily granted him ; but yet , if he asserts the thing , ( as he often does ) and the animadverter puts it for him into a proper scholastical term , and so fits it the better for argumentation , the term , i assure him , will affect him , and his arguments , whether he will admit and make use of it or no : for the animadverter will be judged by his reader who understands him , and not by his adversary who does not . well then ; by [ the formal reason of a thing ] the animadverter understands that internal principle which makes a thing to be what it is . and as vnity inseparably attends being , and distinction accompanies vnity , the same is the principle of all these ; since that , which internally makes a thing such or such a being , thereby also makes it one in it self , and distinguishes it from all other things besides . for still , according to all philosophy , idem est principium constitutivum & distinctivum ; so that as every thing is constituted in such an order of being by what it is , so it is distinguished also by what it is from every thing which it is not . and for this cause the principle here spoken of is called [ formal ] because it is the form ( taking the word in its larger sence as it comprehends also essence ) which makes a thing to be of such a nature , and withal gives it vnity , distinction , and denomination . and upon the same account also , the term [ reason ] is added to the term [ formal ] to shew ▪ that this gives the natural and proper answer to the question , why a thing is such or such , thus or thus ? as if , for instance , it should be asked , why or for what reason a beast is said to be a sensible creature ? the answer is , because it has an internal principle of sence which renders it so ; so that this principle of sence is the formal reason , whereby it is both constituted and denominated sensible . and the like is to be said of other . things in the like case . this is the account , which i give of the meaning of the term [ formal reason , ] as it occurs in the animadversions , viz. that it is that internal principle , which makes a thing to be what it is , to be one in it self , and distinct from all other things , which it is not ; and lastly , is the natural and proper . answer to all enquiries à priore , why or how a thing comes to be essentially such or such , according to its respective denomination ? of all which this author being wholly ignorant , he thinks he has so entirely cleared himself of this term , and whatsoever has been argued against him , under it , that he declares with triumph , p. . l. . that if the animadverter thinks fit to try his skill again upon this argumen● , he believes he shall hear no more of the formal reason of pe●sonality and vnion ] nor of other such like term● . but this poor man should remember how unhappy he has been in his prophecies . for so he had said before both of the socinians , and of the most learned answerer of the vindication of his case , &c. viz. that he belie●ed that he should hear from them no more ; when yet he has heard from them both ; and that in a strain so much above his low talent , that few believe , that either of them will ever hear more from him : and if ●s ( they say ) s●●ing is believing , so f●●ling be bel●●ving too , i doubt not but by this time he himself also is o● the same opinion . and accordingly , i do here assure this man of presumption , that i shall produce this and the like terms in all disputes with him again and again ( having herein the company of all the eminent scholastick writers , both in philosophy and divinity , constantly using and avowing the use of them : ) and i doubt not but in the strength of them to break through all the co●●●b argumentations of this his sophistical and slight discourse . and so i go on ▪ but before i come particularly to examine his shifting answers to the animadverter's arguments , i think fit to lay before the reader the plain and true state of the point between this author and him ; as the most unexceptionable rule , whereby the reader is desired to judge between them both . now the chief heads of dispute between them are these three . first , concerning self-consciousness : and what dependance the personality and personal vnity of persons , both create and uncreate has upon it . secondly , touching mutual consciousness ; and how far the essential vnity of the three divine persons in one and the same numerical divine nature depends upon it . and thirdly , whether the three divine persons are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , or no. concerning all which severally the reader is in the first place to observe , that this author makes self-consciousness both in beings create and uncreate , the formal reason of personality , and personal vnity , viz. that , which [ makes ] a person to be formally a person , and formally one in himself ; or ( in other words ) that , wherein his personal being , unity , and original distinction from other things does consist . and so in the next place , for mutual consciousness , he makes the essential unity of nature , or essence belonging to the three divine persons , to consist formally in their mutual consciousness . so that it is this which renders them formally one in nature or essence . and lastly , he positively affirms , that the three divine persons in the godhead are three distinct infinite minds or spirits , and that it is heresy and non-sence to affirm otherwise . vind. p. . l. . thus he holds , and asserts concerning these three disputed points , as will appear from the following passages in his books , concerning each of them . and . for self-consciousness . the self-vnity of a spirit , says he ( universally by the way reckoning a spirit a person ) can be nothing else but self-consciousness , viz. that it is conscious to its own thoughts , reasonings , passions , which no other spirit is conscious to but it self , vind. p. . l. . this makes a spirit numerically one . vind. p. . l. . the self-consciousness of every person to it self ( viz. of the father , son , and holy ghost ) [ makes ] them three distinct persons , vind. p. . l. . and , we know no other vnity of a mind or spirit but consciousness , ibid. the essential vnity of a spirit consists in self-consciousness , and it is nothing else , which makes a spirit one and distinguishes it from all other spirits , vind. p. . l. . the very nature of a spirit consists in internal , vital sensation , defence p. . l. . the vnity of a single mind or spirit consists in a natural self-conscious sensation ( internal sensation and self-sensation being still with this author the same with self-consciousness ) defence p. . l. . a natural self-consciousness makes one natural person , defence p. . l. . and self-consciousness makes a mind or spirit one with it self , and distinguishes or separates it from all other minds or spirits , defence p. . l. , , . and last of all , more plainly . if this be what he ( the animadverter ) means by the formal reason of personality , viz. that which makes a mind , spirit , or person one , and either distinguishes or separates it from all other minds , spirits or persons , i do affirm , that self-consciousness is [ this formal reason . ] defence p. . l. , , , &c. i think it extremely needless to cite any more passages upon this head ; these being super-abundantly sufficient to prove , that all that is contained in , and signified by [ the formal reason of a thing ] is by this author here ascribed to and affirmed of self-consciousness , with reference to personality , personal vnity and distinction : and that therefore his rejection of the term , while he so amply asserts the thing , is groundless , and indeed senceless and ridiculous . but secondly , as touching the next head in dispute which is mutual-consciousness , he has these following assertions , father , son and holy ghost , a●● one by an internal consciousness , as every man is one with himself , that is , they feel each other in themselves , and they are as essentially one by a mutual consciousness as every man is one with himself , vind. p. . l. . as the self-consciousness of every person to it self ( viz. of every person in the godhead ) makes the three distinct persons , so the mutual consciousness of all three divine persons makes them all but one infinite god , vind. p. . l. . mutual consciousness makes all three persons numerically one divine essence , or one god , vind. p. . l. . the three p●rsons are essentially one god by a mutual self-consciousness , vind. p. . l. , . the three minds ( viz. the three divine persons ) are all mutually conscious to each other ▪ and therefore as essentially one , as the same mind is one with it self by a self-consciousness , vin. p. . l. . from all which it follows , that mutual consciousness is the formal reason of the essential vnity of the three divine persons in one and the same divine nature , or ( in other words , ) that which properly makes them one in nature , on lastly , that wherein the vnity and identity of their nature does formally and properly consist . this , i say , undeniably follows from the forementioned passages cited out of this author . and so i pass to the third and last head in dispute , viz. whether the three divine persons be three distinct minds or spirits ? which this author positively affirms ; as appears from the following passages . the three divine persons ( says he ) father , son and holy ghost , are three infinite minds really distinct from each other , vind. p. . line at the end . and they are three distinct infinite minds , p. . l. . again , the persons are perfectly distinct , for they are three distinct infinite minds , and therefore three distinct infinite persons , and to say , they are three divine persons , and not three distinct minds , is both heresy and non-sence , vind. p. . l. . the three persons are three minds , and therefore as distinct as three minds , vind. p. . l. . and again speaking of the three divine persons , i grant ( says he ) that they are three holy spirits , vind. p. . l. . and to add the crowning and confirming passage of all . if ( says he ) every person in the trinity considered as a distinct person be not a distinct infinite and eternal mind , there is , i confess , an end of the dean's notion , but then , i doubt , there will be an end of a trinity of persons also , &c. defence p. . l. . , &c. all which are the positive assertions of this author , and in all of them the things asserted by him are as positively denied by the animadverter . and i thought it highly necessary thus to draw them all together , and lay them before the reader , that so he may with one easy turn of his eye , be able at any time to have a full view of this author 's whole hypothesis ; and thereby to track him in all his sophistical windings and shiftings , in which he shall find him sometimes denying , what he had before expresly affirmed , and sometimes quite changing the state of the whole matter ; which , i assure him , is the whole design and artifice ( such as it is ) of this book . and accordingly , that i may from the premises give a brief state of the three forementioned heads the dispute here in the first place between this author and the animadverter , is not whether self-consciousness proves , infers , or declares personality , and personal vnity , as a sign or effect of it , or a consequent from it ? for this is not the question . but whether it be the formal reason of it , or ( in other words ) that wherein the said personality and personal vnity properly does consist ? which this author has ( and that in terms signifying only à priore ) over and over affirmed , and the animadverter as positively denied and disproved . and therefore , if this author shall at any time take up with the former , and say , that it is all one to him , if we allow self-consciousness to infer and prove personality and personal vnity as the sign , effect or consequent thereof , or affirm it , in a causal sence , to be the reason of the same . this , i say , is manifestly t● change the question , and to give up the thing in controversie between him and his adversary . in like manner , for mutual consciousness ; since it is allowed on both sides , that the three divine persons are one in nature and essence , the question is , whether mutual consciousness be that wherein this vnity of nature or essence does consist , so that by reason hereof the three divine persons are formally one in nature or essence ? and not whether this mutual consciousness proves , infers , or declares them to be thus one ? for this comes not up to the point . and consequently if this author says , that he looks no further , and means no more than this , ( as his meaning is still a bottomless pit ) he evidently abandons his own positive assertion , and effectually gives up the whole matter in dispute . for surely the antecedent reason of any thing , and the bare sign , proof , or consequent of the same can never hold the same place in argument , nor produce the same conclusion . and so likewise in the third and last place , the question is not , whether the trinity be three distinct intelligent persons , ( which in a rightly stated sence is true ) but whether these persons be three distinct infinite minds or spirits ? that is to say , three distinct absolute beings , essences or substances ? which it is impossible for them in any sence to be . and consequently for this man to change the term [ minds ] into that of [ intelligent persons ] , is quite to alter the question ; and so , to relinquish the thing which he himself had so often , and expresly asserted ; and that as the principal part of his hypothesis contended for : as shall be fully demonstrated when i come to debate this particular head with him . in the mean time , i have laid the premises before the reader , as the true state of the point , and as the measure , which i will deal with this man upon , and resolve to hold him to . and so i address my self to the examination of the answers which he pretends to bring to the animadverter's arguments . where i cannot but first observe the complement which he ushers them in with ; viz. that the animadverter in the very entrance runs headlong past all recovery : which , since it must needs bring his head to the ground first , i heartily wish him this author's forehead to endure it . but to come to his answers , the animadverter having in direct contradiction to this author , denied self-consciousness to be the formal reason , or internal constituent principle of personality in finite persons ; this author replies to him these two things . . that he never said one word of the formal reason of personality , in his whole discourse upon the trinity ; nor has at all concerned himself about it . in answer to which , i here tell him , that though he uses not the term it self , yet if he asserts the thing signified by the term , as he does by affirming , that self-consciousness makes a person to be properly what he is , or in other words is that , wherein his personality , or being a person does consist , this is all , that the animadverter expresses by the term [ formal reason of personality ] and that he has affirmed this concerning self-consciousness , i refer the reader to the passages newly cited to this purpose out of his books ; which demonstrate the same beyond all pretence or possibility of denyal , secondly , he says , that it is only the vnity of a spirit with it self and its distinct , and separate subsistence from all other created spirits , which consists in self-consciousness . in answer to which i must tell him , that this is that very thing which the animadverter affirms to be the formal reason of a thing , viz. that which gives it being , unity in it self , and distinction from all other things . i mean the principal , original distinction , by which it is so distinguished . so that the meaning of this term being thus adjusted , i shall , without any further regard to this author's exceptions proceed to dispute the thing it self in the case now before us . in which he reasons thus , p. . at the end . if that be one distinct separate mind which is conscious only to it self , and feels all that is in it self , and nothing else , and those be two distinct separate minds , each of which is thus conscious to it self , and not to each other , then the dean has gained his point . and no doubt he has , if a mind or spirit 's feeling it self one in it self , makes it to be so . and its feeling it self a distinct , and separate mind from all other minds , gives it that distinction and separation : otherwise , it is a most senceless and ridiculous inconsequence : for the dispute here is , whether self-consciousness be the principle and reason of personal being and vnity , not whether it be the proof of it , or that whereby a man comes to know this of himself ? this latter we may allow it to be , but the former it can never be . for as much as the consequent may indeed infer , and prove both the being and vnity of the antecedent , but cause , or give it , it neither does , nor can . so that when he says , that the dean has gained his point ; i suppose he means his deanry ; for otherwise certainly there was never a more absurd inference made by man , than to conclude , that because a spirit by an intimate self-sensation ( as he cants ) feels it self to be one and not another , therefore its feeling it self so , is that very thing , which makes it so . and yet so very fond is he of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that there is no drawing or driving him off from it . but the defender , it seems , will prove his point against the animadverter from his own maxime laid down in the third chapter of the animadversions , page . viz. that wheresoever the formal reason of personality is , there is personality : and again , that wheresoever personality is , there is the formal reason of personality , viz. that they exist convertibly , and mutually , and essentially infer one another . whereupon the defender argues thus . that since there is such a convertible existence between person and self-consciousness , as the proprium quarto modo of it , so that they mutually infer one another , it must follow that self-consciousness ( even according to the animadverter's own rule ) is and must be the formal reason of personality . to which wonderful piece of logick i have these two things to answer . first , that self-consciousness neither exists convertibly with , nor is the proprium quarto modo of a person : for though every person be self-conscious , yet every thing that is self-conscious is not a person : as the second and third arguments do sufficiently evince . secondly , that though a thing always exists convertibly with its formal reason , yet every thing which it exists convertibly with , is not therefore the formal reason of it . which , had this man been aware of , he could not have been guilty of such a blunder , as to make the proprium quarto modo of a thing the formal reason of the same . for one and the same thing may exist convertibly with several things , though there cannot be several formal reasons of the same thing . and does this man think that the animadverter , by affirming a mutual and convertible existence between a thing , and the formal reason thereof , does therefore deny , that thing to exist convertibly with any thing besides its formal reason ? or that he affirms this convertible existence to be that which makes this formal reason ? no , it is enough to his purpose , that it is one inseparable qualification belonging always to the formal reason of a thing , though it does not belong to that alone . i suppose this author may have heard of that maxime , positâ causâ ponitur effectus ; and so , vice versâ : which is universally true of all causes and effects , relatively considered ; so that here is a convertible existence between them ( for it is this properly , and not a convertibility in direct predication , which is here spoken of ) . now i would know whether this cause has not also its specifick difference , and its property , and whether it may not sustain several relations upon several accounts ? and if so , will this new logician say , that because this cause exists convertibly with its effect , it cannot exist convertibly also with its specifick difference , and with its property , and with its several correlates , or if it does exist convertibly with all and each of these , that therefore all and every one of them must be the formal reason of it ? i protest i am amazed at his ignorance , and must declare , that i can find nothing invincible in all his arguments , but that . and i hope the reader will take a true measure of his logical talent from his discourse about proprium quarto modo : which way of discoursing , though i shall not ascribe to him as his property , yet it has so much of a property , that he is like to be known by it . and so having made good what had been asserted by the animadverter , concerning the formal reason of personality , i leave self-consciousness to shift for it self , and proceed to vindicate the animadverter's first argument against it ; which is this , viz. that self-consciousness presupposes personality in the thing to which it belongs , and therefore cannot be the formal reason of it ; forasmuch as nothing can be the formal reason of that which is in order of nature before it . this is the summ of the argument ; and what says this defender to it ? why , he shifts the terms , and from self-consciousness understood ( as all the world understands it ) for an act , passes to the principle of self-consciousness ; affirming , that although indeed he speaks only of the act , yet that ( by an unfathomable meaning still ) he intends only the principle of the said act , as that alone which makes a person , or gives personality . and accordingly he discourses , as follows : suppose ( says he ) that a man should reason thus . actual knowledge presupposes a mind , and therefore knowledge [ in its principle ] is not , and cannot be the formal reason of a mind , def. p. . l. . to which i answer , . that the dispute here is not con●●●ning the formal reason of a mind , but of a person ; and . that he who reasons in this manner , quite alters the state of the question ; which proceeds not upon the principle but the act of self-consciousness . and so , the true reasoning must be this ; actual knowledge presupposes a mind , and therefore actual knowledge neither is , nor can be the formal reason of that mind . this , sir , is the true arguing upon the point , according to the terms , which , on both sides , it has still been expressed by ; and in which there is not the least mention of the principle of self-consciousness ; which is newly and postliminiously thrust in , and is quite another thing from self-consciousness it self . and this is evident , not only from the proper unforced signification of the word , importing no more , than an act in conjunction with its object , viz. an act of knowledge , terminated upon self : but also from this author 's own explication of it , as still setting in forth by words importing bare action . such as are a person 's knowing himself , and all his internal motions , as likewise his actual feeling or sensation of the same . these , i say , are the words which he always expresses self-consciousness by . and will this man now perswade the world , that acts of knowledge and acts of feeling or sensation , signify the principles of these several acts ? this is so gross a changing the very subject of the dispute , that i need not make one step further towards the confutation of it . for having beaten him off from his own terms , which he himself proposed and declared his hypothesis by , the argument stands good against him ; and having disproved what he had argued from the act of self-consciousness , i am not con●●●●ed about the new medium he brings from the principle ; since the act was the only thing ( so far as words can express things ) which he has all along mentioned and insisted upon . nevertheless , to pursue him through his shifts , i will consider his self-consciousness even in the principle of it too ; and , in order to this , i shall observe , that in every suppositum or completely subsisting being , and consequently in every person ( which is only a rational suppositum ) considered as an agent , these three things are to be taken notice of . first , the form or essence , secondly , the powers of faculties ; and thirdly , the acts proceeding immediately from these powers , but mediately from the essence or form it ●elf operating by them . and now , let us see whether any of all these , as they belong to a person , give personality or personal individuation to that person . where , in the first place , i affirm , that neither can the acts themselves , nor the powers from with they flow ( reckoning the act and power of self-consciousness amongst the rest ) give personality or personal subsistence to the nature to which they belong ; and that as , for other reasons , so particularly for this , that both acts and powers are accidents , and that no accident can give personality , or be the formal reason of a person ; because the formal reason of any thing must be always of the same kind or rank of being with the thing it self , which is formally constituted by it . but a person is an intelligent substance , compleated by its proper subsistence as by its substantial mode . and nothing substantial , whether it be a substance it self , or but a mode of substance ( which is always reduced to it ) is or can be of the same kind with any accident ; since these two make the two grand different orders or ranks of being , and consequently no power or faculty , nor action proceeding from it , can constitute the nature they belong to , a person , by being the formal reason thereof . to which we may add this further consideration ; that no accident can give so much as a natural individuation to its subject , and therefore much less can it give personality or personal subsistence to the same ; this being a degree of perfection in the way of existence , beyond that of bare individuation , and consequently neither upon this account can any action , or power , or faculty of the soul constitute an humane or intelligent nature , a person . in the next place therefore ( having thus shewn , that neither the act nor the power of self-consciousness can give personality ) . let us see whether it can be derived from an higher principle of action , viz. the form of the self-conscious being , which is the rational soul ? now this , we shall find , sustains the capacity of a double principle , viz. of a constituent , as it concurs with the body informed by it , towards the constitution of an humane nature ; and , secondly , of an efficient ; and that both emanative , in respect of the powers and faculties belonging to it ; and properly effective , in respect of all the acts , whether intellection , or volition , &c. produced by the instrumental mediation of the said faculties . but now , under which of these capacities is it the formal reason of a person ? why ; under neither : for as much as in the humane nature of christ it sustains both of them , viz. of a principal part concurring to the constitution of the said nature , both as to its being and unity , and of an efficient principle , giving it all the powers and acts properly issuing from that nature . but for all that , ( we know ) that it makes not that nature a person by giving it a proper humane subsistence . since the humanity of christ has no such subsistence , but subsists by that of the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; which shews , that the said subsistence has no such necessary connexion with nature absolutely considered , but that so considered ( as in the present case ) nature may be without it . for if it were necessarily included in nature ( as personality and the formal reason thereof mutually and essentially imply and infer one another ) the humane nature of christ could neither naturally nor supernaturally be without its proper humane subsistence any more than without its essence . for still we speak here , not of such a subsistence as is opposed to inhesion in a subject , and so makes a substance ; but of such an one , as is opposed to all dependance upon another , as upon a suppositum , and so makes a substance complete , and incommunicable , by giving it its ultimate and most perfect manner of existing . but of this more again presently in my examination of his answer to the animadverter's next argument . in the mean time , the sum of what has been argued is this . that if self-consciousness neither in the act , nor in the faculty or power , nor yet in its higher principle , viz. the form or essence from which it flows , can formally give personality or personal individuation to the nature to which it belongs , then self-consciousness in no respect whatsoever can be said to be the formal reason of a person . but you will say , what is it then that formally constitutes a person ? in answer to which , though it is sufficient for me to have overthrown my adversary's assertion , yet that i may not be only upon the negative , i affirm , that that which formally gives personality , or constitutes a person , is an intelligent nature ultimately compleated by its proper subsistence . this , i say , i hold and let this man of arrogance and ignorance overthrow it if he can . as for what he says p. . l. . of self-consciousness in the abstract , viz. that it is as capable of being the formal reason of a person , as rationality is of being the formal reason of a rational nature , it needs no other answer , than that it is precariously and falsly said ; for the true parallel between these two reaches no further than this ; that as rationality constitutes and denominates its concrete rational ; so self-consciousness constitutes and denominates its concrete self-conscious . and what then ? a [ person ] is not the proper concrete of [ self-consciousness ] but a self-conscious nature or being , whether it be a person or no ; and a self-conscious nature it may be , and yet not a person . by which it is manifest , that this man understands not what abstract and concrete , person and personality mean. he uses the terms indeed at a venture , but they may be so many greek words in english characters , for ought he knows . but he will not give over the animadverter so , but has another terrible objection against that assertion of his , viz. that personality is the ground and principle of action , wheresoever it is ; bragging ( forsooth ) that he has been taught other and better things , viz. that natura est principium motûs & quietis , and consequently of all other actions . but was he never taught also the difference between the principium quod , and the principium quo of an action ? and does he not consider withal , that the dispute here is not indifferently of any sort of actions , but only of such as are personal , and belong to a complete agent , or suppositum ? and i would fain have this wonderfully-taught man , shew me any such action proceeding from nature , as the principium quo , which does not also proceed from the whole suppositum , as the principium quod ; and as that which alone claims the proper denomination of agent , in respect of the said action . which being the true state of this matter , i suppose he has been told often enough , that it is a complete subsistence added to nature which makes a suppositum , and to an intelligent nature which makes a person . i have no more to say to him upon this head , but that , upon a review of the confirmation which i have now given the forementioned argument , viz. that self-consciousness cannot be the formal reason of personality , because in order of nature it follows and presupposes it , i shall not stick ( in spight of this man's ignorance ) to affirm it again and again a demonstration of the point against him . and therefore those words of the defender upon this occasion are very pleasant . i cannot ( says he ) but think how this animadverter must look when he reads over this argument again with its triumphant conclusion , p. . l. . in answer to which he must give me leave to tell him , that ( thanks be to god ) the animadverter's looks are not quite so bad yet , as to put him in any danger of being mistaken for this author 's living image . and as for his other scoff , that this argument was worth its weight in gold , though , he fears , it will not much enrich the buyer , p. . l. . what is that to him ? let him mind his own markets , who never writes to enrich the buyer but the seller ; and that seller is himself : and since he is so , well is it for his books , and his bookseller too , that men generally buy , before they read. the animadverter for his part affects not the reputation of a scribler , and much less of an huckster . but pass we now , to the consideration and vindication of the animadverter's second argument against self-consciousness , which proceeds thus . the humanity or humane nature of christ is perfectly conscious to it self of all the internal acts , whether of knowledge , volition or desire , &c. that pass in it , or belong to it , and yet the humanity , or humane nature of christ is not a person , and therefore self-consciousness does not properly and formally give personality ; for as much as it may be in that , which is not a person . thus the animadverter . and what says our author to the contrary ? why in the first place ( according to his constant custom of denying what he had before affirmed ) he says , p. . l. . that he never [ expresly ] taught that self-consciousness was the formal reason of personality . and again , l. . that he no where makes self-consciousness the formal reason of personality . but , as it is very possible for a man not always to understand his own words , so i would have this good man know , that he has over and over made self-consciousness the formal reason of personality , whether he understands so much or no. for , if by his forementioned denyal of it , he means no more than that he never made use of the term [ formal reason ] this is readily granted him ; but then it is arrant trifling , since it is certain , that he has taught , and asserted the thing signified by this term , as effectually and plainly as if he had used the very term it self . for ( to tell him again what i had told him before ) the formal reason of a thing is that , which constitutes it such a being , giving it withal its proper vnity and distinction , whether natural , or personal , according as the thing is , which it belongs to . for all these three necessarily go together , and essentially imply one another , and consequently there must be one and the same principle of them all . and now , if we would see whether or no this author applies all this to self-consciousness , with reference to minds or spirits ( which he constantly makes to be persons ) let the reader cast his eye back upon some of the fore-alleged passages ; particularly upon that in vindic. p. . l. . that this self-consciousness makes a spirit numerically one with it self . and in vind. p. . l. . that the self-consciousness of every one of the persons ( viz. in the trinity ) to it self makes them three distinct persons . and again , vind. p. . l. . that the essential vnity of a spirit consists in self-consciousness , and that it is nothing else which makes a spirit one , and distinguishes it from all other spirits . likewise in this defence p. . he tells us expresly , that the nature of a spirit consists in sensation , ( which with him is only another word for self-consciousness . ) nay ; and to go no further than the very next page to that in which he here so positively declares , that he no where makes self-consciousness the formal reason of personality , viz. defence p. . he roundly affirms , that self-consciousness makes a mind or spirit one with it self , and distinguishes or separates it from all other minds or spirits . and that such a distinct and separate self-conscious mind is a natural person . now i would have this man in the first place tell us , whether all these passages have not in them a causal sence , but only an illative or probative , and no more ? and in the next place , i would have him shew me whether there be any thing more signified by the [ formal reason of personality ] than what the forecited passages fully contain in them ? and if he cannot prove that there is any more signified by it ( as there is not ) then let him for the future leave off shuffling , and own , that by what he has asserted in the said passages , he has made self-consciousness the formal reason of personality with reference to minds or spirits , which he universally affirms to be persons . and by this i hope the judicious reader will see with both eyes , what a slippery self-contradicting caviller the animadverter has to dispute with . in the mean time the sum of the animadverter's argument against him stands thus . this author asserts every mind or spirit to be a person ; he places this personality in self-consciousness ; he holds this self-consciousness to be essential to , and inseparable from a mind ; ( for as much as he positively asserts the nature of a mind or spirit to consist in it , defen . p. . l. . ) whereupon it does and must follow , that since our saviour , in assuming the humane nature , assumed an humane mind , soul , or spirit , he assumed an humane person too ; for as much as its personality was as inseparable from it , as its self-consciousness ( from which it necessarily resulted ) was . nor will it avail him to allege the interposal of supernatural and extraordinary power in the present instance ; since such power , though never so extraordinary and supernatural , never destroys the essence , or essentially necessary connexion of things . and therefore if the personality of a mind be implied in the very nature of a mind , a mind can be no more without its personality than without its nature : which would be a direct contradiction ; to the effecting whereof the divine power it self does not extend . but on the other side , when we state the personality of an humane nature upon the compleat subsistence of it , which is a mode not necessarily implied in it , the humane nature of christ might very well by the divine power be made to exist without it , and so in a supernatural way be taken into , and supported by the personal subsistence of the eternal word . and all this with full accord to the strictest principles of reason , without the least necessity of making two persons in our saviour ; whereas according to this author's hypothesis , it is impossible for all the reason of minkind to keep off an humane person as well as a divine from belonging to our saviour by his incarnation or assumption of the humane nature . as for his taking shelter in boetius's definition of a person , that will not help him neither ; since the utmost that can be proved against it , is that boetius was under a mistake ( and one man's mistake certainly cannot make another in the right ) : for all , both schoolmen and other divines agree , that this definition strictly taken is defective ; and that instead of substantia individua alone , it should be substantia individua , completa , & incommunicabilis , or something equivalent to the two last terms . for otherwise this definition also would infer two persons in christ ; since there are two individual substances belonging to him , viz. an humane and a divine . but after all we have great reason to believe , that boetius here uses the word substantia for subsistentia , as several of the ancient fathers of great note did , and particularly st. hilary in his books of the trinity very often , and st. austin sometimes ; and then the boetian definition is perfect and good ; and no such consequence of a double personality in our saviour can be drawn from thence ; for as much as the son of god took our humane nature without its proper subsistence , into the subsistence of his own eternal person . and so i proceed to the animadverter's third argument , proving self-consciousness not to be the formal reason of personality in created beings , which is this . the soul in its separate state is conscious to its self of all its own internal acts or motions , &c. and yet the soul in such a state is not a person , and therefore self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality : for if it were , it would constitute a person wheresoever it was . this argument is of the same nature with the former ; each of them being brought as a particular negative against an universal affirmative . and how does this defender confute it ? why ; by the easiest way of confutation , that it is possible for ignorance to give it ; viz. by saying , that it is nothing to the purpose . but does he know what is and what is not an argument ? and what is to confute an assertion , or position , and what is not ? let him know then , that to confute an argument is properly to conclude the contradictory proposition of that which is held by the respondent or defendant , and is called by the greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and by the latines redargutio . and here , i would have this hardy ignoramus own before the world , if he dares , that one negative instance does not overthrow an vniversal affirmative as really and effectually as ten thousand . but possibly one , who can be of all sides , may be for both sides of the contradiction too , and hold , that self-consciousness is the formal reason of personality , personal vnity , and distinction wheresoever it is , and yet that there may be a self-conscious being , one in it self , and distinguished from all others , which is not a person ; of which two propositions this man has affirmed the former ( though he uses not the term formal reason ) , and the animadverter asserts the latter . and the whole dispute shall be resumed , and the thing debated again presently . but as for that insufferably rude and scurrilous reflexion here passed by him upon the animadverter , p. . l. . i shall take no further notice of it now , intending effectually to account with him , both for that , and several other of his billingsgate-scurrilities , as soon as i shall have finished the argumentative part of my reply . in the mean time he declares in a bravado , p. . l. . th●● if the animadverter can prove , that the vnity of a mind and its distinction from all other minds does not consist in self-consciousness , the dean is then a lost man for ever , and must be content to follow his triumphant chariot . and i on the other side affirm , that if the essential being , unity , and original distinction of every thing is and must be in order of nature before any act can proceed , or be so much as conceived to proceed , from the said thing ; then it has been already proved ( and that in defence of the first argument ) beyond all contradiction , that the original vnity of a mind and its distinction from all other minds , neither does nor can consist in self-consciousness , act or power , these being in nature posterior to the said unity and distinction . and that one known short axiom , agere praesupponit esse ( to which we may add also , esse in se vnum , & distinctum ab aliis omnibus ) utterly overthrows this part of his senceless hypothesis . but as for his scoff of following the animadverter's triumphant chariot in this case , he will not claim his promise , as knowing something much fitter for him to follow than that , and some body as fit to follow him . but i shall now come to debate the personality of the soul with him : which dispute , he first tells us , is nothing at all to the purpose ; and then very discreetly bestows the full fifth part of his whole work against the animadverter ( viz. twenty pages of . ) wholly upon this very point , and this he also calls making some short reflections upon it : though more by half than what he has made upon any two or three ( and those principal ) parts or branches of the whole controversy . but whereas he says , p. . l. . that all this was done only with a purpose to expose mr. dean ( forsooth ) i must assure him that it is a mistake ; for that the animadverter found this work effectually done to his hands , before ever he set pen to paper . but to proceed , this author in his vindication has asserted , that the soul without a vital vnion to an humane body , is a person , vind. p. , l. . and not long after he tells us also ▪ that the soul as vnited with the body is a person too , vind. p. . l. . in opposition to both which propositions the animadverter holds , that the soul of man is not a person , and that neither in its conjunction with the body , nor in its separation from it . and what says our author to this ? why in the first place he says , he grants , that the person of a man , as it is used in common speech to signify a man , must include both soul and body as the constituent parts of an humane person ; but that when we enquire into the strict notion of personality , that must be a simple vncompounded thing , as indivisible as self is , which cannot consist of parts separate from each other , p. . l. . whereupon with much foolish confidence he disputes against the supposed absurdity of two parts of personality . to all which i have several things to answer , as first , that he ought to prove , and not gratis only to affirm , that the philosophical sence of this term [ humane person ] and the popular commonly received sence of it , are not the same . whereas i affirm they are , and challenge him to prove the contrary if he can : for otherwise it is a meer supposing the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and a gross petitio principii . secondly , i must tell him , that he disputes not ad idem ; for that he passes from the concrete to the abstract : viz. from [ person ] which consists of parts , to personality which does not ; and then surely , when the dispute is concerning the having , or not having parts , there can be no concluding in that respect from one to the other . thirdly i tell him , that self is not a simple indivisible vncompounded thing , but as compounded as the man himself , and consists of parts separable from one another , viz. of soul and body , as the man himself does , and is as much a concrete as he is . fourthly and lastly , i must tell him , that though personality in the abstract be a simple indivisible term ( as all other abstracts are ) and so cannot actually consist of parts , yet it connotes and implies a necessary inseparable relation to the essential parts of the concrete ; and in this respect , parts are and may be ascribed to it , viz. by way of connotation , though not by way of physical composition . and therefore that question of his , viz. will the animadverter venture to make the body part of the personality of a man ? is very easily answered , viz. that by actual , real , and physical composition it is not so , but by essential connotation of , and relation to , the body , as to part of the concrete , it is so . that is to say , personality implies a body as an essential part of a person , though not of the personality it self . and so both his silly objection , and his sillier scoff of a compounded personality , page . and of the bodies being a part of this personality , page . are at an end . but his absurdity in asserting a beast to be a person will never be so , but stands as firm as ever . for whereas he says , defence p. . l. . that he gave notice of the impropriety of the expression , and used it only by way of allusion and accommodation , let the reader but consult his vind. p. . and he will find every tittle of this an impudent falshood . for he speaks not there so much as one syllable of the impropriety of it ; nor does he pretend to use it by way of allusion , but as a real and a proper instance of the nature of a person , dogmatically asserting a brute to be a person as much as a suppositum ; and this without the help or qualification of either [ a so say , or a so speak ] . with such a shameless front can this man deny a thing , as soon as ever he has affirmed it : and yet before the denyal of it is well out of his mouth , he offers with still a greater impudence to justify it ; affirming p. . that beasts may be said to have reason in a certain measure and degree , and moreover proves their rationality from their self-consciousness . so that we see here , of what virtue this self-consciousness is , that it can extend even to beasts themselves , and make them rational . for having said that a beast is self-conscious , p. . l. . he adds , that wheresoever there is a conscious life there is some degree of reason . and is not this , think we , a blessed assertion , both in philosophy and divinity ? for according to what he has here asserted , a beast may be properly defined animal rationale ; and , which is more , a beast is not a different species from a man ; for rationality is the specifick difference of a man : and if a beast has reason to a certain degree ( as he affirms it has ) then the difference between a man and a beast ( the grinning race it self not excepted ) is only gradual , and consequently neither is nor can be specifical . i shall say no more upon this subject , but leave the whole world to consider what this man is , and what fit propositions these are to be licensed by authority . however i would have the reader observe , that this poor creature who explodes parts in personality ( which his adversary , in a strict and proper sence , never did , nor does assert ) yet admits and holds degrees in personality , p. . l. . for , says he , wheresoever there is a conscious life , there must be some degree of reason ; and that entitles them [ viz. beasts ] to as much share in personality as they have in reason . but let me tell this utter stranger to all philosophy , that as there is no such thing as a magis and minus in substance , so neither is there in substantial modes , of which personality is one , and the principal one too . but he goes on and tells us , that no man will pretend , that an human● body , though united to a reasonable soul , has any reason or sence either , p. . l. . and yet this very man says , vind. p. . l. , . that the body is conscious to all the commands of the will. which how it can be without any thing of sence belonging to it , i must profess surpasses all the sence , that i am master of , to conceive ; and i cannot but declare withal , that if a thing may be conscious , and yet have no sence at all in it , i shall have a worse and a meaner opinion of self-consciousness than ever i had before . but these and the like wonderful things i suppose our author will tell us , that he speaks only by way of allusion ; which , next to his meaning is the surest refuge he has ( when he is baffled ) to fly to . and so from hence he comes to this hypothetical decision of the point , viz. that if personality belongs only to a reasonable nature , it is certain , that the soul makes or constitutes the person , p. . l. . which is an extraordinary consequence indeed ; nevertheless i deny it as utterly false . for in men neither is the soul all that is contained in a reasonable nature , nor a reasonable nature all that is contained in a person : and therefore , as the soul cannot adequately constitute a reasonable nature , so much less can it adequately constitute a person . a reasonable or rather an intelligent nature , may be either simple as the divine and angelical , or compound as the humane nature is , which essentially consists of soul and body ( as the whole world agrees ) and since it does so , i deny that the soul can adequately make or constitute either a reasonable nature , or person ( which includes in it the nature and something besides ) any more than one essential part of the said nature or person can do the joint office of two. and whereas he adds , that the soul ( as he may so speak ) is the centre of personality , i must tell him , that i own the soul to be the principal constituent part of the person , but as for the other notion , i know no more of the centre of personality than i do of the continuity of sensation . which word , as it is perfectly new , and not used before , so it is very absurdly applied here ; for i demand of him , how that can be called the centre of personality which diffuses it self through the whole person even to the utmost extremity of its subsistence ; and consequently reaches as far as the personality of the said person does or can ; nay , and ( to use his own cant ) as far as the conscious life extends ? for certainly it must needs be a pleasant thing to imagine a centre reaching as far as that , which must be drawn to such a considerable distance from it one way , as well as terminate in it another . but if , after all this , our author means by these words the centre of non-sence , i assure him his writings are of a compass large enough to pass for the circumference . but let us see some more of his monstrous assertions . the body , says he , is part of the man , and so part of the person , but it does not make the person , but is taken into the person by a vital vnion , p. . l. . to this i answer , that for the body to be actually a part of the person , and yet , while it is so , not to go to the making of the person , as a part to the making of the whole , is a direct contradiction . and whereas he talks , of its being taken into the person by a vital vnion : let me tell him , that there is no such thing as a vital vnion in created beings , which is not also a composition , that is to say , a concurrence of parts to the constitution of the whole ; and let him shew me in created natures one instance of such an union as is not also a composition , if he can . so that all composition , as such , is an union of parts , and all vital union of parts a composition ; and the body is as essential , though not so noble a part of the person as the soul it self . for the person of a man supposes and includes in it the whole humane nature , and the humane nature includes in it the essential parts of humane nature , which are soul and body . but he tells us further , that since all life , reason and sensation are only in the soul , the whole personality must be in the soul also , though the soul when vnited to the body is not the whole person , p. . l. . to which i answer , that the whole person , and the whole personality , adequately connote one another , and belong to one and the same suppositum ; and that otherwise there would be no commensuration between the abstract and the concrete , but there would be an essential part of the concrete , to which the abstract could not extend or belong : which would be a gross absurdity . but besides , i deny the thing supposed by him , viz. that all life , reason and sensation are only in the soul. for though they may be in the soul as the subjectum proximum & principium quo , that is , as immediately proceeding from it , and subjected in it , yet they are properly in the whole compound , viz. the whole man or person , as the subjectum ultimum , and principium quod ; and as that which receives the whole denomination from what belongs immediately to any part of it . for it is the whole man or person , who is properly said to be a living , reasonable , sensible creature , though it be by virtue of his soul , as the principium quo , that he is so . after this comes another absurdity , where he tells us , p. . l. . that an hypostatical vnion is the swallowing up of a natural personality in its vnion with a superior person . which if it be so , then , say i , where is the hypostatical union of christ's person with the humane nature ? for the humane nature which was united to his divine person , had no personality of its own to be swallowed up : for christ assumed it without any subsistence or personality belonging to it ; which it neither has , nor ever had ; and consequently could never be said to be lost or swallowed up by this union : so that we have a new sort of heresie started ; viz. that as eutyches heretofore affirmed christ's humane nature to have been swallowed up by his divine ; so this author holds an humane personality to have belong'd to this humane nature , which in like manner is swallowed up by the superior person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but where these vile heterodoxies will stop , god only knows : for i cannot see , but this innovator may freely and uncontrollably vent as many of them as he pleases ; and no doubt he has a great many more such in reserve , and will in due time produce them . but the animadverter had argued against the personality of the soul in conjunction with the body , thus ; if the soul , in the composition of a man's person , were an entire person it self ; and ▪ as such , concurred with the body towards the constitution of the man , then the man would be an imperfect accidental , and not a perfect natural compound . he would be that which philosophy calls unum per accidens , that is , a thing made up of such beings as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into one , animadvers . p. . and what says he to this ? why , he tells us , that the soul and the body are vitally united , and that the animadverter's own beloved philosophy never calls things vitally united unum per accidens . to which i answer , that no created person ever was or could be vitally united to any being distinct from it self : and therefore since it is certain , that the soul is vitally united to the body , it is impossible that the soul should be a person . for this beloved philosophy teaches me , that in created beings there can be no vital vnion but between parts ; and consequently , that since there is a vital vnion between soul and body , this soul and body must be united as concurrent parts of the same compound ; and this , by this author's favour must utterly destroy his senceless notion of the personality of the soul ; since that which is a part cannot be a suppositum , or completely subsisting nature , and whatsoever is not so , can never be a person . so that the animadverter's argument stands good , viz. that in created beings an entire person united to a body would make an unum per accidens ; and consequently that a vital vnion between them would be impossible : yet nevertheless , since it is certain , that there is actually such a vital vnion between soul and body , it is upon the same account also as certain , that the soul ( which must be one of the terms of that vnion , and by consequence a part ) cannot be a person . so that all this is but a meer petitio principii : first to suppose the soul a person , which is the principal thing in dispute ; and then to say , that its being vitally united to the body , keeps it from making a man ▪ that , which we call vnum per accide●s . whereas it is affirmed and argued against him , that this very vital vnion of the soul with the body overthrows the soul's personality , as a thing which this vnion is utterly inconsistent with . in short , the soul 's being a person ( if it were so ) can never prove it vitally united to the body , but its being vitally so united , irrefragably proves it to be no person . but he is now for confounding the animadverter with two questions , but still in pursuit of the same point . first , whether the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before the incarnation were a compleat being ? which is readily answered in the affirmative , that he was . secondly , whether the humane nature assumed by him were a compleat or incompleat being ? i answer , that though it were a perfect nature , yet since it was without a proper natural subsistence of its own , it was upon that account an incompleat being . but then i add , that this was a peculiar , and a supernatural case ; there being no other particular humane nature in the world without its particular proper subsistence but this alone , which subsists wholly by a borrowed subsistence , as being assumed into that of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but now what is all this to the vnion between the soul and body , which are vitally united as essential parts of the whole humane person ? but the person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not vitally united to the humane nature as to a part of it . and though ( as i noted before ) it be impossible for a finite person to be vitally united to any other being distinct from it self , yet an infinite person ( as we see in the person of our saviour ) may be united to another distinct being or nature . for this is neither a composition , nor yet a natural vnion . but to this our author very learnedly excepts , and affirms the vnion between the person of christ and his humane nature to be a natural vnion ; and gives this as a reason for it , because it is a vnion of natures , and that an vnion of natures is a natural vnion by whatsoever power it is done , p. . in answer to which , though i might say , that this is not properly ( at least not immediately ) an vnion of natures , but of the divine person of christ to the humane nature , which by and through the person comes to be united to the divine nature ; yet , to let that pass , i absolutely deny both his propositions , viz. that the vnion between the person of christ and his humane nature is a natural vnion . and that all vnion of natures must be a natural vnion , by what power soever it is wrought . both which are absolutely false . forasmuch as a natural vnion is only that which is wrought by a natural cause or principle , acting according to the ordinary course and measures of nature ; which an vnion between two natures so vastly disproportioned as a finite and an infinite , can never be effected by : for will this man affirm , that god , by the ordinary exercise of that power , by which he carries on the daily production of things in the world , ( and which is properly called nature ) united the divine person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the humane nature together ? if this be not a supernatural effect , ( and consequently no natural vnion ) let this man assign me any one that ever was or can be reputed such . and therefore let him take notice for the future , that it is not the bare terms or extreams of an vnion , as that it is between two natures , that can make it natural ; but an agent acting , and joining those natures together , according to the ordinary course of nature , which must make it formally so ; and which can never be wrought by any agent so working , where one of the natures to be united is finite , and the other infinite . but ( as i said before ) what is all this to this present argument , which has nothing to do with the hypostatick vnion , but only with that way or kind of union , by which created beings are united together ? and will this man argue from one sort of union to another , between which there is no cognation at all ? wherefore let the charge not only of boldness , but prophaneness too rest upon him , who dares make the common way of natural unions , the measure of a supernatural ; and that such a one as exceeds all the miracles that omnipotence it self ever yet wrought in the world. but now ( as he tells us ) he is for quitting the school-terms , ( which he never understood ) and for speaking so as . all may understand him . and here the first oracle thus delivered by him is this ; viz. that the soul may be a compleat and perfect person , but not a perfect man , p. . l. . to which i answer , that a perfect man is essentially a compound nature or being ; and that an humane person is essentially so too ; and that therefore the soul being as essentially a simple vncompounded being , can neither be a perfect man , nor a perfect person . but this is such a proposition , that i shall say no more of it , but leave it wholly to the reader 's admiration . nevertheless , to dis-encumber him from such stuff , as this man's ignorance is still throwing in his way , i think fit here to note the difference between a perfect and a compleat being . now a thing is said to be perfect in respect of its essence , as wanting nothing that is essential to it . but it is called compleat in respect of its subsistence , as subsisting so by it self , as to be neither a part , nor adjunct of another thing . accordingly the first of these is the perfection of a man considered barely as a man , as an animal rationale , compounded of soul and body . but the other is the perfection of a person , or of a man , considered not only as a rational nature , but as a rational nature completely subsisting . from whence it follows , that neither does the perfection of a man , nor the perfection of a person , depend upon the perfections or operations belonging to him ; as being neither essential to him as a man , or as a person ; and consequently , though they be never so defective , yet he who has the essence or essentials of a man , is a perfect man ; and he who has this essence or nature of a man , completed with the proper subsistence of the same , is a perfect person . but our author is for explaining this matter to us further by an instance : let us ( says he ) consider a soul vitally vnited to a body , with organs so indisposed for sensation , that a man can neither see , nor hear , nor tast , nor smell , but only just lives and breaths , you will not say this is a perfect man , p. . l. . yes , good sir , i both will and do say so . for he who has the perfect essence of a man , is a perfect man , whether halt , or blind , or deaf , and as defective in the actual exercise of his faculties as of his limbs . but you will say , do not all these great defects render a man more imperfect than he would be otherwise ? yes , as to his state or condition they do , but not as to his nature or essence : and therefore this author may take notice , that there is a twofold perfection belonging to a man , the first essential , which we have been hitherto speaking of , and properly consists in that perfection of nature , or essence , without which he could not be a man ; the other is extra-essential , and in respect of the former accidental , and may ( as we have noted ) be called a perfection of state or condition ; and consists properly in an integrity of parts , and a right disposition of the faculties , enabling a man to exert all the operations belonging to him . and i do here , according to all the principles of philosophy , and the concurrent sence of philosophers affirm , that notwithstanding an universal failure of all those accidental perfections , a man is as perfectly a man by vertue of his bare essence , and as perfectly a person by vertue of his compleat subsistence , as if he had them all in their highest pitch . but our author goes on ; if ( says he ) a compleat person may not be a compleat and perfect man , then the formal reason of personality , and the natural perfection of a man , are two things , p. . l. . i grant they are so ; but utterly deny , that a compleat person can be otherwise than a perfect man ; though there may be a perfect man who is not a person . for every person includes in it a nature rationalis , ( which makes a perfect man ) and , besides that , a compleat subsistence of the same , which makes the person ; and whereas he says , that the whole personality must be in the soul , if a man be a perfect man , who is united to a body which is worse than none , p. . l. . i must tell him , first , that there is no such thing as a man's being united to a body : for though the soul is united to a body , yet the man is not , but contains both body and soul united to one another . and i must tell him further , that the soul 's being united to a body which is worse than none , does not make that body less an essential part of the man and of the person , than if it were the most accomplish'd body in the world. in the mean time i must desire the reader to take notice of the intolerable absurdity of this author 's affirming a man to be united to a body , and that his own body too : for , at this rate , the man must be one term of the vnion , and his body the other . but still he goes boldly on , and tells us , p. . l. , . that the soul is the person , and the body only the instrument or organ of it . in answer to which , i must tell him , that not the soul , but the whole compositum is the person , and that the body is not the instrument of the soul , as of the principal agent , but of the whole compositum ; and , moreover , that the soul is as much the instrument of the said compositum , as the body is or can be : and lastly , that both of them are such instruments , as are also vital , essential parts of the compound , or person ; which makes them of a quite different kind from instruments commonly so called , which are dis-joined from the agent that employs them . but he has not done yet , but tells us ; that our bodies can be no part of our personality , because they are in continual flux , so that we are no more the same for a month , or a year , than a river is , whose waters perpetually flow , and change their place ; and yet we feel our selves to be the same persons still , and consequently that the personality rests wholly in the soul , p. . l. . to which i answer , by denying positively , that there is such a total change and flux of our bodies , as of the waters of a river ; but that on the contrary the principal parts of the body remain the same from first to last ; only with a due accretion of matter , till they come to their just magnitude and proportion ; after which there is little or no efflux from them at all : and let this man of novelty instead of philosophy , prove it otherwise , if he can . but he is now falling to his old trade of proving his point by impossible suppositions , and it is a mercy , that he does not plague his reader with the nonsence of another living image . for suppose ( says he ) p. . l. . it were possible , that the souls of john and peter should change bodies , &c. i would ask the animadverter , if he thinks that such a change of bodies would make any change of their persons ? but before i answer this most wise question , i hope , that i also may have the privilege to propound another . suppose then , say i , that socrates and xantippe should change bodies too , what would be the effect and consequence of such a change ? why it would be this , first , that the soul of socrates vitally joined with a female body , would certainly make a woman ; and yet , according to this author's principle , ( affirming , that it is the soul , and the soul only , which makes the person ) socrates , with such a change of body , would continue the same person , and consequently the same socrates still ; and in like manner for xantippe ; the conjunction of her soul , with a body of another sex , would certainly make the whole compound a man , and yet nevertheless xantippe would continue the same person , and the same xantippe still : save only , i confess , that upon such an exchange of bodies with her husband socrates , she would have more right to wear the breeches than she had before . so that this may pass for another of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ' s. but to leave this man of questions and suppositions to his trifling , and his trifling to him ( since they are not to be parted ) i do here , in answer to his question , tell him in plain terms , that if peter and iohn should shift bodies , it would make two other numerically distinct persons from both of them . for the persons of peter and iohn would be first dissolved , and then two new essential compositions , with a new essential compounding part in each of them , would certainly make two new compositums . but this is such idle , ridiculous trash , that i am ashamed to answer it , though he is not ashamed to write it , and value himself upon it . in the next place , he proceeds to prove the personality of the soul in a state of separation ; and indeed , if it could have been proved to be a person while it is united to the body , i will readily grant it to be so after its disjunction from it . but on the contrary , if it were ever united to the body , as an essential part of the whole compound ; i positively affirm , that no disunion of it from the body , can ever after make that which had been an essential part , to become a suppositum , nor consequently a person . this is what i assert ; and accordingly the animadverter's design in this dispute was to confute his adversarie's assertion of the personality of the soul thus considered , by arguing against it ab absurdo , and shewing , what paradoxes unavoidably issued from it , and therefore that it must needs be false , since if it were true , nothing but truth could follow from it . and here , one of the animadverter's arguments proceeded thus ; if the soul in such a state be a person , then it is either the same person which the man himself was , while he was living , and in the body , or it is another person , &c. to which this author ( shrewdly no doubt ) replies , pray what is this person ( says he ) which he calls the man himself which lives in the body , i hope it is not the body which lives in the body , and then i know no man nor person that lives in the body , but only the soul , p. . l. . thus he. but does this weak man think that this expression of a man's being in the body imports his being locally or properly in it , as a thing is kept in a case , or shut up in a bag ? i must tell him , that to say [ a man is in the body , or personally in a body ] is a form or way of speaking , which has obtained in the world , and signifies no more than that he is in a bodily state or condition . and will his ignorance then exact the popular use of a word of phrase , according to the strictness of its litteral signification ? do we not commonly say , that a man is in a passion , in love , in a rage , or in drink , and yet in truth , and in strictness of speech , all these things are in the man , and not the man in them ? and much after the like manner , when we say a man is in the body , the true sence of it is , that the body is in the man , as the part properly is and must be in the whole . and as for that expression in st. paul , i knew a man in christ fourteen years ago , whether in the body i cannot tell , or whether out of the body , god knoweth , such an one caught up to the third heaven , &c. which he alleges to prove , that the soul of st. paul out of the body , was the person of st. paul ; this does not prove it at all ; for his soul might be caught up into heaven without the body , and hear all this without being a person , as well as the souls of just men do , which go to heaven , and there have such like discoveries made to them , but yet are not persons for all that ; nor can this author prove that they are . but the true meaning of the forementioned words is no more than this ; that st. paul could not certainly tell , whether the discovery of these wonderful things was made to him by the ministry of his bodily senses , or whether the revelation of them was made immediately to his mind , without being conveyed to it through his senses . and as this , i conceive , is all that can be gathered from hence , so is it far enough from proving , that either his soul was then separated from his body , or , if it were , that it was properly a person during that separation . but see how he disputes further upon this matter . does the man ( says he ) and his person dye ? then the man is not immortal ; and if the man and his person lives , then the soul is the man , and the person , and the very same person out of the body , that it was in it , p. . l. . all which as it is a notorious paradox , so the proof of it is no more than one pitiful branch of the fallacy called ignoratio elenchi , which supposes a contradiction between propositions where there is none , by pretending to argue de eodem , when it does not . for certain it is , that the whole person of the man truly and properly dies , as death , in the proper and received sence of the word , imports a dissolution , or separation of the essential parts of the person : and yet as certain also it is , that the same person is immortal , and never dies , as death imports an utter destruction of the said parts . both which propositions are certainly and confessedly true , but in their different sences . where , for this man 's further instruction , i must tell him also , that whatsoever immediately affects , or belongs to any part of the person ( especially an essential part ) does properly and ultimately denominate the whole person ; forasmuch as all denomination rests in the suppositum . thus moses ( which name certainly expresses the person of moses ) is said to have died , and been buried , deut. . , . though it was his body only that descended into the grave : and the same moses again is represented as living and discoursing with our saviour , luke . . at which time it is certain also , that it was only the soul of moses , that could do this . from whence i argue , that if this man will infer the soul of moses to have been the person of moses , because he finds that , which could immediately belong only to his soul , attributed to his whole person , it will follow , that he may with the same reason affirm the body of moses to have been the person of moses likewise , since that which did and could belong only to his body , we find equally attributed to his whole person too . this is plain consequence , and expressed in proper terms , whether this man understands them or no. but he goes on , and argues most invincibly thus ; if the personality be not compounded of soul and body , the soul may be the whole and same person in the body , and out of it , p. . l. . now in the name of sence and logick what a consequence is this , that because personality is not compounded of soul and body , therefore the person is not compounded so neither , and consequently , that the soul may be the whole person ? for will he conclude the same of the concrete , which he does of the abstract ? i have told him before , and tell him here again , that personality being an abstract form has neither parts nor composition properly and physically belonging to it ; but only by connotation , as it essentially connotes and implies both these in its concrete , which is here the humane person ; and consequently , since the soul can neither have parts nor composition in it , it is impossible that it should be that person . i protest i am ashamed to dispute any more against such gross absurdities ; but it is my ill fate to be forced to follow this blunderer through thick and thin . but he is now for trying how he can fence against the absurdities charged upon his assertion of the personality of the soul in its separation from the body . for the animadverter having proved , that if the soul in that condition was a person , it was essentially another person from what the man himself was when he was alive ( forasmuch as a compound person , and a simple uncompounded one , can never be the same ) he inferred from hence , that it would be one person who lives well or ill in this world , viz. the man himself while he was personally in the body , and another person who passes out of the body into heaven or hell , there to be rewarded or punished ( at least till the resurrection ) for what , that other person had done well or ill here upon earth . and what does he answer to this ? why in the first place he repeats the same cavil , that he used before , and tells us , that to say that a man is personally in the body , if the person of the man consists of body and soul , is downright nonsence , p. . l. . to which i reply as i did before ; that if it be nonsence , it is such as the whole world commonly speaks , and ( as i have already shewn ) such as signifies no more than a man's being personally in a corporeal , or bodily estate ; and let this man of confidence instead of sence shew , either that all mankind speaks in this absurdly , or intends any other thing by it than what i have said . but whereas he speaks of the personal presence of the man in the body and the absurdity of it , p. . l. . it is purely his own expression : for the animadverter neither uses it , nor has any thing to do with it . for though he speaks of [ a man 's being in the body , and personally in the body ] because it is a way of speaking commonly used , and thereby authorized , yet he finds no such expression used as [ a man 's personal presence in the body , or his being personally present in the body ] and therefore he neither speaks so , nor is responsible for such a way of speech , whether it be defensible or no. so that this man may take his personal presence ( as he calls it ) back again to himself , for it is a contemptible thing , and none , that i know of , regard it . but in the next place he pretends to return the charge of the same , or the like absurdity upon the animadverter himself , thus : if ( says he ) the man be a person , and the soul no person , then the person sins , and that which is no person suffers . and , if a man be a whole person , and the soul only a part of the person , then the whole sins , and a part suffers for the whole . and let him choose ( says he ) which is most agreeable to the principles of reason and divinity , p. . l. . to which i answer first , that though a part suffers for what it did in the whole , yet it does not suffer for the whole . and secondly , that for a part which bore its share in the sin , while it was joined with the body , to bear its proportion of the punishment while it is disjoined from it , carries with it nothing incongruous either to the principles of reason or divinity . if indeed the soul in its separation from the body should suffer the whole punishment due for the sins of the whole person , the case would be very different . but i hope this author ( as confident and heterodox as he is ) will not affirm , that the soul in its separate estate bears the whole punishment due to the sinner ; or that god inflicts it , till the soul and body meet , and are reunited together at the resurrection . but that one person should suffer for what was done by another person , i am sure is not resolvable into the stated course , or rule of god's dispensing rewards , and punishments . but he now lays about him at an higher rate : does this profound philosopher ( says he ) think indeed that the body either sins or suffers ? p. . l. . my reply to which shall be neither by an absolute affirmation or negation , but by distinction . and here , that must be repeated and applyed which was mentioned before , viz. that we must distinguish between the principal and proper agent , or the principium quod , and between the instrumental principle , or principium quo , by which that agent is properly said to act ; likewise between the subjectum quod , which is also called the ultimate subject , and the subject of denomination , and between the subjectum quo , or subjectum proximum , which is the immediate subject of inhesion . accordingly i answer , that , as from the principium quod , or prime agent , the sinful act proceeds from the whole person or suppositum ; but as from the immediate producing principle , or principium quo , the said act proceeds from the soul. in like manner , as the subjectum quod , or ultimate subject of denomination , the whole man or person suffers ; but as the subjectum quo , or immediate recipient of the impression , it is the body that suffers : so that by reason of this subordination of the principium quo , to the principium quod , and the subjectum quo to the subjectum quod , the soul is not properly denominated the sinner , but the whole person who sins in and by his soul ; nor the body the sufferer , but the whole man who suffers in and through both his body and soul too . and this is the true answer to this his silly objection , and to that other too , viz. that vice and vertue are seated only in the soul , p. . l. . for we affirm them to be seated only in the soul as in the subjectum quo , or immediate subject of inhesion , but in the whole person as the ultimate and proper subject of denomination . by which it is manifest , that this author's ignorance of these terms , or his inability to apply them , has betrayed him into all these wretched paradoxes about the personality of the soul. but whereas in the next place he says , that as the body may be made the instrument of vertue or vice , so it may be the instrument of rewards or punishments , p. . l. . could there well be a grosser blunder than to call that the instrument of rewards and punishments , which is properly the subject of them ? for an instrument is properly an inferior sort of efficient cause , acting in the vertue and strength of the principal ; but a subject is not so . and the principal cause of rewards and punishments is god himself ; and if there be any instrument or instrumental cause of the same , it is properly that by which , and not that upon which he bestows the one and inflicts the other . the next thing he carps at is the animadverter's way of concluding his argument . it is worth observing ( says he ) p. . l. . how notably he winds up his argument ( and possibly the animadverter may not be quite so well skilled in the art of winding , as this man is in that of turning . ) nevertheless , as he lays it before us , so let us consider it . if it be intolerably absurd ( as no doubt it is ) said the animadverter , that the soul in the other world should not be responsible for what the man himself in person had done in this , &c. to this replies our author , what then ? one would then expect the conclusion should be , that the soul is the man himself in person , p. . l. . no ; stay a little , good sir , you are not to form the animadverter's argument for him ( for fear you should cast it into a syllogism consisting only of two terms as you have done for the socinians , p. . ) but if the animadverter had designed to give the principal inference from the thing it self there spoken of , the consequence of the forementioned hypothetick should have been this , then it is equally absurd to affirm the soul in the other world to be another numerically distinct person from what the man himself had been in this. this , sir , would and should have then been the consequence . but since the animadverter had sufficiently shewn this before ; and moreover , since this author had so often and so insolently exploded all the terms used by the ancients in their discourses , about the trinity , as good for nothing but to confound men's notions of it , he thought fit by way of over-plus to his argument , to return the reproach upon him , by shewing that he treated of things in such false and such misapplied terms , that they must of necessity throw all discourse and reasoning about them into paradox and confusion . in a word , the animadverter had no intent here to shew the immediate logical consequence of the thing laid down in that hypothetick proposition ; as being evident to the first apprehensions of all mankind , and having withal been effectually proved by what went before , viz. that one person could not be responsible for what had been done by another ; but his sole purpose was to shew by the present instance the intolerable inconvenience of this man's way of discoursing of things in words quite contrary to the sence which the whole world took them in . for surely none before him ( if he had but one grain of philosophy ) ever affirmed the soul to be the person of the man. and therefore whereas he represents the animadverter in this matter like one who runs out at the back door to avoid paying the reckoning : let him not fear it ; for i assure him that he shall be effectually reckon'd with , before i have done with him , and paid home too . in the mean time i would not have him despise back doors too much , considering what singular use they have been of , in conventicles , and possibly may be again . but the animadverter had argued further against him upon the same subject , thus . that the soul 's thus changing its state forwards and backwards , from one manner of subsistence to another , looks very odd and unnatural . as that from an incomplete state in the body , it should pass to a personal and complete state out of the body ( which state is yet preternatural to it ) and then fall back into an incomplete state again by its reunion to the body at the resurrection ; ( which yet , one would think , should rather improve our principal parts in all respects , not merely relating to the animal life ; as the bare subsistence of them , i am sure , does not . ) these things , i say , seem very uncouth and improbable , and such as ought not , without manifest necessity , to be allowed of : which here does not appear ; since all this inconvenience may be avoided , by holding , that the soul continues but a part of the whole person and no more in all its conditions , animadv . p. . and now , what has this defender here to except against ? why ; as if he were upon a tryal of skill in ribaldry , or railing prizes with his old parishioners of billingsgate ; he says , it is all mere gypsycant ( for it seems , none but conventicle-cant will down with him ) p. . l. . but for that , by his favour , the animadverter will be judged by philosophers and divines , and not by him who is neither . all that the animadverter thinks fit to say at present is this . that to subsist as a part is an incomplete state ; and to subsist as a person ( which this author holds the soul to be out of the body ) is a complete state . again , that for the soul to subsist in the body is a state natural to it , and to subsist out of the body is preternatural . and accordingly the animadverter affirms , that to make the soul first subsist as a part , viz. while it is in the body , and then as a person in its separation from the body ; and then lastly , as a part again in its reunion to the body , at the resurrection , is absurd and preposterous . and if this man of scorn cannot understand this , i shall not concern my self to instruct him . only i think fit to state the sense of the word natural , as it is used by the animadverter . now it may be taken either in a strict and proper sense , only for that which is done by a natural agent or principle , according to the stated ordinary course and measure of nature ; or secondly , it may be taken in a large and less proper sence for that which agrees and sutes with nature , and any way improves or advances it by adding to it some accidental or extra-essential perfection . and this sence the animadverter here does not use the word [ natural ] in , but speaks of it only in its first , proper , and phisophical sence ; which quite blows off all this man's cobweb arguments and objections taken from those advantages of grace , happiness and glory , which may attend the soul after its dislodgment from the body . so that when he flourishes with these vaunting questions , p. . l. . is not the perfection of our graces the perfection of humane nature ? i answer , yes ; the accidental perfection of our nature it is , but not the essential . and again , is not the perfection of nature a natural perfection ? i answer , not always ; but only when it is wrought by a natural principle , and that in a natural way . for god is to be considered both as author naturae , and as author gratiae ; and divines always look upon these considerations of him as so very different , that what god is said to do under one of the said capacities , he is reckoned not to do under the other . what he does as author naturae , is properly natural , and what he does as author gratiae , is supernatural . and if this author will abide by this assertion , that whatsoever perfects nature is a natural perfection , then grace and glory are and must be natural perfections , and god never bestows any thing supernatural upon the souls of men , either in this world , or the next . which would be a blessed assertion indeed , but much fitter to proceed from an arrant heathen , or an atheist , than a dignitary of the church of england . in the mean time , i do again affirm to this man , that all the gifts of grace and glory that god bestows upon the soul in its state of separation from the body , make it not a person , nor any other than an incompletely subsisting being still . for being essentially but a part ( whether in the body , or out of the body ) it is essentially incomplete , and consequently must be so for ever . and this assertion the animadverter has considered too well to be either shamed or huffed out of it . but to pass from the incomplete subsistence of the soul to the naturalness , or preternaturalness of its estate , which quite differ from the former ; those words of this author , p. . l. . for the boldness and absurdity of them are very remarkable . how ( says he ) does the soul's subsisting in the body , or out of the body , change the soul's manner of subsisting any more than the body changes its manner of subsisting when it is naked and when cloathed ? a very learned question indeed , as most of his are . to which i answer . that though the soul , as to its incomplete state , changes not its manner of subsisting , as being always but a part and no more in any condition , yet as to the naturalness or preternaturalness of its state it does change the manner of its subsistence , and greatly too . and would any man living , but himself , affirm it to be as natural for the soul to subsist in the body , or out of the body , as it is for the body to be cloathed or uncloathed , when the body is vitally united to the soul , and in the very nature of it designed to concur with the soul , as an essential part towards the constitution of the whole man , whereas his cloaths are neither united to , nor part of , nor any way essential to his body ? what senceless paradoxes are these ? but he tells us in the last line but one , that the soul owes not its subsistence to the body . and what though it does not ? it owes the natural manner of its subsisting to its being in the body , for all that . and as for his saying in the next line , that the soul can neither subsist more nor less in or out of the body , and that he knows no degrees of subsistence in the soul. all this is meer impertinence , since none affirms the contrary ; for natural and preternatural import not here different degrees , but different sorts or conditions of subsistence , and are founded upon different states of the soul , viz. its conjunction with , or its disjunction from the body . but he goes on and tells us , p. . l. . that the souls of good men out of the body are more happy than in the body , and therefore not in a preternatural state , which can never be a more happy state . which is no more than a fallacy of the accident . forasmuch as it is perfectly accidental to a natural or preternatural state , that either of them are happy or not happy . for if the soul be out of the body , let it be never so happy upon other accounts , it is still out of that estate which it was naturally designed to , and therefore in a state preternatural . but he adds , p. . l. . that the natural progress of the soul in this lapsed estate , is from a less perfect to a more perfect , and from thence to the most perfect state of the soul. all which is true indeed of the moral perfection of the soul , but not of the natural ; and proves , that it is the duty of the soul , and very agreeable to the nature of it , to make a progress in its moral accomplishments , but by no means necessary or essential to it to proceed from a less to a more perfect natural state . for the soul knows no natural state but in its vital union to a natural body : which from first to last is equally perfect and the same . but this man is not to be stopped in his heterodoxies . and therefore , whereas the animadverter had all along asserted , that the soul in a state of separation from the body is but a part of the person still , by reason of its essential relation to the compound . he here very insultingly as well as ignorantly asks , what is this compound , and where is this whole man , which the soul in its separate estate is related to ? p. . l. , & . to which i answer , that it is that compound , and that whole man of which the soul was once actually a part , and of which it shall be a part again at the resurrection . but can it then be part of a compound which is not actually in being ? yes , by an essential relation to it , it may be , and is so ; though by an actual conjunction with the other part of it , it cannot . but to shew the captiousness of this question , where is that man , and where is that compound which the soul , while separate , must relate to as a part , since it is certain , that it can be no part of the body ? i say , to shew the silly sophistry of this question , let us see it in this obvious instance : suppose a fowl or beast divided into its several parts , i now ask concerning each of these parts , where , and what that is , which it is a part of ? for it cannot be a part of any of the other parts , nor yet ( according to this author ) of the whole beast , for that ceases , and there is no such thing as an whole beast after the supposed division . nevertheless it is certain , that it is still a part , and relates to that beast as a part of it : from which it is evident , that it must be understood of the whole beast , that was , though at present the whole of it be actually dissolved : and so in like manner the soul in its state of separation still retains the relation of a part to the whole man , viz. the whole man that was , though he does not now actually exist . so that all such questions are meerly sophistical , and proeeed à sensu diviso ad sensum compositum . but he has another question to confound the animadverter with , p. . l. . does he mean ( says he ) that it is essential to the soul to live in an earthly body ? no , sir , but he both means and says , that it is essential to the soul to relate to the body , as a concurrent part naturally designed for the constitution of the whole man ; and consequently , that it cannot live out of the body , but still in the capacity of a part. which makes it essentially an incomplete being ; as its being actually disjoined from the body , puts it into a preternatural state besides . well , but the animadverter says also , that the soul has a natural aptitude to live in the body . to which this author replies , so has it a natural aptitude to live out of the body too , p. . l. . but this , by his good leave , i deny ; and affirm , that it has only a non-repugnancy to live out of the body ; but a natural aptitude which carries in it a positive inclination or disposition to live out of it , it has not ; but on the contrary , a very strong one , both to continue in the body , and ( as most judge ) when separated from it to return to it . but , says our author , this no man can know , p. . l. . i answer , that the mighty aversion which the soul has to part from the body , is a sufficient proof of the former , and a rational presumption of the latter . but says he again , does not st. paul desire to be absent from the body , and present with the lord ? p. . l. . i answer , that this desire does not prove the absence of st. paul's soul from the body a more natural state to it , though it might upon a supernatural account , ( and by reason of that corruption accidentally adhering to a bodily estate , ) be a more blessed one , and more desirable ; as neither was this desire it self a natural desire , but such an one as proceeded from a supernatural principle of grace ; as is evident from hence ▪ that where there is one , who ( with st. paul ) desires this , there are millions who desire the quite contrary : which questionless is a surer indication of the bent and tendency of nature , than st. paul's particular wish or desire could be . but to give this author an instance which may shew him his ignorance in the midst of his confidence : let us suppose a diamond , or some other precious stone placed in a king's diadem , certainly it could not be placed more gloriously : but for all that , i ask his profoundness , whether this diamond has not a more natural place in its proper centre ( as low as it is ) than in the royal diadem ? and for the proof of this , let it be but unfixed from its place there , and then we shall see whether it would not fall from its former glorious situation , as low as possibly it could . so that this very instance duly applyed , were there no other answer to his impertinent objections , would be sufficient . for nature is one thing , and the accidental state and condition of a thing is quite another . but the paradoxes vented by this author upon this subject are innumerable . and now after all that he has said , and that so confidently , and without any reserve , he has the face to run counter to himself so far as to ask , p. . l. . whether he any where affirms the soul , while united to the body to be the whole person ? to which i answer , that if the person be the whole person ( as it is and must be ) he has affirmed it over and over , and there is hardly a page where he treats of this subject in which he does not affirm it , either expresly , or by evident and direct consequence . particularly vind. p. . l. . the soul ( says he ) is the person : and defence p. . l. . the soul is the person , and the body only the instrument . and again , p. . l. . he affirms , that the soul , whether in the body or out of the body , is the same person still ; and that its separation from the body makes no more change in the person , than a man's putting on or off his cloaths does in the man. but if the soul in the body is not the whole person , and out of the body it is so , i hope that is a change with a witness : nor does he only affirm it , while united to the body to be the person , but he also denies it to be any part of the person , p. . l. . and the body likewise to be any part of the person , p. . l. . and surely if the soul be so the person , as neither to be part of the person it self , nor yet admit the body to be any part of it , then by immediate and irresistible consequence , the soul ( according to this man ) is and must be ( even when united to the body ) the whole person . add to this , that he affirms the soul thus united to be the only seat of personality , p. . l. . and if this man will deny that to be the whole person , in which the whole personality is , he is rather to be exploded than disputed with . but most remarkable are those wretched assertions of his , by which he directly , and inevitably makes the constitution of every man living to consist in an hypostatick vnion and incarnation . for the proving of which , i shall first give this account of an hypostatick vnion , viz. that it is that whereby a person , or completely subsisting intelligent being assumes another being or nature into the unity of its own subsistence ; so that by vertue thereof the person assuming , and the nature assumed , are both but one person , yet so , that the nature assumed is not part of the said person . this i affirm to be an hypostatick vnion , and i gather it both from what scripture , and reason discoursing upon scripture , teaches us concerning the oeconomy of christ's person , which ( according to the unanimous judgment of all divines hitherto ) is the only instance of an hypostatick vnion in the world. but now let us see what a parallel this heady venturous man ( to say no worse ) makes between this , and the union of an humane soul and body in these following propositions . the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a person . the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assumes the humane nature into the unity of the same person . the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is vitally united to the humane nature assumed by it . the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the humane nature thus assumed by it , and united to it , are but one and the same person . the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the humane nature assumed by it , are so one person , that the nature assumed is no part of the said person . the humane soul is a person . the humane soul receives the body into the unity of the same person , p. . l. . the humane soul , as a person , is vitally united to the body , p. . l. . the body being united to the soul ( which is the person ) becomes together with the soul , one and the same person , p. . l. . the soul and the body united to the soul , as to the person , so become one person , that the body is yet no part of the person , p. . l. . i know there are some disparities ( as to finite and infinite , eternal and not eternal , &c. ) between the respective subjects of the union here represented , but as to the union it self , and the kind of it , i freely refer it to the learned reader to judge , whether those conditions which divines peculiarly assign and ascribe to that supernatural hypostatick vnion , be not here ascribed , by this author , to the natural union between soul and body . and indeed what other kind of union can it be ? for the constitution of an human person , must be either by such an union as this , or by an essential concurrence of parts compounding it . but this ( though maintained by all the world besides ) this author utterly explodes as absurd , p. . l. . and the truth is , if neither the soul be a part of the person , nor the body be a part of the person ( as he denies both of them to be ) how can the person be such by an essential composition , where there are no essential parts to make the composition ? or what can be the essential parts , if the body and soul are not so ? nay , and as a further proof of what he holds in this matter , in the , , , , pages of his vindication , he explains the union between the second person of the trinity and the humane nature , and the union between an humane soul and body , by one another ; and that in many more particulars than that mentioned in the athanasian creed . but in the next place , touching the incarnation of the soul in the body ( which i likewise charge this author's opinion with , as the direct result of it ) besides , that it must necessarily follow from such an hypostatick vnion of the soul with the body , as has been described , he himself ( to give him his due ) in plain and express terms , owns so much by telling us , that the soul is an embodied person , p. . l. . and that is manifestly only another word for an incarnate person : for the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i am sure , may be truly said to be an embodyed person , by his incarnation . so that the parallel we see still holds . from all which new cartesian divinity therefore it does and must follow , that so many men as there are in the world , so many hypostatick vnions and incarnations there are also ; and that a man is properly constituted a man by an hypostatick vnion of the soul with the body , and by an embodyment or incarnation of it in the body . so that hereafter , if any one would express or define an humane person properly and exactly , he must not say , that it is an intelligent being compounded of soul and body , and completely subsisting ( for that is the gibberish of the schools ) but he must say , that an humane person is a soul incarnate . for our oracle has declared it so , and therefore in that we ought to rest . and now has not this author , think we , shewn himself an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - man indeed ? for was there ever a more glorious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , either in philosophy or theology than this of a new hypostatick vnion and incarnation ? which having been so happily discovered , and so authentically vouched , possibly when the alterers of our liturgy shall fall to work again , to alter what they cannot mend , it may be brought into our creed too . but after all , there are three questions proposed in the animadversions , p. , . mentioned indeed here , but not replyed to . and since they are not , i do here challenge this author to answer them ; and i do it with more scorn and triumph , than the animadverter ( as he pretends ) at first propounded them . the design of which questions was to shew , that according to this author's assertions , the soul in every man and the man himself , are and must be two distinct persons , and they have shewn it with that force and clearness , that they stand not only unanswered , but against him unanswerable . and therefore to direct his laughter to its right object , i leave him and his friend ( some old conventicler , i suppose ) to laugh at one another ; and to take notice withal , that nothing in nature is more to be laughed at , than he who laughs at an argument because he cannot answer it . i have now examined this man's discourse about the personality of the soul , and must profess , that i never met with so many vile heterodoxies , in so small a compass before . and what offence they will give to the pious and orthodox , and what advantage to hereticks and atheists , i doubt not but the complaints of one , and the scoffs of the other , will in a short time declare . at present i shall only venture to say thus much , that if this audacious innovator and abuser of our excellent religion , shall after all these scandalous paradoxes escape the censure of the church , the church must not expect to escape the censure of the world : in the mean time i know no security that our religion has against such invaders and invasions but this ; that though they get ten thousand imprimatur's to introduce their new christianity amongst us , yet ( thanks be to god ) there is no such thing as licensing heresy into truth , or nonsence into sence . and so i now pass from hence to his pretended answer to some part of the fourth chapter of the animadversions . but before i enter upon it ; it may be pleasant to observe how at the close of the preceding dispute , he beggs his friend's pardon for his long excursion upon this subject , p. . l. . whereas before , at his entrance upon the same , he had declared , that he would only make some short reflections upon it , p. . l. . and now , how short reflections can pass for a long excursion , or a long excursion be truly called short reflections , i must confess i do not understand . but catch this man out of a self-contradiction , and you may as well expect to catch him out of himself . but let us see what he says to the animadverter's fourth chapter : why , he says , that it is an answer to it self , ( though , i hope , not in this author's way , by contradicting it self ) : but how does this appear ? why , because ( as he tells us ) it undertakes to prove , that self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality in the three persons of the blessed trinity . nor ( says he ) does the dean say it is . no ? does he not say it ? when it has been proved over and over to his face from his own words , that he positively affirms self-consciousness to be that , wherein their personal vnity , and distinction from all others does essentially consist , vindic. pag. . and to be that which makes ( i say makes ) each of the divine persons to be one in himself , and distinct from all others , pag. . vind. and having affirmed the three divine persons to be three spirits , does he not say , that the self-vnity of a spirit can be nothing else but self-consciousness ? vindic. pag. . again , does he not affirm , that the nature of a spirit consists in an internal self-sensation , which he uses only as another word for self-consciousness ? defence , p. . nay , and does he not repeat the same in several places of both his books , as we have from several passages , cited out of them , before demonstrated ? and now , what , i pray , does the animadverter , or any one else pretend the formal reason of a thing to be but that which makes it originally and essentially one with it self , and distinct from all other things ; or ( in other terms ) that wherein the said unity and distinction does consist ? well : but having thus seen what this author has unsaid , let us see what it is that he does say : why he tells us , that the question is only this , whether three self-consciousnesses do not prove three persons , each of which is self-conscious , to be really distinct from one another ? p. . l. . in answer to which , i do earnestly desire the observing reader to note , first , how shamelesly he falsifies in this matter , contradicting his own most positive and frequently repeated assertions ; and then how utterly he changes the whole question . for the question has been all along ( as appears from what has been so faithfully quoted and set down ) not , what proves the divine persons to be thus distinct , but what makes them so . and will this man say , that the proving of a thing to be thus and thus , and the making it to be so , are the same ? and besides , supposing that self-consciousness may prove the divine persons distinct , yet it can prove them so onely as a consequent note or sign , not as the original cause or reason of that distinction ; or as an effect proves its cause , not as a cause proves its effect . for the person is originally distinguished by its personal subsistence , which subsistence is not owing to any act or principle of self-consciousness , as shall be fully proved against him in the vindication of the fourth argument . in the mean time i do here refer it to every man of sence to judge , whether by this utter change of the question this author does not plainly give up the whole thing here in dispute between him and his adversary . and accordingly we shall see how by the help of this and the like wretched evasions , he endeavors to slink away from the animadverter's first argument , which is this , no personal act can be the formal reason of personality in the person whose act it is . but self-consciousness is a personal act , and therefore cannot be the formal reason of personality . this is the argument , and what is the defender's , or rather the dean's answer to it ? why he tells us , that neither did he consider self-consciousness as a personal act , nor assign it as the formal reason of personality . to the first of which i answer , that it is as manifest and barefaced a falshood as any that he has uttered ; and that if knowledge , self-conscious feeling , or sensation be acts , and things are to be understood by words , then self-consciousness , which he has constantly expressed by the forementioned words , is as truly , really , and properly an act , and nothing else , as knowledge , feeling or sensation are , or can be said to be acts. and as for the other part of his answer , viz. that he did not assign self-consciousness for the formal reason of personality ; we have superabundantly proved , that he has plainly and fully asserted the thing , and we must pardon the poor untaught man , for being ignorant of the word . nevertheless he adds , that if we consider self-consciousness as a personal act , though it cannot make the person , yet it distinguishes one person from another . p. . l. . to which i answer , that nothing but that which makes the person can originally distinguish the person , and consequently that self-consciousness distinguishes one person from another only by a secondary or consequent distinction , and for that reason can no more originally distinguish than it can make the person . as for instance , a man's bodily stature and dimensions , with a concurrence of all other accidents belonging to him , do really distinguish him from other men : but for all that , they do not originally distinguish him ; for it is only his individual numerical nature which does , or can do that . but it is worth observing , how this ignorant man pursues his point , viz. that self-consciousness is that which gives personal unity and distinction : for ( says he ) by this actual self-consciousness every person feels himself to be himself , and not to be another , p. . l. . and is not this , think we , a demonstration ? yes , no doubt it is so of the ignorance of him , who thinks that it can prove any thing else but the weakness of him who uses it . for i appeal to the whole world to judge , what a consequence this is , viz. that because every person feels himself by self-consciousness to be himself , and not to be another , therefore this self-consciousness is that which distinguishes him from all others . for can a person 's perceiving his own distinction , properly make , or give him this distinction ? upon the whole matter i must declare , that i cannot think any one , who looks upon this as serious arguing , worth arguing against . and whereas he says , that this first argument of the animadverter has been sufficiently exposed already , i shall securely venture it upon the bottom upon which it stands , without any fear of its being exposed any more than answered , especially by one who never yet exposed any thing or person but himself . and so i pass to the animadverter's second argument , which proceeds thus . nothing in the nature of it absolute and irrelative , can be the formal reason of personality in the persons of the blessed trinity . but self-consciousness is a thing in the nature of it absolute and irrelative , and therefore it cannot be the reason of personality in any of the said persons . in reply to which argument , thus fairly , formally , and syllogistically proposed , why does not this author ( as in all regular disputations it ought , and uses to be done ) apply an answer , either by denying one of the two propositions , or by distinguishing one or more of the terms ? but this not being to be done without logick , our author must be so far excused . and therefore he very prudently wraps himself up in such a cloud of insignificant words , as may enable him to escape his adversary without encountring him . for one of these two things he must of necessity disprove , viz. either first , that the divine persons and personalities are perfectly and wholly relative . or secondly , that self-consciousness is a thing wholly absolute and irrelative . as to the first of which he himself elsewhere acknowledges and affirms ; that the three divine persons are three relative subsistences . and let me tell him further , that they are so entirely relative , that their very subsistere is referri , and their referri not only consequent upon , and supervenient to their subsistence ( as it is in created persons ) but one and the same with it ; so that by vertue thereof they are indifferently termed by all schoolmen and divines , either relative subsistences , or subsisting relations . the concrete and the abstract terms in the divine persons being , by reason of the peculiar condition of their personality , as well as the absolute transcendent simplicity of the divine nature , only different ways of expressing the same thing . and therefore whereas this author says , p. . l. . does that which makes john a person make him a father ? i answer , no ; but affirm also , that , that which makes the first person in the trinity a person makes him a father , and convertibly , that that which makes him a father , ( and that only ) makes him also a person . and the reason of the difference here , is not , ( as this ignorant man alleges ) because every humane person has an absolute nature belonging to him as the subject of the relation ; for each of the divine persons has an absolute nature distinctly belonging to him ( though not a distinct absolute nature . ) but the difference lies in this . that an humane person has not only an absolute nature to be the remote subject of the relation , but also an absolute personality as the immediate subject of the same , by vertue whereof the person of iohn continues after the relation of a father ceases . but in the trinity every person and personality is wholly relative , forasmuch as the very subsistence of each of them is so . so that the eternal father is and subsists as a father by having a son , and not by knowing himself to be a father ; and by communicating his essence to another , not by an act passed upon and wholly terminated in his own person . no ; this is postnate to the former , as all other personal acts whatsoever , are and must be . and therefore the godhead or divine nature which is absolute , is not ( as this man precariously pretends ) originally distinguished by three self-consciousnesses , p. . l. . but by three original relative properties , viz. the innascibility and paternity of the first person , which make one personal property , and the two distinct originations of the other two persons , whereby they are both mutually distinguished from , and opposed to one another , as all relatives are . but this man's offering here at an explication of these divine relations , by that exploded figment of a man and his living image , p. . l. . is an unsufferable profaneness as well as an arrant petitio principii . for will he pretend to explain a thing in it self obscure by another that is more obscure , and ( which is worse ) impossible besides ? let him for the future learn , that no man who understands what arguing is , ought to bring that as a medium , either of explication , or probation , which he knows to be doubtful , or has just cause to suspect that his adversary may reject as absurd and unreasonable . but in the next place to shew , whether self-consciousness be a thing in the nature of it perfectly absolute and irrelative , and consequently unable to give such a subsistence and personality to the three divine persons as shall be wholly relative , there needs only a repetition of what is said to this purpose in the animadversions , and which this author has very discreetly said not so much as one word to , viz. that self-consciousness is a thing in the nature of it absolute and irrelative , as being that act , by which each person intimately knows , and is conscious to himself of his own being , acts , motions , and every thing personally belonging to him ; so that as such , it terminates within , and looks no further than that one person , whom it is an entire survey and comprehension of . and as it is an absolute and irrelative term , so it may be conceived distinctly and fully , without conceiving or implying the conception of any thing or person besides . and now , what relation does , or can such an act of self-consciousness imply in it ? it is indeed on the contrary a direct contradiction to all that is relative . for it encloses the person wholly within himself ; neither pointing nor looking further , nor referring to any one else , anim. p. . all which is so very plain and full , that i defy this author , or any man alive to prove , either that this is not a true account of self-consciousness , as to the absolute and irrelative nature of it , or if it be , that it can give a subsistence purely relative to the person which it shall belong to . but to make short work with this man of words without sence . there are in every relation these things to be considered . the subject of the relation both remote and immediate , the foundation of the relation , the correlate or term of the relation ; and lastly , the relation it self . accordingly to give an instance of this in the paternal relation of the first person of the blessed trinity ; the remote subject of it is the divine nature , the immediate subject is the person of the father , the foundation of it is that eternal act by which the father communicates his nature to the son , and the correlate or term of the relation is the son , and lastly , the relation it self is that mutual respect ( resulting from the forementioned act ) which the father and the son reciprocally hear to one another . and here , i confess , that in the divine relations there is a real identity between the subject , the foundation , and the relation it self , contrary to what it is in created persons , in whom they are really distinguished . upon the whole matter then , let this man in the present instance of the eternal person of the father shew , that self-consciousness is either the subject , the foundation , the correlate or term of the relation , or lastly , the relation it self : and then let him make it the formal reason of a relative personality , in that or in any other person of the trinity , if he can ; and if he cannot , i think a little less confidence , with a little more knowledge , would do well . but in the last place , quitting all that he had so peremptorily contended for before , he tells us in plain terms , p. . l. . that if each of the divine persons have a self-consciousness of its own , this distinguishes the divine persons , and proves them to be really distinct ; which is all that the dean desires . now what mr. dean desires ( more than what deans generally do ) i cannot tell , but what he has declared , is this , viz. that self-consciousness makes each of the divine persons to be one in himself , and distinct from all others ; and is that wherein the said vnity and distinction properly and formally does consist . and now , for self-consciousness to be the cause and reason of all this , and for it only to prove this , i must tell him in the name of sence and logick are quite different things . and the first of them ( as appears from the fore-alleaged passages ) he has asserted hitherto , and the latter he fallaciously sneaks into now . but to the same repeated assertion , i must still give the same answer , viz. that self-consciousness can distinguish the divine persons only by a secondary distinction , not by a primary and original ; since nothing can originally distinguish ( as i have shewn ) but that which also constitutes : for still philosophy will have one and the same principle , both constitutive and distinctive too . so that this is manifestly and fairly another delivering up and quitting of the point , which he had all along in his vindication asserted and disputed for . for there he had asserted , that self-consciousness gave original self-vnity and distinction to each of the divine persons , and here he declares himself content if we allow self-consciousness but to prove the same . though we have told him , that this is wholly another case : and it has been inculcated over and over ; but ( it seems ) there is no forcing it into his pate any more than pouring a pottle into a pint. and so i proceed to examine what he says to the animadverter's third argument , which proceeds thus . if self-consciousness be the formal reason of personality in the three divine persons , then there is no repugnancy in the nature and reason of the thing it self , but that there might be three thousand persons in the deity as well as three . which consequence appears from this , that neither is there any repugnancy that there might be so many self-consciousnesses , or self-conscious minds or spirits for the deity to be communicated to , nor any repugnancy proved in the nature of the deity it self , that it should be so communicated . this is the sum of the argument , and what is this defender's reply to it ? why he first tells us , that had the dean said , that self-consciousness [ made ] the trinity , this had been a notable argument , p. . l. . and will he grant this ? then i shall prove , that he did say it , and that as fully as words could express it in his vindication , p. . l. . where he has this passage , as the self-consciousness of every person to it self [ makes ] them three distinct persons , so the mutual consciousness of all the three divine persons makes them all but one infinite god. now i ask this self-contradictor first , whether any words can be more plain and expressive than these ? and in the next place , whether they are not his own ? if he doubts it , let him turn to the place alleged . and if they are his own , then i hope , that , that which [ makes ] the divine persons three distinct persons [ makes ] the trinity also : unless the three distinct persons are one thing , and the trinity another . so that this argument effectually concludes against this shameless man , even by his own concession . but he adds in the next place of the same page , that he hopes however , that self-consciousness may distinguish the three persons , p. . l. . to which it has been answered again and again , that it can distinguish them only secondarily , and consequentially not primarily and originally . but i am weary of these repetitions , though he is not ashamed to outdo battus himself in tautology . and therefore whereas he says further , that self-consciousness proves the distinction , though it does not limit the number of the persons , p. . l. . i deny , that it can originally distinguish them without limiting the number of them also . for , as i have proved , nothing can originally distinguish the persons but that which makes them persons : and that which makes them persons , by the very same , makes them three persons ; it being as essential to them to be three , as to be persons . and therefore to that question of his , does the formal reason of personality make or limit the number of persons ? l. . ibid. i answer , that in persons wholly relative , as the divine persons are , it does and must do so . for the further clearing of which , it must be observed , that the animadverter in the present argument considered the divine nature as wholly abstracted from all personality belonging to it , and so in it self ( as upon such an abstraction it must needs be ) only communicable and determinable ; and consequently such , as cannot be supposed to communicate or determine it self ; but to receive this communication and determination from the personalities , considered as actually joined with it . the number of which personalities must be taken from such a peculiarity of their condition , as shall make one certain number of them necessary and no other ; and that wherein this peculiarity of condition does consist , is the relative opposition of the said persons to one another ; by vertue whereof they are necessarily three and no more . for as there are two and but two such oppositions in this divine oeconomy , viz. one between generation and filiation , and the other between spiration and procession , accordingly there are three and but three personalities founded upon the said oppositions : as is clearly shewn in the eight chapter of the anim. p. . but on the other side , since there is nothing in the nature of self-consciousness to determine it to any certain number of self-consciousnesses , it must follow that neither can any certain number of personalities be derived from thence . in short , if the divine nature or essence thus abstractedly taken on the one hand , cannot be supposed to communicate or determine it self , and the personalities on the other , which alone should and can determine it , are of that condition , as not to imply any certain number in themselves , but are indifferent to any that can be assigned , then it is impossible for the said personalities to determine the divine nature to three personal subsistences and no more . and this i account a full and sufficient proof , that the fixed ternary number of the divine persons can never be stated upon self-consciousness ; but ( so far as the influence of that reaches ) may be multiplyed into any number whatsoever . but says our author , that which naturally distinguishes three persons from each other , would distinguish three thousand if there were so many , but does not prove that there may be so many , p. . l. . to which i answer , that the distinction all along insisted upon hitherto , is not such an one as supposes or follows , but such an one as constitutes or makes the person ; and therefore it is ridiculous to argue , that supposing there were so many persons , they might all be distinguished by so many self-consciousnesses : for that is not the point here , but whether there be any thing in the nature of self-consciousness , rendring it uncapable of such a multiplication or no ; and if there be not , then it is certain , that supposing there might be so many self-consciousnesses , there might and would be also so many persons : for as much as that which originally and principally distinguishes any thing must of necessity constitute it too . but he goes on and tells us , that though there may be no repugnancy to such a multiplication on the part of self-consciousness , yet on the part of the divine nature there may , and therefore that the argument does not conclude , l. . ibid. to which i answer , that the divine nature , as this author considers it actually determined by its respective personalities , must needs have a repugnancy to any other , or greater multiplication of the same ; but as the animadverter here considers it entirely abstracted from all personal determination , i affirm , that it is impossible to prove a repugnancy in it so considered , to subsist in . self-conscious spirits any more than in three : and therefore i would have this author take notice , that the animadverter was not concerned to conclude , that absolutely there might be so many persons in the godhead ; but , that so far as this man's hypothesis reached , and for ought that could be determined from thence about the number of the divine persons , this might be so ; and withal that nothing yet appeared on the part of the divine nature so abstracted to prove , that it could not be so . and as this was the utmost that the animadverter undertook by this argument , so it was sufficient for him to prove thereby , the absurdity of this author 's new hypothesis compared with the old received one of the church ; which makes it utterly impossible that there should be any more than three persons in the godhead : and that from the peculiar condition of the persons themselves necessarily determining them to the fixed number of three and no more ; which this man's hypothesis of three personal self-consciousnesses from the very nature of the thing ( as we have shewn ) can never do . and this was the sum of the animadverter's argument , which this man , with such a magisterial ignorance , pronounces a meer non sequitur : if we may take his word for a sequitur or non sequitur , who has more logick a great deal , to distinguish good money from bad , than a true consequence from a false . and so we are come at length to see upon what terms the animadverter's fourth argument stands with this defender . fourth argument . if three distinct self-consciousnesses formally constitute three distinct personalities , then three distinct self-complacencies will constitute three distinct personalities too . but our author , i suppose will not allow of the latter , and therefore neither ought he to assert the former . this is the animadverter's fourth argument upon the head of self-consciousness , with reference to the divine persons ; and he first declared , that he produced and looked upon it only as an argument ad hominem : there being as much reason to state the formal constitution of a person upon one , as upon the other ; though in truth upon neither . for all that could or can be alleged for self-consciousness upon this account , is , that it is essential to each of the divine persons , and inseparable from them ; and so much i affirm , is allegeable for self-complacency . besides , that if this author pleads no more for self-consciousness , than that it barely distinguishes the divine persons from one another ( as in this whole defence ( by way of subterfuge ) he pretends to no more , and that also without proving it their principal distinction ) i challenge him to prove , that self-complacency does not distinguish the said persons from one another as much as self-consciousness does or can do . to which we may add , that self-complacency is the nobler act of the two , and a step beyond the former ; and for that reason the fittest to give the perfectest state of being which is personality ; if personality could depend upon , or be derived from any personal act ; as the animadverter has all along contended that it cannot . but , says our author , the animadverter proceeds all along upon a mistake , viz. that by self-consciousness he understands the acts of self-consciousness , p. . the end , whereas our author understands only the principle of it . to which i answer , ( as i have done several times before ) ; first , that by self-consciousness ( which this very man over and over expresses by self-feeling or sensation ) nothing can properly be signified but an act ; and that we may as well say , that seeing , hearing , tasting and smelling signifie the principle of these respective acts , and not the acts themselves , as that this self-conscious feeling and sensation do so . and this i shall immoveably insist upon , as the genuine proper signification of the term , without the least regard had to this man 's meaning ; which in no disputation ought to supersede or take place of the proper , universally received sence of his words . for his meaning is to himself , his words to the world. nevertheless since ( like one beaten off from his hold ) he flies from the act to the principle , i do here , in the second place , deny also , that the principle of self-consciousness does or can constitute the person , or give personal vnity or distinction to it , ( which i reckon to be all but the same thing : ) forasmuch as the first and original principle of all acts is the nature and essence of the thing to which the said acts belong . but then the bare essence or nature of a thing , whether create or vncreate can never of it self make or constitute that thing a person , but the determination of the said nature by its proper and complete subsistence , must do that . accordingly in the subject here before us , the principle of self-consciousness is no other than the divine nature as it is an infinite omniscient mind ; which absolutely considered , both as to its being , and actings being the same in all the three divine persons , can never constitute them persons nor originally distinguish them . and if there be any distinction in this infinite omniscient mind , either as to the manner of its subsisting or acting ( for in that must lie all the distinction that it is capable of ) it must be from the personal properties determining and distinguishing both : and consequently since this omniscient principle and its actings receive all their distinction antecedently from the said personal properties or personalities , it is impossible that these properties or personalities should receive their distinction from them . in short , the bare principle of self-consciousness is the divine intellect , or the divine nature , as omniscient , which of it self neither is the person , nor constitutes the person ; and the actual exercise of this principle belongs to the person himself , who alone can be properly said to act , and therefore must be a person antecedently to his acting , ( all personal acts proceeding from a suppositum : ) from both which it follows , that self-consciousness , neither in the actual exercise , nor yet in the principle thereof , does or can constitute the divine persons , or be the proper formal reason of their personal being , vnity , and distinction . and whereas he tells us again , that every act of self-consciousness proves a distinct person , pag. . lin . , . this is an old story , and so often repeated , that it is almost come to the cuckow 's note : but he has been frequently told in answer to it , and must be so told again ; that the question is not , what proves a person distinct , but what makes it so ; and that , not by any sort of distinction , but only by a primary and original . and this is that , which i shall abide by , and am resolved to hold him to ; notwithstanding all his wrigglings , and turnings to get rid of it . but it is now high time to remark upon some more of his absurd , untheological , and indeed scandalous assertions . which are these three , as we find them , p. . l. . viz. that there are no modes in the divine nature ; nor secondly any affections in it ; nor thirdly , that it admits of any priority , so much as in our conceptions of it . to which i answer , . that if there are no modes in the divine nature , there are no persons in it neither : for a person is nothing else but the godhead determined by a peculiar , incommunicable mode of subsistence . to the second i answer , that these prime and transcendental affections of being , viz. unity , verity , and bonity , do and must of necessity belong to the divine nature , if we own it for a real being ; as i hope this man does ; though i am not sure of it . and then thirdly , if no priority of conception is to be allowed in our discourses about the divine nature ( as being uncapable of any ) we can never discourse of it ▪ as of a being , which has attributes belonging to it , or immanent acts flowing from it , and resting in it : for there is no conceiving of the former but per modum subjecti & adjuncti , nor of the latter but per modum principii & actionis , in both of which there is necessarily implyed a priority and posteriority of conception . and i shall say no more of this man here , but that in these assertions he opposes himself to all the orthodox divines in christendom . but that is the less to be wondered at , if we consider also the profaneness of some of his expressions here . for the animadverter having urged , that self-complacency might be as well alleged for the reason of the divine personalities as self-consciousness ; this man blasphemously subjoins , p. . l. . yes , and he might as well have added self-displeasure , and self-condemnation , and as many more such selfs as he could think of . now , had the discourse here been of men , that is , of weak sinful mortals , he might well enough have mentioned such kind of selfs , as self-displeasure , and self-condemnation and the like , provided that the omitted not the prime self of all , and most peculiarly his own , which is self-contradiction . but when the discourse here is wholly of the three sacred persons of the trinity , each and every one of which is god blessed for ever , for him to affirm self-condemnation every whit as applicable to them as self-complacency , when self-condemnation on the one hand must suppose sin or folly as the ground of it , and self-complacency on the other is as essential to , and inseparable from all and each of the divine persons , as any other divine perfection can be , this ( let me tell him ) is downright blasphemy . and therefore in requital of that scurrilous character of an ingenious blunderer , ( which he has so insolently reproached the animadverter with , ) i must and do here return upon him the just charge of an impious blasphemer , and that upon more accounts than this one ; telling him withal , that had he lived in the former times of our church , his gown would have been stripped off his back for his detestable blasphemies and heresies , and some other place found out for him to perch in than the top of st. paul's , where at present he is placed , like a church weather-cock , ( as he is ) notable for nothing so much , as standing high and turning round . and now if he likes not this kind of treatment , let him thank his own virulence for it , in passing such base reflections upon one ( among many more ) who , he might be sure , would repay him , and certainly will , though he has not yet cleared the debt and thus having shewn that the animadverter's arguments against self-consciousness are not to be shook by any of this author 's pittiful cavils , we will now pass to the examination of what he opposes to the arguments brought by the animadverter against his mu●●●l consciousness also : of which the first is this . no act of knowledge can be the formal reason of an vnity of nature in the persons of the blessed trinity . but an act of mutual consciousness is but an act of knowledge , &c. and what answer does he give to this ? why the old one , viz. that he no where asserts , that mutual consciousness is the formal reason of this vnity , but only that the three persons who are thus mutually conscious ●o each other , must be essentially one , p. . l. . to this he has been still answered , that though he uses not the term , yet he asserts the thing . and whether he does not so here , let the reader judge by that passage in this very defence , p. . l. . as self-consciousness ( say● he ) makes a person one with itself , so a natural 〈◊〉 consciousness makes three persons as naturally one as it ●s possible for three to be one . and how far it does that , he 〈◊〉 us in his vindication , p. . viz. that the mutual consciousness of all the three divine persons makes them all but one infinite god. and this i hope is something more than only to assert , that three persons mutually conscious to each other , must be essentially one ( which none denies , provided that by persons he means not three distinct minds ) for the words cited expresly say , that this mutual consciousness makes all the three persons to be essentially one god : and whatsoever [ makes ] them so , is the formal reason of their being so . and therefore this man would do well to take notice for the future , that whensoever he asserts the definition of a formal reason , or of any thing else , he does by the very same assertion , assert the definitum too ; whether he owns it or no. but because he is here making use of his old subterfuge again ( as i think he will never have done with it ) by pretending , that when he argues from self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , he means not the act but the principle of each ; whether that forlorn pretence is to be allowed of , the reader is left to judge yet further , from the following considerations . as first , from the account which this author himself gives of the terms self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , in the book wherein he first made use of them , and built his whole hypothesis upon them , viz. his vindication , &c. from every page of which , where the said words are mentioned , it may be made out as clear as the light , that he neither understands , nor uses them in any other sence , but as they import the respective acts of each of them . as first p. . l. the last but one , where he tells us , that the self-vnity of a spirit can be nothing else but self-consciousness , he explains the same by its being conscious to its own thoughts , reasonings , passions , which no other finite spirit is conscious to , but it self . which expressions neither do , nor can signify any thing else but the acts of self-consciousness . and again , p. . l. . this ( says he ) makes a finite spirit numerically one , that every spirit feels its own thoughts and passions , but is not conscious to the thoughts and passions of another spirit . and again , p. . l. . if three-created spirits were so united as to be conscious to each others thoughts and passions , i cannot see any reason why we might not say , that three such persons were numerically one , &c. now what can any mortal man make of all this but actual consciousness ? and what does his metaphor of feeling mean , but something which is as much an act of the mind , as that , in the proper sence of it , is of the body ? so p. . l. . we know ( says he ) the vnity of a spirit reaches as far as its self-consciousness does , for that is one spirit which knows and feels it self and its own thoughts and motions , &c. in like manner , for the allusion , he quotes out of st. austin , l. . ibid. which ( he says ) represents this much better by that consciousness which is between those distinct faculties in us , of memory , vnderstanding , and will. and what is that ? why the very acts of these faculties , which ( as he says ) know and feel whatsoever is in each other , viz. we remember what we understand and will , likewise , we understand what we remember and will ; and lastly , we will , what we remember and understand . all which , i suppose , are acts of those respective faculties , and not the faculties themselves . and yet this he translates to the trinity , l. . ibid. if ( says he ) we can suppose three infinite minds and persons thus conscious of whatsoever is in each other , &c. that is to say , by acts of consciousness , as the forementioned faculties know and feel what is in each other : ( for otherwise that particle [ thus ] is insignificant , and means nothing at all . ) and he speaks it out fully and plainly , p. . l. . in these words , this intimate vnion and inbeing , when we speak of an essential vnion of pure and infinite minds , is a mutual consciousness . and what is that ? why , it follows , it is ( says he ) as i may so speak , an inward sensation of each other , to know and feel each other as they know and feel themselves . and yet more plainly ( if possible ) father , son and holy ghost ( says he ) are one by an internal consciousness , p. . l. . and then he explains the same in this manner . if i may so speak ( says he ) because we want proper words to express it , they feel each other in themselves , know the same things by feeling each others knowledge , and will and love alike by feeling what each other loves and wills , just as every man feels his own thoughts , knowledge , will , and passions . it were endless to transcribe all the passages in his vindic. which are to the same purpose , and the reader may find five hundred more , if he has a mind to it . but because a person so eminent for contradicting and forgetting himself , may perhaps have forgot what he had said in his vindication , let us see what he says in this very defence , where he asserts the same thing in the same words , with reference to finite spirits , p. . at the end . if that ( says he ) be one distinct separate mind which is conscious only to it self , which feels all that is in it self , and nothing else ; and those be 〈◊〉 distinct separate mind● , each of which is thus conscious to it self , &c. and with respect to the unity in trinity , p. . he expresly tells us , that the dean places the vnity of the three persons in mutual consciousness , and then tells us what that is , viz. that they have a conscious sensation of each other in themselves , as they have of themselves . and what , i ask , is having a conscious sensation , but actual consciousness ? and again , can they be one before they are mutually conscious ? and before they know themselves to be one , and that even in the order of conceiving it ? p. . l. , , . and now what is all this to the principle of consciousness ? i have found it a tedious task to transcribe so much of his stuff , only to make a confident shifting caviller see his own words , while he will not own them . but by what has been quoted , it appears irrefragably , that by self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , and that both with respect to spirits finite and infinite , this author could understand nothing but the acts of them , if these terms [ is conscious , to be conscious , sensation , knowing , feeling ] do properly import acts. and i defy the whole world , and this author himself , to make any other rational sense of them . upon the whole matter therefore , i desire the judicious reader to consider with me these following particulars . . that this author , throughout his whole vindication , ( wherein he first laid down and verited his new hypothesis of self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , and three infinite minds , ) never so much as once mentions [ the principle ] of either of those acts , even where he yet most professedly undertakes to explain the said terms ; in excuse of which it will be in vain for him to take shelter in [ so speaks , and so says ] and to pretend , that we want words to express the meaning of these notions ; for surely the word [ principle ] was as obvious and easy to be thought on , when he wrote his vindication , as it could be since , in the writing this defence of it . . that as he made no mention of it in that former book , so neither does he mention it in this defence ; where , in like manner , he delivers and explains his doctrine about the said ▪ terms and notions , but only when he finds himself pressed by his adversary ; and then he flies to it as a shift , started on purpose , that he may seem to say something to an argument , which he cannot answer . . that , when he mentions this [ principle ] of consciousness upon this occasion , he never expresses what it is , or what he means by it ; when yet he lays all the stress he can upon it , to keep off a baffle ; and when withal it is far from being so clear and certain , but that it may be stated more ways than one . fourthly and lastly , that if instead of self-consciousness and mutual consciousness the term [ principle of self-consciousness and mutual consciousness ] were substituted throughout the writings of this author , it would so utterly pervert them , that it would be impossible to make so much as common sense of most of those passages wherein it should occur . all which particulars i desire the learned reader to lay together , and , when he has throughly weighed them , to believe , if he can , that by self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , this author understood only the [ principle ] of these acts , but not the acts themselves . and thus much for what this man could in reason be presumed to mean by these terms . but then in the second place . the reader is desired to take notice also , that the word consciousness ( as determined by the constant and universal use of it ) will not bear this signification . and accordingly , i do challenge this confident man , to produce me so much as one english writer ( before this new philosophy came to be treated of in our own tongue ) who ever used the word consciousness ( of whatsoever sort it was ) to signify any thing but the bare act of the said consciousness . and whereas , to support his arbitrary distinction he would pretend a parallel case , between the term [ consciousness ] and the term [ reason ] and thereupon conclude , that because [ reason ] is sometimes used to signify the rational principle or power , and sometimes also the act of reasoning , therefore [ consciousness may be so used too , p. . l. . i answer , that there is no parity in the case ; for as much as there has been frequent and common use ( which ought to fix the sence of words ) for such a double signification of the word [ reason ] , but none at all for two significations of the word [ consciousness ] . and therefore let me tell him further , that since [ consciousness ] always imports the act , it cannot answer as a parallel to the term [ reason ] , as reason is indifferent to signify either the act or principle , but as it is limited to the act , and so signifies only ratiocination . and accordingly as ratiocination can never signify the principle by which we reason , so neither can consciousness signify the principle by which we are conscious to our selves of any thing . so that his allegation of the [ principle ] either of self-consciousness as the reason of personal unity and distinction , or of mutual consciousness , as the reason of the essential unity of the divine persons , which he had expresly before stated upon the respective acts of each , is nothing else but a ridiculous shift , and the affixing a sence to a word which it never had before , and which this man 's puny authority ●s far from being sufficient to give it now . i have now evinced , and that i hope to the full satisfaction of the judicious reader , that this author neither did nor could , by the terms self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , understand the principles of these acts , but only the acts themselves ; till he was forced to use the word principle , to elude ( if he could ) his adversarie's argument . nor , in the next place ; that the words themselves can ( according to their constantly received sence ) bear any such signification : after which , that i may leave him no further subterfuge , i will now argue the same from the reason of the thing it self ; and to that end , ( supposing for the present ) that he might , and did all along , mean the principle and not the act , i will prove , that neither can the principle of mutual consciousness be the formal reason of the essential vnity of the divine persons ; nor ( in other words ) that , [ wherein ] the unity of their nature does consist , or [ whereby ] they are naturally and essentially one god ; both which this author has expresly and in terminis , more than once asserted ; though his skill reached not to the philosophical term made use of by the animadverter ; who yet for his own part can indifferently make use of all these three expressions , as equally for his purpose . and here i must premise some things , which ( though they have been sufficiently shewn already , yet in dealing with such an everlasting tautologist ) must be repeated again , viz. first , that the formal reason of a thing , and the thing whereof it is the formal reason , do so essentially cohere , and coexist in nature , and so imply one another , that there is no conceiving of one , without the conception of the other . so that in the natural way of our conceiving of any two objects , where either of them may be conceived of , without the other , there neither of those two can be the formal reason of the other . secondly , that the essential unity of the divine persons is not a specifical , but a numerical unity of nature ; and consequently , that the community of one end the ●ame individual 〈◊〉 to the said persons , is that which renders them naturally and essentially one god. which two considerations being thus laid down , i deny the principle of mutual consciousness to be the formal reason of the unity of the divine persons , in the same individual essence or nature : and that for these following reasons . . if the divine essence as it subsists in , and is common to the three divine persons , must , according to the natural order of conceiving things , be conceived of , as one in it self , before it can be conceived of , as the principle of any act , ( and particularly that of mutual consciousness ) then its being the principle of that or any other act in the divine persons , cannot be the formal reason of vnity of essence in the said persons . but the former is true , and therefore the latter must be so too . the consquence is evident from this . that the formal reason of a thing cannot be conceived of as posterior to that of which it is the formal reason . and the truth of the assumption is as clear : because vnity in order of nature is the first affection or attribute of the divine essence , ( whether as considered in it self , or as subsisting in the three persons , ) and therefore must be conceived of antecedently to any other particular perfection or attribute belonging to the same , and consequently may be conceived of , without it too : which makes it impossible for any such perfection or attribute to be the formal reason of this unity . accordingly , since there is the same order of priority and posteriority between such of the divine attributes as immediately affect and relate to the divine essence or being , and such as immediately import and relate to some divine act , which there is between being and action themselves ; and since withal , vnity is the first and principal of the former sort , and the divine intellect ( which is the proper immediate principle of all acts of consciousness in the divine persons ) is only an attribute or perfection of the second sort , it is impossible that the said principle of mutual consciousness should be the formal reason of the essential unity of the divine persons , or that wherein the said unity of essence properly consists . . the formal reason , that the three divine persons are essentially one god , is the community of one and the same individual divine nature to the said three persons . but a principle of mutual consciousness is not a community of the same individual nature to the three divine persons ▪ and therefore such a principle is not the formal reason that the said three persons are essentially one god. the major is proved thus . because we cannot conceive such a community of the same individual divine nature to the three persons , without conceiving a numerical vnity of the said nature in the said persons , nor vice versa , can we conceive the latter without the former . the minor is proved thus . no particular perfection of the divine nature is properly and formally a community of the divine nature , considered under all its perfections ; but the community of the divine nature to the three persons , is a community of the divine nature so considered ▪ and a principle of mutual consciousness is but a particular perfection of the divine nature , viz. the divine intellect ; which is the divine nature as formally determined to one particular sort of acts and objects ; and therefore this principle of mutual consciousness is not formally the community of the divine nature to all the three persons . . if the principle of mutual consciousness in the divine persons must be multiplied according to the number of the said persons , then it is impossible that this principle should give a numerical unity of essence to those persons . but according to this author's hypothesis , the principle of mutual consciousness is and must be multiplied according to the number of the divine persons ; and therefore the said principle can never be the formal reason of a numerical essential unity in them . the consequence is evident , for three numerically distinct principles can never ( as such ) formally give numerical unity to any thing ; and much less to the most transcendently simple and uncompounded of all beings ; as the divine nature in the three persons confessedly is . and then , as for the assumption , viz. that according to this author's hypothesis ; the principle of mutual consciousness must be multiplied , according to the number of the divine persons , this also is as evident ; because he asserts the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds , which are three distinct essences : and since they are so , i affirm , that the principle of action in every mind or essence , is and must be as distinct , as the mind or essence which it belongs to , and which it is comprehended in . and therefore since these three numerically distinct minds must have each of them a numerically distinct principle of mutual consciousness , it is impossible , that these three distinct principles should either have a numerical vnity themselves , or give a numerical vnity of essence to the said three infinite minds , or to the divine persons , which this author holds to be three such minds . . if a principle of mutual consciousness may make three infinite minds essentially one infinite mind , then it may also make three infinite intelligent persons essentially one infinite intelligent person : but this latter is impossible , and therefore the former must needs be so too . nevertheless , the consequence is evident , because , according to this author [ infinite mind ] and [ infinite intelligent person ] are terms perfectly equipollent , p. l. . and consequently , whatsoever is affirmed or denied of the one , must be equally affirmed or denied of the other ; so that if it be truly affirmed , that three distinct infinite minds , may by a principle of mutual consciousness , become essentially one infinite mind , it may be as truly affirmed , that three infinite intelligent persons may become one infinite intelligent person ; since there is a perfect equipollence in these two predications . as for the assumption , that it is impossible for three infinite intelligent persons to be one infinite intelligent person , this is so self-evident , that , i suppose , neither my reader not my adversary , unless a sabellian , will expect any further proof of it . these are my reasons , upon which i conclude , that this new 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a principle of mutual consciousness , cannot formally give a numerical unity of essence to the three divine persons : and i doubt not , but this defender , who is such an utter stranger to all metaphysical knowledge , will call these arguments as he does others in p. . l. . of this defence , thin , airy weapons ( though by his favour , they may be never the less piercing for that ) but i would have him know , that arguments drawn from , and founded upon the general reason and notions of things , are as strong and conclusive , as any that are taken from any particular material objects incurring into the sense . and as for the divine nature in the divine persons ( the only subject now before us ) since it is a being absolutely and entirely simple , and ( as the schools call it ) simplicissimè simplex , i affirm , that there is no ground of reason to discourse of it philosophically upon , but the natural order and distinction of our conceptions of it , founded upon the several modes , acts , and objects belonging to it ; and this man who explodes all prius and posterius , in the conceptions which our reason forms of the deity , is extremely ridiculous , and yet withal affirms three absolute distinct beings ( as three minds are ) in one numerical absolute , and most simple being , is ( if possible ) infinitely more so . and therefore , without adding any thing further , i leave the reader to make himself merry with that silly swaggering conclusion , which he closes his wretched , trifling , dodging answer to the animadverter's argument with . thus ( says he ) all his arguments vanish like smoak , rise in a dark cloud , but immediately disperse and are seen no more till they return as such vapours use to do , in thunder and lightning , or some threatning storm , p. . at the end . but was there ever such a rhodomontade in words , so big with nothing , and without one grain of sense at the bottom of them ? for is this the way to expose an adversarie's argument to contempt ; first to represent it as vanishing into smoak and vapour , and afterwards returning in storm and thunder ? but it shews , that his rhetorick keeps pace with his logick , and that whether he would describe , or prove a thing , it is much at the same rate . in the mean time the reader may take this for an observation , that will never fail him , viz. that this author is never so high upon the huff , and rant , as when he is lowest ( nay and knows himself lowest ) in point of reason . and so i pass to the vindication of the second argument , which is this . if vnity of nature in the divine persons be the cause , reason , or principle of mutual consciousness in the said persons , then their mutual consciousness is not the cause or principle of the vnity of their nature , but the former is true , and therefore the latter is so too . this is the argument , and a plainer and clearer there cannot well be . to which our author answers thus , that the divine persons may be thus essentially one by mutual consciousness , or mutual consciousness may be essential to this vnity , though they could not be thus actually conscious to each other , unless they were thus united , as to have and to feel each other in themselves , def. p. . l. . which enigmatical , obscure , and confused stuff , if the reader understands , it is well ; for i profess that i do not . but so far as the term [ essential ] made use of here , may seem to make any thing for his purpose , i answer , that mutual consciousness is essential to the unity of the divine nature in the three persons , not as that , wherein this unity does consist , but as that which is essentially consequent upon it , and inseparable from it . so that there is an homonymy in the term [ essential ] as either importing that essential principle , wherein the nature or essence of a thing is placed , or some thing necessarily resulting from it ; in which latter sense alone mutual consciousness is essential to the unity of the divine nature . and whereas he says , that if by vnity of nature in the divine persons the animadverter means the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that , he says , is indeed a necessary foundation of this mutual consciousness , but not the immediate cause of it ; for that , the fathers , he pretends , were sensible , that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not of it self make this essential vnity ; and therefore added the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( which he affirms to be that very mutual consciousness here maintained by him ) to perfect it , p. . l. . in which words there are several very vile heterodoxyes . for first , i affirm , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 adequately , perfectly , and sufficiently makes the vnity and identity of the divine nature in the divine persons : and that ( as i have already shewn ) not meerly from the force of the word it self , but from the peculiar condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which it was applyed to ; which being infinite could not possibly be otherwise than numerically one and the same ; and consequently that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or agreement of the divine persons in such an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could be no other than a numerical vnity and identity of nature belonging to them upon that account . and therefore i deny , that the fathers ever reckoned the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insufficient of it self to make this unity , and challenge him to prove they did . and i deny further , that they ever alleged the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an addition to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to perfect this unity , but as an explication and illustration of it : and i add moreover , that the fathers never accounted this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 either to be mutual consciousness , or to consist in it : but to be the mutual inexistence , or indwelling of the divine persons in each other , founded upon , and resulting from their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; mutual inexistence being no more mutual consciousness , than bare existence can be said to be knowledge : and lastly , i affirm , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ascribed to the three divine persons ( to which this author may add his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 too , if he pleases ) is not the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it self , but a consequent , or effect of it ; for as much as they are not therefore in one another because they mutually know one another , but they thus know one another , because by the essential identity of their nature , they mutually are and exist in one another . all which having been so fully proved in the seventh chapter of animadv . p. , , , , , . and the ninth chapter , p. . , , , . and , . to allege it again , is in effect but dictum dicere , which though it is the constant practice , or rather trade of this author , is the scorn of the animadverter . but to go on , the animadverter having said ( as is here alleged ) that vnity of nature is the cause and principle of mutual consciousness ( which being an essential property equally belonging to all three persons , must issue and result from the divine nature , and so can have no antecedent causal influx upon the same nature , our author , in answer to this , tells us , that mutual consciousness belongs not immediately to nature but to persons , p. . l. . and i dare say , he tells us the best he knows . but in reply to it i must tell him again , that it belongs immediately to both , but upon a different account , viz. to nature , as the immediately producing principle of the act ; and to the person as to the immediate proper subject of denomination from the act. but he adds , that he for his part will not philosophies upon antecedent causal influxes in the divine nature , p. . l. . nor does any one else , in the strict , proper , and philosophical sense of these terms , pretend to do so , but only by accommodating them to help us with the better method and distinction to conceive and discourse of so high a subject , as the divine nature is . and therefore it was not for nothing , that he passed over the nine preliminary considerations , at the beginning of the fourth chapter of the animadversions , without so much as touching upon them : for they would have corrected his ignorance , and taught him how these words are to be understood and used about the divine nature and persons . but his modesty adds , that it contents him to know , what is essential , not absolutely to the vnity of the divine nature , but to the vnity in trinity , p. . l. . and will this man say , that any thing can be essential to the vnity of the one , which is not as essential to the vnity of the other ? for though we frequently use the word vnion of persons , yet strictly speaking , it is improper : since it is not an vnion ( which is but another word for vnition ) but an vnity of persons in nature , or an vnity of nature in the persons , which is the proper expression ; and therefore we neither say an vnion in trinity , nor a trinity in vnion , but always apply the word vnity to both . but our author closes this paragraph with these words , p. . at the end . that if mutual consciousness be essential to this vnity of nature , so that the three persons are thus united , and cannot be one without it , he will contend no further . and so far i think he does discreetly ; but too late . for whether he will contend further or no , his adversary both does and will ; for as much as this author has asserted a great deal more than what this concession amounts to , and if he does not prove all that he has asserted , he is a baffled person . for he has positively asserted ( as we have shewn from his own words ) that mutual consciousness makes the three divine persons to be naturally one , p. . def. . and to be essentially one god , vind. p. . l. . and this , by his favour , is quite another thing , from only asserting , that mutual consciousness is essential to that vnity of nature which is in the three persons . for that it may be , as it is an essential consequent of the said unity of nature , and no more ; as also from asserting ( as he here does , p. . l. the last ) that the three divine persons cannot be one without it . for surely that which is only a conditio sine quâ non , and without which the said divine persons cannot be one in nature , and that which formally makes them so , or wherein their vnity does consist , are wholly different things . and therefore since it is manifest , that this man has no logick , i heartily wish that he had some shame . in the mean time , he is for shewing ( as well as he can ) how the animadverter mistakes the whole matter in these words , quoted from him , anim. p. . l. . the divine nature or essence being one and the same in all the three persons , there is upon this account one and the same knowledge in them also ; and they are not one in nature , by vertue of their mutual consciousness , but they are therefore mutually conscious , because the perfect unity and identity of their nature makes them so . thus the animadverter : and where is now the mistake ? why our author tells us , that three persons who have the same nature may know the same things without feeling one another's thoughts and knowledge in themselves , p. . l. . to which i answer first , that the foundation of this reply is , that there is such a thing as feeling in god distinct from knowledge ; which is the height of nonsence and absurdity ; as shall be declared before we pass from this head of mutual consciousness . secondly i utterly deny , that persons who have the same divine nature can know the same things , i mean all the same things ( for that only here can be insisted upon ) without knowing each other's thoughts and knowledge in themselves : for as much as whatsoever each of these divine persons knows , he does and must know by an infinite act of knowledge , comprehending both himself and the other two persons ; and all that is knowable in the world besides ; and how each of the divine persons can know all this without mutually knowing one another , i desire this man to shew . but he argues further , that if by one and the same knowledge the animadverter means that the knowledge of the divine nature in the three persons is but one individual act , as the knowledge of one single person is , this destroys the distinction of persons : which cannot be distinct without distinct personal acts , as mutual knowledge is ; and destroys mutual consciousness , for there is no place for mutual consciousness , or mutual knowledge , where there is but one single act of knowledge , p. . l. . in answer to which i observe these two notable instances of his great ignorance . first , his supposing and taking for granted the very thing in dispute between him and his adversary , viz. that the distinction of the divine persons depends upon certain distinct acts of knowledge , as the cause or antecedent reason of that distinction ; whereas his adversary on the contrary affirms all distinction of divine knowledge ( as well as all diversification of the divine nature it self ) to be from the distinction , or distinct subsistence of the divine persons , as the prime and original reason of it . and whereas this author says again , that the divine persons cannot be distinct without distinct personal acts , as mutual knowledge is , it is true , that they cannot be without them , as inseparably consequent upon their personal distinction , but not as constituent of it . secondly , the other instance of his ignorance here , is his affirming , that there can be no place for mutual consciousness or knowledge , where there is but one single or individual act of knowledge . which i utterly deny as false ; and in order to the proving it so . i do here observe , that there is but one single act of knowledge in all the three divine persons ; that is to say , single as to the substance of the act , though diversified by the several modifications which it receives from the persons whom it proceeds from ; and from the several respects it bears to the several objects , it terminates upon . which different modifications and respects do by no means infer diverse or distinct acts of knowledge , but only variously modify , determine , and distinguish one and the same act. accordingly , in the present case , i do here affirm to this author , that mutual consciousness is nothing else but one and the same act of divine knowledge , differently modified , as it proceeds severally , and after a different manner from father , son , and holy ghost , as the persons knowing , and jointly terminated in them all as the objects known ; as on the other side self-consciousness is no more than this one and the same act of knowledge , as it issues only from one of the persons , and terminates upon the same too . though i confess , if the three divine persons were three distinct minds or spirits , mutual consciousness could not be one act only , but must be three . this i hold concerning the divine knowledge , and the respective distinctions of it , and i leave this author to try his best skill in divinity and philosophy to confute it . in the mean time he gives us one absurdity more out of his inexhaustible stock , viz. that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ascribed by the fathers to the three divine persons , is that very mutual consciousness which the dean means . for these are his words , p. . and the seven first lines : so that according to him an act of volition , and an act of consciousness or knowledge , are formally and properly one and the same act. in the last place , as to his affirming , that three distinct subsistences of the same individual nature , are by mutual consciousness essentially one , p. . l. . i answer , that if he means hereby , that they are by mutual consciousness made essentially one , as by the cause or antecedent reason of that unity , i deny it ; but if he means , that they are thereby proved essentially one , as by an essential consequent of the said unity , i grant it . but this will do him but little service . for his hypothesis requires more . and so leaving this second argument in its full force against him . i proced to the third argument , which is this . to affirm mutual consciousness to be the cause of the union of the three divine persons in the same nature , is to confound the union and communion of the said persons together : which confusion ought by no means to be allowed . to which he answers , that to affirm , that the three divine persons are essentially one by mutual consciousness , is not to affirm , that mutual consciousness is the cause of their vnion , p. . l. . but on the contrary , i affirm , that if [ for one thing to be so or so , by another ] does and must signify causally : then to say , that things or persons are one by mutual consciousness , and yet that mutual consciousness is not the cause or antecedent reason of their being one , is a direct contradiction in the terms . and it is hard to imagine , how a man in his sences can think otherwise . in the next place , he passes impertinently from the union of the divine persons to their mutual indwelling in each other ( which are very different things ) affirming withal , that his mutual indwelling is their mutual consciousness ; though this has been , and still is , peremptorily denied him , and the reader , for the confutation of it , referred to the two forecited chapters of the animadversions ; which this author neither does nor can say one word in answer to . well ; but how does he prove the mutual inexistence , or indwelling of the divine persons , to be mutual consciousness ? why ; because ( forsooth ) they are in one another as minds , not as bodies , p. . l. . but here , besides that we deny his very supposition , viz. that the three divine persons are three minds , we deny also , that three distinct minds can be made identically one in nature by any consciousness or mutual consciousness whatsoever ; and in the divine persons ( who are neither minds nor bodies ) it is the vnity and identity of their essence , by which alone they are mutually in one another , as the sole proper reason of their being so . for there neither is nor can be such a thing as a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of distinct minds , essences , or natures in one another . but he tells us , that in the divine persons vnion and communion are one and the same thing , p. . l. . but if he means that they are formally , and in all respects the same , i deny it ; affirming withal , that they are as much distinguished as the very divine essence and personalities themselves are ; and consequently , that the union of the persons consists in their identification in one and the same essence or nature , and their communion consists in those mutual acts towards each other , respectively issuing from and belonging to them by vertue of their personal properties . but the animadverter ( he tells us ) falsly represents both the communion of the divine persons with each other , and their mutual consciousness too , in these words cited from him , p. . l. . viz. that all acts of several persons upon each other ( as all that are mutual must be ) are properly acts of communion , by which the said persons have an intercourse among themselves , as acting interchangeably upon one another . to which words of the animadverter this author replies first , that this may be true in persons separate , but that persons only distinct and not separate , do not act upon one another ; for that such acting must ( as he says ) signify an external impression made by one person upon another , p. . at the end , and p. . at the beginning : but will this man here abide by this false and prophane assertion ? for do not the divine persons mutually know and mutually love one another ? and do not these acts of knowledge and love both mutually proceed from them , and mutually terminate in them too ? or will he say that those acts pass mutually between them by an external impression upon each other ? or lastly , that the divine persons are any more than only distinct ? certainly such propositions as this audacious man vents , the church of england was never accustomed to hear or endure before . but in the next place , after he had said that the animadverter's assertion might hold true in persons separate , but not in persons only distinct , which we have confuted ; he says also , p. . at the end , that it holds true of all other mutual acts , excepting mutual consciousness ; which is a fulsome and ridiculous begging of the question by presuming an exception where he should first prove it , and is as arrant a petitio principii as ever appeared in argumentation . and i challenge him to prove how the exception holds in mutual consciousness more than in mutual complacency ; though indeed in neither . but he is now for calling the animadverter to an account for that unwary and improper expression ( as he represents it ) that all acts of several persons upon one another are acts of communion , which ( says he in the gravel-lane dialect ) makes boys in a state of communion with each other at boxing ; and a match at scolding ( for it seems he cannot yet rid his head of billingsgate ) another state of communion . to which my answer in the first place is , that i am sorry to find his ill breeding got so far into his religion , as to dare to mingle such sacred matters with such dirty and prophane comparisons . in the next place , i would have him know , that the animadverter abides by what he has said , and accordingly would have this man learn , that words in discourse , though never so general and indefinite , are yet to be limited and determined in their sence by the subject professedly treated of . and this in the present case was such an act only as supposed persons in a state of agreement , and proceeded from them , and passed between them , considered only as such . and i must tell him further , that though the common use of the world has restrained the sence of the word communion and communication , ad benigniorem partem , yet the literal sence of it imports no more than a bare interchange of acts or offices , whether friendly or hostile ; and there may be as real and as proper a communication of ill turns as of good ; and sometimes of ill for good , as this author very well knows . but as for those words which he concludes this his criticism with , that had the dea● been pleased to have returned mutual acts , he and the animadverter might have been long since in a very strict communion with each other , p. . l. . i shall only return him this one short word , that though all this may be perfect riddle to the reader , yet i understand him very well , and could easily give him such an answer , as should make him understand himself too . but to let the reader see that he is a foul a disputant as he can be a speaker ( and a fouler upon both accounts the world never had ) with a frontless impudence he declares here , p. . l. . that the animadverter grants all that he says , about the notion of a trinity in vnity : and in particular , that every individual person has a self-consciousness of its own , and every such self-conscious person is thereby one with it self , and distinguished from all other persons , in answer to which shameless unconscionable falshood , i do here , in the face of the world , challenge the author of it to prove , that the animadverter grants any one thing that is peculiar to his hypothesis ; and particularly to shew that place in the whole book of the animadversions , in which the animadverter owns , that a self-conscious person , is by virtue of it's self-consciousness one with it self , and primarily distinguished from all other persons , ( which is the only distinction here spoken of . ) i say , i do again and again challenge this man to prove this ; and promise withal , that if he can do it , i will forfeit to him more than ever he was born to ; and if he cannot , i humbly appeal to the most rigid , if but impartial , reader , whether i have not all the cause in the world to proclaim him to all mankind , for a downright lyar , slanderer , and falsificator . and as hard as these words may sound , less than this , upon such an occasion , i neither can nor will say . but we will see what other holes he can pick in the animadverter's coat . and here he first taxes him , p. . l. , . for the improper use of the term [ vnion of nature ] telling him , that the dean ( forsooth ) would have said vnity of nature ( as the same dean not only would have said , but has said , that a beast is a person , with several other such choice proprieties , as chrysome instead of chrisme , and paraphrases instead of periphrasis , and above an hundred solecisms to boot . ) but i must here declare to this great master of proper speaking , forsooth , ( as appears from the whole tenth chapter of the animadversions ) that had the animadverter , in the place cited by him , used the term [ vnion ] instead of [ vnity ] ( which upon this subject are often promiscuously made use of ) surely this man had been the most unfit person in the world to reflect upon him for it ; who has stated the divine nature in the three persons so , as to leave no numerical real vnity in it at all , but only an vnion instead thereof . for three distinct infinite minds ( asserted by this author ) being three distinct natures or essences , neither have nor can have any such vnity in them ; but being united only by mutual consciousness , are capable of no more than a conjunction or vnion thereby ; and that a very slender one too , and far from that essential vnity which belongs to the divine persons . but after all , i would have his critical ignorance know , that the animadverter , by [ the vnion of nature ] here mentioned , understands ( as he may very well and properly do ) no other than [ an vnion in respect of nature ] ; so that it is really an vnion of persons connoting the nature , as the term , which they are united in : and accordingly the animadverter in defiance of this man 's long silly parenthesis ( which , it had been more for his credit to have spared than put in ) still owns , and abides by the expression . but our critick has not done yet . but whereas the animadverter , speaking of the divine persons , had used these words , their essence and personality , he here cries out ( like one big , and bringing forth nothing ) what ? but one personality as well as but one essence in three , p. . l. . but may it please your ignorance , good sir , the animadverter here spoke of personality , not with any respect to number of particulars , but to the common nature and notion of the thing , and consequently might , without the least impropriety , use the term personality , without any epithete of plurality . for suppose , that in a discourse of the general nature of celestial bodies , one should speak of the sun and of the motion of the heavens together ; would this philosopher of goatham presently cry out , what but one motion of the heavens as well as but one sun ? and to give an instance in divine matters , when the prophet ezek. . . tells the israelites , that god would give them [ a new heart ] ; would this wise man , of the forenamed society , cry out here , what ? but one new heart amongst so many thousand men ? for certain it is , that strictly speaking , the heart here mentioned ( which could be nothing else but a pious and gracious disposition of mind , inclining them to obey god ) was to be multiplied , according to the number of individuals , which it was to be given to . but such as understand the force of words , and the way of using them , know that there is a kind of grammatica philosophica , by which we may judge when a single word ought to signify singularly , and when indefinitely and including all the particulars that it may be applied to . but this , i confess , is gibberish and a riddle ( as all sense and learning is ) to one who has neither grammar nor philosophy . and so having answered his impertinent cavils , i come to give an answer to his equally impertinent questions , with such great huff proposed by him , p. . l. . as first , can they , viz. the divine persons be one before they are mutually conscious , even in the order of conceiving it ? i answer , that in order of conception they not only may , but necessarily must ; and that as necessarily , as it is impossible to conceive of ●●owledge without conceiving of entity or being as the ●bject of it , and for that cause ( in the natural order of ●●●ceiving , or apprehending things ) before it . the second question is , can the divine persons be one before they are in one another ? i answer , that in priority of time they cannot ; but that in order of nature they may and must be so conceived : for to be in one another is but a subsequent circumstance of being , and consequently must presuppose the being it self , whereof it is the circumstance , as in nature preceding it . his third question is , can there be any other mutual in-being of minds but by mutual consciousness ? i answer , first , that the divine persons are not minds . secondly , that there is no such thing as a mutual in-being of minds in one another : and thirdly and lastly , that the divine persons are not properly and originally in one another by mutual consciousness , but by an indentity of essence , nature , or substance , common to all three . but i shall now apply my self particularly to answer his noisome extravagant ignorance , in reproaching ( even to the degree of insultation ) all use or admission of priority and posteriority of conception in apprehending or discoursing of the divine nature . and in order to this , i shall lay before the reader some of his expressions concerning it ; as p. . l. . after all this huffing and swaggering ( says he ) this notable dispute issues in a meer metaphysical subtilty about the natural order of our conceptions of things . but , by his favour , they are not meer conceptions and no more ; but conceptions founded in the nature and reason of the thing which they are imployed about , as it exerts different acts , respects different objects , and sustains different relations and considerations thereupon . but he goes on . what confounded work ( says he ) does this make with the pure simple uncompounded eternal nature of god , so to prove a priority or posteriority of being , or causality in the divine nature from the order of our conceptions ? p. . l. . but can this man make it appear , that any philosopher and divine does this ? no ; they do not pretend to prove a priority or posteriority of being , or causality in the divine nature from the order of our conceptions , for they professedly disavow it ; but they say and affirm , that there can be no discoursing of the divine nature , by any humane reason , but by such an order of priority and posteriority in our conceptions of it . this , sir , is their affirmation , and the other is your lye. for neither do philosophers nor divines ascribe these things to god formally , but only virtually and eminently , viz. that god as a pure simple act or being , performs all those acts immediately by one simple efficiency or exertion of himself , which a finite being cannot do but by several acts , powers , faculties , and ( sometimes ) parts enabling it to operate and produce things . no man , i say , ascribes these things to the divine nature , in the strict and philosophical sense of the terms , but by way of analogy to what reason observes in the creature , and that also founded upon god's own condescension to describe and represent himself to us in this manner . and what the animadverter says in the fifth preliminary of his fourth chapter , is sufficient to blow off all these senseless cavils , viz. that when the terms , cause , formal reason , constituent , or productive principle and the like , are used about the divine nature and persons , they are not to be understood as applicable to them in the strict and proper signification of the said terms , but only by way of analogy ; as really meaning no more than a causal or necessary dependance of one notion , or conceptus objectivus upon another ; so that it is impossible for the mind to conceive distinctly of the one , but as depending upon , or proceeding from the other . in answer to all which , i defy this man to speak three words of sence , if he can . and whereas he ignorantly says , that all such conceptions are false , p. . l. . i must tell him on the contrary , that where nothing is affirmed , or denied ( as in bare conceptions nothing is ) there can be no falshood . it is a common rule and maxim in philosophy , and not to be over born by this weak man's little objections , that abstrahentium non est mendacium . for to consider one thing without another , ( though it neither is nor can be without the other ) is no falshood . and the chief thing by which we form several distinct conceptions of the divine nature , is this abstraction ; by which the mind first considers one conceptus objectivus without the other , and then considers , and compares both together , according to the respect they may have to each other , and the natural order which that places them in . but i shall try what metal that confidence is made of , which thus explodes all priority and posteriority in our conceptions of god by these following questions . as , first , i demand of this man , whether he does not own a necessity of our forming several inadequate conceptions of god , and that we have no other way of conceiving of him ? this , i am sure , he has asserted several times , and if he had not , the whole world does : and therefore in the next place i ask him , whether many of these inadequate conceptions do not imply a necessary and essential dependance of one upon the other ? and if so , whether it be possible for the mind of man to form a conception of one thing depending upon another but seoundùm prius & posterius ? again , i demand of him , whether we can consider god as an intelligent being and agent , endued with vnderstanding , will , and power , ( as he in scripture represents himself , and as we must conceive of him , if we conceive and discourse of him at all ) without conceiving of him as willing a thing before he does it , and as understanding it before he wills it ? and again , i demand of him , whether the divine nature and persons consider'd all together are not one pure , simple , uncompounded act or being ? i am sure all orthodox divines affirm it . and yet , i demand of this man , whether he or any one alive can conceive of the father as begetting , and of the son as begotten , and of the holy ghost as proceeding from both , without a priority and posteriority in the conceptions we form of them ? and lastly , to instance in his own whimsical notion of self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , i challenge him to prove it possible for the mind of man to conceive how the divine persons can be mutually conscious to one-another , but subsequently to each person 's being first conscious to himself ; forasmuch as their several self-consciousnesses are properly the object of their mutual consciousness , and so in order of nature cannot but be before it . nay , and to go further , does not this very man , in stating his self-consciousness and mutual consciousness distinguish between the act and the principle ? which , tho' it be but a meer shift , ( as has been shewn ) is yet a good argument against himself : for can any one conceive of a principle , but as prior to the act ? in fine , i challenge this equally insolent and heterodox man , to satisfie the world about him , by a clear and positive answer to these two questions , st , whether all divines , schoolmen , and philosophers ( excepting perhaps such as conradus vorstius , and crellius , in their books de attributis dei ) do not in treating of the divine nature unanimously acknowledge and affirm , that god is a pure , simple , vncompounded act , essence , or being ? and , dly , whether , notwithstanding this acknowledgment and affirmation , they do not universally treat of god in terms necessarily importing and requiring a priority and posteriority of conception ? but why do i dispute against such sottish paradoxes , which all the schools in christendome would hiss , or rather spit at the author of them for ? but this poor ambitious animalculum gloriae has been always affecting to signalize his little self by the character of holding what the whole world besides denies , and of denying what it holds . and now , in the close of this argument , p. . l. . we have him again flying off from his first hypothesis ; in which he had with so much earnestness affirmed self-consciousness to be that which made the divine persons originally distinct both from one-another and all other things besides , and mutual consciousness to be that which made them naturally and essentially one . i say , we have him quite falling down from their making , to their bare supposing , inferring , and proving them to be so . which ( as the whole world must needs fee ) is wholly another thing , and absolutely quits and gives up the first assertion ; but that by his good leave , shall not serve his turn : for ( as he has been several times told ) he shall be still held to it , and justly accounted a baffled person , if he does not make it good . for in all philosophy , and even in common sense , making is one thing , and proving is another . and therefore , whereas he says in the last place , viz. p. . lin . . that to dispute about the cause of self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , is to dispute about the naked essences or essential properties of things , which the dean rejected from the beginning , as without the compass of human knowledge . there are in these words several things to be remark'd upon . as , first , i must tell him , that the dispute here is not directly about the cause of self-consciousness or mutual consciousness : but whether self-consciousness it self be the cause or formal reason of personality , personal unity and distinction ? and mutual consciousness be the formal cause or reason of the essential unity and identity of the divine persons in one and the same nature ? and in the next place supposing that the dispute here were about the cause of self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , yet i deny , that to dispute of them under the notion of a cause or an effect , is to dispute about the naked essences or essential properties of things . forasmuch as we may consider and dispute about the essences and properties of things , without any consideration of their causality at all : and on the other side we may know a thing to be actually a cause , and dispute of it as such , tho' we cannot tell what the essence of the said thing is . we do not indeed know ( that is , by an immediate inspection of the things themselves ) what the essences or forms of things are : but we know that in every thing the essence or form of it is the cause or principle of all the acts proceeding from it and belonging to it , and consequently that no act so proceeding from the said thing can be the essence or form of it , but dly , and lastly , in reply to his saying , that the dean from the beginning rejected all disputes about the essences and essential properties of things , as without the compass of human knowledge . i do here referr the reader to the th ▪ and th pages of the first chapter of the animadversions , to see there how horribly he contradicts himself upon this subject . for there it is proved against him , out of page . of his vindic. lin . . that he says that the essences of things , cannot be known , but only their properties and qualities . which surely inferrs , that then their properties may be known . and again , that as for the essential properties , operations , and powers of matter , sence , experience and observation will tell us what they are . vindicat. p. . line . which passages i would have him reconcile to what he has said here , viz. that the essential properties of things are without the compass of human knowledge ; which how they can be , and yet sence , experience , and observation be able to give us such an account of them , as to tell us what they are , i must confess i cannot comprehend . and whereas again he excludes here the essences of things ( which i averr to be only another word for the natures of them ) from the compass of human knowledge ; does not this very man , in this his defence , p. . lin . . tell us , that the nature of a spirit consists in internal vital sensation ? and now , after that he has given us this account of the nature of a spirit , and told us wherein it does consist , will he tell us , that he looks upon the natures of things as out of the compass of human knowledge ? i shall say no more of him at present , but humbly beg the reader seriously to reflect upon the temper and confidence of this man. and so i dismiss him for an everlasting shameless self-contradictor as he is ; and pass to the examination of what he brings against the animadverter's fourth and last argument , which proceeds equally against mutual consciousness and self-consciousness too , and is founded upon that rule of philosophy ; that entities or beings ought not to be multiply'd nor new notions to be admitted , where the old received ones are sufficient , and that therefore the terms and notions of mutual consciousness and self-consciousness in the present subject ought to be rejected , not only as new and suspicious , but as wholly needless and superfluous : forasmuch as nothing can be signified by them , which is not fully and clearly signified by that one plain word and known attribute , the divine omniscience . to which the defender replies in this fleering expostulation , p. . lin . . pray what hurt have these seemingly innocent words done ? i answer , too much a great deal ( if we may believe his own words ) to suffer them to pass for so much as seemingly innocent . for , p. . lin . . of this defence , he tells us , that these were the words which directly led him to the assertion of three infinite minds ; which is direct tritheism : and not only so , but forced him also to the trouble of a long senceless apology to perswade the world , that by minds he did not mean minds : as we shall more particularly shew in the discussion of his answers to the animadverter's arguments upon that subject . in the mean time he answers further , that admitting that all that is imported by self-consciousness and mutual consciousness may be fully signified by the divine omniscience , yet why ( says he ) may not that one comprehensive attribute very properly receive different names , according to its different objects , as the several arts and sciences do ? to which i answer his ignorance , that neither do several arts nor sciences , nor yet several kinds of action , receive their denomination from any of their particular objects , but only from their adequate and general object formally consider'd , that is , as apprehensible after such a certain way . as for instance ; natural philosophy is so denominated , not from this or that natural body , but from natural body generally and universally consider'd ; and that only in order to the knowledge of the nature , properties , and affections thereof . and so likewise in natural acts , such as those of seeing and hearing , and the like ; every particular different colour which is seen does not give a diverse denomination to the act that perceives it , since it affects it only after the same general way ; nor does every different sound or tune diversly denominate each particular act of hearing , which takes them in ; but they have all one general denomination from one adequate object so consider'd as before express'd ; which to seeing is omn● visibile , quatenus visibile ; and to hearing , omne audibile , quatenus audibile . and in like manner the adequate object of omniscience is omne scibile , quatenus scibile ; and the three divine persons , as this omniscience terminates upon them , are as properly and truly three particular objects of it , as any three created finite beings may be . and it would make very odd work ( in good earnest ) to distinguish the divine omniscience by as many different names as it has particular different objects , ( which yet this man here most absurdly contends for ) ; for according to this his assertion , omniscience , as it terminates upon an angel , must have one name , as upon a man another , and as upon a beast or a fowl , another . and as god is said , upon the account of his omniscience , to know and number the stars , and to call them all by their names , psal. . . his omniscience being terminated distinctly upon every one of them , must by consequence have as many different denominations as there are stars in the firmament . and therefore let this ignorant man know for the future , that the divine knowledge is denominated only from its adequate object , which comprehends all that is knowable , and that only under this consideration , as knowable : and if he can prove [ self ] and [ others ] ( as he speaks ) not to come within the compass of that object , then we will allow , that the knowledge distinctly terminated upon [ self ] and [ others ] ought to receive from thence different denominations . but till then , he and his party may ( to my knowledge ) find much fitter objects to apply their self-consciousness and mutual consciousness to , than the divine persons . but as if he had not sufficiently disturb'd the church with his heretical novelties already , he is now for starting another as great as any of the rest . for the world ( it seems ) has been hitherto under a mistake , which he will now graciously correct by informing us , that there is in almighty god a certain thing specifically different from his divine knowledge , call'd intellectual sensation , p. . lin . . and that he , who does not know the difference between these , is as unfit to meddle in this controversie as a blind man to dispute of colours . and accordingly he tells us , that though self-consciousness and mutual consciousness may in some respect be call'd knowledge , yet in truth they are of a quite different kind from it . for that self-consciousness is that intellectual sensation by which each person feels his own thoughts , knowledge , volitions , &c. and that the mutual consciousness of the three persons is not their knowledge of each other , but their mutual sensation and feeling each other in themselves . so that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 man has here given us a piece of new philosophy and divinity , which the world knew nothing of before . but a notion so odd , as well as new , must not pass without examination ; and in order to that , i shall advance this proposition in direct contradiction to the defender , viz. that there is no such thing in the divine nature as spiritual sensation distinct from spiritual knowledge or intellection . and in opposition to the contrary assertion , i offer these following considerations . . the universal authority of all philosophers and divines , both schoolmen and others , who have treated scholastically of the divine nature and attributes , unanimously acknowledging and asserting , that there are no other immanent acts in god but acts of intellection and volition ( which are absolutely necessary to the conceiving of god , as of an intelligent being ) and consequently , that there is no such thing as an act of sensation in god distinct from these . . that god is entirely and adequately comprehensible by himself these two ways : . by a representation of the entire idea of all his own divine perfections to himself , which is done by intellection . and , . by way of love of and complacency in these his infinite perfections thus represented to him , which is done by volition ; and consequently there can be no such third way necessary to comprehend himself by , as this author here calls spiritual sensation . . that if there be such an act in the divine nature as sensation distinct from intellection and volition , then there is such a thing also in the divine nature as a vis , or potentia sensitiva , different and distinct from the vis intellectiva , and volitiva , in the same . for since in the case of mutual and self-consciousness this author has asserted in the said nature , a power or principle of consciousness distinct from the acts thereof , and has affirmed likewise consciousness and self-sensation to be the same thing , he must for the same reason necessarily assign also a principle or power of sensation distinct from the acts of sensation : that is to say , a certain new thing called a spiritual sensitive power in god , which is neither intellective , nor volitive , and yet absolutely necessary for the said acts of spiritual sensation to issue from . but now for any one to assert the addition of such a new power to the divine nature , is a thing in it self so uncouth and unphilosophical , and contrary to the common sence of all the learned men in the world , that there needs not one word to be argued against it . and as for this author , i desire him to reconcile this new power in god with that zealous harangue , p. p. , . made by him for the actuality and simplicity of the deity , even to the explosion of all priority and posteriority of our conceptions about it . but ly , if there be such a thing as sensation , and a vis sensitiva in god , distinct from the vis intellectiva , and volitiva ; let this man assign a solid reason , if he can , why there are not four persons in the godhead . for ( since , as the schools affirm , totus deus foecundus est , there being no act in god but what is productive of some thing ) what should hinder , but that as the father communicates the divine essence , per intellectum , and so begets a son , and both father and son communicate their divine essence , per voluntatem , and so breath forth the holy ghost ; so all three should produce a fourth person in the godhead , by communicating their divine essence by this way of internal sensation ? i will not , i declare , presume to assert any thing in such a case , but shall leave it to the learned and judicious to judge of the whole matter . but i am sure it must pre●s hard upon this new invention . and now after all , that we have here argued upon this point , i demand of this man , upon what ground he asserts in god such a thing as spiritual sensation distinct in kind from divine knowledge ? ( for it is his way to advance the most heterodox propositions , without the least offer of a proof of them ) why ; i defy all mankind to find out any other ground of this assertion , besides the thing it self asserted by him , viz. that each of the divine persons intimately feels himself to be what he is , and not another ; and that feeling and knowing are quite different things . this is all that he says , or pretends to say . in answer to which , i demand of him , whether he derives the necessity of this expression of feeling , as contra-distinct in god to knowing , ( this being the sole ground of his assertion ) from scripture or reason , or the proper signification of the word it self requireing it ? if from scripture , let it be produced , and we submit . if from reason , let some argument from the nature of the thing be produced , proving that there is some apprehensive act in god of a quite different kind from knowledge : but no such argument ever yet appeared . and much less , in the third and last place , can the genuine signification of the word feeling infer this . for does the word feeling , in the proper use of it , signify any thing spiritual ? or can it be properly applied to god , if it does not ? no ; it is certain , that it properly signifies no such thing , but on the contrary only a corporeal act requiring a corporeal subject to lodge it in . so that ( as has been observed before ) spiritual feeling is an arrant contradiction in adjecto . and therefore the truth is , feeling can be no otherwise applied to spiritual beings , and especially to god himself than by a trope and metaphor ; and as seeing , hearing and smelling , are applied to him : and we may as well ascribe to god a self-conscious seeing , a self-conscious hearing , and a self-conscious smelling , and all distinct from his knowledge , as a self-conscious feeling . god in scripture is said to see and to hear , to express to us the clearness and quickness of his knowledge , and in like manner may be said to feel , to express the intimacy of his knowledge to the object known , there being no act of sence , in which there is so near an application of the object to the faculty , as in feeling . so that this whole new assertion is founded upon nothing but meer trope and metaphor , translating terms from their proper sensible signification to a figurative and spiritual ; which nothing but an absolute necessity , from the very nature of things can ever justify . and now i desire all professors of divinity to consider the confidence of this man , and whither it may tend ; who , by drawing words from their proper signification to a tropical ( and this of his own head ) shall presume to found a new notion about the divine nature and actings . for let him prove any other ground for this notion of spiritual sensation or feeling , distinct from knowledge in god , if he can . and therefore , since this is wholly a new invention of his own , and not hitherto proved by any argument , but his own bare word affirming it , i do here require him to produce his arguments for it : for ( it being a proposition wholly new ) it is incumbent upon the proposer of it , first to prove it , and not upon his adversary ( maintaining the contrary thesis , in actual and long possession ) to disprove it ; but only to expect and answer his arguments as they shall be offered . i have , i confess , produced some reasons against it already ; but it was more than what the rules of disputation obliged me to . and therefore , i do here again call upon this man to produce his arguments for his new assertion , declaring withal , that i here undertake to maintain , this thesis against him , viz. that there is no such thing as spiritual sensation in god distinct , from his knowledge . this , i say , i declare my self ready to defend against him as publickly as he has asserted the contrary affirmative : and accordingly , in the face of the world , i challenge him to the dispute , and do otherwise declare him a disturber of the church , and a perverter of our religion by paradoxes which he is not able to speak one word in the defence of . in the next place we have him making his last effort to keep up his sinking cause and credit with a downright falsification , and an utter change of the whole question , hitherto in dispute between him and his adversary : and that in these following words , p. . lin . . that he hopes , that if the animadverter will try his skill again , he should hear no more of his formal reasons of personality and vnion , but that he will be pleas'd to speak to the true point , viz. whether a self-conscious person be not one with himself , and distinguish'd from all other persons ; and whether he does not feel himself to be thus one , and thus distinguish'd by self-consciousness ; and whether three divine persons , who are thus mutually conscious to each other , be not naturally and essentially vnited into one god ? and all other disputes are certainly beside the question . and if so , then i am sure his whole vindication , and a great part of his very defense of it are so too . but has this man's confidence so totally swallow'd up his conscience , that he dares offer so notorious a falshood to the world in print ? i do here solemnly averr , that what he has now set down as the true state of the question between him and the animadverter , is as far from it , as the bare consequent of any thing is or can be from being the cause of it . and that this may be made as clear to the reader as the day , he is desir'd to take notice , that the animadverter wrote against this man's new hypothesis about the trinity , as he found it deliver'd in his book entituled , a vindication of the doctrine of the blessed trinity , &c. and consequently , that the true state of the question must be drawn from thence . and this has been fully and fairly done already in those several propositions quoted and set down by me in my entrance upon the examination of his answers to the animadverter's arguments ; where the reader will find the true and whole state of the question laid before him in this man 's own words ; which tho' it be abundantly enough to shew his insufferable falsification , yet to shew it more fully still , ( if possible ) and to save the reader the trouble of casting his eye backward and forward , i will here set down both what he says in this his defense , and what he first asserted in his vindication , together ; that so , by comparing what he retracts , or rather falsifies , here , with what he had so positively affirm'd there , the reader may impartially judge , whether such a one upon such a subject can be fit either to dispute , or to be disputed with . and this shall be done in the following particulars . as , first , this author , in his defense , declares , that the question is only this ; whether three self-consciousnesses do not prove three self-conscious persons to be really distinct from each other . defense , p. . l. . but in his vindication he affirms , that the self-consciousness of every person to itself makes them three distinct persons . vind. p. . and will any man alive here grant , or any logick , but this man's , allow , that , for self-consciousness only to prove the three divine persons really distinct , as he says in the defense , and to make them so , as he says expresly in the vindication , is the same thing ? or that , whether you put the question concerning the one , or concerning the other , it is one and the same question still ? secondly , in the same defence he declares again , that if each of the three persons have a self-consciousness of their own , this distinguishes the persons , and proves them really distinct ; which is all that he desires . def. p. . at the beginning . but his vindication , i must tell him , speaks much higher , viz. that the self-vnity of a spirit ( which he reckons each of the divine persons to be ) is nothing else but self-consciousness , vind. p. . and again , the essential vnity of a spirit consists in self-consciousness , and it is nothing else that makes a spirit one , and distinguishes it from all others , vind. p. . now to be that , which only proves the three persons distinct , and to be that , wherein their vnity and distinction consists , and which originally distinguishes them from all others , are things extremely different ; for as much as that may prove them distinct , and secondarily distinguish them too , which neither originally distinguishes them , nor is that in which their original unity and distinction does consist . . he tells us in this defense also , that the dean no where asserts , that mutual consciousness is the formal reason of the essential vnity of the three persons , but that three persons who are thus mutually conscious to each other , must be essentially one , def. p. . l. . in answer to which , he has been often told , that whatsoever makes or constitutes a thing essentially one , or is that wherein its essential unity does consist , is the formal reason of the said unity . and as touching this , he affirms in this very defense , p. . that mutual consciousness makes all three persons as much one , as three can be one . and likewise in his vindication , that mutual consciousness makes all three persons numerically one divine essence , or one god , p. . and again , that the three persons are essentially one god by a mutual consciousness , p. . now this surely implies a great deal more , than that three persons thus mutually conscious are essentially one . for to say , that three mutually conscious persons are essentially one , and that they are thus one by [ or by reason of ] their mutual consciousness are two quite different propositions ; even as different as these , viz. that every learned man is rational , and , that his being learned is that [ by which ] he is rational : which latter is utterly false . . he goes on , and tells us again , that if mutual consciousness be essential to this vnity , so that three persons are thus vnited ( that is , are one in point of knowledge , and cannot be one without it ) he will contend no further with any man about it , defense p. . at the latter end . but whether he will or no , his vindication will contend with him ; in which he has asserted much more than this amounts to , ( as the immediate forecited passages demonstrate ) viz. that mutual consciousness [ makes ] the three persons essentially one god , and is that [ by which ] they are one , and [ in which ] their essential vnity consists . and this i must tell him runs much higher than to say only , that mutual consciousness is essential to their vnity : for it may be so only as a consequent essentially following it , and not as a principle essentially constituent of it , and wherein it does consist . but in the th and last place , he declares himself more fully and roundly than before . if ( says he ) self-consciousness necessarily results from and infers and proves a distinction of persons , and mutual consciousness supposes , results from , infers and proves the vnity of the divine persons in the vnity of the godhead , it will satisfy the dean without disputing the formal reason of personality and vnion , def. p. . l. . to which i answer ; that i am not at all concerned what will satisfy the dean , now that he is driven to the wall , but what the dean has asserted before . and for this ; as to the point of self-consciousness in the first place , he having several times , in his vindication , asserted each of the divine persons to be an infinite spirit , tells us , p. . vind. that the essential vnity of a spirit [ consists ] in self-consciousness : and that it is nothing else , which makes a spirit one , and distinguishes it from all others . and , that the self-consciousness of every one of the divine persons to it self [ makes ] them three distinct persons , vind. p. . l. . and then , for mutual consciousness , he tells us , that father , son , and holy ghost are one by an internal consciousness , as every man is one with himself , vind. p. . l. . and , that the three persons are essentially one god [ by ] a mutual consciousness , p. . . &c. and here , in this very defense he tells us , that the dean places the vnity of the divine persons in their mutual consciousness , defense p. . l. . and now ( to summ up what he has said on both sides ) whether , for self-consciousness to be that in which the personal unity of a spirit does [ consist ] ; and which [ makes ] a spirit or person one with it self , and distinguishes it from all others ; and [ makes ] father , son , and holy ghost three distinct persons : and likewise for mutual consciousness to be that , which [ makes ] all the three persons to be essentially one god : and to be that [ by which ] they are so , and [ in which ] their unity is placed , be no more than to suppose , prove , infer , and result from both these , viz. their personal and their essential vnity respectively ; that is to say , whether the formal antecedent reason of these be only the consequent of them , is left to every one of common sence to judge . but i shall trouble the reader with no more of these passages ( tho' several more might be alledg'd ) not doubting but that by this time he throughly sees , that the true state of the question , and point in dispute is this , viz. whether self-consciousness be that which [ makes ] each of the divine persons properly a person , that is to say , personally one with himself , and distinct from all others , or ( in other words ) be that [ by which ] each person is so , and in which his being so does consist ? and likewise whether mutual consciousness makes the three persons essentially one ; or be that [ by which ] formally they are thus one , or [ in which ] their essential unity does consist ? this i averr to be the true and plain state of the question , as it is held in the affirmative by dr. sherlock throughout his whole vindication on the one side , and as it is opposed by the animadverter on the other : and consequently , that every one of those five fore-cited passages is on the vindicator's part a direct concession and giving up of the point in controversie between them . and i must hereupon seriously and solemnly profess , that the only difficulty which i have yet met with in this disputation , has been to make a proud , shameless man own his own words , and abide by his own plain , positive , and repeated assertions . though i must tell him , that none is or can be more baffled than he who in his defence is brought to deny what before he had affirmed . and thus we have here ( as the book calls it self ) a defence of dr. sherlock's notion of the trinity , if dr. sherlock's denying his words be defending his opinion . but our author comes now at length to clear himself of the imputation of tritheism , and here he says , defense p. . line last . that he heartily thanks the animadverter for being so civil to him as not to charge him with tritheism as his opinion , but as the consequence of his principles . and great reason , i own , he has to thank him for so undeserved a civility ; though the truth is , the animadverter rather judged it a piece of charity while he was disputing with one , who was still contradicting himself , to take him ( as long as he could ) by the better end of the contradiction . nevertheless , if the defender will be pleased to consult the preface to the animadversions , p. . l. . d edition , he will find that how favourably soever the animadverter may be thought to express himself in some other places , he speaks his thoughts more home and fully in that . for there he affirms , that his adversarie's opinion does not only infer but also imply tritheism ; and this surely is as much more than the other , as an equipollent is more than a consequent . and whatsoever the animadverter might think of this author then , yet since his reading this defense ( in which there is ten times more tritheism than was in his first book ) and especially after that peremptory and prophane affirmation , def. p. . l. . viz. that unless we admit the three divine persons to be three distinct minds , there is not only an end of the dean's notion , but ( he fears ) of the trinity too . after this , i say , the animadverter declares , that he does not only look upon his opinion as downright tritheism , but likewise accounts the author himself as arrant a tritheist to all intents and purposes , as peraticus euphrates ( the beginner of the old sect of the peratae ) or iohannes philoponus , or as even valentinus gentilis himself , or any other of the tritheistick name & tribe whatsoever ; and that without any other difference , that he knows of , between this author and valentinus gentilis , save only that valentinus by his tritheism got what he deserv'd , and this man with his tritheism has got what he does not deserve . but let us see how he defends himself ; and that in the first place is by plainly confessing , that to affirm the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds , is an unusual way of speaking , def. p. . and elsewhere , that it is an inconvenient way of speaking , p. . l. . and likewise an improper way , p. . l. . and that , it may be , no body so expresly used these terms before himself , p. . l. . all this , i say , he confesses ; and therefore i desire the reader to compare it with this man's professed design ; which was ( having first proclaim'd himself an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - man , and flouted at all the fathers , as neither able to conceive rightly , nor express themselves properly about the trinity ) to offer a plain , an esie , and much more intelligible account of this great article , than the christian church was ever yet acquainted with . and now must all this be done by terms unusual , inconvenient , and improper , and never used expresly upon this subject ( but hy hereticks ) before ? is this , i say , the way of giving the most intelligible account of this mystery , that was ever yet given of it ; and that by throwing aside the account which the whole christian world has hitherto acquiesced in , to make room for it ? if the church will suffer heresie and impudence thus to ride and impose upon her , she may ; but little , i am sure , is it for her credit , that such things should be endured in her communion , and much less warranted by her authority , and encourag'd by her preferments ; when ( as was shewn in the preface to the animadversions , p. . ) the bare use of any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in these high points , was with such rigour condemn'd by the sixth general council , and the users of it so severely proceeded against . well , but if by this man 's own confession his words are so unjustifiable , how then does he think to bring himself off ? why , by the help of his old friend his meaning , that constant plea and refuge of a baffled person . but still , i say , what have we to do with this man's meaning and intentions against his plain , clear , and unquestionable words used at least forty times over ? for , are men's words to be understood by their meaning , or their meaning by their words ? it is a pleasant thing certainly , that when mr. dean has brought himself into a plunge by his indefensible expressions , mr. meaning must be call'd in to lift him out , and wipe him clean again , with his intentions ; and that he can find nothing else to defend himself with , but that comical salvo of the renowned hugh peters , give me that word again . but i would have this man know , that when the church heretofore found any one heretical in his words , she never own'd or suppos'd him orthodox in his meaning . and accordingly i must here declare further , that i will not be over-rul'd or baulk'd in any argument against him , by what he means , or what he intends ; but having encounter'd and driven him off from his own plain , positive , express words , ( and that according to the sence in which all mankind understands them ) i shall leave his precarious forlorn meaning to shift for it self . nevertheless , that we may not be too hard upon this [ man of meaning ] let us see what his meaning here is : for possibly matters may be mannaged so , that even this meaning it self may need another meaning to rescue and set it right . he tells us therefore p. , . of this defence , that by three infinite minds he means three infinite intelligent persons ; affirming moreover , p. . l. . that a mind is an intelligent person , and every intelligent person a mind . both which propositions , if [ mind ] be universally taken in the first ( as , by the whole tenour of his discourse here , it must be ) are manifestly false . for a man is an intelligent person , and not a mind , and the soul of man on the other side is a mind , but not a person , and the divine nature or essence likewise absolutely considered is a mind , but not a person , and consequently neither of them can be said to be an intelligent person . but let us see whether infinite mind and intelligent person , do or can properly and logically import the same thing , which i utterly deny , and that for these reasons . . because [ mind ] signifies an absolute being ; nothing relative belonging to the definition of it ; nor was it ever used by writers but in an absol ute , irrelative sence ; so that we have here both signification and definition , together with vniversal vse for the absoluteness of the term [ mind ] . but the term [ person ] applied to the divine persons , is always relative , and does and must signify relatively . . because the term [ infinite mind ] is adequately predicated of god , and we properly say , that god is an infinite mind : but the term infinite intelligent person cannot be so predicated of god : for if there be three such intelligent persons in the godhead , we can no more , by a proper and natural predication , say , that god is an intelligent person , that we can say , that god is the father . . because if [ infinite mind ] and [ infinite intelligent person ] be terms equipollent and importing the same thing ; then , since this author elsewhere affirms , that three infinite minds may be one infinite mind , it will follow ( as we observed before ) that three infinite intelligent persons may be also one infinite intelligent person : for as much as in terms equipollent , the same things may , and must be equally affirmed and denied of both of them . and this consequence will affect this author throughout this whole dispute . from all which i conclude , that an infinite mind is not formally and properly an infinite intelligent person , nor equipollent to it , and since it is not so , i conclude further , that unless it may be allowed to any particular member of the catholick church ( and a private one too ) to draw off a word from its proper signification , definition , and universally received use , and that in a principal article of faith ; and to fasten an arbitrary sence of his own upon it , quite different from all these ( as a relative sence is from an absolute ) then it cannot be allowed to this author to interpret three infinite minds by three infinite intelligent persons in the article of the trinity . for at this rate there can be nothing certain in any article or proposition of the christian faith , as setled by councils , and received by the church . but to shew how far this man of confidence , without shame , can stretch his interpreting faculty , let this notable instance suffice . for having affirmed over and over , in his vindication , and particularly , p. . that not to acknowledge the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds or spirits , was heresy and non-sense ; here , in his defense , p. . l. . he tells us , that his meaning there was , that to assert , three distinct divine persons , who are not three distinct infinite intelligent persons , was heresy and nonsence . and nonsence no doubt it is with a vengeance . but in answer to so wretched an evasion , i demand of this man , whether ever he knew any divine or writer in the world , who owned a person , and did not understand by the same an intelligent person ? nay , so far is he from having any ground for such a pretence , that in strictness of speech , the term [ intelligent ] added to person , is a meer redundancy and tautology . for as much as it is essentially implyed in the formal notion of a person , which is defined suppositum intelligens : and therefore for this man to suppose any one to assert three persons , and to deny them to be three intelligent persons , is as much as to suppose that a man may assert three persons , and yet deny them to be three persons . the very supposal of which is certainly a degree of nonsence next to the asserting it . but besides , i hope this man is not so very ignorant , as to affirm that [ a mind ] and [ an intelligent person ] have the same signification . for suppose that it might be truly said [ that a mind is an intelligent person ] that does not prove it to signify the same that [ intelligent person ] does ; any more than because homo is truly said to be animal , therefore homo and animal are terms perfectly synonymous ; and that by one we are still to understand the other ; which yet , if they properly signified the same thing , we certainly ought to do . in a word , i refer it to the whole world to judge , whether , if a man may be suffered thus to interpret what he writes or says , he may not upon these terms discourse of men , and explain his meaning by angels , discourse of trees , and say , he means houses ? but such absurd liberty , especially in strict disputation , must not be endured . and accordingly , after all these shiftings and struglings , he begins to despond , and plainly declares , p. . l. . that he will not contend about the term [ three infinite minds ] : by which i must tell him , that he effectually gives up the thing in dispute ; for as much as the main stress and force of the argument rests upon the proper and received sence of the terms . and whereas he says , that no body before him had so expresly used these terms , [ three infinite minds or spirits ] it has been already proved against him , that they were actually used , and insisted upon long before , by several hereticks on the one hand , and condemned by the catholick church on the other . but to shew that he and his tritheism are not to be parted so ; but that , however ( to save a broken pate ) he quits the term [ three infinite minds ] he yet holds fast the thing signified by it , ( as if the heresy lay not in the thing but in the word ) he tells us , p. . l. . that if the dean [ thinks ] an intelligent person to be a mind , and [ means ] no more by three minds than three intelligent persons ] let the animadverter confute him , if he can . which is just , as if he should say , if the dean by a cock means a bull , let the animadverter confute him for saying a cock has two horns and four legs , if he can . but to his ridiculous plea i answer , first , that the animadverter will dispute with no man's thoughts or meaning , but with his words . secondly , that the defender here quite changes the question . which is not , whether an intelligent person be a mind : but whether a mind be formally and convertibly an intelligent person ; which has been already both denied and disprove : and thirdly and lastly , that in the holy trinity the animadverter admits ( abating still for the forementioned absurdity of the tautology ) every intelligent person to be a mind but , for all that ▪ denies three infinite intelligen● persons to be three minds ; for as much as they are intelligent by vertue of one infinite intelligent mind common to them all . and whereas he adds , that of he means by three minds three intelligent persons , let the animadverter try his skill to make tritheism of three minds , and excuse three intelligent persons from the same charge . my answer is , first , that the animadverter needs try his skill no more where he finds no more strength to try it upon . secondly , that this question is not to be determined by what he or any particular man whatsoever means by a mind contrary to the sense of the whole world concerning it : but by what the whole world means by the word [ mind ] though never so contrary to his particular private sense thereof ; which now after a baffle he alleges to defend himself by . and then lastly , for the difference of charging the assertion of three infinite minds with tritheism , but not that of three infinite intelligent persons , that also has been more than sufficiently proved against him already , by having shewn , that three infinite minds are three infinite absolute beings , and that an infinite absolute being being convertibly the same with god , there can be no multiplying of such a being without a multiplication of gods. but that on the other side , the three divine persons , being properly three relative subsistences of one and the same infinite absolute being included in all and each of them , and a relative subsistence being capable of being multiplied without a multiplication of the said infinite absolute being , it follows , that though three minds infer a plurality of gods , yet three persons do not so . and let this author , with all his noise and flounceing , disprove the reason of this difference between minds and persons , if he can : for i will undertake , that the animadverter will not only abide by it , but also venture the issue of this whole controversy upon it : and we shall have more use of it again presently . in the mean time let us examine his answer to the animadverter's first argument against his three distinct infinite minds , which proceeds thus . first argument . three distinct infinite minds or spirits are three distinct gods. but the three divine persons are not three distinct gods : and therefore the three divine persons are not three distinct infinite minds or spirits . and now how does he clear himself of this argument ? why first , by reproaching it for being proposed in mode and figure ; and i on the contrary reproach him for not answering it with the same logical regularity with which it was proposed . secondly , he alleges as parallel to this argument , an argument brought by the socinians to prove , that there are not three persons in the godhead ; which ( to shew that logick is as much an enemy to him as he can be to logick ) he sets down thus . three distinct infinite intelligent persons are three distinct gods. but there are not three distinct gods ; and therefore there are not three distinct infinite intelligent persons in the godhead . in which syllogism we have these two terms viz. [ three distinct infinite intelligent persons ] and [ three distinct gods. ] but as for the third term i desire this author to shew it me , for i must confess i cannot find it . i know well enough how this socinian syllogism must be supplied and perfected ; and therefore ( though it is not my business to correct his blunders but to expose them ) i shall set it right for him thus . three distinct infinite intelligent persons are three distinct gods , but father , son and holy ghost are not three distinct gods , and therefore father , son and holy ghost are not three infinite intelligent persons . thus i say this socinian argument ought to proceed ; in which the major proposition , and the conclusion , are certainly false . but how does this affect the animadverter , or how does it prove his argument , which proceeds upon a different major terminus , to be false too ? unless this declared enemy of logick will have the syllogistical form ( which indeed is the same in both arguments ) to determine the truth on falshood of the conclusion . but that we know , must be here determined by the truth or falsehood of the matter of the premises , or of one of them , and not by the bare form of the syllogism . accordingly , if this man will prove a parity between the animadverter's argument and that of the socinians , he must prove , that the animadverter's major proposition , [ viz. three distinct infinite mind● are three distinct gods ] is of the very same signification and import , and consequently of the same falshood with that in the socinian syllogism , viz. [ that three infinite intelligent persons are three gods ] . but that is the thing now in dispute ; and the animadverter denies it ; let us therefore see how this defender proves it . which he endeavours to do by affirming , that the proof of the animadverter's major proposition will serve as well for an eternal infinite intelligent person as for an eternal infinite mind , viz. thus. god ( says he ) and eternal infinite intelligent person are terms as equipollent and convertible as god , and infinite mind or spirit are . these are his words , def. p. . l. . and they are false and heretical to the height . for will this man after this open his mouth against sabellius , who asserted the very same thing , viz. that god and infinite intelligent person are terms convertible and commensurate ? but by his , and sabellius's good leave , it is absolutely denied him , that these are terms convertible , as not being adequately predicable of one another . for to say that god is an intelligent person , ( whether we take person determinately or indeterminately ) if there be more intelligent persons than one in the godhead , is ( as was noted before ) a proposition as absurd and illogical , as to say , that god is the father , or that god is the son : the predicate in such propositions being of less compass than the subject , which ( where it is not larger ) ought to be commensurate to it at least . and i do particularly insist upon this , that if the term [ three intelligent persons ] be adequately and convertibly predicated of [ god ] the term [ an intelligent person ] ( which can signify no more than one person ) cannot be adequately predicated of god too . for in all adequate predications , the subject must take in the whole compass of the predicate , and the predicate answer and come up to the whole compass of the subject . what the defender adds next is very impertinent , viz. that the bare terms from which the animadverter argues , do not prove this distinction , to wit , between one mind , and one infinite intelligent person , p. . l. . for if by bare terms , he means terms stripped of their signification , such terms , i confess , can prove nothing but the folly of him that uses them ; but therefore i must tell this man once for all , that the animadverter argues from the terms [ infinite intelligent mind ] and infinite intelligent person ] according to that universally received sense which they actually bear at present all the christian world over ; how or which way soever they came by it . this , i say , is that , which alone the animadverter argues from , and insists upon . for i hope this author would not have the animadverter invade his prerogative , which is to argue , not from terms or words , but from meanings nothing relating to them . i conclude therefore from what has been said , that [ god ] and [ infinite mind ] are terms every way adequate and convertible ( as even this author himself grants ) and that [ god ] and [ infinite intelligent person ] are not so . but he goes on , and tells us , that it is custom only which has more reconciled us to the word [ person ] than [ mind ] ; and that , setting aside this dispute ( viz. of the trinity ) , it is the sense of all mankind ( which he learnedly proves from its being the sense of the socinians ) that the same thing is to be understood by [ an infinite mind ] and [ an infinite person ] . thus he , p. . l. . but can any thing be more absurd and ridiculous than to talk of setting aside this dispute , viz. concerning the trinity , when it is the subject of this dispute alone which we are here concerned in ? and to allege the sense of all mankind about these terms before there was any revelation of a trinity to apply them to , and this also in opposition to the universal sense of the christian church concerning the same , founded upon such a previous revelation ? those indeed who in ancient times owned one god , but knew nothing of a trinity , might use the terms [ infinite mind ] and [ infinite person ] indifferently , and take the latter in as absolute a sense , as they did the former . but what is this to us christians , after general councils , and the universal constant use of the church , has added a relative signification to the word [ person ] as applied to this subject , but never used the words [ mind or spirit ] but ( according to their original and universal signification ) in a sense absolute and irrelative ? and therefore admitting his evangelist plato ( as he reads him , quoted by dr. cudworth ) to have held three infinite minds to be one god , it is not at all the less an absurdity and a contradiction to all principles of reason and religion , for its being held by plato ; though i confess it appears more manifestly so by this author 's holding it too , whose talent lyes so remarkably this way . but he tells us , that the dispute , whether there be one or three infinite minds or intelligent persons in the godhead , is of an higher nature than to be determined by convertible terms , p. . l. . which i positively deny ; and affirm , that although the thing disputed , be of never so high a nature , yet reason is able to determine these two things concerning it . first , whether it be contrary to reason or no ? and secondly , that if it be so , it ought not to be reckoned as an article of religion . to both which i add , that to argue from terms convertible is as sure a way of ratiocination as the mind of man can proceed by ; and consequently , that if reason arguing this way , proves the absurdity and impossibility of three distinct infinite minds in one and the same infinite mind or godhead , we need no further arguments to overthrow it . but as for the author's complement to the animadverter , viz. that he learnedly proves what every school-boy knows . the animadverter bids me tell him , that school-boys generally know greek , latine , and grammar ; which is more than some confident writers , or rather copy-mongers can pretend to . but he proceeds , and says , that since the animadverter has made [ god ] and [ infinite mind or spirit ] only equipollent and convertible terms , the defender may allow him this , and still deny his major proposition [ that therefore three distinct infinite minds or spirits are three distinct gods. ] for though god is an infinite mind , and an infinite mind is god , yet it does not follow , that three distinct infinite minds are three distinct gods , no more , than that three infinite intelligent persons are three distinct gods , p. . l. . all which is profound reasoning indeed , viz. that because in terms not equipollent or convertible ( as the terms [ god and [ infinite intelligent person ] are not ) the multiplication of one term does not multiply the other , therefore neither must it do so in terms perfectly equipollent , as [ god ] and [ infinite mind ] confessedly are . but i shall divide my answer to what he has here said , into two parts , and consider , first , the force of arguing from equipollents . and secondly , examine whether the term [ distinct infinite persons ] ( which puts the case as high as it can be ) does as much infer three distinct gods , or three distinct infinites , as the animadverter contends , that three distinct infinite minds do and must . and first , for the matter of equipollency . whereas this author in the forecited place says , that he may allow the animadverter , that [ god ] and [ infinite mind or spirit ] are equipollent and convertible , and yet deny , that therefore three distinct minds are three distinct gods : i answer , that an ignorant unwary adversary may allow a great deal more than will do him good : but whatsoever this man either grants or denies ( as , for ought i see , cross and pile may be the logick he proceeds by in both ) i do affirm , that if [ god ] and [ infinite mind ] are terms equipollent , then according to all the principles of reason , and rules of argumentation , which have hitherto obtained in the world , the multiplication of one equipollent necessarily and unavoidably infers the multiplication of the other . and the better to make this out , and to relieve his ignorance in some measure , i would have him take notice . first , that the reason of this mutual inference between terms equipollent is , because the equipollency of terms imports a perfect formal identity in their signification , or thing signified by those terms ( for i speak now of equipollent terms only , not propositions ) : as for instance , homo , and animal rationale , are terms properly and formally equipollent : and then , i hope , that for one and the same thing ( i say formally the same ) to be multiplied , and not to be multiplied will be granted impossible . in the next place , i must tell this author , that the conditions of equipollent terms are these . first , that they require the same signs , viz. of universality , singularity , and particularity . secondly , that they require the same predicates , whether affirmative or negative . and thirdly and lastly , that they have the very same consequents . these , i say , are the necessary and essential conditions of equipollents : for supposing a failure of any of them , they cannot be so much as equipollent . which thus premised , we are to observe further , that this author himself allows the terms [ god ] and [ infinite mind or spirit ] to be terms equipollent , p. . l. . from whence i infer , that if there be a plurality of infinite minds , there must be a plurality of gods too : since if one should be multiplied and not the other , there could be no identity of signification , nor consequently equipollency in the terms ; which can never take place where one equipollent term may be truly affirmed , and the other as truly denied of any thing , or any thing of either of them ; which is so very plain , that that fundamental ground of all discourse , impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse , cannot be more self-evident . and therefore let us see what this man alleges next . if god ( says he ) be an infinite mind , and there be three infinite minds , it must follow , that each of these infinite minds distinctly , and by himself considered , is god ; not that these are three distinct gods , but one god , p. . l. . but i affirm , that it must follow not only that each of them [ distinctly ] is god , but that each of them is [ a distinct ] god : for since he grants [ god ] and [ infinite mind ] to be terms equipollent , and since terms equipollent must have the same predicates and consequents , if the term [ distinct ] be ascribed to and predicated of [ infinite mind ] it must be predicated of , and ascribed to the term [ god ] as to the other equipollent ; and so one must be as [ distinct ] as the other : and then if each infinite mind be ● [ distinct god ] three infinite minds must be three distinct gods ; if there be any such thing as consequence in the world : in a word , distinction and multiplication are ( according to this author ) predicates belonging to [ infinite mind ] , and therefore by vertue of the equipollency of the terms they must equally belong to [ god ] too . but this is not all that follows from this man's assertions . for , as he grants here that the terms [ infinite mind ] and [ god ] are equipollent , so he affirms , p. . l. . that [ god ] and [ infinite intelligent person ] are terms equipollent also ; whereupon , by the rule of equipollency , if there be [ but one god ] there can be [ but one infinite intelligent person ] likewise : for as much as both equipollents must have the same predicates and consequents belonging to them . which certainly represents this author's hypothesis as the greatest monster that ever the tongue or pen of man brought forth . for first , by owning the equipollency of [ god ] and [ infinite mind ] and withal asserting three infinite minds , he inevitably brings in tritheism ; and next , by asserting the equipollency of [ god ] and infinite intelligent person ] and thereby a singularity of one as well as of the other , he does as necessarily run into the contrary heresy , which is sabellianism . and so i pass from the equipollency of terms to the second part of my answer , which was to examine , whether the term [ three distinct infinite persons ] does not as much infer a plurality of gods as the term [ three distinct infinite minds or spirits ] does . which the defender here affirms , and the animadverter as positively denies . and both the reason of his denial and the difference of the case are very full and clear . and 〈◊〉 in this , that three distinct minds are three distinct absolute beings , three essences , three natures , each existing by it self , without requiring any subject to inhere in , or to be supported by : and every such numerical nature or essence , must have its numerical distinct attributes or predicates so belonging to it , that one and the same numerical attribute cannot belong to any other numerical distinct nature besides , but that each numerical nature must have its numerically distinct attributes , confined wholly to it self : whereupon one and the same numerical infinity ( which is a natural attribute ) cannot belong to more numerically distinct natures than to one alone . but now on the other side , three divine persons are not three distinct natures , essences , or absolute beings , existing by themselves ( as minds or spirits do ) but three modifications , or relative subsistences of one and the same nature , in which they all exist together , as in their subject , and cannot possibly exist by themselves without it , whereupon as one numerical nature is common to these several subsistences , so the numerical infinity of the said nature , must together with it , belong in common to the same . in short , three distinct minds being three distinct essences or natures , existing by themselves , can never be infinite by one numerical infinity , any more than one numerical nature belonging in common to them . but on the contrary , three divine persons , being properly ▪ three subsistences of one and the same nature , may have one and the same infinity , as well as nature , belonging to them all . but you will say , when there is mention of [ three distinct infinite persons ] does not the term [ distinct ] being joined to the term [ infinite ] import a distinction , and consequently a plurality of infinites , and so of gods too ? i answer , no ; because the term [ distinct ] though next in place to the term [ infinite ] yet being but an attribute , must immediately , in construction , affect the term [ persons ] as the proper subject of it , and not the term [ infinite ] which is but another attribute it self , and immediately affects the same subject too . so that [ three distinct infinite persons ] signify but as much as three distinct persons who are infinite : the term [ distinct ] being here exegetical of the numeral term [ three ] , and so belonging directly to the [ persons ] not to their [ infinity ] : just as if we should say [ three distinct omniscient , or omnipotent persons ] the term [ distinct ] belongs immediately and directly to the persons , and is not properly an attribute of their omniscience or omnipotence . in like manner the divine persons are said to be three distinct infinite persons : but how ? not by three distinct infinities , of which each person has one of it self , but by one and the same numerical infinity , common to all three . and yet i own , that even this one common infinity belongs [ distinctly ] that is to say , after [ a distinct manner ] to each of the divine persons , even as the divine nature it self does . and this is what i insist upon as the true state of this matter , and shall add no more , but leave it to the learned and impartial reader to judge of the disparity of the case : for nothing can prove a parallel in the two forecited instances , or in the consequences of them , but that which prove three absolute entire beings or essences , and three r●lative subsistences of one numerical being or essence to be the same ; and that one and the same numericall attribute may as well belong to three such absolute entire beings or essences , as to one numerical absolute being under three distinct modes or relations . and by this we may judge of the truth of the defender's following words , viz. that the adimadverter was aware that the objection of three gods would lye against three persons as well as against three minds , p. . l. . to which i answer , that the animadverter never judged so , but yet judged it the part of a disputant to answer any seeming objection against the truth defended by him , and accordingly he produced and answered this , as such an one and no better . but how did he answer it ? why , by shewing that there was this difference between them , viz. that the notion of a person in the godhead essentially importing an absolute being under a certain relation , afforded something for the divine persons to be distinguished by , and something for them to agree in ; but that the notion of a mind or spirit , importing nothing but a bare absolute simple being , without any such relation , three infinite minds or spirits could not be otherwise distinguished from one another but by that whole absolute being or nature , and consequently by a total distinction . this argument the defender repeats , adding withal . that the sum of it amounts to no more but this , viz. that three distinct minds are three distinct gods because they are distinguished , l. . but will this shameless falsificator say so ? and affirm , that for several beings or essences to be distinguished by the whole of what they are , is no more than barely to be distinguished ? for are there not partial distinctions , and modal distinctions , and accidental distinctions of some things ? and will this ignoramus say , that things thus distinguished are distinguished by the whole of what they are ? but says he again , if notwithstanding this distinction they are essentially and inseparably one , they are not three distinct gods , p. . l. . and , no doubt , they are not so , if they are essentially one ; as on the contrary , they must be so , if they are not essentially one : but then can there be a grosser absurdity in nature than to suppose it possible for three distinct essences ( as three distinct minds are ) to be essentially one ? i must tell this author , that it is a contradiction in the terms . all distinction of essences by themselves being ( as the very term imports ) an essential distinction of the same : and for three essentially distinct things to be essentially one , is for them to be three , and one , distinct and not distinct , in the same respect , which is absolutely impossible ; and would utterly confound the distinction and vnity of the divine pesons , which can never be both of the same kind . and i am confident , that there is hardly a sophister of a years standing in either of the universities , but would look upon this proposition , viz. that three distinct essences , or essentially distinct minds , may yet be essentially one , as much fitter to be hissed at , than disputed against . but , says the defender , are not three infinite intelligent persons as much three absolute simple beings and essences as three minds ? p. . l. . no ; he has been told again and again , that they are not ; and that because three persons are only three distinct relative subsistences of one and the same infinite intelligent being , or essence included in all and each of them . whereupon he repeats these following words out of the animadversions , viz. that the divine persons are three relatives , or one simple being or essence under three distinct relations , and consequently differ from one another , not wholly , and by all that is in them , but only by some mode or respect peculiar to each , and upon that account causing their distinction . thus the animadverter . and what says sir scorn and ignorance to this ? why ; that it is all perfect gibberish : that is in other words , that he is not able to answer or refute one tittle of it . for let me tell his emptiness , that such gibberish as it is , it is the language used by all the divinity-schools in christendom , in the explication and account they give of this great point of divinity . and accordingly i have transcribed the whole passage , as avowing every syllable of it against this ignorant assumer , and desiring the learned reader to pass his strictest examination , and his severest censure upon it . but let us see what follows . and here he asks the question , what the three divine persons in the vnity of the divine essence are ? three relations , three modes , three respects without some being ? p. . l. . i answer , that they are neither three bare modes nor relations or respects , but three relative subsistences , or subsisting relations of one and the same infinite divine nature , essence , or mind , included in and belonging to all and each of the said subsistences . this is the account which i have given , and still give of the three divine persons , and which ( as i told him before ) i shall firmly abide by ; and therefore without asking any more such silly questions , let him reckon upon it , and set himself to confute it , and prove , that it makes the divine persons three meer modes or relations , if he can . and whereas he says , that three relatives are not three relations , but three things related to each other , p. . l. . i answer , that the first part of his assertion , viz. that three relatives are not three relations , is a meer childish cavil . for both person and relation are sometimes taken in an abstract , and sometimes in a concrete sence ; and no body says , that persons are properly called relations , but thus concretely taken , and as relation implies the essence conjoined with it : though yet , to help us to a better and more distinct conception of these things , we are sometimes forced to conceive and speak of one as abstracted from the other : but still as the schools observe , relative and relation , in divinis , are not really distinct things , but one and the same thing under several ways of conception , and expression . but it is the latter part of his assertion , in which we are most concerned ; viz. that three relatives are three things related to each other . where , if he understands the word [ things ] in a strict metaphysical sence , for three distinct entire beings or essences , i deny , that the three divine persons are in this sence three [ things ] related to each other . but one thing , that is to say , one entire being or essence under three distinct relations , or relative subsistences , mutually respecting or referring to one another . and this indeed is the point , which this man has been driving at all along , viz. that each of the divine persons has a distinct entire being or essence of its own belonging to it , and that as really distinct from the beings or essences of the other two , as one being or essence can be distinguished from another . which i affirm to be perfect , rank , downright tritheism . whereupon he tells us again ( with his usual confidence and no proof ) that though the three divine persons may , with respect to their three real subsistences be called three infinite eternal minds , yet they are not three absolute simple beings or essences , p. . l. . to which i answer . first , that the term [ mind ] is a term properly importing [ nature ] not [ subsistence ] , and consequently , that the divine persons can never be called three distinct minds barely from their being three distinct subsistences ( since all these subsistences may be in one and the same infinite mind ) but from their being three distinct natures or essences ; which because they can never be , neither can they be called three distinct minds . secondly i affirm , that the term [ mind ] universally signifies an absolute being ; and that to talk of a mind that is not an absolute being , is as much as to talk of a man that is not an animal rationale ; and so well am i assured of this , that i do here challenge this man to produce me so much as one classick , one scholastick , or theological writer , or christian council , that ever used the word [ mind of minds ] in any other signification than that of an absolute being or essence . and therefore when he shall have proved , that three minds are not three absolute beings or essences , or that three absolute entire beings can be three relative subsistences or modifications of one and the same infinite mind or being , then i will grant that he has defended his assertion against the animadverter ; and not only so , but that he has full power also ( by a theological use of his own making ) to alter the sence and signification of all words , in spight of the world ; and , by vertue of the same , may ( if he pleases ) call the deanry of paul's the archbishoprick of canterbury , and behave himself accordingly . but it is very pleasant to see him here twice in p. . proving his three infinite minds to be three personal subsistences by that exploded chimera of a man and his living image ; which having been so fully baffled , and exposed , and rejected for its prophaness as well as its non-sence , this man surely must have a degree of luck equal to his confidence , if he thinks to make one gross absurdity an argument to prove and make good another . at length he concludes his lame self-contradicting answer with these words , had the dean ( says he ) made three complete , absolute , eternal minds he had been justly chargeable with making three gods , p. . l. . and that , i assure him is a concession large enough ; for i do here affirm , that he has asserted every one of the said particulars , whether he will own it or no. for first , he has asserted three infinite minds ; and it has been effectually proved against him from the signification , definition , and constant use of the term. that three minds are formally three absolute beings . and secondly , he has asserted these three minds to be three distinct persons , and thereby has asserted also their completeness ; since personality is that , which gives the utmost completion to the existence of an intelligent nature : and thirdly and lastly , by asserting the said minds infinite , he asserts them also eternal . for as much as nothing can be infinite but what is infinitely perfect , nor can any thnig be infinitely perfect without including the perfection of eternity in it . so that if this man would but once in his life abide by his own words ( which a self-contradictor , when he is pinched , never will ) we should need no other proof , but his forecited confession to convince him , that he stands justly charged with asserting three gods. and whereas he asserts next , that one and the same infinite and eternal mind is [ repeated ] in three subsistences , p. . l. . i must tell him again , that the term [ repeated ] is not to be admitted or endured here ; since the repetition of a thing is properly nothing else , but the production of another individual instance , one or more , of the same kind . and whether this be applicable to , or affirmable of the divine nature or godhead , let every one , not abandoned by common sence , judge . in fine , when this man shall have proved these following positions collected from him , and held by him , viz. . that [ infinite mind ] and [ infinite intelligent person ] are terms as equipollent , adequate , and convertible , as [ god ] and [ infinite mind ] are . . that though [ god ] and [ infinite mind ] are terms adequately convertible and equipollent , yet that three distinct infinite minds are not three distinct gods : whereas one equipollent can never without a contradiction be multiplied without a multiplication of the other . . that three minds are not three absolute natures or essences ; or that three absolute natures or essences can be three relative subsistences ( and consequently modifications ) of one and the same infinite mind . . that three distinct essences , or three essentially distinct minds may be essentially one . when , i say , he shall have proved all these with as much evidence as he has asserted them with confidence , then will he have secured his tritheism against the animadverter's first argument , and not before . and so i pass on to consider what he has to say to the second , which is this . three distinct minds or spirits are three distinct substances ; but the three persons in the blessed trinity are not three distinct substances , and therefore they are not three distinct minds or spirits . in answer to which the defender tells us , that the dean does not pretend to know any thing of the substance of a mind , and much less of god , who is an infinite mind , p. . l. . but does not this very man ( who never contradicts himself , but when he speaks , or writes ) positively profess to give an account of the nature of a mind or spirit , in p. . of this defense , telling us , that is consists in internal vital sensation ? and is not the nature of a mind the substance of it , even according to this author , who in the th line of this th page , uses the words [ nature or substance ] as signifying the same thing ? and now , will he disclaim all pretence of knowing any thing of the substance of a mind or spirit , after he has undertook to give the world an account what the nature or substance of them is , and wherein it does consist ? but i leave the reader to reconcile this man as he finds him here in this th page to himself in the th page of the same defense , if he can . but he must not think to carry off this fallacy of the consequent so . for though we understand not , by an immediate inspection of things themselves , the specifick nature , or essence , of this or that kind of substance , yet surely the general nature of substance may by discourse be known : and it would be a pleasant consequence , that because we cannot tell what the particular nature of such or such a substance is , that therefore we cannot know it to be a substance . and therefore he asks , p. . l. . what a substance is ? adding withal , that he hopes the animadverter will not affirm it to be that quod substat accidentibus ; since that would make god himself , who is incapable of accidents , to be no substance . and it is shrewdly argued , upon my word . but why then does he stop here , without giving us the true account what substance positively is ? which the very elements of logick and philosophy might have taught him , viz. that substance is a being existing by it self , so as neither to inhere in , or be supported by another being as a subject . this , sir , is the true account of what a substance is : and such a substance i affirm a mind or spirit to be . but as for that which does substare accidentibus , it imports not the general nature , or essence of substance , but only a property of one sort of substance , viz. such as are created . but he goes on and tells us , that though understanding and being , nature or substance may be distinguished in created finite beings , yet that st. austin had taught him , that they are the same in god , p. . l. . and i grant , that according to the real existence of the thing they are so : but , for all that , i affirm , that they differ formally , that is , according to the several conceptus objectivi , which they afford to the mind , and of which one conceptus objectivus can never be the other , nor be applied to several notions of one and the same thing . so that , although god be indeed one pure simple act , yet if we do not conceive and discourse of this simple act , under some distinction , such as is between a subject and its attributes , a principle and its acts , together with the several respects it bears to several objects , neither st. austin , nor he , nor any man alive can discourse of god as of an intelligent being , or agent at all . and therefore , whereas he adds again , that if in the vnity of the godhead there be but three such distinct vnderstandings , or minds , or intelligent persons , who are not each other , nor understand by each other , but distinctly by themselves , he is not concerned about distinct substances , p. . at the end . in answer to that , i tell him first , that if he is concerned about three distinct minds in the godhead , the reason of things shall force him to be concerned about three distinct substances in the same , whether he will or no. secondly , that though i grant three intelligent persons to be in the godhead , yet i deny three distinct vnderstandings or minds to be in it ; but that these three intelligent persons are such by one numerical infinite intelligence , vnderstanding or mind , common to all three ; and that albeit one of the persons neither is nor can be the other , nor yet understands by the other , but each of them distinctly by himself , yet that they understand by one and the same understanding distinctly belonging to each person ; and accordingly for his better instruction , i must tell him , that it is one thing for each person to have an infinite vnderstanding or mind distinctly belonging to him , and quite another to have a distinct infinite mind belonging to each of them . which distinction being very great ought always carefully to be attended to ; but , that it will be ever able to make its way into this man's understanding , i cannot undertake . but he comes now to examine how the animadverter proves , that three distinct minds are three distinct substances . and because he draws his proof of it from the definition of a mind or spirit , viz. that it is substantia incorporea intelligens ; this man replies , should we now deny his definition and say , that a mind is res cogitans , he would be undone for want of his substances , p. . l. . no , sir ignorance , no. while the animadverter can make good one substance in the godhead he will never be undone for want of more . but could any one imagine this man so very weak as he here makes himself , by thinking that a res cogitans can be any thing else but substantia cogitans ? for can an accident cogitare ? or be either the principium or subjectum quod of any thought ? or does res signify any thing properly but either a substance or an accident ? or can substantia cogitans be any other than substantia intelligens ? or lastly , can there , in simple beings , be a substantia intelligens , that is , not also incorporea ? what gross , thick , abominable ignorance does this man in this very one expression betray ? but he is now , as he tells us for capping definitions with the animadverter , p. . l. . and to that purpose gives us this as the definition of a person , viz. that it is naturae rationabilis individua substantia . though he has been told before , that this definition ( with all due respect to boetius be it spoke ) was long since rejected by most divines , schoolmen and others as defective ; or explained by others in a very different sence from what the term [ individua ] now bears ; for that ( according to the generally received sence of it ) it would certainly infer two distinct persons in our saviour upon his incarnation . it is true indeed , that every person is naturae rationalis indidua substantia , that is to say , true in the nature of an essential predicate , as affirming nothing of a person but what necessarily belongs to it : but , for all that , it is not a true definition , as not being adequate to the thing defined , nor containing all that is in it , and consequently not convertible with it , as a definition ought to be : so that if this be his capping definitions ( as he calls it ) he would be much better imployed in capping verses amongst the boys , if he were able . well , but though ( according to the received sence of the word ) this be not a true , that is to say , a perfect definition of a person , yet if it be an essential predicate of one ( as we have granted ) so that every person is truly said to be rationalis naturae individua substantia , must not then three persons be three individual substances ? i answer , no : because though each person be such an individual substance , and distinctly too , yet each person is not a distinct individual substance ; for as much as one and the same infinite individual substance may sustain three distinct personalities , by reason of three distinct subsistences , or distinct ways of subsisting belonging to it ; from whence it is that in the divine oeconomy the multiplication of persons , or personal subsistences , does not multiply the divine substance . but , says he , let us see how the animadverter will bring off three persons from being three distinct substances , and i will undertake the dean shall do as much , and do it as well for three minds , p. . l. . that by his favour shall be tryed . and first the animadverter brings off the three persons from being three substances , by this one argument . that they are but three subsistences of one and the same infinite substance included in all and each of them ; and to make this out further , i shall premise this assertion , viz. that no substance is properly a subsistence , nor any subsistence properly a substance ; but differ from one another as much as an entire being and the mode of that being ; as a subject , and as an affection qualifying or determining the said subject . and let this author , with his new logick , and his no metaphysicks , prove the contrary , if he is able ; for i here challenge him to do it : in the mean time i thus argue , three distinct subsistences of one and the same infinite substance , included in all and each of them , are not three distinct substances ; but the three divine persons are three distinct subsistences of one and the same infinite substance , included in all and each of them ; and therefore the three divine persons are not three distinct substances . and this one argument i rely upon as so fully conclusive of the point to be proved , that i judge it perfectly needless to add any more . only as i have here proved the three divine persons not to be three substances , so on the other side , i prove this author's three distinct minds to be three substances , thus . three distinct absolute beings existing by themselves , so as not to exist in or depend upon any other being , as a subject , are three distinct substances . but three distinct minds are three such absolute beings , and therefore three distinct minds are three distinct substances . in which syllogism , to shew the disparity between [ minds ] and [ persons ] let the term [ three persons ] be put into the room of [ three minds ] and then the minor which is true and must be granted of [ minds ] must be denied of [ persons ] : for they are not three distinct absolute beings so existing , as was expressed in the major proposition : and therefore that argument which concludes three minds to be three substances , can never conclude three persons to be so too . and whereas the defender affirms , p. . l. . that three eternal minds are but three eternal subsistences of one and the same individual eternal mind . i answer , that it is the height of absurdity , and utterly impossible in reason and philosophy , for a mind , which is an absolute entire being existing by it self , to be the subsistence of another absolute being . for as much as subsistence is properly and formally a mode of substance , and in the divine substance or nature a relative mode too , though still implying in it the said nature as modified or determined by it . so that we see here this man's philosophy in making one mind the subsistence or modification of another mind ; and three distinct minds so many distinct subsistences or modifications of one and the same mind . which i am sure all the schools in christendome will with one voice explode . and so i leave this defender , or rather this dean in masquerade , to bring off his three distinct minds from being three distinct substances at his leisure . but i fear it will cost him a new cast of his [ meaning ] to do it : though let that be what it will , it is not any one man's meaning ( especially founded upon his ignorance ) but the universal judgment and consent of all learned men that must determine the proper and distinct sences both of substance and subsistence in this dispute . but the animadverter in proving an absolute unity , and disproving all plurality of substance in the godhead , had first strengthned his assertion with the authorities of some of the most eminent fathers positively asserting the former , and not without indignation rejecting the other . and what does this defender answer to these ? why ; he tells us , that the fathers , by denying three substances principally rejected three divers natures of different kinds or species in opposition to arianism , p. . l. . very good ; they principally rejected a plurality of specifically distinct substances ; and will this man infer from hence that they did not reject also a plurality of individual substances in the godhead ? why , yes , if he will invalidate the authorities alleged by the animadverter , he does and must do so . and accordingly he tells us , that the fathers by unity of substance here understand only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies only a specifick vnity of substance ; the fathers in opposition to arianism , designing only to disprove a specifick plurality of substance in the godhead , not a plurality of numerical distinct individuals . so that it seems they resolved , though they fell foul upon the arians , yet to do it so , as to keep fair quarter with the heathens . in answer to which , since 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imports an union of persons in such a nature , essence , or substance , as is uncapable of being numerically multiplied ( as the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essentially is , and cannot but be ) i affirm , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 irrefragably proves a numerical unity or identity of substance in the divine persons , and withal that all specifick unity in the divine nature or persons , is absurd and impossible : for i must tell this puny logician , that it is one thing to disprove a specifick diversity of the divine nature in the three persons , and quite another to prove a positive specifick vnity of the same ; which can never be done where there are not several individual natures of the same kind , to collect it from . secondly , i answer , that though the fathers in their disputes with the arians , alleged several things for the unity of the divine nature in the three persons , which strictly reached no further than to specific vnity , yet when they disputed this matter more exactly with the heathen polytheists , they rested not in this but still insisted upon , and contended for a numerical vnity of the divine nature , essence or substance , as the cathol●ck church has done ever since . and besides , the truth is , those very arguments ( or rather instances of resemblance ) brought by the fathers against the arians , though taken from things having no more than a specifick unity of nature , yet did not determinately prove either a specifick or a numerical unity of nature in the divine persons , but only an unity or sameness of nature indefinitely ; which being laid as a foundation , the peculiar condition of the divine nature quickly determined the kind of its unity , and by vertue of its infinity , proved that that vnity or sameness could be no other than numerical . and thus having answered what he has said about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the testimonies of the fathers , if he still persists in this scandalous assertion , that the fathers were only against several kinds and species of substance in the godhead and divine persons , but not against several individual and numerically distinct substances in the same ; i desire him to satisfy the world in these two things . first , how the fathers came to look upon the divine nature or essence in three distinct persons as such an amazing incomprehensible mystery ( as they still avowed it to be ) if the said nature were not more than specifically one : for that one and the same specifical nature should be in a plurality of individual persons , is no wonder at all . secondly , i desire him to satisfy the world also , why the primitive latine church with so much zeal , and for so long a time , refused the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , declaring this for the only reason of their refusal thereof , that they reckoned it to signify three substances , for they could not reckon it to signify three specifically distinct substances ; for as much as they knew , that the greek church which used the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and contended for it , had constantly , zealously , and most expresly , opposed the arians in their asserting three species of substance in the trinity , and therefore it is evident , even to a demonstration , that they were only jealous of three individual substances which they feared the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 might introduce , and so betray them into another sort of arianism , or rather gentilism , as bad as the first . these two quaeries , i say , i challenge this author to answer me in ; by making it appear , notwithstanding the foregoing particulars , that while the fathers asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one divine essence or substance , it was only a specifick not an individual vnity of the same , which they all along pleaded for . but after the fore-alleged testimonies of the fathers , the animadverter thought fit to add the modern testimony of bellarmine in those words , that to assert that the father and the son differ in substance is arianism . in reply to which he first scoffingly excepts against bellarmine's orthodoxy ( because forsooth he was a papist ) like that profound dotard who reprov'd a young student for reading clavius upon euclid , telling him , that he ought to read none but protestant mathematicks ; for surely the romish writers are as orthodox about the article of the trinity , as any protestant writers whatsoever . accordingly from these words of bellarmine the animadverter argued , that if in the trinity the father and the son were two distinct substances , for them not to differ in substance would be impossible . to which this man replies in these words ; as if ( says he ) to be distinct and to differ in substance were the same thing . no , trifler , no ; for accidents may be distinct , and modes may be distinct , which cannot differ in substance ; and the animadverter speaks not here of any sort of distinction in general , but only of the distinction of substances ; and as to that , he affirms , that for substances to be distinct , must infer them to differ in substance too . but he asks us hereupon a very wise question , are not two men ( says he ) unius substantiae , of one and the same substance , because they are two distinct men , and each of them has a distinct nature of his own ? p. . l. . i answer , that a distinct human nature is a distinct substance ; and that altho ' two men are notionally and specifically of the same substance or nature , yet really and numerically they neither are , nor can be so . but he has not done with his questions yet , but asks us , whether to differ in number , and to differ in substance and nature be the same thing ? and , whether difference in number prove a diversity of nature too ? yes , sir , a numerical diversity of individual natures or substances it does prove , tho' their specifick nature ( which is but a notion founded upon things ) be the same . and here i must tell his ignorance what it was that betray'd him to these silly questions , viz. his supposing , that there is no essential difference or no diversity of nature , but a specifick difference or diversity . whereas an essential difference , as well as an essential unity , is threefold , viz. a generical , a specifical , and a numerical ; and this last is as much and as truly an essential difference as any of the two former , or rather more so ; for the two former are properly notions existing only in the mind , tho' collected from things actually existing in nature ; but the last has no dependance upon the conception of the mind at all , but is wholly in the thing itself , whereof it is the difference . and therefore i do here tell this man , that three numerically distinct substances are three numerically distinct essences or natures ; and consequently differ from one another as three such essences or natures do . as for the complement he passes upon the animadverter , at the end of this paragraph , p. . as if he were to be taught by this man to construe the fathers : for that and sundry other of his scurrilities , i will not fail to reckon with him in due place . but after the several testimonies produc'd by the animadverter against a plurality of substances in the godhead , he proceeded to argue against the same from reason ; and what does the defender reply upon this topick ? why , says he , whereas the animadverter would prove , that the three divine persons cannot be three distinct minds , because they are not three distinct substances , the dean may safely deny the consequence , p. . at the latter end . and may he so ? i must tell him , that if the denyal of the genus does and must infer a denyal of the species ( as that which is not an animal cannot possibly be a man ) then that which proves the three persons not to be three substances , must prove them also not to be three minds : for [ substance ] respects [ mind ] as a genus does its species , and the consequence from the genus to the species negatively is unavoidable . but what then would he have the animadverter to prove ? why this , that if three minds are three intelligent persons , and a mind is a substance , therefore three distinct minds or persons are three distinct substances , p. . l. . but what illogical confused stuff is this ? however , since it affords three terms , i will cast it for him into a syllogistical form , and that will quickly shew what may be concluded in this matter , and what cannot . thus. three distinct minds are three distinct substances , but three distinct persons are three distinct minds , therefore three distinct persons are three distinct substances . the major of which syllogism has been effectually proved from the definition of a mind already : and the minor being the defender's avowed principle and assertion , can any thing conclude more plainly than this syllogism does , that according to this man's principles , the three divine persons are three distinct substances ? which is the thing that the defender here calls upon the animadverter to prove : and accordingly proved it is . but ( says he ) three distinct minds may subsist distinctly and inseparably in one eternal and infinite substance , as three intelligent persons do , ibid. to which i answer , first , that let them exist never so inseparably in one infinite substance , they are really three minds still , and can never be one individual substance or mind , but collectively . and that i am sure is neither naturally , properly , or simply one . secondly , that three minds may as well be in one infinite substance as three persons are , this is perfectly gratìs dictum , and ( according to his usual way ) a gross downright presuming the thing in dispute . for it is and has been all along absolutely denied him , and the contrary more than once proved against him , viz. that three distinct minds being three absolute entire beings , essences , or substances , can never subsist in one absolute being , essence , or substance , and that on the other side three intelligent divine persons being relative subsistences , not absolute beings , may subsist in one absolute being or substance . so that the disparity between minds and persons is manifest , and as to the present case irreconcileable . nay , and i shall add one consideration more to the same purpose , and that of no small moment , viz. that no two or more substances ( nor consequently minds or spirits ) do or can subsist inseparably ; ( which yet this man takes for granted ) but that , as they are in their own nature capable of existing by themselves , and for that reason separable , so by the absolute power of god they may be actually separated , provided his decree does not hinder : and this makes another vast disparity between minds , spirits , and substances on the one hand , and the divine persons on the other , viz. that the divine persons , from the very nature of the thing , are even by the divine power it self inseparable both from the essence which they belong to , as also from one another ; which , distinct minds can never be . but the defender adds , that the true and short answer to the animadverter's argument is , that the same substance , repeated in three distinct subsistences , is not three substances but one , p. . ibid. in answer to which he has been sufficiently told already . that the term [ repeating the divine substance or nature ] is new , odd , and unjustifiable , and such as the catholick church never made use of , and for that cause ought utterly to be condemn'd and thrown aside . but for a further answer to it , i do first affirm in general , that for the same numerical nature or substance to be repeated is impossible , and a contradiction ; repetition ( as we have shewn ) being nothing else but another production . in the second place , i deny , in particular , that there is any such thing as a repetition of the divine substance or nature in three subsistences . the said nature indeed [ is ] and [ exists ] in three subsistences , but i absolutely deny that it is repeated in them ; and it will concern this bold novellist to prove , as well as assert , that it is so . in the mean time it is no small shame and calamity to the church , that he is not called to account for such horrible innovations . but the animadverter had argued further against three distinct substances in the godhead , thus , that if the three persons are three distinct substances , then two distinct substances will concur in and belong to each person ; to wit , that substance which is the divine essence , and so is communicable or common to all the persons , and that substance which constitutes each person , and thereby is so peculiar to him , as to distinguish him from the other , and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him to whom it belongs : since for one and the same substance to be common to all three persons , and withal to belong incommunicably to each of the three , and thereby to distinguish them from one another is contradictious , and impossible . and what can this man oppose to this argument with the least shew or shaddow of reason ? what part of it does he deny ? or what term of it does he distinguish ? for the argument proceeds upon his own supposal at present , that the three persons are three distinct substances , as the animadverter had fully proved them to be before . why , all that he says , is , that he is heartily ashamed and sorry ( good man ) to see such stuff as must necessarily expose our faith to the scorn of atheists and infidels ; and therefore that he may not contribute to it , he graciously declares , that all this non-sense shall escape the lash of his pen , p. . l. . that is , according to his constant never failing way , he is then highest in noise and vapour when he is brought most to a nonplus . but i have some answers of another sort to make to this passage alleged out of him ; as first , that whatsoever his sorrow in this case may be , he will hardly convince the world that he has any shame . secondly , that to expose our holy faith to the scorn of atheists and infidels , by one's folly and nonsense , is very bad ; but that to make atheists and infidels by one's scandalous writings , and more scandalous practices , is much worse . thirdly , that nothing does , or can more expose our holy faith to the scorn of atheists and infidels , than for any one , who wears but the name of a christian , to assert three gods ; which three distinct infinite minds , spirits , or substances , upon all the principles of common reason and philosophy , certainly and undeniably are ; and withal , that there can be no non-sense comparable to the asserting three distinct absolute infinites : and fourthly and lastly , whereas he says , that all the non-sense of the foregoing argument ( as he calls every thing which he cannot answer ) shall escape the lash of his pen ; i would have this poor whipster know , that the animadverter is far from dreading the lash of that pen which never yet drew blood of any one but of priscian . and so having answered his compassionate preamble in behalf of our suffering faith ( forsooth ) we will now see what he has to say upon occasion of the animadverter's argument ( for it can be no more called an answer to it , than to that learned reply made to his hobbian vindication of his case , &c. ) and in order to this , i demand of him first , whether that one infinite common essence or substance which formally unites the divine persons together , does or can formally distinguish them also from one another ? secondly , whether ( since he utterly denies all modes as well as accidents in god ) that which distinguishes each person from the other can be any thing else but a substance ? there being nothing in nature conceievable by the mind of man , but what is either a substance , an accident , or a mode of being : and i defy this man , or any one besides , to give instance of a fourth which is none of these : and thirdly and lastly , whether each person hereupon must not either have two substances belonging to him , viz. one uniting him to , and the other distinguishing him from the rest ; or be both united and distinguished by one and the same substance common to them all ? both of which are impossible . this is the argument , though after another and more particular manner proposed , and i challenge this piece of a disputant to overthrow any one part or proposition of it by solid and clear reason ; for fooling and flounceing , and throwing out the word non-sense ( from a plentiful stock within ) will not do it . but to shew how wofully he is hampered , see what desperate assertions he advances , p. , . for the disentangling himself . and first in p. . l. . he roundly tells us , that the dean knows not any distinction between the divine essence and a divine person , but that the essence makes the person . in which words there are two as false and heterodox propositions as can well be delivered by any one professing divinity , viz. first , that there is no distinction between the divine essence or substance , and the divine persons . and secondly , that the divine essence makes the person . both of which i will distinctly examine : and first as to the first of them i affirm , that the divine essence is and cannot but be vertually and fundamentally distinguished from the persons . that is to say , it affords a reason and foundation in the thing it self sufficient for the mind to form thereupon a different conception of the divine essence , from the conception of the divine persons , by proper and metaphysical abstraction : and that so distinct , that the conceptus objectivus of one neither is nor can be the conceptus objectivus of the other . and if this distinction ( or rather distinguishableness ) should not be admitted in the divine nature and persons , as founded upon some reason in the things so distinguished , i desire this man to tell me upon what account it is , that all divines ( not excepting himself ) discourse of the divine essence as determinable , and of the divine persons as of those by whom it is determined ; and again of the divine essence as communicable , and of the divine persons ( two of them at least ) as those to whom it is communicated : for can this be done without a distinct conception of that which is to be communicated , and of those to whom the communication is to be made ? or can there be any distinction in the conception , where there is not a proportionable distinguishableness in the object ? so that upon the whole matter it appears , that nothing could be more contrary to all the principles of christian philosophy and theology , than this author's denial of all distinction ( in the sense we have given of it ) between the divine essence and persons : for without such distinction it is impossible to conceive or discourse of the said persons , as one in essence and three in subsistence . and so i pass to the examination of his other proposition , viz. that the essence makes the person . concerning which , i do with the greatest assurance appeal to all the world , whether any thing more absurd , strange , and paradoxical , was ever asserted in divinity . for how can the divine essence be conceived to make the person ? since all [ making ] must of necessity be one of these two ways , first , either by an efficient production . or secondly , by a formal constitution of a thing . for no third way besides these is assigneable . but it cannot be by the first , because it is and ever was a received maxime in theology , that the divine essence , considered absolutely in it self , neither produces , nor is produced . so that if any production or operation be ascribed to it , it must be only as it subsists in a person ( one or more ) , who is the sole proper agent , or producer in every divine act or effect ; from whence it is evident , that that which can produce nothing but as it is and operates in the person , cannot produce the person it self , which it must presuppose , before it can operate . besides , that if the essence should produce the person , it would follow that it must produce one person , as well as another , and consequently the person of the father , as well as that of the son and of the holy ghost : but if the essence should produce the person of the father , how could the father be said to be the fountain of the deity ? ( as the ancient writers term him very often ) and to be without all original , ( which is the peculiar character of his person . ) for that the deity or divine essence ( which are but two words for the same thing ) should produce the fountain of the deity , or a self-originated person , no mortal man , i believe ( this author still excepted ) can imagine . since therefore it is so insufferably absurd , to affirm , that the essence makes the person , by way of production ; let us see whether it can be said to make it the other way , viz. by a formal constitution of it . but if this be admitted , then the essence must be that by which a person is formally a person : whereupon the essence and the person being commensurate and convertible , it will follow , that if there be but one essence there can be but one person , and that if there be a plurality of persons , there must be a plurality of essences too . for the multiplication of the formal reason of any thing must of necessity multiply the thing it self of which it is so . and here i must tell this author , that as much as he disclaims the use of the term [ formal reason ] yet this very expression of his , that the essence makes the person , truly and properly , neither does nor can import any thing else , than that the essence is the formal reason thereof . and if so , let him , upon this assertion , keep off the forementioned consequence , viz. that either there are three essences , or but one person , if he can . but after all , finding himself pinch'd still harder and harder , and not well knowing which way to turn himself , at length he cries out , it is an amazing thing to think what strange conceits this man ( viz. the animadverter ) must have of a trinity of persons , and vnity of essence or substance , p. . l. . to relieve him from which transport , if this defender , instead of looking into the fathers , ( which he so often mentions ) will be pleas'd to read them , he shall find this amazing conceit or notion of the trinity ( as he calls it ) fully and frequently express'd by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the greek fathers , and in the latin fathers , councils , schoolmen , and other divines popish and protestant , by the vna essentia , and the tres subsistentiae , or modi subsistendi . that is to say , by three distinct modes of subsisting , or three subsistences of one and the same infinite essence or substance included in all and each of them . this is the animadverter's notion of one divine essence , and three divine persons ( as this man has been more than once told ) : and the authorities producible for it , and in a great measure produc'd already in the animadversions , might ( one would think ) have serv'd to cure that amazement , or rather st●por , which this author upon this account has been so deeply seiz'd with . on the contrary , such a notion of the trinity as makes the divine nature or essence a person , and the three divine persons to be three distinct minds or spirits , and consequently three distinct essences , natures , or substances , is matter of much greater amazement and abhorrence too , to all that are concern'd for the faith which they were baptiz'd into ; and moreover , for any one to assert three infinit● minds , and yet to pretend not to assert three gods , is yet more amazing than the former ; and lastly , for such scandalous assertions to wear the stamp of publick licence and authority , and the shameless author of them to be endur'd , and not only so , but to be also under such circumstances in the church of england , is to all sober and pious minds more amazing , monstrous , and astonishing than all his detestable heresies put together . but to draw to a close of this argument against his three infinite minds , from a necessity of asserting three substances in the godhead , as unavoidably consequent thereupon ; i find this author utterly at a loss where to fix , and by no means consistent with himself ; as sometimes denying , and sometimes allowing his three minds to be three substances . his denyal of it appears in these words : let the animadverter ( says he ) bring off three persons from being three substances , and the d●●● will undertake to bring off his three minds from being so as well ; p. . l. . on the contrary , if this author does not allow of three substances in the trinity ; why does he interpret the places alledg'd by the animadverte● out of the fathers for an vnity of substance in the divine nature and persons , only of a specifick vnity of substance ? for that , all know , is fully consistent with a plurality of individual substances , which a numerical vnity of substance ( would he stick to that ) neither is nor can be . to which he adds , that no man can have any idea of divine persons , which are not substances ; p. . l. . but foul and impudent self-contradiction is his constant practice from first to last ; and therefore without pursuing him any further , i shall conclude all with that testimony of faustinus , an eminent divine in the fourth century , and one of those who scrupl'd the use of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for fear of being brought thereby to admit of three substances in the godhead , and those not specifically but only numerically distinct : as appears from the following passage at the end of the confession of hi● faith , entituled , faustini presbyteri fides , and exhibited by him to the emperor theodosius . miramur ( says he ) illos catholicos probari posse , qui patris & fili● & spiritûs sancti tres substantias confitentur ; nam , etsi dicunt , non se credere filium dei aut spiritum sanctum creaturam , tamen contra fidem sentiunt cum dicunt tres esse substantias : consequens est enim , ut tres deos consiteantur qui tres substantias confitentur ▪ quam vocem catholici semper execr●ti sunt . i know faustinus wa● mistaken in reckoning hypostasis and substantia ●o● terms of the same signification ; but his argument founded thereupon is certainly so clear a proof of the church's disowning three substances in the blessed trinity , that a clearer cannot possibly be : and yet this audacious man , at this time of the day , with his three infinite minds or spirits , ( which are undeniably three substances ) is new dressing and setting up that odious tritheism , which the primitive christians so highly abhorr'd , and so zealously declar'd against . sad therefore at this time must needs be the state , and woful the circumstances of our poor church of england ( once so deservedly reputed the noblest and best reform'd part of the catholick ) to have the pest and poyson of such an heresie fretting in her very bowels ; and to be forced to endure what at the same time i am sure she heartily does and cannot but deplore . and so i come to canvase his answer to the animadverter's ▪ third argument , which proceeds thus : if it be truly said , that one and the same infinite mind or spirit is father , son , and holy ghost , ( i mean all three taken together ) and it cannot be truly said , that one and the same infinite mind or spirit is three distinct infinite minds or spirits ; then it follows , that father , son , and holy ghost are not three distinct infinite minds or spirits . " but it may be truly said , &c. this is the argument . in the defender's reply to which , these two things are to be consider'd : . the representation he makes of the argument ; and , . the answer he gives to it . as to the first of which he tells us , that the whole of the argument is this , that one infinite mind cannot be three infinite minds , nor three infinite minds one infinite mind ; and that three infinite persons , who are one infinite mind , cannot be three infinite minds : p. . l. . now supposing this to be the whole argument ( as confusedly and brokenly , according to his known talent in logick , he repeats it ) i demand of this man , which of all these propositions he can charge with want of sence ? nay , i confidently appeal to all the reason and common sence of mankind , whether there can be in nature a clearer and more self-evident proposition than this ; that one and the same infinite mind is not three distinct infinite minds ; or , ( as even this defender has curtail'd it ) that one infinite mind cannot be three infinite minds ? and if so , let the ingenuous reader judge , whether this huff's crying out want of sence could proceed from any thing but extream want of shame . but if in repeating the argument he strips it of its proper sence , nay , and of its principal terms , and thereby makes it so far his own , surely the animadverter is not responsible for that . for he adds , that the whole force of his argument lies in the meer opposition between three and , one , which is childish sophistry ; p. . l. . but will this man say , that these two propositions [ three cannot be one ] and [ three infinite minds cannot be one infinite mind ] are the same ? for , do not the very words of the latter proposition declare , that the animadverter founds not his argument upon the bare numeral diversity or opposition , which is between one and three , but upon the peculiar nature and condition of the subject to which this numeral difference is apply'd ? for it is not any instance whatsoever , but only this particular instance of [ infinite mind and minds ] which the animadverter here argues from . and certainly , there is a vast difference ( whether this man perceives it or no ) between barely saying [ that three cannot be one ] and [ that three distinct infinite minds cannot be one infinite mind ] : for , suppose a man should say , [ that three gods cannot be one god , nor one god three gods ] ( since whatsoever may be said or deny'd of [ infinite mind ] may be equally said or deny'd of [ god ] ) will this man now say , that the whole force of the said propositions lyes in a meer opposition between the terms [ three and one ] ? and consequently , that all that can be concluded from them , is but childish sophistry ? but to relieve his ignorance , and to correct his prophaneness , i would have him take notice , that the force of the animadverter's argument consists in this , that he argues from an infinite absolute being , which , as such , and in the very nature or essence of it , is on the one side uncapable of all multiplication of it self , and on the other as uncapable of any essential vnity or vnion upon supposal of such a multiplication . this , i say , his argument manifestly rests upon , and not upon those thin , pittiful terms of [ three and one ] and [ one and three ] . and therefore none surely would have dared thus in the face of the world , and even in spight of self-evidence , and common sense it self , to have called such propositions childish sophistry , but one who had a brow of brass , and a face never made to blush . but to pass from his shameless representation of the argument to his senceless answer to it , he tells us , that if this proposition or rule , viz. that three cannot be one nor one three , be universally true , then there is an end of the trinity , p. . l. . to which i answer , that the forementioned proposition is neither vniversally true , nor vniversally ▪ false ( nor ever affirmed so by the animadverter ) but true in some respects , and false in many others , viz. according to the different nature of the subjects , which it is applied to . as for instance , it is everlastingly true where the unity and plurality is in the same kind . and for that reason three infinite minds can be no more one infinite mind than the three divine persons can be one person ; for in either of these instances the unity and diversity is in eodem genere : viz. in genere mentis in the former , in genere personae in the latter ; and consequently in both impossible . and therefore , as for that inference , upon which his whole answer relies , viz. that if it be no contradiction for three to be one in several respects , then it is no contradiction for three infinite minds to be one mind , p. . l. . i must tell this anti-logician , that he concludes from a particular proposition instead of an universal ; and not only so , but from a particular instance of one kind to a particular instance of another : his argument amounting to no more than this , that because it is no contradiction for three to be one upon different accounts in some cases , therefore neither is it so in the case of three minds . but this , by his favour will never follow . for though it be no contradiction in some instances ( as particularly in that of three subsistences in one essence , or of three relations or respects so concurring in any one thing as to be all predicable of it ) yet this does not hold in all instances , nor in any indifferently , nor particularly in this of three minds ; for as much as no respect whatsoever can make three minds to be essentially one mind , nor three spirits to be one spirit , nor three substances one substance , and the like ; and it would be a contradiction for them so to be . but according to this author's hypothesis , we have here a trinity and vnity of natures , that is to say , three distinct natures one in nature , three distinct substances one in substance , and three distinct spirits one spirit ; and all this only by vertue of several respects ; whereas no bare diversity , either of respects or actions , can give or cause a diversity of nature or essence in the substances they belong to , and issue from ; howsoever in some instances it may prove or infer the same . and therefore , since it has been abundantly proved , that the terms [ god ] and [ infinite mind ] are so perfectly equipollent , that whatsoever may be affirmed , or denied of the one , must be equally affirmed or denied of the other , i challenge this author to give the world a solid reason , why in different respects three gods may not be one god , as well as in the said respects , three infinite minds may be one infinite mind ? and particularly why mutual consciousness may not unite several gods into one , as well as several infinite minds into one , ( were there several gods to be so united ) ? and i will undertake to prove ( and have indeed more than sufficiently proved already ) that there are and must be as many gods as there are infinite minds . but , as for his old outworn implement mutual consciousness , which is the only vinculum he assigns , to make his three infinite minds essentially one ; it has been shewn , that supposing it ( as this author does ) to proceed from three distinct minds , it cannot be one act , but three distinct acts ; which therefore can never make three essences ( as the three minds are , from which the said acts must proceed ) to be essentially one . besides , that if this mutual consciousness were but one single act , yet being , as such , postnate to the essence from which it flows , it can never give original unity to it . i conclude therefore , that the three divine persons can in no respect whatsoever be three infinite minds any more than three gods. for this very man affirms , in terminis , that infinite mind or spirit is the divine nature or essence it self ( and that even in contradistinction to any of the divine attributes ) p. . l. . and if so , then three infinite minds are three divine natures or essences , and three divine natures are three godheads , and three godheads are three gods : only under a different way of expression . all which is so very plain , yea so flagrantly , so self-evidently plain , that to dispute any longer with him upon this subject , would be but like disputing with one , who denies that the snow is white , or that there is any such thing as motion , even while he himself is walking about the room . and thus having shook in pieces his crazy impertinent answer to the animadverter's third argument ; when i look back upon that shrewd remark of his , with which he begins the said answer , viz. that logick is a very troublesome thing when men want sense , p. . l. . i must confess , that he here speaks like a man who understands himself , and that having so often shewn , how troublesome a thing logick is to him , by his being so angry with it , he now gives us a very satisfactory reason why it is so ; and therefore in requital of it , i cannot but tell him , that , if logick without sense be so troublesome , confidence without either logi●k , or sense , or truth , or shame , or so much as conscience of what one says or denies , is intolerable . and so i am at length come to the fourth and concluding argument which is taken from the form of the athanasian creed , and runs thus . whatsoever attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the divine persons in the athanasian form , so belongs to them all in common , that it can belong to none of them under any term of distinction from the rest . but the attribute [ infinite mind or spirit ] may be truly predicated of all and each of the divine persons , in and according to the athanasian form. and therefore it can belong to none of them under any term of distinction from the rest . and what has our defender now to oppose to this argument ? why , first , according to his usual way of giving a dull scoff , instead of a rational answer , he calls it a wonderful argument ; and i confess it may well be so to him , since wonder generally springs from ignorance . but let us hear what the oracle says ; and here we have him telling us , that infinite mind or spirit is no [ attribute ] but the divine nature or essence it self , and that the metaphysical animadverter uses to distinguish between essence and attributes in god , def. p. . l. . in answer to which , the metaphysical animadverter would have the illogical defender know , that , what metaphysically taken is properly the subject of the divine attributes , and upon that account stands distinguished from them ( as the divine essence or nature so taken does ) may yet , logically considered , be it self an attribute , as it obtains the place of a predicate joined with a subject in a proposition . and therefore to that senceless question of his , is god an attribute ? i answer , that in a logical sense god may be so : for as much as god may be truly and properly predicated of each of the divine persons . and i would have this poor capechumen in logick take notice , that whatsoever stands predicate in any proposition , so as to be affirmed of another thing , as of a subject , that is logically an attribute . and therefore , though the term [ god ] metaphysically taken ( as we have shewn ) be not an attribute , ( which imports only some particular perfection of the divine nature ) but the subject of all such attributes ; yet in these propositions , the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god , it is a logical attritube in every one of them ; and let him champ upon this , till he breaks his teeth upon it , if he pleases . but as men sometimes in a drunken fit cry out fire , fire , not from what they see without them , but from what they feel within : so this man , out of an internal plenitude of ignorance , cries out here in most tragical manner , what will this animadverter make of god at last , when the divine essence is an attribute , and a divine person a mere mode ? p. . l. . in answer to which , as it has been sufficiently explaiend , how the animadverter makes the divine essence concretely expressed by the term [ god ] an attribute , so if this defender will say further , that he makes a divine person a mere mode ; i do here challenge him to point out that place in the animadversions where the animadverter says so . he has indeed over and over declared ( and that without shuffling from his words to his meaning ) that he holds a divine person to be properly the divine nature under such a certain mode of subsistence ; or in other terms such a certain mode of subsistence of the divine nature still including the said nature in it . this , i say , the animadverter all along holds and asserts ; and if this man calls this the making a divine person a meer mode ( as it is a gross and direct falshood , and utterly disowned by his adversary ) so , should i take the liberty of calling things by their own proper names , it might justly entitle him to a very coarse one . now the proposition from first to last , asserted by this author is this , that the three divine persons are three distinct infinite minds or spirits , which the animadverter affirmed to be contrary to the athanasian creed ( as he shewed by casting it into the same form ) and consequently , that if the said form were a true way of reasoning concerning the divine nature and persons , this proposition ought to be rejected as utterly inconsistent with it . and how does our author counter-argue this ? why ; why by running out into an impertinent proof , that [ infinite mind ] belongs distinctly to the three divine persons , and consequently may be distinctly predicated of each of them . both which are as easily granted him , as they can be alleged by him . but by his favour , the question here is not , whether each of the divine persons be distinctly an infinite mind , but whether each of them be a distinct infinite mind , which this defender affirms , and that so positively , that he lays the whole stress of his hypothesis upon it in these remarkable words . that if every person in the trinity , considered as a distinct person , be not a distinct infinite and eternal mind , there is an end of the dean's notion , def. p. . at the end . and the animadverter on the other side , as positively denies each of the divine persons to be a distinct infinite mind ; or that the term [ distinct infinite mind ] can be truly predicated of , or belong to any of the persons of the blessed trinity . and therefore for the clearing of this matter ( and that even to this man's understanding , if possible ) we must always distinguish between attributing a distinct thing to each distinct person , and between attributing a thing distinctly to the said person . for there is a vast difference between these two ; and yet this author perpetually confounds them , and still from the latter infers the former : which is a manifest paralogism à dicto secundùm quid ad dictum simpliciter , viz. to conclude absolutely a diverse or distinct thing from a diverse or distinct mode of a thing . as for instance , omnipotence belongs to each of the divine persons distinctly , but that does not prove , that there is a distinct omnipotence belonging to each of them , but only one and the same omnipotence belonging to the three persons , according to three distinct ways ; and what i have said of omnipotence holds equally in omniscience , or infinite intelligence , and in all the essential divine attributes besides . for a thing 's belonging distinctly to the three divine persons , distinctly considered , imports no more , but that it belongs , after a distinct manner , to each of them so considered , which one and the same infinite being , may , without any multiplication of it self , very well do . but , says our author , the athanasian form does not forbid us to attribute to each distinct person what is common to all three , for it does it expresly , by affirming , that the father is vncreate , the son vncreate , and the holy ghost vncreate , p. . l. . in which words , as by the term [ vncreate ] i affirm ought to be understood an vncreate being or essence ; so i readily grant , that father , son , and holy ghost , distinctly considered , are each of them an vncreate being , but for all that shall never grant each of them to be a distinct vncreate being ; but utterly deny , that the father is a distinct vncreate being , the son a distinct vncreate being , and the holy ghost a distinct vncreate being ; as being all of them propositions absolutely false , and founded upon this perpetual blunder , that he shifts the term [ distinct ] from the subject to the predicate ; still arguing thus , that because every distinct person distinctly considered is an infinite mind , therefore every such person so considered is a distinct infinite mind . which no logick , or rule of consequence , will or can infer . and therefore , whereas he makes the animadverter give this as the reason of the athanasian predication , that what is common to all three persons does not distinctly belong to each , def. p. . l. . i must tell him , that it is false . for the animadverter affirms the same nature which is common to all the persons , to belong distinctly to each person : but nevertheless denies , that , in the same respect in which it is common to all , it does or can belong distinctly to any one . for it belongs to all as an essence or being absolutely considered ; but it belongs distinctly to each person , according to a distinct way , or mode of subsisting , which the said being or essence has in each person : and consequently , since the same divine essence or being has three distinct ways of subsisting , it does , according to each of them , belong distinctly to each person ; yet still ( as i said before ) not as a distinct being or essence in any person . and whereas this man states the reason of the athanasian form upon this , that the divine perfections distinctly existing in the divine persons , are so inseparably united , as to be essentially one , p. . l. . that is still trumping the same old petitio principii upon the reader , for it is still positively denied him ( and will be so for ever ) that an inseparable vnion of three distinct infinite minds ( were such an vnion possible ) can make the said minds essentially one . since it is not so much as possible to conceive them to be three distinct minds without conceiving them also to be three particular distinct essences , and surely three distinct essences can never be essentially one . besides , that he has been told , that no substances can be so vnited , as to be inseparable by god's absolute power ; and therefore as for that precarious conclusion , in which he says , that the dean has not transgressed the athanasian form , by asserting three distinct infinite minds , if we understand by them three infinite intelligent persons , p. . l. . i answer , that since it is impossibble for three infinite minds ( which by their very essence are three absolute beings ) to be three relative subsistences of one and the same infinite mind included in all and each of them , ( which the three divine persons are ) it is evident , that he has transgressed , and ( as much as in him lay ) overthrown the athanasian form , and that it is impossible for all the wit of man to reconcile three distinct infinite minds to the said form. besides , that it is manifest , that notwithstanding , he says , that by three infinite minds , he means three infinite intelligent persons , he yet discourses of them all along so , that vice versâ , it is evident , that by these three infinite intelligent persons , he means no other than three infinite minds : for if each of these infinite intelligent persons be a distinct infinite mind ( as this author has positively affirmed ) i leave it to the judgment of any one who can tell three , whether three distinct infinite intelligent persons be not three distinct infinite minds ; so that he is still but where he was , and all that he has said is nothing but dodging and shewing tricks . in fine , it is extreamly in vain to dispute any longer wi●● a man who has not a clear or true conception of any one thing or term belonging to the subject here disputed upon ; and therefore i shall add no more upon this argument , but shut up all with the following passage out of the first of those two latine tracts inserted into the second tome of athanasius's works , and entituled de unitâ deitate trinitatis ad theophilum , p. . colon. edit . cur pater spiritus dicitur , & filius spiritus nuncupatur , & spiritus sanctus spiritus appellatur ? ad haec respondetur , an ignoras , quia pater unus deus est , filius unus deus , & spiritus sanctus vnus deus est , dum unitum nomen sit in naturâ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; sic & vnus spiritus est , quia unita est dei●as eorum ? nam si tu per singula nomina personarum vnitum nomen spiritus ter designâsti , nunquid tres spiritus dicere oportebat ? absit . which testimony i think as plain and full against this author's three spirits or minds , as words can well express a thing . the author ( whosoever he was ) seems to have lived since the eutychian heresy , and may be placed about the seventh century . and so i take my leave of the dean's three distinct infinite minds , spirits , or substances , that is to say , of his three gods ; and having done this , methinks i see him go whimpering away , with his finger in his eye , and that complaint of micah in his mouth , iudg. . . ye have taken away my gods which i made , and what have i more ? though , i must confess , i cannot tell , why he should be so fond of them , since i dare undertake , that he will never be able to bring the christian world either to believe in , or to worship a trinity of gods : nor do i see what use they are like to be of , even to himself , unless peradventure to swear by . and so i have examined and gone over all this author's exceptions against the animadverter's arguments , and that with all the particularity and impartiality that it was possible to examine any writing with ; and upon a survey of what has been said on either side , i cannot perceive , but that the animadverter's arguments stand just as they did before ; unless possibly something firmer , for this author's attempts to shake them . for , upon the whole matter , i must profess , that i never met with a weaker , and a lamer defence of any hypothesis whatsoever . but he threatens the animadverter with an answer to the testimonies alleged by him out of the fathers , and others , def. p. . l. . and i have heard that learned person mentioned , who is generally supposed to be imployed by this author to do that for him , which he cannot do for himself ; though i reckon him to be one of too much judgment , as well as learning , to appear in the world , both as veterum vindicator , and novatorum vindicator too . in the mean time , as for those blasphemous passages extracted out of this author's book of the knowledge of iesus christ , and charged by the animadverter upon him in his preface , the animadverter continues and persists in the same charge still ; nor does he find , that this author has at all cleared himself from it , in the defence of that book here mentioned by him ; p. . nor are the said lewd passages ( as he pretends ) proposed there by him as objections to be answered , but as his own vile descants upon the received doctrine of the church , about some of the most important points of christianity . besides , that what is said , in the preface , upon this subject , makes but a small part of the said preface ▪ so that if he should attempt to answer it ( which he has too much wit in his anger , to do ) it would be but like this pittiful little scrap of an answer published by him against the animadversions themselves . but still , after all , the blasphemies there placed to his account are so very foul and flagrant , that none but he , who uttered them , can pretend to defend them : and the whole plea , which he or any of his partisans , ever yet did or could pretend to make for them , was that he uttered them in the person of dr. owen , and as the results of his opinion . but since he could never so much as pretend them to be dr. owen's words , nor yet prove them to be the certain consequent of his assertions , the blasphemy is , and must be his , who formed and uttered those diabolical expressions . for suppose a mahumetan should single out some passages of st. paul's epistles , and descant upon them , and affix an impious and blasphemous sense to them , and being reproved for his blasphemy and impiety , should allege in his defence , that he spoke them in st. paul's person , and as the genuine result of st. paul's writings , i desire to know of this man and his absurd favourers , whether the charge of blasphemy ought to lye against st. paul , or against the mahumetan ? the case is exactly the same as to the thing it self ; abating for the disparity of the persons , viz. of an inspired apostle , and of any the most learned modern doctor whatsoever . and therefore i do here charge him afresh as guilty of all those blasphemies set down in that preface , nor has he in the defence of that wretched book answered any one of them , saving that at the latter end of it , viz. p. . l. . of his defence of the discourse concerning the knowledge of iesus christ , he seems to knock under board , and to own that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 due to the discoursing of things sacred , be the case what it will : which apology declares , that , even by his own confession , he had treated of these things in a most scandalous unbecoming manner ; as in truth he did , and not only so , but ( whosoever set him upon it ) in a most profane , and devillish way too : so that whereas he here says , that he had by that answer silenced his adversaries , so that he heard from them no more , def. p. . l. . i must tell him , that some silence their adversaries , because they cannot be answered by them , and some because they are not thought worth the answering ; which was this author's case here . for his adversaries ( as inconsiderable as they were ) having effectually baffled and overthrown his whole book , and broken the strength and sinews of it ( if it had any ) , little concerned themselves at any insignificant replies , he did or could afterwards make , though never so many ; but were willing to let him have the last word ; considering , that , as rector of billingsgate at that time , he might claim it by his place . but the following instruction to his friend is certainly very diverting , def. p. . at the end , in these words , where the animadverter ( says he ) charges the dean with absurdities and contradictions , turn to the place , and read it with it 's context , and tell me what you cannot answer , and i will : to which he should have done well to have added , if i can . but the whole passage is just as if he had said , sir , if you find not absurdities and contradictions enough in my book to satisfy your curiosity that way , pray come to the fountain head , and consult me , and you shall be sure of a more plentiful supply . but he goes on . if you or any body else ( says he ) can be perswaded by the animadverter , that the dean understands neither english , latin or greek , logicks , metaphysicks , &c. i need wish you no other punishment , than , when ever you write , to fall into the hands of such an adversary , p. . l. . in answer to which i am bid only to tell him , that touching his qualifications as to the forementioned respects , the animadverter is perfectly of the same mind which he was of , when he wrote the ninth and tenth chapters of the animadversions ; but thinks it not worth his while to use many arguments to perswade the reader to be of the same opinion , but only refers him to two irrefragable ones , viz. his own two eyes to convince him . in the mean time it may be some diversion to him to observe how , that because most parts of philosophy , viz. physicks , metaphysicks , mathematicks , ethicks , politicks , &c. are always expressed plurally , therefore this author very wisely expresses logick so too , calling it logicks , def. p. . l. . which i dare say no scholar ever called so before ; and in my poor judgment he might have forborn to speak of logicks in the plural , till he had better understood one . but 't is evident that he knew no better , and we must not expect that any one should speak better than he knows . but since he is such a grand exemplar of pride and disdain towards all whom he ever wrote against ; that he may not however lie too open to them , when they turn upon him again ( as , in all likelyhood , the way being now opened to them , they will ) i would advise him in time ( though i confess it is something with the latest ) to procure himself some good honest systems in all the forementioned sorts of learning ( adding ( to use his own dialect ) grammaticks withal ; ) since i would not direct him to books too much above his reach at first . and when he has once got them about him , i would have him ply them hard , assuring himself ( which all know , though scarce any one is so much his friend as to tell him so ) that he has a great deal more need of studying , than the world has or can have of his writing . nevertheless , if writing be so absolutely necessary to him , that his health requires it , and that nature cannot be at ease , nor enjoy it self , unless the scripturient humour has sometimes vent by throwing it self off into paper ; let him , at least , make choice of proper subjects , and forbearing all controversial discourses about christ's satisfaction , god's punitive iustice , and the trinity ( which he was never cut out for ) let him rather jog on in the old beaten track of church communion , and of death and iudgment , and upon these and such like heads , ( the two last especially ) he may continue on , writing and printing , and printing and writing ( and the world never the wiser for either ) even till his subject overtakes him . i have now gone through his whole defence , and having done so , cannot but think it very proper , and equally for the reader 's satisfaction , to lay before him a brief scheme or analysis of it , together with those pittiful mean ways and methods by which ( with much ado ) it has been patched up and put together ; that so he may see what a kind of antagonist the animadverter has had to deal with , and that in these following particulars . as first , that ( for the better salving of his credit ) he imposes his book upon the world , under the specious but false title of an answer to the animadversions ; whereas it is but a very small part of that discourse which he attempts to answer , passing over the main body of it , without answering , examining , or so much as medling with it at all . secondly , that he boldly and positively denies several things in this book , which he had as positively affirmed before . for which , compare what he had said of the term [ substance ] in his vindication , with what he says of it in this his defense . in the former he explodes it from all our discourses of god ; for that , as he affirms , the mind of man cannot form any conception of substance , either without matter , or without a beginning , ( upon which score i am sure it cannot be applicable to god ) vind. p. . l. . and . l. . and yet here in this book he allows of it in our discourses of god as a term not only very good , but vseful and necessary , def. p. . l. . which two let the reason of all mankind reconcile , if it can . likewise for [ subsistence ] compare what he says for the utter rejection of this term from all discourses about the trinity , vind. p. . line the last , and . line the first , with what he says in behalf of it in this defense , p. . l. . affirming , that there could not be a more proper word used to express an vnity in trinity by : but all instances of this kind falling under the head of self-contradiction , i pretend not to arithmetick enough to number them . thirdly , that when he finds himself overborn by an argument , he flyes off , and quite alters the state of the question , and in the room of that term which he finds indefensible , he presently substitutes another . as instead of the act of self-consciousness , which he had so frequently , and so expressly made use of , and insisted upon , he puts the principle of the said act , def. p. . l. . fourthly , that he takes shelter in several fallacious expressions , which being once stripped of their ambiguity by distinctions duly applyed , leave the thing , they would prove , in the lurch , and vanish into nothing ; such as for instance , amongst many others , is his insisting upon a substantial trinity in opposition to such a one , as admits of no greater than a modal distinction between the divine persons : by which , if he means , that the said three persons , are three distinct substances , it is false , but if he means that they are three substantial persons , so called from one and the same infinite substance common to them all , and subsisting differently in each of them , it is true , and every one grants such a substantial trinity ; but this makes nothing at all for his hypothesis : the argument resting wholly upon the ambiguity of the term substantial . fifthly , that finding some of the chief notions , which he built his whole hypothesis upon , quite baffl'd , and by none of his palliating tricks to be justified , he fairly quits and gives them up , and thereby ( whether he will or no ) absolutely yields the point in debate to his adversary . see this grosly exemplified in his notion of mutual consciousness ( which frequently comes in my way ) made by him at first the reason of the essential vnity of the divine persons , and afterwards allow'd by him to be no more than the result and consequent of the said unity . defence , p. . l. . sixthly , that when he is nonplus'd in any proposition taken and understood according to the universally receiv'd sense of the words of it , he presently strikes off from thence to his meaning , and tells the reader , that he , for his part , means quite another thing by it . see his def. p. . l. . these , i say , are some of those arts and shifts with which he all-along encounters the animadverter ; but shifts , by his favour , will neither pass for arguments , nor yet for answers to them , any more than shuffling the cards can be reckon'd winning the game . but because his chief engine of all , and which he makes most use of , is his frequent allegation of his meaning , in opposition to his plain express assertions , i think it not amiss to illustrate it by some examples . thus for instance . . when he says , that we know the nature of a body , vind. p. . l. . his meaning is , that we know the nature of nothing in the world. vindic. p. . l. . . when he says , that a person and an intelligent substance are reciprocal terms , vind. p. . l. . his meaning is , that a beast or brute , which is not an intelligent being , is and may be called a person . vindic. p. . l. . . when he says , that susistence ( and the like terms reckon'd up by him ) serve only to perplex and confound mens notions about the trinity ; vindic. p. . l : the last , & . l. . his shameless meaning ( as we have shewn ) p. . l. . of his def. is , that there could not have been a more proper word thought on to represent the trinity by , than three subsistences in one individual nature . . when he says , a trinity in vnity is a venerable mystery , and that there may be a great deal more in it , than we can fathom , vind. p. . l. , . his meaning is , that it is a plain , easie , and intelligible notion , ( as explain'd by him ) and such as gives a plain solution of all the difficulties and seeming contradictions in the doctrine of the said article . vind. p. . l. , . . when he professes to explain the mysterious vnion between the eternal father and the son by the vnity of a spirit , as the best way of explaining it , def. p. . l. . his meaning in the same def. from p. . to p. . is , that the said mysterious vnion is best explain'd by a man , and his living image : though neither of them is a spirit . and i suppose that that which is not a spirit can neither have the vnity of a spirit belonging to it . . when he makes self-consciousness the reason of personality , personal vnity and distinction in each of the divine persons , and mutual consciousness the reason of their essential vnity , ( as we have shewn he does ) his meaning is , that self-consciousness and mutual consciousness do only suppose , result from , prove and inferr the said distinction upon the former account , and the said vnity upon the latter . that is to say , when he speaks of a cause or antecedent , he always means an effect or consequent . and i need not quote page and line for this , having quoted them so often before . . when he speaks of an infinite mind , and of three infinite minds , ( as he does very often ) he tells us , that by mind he means a person , def. p. . l. . though [ mind ] and [ person ] are terms quite differing from one-another , both in signification and definition , and accordingly are , and ever have been so used . . when he says , that not to allow the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds or spirits , is heresie and nonsense , ( as he affirms in words equally express and impudent ) he tells us , his meaning is , that it is heresie and nonsence to assert three persons , who are not three distinct intelligent persons , def. p. . l. . which , i dare say , no man alive ever asserted , or any man of sence ever imagin'd ; any more , than any one ever asserted peter , and iames , and iohn to be three men , and yet deny'd them to be three rational creatures . but an impudent copy-monger will venture to say something , though in defiance of sence , and in spight of nonsence too . . when he calls a man a person , ( as he often does in his writings ) his meaning is , not that the man , but that the soul is the person , and the body the vital instrument of the soul ; and that neither soul nor body are parts of the person . nor is this soveraign thing of use only in matters of argument and dispute , but also in matters of a very different nature . as for example . st , when a known writer publish'd some queries against the commission and commissioners for making alterations in our liturgy , severely reflecting upon both ; his [ meaning ] was , only to inform the world what excellent persons ( as he styles them ) they were , who so ( zealously ) design'd and promoted the said alterations . see an apology , &c. p. . l. . dly , when a certain divine told an irish bishop ( as was hinted before in the animadversions , p. . l. . edit . . ) that he would be crucified before he would take the new oath to k. w. and q. m. his [ meaning ] was , that he resolv'd to take it , and accordingly did so . dly , and lastly , when one ( very well acquainted with the former ) said , that those very hands of his should restore king james , but that they were tyed up from writing . his meaning was , that those hands should write answers to king iames's declaration . by all which we see the strange and wonderful force of a skilful mannaged meaning , as having certainly something of enchantment or spell in it . for it is proof against all impressions : and no argument can pierce , or so much as reach it , but it absolutely renders the person , who carries it about him , invulnerable , and by consequence invincible . and therefore whereas this author in his defense , p. . l. . prescribes some rules to the animadverter , in case he should think fit to try his skill again upon this subject ( which words seem to ●ound very much like a challenge . ) i must tell him , that the animadverter ever yet took him for as easy a combatant as heart could wish , and bids me acquaint him further , that he shall be readier to engage in a controversial duel with him , than with any man alive , provided , that he does not bring his meaning for his second . but it is now time to discharge the debt i brought my self under , and to account with this author ( in some measure at least ) for the scurrilities which he had so freely bestowed upon the animadverter . but before i enter upon so just , and ( as i think ) so requisite a work , i cannot but solemnly declare , that nothing seems to me so strange , amazing and unaccountable , as that there should be so much as one mouth opened , either for this man , or against the animadverter , by way of complaint , as if too much sharpness had been used by one against the other . for did the animadverter appear against this man as the aggressor , or rather as the vindicator of so many excellent persons whom he had trampled upon with the utmost insolence and contempt ? for i challenge the most zealous and partial of his friends , to shew me that man , whom he ever wrote against , and did not treat in this manner . nor is his conversation ( by what i can hear ) at all less provoking and insulting than his pen ; so that very slavish animals certainly they must needs be , who can frame themselves to endure either . but what would these abject creatures have ? would they have the whole world lye down as often as this man writes a book ? and all mankind suffer themselves to be aspersed as long as his everlasting diabetical quill shall be disposed to drop pamphlets ? this is very hard upon my word : for his pen scarce ever lies still for four months together , but that its old laxe returns upon it afresh , and then so much paper is sure to be fouled , and many a worthy and good name besides . but perhaps these men would have the animadverter come cringing to his deanship , as the socinian considerer has done , whom i find with the most unparallelled humility , or rather prostration of carriage ( that i ever met with in a man of parts and spirit ) in lowly manner kissing his reverend feet , for having so scornfully kicked and trod upon him and his party , and swallowing all the foul stuff which he had with such insufferable contumely spit upon them ; as if it had not been enough for him tamely to bear his base reproaches , but that he must also requite him with panegyricks and commendations . but i shall pay my devoirs to this gentleman again presently . in the mean time i can assure him , and the whole world , that the animadverter is quite of another temper , and accordingly does here by me solemnly declare , that whatsoever he has born or may bear from others , he is resolved not to take the least affront at this man's hands , but will be sure to repay him to his face . and this is all the apology that shall be made for any sharpness used either in the animadversions themselves , or in this vindication of them . and so i proceed to animadvert upon his scurrilities , which i shall do in such order as i think fit , since the reader shall be sure to have the several places faithfully pointed out to him , which i intend to remark upon . and here i shall direct him , first , to that remarkable passage in this defence , p. . at the end . the animadverter ( says he ) is a notable man , if he can draw you into a school-question , for he can make a shift to read and transcribe , but he hates an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - men at his heart , which is none of his talent , for it requires thinking . concerning which , i desire the impartial and ingenuous reader to judge , whether it be possible for the tongue or pen of man to utter any thing more opprobrious . and therefore if the byassed and malicious part of the world will not excuse me , they must give me leave to excuse my self , if i answer this libeller as he deserves . and here in the first place i require him in the animadverter's name and behalf to declare and assign that writer from whom the animadverter even transcribed any thing , unless by way of quotation ; though , i must confess , that i cannot return upon him this charge of transcribing from any schoolman , or other ominent greek or latine writer , since , i dare swear , he never quoted any such , but from those who had first quoted them to his hands . but must the animadverter then pass for a transcriber ? what will this man make of him ? will he make him write cases of allegiance , and borrow his arguments out of a letter from a * friend ? which a certain person in the world has been as good at , as he can be at writing letters to a friend . but what is this his boasted of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 after all ? why , even this one poor greek word , which having by much ado got by the end , i would have him by all means make the best , he can , of . for i dare say his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will never make him an archimedes , or indeed so much as a figure in any thing . and therefore whereas he says the animadverter hates him , that is his mistake , and i wonder that he cannot distinguish between hatred and pity . he owns himself indeed ( as all good men ought to do ) an hater of the character of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 man in matters of faith , which god has proposed to men as objects to employ their assent and submission , but by no means to exercise their invention ; and there was no sort of men whatsoever , whom the catholick church always looked upon as such pests as these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 men , which is only another word for venturous , meddlesome , self-opiniators and self-conscious innovators , and that in those sacred points , in which all innovation ever was , and is , and ought to be intolerable . for arius , macedonius , nestorius , and eutyches , were all of them great 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - men in the several ages they lived in . nor were there any whom the primitive church still kept so watchful an eye , and so severe an hand over , as these novellists ; and had this author lived , not only under the discipline of the church of those ages , but even of that excellent copy of it the church amongst our selves before the great rebellion ( which gave it such an incurable wound ) he would have found to his cost , what it had been to play the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . man upon the trinity ; for whatsoever else it might have done for him , it would have been sure to have stopp'd him in his way to st. paul's . but this is not all his civility to the animadverter , for he allows him not only able to transcribe , but to make a shift to read too ; ( for this author has convinced me , that 't is not impossible for one to transcribe what he cannot read. ) in requital of which complement , i do here tell this man , that if he could , and should pay to the crown a penny for every greek word which he can neither read nor spell , nor make any thing of , i dare undertake that it might save the nation a tax for one year at least . in fine , as much a transcriber as his foul mouth would make the animadverter , let him but prove that he ever transcribed any thing out of his writings , and i will give him leave to prosecute him , not only for a thief , but for the very worst , the basest and meanest of thieves , viz. a robber of the spittle . but i assure him , that for what concerns his own writings , he is safe ; for as to them , let any man but first read , and i dare undertake he will never be tempted to transcribe . secondly , the next passage , i shall take notice of , is that in p. . at the end , and . at the beginning , where ( with the grossest ignorance ) pretending to prove risibility the formal reason of humanity , from an assertion of the animadverter , which he understood not . this ( says he ) makes well for the animadverter to prove him to be a man , though he is seldom in so good an humor , as to laugh without grinning , which belongs to another species . thus the courtier of gravel-lane ; by which words it is evident , that the poor man is here offering at wit , but cannot reach it . but as for the risibility he is so much concerned against , do not all the schools of philosophy make risibility the property of a man ? and withal deny the form or nature of any thing to consist in the property of it , as well as the animadverter ? but let him set his heart at rest ; for whatsoever risibility may be in others , yet so far as it concerns himself , the animadverter will hardly allow it for an argument of rationality , as it is in him , but as it is imployed upon him . but to cut off the unfortunate animadverter from all hopes of ever proving his rationality by his risibility , with one terrible blow he strikes him down into the grinning species : the meaning of which word is very well known , and a word it is as fit for this man 's billingsgate mouth , as his mouth is peculiarly fitted for that . though by his favour , he shall never make the animadverter so far of the grinning species , as either to find him amongst the sneaking spaniels , or the hybrid mongrils : but rather of that genuine english kind , which having once fastned ( as the animadverter has upon this man ) will not be made to quit their hold. but if he were desirous to learn that canine art of fetching and carrying , ( especially between paul's and lambeth ) he knows where to find one very well able to instruct him . in the mean time i humbly present the world with this specimen of mr. dean's refined breeding , civility , and discretion , that he has no other answer to give his adversary , but by calling him grinning dog. which yet , i confess , is very agreeable to the rage i hear the animadversions have put him into ; which is such , that in most companies he speaks of nothing but daggers , gibbets , and furnaces ; the very mention either of the animadverter or animadversions , transporting him into such fits and agonies , as render him extremely troublesom both to himself , and to all who are so unhappy as to be with him : and much ado has he , in one of those fits , to forbear cursing both of them by his gods. but , thirdly , i pass on to present the reader with another of his flowers , gather'd out of p. . l. . of this defence , where he closes a paragraph with these magisterial words pronounc'd ( one would think ) out of the chair of aristarchus himself , or some such eminent grammarian . it is ( says he ) a tedious thing to dispute with men who must be taught to construe the fathers , and understand common sence . but will this abcedarian venture to reproach any one for that , who , but a few pages before this , construes that expression of the fathers , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by mutual consciousness , p. . l. ? and that in those remarkably positive words ; this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( says he ) is that very mutual consciousness which the dean holds ; that is to say , with the grossest ignorance he construes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies an act of the will , by mutual consciousness , which is an act of knowledge , or ( as he whimsically calls it ) of sensation . and therefore let me tell this * anti-nicene , quadrigesimal , chrysom , paraphrases-man , that the animadverter can construe the fathers , and understand them too , at much another rate than this comes to , provided that he reads them in their own works ; but he confesses , that when he reads them quoted by him in his writings , he cannot construe them for solecisms . in the mean time , i , for my part , am so far from thinking this author fit to set up for a construer of the fathers , and much less for a teacher of others to construe them , that i shrewdly suspect that it has been for want of a construing-book , that he is no better acquainted with his grammar . fourthly , the next thing which i think fit to take notice of , is his frequent reproaching the animadverter with the character of a wit , though joyn'd with such ill-favour'd epithets as his witless malice has thought fit to degrade it with ; as , p. . l. . that he is a spightful wit ; and p. . i. . a wrangling wit ; and p. . l. . a satyrical wit , and the witty , subtile , good-natur'd animadverter , p. . l. . &c. though after all , i think , there is but very little wit shewn in making such charges . however , if wit be a reproach , ( be it of what sort it will ) the animadverter is too just to return this reproach upon the defender ; and withal , understands himself , and what becomes him , too well , either to assume to himself , or so much as to admit the character of a wit , as at all due to him ; especially since he knows that common sence ( a thing much short of wit ) is enough to enable him to deal with such an adversary . nevertheless , there are many in the world , who are both called and accounted wits , and really are so ; which ( one would think ) should derive something of credit upon this qualification , even in the esteem of this author himself , or at least rebate the edge of his invectives against it , considering that it might have pleas'd god to have made him a wit too . but , fifthly , to come to another of his reproaches , and that of a much blacker import than the former ; he tells the animadverter , that he is by much an overmatch for any one who is a christian , p. . l. . and again , that his example is too scandalous to be imitated , p. . at the end . worse than which , i am sure , can be said of no man. but , in the mean time , what flat downright railing is this ? and , what dull , dry , wooden blows does he deal forth here , fit only ( one would think ) to come from an hand made rather to manage a flayl , or a coulstaff , than a scholastick pen , and such as i defie him to find any thing like to , in all the animadversions ? but is the animadverter , in good earnest , so enormously wicked , that his very example is scandalous , and himself a reproach to his christian profession ? what has he done , besides animadverting upon a publick nusance , who had affronted and abused the whole world besides ? has he wrote a plea for the lawfulness of taking the new oath to k. w. and q. m. asserting it upon the strictest principles ( as one calls them ) of old church of england loyalty : and after a few weeks wrote another tract to prove the utter vnlawfulness of the same ? ( both which pieces have flown abroad as far as manuscripts could well spread ) or did he upon the late publick turn of affairs , not only most zealously own k. iames's cause himself , but also join with and abett those who owned it too , and yet presently after , in a barbarous manner , reflect upon and insult over those very persons when they had lost all they had for it ? this man indeed , for his part , had his preferments all the time kept void for him , ( thanks to his honourable diocesan , whom , i doubt not but , he has since fairly requited for that supererogation of his kindness to him ) so that his stake in the church was sufficiently secured , while his refusal of the oath gave him opportunity to enter into the bosomes of those who refused it too : and to observe their behaviour , and to scan all that was either said or done by them ; which i hope he did without turning it to their prejudice ; though the known case of dr. h n and dr. i m ( who complain of a scurvy trick play'd them for their confidence ) shews , that in this man , hearing , and seeing , and saying nothing do not always go together . nor was this all , viz. that his places were kept undisposed of during his suspension , but assoon as he took the oath ( the time of which was fairly intimated by a friend of his at a publick table at oxon , about three months before he took it ) assoon , i say , as he had taken it , he was immediately and per saltum mounted up to one of the best preferments in the church of england ; which demonstrated that his recusancy of the oath so long , was not accounted so criminal a thing by those who knew him , as to need any time of probation , gradually to clear and set him right again in their opinions , but that he presently stepped forth all worth , merit , and pure allegiance , after the turn was once served , and the scene was over . in fine therefore , since he has so reproachfully objected scandal of example to the animadverter , i would advise him to lay his hand upon his heart ( if he can find where it is ) and consider how many worthy and sincere persons have by the fallacious influence of his example and pretences ( still bleeding-fresh both in their minds , and the minds of many others ) been brought , through their refusal of that oath , to misery and want , and a piece of bread , when they can get it . which , let me tell him , is a very dreadful consideration , and when he comes to look death in the face ( which he will find a much harder work than to write upon it ) may chance to lye cold at his heart . in the mean time , i should be glad to hear how much of the revenue of his deanry he lays aside for the relief of those poor men , who have been so unhappily trapanned into this distress . but not a tittle could i ever hear of this or any thing like it . so that as ill a christian as he would represent the animadverter , let him for me keep his new-fashioned christianity to himself ; with this charitable wish however , viz. that it may do him more good in the other world , than it has done others in this . . the last instance of his rancor , which i shall mention , and by which , i doubt not , he designed a shrewder blow to the animadverter than by any of the rest , is his calling the socinians his friends , and admirers , def. p. . l. . though these words ( to such as know what this man was ) shew only how desirous of late he is to throw off his old friends , whomsoever he throws them upon ; but that the reader may see , whether the animadverter , or that disguised dean , have the greater interest in the friendship and esteem of the socinians , i must refer him to a certain socinian tract , published something above a year since , and entituled , considerations upon the several explications of the trinity , &c. a book wrote with such an hearty zeal and concern for dr. sherlock , and such a peculiar design to reproach the animadverter , that it is really a set and formed defence of the former against the latter , and can be called by no name so properly as a panegyrick upon the one , and a satyre against the other . this piece the animadverter read soon after it was published ; but finding so few things said in it with reference to the main argument , and those so grosly ( if not also wilfully ) misrepresenting the doctrine which they were brought to impugn , he could not think himself obliged to answer it . nor should it have been at all medled with now , but that the bitter reflexive part of it ( which i shall chiefly remark upon ) offers it self , as so apposite and full an answer to the imputation , which the defender has thought fit to load the animadverter with , that it could not have been more full and home , had it been contrived and wrote for this very purpose . and here to enable the reader the better to pass his judgment on both sides , i think it requisite first to premise after what manner dr. sherlock , whom this considerer so much magnifies , had on the one hand , and the animadverter , whom he so reviles , ( having first assigned him a name , or rather a piece of a name , accorning to his own fancy ) had on the other hand treated the socinians ; of which number this author professes himself to be one . and for this , he will find dr. sherlock reproaching them in his vindication for having neither greek nor latine , and thereupon very magisterially sending them to school again ( i suppose in his own room ) likewise charging them with nonsense , and calling their opinion one of the most stupid senceless heresies that ever infested the christian church , pref. to vind. at the end . vowing withal , never to put up his goose-quill in this quarrel against them , ibid. and , in short , treating them with the utmost scorn , that it was possible for words to express : whereas on the contrary , the animadverter , though he could by no means be of their opinion , nor yet come up to the lambeth-strain , in declaring them the only scholars and disputants in the world , and in comparison of whom , some of the most eminent , upon both accounts , that christendom ever had , were but meer bunglers , yet with a due and just deference to truth , he frankly acknowledged their parts and learning , and asserted the reputation of both against their beloved dr. sherlock , who had with the utmost contumely and disdain , vilified them . all which considered , the whole conduct of this spightful usage of the animadverter , by persons ( even by their own confession , consid. p. . col. l. . ) wholly unprovoked by him , is to me ( i must confess ) all riddle , and i believe to all sober persons besides : nor can i see what tolerable account can be given of it , but that they did all this by particular orders , and then it is easy to judge from whom those orders came ; which by such a mighty act of restraining grace , put a stop to all socinian pens , from writing against such a bosome-favourite , and turned them against that sawcy church of england-animadverter , for daring to assert the old doctrine of the trinity against the sentiments of those new dons , who may perhaps for fashion-sake , own a trinity , and some such other articles of the church of england , ☞ but ( according to mr. dean's excellent , and never to be forgotten words ) not perfectly in her own way . now as to the argument debated in the animadversions , the grand charge this considerer brings against the animadverter is , that he makes the three divine persons in the blessed trinity only three different postures of the godhead , consid. p. . col. . l. . repeating the same objection again and again , that none may mistake him . but is this fair dealing in disputation , or a just and true representation of the animadverter's assertion ? he asserted indeed ▪ that as posture and figure were modes affecting the body , without superadding any new entity ( properly so called ) to it : so a spirit , whether finite or infinite , might have its proper modes also , affecting it sutably to its particular nature , without superadding to it any new entity or being distinct from it . for since the general nature of a mode consisted only in this , viz. that it determined a being , in it self absolute and undetermined , to some certain state or condition , without superadding to it any such new distinct entity , as we have mentioned ; i would gladly know , why there might not be an agreement and analogy in this general nature of a mode between such particular modes , as do yet otherwise , upon their proper accounts , vastly and infinitely differ from one another ; ( as the modes of an infinite vncreate . being and the modes of all finite created natures must needs do . ) why , i say , these ( notwithstanding their peculiar differences ) may not agree as analogous in the general nature of a mode , as well as an infinite and a finite substance do agree in the general nature of substance ; let any one by some solid reason prove . but besides this , the animadverter affirmed also , that the personal modes belonging to the deity , were of that peculiar kind as to affect it eternally , necessarily , and inseparably ; though there are several modes of another kind belonging to the said nature , which do not so . this , i say , and no more , was the doctrine delivered by the animadverter concerning the divine modes ; which is so utterly uncapable of the representation made of it by this considerer , that though he is pleased to sport himself with a thing by no means fit to be sported with , yet i am confident , in the present case , his own judgment will not suffer him to believe his own words . but he is for putting the whole dispute to a short issue ( if he will say and hold ) by the decision of this one question ▪ to which ( he says ) if the animadverter will give a clear and categorical answer , it will appear to all men , that either he falls in with dr. sherlock , and the tritheists , or with the socinians . and the question is this , whether there are in god three distinct all knowing almighty understandings , wills and energies , as there are three distinct persons ? or whether the three persons have but one onely self-same understanding will and energy , as there is but one self-same substance in number . consider . p. . col. . l. . to which i answer , and that as categorically as he can desire . first , that there are not three distinct infinite vnderstandings , &c. in god as there are three persons : and that to assert , that there are , is as arrant tritheism as any that dr. sherlock is guilty of , and greater there cannot well be . secondly , that there is but one numerical infinite understanding in god or in the three persons . but then i affirm withal , that this one numerical infinite understanding has three distinct ways of subsisting , according to which it subsists distinctly and differently in each of the three divine persons . for still three distinct infinite vnderstandings and one infinite understanding subsisting after three distinct ways or modes , are two vastly different hypotheses . and if by this latter the animadverter falls in with the socinians , it is certain that the socinians must also fall in with him . which i should be very glad to find ▪ for i 'm sure it is the received doctrine of the church , and that which the animadverter has all along contended for , and this very man with so much spight and personal reflection ( beyond all that i ever met with ) has opposed and reviled . however i have answered him civilly , which is a way of answering , which he seems a stranger to . but to pass to the main business of his paper , which is to expose and ridicule the animadverter as much as ( in so small a compass ) he can . the first instance of his spleen against him ( though i think very little savouring of the spirit of a gentleman ) is his expressing a grudge at the very support and maintenance which the animadverter has from the church , telling him , that he is full and even overflows with the blessings of his holy mother , consid. p. . col. . l. . and so much , i hope , i may say in the animadverter's behalf ; that if he does indeed overflow , there are many about him who find themselves the better for it : though yet i know several in the church much fuller , who never overflow . and for this i will instance in a certain dean , who was applied to by a poor widow , about the renewing of a lease ; the fine for which was to be l. and she , to obtain some abatement thereof , pleaded her husband's and her own kindness to him while they had been all formerly of the same conventicle ( that is , during his probationship for his future church preferments ▪ ) but a deaf for ( it seems being turned to all such pleas , she at length in plain terms told him , that her poor children were in a starving condition . to which he presently replied , what if they do starve , what is that to me ? concerning which christian and compassionate reply i shall only say thus much : that if this author can ever prove ▪ that the animadverter sends such an ob●ect of charity away with such an answer , he will not expect so much charity from him , or from any man alive , as to be accounted by them a christian . but the considerer goes on ; and as if it were not enough for him to expose the animadverter to the odium of the world , as so much overladen with church-preferments , he taxes him also with avarice or ambition , or both , by traducing him as one who thought that he had not yet enough , consid. p. . col. . l. . but if the animadverter really thought so , let this gentleman give some good reason , why he never applies himself to such as are able to give him more ; and particularly let him ask that noted citiz●n of the same perswasion with himself ( who of late years saw the inside of lambeth as often , and knew i● as well as any man ) whether ever he saw the animadverter amongst the seekers there ? no ; let me tell him , and the whole world besides , upon this occasion , that from the very bottom of his heart , he scorned it . but in the mean time , may i not calmly ask this author , whether the animadverter ever rivall'd or defeated him , or any of his brethren in their suit for any church-preferment , that they thus envy and repine at his ? or whether they are at all the poore● for what he has● no , nothing like this , i am sure , can be so much as pretended . but the truth is , the main quarrel this man , and others like him , have with the animadverter is , that ( thanks be to god ) his condition is such yet , as neither forces him to want , or sneak ; and that he can be much sooner brought to the former , than he can be made to do the latter . but since it is hardly imaginable , upon terms of common humanity , that one man should venture to charge another in so contumelious a manner , but for some very great reason ; let us see what reason this considerer brings for charging the animadverter at this rate ; and it is in short this : because the animadverter submitted his explication of the trinity to the iudgment of the church of england , consid. p. . col. . l. . whereupon he not only brands him ( as has been shewn ) with avarice and ambition , but sets him out further , as one ready at the first nod of the church to throw his faith into the kennel : and in a word as a person of neither faith ; conscien●● nor religion . in reply to which odious stuff , i would have this man take notice , that the whole force of his charge ( if there be any force in it ) must depend upon his proof of these three things , viz. . that the animadverter affirms his explication of the trinity to be a fundamental of the christian faith. which i utterly deny to be any where affirmed by him . . that a man may not quit his explication of an article of the faith without parting with the article it self . which das positively affirm he may : and , . ( which is much more ) that a man may not quit his explication of an article of the faith without so much as renouncing the said explication as false , but ●●ly by his forbearing to asser● , publish , or insist upon it . which , i 〈…〉 man may very 〈…〉 , that this author ( till he proves the contrary ) has most unworthily abus'd and defam'd the animadverter , as without any provocation , so beyond all possibility of making him satisfaction : but ( thanks be to god ) the charge is so very black and foul , that the animadverter dares trust the world with the belief of it , and thinks it extreamly below him so much as to offer to clear himself from it . and so i pass to the next instance of his spleen against the animadverter , and that ( if possible ) more hostile than the former , as carrying in it all the symptoms of an extream malice , viz. his endeavour to enrage an whole university against him , by representing him as a great undervalue● of one of those two noble seats of learning , in comparison of the other : for , what else can he mean by that dirty ironical expression of [ poor , senceless , illiterate , cantabrigian ignoramus ] on the one hand , and of [ the oxford adep●i ] consid. p. . col. . l. . on the other ? for , has the animadverter in his book given the least occasion for this ? did he speak one tittle in preference of oxford before cambridge ? or , did he at all reflect upon his advers●ry , for being of that university , which he equally honours with the other ? no ; so far was he from it , that i have often heard him say , that he could not perceive by his writings that he had been of either vniversity . but let us see the next complement he passes upon the animadverter , viz. his comparing him in a long ridiculous romance , with the spanish fool err●nt don qui●●t , p. . col . ● . tho● i must tell him ; that the animadverter is not sensible ( nor other● neither ) of my resemblance that he bears to don qui●●● , 〈…〉 be 〈…〉 one whom the world took for a giant , but whom , by his turning round , he found to be but a windmill . these , i say , are some of the instances of the socinians respect and friendship , which the defender has upbra●ded the animadverter with . to which we may add the change of barbarity , p. . col . . l. ult . of more 〈◊〉 than argument ; p. . col . . l. . of arrogance ; p. . col . . l. . of nonsence ; p. . col . . l. . and ( which is of a much blacker import ) of his vnfi●edness in his religion , p. . col . ● . l. ● . of a readiness to turn from his faith with every wind , p. . ibid. l. . to set it afloat , ibid. l. . and to throw it into the kennel , p. . col . . l. . which , i must tell him , are not meer scoptical reflections , but high and criminal charges , and fitter to be try'd before the judge , than to be debated with the p●● ; at a●●aigning the animadverter in the face of the world for a rogue , an hypocrite , a renouncer of his faith , and a man of no religion . and all this ( as has been noted ) usher'd in by this considerer himself with a free and full acknowledgment , that the animadverter had not concern'd himself with the socinians , and that therefore the socinians would not concern themselves with him , p. . col. . towards the end ; and at last closed up by him with this affirmation also , that he had given the animadverter on disrespectful language at all , p. . col. . l. . and consequently , that he ought not to take the foregoing reproaches ill , but to embrace and accept them all , as pure , perfect socinian courtship and civility . though in the judgment of all that i can meet with , these things clash so irreconcileably both with themselves and some other passages in the same tract , and carry in them so much of sherlocism and self-contradiction , that they evidently shew , how hard ( if not impossible ) it is for any one to write for dr. sherlock without writing like him too . in fine , i believe the whole world can hardly shew another instance of such bitter , virulent , reproachful language given ( and that even by the confession of him who gave it ) without the least provocation . nevertheless i have thought fit to treat this considerer in a very different way from that , in which i treated dr. sherlock , and much more from that , in which he himself has ( to the amazement of all sober persons ) treated the animadverter : not , but that i am sufficiently . sensible of every one of his reproaches ; but since they are only personal , and designed against the animadverter alone , and wrote ( as i am well satisfied ) by order too , he may easily command me ( as he 〈◊〉 done ) to slight and overlook them . but dr. sherlock is to be looked upon as a common , or rather an universal adversary , and deserves to be treated as such , and that in a due vindication of all those worthy suffering reputations ( those of the fathers themselves reckoned for the chief ) which he has so rudely and illiterately , and in a word ( so like himself ) made an invasion upon . and so having represented the invectives of this socinian writer against the animadverter , without returning them upon himself ( howsoever i have turned them upon him for whose sake they were written ) i leave it to the reader and all mankind to judge from the forementioned passages , what a share the animadverter has in the socinians friendship and how much he is the object of their admiration . but the animadverter has been attacked by enemies from more quartels than one , and amongst the rest , by that diminutive oberon in divinity the little oxford-excommunicate . a person little indeed in every thing but spight and heresie . he in his poor still-born pamphlet published against the animadversions endeavours to set off his small ware with the specious title ( forsooth ) of the trinity placed in its due light . though i must tell him , that his naked gospel has much the advantage of this piece , as having been placed by the execution done upon it at oxford , not only in its due light , but in its due heat too . but has not this man , think we , found out a very odd way of explaining this high mystery to us , viz. by first setting his college all in a flame , and then pretending to show us the trinity by the light of it ? but how in the name of all the fairies ( amongst whom he is no small prince ) comes he to be so fierce and furious against the animadverter ? for the animadverter never deposed against him , nor does he know that he ever disobliged this pettit doctor either by word or deed . nevertheless since there are some tempers that can be spightful purely for spight 's sake . this man was resolved to vent his spleen , though i believe it would put him hand to it , to give a good reason , why , whether we respect the person whom he wrote against , or whom he wrote for . accordingly , several sourvy passages of no small rancor occur in his discourse ; which , i assure him , might easily be returned upon him , and that with shrewd advantage ; but that i scorn to foul my paper , 〈◊〉 indeed my very ink , upon one of such a character , by quitting scores with him in his own way . nor shall i step so low , as to engage against a book wrote in an entire ignorance of the subject which it was wrote upon ; or think that worth answering , which hardly any man of fence thinks worth reading ; as his bookseller by woful experience finds . however , in case the learned and judicious shall at any time judge it needful to have so slight a piece replied to , ( which i could never yet find ) the way is so far already prepared for it , that the author is more than sufficiently known , how little soever he is taken notice of ; we have his mark and his measure ; there being scarce any one but s●e● , and s●es through him too . for since the world has been acquainted with his naked gospel ( thanks be to his good stars for it ) he may be distinguished by the stroke of his hand , as well as by the mole on his foot . there are others also who have discharged their potg●ns at the animadverter ; but he does not think it worth his while to fight with every one who can shoo● paper . and thus , having at length brought the work intended by me to a conclusion , ( after the churche's and the reader 's pardon begged for all failures that shall appear in it ) i cannot but own and declare , that many wise and good men , and hearty lovers of our church ( to my knowledge ) are of opinion , that , this important and fundamental point , has been sufficiently argued , and the truth effectually proved against this innovator ( whom i have been hitherto dealing with ) already ; and that the properest way of proceeding against him for the future , is not by argame●● , but authority . and that his bishop would admonish him of his heresy once and again , and if he persists in it , resolutely excommunicate him ; and that all sober christians , ( who make conscience of their duty , and their holy christ●●n profession ) would thereupon shun and abandon , and refuse all converse with him , according to the rule of scripture , and the practice of the primitive church towards persons obstinately persisting in any heresy , and excommunicated thereupon . in the mean time , let him and his partisan● put the best face they can upon the matter , yet i know no true sons of the church of england , who account of him otherwise in his present station and condition , than as of a flag of defiance to our old established religion . nor could i ever imagine from the very first , what his design could be in writing that wretched book , and of others in approving it , but to confound and embroil that great article of our faith , in order to the laying in quite aside . and most certainly , it cannot be for nothing , that even the socinians themselves ( as great an opposition as they profess to tritheism ) are yet so very fond of , and zealous for this tritheist , that ( as it has been shewn ) they could almost tear the animadverter in pieces , for having wrote against him . he tells us at the latter end of the preface to his former book called his vindication , &c. that his new hypothesis of the trinity cost him many thoughts , and that it must cost others many too , if they will understand it . and i must confess , that it has cost me several thoughts also . but since it is certain that a man may throw away his thoughts , as well as his money upon that which will never quit costs , i must profess likewise , that i grudge every thought , which i have spent upon it . for to hear ones brains upon such a dull , senceless hypothesis ( having nothing to recommend it but it's novelty ) is but just as if a man should beat his head against a post ; which being a dry , wooden , hard thing ( and upon that account a lively , though not living image of this man's work ) may break one's head indeed , but can never improve it : and therefore , did not my duty to , and concern for our excellent , and now suffering church , oblige me to serve her even in the lowest ( if lawful ) offices , i would never trouble my thoughts with his heretical stuff more ; especially since i can truly say of this new hypothesis , ( what a certain divine of a very voluble conscience ( and known to this man as well as he knows himself ) said of the new oath before he took it , ) the more i think on 't , the worse i like it . finis . advertisement . animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book , entituled a vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity , &c. together with a more necessary vindication of that sacred , and prime article of the christian faith , from his new notions and false explications of it . humbly offered to his admirers , and to himself the chief of them . by a divine of the church of england . the second edition with additions . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e the objection about the derivation of a mystery , prov'd only a blunder of the objector . see the preface to the animadvers . p. . see a pamphlet entitled , the trinity set in its true light , p. . lin . . non accipienda est processio secundùm quod est in corporalibus , vel per motum localem , vel per actionem aliquam causae in exteriorem effectum ▪ ut calor à calefaciente in calefactum . sed secundùm emanationem intelligibilem , u●po●e verbi intelligibilis à dicente quod manet in ipso : & sic fides catholica processionem ponit in divinis . aquinas , ● . p. q. . art. . in c. answer to the antapology , p. . l. . argum. . arg. . arg. . arg. . arg. . arg. . arg. . arg. ● . arg. . arg. . arg. . the state of the question concerning self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , with reference to the divine persons , changed and falsified by the defender from what it is , as deliver'd by dr. skerlock , in his vindication , &c. the true state of the question concerning self-consciousness and mutual consciousness , with reference to the divine persons , taken from dr. sherlock's own words in his vindication , &c. arg. . arg. . arg. . the wonderful vertues of a skillfully managed [ meaning . ] * dr. w. * see the meaning of these extraordinary words in chap. of the animadversions . a specimen of the friendship of the socinians to the animadverter objected to him by this defender , together with some remarks upon a socinian . tract , entituled , considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity , &c. so far as they concern the animadverter . see the animadv . p. , . ☞ see serm. on ps. . . p. . l. . ☞ a remark or two upon the little oxford-excommunicate , who also has had a fling at the animadverter . the conclusion . a second defence of the propositions by which the doctrine of the holy trinity is so explained according to the ancient fathers, as to speak it not contradictory to natural reason : in answer to a socinian manuscript, in a letter to a friend : together, with a third defence of those propositions, in answer to the newly published reflexions, contained in a pamphlet, entituled, a letter to the reverend clergy of both universities / both by the author of those propositions. fowler, edward, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a second defence of the propositions by which the doctrine of the holy trinity is so explained according to the ancient fathers, as to speak it not contradictory to natural reason : in answer to a socinian manuscript, in a letter to a friend : together, with a third defence of those propositions, in answer to the newly published reflexions, contained in a pamphlet, entituled, a letter to the reverend clergy of both universities / both by the author of those propositions. fowler, edward, - . [ ], p. printed for b. aylmer ..., london : . reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. attributed to edward fowler. cf. nuc pre- . the "socinian manuscript" was submitted to fowler by giles firmin. errata: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng fowler, edward, - . -- certain propositions by which the doctrine of the h. trinity is so explain'd. firmin, giles, - . -- socinian manuscript. tindal, matthew, ?- . -- letter to the reverend clergy of both universities. trinity -- controversial literature -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - rina kor sampled and proofread - rina kor text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a second defence of the propositions , by which the doctrine of the holy trinity is so explained , according to the ancient fathers , as to speak it not contradictory to natural reason . in answer to a socinian manuscript , in a letter to a friend . together , with a third defence of those propositions , in answer to the newly published reflexions , contained in a pamphlet , entituled , a letter to the reverend clergy of both universities . both by the author of those propositions . london , printed for b. aylmer at the three pidgeons in cornhil , errata . page . line . dele is . p. . l. . for doth read do . p. . l. . for that proceed from the sun r. that proceeds , without the sun. p. . l. . for pooceed r. proceed . p. . l. . for stages r. stage ) . l. . for soul ) r. souls . p. . l. . for incorporal r. incorporeal . p. . l. . for does r. do . the preface . the propositions relating to the doctrin of the h. trinity , were but twenty-one when the manuscript mentioned in the title-page , was writ against them : but all the twenty-eight , which since came out , are implyed in them . and i acknowledge that those written papers occasioned my making them so many more , to put the explication more out of danger of misconstruction . there is likewise some difference in the wording of those twenty-one and the title , and two or three small additions , but the sence of both is exactly the same . those i drew up in compliance with a gentleman of as great worth as quality , who requested me to give him in writing the sence , he once heard me affirm to be the most ancient , of this grand article of our faith ; and in my opinion incomparably preferrable to the later hypotheses . and falling into this method , of expressing , clearing , and confirming the fathers notion of the trinity , by propositions , i delivered , when i had finished them , a fair copy of them to that gentleman , and gave my foul one to a friend , who needed satisfaction about this great point . this person , some time after , brought me from a socinian acquaintance of his , an answer to my paper , concealing his name from me : and i sent him my thoughts of his performance , as soon as my occasions would permit me to consider it ; which are contained in the next following defence . only in what i now publish , i abridge a little in a few places of what i writ , nor is there any other considerable alteration . and as i printed not more than an hundred copies of the propositions , till i reply'd to the answer to them , a while since publish'd by another hand ; so the now coming abroad of this answer , is solely occasion'd by the new reflections . but if it be thought no fair dealing with my adversary , that i do not publish also his papers , i have this to say , i have them not to publish , but returned them at his desire , who brought them to me , not thinking it worth the while to take a copy of them , since i had not then a thought of ever printing my reply . but if i have played any tricks in transcribing what i animadvert upon ( which is the substance of the whole ) both my adversary and his friend are able to let the world be acquainted with them . but i abhor such doings . the twenty eight propositions . . the name of god is used in more sences than one in holy scripture . . the most absolutely perfect being , is god in the highest sence . . self-existence is a perfection , and seems to be the highest of all perfections . . god the father alone , is in reference to his manner of existence an absolutely perfect being ; because he alone is self-existent . . he alone , consequently , is absolutely perfect , in reference to those perfections , which do presuppose self-existence . . those perfections are absolute independence , and being the first original of all other beings : in which the son and the holy ghost are comprehended . . all trinitarians do acknowledg , that these two persons are from god the father . this is affirmed in that creed which is called the nicene , and in that which falsly bears the name of athanasius : tho' with this difference , that the holy ghost is asserted in them , to be from the son as well as from the father . wherein the greek church differs from the latin. . it is therefore a flat contradiction , to say that the second and third persons are self existent . . and therefore it is alike contradictions , to affirm them to be beings absolutely perfect in reference to their manner of existence ; and to say that they have the perfections of absolute independence , and of being the first originals of all things . . since the father alone is a being of the most absolute perfection , he having those perfections which the other two persons are uncapable of having ; he alone is god in the absolute highest sence . . and therefore our blessed saviour calls him , the onely true god , joh. . . this is life eternal , to know thee the onely true god , and jesus christ , whom thou hast sent . and it is most absurd to think , that in these words , and the following prayer , he did address himself to the three persons of the trinity conjunctly , since throughout the prayer he calls this onely true god his father ; and calls himself twice his son , before these words . not to mention the absurdity of making our lord to pray to himself , or of distinguishing himself from those three , of which himself was one. if such a liberty as this , in interpreting scripture , be allowable , what work may be made with scripture ! . our lord calls the father , the onely true god , because he only is originally , and of himself god , and the first original of all beings whatsoever . as he calls him the onely good , saying , there is none good but god , because he alone is originally so , and the spring of all that good which is in other beings . . the god head , or god in this highest sence , can be but one numerically . of which the best philosophers were satisfied by their reason ; and therefore the oneness so frequently affirmed of him in scripture is a numerical oneness . . there seems to be neither contradiction , nor absurdity , in supposing the first original of all things , to be productive of other beings so perfect , as to have all perfections , but that of self-existence , and those which are necessarily therein implyed . . supposing any such beings to have immediately issued forth from that infinite fullness , and foecundity of being , which is in the deity , each of them must have a right to the name of god , in a sence next to that in which it is appropriated to the father ; since they have all the perfections of the godhead , but those that must of necessity be peculiar to him. . it is evident from the holy scripture , that the son and holy spirit are such beings , viz. that they have all divine perfections but the forementioned : such as unlimited power , wisdom , goodness , &c. . and they are always spoken of in scripture , as distinct beings or persons , according to the proper signification of this word , both from the father and from each other . nor are so many men or angels more expresly distinguished as different persons or substances , by our saviour or his apostles , than the father , son and holy ghost still are . . it is a very presumptuous conceit , that there can be no way but that of creation , whereby any thing can be immediately and onely from god , which hath a distinct existence of its own . or , that no beings can have existence from him , by way of necessary emanation : of which we have a clearer idaea than of voluntary creation . it is the word of the ancients both fathers and philosophers ; nor can a better be found to express what is intended by it , viz. a more excellent way of existing , than that of creation . . it is no less presumptuous to affirm , that it is a contradiction to suppose , that a being can be from eternity from god the father , if 't is possible it may be from him , in a more excellent way than that of creation . and we have an illustration of both these propositions , by something in nature . for , according to our vulgar philosophy , light doth exist by necessary emanation from the sun , and therefore the sun was not before the light which proceeds from thence , in order of time , tho' it be in order of nature before it . and the distinction between these two priorities , is much elder than thomas aquinas , or peter lombard , or any school-man of them all , or christian-man either . . and if any thing can be from another thing by way of necessary emanation , it is so far from a contradiction to suppose , that it must only be in order of nature before it ; that 't is most apparently a contradiction to suppose the contrary . . our th . and th . propositions do speak our explication of the h. trinity , to be as contrary to arianism as to socinianism ; since the arians assert , that there was at least a moment of time , when the son was not ; and that he is a creature . . altho' we cannot understand , how it should be no contradiction to affirm , that the three persons are but one numerical being , or substance ; yet hath it not the least shadow of a contradiction to suppose , that there is an unconceivably close and inseparable union both in will and nature between them . and such a union may be much more easily conceived between them , than can that union which is between our souls and bodies ; since these are substances which are of the most unlike and even contrary natures . . since we cannot conceive the first original of all things , to be more than one numerically ; and that we acknowledg the now mentioned union between the three persons , according to the scriptures , together with the intire dependence of the two latter upon the first person , the unity of the deity is , to all intents and purposes , as fully asserted by us , as it is necessary or reasonable it should be . . and no part of this explication , do we think repugnant to any text of scripture ; but it seems much the easiest way of reconciling those texts which according to the other hypotheses , are not reconcilable , but by offering manifest violence to them . . the socinians must needs confess , that the honour of the father , for which they express a very zealous concern , is as much as they can desire taken care of by this explication . nor can the honour of the son and holy spirit be more consulted , than by ascribing to them all perfections , but what they cannot have , without the most apparent contradiction ascribed to them . . and we would think it impossible , that any christian should not be easily perswaded , to think as honourably of his redeemer and sanctifier as he can , while he robs not god the father for their sake ; and offers no violence to the sence and meaning of divine revelations , nor to the reason of his mind . . there are many things in the notion of one god , which all hearty theists will acknowledg necessary to be conceived of him , that are as much above the reach and comprehension of humane understandings , as is any part of this explication of the h. trinity . nay , this may be affirmed , even of the notion of self-existence ; but yet there cannot be an atheist so silly as to question it : since it is not more evident , that one and two do make three , than that there could never have been any thing , if there were not something which was always , and never began to be . . lest novelty should be objected against this explication , and therefore such should be prejudiced against it , as have a veneration for antiquity , we add , that it well agrees with the account which several of the nicene fathers , even athanasius himself , and others of the ancients who treat of this subject , do in divers places of their works give of the trinity : as is largely shewed by two very learned divines of our church . and had it not been for the school-men , to whom christianity is little beholden , as much as some admire them , we have reason to believe that the world would not have been troubled since the fall of arianism , with such controversies about this great point , as it hath been and continues to be . this explication of the b. trinity perfectly agrees with the nicene creed , as it stands in our liturgy , without offering the least violence to any one word in it . which makes our lord jesus christ to be from god the father by way of emanation ; affirming him to be god of god , very god of very god , and metaphorically expressing it by light of light ; answerably to what the author to the hebrews saith of him , ch. . . viz. that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the effulgency of his glory , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the character of his substance : and so is as much of one substance with the father , as the beams of the sun are with the body of it . and since there have been of late so many explications or accounts published of this most adorable mystery , which have had little better success than making sport for the socinians , i thought it very seasonable now to revive that , which i affirm with great assurance to be the most ancient one of all ; much elder than the council of nice ; and to have much the fewest difficulties in it , and to be incomparably most agreeable to h. scripture . the defence , &c. sir , i have perused your friends answer to the paper i put into your hand , and here hope to give you a satisfactory reply to it . i shall dispatch his preface in a few words . he saith , that the trinitarians have in vain tryed their strength against their adversaries . and there 's no doubt of it , if their adversaries may be judges . as to his saying , that the vanquished victors are ( viz. among the trinitarians ) for each buys his victory with the loss of his own explanatory hypothesis ; i confess i have that soft place in my head , which in his great modesty he saith our education has given us , that disables me to understand the sence of that saying : and am inclined to think , that the inversion thereof would have been better sence , how true soever it would have been , viz. the victors vanquished are ; since it follows , for each buys his victory , &c. and whereas he saith , that in their unitarian tracts , they have thrown a stone of contention among the trinitarians , and this stone has committed them among themselves : to pass by the conceitedness of this latter phrase , and the paedantry of affecting to speak english in latin phrases , sound they never so untowardly , i may i hope without offence tell him , that neither are the socinians at a perfect agreement in their notions : as particularly in that question relating to the h. ghost , viz. whether he be a person or no ; or a meer divine vis or energy : the followers of mr biddle asserting him to be a person , viz. an angel. nor need i tell him what a controversie hath been among them , about the adorability of our b. saviour ; wherein they are not of a mind yet , and i doubt never will be . and many more disagreements in their opinions , may be instanced in , if i cared to go on upon this topick . but what tho' the trinitarians differ in some particulars , in their explication of the trinity , so long as they agree in the main substance ? i mean , what if they differ in certain notions relating to this doctrine , wherein the h. scriptures are silent , so long as they are agreed in what the scriptures expresly say of it , or of any one of the persons of which the trinity consisteth ? and they all agree in giving divine perfections to each of them ; which the scriptures most expresly do . and in affirming them consequently to be each of them god , which also they believe the scriptures affirm them expresly to be . and farther they agree in believing them to be one god ; tho' they are not all agreed in what sence they are one ; nor in the notion of the word person , as relating to them ; nor in their opinion about using that word . but if any of them have such a value for their own explications , as to be severe upon such as dissent from them in any of the less certain parts of them , i will not , i cannot , apologize for this . and now , sir , i follow your friend from his own preface , to my papers title , which is this : an explication of the doctrine of the trinity in certain propositions , which speak it to be agreeable with natural reason , and therefore intelligible , tho' not comprehensible by our shallow capacities . and here he is pleased to exclaim somewhat tragically , against my distinguishing between intelligible , and comprehensible . i am , saith he , perfectly amazed at this his distinction . i will not say , that i am amazed at his amazement , but it seems somewhat strange to me , that first , he should call this my distinction , when i should think he hath heard and read it a thousand times ; since there is no distinction more common . and therefore , secondly , that he should be amazed , nay perfectly amazed at it . and thirdly , that he should be so , for such a reason as this that follows , viz. that which makes a doctrine unintelligible , is its disagreeableness to reason ; therefore if the doctrine of the trinity be not disagreeable to reason , neither is it unintelligible ; and if it be not unintelligible , neither is it incomprehensible . i answer , that i think the obscure expressing a doctrine may also make it unintelligible : but this his reason may be expressed in these fewer words , i am perfectly amazed at this mans distinction between intelligible and comprehensible , because they ought not to be distinguished : or , as he adds , because they are synonimous , and signify one as much as the other . but sure your friend cannot think , i should have such an opinion of a perfect stranger , as to be satisfied with his bare word for this . he is perfectly amazed at my distinguishing betwixt intelligible and comprehensible : i ask why ? he answers , because they ought not to be distinguished . but i am so impertinent as to ask again , why they ought not ? and he so magisterial , as to let me have no other answer than , i say they ought not . but he needs not be told , that tho' these two words are sometimes used in the same sence , yet not always ; but have most frequently different significations . comprehensible always implyes intelligible ; but intelligible is found innumerable times , not to imply comprehensible . and therefore comprehensible is taken either in a larger , or a stricter sence : and in my distinction , as he calls it , 't is taken in the stricter , as for the most part it is . even his dictionary will tell him , that comprehendere signifies something , that intelligere doth not . and according to the most proper acceptation of the word , there is as much difference between these two , as there is , between seeing a thing and looking through it ; or understanding it , and compleatly understanding it , and having an adoequate preception of it . and indeed , if your friend had learnt socrates his first lesson , he would acknowledg himself so short-fighted a mortal , as , tho' he understands many things , not to be able to comprehend the most obvious ones . he would acknowledg that in this state , things are only to be understood by their properties , and certain modes , and that the naked essence neither of a spirit nor of a body is known to us . in short , had i distinguished between intelligible and apprehensible , your friend might have had more cause for amazement . next he saith , that the incomprehensibility of god himself implyes no more , than what the apostle expresseth , when he saith , his ways are past finding out ; we cannot understand them , that signifies as much as , we cannot comprehend them . now it is my turn to be amazed ; at least this sentence must be greatly surprizing to more heads , than those that have ( like trinitarians ) a soft place in them . for , first , who hath so hard , or so large a head , as to find only the ways of god incomprehensible to him ? as to be able to comprehend gods nature and glorious attributes ? second , if comprehending must needs be no more than understanding , there cannot be a proposition less true than this , that we cannot comprehend gods ways ; for mankind is capable of understanding them , or god almighty would never have appealed to the jews as he did , about the equity of his ways . and therefore when the apostle saith , his ways are past finding out , his meaning must be , they are not to be comprehended by us , in our sence of the word : we cannot grasp , or fathom them ; they are of too great a depth for us to dive to the bottom of them . and now , sir , i believe you are sufficiently prepared to wonder , if not to be amazed at this following saying of your friend , viz. it were a very hard thing , that a law should be passed , postnate to a crime , on purpose for the taking off one particular offender ; and 't is as unreasonable , that a distinction should be coyned ( viz. this between intelligible and comprehensible ) purely for the service of a particular mystery ; and when that is done , can be of no further use , unless new mysteries were to be created . and i appeal to your self , as much as you may be byassed by affection to your friend , not only whether all he hath said about this distinction , be not unaccountably strange , but likewise , whether i have not given a more than sufficient answer to the request he makes me in these words : ignorant , or unthinking people , may be cheated with an empty verbal distinction , but since a. t. ( by which letters he all along decyphereth me , and i understand he means by them the anonymous trinitarian ) offers his explanation to satisfie men that are knowing , as well as religious , scholars as well as christians , i must beg him to assign the difference between these two words , intelligible and comprehensible . and he guesseth what answer i will make , in these words ; i am apt to think that he will tell me , we can well understand that this proposition is true , three are one ; but we cannot understand the manner how three should be one : and then makes this reply upon me , now he might as well say , we comprehend the truth of this proposition , but we do not understand the manner ; but then what becomes of his distinction ? but he might have saved himself the pains of putting words into my mouth , and then replying upon them : for you have seen he is much out in his guess what i would answer ; and if he were not , i should be content to be told that i have more than one soft place in my head. for what should ayl me to offer at an explication of the doctrine of the trinity , agreeable with natural reason , if i did think what he would have me say , that 't is impossible to understand the manner how three should be one ? and now he saith , he will take his leave of my title , with these two propositions . . three are one , is not true in a sence that is disagreeable to reason ; and the sence of a proposition that is not disagreeable to reason is intelligible and comprehensible . to which he must needs , by this time , expect this reply , it is intelligible , but 't is not therefore comprehensible . . he that understands the truth of a proposition , understands the manner in which it is true ; and he which does not understand the manner in which a proposition is true , does not understand the truth of a proposition , but takes it on authority . this proposition of his is worded very oddly , i cannot make better sence of it , than by thus expressing it : he who assents to the truth of a proposition , understands the sence in which it is true ; but he that does not understand the sence , does not assent to a proposition , but assents to it upon authority . now the former part of this proposition is sence , but nothing to the present purpose ; but the latter is neither to the purpose nor sence ; as i need not inform you . and now , sir , your friend is at length come to my propositions . as prop. . god is a being absolutely perfect . to this he saith all theists agree it . prop. . that being which wants any one perfection , cannot be absolutely perfect . that is , in the strictest sence of that phrase , as i afterwards explained my self . and he saith , that this proposition is self-evident ; as who sees not that so it is ? but his consequence is so far from being so , that it is a false one , viz. therefore our b. saviour is not god , but in a metaphorical sence , &c. but had he had but a little patience , he might quickly have seen , that notwithstanding our lord is not self-existent , there is no necessity of his being god only in a metaphorical sence . prop. . self-existence is a perfection , and seems to be the highest ; it being an abatement of any other perfections greatness and excellency , tho' in it self boundless , not to be originally in him who hath it , but derivatively . to this he saith , that self-existence does not only seem , but is the highest perfection . this he might perceive i could have told him , as well as he me ; but 't is no fault to express our selves a little modestly , tho' he all along seems to be of another mind . but whereas he here saith , that creatures perfections are improperly so called , with respect to the creatures ; as he afterwards found , i by no means acknowledg , either the son , or . h. ghost to be creatures , so we have only his word for it , that the perfections of creatures are improperly so called with respect to them . prop. . god th father alone ( strictly speaking ) is a being absolutely perfect , because he alone is self existent ; and all other beings , even the son and holy ghost are from him. this all trinitarians do acknowledg , and is asserted both in the nicene creed , and that which bears the name of athanasius . this proposition too must needs down with your friend , but he likes not the parenthesis , strictly speaking , and saith he is very suspicious of it , not that he thinks a. t. inserted it to help a cause off the weakness , whereof he was jealous , but yet to make his scheme the more accountable . i thank the gentleman for being so modest in this wipe ; but he could not wonder , had he read to the end of my propositions before he entred on his animadversions , that i should here insert the foresaid parenthesis . for i do affirm the son and h. ghost to be absolutely perfectly beings , in reverence to the perfections of their nature ; that is , that they are all boundless and infinite ; and that they have all perfections they can have , without a contradiction ; and those are all but self existence , and what necessarily follows upon it , viz. being the first original of all things ; and i add too absolute independence . but more of this anon . the four next propositions , he hath no controversy with me about . but now , sir , comes a proposition that makes your friend tearingly angry , viz. prop. . a being which hath all the divine perfections , that are capable of being communicated , may be properly said to be essentially god , upon the account of those perfections ; or to be indued with the divine nature . this he calls a gross proposition , because it contradicts , not only common sence and reason , but even all that a. t. hath advanced . this is , sir , a heavy charge , but we must wait a while before he makes it out , that this proposition is contradictory to common sence and reason ; for he thus goes on : he had advanced , that god is a being absolutely perfect : that a being which wants any one perfection , can not be absolutely perfect : that self-existence is the highest perfection : that jesus christ and the h. ghost are not self - existent : that they depend on god the father : that god the father is the original ( he should have said the first original ) of all things : and that he can be but one numerically . he should have said , that god , in this highest of sences , can be but one numerically . and now he saith , that point-blank against all this , a. t. affirms that a being which is not absolutely perfect , which wants self existence , which wants the highest perfection , which derives it self from god , which depends on god the original of all things , who is but one numerically , may be properly said to be essentially god , upon the account of some perfections ( for two it seems are not communicated ) or to be induced with the divine nature . now , sir , what a multiplying of words is here ! which wants self-existence , which wants the highest perfection , which derives it self from god ; as if these three were more than one thing : tho i had no such expression neither as , derives it self from god. and he is a little injurious to me too , in representing me as saying , that the son and holy ghost have only some perfections , notwithstanding the following parenthesis ; whereas he knows he ought to have represented me as saying , that they have all that are capable of being communicated ; which are all but self-existence , and what is necessarily therein implyed . and i say , that this is not capable of being communicated , because there is not a more gross contradiction , than to say it is . but how is this proposition point-blank contrary to my foregoing ones ? this question he answers by askking questions . for he next saith , he must make bold to ask me these following questions : and i will answer them , as well as i can , as he asks them . quest. . doth the divine nature comprehend all perfections ; or can it want one or two of the chiefest , and be still the same divine nature ? i answer , that the divine nature doth comprehend all perfections ; but self existence is a perfection relating immediately to the fathers existence ; not to his nature or essence ; it speaking the most excellent manner of existing peculiar to himself . even as adam's coming into being by gods immediate creation , speaks not the humane nature in him , a different nature from that of his posterity , tho it spakes his person to have an excellency above all that have come into the world by ordinary generation : and as the humane nature of our b. saviour is not of a different kind from other mens , because he came by it in a supernatural way , so , i say , god the father's existence being without a cause , doth not make him to have another sort of nature , from that of the son and h ghost ; which may be a necessary nature , and uncreated , and be constituted of all the boundless perfections , of which the nature of the father consists abstracted from the consideration of the manner of his existence , notwithstanding whatsoever your friend can object against the possibility thereof : and notwithstanding any thing i have said in my first . propositions , this may be asserted , without danger of being caught at contradicting my self ; as i hope you 'l be convinc't anon . and now for his next question . quest. . can the divine nature be communicated to a being , when less than all perfections are communicated to it ? i answer , that if you 'l read again what i have said to the former question , you will find there needs no other answer to this . but i must blame the wording of this question , because it seems to suppose prae existent beings to which the divine nature is communicated . whereas the possibility of the existence of other beings from god the father , which have the perfections of his own nature , is that which is to be understood by the communicableness of those perfections . quest. . can a being that depends on god , be properly said to be essentially that god , on whom it depends ? i answer , that such a being can be properly said to be essentially that god in one sence , but cannot in another . i. e. it can have an essence of the same kind , tho' not the same numerical one . quest. . can a being that distinguisheth it self from the only true god , be properly said to be essentially that god , who is the onely true god , and but one numerically ? i answer , that because he loves needlesly to multiply questions , i am not obliged so to multiply answers . and this being the self-same with the other question , i have given my answer to it . and now i hope the gentleman may be satisfied of the true reason of my parenthesis in the th . proposition ; namely , because the son and h. ghost may be absolutely perfect as to their nature , abstracted as i said from the consideration of the manner of their existence ; wherein yet they may be said infinitely to excel even arch-angels : these existing by voluntary creation , but those by necessary emanation : which is the word of the ancients , and i cannot find a better , to express what is intended by it , viz. a more excellent manner of existence , than that of creation . which thousands of persons , no whit inferiour to the greatest masters of reason , the socinians can bost of ( both ancient and modern , divines and philosophers ) have not thought deserves to be scoffed at , as non-sence and a contradiction to natural reason , as much as it is above the comprehension thereof ; and is every whit as intelligible as are many notions relating to the deitt , in which all true theists as well as christians are agreed ; and also as are not a few relating to our own souls , their powers and faculties , and their union with , and influence upon , our bodies ; and as are innumerable notions too relating to material things , which an experimental philosopher cannot doubt the truth of . in the next place , sir , your friend saith , he despairs of hearing a wise word answered to these questions , viz. the forementioned . but i will not say , where was his wisdom then , when he askt them ; because you will reply , they are however wise questions , if they serve to expose the trinitarian to whom they are put , and to make his explication of the doctrine of the trinity down right non-sence . but i reply , let the unbyassed readers judge of this ; and sir i heartily wish , that your self may be one of them . and whereas he saith , that he will do what he can , to prevent troubling ( that is my troubling ) the questions , with confused empty jargon : my answer is , that i think i have not at all troubled the questions , whether i shall trouble him or no , by my answering them . but i expect he will tell you , that my answers are confused empty jargon , and if he will please to tell me so , i shall give him no rougher reply than this , sir , this is a rare demonstration , that your self is one of those anti-trinitarians , whom you extol in the beginning of your answer to my propositions , as having modestly , as well as learnedly and piously , and strongly impugned , the commonly received doctrine of the trinity . but how does he endeavour to prevent my troubling his questions , with confused empty jargon ? he does it thus : by essence , i suppose he means nature . i answer , i am willing to do so too . and , saith he , in that respect perhaps . men who have the same nature , may be properly said to be essentially one , but not essentially one person . i answer , this may be more than a perhaps ; but he may perceive by my th . proposition ( now the . ) that i am far from thinking the . persons in the h. trinity to be in so low a sence one as . men are . but , proceeds he the nature of the self-existent god , is above the nature of all beings which proceed from him ; and it can not be communicated . i answer , that the individual nature of the father , is not a divine nature more truly than that of the two other persons : but how does he prove that his nature cannot be communicated ? why , saith he , we have no other notion of the word communicate , but to impart or give ; and what one person does impart or give , of any essential and singular thing , that himself hath not , but he hath it to whom it is given . it may be some will say , thus it is among finite creatures , but the essence of god is not of the same condition , &c. but as god said to job , who is this that darkneth councell by words without knowledge ? it may be replyed to this man , who is he that multiplyeth words without knowledge ? for it is not thus , as he positively asserts , even among creatures . for there is not a creature that generates another of the same kind , but may be properly said to communicate its own nature , and yet notwithstanding it foregoes not its own individual nature , nor any part thereof . what a boldness then is it to affirm , that the infinite creator cannot do the like ! he that planted the ear shall he not hear ? and he that formed the eye shall not he see ? he that hath gi-given a generative power to the meanest of creatures , or creatures that have the lowest degree of life , shall not he have the same power himself ? i mean a power of doing that which may be called generating his own essential likeness , in an inconceivably infinitely more excellent manner . i wish , sir , your friend would well lay to heart that old maxim , temerè affirmare , vel negare de deo periculosum est . which i will english to you , who i doubt are no great latinist , 't is a dangerous thing to affirm or deny any thing rashly of god , as to the little that remains upon this proposition , it consists of a repetition of what i have answered , and of what he repeats upon the next proposition , which i will answer . and indeed , sir , your friend is excellently good , next to dareing assertions , at repetitions , and saying things , that are nothing , or very little , to the purpose . but you will find every thing , to have more or less spoken to it , that is but one remove from what is nothing but mere words . and now to what he animadverts on the th . proposition . prop. . there seems to be no contradiction , nor the least absurdity in asserting , that god is able to communicate every one of his perfections , except those of self-existence , and being the first original of all things . by the way , my meaning in these words , appears plainly by other following propositions , to be this . that there is no contradiction or absurdity in asserting , that such beings may have their original from god the father , as have all perfections but those two ; and which indeed ( as i have said ) do amount to but one . now what faith your friend to this ? he tells us in the first place . that for the same reason that these two are incommunicable , all the other divine perfections are likewise so . and whereas he assigns two reasons , why god cannot communicate these two , he saith for the same reasons , he cannot communicate any of his other perfections . but how egregiously absurd is it , to go about to give reasons , why god cannot communicate his self-existence , and his being the first original of all things ? since that he cannot communicate these , is a first and self-evident principle : and therefore is uncapable , as all such principles are , of being demonstrated ; as every body knows that understands , what a first and self-evident principle is ; which every one must understand , that can understand any thing . whatsoever is capable of being proved , must be less clear , than is the argument by which it is proved ; and whatsoever proposition is so , cannot possibly be a first or self-evident principle ; as no man in his wits does need to be informed . and therefore no such one will go about to prove this proposition , the same thing can be , and not be , in the same moment . and the foresaid proposition is every whit as self-evident as this : and the denial thereof as manifest a contradiction . there cannot be a greater , or clearer , contradiction than to say , that god can communicate self-existence ; it being to say in other words , that god can be the cause of that which hath no cause . nor than to say , that god can make a first original of all things ; since this is to say , that he can make a thing to be before himself , and to be the original of himself ; for what is not so , cannot be the first original of all things . and therefore , whereas his first , reason , why god cannot communicate these perfections is , because it is a contradiction so to do ; he might as well have said , 't is a contradiction to say that god can do a contradiction . that he can communicate them is contradictio in terminis ; and therefore 't is absurd to give it as a reason why he cannot do it , that 't is a contradiction . for you may as well ask , why god cannot do a contradiction ? and if a reason can be given for this , you may ask a reason for that reason ; and so in infinitum . but if it were onely contradictio in adjecto , i acknowledg , that because such contradictions are not manifest at first hearing , at least to every body , 't is proper to give reasons to shew that there are contradictions implyed in such propositions . but if , any man should ask me a reason , why two and two do not make twenty , i would bid him go look , instead of telling him , that it is a contradiction that they should ; since i had as good tell him , he has a nose in his face , and better too . but that god can make a self-existent thing , or a first original of all things , are every jot as evident contradictions , as that two and two do make twenty . but , sir , your friend saith , that , 't is equally absurd and contradictions , to suppose more than one infinitely powerful , wise and good being . if he means by equally absurd and contradictions as evidently so , sure he is the onely man that will say so , nor can he think so , say he what he will. but how does he prove this ? this is the argument by which he does it , viz. infinite power , infnite wisdom and infinite goodness go together , and may all of them , as well as either of them , be in all beings whatsoever , as well as in more beings than one . but what if i say that this is as much needs to be proved , as that which it is brought to prove ? his onely answer is like to be , you must take this upon the authority of my lord of canterbury . for he onely goes about to confirm it by a passage in his sermon on tim. . . p. . but i not having that sermon by me , and he making no marks to distinguish between , what is his graces and what is his own , it is enough to give him that for an answer . his second argument , whereby he endeavours to prove the forementioned self-evident proposition , is , that self-existence is indivisible , and gods self-existence is necessary ; and therefore if he should communicate his self-existence to another , he himself should remain not self-existent , which is a gross absurdity , and a manifest contradiction . o wonderful ! is it so indeed ? i marvel who told him so ; it may be he takes this too on the authority of some great man , since he troubles not himself to make it out . but there is as great a necessity of proving this also , as of proving that of which it is a proof . and he makes this brave argument to prove too , that infinite power is as incommunicable as self-existence , and infinite wisdom and goodness , because these are also indivisible . but the trinitarian is not so knockt down by this unmerciful argument ( to use a phrase of his own ) but that he may soon rise again . nay , as goodluck would have it , 't is so weak a blow , that he has not felt it . and 't will be found weaker than a puff of breath , by that time i have askt him this one question , viz. is not also the individual nature of every living creature indivisible ? but , as was before said , even the lowest sort of them can propagate their own nature , which is the same thing with communicating it ; and therefore methinks it should not be so great a contradiction to say , that he who gave being to those creatures can do the like . or if you please , thus : 't is therefore no contradiction to say , that god the father may be the original of a being , which hath power to do all things possible to be done , and hath unlimited wisdom and goodness . as to the rest of this animadversion , i will not spend one minute so vainly as to take notice of it ; for half an eye must see it to be nothing better than ( to give it his own word ) mere jargon . prop. . it seems evident from the h. scriptures , that the son and h. spirit have all divine perfections but those two , such as unlimited power , wisdom and goodness , and unspotted purity . as to unspotted purity he grants , that the scriptures do plainly assert it of our saviour , but faith , that that is but the perfection of a man or angel , not an infinite perfection of a god. i answer , that this he onely with his usual confidence saies , but tells us not how he comes by this confidence . but suppole he could demonstrate this , yet the unspotted purity of the h. ghost one would think to be the purity of a god , since we are so assured from scripture , that he is the author of all that purity and holiness , which is or ever shall be found in men. and he must have a large stock of confidence , who dares say . that the purity which excells not that of a man or angel , is sussicient to qualify a person to be the sanctisier , of all that are or shall be sanctified . and if the purity of the h. ghost be the purity of a god , i hope the son's purity may be acknowledg'd so to be too : surely those socinians who believe the h. ghost to be a person , will not make him to excell the son in holiness . next he cavils at my saying , that this th . proposition seems evident to me , and saith that seems and evident , are two words very ill put together ; because that which doth but seem evident is not really so ; and that which is evident doth more than seem so . i see , sir , i must not hope to please this friend of yours , i verily thought he was about to praise me for my it seems evident : for he saith upon it , that [ seems ] is a word that speaks the modesty of an ingenuous enquirer after truth ; and on the contrary , that evident fills the mouth of a man of confidence ; as by the way i must tell him he knows by experience . yet for all this , the good man designed to expose me for my it seems evident ; and those two sentences are fleering ones , and were intended for scoffs . but i pray him to mock on after i have told him that , first , he knows i did not say , it but seems evident . and that , secondly , 't is utterly false , that that which is evident doth more than seem so to all persons . there are many evident truths , that to those who shut their eyes against the light , may not so much as seem so ; and there are those who being sensible of the weakness of their understandings , may say of very evident truths , this or that seems or appears evident to them . but we shall not in haste , sir , catch your friend at the extreme of modesty . for whatsoever seems not agreeable with his reason ( which we have found to be a clear and strong reason indeed ) must be immediately contrary to natural reason . and he is onely puzled at comprehending gods ways , not god himself and his glorious attributes . and he can comprehend whatsoever he understands . and now follows another of his modest sayings , viz. that this proposition we are now upon , does not so much as seem evident from scripture . and he wishes i had cited some of the plainest texts to my purpose . but he hath had enough of those cited by other trinitarians ; many of which the socinians so play the criticks upon , that should the same liberty be taken as to all other texts , which are capable of having the same work made with them , the scriptures would be made a mere nose of wax . but however , methinks , the apostle's so expresly applying those words of the psalmist to the son of god , viz. thou lord in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth , and the heavens are the work of thine hands , &c. doth at least seem to speak him infinitely powerfull . and thesame thing does seem at least , to be affirmed in those words , coloss. . . &c. by him were all things created , that are in heaven and that are in earth &c. for he is before all things , and by him all things consist . and st peters saying to him , lord , thou that knowest all things , knowest that i love thee , doth at least seem to speak his believing him to be infinitely wise , and a searcher of the very hearts of men : which is also expresly affirmed of him by st paul , rom. . . and cor. . . and by our saviour himself too , rev. . . i am he which searcheh the reins and hearts . and the apostles saying , that in christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledg , doth sure seem at least to speak his wisdom and knowledg boundless or infinite . and those words rom. . . — of whom as concerning the flesh christ came , who is god over all blessed for evermore , do at least seem to speak him to have the divine added to the humane nature . and those words , coloss. . . in him dwelleth all the fulness of the god-head bodily : and christ's giving himself the title that is proper to god , in his saying , i am alpha and omega , the first and the last , doth likewise seem at least to assert the same thing . and so doth god the father's saying of his son , let all the angels of god worship him ; especially since it is said , thou shalt worship the lord thy god , and him onely shalt thou serve . and the same thing seems at least to be implyed too , in that saying of christ , that all men should honour the son , as they honour the father ; which is , i think , with divine honour ; and must at least seem to this man himself so to be . and what think you of those words which begin st johns gospel ? in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god , &c. all things were made by him , &c. compared with v. . and the word was made flesh , &c. do not these words at least seem to speak the same thing ? and socinus his exposition of them , would at least seem to be no true one ( tho' there were no such gross absurditys as the arch bishop , among others , hath shewn it to be guilty of ) since he himself does acknowledg , that he was the first inventer thereof , and therefore not known till above fifteen hundred years after the coming of our saviour . and those words , isa. . , . do seem at least to be a prophecy of christ , viz. to us a child is born , to us a son is given . he shall be called wonderfull , counsellour , the mighty god , the everlasting father , the prince of peace , &c. nor is it so much as a seeming objection , which the socinians urge against these words being a prophecy , that the first do run in the present tense , viz. to us a child is born , a son is given , since in that unquestionable prophecy of christ , isa. . several of the praedictions run in both the present and praeterperfect tense : as he is despised and rejected of men. he hath born our griefs . he was wounded for our transgressions : and the like almost in every verse throughout the chapter . nor is any thing more common than this enallage of tenses in the hebrew language . and their rendring the words next following , so as to adapt them to k. hezekiah instead of our saviour , is a wonderful instance of their offering violence to texts of scripture ; for thus they read them , the wonderful counsellour , the mighty god , the everlasting father , shall name him ( viz. hezekiah ) the peaceable prince . and wheras it follows , of the encrease of his government and peace there shall be no end ; they make this to be fulfilled in hezekiah , because he reigned no less than nine and twenty years . see this in the brief history of the unitarians so much magnified by them , p. . of the d . edition . i have , sir , now given your friend a taste , and a mere tast of the plainest texts to my purpose , in compliance with his wish ; and notwithstanding my seems , which he makes such a do with , i am as certain as i can be of any thing of this nature , that these sriptures and abundance more , do much more than seem to confirm the truth of this proposition . and as to the h. ghost , i need give no other proof , of his having all the perfections of the divine nature , than what hath bin already said of his being the sanctifier ; for since this speaks him infinitely pure and holy , and i may add too , omnipresent , he must needs have all the other , according to your friends assertion , viz. that they cannot be some in one , and some in another , but must be inseparate , and go together . and he now betakes himself to cite texts against christs having unlimited perfections , but he gives us only two ; one to prove his power , and the other his wisdom to be limited . that for the limitedness of his power , is that saying of our lord to peter , when he was apprehended in the garden , mat. . . put up again thy sword , &c. thinkest thou that i cannot now pray unto my father , and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels ? but . there is no necessity , that it should be implyed in these words , that christ had not power to deliver himself without praying to his father for the help of angels , or any other help , since unspeakably greater works are recorded of him , without any mention of his praying for ability to do them : and since he had twice before done this very work , when he was as much as now in the hands of his adversaries ; as may be seen luke . . and john . . . our lord 's whole power being originally from the father , he , we find , took all opportunities of giving him the glory of whatsoever he did . . he now thought fit to declare in the ears of his enemies , how dear he was to god , as much as they hated him. and therefore , whereas one legion of angels could have delivered him , as well as twelve ; nay , one angel , as well as so many legions ; yet he saith his father would send him twelve legions , upon his praying to him ; i. e. supposing he could stand in need of them . . our lord did industriously conceal the highest sence in which he was the son of god , from those who were so far from being capable of then receiving that doctrine , that he knew they would make him so much the greater blasphemer upon that account . nor would it have been so congruous to his state of humiliation , for himself then to have proclaimed his divinity ; but after his glorious ascension , and sending the h. ghost , according to his promise , was the season for the doing hereof by the apostles : as particularly st chrysostom hath shewed , in more than one of his homelys . again , sir , your friend attacques christs infinite wisdom , from its being said of the child jesus , that he grew in wisdom . but does he think us to have so soft a place in our heads , as to believe the humane nature of christ capable of all the wisdom of the divinity thereto united ? no he does not , for foreseeing what answer was ready for him , he saith , if it be replyed that his wisdom as god was infinite , the scripture does not so much as seem to tell us any thing of christ , with distinguishing respect to a supposed divine nature , in opposition to an acknowledged humane . to pass over the odd phrase [ with distinguishing respect ] what if the scripture saith nothing of christs having a divine nature in opposition to his humane , does it not therefore so much as seem to tell us any thing of his having a divine nature distinct from his humane ? that text , god was manifested in the flesh , doth seem so to do , but i will despair of understanding much of scripture , if several of the forecited texts do not much more than seem to do it . but i have slipped one passage , which 't is convenient to take some notice of , viz. but it may be said , that all power in heaven and earth , is committed to christ. and he answers , tes , to fit him to be the great minister by whom god will judge the world. i will interrupt him but while i tell him , i wonder it should not seem to him and every man , not only strange but impossible , that a mere man ( tho' in an extraordinary manner conceived ) should be a subject capable of receiving all power in heaven and earth , and of judging the world , both men and angels . but he thus proceeds , but when that great day shall be over , that power , that fulness of power , shall be given up to the great god again . and i answer , to what purpose should a power ( or authority ) be longer retained , than while there is any occasion for the exercise thereof ? the authority relating to christs mediatory kingdom must cease , with the ceasing of that kingdom it self . i did not cite that text among those i instanced in to prove the infinite power of the son of god , and industriously declined it upon considering , that christ speaks in those words of a power committed to him , and therefore not essentially in him ; and that by power here is to be understood authority , and a new authority relating to a new kingdom . and now what hath he to say to my th . proposition ? prop. . it is intolerable presumption to conclude , that there can be no way besides that of creation , whereby any thing can be immediately and onely from god , which hath a distinct existence of its own : or that no beings can have their existence from him , by way of necessary emanation ; since there is a resemblance of such a thing in nature , viz , the issuing forth of rays from the sun. and now see a rare , and as charitable a remarque upon the first words , it is intolerable presumption . there is , saith he , the very spirit of the church in it . well , what means he by the very spirit of the church ? it follows , the spirit of degrading and scourging ; the spirit of jayling a man , and ruining his business ; the spirit of fining him , and starving his wife and children : the spirit of burning him , and ( if anger could do it ) sending him to the devil . and instead of sending me to the devil , he makes a very devil of me ( which is the worse punishment of the two ) as mighty good as he has thought me sometimes , when he and i have had the good luck to jump in our notions . but why must i be such a devillish persecutor merely for one word ? cannot this [ intolerable ] bear a more merciful interpretation ? i was very unlucky in lighting upon this epithet , if it cannot ; for time has bin , when i could have bin a persecutor but would not ( and that is more than the socinians can say ) nor have i since ever changed my mind . but i am old enough to be assured from my own observation , that there is no being secure of any party , that they will never persecute till they have been tryed . and there is no party ( the papists themselves not excepted ) but hath decryed persecution , while it hath had no power , to persecute . but , sir , i will take leave to tell your friend , that , as great an enemy of persecution as he professeth himself to be , he is himself a persecutor , and a pretty fierce one too . there are more ways of persecuting than one , and a man may persecute with his tongue and pen ; and whosoever can do so with either of these , i won't be bound for him , that he will not do it with his hand too , when he hath an opportunity . now he persecutes with his pen , who employs it in heavily censuring his brother without just cause , but so hath he employed it now against me . for i meant no more by intolerable , than a most high presumption ; nor did you , sir , i dare say , understand it otherwise ; i will not descant upon his very spirit of the church , i am sure it shews his spirit sufficiently . but , sir , i thank your friend for the charity he next expresseth towards his persecutor . let us try , sayes he , , whether we can restore him to himself , and the spirit of meekness . but if i am restored to that spirit , which he cannot say i ever lost , it must be by one , to whom i can't reply , physician heal thy self . and do you judge , sir , whether there is more heat in my propositions , or his animadversions . but how will he allay the fury i have expressed in those words , or rather in that one word ? he attempts it by saying , that the socinians know of no otherway but that of creation , whereby any thing can be immediately and onely from god. but i did not say , that 't is intolerable presumption not to know any other way , but to conclude there can be no other . and i still say , 't is a wonderful boldness ( to wave intolerable because 't is so intolerable to him ) so to conclude , tho' no other way should be known to us . as to the way of necessary emanation , he saith it is the supposal of a thing , where of we have no idea . well , suppose this , is it impossible for a thing to be , of which we sorry mortals have no idea ? is god almighty bound to give us ideas of the way and manner how any thing can be produced by him ? or how what we know does exist is produced ? or to give us ideas of every thing that he can produce ? or of every thing that he hath produced ? sure your friend will not dare to answer yes to the two latter of these questions , and much less ( then ) to the two former . and if he be not so daring , with what face could he object against the possibility of a necessary emanation from god , because we have no idea thereof ? but i tell him , we have every whit as much an idea of necessary emanation , as of voluntary creation , understanding thereby the making of something out of nothing . which aristotle and his followers thought an impossibility , ex nihilo nihil fit ; or nothing is made out of nothing , being a maxim of theirs . and therefore they held both the eternity and self existence of the matter of the world. and the platonists thought the idea of necessary emanation , at least as clear as that of creation ; and the younger platonists for the most part held humane souls to be by such an emanation from the deity , and therefore to be eternal , tho' not self-existent . but he saith , that something should come from god which wants some perfection that god has , is at 's ( that is my ) prodigious supposition , under the name of necessary emanation . and i say , it would be a prodigious supposition indeed , that any thing should come from god , that hath the perfection of his manner of existence ; or that any thing can have it's existence from god , and be self-existent . and now , he will display , he saith , the absurdity and impossibility of this necessary emanation , in two or three questions ; and , i thank him , in consideration of my soft place , he himself answers them for me . q. . was god conscious to the emanation ? yes saith he , else his understanding is not infinite . q . was he sensible of the necessity ? yes again , for the same reason . and i answer yes , yes too , though he has excused me . but now , when i have most need of his help , he leaves me to answer for my self , to a stabbing consequence from those concessions , viz. but then it follows , that he was determined to one thing , and sensible that he was so . i will here too adventure to give him two more yesses . then , proceeds he , there is some power above him , or such a determination is the law of his nature ; the former , he saith , cannot be , because god is the supreme being . and he would have done like himself , had he given us a reason , why nothing can be above the supreme being . nor , saith he , can the latter , because neither reason , nor scripture , describes god by any such law. but , being aware that this is too difficult for my brains , he tells me , he 'l make the matter plain by a question . i see he 's excellent at questions , and his question is this , by what evident principle of reason , or what text of scripture , does it appear to be the law of an infinite nature , to beget infinite power , wisdom , goodness ; and that in a being that must want self-existence , and being the maker of all things ? i answer , that if he hath any idea of the thing called non-sense , and any true mark to find it by , he cannot miss of it in this question . but who ever talked of the fathers begetting infinite power , wisdom and goodness in any being ; or otherwise than of his begetting an infinitely powerful , wise and good being ? and now comes a third question , does the idea of an infinitely perfect being , evidently imply the necessary emanation of another being ? this question , sure , he asked for askings sake ; for he knows i desired to have no more granted me , than that it is not impossible , or there is no absurdity in it , that beings may have exstence from god by way of necessary emanation . and now for the . proposition . prop. . it is no less presumption to affirm , that it is a contradiction to say , that a being can be from all eternity from god the father , supposing it possible that it may be from him , in an higher and more excellent way , than that of creation ; since the sun , tho' it is the cause of light , is onely in order of nature before it . to this he saith , first , that for one being to be from all eternity from the eternal father , is a contradiction one degree more absurd , than barely two eternals . not to tell him , that i have hitherto thought , that all contradictions are alike absurd ; how does he prove this to be in any degree an absurd contradiction ? he saith , that it is so , is the most manifest thing in the world. if i demand a proof now hereof , i should affront him , had i not already catcht him at proving ( after his manner ) the most manifest thing in the world. but i need not demand a proof hereof , for he presently sets about it . and the argument whereby he proves this most manifest thing in the world is this , we neither have , nor can have , any notion of proceeding , or being from another , but what implyes the proceeder who derives his being , to be inferiour ( he should have said posteriour ) to that other being , in order of time. in truth , 't is a pleasant thing to see men all of a piece . this is perfectly like his arguing ; that is , proving the most manifest thing , by what is less manifest ; nay , this is proving it by what is very false . he saith , we have no notion of such a thing , and i have already told him , that a thing may nevertheless be , for our having no notion of it . but he also saith , we can have none ; here 's confidence too like his own , but let him speak for himself , and not say we ; for i both can have , and have some notion of such a thing , and so may any one that pleaseth ; for such a thing is a daily object of our sight ? of which anon , after i have considered . more of his wise sayings . the absurdity and impossibility , saith he , of deriving existence from god , by a more excellent way than that of creation , i have already made manifest . but if any man of sense be found to be herein of his mind , i will never trust my sense more , in the most manifest matters . and then he sayes , i therefore conclude , that eternal generation cannot be proved by it , unless it can be made to appear , that a true notion is a necessary consequence of a false . but , sir , can you think it possible , that your friend should do such mighty feats as he makes his brags of , since he cannot distinguish between , denying a thing to be contradictions and impossible , and asserting the truth of it . and if he knows not , that the proof of such a thing as eternal generation , was now none of my business ; and much more , if he needs to be told , that i only affirmed that there is no contradiction therein to natural reason , 't is hard to say , whether he was more weak in offering to animadvert on my propositions , or i in troubling my self with taking any notice of his animadversions . and now we come to the instance i give in this proposition , of an effect every whit as old as the cause of it ; and your friend being come to it too , asks me how i know , that the sun is the cause of light ? and adds , by the revelation of school-divines perhaps , not by the history of the bible ; for , if the account of the creation in genesis , be to be taken in a litteral sence , that will convince me of a philosophical errour ; for there 't is said , that god made the light the first day , the sun not till the fourth . but , sir , did you ever meet with such triflng ? first , he saith , perhaps i have learnt that the sun is the cause of light , from the revelation of school-divines . how well was this flurt bestowed on me , since he knew what a veneration i exprest for those divines , in my last proposition ? secondly , he saith , i could not have this rare notion , from the history of the bible ; because the book of genesis saith , that light was made the first day , and the sun the fourth . admirable i profess ! sure this man hath himself been dabling with the school-men , he 's so subtil . but what if i grant him , that that light which was created before the sun , the sun was not the cause of ? does it follow thence , that the sun is the cause of no light ? my candle is the cause of the light i now write by , therefore the sun is not the cause of any light. but whereas i humbly conceive ( after all ) that the sun is the cause of light , i owe this my opinion neither to the history of the bible , nor to the schools , but to a certain thing called eye-sight ; and for this satisfaction he owes me thanks . but thirdly , saith he , the sun is the cause of light ! he may as well say , the sun is the cause of the sun ; and the light of light ; or any thing whatsoever is the cause of its own nature . but why so i beseech him ? are the sun and light the self-same thing ? then a glow-worm hath the sun in the tayl of it . and then , the light was not made . days before the sun , for all the book of genesis . but if he please to give any credit to his own eyes , he will be tempted to think , that the body of the sun , and the light which comes in at his windows are two things . but at last we find him in a good humour ; for , well then , saith he , be it granted him , that the sun and the light which proceeds from it did begin to co-exist in the same moment of time , but then they cannot be the cause of one another . but i must be still a little cross , and say , first , that i will not have it granted me , that they did begin to co-exist in the same moment , for i am satisfied to have them begin only to exist in the same moment . secondly , neither shall he grant it to me , that therefore they are the cause of one another ; for i was so reasonable as to be content to have but one of them the cause of the other . but now he is cross again , and saith , that thing which is the cause of another , must be in respect of time before the other thing , whereof it is the cause . in sober sadness , my friend , he might have spared all his other wise talk , and only have told me this and he had done his business . for 't is as much as if he had said , let the sun be the cause of light , with all my heart , and let them begin to exist together too , yet notwithstanding i would have you know , that whatsoever thing is the cause of another thing must be in order of time before it : and for once take my word for it . and now , to my comfort , we are come to the conclusion of this ammadversion , viz. what a. t. means by order of nature , i am not sure that i can guess , for i am not much versed in school-jargon ; yet guessing at his meaning , i tell him , that i can no more conceive the sun without the light which proceeds from it , than the light that proceeds from the sun , from whence it does proceed . this sentence is long enough too , to be taken to pieces . . he saith , he is not sure that he can guess , and yet does guess . but my school-learning tells me , that if he is sure he does guess , he is sure he can guess . . he saith , he is not much versed in school-jargon , that is to say , he is verst in jargon , but not in school-jargon . and , because we will part fairly i am willing he should know , that i believe both these propositions . . he saith , he is not sure that he can guess , what a. t. means by order of nature . as if priority in order of nature , and in order of time were a distinction of my coyning , like that of intelligible , and incomprehensible . i perceive he is as great a philosopher , as school-divine if he never before met with that distinction , which is much more ancient than the most ancient of the school-men , or than christianity it self . but if he hath ever met with that distinction before , he might have presumed , that what i mean by it , is but what other folk have ever meant . . he saith , i can no more conceive the sun without the light that pooceeds from it , than this light without the sun. no nor can i neither , for i can perfectly well conceive them both . i can conceive the sun abstractly from any other light , than what is in the body of it ; and i can conceive too every jot as well of the light in my house at noon-day , abstracted from the sun : and so can he too , if his great modesty would but let him think so . but we must not forget the last words of this his conclusion , viz. thus i reckon to have done justice to a. t 's . th . proposition , not forgetting the appendent similitude . and i reckon i have done no injustice to his animadversions , on this or any other of my propositions ; and whether he be out in his reckoning , or in mine , let any man of his own chusing be judg , that has but common-sense . prop. . those two propositions do speak our explication of the h. trinity , to be as contrary to arianism as to socinianism ; since the arians assert , that there was at least a moment of time , when the son was not , and that he is a creature . on this he sayes nothing , that i can be concerned to reply too , unless i delighted in exposing him , for exposings sake . prop. . tho' we cannot understand , how it should be no contradiction to affirm , that the three persons are but one numerical being , yet hath it no appearance of a contradiction to say , that there is an unconceivably close and inseparable union , both in will and nature between them . and here too is very little to draw a reply from me , except i delighted in repetitions as much as he does ; but two or three passages i can't well let go . he saith , it is a very stange boldness for men to determine , that such or such a notion is true , which they cannot conceive is true . but i. how comes boldness all o th' suddain to be such a crime with this gentleman ? . how comes that proposition by such a remarque as this ? since it speaks nothing of the truth of any notion , but affirms one notion , to have no appearance of a contradiction in it . nor does he offer a word to shew that there is any contradiction therein , or any appearance thereof ; which a wise man would believe to be his onely business , could such a one undertake confuting of this proposition . . who are they that determine any notion to be true , while they cannot conceive it to be so ? and another saying he hath here , which further demonstrates what a deadly enemy he is to the crime boldness , viz. a close and inseparable union between god and christ , there cannot be ; unless he means such a union as is between different natures ; but that will not content him , yet 't is all that can be granted . but i much doubt , that this is much more than he will grant ; i fear he will not grant , that god the father and his begotten son , are as closely united as are his soul and body , the natures of which are as different , as the natures of any two created things can be ; and their union with each other so close ( tho' not inseparable ) that he is as unable to give an account of this union as of that which trinitarians do believe to be between god the father , the son and the h. ghost . but he saith , the nature of god the father includes perfections , which are not in the nature of jesus christ ; and from thence concludes that such a union as the forementioned cannot be between them . to which , i am loth to repeat what i have so often said , that the fathers self-existence , with what is there in implyed , is a perfection immediately relating to his manner of existence but however , are there not many perfections , or excellent powers and properties in souls , which are not in bodys ? and yet the union between them ( as was said ) is too close for us to give an account thereof . prop. . such an union as this between them , being acknowleg'd by us , together with the forementioned intire dependance of the son and h. spirit upon the faher ; the unity of the deity is as fully , to all intents and purposes , asserted by us , as it is necessary or desirable it should be . but to this , sir , as he saith very little , so not a line that i can reply a new word to ; nor a syllable is here of confutation . prop. . and no part of this explication , do we think repugnant to any text of scripture , but it seems to be the best and easiest way of reconciling those texts , which according to the other hypotheses , are not reconcileable , but by offering extreme violence to them . now to this he saith , that he is infinitely certain , that this explication is in a great part repugnant to many texts of scripture , and to many self-evident principles of reason . but not one of those many texts of scripture , does he instance in , and we have seen what work he makes with self-evident principles . nor is here any offer at a confutation , except his calling me an ishmalite trinitarian be so , whose hand is against all the heads of the trinitarian-expositors , and all their hands against me ; and a scareing threat , how merciless — would expose me , and that he would do it at another kind of rate than he hath done . but i say , should he expose me at the same rate , he would be merciless to himself onely . but since he saith , that my hand is against all the heads of trinitarian expositors , 't is enough to tell him that 't is false . prop. . the socinians must confess , that the honour of the father , is as much as they can desire taken care of by this explication ; nor can the honour of the son and h. ghost be more consulted in any explication of the h. trinity , than it is in this ? it ascribing to them all perfections , but what they cannot have , without the most manifest contradiction . now the first thing he here saith , that i ought to take notice of , is , that he who gives more to an excellent person , than of right belongs to him , may perhaps be in a great part excused for the sake of his good intention , but must nevertheless always be chid for the injury he offers to him , because by giving too much to him , he brings the just measures of his real excellency into question . now instead of an answer , i would ask him one question more , who has askt me so many , viz. which is the safer of the two extremes , to think of the son and h. ghost more or less honourably than we ought , provided that god the fathers honour be not in the least intrenched upon ? sure , 't is impossible for any sincere christian not to chuse to err on the right-hand , if he must err on one. on that hand we chuse to err in our opinion of whomsoever we have a respect and value for . now if the honour of the father be as much as can be taken care of in this our explication ; and we believe it is , since he is made the original of all the excellencies and perfections , that are in the other persons , and of their existence . and since there are so great a number of texts , which have more than seemed to the generality of christians ( and to all but a small handful since arianism went off the stages to give the perfections of the divine nature to these persons , surely the love and esteem which all good soul ) must necessarily have for them , must needs byass them towards the understanding of scripture in that sence , which makes most for their honour , provided it be not forced and too artificial ; and provided , i say again , the father loseth no honour thereby . again he saith , that , to his knowledge , the socinians are not willing to confess that the honour of the father is as much taken care of in this explicaiion , as they do wish it were . but he offers not at any reason , why they are not willing to confess this . but sure they will not say , that their own hypothesis doth give more honour to the father , than that which speaks him the author of all that the other persons either have or are . lastly , he saith , that the scripture no where tells us , that jesus christ , or the holy ghost desired to be accounted god : that jesus christ did not command nor desire divine honours to be paid him is plain , in that when he taught his disciples to pray , he did not propound himself as the object of prayer , but directed them to address themselves to the father . to this i reply , first , that suppose neither of these persons is said in scripture to desire to be accounted god , are there there fore no texts which speak of either of them as god ? i have i think sufficiently minded him of the contrary . secondly , how can he say that jesus christ desired not divine honours to be paid to him ? ( except he means , that he desired none to be paid him while he was on earth ) when he hath told us john . . that the father hath committed all judgment to the son ; that all men should honour the son , even as they honour the father . and are not all the glorious angels commanded by the father to worship his son ? heb. . . and is not eternal glory given to him , apocal. . , . now to him that loved us , and washed us from our sins in his own blood , and hath made us kings and priests unto god , and his father : to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever ? and will not all such texts speak him an object of divine worship , because that in the days of his humiliation , he expressed no desire of being so ; but still gave all the honour of whatsoever he did to his father ? thirdly , i doubt from this passage , that your friend is gone beyond his master socinus , and denyeth the adorability of the son of god , for which he was a zealous champion . i am heartily sorry for him , if it be so ; this being ( to speak modestly ) to make a very large step towards being no christian. prop. . and one would think it impossible , that any christian should not be easily perswaded , to think as honourably of his redeemer and sanctifier , as ever he is able , while he robs not god the father for their sake ; and doth not offer any violence either to the sence and meaning of divine revelations , or to the reason of his mind . to this he replys , i. that saving the honour of the father intire and uninjured , the socinians think as honourably of the son , as any men whatsoever . i answer , surely the arians opinion of him is far more honourable than the socinians , who will not allow him to be other than a mere man , nor to have had a being before he was in the womb of the virgin ; whereas the arians doctrine is , that he hath a super-angelical nature , and that he was before all worlds , and that the father created them by him ; and yet they consult the honour of the father , as much as the socinians can no ; they making all that belongs to the son to be from him. ii. he saith , that some of the socinians think as honourably too of the h. ghost ; tho' 't is to be confessed , that others do think the h. ghost to be a divine energy or virtue , and not a person ; whether of the two is not plainly revealed , and my antagonist does not tempt me to dispute the question . not to reflect upon your friends wisely calling me his antagonist , who had nothing then to do with him , don't those socinians that believe the h. ghost to be a person , make him no better than an angel , how then do they think as honourably of him , as those that believe him to be god , and yet rob the father of no honour ? and whereas he saith , it is not plainly revealed whether the h. ghost be a person or no ? i say , it is as plainly revealed , as that the father himself is a person ; nor can any one be more plainly spoken of as a person , than the h. ghost still is by our b. lord. but some men will dispute any thing ; and some too , who little understand the knack of disputing . iii. he saith , that to think as honourably as possibly we can , of any person , besides god the father almighty , is not our duty . but i hope i need not tell him , that id solùm possumus , quod jure possumus . we can only do that , which we can lawfully do . and he knew i could mean no other by possibly can , than lawfully can . iv. he saith , we are to think but just so honourably of jesus christ , as god directs us in the new testament . and i say , what ever directions we have what to think of him in the old testament too , are also to govern our thoughts concerning him. and we are wholly led by the h. scripture to think so much more honourably both of christ and the h. ghost , than he and his friends do . v. he saith , that we must leave it to god , who will be honoured above all things he hath made , and will not communicate his honour to another , to appoint what honour shall be done to his son. and we say so too ; and therefore wholly take our direction in this point from divine revelation . and that saying of god almighty's , that he will not give his glory to another ; or to any one of his creatures , confirms us in our belief , that the son of god is not a creature ; since he will have us to honour him , even as we honour himself . and whereas the socinians say , that god will have him so honoured , as he is his ambassador , and representative , i answer , that so angels have often been too , and yet ( as i need not tell them ) it was ever idolatry to pay religious honour to them , upon any account . an angel that was sent on an embassy to st john , said to him , upon his falling down before him , see thou do it not , for i am thy fellow-servant , &c. worship god. and thus have i replyed to every thing in this animadversion too , that i have not already spoken , more than once , to . prop. . there are many things in the notion of one god , which all hearty theists will own are necessary to be conceived of him , that are every whit as much above the reach and comprehension of humane understandings , as is any part of this explication of the trinity . nay this may be affirmed , even of the notion of self-existence : but yet there is not an atheist so silly as to call it in question ; since it is not more evident that one and two do make three , than that there could never have been any thing , if there were not something in being , which was always , and never began to be . to this he only replys , that there are many things directly contrary , to self-evident principles in this explication ; and he trusts he hath plainly proved it . and , sir , do you judge , as much as he is your friend , how he has proved it . prop. . lest novelty should be objected against this explication , and so such as have a veneration for antiquity ( as it becomes all to have ) should be prejudiced against it , we can make it evident , that it very well agreeth with the account , which the nicene fathers ( even athanasius himself ) and others of the ancients who have treated of this subject , do in divers places of their works , give of the trinity . and had it not bin sor the subtil school-men ( to whom christianity is little beholden ) we have reason to believe , that the world , since the fall of arianism , would never have been troubled with such controversies about this great point , as it hath bin and continues to be . now to this your friend saith , . novelty is the least objection i have against his explication , but 't is a good exception , which he will never be able to answer . but this proposition tells him , i am prepared to shew , that this explication agreeth very well with the account that the ancients do give of the trinity . and therefore he might have had the patience to have seen whether 't was a vain boast or no , before he had so confidently pronounced me forever unable to answer the objection of novelty . . he saith , i can hardly think that his hypothesis , take it altogether , will down with any trinitarian . but i phansy that if he did not mistrust it would down with many , he would not be so angry , as he is , with it . and now , . he gives me his parting blow , and it is a stunner , viz. and as for ancient fathers , how weak a thing is it , to seek credit to an hypothesis , upon the account of their concurring ! but , but now , novelty he acknowledg'd to be a good exception , tho' the least objection , of which distinction between objection and exception , himself must have the honour , and 't is as wise a one , as mine between intelligible and comprehensible is a weak one ; but how is novelty any exception against an hypothesis , if the concurrence of the judgments of ancient fathers can give no credit to it ? but whereas i called this blow a stunner , i was in too good earnest , ; for these his last words do as perfectly amaze me , as my now mentioned distinction did him . and since stunned people are not good at talking , i have no more to say , but that i know not , whether there be more of arrogance than ignorance , or of ignorance than arrogance in these words . and now , sir , if you shall think that i have treated your friend with too much freedom , and have given him too course a farewell , the onely apology i can make for it , is , that i find him such a sort of adversary , as would not permit me to treat him otherwise . however , the liberty he hath taken with me , hath not the least influence upon my spleen , and i wish him as well as you know i do your self . and particularly , that he may learn to be more modest , and think it possible that those opinions which he takes for most evident and most necessary truths , may be as gross and dangerous errors ; and that his understanding is not so much above the pitch os other fallible mortals , but that he may be mightily mistaken when he is most confident . and i heartily pray , that you both may with all sincerity and impartiality consider what is here offered to you , and that god would give us all a right understanding in all divine truths . these things i say , are heartily prayed for , by your affectionate friend , e. g. the latter defence . there are other trinitarians concerned with me , in this gentlemans book of reflexions mentioned in the title-page . his th . chapter conteins those he hath made upon the . propositions , which consists of . sections , that begin with numb . . the first is no more than a recital of . or . of my propositions . the writer saith upon them , sect. . . that two infinite substances should emane from one infinite substance , is so gross a notion , that i wonder any man of sense should be guilty of it : and my reason is , because all infinites , of what sort or nature soever , are equal ; for if one infinite be less than another , there must be some terminus bound or end of it , and consequently it cannot be infinite , of which there can be no bound or end ; or if one infinite were any ways more than another , there would be somewhat more than infinite ; which is evidently absurd : therefore to suppose two infinites to emane from one , is to suppose two to emane from one , when each is equal to the one from which it emanes . here , and in the remaining part of this section , is demonstration with a witness against the ancient fathers hypothesis , of the sons and h. spirits being from the deity by emanation ; and against my hypothesis , of the possibility hereof . i will take a little more liberty with this subtil gentleman , when i am better acquainted with him ( as i shall be quickly ) than i will at present . for he may think it no good breeding to tell him homely all my mind , at our very first meeting . but now a complement is more civil , as i thank him , he begins with too great a one to me . and my complement is , sir , i commend your wisdom in changing all along my phrases , viz. beings whose perfections are unlimited , and who have all they can have without a most manifest contradiction , for a phrase i not once use in my propositions , viz. infinite substances ; because i understand it nothing so well as those phrases . and i say he did wisely herein , since had he used my phrases , this section would not have looked quite so scaringly . but let the reader still put one of my phrases in the place of infinite substances , and then consider whether contradictions would so immediately and at first sight seem to appear in this hypothesis . but i shall deliver my mind a little more freely to him , relating to the matter of this section when i come to his d . but i have not so done with this , but shall farther consider what it sayes . and be he pleased to take notice , that there is nothing in this acute arguing , except he means by infinite substances , substances of an infinite quantity , or bigness . but i hope he will be so far from attributing quantity or bigness to the substance of the deity , that he will not do it to the substance of an angel or humane soul. . it next follows , to suppose one infinite substance to emane from another , is to suppose the whole entire substance to emane from it self . but this i deny , and do acknowledg that if i granted it , i must without any farther troubling either him or any of his brethren , bid adieu to the fathers hypothesis they are so displeased with , as a plainly contradictions one : seeing it asserts a real distinction of the divine substances , tho' no difference in them . it follows . and what makes it stranger , is , that the two infinite substances emaned from the fathers single substance , yet there was no diminution in the substance of the father ; it is as infinite as it was at first . but how should this make the hypothesis stranger , when it would be the strangest thing in the world , if the divine substance were capable of the least diminution , since those that believe spiritual substances , know that none of them are : but anon a little more of this . but it may be said , saith he , . why may not one infinite , as well as one finite , proceed from another ? and then he thus answers himself , but nothing can be more absurd , than to suppose one finite ( much more two ) to proceed from one but of the same bigness . yes , i 'le tell him what is more absurd , viz. to suppose one or more infinite substances , to proceed from another infinite substance of the same bigness . this is more absurd , because there is one more contradiction in this supposition than in that , viz. that bigness belongs to a spiritual substance ; which kind of substance , i hope he will acknowledg to be alone capable of infinity . but as notable work as our author makes , at demonstrating the absurdity of two infinite substances emaning from one , i fancy i know those who may almost as much put him to it , to defend the non-absurdity of a sparks being kindled by ( or emaning from ) a spark ( both being of the same bigness ) as a trinitarian shall need to be by his arguments ( i will not be so rude as to call them cavils ) against the possibility of the other emanation . but to use his own phrase infinite substance , 't is so far from being impossible , that an infinite substance , should emane from an infinite substance , or ( to use the scripture-phrase ) be begotten by it , that if any being can emane or be begotten by an infinite substance , it must be infinite too . for , as athanasius saith , it is impossible that that which is begotten , should be a different essence from that which begat . the reader may see what is farther said of emanations , in d defence p. . i have abundantly too much business lying now upon my hands , to find leisure for so close a consideration of all that this gentleman hath reflected on the . propositions , as possibly i might apply my self to , had i time to spare . but the truth is , i find his arguing to be such , as if well followed upon other arguments , it might make those , who are willing to be so , down right scepticks , as to almost every thing . he needs not to be informed , what doughty dexterity a sophister might shew in making it out , that creation is a perfect impossibility : that eternity in both the notions thereof , is a monstrous contradiction to the reason of our minds . and that so is also the notion of an incorporal substance . and of liberty , nay even in god himself : and of the divine omnipresence : and that both parts of a contradiction may possibly be true . and perhaps a thousand other things , for which we have the highest rational evidence , may be exposed to ridicule , by a man who loves to chop logick . and likewise a many other things , the contrarys to which , we have even ocular and the most sensible demonstrations of , may one make such a shew of demonstrating , as to baffle most men . as that there is no such thing as motion : that a body can have no influence upon a spirit , nor a spirit upon a body : and much less can they be vitally united : that 't is impossible that will and thought should stir a finger : that all bodies are alike big , &c. i say most , if not all , these strange propositions , are capable of being with as plausible a shew of reason defended by a subtile sophister , as the emanation of the son and holy ghost from the father hath bin now confuted by this gentleman . so that i cannot but apply those words of the apostle to such disputers , they have turned aside unto vain jangling , understanding neither what they say , nor whereof they affirm . but i have said enough to this section : each of the following , i shall ( i think ) dispatch as easily . sect. . he saith , that whatsoever emanes , or any way proceeds , from a self-existent substance ( except it were created and then joyned to it ) is as self-existent as that substance . but i say with as great assurance , that whatsoever substance emanes from another , must owe its existence to that other ; and the contrary is a manifest contradiction . as to his reason for thus asserting , viz. because before its emanation , it was a part of the self-existent substance , it is taken from material substances , which do consist of parts ; but this cannot be said of spiritual ones , because they are not divisible , and therefore have no parts . and it is observable too , how well this reason suits to eternal emanations . sect. . this section hath several very surprizing things in it . as . our author cannot see , since the son and spirit are necessary emanations , how they owe their origin more to the father , than the father owes his to them . which is as much as to say , since the tree necessarily issues forth from the root , and the rays from the sun , therefore the root owes its origin no less to the tree , and the sun to its rays , than the tree to the root , and the rays to the sun. . his reason for that assertion is , that the father son and spirit are all three of a substance , that is self-existent . but i say onely the two latter are so , for the first ( as he needs not to be told ) is the self existent substance ; not of or from such a substance . but if he asks me how they emane from the father , i know not which of us would be the more presumptuous , he for asking , and for endeavouring to answer thatquestion . but ( on second thoughts ) i will undertake to answer it , when he shall be pleased to answer me this , how did your self come into being ? or , what is the modus how any thing comes to be what it is , or to be at all ? . he adds , nor could the father more than they , be the cause of the separation , since they necessarily separated from one another . but can i need to mind him , that our hypothesis will not bear a separation between the divine persons , and only asserts a distinction betwen them ? and sure i need not tell him , that he is not over-fit to write books , who knows not that distinction , and separation , and difference too , are several things . but . whereas he saith that , no one of these persons can be the cause of their separation , because they necessarily separated , doth he think that god can be the necessary cause of nothing ? or that he is in his own nature indifferent to every thing ? if he believes ( for instance ) that the perfection of his nature doth not necessarily determine him , to what is best ; or to do whatsoever he in his infinite wisdom knows fit to be done , i hope there are not many of his mind . he saith , . that it is another contradiction to affirm , that an infinite substance is divided into three infinite parts . how does our author already run taplash ! but i will not therefore forbear replying , and i answer , no doubt it is a horrid contradiction so to affirm . but how rank does this smell of the gross thing called body ! his mind runs altogether upon material substances , which alone i say have parts to be divided into . and if a spiritual substance cannot be divided into spiritual parts , much less can an insinite spiritual substance be divided into infinite spiritual parts . and he who thinks that a spirit can be divided into parts , had as good never take that word into his mouth , and much less can he pretend to believe it a thing of an immortal nature , which whosoever does not , whatever theologers they may be , i can't admire them for philosophers . . he makes it in what follows an absurdity to deny that whatsoever proceeds from another thing , must be in order of time after it . these are his words , whatsoever proceeds from a thing must first be in it , except it can be in it and proceed from it , at the same time . but as we never thought of such a thing , as the two persons so proceeding , as to be separated from the first ; nor of any more than their having their origin from him , so this they may have and yet still be in him , and might ever have been in him. can our author think ( not to trouble him too often with the rays being from the sun , and yet as old as it ) that all thoughts must be younger than minds , because they have their original from them . this can be denied by none , that make minds to be thinking beings : i mean , that do acknowledg thinking to be essential to minds . but this i have spoken to in the preceding defence . p. , , &c. sect. . he saith , that it had bin intolerable in the pagans , to believe those rays that come from the sun , to be the sun it self . and i need say no more , than that it is as intolerable to believe the son and spirit , who have their existence from the father , to be the father himself . but i desire him to think sedately with himself , whether gods decrees could none of them be eternal , i phansy he is not so much a school-man as to answer , gods decrees are god himself . sect. . he saith , what i further add are direct contradictions , reciting several more things conteined in my propositions ; and this is the whole of this section . here is not one word of proof , that any one of them is a contradiction ; and therefore i have nothing to add here . sect. . he affirms , . that necessary existence from eternity is as great a perfection , as self-existence . but not to tell him , that whatsoever doth necessarily exist , must have bin from eternity , and therefore such an existence is never attributed to a creature ; i do absolutely deny , that necessary existence from another , is as great a perfection as necessary existence from ones self . can our author in his cool thoughts imagine it is ? he saith . if the father hath given existence to any being , which he cannot take away , he would cease to be almighty . but i conceive , that to suppose that the father can make a being to cease , which hath a necessary existence from him , would be a contradictions supposal ; and that contradictions being objects of no power , cannot be objects of divine power ; and that therefore the almightiness thereof consisteth in an ability to do whatsoever implyes not a contradiction , or that power can do : and so doth our author conceive too . he saith , . that self . existence separate from those powers , which can only belong to a self-existent being , is no perfection . but i ask him , how self-existence can be separated from those powers ? and if it cannot , what does this saying signifie ? and it is certain it cannot . but if he means abstracted by separate , as he used a very improper word to express his thoughts by , i deny that the notion of self-existence abstracted from all other considerations whatsoever , implyeth no persection . and i have as much liberty to contradict him without giving my reason , as he hath to affirm this without giving his . but indeed this denial of mine needs no reason , for that self-existence is as such a perfection is self-evident , or i know not what is so . but were it not that i find him in one of these sections , asserting creation out of nothing , this passage would lead me to a very shrewd suspicion , that he is of wolzogenius his mind , and some others of his brethren , that god is not the only self-existent being , but that the rude chaos was , and therefore all matter now is , self-existent too . and if they could demonstrate this to me , i confess i should do what lyes in me , to think self-existence to be no perfection at all , in spight of its being self-evident that it is a great perfection , if not the greatest . . he saith , that if the persons have the some unlimited perfections , but their manner of getting them was different , that would not cause any inequality betwen them . but i say it would ; that is in reference to their manner of existence , tho' not in reference to their mere essence . what follows , is but dilating on the same thing , and repeating what hath been already considered . sect. . he asks , . how the father can be greater than the son and h. spirit , and be the only good , when they have the same unlimited power and goodness ? i answer , they have an unlimited power , but not the same unlimited power with the father . ad extrà , or in relation to the creation , their power is unlimited ; but no body will say , that ad intrà , it is the same with the fathers , except he can believe , that the son could beget the father , as the father hath begot the son. and as to the fathers being called by our saviour the only good , in that he saith there is none good but god , i have said in my propositions ( with grotius and others ) that that phrase must needs signifie the only original good , or the only fountain of goodness ; which the father may be , and yet not the onely perfectly good. and i think that the perfection of self-existence belonging to the father alone , and therefore those perfections too , which do necessarily suppose self-existence , the father may most truly be said to be greater than the son and h. spirit , although all the perfections of these persons are unlimited . . he asks , what greater absurdity there can be , than that beings which have infinite unlimited perfections , should want some perfections ? i answer , that indeed there cannot be a greater absurdity than to say , that a being which hath an infinite number of unlimited perfections , can want some ; this would be an ab'urdity with a vengeance : but i doubt i am not capable of understanding where lyes the absurdity of asserting , that a being which hath not the perfection of self-existence , and those that suppose it , may notwithstanding have in as high a degree as can be those perfections which they have . . he saith , that a being cannot be partly infinite and partly finite . and so he runs on upon infinite , infinite , which he all along does ; and the reason of it is obvious enough , viz. because it is a rare amusing confounding word , for my brains , and the brains of his readers ; there is not such another to be met with for the purpose . but infinity is not a thing to be made so bold with , or talk't of with such freedom and confidence , as he still does , as if it were a very familiar matter . but i say again , it is no such monstrous business to imagine , that a being which hath not every perfection , may have those it is possessed of , in the highest degree . if i cared to talk things which i understand nothing of , i could talk too of infinity ; and say , that there are several sorts of infinity : that there is infinity of substance : and infinity of quantity : and infinity of duration : and infinity of space ; and god knows how many more infinities : and could shew that there is no absurdity in saying , that all these infinities do not necessarily belong to every one of these , and i should get great reputation among wise men for my pains , should they catch me thus employing my tongue or pen. but now i think better of it , i find i am not quite so ignorant , as i thought i was ; for i can tell this gentleman , that a being can be partly infinite and partly not ; since i have learned that angels and humane souls are so : that is , with respect to the infinity of duration they are infinite à parte post , tho' not à parte antè . and what a rare notion is this ! sect. . as to the little that is here said , viz. upon the odious topick of tritheism , i referr him to my reply to the considerator , my much more ingenuous adversary , which i presume he hath read , tho' he takes no notice of it . sect. . here is nothing to be spoken to without repetitions ; and i want time to make them , and he is not in such want of sense as to need them . sect. . here he misrepresents me , and argues upon his misrepresentation . see prop. th . sect. . considering what i have said to the considerator , and already to this person , relating to the matter of this section , i shall onely observe upon it , . that i wonder how any man that hath a due awe of the infinite majesty of god upon his mind , can give himself leave to use such an expression , as tacking two persons to god the father . i scrupled a while , whether i might foul my pen with transcribing it . . he tells us that nothing can be more absurd than to say , that the . persons are one god by union , and yet are distinct from one another . but is there no difference betwixt union and identity or self samenefs ? is there not a real distinction between our souls and bodys , tho' united so closely as that he cannot conceive how closely , nor any man else ? if he shall say , that union is but another word for composition , i shall say he is extreamly out . composition being a blending or mixing of the parts of distinct things . the word is commonly used onely of heterogeneous things : spiritual substances therefore having no parts , are incapable of being compounded . and , in my poor opinion , tho' a man consists of a soul and body , he cannot be said to be compounded of them , because onely one of these hath parts . our author 't is like will cry mystery ! mystery ! to this talk ; as he despiseth trinitarians for calling the union of the three divine persons a mystery : but if even to the union of the two created beings himself consists of , he cannot seriously cry mystery , i know what i know of him . i will not say every witty man , but i am sure every wise man will cry mystery ! to every thing , as ill as some can bear that word . i confess no man shall perswade me any more than him and his friends , to swallow a palpable contradiction by calling it a mystery , till he can perswade me too that god almighty indued me with false faculties ; and then , do what i can , i am like to believe but few things more than cogito ergo sum. but i am as certain as i can be of any thing but what i see or feel , that it is not more difficult to understand this union , than abundance of other things relating to the deity , and innumerable things which our author must believe in spight of fate , if he will be a christian , or a theist , or but a man. sest . . he here banters the real trinitarians , as doing very wisely in supposing their three infinite substances , to be as close together as can be , lest there should not be room enough for them , in but one infinite space , &c. and then he enquires , if the substance of the father be every where , how the substance of the son can be every where too ? i shall be a little closer upon this gentleman for the strange liberty he takes in talking of infinite substances , as soon as i have done with his sections , than i have bin yet or will now be . in the mean time , i will be satisfied to reply thus to this section , viz. doth not this kind of talk suppose , that he takes the three divine persons ( if he thinks two of them are any thing ) to be corporeal substances ? which is so gross a conceit , and speaks such beastly stupidity , that i would charge no man therewith , who doth not expresly own it . but , hoping he doubts not of the being of spiritual substances , nor of the divine omnipresence , i ask him how the substance of god the father can be in those spaces which are filled with bodies ? or how can his soul and body , or that part of his body which his soul possesseth ( if his philosophy will permit him to think it doth not pervade the whole of his body ) how can they be , i say , in the self-same place or ubi , call it which he pleases ? surely , one would think , that several spirits may be together in the same individual space , seeing the penetrability of spirits must be acknowledg'd by all that believe there are such substances ( except they have no manner of notion of what they believe ) as well as that a spirit and an impenetrable body may be together in the same space . as to his adding [ and after the same manner ] to [ at the same time ] this can be onely for a blind . but we may talk endlesly upon this subject , and little understand one another or our selves ; for this , for certain , is one of those things , which our minds were never made for any thing like a clear perception of ; at least in these gross bodies . and much more then ( as he will be shewed anon ) is the infinity of the divine substance to be reckoned of that number . and he is an intolerably conceited fop , who will not confess so much ignorance , as to have no other idea of gods infinity , than that he hath all possible perfections , and that all his perfections are unlimited . and we are at a perfect loss what to say or think further about the divine essence . nay , we have now no cognizance of more than the modes and properties of bodily substance , we have none at all of its naked essence . all we can say of body as body , is , that 't is extended penetrable bulk . sect. . he saith , . that the trinitarians say , the persons are one god , as the soul and body are one man : and then he exposeth the folly of that simile . but he might have saved himself this little labour ; for as i never said so , so neither know i of any other trinitarian that hath . the creed indeed which is called the athenasian , saith , that as the soul and body are one man , so god and man are one christ ; but what is this to his purpose ? but what i have said , is , that the union between the three divine persons , is not more unaccountable , than is the union between the soul and body ; and that in one respect it is less unaccountable than this union , viz. because this is between beings of perfectly unlike natures ; whereas that is between persons of the same nature . and why distinct intelligent substances , which is the onely definition i can give of persons , may not be as closely united because they are all intelligent , as one intelligent substance and a body , is above the little philosophy that i can pretend to be master of , to understand . . upon the simile , of the close union of the sun with its light and heat , as he words it ; he saith , there are no such perceptions as those we call light and heat , in any beings , but those that are capable of seeing and feeling ; and that this every common systeme demonstrates : and that this is obvious to all but children and metaphysicians . what a wonderful piece of learning is here ! . light and heat perceptions ! i have heard of perceptions and sensations of light and heat , but that they are perceptions and sensations themselves , i have hitherto bin to learn. . but they are not ( tho' ) perceptions in any beings , but such as have faculties capable of seeing and feeling . and 't would be some what extraordinary , if any thing could perceive light and heat , that can neither see nor feel . yet i am a little mistaken , if heat , and light too , cannot have some operation on bodies , which have never a one of the five senses . . he saith , that every common systeme demonstrates , that there are no such perceptions as light and heat , but in things that are capable of seeing and feeling . a goodly demonstration ! but the commonness of it may make it the less observable . but it is pretty much it should be demonstrated in every common systeme , and i should never light on it in any one systeme . but 't is no matter , since i am a little too old to be a child ( unless twice one ) and then to be a metaphysician too ; for i am told to my comfort , . that this notion is obvious to all but children and metaphysicians . yet 't is obvious to this gentleman , tho' a metaphysician ; as i dare warrant him he is ( whether he knows it or no , as 't is like he does not since he so despising them ) or he could never be so notable at infinity , and other most sublime and abstruse matters . . but in good earnest , i am so dull as to be utterly unable to imagine , but that light would be light ( whatsoever is to be thought of colours ) tho' there were no eyes to perceive it : and such a heretick in philosophy ( whether i am in divinity or no ) as to think , that it is an aggregation of a certain sort of particles , as much as air is . and therefore i am not like in haste to be shamed out of the fathers simile , of emanations of light from the sun. nor do i think that our author himself , will ever be able to demonstrate any absurdity in conceiving , that heat differs onely gradually from fire , and light from both : and that fire is a fluid constituted of an excessively small sort of particles , and therefore very active , subtile and piercing ; and that a collection of these minute bodys in such a quantity , and so closely as to become an object of sight , is that which we express by the words fire and flame ; and a less close collection is what we call heat . and that flame differs from fire , as it is a more dispersed collection of these particles , than fire ; and light from both , as it is a thinner collection of them than either of the other : i say , i do not think that our author , as skilled as he is content to be thought to be in physicks ( tho' not in metaphysicks ) can demonstrate that these are absurd notions . sect. . there is nothing to be taken notice of in this very small section , but our being charged with terminating our devotions in each of the three persons in our praying to each of them . but i say , this is a very false charge ; for we as heartily acknowledg that all the honour we pay to the son , and h. spirit , ought to be ultimately terminated in god the father , tho' we believe they are not creatures , as those socinians do who are for giving divine honour to the son , believing him to be a creature and a mere man. and i am sure he cannot think otherwise , of those whom he calls the real trinitarians , because their hypothesis necessarily obligeth them so to believe , what ever the hypothesis of the other does . but the h. scripture is so express upon this point , that i should think no christian should find it hard to believe it : no , tho' there were no other text but this for it , viz. — that at the name of jesus , every knee should bow , of things in heaven , and things on earth , and things under the earth : and that every tongue should confess , that jesus christ is lord , to the glory of god the father . having now done with my adversarie's reflexions upon the . propositions , i will make bold to argue a while with himself ; and to give him a sample of his reasoning . with as infallible assurance , sir , as you talk of infinite substances , and reason against the possibility of the sons and h. spirits being infinite substances from the nature of such substances ; i never yet met with your fellow , if you will pretend to have a distinct and explicite idea of the thing call'd substance ; but i know not what epithet to give you , if you can take the liberty to tell me , that you have any such idea of infinity , as it relates immediately to a substance . you have indeed told us , that an infinite substance is that which hath no bounds or limits ; but did you think you then gave us a definition of an infinite substance ? no , you are a wiser man than so ; or than to hope that the construing of a word , would pass with any but children and fools for a definition of a thing . but suppose , sir , that i were so easy , as to accept of boundlesness and unlimitedness for a definition , or description of infinity , yet i should ( ten to one ) put this question ( whether an easy one or no ) what is the infinity of a substance ? you will not say , this is an easy question because answered already , viz. that the infinity of a substance , is the boundlesness thereof ; for you know you must tell us what a substance is , before you can make us the wiser , by discoursing upon infinite substances , or the infinity of a substance . if you will now be defining this thing called substance , by certain of its properties , i cannot for bear proceeding to ask , what is the subject of these properties ? or , what is substance considered abstractedly from all accidents ? if you tell me , it is something that doth substare accidentibus , and needs no support it self , i must be satisfied with this answer , since i know you will not attempt to give a better . but however i will not be discouraged , from asking on a while longer , tho' you should give me the proverb for my pains : and this question next occurrs , viz. since an insinite substance is something that hath no bounds , must it not reach to all the dimensions of infinite space , which you were up with in your th . section ? one might be tempted to think , that after you had said absolutely , as you did sect. . there can be no bound or end of what is infinite , you will grant this ; for if it were extended through the length and breadth of a million of worlds , if there be so many , this would not speak it to have no bound or end ; since all these worlds put together will not fill a boundless space . but then i ask what is space ? or ( to speak a little learnedly ) what is the ratio formalis of space ? and you have a ready answer for me , viz. 't is vacuity or emptiness . then demand i , what kind of thing is emptiness ? and you have an answer at hand to this too , viz. 't is an imaginary thing . and when i have asked , what is a mere imaginary thing ? i am much mistaken , if a man of your head-piece will in the least hesitate at replying , a mere imaginary thing , is a real nothing . and then , sir , this is your disinition of an infinite substance , it is a thing that is of equal extent with an infinite nothing . but hold ! cry you , who gave you leave thus to ask me questions , and then to answer them as you list for me ? i would have told you , that my phrase without bounds or limits , is not to be taken so strictly , as to surpass the space which holds all worlds . but , sir , will this answer do ? is , after all your arguing from the infinity of the divine substance , your notion of it onely this , that it is as much without bounds as gods creature the universe ? and can this consist with your having asserted , that 't is a contradiction to say , that there can be more than one infinite being ? but i foresee you will go near to reply , my notion thereof is far from being so scanty a one as you imagine ; for i hold , that the infinity of the divine substance , consists in its power to extend its presence thro' all the parts of new worlds , as they are created ; which god almighty can if he pleases create to all eternity . but then say i , will you pretend , sir , to have any the least idea , how the divine substance can do this ? and is not this dilatation and farther expansion thereof , think you , capable of being made as ridiculous and contradictory a thing , by such a wit as yours , as you think you have made emanations from thence to be ? i know you cannot but be aware , that it is certainly so . and therefore let the reader judg , what prodigious monstruous presumption it is , excuse me if i am now a little warm , to draw most confident conclusions from premises , which are unspeakably above the reach of humane understandings ; as the gentleman i have now bin socratically talking with , must confess the premises are , from which he hath argued against me . nay , they must be above the comprehension of all finite , as well as humane understandings ; or nothing is so . for my part , i dare not trust my shallowness with two thoughts upon such a subject as this of infinite substances , nor of an infinite substance neither . i have a distinct notion of a being absolutely perfect , and beings of unlimited perfections , tho' infinitely short of a comprehensive one , and therefore i chose to use onely such expressions in my propositions . and because these are in some measure adapted to humane capacities , the deity is every where described in h. scripture , by its glorious perfections of wisdom , power , goodness , mercy , righteousness and purity ; and by its most wonderful exertions and displayings of them in the creation : and by these are the son and h. spirit described there as well as god the father . wherefore i could not without mighty regret critizare cum cr●tensi ( taking the phrase , for paying our author in his own coyn ) as i now did , had i not so good a design therein , as to expose the folly and madness of the liberty which he and others take , with the most profoundly adorable deity . can such persons read those questions of zophar , without astonishment , which he put to job , ch. . , &c. canst thou by searching find out god ? canst thou find out the almighty to perfection ? it is as high as heaven , what canst thou do ? deeper than hell , what canst thou know ? the measure thereof is longer than the earth , and broader than the sea. and now i have done with this author , as well as with his reflexions ; who must not take it unkindly , that i have been so plain with him ; there being not the least of ill-will in it , but the greatest good-will i am sure . and notwithstanding we differ so mightily in our sentiments , i wish him as well as i do my self . if any do expect that i will be still replying on , as i am farther attackt , they 'l find themselves disappointed , unless such objections shall happen to be offered , against the hypothesis of the fathers , the non-absurdity of which i endeavour to desend , as have not yet appeared . and if such hereafter appear , as upon impartial consideration i shall think convictive , i will not ( by god's grace ) be ashamed to confess that i have bin in an errour . but rather shall think , i cannot do my self a greater honour , as i cannot do a greater right to truth , than by publishing a recantation . but i will not be so idle , as to contend for the last word with such men as i know will never yield it me ; i mean those who will not distinguish between dicibile & dicendum , what it is possible to say and what ought to be said ; but will adventure to say any thing , and turn every stone , and put their wits to their utmost stretch , to invent replys and rejoynders , rather than let their pens rest ; and much more , rather than they 'l own the least mistake . and where-ever i find a deal of art and subtilty , and mightily laboured oppositions , defences or provings , i cannot but suspect , that the desire of victory , and the encreasing or upholding of a party , or mens great opinion of their own understandings , have very much the ascendent of the love of truth . but how may the learned socrates shame the self-conceited dogmatizers ? who would not acknowledg that the oracle could have any other reason to pronounce himself the wisest of all men , but because he knew how ignorant he was ; and did not think he knew , what indeed he did not . and how may those words of s paul , lay the plumes of these gnosticks , viz. if any man thinketh he knoweth any thing , ( or prideth himself in an opinion of his being a knowing person ) he knoweth nothing yet , as he ought to know . and it is certain , that the more sincerely and impartially inquisitive any man is after truth , the less stiff , opiniative and pertinacious he will be ; and the less confident of those notions which are very disputable : because such a man is no less acquainted , with the strongest objections against them , than with the best arguments for them . and the more extensive knowledge any one hath acquired , the more vigorously sensible will he be , that he knows but very little . nor is any man in a capacity of perceiving such shallowness and emptiness in his mind , as he who is surnished with the largest stock of the most useful knowledge . the more we know of the deity , and the stupendious works of creation and providence , with the greater amazement shall we cry out with holy job , how little a portion is heard of him ! how little am i capable of understanding , either of him or them ! and the more a man hath enquired into the works of nature , the more conscious will he be to himself , how extreamly little he hath bin able to discover , even of the most despised things ; and such as the vulgar take for granted , to have nothing belonging to them , that will afford any matter for enquiry . there is no such antidote therefore against pride , as the most substantial and comprehensive knowledg , whereas nothing makes a man so conceited and self-assuming , as a small smattering of learning . and there are no such masters of reason ( in their own opinion ) as such men. the most ancient fathers , when they han't the good luck to be of these mens mind , are old dunces ; and as nothing is the truer for their saying it , so neither is it one jot the more like to be true . nor is novelty and objection to them , against the probability of any darling opinion . how much rather would i be modest socrates , than a christian who so leans to his own ( or his parties ) understanding . in what i have now bin saying , i cannot for bear thinking , of more denominations than one of professors of christianity . but yet i have bin far from reflecting upon all of any denomination . i am not such a censurer . god give us all more humility . the end . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e dr. cudworth , and dr. bull. notes for div a -e orat. ● . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a seasonable vindication of the b. trinity being an answer to this question, why do you believe the doctrine of the trinity? : collected from the works of the most reverend, dr. john tillotson, late lord archbishop of canterbury, and the right reverend dr. edward stillingfleet, now lord bishop of worcester. tillotson, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing t estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a seasonable vindication of the b. trinity being an answer to this question, why do you believe the doctrine of the trinity? : collected from the works of the most reverend, dr. john tillotson, late lord archbishop of canterbury, and the right reverend dr. edward stillingfleet, now lord bishop of worcester. tillotson, john, - . stillingfleet, edward, - . assheton, william, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed for b. aylmer ..., london : . compiled by w. assheton. cf. bmc. reproduction of original in the university of illinois (urbana-champaign campus). library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a seasonable vindication of the b. trinity . being an answer to this question , why do you believe the doctrine of the trinity ? collected from the works of the most reverend , dr. john tillotson , late lord archbishop of canterbury . and the right reverend , dr. edward stillingfleet , now lord bishop of worcester . london : printed for b. aylmer , at the three pigeons against the royal exchange in cornhill . mdcxcvii . the preface . our modern socinians ( who are pleased to call themselves unitarians ) having not only disputed , but most blasphemously ridiculed the doctrine of the b. trinity ; for the conviction of such gainsayers , and the confirmation of others , it is thought fit to publish the following discourse , faithfully collected from the learned works of archbishop tillotson , and bishop stillingfleet . concerning bishop stillingfleet , i shall say nothing , because he is alive to answer for himself . but as to archbishop tillotson , i hope it will appear even from this collection , that his grace was very far from being a socinian ; however his memory hath been very unworthily reproached in that , as well as other respects , since his death . a vindication of the b. trinity . q. why do you believe the doctrine of the trinity ? a. because it is a very rational doctrine , that is , there is the highest reason to believe it . q. what do you mean by this word trinity ? and , what doctrines concerning it are proposed to our belief ? a. i shall answer this question in the very words of the church of england ; whose doctrine , i am fully perswaded , is orthodox and catholick . there is but one living and true god , everlasting , without body , parts , or passions ; of infinite power , wisdom and goodness , the maker and preserver of all things both visible and invisible . and in unity of this godhead there be three persons , of one substance , power and eternity ; the father , the son , and the holy ghost . art. . the catholick faith is this , that we worship one god in trinity , and trinity in unity ; neither confounding the persons ; nor dividing the substance . for there is one person of the father , another of the son , and another of the holy ghost . but the godhead of the father , of the son , and of the holy ghost is all one ; the glory equal ; the majesty coeternal . the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god. and yet they are not three gods , but one god. athan. creed . it is very meet , right , and our bounden duty , that we should at all times , and in all places give thanks unto thee , o lord almighty , everlasting god. who art one god , one lord ; not one only person , but three persons in one substance . for that which we believe of the glory of the father , the same we believe of the son , and of the holy ghost , without any difference or inequality . pref. on the feast of trinity . o holy , blessed and glorious trinity , three persons and one god , have mercy upon us miserable sinners . lit. this is what we believe concerning the trinity . and that this is very rational doctrine ; and that we have the highest reason thus to believe , i shall endeavour to evince , when i have first explained the nature of faith in general , by shewing , what it is to believe ; and what this act believe doth denote when applied to any object . q. what is faith , or belief in general ? a. belief in general i define to be , an assent to that which is credible as credible . v. bishop pearson on the creed , p. . q. what is meant by this word assent ? a. by the word assent is expressed that act or habit of the understanding , by which it receiveth , acknowledgeth , and embraceth any thing as a truth , id. ib. q. but are there not several other kinds of assent , besides faith , by which the soul doth receive and embrace whatsoever appeareth to be true ? a. this assent , or judgment of any thing to be true , being a general act of the understanding , is applicable to other habits thereof as well as to faith. id. ib. q. how then is this assent which we call faith , specified and distinguished from those other kinds of assent ? a. it must be specified as all other acts are , by its proper object . id. ib. q. what is this object of faith ? a. this object of faith is that which is credible as credible . q. why do you repeat the word credible , and say credible as credible ? a. to denote the twofold object of faith , viz. material and formal . q. what is the material object of faith ? a. the material object of faith , is the thing to be believed , or something which is credible . q. what is the formal object of faith ? a. that whereby it is believed , or the reason why it is believed . q. what is it to be credible ? a. that is properly credible , which is not apparent of it self ( either in respect of our senses or understanding ) nor certainly to be collected , either antecedently by its cause , or reversely by its effect , and yet though by none of these ways , hath the attestation of a truth . v. bishop pearson , p. . q. what then is that kind of assent , which is called faith ? a. when any thing propounded to us is neither apparent to our sense , nor evident to our understanding in and of it self ; neither certainly to be collected from any clear and necessary connexion with the cause from which it proceedeth , or the effects which it naturally produceth ; nor is taken up upon any real arguments or relations to other acknowledged truths ; and yet notwithstanding appeareth to us true , not by a manifestation but attestation of the truth ; and so moveth us to assent , not of it self , but by virtue of the testimony given to it . in plain terms ; when we therefore acknowledge a thing to be true , for this only reason , because we are told that it is so : then , and in such a case we do properly believe it . and the assent that we give to such a truth thus attested , is neither science nor opinion , but faith. id. ib. q. the nature of faith in general being thus explained , i am now prepared to be instructed by you in this important question ; why do you believe the doctrine of the trinity ? a. though this doctrine of the trinity , viz. that there are three distinct persons in one and the same undivided divine essence , is neither apparent to my sense , nor evident to my understanding ( for being a great mystery , i could never have known it , unless it had been revealed ; and now it is revealed , i am not able to comprehend it ) yet since it is testified and declared by an all-knowing , and most just and faithful god , who can neither deceive nor be deceived , i do therefore give my assent unto it , as a most credible truth , and as such , i do firmly believe it . now that god , who is infinite in wisdom and knowledge , doth fully know himself , and perfectly understand his own nature : and also , that he who is infinitely good and faithful cannot deceive us ( for it is impossible for god to lye ) this i shall not pretend to prove , but can fairly suppose it , as being granted by the socinians themselves . the only thing therefore for us to prove , and which they deny , is this , viz. that the doctrine of the trinity is revealed by almighty god. for if we can make it appear , that an infinitely wise and faithful god hath revealed it ; we shall then easily convince them , that there is the highest reason to believe it . q. how then do you prove that god hath revealed it ? where hath god told us , that there are three distinct persons , in the same undivided divine essence and nature ? a. were i to discourse an atheist , or a deist , then , since all conviction must be ex concessis , i ought to prove these two things , . the possibility and necessity of divine revelation . . that the books of the old and new testament , which by way of eminency we call the scriptures , do contain this divine revelation . and that in these books god hath revealed so much of his own nature , as is necessary for us to know in order to our salvation . but since these unitarians do profess themselves christians , and consequently to believe the holy scriptures , i shall have so much charity for ▪ them at present , as to suppose it : and shall treat them as such . and then the only thing i am to prove , is this , viz. that the doctrine of the trinity is revealed in the scriptures . q. but neither the word trinity , nor the word person are to be found in scripture . how then can you pretend to prove a trinity of persons from the scriptures ? a. though neither the word trinity , nor perhaps person , in the sense in which it is used by divines when they treat of this mystery , be any where to be met with in scripture ; yet it cannot be denied but that three are there spoken of by the names of father , son , and holy ghost , in whose name every christian is baptized , and to each of whom the highest titles and properties of god are in scripture attributed . and these three are spoken of with as much distinction from one another , as we use to speak of three several persons . so that though the word trinity be not found in scripture , yet these three are there expresly and frequently mentioned . and trinity is nothing but three of any thing . and so likewise though the word person be not there expresly applied to father , son , and holy ghost ; yet it will be very hard to find a more convenient word whereby to express the distinction of these three . for which reason i could never yet see any just cause to quarrel at this term. for since the holy spirit of god in scripture hath thought fit in speaking of these three to distinguish them from one another , as we use in common speech to distinguish ▪ three several persons , i cannot see any reason why in the explication of this mystery , which purely depends upon divine revelation , we should not speak of it in the same manner as the scripture doth . and though the word person is now become a term of art , i see no cause why we should decline it , so long as we mean by it neither more nor less than what the scripture says in other words . v. archbishop tillotson's sermon on tim. . . p. . here then i fix my foot : that there are three differences in the deity , which the scripture speaks of by the names of father , son , and holy ghost , and every where speaks of them as we use to do of three distinct persons . and therefore i see no reason why in this argument we should nicely abstain from using the word person . id. sermon ii. on john . . p. . q. you confess then that the word trinity is not to be found in scripture . however , ( may these unitarians reply ) have you not found it in the athanasian creed ? and because the church of england hath owned this creed , by taking it into her liturgy , that you may approve your selves true sons of the church , therefore , say they , you are resolved to defend it . v. pref. to mr. milb . p. . a. we assert three persons in the godhead , not because we find them in the athanasian creed ; but because the scripture hath revealed that there are three , father , son , and holy ghost , to whom the divine nature and attributes are given . this we verily believe , that the scripture hath revealed ; and that there are a great many places , of which we think no tolerable sense can be given without it , and therefore we assert this doctrine on the same grounds , on which we believe the scriptures . and if there are three persons which have the divine nature attributed to them ; what must we do in this case ? must we cast off the unity of the divine essence ? no , that is too frequently and plainly asserted for us to call it into question . must we reject those scriptures which attribute divinity to the son and holy ghost , as well as to the father ? that we cannot do , unless we cast off those books of scripture , wherein those things are contained . v. bishop stillingfleet's vind. of the trinity , p. . q. but is it not trifling to prove a doctrine by scripture , which ( as the socinians pretend ) is contrary to reason ? it being a known rule ( which i shall express in the words of bishop stillingfleet ) that , whatever speaks a direct repugnancy to any of the fundamental dictates of nature , cannot be of divine revelation . v. orig. sacr. p. . for the law of nature , and of right reason , imprinted in our hearts , is as truly the law and word of god , as is that which is printed in our bibles . v. bishop sanderson's ser. . ad cl. p. . and therefore since truth is never contrary to it self , is it not impertinent to prove this doctrine of the trinity by the scriptures , which is not only above reason , but plainly contrary to it ? a. as to its being above reason , which they are loth to admit any thing to be ; this i think will bear no great dispute : because if they would be pleased to speak out , they can mean no more by this , but that our reason is not able fully to comprehend it . but what then ? are there no mysteries in religion ? that i am sure they will not say , because god , whose infinite nature and perfections , are the very foundation of all religion , is certainly the greatest mystery of all other , and the most incomprehensible . but we must not , nay they will not for this reason deny , that there is such a being as god. and therefore if there be mysteries in religion , it is no reasonable objection against them , that we cannot fully comprehend them : because all mysteries , in what kind soever , whether in religion , or in nature , so long , and so far as they are mysteries , are for that very reason incomprehensible . vid. archbishop tillotson , serm. ii. on joh. . . p. . i desire it may be considered , that it is not repugnant to reason to believe some things which are incomprehensible by our reason ; provided that we have sufficient ground and reason for the belief of them : especially if they be concerning god , who is in his nature incomprehensible ; and we be well assured that he hath revealed them . and therefore it ought not to offend us , that these differences in the deity are incomprehensible by our finite understandings ; because the divine nature it self is so , and yet the belief of that is the foundation of all religion . there are a great many things in nature which we cannot comprehend , how they either are , or can be . id. ser. on tim. . . pag. . for my own part , i confess it to be my opinion , that we converse every day with very many things , none of which we comprehend . who is he that comprehends either the structure , or the reason of the powers of seminal forms or seeds ? or how the parts of matter hold together ? or how , being in their own nature lifeless and sensless , they do ( for all that ) in some positures and textures , acquire life , sensation , and even volition , memory and reason ? or how the sun and other vast heavenly fires subsist for so many ages , without any nourishment or fuel ; which fire , of all other bodies , most requires ? or how , when the sun arrives at the tropicks , he never goes further , either northward or southward , but returns towards the equator , and thereby preserves the world by his vital warmth ? v. consider . on the trinity , to h. h. p. . there are many things likewise in our selves , which no man is able in any measure to comprehend , as to the manner how they are done and performed . as the vital union of soul and body . who can imagine by what device or means a spirit comes to be so closely united , and so firmly link'd to a material body , that they are not to be parted without great force and violence offer'd to nature ? the like may be said of the operations of our several faculties of sense and imagination , of memory and reason , and especially of the liberty of our wills. and yet we certainly find all these faculties in our selves , though we cannot either comprehend or explain the particular manner in which the several operations of them are performed . and if we cannot comprehend the manner of those operations , which we plainly perceive and feel to be in our selves , much less can we expect to comprehend things without us ; and least of all can we pretend to comprehend the infinite nature and perfections of god , and every thing belonging to him . thus you see , by these instances , that it is not repugnant to reason to believe a great many things to be , of the manner of whose existence we are not able to give a particular and distinct account . and much less is it repugnant to reason to believe those things concerning god , which we are very well assured he hath declared concerning himself , though these things by our reason should be incomprehensible . and this is truly the case as to the matter now under debate . we are sufficiently assured that the scriptures are a divine revelation , and that this mystery of the trinity is therein declared to us . now that we cannot comprehend it , is no sufficient reason not to believe it . for if it were a good reason for not believing it , then no man ought to believe that there is a god , because his nature is most certainly incomprehensible . but we are assured by many arguments that there is a god ; and the same natural reason which assures us , that he is , doth likwise assure us that he is incomprehensible ; and therefore our believing him to be so , doth by no means overthrow our belief of his being . in like manner , we are assured by divine revelation of the truth of this doctrine of the trinity : and being once assured of that , our not being able fully to comprehend it , is not reason enough to stagger our belief of it . a man cannot deny what he sees , though the necessary consequence of admitting it , may be something which he cannot comprehend . one cannot deny the frame of this world which he sees with his eyes , though from thence it will necessarily follow , that either that or something else must be of it self : which yet is a thing , which no man can comprehend how it can be . and by the same reason a man must not deny what god says , to be true ; though he cannot comprehend many things which god says : as particularly concerning this mystery of the trinity . it ought then to satisfy us that there is sufficient evidence , that this doctrine is delivered in scripture , and that what is there declared concerning it , doth not imply a contradiction . for why should our finite understandings pretend to comprehend that which is infinite , or to know all the real differences that are consistent with the unity of an infinite being ; or to be able fully to explain this mystery by any similitude or resemblance taken from finite beings ? v. archbishop tillotson's serm. on tim. . . p. . great difficulty i acknowledge there is in the explication of it , in which the further we go , beyond what god hath thought fit to reveal to us in scripture concerning it , the more we are entangled ; and that which men are pleased to call an explaining of it , does , in my apprehension , often make it more obscure , that is , less plain than it was before . which does not so very well agree with a pretence of explication . id. ser. on joh. . . p. . and therefore , though some learned and judicious men may have very commendably attempted a more particular explication of this great mystery by the strength of reason , yet i dare not pretend to that , knowing both the difficulty and danger of such an attempt , and mine own insufficiency for it . all that i ever designed upon this argument , was to make out the credibility of the thing from the authority of the holy scriptures ; without descending to a more particular explication of it than the scripture hath given us : lest by endeavouring to lay the difficulties which are already started about it , new ones should be raised , and such as may , perhaps , be much harder to be removed , than those we have now to grapple withal . nor indeed do i see that it is any ways necessary to do more ; it being sufficient that god hath declared what he thought fit in this matter , and that we do firmly believe what he says concerning it to be true , though we do not perfectly comprehend the meaning of all that he hath said about it . id. ser. on tim. . . p. . q. but these unitarians do urge the matter much further , and pretend ; that this mystery of the trinity , now under debate , is not only above reason , but plainly contrary to reason . for thus they expostulate with the bishop of worcester . he utterly mistakes ( to give you their own words ) in thinking , that we deny the articles of the new christianity , or athanasian religion , because they are mysteries , or because we do not comprehend them ; we deny them , because we do comprehend them ; we have a clear and distinct perception , that they are not mysteries , but contradictions , impossibilities , and pure nonsense . v. consid. on expl. of the trinity , in a letter to h. h. p. . now what reply hath his lordship made to this ? a. this is a very bold charge , and not very becoming the modesty and decency of such , who know at the same time that they oppose the religion publickly established , and in such things which they look on as some of the principal articles of the christian faith. v. vind. of the trinity . p. . these words contain in them so spiteful , so unjust , and so unreasonable a charge upon the christian church in general , and our own in particular , that i could not but think my self concerned , especially since they are addressed to me , to do what in me lay ( as soon as my uncertain state of health would permit ) towards the clearing the fundamental mystery of the athanasian religion , as they call it , viz. the doctrine of the trinity , which is chiefly struck at by them . v. pref. p. . q. 't is a seasonable service to the christian church in general , and our own in particular , that a person so eminent for learning and prudence , hath at this juncture undertaken the defence of the b. trinity . but in what manner doth his lordship propose to defend it ? a. without running into any new explications , or laying aside any old terms , for which he could not see any just occasion . for however thoughtful men may think to escape some particular difficulties better , by going out of the common roads ; yet they may meet with others , which they did not foresee , which may make them as well as others judge it , at last , a wiser and safer course to keep in the same way , which the christian church hath used ever since it hath agreed to express her sense in such terms , which were thought most proper for that purpose . why then are new explications started , and disputes raised and carried on so warmly about them ? we had much better satisfy our selves with that language which the church hath received ▪ and is expressed in the creeds , than go about with new terms , to raise new ferments , especially at a time , when our united forces are most necessary against our common adversaries . no wise and good men can be fond of any new inventions , when the peace of the church is hazarded by them . and it is a great pity , that any new phrases , or ways of expression , should cause unreasonable heats among those who are really of the same mind . vtd. pref. p. . and . and vind. p. . q. but how can these unitarians pretend , that the doctrine of the trinity is contrary to reason ? how , and in what manner have they attempted to prove it ? what grounds have they for such a charge as this , of contradiction and impossibility ? a. i shall draw up the charge in their own words : theirs , they say , is an accountable and reasonable faith , but that of the trinitarians is absurd , and contrary both to reason and to it self ; and therefore not only false but impossible . but wherein lies this impossibility ? that they soon tell us . because we affirm that there are three persons , who are severally and each of them true god , and yet there is but one true god. now , say they , this is an error in counting or numbring , which when stood in , is of all others the most brutal and inexcusable ; and not to discern it , is not to be a man. v. hist. of the unit. p. . n. . for we cannot be mistaken in the notion of one and three ; we are most certain that one is not three , and three are not one. v. def. of hist. of unit. p. . so that here is an arithmetical , as well as grammatical contradiction . for , in ▪ saying , god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost , yet not three gods , but one god ; a man first distinctly numbers three gods , and then in summing them up , brutishly says , not three gods , but one god. v. acts of athanasius , p. . which is plainly , as if a man should say , peter , james , and john being three persons , are one man ; and one man is these three distinct persons , peter , james and john. is it not now a ridiculous attempt , as well as a barbarous indignity , to go about thus to make asses of all mankind , under pretence of teaching them a creed ? v. notes on athanasius's creed , p. . this is their charge . and 't is very freely spoken , with respect , not merely to our church , but the christian world ; which owns this creed to be a just and true explication of the doctrine of the trinity . but there are some creatures as remarkable for their untoward kicking , as for their stupidity . v. bishop of worcester's defence of the trinity , p. . it is strange boldness in men to talk thus of monstrous contradictions in things above their reach . but some have so used themselves to the language of jargon , nonsense , contradiction , impossibility , that it comes from them , as some men swear , when they do not know it . id. p. . but that the rudeness of these unitarians , in thus condemning the christian church , may more fully appear , let us proceed very distinctly to examine this matter . do you therefore , first , give their objection its full strength , and then , through divine assistance , i 'll return you my answer . q. are not peter , james , and john , three distinct humane persons ? a. 't is granted . q. are not peter , james , and john , three distinct different men ? a. who doubts it ? q. is it not a contradiction to say , that peter is james , or that james and john are peter ? a. this likewise must be acknowledg'd . q. is it not a contradiction to affirm , that peter , james and john , being three men , are but one man ? and is it not equally absurd to declare , that one man is these three men ? a. sure i cannot be mistaken in the notion of one and three . but am most certain , that one is not three , and three are not one. but what of all this ? q. observe what follows . are not the father , the son , and the holy ghost ( according to the athanasian creed ) three distinct different divine persons ? a. i firmly believe it . q. and if these three divine persons , father , son and holy ghost , are three gods , is it not a contradiction to say , there is but one god ? a. to say , there are three gods , and yet but one god , is doubtless a contradiction . but who affirms , there are three gods ? q. doth not the athanasian creed ? a. no. that creed expresly saith , there are not three gods , but one god. q. if you will not renounce your reason , i do thus prove it to you . the father is god , there is one. the son is god , there is two. the holy ghost is god , there is three . are not here three gods ? do you think me such a fool , that i cannot count , one , two , and three ? a. thus indeed the unitarians do wisely argue . but can these men of sense and reason think , that the point in controversy ever was , whether in numbers , one could be three , or three one ? if they think so , i wonder they do not think of another thing ; which is , the begging all trinitarians for fools ; because they cannot count one , two and three ; and an unitarian jury would certainly cast them . one would think such writers had never gone beyond shop-books ; for they take it for granted , that all depends upon counting . but these terrible charges were some of the most common and trite objections of infidels . st. augustin mentions it as such when he saith ; the infidels sometimes ask us , what do you call the father ? we answer , god. what the son ? we answer , god. what the holy ghost ? we answer , god. so that here the infidels make the same objection , and draw the very same inference . then , say they , the father , son , and holy ghost , are three gods. but what saith st. augustin to this ? had he no more skill in arithmetick , than to say , there are three , and yet but one ? he saith plainly that there are not three gods. the infidels are troubled , because they are not inlightned ; their heart is shut up , because they are without faith. by which it is plain , he look'd on these as the proper objections of infidels , and not of christians . but st. augustin doth not give it over so . when you begin to count , saith he , you go on ; one , two and three . but when you have reckon'd them , what is it you have been counting ? the father is the father , the son the son , and the holy ghost , the holy ghost . what are these three ? are they not three gods ? no. are they not three almighties ? no. they are capable of number as to their relation to each other ; but not as to their essence , which is but one . v. bishop stillingfleet's vindic. of the trin. p. . will men never learn to distinguish between numbers and the nature of things ? for three to be one is a contradiction in numbers ; but whether an infinite nature can communicate it self to three different subsistences , without such a division as is among created beings , must not be determined by bare numbers , but by the absolute perfections of the divine nature ; which must be owned to be above our comprehension . id. serm. on tim. . . p. . this is plain and convincing to all modest unprejudiced persons . but it seems our unitarians are not thus to be convinced : who do further object ; that it is as ridiculous to affirm ; that the father , the son , and the holy ghost , being three persons , are one god ; as it is to say , that peter , james , and john , being three persons , are one man. q. if i rightly apprehend them , their argument is this . three human persons are three men , therefore three divine persons are three gods. and this they repeat with great triumph in several of their pamphlets . what answer therefore can you return to this ? a. how can any man of sense be satisfied with such kind of arguments as these ? one would think , they wrote only for such as would take their words ; they join so much confidence with so very little appearance of reason . for is not this great skill in these matters , to make such a parallel between three persons in the godhead , and peter , james and john ? do they think there is no difference between an infinitely perfect being , and such finite limited creatures as individuals among men are ? do they suppose the divine nature capable of such division and separation by individuals , as human nature is ? q. no , they may say , but ye who hold three persons must think so . a. for what reason ? we do assert three persons , but it is on the account of divine revelation , and in such a manner , as the divine nature is capable of it . for it is a good rule of boethius , talia sunt praedicata , qualia subjecta permiserint . we must not say that there are persons in the trinity , but in such a manner as is agreeable to the divine nature ; and if that be not capable of division and separation , then the persons must be in the same undivided essence . id. vind. p. . so that herein lies the true solution of the difficulty , by considering the difference between the humane and divine nature . the humane nature , being finite , is capable of division , multiplication and separation . but the divine nature , being infinite , is not capable of any division , multiplication and separation . now the divine essence is that alone which makes god ; that can be but one , and therefore there can be no more gods than one. but because the same scripture , which assures us of the unity of the divine essence , doth likewise join the son and holy ghost in the same attributes , operations and worship , therefore as to the mutual relations , we may reckon three , but as to the divine essence , that can be no more than one. here then is the true reason why we affirm ; that three human persons , peter , james , and john , are three men ; and yet three divine persons , the father , the son , and the holy ghost , are but one god , because , the divine essence is not capable of such division and separation , as the human nature is . id. p. , & . q. this is full , and to the purpose ; and hath given great satisfaction to my self , as well as others . but is there nothing further objected against the doctrine of the b. trinity , wherein i may be instructed by you ? a. there is an objection lately started ; and i wonder you have not charged me with it . q. pray let me hear it ? a. 't is this . three divine substances are three gods. but three divine persons , are three divine substances . therefore , three divine persons are three gods. this hath most insultingly been repeated by our unitarians , and hath made no little noise in their late papers and pamphlets . q. who revived this old objection , and how came it now to be brought again upon the stage ? a. to understand this matter rightly , we must consider that when the socinian pamphlets first came abroad , some years since , a learned and worthy person of our church , who had appeared with great vigour and reason against our adversaries of the church of rome in the late reign ( which ought not to be forgotten ) undertook to defend the doctrine of the trinity against the history of the unitarians , and the notes of the athanasian creed : but in the warmth of disputing , and out of a desire to make this matter more intelligible , he suffer'd ▪ himself to be carried beyond the ancient methods ▪ which the church hath used to express her sense by , still retaining the same fundamental article of three persons in one undivided essence , but explaining it in such a manner , as to make each person to have a peculiar and proper substance of his own . v. bishop of worcester's pref. to vind. of trin. p. . q. let me hear the opinion of that learned person more distinctly . a. in short it is this : that the same author asserts , ( . ) that it is gross sabellianism to say , that there are not three personal minds , or spirits , or substances . ( . ) that a distinct substantial person must have a distinct substance of his own , proper and peculiar to his own person . but he owns , that although there are three distinct persons , or minds , each of whom is distinctly and by himself god , yet there are not three gods , but one god , or one divinity . which he saith , is intirely , and indivisibly , and inseparably in three distinct persons or minds . that the same one divine nature is wholly and intirely communicated by the eternal father , to the eternal son , and by the father and son to the eternal spirit , without any division or separation ; and so it remains one still . v. modest exam. p. , , , . this is the substance of this new explication , which hath raised such flames , that injunctions from authority were thought necessary to suppress them . v. pref. p. . q. pray tell me your thoughts with freedom . is this explication of the trinity , by three distinct infinite minds and substances , orthodox , or not ? a. now to deal as impartially in this matter as may be , i do not think our understandings one jot helped in the notion of the trinity by this hypothesis ; but that it is liable to as great difficulties as any other . q. you begin then to suspect his explication . a. none ought to be fond of it ; or to set it against the general sense of others , and the currant expressions of divines about these mysteries : nor to call the different opinions of others heresy or nonsense , which are provoking words , and tend very much to inflame mens passions , because their faith and understanding are both call'd in question , which are very tender things . v. pref. p. . q. is it then your opinion , that this hypothesis , of three distinct substances in the trinity , can scarce be defended ? a. i fear it will be impossible to clear this hypothesis as to the reconciling three individual essences with one individual divine essence ; which looks too like asserting , that there are three gods , and yet but one. id. p. . q. will you please to explain this more fully , that i may better understand it ? a. can one whole entire indivisible substance be actually divided into three substances ? for if every person must have a peculiar substance of his own , and there be three persons , there must be three peculiar substances . and how can there be three peculiar substances , and yet but one entire and indivisible substance ? i do not say , there must be three divided substances in place , or separate substances ; but they must be divided as three individuals of the same kind , which must introduce a specifick divine nature , which i think very inconsistent with the divine perfections . ib. p. . q. but every person must have his own proper substance , and so the substance must be divided if there be three persons . a. that every person must have a substance to support his subsistence is not denied . but the question is ; whether that substance must be divided , or not ? we say , where the substance will bear it , as in created beings , a person hath a separate substance ; that is , the same nature diversified by accidents , qualities , and a separate existence . but where these things cannot be , there the same essence must remain undivided ; but with such relative properties as cannot be confounded . v. vind. p. . when we speak of finite substances and persons , we are certain that distinct persons do imply distinct substances , because they have a distinct and separate existence . but this will not hold in an infinite substance , where necessary existence doth belong to the idea of it . id. p. . q. but say our unitarians , a person is an intelligent being : and therefore , three persons must needs be three intelligent beings . so true it is , that whosoever acknowledges three persons in the godhead ( if he takes the word in its proper sense ) ▪ must admit three gods. which the learned doctor cannot avoid , who says they are three distinct minds , three substantial beings , three intelligent beings : therefore unavoidably three gods. v. defence of hist. of unit. p. . a. the full and adequate definition of a person ( from which the learned doctor doth . draw his argument , and the unitarians their objection ) is not this , as they suppose , viz. a person is an intelligent substance . for this is but part of the definition . but the full and adequate definition of a person is this . a person is a compleat intelligent substance , with a peculiar manner of subsistence . so that , an individual intelligent substance , is rather supposed to the making of a person , than the proper definition of it . for a person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another intelligent substance in the same nature : and therefore the foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of subsistence , which agrees to one , and to none else of the kind ; and this is it which is called personality . which doth not consist , i say , in a meer intelligent being , but in that peculiar manner of subsistence in that being , which can be in no other . so that the proper reason of personality , whereby one person is constituted and distinguished from another , it is the peculiar manner of subsistence , whereby one person hath such properties as are incommunicable to any other . v. vind. p. , & . from these premises we are instructed , why in the blessed trinity , the father , the son , and the holy ghost , are three persons , and yet but one god. the reason is this , god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost , are but one god ; because the divine essence , nature , and substance , which alone makes god , is intirely one , and is not capable of any separation , multiplication or division . therefore , there can be no more gods than one. but since these three , father , son , and holy ghost , have each of them a peculiar manner of subsistence ; that is , each of these three hath a peculiar property , incommunicable to any other ; therefore as to their mutual relations and personalities they are three , but as to the divine essence and godhead , they are but one. and this is so far from being contrary to reason , as the socinians pretend , that it is highly rational to believe , a trinity in unity . that is , three distinct persons , and yet but one god. as i hope hath been fully proved , and that to your satisfaction . q. before you talk too much of satisfaction , you must answer me a question . a. what is it ? q. do you believe transubstantiation ? a. no , i do not . but what 's this to the purpose ? will you not allow me to believe the trinity , unless i will believe transubstantiation ? and must i renounce the trinity , because i reject transubstantiation ? q. the unitarians pretend that the case is parallel . a. pray give me their objection in their own words ; and then i shall instruct you , what answer to return to these men of sense and reason . q. i find that the belief of a trinity does contradict reason as much as transubstantiation . now who should not scruple an opinion perfectly parallel with transubstantiation , and equally fruitful in incongruities and contradictions ? well then , if the trinity implies no less contradiction than transubstantiation ; why can't we say , that it cannot be contained in scripture ? we say , transubstantiation cannot be found in scripture , because it is a plain contradiction to our reason ; but if the trinity be also a plain contradiction to our reason , why shan't we be allowed to say , that it cannot be contained in scripture ? v. def. of brief hist. of unit. p. , and . but oh ! were the press as free for the unitarians , as 't is for other protestants ; how easily would they make it appear , that the follies and contradictions so justly charged on transubstantiation ; are neither for number , consequence , nor clearness , any way comparable to those implied in the athanasian creed ; and that the trinity hath the same , and no other , foundation with transubstantiation ? so that we must of necessity admit both , or neither . v. acts of athanasius , p. . this is the sum of what they object . to which i expect an answer according to your promise . a. as preparatory to a just answer , i cannot but observe , how exactly these socinians do symbolize with the papists . for as on the one hand , they of the church of rome are so fondly and obstinately addicted to their own errors , how mishappen and monstrous soever , that rather than the dictates of their church , how absurd soever , should be called in question , they will question the truth even of christianity it self : and if we will not take in transubstantiation , and admit it to be a necessary article of the christian faith , they grow so sullen and desperate that they matter not what becomes of all the rest : and rather than not have their will of us in that which is controverted , they will give up that which by their own confession is an undoubted article of the christian faith , and not controverted on either side : in like manner ; these unitarians are so impertinently zealous in their designs against the trinity , that rather than admit that fundamental article of the christian faith , they will plead for transubstantiation ; and this even contrary to the light and dictate of their own conscience . for the socinians are hearty enemies to transubstantiation , and have exposed the absurdity of it with great advantage . v. arcbishop tillotson ' s serm. on tim. ii. . p. . q. have you nothing further to say in this matter ? a. you must give me leave to add ; i did not expect to have found this parallel so often insisted upon , without an answer to two dialogues purposely written on that subject , at a time when the doctrine of the trinity was used as an argument to bring in transubstantiation , as that is now now alledged for casting off the other . but i must do them that right to tell the world , that at that time a socinian answer was written to those dialogues , which i saw , and wished it might be printed , that the world might be satisfied about it and them . but they thought fit to forbear . and in all their late pamphlets where this parallel is so often repeated , there is but once , that i can find , any notice taken of those dialogues , and that in a very superficial manner : for the main design and scope of them is past over . v. vind. of trinit . p. . and i must needs remind these unitarians , that it is not fair nor scholar-like , so insultingly to repeat the parallel between the trinity and transubstantiation , which hath been so fully confuted in those two dialogues . q. you promised an answer , and you bring me a challenge : which i shall send to the unitarians . who indeed are obliged , in point of honour , to give satisfaction , by a just reply to those two dialogues . a. if they would consult their reputation , and credit their cause , they ought not to defer it . for those two dialogues were writ by an author , who ( to give you the very words of an unitarian ) hath all the properties , for which an adversary may be either feared , or reverenced . he understands perfectly the doctrine of the church ; and the points in question . he will commit no oversights through ignorance , hast , or inadversion . he is too experienced and judicious to hazard his cause , as others have lately done , on the success of a half-thought hypothesis , a crude invention , a pretty new querk . in a word , we can only say of him , since there is no remedy , contenti simus hoc catone . v. consid . &c. in a letter to h. h. p. . such an adversary as this is worthy the pens of their ablest writers . if therefore at this juncture , when the press is open , these unitarians shall not answer those dialogues , i must with freedom tell them , it is not because they dare not , but because they cannot . q. leaving these unitarians to defend their parallel at their leasure ; let me now hear your answer which you were pleased to promise . a. i shall endeavour to return a more particular answer to this objection ; and such a one as i hope will satisfy every considerate and unprejudiced mind , that after all this confidence and swaggering of theirs , there is by no means equal reason either for the receiving , or for the rejecting of these two doctrines of the trinity and transubstantiation . vid. archbishop tillotson's serm. on tim. ii. . p. . q. first ; let us examine , whether there be equal reason for the belief of these two doctrines ? a. if this suggestion of theirs be of any force , we must suppose that there is equal evidence and proof from scripture for these two doctrines . q. how do you prove there is not ? a. from the confession of our adversaries themselves . for several learned writers of the church of rome have freely acknowledged , that transubstantiation can neither be directly proved , nor necessarily concluded from scripture . but this the writers of the christian church did never acknowledge concerning the trinity , and the divinity of christ ; but have always appealed to the clear and undeniable testimonies of scripture for the proof of these doctrines . and then the whole force of the objection amounts to this ; that if i am bound to believe what i am sure god says , though i cannot comprehend it ; then i am bound by the same reason to believe the greatest absurdity in the world , though i have no manner of assurance of any divine revelation concerning it . q. you think then , that as there is not equal reason for the believing , so neither is there equal reason for the rejecting of these two doctrines . a. this the objection supposes ; which yet cannot be supposed but upon one or both of these two grounds . either . because these two doctrines are equally incomprehensible . or , . because they are equally loaded with absurdities and contradictions . q. as to the first ; is not the trinity as incomprehensible as transubstantiation , and as such equally to be rejected ? a. it is not good ground of rejecting any doctrine , merely because it is incomprehensible ; as i have abundantly shewed already . but besides this , there is a wide difference between plain matters of sense , and mysteries concerning god. and it does by no means follow , that if a man do once admit any thing concerning god which he cannot comprehend , he hath no reason afterwards to believe what he himself sees . this is a most unreasonable and destructive way of arguing , because it strikes at the foundation of all certainty , and sets every man at liberty to deny the most plain and evident truths of christianity , if he may not be humoured in having the absurdest things in the world admitted for true . the next step will be to persuade us , that we may as well deny the being of god , because his nature is incomprehensible by our reason , as deny transubstantiation because it evidently contradicts our senses . id. ib. p. . q. as transubstantiation evidently contradicts our senses ; so these unitarians pretend , that the trinity as evidently contradicts our reason . and then , say they , are not these two doctrines loaded with the like absurdities and contradictions ? a. so far from this , that the doctrine of the trinity , as it is delivered in the scriptures , and hath already been explained , hath no absurdity or contradiction either involved in it , or necessarily consequent upon it . but the doctrine of transubstantiation is big with all imaginable absurdity and contradiction . as the unitarians themselves do acknowledge : and therefore i am not now concerned to prove it . q. however you are concerned to defend the trinity . the contradictions and absurdities of which ( as these unitarians pretend ) are as great as those of transubstantiation . a. i cannot help their pretences . but if their prejudices will allow them to examine my reasons , i shall yet further endeavour their conviction . and that i may do it the more effectually , i shall desire you ( as their advocate , and in their name ) to produce those absurdities which appear the most dreadful . q. i shall reduce all to these two , which comprehend the rest . . how there can be three persons , and but one god. . how these can agree in a third , and not agree among themselves . for the first , it seems very absurd , that there should be three persons really distinct , whereof every one is god , and yet there should not be three gods. for nothing is more contradictious , than to make three not to be three ; or three to be but one. a. i hope now you will give me leave to make an answer to your difficulty , as distinct as possible . it is very true , that according to arithmetick , three cannot be one , nor one three . but we must distinguish between the bare numeration , and the things numbred . the repetition of three units , certainly makes three distinct numbers ; but it doth not make three persons to be three natures . and therefore as to the things themselves , we must go from the bare numbers to consider their nature . we do not say , that three persons are but one person , or that one nature is three natures ; but that there are three persons in one nature . if therefore one individual nature be communicable to three persons , there is no appearance of absurdity in this doctrine . and on the other side , it will be impossible there should be three gods , where there is one and the same individual nature . for three gods must have three several divine natures , since it is the divine essence which makes a god. v. two dial. part. ii. p. . but of this there hath been given so full an account in this collection , that those who shall seriously and attentively consider it , will , i hope , through god's blessing , receive satisfaction . q. but yet you have not answer'd the other great difficulty in point of reason , viz. that those things which agree or disagree in a third , must agree or disagree one with the other . and therefore if the father be god , the son god , and the holy ghost god ; then the father must be son and holy ghost , and the son and holy ghost must be the father . if not , then they are really the same , and really distinct ; the same as to essence , distinct as to persons ; and so they are the same , and not the same , which is a contradiction . a. now i think you have drawn out the most refined spirits of socinianism , to make the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation parallel , because , you say , it implies a contradiction ; which is the nearest parallel you have yet offered at . but this terrible argument is grounded on this mistaken supposition , viz. that the divine essence is no more capable of communicating it self to three distinct persons , than any created being is . the reason of that axiom being , that created things , by reason of their finite nature , cannot diffuse or communicate themselves to more than one ; and therefore those which agree in a third , must agree together . but supposing it possible that the same finite nature could extend it self to several individuals , it would be presently answered ; the axiom did hold only , where they did adequately and reciprocally agree , and not where they did agree only in essence , but differ'd in the manner of subsistence . for where a different manner of subsistence is supposed possible , in the same individual nature , the agreement in that cannot take away that difference which is consistent with it ; which we attribute to the unlimitedness and perfection of the divine nature . q. but you can bring no other instance but the thing in question ; and therefore this is a petitio principii , or taking that for granted which is in dispute . a. i do not think it to be so , where the reason is assigned from the peculiar properties of the divine nature , to which there can be no parallel . and i think it very unreasonable in the socinians , to send us to created beings for the rules and measures of our judgment , concerning a being acknowledg'd to be infinite . q. are not the divine persons infinite , as well as the divine nature ? and therefore as created persons do take in the whole nature , so infinite persons will do the infinite nature . a. no question , but the persons are infinite in regard of the nature which is so ; but if an infinite nature be communicable to more persons than one , every such person cannot appropriate the whole nature to it self . q. if the difference be on the account of infinity , then there must be an infinite number of persons in the divine essence . a. i answer ; that infiniteness of number is no perfection ; and as to the number of persons , we follow not our own conjectures , nor the authority of the church ; but divine revelation , which hath assured us , that there is but one god , and yet there are three that are one. which depends not merely on the place of st. john , but the form of baptism is remarkable to this purpose ; which joyns together the father , the son , and the holy ghost ; without any other distinction besides that of order and relation : and it is against the fundamental design of christianity , to joyn any created beings together with god in so solemn an act of religion . and st. paul joyns them together in his benediction : the grace of our lord jesus christ , and the love of god ▪ and the communion of the holy ghost be with you all . amen . cor. . . from whence the christian church hath always believed a trinity of persons in the unity of the divine nature . v. two dial. part ii. p. . the close . the unitarians themselves cannot deny , that many things certainly are , the particular manner of whose existence we can neither comprehend nor explain . therefore , though the particular manner of the existence of these three differences or persons in the divine nature , expressed in scripture by the names of father , son , and holy ghost , is incomprehensible by our finite understandings , and inexplicable by us ; that is , though the manner of the union and distinction between them , is above our reach and comprehension ; yet considering the infinite perfections of the divine nature , which are so far above our reach , god may justly oblige us to believe those things concerning himself , which we are not able to comprehend . and of this , i hope , i have given a sufficient account in the foregoing discourse . finis . the contents . the doctrine of the trinity is a very rational doctrine . p. what is meant by this word trinity , and what doctrines concerning it are proposed to our belief ? what is faith or belief in general ? why we believe the doctrine of the trinity ? how it can be proved that god hath revealed it ? object . neither the word trinity , nor the word person are to be found in scripture . answer'd . object . 't is the doctrine of the athanasian creed , therefore , the clergy of the church of england are resolved to defend it . answer'd . object . 't is above reason . answ. 't is not repugnant to reason to believe some things which are incomprehensible by our reason . object . 't is contrary to reason . answ. object . three divine persons , are three divine substances , therefore three gods. answ. the parallel between the trinity and transubstantiation largely considered . the close . catalogue of some books printed for b. aylmer . a conference with an anabaptist . being a defence of infant-baptism . in vo . price d. a theological discourse of last wills and testaments . in vo . price d. a discourse concerning a death-bed repentance . price d. a seasonable vindication of the b. trinity . being an answer to this question , why do you believe the doctrine of the trinity ? collected from the works of the most reverend , dr. john tillotson , late lord archbishop of canterbury . and the right reverend , dr. edward stillingsteet , now lord bishop of worcester . price d a short exposition ( of the preliminary questions and answers ) of the church catechism . being an introduction to a defence of infant-baptism . price d. directions in order to the suppressing of debauchery and prophaneneness . d. a discourse against blasphemy . being a conference with m. s. concerning . the rudeness of atheistical discourse . . the certainty and eternity of hell-torments . . the truth and authority of the holy scripture . d. a discourse against . drunkenness . . swearing and cursing . d. the plain man's devotion . part . being a method of daily devotion , fitted to the meanest capacities . d. the plain man's devotion . part . being a method of devotion for the lord's-day . d. these are the price of each of these small books single ; but for the encouragement of those that are so charitably inclined to give away some quantities of them , they may have them at ten shillings a hundred , at brab . aylmer ' s , in cornhill . these above , all writ by the reverend william assheton . d. d. six sermons concerning the divinity and incarnation of our blessed saviour ; his sacrifice and satisfaction : and of the unity of the divine nature in the b. trinity . by his grace , john , late lord archbishop of canterbury . in vo . certain propositions by which the doctrine of the h. trinity is so explained , according to the ancient fathers , as to speak it not contradictory to reason . a second defence of the propositions . both by edward , lord bishop of glocester . a brief exposition on the creed , the lord's prayer , and ten commandments . to which is added the doctrine of the sacraments . by isaac barrow , d. d. and late master of trinity college , cambridge . this on the creed never before published : being very different from the volume of sermons on it . in vo . now in the press . a defence of the blessed trinity . by isaac barrow , d. d. never before printed . price s. notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e interrogant enim nos aliquando infideles , & dicunt , patrem quem dicitis , deum dicitis ? respondemus deum . filium quem dicitis , deum dicitis ? respondemus deum . spiritum sanctum quem dicitis , deum dicitis ? respondemus deum . ergo inquiunt , pater & filius , & spiritus sanctus tres sunt dii . respondemus , non. turbantur , quia non illuminantur , cor clausum habent quia clavem fidel non habent . aug. in job . tr. . ubi cogitare coeperis , incipis numerare : ubi numeraveris , quid numeraveris , non potes respondere . pater , pater est ; filius filius ; spiritus sanctus , spiritus sanctus est . quid sunt isti tres ? non tres dii ? non. non tres omnipotentes ? non , sed unus omnipotens . hoc solo numerum insinuant , quod ad invicem sunt , non quod ad se sunt . id. ib. the mystery of christ in us, with the mystery of the father, word, and holy ghost or spirit, opened also, the parable of the rich man's flocks and herds, and the poor man's ewe-lamb, explicated. likewise, the way that christ takes to undo a man, and take away his life. together with a discovery of the neerness of christs coming, and of those glorious things which are to be fulfilled in these later days. set forth and published by ed. hide jun. hyde, edward, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (thomason e _ ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing h thomason e _ estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; :e [ ]) the mystery of christ in us, with the mystery of the father, word, and holy ghost or spirit, opened also, the parable of the rich man's flocks and herds, and the poor man's ewe-lamb, explicated. likewise, the way that christ takes to undo a man, and take away his life. together with a discovery of the neerness of christs coming, and of those glorious things which are to be fulfilled in these later days. set forth and published by ed. hide jun. hyde, edward, - . [ ], p. printed by ja. cottrel, for giles calvert, at the black spread-eagle at the west-end of pauls, london : . ed. hide jun. = edward hyde. annotation on thomason copy: "may. ". reproduction of the original in the british library. eng jesus christ -- meditations -- early works to . christian life -- early works to . trinity -- early works to . holy spirit -- symbolism -- early works to . god -- knowableness -- early works to . a r (thomason e _ ). civilwar no the mystery of christ in us, with the mystery of the father, word, and holy ghost or spirit, opened: also, the parable of the rich man's fl hyde, edward c the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the c category of texts with between and defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - robyn anspach sampled and proofread - robyn anspach text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the mystery of christ in us , with the mystery of the father , word , and holy ghost or spirit , opened . also , the parable of the rich man's flocks and herds , and the poor man's ewe-lamb , explicated . likewise , the way that christ takes to undo a man , and take away his life . together with a discovery of the neerness of christs coming , and of those glorious things which are to be fulfilled in these later days . set forth and published by ed. hide jun. rom. . , , , . sam. . , , , , , , . joh. . , . psal. . , , , , , , . isa. . , . zech. . , . zech. . , , , . london , printed by ja. cottrel , for giles calvert , at the black spread-eagle at the west-end of pauls . . to the reader . christian reader , before i was stirred up to set pen to paper in this following treatise , i found in my spirit such a contrariety to it , that i resolved within my self i would write no more . but within a little while after , i found the spirit of god to have such violent , strong , and powerful influence upon me , that i could not withstand it , but write . and besides , i had no peace and quietness in my spirit , till i had unloadened my spirit , and finished this work : for i had this dashed into my spirit , write . but no sooner was it dashed in , but i went and consulted with flesh and blood , and so questioned it , whether it was from the lord , or no . and after some further clearings of it up by the lord to my spirit , i was forced to lie down under the truth , power , and authority of it . within a while after , there were divers places of scripture given in unto me , with the minde , interpretation , and meaning thereof ; which i was to write , and which i have in this discourse inserted . two things therefore i do desire of you in the reading of this discourse : first , that you would not pass censure upon it , till you have thorowly examined and tried what is written , lest you pass sentence upon the truth , and so be found an opposer of it . the second is this : that you would not judge nor take that for error , that doth not sute with your judgements or apprehensions : this is the weakness of many professors in our age ; if their judgments and lights cannot comprehend a thing , they look upon that thing to be erroneous : they measure truth according to their capacity ; it is not truth no further then they can reach it : this very thing hath made many to withstand truth ; as for example , our priests and others , how often have they withstood truth , meerly upon this ground ! weigh what is written , ponder it in your heart and spirit : if you cannot comprehend what is written , be silent , do not resist it ; it may be , you may have a discoverie of that you never had before ; haply what is written , may meet with some of your hearts and spirits ▪ here are waters to the ancles , to the knees , to the loyns ; a river that cannot be passed over , a fountain that will never be dry ; waters to wade in , to swim in ; living waters , waters of life ; healing waters , pure waters ; waters to drown man in , to bury man in : do not despise these waters , wait on them ; you know not but that an angel from heaven may come down and put you into them , and involve you in them : there is one in this discourse , it may be , may meet with you ; if he doth , he will rob you of all your goods , wit , parts , gifts , understanding , knowledge , wisdom , power ; he will quite undo you , yea , take away your life . if you meet with one that doth this , do not forget to return praises to him ; wait , it may be you may have that great doubt resolved , christ in you , whom you have so much expected from heaven & from the deep : if you have , exalt the lord , not me . it may be , you may meet with some discoveries of the father , word and spirit , or water , blood and holy ghost , and of their several testimonies ; if you do , praise him that lives for ever and ever , not me . it may be , god may meet with you in a parabolical way and manner , as he did david , and make you pass sentence upon your self , in passing sentence upon another , and condemn you out of your own mouth that you have sinned ; if he doth , magnifie the lord , not me . it may be , jesus christ may steal like a theef into your hearts by this discourse , with greater power and glory then ever he hath done heretofore : if he doth , be sure to return praises unto him , not to me . it may be , god may make mention of rahab and babylon to you , in this discourse ; it may be he may call you to behold philistia and tyre , with ethiopia , & tell you that this man was born there : if he doth , admire the lord , not me . it may be , you may have a discoverie of that glory that is to be revealed in these latter days , and is in this discourse set down : who would resist and withstand therefore ? who would not wait , seeing there is no safety in resisting , but in patiently waiting ? then resist rather say , ah lord , there may be truth in this discourse , though i cannot comprehend it ; and it is madness in men , to withstand and speak evil of that they know not , nor are able to comprehend : reveal it , discover it , that i may praise thee ; then he will discover it to thee . here is no need of the sun , moon , stars , candle , and temple ; for the lord god almighty , and the lamb , are the temple thereof , and the glory of god did lighten them , and the lamb is the light thereof : and there shall be no night there , and they need no candle , neither light of the sun ; for the lord god giveth them light . i look for some to scoff , laugh , and jeer at me , and that which i have written ; to slight and scorn me , and what is written , as i am sure the priests and others will . do , slight , scorn , laugh and jeer at me and what i have written ; see what you will get by it in the end ; see what will be the issue of it . and i look for others to finde fault with me , and speak evil and reproach me , and be angry with me for what i have written . others i look should say that i go backward and forward in what i write , and contradict my self . i look that others haply should say , that i write scatteringly , meanly , and not learnedly , but poorly . i care not what they say , i weigh it not ; i desire to speak not in the eloquence of mans wisdom , but in the plainness of the spirit : and as for their scoffs , jeers , laughters , evil speakings , and reproaches , i weigh them not likewise ; they are my portion , i rejoyce in them all , if there were as many more of them : i shall and do count them my crown , and shall and do not think my self worthy of them . i know whom i have believed , whose i am ; not mens , not sins , not satans , but the lords , in the truth that is after godliness , edvv. hide junior ▪ chap. i. some sweet discoveries of christ in us , out of rom. . , , , , ▪ vers . . but the righteousness which is of faith , speaketh on this wise : say not in thine heart , who shall ascend into heaven ? that is , to bring christ down from above . . or , who shall descend into the deep ? that is , to bring up christ again from the dead . . but what saith it ? the word is nigh thee , even in thy mouth , and in thy heart ; that is the word of faith which we preach , . that if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the lord jesus , and shalt believe in thine heart that god hath raised him from the dead , thou shalt be saved . in the thirtieth and one and thirtieth verses of the ninth chapter to the romanes , there are two nations spoken of ; that is to say , the gentiles and the jews . the gentiles were those which followed not after righteousness , yet had attained to righteousness , even the righteousness which is of faith : and the jews , otherwise israel , were those which followed after the law of righteousness , but had not attained to the law of righteousness . the first reason of it , is set down in verse . wherefore ? because they sought it not by faith , as the gentiles did , but as it were by the works of the law . the second reason of it , is , because they stumbled at that stumbling stone , v. . as it is written , behold , i lay in sion a stumbling stone , and rock of offence ; and whosoever believeth on him , shall not be ashamed . jesus christ is a great stumbling block , and rock of offence , to those professors that do not openly nor professedly , but , as it were , seek righteousness by the law . quest . but what is it to seek righteousness , as it were , by the law ? answ. it is to seek righteousness partly by believing , and partly by doing . those that do so , stumble at christ , and know not what to make of him , and are offended at him ; and , in the end , they split themselves against him , just as those glorious professors the scribes and pharisees did , by reason of their not knowing him . now in the first verse of the tenth chapter to the romanes , paul tells his brethren the jews what a hearty desire he had , and how he prayed that they might be saved : brethren , my hearts desire and prayer to god for israel is , that they might be saved . and the reason of this prayer , he tells them ▪ vers. . for i bear them record , that they have a zeal of god , but not according to knowledge . they were mighty zealous for god , but it did not proceed from true knowledge : as the scribes and pharisees were mighty zealous and strict in keeping the sabbath , praying , giving of alms , and the like ; but it proceeded not from a right knowledge , it did not proceed from a true principle . and there are many zealots in our days , oh how full of zeal they are for god , in praying , speaking , preaching , and the like ! but yet not agreeable to true knowledge . and the reason of this is in the third verse : for they being ignorant of gods righteousness , and going about to establish their own righteousness , have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of god . as the not seeking righteousness by faith , keeps those from attaining to the law of righteousness , that follow after the law of righteousness : so ignorance of gods righteousness makes many go about to establish their own , and so by that means do not subject to god's righteousness . in the fourth verse , paul sheweth , that christ is the end of the law , for righteousness , to every one that believeth : which the glorious israelites , scribes and pharisees , follow after , thinking to be justified thereby . the righteousness of which law , moses describes in the fifth verse , that the man which doth those things shall live in them . which saying , satan , many times , makes use of against poor souls , thereby to stir them up to follow after the righteousness of the law : and he makes use of it thus : saith satan , if you do the things that the law commands you , you shall live by them : this is scripture saith the devil , if you perform the law , you shall live ; for there is life wrapped up , in keeping of the law : and poor souls set upon the keeping of it , and trouble , and perplex , and wear out themselves ; and the more they strive to keep it , the further off are they from keeping of it ; and the devils design in it , is , to keep poor souls from submitting to the righteousness of god ; the devil knowing well , that as many as are of the works of the law , are under the curse ; for it is written , cursed is every one that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law , to do them , gal. . , . and that no man is justified by the law , in the sight of god , is evident : for the just shall live by faith , now in the . ver. which is that i intend to speak to , paul describes the righteousness of faith : but the righteousness which is of faith , speaketh on this wise , say not in thine heart , who shall ascend into heaven ? that is , to bring christ down from above , &c. the words are the voice of the righteousness which is of faith ; they are what the righteousness of faith speaketh : and there are in the words , these things to be considered : first , what faith is . secondly , what the voice of the righteousness of faith is . thirdly , what it speaks . fourthly , to whom it speaks . the first thing to be considered , is , what faith is ; that is , what the faith of christ is , as it is in the original . it is a supernatural divine work of god , upon the spirit , which enables the soul to believe above all that natural faith and hope that is in the soul , and above all fear and questionings , and against all grounds that are in the soul to the contrary : it is that which letteth us into god , into the righteosness of god ; it is the key that unloks the cabinet where righteousness is , and lets us in into the mysteries of the kingdom : gal. . , . know ye therefore , that they which are of faith , the same are the children of abraham , and are blessed with faithful abraham . or , faith in this place may be taken for christ ; gal. . . but before faith came , we were kept under the law , shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed . the second thing to be considered , is , what the righteousness which is of faith is . it is the righteousness which is by believing . but what is the righteousness which is by believing ? it is the righteousness of god . but you will ask me , what is that ? see in rom. . , . whom god hath set forth to be a propitiation , through faith in his blood , to declare his righteousness , for the remission of sins that are past , through the forbearance of god ; to declare , i say , at this time his righteousness , that he might be just , and the justifier of him which believeth in jesus . his righteousness consisteth in this , in that he can remit sin , and yet be faithful ; in that he can justifie the ungodly , and yet be just : or the righteousness of faith is the righteousness of christ ; for faith is called christ , as i said before ; he is made of god unto us , wisdom , sanctification , justification , redemption , righteousness , and the like . but what is the righteousness of christ ? or in what doth the matter of it consist ? in the active and passive obedience of christ ; that is , in what he hath done and suffered for us . the third thing to be considered , is , what the voice of the righteousness of faith is , or what it speaketh . it speaketh these following things ; that is to say , say not in thine heart . that is , do not speak secretly . it speaks this to us , our readiness to speak that secretly , which haply we would not speak openly , that others may take notice of what we say . quest . but what should i not say in my heart ? answ. these two things following : first , who shall ascend into heaven ? what is that ? that is , to bring down christ from above . we are ready to speak it in our hearts , though not in our mouthes , who shall ascend into heaven ? we want christ ; he is not in our hearts ; surely he is in heaven ; and our souls are troubled with care for one to go up into heaven , to fetch him down into our hearts : o how we have endeavoured to fetch him down , by prayer and striving ! as i my self have done : o how i have gaped for him to come down from heaven into my mouth and heart , when i was many times praying ! and when i could do no good this way , i have been much inquisitive in my spirit for one to fetch him down from out of the skies , and out of the deep , into my heart . answ. . say not in thine heart , who shall descend into the deep ? what is that ? that is , to bring up christ again from the dead . for want of a feeling of christ within us , we are ready to say in our hearts , though not with our mouthes , who shall descend into the deep ? we conclude many times in our spirits , that either he is in the heavens , or in the deep . but first , we are carried out , with much care , for one to fetch him from above : and if jesus christ come not down from thence into our hearts , then we conclude he is not there , but in the deep ; and we are very inquisitive who shall fetch him from the dead . we think that either he is above us , or beneath us , among the dead in the grave , in hell . sometimes we think he is risen , and ascended above ; and sometimes we think that he is not . thus much for that which the righteousness of faith would have us not say . now we are to speak of that which the righteousness of faith saith . what is that ? first , the righteousness of faith saith , the word is nigh thee . but what word ? the word of faith , which we preach ▪ what word is that ? christ . why is he called the word of faith ? because he it is that begets faith in souls . the righteousness of faith saith , that word is nigh thee . oh that god would give us ears to hear : it is good news that the righteousness of faith speaks . we will hear thee what thou sayst , therefore speak , lord . the word is nigh , whom ? thee , us , them , him , her , all . friends , christ is nigh us ; he is on our right hand , and on our left hand ▪ though we see him not , job . . the word of god is nigh us . but why is christ called the word of god in scripture ? because , as the word of a man is that whereby a man expresseth himself , his minde : so christ is called the word of god in this respect ; he is the minde of the father expressed . that by which we know the minde of a man , is his words ; that by which we know the minde of god , is by his word . so that christ is the minde of god discovered ; the word is god made known , revealed : this word was god , and was with god , joh. . . christ is called the word of truth likewise in scripture : who hath begotten us to himself by the word of truth . but why is he called the word of truth ? because he begets truth in the soul . this word is nigh thee . how nigh me ? very nigh thee : deut. . . for the word is very nigh unto thee . where is it ? in thy mouth . i do not finde him there . though you do not , yet he is there . secondly , he is in thine heart . i do not feel him there , and therefore he is not there . that will not follow : he is there , though you feel him not : that jesus which you look for from above and beneath , is exceeding nigh to thee , even in thy mouth , and in thine heart ; he is as nigh as possible can be : he is not far from every one of us , acts . . we many times disquiet our selves for one to fetch him from above , and from the deep ; whenas , poor souls , our christ is within us . we are carried out after more sense then faith ; and that is the reason that we no longer then we feel christ to be in us , do conclude him to be in our hearts . the next thing to be enquired into , is , to whom the voice of the righteousness of faith speaketh . that is , to those , who , by reason of the want of feeling jesus christ within them , are carried out to enquire who shall ascend into the heavens , and who shall descend into the deep , to fetch christ from thence into their hearts : which were the jews , israel , and , in them , the saints : and the words indeed are spoken , to prevent all objections in them , and others , against this truth , christ in them . and there is not an objection that they can make , or that we and others can make , but it is there answered . the voice of the righteousness of faith speaks so fully to all objections , that i cannot but subscribe to the truth of what it saith , that christ is in me : i am forced to do it , by reason i have nothing to say against the truth ; though my base heart , together with the devil , is ready to question every truth of god , though it be never so plain . the words being explicated , there will arise naturally this corollary ; that is to say , that there is an aptitude in the spirits of those who feel not the lord jesus within them , to enquire who shall ascend into heaven , or who shall descend into the deep , to fetch christ from thence into their spirits , whenas christ is within them . this is clear from the words . the grounds of this doctrine are two : . ignorance . . unbelief . first , ignorance . we are ignorant of the omnipresencie of christ , that he is present in every place , and in our hearts , as in every place . i have heard many professors subscribe to this truth , but yet have denied it a truth in their particular souls . secondly , unbelief . we cannot believe that he is in our hearts : we will give christ a being in every place , but not in our hearts . the cause of unbelief , is ignorance : we are ignorant of this truth , christ in us , and therefore cannot believe it . if it be so , that there is a readiness in those who feel not the lord jesus in them , to enquire who shall ascend into heaven , and who shall descend into the deep , to fetch christ from thence into their hearts ; then say not in your hearts , who shall ascend , and who shall descend , to fetch christ from heaven and the deep , into your hearts : it is the voice of the righteousness of faith . why do you say so ? what is the reason of it ? because , saith the soul , i do not injoy him , nor possess him within me . how do you know that you do not injoy him ? because i feel him not : i should feel him within me , if he were there . poor soul , he may be within thee , though thou feelest him not ; and it is thy being carryed out after more feeling then faith , that blindes thine eyes . . if it be so , this may serve to discover what manner of spirit we are of ; it discovers the baseness of our spirits , that though the righteousness of faith saith , say not in your hearts , who shall go up into heaven , and who shall go down into the deep , to fetch christ from thence into our hearts ; yet we will say so , and do say so often in our hearts , though we have no ground to say so , seeing christ is within us . a second corollary from the words , is this : that that christ which we take care for , who shall ascend into the heavens , and who shall descend into the deep , to bring him into our hearts , is within us , even in our hearts . this is cleer from the words : they enquired , who shall ascend , and who shall descend , to bring christ into their hearts ; whenas he was within them . to prove this truth further , we shall bring divers places of scripture : see that in joh. . . abide in me , and i in you : he speaks to his disciples that were offended at his fleshly departure from them : and that in joh. . . i in them , and thou in me : and then that in cor. . . examine your selves , whether ye be in the faith : prove your own selves : know ye not your own selves , how that jesus christ is in you , except ye be reprobates ? that is , unapproved , or rejected . as if the apostle should say , you are reprobates , if christ be not in you : and therefore he puts them upon trying & proving whether he be in them or no . and that in eph. . . one god and father of all who is above all , and through all , and in you all . and that in joh. . ye are of god , little children , and have overcome them ; because greater is he that is in you , then he that is in the world ; speaking of christ , that he is in us , and is stronger then he that is in the world , which is the devil . it is very sweet to consider this well ; and the right consideration of it , will take away the fear that is many times in our spirits of the devil , and of christ not being in us . and that in gal. . . i am crucified with christ , nevertheless i live ; yet not i , but christ lives in me . i am crucified , and yet i live . this is a paradox , a strange thing : how can a man be crucified , and yet live ? the meaning of it is , he was crucified to the world , and lived to god . and in psal. . . god is in the midst of her ; she shall not be moved . friends , god will not suffer us to be moved away from the hope of the gospel , but will help , and that early , when a temptation seizeth upon us , because he is in the midst of us . and that in jerem. . . why shouldst thou seem to be as a man amazed with us , and as a mighty man that cannot save us ? they ask god this question ; yet , that is , though it be so , thou art in the midst of us , thou art neer to us , we are called by thy name : that is , we are thine , and therefore leave us not . just so , poor souls many times say to god , when he seems to their souls as a man amazed , and as one that cannot save them ; why art thou so , lord ? tell us the reason of it : notwithstanding this , thou art in the midst of us ; thou art ours , and we are thine ; we are called by thy name ; do not forsake us . and that in zeph. . . the just lord is in the midst thereof , ( speaking of his sanctuary : ) he will not do iniquity , that is , sin . friends , the holy lord is within us : see the fifteenth verse : the lord is in the midst of thee ; thou shalt not see evil any more . therefore , in the fourteenth verse , he calls upon his people to sing : sing , o daughter of zion ; shout , o israel ; be glad and rejoyce with all the heart , o daughter of jerusalem . is not this good news ? friends , why do ye not sing and shout for joy , seeing the lord is within you ? and in the seventeenth verse he speaks of the same thing : the lord thy god in the midst of thee ; or , he that is thy god , is in the midst of thee : he is mighty ; that is , he is strong ; he will save thee ; nothing shall hinder him , neither sin nor devils : he will rejoyce over thee with joy ; that is , he will spend his joy upon thee ; thou shalt have his joy ; he will love thee , and he will rest in that love ; he will lie down and take his ease in that love wherewith he hath loved thee : he will not onely rejoyce over thee with joy , but he will joy over thee with singing : he will sing and joy over thee ; thou shalt be the subject of his joy and rejoycing . now in the sixteenth verse it is said , in that day it shall be said to jerusalem , fear thou not , i am in the midst of thee ; and to zion , let not thy hands be slack ; that is , be not unbelieving . the reason why i mentioned all these places of scripture , was , that so the objections might be fully satisfied concerning this truth , christ in them . if it be so , that that christ which we take care for , who shall ascend into the heavens , and who shall descend into the deep , to bring him into our hearts , is within us , that is , in our hearts : then , friends , be peswaded of this truth , that christ is within you . but who is it that saith , that christ is within us ? the righteousness of faith and the scriptures say so , that he is in us , in the midst of us , nigh to us , even in our hearts . o glorious truth ! o excellent truth ! this is sweet , sweet . but you seem to make no difference between christ's being in all the world , and his being in the saints . yes but i do ; there is a great deal of difference . he is in all the world more generally ; he is in his saints more particularly . if it be so , then this may serve to discover this truth to us : o how pitiful ignorant many professors are of this truth , christ in them ! how ready are they to disclaim it , and put it away from them , and not to own it , by teason of their not knowing and ignorance of it ! friends , do ye believe it ? is it a truth to your souls ? then why do you not rejoyce and sing ? why are ye sad , seeing the lord god , in the midst of you , is mighty . if it be so , wait upon god , till he reveal his son in you . paul did not know christ to be in him , before god revealed him : when it pleased god to reveal his son in paul , then paul knew him to be in him . no man knows the son , but he to whom the father will reveal him : therefore desire the father to reveal him in you . if it be so , awake him not , till he please . cant. . . i charge you , o ye daughters of jerusalem , by the roes and hindes of the field , that ye stir not up , nor awake my love , till he please . and cant. . . he speaks of the like thing , we are ready to awake the lord , and stir him up , when he doth not please : we are not contented that he should awake when he pleaseth . if he doth not awake when we would awake him , and discover himself in us and to us , then we are discontented and troubled at it . the spouse chargeth the daughters of jerusalem not to do it , by the roes and hindes of the field : the meaning is , the spouse doth call the very dumb creatures to witness against stirrers up of christ ; and we are charged also not to do it . and therefore , friends , take heed , be patient ; wait , wait , till he is pleased to make known himself in you . if it be so , then take heed of conferring with flesh and blood , ( which is men , or the fleshly part of the soul ) when he doth please to reveal himself . this we are ready to do , and then immediately we question whether it be true or no , that he is within us . paul saith , gal. . , that he consulted not with flesh and blood , when he had adiscovery of christ in him , whether it was true or no . if ye go to ask flesh and blood the truth of your discoveries , it will tell you , that all your discoveries of christ are false . have a care therefore of going to flesh and blood : so soon as ever you have a manifestation of christ in you , flesh and blood will make you question all your discoveries of christ ; and the reason is , because it is an enemy to the soul . if it be so , that christ is within us , then let us confess him with our mouthes ; this is our duty , to confess him : whom ? jesus christ . how confess him ? to be within us . where ? in our hearts . that which is required on our parts , is , i say , to confess him to be within us : that if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the lord jesus , he is in us ; it is so , it is no lye . whether we confess it , or no , this is the true saying of the righteousness of faith ; and therefore let us confess him . object . but , may some say , how shall i confess him , when i do not know whether or no he is in me ? whether you know , or do not know it , he is there . but i cannot acknowledge it , saith the soul . why cannot you acknowledge it ? because i do not feel him to be within me : nay , surely he is not within me . why do you say so ? what makes you say so ? what makes you think he is not within you ? i am such a vile wretch , saith the soul , so sinful , so ungodly ; my heart is so filthy , so vain , and that makes me conclude and think he is not within me : it doth not consist , saith the soul , with christs holiness , to be in such a vile unclean heart . answ. . to this i answer : what thou sayest , is a cleer argument to me , that he is in thy heart : for else , if he were not there , how camest thou to have such a discovery of the baseness of thy heart ? who gave it thee ? where hadst thou it ? deal seriously with me ; did not christ within thee , discover it to thee ? thou canst not have otherwise a discovery of thy heart , but by christ within thee . he that hath an ear to hear , let him hear . answ. . i answer to it thus : i can prove it to you , that he is in the worst of sinners : see in hos. . . i will not execute the fierceness of my anger , i will not return to destroy ephraim : for i am god , and not man , the holy one in the middest of thee . ephraim was as vile as could be , yea , as thou canst be : we shall see this , if we look into hos. . . because ephraim had made many altars to sin , altars shall be unto him for sin . idolatry is a great sin , in the account of god ; it is worse then witch-craft , and yet he committed it . and then that in hos. . . for they are gone up to assyria , a wild ass , alone by himself : ephraim hath hired lovers . and that in hos. . . i have seen a horrible thing in the house of israel ; there is the whoredom of ephraim . and so throughout all the chapters of hosea , the prophet discovers ephraims wickedness . and he was in paul the chiefest of sinners , before god revealed him in him ; gal. . . so that now i think your objections are answered . ( selah . ) answ. . and by way of answer to that , you do not know him to be in you , i say thus : that though you do not know him to be in you , yet you shall know him to be within you . see joh. . . at that day , you shall know that i am in my father , and you in me , and i in him . that day is to be understood when christ does send the comforter . and that in joel . and ye shall know that i am in the middest of israel , and that i am the lord your god , and none else . the time is coming , yea , it is at hand , that you shall know christ to be in the middest of you , and to be your lord and god : you shall know him ; nothing shall hinder you from knowing of him , neither sin nor devils . o it is a good word of god , ( praised be god : ) you shall not onely know it , but god is willing to make it known , to reveal it . see that in col. . . to whom god is willing to make known christ in you the hope of glory : and all the promises in christ are yea and amen . he is very willing to do it . see that in zach. . . for i , saith the lord , will be unto her a wall of fire round about , and will be the glory in the middest of her : which is spoken of jerusalem , ver. . see likewise , gen. . , , , . then joseph could not refrain himself before all them that stood by him , but he must discover himself to his brethren : for he had no power over himself . and he cryed , cause every man to go out from me . and there stood no man with him , while joseph made himself known to his brethren . and he wept aloud ; and the egyptians and house of pharoah heard . and joseph said unto his brethren , i am joseph : doth my father yet live ? and his brethren could not answer him : for they were troubled at his presence . and joseph said to his brethren , come neer me , i pray you . and they came neer . i am joseph your brother , whom ye sold into egypt . this joseph is a type of christ ; and his discovering himself to his brethren , is the manner that christ takes to reveal himself to his brethren . christ cannot many times refrain himself ; he cannot forbear , but discover and reveal himself to his brethren , that have sold him into egypt ; he must discover himself to his brethren , as joseph did : as joseph wept to see his brethren , so doth jesus christ to see his brethren ; he weeps aloud to see us ; yea , he weeps for joy to see his brethren , before he discovers himself to them ; and afterwards he saith , i am ioseph , i am your ioseph , one of your fellow-brethren ; doth my father yet live in you ? when christ speaks thus to the soul , the soul cannot answer him , because it is troubled at his presence . and as ioseph said to his brethren , come neer ; so christ bids us come neer . we are ready , when we have a discovery of christ , to stand afar off , and to be afraid of him ; and then christ saith , come neer ; as if he should say , why stand you a loof off ? come neer : and to encourage them to come neer , he speaks more plainly to them now , i am joseph your brother , whom ye sold into egypt ; but before he said , i am joseph , onely : and then the soul comes neer to christ . o how sweet this is ! christ shall not , no , will not , onely reveal himself ; but he can do no otherwise ; he cannot refrain himself ; and therefore christ saith unto them , be not grieved nor angry with your selves , that ye sold me into egypt : for god did send me before you , to preserve life . see how christ endeavours to take away all grief and anger from his brethren , by telling them that god sent him into egypt to preserve life . selah . so that confess him to be in you , though you do not feel him within you : yet if you believe he is in you , you may confess him : but what is it to confess him ? to confess him , is to acknowledge him come in the flesh , and come within you : joh. . . hereby know yee the spirit of god : every spirit that confesseth that jesus christ is come in the flesh , is of god . joh. . . whosoever shall confess that jesus is the son of god , god dwels in him , and he in god . confessing there , is acknowledging . phil. . . and that every tongue shall confess , that jesus christ is lord , to the glory of god the father . there is the same word . so that to confess him , is to acknowledge him . how ? thus : thou art within me ; i do subscribe to the truth of it , that it is so even so . but yet i cannot confess him , saith the soul . the word of faith is in thy mouth , to make thee to confess that christ is within thee , and to say , it is true , lord , as i have believed , thou art within me . there is the acknowledgement of the soul . there is not onely a confession of the mouth required of the soul , but a belief of the heart likewise , that god raised christ from the dead ; which i do intend a little to speak to . dead here is to be understood grave , hell , that state that jesus christ was in , of whom it was said , thou wilt not leave my soul in hell , neither wilt thou suffer thy holy one to see corruption , psal. . . it is not enough to confess christ to be within us , but to believe in our hearts that god raised him from the dead : if we would be saved , our faith must reach further then christ in us ; it must reach to the father also . see pet. . . who by him do believe in god , that raised him from the dead , and gave him glory , that our faith and hope might be in god . see further in act. . , , . and we declare unto you glad tidings , how that the promise which was made to our fathers , god hath fulfilled the same unto us their children , in that he hath raised up iesus again , as it is also written in the second psalm , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee . and as concerning that he raised him up from the dead , now no more to return to corruption , he said , i will give him the sure mercies of david . a faith that saves , that is , a faith that is accompanyed with salvation , is in god as one that raised christ from the dead : for there is in gods raising christ remission of sins , and justification from all things ( as sin , iniquity , and the like ) from which we could not be justified by the law of moses , act. . , . and besides , to us , there is an imputation of righteousness , which was imputed to abraham , if we believe on him that raised up iesus our lord from the dead , who for this very end was raised from the dead , that is to say , for our justification , rom. . , . god would have us believe in him ; as one that raised christ from the dead , because in gods raising christ , he raised us , through the faith of the operation of god , who hath raised him from the dead , and the uncircumcision of our flesh hath he quickened together with him , having forgiven us all trespasses ; blotting out the hand-writing of ordinances that was against us , which was contrary to us , and took it out of the way , nayling it to the cross ; and having spoyled principalities and powers , he made a shew of them openly , triumphing over them all . a glorious slaughter of all our enemies is to be seen , in gods raising christ from the dead . and then that in eph. . , . in gods raising christ , we , though we were dead in sins , yet were quickened together with him , and were raised up together with him , and made to sit together in heavenly places , in christ iesus ; which was gods rich mercy and great love : and his end in it , was , that in the ages to come he might shew the exceeding riches of his grace , in his kindness towards us in christ iesus , eph. . , . now god many times suffers us to have the sentence of death in our spirits , he suffers us to be pressed out of measure , beyond strength , insomuch that we despair of life , that we should not trust in our selves , but in god that raised the dead . quest . but you will ask me , first , how god raised christ from the dead . secondly , what it is to be believe it . answ. for the first , how god raised christ ; it was , . by the glory of the father , rom. . , . by the spirit , rom. . . . by his mighty power , eph. . . the second thing to be enquired into , is , what it is to believe that god raised his son from the dead . there are divers sorts of faith spoken of in scripture : there is a believing from the relation of another , ioh. . . as the samaritans did , meerly upon the report of the woman , but afterwards they believed because they had seen christ : and there is a believing , as i said before , that is not accompanied with salvation ; which simon magus had : and there is a believing that is accompanied with salvation , heb. . . but we are not of them who draw back unto perdition , but of them that believe to the saving of the soul : this is the belief that is intended here . now that faith that saves ▪ is the faith of christ ; which consisteth in yeelding up hearty obedience and subjection to this truth , that god raised christ from the dead : we have obeyed from the heart , that form of doctrine that hath been delivered unto us , rom. . . this believing in god , that he raised christ from the dead , is nothing but a souls lying down under the power and authority of it , and saying , it is so , it is so , lord . lie down therefore under the power of this truth , that god raised his son ; say it is a truth , and thou shalt be saved : it is a truth , lord , it is even so ; thou art saved . quest . but you seem to make no difference between confession of the mouth , and belief with the heart . answ. yes but i do . faith in the heart believes this is a glorious truth , that god raised jesus christ from the dead , and that christ is within us ; confession with the mouth declares and publisheth nothing but what saith in the heart believes is truth . chap. ii. the parable of the rich man's flocks and herds , and the poor man's ewe-lamb , unfolded , out of sam. . , , , , , , . vers . and the lord sent nathan unto david : and he came unto him , and said unto him , there were two men in one city ; the one rich , and the other poor . the rich man had exceeding many flocks and herds . but the poor man had nothing save one little ewe-lamb which he had bought , and nourished up ; and it grew up together with him , and with his children : it did eat of his own meat , and drank of his own cup , and lay in his bosom , and was unto him as a daughter . and there came a traveller unto the rich man ; and he spared to take of his own flock , and of his own herd , to dress for the wayfaring man that was come unto him , but took the poor mans lamb , and dressed it for the man that was come to him . and davids anger was greatly kindled against the man ; and he said to nathan , as the lord liveth , the man that hath done this thing , shall surely die . and he shall restore the lamb fourfold because he did this thing , and because he had no pity . and nathan said unto david , thou art the man . in the first verse of this chapter , there is the lord sending nathan unto david , with a parable in his mouth : it was the lord that sent him unto david , and that put the parable into his mouth , to declare to david . from part of the first verse to the fifth verse , nathan makes known the parable . a parable , you know , is to be taken otherwise then is set down in the letter of it , and is much like an allegory . the first words of the parable are these : there were two men in one city ; the one rich , and the other poor . the city are the saints : see heb. . . but ye are come unto mount sion , and unto the city of the living god , the heavenly jerusalem , and to an innumerable company of angels . and eph. . . matth. . . rev. . , the rich man is david , who had exceeding many flocks and herds . the poor man is christ : see eccles. . . there was a little citie , and few men in it ; and there came a great king against it , and besieged it , and built great bulwarks against it . now there was found in it a poor man , and he by his wisdom delivered the city . see likewise cor. . . for ye know the grace of our lord jesus christ , that though he was rich , yet for our sakes he became poor , that ye through his poverty might be made rich . see psal. . . this poor man cried , and the lord heard him , and saved him out of all his troubles . and in another place he is called , the man christ jesus . now the rich man's and poor man's living in one city , was their enjoying each other , and having fellowship with each other , in the city of god . the rich man's flocks and herds , are those exceeding many spiritual blessings that god had blessed david with ; which are those blessings that god blesseth many of his people with : see ephes. . . blessed be the god and father of our lord jesus christ , who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in christ . the poor man's ewe-lamb is the beloved disciple of christ , as john was : see luke . . now there was leaning on jesus bosome one of his disciples , which jesus loved . this ewe-lamb the poor man bought with a price , even with that price he bought the rest of his people with : cor. . . ye are bought with a price ; therefore glorifie god in your body , and in your spirits , which are gods . and then that in cor. . . ye are bought with a price : be not ye the servants of men . jesus christ did not onely buy this ewe-lamb , but nourished it up himself , with the milk of himself ; it grew up together with him : that is , christ brought it up with himself , as he was brought up with the father : see prov. . . and it grew up with his children ; that is , with christ's children : who are those ? such that are of faith , and so are blessed with faithful abraham , and are gal. : , . those which are born of the free woman , that is , born after the spirit , or by promise . it did not grow up with christ alone , but with the rest of his children , who grew up with him . and it did eat of the poor man 's own meat , and of the poor man 's own drink ; which is christ himself . that which nourished the lamb , and which the lamb fed upon , was the meat and drink of christ , which is his flesh and blood . see in joh. . , , , . then jesus said unto them , verily , verily , i say unto you , except ye eat the flesh of the son of man , and drink his blood , you have no life in you . whosoever eateth my flesh , and drinketh my blood , hath eternal life . for my flesh is meat indeed , and my blood is drink indeed . he that eateth my flesh , and drinketh my blood , dwells in me , and i in him . that which christ fed this lamb with , was life and spirit , which is his flesh and blood . o glorious food ! friends , it is the best food christ hath , or that he can feed a soul with . christ did not onely buy this lamb , nourish it up with himself , and with his children , feed it with his own flesh , and with his own blood ; but it must lie in his own bosom : his beloved disciple is so dear to him , that he will not have it lie out of his own bosom : and therefore he is said toca●ry the lambs in his own bosom , isai. . . he shall feed his flock like a shepherd : he shall gather the lambs with his arm , and carry them in his bosom , and shall gently lead those that are with young . and then he goes on with the parable : and it was unto him as a daughter , that is , as one of the daughters of jerusalem : see cant. . . he made the pillars thereof of silver , the bottom thereof of gold , the covering of it of purple ; the midst thereof being paved with love , for the daughters of jerusalem . speaking of solomon , who made himself a chariot of the wood of lebanon , verse . see luke . . but jesus turning to them , said , daughters of hierusalem , weep not for me , but weep for your selves , and for your children . this was spoken when jesus was a leading away to suffer . see that in cant. . . this is my friend , o daughters of jerusalem ; meaning christ . but what is a daughter of hierusalem ? it is a daughter of love and glory . nathan goes on further with the parable . and there came a traveller unto the rich man . this traveller is a wayfaring man ; and a wayfaring man is one that is here , and there , and everywhere ; an unstable and unsetled man . wayfaring men are often spoken of in scipture . see jer. . . o that i had in the wilderness a lodging place of wayfaring men , that i might leave my people , and go from them ! for they be all adulterers , and an assembly of treacherous men . and that in is . . . and an high-way shall be there , and a way ; and it shall be called the way of holiness : the unclean shall not pass over it , but it shall be for those : the wayfaring men , though fools , shall not erre therein . and that in ier. . . o the hope of israel , the saviour thereof in the time of trouble , why shouldst thou be as a stranger in the land , and as a wayfaring man , that turneth aside to tarry for a night ? this rich man spared to take of his own flocks , and of his own herds , to dress or make ready for the wayfaring man that was come to him , but took the poor mans lamb , and dressed it for the man that was come unto him . the taking of the poor man's lamb , and dressing it for the wayfaring man , is the doing of any thing that is sinful before god ; as david's slayingvriah the hittite , and taking the hittite's wife to be his , vers. . or a man offending his weak brother : see cor. . , . and through thy knowledge shall thy weak brother perish for whom christ died ? but when you sin so against the brethren , and wound their weak conscience , ye sin against christ . therefore he saith , vers. , . take heed lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling block to them that are weak . for if any man see thee which hast knowledge , sit at meat in the idols temple , shall not the conscience of him that is weak be by you emboldened to eat those things which are offered to idols ? the committing of any sin , is the slaying of the poor mans lamb for the traveller . after this , david's anger was greatly kindled against the man : and he said to nathan , as the lord liveth , ( that is , as sure as the lord liveth ) the man that hath done this thing shall surely die ; or , is worthy to die ; or , he is a son of death . this kinde of saying of david , is sutable to that , in a manner , in gen. . . and it came to pass about three months after , that it was told iudah , saying , tamar thy daughter in law hath played the harlot ; and also behold , she is with childe by whoredom . and iudah said , bring her forth , and let her be burnt . in this sam. . . david sets forth what the rich man that had killed the poor mans lamb , shall restore : and he shall restore the lamb fourfold , according to the levitical law : see exod. . . because he did this thing , and because he had no pity , of the poor man's lamb . sutable to this , is that in psal. . . because he remembred not to shew mercy , but persecuted the poor and needy man , that he might even slay the broken in heart . now in the seventh verse of sam. . nathan describes the man that took the poor mans lamb , and slew it for the traveller : and nathan said unto david , thou art the man that did this thing . see how all this while david condemns himself out of his own mouth ; and passeth sentence upon himself , in passing sentence upon another ; just as iudah did : see that fore-named place of scripture , in gen. . , . when she was brought forth , she sent to her father in law , saying , by the man whose these are , am i with childe : and she said , discern , i pray , whose these are , the signet , and bracelets , and staff . and iudah acknowledged them , and said , she hath been more righteous then i , because i gave her not to shelah my son . and he knew her again no more . iudah condemned himself out of his own mouth , in condemning tamar ; as well as david did , in passing sentence upon the rich man : and he knew , after that tamar had shewed him the bracelets , signet , and staff , that he was the man that judged himself out of his own mouth . the parable being explicated , there will arise naturally these points of doctrine . the first is this , that nathan the prophet never went about any thing , but he was sent of god to do it . the second is this , that christ suffers that disciple whom he dearly loves , to be brought and nourished up with him , and to grow up together with christ , and with his children ; to eat of his own meat , and drink of his own drink , and lie in his own bosom , and to be unto him as a daughter . the third is this , that committing of any sin whatsoever , is the killing of the poor man's lamb . the fourth is this , that god many times speaks in a parabolical way and manner , to awaken poor souls out of the deep sleep of security and sin , by causing them unknowingly to pass an impartial sentence against themselves in the person of another ; that so they might be brought to unfeigned repentance . the fifth is this , that that which convinceth a soul of sin , is god's saying unto him , thou art the man . for the first , that nathan the prophet never went about any thing , but he was sent of god to do it ; this is clear from the words . he was sent from god unto david , to declare this parable unto him : he was sent from god to david , to tell him that the lord had put away his iniquity : he was sent of god to david , to speak nothing but what god had put into his mouth ; according to all the vision , so did nathan speak unto david , chron. . , , , . if it be so , then this may serve to discover those that go before they are sent , with this in their mouthes , the lord hath sent them ; whereas the lord hath not sent them : they tell the people so indeed , that the lord sent them to this place , and to that place ; whenas they should finde , if they would deal seriously with their own hearts , that it was their great livings that brought them thither . there are many that take upon them the apostles commission to preach , without power from above , meerly to get livings , to get a livelihood : what enquiring hath there been , and yet still is , among the priests , for fat benefices ! what asking ▪ each other is there amongst them , what is such a living worth , and such a living ; is it worth any thing ? is it a great one or not ? if it be a great one , then what laying of heads together amongst the priests , is there ; to get it ! and if it be a small living , rather then they will have none , they will have that . they make merchandise of the word . o how christ speaks of these priests , in matth. . , , , , , , . wo unto you , hypocrites ; for ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men : for ye neither go in your selves , neither suffer ye them that are entring to go in . wo unto you hypocrites , who for a pretence make long prayers : you use vain repetitions , and think to be heard for your much speaking . wo unto you , ye hypocrites ; ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte ; and when he is made , you make him twofold more the childe of hell then your selves . when ye fast , ye are like the hypocrites , that are of a sad countenance : for they disfigure their faces . wo unto you , ye blinde guides , which strain at a gnat , and swallow a camel . well did isaiah prophesie of you , saying , this people draw nigh unto me with their mouth , and honoureth me with their lips , but their heart is far from me . but in vain do ye worship , teaching for doctrines the commandments of men . ye blinde leaders of the blinde ; if the blinde lead the blind , both shall fall into the ditch . ye can discern the face of the skie , but ye cannot discern the signes of the time . ye are graves that appear not , and the men that walk over them are not aware of them . wo unto you ; for ye lade men with burdens grievous to be born , and ye your selves touch not the burdens with one of your fingers . ye love the uppermost seats in the synagogues , and greetings . beware therefore , friends , of the leaven of the pharisees . wo unto you ; for ye make clean the outside of the cup and of the platter , but within ye are full of extortion and excess . ye are like ( saith christ ) whited sepulchres , which indeed appear beautiful outward , but are within full of dead mens bones , and of all uncleanness : ye outwardly appear righteous to men , but within ye are full of hypocrisie and iniquity : ye do what ye do , to be seen of men , and have glory of men . ye serpents , ye generation of vipers , how can ye escape the damnation of hell ? and the old prophets speak as much , if not more , against them ; that they prophesied in his name , whenas he sent them not : see jer. . . i am against the prophets , saith the lord , that steal my word every one from his neighbour , jer. . . o what picking and stealing by whole-sale , is there among the priests of our age , out of other mens books and writings , and from one another ! what patching up of sermons is there amongst them , of other mens experiences , and so preach them ! i have not sent these prophets , yet they ran ; i have not spoken to them , yet they prophesied , jer. . . they prophesie lyes , yea , they are prophets of the deceit of their own heart . jerem. . . the heads thereof judge for reward , and the priests thereof teach for hire , and the prophets thereof divine for money ; yet they will lean upon the lord , and say , is not the lord among us ? none evil can come upon us , mic. . . her prophets are light and treacherous persons , her priests have polluted the sanctuary , zeph. . . and it shall come to pass in that day , that the prophets shall be ashamed every one of his vision , when he hath prophesied ; neither shall they wear a rough garment to deceive , zech. . . you priests , and prophets , hearken to the word of the lord in mic. . , . thus saith the lord god concerning the prophets that make my people erre , that bite with their teeth , and cry peace ; and he that putteth not into their mouthes , they even prepare war against them . therefore night shall be unto you , that ye shall not have a vision ; and it shall be dark unto you , that ye shall not divine : and the sun shall go down over the prophets , and the day shall be dark over him . and then that in jer. . . thus saith the lord concerning the prophets , behold , i will feed them with wormwood , and make them drink the water of gall : for from the prophets of jerusalem , is prophanes gone forth into all the land . they commit adultery , and walk in lies ; they strengthen also the hands of evil doers , that none doth return from his wickedness : they are all of them unto me as sodom , and the inhabitants thereof as gomorrah , ver. . see here what god threatens and speaks to you priests and prophets ; your judgement doth not linger , it is at the very door ; and god himself will exalt a poor despised people that shall do his work . behold i am against the prophets , saith the lord , that use their tongue , and say he saith . behold , i am against them that cause my people to erre by their lies , and by their lightness , yet i sent them not , nor commanded them : therefore they shall not profit this people at all , saith the lord , jer. . , . there is a voice of the howling of the shepherds ; for their glory is spoyled : a voice of the roaring of young lions , for the pride of jordan is spoiled , zach. . . methinks i hear this voice , howl , o ye priests ; howl , o ye shepherds ; howl o ye prophets , that slay the flock of the slaughter , and hold your selves not guilty : and they that sell them say , blessed be the lord , for i am rich ; and their own shepherds pitty them not . three shepherds also i cut off in one month , and my soul loathed them , and their soul also abhorred me , zech. . ▪ ▪ . gird your selves and lament , ye priests ; howl , ye ministers of the altar : come , lie all night in sackcloth for the sinfulness of your doings , in changing your selves into angels of light , and ministers of righteousness . but they also have erred through wine , and through strong drinke are out of the way , the priest and the prophet have erred through strong drink , they are swallowed up of wine : they are out of the way through strong drink ; they erre in vision , they stumble in judgement , isa. . . from the prophet even unto the priest , every one dealeth falsly , jer. . . for both prophet and priest are prophane , yea , in my house have i found their wickedness , saith the lord , jer. . . and there shall be like people like priest : and i will punish them for their ways , and reward them their doings , hos. . . the priests said not , where is the lord ? and they that handle the law , knew me not : the pastors also transgressed against me , and the prophets prophesied by baal , and walked after things that do not profit . wherefore i will yet plead with you , jer. . , . the prophets prophesie falsly , and the priests bear rule by their means , and my people love to have it so : and what will you do in the end thereof ? jer. . . hear ye this , o priests , and hearken , ye house of israel , and give you ear , o house of the king : for judgement is toward you , because you have been a snare to the people of god , hos. . . as troups of robbers wait for a man , so the company of priests murther in the way by consent : for they commit lewdness , hos. . . thus saith the lord , o priests , that despise my name ; and ye say , wherein have we despised thy name ? ye offer polluted bread upon mine altar , and ye say , wherein have we polluted thee ? mal. . , . and now , o yee priests , this commandment is for you . if ye will not hear , and if ye will not lay it to heart , to give glory to my name , i will even send a curse , upon you , saith the lord , and i will curse your blessings , mal. . . the pastors are become brutish , and have not sought the lord : therefore they shall not prosper , and all their flocks shall be scattered , jer. , . many pastors have destroyed my vineyard , they have troden my portion under foot , they have made my pleasant portion a desolate wilderness ; and being desolate , it mourneth unto me , jer. . , . we be unto the pastors that destroy and scatter the sheep of my pasture , saith the lord . therefore thus saith the lord god of israel against the pastors that feed his people , ye have scattered my flock , and driven them away , and have not visited them : behold , i will visit upon you the evil of your doings , saith the lord , jer. . , . and in another place he saith , i will require my flocks at your hands . object . but you will say , that you are no priests , and that i have no warrant to call you so . answ. that you are priests , will appear by comparing you with the priests under the law ; as , first , the priests under the law did wear holy garments , exod. . . so did and do you ; as copes , surplices , and the like . secondly , the priests office under the law , was to make atonement for sin by offering sacrifice , levit. . . levit. . . numb. . , . this hath been and is the work of you priests , to offer sacrifice , to make atonement , peace , and reconciliation for sin . for this purpose you have prayed , and moved others to pray ; as i have heard some of you say to your hearers , make your atonement , peace , and reconciliation with god , by prayer , fasting , humbling your selves , and the like . thirdly , the priests under the law were to offer up sacrifice to take away sin , levit. . . so do you priests ; you pray , and fast , and humble your selves , and do this and that , to take away sin . fourthly , none but the high-priests , under the law , were to enter into the holy of holies , heb. . , , . so you say and hold now , none but you are to enter into the holy of holies , whenas there is a free way and passage made by the veil of christ , that is to say , his flesh , for all the saints to enter into the holy of holies . fifthly , the priests under the law lived by tythes , they had no other maintenance but tythes : so do you priests live upon that which was for the maintenance of the priests under the law , that served at the altar , which was tythes ; and so may fitly be called priests . it was a legal administration that they were under , therefore they were to live of the law : but those who are under the dispensation of the gospel , they live of the gospel ; that is , free , and can trust god for their maintenance . sixthly , the priests under the law were to interpret the law , neh. . . this hath been and is the work of you priests , to open the law , to press the people upon working for life , and to threaten judgement to drive to christ . son of man ▪ therefore prophesie against the shepherds of israel , prophesie and say unto them , thus saith the lord god unto the shepherds , wo be to the shepherds of israel that feed themselves : should not the shepherds feed the flocks ? ye eat the fat , and ye clothe you with the wooll : ye kill them that are fed : but ye feed not the slock . the diseased have ye not strengthened , neither have ye healed that which was sick , neither have ye bound up that which was broken , neither have ye brought again that which was driven away , neither have ye sought that which was lost , but with force and with cruelty have ye ruled them , ezek. . , , . his watchmen are blinde : they are all ignorant , they are all dumb dogs , they cannot bark , sleeping , lying down , loving to slumber . yea , they are greedy dogs , which can never have enough , and they are shepherds that cannot understand : they all look to their own way , every one for his gain from his quarter . come ye , say they , i will fetch wine , and we will fill our selves with strong drink , and to morrow shall be as this day , and much more abundant , isa. . , , . howl , ye shepherds , priests and prophets cry , and wallow your selves in the ashes , ye principal of of the flock : for the days of your slaughter and of your dispersions are accomplished , and ye shall fall like a pleasant vessel . and the shepherds shall have no way to flee , nor the principal of the flock to escape . a voice of the cry of the shepherds , and an howling of the principal of the flock shall be heard : i hear it , i hear it ; and others shall hear it : for the lord hath spoiled their pasture , jer. . , , . ye shepherds and priests , hear the word of the lord again , thus saith the lord god , behold , i am against the shepherds , and i will require my flock at their hand , and cause them to cease from feeding my flock , neither shall the shepherds feed themselves any more : for i will deliver my flock from their mouth , that they may not be meat for them . and as for his people , he saith , i will seek out my sheep , and will deliver them out of all places where they have been scattered in the cloudy and dark day , and will bring them to their own land , and feed them upon the mountains of israel by the rivers , and in all the inhabited places of the country . i will feed them in a good pasture , and upon the high mountains of israel shall their fold be : there shall they lie in a good fold , and in a fat pasture shall they feed ; i will feed my flock , and cause them to lie down , saith the lord . i will seek that which was lost , and bring again that which was driven away , and will binde up that which was broken , and will strengthen that which was sick . god will feed his flock himself , and cure them and heal them himself . ezek. . , , , , , , , . if it be so , that the prophet nathan never went about any thing without a call from god ; then take heed of those that venter upon any thing without a call from god ; as there are many of our priests do : they preach and prophesie without a call from god : they have been at cambridge , and have taken their orders and degrees , and have been chosen by men to the work ; and they think that is a sufficient call from god . paul had not his ministery from man , nor by man , but as he was taught it by the revelation of jesus christ : and therefore these are false priests and prophets . there shall false prophets arise , that shall deceive many ; if it were possible , the very elect. if the priests in our age , were put to prove their call to the ministry , there would be found very few of them that could prove their call from god . beware therefore of these wolves ; take heed of the voice of strangers , lest they devour you : they will pretend that they are fearful of offending or troubling the consciences of gods people ; but if any child of god makes a scruple in his conscience of paying tythe , and that it is a trouble to his conscience to pay it , and he should , if he dist pay tythe ▪ sin against his conscience ; yet the priests will have it . what care they for offending the conscience of gods people ? how shall we live ▪ say they , else ? it is not conscience , say they , it is rather humor ; and besides , tythes is a civil right , and a soul need not scruple them , say they . this is a divelish cloak to cover the priests baseness . but we hope you would have us have a livelihood ? yes , ( god forbid else : ) work with your hands as the apostle saith , and live no more upon the sweat of other mens brows ; else you must fast , and not eat : see thes. . . for even when we were with you this we commanded you , that if any would not work , neither should he eat . and if any man obey not our word by this epistle , note that man , and have no company with him , that he may be ashamed , ver. . we do work , they will say ; we sweat and take pains day and night for the good of peoples souls . but do you work with your hands , and set upon some manual calling or other ? i know you take a great deal of pains for to study and get by heart this mans and that mans writings , and to preach them in publike congregations , to get a living : but do you work as the apostles did with their hands ? obj. but it is said in scripture that the lord hath ordained that they which preach the gospel should live on the gospel ; and , do ye not know that they which minister about holy things , live of the things of the temple ; & they which wait at the altar , are partakers with with the altar ? or i onely and barnabas , have not we power to forbear working ? who goeth a warfare at his own charges ? who planteth a vineyard , and eateth not of the fruit thereof ? who feedeth a flock , and eateth not of the milk thereof ? say i these things as a man ? or saith not the law the same also ? for it is written in the law of moses , thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn . doth god take care for oxen ? or saith he it altogether for our sakes ? for our sakes , no doubt , this is written ; that he that ploweth , should plow in hope ; and he that thresheth in hope , should be partaker of his hope . if we have sown unto you all spiritual things , is it a great thing , if we shall reap your carnal things ? if others be partakers of this power over you , are not we rather ? cor. . , , , , , , , , . answ. i answer thus : it is true , that those that preach the gospel , should live by the gospel ; but you preach other mens books and writings : you preachers of the gospel ! what , you ambassadours of christ , and have not matter to speak from christ , but speak other mens experience ! neither , as i said before , had you your ministery from christ , nor by revelation , as paul had . if you had your ministery from christ , you would trust christ for a livelihood ; you would not first seek a living , and then go and preach the gospel . you cannot preach without other mens books , and therefore are not fit to preach the gospel . can you preach , all books being taken away from you save the bible , at any time when you are desired to do it ? can you preach twice every day of the week throughout the yeer , without other mens books ? if you cannot , you are not to live on the gospel : for ye are no true preachers of the gospel . secondly , i answer thus : though those that preach the gospel may live on the gospel , as paul and barnabas might ; yet , saith paul , we have not used this power , but suffer all things , lest we should hinder the gospel of christ , cor. . . but i have used none of these things , neither have i written these things ( saith paul ) that it should be so done unto me : for it were better for me to die , then that any man should make my glorying void , cor. . . what is my reward then ? verily , that when i preach the gospel , i may make the gospel of christ without charge , that i abuse not my power in the gospel , cor. . . for your selves know how ye ought to follow us : for we behaved not our selves disorderly among you , neither did we eat any mans bread for nought , but wrought with labour and travel night and day ▪ that we might not be chargeable to any of you , thess. . , . let me see you priests do so : where is there such a spirit as paul had , among you ? o how you make the gospel of christ chargeable ! your reward is tythes ; but this was paul's reward , his preaching the gospel for nothing : he abused not his power in the gospel , as you do : he wrought with labour and travel night and day , that he might not be chargeable to any ; you are idle , and mad upon taking tythes . object . but you will say , we have done good , many of us , and converted souls , and are worthy of somewhat for our pains . answ. this was paul's reward , his preaching the gospel for nothing ; and it is a bigger reward then taking tythes . o that you would consider of it therefore ! if it be so , let us be sure to have a call from god for what we do . we do many things that we have no call for from god . o how sweet it is , when we do what we do from a call from god! we cannot take pleasure in any thing we do , unless we have a call from god to do it . we cannot warrant unto our selves safety and prosperity in going unto such a place , and such a place , and convert such a soul , without a call from god . we must not look that god should go with us , and be with us , in any enterprise , without a call from god . if we have a call for what we do , we may do what we undertake with cheerfulness , and may expect god to go with us , and be with us , and in us , to help us to do what he calls us to . quest . but , may some say , how shall we know whether we have a call to this or to that ? answ. you may know it by this , that is to say , by the power of god : if it be nakedly the power of god that carries you out to do this or that , and not any by-respect , or self-end , then you have a call from god . or you may know it by this : if you be called by god to do this or that , he enables you to do that which you are called to , sutable and according to his will . if it be so , then if god hath called any of you to teach , instruct , pray , and the like , to go to such a place , and do such a thing ; whatsoever he hath called you to , that do ; be not disobedient to the heavenly vision : follow the lamb whithersoever he calls you ; if it be to suffer , yet follow him ▪ if he bid thee go to such a one , and such a one , to tell him of his sinfulness , pride , baseness , hypocrisie , to convince him of his sin , though in a parabolical way and manner ; go , and the lord will be with thee . the next point of doctrine to be ▪ spoken to , is , that christ suffers that disciple whom he dearly loves , to be brought up and nourished with him , and to grow up together with him and his children ; to eat of his own meat , and drink of his own cup , and lie in his own bosom , and to be unto him as a daughter . this is clear from the words . if it be so , then this speaks the great love that christ hath to his beloved disciple . friends , what high love is here ! what , for his beloved disciple to be brought up and nourished with christ , and to grow up together with him ; to eat of christ's own meat which he eats of , and to drink of his own cup , that cup which he drinks in ! and moreover , to lie in his own bosome , and be unto him as a daughter ! greater love then this , can no man shew . what heart would not this love ravish and melt ! it speaks the heighth , length , bredth , and depth of love . lord , thou makest us amazed at it ; we cannot do any thing but wonder at it : we are not able to express it , and tell what it is , and how much it is : it is so vast , that when we look into it , we lose our selves in the apprehensions of it : we cannot declare it , but stand and admire , that he should suffer us to lie in the bosome of himself , who lay in the bosom of his father , and there drink of those brests of consolation that are in him , and to sit at his own table , and eat his own meat , and drink his own drink . o admirable ! o excellent ! and i appoint unto you a kingdom , as my father hath appointed unto me , that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom , and sit on thrones , judging the twelve tribes of israel , luke . , . if it be so , friends , then beg of christ to be one of his beloved disciples , that so you may be brought up and nourished with him , and grow up together with him , and with his children ; eat of his own meat , and drink of his own cup , and lie in his own bosome , and be unto him as a daughter of jerusalem . it is a high priviledge to be one of the beloved disciples of christ : for then we are interessed into all the glory of christ ; there is nothing that christ hath , but we have a share in : if we be his lambs , we are under his tender care and protection from the wolfs mouth . if it be so , then do not envie the poor lambs happiness ; that is to say , his being brought up and nourished with christ , and growing up together with him , and with his children ; his eating of christ's own meat , and drinking of christ's own cup , and lying in his bosome , and being unto him as a daughter . we are ready to envie another's happiness : because we are not as this man , and cannot do as this man , therefore we envie him : such a one hath notable parts , can write and preach ; he hath sweet enjoyments of god , knows much ; but i am poor , and enjoy nothing , and can do nothing : and because the soul cannot do as that man doth , therefore , through the baseness of the heart , and malice of the devil , it envies , speaks evil of , and reproacheth that man . i beseech you , therefore , take heed of speaking evil of the poor man's lamb , that is as dear to christ as the apple of his eye , lest you speak evil of , envie and reproach christ . that is indeed a beloved disciple of christ , which christ suffers to lie in his bosome , to eat of his own meat , and drink of his own drink , &c. therefore , beware , beware , take heed what you speak of a beloved disciple of christ . the next point of doctrine to be spoken to , is this , that the committing of sin is slaying the poor man's lamb . this is clear from the words . if it be so , that the committing of sin is the slaying the poor man's lamb , then , friends , take heed of sinning , of committing adultery , murder , fornication ; of offending a weak brother ; of being proud , high-minded , lifted up ▪ lest you kill the poor man's lamb . if it be so , then this may serve to discover what the killing of the poor man's lamb , or slaying the beloved disciple of christ ▪ is : it is the doing of any thing that is sinful before god ; all your unholy walkings , all your self-admirations , all your self-exaltations high conceit of your selves , self-applause , is the slaying the poor man's lamb . if it be so , let the poor man's lamb be tender in your eyes : it is tender in christ's eyes , let it be so also in yours . do you love it as christ loves it ? be you careful of offending , killing , slaying of it , as christ is : let it be dear to you , as it is to christ . the next point of doctrine to be spoken to , is this , that god many times speaks in a parabolical way and manner , to awaken a poor soul out of the sleep of security and sin , by causing him unknowingly to pass an impartial sentence against himself , in the person of another , that so he might be brought unto unfeigned repentance . this is clear from the parable . if it be so , then this may serve to discover the truth of this , how that god many times takes such a mystical way of speaking , that he makes the poor creature condemn himself , pass sentence upon himself in the person of another , as he made david . it makes me wonder at david's being caught by god , and what he said , when the prophet said unto him , thou art the man . friends , if you have committed adultery , murder , fornication , or some secret sin , or the like ; god hath a parabolical way and manner , to make you pass sentence upon your selves , in passing sentence upon others , if he intend good to you . there is no hiding of your sins ; god will finde them out . david little thought that he was the man the prophet spoke to , and that he passed sentence upon himself in the person of another . god can catch us , some way or other : if he intend good to our souls , he will shew us that we have sinned , as he did david , some way or other . if it be so , it speaks the wisdom of god . o how wise is our god , for our good ! though haply , we think him not to be so . o the depth of the wisdom of god! his ways are past finding out , in this thing , in convincing of sin in such a parabolical way . we many times speak against his wisdom and ways , because we do not comprehend them : there is no searching of his ways , they are past finding out ; the more we search into them , the more we lose our selves in them . the fifth doctrine is this : that that which convinceth a man of sin , is , gods saying unto him , thou art the man : this is cleer from the words . if it be so , then you that take your fill of sin , that commit sin with greediness ; when god comes to say to you souls , you are the men and the women that have sinned against him , what will you do then ? and you that are proud , self-conceited , high-minded , and the like ; god will finde you out , and discover to you , that you are the men and women that have sinned against him , and wronged your own souls . to confirm this doctrine , consider that in act. . , . therefore , let all the house of israel know assuredly , that god hath made that same jesus , whom ye have crucified , both lord and christ ; whom they had crucified . when god had said unto them , that they were those which crucified christ , that they were the men which did it ; when they heard this , they were pricked in their hearts , and cryed out , what shall we do to be saved ? and in another place , it was ye that denyed christ in the presence of pilate , that denyed the holy one and just , and desired a murderer to be granted unto you : it was ye that killed the prince of life , whom god , raised from the dead , act. . , , . the god of our fathers raised up jesus , whom ye slew and hanged on a tree , him hath god exalted with his right hand , to be a prince and a saviour , to give repentance unto israel , and forgiveness of sins . when they heard that , they were cut to the heart , and took counsel to slay them , act. . , , . the apostles saying unto them in the spirit of christ , that they were those that slew christ , they were the men that did it ; that cuts them to the heart , and makes them take counsel to slay them . vvhen god speaks to a soul , thou art the man that hast sinned , that hast slain christ ; either he will cry out , vvhat shall i do to be saved ? or else he will inrage and take counsel against the people of god . the vvord of god is like a two edged sword , and will cut one way or other . if it be so , then o that god would say to you , as he did to david , you are the men and women , that have killed the poor mans lamb ! vve are ready , with the whorish woman , to wipe our mouthes , and say , vve have not sinned : but when god comes to discover sin , we shall see we have sinned , been proud , vaunted , and gloried in our selves what we have been , done , or can do ; that we have spoken honourable of those that admired us , and poor , and base , and contemptible , of those that did not admire us , and cry us up . chap. iii. the three witnesses in heaven with their testimonies ; and the three witnesses on earth , with their testimonies , explicated , out of joh. . , . vers . . for there are three that bear record in heaven , the father , the word , and the holy ghost ; and these three are one . and there are three that bear witness in earth , the spirit , and the water , and the blood ; and these three agree in one . in the fifth verse of this chapter , there is a question propounded with an answer annexed to it . the question is this : who is he that overcometh the world ? the answer is this : but he that believeth that jesus is the son of god , this is he that came by water and bloud , even jesus christ ; not by water onely , but by water and blood . and it is the spirit that beareth witness of this . the reason is , because the spirit is truth . now these two verses which we are to speak to , are a reason of part of the sixth verse . there are in the first verse of the words , these things to be considered , first , who the witnesses are that bear record in heaven . secondly , what heaven is , in which they bear testimony . thirdly , what the witnesses records are . fourthly , what the witnesses oneness is . there are in the second verse of the words these things likewise to be considered , first , what earth is . secondly , who they are that bear witness in earth . thirdly , what their testimonies are . fourthly , how the witnesses agree in one . the first thing to be considered in the first verse of the words , is this : who the witnesses are , that bear record in heaven . they are three great mysteries , the father , the word , and the spirit ; the hugest mysteries that ever were ; which no natural eye can finde out : all the parts , learning , and gifts of men , are here lost : and besides , they are of such infinite vastness , that they swallow up all other mysteries whatsoever . the very marrow of godliness and christianity consists and lies hid in the knowledge of these three : it is the right understanding of these three , that makes the soul truly godly . all happiness and glory lie involved in these three , the father , word , and holy ghost . quest . but you will ask me , what is the father ? what is the son ? and what is the holy ghost ? answ. the father is god , the son the same god , and the holy ghost the same god ; though in a different manner . quest . but why is god called the father ? why the son ? and why the holy ghost ? answ. he is called the father , with respect to two creations : first , the old creation ; secondly , the new creation . first , he is called the father with respect to the old creation : he is the former , begetter , and framer of the heavens , and of the earth , and of the sea , and of every thing in the earth and in the sea ; that belongs to the old creation : for it is the proper work of god , as he is the father , to beget and create . secondly , he is called the father with respect to the new creation : he is the father , as he is the begetter of christ , psal. . . and as he is the begetter of souls to himself by the word of truth in the new creation , james . . as he is the begetter of us to a lively hope , by the resurrection of jesus christ from the dead , pet. . . and as he is the begetter of us to himself by the gospel , cor. . . he is called the word , first , with respect to the old creation likewise ; secondly , with respect to the new creation also . first , he is called the word , with respect to the old creation , as he is the thing begotten in the heavens , and in the earth , and in the sea , and in every thing in the heavens , earth , and sea : for there is nothing in them , but holds forth the power and wisdom of god , which is christ : see cor. . . for it is the proper work of the son , to be begotten in the old creation . secondly , he is called the word , with respect to the new creation , as he is the thing begotten in us in the new creation ; as he is the life , power , and hope of glory within us , col. . . as he is our wisdom , justification , sanctification , redemption , and the like . for it is the proper work of the son , to be begotten in us . he is called the spirit , with respect to two things : first , as he is a discoverer and revealer of truth and glory to us , and in us , in the old creation : there is abundance of truth and glory to be seen there , which we see not , nor know : every thing of the old creation sets forth more or less glory . the heavens declare the glory of god , and the firmament sheweth his handy-work . and the devil keeps us from looking after the glory of god that shines forth in the things of the world . now it is the onely work of god , as he is the spirit , to discover and reveal that glory and truth that lies hid in every thing in the world . secondly , he is the spirit , as he is the revealer and discoverer of truth and glory in the new creation : there is no glory to be seen , without the spirit ; and there is no knowing of truth and glory , but by the spirit . we may seek to finde it out , and labour , and weary out our spirits , and yet not finde it . it is not the joyning of every mans learning together , can finde it out : truth indeed will put all learned rabbies to a non-plus . and so for the glory of god , it is unsearchable ; men cannot finde it out , though they joyn all their heads together . where is the wise ? where is the scribe ? where is the disputer of this world ? tell me what is glory of god , and what is truth . you cannot tell me : for , no man knows the minde of god , but god . now it is the onely work of god , as he is the spirit , to reveal and make known truth and glory to us and in us . again , he is called the spirit , as he is the leader of the poor creature into truth and glory , in the old creation . though god , as the spirit , discovers truth and glory to us in the old creation ; yet , friends , we cannot be led into it , but by the spirit : though we see never so much truth and glory shine forth in the old creation , yet we cannot enjoy it , without the spirit ; the spirit is that which leadeth us into the enjoyment of it , which is sweeter then the seeing of it . howbeit , when he the spirit of truth is come , he will guide you into all truth : for he shall not speak of himself ; but whatsoever he shall hear , that shall he speak ; and he will shew you things to come , joh. . . secondly , he is the spirit , as he is the guider of poor creatures into truth and glory , in the new creation . friends , if there be any truth and glory that you possess , the spirit guided you into it : for we are so ready to go out of the way of truth and glory , though it be discovered to us , that unless we had some one to guide us into truth and glory , we should miss of the enjoyment of it , though we see it . the second thing to be spoken to in the first verse of the words , is this : what heaven is , in which the witnesses bear record . heaven here , is the uncompounded and unmixt state of saints ; it is such an estate of glory in which saints shall be , as shall not be mixed or compounded with flesh . that state which we are now in , it is a mixt state of flesh and spirit ; but that state which we shall be in , in heaven , is a pure state of spirit and glory . the third thing to be enquired into , is , what the witnesses record in heaven is . in which , we shall consider four things . . what the father's report is . . what the word's report is . . what the holy ghost's report is . . how they witness . for the first , what the father's report is : the father's report is somewhat concerning the son . what is that ? see in joh. . , , , . if we receive the witness of men , the witness of god is greater : for this is the witness of god , which he hath testified of his son . he that believeth on the son of god , hath the witness in himself : and he that believeth not god , hath made him a lyer , because he believeth not the report that god gave of his son . and this is the report , that god hath given to us eternal life , and this life is in his son . he that hath the son , hath life ; and he that hath not the son of god , hath not life . see that in joh. . . there is another that beareth witness of me ; and i know that the witness which he beareth of me , is true . see verse . and the father himself which hath sent me , hath born witness of me . but what doth the father witness of christ ? see in matth. . , . and jesus , when he was baptized , went up straightway out of the water ; and lo , the heavens were opened unto him , and he saw the spirit of god descending like a dove , and lighting upon him . and lo , a voice from heaven , saying , this is my beloved son , in whom i am well pleased . that which the father testifies of christ , is , that he is the messiah , the son of god ; and that he is well pleased with his son , and so with us , in his son . then that in joh. . . the father that sent me , beareth witness of me . what is that ? see vers . . then spake jesus again unto them , saying , i am the light of the world : he that followeth me , shall not walk in darkness , but shall have the light of life . god beareth record of christ , that he is the light of the world , that enlightens the world ; and that he that is a follower of christ , shall not walk in darkness , but shall have the light of life , that is , life's light ; that is , he shall have that light that is accompanied with life . see that in heb. . . for he testifieth , thou art a priest for ever after the order of melchizedek . the father testifieth of christ , that he is an everlasting priest , to make intercession for us , and to take away our sins . who is made , not after the law of a carnal commandment , but after the power of an endless life , that is , unlooseable and indissolvable life . the second thing to be enquired into , is , what the word's report is . . it beareth witness of the father . . of it self . first , it beareth witness of the father , that he sent his son to be the saviour of the world ; it testifieth what it hath seen and heard , in the father , and from the father , joh. . . the word testifieth of that good will , love , and grace , which it hath seen and heard to be in the father , towards the worst of sinners : the word beareth witness of the father , by its works that it did , that the father sent him into the world , to finish that great work of redemption and reconciliation . see joh. . . to this end was i born , and for this cause came i into the world , that i should bear witness unto the truth . every one that is of the truth , heareth my voice . secondly , it testifieth of it self . see joh. . , . jesus answered and said unto them , though i bear record of my self , yet my record is true : for i know whence i came , and whither i go . i am one that beareth witness of my self , that i came from the father , and go to the father . object , but , may some say , christ saith in joh. . . if i bear witness of my self , my witness is not true : so that christ bearing witness of himself , is not true . answ. to this i answer ; if christ bear witness of himself alone , that is , without the father , and not as one sent from the father ; then indeed his witness is nottrue ; otherwise it is . the third thing to be enquired into , is , what the holy ghost's report is . the holy ghost's report , see in heb. . . whereof the holy ghost also is a witness to us : of which see in vers. . by the which will we are sanctified , through the offering of the body of jesus christ once for all . see likewise vers. . this man , after he offered one sacrifice for sins for ever , sate down on the right hand of god , from henceforth expecting till his enemies be made his footstoole . see vers . . for by one offering , he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified . all which the holy ghost testifieth . and that in act. . . for we are his witnesses of these things , and so is also the holy ghost , whom god hath given to them that obey him . what doth the holy ghost witness ? see in vers . , . the god of our fathers raised up jesus , whom ye slew and hanged on a tree . him hath god exalted with his right hand , to be a prince and a saviour , for to give repentance to israel , and forgiveness of sins : of which the holy ghost is a witness . now the holy ghost beareth witness by cloven tongues , that christ is exalted . see act. . , , . and there appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire , and it sate upon each of them . and they were all filled with the holy ghost , and began to speak with other tongues , as the spirit gave them utterance . therefore , being by the right hand of god exalted , and having received of the father the promise of the holy ghost , he hath shed forth this which you now see and hear . the fourth thing to be inquired into , is , how the father , word , and holy ghost witness . they witness immediately , that is , without means . the next thing to be inquired into , is , how the father , word , and holy ghost , are one . they are one in substance , in being ; they are one pure essence and person . he doth not say , they agree in one ; but , are one . if it be thus , then this may serve to discover what these three witnesses in heaven are ; they are the father , word , and holy ghost ; three immediate , true , and strong witnesses . it is written in the law , that the testimony of two witnesses is true ; much more the testimony of three . what greater testimony can there be in heaven , then the testimony of three ? the father bearing testimony of the son , and the son of the father , and the holy ghost of both ; all three witnessing grace and love , to our spirits , that we are theirs , and they ours . job saith , also now behold , my witness is in heaven ; ( speaking of the father , son , and holy ghost in unity ) and my record is on high , that is , in the high places , job . . it shall be established for ever , as the moon , and as a faithful witness in heaven : selah : speaking of davids throne . so psa. . the witnesses in heaven are such as are faithful . now a faithful witness will not lye , prov. . , . if it be so , then desire god to open the temple of the tabernacle of the testimony in heaven to you . rev. . . it is said , when the temple of god was opened in heaven , there was seen in the temple the arke of his testament ; and there were lightnings , and voices , and thunderings , and an earthquake , and great hail , rev. . . friends , when god comes to open his temple in heaven , then we shall see the ark of his testament , and lightenings , and voices , and thunders , and an earthquake , and great hail fall upon the man of sin in us . if it be so , then this may serve to discover what the mystery of the father , son , and holy ghost or spirit is ; that they are three , and yet one ; one , and yet three : that the father is one , the son another , and the holy ghost another ; and yet the same ▪ god variously come forth . so that unity brancheth forth it self into variety , and variety into unity : the father is not limited to unity , but spreads forth himself into diversi●y . if it be so , then this may serve to discover the vanity and blasphemy of those that hold that christ and the spirit are meer creatures , and not the most high god ; for it is cleer from what hath been spoken , that they are the most high god in unity ; and the father , son , and spirit differ not , but in their several makings forth ; all are but one , eternal , wise , immortal , and invisible being . and the reason why people fall into such gross absurdities , is , because they are ignorant of this mystery : he that sendeth , and he that is sent ; he that gave the holy ghost , and the holy ghost that was given ; he that speaketh of himself , and he that speaketh not of himself ; he that teacheth , and he that is taught ; he that gives , and he that receiveth ; he that is the giver , and he that is the gift ; he that prayeth , and he that offers up prayer , are all but one incomprehensible being ; and therefore christ saith of the father and himself , that they are one : i and my father are one . till we come to understand things thus , we shall miss of the truth , and run into a thousand errours . thus much for the first verse of the words . the first thing to be considered in the second verse of the words , is , what earth is , in which the water , blood , and spirit witness . earth is the mixt and compounded state of saints , in which they live in this life ; which is an estate part of flesh , and part of spirit ; part fleshly , part spiritually : in which state , there is such a lusting and fighting of the spirit against flesh , and flesh against the spirit , that a saint cannot do many times the things he would , but is led captive into the law of sin . the second thing to be considered in the second verse of the words , is , who they are that bear witness on earth . they are three ; the spirit , vvater , and blood . but you will ask me , vvhat the spirit is , what the vvater is , and what the blood is . the spirit is god , and the lord is that spirit . now god is the spirit ( as i said before ) in reference to the discovery of truth , and leading into truth : or , he is called the spirit , in respect of his omnipresency , or because of its invisibility : a spirit cannot be seen . the second thing to be spoken to , is , vvhat the vvater is . it is that which came out of the side of christ , when one of the souldiers with a spear pierced his side . the third thing to be spoken to , is , vvhat the blood is , that beareth witness in earth : it was that likewise which issued out of christ's side . see both these in joh. . . the next thing to be considered in the words , is , vvhat the vvitnesses testimonies in earth are : and in this , there are these three things to be considered : vvhat the witness of the spirit is . vvhat the witness of vvater is . vvhat the witness of blood is . how they witness . the first thing to be inquired into , is , vvhat the witness of the spirit is , or what it testifieth . it testifies of christ : see joh. . . but when the comforter is come , whom i will send unto you from the father , even the spirit of truth which proceedeth from the father , he shall testifie of me , and make known me : i say , the spirit testifies of christ ; it witnesseth christ to the soul . it testifies of the sufferings of christ . of the glory that should follow those sufferings . first , it testifieth the sufferings of christ ; it witnesseth them to the soul ; it makes known what christ hath suffered , and the fruit of those sufferings ; and witnesseth the truth thereof to the soul , pet. . . secondly , it testifies of that glory which should follow those sufferings . vvhat is the glory ? that glory which jesus christ is in at the right hand of the father . vvhat is that ? see in joh. . . and now , o father , glorifie me with thine own self , with the glory which i had with thee before the world was ; which was with his own self . now the spirit testifies of that glory , and witnesseth it to the soul . there is always glory following after affliction ; and the more affliction , the more glory : our light afflictions , which are but for a moment , are not worthy to be compared with that glory which is to be revealed in us . all which the spirit testifies . the next thing to be considered , is , vvhat vvater witnesseth . it witnesseth mystically sanctification , purity , vvashing , cleansing , doing away sin . the third thing to be considered , is , vvhat blood witnesseth . it witnesseth salvation , redemption , justification , life , though in a mystical sence . object . but , may some say , how can vvater witness sanctification , washing , cleansing of the soul ? and how can blood witness salvation , justification , and the like , seeing the vvater and blood of christ was long since spilt upon the ground ? answ. i shall answer this , by asking another question : how did abel , being dead , speak ? rev. . . the fourth thing to be inquired into , is , how the spirit , vvater , and blood witness . they witness mediately , that is , by means . the last thing to be inquired into , is , how the spirit , vvater , and blood agree in one . thus : they witness to one thing : what the spirit witnesseth , that vvater witnesseth ; and what vvater witnesseth , blood witnesseth ; and what vvater and blood witness , that the spirit witnesseth , which is love . if it be thus , then this may serve to inform us of this truth , that god hath not left us without three vvitnesses in earth : god would not have us be without three , by reason that he tenders us so much : he knows our frailties , that we are ready to be set upon by satan , and to sink in our spirits for want of vvitnesses : he hath given us three , to confirm us , and establish us , in our mixt state of flesh and blood , lest we should be discouraged , and so faint away in our spirits , because of those corruptions and flesh which are within us : he hath given us his own spirit , and his own vvater and blood , to bear witness to our souls of loving kindness and mercy , sanctification , pardon of sin , righteousness , and the like . if it be thus , then do not say you shall not be sanctified and made clean : vvater witnesseth sanctification , and purity to the soul . do not say you are not , nor shall be justified , that your sins are not pardoned : blood speaks it , that your sins are pardoned , and you justified . if it be thus , then set to your seals to that which the spirit , vvater , and blood testifie : the not receiving what they witness , is the cause of abundance of trouble , and sinkings of the spirit . listen therefore what vvater and blood , or rather the spirit in water and blood witnesseth , and it will force you to submit to its testimonies ; and those that have received their testimonies , have set to their seals that god is true . chap. iv. some sweet discoveries of those glorious things that are spoken of the city of god ; out of psal. . , , ▪ , , . vers . . his foundation is in the holy mountains . . the lord loveth the gates of sion , more then all the dwellings of jacob . . glorious things are spoken of thee , o city of god . selah . . i will make mention of rahab and babylon to them that know me ; behold , philistia , and tyre , with ethiopia : this man was born there . . and of zion it shall be said , this and that man was born in her : and the highest himself shall establish her . . the lord shall count when he writeth up the people , that this man was born there . selah . . as well the singers as the players on instruments , shall be there : all my springs are in thee . there are in the first verse of this psalm , these things to be considered : first , what is meant by foundation here . secondly , whose this foundation is . thirdly , where this foundation is . fourthly , what the holy mountains are in which the foundation is . the first thing to be enquired into , is , what is meant by foundation here . it is meant christ ; he is a saints foundation , upon which he builds , or is built . we are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets , jesus christ himself being the chief corner-stone . it is not any thing that a believer builds upon , but jesus christ . as a wise master-builder , ( saith paul ) i laid the foundation , christ : for other foundation can no man lay , then that is laid , jesus christ . now if any man build upon this foundation , gold , silver , precious stones , wood , hay , stubble , which are false doctrines and principles ; every mans work shall be made manifest : for the day shall declare it , because it shall be revealed by fire ; and the fire shall trie every mans work , of what sort it is ▪ if any mans work abide , which he hath built thereupon , he shall receive a reward . if any mans work shall be burnt , he shall suffer loss ▪ but he himself shall be saved ; yet so as by fire , cor. . , , , , , . the second thing to be enquired into , is , whose this foundation is . it is god's foundation , of god's own laying in the mountains : behold , i lay in zion for a foundation , a stone , a tried stone , a sure foundation , isai. . . and in another place it is said , that the foundation of god standeth sure , tim. . . the third thing to be enquired into , is , where this foundation is : that is to say , in the holy mountains . what is meant by the holy mountains ? see dan. . . o lord , according to all thy righteousness , i beseech thee , let thine anger and thy fury be turned away from thy city jerusulem , thy holy mountain ; because , for our sins , and for the iniquities of our fathers , jerusalem and all thy people are become a reproach to all that are about us . and that in joel . . so shall ye know that i am the lord your god , dwelling in zion my holy mountain : then shall jerusalem be holy , and there shall be no strangers pass thorow her any more . so that the holy mountain is the city jerusalem ; it 's zion : god hath laid his foundation in jerusalem , in zion , for zion to build upon . the lord loves the gates of zion more then all the dwellings of jacob . there are in this verse these things to be considered : first , what the gates of zion are . they are those that open into zion , that give an entrance into zion , that let us into zion . it is the property of a gate to let in into some place or other : so the gates of zion are those which give us an admittance into zion . the second thing to be enquired into , is , what the dwellings of jacob are . they are these : they dwelt upon somewhat that was not god ; they dwelt upon wickedness , as those that know not god do : see job . from vers. of this chapter , to vers. . yea , the light of the wicked shall be put out , and the spark of his fire shall not shine ; the light shall be dark in his tabernacle , and his candle shall be put out with him : the steps of his strength shall be straightned , and his own counsel shall cast him down . for he is cast into a net by his own feet , and he walketh upon a snare . the grin shall take him by the heel , and the robber shall prevail against him . the snare is laid for him in the ground , and a trap for him in the way . terrours shall make him afraid on every side , and shall drive him to his feet . his strength shall be hungerbitten , and destruction shall be ready at his side . it shall devour the strength of his skin ; even the first-born of death shall devour his strength . his confidence shall be rooted out of his tabernalce , and it shall bring him to the king of terrours . it shall dwell in his tabernacle , because it is none of his : brimstone shall be scattered upon his habitation . his roots shall be dried up beneath , and above shall his branch be cut off . his remembrance shall perish from the earth , and he shall have no name in the street . he shall be driven from light into darkness , and chased out of the world . he shall neither have son nor nephew among his people , nor any remaining in his dwellings . they that come after him , shall be astonied at his day , as they that went before were affrighted . surely such are the dwellings of the wicked , and this is the place of him that knoweth not god . then that in psal. . . let death seise upon them , and let them go down quick into hell : for wickedness is in their dwelling , and among them . now the lord loves the gates of zion , the outward part of zion , the entrance of zion , more then jacob's dwellings : he cannot endure dwelling places where wickedness is : he cannot endure our dwelling places , that which we dwell and live upon besides god . glorious things are spoken of thee , o city of god . selah . the things that are to be enquired into in this verse , are these following ▪ first , what the city of god is . it is that in which god dwells and inhabits , and takes up his abode : it is zion , jerusalem ; it is god's people . the second thing to be enquired into , is , what those glorious things are that are spoken of the city of god . see psal. . , , . the kings daughter is all glorious within ; ( which is the church of christ : ) her clothing is of wrought gold . she shall be brought to the king christ jesus in rayment of needle-work : the virgins her companions that follow her , shall be brought unto thee . with gladness and rejoycing shall they be brought : they shall enter into the kings palace ; that is , into christs glory ; whose garments smell of myrrhe , aloes , and cassia , out of the ivory palaces whereby they have made thee glad , vers. . kings daughters were among thy honourable women : upon thy right hand did stand the queen in gold of ophir , vers. . see that in isai. . , . look upon zion , the city of our solemnities : thine eyes shall see jerusalem a quiet habitation , a tabernacle that shall not be taken down : not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed , neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken ; but there the glorious lord will be unto us a place of broad waters and streams , wherein shall go no galley with oars , neither shall gallant ships pass thereby . see rev. . . and i saw a new heaven and a new earth . this new heaven and earth is a state of righteousness : see pet. . . nevertheless we , according to his promise , look for new heavens and a new earth , wherein dwelleth righteousness : that is , such heavens and such an earth as is free from all corruption and sin . this new heaven and new earth is spoken of in isai. . . for behold , i create new heavens and a new earth ; and the former shall not be remembred , nor come into minde . this new heaven and new earth is described there to be such an estate of glory , in which the voice of weeping shall be no more heard , nor the voice of crying , vers. . but jerusalem shall be created a rejoycing and a joy , vers. . and he who blesseth himself in the earth , shall bless himself in the god of truth ; and he that sweareth in the earth , shall swear by the god of truth ; because the former troubles shall be forgotten , vers. . for the first heaven and first earth were passed away : they shall not be remembred , nor come into minde . which first heaven and earth is that state of things in and under which the saints are now : whose voice then shook the earth ; but now he hath promised , saying , yet once more i shake not the earth onely , but also heaven , heb. . . god is now a shaking the old heaven and earth , and they begin to fall apace , and to make way for the new heavens and earth . and there was no more sea : that is , no more troublesomness , confusedness , broils , waves , tempests , and storms . this john saw , and it will shortly be fulfilled . and i john saw the holy city , new hierusalem , coming down from god out of heaven , prepared as a bride adorned for her husband . this holy city , new hierusalem , is the church of christ in her glorious triumphing estate . it is therefore said to come down from god out of heaven , because it hath all its newness and holiness from god , and from heaven , by which she is now prepared and adorned for her husband . and i heard a great voice out of heaven , saying , behold , the tabernacle of god is with men , and he will dwell with them , and they shall be his people ; and god himself shall be with them , and be their god . iohn heard a voice from heaven , which called him to behold , see , and take notice , that god would tabernacle in men , make men his tabernacle . he tells iohn that this his tabernacle is with men ; he doth not tell him it shall be with men ; but it is already ; he dwells himself with the saints already : intimating unto us this , that it is so in the counsel of god . there is a great deal in that word himself : he dwells in us now by the spirit : ( ye are the habitation of god by the spirit : ) but he will dwell himself , in his own proper substance , being , and person : god himself shall be with them : he is with us now , but he shall be with us in greater glory : and he will dwell with us : now he is in us and with us for a while , and then withdraws himself ; but then he shall take up his dwelling for ever in our hearts : and we shall be his people : we are his people now ; but we shall be so his people , as that his name shall be written upon our foreheads , that we shall be distinguished from the world : the world shall acknowledge us to be his : and he shall be their god : he is their god now , but it shall appear to all then that he is their god . and god shall wipe away all tears from their eyes ; and there shall be no more death , neither sorrow , nor crying , neither shall there be any more pain : for the former things are passed away . here is a further description of hierusalem's state . when god comes to dwell among us himself , when he himself comes to be with us , he will put an end to all our sorrow , and crying , and pains ; yea , he will wipe away all our tears ; so that we shall weep no more ; he will take away death , even that death through fear of which many were all their life-time subject to bondage , heb. . . and we shall live for ever in his sight : and the reason is , because the former things are past away . and he that sate upon the throne , said behold , i make all things new . and he said unto me , write : for these words are true and faithful . and he said unto me , it is done . here is christ upon the throne , calling us to behold that he makes all things new . friends , jesus christ is doing of it , and he will restore his people into a better and more firm estate then they were in in the first adam ; and for the confirmation of this , commandeth john to write it as a thing already done . things to come , which are decreed in the counsel of god , are as certain as if they were past : for god cannot change nor alter : therefore he saith , i am alpha and omega , the first and the last , ver. . now at the ninth verse he saith , and there came unto me one of the seven angels which had the seven vials full of the seven plagues , and talked with me , saying , come up hither ; ( here the spirit of the lord calls up john above himself , that so he might see and receive the visions of the lord ) i will shew thee the bride the lambs wife , that is , the church of christ in her glorious estate . and he carried me away in the spirit to a great and high mountain , which is christ , that so he might take a view of the spouse of christ in her glory . which thing holds forth this to us , that none can take a right view of the new jerusalem , unless they be taken from earth into heaven . and shewed me that great city , the holy jerusalem , descending out of heaven from god , having the glory of god , that is , the light , wisdom , power , beauty , and excellency of god : no less then the very glory of god is the new ierusalem clothed with . and her light was like unto a stone most precious , even like a jasper stone ; which is full of beauty , excellency , and glory . and cleer as crystal , that is , in respect of its bright shining and glistering light ▪ and had a wall great and high ; which speaks the security , defence , and safetiness of the city . and it had twelve gates ; which signifieth this to us , the hardness and difficulty of enemies to enter in . and at the gates twelve angels , to keep the gates , that none but the righteous enter in . and names written thereon , which are the names of the twelve tribes of the children of israel ; that is , all the elect of god , both jews and gentiles , that are not israelites after the flesh , but true israelites . which holds forth this to us , that those that are to enter into the city , their names are written upon the gates of the city . on the east three gates , on the north three gates , on the south three gates , and on the west three gates . which holds forth this unto us , that out of all the four quarters of the earth , the elect shall be gathered . see mat. . . and he shall send his angels with a great sound of a trumpet ; and they shall gather together his elect from the four windes , from one end of heaven to the other : or , from the uttermost parts of the earth , to the uttermost part of heaven , mark , . and some shall be let in at one gate , and some at another . and the wall of the city had twelve foundations ; which speaks the sureness of its foundation : and in them the names of the twelve apostles of the lamb ; to signifie unto us , that the ground and foundation of this city is laid upon the doctrine of the apostles and prophets , jesus christ being the corner-stone . and he that talked with me , had a golden reed to measure the city , and the gates thereof , and the wall thereof . measuring with reeds , was a thing of great use , as we read among the prophets . because every thing of this spiritual ierusalem is glorious , therefore the measuring-reed is said to be of gold . this golden reed is the spirit . and the city lieth foursquare : which presents us with this , the fastness and unmoveableness of its stature : for round things are easily rolled and moved aside ; but square things are not . seeing we receive a kingdom that cannot be shaken , let us have grace , whereby we may so serve god , that we may please him , with reverence and fear , hebr. . . and the length is as large as the breadth . and he measured the city with the reed , twelve thousand furlongs : the length , and the breadth , and the height of it are equal . the angel with his golden reed measureth the square side of the city , both in length , breadth , heighth , and depth of it and findeth each of them to be twelve thousand furlongs ; which after furlongs to the mile , maketh in our account fifteen hundred miles , as some say ; and so the whole square of this great city cometh to six thousand miles ; which is a great compass ; and holdeth forth unto us the great largeness of this city , that there is room enough for all the inhabitants thereof , yea most pleasant and commodious rooms . and he measured the wall thereof , an hundred fourty and four cubits , according to the measure of a man , that is , of the angel : which , after our common account of two cubits to a yard , amount unto seventy and two yards ; which is a great thickness , even so thick , as no enemy can break in . and the building of the wall of it was of jasper ; that is , spotty , greedy , green , and flourishing . and the city was pure gold , without any mixture . like unto clear glass , pure and glistering . and the foundations of the wall of the city were garnished ; beautified and adorned with all manner of precious stones , which were written upon the brest-plate of the high-priests under the law . but here we are not to think that the city of god is of such metal and matter indeed , as is here described : but the holy ghost would give us some taste of it , and , after a sort , shadow out unto us under these things , which are of most esteem amongst men , what the glory and excellency of this new hierulem is . and the twelve gates were twelve pearls ; every gate was of one pearl : and the street of the city was pure gold , as it were transparent glass . all which hold forth to us the braveness , beautifulness , gloriousness , glistering , and admirableness of the city . if the gates be of pearl , and the street of gold , then what are the inmost rooms ! and i saw no temple therein , as was in the old ierusalem . for the lord god almighty , and the lamb , are the temple of it . as the city hath no need of the temple , so it hath no need of the sun , neither of the moon , to shine in it : that is , it hath no need of any light : for the glory of god did lighten it , and the lamb is the light thereof . god and christ is all in all there . the kings of the earth do bring their glory and honour into it . though none of the kings and nobles of the gentiles might be admitted into the old jerusalem , yet they have free passage into this . and the gates of it shall not be shut at all by day . the gates of this city always stand open for believers to come in , as not fearing enemies . for there shall be no night there . all shall be light . and they shall bring the honour and glory of the nations into it ; and throw it down at christ's feet . and there shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth , neither whatsoever worketh abomination ▪ or maketh a lye , but they that are written in the lambs book of life . no unclean thing shall enter in here . now in chap. . to verse . he speaketh of a pure river of water of life : this river is christ , who is pure : the water of this river , is the spirit , that flows from him , and begets life in us . clear as crystal . there is no muddiness in it . proceeding out of the throne of god and the lamb . which holds forth unto us , that god in christ is the original of all our life and happiness . in the midst of the street of it , and of either side of the river , was there the tree of life ; which is christ : which bare twelve manner of fruits : which speaketh those varieties of pleasures and delights that are in jesus christ . and yeelded her fruit every month , as well in summer as in winter : which speaks this to us ▪ the plenty of pleasures and delights that are in jesus christ . and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations ; to preserve them from all diseases and griefs , sorrow and pain , and sickness . the tree stands not in an outward corner of the city ▪ but in the midst of the street , and of both sides of the river , that all the citizens of jerusalem might freely come unto it , and taste of the fruits of it . and there shall be no more curse . we shall be no more subject to any curse in the heavenly paradise , as adam was in the earthly . but the throne of god and the lamb shall be in it . god shall be on his throne , and the lamb there . and his servants shall serve him ; yea , they shall see his very face , ( which moses could not endure the sight of ) and be taken with his glory . and his name shall be in their foreheads ; which shall distinguish them from the world : yea , his name shall be so seen in their foreheads , that all the world shall take notice of it . and there shall be no night there , and they need no candle , neither light of the sun : for the lord god gives them light ; and they shall reign for ever and ever with the lord . and he said unto me , these sayings are faithful and true . and the lord god of the holy prophets sent his holy angel to shew unto his servants the things which must shortly be done . all which are spoken of the city of god . selah . and if you look into the , , , of isaiah , you shall see further what glorious things are spoken of the city of god . i will make mention of rahab and babylon to them that know me . the first thing to be inquired into in these words , is , what rahab is . it is egypt : see isa. . . awake , awake , put on strength , o arm of the lord ; awake as in the ancient days , in the generations of old . art thou not it that hath cut rahab , and wounded the dragon ? see psal. . . thou hast broken rahab in pieces . or ▪ rahab may be taken for the harlot . heb. . . by faith , the harlot rahab perished not with them that believed not , when she had received the spies with peace . the second thing to be inquired into , is , what babylon is . it is a great city , rev. . . alas , alas , that great city babylon . the third thing to be inquired , is , what gods making mention of rahab and babylon is . it is his making known and discovering of rahab and babylon . the fourth thing to be inquired into , is , to whom god will make mention of rahab and babylon : and that is , to those that know him ; to those that are acquainted with god ; that have not an outward cognizance of god , but a divine inward knowledge of him : god will make mention of rahab and babylon to them that thus know him . what , make mention of rahab and babylon ? why ? what is to be seen in rahab ? is there any thing to be seen that is worth the seeing , in egypt , where there is nothing but blackness ▪ darkness , bondage , cruelty , and the like ? yes , this man was born there . who is that ? christ . vvhat , christ born in egypt , among the egyptians , where there is nothing but cruelty , darkness , and bondage ? this is strange . god will make mention of this , to them that know him , as an incouragement to them to believe , notwithstanding their darkness and bondage , that christ shall be born in them . or , rahab here ▪ may be taken for the harlot . if you take rahab for the harlot , then it is thus : god will make mention of rahab the harlot to them that know him . vvhat , a harlot ? is there any thing to be seen or learn'd from her ? yes ; though she was a harlot , yet she obtained mercy ; and so it is an incouragement to us . gods making mention of rahab the harlot to them that know him , is his letting them see , that she obtained mercy ; that so it might be an incouragement to those to whom he makes mention of it , to believe . i will make mention of babylon likewise to them that know me . vvhy , is there any thing to be seen in babylon , among the babylonians ? yes : this man was born there . vvhere ? in babylon , among the babylonians , those sinful persecuting creatures , that held the people of god in captivity : this god will make mention of to them that know him , as an incouragement to them likewise . behold , see , take notice . what shall we take notice of ? philistia . what is philistia ? a country , of which the philistims came . what is to be seen there ? this man was born there . where ? among the philistims that fought against christ , and were enemies to him . behold , see , take notice of tyre . what is tyre ? a city , mat. . , what is to be seen there ? this man was born there . what , born in that sinful city ? yes . behold , ethiopia . what was ethiopia ? a country , of whom the ethiopians came , that is , blackamores . what is to be seen there ? this man was born there . where ? among the blackamores , those sullied , sinful , black creatures . so that if satan makes the question , how christ can be born in such an egyptian babylonish rahab-like heart as thine is ; make mention of rahab and egypt , and tell him ▪ that this man was born there . if satan makes the question , how christ can be born in thee , that art so philistia and tyre-like ; behold philistia and tyre , and tell him , that this man was born there . if satan tempt thee with thy blackness and sulliedness ▪ and makes thee question whether christ be born in thee , from thy blackness and sulliedness ; behold philista ; and tell satan , that this man was born there . as it was said of rahab and babylon , philistia ▪ tyre , and ethiopia , that this man was born there : so it shall be said of zion . and of zion it shall be said ▪ this man , and that man , that is , man and man , the man christ jesus , and the man david , was born in her . and the highest himself shall establish her . god himself shall establish her with grace , shall root her and ground her in himself , against all winds of doctrine , temptations , sin ▪ and the gates of hell . the lord shall count , or , reckon , when he writeth up the people ( among the living in jerusalem ▪ isa. . . in the writing of the house of israel , ezek. . . ) that this man christ , was born there . born where ? in zion . selah . he that hath an ear to hear , let him hear . as well the singers , as the players on instruments shall be there . where ? in zion ; and shall make sweet and heavenly musick and melody in their hearts to god . what singers and players on instruments shall be there ? not carnal singers , but such as can sing the song of the lamb ; and not carnal players or carnal instruments neither , but spiritual . the psalmist ends the psalm with this sweet saying , all my springs are within thee : as if he should say , i am nothing but what i am from thee , thy springs are mine ; all my springs of comfort joy , parts , are in thee ; and if thou withdrawest them , i die : my lower and upper springs are in thee , my lesser and my greater . christ saith of his people , a garden inclosed is my sister , my spouse ; a spring shut up , a fountain sealed ▪ a fountain of gardens , a well of living waters and streams , from lebanon ▪ cant. . , . therefore with joy , shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation , isa. . . therefore are they before the throne of god , and serve him day and night in his temple ; and he that sitteth on the throne shall dwell among them . they shall hunger no more , neither thirst any more ; neither shall the sun light on them , nor any heat : for the lamb which is in the midst of the throne , shall feed them , and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters ; and god shall wipe away all tears from their eyes , rev. . , , . chap. v. some sweet discoveries of the way christ takes to undo a man , and take away his life , light , understanding , knowledge , wisdom , and so make him a meer begger ; out of isa. . , , . vers . . then said i , wo is me , for i am undone ; because i am a man of unclean lips , and i dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips : for mine eyes have seen the king , the lord of hosts . . then flew one of the seraphims , unto me , having a live coale in his hand which he had taken with the tongs froṁ off the altar . . and he laid it upon my mouth , and said , loe , this hath touched thy lips , and thine iniquity is taken away , and thy sin purged ▪ in the verses going before , the prophet isaiah gives a description of that discovery that he had of the lord , and of the time when he had it : the description of his dicovery is part of the first verse , to the fifth : the time when he had this discovery , is set down in the first words of the first verse , which was in the year that king vzziah dyed , chron. . . the prophets discovery of the lord , is as followeth . i saw the lord sitting upon a throne ; as ready to judge , psa. . , . but the lord shall endure for ever : he hath prepared his throne for judgement , and he shall judge the world in righteousness ; he shall minister judgemen to the people in uprightness . see dan. . , . i beheld till the thrones were cast down , and the ancient of days did sit , whose garment was white as snow , and the hair of his head like the pure wool ; his throne was like the very flame , and his wheeles as burning fire ▪ a fiery stream issued and came forth from before him : thousand thousands ministred unto him , and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him . the judgement was set , and the books were opened . see that in rev. . ▪ . and immediately i was in the spirit , and behold , a throne was set in heaven , and one sate on the throne ; and he that sate , was to look upon like a jasper , and a sardine ; two glistering stones . and there was a rain-bowe round about the throne , in sight like unto an emerald ; which holds forth the covenant of grace . see revel. . . and they said to the mountains and rocks , fall on us , and hide us from the face of him that sitteth on the throne , and from the wrath of the lamb . and that in rev. . . and i saw the dead ▪ small and great , stand before god : and the books were opened , and another book was opened , which is the book of life : and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books , according to their works . at vers. . and i saw a great white throne , and him that sate on it , from whose face the earth and the heaven fled away , and there was found no place for them . or , the throne may be taken thus : a throne denotes dignity , rule , kingliness , authority : sitting holds forth rest . the words being thus explained , the meaning of them is this : isaiah saw the lord sitting upon the throne ; that is , ruling , reigning , triumphing , in a peaceable manner , over his enemies . high , and lifted up ; that is , far above all principalities and powers , might and dominion , and every name that is named , not onely in this world , but that which is to come , eph. . . and his train filled the temple : that is , the skirts of his robes ▪ with which he sate upon the throne , filled the temple , that is , the saints : for they are the temple of the living god , cor. . , . above it ( that is , above the throne ) stood the seraphims . what are those ? angels appearing as fire , psal. . . who maketh his angels spirits , his ministers a flaming fire . these stood and attended christ . see dan. . . thousand thousands ministred unto him , and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before the ancient of days ▪ that sate upon the throne , whose garments were white as snow . each one had six wings : with twain he covered his face ; as not able to endure the brightness of christ's glory ; even as moses did : see exod. . . moreover , he said , i am the god of thy fathers , the god of abraham , the god of isaac , and the god of jacob . and moses hid his face : for he was afraid to look upon god . see that likewise in king. . , , . and he said , go forth , and stand upon the mount before the lord . and behold , the lord passed by , and a great and strong winde rent the mountains , and brake in pieces the rocks before the lord ; but the lord was not in the winde : and after the winde , an earthquake ; but the lord was not in the earthquake : and after the earthquake , a fire ; but the lord was not in the fire : and after the fire , a still small voice . and it was so , when elijah heard it , that he wrapped his face in his mantle ▪ and went out ▪ and stood in the entring in of the cave . elijah could not endure the glory of god , and therefore puts a mantle before his face . and with twain he covered his feet ; as abashed in apprehension of their own infirmities and imperfections , compared with god's incomparable perfection and majestie , job . . behold , he put no trust in his servants , and his angels he charged with folly . and with twain he did flie : which speaks their readiness and swiftness to go about god's business , psal. . . bless the lord , ye his angels , that excel in strength , that do his commandments , hearkning unto the voice of his word . and one cried to another , or , this cried to this , holy , holy , holy . their constant employment is praising god . see rev. . . and the four beasts had each of them six wings about them , and they were full of eyes within ; and they rest not day and night , saying , holy , holy ▪ holy lord god almighty ▪ which was , and is , and is to come . the whole earth is full of his glory ; or , his glory is the fulness of the whole earth : he fills heaven and earth with his glory : we can look nowhere , but behold glory . psal. . , . lord ▪ how manifold are thy works ! in wisdom hast thou made them all : the earth is full of thy riches ; so is this great and wide sea . and the posts of the door moved at the voice of him that cried ; and the house was filled with smoak ▪ that is , the posts of the door of the house or temple moved . the posts are those upon which the door hangs : their moving was a signe of god's indignation . see amos . . i saw the lord standing upon the altar , and he said smite the lintel of the door , that the posts may shake ; and cut them in the head all of them ▪ and i will slay the last of them with the sword : he that fleeth of them , shall not flee away ; and he that escapeth of them shall not be delivered . and the house was filled with smoak : another signe of his fierce anger incensed . see psal. . , . then the earth shook and trembled ▪ the foundations of the hills moved and were shaken , because he was wroth . there went up a smoak out of his nostrils , and fire out of his mouth devoured ; coals were kindled by it . see deut. . . the lord will not spare him but then the anger of the lord , and his jealousie shall smoak against that man . or by smoak here is meant darkness : see rev. . . and the temple was filled with smoak from the glory of god , & from his power : and no man was able to enter into the temple , till the seven plagues of the seven angels were fulfilled . in this symbolical vision , isaiah saw the lord ; and the discovery of the lord had such an efficacie and power upon his spirit , that he was forced to cry out , that he was undone . so that the words are a fruit of that discovery that isaiah had of christ . and there are in them these things to be considered : first , here is what isaiah said when he saw the lord : wo is me , or , wo belongs to me ; it is my portion . secondly , here is the reason of that saying , wo is me ; and that is , for i am undone , that is , cut off . thirdly , here is the ground why he said he was undone ; which is threefold : . because i am a man of unclean lips ; that is , because he was vile . . i dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips . . because mine eyes have seen the king , the lord of hosts . that which we shall raise from the words , is this : that a true seeing the lord , is accompanied with these things following : first , it undoes a man . secondly , it makes him cry out , wo is he . thirdly , it makes him cry out that he is a man of unclean lips . fourthly , that he dwells in the midst of a people of unclean lips . i. first of all , a true discovery of the lord , undoeth a man ; that is , cuts him off from what he is , or can do . as for samaria ▪ her king is cut off , as the foam upon the water , hos. . . as the foam upon the face of the water is cut off , so is that man cut off and beheaded , that hath seen the lord . or , it may be meant that isaiah was cut off in his own apprehensions & thoughts . or , the word undone may be taken thus : an undone man is one that hath nothing to live upon of his own ; no victuals or cloathes of his own : friends , to be undone , is to have nothing to live upon of our own ; as parts , gifts , righteousness , doing , working , being , thinkings , conceits , self-perswasions , high estimation of our selves , fancies , fictions , and the like ; but to live upon somewhat of another , which is christ . there is in a true undoing of a man by the sight of the lord , these things following : first , there is a striking of a man down . when god intends good to a soul , the first work that god takes with him , is , he strikes him down stark dead , that he never lives any more to himself , or to sin , or to the devil , but unto god . in this manner paul was struck down , as he journeyed with letters to damascus : he came neer to damascus , and suddenly there shined round about him a light from heaven ; and he fell to the earth , and heard a voice saying unto him , saul , saul , why persecutest thou me ? acts . , . much like to this , is that in rev. . . and when i saw him , i fell at his feet as dead . secondly , a true discovery of the lord , takes away a man's sight , that he cannot see with his own eyes . friends , if god intends us good , he will put out our eyes ; he will blinde us , that we shall not see in our own light ▪ as he did paul ▪ and saul arose from the earth ; and when his eyes were opened , he saw no man ▪ but they led him by the hand , and brought him into damascus . see acts . . and . . we would live and see , but god will destroy our life and sight , if he intend us good . thirdly , a true discovery of the lord , takes away a mans strength and breath . see dan. . , . and behold , one like the similitude of the sons of men , touched my lips . then i opened my mouth , and said unto him that stood before me , o my lord , by the vision my sorrows are turned upon me , and i have retained no strength : for how can the servant of this my lord talk with this my lord ? for as for me , straightway there remained no strength in me ▪ neither is there breath left in me . it takes away our breathing after god , and our strength , our power to do this and that ▪ to subdue sin , withstand temptation , and to wrestle with god , ond the like . we are ready to vaunt , and say , this is that which we have done by our might , for the honour of our majestie : but god will , if he intend good to us , confound our breathings and strength , yea , all that we are , or can do . fourthly , a true discovery of the lord confounds a mans understanding . see prov. . , . the words of agur the son of jakeh , even the prophecie : the man spake unto ithiel , even unto ithiel and vcal . surely i am more brutish then any man , and have not the understanding of a man . our understandings are a great hinderance to us , in the knowledge of the things of god ; and till our understanding of things be destroyed , we shall not see into the truth of things . fifthly , a true discovery of the lord ▪ destroys our knowledge , we would and do know things ; and no further then things do sute with our knowledge , do we take things to be truth . we make our knowledge the measure of all truth . but a true sight of god , will confound it : if once you come to see the lord ▪ then you will say , you have not the understanding of a man ; as i was forced to say . sixthly , a true sight of the lord , destroys our wisdom that makes us wise in our own eyes . we think we are wise , and we need not the wisdom of god , whenas our wisdom is foolishness . we think we carry our selves wisely : but god will destroy the wisdom of the wise . we think we are wise to do good , and all other wisdom is nothing to our own : but a true sight of god will put an end to it . seventhly , a true discovery of the lord , destroys all mans holy walkings : not that i am against holy walkings , if they be the holy walkings of christ : it destroyeth all that a man hath trusted in , and put confidence in , beside the lord ; all his natural faith and hope of being saved ; all his speakings , pride , selfishness , and the like . ii. a true sight of god doth not onely undo a man , but discovers sin to him , and makes him cry out , that he is a sinner , that he is a man of unclean lips , that he hath sinned against the lord : against thee , thee onely have i sinned , and done this evil . it makes a man abhor himself : i have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear , but now mine eye hath seen thee ; wherefore i abhor my self , and re pent in dust and ashes , job . . , . iii. a true sight of god , makes a man cry out that he dwells among a sinful people : o it is a wicked people among whom i dwell and live ! it makes him cry out of their sinfulness . a soul that hath seen god , cries out of sin ▪ whereever he sees it ; and of his dwelling in the tents of sechem . it doth not onely make a soul cry out that he is a man of polluted lips , but makes him acknowledge , that the people among whom he dwells are sinful . a man that hath seen the lord , will not onely cry out that he himself hath sinned , but that those among whom he dwells have sinned . iv. a true sight of god makes a man cry out , wo is him : wo and destruction belongs to me , for i am undone ▪ i am a man of polluted lips , for i have seen the lord . friends , if once you come to see the lord , then you will cry out ▪ wo is you , wo is you , we are undone ▪ we know not what to do ; how shall we do to be saved ? then flew one of the seraphims unto me : that is ▪ one of the fiery angels , at the command of god . see psal. . . it is said , it flew : it speaks the swiftness with which it went to isaiah ; it speaks the haste that it made to him , isaiah being in an undone state . having a live coal in his hand ▪ this seraphim did not fly empty to isaiah , but it had in his hand a live coal ; it came with somewhat to enliven and comfort isaiah in this state . but what is this live coal ? and whence had the seraphim it ? this live coal is the spirit : and the seraphim , had taken it with the tongs from off the altar : which altar , in the type of it , was the altar of burnt offerings , where the fire never went out , and upon which the fat of the peace-offerings was burnt : see lev. . . the antitype of which altar is christ : so that the seraphim had it from christ . the tongs are that with which he took the coal from off the altar . and he laid it upon the prophets mouth ; or ▪ caused it to touch the prophets lips . and said , lo , this hath touched thy lips , and thine iniquity is taken away , and thy sin purged . the coal touching the prophets lips , is nothing but a secret perswasion by the spirit , that his iniquity was done away . god no sooner strikes a man down dead , and undoes him , but he sends a seraphim with a live coal , to tell him good news , that his sins are pardoned , and his iniquities are done away . if it be thus , then this may serve to discover a true sight of the lord from all false sights of him . friends , if it be a true sight of the lord that you have had , then it hath undone you , taken away your strength , breath ▪ understanding ▪ knowledge , wisdom , light , life , &c. it hath robbed you of all yours , made you a meer beggar , so that you have nothing of your own to trust to ▪ feed and live upon : it hath stricken you stark down dead ; dead to every thing of your own and of the worlds , and alive to god : it hath crucified you , slain you , that you no more live ▪ but christ lives in you : it hath forced you to cry out , wo is you , wo is you ; for you are of unclean lips , and you dwell among a people of unclean lips . he that hath an ear to hear ▪ let him hear . if it be so , then do not cozen and cheat your own souls : do not say you have seen , when you have not seen him . vvhat , have you seen the lord , and are not dead , and are not undone ? vvhat have you seen the lord , and are alive ? do not lye . i beseech you , let not a deceived heart lay hold on you ; do not feed on lyes , in this respect . if you have not seen him , speak the truth , and do not decieve your own souls : if you have seen him , he hath stricken you down dead . if you say you have seen him , & are yet alive , then i know not what seeing of him is . if it be so , then this may serve to discover the goodness of god , that when he hath struck a soul down dead , and took away his life from him , undone him , forced him to cry out that he is undone , and that wo , wo is he , for he is a man of uncircumcised lips , and dwells among a people of unclean lips ; yet , that god should not suffer that man to be swallowed up in despair , but should cause to flie one of his seraphims unto him with a live coal in his hand , and to lay it upon his mouth , to put life into him , and say , lo , this hath touched thy lips , and thine iniquity is taken away ▪ and thy sin purged ; and should say ▪ o man greatly beloved , fear not ; peace be unto thee : be strong , yea , be strong ; as he did to daniel , dan. . . this is admirable . if it be so , be not afraid to be undone , to lose your life , light , breath , understanding , knowledge , wisdom , and strength . o it is sweet , sweet : do not think much , though god by the discoveries of himself to you , rob you of all you have ▪ leave you a begger . be not afraid of the discoveries of sin ; do not fear that you shall be swallowed up in despair , if god should discover your self and sin to you : so soon as ever he hath discovered sin to you , undone you , taken away your life , he will send a seraphim with a live coal in his hand , a coal that hath life in it , and will lay it upon your mouth , and say to you , this hath touched thy lips , and thine iniquity is taken away , and thy sin purged , thou art greatly beloved ; fear not ; peace be unto thee ; be strong ; and so fetch life in thee again , keep thee from sinking in spirit , and being swallowed up in despair . and you shall no more live your own life , but for ever live the life of god ; and you shall no more understand and know things , and see things in your own understanding knowledge , and light : but in the understanding , knowledge , and light of god : you shall do nothing in and by your own strength and wisdom , nor breathe after god in your own breath : but you shall do all things in the strength and wisdom of god , breathe after himself in the breath of god . selah . if it be so , beg of god a discovery of christ upon the throne ; of a risen christ ; that it may undo you , take away your life , vvisdom ▪ strength , understanding , knowledge , light , strength . it is a sweet thing to be undone , to be stript of all a man hath , to lie naked before god ; and we to have nothing and be nothing of our own , but to have all and be all in god : it is the greatest work god can do for a soul , and it is the greatest mercy god can shew to a soul . if it be so , then o that i had a discovery of a risen christ , of christ upon the throne , saith the soul . do you know what you desire , what you ask for ? are you contented to be undone , to lose all that you have and are ? are you willing to have all burnt up in you by that fiery flame that issueth out of christs mouth ? then he will manifest himself to you , and you shall know the lord indeed and in truth , in your souls . chap. vi . some sweet discoveries of what shall be in the later days , out of zech. . , . vers . . in that day , shall there be upon the bells of the horses , holines vnto the lord : and the pots in the lords house shall be like the bowls before the altar . . yea every pot in jerusalem and in judah shall be holiness unto the lord of hosts : and all those that sacrifice , shall come and take of them , and seethe therein . and in that day , there shall be no more the canaanite in the house of the lord of hosts . the words are a prophecie of what shall be in the later days , and of the time in which shall be that which is prophesied of . what shall be , are these things following . first , there shall be upon the bells of the horses , holiness unto the lord . secondly , the pots in the lords house , shall be like the bowls before the altar . thirdly , every pot in jerusalem and in judah , shall be holiness unto the lord of hosts . fourthly ▪ all they that sacrifice , shall come and take of them , and seethe therein . fifthly , in that day , there shall be no more the canaanite in the house of the lord of hosts . sixthly , the time when all these things shall come to pass ▪ will be , in that day . there are in the first verse of the words , these things to be considered : first ▪ what the bells of the horses are . secondly , what the meaning of that saying is , there shall be upon the bells of the horses ▪ holiness unto ▪ the lord . thirdly ▪ what the lords house is . fourthly , what the pots in the lords house are . fifthly ▪ what the altar is . sixthly , what the bowls before the altar are . seventhly , in what sence the pots in the lord's house shall be like the bowls before the altar . the first thing to be enquired into , is , what the bells of the horses are . they are the bridles of the horses , which govern , rule , and command the horses . bridles are such , that are put into the horses mouthes , to restrain them . the second thing to be enquired into , is , what the meaning of that saying is , there shall be upon the bells of the horses , holiness unto the lord . the prophet having spoken before , of the horses overthrow , and other cattel of the enemies , ( see v. . ) he addeth , to make up the measure , that all their spoils , even the very deckings of their furniture , should be consecrated to god , to make utensils for his service . the meaning is , god shall convert to his service , in his church , all such things as before were employed against him . see this interpretation further cleared , in isai. . , . and it shall come to pass , after the end of ten yeers , that the lord will visit tyre , and she shall turn to her hire , and commit fornication with all the kingdoms of the world upon the face of the earth : and her merchandise and her hire shall be holiness to the lord ; it shall not be treasured , nor laid up : for her merchandise shall be for them that dwell before the lord , to eat sufficiently , and for durable cloathing . her hire shall be holiness unto the lord ; that is , shall be converted to the service of god , which was before employed against god . or , the meaning of that saying , there shall be upon the bells of the horses , holiness unto the lord , may be this : there shall be holiness seen upon mean things poor things comparatively , as a bridle is : a man shall look nowhere , but he shall see holiness written , yea , upon the most contemptible things : if a man look behinde him , or before him , or on either side of him , he shall see holiness , that is ▪ he shall see somewhat of god in every thing in the world ; shall see holiness in mount zion : though mount zion now seems to be that she is not , black , unholy , yet there shall be holiness seen there : for it shall shine forth , and all the world shall see it : see obadiah vers. . vpon mount zion shall be deliverance , and there shall be holiness . as there is written holiness upon the brestplate of our high-priest christ jesus : so shall there be holiness written upon us , upon mount zion ; and it shall be visible too , as it is in our head , and as it was in the high-priest under the law : see exod. . . and they made the plate of the holy crown of pure gold , and wrote upon it a writing like to the ingraving of a signet , holiness to the lord , or of the lord . and as holiness was ingraven upon the brestplate of the high-priest under the law : so it shall be upon us . consider that in joel . . so shall ye know that i am the lord your god , dwelling in zion , my holy mountain . zion is holy , but the world sees it not , and therefore the world speaks evil of zion . then shall jerusalem be holy , or holiness ; and there shall be no stranger pass thorow her any more . god looks upon jerusalem to be holy , now ; but when there shall be no stranger pass thorow her , then she shall be more holy ; then she shall be visibly holy ; holiness shall so break forth in her , that the world shall acknowledge her to be holiness to the lord . the third thing to be enquired into , is , what the lords house is . it is zion , it is jerusalem : the lords house are those in whom he dwells ; and they are his people . the fourth thing to be enquired into , is , what the pots in the lords house are . the pots in the letter , were those that were made use of under the law , and were made of brass . see exod. . . he made all the vessels of the altar , the pots , and the shovels , and the basins , and the flesh-hooks , and the fire-pans , all the vessels thereof , made he of brass ; and they were such in which they sod the holy offerings . see chron. . . and they rosted the passeover with fire , according to the ordinance ; but the other holy offerings sod they in pots , and in caldrons , and in pans , and divided them speedily among the people , and afterwards they made ready for themselves and the priests , because the priests the sons of aaron were busied in offering of burnt offerings . see that in ezek. . , , . in the four corners of the court , there were courts of fourty cubits long , and thirty cubits broad ; these four corners were of one measure : and there was a new building round about in them , round about them four : and it was made with boylingplaces under the rows round about . then said he unto me , these are the places of them that boil , where the ministers of the house shall boyl the sacrifice of the people . so that you see the pots in the letter were those in which the sacrifices of the people were to be boiled . the pots in the mysterie , are those divine discoveries and manifestations of christ , in which the spiritual sacrifices of the saints are and shall be boyled . that they are the discoveries of christ that fit a sacrifice to be offered to god , see mal. . , , . but who may abide the day of his coming , and who shall stand whon he appeareth ? for he is like refiners fire , and like fullers soap ; and he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver ; he shall purifie the sons of levi , and purge them as gold and silver , that they may offer unto the lord an offering in righteousness : then shall the offering of judah and jerusalem be pleasant unto the lord ▪ as in the days of old , and as in former yeers . the fifth thing to be enquired into , is , what the altar is . the altar is christ . the sixth thing to be enquired into , is , what the bowls before the altar are . the bowls , in the letter , were those in which was put the blood of the sacrifice , and of sprinkling . see chron. . . exod. . . levit. . . levit. . , . or , the bowls in the letter were those in which they put fine flour mingled with oil , for a meat-offering : see numb. . , , , , , , , , , , , . the bowls in the spiritual interpretation , are the saints , in which the blood of sprinkling is . the pots in the lords house shall be like the bowls before the altar , in this respect , that is to say , for multitude ; as it was in the letter : see chron. . . he made also ten tables , and placed them in the temple , five on the right side , and five on the left : and he made an hundred basins , that is , bowls of gold . now the pots were not so many . it speaks the manifold discoveries of god that shall be in the later days to his people . or , it speaks this , that is to say , the multiplicity of spiritual services that shall be offered to god in the later days . the things that are to be enquired into in the last verse of the words , are these following . first , what judah and jerusalem are . secondly , what every pot in judah and jerusalem is . thirdly , how and in what sence it shall be holiness to the lord of hosts . fourthly , what is meant by the canaanite . fifthly , when these things shall come to pass . the first thing to be spoken to , is , what judah and jerusalem are . judah was one of the twelve tribes : see revel. . . hierusalem is the saints of the most high , the lambs wife . the second thing to be spoken to , is , what every pot in judah and jerusalem is . it is the same as the pots in the lords house are : every pot , that is , every discovery of christ , that purifies every sacrifice , and makes it fit to be offered up to god . the third thing to be spoken to , is , how and in what sence every pot in judah and jerusalem shall be holiness to the lord . the meaning is , it shall be of a holy use to the lord of hosts , that is , of armies . but of what use ? to purifie and make fit sacrifices to be put up to him . or ▪ it may be taken thus : every discovery of christ shall be holy to the lord ; that is , there shall be written upon every discovery , holiness : for those are truest discoveries , that have holiness written upon them . sclah . and all they that sacrifice shall come and take of them , that is ▪ of the discoveries , and seethe therein : they shall boyl their sacrifices in the discoveries and manifestations of christ , and so make them pure sacrifices , to be offered up to god , mal. . . the fourth thing to be spoken to , is , what is meant by the canaanite . the canaanite may be meant the merchant : he seems to have a special relation to the abuse of merchandising and selling , which was used in the temple : see joh. , . and when he had made a scourge of smallcords ▪ he drave them all out of the temple , and the sheep and the oxen and poured out the changers mony , and overthrew the tables , mat. . . or , by the canaanite may be meant the unclean , person : see isa. . . and an high-way shall be there , and a way ; and it shall be called the way of holiness : the unclean shall not pase over it . see rev. . . and there shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth , neither whatsoever worketh abomination or maketh a lye . god will so purifie his people , that there shall be no unclean thing in them ; but they shall be holy and unblameable before him . the last thing to be spoken to , is , when all these things shall come to pass ; and that is , in that day . what is meant by that day ? the day of gods coming : see zech. . the latter part of vers . . then shall these prophecies be fullfilled , when jesus christ shall appear the second time without sin , to salvation . if it be thus , then this may discover what shall be in that day ; there shall be holiness written upon every thing : we shall see somewhat of god in every thing , even in the meanest things . and those things that have been made use of against the lord , shall be turned into an holy use : they shall be holiness unto the lord . the pots in the lords house shall be like the bowls before the altar : there shall be multiplicities of discoveries of christ ; that is , abundance of discoveries of christ in the latter days : every pot in jerusalem shall be holiness unto the lord ; there shall be holiness written upon every discovery of god : they shall come and boyl their sacrifices in these discoveries of god : there shall no merchant , no unclean thing , be in zion , in jerusalem , but all shall be pure , and nothing shall hurt nor destroy in gods holy mountain . so that zion shall be a peaceable and pure estate . if it be so , this may serve to discover what zion , the lords house , is . it is not a stonewalled house , such as your meeting-places are : the lords house is his people , in whom he dwells : the the foundation of this house , is christ ; it is founded upon a sure rock , that the winds and storms of corruptions and temptations cannot shake it . the lords house is a spiritual building , built by himself , to be the habitation of himself by the spirit . if it be thus , then this may serve to inform us of those pure sacrifices that shall be offered up to god in the latter days . now , our sacrifices are full of dross and mixture of somewhat of our own ; but then , they shall be clean : that which shall make them clean , shall be those great and large discoveries of god that then will be . now , we are troubled and perplexed that we cannot offer up better sacrifices then we do , to god , that we cannot worship him as we would do , in spirit and in truth ; but then , we shall worship in the pureness of the spirit . if it be so , then this may serve to discover true discoveries of christ , from false . vvhat a many rotten pretended discoveries of christ we and others have had ! o how we have entertained falshood instead of truth , and lived upon it ! but a true discovery of christ , hath this motto written upon it , holiness to the lord . if your discoveries of god bring not along with them holiness , they are delusions of satan : if any discoveries of god come with holiness engravened upon them , receive them . if it be so , then this may serve to overthrow that doctrine that is newly sprung up ; which is , that there shall not be sacrifices offered up to god in the new jerusalem-state . that there shall be , it is cleer from what i have said : onely there shall be this difference ; more purer sacrifices shall be offered up then , then now there are : then shall the offerings of judah and jerusalem be more pure and pleasant to the land . and that the words here speak of the new jerusalem-state , it appears by the last verse : there shall be no more the canaanite in the land ; of which thing john speaks of , when he speaks of the new jerusalem-state , in rev. . . quest . but , may some say , it will be a long while before what you have said will come to pass . answ. to this i answer , it will come to pass in that day ; and how soon god may come , we know not : he may come presently , and deceive many , for ought that we know . secondly , i say this , that all the promises of christ are yea and amen in christ ; and we are not to look upon prophecies and promises as altogether at a distance , and to be fullfilled hereafter ; but ●●gh , and fulfilled in christ . chap. vii . some sweet manifestations of the neerness of christ's coming , and of those glorious things that shall follow after his coming ; out of zech. . the later end of vers . . and v. , , , . vers . . and the lord my god shall eome , and all the saints with thee . . and it shall come to pass in that day that the light shall not be clear nor dark . . but it shall be one day , which shall be known to the lord , not day nor night : but it shall come to pass , that in the evening-time it shall be light . . and it shall be in that day , that living waters shall go out from jerusalem , half of them towards the former sea , and half of them toward the hinder sea : in summer and in winter shall it be . . and the lord shall be king over all the earth : in that day shall there be one lord , and his name one . in the first verse of this chapter , the prophet speaks of the coming of the day of the lord : behold , the day of the lord cometh , saith he : behold ; as if he saw it , and therefore called upon them to see it : and tells them , that their spoil shall be divided in the midst of them . he bids them behold and take notice of the coming of the day of god , lest it should come upon them unawares . he gives them the reason why he would have them take notice of the coming of the day of god : for i will gather all nations against jerusalem to battel , and the city shall be taken , and the houses rifled , and the women ravished . here he speaks of the ruine of jerusalem . and half of the city shall go forth into captivity . here he speaks of leading one half of the city into captivity . and the residue of the people shall not be cut off from the city . here , he would save a remnant that should possess and enjoy those glorious things prophesied of in this chapter . then shall the lord go forth , and fight against those nations : or , as it is in the margine of some bibles , in the middle , or among those nations gathered together against jerusalem ; not as an enemy , but helper . and he shall fight as when he fought in the day of battel for gideon , judg. . . god setting every mans sword against his fellow ; and as at the red-sea , causing his enemies to be drowned in the sea , and his people to go over dry-foot . and his feet shall stand in that day upon the mount of olives which is before jerusalem on the east . god would fight upon that mount against jerusalem . or , it may be taken thus : by this manner of speech the prophet sheweth gods power and care over his people , and how he will as it were by miracle save them . and the mount of olives shall cleave in the midst thereof , toward the east , and toward the west ; and there shall be a very great valley : and half of the mountain shall remove toward the north , and half of it toward the south , so that there shall be a very great valley ; insomuch that out of all the parts of the world they shall see jerusalem , which was before hid with this mountain . this is to be understood of spiritual ierusalem , the people of god . see isai. . . and it shall come to pass , that from one new moon to another , and from one sabbath to another , shall all flesh come to worship before me , saith the lord . and ye shall flee to the valley of the mountains : all you believers shall run unto the people of god , to be safe from the destruction of ierusalem . or it may be taken thus : the prophet speaketh of the hypocrites , that could not endure the presence of god , but should flee into all places where they might hide themselves among the mountains . for the valley of the mountains shall reach unto azal ; that is , to the place he separated for his people ; which the word azal signifieth . yea , ye shall flee , like as ye fled from before the earthquake in the days of vzziah king of iudah ; which fleeing was with fear and trembling . and the lord my god shall come , and all the saints with thee . because they did not credit what the prophet said to them , he turneth to god , and comforteth himself , in that he knew these things should come to pass , and saith , and the lord my god shall come , and all the saints with thee , to perform this . the prophet speaks to the lord , as his god , and can claim an interest and propriety in him ▪ as his ; as the psalmist in many places of the psalms doth : thou art my god , and i will praise thee . oh how sweet a thing it is , when a soul can claim an interest in god , and can say , thou art my god , the lord my god shall come ! the prophet cannot onely claim an interest in the lord , as his god ; but he can command god ; he shall come : he had power with god , as iacab had over the angel . friends , what an excellent thing it is , for a soul to command god , to have power with god for any thing ; to subdue sin , repel a temptation , conquer the devil ! a believer hath this priviledge and power ; he may command the lord , as his god , for things to come , things concerning his sons , or the work of gods hands ; and he will be commanded by him . see isai. . . and there was no day like that , before it , or after it , that the lord hearkened unto the voice of a man : for the lord fought for israel . see this in iosh. . . and this is the confidence that we have in him , or concerning him , that if we ask any thing according to his will , he heareth us : and if we know that he hear us , whatsoever we ask , we know that we have the petition that we desired of him , joh. . , . and whatsoever ye shall ask in my name , that will i do , that the father may be glorified in the son . if ye shall ask any thing in my name , i will do it , joh. . , . and in that day ye shall ask me nothing : verily , verily , i say ▪ unto you , whatsoever ye shall ask the father in my name , he will give it you , joh. . . the lord my god shall come . there are three sorts of the coming of christ , in scripture . first , there was a coming of christ in flesh . great is the mystery of godliness , god manifested in the flesh , tim. . . who verily was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world , but was manifested in these last times for you , pet. . . but we have not followed cunningly-devised fables , when we made known unto you the power and coming of our lord iesus christ ; but were eye-witnesses of his majestie . see this in pet. . . now this coming of christ was to finish transgression , and to make an end of sin , and to make reconciliation for iniquity , and to bring in everlasting righteousness , dan. . . secondly , there is a coming of christ in spirit . see ioel . , . and it shall come to pass in the last days , saith god , i will pour out of my spirit upon all flesh ; and your sons and daughters shall prophesie , and your young men shall see visions , and your old men shall dream dreams . see that likewise in zech. . . and i will pour out upon the house of david , and upon the inhabitants of ierusalem , the spirit of grace and of supplication ; and they shall look upon me , whom they have pierced , and they shall mourn for him , as one mourneth for his onely son , and shall be in bitterness for him , as one that is in bitterness for his first-born . now all this was fulfilled in part , in act. . , . and is yet to be fulfilled . and the end of his coming thus , was , to convince the world of sin , of righteousness , and of judgement . see ioh. . , , . and to teach his disciples all things , and to bring all things to their remembrance . see ioh. . . and to testifie of christ to them , and to guide them into all truth ; and many other things . thirdly , there is a third appearance of christ , which is his appearance the second time , without sin ▪ unto salvation , unto them that wait for him , heb. . . which coming of christ , is the last coming of christ ; of which i do intend now to speak . my god shall come . i can say boldly , as well as the prophet my god shall come , ( blessed be his holy name : ) i can command him , and he will be commanded by me . and not onely my god shall come , but your god shall come . he is not onely the prophet's god that shall come ▪ but my god , our god , thy god , and your god which shall come . what , my god ? yes : see isai. . , . strengthen ye the weak hands , and confirm the feeble knees : say to them that are of a fearful heart , that is , of an unbelieving heart , or hastie heart , be strong fear not : behold , your god will come : your god that you seek for , and wait for , will come , and he shall come . what , to me ? yea , to a hastie heart . but he will appear to my shame . no , to your joy and comfort . see isa. . . behold , the lord god will come . behold ; as if he saw him coming . isa. . . behold , the lord will come , will indeed come . the vision is for an appointed time ; wait for it , it will come , it will surely come , it will not tarry , habb . . . sing and rejoyce , o daughters of zion : for lo , i come , and will dwell in the midst of you , zech. . . say unto the cities of jerusalem , behold , your god , isa. . . let the fields be joyful , and all that is therein : then shall all the trees of the wood rejoyce before the lord ; for he cometh , for he cometh to judge the earth : he shall judge the world with righteousness , and the people with his truth , psal. . , . quest . but how shall he come ? answ. see that in psal. . . our lord shall come , and shall not keep silence . i have a long time , ( saith god ) holden my peace , i have been silent , i refrained my self ; now will i cry like a travelling woman , i will destroy and devour at once . the lord shall go forth like a mighty man ; he shall stir up jealousie like a man of war ; he shall cry , yearoar : he shall prevail against his enemies , isa. . . . a fire shall devour before him ; which is himself : see deut . . for the lord thy god is a consuming fire , even a jealous god : understand therefore ▪ this day , that the lord thy god is he which goeth over before thee : as a consuming fire he shall destroy them , and he shall bring them down before thy face ; so shalt thou drive them out , and destroy them quickly , as the lord hath said unto thee , deut. . . and it shall be very tempestuous round about him . who shall stand when he appeareth ? for he is like the refiners fire , and he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of gold , mal. . . consider that in isa. . . your god will come with vengeance , even god with a recompence will come and save you . this scripture holds forth the coming of christ two manner of ways . first , he will come with a vengeance against all our sins , and temptations , and divel ; and save us from them all . secondly , he will come with a recompence : he will come with a reward for all those sufferings that we have endured from sin , men , and satan : he will reward us for all our sufferings . or it may be taken thus : he will come with a recompence ; he will reward with destruction all our enemies : for the lord is our judge , the lord is our lawgiver ▪ the lord is our king ; he will save us , isa. . . and then that in isa. . . the lord will come with a strong hand ▪ or against the strong with a mighty hand ▪ or mighty power , against his enemies against our corruptions ; and his arm shall rule for him . the strength of a man is in his armes ; so gods strength is in his armes : gods armes shall rule for him : behold , his reward is with him , and his work ( or recompence ) before him . consider that in isa. . . behold , the lord will come with fire ; and with his chariots like a whirlwind ( that is , he will come swiftly and fiercely ) to render his anger with fury upon his enemies , and his rebuke with flames of fire : that is , with the scorching burnings of himself . we shall further illustrate the coming of christ by these things . first ▪ he shall come in a cloud . secondly ▪ he shall come in the clouds . thirdly ▪ he shall come with clouds ▪ fourthly , he shall come with his saints and angels . first , he shall come in a cloud . see luke . . and then shall they see the son of man coming in a cloud . what cloud ? in a cloud of darkness . as he went up in a cloud , so he shall come down in a cloud : in the same manner that he went up , in the same manner he shall come down . see act. . . which also said , ye men of galilee , why stand ye gazing up into heaven ? this same jesus which is taken up from you into heaven , shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven . for the lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout , with the voice of the archangel , and with the trump of god : and the dead in christ shall rise first . then we which are alive and remain , shall be caught up together with them in the clouds , to meet the lord in the air ; and so shall we ever be with the lord ▪ thes. . , . quest . but , may some say , you hold the personal reign of christ . answ. yes : but i do not hold it as many hold it : i hold that he shall come personally , and reign ; but yet spiritually , with spiritual flesh and blood , with a glorified body ; and what that is , i know not . object . but shall not he come and reign , with that very flesh and body which he had at ierusalem ? answ. no . my reason is : for thou sowest not that body which shall be : that which shall be , is changed , metamorphosed . object . but some will say , how are the dead raised ? and with what body do they come ? answ . thou fool , that which thou sowest is not quickned , except it die ; and that which thou sowest , thou sowest not that body that shall be ▪ but bare grain , it may chance of wheat , or of some other grain ; but god gives it a body , as it hath pleased him , and to every seed his own body , cor ▪ . , , , . selah . secondly , he shall come in the clouds . see matth. ▪ . jesus said unto them , thou hast said . nevertheless i say unto you , hereafter shall ye see the son of man sitting on the right hand of power , which is the father , and coming in the clouds of heaven . what are these clouds ? they are clouds of darkness : psal. . . clouds and darkness are round about him , and he maketh the clouds his chariot , psal. . . clouds of darkness are christ's chariot , in which he will come riding into the world , and into the spirits of his people . he shall come in this chariot two manner of ways : first , he shall come with power : he shall come with power into the world , and the spirits of his people : they shall feel his power : he will come with majestie , and as one that hath authority : he will beat down the mountains , and every thing that lies in opposition to him ; the lofty looks of men and women shall he humble , and the haughtiness of them shall he bow down : then every one that is proud , lofty , and lifted up , shall he bring lowe ; all the tall cedars of lebanon , that are high and lifted up , and all the tall oaks of bashan , and all the high hills , and the high towers , and fenced walls , and the ships of tarshish , and pleasant pictures ; and the idols shall he utterly overthrow and abolish . and they shall go into the holes of the rocks , and into the caves of the earth , for fear of the lord , and the glory of his majestie , when he ariseth to shake terribly the earth : and then shall they cast their idols of silver and gold , which they have made every one for himself to worship , to the moles , and to the bats , to go into the clefts of the rocks , and into the tops of the ragged rocks ▪ for fear of the lord , and for the glory of his majesty . secondly , he shall come in great glory ; that is , huge ▪ vast glory , that shall dazzle the eyes of all people : he shall come in such glory as shall scorch the men of the earth : he shall come in the brightness of himself , which shall astonish all flesh . thirdly , he shall come with clouds . see revel. . . behold , he cometh with clouds , and every eye shall see him , and they also which pierced him ; and the kinreds of the earth shall wail because of him . even so . amen . clouds of darkness shall usher him in into the world , and all shall see him ; and those that have pierced him , shall cry out because of him . fourthly , he shall come with his saints and angels . first , he shall come with his saints : my god shall come , and all his saints with him . and enoch also , the seventh from adam , prophesied of these , behold , the lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints , jude vers. . to the end he may establish your hearts unblameable in holiness before god , even our father , at the coming of our lord iesus christ with all his saints , thes. . . secondly , he shall come with his angels likewise . the chariots of god are twenty thousand , even thousands of angels : the lord is among them as in sinai , in the holy place , psal. . . for the son of man shall come in the glory of his father , with his angels , matth. . . and to you who are troubled , rest with us , when the lord jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels . thess. . . as clouds and darkness shall usher him in , so saints and angels shall be his guard to wait upon him , in his coming . i shall further hold forth the coming of christ , these manner of ways following ; and then shew you the end of his coming . first , he shall come in the glory of his father . secondly , he shall come in the glory of himself . thirdly , he shall come in the glory of his angels . first , he shall come in the glory of his father , cloathed with his fathers glory , clad with his riches , grace , and good will ; filled with his fulness . see mar. . . whosoever therefore shall be ashamed of me , and of my words , in this adulterous and sinful generation , of him also shall the son of man be ashamed , when he comes in the glory of his father . secondly , he shall come in his own glory , which is god himself . father , glorifie me with thine own self , which is with the glory i had with thee before the beginning of the world , joh. . . the lord possessed me in the beginning of his way , before his works of old : i was set up from everlasting , from the beginning , or ever the earth was , prov. . , . in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god , joh. . . he shall come with the fulness of the godhead in him , col. . . he shall come with a fulness of grace and truth , joh. . . for it pleased the father that in him all fulness should dwell , col. . . with all his fulnhss he shall come . thirdly , he shall come in the glory of his angels , cloathed with the angelical glory . but what is the glory of angels ? see heb. . . and of the angels he saith , who maketh his angels spirits , and his ministers a flame of fire . the glory of angels is that flame of fire that is in them , and wherewith they are cloathed , which is nothing but their fiery and flame-like appearances . the glory of angels is the strength of angels ▪ bless the lord , ye his angels , that excel in strength , or , are mighty in strength ▪ psal. . . the glory of angels is their holiness : see mat. . . when the son of man shall come in his glory , and all the holy angels with him , then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory . the glory of angels consisteth in this likewise : they neither marry , nor give in marriage . the last thing to be enquired into , is , the ends of his coming . they are these things following . the first is this : that in the dispensation of the fulness of times , he might gather tother into one , all things in christ , both which are in heaven , and which are on earth , eph. . . and he shall send his angels , with a great sound of a trumpet or , with a trumpet and a great voice ; and they shall gather together his elect from the four windes , from one end of heaven to the other , matth. . . or , from the uttermost parts of the earth , to the uttermost part of heaven , mar. . . secondly , that he might gather his people together , unto the supper of the great god ; that is to say , to eat the flesh of kings , and the flesh of captains , and the flesh of mighty men ; and the flesh of horses , and of them that sit on them ; and the flesh of all men , both free and bond , both small and great . friends , we shall feed upon all our enemies ; we shall make a supper of them all , rev. . . and i saw an angel standing in the sun , and he cried with a loud voice , saying to all fowls that flie in the midst of heaven , come and gather your selves together to the supper of the great god , vers. . the third end , is to take vengeance on them that know not god , and that obey not the gospel of our lord jesus . thes. . , . and to you who are troubled , rest with us , when the lord jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire , taking vengeance on them that know not god , and that obey not the gospel of our lord jesus christ : who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the lord , and from the glory of his power . the fourth end of his coming , is , that he might destroy that wicked one : and then shall that wicked one be revealed , whom the lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth , and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming ; which is antichrist , thes. . . if it be thus , that my god , thy god , our god , your god shall come , yea , will come ; be not afraid of his coming and of his fiery appearance : he comes to save you , to redeem you : he brings with him redemption and salvation : he comes to deliver you from your corruptions , from your temptations , from your bondage and affliction . why should ye fear ? therefore , lift up your heads : for your redemption draws nigh . if it be thus , that my god , thy god , your god shall come , do not doubt of his coming . say to them that are of a fearful heart , be strong , fear not ; behold , your god will come ; you need not fear but that he will . but when will he come ? he shall suddenly come , mal. . . the lerd whom ye seek , even the messenger of the covenant , whom ye delight in , shall suddenly come into his temple . behold , i come quickly ; hold that fast which thou hast , that no man take thy crown , revel. . . friends , look to your crown : god hath set a crown of pure gold , that is , of salvation , upon your heads ; take heed that satan rob you not of it : behold , i come as a thief : blessed is he that watcheth , and keepeth his garments , lest he walk naked , and they see his shame , rev. . . behold , i come quickly : blessed is he that keepeth the sayings of the prophecies of this book , rev. . . behold , i come quickly , and my reward is with me , to give every man according to his work , vers. . as the light cometh out of the east , and shineth even unto the west , so shall also the coming of the son of man be ; which will be with speed , quickly , matth. . . he hath promised that he will come , and come quickly . quest . but , may some say , where is the promise of his coming ? for since the fathers and apostles fell asleep , all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation . answ. take heed what you say . this was the saying of scoffers that walked after their own lusts ▪ see pet. . . quest . but , may some say , there are a great many things to be fulfilled and accomplished before christ comes in this manner ; as . the calling of the jews , the bringing in of the gentiles , the time of restitution of all things , spoken of in acts . , . and divers other things , spoken of in matth. . also , satan is to be cast into the bottomless pit , and to be shut up there , and to have a seal set upon him , that he should deceive the nations no more , till the thousand yeers should be fulfilled : after that , he must be loosed for a little season , rev. . , , . answ. to all these objections , i answer thus : it is true , there are the jews to be called , and the fulness of the gentiles to be brought in ; but when this shall be , no man knows : and , for ought that we know , it may be quickly , in a very short time , in the twinkling of an eye . and as for the restitution of all things , which is to be fulfilled before the coming of christ ; that may be as soon , for ought that we know . and as to those things spoken of in the of matthew , which are to be fulfilled before the coming of christ ; i say , the most part of them are already fulfilled , and the rest are about fulfilling , and will be fulfilled in a very short time . and as to satan's being bound , and cast into the bottomless pit , and there to be shut up , and sealed , that he should deceive the nations no more till the thousand yeers be fulfilled : i say this , that satan hath been bound already , and cast into the bottomless pit , and there was shut up and sealed , that he should not deceive the nations : i say , he was , comparatively to that which he is now ; and that he is let loose again : if ever the dragon was let loose , he is let loose now ; and he is now gon out to deceive the nations which are in the four quarters of the earth , gog and magog , to gather them together to battel , the number of whom is as the sand of the sea : and they shall go upon the breadth of the earth , and compass the camp of the saints about , and the beloved city ; and fire shall come down from god out of heaven , and devour them . and after this , the devil , that deceived them , shall be cast into the lake of fire and brimstone , where the beast and the false prophet are , and shall be tormented day and night for ever and for ever . and if i be out in this , then i shall say thus , that a thousand yeers with the lord are as one day , pet. . . and by the way note this , that i do not believe that it is so to be understood , that satan shall be so shut up , as that he shall not decive some . if it be so , that which any of you hath already , hold fast , until christ comes , rev. . . you that are professors in deed , and not in shew onely , hold fast your good profession ; let not satan drag you out of your profession , into earth : hold fast , and repent : if thou shalt not watch . i will come on thee as a thief , saith christ ; and thou shalt not know what hour i will come upon thee , rev. . . watch ye therefore when the master of the house cometh , lest coming suddenly , he finde you sleeping . and what i say unto you , i say unto all , watch ; mark . , , . watch therefore ; for ye know not at what hour your lord will come , matth. . , , . but know this , that if the good man of the house had known in what watch the thief would come , he would have watched , and would not have suffered his house to be broken up . therefore be ye also ready : for in such an hour as ye think not , the son of man cometh . surely jesus christ is not far off , but will steal in upon us unawares , when we look not for him : therefore watch , with oil in your lamps . and to encourage you to watch , consider that place of scripture in luke . . blessed are those servants , whom the lord when he cometh shall finde watching ; verily i say unto you , that he shall gird himself , and make them to sit down to meat , and will come forth and serve them . and if he shall come in the second watch , or come in the third watch , and finde them so doing , blessed are those servants . but if that servant shall say in his heart , my lord delayeth his coming ; the lord of that servant shall come in a day when he looketh not for him , luke . . if it be thus , be patient unto the coming of our lord : be ye patient also ; for the coming of the lord draws nigh ; it is at hand , james . , . it was nigh in the apostles times ; it is neerer now . for ye have need of patience , that after ye have done the will of god , ye might receive the promise . for yet a little while , and he that shall come , will come , and will not tarry , heb. . , . certainly he is not far off , but will steal in upon us , when we never expect him . if it be so , wait and look for christ's coming . ye come behinde in no gift , waiting for the coming of our lord , cor. . . looking for and hasting to the coming of god , wherein the heavens being on fire , shall be dissolved , and the element shall melt with fervent heat , pet. . . look for him from the clouds ; expect him to come down in a cloud of darkness into your spirits : for he will break thorow your darkness , and turn it into light . wait : who knows but that he may come down in a cloud of darkness into your hrarts ? if it be so , little children , abide in him , that when he shall appear , we may not be ashamed at his coming , joh. . . for as the days of noe were , so shall also the coming of the son of man be . for as in the days that were before the flood , they were eating and drinking , marrying and giving in marriage , until the day that noe entered into the ark , and knew not until the flood came , and took them all away : so shall also the coming of the son of man be , matth. . , , . the very god of peace ( therefore ) sanctifie you wholly : and i pray god that your whole spirit , soul and body may be preserved blameless unto the coming of our lord ▪ thes. . . if it be thus , then occupie till christ come . god hath given every one of us a talent ; let us improve our talents ; and let us not say , when christ comes ( as one of those ten did ) lord , here is thy talent , which i have kept laid up in a napkin : for i feared thee , because thou art an austere man , that thou takest that up thou layest not down , and reapest that thou didst not sowe ; but let us give him his own , with overplus ; luke . , . let us not be as one of those husbandmen to whom god committed his vineyard till he came ; that when god should send one of his servants , or his heir , for the fruit of his vineyard , that should beat or wound any of his servants that he sends , or kill the heir , and cast him out of the vineyard ; lest he come and destroy us , luke . , , , , , , . and it shall come to pass in that day , that the light shall not be clear , nor dark . there are three things in these words , to be enquired into : first , what that day is . it is the day of god's coming , of his appearance ; as appears by vers . . secondly ▪ what is meant by light here ▪ i may be taken either for a natural or spiritual light . thirdly , what is meant by that expression , the light shall not be clear nor dark . the meaning is , it shall be a medium betwixt both : part clear , that is , precious ; and part dark , that is , darkness ; not altogether clear , nor yet altogether dark : we cannot say that it shall be clear , nor yet can we say it shall be dark ; but it shall be betwixt both . but it shall be one day : or , the day shall be one ; that is to say , one perpetual day . the prophet's meaning is , that there shall be continual light in the church of christ under the messiah ; though sometimes more dim and dark then at other times , yet ways some light . or , one perpetual day may be taken thus ; in which there shall be no darkness at all : rev. . . and there shall be no night there ; and they need no candle , neither the light of the sun : for the lord god gives them light . and they shall raign for ever and ever . or , it may be taken for a singular day , to wit , of christ's death , when the sun was darkened at noon : amos . . and it shall come to pass in that day , saith the lord god , that i will cause the sun to go down at noon , and i will darken the earth in the clear day . which thing god did ; and so remained three hours : see matth. . . now from the sixth hour there was darkness over all the land , until the ninth hour . or it may be taken for the day of christ's coming : and the reason of it , are the words following , which shall be known to the lord . of that day and hour knows no man , no not the angels in heaven , but my father , mat. . . not day nor night : it shall not be day , neither shall it be night . what then shall it be ? it shall be somewhat of either . but it shall come to pass , that at evening-time it shall be light . when we look for nothing but darkness to approach , when dark night draws on , then light shall break forth : when we look for darkness , then behold glorious light . see isai. . , . the sun shall be no more thy light by day , neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee ; but the lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light , and thy god thy glory : the lord himself shall be unto us an everlasting light : thy sun shall no more go down , neither shall thy moon withdraw it self : for the lord shall be thine everlasting light , and the days of thy mourning shall be ended . see revel. . . and the city had no need of the sun , neither of the moon , to shine in it : for the glory of god did lighten it , and the lamb is the light thereof . in the evening-time , when we little expect light , this everlasting glorious light shall break forth . the prophet further goes on , to discover what shall be in that day . and it shall be in that day , that living waters shall go out from jerusalem . jerusalem here , is to be taken for the city of god , his saints . the living waters here , are waters that have life in them , which are the abundance of the spirit : see joh. . . he that believeth in me as the scripture hath said , out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water . these shall flow out of the saints : see ezek. . from the first verse to the seventeenth . afterward he brought me again unto the door of the house , and behold , waters issued out from under the threshold of the house eastward : for the forefront of the house stood towards the cast ; and the waters came down from under from the right side of the house , at the south side of the altar . then brought he me out of the way of the gate northward , and led me about the way without unto the utter gate , by the way that looketh eastward , and behold , there ran out waters on the right side . and when the man that had the line in his hand went forth eastward , he measured a thousand cubits , and he brought me thorow the waters : the waters were to the ancles . again he measured a thousand , and brought me thorow the waters : the waters were to the knees . again he measured a thousand , and brought me thorow the waters : the waters were to the loins . afterward he measured a thousand , and it was a river , that i could not pass over : for the waters were risen , waters to swim in . and he said anto me , son of man , hast thou seen this ? then he brought me , and caused me to return to the brink of the river . now when i had returned , behold , at the brink of the river were very many trees , on the one side , and on the other . then said he unto me , these waters issue out toward the east country , and go down into the desart , and go into the sea : which being brought forth into the sea , the waters shall be healed . and it shall come to pass , that every thing that moveth , that liveth , which moveth whithersoever the river shall come , shall live ; and there shall be a very great multitude of fish , because these waters shall come thither : for they shall be healed , and every thing shall live whither the river cometh . and it shall come to pass , that the fishers shall stand upon it , from engedi even unto eneglaim : they shall be a place to spread forth nets ; their fish shall be according to their kindes , as the fish of the great sea , exceeding many . but the miry places thereof , and the marishes thereof , shall not be healed ; they shall be given to salt . and by the river , upon the bank thereof , on this side , and on that side , shall grow all trees for meat , whose leaf shall not fade , neither shall the fruit thereof be consumed : it shall bring forth new fruit , according to his months , because their waters they issued out of the sanctuary ; and the fruit thereof shall be for meat , and the leaf thereof for medicine . so that you see what these waters are ; they are such as are not passable , healing waters , waters of life . see joel . . and it shall come to pass in that day , that the mountains shall drop down new wine , and the hills shall flow with milk and all the rivers of judah shall flow with waters ; and a fountain shall come forth of the house of the lord , and shall water the valley of shittim . the mountains , here , are the saints : for they are so called in scripture . the new wine which they shall drop down , is new discoveries of the spirit . the hills are the saints likewise , caught up into high enjoyments of god . their flowing with milk , is nothing but the spirit breaking forth in an abundant manner in them , in another consideration . the meaning of that saying , a fountain shall come forth of the house of the lord , is this : there shall be such a fountain of living waters , that is , of the spirit , flow forth from the saints , as shall not be dry . see revel. . . and he shewed me a pure river of water of life , clear as crystal , proceeding out of the throne of god , and the lamb . which speaks the same thing ; onely it holds forth the pureness of those waters . in the midst of the streets of it , and of either side of the river , was there the tree of life , which bare twelve manner of fruits , and yeelded her fruit every month ; and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations . half of these waters shall go towards the former or eastern sea , and half of them toward the later sea , or hinder sea . the eastern sea , here in the letter , is the lake of sodom ; and the hinder sea is the mediterranean sea . but take it in the mystery , and the meaning is this : by the former sea are meant those that are forwardest in the ways of christ : by the hinder sea , those that are hindermost in the ways of christ . or , the former sea , and hinder sea , may be taken for the gentiles : the abundance of the sea shall be converted to thee : see isai. . . it speaks this clearly , a general and large pouring forth of the spirit . in summer and in winter shall it be . when it is summer , and when it is wintet with a soul , these waters shall never be dried up ; no , not in the hottest time of summer , as your natural summer-streams are . and the lord shall be king over all the earth . he shall alone be acknowledged and worshipped , he shall alone reign and rule ; none but the lord . in that day shall there be one lord , and his name one . that day is to be understood of the day of god's coming , and of the appearance of christ . there shall be one lord . now there are many lords , but then shall there be onely the true god acknowledged . there shall be one lord , or , the lord shall be one . now he is twain ; then he shall be one . and his name shall be one . now twain , then one . o what a glorious state will that be , when there shall be but one lord and one name worshipped ! then shall be no other name professed , but onely the name of the lord . though all people now profess another god , and walk in the name of his god ( micah . . ) yet they shall then walk in the name of the true god alone . question . what is it to walk in the name of the lord ? answer . it is to walk in the power , majesty , wisdom , knowledge , light , and life of god . if it be thus , that the light shall not be clear nor dark , neither day nor night , in the day and coming of christ ; then think it not strange , if it fall out so , as surely it will . but in the evening it will be light . when the night begins to approach , and gross darkness to follow , then light will break forth , even the everlasting light of god himself . a strange thing is , friends , when a man is in spiritual blindness , betwixt darkness and light : sometimes he thinks he sees , and sometimes he thinks he sees not ; he cannot tell . in the evening it shall be light ; when a soul least looks for it . who would look for light to break forth in the evening ! but it is true that it shall ; therefore , wait for it . if it be so , that living waters shall flow forth from jerusalem , half of them toward the former sea , and half of them toward the hinder sea ; then this may serve to discover the abundance of the spirit that shall be poured forth in the later days ; a fountain of living waters shall flow forth from jerusalem , to water the world with ; the mountains shall drop down new wine , and the hills shall flow with milk , and all the rivers of judah shall flow with waters . the church of christ shall be so filled with the spirit , as it shall be in them as a fountain ; and it shall come flowing sorth from them , towards the former sea , and later sea . this shall be in summer and in winter ; it shall be always , it shall constantly flow forth from them towards the world . if it be so , you that want the spirit , wait for it : if you believe , out of your belly shall flow rivers of waters ; a fountain of living waters shall flow forth from you , to water the dry and parched ground . if it be thus , this may soon discover who shall reign in that day , the lord alone shall reign ; he shall be king then over all the earth ; then our lord will be exalted . now men reign , and are exalted ; but he will throw them down , and exalt himself . and his name shall be one . his name is not one now ; there are other names besides his , worshipped : but god will throw them down , and his alone shall be lifted up . the postscript . there are three things which moved me to write this postscript : the first was , to declare and make known , that that which i have written against the priests , was intended onely against those that are base and vile , and such as take tythes , and are proud , ignorant , idle , blinde priests , such as are for gain ; that feed themselves , and not the flock ; that go , before they are sent ; that teach for hire , and the like . the second thing was , to take off those things that have been laid to my charge by some , concerning my first book ; which are these : first , they affirm that i say in my book , that i take heaven to be the light and glory of god ; which is true : and that satan in heaven , is satan in the very light and glory of god ; which i deny : for it is an impossible thing , and cannot be . though this i cannot but subscribe to , that is to say , that he will administer to souls in that state , and teach souls to make false applications and misapprehensions of things . and besides , if they would look diligently into my book , and search narrowly how things are spoken there , they would finde that i speak a quite contrary thing : for i say , that satan in heaven , is satan in glory ; and satan in glory , is satan in an angel of light . as in these words , and there appeared another wonder in heaven ; the meaning is not , that there appeared really a great red dragon in the light and glory of god ; but the meaning is , john being taken up by the spirit into heaven , that is , into the light and glory of god , he saw the appearance of the great red dragon there ; but not really the dragon , in the very light and glory of god . the second thing that they lay to my charge , is , the title of my last book , which is , a wonder , and no wonder : they admire how i can make that which is a wonder , to be no wonder . this is a poor thing to give an answer to : but i will satissie them so far , as to tell them , i make a wonder , no wonder , thus : it is a wonder to those that are not acquainted with what satan in heaven is ; for they stand and admire at the thing : but it is not a wonder to those that know what satan in heaven is ; they do not admire , neither do they at all wonder at it , because they know it , and are well acquainted with it . and the reason wherefore john called it a wonder , was , because he knew not what satan in heaven was , he was not acquainted with satan in an angel of light . consider that place in cor. . ▪ and no marvel : for satan himself is changed into an angel of light . the rest of the things they lay to my charge , are words in my book which are falsly printed ; for which the printer indeed is to be blamed , not i. the third thing that moved me to write this postscript , was , to answer a poor weak saying of one whom i forbear to name , which was this : there are many that take upon them to write now a days , but i know no warrant for any of them to write , seeing there are so many learned , able , and godly men , that do write ; unless they could write some new truth , that was never heard of before . to the first , i ask you this : is all truth in learned godly men ? have none but they a warrant to write ? may not a childe of god , that hath no learning at all , be endued with the spirit , and power from on high , and so be made as fit as they to preach and write ? is not the same spirit in one , as in the other ? certainly you have lost your senses ; you seem to hold that which many ignorant priests do ; that is to say , that none are so able to deliver and write truth , as themselves are . i am sure that godly learned men will not assume this to themselves , but will esteem others above themselves . there is that revealed , many times , to a poor , ignorant , weak christian , that learned christians are ignorant of : and i have seen that written by a babe , the like whereof i never saw come from learned professors , though they were godly . i speak not this to discourage them , or to set light by them ; but to take off partiality : and my end in answering the foresaid saying , was ( god knows ) that those that heard it , might not be led aside by it , but that they might see the vanity of it , and that it proceeded either from ignorance or envie to the second , i say , there is no truth new , that is to be written ; but that which is written , and shall be written , is the old truth . it is true , in one sence , old truth may be new ; as in that sence , i write to you a new commandment : it was new to them , because they had not practised it before ; but yet it was the old commandment , which was , that they should love one another . now he that writes , must write old truth , that was heretofore , or else he must write a lye : there is nothing new under the sun . there are many hidden old truths which you and others know not , though ye and others think ye know them ; and therefore they may write them , and declare them , if they be called to it of god . and those that think themselves to know most , know least , yea , are very fools : nay , a man may write those things that you and others haply know to be truth : for though you and others know them to be truth , yet haply others do not ; so that he writes the things he hath seen , felt , and handled : but for any to write the things of another ( as he may ) which he hath not seen nor felt , this is not lawful . finis . a sixth letter, concerning the sacred trinity in answer to a book entituled, observations on the four letters, &c. / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a sixth letter, concerning the sacred trinity in answer to a book entituled, observations on the four letters, &c. / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . [ ], p. printed for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng nye, stephen, ?- . -- observations on the four letters. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a sixth letter , concerning the sacred trinity ; in answer to a book entituled , observations on the four letters , &c. by iohn wallis , d. d. professor of mathematicks in oxford . london : printed for tho. parkhurst , at the bible and three crowns , in cheapside , . a sixth letter concerning the sacred trinity . sir , i find from my socinian adversary , observations ( as he calls it ) on my four letters ; ( he might have said five , if he pleased . ) which i saw not till yesterday , mar. . nor do i see any great need of publishing a hasty answer . there being so little in it that deserves an answer , which had not been answered before it was written . and i may perhaps ere long meet with some such like observations upon my fifth ; and then i may at once answer both . his first head he calls the design of the letters . that which i undertook to maintain , was clearly stated thus , that it is not inconsistent with natural reason , that there may be three somewhats which are but one god ; and that what in one regard are three , may in another regard be one. to prove this ( and this only ) i brought those arguments or instances at which he cavils . this he now tells me ( p. . ) the socinians will grant me this . ( that is , they grant what i undertook to prove . ) and of which , he says , no man ever was so foolish as to doubt . and my arian adversary in like manner , ( in his answer , p. . and his vindication , p. , . ) that none but a madman would ever deny it . and that he cannot say , there is any contradiction in saying , there may be three persons in god. thus far therefore we are agreed on all hands . but he now tells me , p. . that this is not the question . yes ; this is the question that i undertook . 't is true , there be other questions between us and the socinians . but the question i undertook was that . and he knows it was so . well ; but what says he , is the question ? 't is this he says ( p. . ) whether there be three gods , or but one god. no : this is not the question . for in this we are agreed also . the socinians ( he says ) affirm there is but one god. and so do i. the proposition , he says , which ( in favour of the trinity ) i should have proved , ( that is , the task he sets me , not what i undertook ) was this , that what are in one regard three , may in another regard be so one , that all of them ( together ) are but one , and yet each of them ( singly , and by it self ) is that one. now , i think , i had proved this ; this corpus longum , corpus latum , and corpus profundum , is one cube . the corpus longum is a cube ; the corpus latum is a cube , and the corpus profundum is a cube : and yet this corpus longum , latum & profundum , is ( altogether ) but one cube . but this is latin : and his challenge is , ( p. . ) shew me that trinitarian that dares dispute the question in plain english. i 'll endeavour that too . david the son of iesse was a man ; and david king of israel was a man ; and david the father of solomon was a man : yet david the son of iesse , the king of israel , and father of solomon , was ( altogether ) but one man. and this is plain english , without the words of abstract , concrete , paternity , personality , ( at which he there cavils , ) or other hard words than what his tankard-bearer might understand . well but ( says he ) we may indeed say , this long body is a cube , meaning thereby , this long body , which is also broad and high , is a cube ; and if it were not broad and high it were not a cube : but we cannot say so here . i 'll try if i cannot hit this too . the all-wise god , is god all-sufficient ; the almighty god , is god all-sufficient ; the everlasting god , is god all-sufficient : meaning by the all-wise god , the god who is also almighty and everlasting ; and if he were not also almighty and everlasting , he were not all-sufficient . yet this all-wise , almighty , and everlasting god , is ( altogether ) but one god all-sufficient . but supposing ( says he ) the doctor 's instances do satisfy this difficulty , ( as i think they do ; ) does he not know there are many more , ( yes , he doth know it ) to which these instances are not applicable ? very true . and therefore they were not brought to prove all points which concern the trinity . they were brought to prove this point in particular , that it is not inconsistent with reason , that three somewhats may be one god. and if they prove this , it is what they were brought to prove . ( when i undertake other points , i may use other arguments . ) and this hath been said so often , that ( if he have any thing else of moment to say ) it is strange , that repeating the same objection ( without any further strength ) he should put me so often to give the same answer . his next head is of somewhats and persons . we are told , that christ and the father are one , joh. . . and these three are one , joh. . . without giving a name to these three . nor what shall we call them ? these three — what ? not three gods ; for that 's false : ( there is but one god. ) and three persons he will not allow me to call them , because it is not a scriptural word . ( person he grants is scriptural , heb. . . but not persons . ) i must not call them three nothings . ( for certainly it was never meant to be thus understood , these three nothings are one : and when christ said i and the father are one , he did not mean we two nothings are one. ) and if they be not nothing , they must be somewhat ; and three such , must be three somewhats . and i could not think of a more innocent word , to design them by . and therefore ( that we might not quarrel about words ) i was content to wave the name of persons , and ( without fixing a new name on them ) design them by the word somewhat . ( presuming that those who do not take them to be nothing , would allow them to be somewhat . ) but neither will this word pass with him . now this is a hard case . the scripture says these three , without giving them a name . and then , we must not give them a name ; because that name will be unscriptural . and yet if we do not give them a name ; he tells us , they be three somewhats , without name or notion : and that no two can agree , what this is , or what is thereby meant ; but as many writers , so many explications . p. . . to which i say ; as to the notion , i think the orthodox are all , thus far , agreed ; that they are three such somewhats in god , as differ from each other more than what we commonly call the divine attributes , but not so as to be three gods. and though ( within these limits ) divers men may diversly express themselves , yet in this notion the orthodox i think do all agree . and this i had before declared , ( let. iv . p. . ) though he please totake no notice of it . ( so that we are not without a notion of it . ) and if he will allow us to give a name to it ; that name ( whatever it be ) is so to be understood as to denote this notion . and we think the word person , a fit name to denote this notion by . but if we may not give it a name ; we must then say , the notion is such as was but now explained . but they will not allow us to give it a name . and as to our agreement or disagreement , i think the trinitarians do less disagree amongst themselves , than do the anti-trinitarians . but he says , ( p. . ) i own the word persons ( when applied to god ) to be but metaphorical ; and not to signifie just the same as when applied to men , but somewhat analogous thereunto . true ; i do so . and i have given my reasons why i do so , more than once . because two of them being represented to us in scripture under the names of father , and son , and this son said to be begotten of that father : ( which words are therefore not to be quarrelled with , because scripture language : ) no man thinks that the one is so a father , or the other so a son , or so begotten , as these words signifie concerning men ; but somewhat analogous thereunto . and in what sense they are father and son , they are ( in a sense analogous thereunto ) two persons , and the holy-ghost a third . for father and son in a proper sense amongst men , are such relatives as the latins did denote by the word persona in the first and proper signification of that word : and consequently father and son in this analogical sense , are ( in a continuation of the same analogy ) persons in a like analogical sense . but he says further , that in the explication of the athanasian creed , ( let. iii. p. . ) i interpret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by truly persons , or properly persons . i do so : because i suppose it was intended to call them truly or properly such persons as are there meant , ( answering to the greek hypostases ; ) that is in such a sense as they are there called father and son , and that the word person is a true and proper continuation of the same analogy . i have before declared , more than once , ( in the places by him cited , p. , . ) that the true and proper sense of the latin word persona , is not to denote a man simply ( for this with them was homo , not persona , ) but such quality , state , or condition of a man , whereby he is distinguished from , or stands related to , other men . as a king , a father , a iudge , and the like . and accordingly the same man , may sustain divers persons . ( he may be a king , and a father . ) and according as such condition varies , the person also varies . 't is true that in english , ( for want of a word that answers to homo , ) we sometimes make use of the word person , when we speak indifferently of man , woman , or child ; as when a man , or woman , and an infant are spoken of as three persons : but these the latins would not have called tres personas , but tres homines . ( but if consider'd as father , mother , and child , they may , as thus related , be called tres personae . ) and the schoolmen sometimes ( and some others in imitation of them ) do in a like sense use the word persona , for want of a latin word which did indifferently respect men and angels . but these are new senses of the word persona , quite different from what the word signified in the purity of the latin tongue ; and unknown ( i suppose ) to the fathers , who first applied the word personae to those of the sacred trinity : as i had before shewed at large . let. v. p. . &c. but at this rate , he tells us , ( p. . ) the socinians will allow , god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier , or god the father , son and holy-ghost , to be three persons . and i am not sorry to hear it . but then i would not have him say ( as here ) that i make them to be only three names , nor yet ( as p. . ) three gods. they are more than three names , but not three gods. for even amongst men , to be a father , is more than a name , or title : and , in the godhead , the father , son , and holy-ghost , differ more than so many names . and , though i will not take upon me to determine precisely , how great the distinction is , ( which is what at p. . he cites out of my let. ii . p. . ) because i would not be positive where the scripture is silent ▪ yet certainly 't is not so great as to make them three gods , but greater than merely three names , or even that between what we commonly call the divine attributes . his next head is about my explication of the athanaan creed . which he finds ( he says ) to be an explication of the damnatory clauses therein . and he is not much amiss in that observation . he was told so in the first words of that explication , and in the last words of the postscript , that it was in pursuance of a clause in a former letter to that purpose ; and that ( though other things are explained in it ) it was chiefly intended for the satisfaction of those who do believe the doctrine of it , ( but stumbled at those clauses , ) to shew that they need not ( for these clauses ) to reject that creed . he tells us ( p. . ) there is a difference between necessary and requisite . be it so . but the word there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , oportet ( not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which i had rendred ( p. . . ) by these words , it is necessary , it is mainly necessary , 't is a principal requisite , he ought to believe it . and certainly , if he had not a great desire to cavil he would not have quarrelled at this exposition , as not full enough for the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i had said , this creed was part of the catholick faith ; the whole of which i took to be the whole word of god : which a man is obliged to believe as to the substantials of it ; but may be saved notwithstanding an ignorance or mistake as to some particulars of lesser moment . now he would have it to be understood , that this creed is the whole , not only a part of the catholick faith : that nothing must be added to it , nothing taken from it : and that every man and woman shall perish everlastingly who doth not believe and profess this , without taking ought from it , or adding ought to it . why i think otherwise , i have shewed before , and need not repeat it . but leave it to the reader to judge , whether this or that be likelier to be true . and , whether he take it to be the meaning of this writer , that all must needs be damned , who lived and died before this creed was written ; or who possibly never saw it or heard of it , ( though they should believe all the substantials of the christian faith , or word of god , and held nothing destructive of it ; ) or , who do not believe just so much and no more . but if that be his opinion , he doth interpret it more severely against himself than i would have done ; or ( i think ) any man who had not a mind to cavil . his next head is , about the opinions charged upon socinus and the socinians . concerning which , i do not think it needful to trouble the reader with repeating what i had said of those opinions , let. iii. p. , , , , . and let. iv . p. , , , , . or what he now brings in excuse of it . but shall leave it to the reader , to judge ( upon what is said on both sides ) whether i have not thereby fully proved the charge ; of the slight opinion they have of the scripture ( in competition with reason ) when it crosses any of their beloved tenets . and yet , if that be not enough , himself directs , p. . to maresius and lubertus , where ( it seems ) is more to be found to the same purpose . but his plea for himself , p. . i do admit . that if socinus have spoken erroneously , or unadvisedly , or hyperbolically , he is not obliged to defend it ( nor do i know that he is obliged to be a socinian . ) he may renounce of socinus , what he pleases . whether he who defended the thesis at franeker , were a professed socinian , or but covertly so , i tannot tell ( because i do not know the man : ) but i do not think it more strange , to find a socinian at franeker ( notwithstanding the synod of dort ) than at london . and sometime ( p. . ) he will hardly allow himself a socinian , nor any of his party . but i hope he will not deny socinus to have been a socinian . therefore so far , at least , i was right . but he would not have me blacken a man , long since dead , who never did me any injury . very well : he had before challenged me to maintain my charge against the socinians : and he now quarrels with me for so doing . he will now hardly allow any to be a socinian but socinus himself ; and yet i must not blacken socinus . what am i then to do ? i will even leave it as it is , and let the reader judge . and if he doubt , whether i , or my adversary be more fair in our quotations ; let him consult the places and judge accordingly . and particularly that of epist. . ad volkelium . i am at present not at home , nor have books about me . but sure i am , that socinus doth there ( a few lines before what this observator repeats ) directly deny , that the soul after death doth subsist ; according as i had affirmed ( though i cannot now recite the whole sentence because i have not the book at hand . ) but this the repeater ( whether by docking or decapitation ) thinks fit to omit . and then i presume the reader will then find , that per se is not meant so by it self , or of his own nature , as not by the gift and grace of god , ( for so it might as well be said of the soul before death , ) but , so by it self as not in conjunction with the body ; and then the sense must be , that though the soul with the body be praemiorum & poenarum capax , yet the soul of it self without the body , is not so . but i leave this , and the rest , wholly to the readers judgment , to judge ( upon view ) as he shall see cause . adding this also , that he will find it is not onely as to this point of the trinity , that socinus discovers so slight an opinion of the scriptures in competition with reason ; but in other points also where they do not favour his opinions . he had told us before , of some body at oxford , who , maintaining a thesis against the socinians , was baffled by his opponent . who or when this was he had not told us ; nor what that thesis was . he now tells us , p. . it was a thesis against the socinians , that they preferred reason before scripture . perhaps , when he recollects himself , ( or consults his informer , ) he may find ( if any such thing happened as he suggests ) it was on some other thesis ; and not against the socinians , but against the arminians . but , be it as he says ; i know nothing of it , and shall not concern my self about it . but in requital of this story i told him another of sandius , who having proposed a challenge , upon his problema paradoxum ( contrary to the divinity of the holy-ghost ) was so answered by wittichius , that ( as appears by a printed letter published by his friend and partner in that disputation ) they were so convinced , as to change their opinion . i now add , that it so appears , not only by his friend 's printed letter : but by another of sandius himself to wittichius ; which i have not seen ( and i think it was never printed , ) but the contents of it may be seen in another treatise of wittichius , with this title , causa spiritus sancti victrix . printed at london , . but this matter ( he says ) is both vnskilfully and vnfairly related . why unskilfully ? why unfairly ? he says , sandius was an arian ; ( be it so : ) not a socinian . very well : nor did i say that he was ; but a friend of the socinians . he was an anti-trinitarian ; and did promote ( against the trinitarians ) the common cause of arians and socinians , ( though these perhaps might quarrel amongst themselves . ) but this observator thought ( it seems ) because i did not call him an arian , that i did not know him so to be . and this ( i guess ) is what he calls unskilful . but i can give him a better reason why i should not call him so . i did not then know i should have an arian adversary to deal with , ( for my arian adversary did not yet appear : ) but my socinian adversary was already upon the stage , and with him i was now dealing . yet i could not say that sandius was a socinian , but ( that the socinian might be concern'd in the story ) i said , he was a friend of theirs . and what vnskilfulness appears in this ? had i then known ( what since i do ) that i was to be attacqued by an arian also ; i should rather have called him an anti-trinitarian , which had been common to both : but , knowing then of none but a socinian adversary , i chose to call him a friend of theirs . which was neither vnfair nor vnskilful . perhaps he thinks if not vnskilful , 't was at best vnfair to say that his partner and he changed their opinion . but was it not so ? doth not his associate expresly tell us ( in the very title-page of his letter of thanks for those animadversions ) per quas ( animadversiones ) errores suos rejicere coactus est ? ( whereby he was constrained to relinquish his errors ? ) well , but did they change all their opinions ? did they relinquish all their errors ? i believe not : but , that opinion which was then in dispute ; his problema paradoxum , and the errors therein . and , if he consult the book , he 'll find it was so : and , that this paradox was it which he did relinquish . and , what his paradox was , he might there see it as well as i. nor had he told me , who , and when , and upon what question , his supposed anti-socinian was baffled by his opponent ? or , how i might come to know it ? ( and even now , when he pretends to tell me the question , i doubt he is mistaken therein . but what vnfairness was there in all this ? when i had told him where he might find as much of it as i could tell him . but he tells us now , that sandius was satisfied indeed ( as to the point then in question , ) but not of the divinity of the holy spirit . nor did i say that he was . but i can tell him , that he was nearer , even to this , than our observator was aware , or at least nearer than he thinks fit to own to us . if he consult wittichius's latter treatise , entituled causa spiritûs sancti victrix , he will there find an extract of a manuscript letter of sandius to him . in which , to the best of my remembrance ( for i have not here the book at hand ) he tells wittichius to this purpose . that whereas in his problema paradoxum he had been of opinion that by the holy spirit might be meant the whole number of good angels , he did not now think so well of that opinion , as before their disputation : but was considering of two other opinions to be substituted instead thereof : that by the holy-ghost might be meant , not the whole number of good angels , as before ; but either some select number of them , as being a superiour order ; or else some one angel as superiour to all the rest . ( which two he suggests to wittichius's further consideration . ) but , if neither of these should succeed ( as he doubted they would not ; ) he was then inclinable to say , with him : that the holy-ghost was , indeed , the same eternal god with the father and the son. if in reciting this by memory , i have failed in any considerable circumstance , i submit it to be rectified by the book . but if our observator have seen that treatise , and knows it thus to be , i think we have more reason to complain of vnfairness , in his representing it as he doth : as if he remained fixed in this opinion , that the holy-ghost was so a person as the arians always held . i am sorry to detain the reader by following our observator in his so many long excursions which do so little concern the business before us . for what ( almost ) of what hath been hitherto mentioned of his , doth tend to the confutation of what we affirm , that what we call three persons , are more than three names , but not three gods. in ( part of ) his two last leaves , he would seem to come somewhat nearer to the business , but not much . he tells us , p. . that luther and calvin did not like the word trinity . it may be so . ( i 'll take his word for it without seeking the places ; because i do not think it worth while . ) that they say 't is barbarous and sounds odly ( i suppose he knows that by a barbarous word , is commonly meant , a word not used by classick authors , or not agreeable to the usual forms of speech in latin and greek writers . ) be it so . ( and what if i had said so too ? ) suppose a hunter should say , a trinity of hares sounds odly , and another say the like of a leash , and choose rather to say ( in plain english ) three hares : the sense is still the same . and if calvin ( who loved a smooth stile , and pure-latin words , ) should say that trinitas is a barbarous word , ( as not extant in classick authors : ) what great matter is there in all this ? i will not trouble my self to enquire whether trinitas be , in that sense used in tully ; but sure i am that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a good greek word . and words , though not so well contrived at first , yet when once received into common use , and the meaning thereof understood , we chuse to retain , rather than to make a needless change . this the common phrases of , your worship , your honour , your lordship , &c. for one worshipful , honourable , a lord , &c. have been noted long since to be not analogous to the more usual forms of speech in latin and greek writers : yet custom hath made them allowable ; and therefore we do not scruple to use them . so luther and calvin , it seems , thought the word tres to be a better latin word , in this case , than trinitas . and i had allowed our adversary , ( let. iv . p. . ) instead of trinity in vnity , to say ( if that will please him better ) three in one. yet three and trinity ( to my apprehension ) differ no more than ten and a decade ; or twelve and a dousain . but what 's all this to the matter in hand ? doth luther or calvin any where say , that father , son , and holy-ghost , are but three names ? or , that they be three gods ? if they say neither of these ; they do not contradict what we affirm . 't is but as if a man should chuse to say ten commandments , rather than a decade , or half a score ; or to say , there are , in the apostles creed , twelve articles rather than a dousain . and if these be the great disagreements he there complains of , it comes to a very small matter . to his argument , that only the father is god , because of ioh. . . to know thee the only true god ; he says , p : . i give three answers . ( i do so . ) but , he says , the first and third are destructive of one another . not so : they all agree very well . and any of them will destroy his argument . 't is not said , thee only , but the only true god. he would have us think it all one to say , thee only , to be the true god , and thee to be the only true god , i think otherwise . the one gives some seeming colour for his objection : the other , not the least shadow . his argument , the father is the only true god , therefore not the son or holy-ghost , is just in this form , the god of abraham is the only true god , therefore not the god of isaac , nor the god of iacob . which , i presume he will not allow to be a good consequence . he would have it thought i grant , that if it were as this form , the only , thee true god , then the socinians had undoubtedly gained the point . not so . he hath not heard me say so yet ; nor is he like to do . if i should say , he that brought israel out of egypt , and he only , is the true god : my meaning would be but this , that god who brought israel out of egypt , and that god only , is the true god : and this must be understood to be said of him , not as their deliverer out of egypt , but as god. for he was the true god ( and the only true god ) long before he brought israel out of egypt ; and would have been so , though they had never been ; or had never been so brought out . there may be vera praedicatio , which is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and , of all men living , the socinians are obliged to say , that this title the true god , or only true god , belongs to him , not as father , but as god. for if ( as they would have us think ) our lord iesus christ had no being before his being made man of the virgin mary ; then neither had he a father till that time : but he was the only true god from all eternity ; and therefore not ( with this reduplication ) as father of our lord iesus christ. for he was the only true god ( according to their doctrine ) long before the man christ had a father ; and would so have been , though this man had never been . and though christ speak to him as his father , yet the title of the only true god , he ascribes to him as god. if solomon should have said to david , thou father art king of israel ; he was not therefore king of israel as father of solomon ; for he was so , long before he was solomon's father . which takes away all colour of our observator's ( imaginary ) contradiction here pretended : and leaves not the least umbrage for it . as little force is there in his other cavil , p. . if the father and son be the onely true god , then not the holy-ghost . yes ; the holy-ghost also . for though it be not here affirmed ; yet neither is it here denied . but these objections of his have been so often brought , and so often answered , that 't is tedious to see the same things brought so often over and over again . the like i say of what he repeats from cor. . . which is answered sufficiently , let. iii. p. . nor is it at all strange , or uncommon , that the word father should be sometime spoken of god personally considered , as father of our lord iesus christ , and sometime of god indefinitely ( according to his essence ) without respect to this or that person . father of spirits , heb. . . doubtless thou art our father , thou o lord art our father and our redeemer , isai. . . thou shalt call me my father , jer. . , . which the socinians must not say to be meant as to his personality , as father of our lord iesus christ , ( for such , they say , he then was not , ) but as to his essence . the everlasting father , isai. . . spoken of christ , not as to his personality ( for so , he was son ) but as to his essence . as to what he objects , p. . to that of rom. . . christ ; who is over all , god blessed for ever , amen . i refer to what is said , let. iii. p. . ( too large to repeat here ▪ ) but how amen ( which is a word of asseveration ) should make it nonsense , i do not understand . and what was said of god indefinitely , rev. . . is said particularly of christ , ver . . who was dead and is alive , ver . , . ( which description of christ in particular , he had begun at ver . . and continues beyond this place . ) if he deny it , let the reader judge . as to that of ioh. . . i refer to what hath been said already . i think there is not much more to be said thereof on either side than had been said long before either he or i began to write . and if after all he resolve to hold to his opinion ; he must give me leave to retain mine . and let the reader judge as he sees cause . and so for that of matt. . . as to all , in all those leters to which he makes no reply ; it stands as it did : and if the reader please to read them over again , he will be able to judge , whether it be all so contemptible as to have nothing of weight in it . i have said nothing to his blustring and contemptuous language , his canting ( or rather railing ) against schools , metaphysicks , mother church , alma mater academia , school-terms , gothish and vandelick terms , abstract , concrete , ( as if long and length were all one ; and all one to say david was kingdom of israel , and the kingdom of israel was father to solomon , as to say this of the king of israel ) and other the like . ( to which he is wont to run out when he hath little else to say , but would seem to say somewhat to make a noise . ) because the reader would know ( without my telling him ) that this is raving rather than arguing . and when he tells us , so often , of the brief history of the vnitarians ; why might not i as well tell him , that doctor sherlock had answered it ; and means ( i suppose ) to vindicate that answer , if he think there be need . so , when he runs division upon imperial edicts , confiscations , and banishments , seizing and burning of books , capital punishments , fire , and fagot ; ( with many other things wherein i am not concern'd , ) what is all this to me ? i do not know that i ever did him any hurt ( unless by discovering his errors ; ) i was only arguing as a disputant ; not making laws . as little need be said of a many little things , as little to the purpose : as , whether my third letter were not rather a book ? whether the things which god hath prepared for them that love him , are the onely deep things of god which we cannot comprehend ? or the onely secret things which belong to god , while things revealed belong to us ? whether , what i knew forty years ago , i had been studying and considering forty years ( without thinking of ought else all the while ) ? which certainly i could not be , for i was then forty years old . whether it be better english to say , god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier are , or is but one god ? whether vnum ( in the neuter gender , put absolute without a substantive ) do not usually signifie one thing ? whether the word trinitas , be a pure latin , or a barbarous word , ( not to be found in tully , any more than vnitarian ) ? whether tres or trinitas be the better latin-word ? whether , what in his former letter , p. . were but old-fashioned notions , be now ( in this last ) new and cautious ? with other the like . but ( besides in these and many others , he cavils without a cause ) what 's all this to the business in hand ? or how doth it contradict what i affirm ? viz. that , what in one consideration are three , may in another consideration be but one. that , we may safely say ( without absurdity , contradiction , or inconsistence with reason , ) there may be in god , three somewhats ( which we commonly call persons ) that are but one god. that , these three , are more than three names , but not three gods. that , god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier , ( otherwise called god the father , god the son , and god the holy-ghost , ) are such three . i see nothing of what he hath said , doth overthrow any of these . march . / . yours , i. wallis . an explication and vindication of the athanasian creed in a third letter, pursuant of two former, concerning the sacred trinity : together with a postscript, in answer to another letter / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) an explication and vindication of the athanasian creed in a third letter, pursuant of two former, concerning the sacred trinity : together with a postscript, in answer to another letter / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . [ ], p. printed for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . reproduction of original in the union theological seminary library, new york. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng athanasian creed. trinity. theology, doctrinal. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an explication and vindication of the athanasian creed . in a third letter , pursuant of two former , concerning the sacred trinity . together with a postscript , in answer to another letter . by iohn wallis , d. d. london : printed for tho. parkhurst , at the bible and three crowns , in cheapside , . an explication and vindication of the athanasian creed . sir , in pursuance of what i have said in a former letter , concerning ( what we commonly call ) the athanasian creed ; it may not be amiss to express it a little more distinctly . we call it commonly the athanasian creed , not that we are certain it was penned ( just in this form ) by athanasius himself ; ( for , of this , i find that learned men are doubtful , ) but it was penned either by himself , or by some other about that time , according to the mind and doctrine of athanasius . in like manner as what we call the apostles creed , we take to be penned ( very anciently ) according to what doctrine the apostles had taught them , though not perhaps in those very words . but whoever was the compiler ( whether athanasius himself , or some other ) of the athanasian creed , i suppose , the damnatory sentences ( as they are called ) therein , were not by him intended to be understood with that rigor that some would now insinuate , ( who , because perhaps they do not like the main doctrines of that creed , are willing to disparage it , by representing it to the greatest disadvantage they can , ) as if it were intended , that whoever doth not explicitely and distinctly know , and understand , and assent to , all and every clause and syllable therein , could not be saved . ( which , i suppose , neither the author did intend , nor any other sober person would affirm . ) but , that the doctrine therein delivered ( concerning god and christ ) is sound and true doctrine in it self , and ought , as to the substance of it , to be believed as such , by all persons ( of age , and capacity , and who have opportunity of being well informed in it , ) who do expect salvation by christ ; at least so far as not to disbelieve the substance of it , when understood . there being no other ordinary way to be saved , ( that we know of ) than that by the knowledge and faith of god in christ. but what measures god will take in cases extraordinary , ( as of infancy , incapacity , invincible ignorance , or the like , ) is not the thing there intended to be declared ; nor is it necessary for us to know ; but to leave it rather to the wisdom and counsel of god , whose iudgments are unsearchable , and his ways past finding out , rom. . . much less do i suppose , that he intended to extend the necessity of such explicite knowledge , to the ages before christ. for many things may be requisite to be explicitely known and believed by us to whom the gospel is revealed , which was not so to them , before the veil was taken away from moses face , and immortality brought to light through the gospel , cor. . , . tim. . . nor are we always to press words according to the utmost rigor that they are possibly capable of ; but according to such equitable sence as we use to allow to other homiletical discourses , and which we have reason to believe to have been the true meaning of him whose words they are . and i have the more reason to press for such equitable construction , because i observe those hard clauses ( as they are thought to be ) annexed only to some generals ; and not to be extended ( as i conceive ) to every particular , in the explication of those generals . it begins thus ; whosoever will be saved ; before all things , it is necessary , that he hold the catholick faith. where , before all things , is as much as imprimis ; importing , that it is mainly necessary , or a principal requisite , to believe aright ; especially , concerning god , and christ. which , as to persons of years , and discretion , and who have the opportunity of being duly instructed , i think is generally allowed by all of us , to be necessary ( as to the substantials of religion ) in the ordinary way of salvation , without disputing , what god may do in extraordinary cases , or how far god may be pleased , upon a general repentance , as of sins unknown , to pardon some culpable misbelief . it follows ; which faith , except every one do keep whole and undefiled , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) without doubt he shall perish everlastingly . that is , ( as i conceive ) unless a person ( so qualified and so capacitated , as i before expressed ) do keep it whole or sound , as to the substantials of it ( though possibly he may be ignorant of some particulars of the true faith ; ) and undefiled , or intemerate , ( without adding thereunto , or putting such a sence upon such substantials , as shall be destructive thereof , ) shall ( except he repent ) perish everlastingly . which , i think , is no more than that of mar. . . he that believeth not , shall be damned . and what limitations or mitigations are there to be allowed , are ( by the same equity ) to be allowed in the present clause before us . which therefore may ( in this true sence ) be safely admitted . and here i think fit to observe , that whereas there may be an ambiguity in the english word whole , which sometime signifies totus , and sometime sanus or salvus , it is here certainly to be understood in the latter sence , as answering to the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 totam , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sanam or salvam . and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to keep the faith salvam & intemeratam , which is translated whole and undefiled , might ( to the same sence ) be rendered safe and sound . now a man may well be said to be safe and sound , notwithstanding a wart or a wen , or even a hurt or maim , so long as the vitals be not endangered . and so , of the catholick faith , or christian doctrine , so long as there is nothing destructive of the main substantials or fundamentals of it , though possibly there may be an ignorance or mistake , as to some particulars of lesser moment . after this preface ( between it and the conclusion , or epilogue ) there follows indeed a large exposition of ( what he declares to be ) the catholick faith ; ( that is ; to be some part of it : for i take the whole scripture to be the catholick faith ; whereof this collection is but a part . ) beginning with , the catholick faith is this : and ending with , this is the catholick faith. but it is not said , that except a man know and believe every particular of that explication , he shall perish eternally ; but only , except he keep the catholick faith ( as to the substantials of it ) safe and sound . for doubtless there may be many particulars of catholick faith ( contained in the word of god ) which a man may be ignorant of , and yet be saved . it is true , that the name of our saviour's mother was mary ; and the name of the judge who condemned him was pontius pilate : and both these are put into ( what we call ) the apostles creed ; and are part of the catholick faith ; and which ( supposing that we know them to be declared in scripture ) we ought to believe . but i see not why it should be thought ( of it self ) more necessary to salvation ( if he do not know it to be declared in scripture ) for a man to know that her name was mary , than that the name of adam's wife was eve , or abraham's wife sarah , or that one of iob's daughters was called iemima ; ( for all these are declared in scripture ; and , supposing that we know them so to be , ought to be believed as part of the catholick faith. ) nor do i know , that it is ( of it self ) more necessary to know that the name of the judge who condemned our saviour was pontius pilate , than that the name of the high-priest was caiaphus . and though one of these , and not the other , be put into the apostles creed , whereby we are more likely to know that than the other : yet both of them being true , and declared in scripture ; they are , both of them , parts of the catholick faith , and to be believed : but neither of them ( i think ) with such necessity , as that , who knows them not , cannot be saved . and what i say of this general preface in the beginning , is in like manner to be understood of the general conclusion in the end ; which ( catholick faith ) except a man believe faithfully , he cannot be saved . of which i shall say more anon . after the general preface , ( concerning the necessity of holding the catholick faith , ) he proceeds to two main branches of it , ( that of the trinity , and that of the incarnation , with the consequents thereof ; ) which he declares likewise , as what ought to be believed . that of the trinity , he declares thus in general ; and the catholick faith is this ; ( that is , this is one main part of the catholick faith ; ) namely , that we worship one god in trinity , and trinity in unity ; neither confounding the persons , nor dividing the substance . which is what we commonly say , there be three persons , yet but one god. and this general ( which , after some particular explications , he doth resume ) is what he declares ought to be believed . but he doth not lay such stress upon each particular of that explication , though true. he thus explains himself ; for there is one person of the father , another of the son , and another of the holy ghost . ( which persons therefore are not to be confounded . ) but the godhead of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost , is all one. that is , one substance , one god. ( which is what he said of not dividing the substance , as if the three persons should be three substances , or three gods. ) according as christ says of himself and the father , iohn . . i and the father are one : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) that is , one thing , one substance , one god , not one person . and iohn . . these three are one ; ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) hi ires sunt unum , not unus . these three who 's , are one what. they are one thing , one substance , one god , though three persons . and as their godhead , or substance undivided , is all one ; so it follows , the glory equal , the majesty co-eternal . such as the father is , ( as to the common godhead ) such is the son , and such is the holy ghost . the father uncreate , the son uncreate , and the holy ghost uncreate . the father incomprehensible , the son incomprehensible , and the holy ghost incomprehensible . the father eternal , the son eternal , and the holy ghost eternal . for all these are attributes of the common deity , which is the same of all. and yet they are not three eternals , but one eternal . not three eternal gods , ( though three persons ) but one eternal god. as also there are not three incomprehensibles , nor three uncreated ; but one uncreated , and one incomprehensible . one and the same substance or deity , uncreated and incomprehensible . so likewise the father is almighty , the son almighty , and the holy ghost almighty ; and yet there are not three almighties , but one almighty . so the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god ; and yet there are not three gods , but one god. so likewise the father is lord , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the word by which the greeks do express the hebrew name iehovah , the proper incommunicable name of god , ) the son lord , and the holy ghost lord ; and yet not three lords , but one lord. ( not three iehovahs , but one iehovah . ) for like as we are compelled by the christian verity to acknowledge every person by himself to be god and lord , so are we forbidden by the catholick religion , to say , there be three gods , or three lords . which are so many particular explications or illustrations of what was before said in general of not confounding the persons , nor dividing the substance . which explications , though they be all true , ( and necessary consequents of what was before said in general ; ) yet to none of them is annexed such sanction , as that whosoever doth not believe or not understand these illustrations , cannot be saved . 't is enough to salvation , if they hold the true faith , as to the substance of it , though in some other form of words , or though they had never heard the athanasian creed . nor is any such sanction annexed to the personal properties , which next follow ; the father is made of none ; neither created , nor begotten . the son is of the father alone ; not made , nor created , but begotten . the holy ghost is of the father , and of the son ; neither made , nor begotten , but proceeding . where , by the way , here is no anathematization of the greek church , ( of which those who would , for other reasons , disparage this creed , make so loud an out-cry . ) 't is said indeed he doth proceed , ( and so say they , ) but not that he doth proceed from the father and the son. and 't is said , he is of the father and of the son ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) some way or other ; ( and even this , i suppose , they would not deny ; ) but whether by procession from both , or ( if so ) whether in the same manner , it is not said ; but warily avoided . ( though indeed it seems to favour what i think to be the truth , and what in the nicene creed is said expressly , that he doth proceed from both ; and , for ought we know , in the same manner ; which yet we do not determine ) nor do i see any reason , why , on this account , we should be said to anathematize the greek church , or they to anathematize us , even though we should not exactly agree , in what sence he may be said to be of the father , and in what of the son. and those who are better acquainted with the doctrine and the languages , of the present greek churches , than most of us are , do assure us , that the differences between them and us are rather in some forms of expressions , than in the thing it self . however , those who would make so great a matter of this , should rather quarrel at the nicene creed , than the athanasian : where it is expresly said of the holy ghost , that he proceedeth from the father and from the son. 't is not therefore for the phrase filioque , that they are so ready to quarrel at this creed rather than the nicene , but from some other reason , and , most likely , because the doctrine of the trinity is here more fully expressed than in that , at which the socinian is most offended . i observe also , that these personal properties are expressed just by the scripture words , beget , begotten , proceeding , without affixing any sence of our own upon them ; but leaving them to be understood in such sence as in the scripture they are to be understood . agreeable to that modest caution , which is proper in such mysteries . it follows ; so there is one father , not three fathers ; one son , not three sons ; one holy ghost , not three holy ghosts . and in this trinity , none is afore or after other . ( that is , not in time , though in order . ) none is greater or less than another : but the whole three persons are co-eternal together , and co-equal . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the three ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) are ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) truly persons , or properly persons , and co-eternal each with other , and co-equal . having thus finished these particular explications , or illustrations , concerning the trinity , ( without any condemning clause of those who think otherwise , other than what is there included ; namely , that if this be true , the contrary must be an errour : ) he then resumes the general , ( as after a long parenthesis , ) so that in all things ( as is aforesaid ) the unity in trinity , and the trinity in unity , is to be worshipped . and to this general , annexeth this ratification , he therefore that will he saved , must thus think of the trinity : or , thus ought to think of the trinity , or , let him thus think of the trinity , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and to this , i suppose , we do all agree , who believe the doctrine of the trinity to be true . for , if the thing be true , those who would be saved , ought to believe it . he then proceeds to the doctrine of the incarnation . which he declares in general as necessary to salvation . furthermore , it is necessary to everlasting salvation , that he also believe rightly the incarnation of our lord iesus christ. which is no more than that of iohn . . he that believeth not the son , shall not see life , but the wrath of god abideth on him . and therefore we may safely say this also : there being no other name under heaven whereby we must be saved , neither is there salvation in any other , acts . . after this ( as before he had done of the doctrine of the trinity ) he gives first a general assertion of his being god and man ; and then a particular illustration of his incarnation . for the right faith is , that we believe and confess , that our lord iesus christ , the son of god , is god and man. what follows , is a further explication of this general . god , of the substance of the father , begotten before the worlds . and man , of the substance of his mother , born in the world. perfect god , and perfect man ; of a reasonable soul and humane flesh subsisting . equal to the father , as touching his godhead ; and inferiour to the father , as touching his manhood . who , although he be god and man , yet he is not two , but one christ. one , not by conversion of the godhead into flesh , but by taking of the manhood into god. one altogether , not by confusion of substance , but by unity of person . for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man , so god and man is one christ. and thus far , as to the description of christ's person and natures . the particulars of which i take to be all true ; and therefore such as ought to be believed , when understood . but such ( many of them ) as persons of ordinary capacities , and not acquainted with school terms , may not perhaps understand . nor was it , i presume , the meaning of the pen-man of this creed , that it should be thought necessary to salvation , that every one should particularly understand all this : but , at most , that , when understood , it should not be disbelieved . that in the general , being most material , that iesus christ , the son of god , is god and man : the rest being but explicatory of this . which explications , though they be all true , are not attended with any such clause , as if , without the explicite knowledge of all these , a man could not be saved . he then proceeds to what christ hath done for our salvation , and what he is to do further at the last judgment , with the consequents thereof . who suffered for our salvation , descended into hell , rose again the third day from the dead . that clause of descending into hell , or hades , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) which we meet with here , and in the apostles creed , as it is now read , is not in the nicene creed ; nor was it anciently ( as learned men seem to be agreed ) in what we call the apostles creed . when or how it first came in , i cannot well tell : nor will i undertake here to determine the sence of it . the hebrew word sheol , and the greek hades , which here we translate hell , ( by which word we now-a-days use to denote the place of the damned , ) was anciently used to signifie , sometime the grave , sometime , the place , state , or condition of the dead , whether good or bad . and when iob prays ( iob . . ) o that thou wouldst hide me in sheol ( as in the hebrew ; ) or in hades , ( as in the greek septuagint ; ) certainly he did not desire to be in what we now call hell ; but rather ( as we there translate it ) in the grave , or the condition of those that are dead . but what it should signifie here , is not well agreed among learned men. the papists generally ( because that is subservient to some of their beloved tenents ) would have it here to signifie the place of the damned ; and would have it thought , that the soul of christ , during the time his body lay in the grave , was amongst the devils and damned souls in hell. others do , with more likelyhood , take it for the grave , or condition of the dead : and take this of christ's descending into hades , to be the same with his being buried , or lying in the grave . the rather , because in the nicene creed , where is mention of his being buried , there is no mention of his descent into hell , or hades : and here , in the athanasian creed , where mention is made of this , there is no mention of his being buried ; as if the same were meant by both phrases , which therefore need not be repeated . and though in the apostles creed there be now mention of both , yet anciently it was not so ; that of his descent into hell , being not to be sound in ancient copies of the apostles creed . if it signifie any thing more than his being buried , it seems most likely to import his continuance in the grave , or the state and condition of the dead , for some time . and the words which follow , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , say nothing of his coming out of hell , but only of his rising from the dead . but the words here stand undetermined to any particular sence ; and so they do in the apostles creed ; and are so also in the articles of our church . where it is only said , ( because in the creed it stands so , ) that we are to believe , that he descended into hell , without affixing any particular sence to it . the words , doubtless , have respect to that of acts . . where , thou wilt not leave my soul in hell , ( or hades ) nor suffer thine holy one to see corruption , is applied to christ , ( cited out of psal. . . where the same had before been spoken of david . ) and his not being left in hades , seems to suppose his having been ( for some time ) in hades , whatever by hades is there meant . and verse . his being not so left , is expresly expounded of his resurrection . and so again in acts . . now , as we have no reason to think , that david's being in hell , or sheol , ( though not to be left there ) can signifie , his being in hell among the devils and damned spirits , but rather in the grave , or the condition of the dead ; so neither that christ's being in hell , or hades , ( which is the greek word answering to the hebrew sheol ) should signifie any other than his being in the grave , or condition of the dead ; from whence , by his resurrection , he was delivered . and to this purpose seems that whole discourse of peter , acts . , — . and of paul , acts . , — . but , without determining it to any particular sence , the creed leaves the word hell indefinitely here to be understood , in the same sence what ever it be , in which it is to be understood , acts . , . and psal. . . and so far we are safe . it follows ; h●●scended into heaven ; he sitteth on the right hand of the father , god almighty . from whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead . at whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies ; and shall give account for their own works . and they that have done good , shall go into life everlasting : and they that have done evil , into everlasting fire . ( of all which , there is no doubt but that it ought to be believed . ) ending with , this is the catholick faith. that is , this is true and sound doctrine , and such as every true christian ought to believe . and , as he had begun all with a general preface , so now he closeth all with a general conclusion : which ( catholick faith ) except a man believe faithfully , he cannot be saved . that is , the doctrine here delivered is true , ( and so i think it is in all the parts of it , ) and is ( part of ) the catholick faith : ( the whole of which faith , is the whole word of god. ) that is , part of that faith , which all true christians do , and ought to believe . which catholick faith , ( the whole of which is the whole word of god ) except a man ( so qualified as i before expressed ) do believe faithfully , ( that is , except he truly believe it ) as to the substantials of it , ( though possibly he may be ignorant of many particulars therein ) he cannot ( without such repentance as god shall accept of ) be saved . which , so limitted , ( as it ought to be ) i take to be sound doctrine , and agreeable to that of iohn . . he that believeth not , is condemned already ; because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten son of god : and ver. . he that believeth not the son , shall not see life ; but the wrath of god abideth on him : that is , ( according to the words of this creed ) he that believeth not aright ( of god and christ ) cannot be saved . which words of christ , we may safely interpret both with an aspect on the doctrine of the trinity ( because of those words , the only begotten son of god ; ) and to that of the incarnation of christ , and the consequents thereof ; ( because of those words in the beginning of the discourse , ver. , , god so loved the world , that he gave his only begotten son , &c. and god sent his son into the world — that the world through him might be saved : ) which are the two main points insisted on in the athanasian creed . and he who doth not believe on the name of this only begotton son of god , and thus sent into the world , ( the text tells us ) shall not see life ; but the wrath of god abideth on him . which fully agrees with what is here said , except a man believe the catholick faith , ( of which the doctrine of the trinity , and of the incarnation , are there intimated , and are here expressed , to be considerable branches ) he cannot be saved . and what limitations or mitigations are to be understood in the one place , are reasonably to be allowed as understood in the other . and , consequently , those damnatory clauses ( as they are called ) in the athanasian creed ( rightly understood ) are not so formidable ( as some would pretend ) as if , because of them , the whole creed ought to be laid aside . for , in brief , it is but thus ; the preface and the epilogue tell us , that whoso would be saved , it is necessary , or ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) he ought to hold the catholick faith. which faith , except he keep whole and undefiled , or ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) safe and inviolate , he shall perish everlastingly ; or , which except he believe faithfully , he cannot be saved . which is no more severe , than that of our saviour , mark . . he that believeth not , shall be damned . he then inserts a large declaration of the catholick faith , especially as to two main points of it ; that of the trinity , and that of the incarnation . and if all he there declares be true , ( as i think it is , ) we have then no reason to quarrel with it upon that account . but he doth not say , that a man cannot be saved , who doth not know or understand every particular thereof . of the first , he says but this , he that would be saved , ought thus to think , or ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) let him thus think of the trinity ; namely , that the unity in trinity , and trinity in unity , ought to be worshipped . of the second , what he says is this , furthermore it is necessary to eternal salvation , that he believe aright the incarnation of our lord iesus christ : which is no more severe than that of our saviour , he that believeth not the son , shall not see life , but the wrath of god abideth on him ; because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten son of god , whom god hath sent into the world , that the world through him might be saved , john . , , . beside these , there are no damnatory clauses in the whole . all the rest are but declaratory . and , if what he declares be true , we have no reason to find fault with such declaration . now as to those two points ; that of the trinity , and that of the incarnation , ( which are the only points in question , ) there is a double inquiry , ( as i have elsewhere shewed , ) whether the things be possible ; and whether they be true. the possibility may be argued from principles of reason : the truth of them from revelation only . and it is not much questioned , but that the revelation , in both points , is clear enough , if the things be not impossible . as to that of the trinity ; i have already shewed , ( in a former letter ) that there is therein no impossibility , but that what in one consideration are three , ( which we commonly call three persons , ) may yet ( in another consideration ) be one god. i shall now proceed to shew , that neither is there any impossibility , as to the incarnation of our lord jesus christ. now this consists of two branches ; that of his being born of a virgin ; and that of the hypostatical union ( as it is commonly called ) of the humane nature with the second person of the sacred trinity . as to the former of the two , there can be no pretence of impossibility . for the same god who did at first make adam of the dust of the earth , without either father or mother , and who made eve of adam's rib , ( without a mother at least , however adam may be fansied as a father , ) and who shall at the last day recall the dead out of the dust , may doubtless , if he so please , cause a woman , without the help of man , to conceive a child . there is certainly no impossibility in nature , why it may not , by an omnipotent agent , be brought to pass . and when the scripture declares it so to be , there is no reason ( if we believe the scripture ) to disbelieve the thing . it is no more than when christ cured the blind man's eyes with day and spittle : or when he said , lazarus , come forth , and he did so . or when god said , let there be light , and there was light : and , of the whole creation ; he spake , and it was done , he commanded , and it stood fast . no more than when he made aaron's rod ( a dry stick ) to bud and blossom , and yield almonds : or what is implied in that , let not the eunuch say , i am a dry tree . and not much more than when god gave abraham a son in his old age ; and , notwithstanding the deadness of sarah's womb . i was about to say , ( and it is not much amiss if i do ) it is not much more than what ( pretty often ) ( happens amongst men , when god gives both sexes to the same person , ( such there are , and have been ; and i think there is one yet living , who was first as a woman married to a man , and is since as a man married to a woman ; ) and what hinders then , but that god , if he please , may mingle the effects of both these sexes in the same body ? a little alteration in the structure of the vessels would do it . for when there is in the same body , and so near , semen virile & muliebre , what hinders but there might be a passage for them to mix ? and plants , we know , do propagate without a fellow , though it be otherwise in animals . and whereas this is said to be by the holy ghost coming upon her , and the power of the highest over shadowing the blessed virgin ; it is not much unlike that of the spirit of god's incubation , or moving upon the face of the waters . so that , as to this point , here is nothing impossible , nothing incredible . the other particular , as to the hypostatical union ; how god and man can be united in one person , may seem more difficult for us to apprehend , because we understand so little of the divine essence , and consequently are less able to determine , what is , and what is not , consistent with it . and , when all is done , if we be never so certain , that there is such an union , yet it will be hard to say how it is . but we have no reason from thence to conclude the thing impossible because we know not how it is done . because there be many other things in nature , which we are sure to be ; of which we are almost at as great a loss as to the manner how they be , as in the present case . solomon , as wise as lie was , and how well so ever skilled in natural philosophy , doth yet acknowledge himself , in many things to be at a loss , when he would search out the bottom of natural things , and even when he made it his business so to do . when ( says he ) i applied my heart to know wisdom , and to see the business that is done upon the earth : then i beheld all the work of god ; that a man cannot find out the work of god that is done under the sun : because though a man labour to seek it out , yet he shall not find it . yea further , though a wise man seek to know it , yet shall he not be able to find it , eccles. . , . and shall we then say , of the deep things of god , the thing is impossible , because we cannot find it out ? and if we consider how many puzzling questions god puts to iob , in the , , , , . chapters of iob , even in natural things , we may very well ( as iob did ) abhor our selves in dust and ashes , and be ashamed of our ignorant curiosity ; and confess ( as he doth ) i have uttered what i understood not ; things too wonful for me which i know not : when he found he had talked like a fool , while he thought to be wise , and would measure the power and wisdom of god by the narrow limits of our understanding : and might come to iob's resolution ( when he had well weighed the matter ) i know that thou canst do every thing , and that no thought can be withholden from thee , job . , , . the wind bloweth where it listeth , ( not where you please to appoint it , ) thou hearest the sound thereof , but canst not tell whence it cometh , or whither it goeth , ( saith christ to nicodemus : ) but shall we therefore conclude , the wind doth not blow , because we know not how or whence it bloweth ? or , that god cannot command the winds , because we cannot ? we should rather conclude , the wind doth certainly blow , ( because we hear the sound of it , ) though we know neither how , nor whence : and , though they do not obey us , yet the wind and the seas obey him . now ( as he there further argues ) if , when he tells us of earthly things , we do not apprehend it , how much more if he tell us of heavenly things ? of the deep things of god ? but ( to come a little nearer to the business ) consider we a little the union of our own soul and body . 't is hardly accountable , nor perhaps conceivable by us , ( who are mostly conversant with material things , ) how a spiritual immaterial being ( such as our souls are ) and capable of a separate existence of its own , should inform , actuate , and manage a material substance , such as is that of our body , and be so firmly united as to be one person with it . by what handle can a spirit intangible take hold of a tangible material body , and give motion to it ? especially if we should admit lucretius's notion ; tangere vel tangi , nisi corpus , nulla potest res : ( which he repeats almost as often as homer doth his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) who doth thence repute it impossible for an immaterial being to move a body . but we who believe the soul to be a a spirit , know it to be possible . much more is it possible for god ( though a being infinitely act. , , , . more pure ) who giveth to all , life and breath and all things ; and in whom we live and move and have our being ; and who is not far from every one of us . it would be hard for us to give an intelligible account , either how god moves all things , or how our soul moves the body ; yet we are sure it is so . that a body may move a body , seems not so strange to apprehend , ( for we see one engine move another ; ) but , by what mechanism , shall a spirit give motion to a body when at rest ? or , stop it when in motion ? or , direct its motions this way or that way ? it would be thought strange , that a thought of ours should move a stone : and it is as hard to conceive ( did we not see it daily ) how a thought should put our body in motion , and another thought stop it again . yet this we see done every day , though we know not how. and it is almost the same thing in other animals . and more yet , when an angel assumes a body . there are none of these things we know , how ; and yet we know , they are done . i shall press this a little farther . our soul ( we all believe ) doth ( after death ) continue to exist , in a separate condition from the body . and , i think , we have reason to believe also , that it will continue to act as an intellectual agent , ( not to remain in a stupid sensless 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) else i see not why paul should desire to depart , or to be dissolved , and to be with christ , which is far better ; rather than to abide in flesh. for while he abides in the flesh , he hath some enjoyment of christ , ( as well as an opportunity of doing some service ) which is more desirable , if when he is departed , he have none at all . and , how can he then say , that to dye is gain ? whether the soul thus separated shall be said to have a subsistence as well as an existence ; or , whether it may be properly said then , to be an intire person ; ( as the soul and body are , before death , and after the resurrection ) i will not dispute , because , that were to contend about words , and such words so signify , as we please to define them , and bear such a sence , as we please to put upon them . but it is ( as the angels are ) an intellectual , spiritual agent ; and we use to say , actiones sunt suppositorum ; and suppositum rationale , is either a person , or so near a person , that it would be so if men please to call it so . and the spiritual being , which doth now separately exist , shall at the resurrection , resume a body into the same personality with it self , and shall with it become one person , as before death it had been . now if a spiritual immaterial intellectual being , separately existent by it self , and separately acting as an intellectual agent , may , at the resurrection , assume or reassume a material corporeal being ( heterogeneous to it self ) into the same personality with it self , or so as to become one person with it , while yet it self remains spiritual as before : what should hinder ( for it is but one step further ) but that a divine person , may assume humanity , into the same personality with it self , without ceasing to be a divine person as before it was ? if it be said , that person and personality in the sacred trinity , are not just the same as what we so call in other cases : it is granted ; and by these words ( which are but metaphorical ) we mean no more , but somewhat analogous thereunto ; and which , ( because of such analogy ) we so call , as knowing no better words to use instead thereof : according as we use the words , father , son , generate , beget , and the like , in a metaphorical sence , when applied to god. for no words , borrowed from created beings , can signifie just the same when applied to god , as when they were applied to men , but somewhat analogous thereunto . and if the soul ( though we know not how ) may and do ( at the resurrection ) assume a body so as to become the same person with it self ( though neither the body be thereby made a soul , nor the soul a body ; but remain as before , that a body , and this a soul , though now united into one person : ) why may not a divine person assume humanity , so to be what is analogous to what we call a person ; the humanity remaining humanity , and the divinity remaining divinity , though both united in one christ ; though we do not particularly know how ? we should be at a great loss , if ( to answer an atheist , or one who doth not believe the scriptures ) we were put to it , to tell him , how god made the world ? of what matter ? with what tools or engines ? or , how a pure spirit could produce matter where none was ? he would tell us perhaps , ex nihilo nihil , in nihilum nil posse reverti ; where nothing is , nothing can be made : and what once is , ( though it may be changed ) can never become nothing : and will never believe the world was made , ( but rather was from all eternity ) except we can tell him , how it was made . now , if in this case , we may satisfie our selves ( though perhaps it will not satisfie him ) by saying , god made it , but we know not how : the same must satisfie us here ; that christ was incarnate , ( god and man ) we are certain , ( for so the scripture doth assure us , as well as , that god made the world ; ) but , how god made the world ; or , how the son of god assumed humanity , we cannot tell . nor indeed is it fit for us to enquire , farther than god is pleased to make known to us . all further than this , are but the subtile cob-webs of our brain : fine , but not strong . witty conjectures , how it may be ; rather than a clear resolution , how it is . another objection i have met with : to which the objecters must be contented with the same answer ; we know it is , but we know not how. it would be endless for us , and too great a curiosity , to think our selves able fully to explicate all the hidden things of god. the objection is this : since the three persons cannot be divided ; how is it possible , that one of them can assume humanity , and not the other ? and why the second person , and not the first or third ? as to the question , why ? i say , it is so , because so it pleased god ; and he giveth not account of his matters ; he is not accountable to us , why he so willeth . as to the question , how is it possible ? i see no difficulty in that at all . the persons are distinguished , though not divided . as in the divine attributes , god's justice and mercy are distinguishable ; though in god they cannot be divided . and accordingly , some things are said to be effects of his justice , others of his mercy . so the power and will of god ( both which are individual from himself : ) but when we say god is omnipotent , we do not say he is omnivolent . he wills indeed all things that are , ( else they could not be ) but he doth not will all things possible . and the like of other attributes . if therefore we do but allow as great a distinction between the persons , as between the attributes , ( and certainly it is not less , but somewhat more , ) there is no incongruity in ascribing the incarnation to one of the persons , and not to the rest . 't is asked further , how i can accommodate this to my former similitude , of a cube and its three dimensions ; representing a possibility of three persons , in one deity . i say , very easily . for it is very possible , for one face of a cube , suppose the base , ( by which i there represented the second person , as generated of the father , ) to admit a foil , or dark colour , while the rest of the cube is transparent ; without destroying the figure of the cube , or the distinction of its three dimensions , which colour is adventitious to the cube . for the cube was perfect without it , and is not destroyed by it . which may some way represent christ's humiliation . who being equal with god , was made like unto us , and took upon him the form of a servant , phil. . , . so that , upon the whole matter , there is no impossibility in the doctrine of the incarnation , any more than in that of the trinity . and , supposing them to be not impossible ; it is not denied but that they are , both of them , sufficiently revealed ; and therefore to be believed , if we believe the scripture . and of the other articles in the athanasian creed , there is as little reason to doubt . there is therefore no just exception , as to the declarative part of the athanasian creed . and , as to the damnatory part ; we have before shewed , that it is no more severe , than other passages in scripture to the same purpose ; and to be understood with the like mitigations as those are . and , consequently , that whole creed , as hitherto , may justly be received . 't is true , there be some expressions in it , which , if i were now to pen a creed , i should perhaps chuse to leave out : but , being in , they are to be understood according to such sence as we may reasonably suppose to be intended , and according to the language of those times when they did use to anathematize great errors , which they apprehended to be destructive of the christian faith , as things of themselves damnable , if not repented of . and , i suppose , no more is here intended ; nor of any other errors , than such as are destructive of fundamentals . oxford , octob. . . yours , iohn wallis . postscript . november . . when this third letter was printed , and ready to come abroad , i stopped it a little for this postscript ; occasioned by a small treatise which came to my hands , with this title , dr. wallis ' s letter , touching the doctrine of the blessed trinity , answered by his friend . it seems , i have more friends abroad than i am aware of . but , who this friend is , or whether he be a friend , i do not know . it is to let me understand , that a neighbour of his , reputed a socinian , is not convinced by it : but names some socinian authors , who endeavour to elude scriptures alledged for the trinity , by putting some other sence upon them . he might have named as many , if he pleased , who have ( to better purpose ) written against those authors , in vindication of the true sence . and if he should repeat what those have said on the one side ; and i , say over again , what those have said on the other side ; we should make a long work of it . but he knows very well , that was not the business of my letter , to discourse the whole controversie at large , ( either as to the evidence , or as to the antiquity , of the doctrine . ) for this i had set aside at first , ( as done by others , to whom i did refer : ) and confined my discourse to this single point , that there is no impossibility ( which is the socinians great objection ) but that what in one consideration is three , may in another consideration be one. and if i have sufficiently evinced this , ( as i think i have ; and i do not find that he denies it ; ) i have then done what i there undertook . and , in so doing , have removed the great objection , which the socinians would cast in our way : and , because of which , they think themselves obliged to shuffle off other arguments on this pretence . now ( whether he please to call this a metaphysick , or mathematick lecture , ) certain it is , that there are three distinct dimensions ( length , breadth , and thickness ) in one cube . and , if it be so in corporeals , there is no pretence of reason , why in spirituals 〈◊〉 should be thought impossible , that there be ●●ree somewhat 's which are but one god. and these somewhat 's , till he can furnish us with a better name , we are content to call persons , ( which is the scripture word , heb. . . ) which word we own to be but metaphorical , ( not signifying just the same here , as when applied to men , ) as also are the words , father , son , generate , begot , &c. when applied to god. and more than this need not be said , to justifie what there i undertook to defend . now 't is easie for him ( if he so please ) to burlesque this , or turn it to ridicule , ( as it is , any the most sacred things of god ; ) but not so safe , ludere cum sacris . the sacred trinity ( be it as it will ) should by us be used with more reverence , than to make sport of it . i might here end , without saying more . but because he is pleased to make some excursions , beside the business which i undertook to prove , ( and which he doth not deny ; ) i will follow him in some of them . he finds fault with the similitude i brought , ( though very proper to prove what it was brought for , ) as too high a speculation for the poor labourers in the country , and the tankard-bearers in london . and therefore ( having a mind to be pleasant ) he adviseth rather ( as a more familiar parallel ) to put it thus , i mary , take thee peter james and john for my wedded husband , &c. ( thinking this , i suppose , to be witty. ) and truly ( supposing peter , iames , and iohn , to be the same man , ) it is not much amiss . but i could tell him , with a little alteration , ( if their majesties will give me leave to make as bold with their names , as he doth with the names of christ's mother , and of his three disciples which were with him in the mount at his transfiguration , matth. . . ) it were not absurd to say , i mary , take thee henry william nassaw ; without making him to be three men , or three husbands ; and without putting her upon any difficulty ( as is suggested ) how to dispose of her conjugal affection . and , when the lords and commons declared him to be king of england , france , and ireland ; they did not intend , by alotting him three distinct kingdoms , to make him three men. and when , for our chancellor , we made choice of iames , duke , marquess and earl of ormond ; though he had three distinct dignities , he was not therefore three men , nor three chancellors . and when tully says * , sustineo unus tres personas ; meam , adversarii , judicis ; which is in english , ( that the tankard-bearer may understand it , ) i being one and the same man , do sustain three persons ; that of myself , that of my adversary , and that of the iudge : he did not become three men , by sustaining three persons . and ( in this answer to my letter ) the friend and his neighbour , may ( for ought i know ) be the same man , though he sustain two persons . and , i hope , some of these resemblances , may be so plain , and so familiar , as that he and his tankard-bearer may apprehend them : and thence perceive , it is not impossible that three may be one. for if ( among us ) one man may sustain three persons , ( without being three men , ) why should it be thought incredible , that three divine persons may be one god ? ( as well as those three other persons be one man ? ) nor need he the less believe it for having ( as this answerer suggests ) been taught it in his catechism , or ( as timothy did the scriptures ) know it from a child . but i would not have him then to tell me , the father is a duke , the son a marquess , the holy ghost an earl , ( according as he is pleased to prevaricate upon the length , breadth and thickness of a cube ; ) but thus rather , that , god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier , are the same god. that god the creator is omnipotent and allsufficient ; that god the redeemer is so too ; and god the sanctifier likewise . that god the creator is to be loved with all our heart ; and so god the redemer , and god the sanctifier . and then there will be no absurdity in all this . as to what he says , that all people that have reason enough to understand numbers , know the difference between one , and more than one ; i might reply , that all people who can tell mony , know that three groats are but one shilling , and three nobles are one pound ; and what in one consideration is three , may in another consideration be but one. which , if it look like a slight answer , is yet sufficient to such an argument . he tells me somewhat of dr. sherlock , ( wherein i am not concerned , ) and somewhat of the brief history of the unitarians , ( of which his neighbour gives the friend a copy ; ) but he doth not tell me , as he might , ( and therefore i tell him ) that dr. sherlock hath confuted that history . but dr. sherlock says nothing contrary to what i defend . for if there be such distinction ( between the three persons ) as he assigns , then at least , there is a distinction ( which is what i affirm , without saying how great it is ; ) . nor doth he any where deny them to be one god. he tells me a story of somebody , who , in a publick disputation at oxford , maintaining a thesis against the socinians , was baffled by his opponent . whom , or when , he means , i do not know ; and so say nothing to it : but , that i may not be in his debt for a story , i shall tell him another , which will be at least as much to the purpose as his . it is , of their great friend , christophorus christophori sandius , a diligent promoter of the socinian cause . he printed a latin thesis or discourse against the divinity of the holy ghost , which he calls problema paradoxum de spiritu sancto , with a general challenge to this purpose , ut siquis in toto orbe eruditorum forte sit , qui doctrinâ magis polleat , quam quibuscum hactenus sit collocutus , ea legat quae à se publice sint edita argumenta , seque errare moneat , ac rectius sentire doceat . hereupon , wittichius accepts the challenge , and writes against sandius . to which sandius answers , ( taking in another as a partner with him in the disputation . ) and wittichius replies . and that with so good success , that sandius and his partner , acknowledged themselves to be convinced by it , and to change their opinion . this happening but a little before sandius his death ; his partner ( surviving ) published to the world an account hereof , ( and of sandius declaring , before his death , that he was so convinced , ) in a letter of thanks to wittichius for it . what sandius would have done further , if he had lived a little longer , we cannot tell . that of wittichius bears this title , causa spiritûs sancti , personae divinae , ejusdem cum patre & filio essentiae , ( contra c. c. s. problema paradoxum , ) asserta & defensa , à christophoro wittichio . lugduni batavorum apud arnoldum doude , . the letter of thanks bears this title , epistola ad d. christophorum gittichium professorem lugdunensem ; qua gratiae ei habentur pro eruditissimis ipsius in problema de spiritu sancto animadversionibus : scripta à socio authoris problematis paradoxi : per quas errores suos rejicere coactus est . coloniae , apud ioannem nicolai . he takes it unkindly , that i charge it upon some of the socinians that though they do not think fit directly to reject the scriptures , yet think themselves obliged to put such a forced sence upon them , as to make them signifie somewhat else . and tells me of some socinians , who have so great a respect for the scriptures , as to say that the scripture contains nothing that is repugnant to manifest reason ; and that what doth not agree with reason , hath no place in divinity , &c. but this is still in order to this inference ; that therefore what they think not agreeable to reason , must not be thought to be the sence of scripture : and therefore that they must put such a force upon the words , how great soever , as to make them comply with their sence . if he except against the words , how great a force soever , as too hard an expression of mine : they are socinus's own words , ( in his epistle to balcerovius , of ianuary . . ) certe contraria sententia adeo mihi & absurda & perniciosa ( pace augustini , &c. dixerim ) esse videtur , ut quantacunque vis potius pauli verbis sit adhibenda , quam ea admittenda . that is , the contrary opinion ( with augustin's leave , and others of his mind ) seems to me so absurd and pernicious , that we must rather put a force , how great soever , upon paul's words , than admit it . and , as to the suspicion i had of some of their sentiments , as to spiritual subsistences , ( that it may not appear to be groundless ) he doth ( in his epist. . ad volkelium ) absolutely deny , that the soul after death doth subsist ; and adds expresly , ostendi me sentiresnon ita vivere post hominis ipsius mortem , ut per se praemiorum poenarumve capax sit : that is , that the soul after death doth not subsist ; nor is in a capacity of being , by it self , rewarded or punished . and how he can then think it an intelligent being , i do not see . st. paul , it seems , was of another mind , when he had a desire to be dissolved ( or depart hence ) and to be with christ , as being far better for him , than to abide in the flesh , phil. . , . and willing rather to be absent from the body , and present with the lord , cor. . . now i do not understand the advantage of his being with christ , or being present with the lord ; if he were then to be in a sensless condition , not capable of pain or pleasure , punishment or reward . in epist. . ad dudithium , we have these words , unusquisque sacrae scripturae ex suo ipsius sensu interpres : eaque quae sibi sic arrident pro veris admittere de bet ac tenere , licet universus terrarum orbis in alia omnia iret . that is , every one is to interpret scripture accerding to his own sence : and what so seems pleasing to him , he is to imbrance and maintain , though all the world be against it . socinus , in his tract , de ecclesia , pag. . says thus , non attendendum quid homines doceant sentiantve , vel antehac docuerint aut senserint , quicunque illi tandem , aut quotcunque , sint aut fuerint . which is pretty plain . i am not ( says he ) to regard what other men do teach or think , or have before now taught or thought , whosoever , or how many soever , they be or have been . and if his whosoever are not here to be extended to the sacred writers ; he tells us of them elsewhere , ego quidem , etiamsi non semel , sed saepe , id in sacris monimentis scriptum extaret , non idcirco tamen ita rem prorsus se habere crederem . soc. de jesu christo servatore , par. . cap. . operum tom. . p. . as for me ( saith he ) though it were to be found written in the sacred moniments , not once , but many times , i would not yet for all that believe it so to be . and a little before , in the same chapter , ( having before told us , that he thought the thing impossible , ) he adds , cum ea quae fieri non posse aperte constat , divinis etiam oraculis ea facta fuisse in speciem diserte attestantibus , nequaquam admittantur ; & idcirco sacra verba , in alium sensum quam ipsa sonant , per inusitatos etiam tropos quandoque explicantur . that is , when it doth plainly appear , ( or when he thinks so , whatever all the world think beside ) that the thing cannot be ; then , though the divine oracles do seem expresly to attest it , it must not be admitted : and therefore the sacred words are , even by unusual tropes , to be interpreted to another sence than what they speak . which sayings are , i think , full as much as i had charged him with . and if these instances be not enough , i could give him more of like nature . but i shall conclude this with one of a later date : at a publick disputation at franeker , octob. . . where ( amongst others ) this thesis was maintained ; scripturae divinitatem non aliunde quam ex ratione adstrui posse ; eosque errare , qui asserere sustinent , si ratio aliud quid nobis dictaret quam scriptura , huic potius esse credendum . and when ulricus huberus ( because it was not publickly censured , as he thought it deserved to be ) did oppose it in word and writing ; the same was further asserted , in publick disputations , and in print , by two other professors in franeker , in vindication of that former thesis ; that , if reason do dictate to us any thing otherwise than the scripture doth ; it is an error to say , that , in such case , we are rather to believe the scripture . an account of the whole is to be seen at large in a treatise entituled , ulrici huberi , supremae frisiorum curiae ex-senatoris , de concursu rationis & scripturae liber . franakerae apud hen. amama & zachar. taedama , . and a breviate of it in the lipsick transactions for the month of august , . and , after this , i hope this answerer will not think me too severe in charging such notions on some of the socinians , while yet ( i said ) i was so charitable as to think divers of them were better minded . but what should make him so angry at what i said of guessing , i cannot imagine . that there is a distinction between the three , we are sure ; ( this i had said before , and the answerer now says , it is so . ) but not such as to make three gods ; ( this i had said also , and the answerer says so too . ) that the father is said to beget , the son to be begotten , and the holy ghost to proceed , i had said also , ( and i suppose he will not deny , ) because thus the scripture tells us . ( and whatever else the scripture tells us concerning it , i readily accept . ) but if it be further asked , ( beyond what the scripture teacheth , ) as , for instance , what this begetting is , or , how the father doth beget his only begotten son ; this , i say , we do not know , ( at least i do not ) because this , i think , the scripture doth not tell us ; ( and of this therefore i hope this gentleman will give me leave to be ignorant : ) certainly it is not so as when one man begets another ; but how it is , i cannot tell . and if i should set my thoughts awork , ( as some others have done , and each according to his own imagination ) to guess or conjecture , how perhaps it may be ; i would not be positive , that just so it is : because i can but guess or conjecture , i cannot be sure of it . ( for i think it is much the same as if a man born blind , and who had never seen , should employ his fancy to think , what kind of thing is light or colour : of which it would be hard for him to have a clear and certain idea . ) and if this gentleman please to look over it again , i suppose he will see , that he had no cause to be so angry , that i said , we can but guess herein , at what the scripture doth not teach us . that the socinians have set their wits awork to find out other subsidiary arguments and evasions against the trinity , beside that of its inconsistence with reason , i do not deny : but that is the foundation , and the rest are but props . and if they admit , that there is in it no inconsistence with reason ; they would easily answer all the other arguments themselves . i thought not to meddle with any of the texts on either side , because it is beside the scope which i proposed , when i confined my discourse to that single point , of it s not being impossible or inconsistent with reason : and did therefore set aside other considerations , as having been sufficiently argued by others , for more than an hundred years last past . but having already followed him in some of his excursions , i shall briefly consider the two signal places which he singles out as so mainly clear . in the former of them , iohn . . this is life eternal , that they might know thee the only true god , and iesus christ whom thou hast sent ; he puts a fallacy upon us : which perhaps he did not see himself , or at least hoped we would not see it . and therefore i desire him to consider , that it is not said thee only to be the true god ; but thee , the only true god. and so in the greek ; it is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the restrictive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , only , is not annexed to thee , but to god. to know thee to be the only true god ; that is , to be that god , beside which god , there is no other true god. and we say the like also , that the father is that god , beside which there is no other true god : and say , the son is also ( not another god , but ) the same only true god. and if those words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; should be thus expounded , to know thee to be the only true god ; and whom thou hast sent , iesus christ , ( to be the same only true god ; ) repeating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , those words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he would not like that interpretation ; but both the words and the sence will very well bear it , ( without such force as they are fain to put upon many other places . ) or if , without such repetition , we take this to be the scope of the place ; to set forth the two great points of the christian religion , or way to eternal life ; that there is but one true god ( though in that godhead there be three persons , as elsewhere appears , ) in opposition to the many gods of the heathen : and the doctrine of redemption , by iesus christ , whom god hath sent , ( of which the heathen were not aware : ) the sence is very plain . and nothing in it so clear , as he would have us think , against the trinity ; but all very consistent with it . and the same answer serves to his other place , cor. . . but to us there is but one god , the father , of whom are all things , and we in him , ( or for him : ) and one lord iesus christ , by whom are all things , and we by him . for here also one god may be referred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , both to the father ( if here taken as a distinct person ) and to the lord iesus christ : or , without that , it is manifest , that one god is here put in opposition ( not to the plurality of persons , as we call them , in one deity ; but ) to the many gods amongst the heathen : and our one saviour , against their many saviours . as is manifest , if we take the whole context together ; we know that an idol is nothing in the world : and that there is no other god but one . for though there be that are called gods , whether in heaven or in earth , ( as there be gods many , and lords many : ) but to us there is but one god , the father , of whom are all things , and we in him ; and one lord iesus christ , by whom are all things , and we by him , ver. , , . where it is evident , that the scope of the place is , not to shew either how the persons ( as we call them ) or how the attributes of that one god are distinguished amongst themselves : but to set our one god ( who is the father or maker of all things , ) in opposition to the many gods of the idolatrous world : and our one saviour or redeemer , against their many saviours . indeed , if we should set up our jesus christ to be another god , the text would be against us : but not when we own him for the same god. so that here is nothing clear in either place ( as he pretends ) against christ's being the same god with the father . but in that other place of iohn . ( which he labours to elude ) the evidence for it doth so stare him in the face , that if he were not ( as he speaks ) wilfully blind , ( or did wink very hard ) he must needs see it . in the beginning was the word ; and the word was with god ; and the word was god. the same was in the beginning with god. all things were made by him ; and without him was not any thing made that was made . in him was life , and the life was the light of men , ( ver. , , , . ) he was in the world ; and the world was made by him ; and the world knew him not . he came unto his own , and his own received him not . but to as many as received him , he gave power ( or right , or privilege , ) to become the sons of god , even to them that believe on his name , ( ver. , , . ) and the word was made flesh , and dwelt among us ; and we beheld his glory , the glory as of the only begotten of the father ; full of grace and truth , ( ver. . ) why he should not think this very clear , is very strange , if he were not strangely prepossessed . unless he think nothing clear , but such as no man can cavil against . but there can hardly be any thing said so clearly , but that some or other ( if they list to be contentious ) may cavil at it , or put a forced sence upon it . for thus the whole doctrine of christ , when himself spake it , ( and he spake as clearly , as he thought fit to speak , ) was cavilled at . and himself tells us the reason of it , matth. . , . and ioh. . , , , . and after him st. paul , acts . . and rom. . . not for want of clear light , but because they shut their eyes . in iohn . it is thus , but though he had done so many miracles before them , yet they believed not on him : that the saying of esaias the prophet might be fulfilled , which he spake ; lord , who hath believed our report ? and to whom hath the arm of the lord been revealed ? therefore they could not believe , because esaias said again , he hath blinded their eyes and hardened their heart , that they should not see with their eyes , nor understand with their heart , and be converted , and i should heal them . these things said esaias , when he saw his glory and spake of him . and thus in matth . hearing ye shall hear and shall not understand , and seeing ye shall see and shall not perceive . for this peoples heart is waxed gross , and their ears are dull of hearing , and their eyes they have closed ; lest at any time they should see with their eyes , and hear with their ears , and understand with their heart , and should be converted , and i should heal them . so that 't is no argument of a place or doctrine's not being clear , because prejudiced persons are able to pick cavils at it , or put a forced sence upon it . but let us see what these cavils are . this i confess ( saith he ) were to the purpose , if by the term word could be meant ( he should rather have said , be meant ) nothing else but a pre-existing person ; and , by the term god , nothing but god almighty the creator of heaven and earth ; and if taking those terms in those sences did not make st. john write nonsence . now in reply to this , i first take exception to that phrase , if it could be meant of nothing else . for if his meaning be this ▪ if no caviller can start up another sence , right or wrong : this is no fair play . for hardly can any thing be so plain , but that somebody may find a pretence to cavil at it . it is enough for us therefore , if it be thus meant , without saying , it is impossible to put a forced sence upon it . but this would have spoiled his design , in mustering up a great many forced sences ; not that he thinks them to be true , ( for surely they be not all true ; and i think none of them are ) nor telling us which he will stick to ; but only that he may cast a mist ; and then tell us ( which is all that he concludes upon it ) the place is abscure , he knows not what to make of it . but when the mist is blown off , and we look upon the words themselves , they seem plain enough , as to all the points he mentions . the word which was with god , and was god , and by whom the world was made , and which was made flesh and dwelt amongst us , and we saw his glory , and of whom iohn bare witness ; must needs be a person ; and can be no other than our lord iesus christ , who was born of the virgin mary . and this word , which was in the beginning , and by whom the world was made , must needs have been pre-existent before he was so born . and this word , which was with god ( the true god ) and was god , and by whom the world was made , and who is one with the father , ( joh. . . ) and * who is over all , god blessed for ever , ( rom. . . ) is no other god than god almighty , creator of heaven and earth . ) and this plain sence the words bear , without any force put upon them : without any incoherence , inconsistence , or contradiction ; s●●e that they do not agree with the socinian doctrine . and there is no other way to avoid it , but what socinus adviseth in another case , quantacunque vis verbis adhibenda ; putting a force upon the words , no matter how great , to make them , not to signifie , what they plainly do . or else to say , ( which is his last refuge ) that st. iohn writes nonsence . but let him then consider , whether this do savour of that respect which he would have us think they have for the holy scripture ; and whether we have not reason to susp●●t the contrary of some of them . and , whether we have not reason to complain of their putting a forced sence upon plain words , to make them comply with their doctrine . and lastly , whether it be not manifest , that the true bottom of their aversion from the trinity ( whatever other subsidiary reasons they may alledge ) is , because they think it nonsence , or not agreeable with their reason . ( for , set this aside , and all the rest is plain enough ; but , because of this , they scruple not to put the greatest force upon scripture . ) nor is there any other pretence of nonsence in the whole discourse , save that he thinks the doctrine of the trinity to be nonsence . so that the whole controversie with him , turns upon this single point , whether there be such impossibility or inconsistence , as is pretended . that of iohn . . there be three that bear record in heaven , the father , the word , and the holy ghost ; and these three are one : is wanting , he says , in some copies . and it is so ; ( and so are some whole epistles wanting in some copies . ) but we will not for that quit the place . for we have great reason to think it genuine . if this difference of copies happened at first by chance ( upon an oversight in the transcriber ) in some one copy , ( and thereupon in all that were transcribed from thence ; ) it is much more likely for a transcriber to leave out a line or two which is in his copy , than to put in a line or two which is not . and if it were upon design , it is much more likely that the arians should purposely leave it out , ( in some of their copies ) than the orthodox foist it in . nor was there need of such falsification ; since 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , concludes as strongly , as to a plurality of persons , ( and of the son in particular , which was the chief controversie with the arians ; ) as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth as to all the three . and , i think , it is cited by cyprian , in his book de unitate ecclesiae , before the arian controversie was on foot . and therefore , if it were done designedly ( and not by chance ) it seems rather to be razed out by the arians , than thrust in by the orthodox . and the language of this in the epistle , suits so well with that of the same author in his gospel , that it is a strong presumption , that they are both from the same pen. the word , in iohn . . agrees so well with the word in iohn . ( and is peculiar to st. iohn : ) and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in iohn . . with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in iohn . . ( these three are one , with i and the father are one ) that i do not at all doubt its being genuine . and that evasion of his , these three are one , that is , one in testimony , will have no pretence in the other place , where there is no discourse of testimony at all : but i and the father are one , ( unum sumus ) must be one thing , one in being , one in essence . for so adjectives in the neuter gender , put without a substantive , do usually signifie both in greek and latin : and there must be some manifest reason to the contrary , that should induce us to put another sence upon them . the other place , matth. . . baptizing them in ( or into ) the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost ; is not so slight an evidence as he would make it . for whether 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) be rendred in the name , and taken to denote the joint authority of father , son , and holy ghost , admitting the person baptized into the christian church : or , into the name , ( which this answerer seems to like better ) and taken to denote the dedication of the person baptized to the joint service or worship of father , son , and holy ghost ; ( baptism it self being also a part of divine worship : ) they are all conjoined ; either , as in joint authority ; or as joint objects of the same religious worship ; and , for ought appears , in the same degree . and socinus himself doth allow , the son to be worshipped with religious worship ; as adoration , and invocation ; as lawful at least , if not necessary . now when this answerer tells us of the first commandment , thou shalt have no other god but me , ( the god of israel ; ) he might as well have remembred that of christ , matth. . . thou shalt worship the lord thy god , and him only shalt thou serve . and therefore since socinus ( and other of his followers ) do allow christ to be worshipped , they must allow him to be god , even the god of israel . and i am mistaken if he be not expresly called , the lord god of israel . luke . . many of the children of israel shall he ( john the baptist ) turn to the lord their god ; for he shall go before him in the spirit and power of elias , &c. now he before whom iohn the baptist was to go in the spirit and power of elias , is agreed to be our lord jesus christ ; 't is therefore he that is here called the lord god of israel . and we who own him so to be , worship no other god in worshipping him . it is those , who do not own him so to be , and do yet worship him , that are to be charged with worshipping another god. now when here we find father , son , and holy ghost , all joined in the same worship , we have reason to take them all for the same god ; and , that these three are one. and do say , ( as willingly as he ) hear , o israel , the lord thy god is one god. father , son , and holy ghost , are but one god : as god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier , are one god. and what in the old testament are said of god , indefinitely , without taking notice of this or that of the three persons ; are , in the new testament , attributed some to one , some to another , of the three persons . that which makes these expressions seem harsh to some of these men , is because they have used themselves to fansie that notion only of the word person , according to which three men are accounted to be three persons , and these three persons to be three men. but he may consider , that there is another notion of the word person , and in common use too , wherein the same man may be said to sustain divers persons , and those persons to be the same man , that is the same man as sustaining divers capacities . as was said but now of tully , tres personas unus sustineo . and then it will seem no more harsh to say , the three persons , father , son and holy ghost are one god ; than to say , god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier are one god ; which , i suppose , even to this answerer would not seem harsh , or be thought nonsence . it is much the same thing , whether of the two forms we use . and , all the cavils he useth , may be equally applied to either . what answer therefore he would give to one who should thus object against the latter form , will serve us as well to what he objects against the former . if therefore the gentleman please to consider it calmly ; he will find , that , even amongst men , though another person do many times denote another man , ( and thereupon the words are sometimes used promiscuously , ) yet not always ; nor doth the word person necessarily imply it . a king and a husband ( though they imply very different notions , different capacities , different relations , or different personalities , ) yet may both concur in the same man. ( or , in that sence wherein person is put for man , in the same person . ) so a king and a father , a king and a brother , and the like . and this gentleman , though ( in the dialogue ) he sustain two persons ; that of an opponent , and that of an answerer ; or that of a friend , and that of an adversary ; ( that so , while one gives ill language , the other may give up the cause ; ) yet they do not act each their own part so covertly , but that sometime the vizard falls off , and discovers the man to be the same . for though my letter be answered by a friend , pag. . yet 't is the neighbour that is weary of writing , p. . now , if person , in a proper sence , when applied to men , do not imply , that different persons must needs be so many different men : much less should it be thought nonsence , when ( in a metaphorical sence ) it is applied to god , that different persons in the deity , should not imply so many gods : or , that three somewhat 's ( which we call persons ) may be one god. which is what i undertook to prove . and , having made this good , i need not trouble my self to name more texts ( though many more there be which give concurrent evidence to this truth ) or discourse the whole controversie at large , ( which was not the design of my letter . ) for himself hath reduced it to this single point ; when st. iohn says , the word was with god , and the word was god ; if by the word , be meant christ , and by god , the true god ; whether , in so saying , st. iohn do not speak nonsence ? and if i evince this not to be nonsence , ( as i think i have done ) he grants the place is to the purpose . which quite destroys the foundation of the socinian doctrine . without being obliged to prove , that these persons are just such persons , and so distinct , as what we sometime call persons amongst men , ( but with such distinction only as is agreeable to the divine nature , and not such as to make them three gods. ) like as when god the father is said to beget the son ; not so as one man begets another , ( nor is the son so a son as what we call son amongst men : ) but so as suits with the divine nature : which how it is , we do not perfectly comprehend . i have now done with him . but i have one thing to note upon what i have before said , of the athanasian creed . i there read it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because i so find it in the copy i used ; which is that at the end of the greek testament in octavo , printed at london by iohn bill , ; with robert stephan's , ioseph scaliger's and isaac casaubon's annotations . but in whitaker's greek testament , reprinted by this copy , , i since find it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( which edition , i suppose , is followed by some others . ) i take the former to be the better reading , ( as giving a clearer sence ; ) and that the correcter of the press , had put 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , intending thereby to mend the greek syntax , ( because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 follows , ) but doth ( i think ) impair the sence . but , as to the doctrine , it is much one whether we read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and what i have said of that whole creed , is chiefly intended for those who do believe the doctrine of the trinity , and of christ's incarnation ; that there is no reason ( in my opinion ) why they should not allow of that creed . but such as do not believe those points , cannot ( i grant ) approve the creed . and it is these , i suppose , who would fain have others to dislike it also . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e joh. . . joh. . . . gen. . . psal. . . numb . . . isai. . . gen. . , . rom. . . luke . . . gen. . . cor. . , . rom. . . joh. . , . mat. . , . phil. . , , . job . . notes for div a -e * de orat. * what we render who is , ( in rom. . . ) is in the greek , not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( he that is , ) which in rev. . . ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. ) and elsewhere , is used as a peculiar name or title proper to god almighty ; and answers to i am , exod. . . i am hath sent me unto you ( of the same import with iah and iehovah . ) and what is said of god indefinitely , ( without respect to this or that person in the godhead ) at rev. . . ( for christ in particular is contradistinguished , ver. . ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( from him that is , and was , and is to come , ) is at ver. . applied in particular to christ , i am alpha and omega , the beginning and the end , saith the lord , which is , and was , and is to come , the almighty . which closeth the description of christ , that begins at ver. . and that , by the lord , is here meant christ , is evident from the whole context , ver. , , , , and the whole second and third chapters . and so the description of christ , rom. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in its full emphasis , is thus , that being over all , ( or , the supreme being ) god blessed for ever , ( or the ever blessed god ) amen . and there will be need of socinus's expedient , ( quantacunque vis pauli verbis adhibenda ) to make it signifie any other god , than god almighty , the creator of heaven and earth . the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's letter, concerning some passages relating to his essay of humane understanding, mention'd in the late discourse in vindication of the trinity with a postscript in answer to some reflections made on that treatise in a late socinian pamphlet. stillingfleet, edward, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's letter, concerning some passages relating to his essay of humane understanding, mention'd in the late discourse in vindication of the trinity with a postscript in answer to some reflections made on that treatise in a late socinian pamphlet. stillingfleet, edward, - . p. printed by j.h. for henry mortlock ..., london : . first edition. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng locke, john, - . -- essay concerning human understanding. toland, john, - . -- christianity not mysterious. trinity. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's letter , concerning some passages relating to his essay of humane understanding , mention'd in the late discourse in vindication of the trinity . with a postscript in answer to some reflections made on that treatise in a late socinian pamphlet . london , printed by i. h. for henry mortlock at the phoenix in st. paul's church-yard , . the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's letter , &c. sir , i have seriously consider'd the letter you were pleased to send me , and i find it made up of two parts ; a complaint of me , and a vindication of your self : to both which i shall return as clear and distinct on answer , and in as few words , as the matter will permit . . as to the complaint of me , it runs quite through the book , and even your postscript is full of it . the substance of it is , that in answering objections against the trinity , in point of reason , i produce several passages out of your essay of humane vnderstanding , as if they were intended by you to that purpose ; but you declare to the world , p. . that it was written by you without any thought of the controversie between the trinitarians and unitarians ; and p. . that your notions about ideas have no connexion with any objections that are made by others against the doctrine of the trinity , or against mysteries . and therefore you complain of it , as an injury done to you , in imputing that to you , which you have not done , p. . or at least in leaving it so doubtfull , that the reader cannot distinguish who is meant , p. . and this you call my peculiar way of writing in this part of my treatise . now to give you and others satisfaction as to this matter , i shall first give an account of the occasion of it , and then shew what care i took to prevent misunderstanding about it . the occasion was this , being to answer the objections in point of reason , ( which had not been answered before ) the first i mention'd , was , that it was above reason , and therefore not to be believed ; in answer to this , i proposed two things to be consider'd ; . what we understand by reason . . what ground in reason there is to reject any doctrine above it , when it is proposed as a matter of faith. as to the former i observ'd that the vnitarians in their late pamphlets talk'd very much of clear and distinct ideas and perceptions , and that the mysteries of faith were repugnant to them , but never went about to state the nature and bounds of reason in such a manner as those ought to have done who make it the rule and standard of what they are to believe . but i added , that a late author in a book , call'd christianity not mysterious , had taken upon him to clear this matter , whom for that cause i was bound to consider ; the design of his discourse related wholly to matters of faith , and not to philosophical speculations ; so that there can be no dispute about his application of those he calls principles of reason and certainty . when the mind makes use of intermediate ideas to discover the agreement or disagreement of the ideas received into them , this method of knowledge , he saith , is properly called reason or demonstration . the mind , as he goes on , receives ideas two ways : . by intromission of the senses . . by considering its own operations . and these simple and distinct ideas , are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning . and so all our certainty is resolved into two things , either immediate perception , which is self-evidence , or the use of intermediate ideas , which discovers the certainty of any thing dubious ; which is what he calls reason . now this i said did suppose , that we must have clear and distinct ideas of what-ever we pretend to any certainty of in our minds ( by reason ) and that the only way to attain this certainty is by comparing these ideas together ; which excludes all certainty of faith or reason , where we cannot have such clear and distinct ideas . from hence i proceeded to shew , that we could not have such clear and distinct ideas , as were necessary in the present debate , either by sensation or reflection , and consequently we could not attain to any certainty about it ; for which , i instanced in the nature of substance and person , and the distinction between them . and by vertue of these principles i said , that i did not wonder , that the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning had almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world. which expression you tell me you do not understand . but if you had pleased to have look'd back on the words just before , a person of your sagacity could not have missed the meaning i intended . which are , now this is the case of substance ; it is not intromitted by the senses , nor depends upon the operations of the mind , and cannot be within the compass of our reason . but you say , that if i mean that you deny or doubt that there is in the world any such thing as substance , i shall acquit you of it , if i look into some passages in your book which you refer to . but this is not the point before us , whether you do own substance or not ? but whether by vertue of these principles , you can come to any certainty of reason about it ? and i say , the very places you produce do prove the contrary ; which i shall therefore set down in your own words , both as to corporeal and spiritual substances . when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substance , as horse , stone , &c. tho' the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities which we use to find united in the thing called horse or stone , yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone , or one in another , we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject , which support we denote by the name substance , tho' it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support . the same happens concerning operations of the mind , viz. thinking , reasoning , &c. which we considering not to subsist of themselves , nor apprehending how they can belong to body or be produced by it , we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance , which we call spirit , whereby yet it is evident , that having no other notion or idea of matter , but something wherein those many sensible qualities , which affect our senses do subsist , by supposing a substance wherein thinking , knowing , doubting , and a power of moving , &c. do subsist , we have as clear a notion of the nature or substance of spirit as we have of body , the one being supposed to be ( without knowing what it is ) the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without , and the other supposed ( with a like ignorance of what it is ) to be the substratum to those operations which we experiment in our selves . you mention other places to the same purpose , but these are sufficient for mine . these and the like fashions of speaking , you say intimate , that the substance is supposed always something , &c. i grant that you say over and over , that substance is supposed ; but that is not what i looked for , but something in the way of certainty by reason . yes , you say , we cannot conceive how these sensible qualities should subsist alone , and therefore we suppose a substance to support them . it is but supposing still , because we cannot conceive it otherwise . but what certainty follows barely from our not being able to conceive ? are there not multitudes of things which we are not able to conceive , and yet it would not be allowed us to suppose what we think fit on that account ? i could hardly conceive that mr. l. would have brought such evidence as this against himself ; but i must suppose some unknown substratum in this case . but you go on , that as long as there is any simple idea , or sensible quality left , according to my way of arguing , substance cannot be discarded , because all simple ideas , all sensible qualities carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist in and of a substance wherein they inhere . what is the meaning of carrying with them a supposition of a substratum and a substance ? have these simple ideas the notion of a substance in them ? no , but they carry it with them . how so ? do sensible qualities carry a corporeal substance along with them ? then a corporeal substance must be intromitted by the senses together with them . no ; but they carry the supposition with them . and truly that is burden enough for them . but which way do they carry it ? it seems it's only because we cannot conceive it otherwise . what is this conceiving ? it may be said that it is an act of the mind , not built on simple ideas , but lies in comparing the ideas of accident and substance together , and from thence finding that an accident must carry substance along with it ? but this will not clear it ; for the ideas of accidents are simple ideas , and carry nothing along with them ; but the impression made by sensible objects : and the idea of substance comes in by way of supposition with the other , so that it is not the comparing two ideas together , but the supposing one idea from another , and that a very obscure and confused one too , as is confessed , viz. that it is something which supports accidents , and was found out for that substantial end. as appears from these remarkable words of yours . they who first ran into the notion of accidents , as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in , were forc'd to find out the word substance to support them . had the poor indian philosopher , but thought of this word substance , he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it , and a tortoise to support his elephant . the word substance would have done it effectually . and it might have been taken for as good an answer from an indian philosopher , that substance without knowing what it is , is that which supports the earth , as we take it for a sufficient answer , and good doctrine from our european philosophers , that substance without knowing what it is , is that which supports accidents . what can be ridiculing the notion of substance , and the european philosophers for asserting it , if this be not ? i forbear now your repetition of it ; because i see it doth not please you . but truly it was not to upbraid you with the bare repetition as a fault in writing ( many of which i am too much sensible of my self , to blame it in others ) but only to shew that it was not a sudden fancy , but a deliberate , and ( as you thought ) a lucky similitude . but you say , you would be glad to hear a clearer and more distinct idea of substance , but you can find no better in your own thoughts , or in the books of logicians . are not these logicians a sort of european philosophers , who were despised so much before , for this very notion of substance ? even burgersdicius and sanderson ( whom you quote ) were so , as well as many others of the dull tribe of logicians . but i do not find fault with the definition of substance brought by logicians ; for they do not say , that it was found out only to support accidents , but they say , it first implies a subsistence by it self ; and then that it supports accidents : but you say , the former implies no more than that substance is a thing or being ; or in short , something they know not what . is there no difference between the bare being of a thing , and its subsistence by it self ? i had thought accidents or modes of matter which make sensible impressions on us , were things or beings ; or else there could be no effect of them , but you will not say they subsist of themselves , and are in no other thing as the proper subject of them , and you confess at last , that substance doth imply that it is not supported it self as a mode or accident . so that our european philosophers happen to be in the right at last . well! but i would think it hard to be thought to discard every thing which i do not comprehend ; for i own mysteries . why then should i charge others for discarding substance , because they have but a confused idea of it . this is the force of the charge which i bring into as few words , as may be , but without the least intention to abate the strength of it . to which i answer , that i do not charge them with discarding the notion of substance , because they have but an imperfect idea of it ; but because upon those principles there can be no certain idea at all of it , whereas i assert it to be one of the most natural and certain ideas in our minds , because it is a repugnance to our first conception of things that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves ; and therefore i said the rational idea of substance is one of the first ideas in our minds ; and however imperfect and obscure our notion be , yet we are as certain that substances are and must be , as that there are any beings in the world. herein you tell me you agree with me , and therefore you hope this is no objection against the trinity . i never thought it was , but to lay all foundation of certainty as to matters of faith upon clear and distinct ideas , which was the opinion i opposed , does certainly overthrow all mysteries of faith , and excludes the notion of substance out of rational discourse , which at length you apprehend to have been my meaning . but , say you , if any assert , that we can have no ideas but from sensation or reflection , you declare , that this is not your opinion . i am very glad of it : and i will do you all the right i can in this matter . but we must take your meaning from your own words . and there are three particulars you express it in . ( . ) that your meaning was , to signifie all those complex ideas of modes , relations , and specifick substances , which the mind forms out of simple ideas . so that these ideas are allowed by you although they come not by sensation or reflection . but is not the notion of particular substances a complex idea , because it is a complication of simple ideas , as will presently appear from your own words ; but all simple ideas come in by sensation and reflection . but you may say the combination of them to make one idea , is an act of the mind , and so this idea is not from sensation or reflection . it seems then , the mind hath a power to form one complex idea out of many simple ones , and this makes a true idea of a particular substance not coming in by sensation or reflection . but i am still to seek , how this comes to make an idea of substance ; i understand it very well to be a complex idea of so many accidents put together ; but i cannot understand , how a complex idea of accidents should make an idea of substance . and till you do this you are as far as ever from a true idea of substance , notwithstanding your complex ideas . ( . ) you never said that the general idea of substance comes in by sensation or reflection . and if there be any expressions that seem to assert it to be by a complication of simple ideas , ( and not by abstracting and inlarging them ) because we accustom our selves to suppose a substratum ; it ought to be look'd on as a slip of the pen , or a negligence of expression . in which cases , i think no man ought to be severe . but was there not too much occasion given for others to think , that the idea of particular substance was only a complication of simple ideas ; and because all simple ideas do come in , you say , only by sensation and reflection , therefore all the ideas of particular substance ( which is but a complication of them ) must either come in those ways , or else we can have no true idea of particular substance at all ? so that there are two things , wherein you are very far from giving satisfaction . . that although you say , that the idea of substance in general is made by abstraction ; yet you add , that all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas . from whence it is plain , that according to your repeated assertions , we can have no idea of particular and distinct substances , but what is made up of a complication of simple ideas : and although there may be some abstracted notion or general idea of substance , which is only an act of the mind , yet there is no real idea of any particular substance , but what is a complication of simple ideas . and that a man hath no other idea of any substance , let it be gold or horse , iron , man , vitriol , bread , but what he has barely of those sensible qualities , which he supposes to inhere with a supposition of such a substratum , as gives as it were a support to those qualities or simple ideas , which he has observed to exist united together . these are your own words ; and what can the meaning of them be , but that we neither have nor can have any idea of a particular substance , but only with respect to the simple ideas which make it up ; and these being sensible qualities , there is no such thing as an idea of substance , but only a supposition of a substratum to support accidents . . that although the idea of substance be made doubtfull by attributing it only to our accustoming our selves to suppose some substratum ; yet the being of substance is not . how is this possible ? is not the being doubtfull if the idea be ; and all our certainty come in by ideas ? no , say you , the being would not be shaken , if we had no idea of substance at all . what! not as to our knowledge ? but you say , there are many things in nature of which we have no ideas . and can we have any certainty of reason as to those things ? for about that our debate is , viz. what certainty we can have as to substance , if we can have no idea of it ? so that the being of substance on these principles is far from being safe and secure as to us , when we have so lame an account of the idea of it . but you have yet a farther distinction to bring off the idea of substance ; for you say , ( . ) that the idea of substance is a relative idea . for the mind can frame to it self ideas of relation , and perceiving that accidents cannot subsist of themselves , but have a necessary connexion with inherence or being supported , which being a relative idea , it frames the correlative of a support , which is substance . and now i think we have all that is said in defence of the idea of substance ; viz. that there is a complex , abstracted and relative idea of it ; which is derived from the simple ideas got by sensation or reflection . but this relative abstracted idea is confessed to be an obscure , indistinct , vague idea of thing or something ; and is all that is left to be the positive idea , which hath the relation of a support or substratum to modes or accidents : and that what idea we have of particular and distinct substances is nothing but a complication of simple ideas with the supposition of a substratum or support . these being the concessions and distinctions you make in this matter , i must now return to the occasion of this debate , which was , whether the ground of our certainty , as to the nature of substance can be resolved into the simple ideas we receive in by sensation or reflection . the question is not , whether you doubt or deny any such being as substance in the world ? nor whether the notion you have of it be clear and distinct ? for you confess it is not ; but the point in debate is , what certainty we can have of the nature of substance from the simple ideas we have by sensation or reflection ? and here the question is not , whether the mind cannot form complex and abstracted general ideas from those simple ideas ? but whether those simple ideas are the foundation of our knowledge and certainty as to the nature of substance ? for you affirm over and over ( if i may have leave to say so ) that the simple ideas we have by sensation and reflection are the foundation of all our knowledge . and yet that the ideas we have of particular distinct substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas of accidents . which being supposed , i think it no hard matter to make it appear that we cannot come to any certainty as to the nature of substance in this way of ideas . for , . the simple ideas afford no ground of certainty any farther than as to themselves . outward objects make an impression on our senses ; and all the certainty we have by them is that our senses are so and so affected by them ; but what that is in those objects which produces those effects in us , these simple ideas do not acquaint us . for the old or new doctrine of qualities may be true , notwithstanding any effect of these simple ideas upon us ; for the same effects would be whether there be real qualities in the objects , or only a power to make such impressions on us , which we fancy to be qualities without us . and so for our inward perceptions ; we certainly know , that we have a power of thinking , doubting , considering , &c. these simple ideas we are very certain of ; but whether these perceptions come from a material or immaterial substance , you say , cannot be certainly known by these simple ideas : for you think matter may be so refined and modified as to produce them . now it is a very strange thing to me , that men of understanding should make these simple ideas the foundation of all our knowledge and certainty ; and yet , that we should be able to attain to no certainty at all by them , from whence they proceed . for if these ideas were intended for the means of our attaining to any certainty , this would be the first thing we should know by them . it is not distinguishing primary and secondary qualities will help us out here . for these sensible qualities of bodies , which arise from the first , viz. bulk , figure , texture and motion of parts , do not carry any evidence along with them that they are not resemblances of something in the objects as well as the primary . it is very easie to affirm , that there is in truth nothing in the objects themselves , but only powers to produce various sensations in us : but i intend not to dispute whether it be so or not ; all that i observe , is , that there have been philosophers , both european and others , of another opinion ; and that these simple ideas , which are said to be the only foundation of our knowledge , do not help us one jot in the discovery . for it is confessed by your self , that sensation discovers nothing of bulk , figure or motion of parts in the production of sensible qualities , nor can reason shew how bodies by their bulk , figure and motion should produce in the mind the ideas of blew , yellow , &c. how then are these simple ideas the foundation of our knowledge and certainty , when by them we can discover nothing of the true causes of those impressions which are made upon us ? and you own , that the ideas of sensation are often corrected by iudgment , and that so insensibly , that we are apt to mistake one for the other ; so that these simple ideas are but a very slippery and uncertain foundation for our knowledge , unless reason and judgment be watchfull to prevent the errors we are liable to in the ideas of sensation but if no more be meant by the simple ideas that come in by sensation or reflection , and their being the foundation of our knowledge , but that our notions of things come in either from our senses or the exercise of our minds : as there is nothing extraordinary in the discovery , so i am far enough from opposing that , wherein i think all mankind are agreed . but when new terms are made use of by ill men to promote scepticism and infidelity , and to overthrow the mysteries of our faith , we have then reason to enquire into them , and to examine the foundation and tendency of them . and this was the true and only reason of my looking into this way of certainty by ideas , because i found it applied to such purposes . ( . ) the idea of particular substances being only the complication of many simple ideas , can give no greater foundation of knowledge or certainty than those simple ideas of which it consists . which is so clear of it self , that i shall not go about to prove it . but that you make the ideas of particular substances to be no other , is plain from the several places before mention'd , produced by your self in this book . so that as to the notion of particular substances , we can find no foundation of knowledge or certainty at all from the ideas . it cannot be denied , that you joyn the supposition of a substratum with this complication of simple ideas ; but we must take notice that you place the idea of particular and distinct substances in that complication , and only reserve the supposition of the substratum , as a general confused unknown thing , which makes no part of the idea , but is only kept at a dead lift to support accidents . your words are , when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substance , as horse , stone , &c. tho' the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities , we use to find united in the thing called horse or stone : then follows , yet we suppose them existing in some common subject , &c. so that the idea was compleat before the supposition . and again , whatever be the secret nature of substance in general , all the ideas we have of particular substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas . can any thing be plainer ? yet there follows , co-existing in such , though unknown cause of their vnion , as makes the whole subsist of it self . here we have still an unknown support , but made no part of the idea it self . in another place , the idea of substance is said to be a complication of many ideas together , because not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves , we accustom our selves to suppose some substratum which we call substance . and this is said to be the notion of pure substance in general , and not of any particular substance , which consists in a complication only of simple ideas . ( . ) the relative idea of substance arising from the necessary support of accidents is a mere effect of reason and judgment , and no effect of any simple ideas . for it arises from nothing suggested by the ideas of sensation or reflection , but it comes only from the mind it self . because , as i said before , it is a repugnancy to our first conception of things , that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves . but which of the simple ideas is this built upon ? you tell me , you say the same thing , and quote these words of yours ; and i say , because we cannot conceive how simple ideas of sensible qualities should subsist alone , or one in another , we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject . but you have not told me , how this is founded on the simple ideas , which was your main point ; you boast , you say , of my agreement with you herein : i wish we might as well agree in all other things under debate ; but why did you not inform me , how you came to this , by your simple ideas ; and what steps and progress you made in the complication of your simple ideas before you came to it . for truly , i should have found some difficulty in it , since you make the idea of a particular substance a complication of many simple ideas : for if it be so , how could a complication of simple ideas , which cannot subsist by themselves , make the idea of a substance which doth subsist by it self ? this looks a little untowardly in the way of knowledge and certainty . but there is no help for it , a substratum must be supposed to support these unlucky accidents . let it be so then . how came we to know that these accidents were such feeble things ? what simple ideas inform'd you of it ? if none , then it is to be hoped there is some other way to attain knowledge and certainty in this matter . no ; you tell me , there is no need of any other way , but this of ideas . how so ? your words are these , the general indetermined idea of something , is by the abstraction of the mind derived also from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection . but alas ! we are not upon the general indetermined idea of something ; but upon the particular idea of distinct substances , which is granted not to be by abstraction , but by a complication of simple ideas . so that this is quite off from the matter . but as to your general abstracted idea , i have something farther to say . ( . ) a general abstracted idea of substance is no real substance , nor a true idea of one , if particular substances be nothing but a complication of simple ideas . for you say , that the mind by abstraction from the positive simple ideas got by sensation or reflection comes to the general relative idea of substance . if then the general idea be raised from the simple ideas , and those simple ideas make that of particular and distinct substances only by complication , then the general idea of substance can be nothing but an abstracted complication of these simple ideas , or else it is not by abstraction from the simple ideas . but i do not deny that there is a general nature of substance , which is as real as a general idea can be , and it is that , which makes any particular substance be what it is in its own nature without respect to individual modes and properties . and although this general substance doth not exist of it self , yet it doth really exist in the several individuals that belong to its kind ; and the several kinds of particular substances are really distinguished from each other , not merely by simple ideas of sensible qualities , but by their inward frame and constitution : as the substance of a man is from that of a horse or a tree . for it is ridiculous to imagine , that these really differ from each other only as individuals of the same sort under the general abstracted idea of substance . and if there be substances of several kinds really different from each other , an account must be given , not only of the general notion of a substratum for accidents , but of the specifick nature of different substances , and wherein the difference of the unknown support lies , as to the modes and accidents of their kinds , which i despair of ever seeing done by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection . and your self confess , that we have no idea of abstract substance ; and that by the complex idea of sensible qualities , we are as far from the idea of the substance of body , as if we knew nothing at all . and now i freely leave the reader to judge whether this be a tolerable account of the idea of substance by sensation or reflection , and whether i deserve so much to be complained of , for exposing the unreasonableness of laying the foundation of all our certainty and knowledge upon simple ideas which we receive by sensation or reflection . but before i proceed further , it will be proper here to take notice how you justifie your idea of substance from the etymology of the word ; which , say you , is standing under or upholding . i told you very little weight is to be laid on a bare grammatical etymology , when the word is otherwise used by the best authors for the essence of a thing ; and i named cicero and quinctilian ; and the greek word imports the same . but still you say , it is derived à substando ; and you tell us your opinion , that if we knew the original of words , we should be much helped to the ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for . if you mean the true ideas of them , i must beg leave to differ in my opinion , and my reason is this , because words were used before men came to form philosophical notions or ideas of things ; and therefore they were forced to make use of words applied in another sense ; or else to coin words on purpose to express their own ( as cicero often doth , as qualities , evidence , comprehension , &c. ) so that if substare were used in another sense before , it doth not follow , that it ought to be so , when we enquire into the true ideas of things . but one of the best criticks of the latin tongue in our age , hath told us , that substantia is so called , quia per se substat . and substare is used by terence , not for standing under , but for being stedfast , metuo ut substet hospes . but as to your general observation ; i think there are very few words used in the philosophical language of the romans , but what were taken off from the original sense they were applied to ; as persona was first taken for a man in masquerade , genus for a pedegree , species for a sight , from specio , to see , virtus for manly courage , and distinguish'd from probity . sit virtus etiam non probitate minor . ovid. de pont. l. . and so anima was first taken for the breath in the body , as well as spiritus . thence varro saith , their ancestors , although they eat leeks and onions , yet were bene animati , had no ill breath ; and thence animam agere and efflare , saith cicero ; and from anima , he saith , came animus , by which they understood the mind ; hinc animus ad intelligentiam tributus , saith varro ▪ and many others of a like nature . but i shall only add one more , and that is the name of idea , so very often used by your self and others of late . i wish we had been told the original use of it , and how it was first applied , that we might better judge of the true meaning of it now when so much weight is laid upon it . i find in thucydides , who was an accurate writer , and understood the true sense of words , that an idea is used by him for an appearance and shew without reality , as when he saith , that the athenians in dealing with the sicilians , made use of the same idea which they had done before . where it can signifie nothing but what he calls before a pretence . but when the philosophers came to use this word , they applied it to another sense ; plato made use of it to signifie the true exemplars or models of things , according to which the several sorts of them were framed and distinguished . this notion he had , as many others , from the pythagoreans , but what they mystically called numbers he called ideas . but idea in its original sense from the etymology of it , is derived from seeing , and so the natural sense of it is something visible ; from thence it came to signifie the impression made in us from our senses ; and thence it was carried to the general notion of a thing , and from thence by metaphysical and abstracted speculations to the original exemplars of particular essences , which were simple and vniform and not liable to those changes which visible objects are subject to . so cicero tells us , plato formed his notion of idea , which he would by no means allow to any representation made by our senses , which are dull , heavy , uncertain and imperfect either by the minuteness , or distance , or mutability of the objects ; thence the philosophers of his school denied any true grounds of certainty to be laid in the ideas we have by our senses , which can only afford ground for probability ( not as to the bare objects ) but as to the notions we take from them . but all knowledge and certainty was placed in the acts of the mind ( scientiam nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus ) i. e. in examining and comparing , not the bare ideas , but the definitions of things ; and from these , judging of the truth and certainty of them . and if our ideas of things be so few , so superficial , and so imperfect as you confess them to be ; if we are so much to seek , as to the connexion of ideas , and the finding out proper intermediate ideas , i am afraid this way of certainty by ideas will come to very little at last . and so this agreement and disagreement of ideas will have the fate of the stoicks criterion of truth , which only multiplied disputes , but ended none . never any men talked more of certainty than they ; and they boasted of their discoveries of the true grounds of it : and the question then was not about a criterion of the bare existence of things ; ( about which they allow'd the judgment of the senses to be sufficient , and the ideas from them to be true ; ) nor was it about a criterion for the actions of life , for which they thought probability or opinion sufficient ; but it was about finding out such a mark of truth in the ideas of our minds as could not agree to a falshood , i. e. such an impression or signature , as cicero expresses it , as appear'd in that which was , which could not be found in that which was not . and this was called visum , or a true idea ; his words are , quale igitur visum ? quod ex eo quod esset , sicut esset , impressum est , signatum , & effectum . the greeks called it a comprehensive idea , which they compared to light , which discovers it self as well as other things . but when they came to be pinched with particular difficulties about the natures of things , they were never able to make out that infallible mark of truth in their idea ; and yet this was a more likely way to have found it , than to place the grounds of certainty in the comparing the agreement and disagreement of ideas , unless it could be made out that we have a full stock of ideas , and are able to discern and make out the connexion of them with one another . for if we fail in either of these , the talking of ideas and comparing those which we have will do us little service in finding out of truth . but i confess , the design in general is so good , that it's pity that it should lie open to so many objections ; and much more , that it should be abused to very bad purposes . but my joyning your words with another's application , is that which hath given you so much offence as to make you think it necessary to publish this letter for your vindication . . i come therefore now to shew the care i took to prevent being mis-understood ; which will best appear by my own words . i must do that right to the ingenious author of the essay of humane vnderstanding , ( from whence these notions are borrow'd to serve other purposes than he intended them , ) that he makes the case of spiritual and corporeal substances to be alike . it was too plain , that the bold writer against the mysteries of our faith took his notions and expressions from thence , and what could be said more for your vindication , than that he turned them to other purposes than the author intended them ? and the true reason why the plural number was so often used by me , was because he built upon those which he imagin'd had been your grounds , and my business was to shew that those expressions of yours , which seemed most to countenance his method of proceeding could not give any reasonable satisfaction . but you say , you do not place certainty only in clear and distinct ideas ; but in the clear and visible connection of any of our ideas . and certainty of knowledge , you tell us , is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas , as expressed in any proposition . whether this be a true account of the certainty of knowledge or not , will be presently consider'd . but it is very possible he might mistake or misapply your notions ; but there is too much reason to believe , he thought them the same , and we have no reason to be sorry , that he hath given you this occasion for the explaining your meaning , and for the vindication of your self in the matters you apprehend i had charged you with : and if your answer doth not come fully up in all things to what i could wish , yet i am glad to find that in general you own the mysteries of the christian faith , and the scriptures to be the foundation and rule of it . for thus you conclude your book , in the last paragraph of the postscript . the holy scripture is to me , and always will be the constant guide of my assent , and i shall always hearken to it , as containing infallible truth relating to things of the highest concernment . and i wish i could say there were no mysteries in it ; i acknowledge there are to me , and i fear always will be . but where i want the evidence of things , there yet is ground enough for me to believe , because god hath said it : and i shall presently condemn and quit any opinion of mine , as soon as i am shewn that it is contrary to any revelation in the holy scripture . which words seem to express so much of a christian spirit and temper , that i cannot believe you intended to give any advantage to the enemies of the christian faith ; but whether there hath not been too just occasion for them to apply them in that manner is a thing very fit for you to consider . for in an age wherein the mysteries of faith are so much exposed by the promoters of scepticism and infidelity , it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new methods of certainty as are apt to leave mens minds more doubtfull than before ; as will soon appear from your own concessions . for if the ground of certainty be resolved into the agreement and disagreement of the ideas as expressed in any proposition ; is it not natural enough from hence to infer , that from whencesoever this proposition comes , i must judge of it by the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in it ? you make a distinction between the certainty of truth and the certainty of knowledge . the former you say , is when words are so put together in propositions as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for : and the latter , when we perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas , as expressed in any proposition . but our question about certainty must relate to what we perceive , and the means we have to judge of the truth and falshood of things as they are expressed to us ; which you tell us , is by the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in the proposition . and in another place , where-ever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas , there is certain knowledge ; and when-ever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things , there is certain real knowledge : and then conclude , i think i have shewn wherein it is that certainty , real certainty , consists , which , what-ever it was to others , was , i confess , to me heretofore , one of those desiderata which i found great want of . so that here is plainly a new method of certainty owned , and that placed in the agreement and disagreement of ideas . but the author already mention'd , professes to go upon the same grounds , and therefore it was necessary for me to examine them . he saith , that the simple and distinct ideas we receive by sensation and reflection are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning ; and that our knowledge is in effect nothing else but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas . and that where our perception is not immediate , our certainty comes from the clear and visible connexion of ideas . for he saith , that if the connexion of all the intermediate ideas be not indubitable , we can have no certainty . wherein now do his grounds of certainty differ from yours ? but he applies them to other purposes . i grant he doth so , and that was it which i had said for your vindication . but the question now is , whether your general expression had not given him too much occasion for it ? it is true , that ch . he distinguishes the means of information from the ground of perswasion ; and he reckons all authority divine as well as human among the means of information : and the ground of perswasion he makes to be nothing but evidence ; and this evidence , he saith , lies in our ideas , ch. . in the agreement or disagreement of them , p. . and he places certainty in our clear perceptions of this agreement or disagreement , which you call clear and visible connexion of ideas . and wherein then lies the difference as to the grounds of certainty ? but his design is to overthrow the mysteries of faith. this is too true . but upon what grounds ? is it not upon this principle , that our certainty depends upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas in any proposition . now let the proposition come to us either by human or divine authority : if our certainty depends upon this , we can be no more certain , than we have clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in it ; and so he thought he had reason to reject all mysteries of faith , which are contained in propositions , upon your grounds of certainty . but you say , you own the infallible truth of the scriptures , and that where you want the evidence of things there is ground enough for you to believe , because god hath said it . i do verily believe you , because i have a far greater opinion of your sincerity and integrity than i see reason for , as to the other person who pretends mightily to own the authority of scripture at the same time when he undermines it . for his words are , the authority of god or divine revelation is the manifestation of truth by truth it self , to whom it is impossible to lye , p. . but when he comes to state the point , how far we are to believe upon divine revelation , he hath these words , sect. . ch . . n. . the natural result of what hath been said is , that to believe the divinity of scripture , or the sense of any passage thereof without rational proofs , and an evident consistency is a blameable credulity , and a temerarian opinion ordinarily grounded upon an ignorant and wilfull disposition . and in the next chapter he saith , that revelation is not a necessitating motive , but a mean of information . not the bare authority of him that speaks , but the clear conception i form of what he says is the ground of my perswasion . and again , whoever reveals any thing , his words must be intelligible , and the matter possible . this rule holds good , let god or man be the revealer . as for unintelligible relations , we can no more believe them from the revelation of god , than from that of man. sect. . ch . . n. . p. . but what are all these things to you , who own , that where you want the evidence of things , the authority of revelation is ground enough for you to believe . i do not impute them to you , but i must say , that he alledges no ground for his sayings but your ground of certainty : for in the same page he saith , that the conceived ideas of things are the only subjects of believing , denying , approving , and every other act of the understanding . all the difference we see is , that he applies that to propositions in scripture , which you affirm'd of propositions in general , viz. that our certainty depends upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in them . but i shall do you all the right i can , as to this matter , by shewing what reason i had to say , that your notions were turn'd to other purposes than you intended them , and that i shall make appear from several passages in the same book . . you own the great defects of humane knowledge , notwithstanding the simple ideas we have by sensation or reflection . and from these things , . the paucity and imperfection of our ideas in general ; because our sensation and reflection goes so little a way in respect of the vast extent of the universe ; and the infinite power and wisdom of the creator of it : so that what we see in the intellectual and sensible world , holds no proportion to what we see not : and whatever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of either of them , is but a point , almost nothing in comparison of the rest . . the want of ideas which we are capable of , because although we have ideas in general of bulk , figure and motion ; yet we are to seek as to the particulars of them in the greatest part of the bodies of the universe ; although we daily see their effects . and that because of the distance and remoteness of some , and the minuteness of others , and therefore we cannot come to a scientifical knowledge in natural things , much less to that of spiritual beings , of which we have only some few and superficial ideas . . want of a discoverable connexion between those ideas we have . because the mechanical affections of bodies have no affinity at all with the ideas they produce in us ; there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body , and any perception of any colour or smell which we find in our minds . and so the operations of our minds upon our bodies are unconceiveable by us ; and the coherence and continuity of parts of matter ; and the original rules and communication of motion , are such as we can discover no natural connexion with any ideas we have . . want of finding out such intermediate ideas , which may shew us the agreement or disagreement they have one with another . and this for want of due application of mind in acquiring , examining and due comparing those ideas ; and by ill use of words , which have so much perplexed and confounded mens understanding . . you own the many failings in our reason . by which you understand two faculties in our minds , viz. sagacity and illation ; the one finding out , and the other ordering the intermediate ideas ; so as to discover the connexion between them . but reason , you say , fails , where our ideas fail us , and because of the obscurity , confusion or imperfection of our ideas , both as to matter and our own minds , and the divine operations ; and for want of intermediate ideas ; and by proceeding upon false principles and dubious expressions . . as to propositions you own these things ; . those are according to reason , whose truth we can discover , by examining and tracing those ideas we have by sensation or reflection ; and by natural deduction find to be true or probable . . those are above reason , whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles . . those are contrary to reason , which are inconsistent with , or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct ideas . . as to faith and divine revelation you own , . that faith is the assent to any proposition , not thus made out by deductions of reason , but upon the credit of the proposer , as coming immediately from god which we call revelation . . that things above reason and not contrary to it , are properly matters of faith , and to be assented to on the authority of divine revelation . thus far i have endeavoured with all possible brevity and clearness to lay down your sense about this matter . by which it is sufficiently proved that i had reason to say , that your notions were carried beyond your intention . but you still seem concerned that i quote your words , although i declare , that they were used to other purposes than you intended them . i do confess to you , that the reason of it was , that i found your notions as to certainty by ideas was the main foundation which the author of christianity not mysterious went upon ; and that he had nothing which look'd like reason , if that principle were removed ; which made me so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold . and so i suppose the reason of my mentioning your words so often is no longer a riddle to you . i now proceed to other particulars of your vindication . among other arguments against this principle of certainty , i instanced in the being of spiritual substances within our selves , from the operations of our minds , which we do perceive by reflection , as thinking , doubting , considering , &c. this argument i yielded to be very good ; but that which i urged from thence was , that it could not be from those simple ideas of the operations of the mind ; because you had affirmed that it is impossible for us by the contemplation of our ideas to be certain without revelation that a material substance cannot think . this is a point , in my apprehension , of great consequence , and therefore i must more strictly examine what you say in answer to it . which is , that thinking is inconsistent with the idea of self subsistence , and therefore hath a necessary connexion with a support or subject of inhesion , i. e. if there be thinking there must be something that thinks . but the question is , whether that something be a material or immaterial substance ? but this thinking substance is in your sense a spirit . the question i put is , whether matter can think or not ? if not , then the substance which thinks must be immaterial ; if it can think , then there can be no evidence from the idea of thinking to prove the substance which thinks to be immaterial . this i take to be plain reasoning ; which you must allow , because it is about the agreement or disagreement of two simple ideas , viz. matter and thinking . but you say , that the general idea of substance being the same every-where , the modification of thinking , or the power of thinking joyned to it makes it a spirit , without considering what other modification it has , as whether it has the modification of solidity or not . as on the other side , substance , which hath the modification of solidity , is matter , whether it has the modification of thinking or not . and therefore if i mean by a spiritual an immaterial substance , you grant that you have not proved nor upon your principles can it be demonstratively proved , that there is an immaterial substance in us that thinks . i have thus set down your own words , that you may not complain i have done you injury . but when you put in demonstratively proved , i suppose you mean in the way of certainty by ideas ; for concerning that our dispute is . and therefore when you add , that you expect that i should conclude it demonstrable from principles of philosophy ; you must give me leave to say , this is going off from the business before us ; which is about your principles of certainty from ideas ; for it was only to that purpose , that i brought this argument to prove , that we cannot from our ideas be certain of one of the points of greatest importance , viz. that there is a spiritual substance within us ; and yet the operations of our mind are made one of the sources of those simple ideas , which are made by you the foundation of knowledge and certainty . so that the point before us is , whether this assertion of yours , that the power of thinking may belong to modified matter , doth not overthrow your certainty by ideas ? no , say you , that which you are certain of by the idea is only , that there is in us a spiritual substance , and that , you say , implies no more than a thinking substance , i. e. that by thinking you can prove you have a power of thinking , which i believe may be demonstratively proved . but i pray sir , consider how this question arose , it was from your distinguishing spiritual and corporeal substances from each other ; and saying that we have as clear a notion of a spirit as we have of a body . against this i urged , that if it be possible for matter to think , which you assert , then from the idea of thinking , we cannot prove the certainty of a spiritual substance within us , where it is plain , that a spiritual substance is opposed to the power of matter . it is not , whether matter so modified can think , but whether matter can think ; and let it be modified how it will , matter is matter still . but the power of thinking makes it a spirit , say you . but doth it cease to be matter or not ? if not , then it is matter still endued with a power of thinking ; and so our idea can be no other , than of a material thinking substance . but you say further , that the power of thinking makes it a spirit , without considering what other modifications it has , whether it hath the modification of solidity or not . that is , although it be really a material substance , yet the modification of thinking makes it a spiritual substance ; for we are to go no farther than that modification of thinking , and from thence we are to conclude it to be a spiritual substance . but we are now enquiring not into the bare modification of thinking ; but whether from thence we can prove an immaterial substance within us , or which is all one , a spiritual substance as opposed to corporeal , which is your own distinction . and that i may not be thought to do you injury , i shall produce your own words . by the simple ideas we have taken from our own minds — we are able to frame the complex idea of a spirit . and thus by putting together the ideas of thinking , perceiving , liberty and power of moving themselves , we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances , as well as material . so that here we have two things clear . . that a spirit and immaterial substance are the same . . that from the operations of our minds , we have a clear idea of an immaterial substance within us . again you say , that the primary ideas we have of body as contradistinguished to spirit , are the cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts , and a power of communicating motion by impulse . these you think are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body . here body is contradistinguished to spirit ; and as it is so , the cohesion of solid and separable parts is made one of the original ideas proper and peculiar to body as distinguished from a spiritual substance : how then , i pray , can a spiritual substance consist of solid and separable parts ? for whatever is solid , you grant to be consequently separable . this seems to me to confound the ideas of body and spirit , which you had taken so much care to distinguish ; and so must destroy all certainty of a spiritual substance from your ideas . for although the bare simple idea of thinking may be said to be distinct from that of a solid body ; yet it is impossible from that idea so explained to prove a spiritual substance , as distinct from body . which was the thing i intended to prove . but you go on to compare the complex idea of spirit and body in these words ; let us compare then our complex idea of spirit , without our complex idea of body . our idea of bod● is an extended solid substance , capable of communicating motion by impulse ; and our idea of our souls is of a substance that thinks and has a power of exciting motion in body by will and thought . these you think are our complex ideas of soul and body as contradistinguished . here you do not speak of the bare ideas of thinking and solidity ; but of the different substances , and one is said to be a solid substance and the other a substance that thinks . i shall add one passage more to the same purpose . the idea we have of spirit compared with that we have of body , stands thus . the substance of spirit is unknown to us , and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us . here we have again the substance of spirit and the substance of body distinguished from each other ; and not the bare modifications . so that i need no body to answer you but your self . but least such expressions should be thought a mere slip of the pen ; you are pleased again to assert the notion of an immaterial knowing substance to imply no more of a contradiction than an extended divisible body . and yet after all this you confess , that you have not proved an immaterial substance , and that it cannot be proved upon your principles . what is the meaning of this ? i cannot think you intended to lessen the authority of your book in so considerable a part of it : and i should much rather have thought the latter passage a slip of your pen , but that in your letter you go about to defend it . therefore i must attend your motions in it . you say , that all the great ends of religion and morality are secured barely by the immortality of the soul without a necessary supposition that the soul is immaterial . i am of opinion , that the great ends of religion and morality are best secured by the proofs of the immortality of the soul from its nature and properties ; and which i think prove it immaterial . i do not question whether god can give immortality to a material substance ; but i say it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality , if it depend wholly upon god's giving that , which of its own nature it is not capable of . for if the soul be a material substance it is really nothing but life ; or matter put into motion with such organs and parts as are necessary to hold them together ; and when death comes , then this material substance so modified is lost . god may by his power grant a new life ; but will any man say , god can preserve the life of a man when he is dead ? this is a plain absurdity , and i think no such thing tends to preserve religion or morality . mr. hobbes speaks very consonantly to his own principles ( although not to those of religion and morality . ) for he saith , that the universe being the aggregate of all bodies , there is no real part of it that is not also a body . and so he saith , that substance and body signifie the same thing , and therefore substance incorporeal are words which destroy one another . but what then is a spirit ? that , he saith , in the proper signification of it in common speech , is either a subtle , fluid , invisible body , or a ghost , or other idol or phantasm of the imagination . but is there not an immortal soul in man ? the promise of immortality , saith he , is made to the man and not to the soul ▪ and immortal life doth not begin in man till the resurrection . from whence it is plain , he look'd on the soul as nothing but the life ; and so he saith , that soul and life in scripture do usually signifie the same thing . and in the vindication of his leviathan , he saith , that his doctrine is , that the soul is not a separated substance , but that the man at his resurrection shall be revived . and he answers that place , fear not them which kill the body , but cannot kill the soul ; thus ▪ man cannot kill a soul , for the man killed shall revive again . i think he might as well have said , that man cannot kill the body ; for that shall be revived at the resurrection . but what is all this to you ? i hope nothing at all . but it shews , that those who have gone about to overthrow the immortality of the soul by nature , have not been thought to secure the great ends of religion and morality . and although we think the separate state of the soul after death is sufficiently revealed in scripture , yet it creates a great difficulty in understanding it , if the soul be nothing but life , or a material substance , which must be dissolved when life is ended . for if the soul be a material substance it must be made up as others are , of the cohesion of solid and separate parts , how minute and invisible soever they be . and what is it which should keep them together , when life is gone ? so that it is no easie matter to give an account , how the soul should be capable of immortality , unless it be an immaterial substance ; and then we know the solution of the texture of bodies cannot reach the soul being of a different nature . and this is no more than what the wisest and most intelligent philosophers have asserted , merely from the consideration of the nature and properties of the soul : as you very well know ; and i need not for your sake , run into such a digression , ( or as you call it step out of my way ) any farther , then you give occasion for it in what follows . for you tell me , you have great authorities to justifie your using a spiritual substance without excluding materiality from it . and for this you refer me to two great men indeed among the romans , cicero and virgil. i was surprized at what you say out of cicero , having been no stranger to his writings about these matters , and i have consulted the place you refer to ; where you say that he opposes corpus to ignis and anima , i. e. breath ; and that the foundation of his distinction of the soul from the body is , because it is so subtle as to be out of sight . it is a very easie matter to multiply citations out of cicero , where spiritus and anima are both taken for breath ; but any one who will but read the very beginning of his tusculan questions , may understand his meaning . for in the entrance of that dispute he takes animus for the soul , and neither anima nor spiritus : and he tells us , there were two opinions about it at death . some held a discessus animi à corpore , a departure of the soul from the body , others said , that the soul never departed , but was extinguished with life : and the several opinions he sets down at large , ch. , . and then ch. . he summs up the different opinions ; and saith he , if it be the heart , or blood , or brain ; because it is a body , it will be extinguished with it : if it be anima , the vital breath , it will be dissipated , if it be fire , it will be extinguished . it is true , he distinguishes here the vital breath from the body ; and no one questions such a distinction of the animal and vital spirits from the grosser parts of the body ; but all this proceeds upon the supposition of those who held nothing to survive after death ; but then he goes on to those who held the souls , when they are gone out of their bodies , to go to heaven as their proper habitation . and here he plainly supposes the soul not to be a finer sort of body , but of a different nature from the body which it leaves . nam corpus quidem , saith he , quasi vas est & receptaculum animi , c. . and elsewhere he calls the body the prison of the soul , c. . and saith , that every wise man is glad to be dismissed out of the bonds and darkness of it : and his business in the body is secernere animum à corpore , to draw off the soul from the body ; which the philosophers called commentatio mortis , i. e. a continual exercise of dying ; therefore , saith he , disjungamus nos à corporibus , id est , consuescamus mori . is it possible now to think so great a man look'd on the soul but as a modification of the body , which must be at an end with life ? instead of it , there are several things very remarkable in this very book concerning the immortality of souls by nature ; . he extremely despises those who made the soul a mere mode of matter which was extinguished with life ; and he saith , they were plebeii philosophi , ch. . a mean sort of philosophers , and in another place minuti philosophi , de senect . c. . who held there was no sense after death . but he represents cato there , as weary of the noise and filth of this world , and longing to go to far better company . o praeclarum diem , cum ad illud divinum animorum concilium coetumque proficiscar , atque ex hâc turbâ & colluvione discedam ! did these men look on the souls of men , as mere modifications of matter ? . he urges the general consent of nations for the permanency of souls after death . c. . and he affirms nature it self de immortalitate animorum tacitè judicare , c. . and i do not think the general consent of mankind in this matter , so uncertain , or so slight an argument , as some have made it ; even since the late discoveries : as i think it were no hard matter to prove ; but i shall not here go out of my way to do it . . the most ancient philosophers of greece held the same opinion as he shews from pherecydes , pythagoras , socrates , plato , &c. c. , , &c. and they went upon far better reasons than the other , as he proves at large , c. , , . . that the bodies and souls of men have a different frame and original . our bodies , he saith , c. . are made of terrestrial principles ; but the souls , he saith , are of a divine original ; and if we could give an account how they were made , we should likewise how they were dissolved , c. . as we may of the parts and contexture of bodies ; but saith he , animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest , nihil est enim in animis mixtum atque concretum , aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur , c. . so that here he plainly makes a difference between our bodily substance , and that of our souls , which have no bodily texture and composition ; because there is no material substance , which can reach to the wonderfull faculties and operations of the soul ; and therefore he concludes in these words , singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis . what can express the soul to be of a different substance from the body , if these words do it not ? and presently adds , that the mind is of a divine and spiritual nature and above material composition as god himself is . i hope this may give you satisfaction as to cicero , how far he was from making the soul a material substance . and the only place you produce out of him , c. . proves nothing but that the soul is invisible , as you may see by looking upon it again . as to virgil , you quote that expression , dum spiritus hos regit artus ; where it is taken for the vital spirit ; which sense i know no body questions ; and so tully expresses life , quae corpore & spiritu continetur , and opposes it to a life of immortal fame , which he there speaks of , pro marcello , c. . but the only matter in debate is , whether they excluded any other notion of spirit , which was not done , as i have made it appear concerning cicero , and so i shall of virgil too . for soon after , aeneid . . he hath these words , et cum frigida mors animae seduxerit artus , omnibus vmbra locis adero , dabis improbe poenas . which shews that virgil did believe the soul to be more than a mere vital spirit , and that it subsisted and acted in a separate state : and it is observed by servius , that virgil uses spiritus , mens and animus for the same . in aeneid . . spiritus intus alit , totamque infusa per artus . mens agitat molem — and he proves , that virgil asserted the immortality of souls , and answers the arguments against it ; and as far as he could understand , he saith , that our bodies are from the elements and our souls from god ; and the poets intention was , vt animos immortales diceret . so that neither cicero nor virgil do you any kindness in this matter , being both assertors of the souls immortality by nature . if these will not do you bring me to scripture , and say , that solomon himself speaks after the same manner about man and beast , as the one dieth , so dieth the other , yea , they have all one spirit , eccles. . . i will not dispute about the proper sense of the hebrew word , but i must about solomon's sense . for although he makes life and death common to man and beast ; yet he saith , v. . the spirit of a man goeth upward , and the spirit of a beast goeth down to the earth . but you say , if the notion of a spirit excludes materiality then the spirit of a beast must be immaterial , as well as that of a man. i answer , that although the bare word doth not prove it , yet the design of solomon's discourse doth , and so the going upward of the spirit of a man must be understood in a very different sense , from the going downward of the spirit of a beast . for he saith concerning man , that the spirit shall return to god that gave it , c. . . to what purpose ? to be dissipated in the common air ? or to be lost in the vast confusion of matter ? no , but he concludes his book thus ; v. . for god shall bring every work into iudgment with every secret thing , whether it be good , or whether it be evil . if these be solomon's words , as no doubt they were , and he were a man of sense , and laid his sayings together , as no doubt he did ; these last words must interpret the foregoing , and his other sayings be made consonant to this . yes , you may say , this relates to the general iudgment , and not to the soul's subsistence after death . but solomon speaks of the spirit of a man going upward at death , and returning to god that gave it : what sense is there in this , if it be a material substance which vanishes and is dissolved then ? and if the soul be not of it self a free , thinking substance , i do not see what foundation there is in nature for a day of judgment . for where there is nothing but matter , there is no freedom of acting ; where there is no liberty , there is no choice ; where there is no choice , there is no room for rewards and punishments , and consequently no day of iudgment . but solomon positively concludes , there will be a judgment to come as to good and evil actions in another world , and therefore he must be understood in those expressions , to mean a free and thinking , and consequently an immaterial spirit in us . but you urge farther , that our saviour himself opposes spirit to flesh and bones , luk. . . i. e. to such a gross compages as could be seen and felt . the question then was , whether it were the real body of christ or only an appearance of it ; and how could this be resolved better than our saviour doth ? handle me and see , for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me have . but he calls this a spirit . what follows ? therefore a spirit is only an appearance ? i do not think that is your meaning . and no body questions but the name of spirits is sometimes given to apparitions . but this is far from our case , which is , whether that real spiritual substance we find in our selves be material or not ? doth a spiritual substance imply matter in its idea or not ? you cannot say it doth : then it may be immaterial : but how come we to know things but by their distinct ideas ? is the idea of matter and spirit distinct or not ? if not , to what purpose do we talk of knowledge by ideas when we cannot so much as know body and spirit from each other by them ? is it then any absurdity to call a spiritual substance immaterial ? no , you say , you would not be thought to affirm , that spirit never does signifie a purely immaterial substance ; for in that sense the scripture attributes the notion of spirit to god , and you have proved from your principles , that there is a spiritual immaterial substance . and this you think proves an immaterial substance in your way of ideas . but of that afterwards . we are yet upon the proving an immaterial substance in our selves from the ideas we have by sensation and reflection . now , i say , still this is impossible if the spiritual substance in us may be material . and at last you grant , that what i say is true , that it cannot upon these principles be demonstrated . then , say i , your grounds of certainty from ideas are plainly given up . but you say , it may be proved probable to the highest degree . but that is not the point ; for it is not probability , but certainty , that we are promised in this way of ideas ; and that the foundation of our knowledge and real certainty lies in them ; and is it dwindled into a probability at last ? the only reason i had to engage in this matter was a bold assertion , that the ideas we have by sensation or reflection are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning : and that our certainty lies in perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas as expressed in any proposition ; which last are your own words . how can we then be certain where we have no ideas from sensation or reflection to proceed by ? as in the present case . i have a mind to be resolved whether the soul in man be an immaterial substance or not ; and we are to judge of the truth of it by our ideas . i ask then , what idea you have of the soul by reflection ? you answer , that it is a thinking substance . but doth this prove it immaterial ? you answer , that you cannot be certain , but that it is very probable . is not this giving up the cause of certainty ? but you say , you never offer'd it as a way of certainty where we cannot reach certainty . but did you not offer to put us into the way of certainty ? what is that , but to attain certainty in such things , where we could not otherwise do it ? and what a strange way is this , if it fails us in some of the first foundations of the real knowledge of our selves ? but you say , if i dislike your way , you desire me to shew you a better way of certainty as to these points . i am sensible that you design herein , to draw me out of my way to do you a kindness ; but i will so far gratifie you at this time ; and to oblige you the more , i will make use of no other principles or ideas , than such as i meet with in your book ; and from thence i do not despair of proving , that we may be certain that a material substance cannot think . and the method i shall proceed in , shall be to prove it , by such ways and steps as you have directed me to , although you might not think to find them so laid together . . from your general principles as to knowledge and certainty . you say , that all our knowledge consists in the view the mind hath of its own ideas ; which is the utmost light and greatest certainty , we with our faculties and in our way of knowledge are capable of . here you resolve our knowledge and certainty into the view of the ideas in our minds ; therefore by those ideas we may come to know the certainty of things ; not in the frame and inward essence of them , as you often tell us ; but by the powers and properties which belong to them . whatever , say you , be the secret and abstract nature of substance in general , all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances , are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas and you take pains to prove , that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances : and their secondary qualities are those which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another ; which secondary qualities , as has been shewn are nothing but bare powers . so that our knowledge cannot reach the inward substance of things ; and all our certainty of knowledge as to them , and their distinction from each other , must depend on those powers and properties which are known to us . one would think sometimes , that you would allow mankind no more knowledge than suits with the conveniencies of life ; but this would overthrow the great design of your book , which is to put us into a way of real certainty by the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; and where ever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas , there is certain knowledge . so that here you own we may come to a certainty of knowledge ( which is beyond mere probability ) and that by perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas . . if we can find the disagreement of any two ideas upon your own principles , we must do those of body and spirit . for the idea of matter in general , you say , that in truth it contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance , which is every-where the same , every-where uniform . and that body stands for a solid extended figured substance . so that solidity , extension and figure are the inseparable properties of bodies . and in another place you have these words , the primary ideas we have peculiar to bodies as contradistinguished to spirit , are the cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts , and a power of communicating motion by impulse . these you think are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body , for figure is but the consequence of finite extension . here we have the idea of body laid down by your self as contradistinguished to spirit . therefore by your own confession we may perceive the disagreement of these two ideas of body and spirit , and consequently may certainly know their distinction from each other by their inseparable properties . but if it be possible for matter to think , then these ideas must be confounded : yet you distinguish the ideas of a material and immaterial substance in these words , putting together the ideas of thinking and willing , and the power of motion or rest added to substance , we have the idea of a spirit , and putting together the ideas of solid coherent parts , a power of being moved , joyned with substance , we have the idea of matter . the one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other ; the idea of thinking and moving a body being as clear and distinct ideas , as the ideas of extension , solidity and being moved . can any thing now be plainer than the disagreement of these two ideas , by the several properties which belong to them ? but if after all this matter may think , what becomes of these clear and distinct ideas ? and yet you have th●se words , thus by putting together the ideas of thinking . perceiving , liberty and power of moving themselves and other things , we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material . here it is plain , that you make thinking and perceiving to be part of the complex idea of an immaterial substance . how is this possible , if a material substance be capable of thinking as well as an immaterial ? either therefore you must renounce your own doctrine of certainty by ideas , or you must conclude , that matter cannot think . . but i urge this yet further from your notion of liberty and necessity . liberty , you say , is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any action , according to the determination or thought of the mind , whereby either of them is preferred to the other . so that liberty cannot be , where there is no thought , no volition , no wish . and again , agents that have no thought , no volition at all are necessary agents . but you make a power of thinking and liberty to be parts of the complex idea of an immaterial substance , in the words before cited . but what liberty can you conceive in mere matter ? for you grant , that bodies can operate upon one another only by impulse and motion ; that the primary qualities of bodies which are inseparable from it , are extension , solidity , figure and mobility from any body . now how can the idea of liberty agree with these simple ideas of body ? to be moved only by impulse from another body ; and from the free determination of our own thoughts ; are two ideas as disagreeing with each other , as we can well imagine . but if matter may think , it may have liberty too , because you join these together ; but if it be uncapable of liberty which goes along with thinking , how can you imagine it should be capable of thinking ? i argue , from your notion of personal indentity , which you place in self consciousness . for you tell us , that a person is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection ; and can consider it self , as it self , the same thinking thing in different times and places ; which it does only by that consciousness , which is inseparable from thinking , and seems to you essential to it . from whence it follows , that if there can be no self-consciousness in matter , then it cannot think , because it wants that which you say is essential to it . it being impossible , for any one to perceive , but he must perceive , that he doth perceive . but what is there like self-consciousness in matter ? or how is it possible to apprehend that meer body should perceive that it doth perceive ? for bodies , you say , operate only by impulse and motion ; i. e. one body upon another . but how can a body operate upon it self without motion ? those you call the secondary qualities of bodies , are only you say , the effect of the powers in some bodies upon others endued with sense and perception . so that the effects of these powers in bodies , or of the primary qualities of bulk , site , figure , motion , &c. is not upon themselves but upon other bodies , either by changing those primary qualities in them by different site , figure , motion , &c. or producing those effects in us , or which we call sensible qualities . but either of these ways there is no possibility for matter to operate upon it self in a way of self-consciousness . if then every intelligent thinking being have this so inseparably belonging to it , that you say , it is impossible , for any one to perceive , without perceiving that he doth perceive ; and it be impossible from the idea of matter to make out that a meer body can perceive that it doth perceive , i think it is more than probable in the way of ideas that matter cannot think . . i argue , from the power of abstracting which you make proper to a thinking substance . this is done , say you , by considering ideas in the mind as separate from the circumstances of time and place . and this power of abstracting , you add , puts a perfect distinction between man and brutes ; and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to . you tell me , that you did not say the chief excellency of mankind lies chiefly , or any ways , in this that brutes cannot abstract ; for brutes not being able to do any thing , cannot be any excellency of mankind . but i hope it is the excellency of mankind , that they are able to do what the brutes cannot : and you say , this puts a perfect distinction between man and brutes ; and i had thought in comparing man and brutes that which put a perfect distinction was the chief excellency with respect to them . but let that be as it will ; the thing i insist upon is , the power of abstracting following that of thinking so closely that you utterly deny it to brutes ; but if it may be in the power of matter to think , how comes it to be so impossible for such organized bodies as the brutes have to inlarge their ideas by abstraction ? pomponatius thinks to avoid the argument from abstraction to prove the souls imateriality , by saying , that in the most abstract speculation the mind rests upon particulars ; vniversale in singulari speculatur . but this doth not reach the force of the argument ; which is not , whether the mind hath not an eye to particulars , when it forms universal notions ; but whether the power of forming such abstract ideas from particulars do not argue a power which meer matter can never attain to : and all that philosopher hath said , doth not amount to the least proof of it . . lastly , i argue from the reason you give , why god must be an immaterial substance . for these are the words in your letter . and the idea of an eternal , actual , knowing being is perceived to have a connection with the idea of immateriality , by the intervention of the idea of matter , and of its actual division , divisibility and want of perception , &c. here the want of perception is owned to be so essential to matter , that god is therefore concluded to be immaterial ; and this is drawn from the idea and essential properties of matter , and if it be so essential to it , that from thence you concluded god must be an immaterial substance , i think the same reason will hold , as to any thinking substance . because the argument is not drawn from any thing peculiar to the divine perfections , but from the general idea of matter . but after all , you tell me , that god being omnipotent , may give to a system of very subtil matter , sense and motion . your words before were , a power to perceive or think ; and about that , all our debate runs ; and here again you say , that the power of thinking joined to matter , makes it a spiritual substance . but as to your argument from god s omnipotency , i answer , that this comes to the same debate we had with the papists about the possibility of transubstantiation . for , they never imagin'd , that a body could be present after the manner of a spirit in an ordinary way , but that by god's omnipotent power it might be made so : but our answer to them was , that god doth not change the essential properties of things while the things themselves remain in their own nature : and that it was as repugnant for a body to be after the manner of a spirit , as for a body and spirit to be the same . the same we say in this case . we do not set bounds to god's omnipotency : for he may if he please , change a body into an immaterial substance ; but we say , that while he continues the essential properties of things , it is as impossible for matter to think , as for a body by transubstantiation to be present after the manner of a spirit ; and we are as certain of one as we are of the other . these things i thought necessary on this occasion to be cleared , because i look on a mistake herein to be of dangerous consequence as to the great ends of religion and morality : which , you think , may be secured although the soul be allowed to be a material substance ; but i am of a very different opinion : for if god doth not change the essential properties of things , their nature remaining : then either it is impossible for a material substance to think , or it must be asserted , that a power of thinking is within the essential properties of matter ; and so thinking will be such a mode of matter , as spinoza hath made it : and i am certain you do not think , he hath promoted the great ends of religion and morality . i shall now proceed to consider the arguments for proving a supream immaterial substance , which you freely allow to be so . and my design , as i said , was to shew , that the certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and distinct ideas , but upon the force of reason distinct from it . to this you answer , that knowledge and certainty in your opinion , lies in the preception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , such as they are , and not always in having perfectly clear and distinct ideas . but those who offer at clear and distinct ideas , bid much fairer for certainty than you do ; and speak more agreeably to your original grounds of certainty . for your relative idea , which you here run to again is no certainty at all from the idea , but from the plain evidence of reason , that accidents cannot support themselves . i pass over all which i think i have sufficiently answered already ; as when you spend so many pages about my using the plural number when your words are only mentioned , &c. but i shall pass over nothing which may seem to an indifferent reader to require any farther consideration . whether you took this way of ideas from the modern philosopher mentioned by you , is not at all material ; but i intended no reflection upon you in it ( for that you mean by my commending you as a scholar of so great a master ) i never meant to take from you the honour of your own inventions ; and i do believe you when you say , that you wrote from your own thoughts , and the ideas you had there . but many things may seem new to one that converses only with his own thoughts , which really are not so ; as he may find when he looks into the thoughts of other men which appear in their books . and therefore , although i have a just esteem for the invention of such who can spin volumes barely out of their own thoughts ; yet i am apt to think they would oblige the world more , if after they have thought so much themselves , they would examine what thoughts others have had before them concerning the same things , that so , those may not be thought their own inventions , which are common to themselves and others . if a man should try all the magnetical experiments himself , and publish them as his own thoughts , he might take himself to be the inventor of them ; but he that examines and compares them with what gilbert and others have done before him , will not diminish the praise of his diligence , but may wish he had compared his thoughts with other mens , by which the world would receive greater advantage , altho' he lost the honour of being an original . the matter of certainty , you say , one cannot imploy too many thoughts about , viz. as to the finding the true grounds of it , or wherein it is placed . this i was led to consider , by our vnitarians placing it in clear and distinct ideas ; and therefore rejecting the mysteries of faith , because they could not have clear and distinct ideas of them . and one wrote purposely to shew that we were not to believe any mysteries in the gospel , because all our certainty depended upon the preception of the agreement or disagreement of those simple ideas which we have by sensation or reflection . now if these principles of certainty hold good as to all propositions we can have no certainty of faith , where we cannot perceive the connexion of the ideas contained in them . i own that you say , that faith is an assent to any proposition not made out by any deductions of reason , but upon the credit of the proposer . but this doth not clear the matter ; for , is faith an vnreasonable act ? is it not an assent to a proposition ? then , if all certainty in acts of reason be derived from the perceiving the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in it , either there can be no certainty of the reasonable act of faith , or the grounds of certainty must be laid some other way . but you say , where you want evidence of things there is yet ground enough for you to believe because god hath said it . which doth not yet remove the difficulty , from the true ground of certainty ; for say they , revelation is but a means of information ; and god discovers by that such propositions , which we could not have found out without revelation ; but where-ever propositions are offered to our vnderstandings , we must judge of them by our perception of the agreement and disagreement of the ideas contained in them . and faith doth not overthrow nature : if therefore the nature of certainty lies herein we cannot be certain without it . is it not enough for you to disown the consequence , but to shew that it doth not follow from your principles of certainty : but of this i have spoken already , and i love not repetitions . i only take notice , that you assert and hold to the same . i stick to my own plain way of certainty by ideas . and so do those who reject the mysteries of faith , because not agreeable to their ideas , and think they proceed upon your grounds . but you say , that according to my rules you know not where to place certainty ; for in the account i give of des cartes , i have these words concerning him . the first thing he found any certainty in , was his own existence , which he founded upon the perception of the acts of his mind . from hence he proceeded to enquire how he came by this certainty , and he resolved it into this , that he had a clear and distinct preception of it . and from hence he formed his general rule , that what he had a clear and distinct perception of was true . which in reason ought to go on farther , than where there is the like degree of evidence ; for the certainty was not grounded on the clearness of the perception , but on the plainness of the evidence . which is of that nature that the very doubting of it proves it , since it is impossible that any thing should doubt or question its own being that had it not . so that here it is not the clearness of the idea , but an immediate act of perception , which is the true ground of certainty . and this cannot extend to things without our selves , of which we can have no other perception , than what is caused by the impression of outward objects . but whether we are to judge according to those impressions doth not depend on the ideas themselves , but upon the exercise of our judgment and reason about them , which put the difference between true and false , and adequate and inadequate ideas , so that our certainty is not from the ideas themselves , but from the evidence of reason , that those ideas are true and just , and consequently , that we may build our certainty upon them . these i acknowledge to be my words ; and yet i see no reason why i may not stick to them . but you say , that i have placed the grounds of certainty of our own existence , sometimes in the plainness of evidence , in opposition to the clearness of perception ; sometimes in the immediate act of perception in opposition to the clearness of the idea ; and the certainty of other things without us in the evidence of reason , that these ideas are true and just in opposition to the ideas themselves ; so that such is your dulness you cannot by these rules tell , where to place certainty . but all these mists will easily be scattered , if you set your self a little to consider the design of my discourse ; which was not , to lay down rules of certainty , but to shew that the grounds of certainty from clear and distinct ideas were not well laid at first by des cartes himself . because he deduced his rule as to certainty of other things , from the evidence he had as to his own existence , which he had both from immediate perception and uncontroulable evidence , when even the doubting of it necessarily proved it . but the main question was , whether this would reach to other things without us : yes said he , the rule will hold , where-ever there are clear and distinct ideas . but i say the certainty doth not depend upon the idea but upon inward perception and the evidence founded upon it ; and we have not the same as to external objects : for we have no inward perception of them , nor any evidence that results from our own beings ; therefore the rule of certainty is carried beyond the true ground of it . i do not oppose in the former case the plainness of the evidence to the clearness of the perception ; but i suppose them both as to our own existence . i say indeed after , that it is not the clearness of the idea , but an immediate act of perception which is the true ground of certainty as to our own existence ; but there i take idea as des cartes did , for the clear and distinct perception of our minds , which might reach to other objects as well as our selves ; and such an idea i deny is the ground of certainty as to our own beings , which is founded on an immediate act of perception . and when they prove this as to such outward objects , which we have the ideas of , they may then carry the rule so far ; but i say the case is vastly different , as to a clear perception we have from our own acts , and that which we have as the impressions from outward objects ; in the former case we have such an evidence , as it is impossible to doubt of , but the very doubting must prove it : is it the same as to the ideas of external objects ? and as to these i do not deny , but we may come to a certainty : but i say , it is not from the ideas , which may be true or false , adequate or inadequate , and whether we may be certain of them or not , depends upon the exercise of our reason and judgment about them . so that i found the certainty of ideas upon reason , and not reason upon the certainty of ideas . and so i come more closely to consider the argument from the idea as to the proof of a supream immaterial substance . if our certainty did arise from clear and distinct ideas then it must hold , where we have a clear and distinct idea , as it is confessed we have concerning god. but this argument from the idea will not be allowed in this case ; it is denied by others plainly ; but i do not say , that it is denied by you , but that it is made a doubtfull thing . which comes to the same , in the point of certainty : and so the force of my argument doth by no means fail . but you say , that you intended by your words not to deny that the idea of a most perfect being doth prove a god , but to blame those who take it for the only proof , and endeavour to invalidate all others . for the belief of a god being the foundation of all religion and genuine morality you thought no arguments that are made use of to work the perswasion of a god into mens minds should be invalidated , which you grant is of very ill consequence . here you must give me leave to ask you , what you think of the universal consent of mankind , as to the being of god ? hath not this been made use of , as an argument not only by christians , but by the wisest and greatest men among the heathens ? and what then would you think of one who should go about to invalidate this argument ? and that by proving , that it hath been discover'd in these latter ages by navigation , that there are whole nations at the bay of soldania , in brasil , in the caribbe islands , and paraquaria , among whom there was found no notion of a god , and even the author of the essay of human vnderstanding hath done this . this cannot be thought a mere slip of the pen. for men do not quote authors so punctually then . but if it would not be thought stepping too much out of my way , i think i could prove that these instances are very ill chosen , because either they were taken from such as were not sufficiently acquainted with the people and language of the country ; or that their testimony is contradicted by those who have been longer among them and understood them better ; or lastly that the account given of them makes them not fit to be a standard for the sense of mankind , being a people so strangely bereft of common sense , that they can hardly be reckoned among mankind , as appears by the best accounts both of the cafres of soldania , and the caiguae of paraquaria . but this would be too much a digression in this place . i return therefore to the argument for proving the existence of god ; and you may plead for your self that your design was only to prove , that there is no innate idea of a god. but doth not this however take off from the force of an argument some have used to perswade men that there is a god ? i meddle not with innate ideas ; but have not some persons of note , in these matters , used the argument from the mark and character of god imprinted on the minds of men to prove his being ? and have you not set your self to disprove it ? but i leave this , and come to the argument from the idea of god , concerning which you say , that though the complex idea for which the word god ( whether containing in it the idea of necessary existence or no , for the case is the same ) will not prove the real existence of a being answering that idea , any more than any other idea in any ones mind will prove the real existence of any real being answering that idea , yet you conceive it does not hence follow , but that there may be other ideas by which the being of god may be proved . and afterwards you offer to shew that your proof of a deity is all grounded on ideas , i. e. from the ideas of our selves , as we are thinking beings . but you confess , that you think , that the argument from the idea will not hold , but however you will not give up the argument from ideas . against which i urged your own argument , that from the consideration of what we find in our selves and in our constitutions , our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth , that there is an eternal , most powerfull , and most knowing being . all which , i said , i did readily yield ; but we see plainly , the certainty is not placed in the idea , but in good and sound reason from the consideration of our selves and our constitutions . to which you reply , that you never thought the consideration of our selves and our constitutions excluded the consideration of the idea of being or of thinking , two of the ideas that make a part of the complex idea a man hath of himself . but is the reason you speak of , which leads us from thence to the knowledge of an eternal , most powerfull , and most knowing being , con●ained in the complex idea of a man or not ? a complex idea is made up of simple ideas , all simple ideas come in by sensation or reflection ; and upon comparing these simple ideas our certainty you say is sounded . what simple ideas then are there in man , upon which you ground the certainty of this proposition , that there is a god ? i grant you , that there is a certainty grounded upon our beings and the frame of our natures ; but this i still say , is a certainty of reason and not of ideas you say , you do not well understand what i mean by being not placed in the idea ; for you see no such opposition , but that ideas and sound reason may stand together ▪ i. e. in reason rightly managing those ideas so as to produce evidence by them . but what need all this great noise about ideas and certainty , true and real certainty by ideas : if after all , it comes only to this , that our ideas only represent to us such things , from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things ? but the world hath been strangely amuzed with ideas of late , and we have been told , that strange things might be done by the help of ideas , and yet these ideas at last come to be only common notions of things , which we must make use of in our reasoning . you say , in that chapter about the existence of god , you thought it most proper to express your self in the most usual and familiar way , by common words and expressions . i would you had done so quite through your book ; for then you had never given that occasion to the enemies of our faith to take up your new way of ideas , as an effectual battery ( as they imagin'd ) against the mysteries of the christian faith. but you might have enjoy'd the satisfaction of your ideas long enough , before i had taken notice of them , unless i had found them employ'd in doing mischief . but at last you tell me , that whether i will call it placing the certainty in the idea , or placing the certainty in reason ; or if i will say , it is not the idea that gives us the argument , but the argument , it is indifferent to you . and if you mean no more by your certainty from ideas , but a certainty from reason , i am not such an unreasonable man to disagree with you . the next argument for the existence of god stands thus , as i have summ'd it up . we find in our selves perception and knowledge . so that there is some knowing , intelligent being in the world. and there must have been a knowing being from eternity , or an unknowing ; for something must have been from eternity : but if an unknowing , then it is impossible there ever should have been any knowledge , it being as impossible for a thing without knowledge to produce it , as that a triangle should make three angles bigger than two right ones . to which i added , that allowing the argument to be good , yet it is not taken from the idea , but from principles of true reason , as that no man can doubt his own perception ; that every thing ( we see ) must have a cause ; that this cause must either have knowledge or not ; if it have , the point is gain'd ; if it hath not , nothing can produce nothing , and consequently a not knowing being cannot produce a knowing . in your answer to this , i must first take notice of your exception to that expression , allowing the argument to be good ; which you say , seems to imply that i thought the argument not to be good , which was very far from my meaning . for i had said before , that you brought very good arguments to prove the existence of a god in that chapter : and afterwards , that i was far from weakning the force of your arguments . and so i hope that exception is removed . you except not , you say , against my arguments or principles of reason : but you think still , this is an argument taken from ideas : if you will think so , i cannot help it . but you endeavour to shew , that the very principles you allow are founded upon ideas : as that a man cannot doubt of his own perception ; this , you say , is by perceiving the necessary agreement of the two ideas of perception and self-consciousness . but i rather think , it is from that self-evidence which attends the immediate perception of our own acts , which is so great , that as s. augustin observes , the academicks had nothing to say against that kind of certainty , but only against that which arose from things convey'd by our senses to our mind . the next principle that every thing must have a cause , must be understood of the matter treated of , i. e. the things we see and perceive in the world. you say , it is a true principle that every thing that hath a beginning must have a cause , because by contemplating our ideas we find that the idea of beginning is connected with the idea of some operation ; and that with the idea of something operating which we call a cause , and so the beginning to be , is perceived to agree with the idea of a cause , as is expressed in the proposition . is not here a great ado to make a thing plain by ideas , which was plainer without them ? for is not any man who understands the meaning of plain words satisfied that nothing can produce it self ? or , that what is not cannot make it self to be ? and so the evidence doth not depend on the agreement of the ideas of beginning , and operation , and cause ; but upon the repugnancy of the contrary supposition . as in that principle , that it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time : if you say , that this depends upon the disagreement of the ideas of not-being and being , it will be to little purpose for me to say any more about it . but there is one thing which deserves to be consider'd ; which is the connexion between the idea of an eternal , actual , knowing being with the idea of immateriality . this was the thing i look'd for . and by what means now doth this connexion between these two ideas appear ? by the help of an intermediate idea . what is that ? even the idea of matter . how so ? the idea of matter you tell us , implies its actual division , divisibility , and want of perception , &c. which are the arguments you use in this proof . are they so indeed ? and will not the same ideas prove our souls to be immaterial ? if want of perception be in the very idea of matter , how can matter be made capable of perceiving ? but i find you do not always attend to the agreement or disagreement of your own ideas . but of this before . i proceed to the last argument i produced to shew , that your proofs of the existence of god doth not depend upon ideas . and the substance of it i thus put together . if we suppose nothing to be first , matter can never begin to be ; is bare matter without motion be eternal , motion can never begin to be ; if matter and motion be supposed eternal , thought can never begin to be . for if matter could produce thought , then thought must be in the power of matter ; and if it be in matter as such , it must be the inseparable property of all matter , which is contrary to the sense and experience of mankind . if only some parts of matter have a power of thinking , how comes so great a difference in the properties of the same matter ? what disposition of matter is requir'd to thinking ? and from whence comes it ? of which no account can be given in reason . this i took to be the force of your argument , which i said , i was far from designing to weaken : only i observed that the certainty of it is not placed upon clear and distinct ideas , but upon reason distinct from it ; which was the thing i intended to prove . but you say , you do not see but the same proof may be placed upon clear and distinct ideas , and upon reason too . i hope this matter is made a little clearer to you ; having so fully shew'd to you before , that in the way of ideas you can come to no certainty about any substance , but by reason as it is distinct from the ideas ; i. e. as to material substances that your certainty is resolved into this principle of reason , that accidents cannot subsist without a substratum . as to spiritual substance in us , that depends on two things , . that thinking is only a mode , and must suppose a substance . . that matter cannot think , and therefore it must be an immaterial substance ; which i have proved from your own principles . as to a supreme immaterial substance , the evidence depends upon this reason , that matter and motion cannot produce thought ; and therefore an eternal thinking being must be immaterial . and that matter and motion cannot produce thought , is proved by this reason , that either it must be an inseparable property of matter ; or some account in reason must be given why some part of matter should think and not others . and doth not all this proceed upon reason as distinct from ideas ? and when i said , that the certainty of it , i. e. the argument is not placed on clear and distinct ideas , but upon the force of reason distinct from it , i meant the certainty from ideas , although it were not so clearly expressed as it might have been ; but here i observe you call for the plural number , which you are so offended with in other parts of your letter . the next thing i undertook to shew was , that we can have no clear and distinct idea of nature and person from sensation or reflection . here you spend many pages to shew that this doth not concern you . let it be so . but it concerns the matter i was upon ; which was to shew that we must have ideas of these things which we cannot come to by sensation or reflection . my words are , i grant that by sensation or reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things . but our reason is satisfied , that there must be something beyond these , because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves . so that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason , and not to mere ideas . still you are at it , that you can find no opposition between ideas and reason : but ideas are the objects of the vnderstanding , and vnderstanding is one of the faculties imploy'd about them . no doubt of it . but you might easily see that by reason , i understood , principles of reason , allow'd by mankind . which i think are very different from ideas . but i perceive reason in this sense is a thing you have no idea of , or one as obscure as that of substance . but if you set aside these common principles of reason , your ideas will signifie very little ; and will like accidents want a substratum to support them . but your notion of nature and person deserves to be more throughly consider'd . therefore to proceed more clearly in a debate of this consequence with respect to the doctrine of the trinity ( what-ever you pretend to the contrary ) i shall first set down your notions of nature and person from your own words , and then enter upon the examination of them . as to nature , you tell me in short it is this , that it is a collection of several ideas combined into one complex abstract idea . which when they are found united in any individual existing , though joyned in that existence with several other ideas , that individual is truly said to have the nature of a man , or the nature of man to be in him : for as much as all these simple ideas are found united in him , which answer the complex abstract idea to which the specifick name man is given by any one ; which abstract specifick idea keeps the same , when he applies the specifick name standing for it , to distinct individuals , i. e. no body changes his idea of a man , when he says , peter is a man , from that idea which he makes the name man to stand for , when he makes john a man. as to person in the way of ideas , you tell us , that the word person in it self signifies nothing , and so no idea belonging to it , nothing can be said to be the true idea of it ; but when any language appropriates it to any idea , then that is the true idea of a person and so of nature . these are therefore the signs of two ideas they are put to stand for ; and by enumeration all the simple ideas that are contained in the complex idea that each of them is made to stand for ; we shall immediately see the whole difference that is between them . after which , you conclude , that you must content your self with this condemned way of ideas , and despair of ever attaining any knowledge by any other than that , or farther than that will lead you to it . but this must not hinder me from enquiring a little more strictly into these notions of nature and person , for if these hold , i do not see how it is possible to defend the doctrine of the trinity . for if these terms really signifie nothing in themselves , but are only abstract and complex ideas , which the common use of language hath appropriated to be the signs of two ideas ; then it is plain , that they are only notions of the mind , as all abstracted and complex ideas are ; and so one nature and three persons can be no more . we must therefore examine what your notion is , of abstracted and complex ideas , and how it can be applied to nature and person : and whether they are only signs of such ideas as people have agreed to signifie by them . to explain this , i must give an account , as well as i can , from your self , how these abstracted and complex ideas come to be formed in our minds , and what is implied in them . the vnderstanding , you say , seems to you not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it hath not by sensation or reflection . these and their several modes and the compositions made out of them , we shall find contain our whole stock of ideas ; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways . from hence you consider the several sorts of ideas , some simple and some complex . the simple ideas are the materials of all our knowledge ; and when the vnderstanding is once stored with these simple ideas , it has the power to repeat , compare and unite them , even to an almost infinite variety , and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas : but no understanding can make one new simple idea , not taken in by the ways before mention'd , nor can it destroy those that are there . after you have given an account of the simple ideas both ways , you come to the faculty of discerning in our minds , and there you reckon up , distinguishing ideas , comparing , compounding and abstracting . the reason of abstraction , you say , is to have one general name for many particulars , or else names would be endless . which abstraction is performed by separating the ideas of particular objects from the circumstances of real existence , as time , place , &c. complex ideas are those simple ideas which the mind unites as one idea . but still it is confin'd to those simple ideas which it received by sensation or reflection , which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions . of these you reckon , modes , substances and relations . the ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas , as are taken to represent particular things subsisting by themselves . and these are of two sorts , one of single substances as they exist separately , as of a man , &c. the other of several of these put together as an army of men. in your chapter of complex ideas of substances ▪ you affirm the ideas of particular substances to be made by a combination of simple ideas : and again , that it is by such combination of simple ideas as co-exist in some unknown cause of their vnion . that the complex ideas we have of god and separate spirits are made up of the simple ideas we have by reflection ; by inlarging the ideas we find in our selves . in your d book you consider general terms . and the reason of them , you say is because it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all particulars . and these are made by way of abstraction from circumstances of time and place . after which you tell us , that general natures are nothing but abstract ideas ; and the whole mystery of genera and species , which make such a noise in the schools , is nothing else but abstract ideas with names annexed to them . from whence , you say , it is plain , that general and vniversal , belong not to the real existence of things , but are the inventions and creatures of the vnderstanding ; made by it for its own use and concern only signs whether words or ideas . and the abstract idea and the essence of the species or genus of the same thing : and every distinct , abstract idea is a distinct essence . but then you distinguish the real and nominal essence . the former is the real , internal constitution of particular things ; and the nominal is the abstract idea . but there is so near a connexion between them that the name cannot be attributed to any particular being , but what has this essence , whereby it answers that abstract idea , whereof that name is the sign . these things you repeat and inlarge upon in several other places , but this i think is the substance of what you say upon this matter : for i would not willingly mistake or mis-represent your meaning . the question now between us comes to this , whether the common nature or essence of things lies only in an abstract idea , or a general name , and the real essence consists only in particular beings from which that name is abstracted ? the question is not , whether in forming the notion of common nature , the mind doth not abstract from the circumstances of particular beings ? but it is whether there be not an antecedent foundation in the nature of things upon which we form this abstract idea ? for it there be , then it cannot be called an universal name only : or a meer sign of an idea , which we have formed from putting many simple ideas together , which name belongs to all of such a sort , as have those simple ideas united together . i know not how it comes to pass , that a man spinning books out of his own thoughts should hit so luckily upon the thoughts of another man : i do not mean now , about clear and distinct ideas , but about this point of universal names . for mr. hobbs in his chapter of speech , tell us , that names were to serve for marks or notes of remembrance , and therefore were called signs . of these names , some are proper and singular to one thing , as peter , john , this man , this tree ; some are common to many things , as man , horse , tree , in respect of all which it is called an vniversal , there being nothing in the world vniversal but names ; for the things nam'd , are every one of them individual and singular . one universal name is imposed on many things , for their similitude in some quality or other accident ; and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only vniversals recall any one of those many . and of vniversals some are of more , or less extent , the larger comprehending the less large , and some of equal extent , &c. this is enough to let you see that these notions are not so peculiar but that another person , from his own thoughts too , had said much the same things . but whoever said or thought them first , we must examine how reasonable these thoughts are . i know no body that thinks now-a-days , that vniversals exist any where by themselves ; but i do think , that there is a difference to be made between that and making them meer names , or signs of ideas . i. and the reasons i go upon are these . in the first place , we are agreed , that there is a supream immaterial most perfect being ; whose essential attributes do not depend upon our arbitrary ideas ; nor any names or signs of honour we give him , nor upon the meer inlarging the ideas of our own perfections ; or such as we account to be so in our selves : for we attribute those to god which we are not capable of , as eternity or necessary existence , immutability , &c. herein , we take up no complex ideas from several individuals ; but we form a true idea of a divine essence , from such attributes as are essential to an infinitely perfect being , which being infinite is thereby , incomprehensible by us . and so you own , that the great god of whom and from whom are all things is incomprehensibly infinite . and that god is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities . ii. in the next place , we look on this supream being , as the wise creator of all things , who hath ordered the several sorts and ranks of beings in the world according to his own eternal wisdom ; and hath given them all such properties as himself thought fit , whereby they are really and essentially distinguished from one another ; as appears by mankind , and brutes , and plants . and no man that ever imploys his own thoughts can think , that these are distinguished from each other , only by an act of our minds . iii. among these it is evident , that there are some things , wherein they agree ; and some wherein they differ . they all agree in being real , created beings , and having a sort of life belonging to them . but they differ , that some have sense , which others have not ; and some have reason and understanding which others want . and all this , is so plain and evident , that one might question , whether those had understanding or not , who could think the difference of these from each others was not in their natures , but only depended on the several names that we call them by . iv. among the individuals of the same kind , there is an agreement in the same essential properties ; as all men in being rational creatures ; and there is a real difference from each other in the several accidents that belong to them ; as to time , place , qualities , relations , &c. and no man in his senses can call this in question . for his most plain and simple ideas will inform him of it . v. the question now is , whether that wherein they do all agree , be a meer vniversal name and abstract idea or not . it is certain , that what god created is no meer name or idea : it is certain , that god created not only individuals but the several kinds , with the differences , which they have from each other ; it is certain , that these differences do not lie in meer names or ideas : how comes it then not to be certain that there is a real common essence or nature in the individuals of the same kind ? but it comes not to us in the way of ideas . if it be so , the way of ideas and reason are two different ways ; and i shall never forsake one for the other , unless i could see better reason for it ; and even then i should not ; but adhere to reason still . but how doth it appear by reason , that nature is any thing else but a collection of several ideas combined into one complex abstract idea . that will be done by considering , . what these ideas are , which are so collected into a complex idea ; which is called nature . . what that essence is which is implied in this idea ; whether it be a real or only a nominal essence . . what these ideas are , of which this complex idea of nature consists ; and they are said to be , the simple ideas of particular substances united together , without the circumstances of time and place . but those simple ideas may be considered two ways . . with respect to the qualities of things , and these ideas are said to be true and adequate ; but they go no farther than the qualities ; which reaches only to that sense of nature , as it is taken for properties . . with respect to the subject of them , which is the nature or substance that supports them , and of this you confess we have only imperfect and inadequate ideas . as they are true and adequate ; and so they are not the true representations of things without us , but of the effects of such powers in them as produce impressions in us ; which are those you call secondary qualities . and in that sense i take your words . and of these i said , that we can understand nothing really by them but the effects they have upon us ; i. e. the powers and not the ideas . the ideas are the impressions on our minds ; and by these we can understand nothing but the effects which the powers in outward objects have upon us , and consequently not the nature of them . this i take to be plain sense . to this you answer two things ; . that we certainly know to distinguish things by ideas , supposing them nothing but effects produced in us by these powers , as if they were representations . . that we have certainly as much pleasure and delight by those ideas , one way as the other . granting all this to be true , what is it to the complex idea of nature , which arises from these simple ideas ? nature is a collection of several ideas combined into one complex abstract idea . but the simple ideas acquaint us not with the nature of the objects , but only with the powers which are in them ; by the help of bulk , size , figure and motion ; which you call the primary qualities . now these , you say , are really in the things themselves ; whether the senses perceive them or not ; and the ideas of these are the true resemblances of what exists in the objects ; i. e. that by the impressions we find in our selves , we are certain that there are bodies of a determinate bulk , size , figure and motion . and this is all , we can by these simple ideas come to , as the nature of corporeal substances . but suppose one should ask how we can understand , the nature of these operations of the primary qualities in producing the secondary ; we are soon answered , that there is no conceivable connexion between them and that reason cannot shew how bodies by their bulk , figure and motion should produce in the mind , the ideas of blue , yellow , &c. and so we are extremely helped by these simple ideas in understanding the nature of any particular substance . for the sensible qualities in us are only the effects of certain powers in the objects , caused by their bulk , size , figure and motion ; but if we ask how they are produced , we are plainly told , that our reason by these simple ideas can reach to no knowledge of it . and so we are left in as much ignorance , as ever as to the manner how things without us produce ideas in us . but say you , by these simple ideas , we can as certainly distinguish the beings wherein those powers are , and receive as certain advantages from them , as if those simple ideas were resemblances . as to advantages from them , that is quite out of our enquiry ; which is concerning the idea of nature ? as it is a complexion of simple ideas ; and all that it amounts to is , that by these simple ideas , we understand the distinct powers in several bodies to produce impressions in our minds ; and by the secondary qualities we find in our selves , we are certain of the primary qualities in bodies , from their different bulk , size , figure and motion . but still we have nothing but an idea of qualities , which goes no farther than the essential properties ; but the idea of nature goes farther and implies that being wherein those qualities are ; and that i said , which is the subject of powers and properties is the nature or substance of it ; which in this respect is the same . have we any adequate idea of this ? to this you say : . that all ideas of substances , which are referr'd to real essences are in that respect inadequate . this is what your self own to be your sense ; and is as much as i desire . for , i pray consider what a fine abstract complex idea you have given us of nature . our adequate ideas go no farther than qualities , and if we enquire into the real essence , or substance that supports them , we are told that they are inadequate ; and consequently we can have no true notion or idea at all of it . but you say farther , that you do not affirm , that abstract ideas are only general names . for you assert a real essence in things ; the internal unknown constitution is the real essence ; and the abstract idea is the nominal essence . the former you tell me , you do readily own ; viz. that essence which is in particular substances ; but the question before us is , whether that which is in more individuals than one , be a real or only a nominal essence . . and this is that , which we are next to examine . to clear this , i put the instance of the sun , where an essence was said by you to be in one individual ; and yet more suns might agree in it . in this one sun there is a real essence , and not a meer nominal and abstracted essence : upon which i asked , if there were more suns , would not each of them , have the real essence of the sun ? for what is it makes the second sun , to be a true sun , but having the same real essence with the first ? if it were but a nominal essence , then the second would have nothing but the name . here i must examine your answer , as far as i can understand it : for here indeed you may complain of the want of clear and distinct ideas ; but i will do what i can to explain that which i conceive to be your sense . you say , this doth not at all concern the real , but the nominal essence . how is this possible ? is there not the real essence of the sun in that individual , we call the sun ? but i put the case , that there were a multiplication of individuals ; and there were more suns : would not each of these have the real essence of the sun ? if it were only a nominal essence , the rest would have only the name . but you say , you did not mean the real essence of the sun was in that individual . how could you mean otherwise , when you acknowledge the real essence to be in particular substances ? and is not the sun a particular substance ? but the idea of it being a complex and abstracted idea , could not be the real essence . i answer , that the essence of the sun being communicated to another is a real essence ; or else , the second is but the name and nothing else . you tell me , that you say expressly , that our distinguishing substances into species by names , is not at all founded on their real essences . and i think it is clear to any one that understands things , and not meer ideas ; that another true sun must have the real essence of a sun. you ask , what i mean by a true sun. i answer , that which hath the essence of a sun ; and that the name cannot be truly applied to that which hath it not . yes , say you , it may to any thing , which hath united in it that combination of sensible qualities , by which any thing else that is called sun is distinguished from other substances , i. e. by the nominal essence . so that now the abstract complex idea is owned to be nothing but a combination of qualities in one idea . but i must still ask , what becomes of this combination of qualities in the second sun , if there be not a real essence to support them ? you grant it when the second sun comes to exist . and if it does not exist , how can it be the second sun ? should it be true , say you , that the real essence of the sun were in any of the fixed stars , yet it could not be called by us the sun , whilst it answers not our complex idea , or nominal essence of a sun. if the real essence of a sun be in a fixed star , it is really a sun , whether you call it so or not ; as a laplander is as really a man whatever you call him , if he hath the essence of a man. and it is strange to me to find any man dispute such evident things . and so i come to the instance of the individuals among men. i said , that there must be a real essence in every individual of the same kind . peter , iames and iohn are all true and real men ; not by attributing a general name to them ; but because the true and real essence of a man is in every one of them . but you say , i first suppose them to be men : no otherwise than as they are individuals of the same kind . your weweena , cuchepy and cousheda i have nothing to say to , they may be drills for any thing i know ; but peter , iames and iohn are men of our own country , and we know them to be several individuals of the race of mankind : and what is it makes them men , but that the true and real essence of a man is in every one of them ? yes , say you , if making be taken for the efficient cause . whoever dreamt of a specifick essence being the efficient cause ? but i said , that it was the true and real essence of a man , which made every individual a true and real man ; of which i said we are as certain , as that we are men. that , say you , is only by our senses finding those properties , which answer the abstract , complex idea , which is in our minds of the specifick idea to which we have annexed the specifick name man. i leave to you the honour of this scholastick language , which is always most proper when there is nothing under it . i love to speak plain sense if i can , and so as to be understood by every one that is acquainted with these matters : but these specifick names and abstract and complex ideas , i think tend to confound mens apprehensions ; who can never think otherwise , but that every man is said to be a true real man ; not for any specifick name , but because his properties shew him to be endued with the true real essence of a man. i said , that the general idea is not made from the simple ideas , but by meer act of the mind abstracting from circumstances , but from reason and consideration of things . you reply , that you thought reason and consideration had been meer acts of the mind , when any thing was done by them . i hope the ideas you have of the acts of your own mind , are clearer than those you have of other mens . for it is plain , i opposed your general and abstract idea by a meer act of the mind , to a rational inference from the nature and properties of things . for i added ; for , when i see so many individuals , that have the same powers and properties , we thence inferr , there must be something common to all , which makes them of one kind ; and if the difference of kinds be real , that which makes them of one kind and not of another , must not be a nominal but a real essence . is there now no difference between these two acts of the mind , viz. abstraction and ratiocination . and you grant , that the inference is true . but you say , it doth not follow , that the general or specifick idea is not made by the meer act of the mind . where do i deny that abstraction is made by an act of the mind ? but that is not the question ; but whether the notion of essence in individuals of the same kind , be a meer act of the mind by abstraction , or have a real foundation in the nature of things ? i. e. whether it be a real or a nominal essence . but you say , there may be objections to the name of nominal essence . my objection is not to the name , but to the thing you understand by it , viz. that there is nothing beyond individuals but names , which utterly overthrows the difference of nature and person . for if there be nothing really , but an individuated essence , then it must follow , that there can be no difference of hypostases in the same nature : for nature individuated must take in the hypostasis ; and nature being taken as common is affirmed by you to be nothing but an abstract and complex idea , and a mere nominal essence . you say , that we cannot know the differences of things by their real essences . and what then ? do i ever deny , that the difference of kinds is to be understood from the different properties ? but we are not upon our knowledge of the difference of species , but upon the real and nominal essence . and i shew'd that the real essence doth not depend upon complex ideas ; because if men mistake never so much in the combination of ideas , yet the same essence remains ; as i instanced in the essence of a man , a horse and a tree . true , you say , our thoughts or ideas cannot alter the real constitutions of things that exist ; but the change of ideas can and does alter the signification of their names , and thereby alter the kinds , which by these names we rank and sort them into . but this doth by no means reach the point , which is not concerning our sorting of things , which is by names , but god's sorting them , when he made them of different kinds . for so i said , that the essences remain always the same , because they do not depend on the ideas of men , but on the will of the creator , who hath made several sorts of beings . all the answer you give is this , that the real constitution or essence of particular things existing , do not depend on the ideas of men , but on the will of the creator , but their being ranked into sorts , under such and such names , does depend and wholly depend upon the ideas of men. but my argument did not proceed upon particular things existing , but upon the several kinds of god's making , and is it possible for you to think that the kinds are not of his making , but that men only by their ideas make the several sorts ? if so , i have very little hopes to remove you from your ideas ; but i am bound to do what in me lies to hinder such notions from overthrowing the mysteries of our faith. and it is a great satisfaction to me to find , that these notions of ideas , as far as they tend that way , have so very little foundation in reason , or rather are so manifestly repugnant to them . before i conclude my self , i must take notice of your conclusion , viz. that you must content your self with this condemned way of ideas , and despair of ever attaining any knowledge by any other than that , or farther than that will lead me to it . which is in effect to say , that you see no way to avoid scepticism but this : but my great prejudice against it is , that it leads to scepticism , or at least , that i could find no way to attain to certainty in it upon your own grounds . for ( . ) you say , that knowledge to you seems to be nothing , but the perception of the connexion and agreement or disagreement , and repugnancy of any of our ideas . in this alone it consists . whence it unavoidably follows , that where we can have no ideas , we can have no knowledge . but you go about to prove , that there are many more beings in the world , of which we have no ideas , than those of which we have any ; and that one holds no proportion to the other . so that we are excluded from any possibility of attaining to knowledge , as to the far greatest part of the universe for want of ideas ; and yet you say , that he that will consider the infinite power , wisdom and goodness of the creator of all things , will find reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable , mean and impotent a creature , as he will find man to be , who in all probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings . and not long after , you say , that the intellectual world is a greater certainly and more beautifull world , than the material . but whence comes this certainty , where there can be no ideas ? is a general reason sufficient without particular ideas ? then why not in other cases as well ? . suppose we have no ideas of the intellectual world , yet surely we may have as to the visible world : no , you say , that although we have ideas of bulk , figure and motion in general ; yet not knowing what is the particular bulk , figure , and motion of the greatest part of the bodies of the vniverse , we are ignorant of the several powers , efficacies and ways of operation , whereby the effects we daily see are produced . these are hid from us in some things by being too remote , in others by being two minute . so that you confess , we can attain to no science , either as to bodies or spirits . and what a narrow compass must our knowledge then be confined to ? you confess , we have no ideas of the mechanical assertions of the minute particles of bodies ; and this hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies ; and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact. certainty and demonstration we must not in these things pretend to . so that all certainty is given up in the way of knowledge , both as to the visible and invisible world , or at least , the greatest part of them . . but still it is to be hoped , that where we have ideas , we may come to a certainty in discerning the connexion between them . no , you say , another cause of our ignorance is , the want of a discoverable connexion between those ideas we have . what! are we at a loss here too , and yet all our certainty depend no the perceiving the agreement and disagreement of ideas ? yes , you confess , that the mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with the ideas they produce in us , we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond experience . and the operations of our minds on our bodies is as unconceivable . . but by the help of intermediate ideas , may we not come to find out the certain agreement or disagreement of ideas , so there be due application of the mind to it ? yes , say you , this may be done , and this is that we call reasoning , and those intervening ideas are called proofs : and where the agreement or disagreement is clearly and plainly perceived , it is called demonstration . but how if this way of demonstration be made impossible ? what benefit can we have of it in the way of certainty : each step , you tell us , that reason makes in demonstrative knowledge must have intuitive evidence ; for else , you say , that intermediate idea would need a proof . and for want of this , men often embrace falshoods for demonstrations . but if there be no way of coming to demonstration but this , i doubt we must be content without it . . you give no reasonable satisfaction in the way of ideas , as to the plainest evidence of sense concerning the existence of external objects . for there is no intuition of the mind , nor demonstration in this case ; and all the evidence in your way must be from the ideas in our minds , which are supposed to arise from external objects ; but the question is , how from these ideas within our selves , we can prove the certain existence of objects without our selves . because men may have such ideas in their minds by the power of imagination , when there are no objects to produce them ? you say , a man is invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception , in seeing the sun in the day , and remembring it in the night , and tasting of wormwood and smelling of a rose , and thinking of it afterwards . but this doth not clear the main difficulty , which is , how from the idea of the tast of wormwood or smell of a rose i can prove the actual being of such things without me , since you grant , that there is no conceivable connexion in reason , between the powers in the objects and the ideas in us : and if there be not , how can we be certain in the way of ideas ? i do not speak , as to pain or pleasure , but as to the evidence from the ideas in our selves . for the most that you say is , that a man may perceive a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in a fire , and being actually in it , because of the pleasure or pain that follows the application of certain objects ; which certainty is as great as our happiness or misery , beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be . but the present difficulty is not merely about the difference between sleeping and waking ; and i grant you , that a man's being sensible of fire touching him , will effectually convince him that he is not in a dream : but the point before us is , when we are sensible we are awake , what it is in the way of ideas , which can satisfie us of the real existence of external objects . for you confess , that the having the idea of any thing in our mind , no more proves the existence of that thing , than the picture of that man evidences his being in the world , or the visions of a dream make a true history . how then can we come to any certainty in the way of ideas ? the account you give is this , that the actual receiving ideas from without , makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us , which causes that idea within us . which is in other terms to remove the certainty from the idea to the mere act of sensation : but all our dispute hath been not about the certainty either of sense or reason ; ( which i freely yield to ) but about a particular way of certainty by the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; and of this i shew that you give no satisfactory account , as to the existence of the plainest objects of sense . for you say , the certainty lies in perceiving the connexion between ideas ; and here you grant , that reason cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas , how then should we possibly attain any certainty in the way of ideas ? so that your self gives up the way of certainty by ideas . i might easily pursue this matter farther ; but i think this is sufficient to let you see , you have no such cause to be so well contented with this condemned way of ideas , as you are pleased to call it . and now to conclude , i am very far from being an enemy to any free enquiries into the nature and reasons of things , and would be glad to find any real discoveries that way . and i can easily bear the putting of philosophical notions into a modern and fashionable dress . let men express their minds by ideas if they please ; and take pleasure in sorting and comparing and connecting of them ; i am not forward to condemn them ; for every age must have its new modes , and it is very well if truth and reason be received in any garb. i was therefore far enough from condemning your way of ideas , till i found it made the only ground of certainty , and made use of to overthrow the mysteries of our faith , as i told you in the beginning . this was it which made me look more narrowly into it at first , and now to give you this trouble of an answer to your letter . i hope that in the managing this debate , i have not either transgressed the rules of civility , or mistaken your meaning , both which i have endeavourd to avoid . and i return you thanks for the civilities you have expressed to me through your letter ; and i do assure you , that it is out of no dis-respect , or the least ill will to you , that i have again consider'd this matter , but because i am farther convinced , that as you have stated your notion of ideas , it may be of dangerous consequence as to that article of christian faith , which i endeavour'd to defend . i am no lover of controversies , however i have been often engaged in them ; but i have that satisfaction in my mind , that my design was to promote that , which upon my best enquiries , i thought to be truth ; and by such means as were most sutable to the pursuit of it , without any bitterness against those i opposed . but of all truth , i am convinced , that it is fittest for me to employ the remainder of my days in what concerns the vindication of our holy religion contained in the scriptures , which gives us the only sure grounds to hope for a blessed immortality . and in the defence and practice of that , i hope , by the grace of god both to live and die . i am , sir , your real friend , and humble servant , edw. wigorn. worcester , march . . postscript . i had no thoughts of adding a postscript to my answer , as you had done to your letter ; but before the sheets were wrought off , there was sent to me a new socinian pamphlet , wherein there are reflections ( and little more ) on my late treatise in vindication of the trinity . the reason i had to joyn my short animadversions on that to these papers , was the advantages he takes from the abstracted notion of nature against the doctrine of the trinity , which was the thing i told you , i apprehended to be of dangerous consequence in it . but before i come to that , i cannot but take notice of their very different way of writing from yours , which is grave and civil , but theirs is trifling , and too scurrilous in matters of religion , for which i had so justly rebuked them before , but it seems to very little purpose : which makes me apt to think , their greatest hopes still are in such readers , who love to see matters of religion ridiculed ; and the persons who are concerned to defend them exposed to scorn and contempt . this was that i told them , which gave such a relish to their late pamphlets , as though nothing would go down with such vitiated palats , that had not a mixture of this assa soetida with it . but because in the conclusion of his pamphlet , he charges me as well as others , with using them unjustly as well as roughly . i shall give a tast of this man's decent manner of writing . the first thing he insists upon against me , is , that i openly profess my method , that i will prove first , then secondly , then thirdly , then fourthly and fifthly . and what harm is there in using the plainest method in a nice and intricate subject ? should i go about to justifie this , by the rules of the ancient and best masters of writing in arguments of such a nature ? that would be shewing too much regard to such pitifull cavilling . but methinks these men should not object this method against us , of first , secondly and thirdly , who had before charged us with brutal and inexcusable ignorance in counting or numbring . but he goes on . and now beloved first of the first . have i any words like these ? no matter for that . but this serves well enough for the farce ; when the design is to ridicule the form and way of modern sermons ; which he knew was an acceptable subject to his men of wit , as he calls them . if they be really so , they cannot but despise such fooling in serious matters . and our modern sermons are such , both as to the structure and reason of them , as will bear the censures of men of judgment , ( as well it may be , as of any age ) but his men of wit , who love religion in no dress , will always have something or other in sermons to find fault with . and our author was hard put to it to bring in this smart reflection on modern sermons to please his friends , which was very remote from a debate about the trinity . the next thing is , ( for i must not say secondly ) that my way of writing is too obscure ; and that he could not take my meaning under two or three readings . which to please his men of wit , he facetiously expresses after this manner ; and when i have strained my iaws and hazarded my teeth to break the shell , most commonly it proves nothing but a shell , that i am tempted to renounce nuts for ever . and i think he will do wisely in it . i am certain , i was so far from affecting obscurity , that i endeavoured to put the darkest points into as good a light , as i could ; and i am afraid he sometimes shut his eyes , that he might complain of the darkness of the room . i dare not go so far as thirdly ; and therefore come to consider the main parts of his pretence to answer my book . as to the contents of my book , he saith . i shew , that neither antiquity , nor reason , nor scripture is at all for them , they are all against them . wherein he is very much in the right . and i shall now examine what he hath said , to take off any part of the charge . he begins with antiquity , and very fairly takes it for granted , that for years , the doctrine of the unitarians was the true doctrine : but he observes , that i make the doctrine of the trinity to have been a part of the cabala or oral tradition among the iews ; upon which he cries out , where is conscience , or is religion nothing but a name ? why , what 's the matter ? how comes conscience and religion to be so deeply concerned , whether the jews had any anticipation of the trinity among them ? but he saith , i do not believe the iewish cabala , no more than the alchoran , and yet i produce the authority of it : and he adds , that it was a fiction of the pharisees ; and that it is a prevarication in me to mention it as the unwritten word of god. i am afraid his cracking of nuts hath put him into some disorder , and made him cry out , without any other cause but the pain of his teeth . where did i ever give the least cause to suspect my owning the iewish cabala , as the unwritten word of god ? all that i said was this . the socinians had said , that christ was called the word , because he was the bringer or messenger of god's word . to which i answer'd , that the jews were to understand it in the sense it was known among them : which was for a divine subsistence , as i proved from the chaldee paraphrast , and the testimonies of philo the alexandrian iew , who lived so near our saviour's time . here is not a word of the pharisaical cabala , which every one knows to have been about traditional customs , which they laid as much weight upon , as upon the law of god , if not more . but the chaldee paraphrast was in very great esteem , as giving the true sense of the scripture , and for that only i produced it . and what answer doth he give to the testimonies out of it ? he saith , they relate either to the law , or to the command of god to moses , or to the power of god. but i shew'd that rittangel , who managed the debate on this argument with a learned vnitarian , proved to his plain conviction , that these places could be understood of nothing but a divine subsistence . but he mightily triumphs , that the most pertinent place is false printed ; for it is set down , gen. . . and he tells us , there are but verses in that chapter ; but a man of common ingenuity would suspect an error in the press in such a case ; and if he had pleased to have look'd on gen. . . he might have have found verses , and the words in the . therefore , saith he , so much for chaldee and cabala , despised by all learned men , iews as well as christians ; and never used but when the people are to be gulled with noisy nothings . one would hardly think it possible such mean stuff as this should pass for an answer , among any that pretend to sense or knowledge . for how can he deny the sense of the chaldee paraphrast , when philo the alexandrian iew concurs in that interpretation , as is evident by multitudes of places in him ? did i not expresly mention his testimony as concurring with the other ? why not a word said to it ? did i not add the consent of eusebius concerning the jews owning the divinity of the messias , till they fell off from it in opposition to the christians ? and are these but noisy nothings to gull people with ? let what will become of the dispute between the pharisaical jews and the karaites ; those who know any thing of these matters , do know that i went upon other grounds ; viz. whether the israelites did receive from god an oral law , which they are bound to observe as much as the written law , and to interpret the written law , and the force of its obligation by it . and this i never mention'd or intended to plead for it . and as to the ways of cabalistical interpretations , i look on them as groundless and frivolous things ; but the thing i aimed at , was only this , there are certainly places of the old testament , which speak of the messias as the son of god ; thou art my son , &c. and call him lord , the lord said unto my lord. the question is , what the sense of these places was , and how they are to be applied to christ ? now if it appear , that the most ancient jews did understand them in such a manner , as to apply them to a second subsistence in the divinity , we have great reason to follow that sense , which is so agreeable to the new testament ; and about this we have no manner of reason to despise the sense of the ancient jews , and especially of the chaldee paraphrast , who asserts a second and a third subsistence in the divinity . and this he could not but find without any danger to his iaws , was the only thing i intended . the next thing in point of antiquity which he contests , is about the nazarenes : that name , i said , was at first common to all christians , as is plain from act. . . afterwards it was applied to the jewish christians at pella and decapolis ; and to such as admitted no gentiles to their communion , but kept to the ceremonies of the law ; and of these i said they might be all ebionites ; but i utterly denied it of such as were members of the catholick christian church , as it was made up of iews and gentiles . this distinction he calls a pure figment , but answers not one of the reasons i brought for it ; although i proved from uncontroulable evidence , that they made two different bodies , had different rules of faith ; and that the church of ierusalem did hold the divinity and pre-existence of our saviour . and is all this cabala too , and only to be used when people are to be gulled with noisy nothings ? i. e. with empty pleroma's , and silent thunder-claps . the alogians were theirs , for any thing i know in all respects ; and i will give them theodotion , and paulus samosatenus , and photinus . but i think not much to their comfort ; the two latter were most certainly condemned by the christian church ; and whether the former were a mere iewish proselyte , or an ebionite is not worth contending about ; since s. ierom makes him to translate the places about our saviour like a jew , and aquila like a christian ; which shews how mean an opinion he had of his sincerity . i proved the condemning paulus samosatenus while they were under the power of zenobia , to be a plain evidence of the sense of the christian church against his doctrine ; at a time when no interest could be supposed to sway them . to this he gives a twofold answer , ( . ) that be sure it is false , that they were then under the power of zenobia . but how can we be sure it is false , when i brought proof it was true , and he answers nothing at all to it ? but it seems , all is cabala and noisy nothings that stand in his way . ( . ) he saith , they were all hereticks . a very short answer . but how is this proved ? for a little proof looks well sometimes , and a man must not always say , be sure it is so . well , here is a plain proof ; they differ'd from the council of nice about homoousios . but i had before given a full answer to that , p. . to which he gives not the least reply , viz. that they took it in two different senses . as to lucian , i leave it to the readers judgment , if he compares what i have said , and what he answers together , and whether he thinks it probable that the arians should forge a creed under his name at antioch ; if he continued in the doctrine of paulus samosatenus , which was contrary to it . this is all , he saith , that seems considerable in point of antiquity ; and whether he hath said any thing really considerable about it , let the reader judge . come we now to the point of scripture , which is the main point in the case . for i had declared , p. . that our faith as to the trinity , is built upon that ; and that there are many places of scripture , of which no tolerable sense can be given without it . and therefore i examined the sense the vnitarians gave of the most remarkable places , and shew'd the weakness and inconsistency of it , and then in an entire chapter proved our doctrine from the form of baptism delivered by our saviour , as it was always understood in the christian church . this i think was a very plain and easie method of proving our doctrine . and what now saith our vnitarian to all this ? truely , i have met with few answers like it . in short , he saith , that for his part , he is enough perswaded without further arguing the matter , that i have spent my breath against a rock . this is just the popish way of answering by infallibility and super hanc petram . but in neither case can i see the least ground for such mighty confidence . alas for them ! they say , that if we write against their interpretations of scripture , they are not at leisure to wipe off every small soil that may happen to be scatter'd in their books . not at leisure ! whence have come all those swarms of pestilent books which have come abroad of late years among us , to spread their infectious doctrine over the nation ? and now are they not at leisure to defend them ? and at the same time have leisure enough to run into other matters , about which there may be more colour for cavilling . so that this cannot be the true reason , and i leave the reader to judge what it is . the last thing is the point of reason ; and here he finds leisure enough to expatiate . but i shall keep to that point , upon which he supposes the whole controversie to turn , which is , whether the difference between nature and person , which we observe in mankind , do so far hold with respect to the divine nature , that it is a contradiction to say , there are three persons and not three gods ? and there are several things i proposed , in order to the clearing of this matter , which i shall endeavour to lay down as distinctly as i can ; and i shall not be hector'd or banter'd out of that which i account the most proper method , although it happen to be too obscure for our men of wit to understand without hazard of their iaws . the principles or suppositions i lay down are these ; i. nature is one and indivisible in it self , whereever it is . ii. the more perfect any nature is , the more perfect must its unity be . iii. whatever is affirmed of a most perfect being , must be understood in a way agreeable to its perfection . iv. it is repugnant to the perfection of the divine nature , to be multiplied into such individuals as are among men ; because it argues such a dependence and separation , as is inconsistent with the most perfect unity . v. to suppose three distinct persons in one and the same indivisible divine nature , is not repugnant to the divine perfections ; if they be founded on such relative properties , which cannot be confounded with each other , and be in themselves agreeable to the divine nature . vi. whether there be three such distinct persons or not , is not to be drawn from our own imaginations , or similitudes in created beings , but only from the word of god , from whom alone the knowledge of it can be communicated to mankind . let us now see how he proves , that since there is no contradiction for three persons to be in one common human nature , it must be a contradiction to assert three persons in the same divine nature . he offers at no less than demonstrative reason , p. . c. . but i have always had the most cause to fear the men that pretend to infallibility , and demonstration . i pass over his mysterious boxes , as trifles fit only to entertain his men of wit , and come immediately to his demonstrative reason , is it be to be met with . it comes at last to no more than this , that human nature , and angelical nature , and camel nature have no existence but only in our conception ; and are only notions of our minds ; but the persons in the same rational being are not mere metaphysical persons or relative properties , but they are such as necessarily suppose distinct substances as well as distinct properties . but in the trinity , the nature is a really existing nature , 't is a spiritual substance , and endued with a great number of divine attributes , not an abstracted or mere notional imaginary nature ; and the divine persons are not distinct substances or real beings , but properties only in a real being and in an infinite substance . this is the force of the demonstration . but now if i can make it appear , that every nature is not only one and indivisible in it self , but endued with essential attributes and properties belonging to it as such , then it will be evident , that nature is not a mere abstracted notion of our minds , but something which really exists somewhere ; and then the foundation of this demonstrative reason is taken away . and i appeal to any persons that consider things , whether the human , angelical , and camel nature ( as he calls it ) do not really differ from each other , and have such essential properties belonging to them as cannot agree to any other nature ? for else it must be a mere notion and fiction of the mind , to make any real difference between them . but if human nature and camel nature do essentially differ from each other , then every nature hath its essential unity and properties which cannot belong to any other , and that without any act of our minds . and if every nature is really and essentially different from another , it must have an existence somewhere independent on our notions and conceptions . it may be said , that no such nature doth really exist by it self , but only in the several individuals . but that is not the present question , where or how it exists , but whether it depend only on our imaginations or the acts of our minds ; and if it doth so , then there can be no real and essential difference in the natures of men and beast , which i think none who have the understanding of a man can imagine . but really existing natures , he saith , are in such persons , as necessarily suppose distinct substances , as well as distinct properties ; and if they existed only in a common nature , as the humanity , and had not also distinct substances , they would never make distinct persons . i do allow , that in created and dependent beings , there must be distinct substances to make distinct persons ; but he ought to have given an account what that is which makes distinct persons ' necessarily to suppose distinct substances . for the nature is one and indivisible in them all ; or else every individual must make a new species , which is an absurdity i suppose he will not be fond of . if there be then one and the same nature in the individuals , whence comes the difference of substances to be so necessarily supposed ? if it be from diversity , dissimilitude , dependence and separate existence , as i asserted , then these reasons can hold only in created beings ; and where they cannot hold , as in the divine nature , why may there not be a distinction of persons founded on relative properties , without any distinction of substances , which is repugnant to the perfect unity of the godhead ? what demonstrative reason , nay , what probable argument hath he offer'd against this ? he takes notice p. . of what i had said about the distinction of personality and person ; and that personality is originally only a particular mode of subsistence ; and a person besides the relative property takes in the divine nature together with it . and what demonstration have we against this ? so far from it , that he falls to tristing again to keep his men of wit in good humour . so much for madam personality , now for sir person . is this a decent way of writing about these matters ; to begin with the talk of demonstrative reason , and to end with burlesquing , and turning them into ridicule ? if this be an agreeable entertainment for his men of wit , it shews that they deserve that character , as well as he doth that of a demonstrator . but this sportfull gentleman hath found something else to play with , viz. that my notion of three subsistences without three substances is really nothing but sabellianism . but i had already said so much for the clearing of this , both in the preface and the book it self , that i need not to add one word about it , unless he had suggested some new demonstrative reason to prove it . which he is far enough from . all that he saith , is , that they must be called fools as well as sabellius , if they asserted relative properties , or any properties that were in no essence . but the author of the discourse of real and nominal trinitarians , ( to whom he is no stranger ) had said that the sabellians held that the father , son and spirit are but only three names of god given to him in scripture by occasion of so many several dispensations towards the creature , and so he is but one subsisting person and three relative persons . if this be true , here are relative properties indeed relating to a divine essence : but how ? not as to any internal relations of father , son and holy ghost ; but as to external dispensations , which are another kind of relative properties . this is all that i can find in this last effort , that relates to my self : as to what concerns others , they are very able to defend themselves , and particularly as to dr. s. and dr. sh. i must still say i think them much his superiours as to wit and learning , ( for of them i spake without the least respect to my self , however he makes it a complement to my self and them , i know not for what reason , unless it be that i speak of those against whom they had written with insolence and scorn . ) but i hope they will shew themselves so much his superiours too in wisdom and discretion , as not to renew their quarrels upon his provocations , for he doth what in him lies to inflame them ; and he thought it , ( and i do not blame him for it ) the best service he could do to his sinking cause . worcester , april , . e. w. finis . errata . pag. . . an answer . p. . l. . for temerarian r. temerarious p. . l. . for diceret r. doceret . p. . l. . for preception r. perception . books published by the right reverend father in god , edw. l. bishop of worcester , and sold by h. mortlock at the phoenix in st. paul's church-yard . a rational account of the grounds of the protestant religion ; being a vindication of the lord archbishop of canterbury's relation of a conference , &c. from the pretended answer of t. c. d . edit . fol. origines britannicae , or the antiquities of the british churches , with a preface concerning some pretended antiquities relating to britain , in vindication of the bishop of st. asaph . fol. irenicum , a weapon-salve for the churches wounds . to . origines sacrae , or a rational account of the grounds of christian faith , as to the truth and divine authority of the scripture and the matters therein contained . to . a discourse concerning the idolatry practised in the church of rome , and the hazard of salvation in the communion of it . vo . an answer to several late treatises occasion'd by a book , entituled , a discourse concerning the idolatry practised in the church of rome , and the hazard of salvation in the communion of it ; part i. vo . a second discourse in vindication of the protestant grounds of faith , against the pretence of infallibility in the roman church , in answer to the guide in controversie , by r. h. protestancy without principles , and reason , and religion ; or the certain rule of faith , by e. w. with a particular enquiry into the miracles of the roman church . vo . an answer to mr. cressy's epistle apologetical to a person of honour , touching his vindication of dr. stillingfleet . vo . a defence of the discourse concerning the idolatry practised in the church of rome , in answer to a book entituled , catholicks no idolaters . vo . several conferences between a roman priest , a fanatick chaplain , and a divine of the church of england ; being a full answer to the late dialogues of t. g. vo . a discourse concerning bonds of resignation of benefices in point of law and conscience , vo . a discourse concerning the illegality of the ecclesiastical commission , in answer to the vindication and defence of it : wherein the true notion of the legal supremacy is clear'd ; and an account is given of the nature ▪ original and mischief of the dispensing power . the unreasonableness of separation , or an impartial account of the history , nature and pleas of the present separation from the communion of the church of england . to . the grand question concerning the bishops right to vote in parliament in cases capital stated and argued , from the parliament rolls and the history of former times ; with an enquiry into their peerage , and the three estates in parliament . vo . a discourse concerning the doctrine of christ's satisfaction ; or the true reasons of his sufferings ; with an answer to the socinian objections . to which is added , a sermon concerning the mysteries of the christian faith , preached april . . with a preface concerning the true state of the controversie about christ's satisfaction . vo . twelve sermons preached on several occasions , by the right reverend father in god , edward , lord bishop of worcester . the first volume . vo . a second volume will speedily be publish'd . the effigies of the right reverend father in god , edward , lord bishop of worcester , engraven on a copper-plate by robert white . price d. notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e p. . p. . p. . p. . book . ch. . sect. . p. . ch. . sect. . p. . p. ▪ p. . p. . p. . p. . p. , . p. . book . ch . . sect. . p. . p. . p ▪ . p. , , , , . p. . essay , b. . ch . . sect. . ch. . sect. , , . p. , , , . p. . p. . b . ch . . sect. . sect. , , . p. . p. . p. . b. . ch. . sect. . p. . p. . voss. etymol . in v. sto. thucyd. l. . p. . ed. ox. & l. . p. acad. l. . . cicer. in lucul . c. . c. . p. . p. . book . ch. . sect. . ch. . sect. . christianity not myst. p. . p. . p. . b. . ch . . sect. . sect. , &c. sect . sect. . book . ch. . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . b. . ch . . . sect. . b. . ch . . sect. . p. . p. . p. . p. . id. p. . . b. . ch. . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . p. . p. . leviath . ch . . leviath . ch . . vindicat. of leviath . p. , . p. p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . book . ch. . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . . sect. . sect. . sect. . book . ch. . sect. . b. . ch . . sect. . b . ch . . sect. . b. . ch . . sect. . b. ch . . sect. . sect. . b. . ch . . sect. . sect . b. . ch . . sect . b. . ch . . sect. . sect. . letter , p. . de immort . animae . c. . let. p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . ib. p. . p. p. . p. . b. . ch. sect . ch. . sect. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . cum enim duo sint genera rerum quae sciuntur , unum earum quae per sensus corporis percipit animus , alterum earum quae per scipsum ▪ multa illi philosophi garrierunt contra corporis sensus ; animi autem quasdam firmissimas per seipsum perceptiones rerum verarum , quale est illud , scio me vivere , nequaquam in dubium vocare potuerunt . de trin. l. . c. . p. . p. p. . p. . p. . p. . ● . ch . . sect. . ch. . sect. . sect. . ch. . sect. ch. . sect. . sect. . sect. ch ●● . sect. . sect. , sect. . b . ch . . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . leviath . ch . . b. . ch . . sect. . p. p. . p. . b. . ch . . sect. , , , . sect. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. ● . p. . p. . p. . book . ch. . sect. . ch. . sect. . sect. . sect. sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . b. . ch . . sect. . sect. . ch. . sect. ▪ ●●●● sect. . sect. . the divine trinunity of the father, son, and holy spirit, or, the blessed doctrine of the three coessentiall subsistents in the eternall godhead without any confusion or division of the distinct subsistences or multiplication of the most single and entire godhead acknowledged, beleeved, adored by christians, in opposition to pagans, jewes, mahumetans, blasphemous and antichristian hereticks, who say they are christians, but are not / declared and published for the edification and satisfaction of all such as worship the only true god, father, son, and holy spirit, all three as one and the self same god blessed for ever, by francis cheynell ... cheynell, francis, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the divine trinunity of the father, son, and holy spirit, or, the blessed doctrine of the three coessentiall subsistents in the eternall godhead without any confusion or division of the distinct subsistences or multiplication of the most single and entire godhead acknowledged, beleeved, adored by christians, in opposition to pagans, jewes, mahumetans, blasphemous and antichristian hereticks, who say they are christians, but are not / declared and published for the edification and satisfaction of all such as worship the only true god, father, son, and holy spirit, all three as one and the self same god blessed for ever, by francis cheynell ... cheynell, francis, - . [ ], p. printed by t.r. and e.m. for samuel gellibrand ..., london : . error in paging: p. and misnumbered and . reproduction of original in the bodleian library. includes bibliographical references. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity. theology, doctrinal. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the divine trinunity of the father , son , and holy spirit : or , the blessed doctrine of the three coessentiall subsistents in the eternall godhead without any confusion or division of the distinct subsistences , or multiplication of the most single and entire godhead , acknowledged , beleeved , adored by christians , in opposition to pagans , jewes , mahumetans , blasphemous and antichristian hereticks , who say they are christians , but are not . declared and published for the edification and satisfaction of all such as worship the only true god , father , son , and holy spirit , all three as one and the self same god blessed for ever . by francis cheynell , minister of that gospel which is revealed from heaven by father , son , and holy spirit in the holy scriptures of truth . london , printed by t. r. and e. m. for samuel gellibrand at the ball in pauls church-yard . . academiae oxoniensi : electorum senatui reverendo , d. d ri . reynoldes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 procancellario exoptatissimo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vitam cùm omni bonorum copiâ sospitem . solem non vidit ( reverendissimi ) qui luce solis solem non aspexit . quis poetarum , quis sophistarum qui non omnino de prophetarum fonte potaverit ? nulla sine sapientiâ suscipienda est religio , nec ulla sine religione sapientia probanda . varii sunt disciplinarum sapores , ingeniorum gustus ; tota autem christianorum salus in credendo , colendo , nec non obediendo consistit . doctrina nostra christum auctorem laudat , christumque parat defensorem . noluit magnus olim epiphanius , ut christiani 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gestarent , sed solo christianorum nomine contenti satis gauderent . valete flosculi , & quicquid est facundiorum deliciarum ; nec medicamentis opus est , nec lenociniis ut benevolentiam masculam , virilem , academicam aucupemur . haud aliter de rebus theologicis judico , quàm de rebus philosophicis judicabat cicero . istiusmodi res dicerè ornate puerile est , plane aurem & perspicuè expedire posse , docti & intelligentis viri . deum testem laudo me illis nec conscribere nec vigilare qui in theologicis conjecturas venari mallent , quàm scripturas amplecti . nostrûm enim est theologiam antiquam & penè antiquatam antiquitati primitivae restituere , & doctrinae capitibus vetustis gratam quandam novitatem , obscuris lucem , dubiis fidem , vel quasi postliminio superaddere . in quo quidem opere quantopere desudandum sit , viri ut diffusissimae eruditionis , ita sapientiae prope incomparabilis satis norunt . nec argumentum majus esse potest , nec praelector minor : quis enim ego qui tot clarissimis viris de academiâ nostrâ , imò de totâ literarum republicâ optimè meritis succederem , vel munus in hoc incomposito rerum statu infirmus obirem ? eheu nec fictis lachrymis dolendum studiorum decus saeviente bello non mediocriter spretum jacuisse , nec inficias ivero in tam occupato vitae genere meditationes nostras satis acerbas nec dum ad gustum academicum satis maturuisse ; & certè tantarum dimensionum opus si non immensum , non adeo tumultuariâ operâ deproperari debet , ut officio simul deesse ( aliud quam hoc agens ) & publico minus prodesse saltem prudentibus videar . in cogitationem autem sensim deveni , quantum mihi honoris electorum senatus immerenti habitum iverit , quem dignati est is ( r●verendi ) ad functionem non tantum in academiâ , sed & in ecclesiâ dei tam celebrem obeundam vocatione solenni honestare ; quibus antem rationibus hanc difficilem scribendi provinciam imò necessitatem deprecatus sim , probè norunt quibus imbecillitas nostra satis not a est ; at at de pudore nostro bene subrustico ( unico tenuitatis meae praesidio ) amici hac ex parte nimiùm diligentes cogentibus amoris nec non prudentiae machinis tandem triumpharunt . omnibus itaque testatum volo quanti piorum doctorumque auctoritatem facio , cùm adversùs judicium meum , & ultra posse meum cum bono deo hac in re reverendorum decretis , amicorum monitis paruerim saltem , si non satisfecerim . sed nihil uti spero ( electores ornatissimi ) splendori nominis vestri bene magni detrahet benevolentia vestra , vel tenuitas nostra ; non enim sol eò minor est , quòd loca lustret humilia , & res exiguas . ex laboribus enim nostris fructum non contemnendum ( ni fallor ) funiores percipient . in capitibus quibusdam quae magna exercebant ingenia , virisque gravissimis contumax facessebant negotium , textui certè lucem adferimus perquàm gratissimam . in translatoribus infidelibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , exemplum dabo , quaeso à vobis ut audiatis , infaelicissimum . de authoritate verborum quae iohan. . . extant , non eadem sunt doctorum judicia . hieronymus in prologo in epistolas catholicas ad graecorum codicum fidem provocat . vterque robertus stephanus pater filiusque manuscriptis quamplurimis optimae etiam fidei usi sunt , & tamen nullam lectionis varietatem in hoc versu indicant . hieronymum graviter tonantem audiamus ; fulmen ausem interpretes solos tangit . si ( epistolae ) sicut ab iis digestae sunt : ita quoque ab interpretibus fideliter in latinum verterentur eloquium , neque ambiguitatem legentibus facerent ; nec sermonum sese varietas impugnaret , illo praecipuè loco ubi de unitate trinitatis in prima johannis epistolâ positum legimus : in quà etiam ab infidelibus translatoribus multum erratum esse à fidei veritate , comperimus , trium tantummodo vocabula , hoc est aquae , sanguinis & spiritus , in ipsâ suâ editione ponentibus , & patris , verbique ac spiritus testimonium omittentibus , in quo maximè & fides catholica roboratur , & patris , & filii , & spiritus sancti una divinitatis essentia comprobatur . britannus codex hunc versum habet , quanquam sine articulis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . pleraeque editiones graecae ut basiliensis , oecolampadii , & altera brittiingeri & lipsensis vogelii hu nc versum retinent . complutensis vocem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 omittit , & pro 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 corruptè legit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 deinde patrum orthodoxorum testimonia adducimus ; qui partim ita legerunt , partim etiam ita legendum asseruerunt . athanasius lib. . ad theophilum , & cyprianus de unitate ecclesiae , & de simplicitate praelatorum , hieronymus , athanasius , fulgentius , &c. vide gomari analys●in● johan . bellarminum de trinitate . stegman . photin . d. sal. glassium de consubstantialitate christi &c. d. alting . loc. com. part . . pag. , . & explicat . catechet . part . . pag. . inter tres personas coessentiales est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essentialis & proinde 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . citavit etiam hunc locum athanasius in disputatione cum ario habitâ in concilio nicaeno , adversario nihil quicquā contra excipiente . fulgentius lib. contra objectiones arianorum . insignis est magni hyeronymi provocatio ( cujus ante memini ) ad graeca exemplaria extra controversiam incorrupta , & doctis cognita . hieronymus enim ait se latinorum codicum vitiositatem ( quae ex diversitate librorum omnium comprobatur ) ad graecam originem , unde & ipsi translata non denegant , voluisse revocare . hieronymum liquet nihil queri de codicibus graecis , sed tantum de iis qui graeca latinè verterunt , & hoc magnum indicium est , etsi graeci codices nonnulli essent corrupti ab arianis ( qai constantii tempore , pulsis orthodoxis totum penè orbem teste hieronymo occuparant ) incorruptos tamen reliquos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fuisse tempore hieronymi . translatores itaque infideles vocat hieronymus , qui hunc versum septimum omiserunt , & in fine subjicit , sed ego in tali opere nec aemulorum meorum invidentiam pertimesco , nec sanctae ecclesiae veritatem poscentibus denegabo . erasmus vir ( ne quid gravius dicam ) suspectae fidei , augustinum citat , latinam versionem ( quae tunc temporis obtinebat ) vulgò vitiosè translatam proponentem , & bedam graecae linguae ignarum , vel sat superque ignavum . augustino & bedae cyprianum opponimus linguae graecae peritum , cujus haec sunt verba ; dicit dominus , ego & pater unum sumus , johan . . . & iterum de patre , filio & spiritu sancto scriptum est , & hi tres unum sunt , joh. . . consulantur eugenius carthaginiensis in explicatione fidei catholicae apud victorem lib. . de persecutione vandalica , idacius libro adversus varimadum , higinus epist. . paxillus de monomachia , calovius de fide patrum ante concilium nicaenum , d. heinsius in ioh. . . d. altingius explicat . catech. part . . resp. ad . quaest . pag. . locus joh. . . extat ( inquit ille ) in melioribus & antiquissimis exemplaribus , & in quibus desideratur , ex iis perfidiâ arianorum erasus est . d. gomarus in analysi . epist. . iohan. cap. . . haec sunt ( domini fratresque in domino colendi ) de quibus vos hujusce certaminis arbitros praemonere visum . haereticos detegere est refutare ; haereticorum patriarchas , qui veritatem adulterio stuprant haeretico , detegimus certè & proinde refutamus . factionem antichristianam racoviensem , nec non pontificiam satis irreformabilem detegimus , damnamus . . antichristus racoviensis divinam christi essentiam , personam , satisfactionem negat , objectum fidei christianae , cultusque evangelici tollit , & proinde christianismum evertit ; ex verbo dei persuasi sumus anti-trinitarios ( sic stante ipsorum fide ) non posse salvari . mysterium dei trinunici est fundamentum fundamentorum , ita ut sublatâ trinitate necesse sit omnia protinus evangelica funditus corruere . est enim socinismus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , pet. . . ( haud secus quàm iudas iste proditorum perfidissimus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , joh. . . & antichristus ille romanus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , thes. . . ) haeresis omnium pestilentissima divinitatem christi , spiritusque coessentialis , ipsamque patris paternitatem aeternam abnegans , viamque per propriam vitae obedientiam ad coelum affectans . anres ingenuas violare nollē , nec modestiā christianam onerare . socinianas igitur blasphemias sapienter dissimulasse generosius judico , quàm magisterialiter , sed inutiliter not avisse . parum certe christiani sunt francisci-davidici qui christum adorandum verbis conceptis negant , nec pro fratribus habendi sunt socinani idolatrae , qui catechismum racoviensem tuentur , novumque deum minimè trinunicum , imò novum christum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sine fide vel amore divino colunt , & spiritum sanctum impii adorandum negant . libertatem conventus suos agendi , atque adeo haereses nec non blasphemias exitiales spargendi desiderant . antiqua autem ecclesia pacis repudium misit anti-trinitariis universis , ut videre est in actis a concilii niceni , athanasii , epiphanii , hilarii , & aliorum reverendissimorum doctorum scriptis . pacem profanam , haereticam , syncretismum tremendum damnamus omnes ; socinianos nec politicè nec ecclesiasticè tolerandos esse fortiter clamamus . det seductis deus ut resipiscant . observandum est ex sanâ b antiquitate usque in hunc diem celebre illud in oriente & occidente 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quo perpetuam sacratissimae trinitatis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in ecclesiis suis sonare voluerunt . suspectae autem fidei sunt , quae de trinitatis mysterio ex quibusdam laciniis , sibyllarum carminibus , hydapsis , m. trismegisti , platonis , & aliorum scriptis doctores nominis bene magni collegerunt . in trismegisto qui mose antiquior est ( credite posteri ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 occurrit ; narrantur in super nonnulla , quae post christum acciderunt . multa denique fraude parum piâ confinxit non nemo , ut religionis christianae gentilibus sidem faceret , quorum apud curiosissimos disciplinarum , nec non antiquitatum scrutatores nec vola , nec vestigium extat . omnia autem adulterina & supposititia tanquam vana rejicimus , damnamus . mysterium trinitatis quantum ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 è scripturâ demonstrandum est ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ipsis etiam angelis est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . mysterium illud dogmaticè ac elencticè tractant saniores ecclesiae doctores , athanasius , cyrillus , basilius , hilarius , nazianzenus , augustinus ▪ fulgentius , alcuinus & alii , quorum nec nomina recensere hic par est . haec de factione antichristianâ racoviensi . . quod ad romanam attinet . spiritum iesuiticum nimis immundum loca arida perambulantem , à scripturâ ad traditiones , ab apostolis ad patres , à christo ad ecclesiam , à catholica ad romanam : ab ecclesiâ ad episcopos , ab episcopis ad concilia , a conciliis ad papam , ab omnibus ad nihil discurrentem digito demonstramus . de judice nec non normâ fidei hujusce tractatus capite nono aliquam-multa protulimus . judicium discretionis non arguit officum judicis . legislator nec non evangelii dictator spiritus sanctus judicat , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : minister publicus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . christianus privatus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . coeli mysterium doceat me deus ipse qui condidit , non homo qui seipsum ignovarit . iesuitae omnes fidei controversias ad tria capita revocant . . de ecclesiâ catholicâ . . de sanctorum communione . . de peccatorum remissione . evangelicorum nonnulli omnes controversias quae reformatis ecclesiis cum pontificiis intercedunt , in quatuor partes tribuunt . . de scriptura . . ecclesiâ . . sacramenis . . iustitiâ . noverint autem catholici se cum ecclesiâ fideles doctores recipere debere , non cum doctoribus ecclesiae fidē deserere vti graviter vincentius lirinensis . fundamentum theologiae unicum sacram scripturam statuimus . in omnibus fidei controversiis spiritus sanctus judicium suum absolutum , supremum , universale , nec non authenticum in cripturis consignatum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ecclesiae promulgavit , omnesque errores infallibiliter condemnavit . de papâ itaque & papismo non tantum conclamatum est , sed & actum . cùm in terris nullam poterit reperiri judicium , de coelo quaerendus est judex ; sed ut quid pulsamus ad coelum , cum habemus hic in evangelio ? frustra etiam pontificii iustitiam suam ostendunt imò ostentant injusti . omnis enim humana justitia injustitia esse deprehenditur , si divinitùs districtè judicetur , si gregorio fidem adhibeant . moral . l. . cap. . partes theologiae sunt agnitio cultusque patris aeterri , filii naturalis , & spiritus coessentialis , dei veri , nec non trinnici . deum enim rectè agnoscimus ut sincerè colamus . tractatio theologiae est vel didactica , vel practisa , vel problematica , vel mixta . didactica quae ad fidem facit , est vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . practica ad pietatis , iustitiae , nec non charitatis officia conducit . theologia autem problematica sive elenctica problemata selectiora proponit . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 damnat . oportet enim episcopum esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , qui possit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . tit. . . theologia autem mixta est catechetica , scholastica , moralis sive practica . theologia haec mixta . locos communes sive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( uti theodorus apud quintilianum ) colligit . . controversias emergentes feliciter dirimit , ne quid aut vafrè dissimulatum , aut callidè delumbatum , aut perfidè inversum sit aut esse videatur . in ipsis principiis falli absurdum est , & prudentis est omnia quae à principiis deducuntur , perspecta habere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . casus conscientiae perplexos fideliter enucleat : sapiens enim est qui omnia & singula ad normam religionis aptare novit . theologia autem ista questionaria à scholasticis , sententiariis , summistis nec non quodlibetariis venditata parum ▪ theologica est , imô mataeologia est , doctrinae lanfrancianae consentanea , decretis pontificum munita , que ad lombardi dictata , thomae placita , vel scoti 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subtiliter absolvitur . patrum scripta , nec non aristotelis axiomata passim detorquent , scripturas contemnunt ; et proinde authoritatem eorum in divinis totam contemno , nec prudentiam eorum valde praedico . sophistas esse nullus dubito , philosophos autem bene christianos fuisse pertinaciter nego . apud cautos enim obtinet illud maximi tyrii , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . et si 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 istiusmodi scholasticae theologiae patroni aliquem humanioris musae sensum habeant , fateantur necesse est magnis istis doctoribus melius fuisse studia theologica nunquam attigisse , quàm adeo infaeliciter tractasse . dubitare soleo debeamne illa saecula 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; nominare . valete ( domini fratresque observandi ) academiam laborantem precibus vestris apud deum trinunicum adjuvate , professori vestro nondum praelectori ignoscite , qui silentii culpam hâc justâ nimis apologiâ deleturus est . professor vester vixit , & proinde praelector non est ; professor autem vester vel mortuus & adhuc loquitur . frustra gratisque olim dictum fuit cura 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . pastorum , professorum , doctorum cura haud cura secura est . sudoribus certè maximis terram subigimus agricolae , fructûs autem quàm nil percipimus . vixisse nimio satius est , quâm vivere . obtrectatoribus respondebo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . obtrectatio stultorum thesaurus est , quem in linguis gerunt . invidia the saurum nutrit , malevolentia effundit , quae quidem vitia domicilium non in alio quàm jejuno animo collocarunt . profesor vester vix usque ad invidiam faelix , sine invidiâ vel malevolentiâ jejunus , exit wigorniensi studiorum solatio denudatus , majoris iniquitatis a auctoramentum , culpaeque suadelam nimis efficacem pertimescens : malletque insuper cum b timore domi esse , quam sine timore athenis . scissae in partes academiae valedixit magnus camero . vale reverende procancellarie , praestabilis eruditionis respub . dei munus , academiae decus . floreat theologorum senatus , pereat sciolorum impudentia , ne politioris literaturae atque adeo divinae cognitionis pars bene magna pulsa , heu pulsa tandem exulet . valete omnes , qui musas colitis honestiores , & istiusmodi faeces sub acumen calami congerere sapienter timetis , quae aegri animi fastidia adaugent potiùs , quàm detergunt . deus veritatis & pacis dirigat vos spiritu suo sancto , ut academiae , patriae , ecclesiae , diu multumque prodesse valeatis , propter illum qui est via , veritas & vita . gratia domini iesu christi , charitas dei , & communicatio spiritus sancti sit cum omnibus vobis . amen . datum oxon . martii . vicessimo anno dom. . - . vestris d d. devotus fr. cheynell . to the worshipfull francis rovs esq the learned provost of eaton college . sir , it was the sad complaint of hilary in his time , that there were as many creeds as wills , and every one presumed to alter the wholesome forme of sound words , or else wrest it to a corrupt sense . and you know the sense of a creed is the creed . in these dayes of libertinisme , men account it a kinde of bondage to confine themselves to a wholesome forme of sound words , though they are a consecrated words , and therefore such as cannot be condemned . the devil hath set good men at variance about saeculal affaires , private interests and publique rights , and in the mean time robs or cheates us of what is spirituall and glorious , the purity of truth , the power and beauty of holinesse . we live in sad times , in which atheisme pleads for protection and intolerable errours contend for a toleration . they who blaspheme christ and his gospel in jeast , are atheists in good earnest ( as lucian and rablais were ) but god will plead his own cause , if we will not . lucian ( as suidas relates ) was torne to pieces with dogs , and rablais died drunk with wine and atheisme : we have good cause to suppresse and bewaile the very first risings of naturall atheisme ; we must not suffer any black suggestions or hovering thoughts which rellish of atheisme to roost and nestle in our hearts ; these extemporary thoughts , are sins which do proceed from us ; but o let them not be familiars , and inmates which lodge , and dwell within us . i fear that atheisme may soon become a nationall sin in england , if there be an indulgence ( worse then any at rome ) vouchsafed to irregular phantasies , and appetites under pious pretences . they who deny the god head of iesus christ , and the holy ghost , hope to escape censure in england , if they can have the favour to be called devout familists , although their blasphemy and wantonnesse doth declare them to be sensuall socinians , and beastly atheists . the socinians and familists have even already shamed the more modest mahumetans . mr. pocock ( the learned and ingenuous professour of hebrew and arabick in this vniversity , in his notes upon gregory the arabian phaenix ) assures me that the al hayetians acknowlege the incarnation of the eternall word , and that we shall all be judged by this incarnate word at the last day . the more moderate turks would stop their ears at the hearing of such blasphemies agaist christ , as hath poysoned this english air . some mahumetans hold that christus est deus de novo ortus , as the socinians say , he is deus factus , subordinatus , &c. and the mahumetan-sectaries talk just like our familists , antinomians : &c. as will be evident to any one that will persue m. pococks choise and learned annotations . licitum pronuntiant vino & scortationi indulgere , & reliqua quae lege vetita sunt perpetrare ; omittenda esse censent , quae lege mandata sunt , & orationē . i am ashamed to english that with my pen , which some professours have translated in broad and foule english by their grosse neglect of duties , contempt of ordinances , and bold practice of abominable leudnesse ; i will not mention their dreams of a phantasticall hell , and heaven . but sure i am our familists , and their alshii speak the same dialect , when they discourse of their being godded with god , and salute one whom they reverence with this atheistall complement , tu est tu , id est , tu es deus . sir , you are what you are , you are god! henry nicholas , the father of the family of love , said of himself , i am god. a man would think that our familists had met with some mahumetans at poland , or constantinople , and some of the worst of them also . for al gazalius a precise and learned mahumetan would teach them better langnage and behaviour also ; he saith that cleanlynesse is a part of faith , and the key of prayer , that we must have pure mindes , clean hearts and hands . but enough of that . sir , being encouraged by the committee , for regulating this vniversity , to undertake a service which i even tremble to repeat , and you being chaireman of that committee , i conceived my self obliged to present you with this treatise . when the vniversity was pleased to elect me the l. margarets professour of divinity , the revenue due to that professour by a grant made under the great seale of england io . caroli , was setled by speciall act. and the vniversity did purchase the lease of the house and meadowes in worcester , which belong to the said professour , and would ( if they might have had the common priviledge of leaseholders ) have bought the inheritance of the premises outright for ever ; but the vniversity is denyed the benefit of the lease and the common priviledge aforesaid . the house and meadowes are sold to others , and no revenue payed to the professour . i desire that the vniversity may be righted , and that my successour may not suffer as i have done . sir , notwithstanding these discouragements , i conceived it my duty either to read or write for the propagation of the christian faith , and honour of the blessed trinity according to the first grant. i consulted the vniversity and your self , and you both concurred that rebus sic stantibus , it was better to write then read , and that it did most conduce to the propagation of the christian faith ; finally , that it was most requisite that i should write in english , because since the beginning of the year . there have been many blasphemous bookes to the great dishonour of the blessed trinity printed in england . but i have found the task far more difficult , because there are many socinian subtiltyes which will hardly bear english , and i could not but take some notice of them , either by a formall answer , or else by a confirmation of that deep truth which they do with no lesse blasphemy , then subtilty reject , deny . i have been forced sometimes to expresse my minde in latine in the margine , merely upon that accompt ; but the plainest reader may if he please to read the . . . and . chapters , understand as much of this mystery as is necessary to bee known ; and i am confident that the happy union between the mystery of faith , and the practicall mystery of godlinesse is as plainly represented in this little treatise , as in any of the ancient or moderne divines ; for i have faithfully endeavoured to give you the strength and quintessence of both in a familiar way with many experimentall observations of mine own , which i shall now reveiw and practise in my most retired condition . but before i retire , give me leave to speak a word for my brethren who are eminent for all manner of learning , sound in the faith , holy in their life , and peaceable in their conversation ; if men of such qualifications know not how to rest in the present unsetlednesse of publike affaires , and yet are ready to performe all lawfull things required of them for the defence and preservation of the true religion and publique liberties ; why may not such be still employed for the promoting of such a just accommodation & reformation as may effectually advance the grand publike interest , the power , purity and growth of religion in this land ? you cannot look upon these men as enemies , and dare not deale with them as the worst of infidels ( whom christian * princes have sometimes banished from their dominions ) if you desire to have the same common friends and enemies with iesus christ. now which is the more tolerable penalty , to be out-lawed or banished , is not hard to determine . if you look upon them as presbyterians , it is no dishonour to them to be true to their principles in the midst of changes ; it is a signe that they were never friends to the fortune of the cause , but to the cause it selfe ; forgive them if they know not how to pursue a new interest without new light or direction from the word of god. besides they are such presbyterians as all godly and prudent independents will close with in the highest and sweetest acts of church-communion . for i am confident that no wise and godly men will practically separate from us in those very things in which they do doctrinally agree with us , because that text which they do so often cite , philip . , . is demonstratively clear in this very point , and doth manifestly condemne all causelesse separation from lawfull communion with the godly members of reforming churches . godly presbyterians and independents do . . receive the same officers , pastours , teachers , ruling elders , and of the same qualification required in the rule set forth by the parliament . . admit members of the same qualification held forth by the assembly , namely visible saints , who being of age , do professe faith in , and obedience to the lord jesus christ according to the rules of faith and life delivered in the word . . desire that the above mentioned officers should be incorporated in one eldership , and joyn in all acts of government of the church . . hold the same censures of admonition and excommunication , and do likewise receive such as have been censured into communion again , as soon as they give testimony of their repentance to them . godly independents doe acknowledg that parochial churches ( wherein ministers and others endeavor to remove all things justly offensive , that so all ordinances may be administred in purity ) are true churches of christ. . they retaine communion with these parochicall churches by baptizing their children , and receiving the lords supper there , as occasion serves . and if occasionall communion with us be lawfull , constant communion with us would not be sinfull . . they receive the members of such parishes as aforesaid unto communion with themselves in their own congregations also occasionally . . they professe that they are ready to give an account to such parochiall congregations , as to sister-churches , whensoever they are offended at any irregular administrations in independent churches . . they esteem a sentence of non-communion passed by such parochicall congregations , is churches against them , upon any scandall wherein they are unsatisfied , as a means to humble them , and as an ordinance of god to reduce them . much more might be added : but it is clear from these premises , that prudent and godly independents cannot conceive themselves obliged . to set up other churches with differing rules of constitution or worship ; for presbyterians and independents did both agree in the same confession of faith and directory for worship , and resolved to practice most of the same things , and those the most substantiall in respect of government also , as doth appeare by those few transactions in the assembly , and committee for accommodation , which have been printed . . nor can they say , that they are enforced to gather new churches out of true reformed churches ; for a circumstantiall difference cannot be a sufficient ground for leaving of all ordinary communion with true reforming churches . the prudent and godly presbyterians have set no bounds to themselves in their reformation but the word of god ; and therefore if the independents will set forth a compleat modell of their whole church-way , and church-order , fully , freely , and clearely , and prove it by plaine texts out of the holy scriptures , we shall thankfully receive whatsoever they shall convincingly impart . and i shall be bold to say , that there had been a judicious , affectionate and practicall accommodation between us ( notwithstanding some speculative differences in notionall ideas ) if there had been no interposition of statesmen , or sword-men , when the committee of accommodation had sadly considered and reviewed all materiall arguments on this side , and on that ; and if you set aside all reasons of state and saecular considerations , i do not see why men who agree in the substance of the service and worship of god , in the directory according to the preface , in the confession of faith set forth by the assembly , and in the doctrine contained in the confessions and writings of the reformed churches , should not mind the same thing , and walk by the same rule , that there might be a practicall communion between us in all points wherein there is a doctrinal agreement , and we might go hand in hand to heaven together , with meeknesse of wisdome , and sincerity of love . let men of both perswasions beware of such a superstitious tendernesse as doth usually arise from some unconscionable errour , and unmortified lust , because it is no priviledge , but a judgement to be given up to errour or lust ; and from such ensnaring liberty , which is indeed perfect bondage , good lord deliver us . no man is obliged to follow the positive praescript of an erroneous conscience in any point or case whatsoever : differences of iudgment did not extinguish the relation of membership amongst the romans and corinthians . and it is certaine that the substantials of church-government must not be changed in every age acording to the graduall differences of light in severall persons and congregations . we humbly desire that there may be a strict and mutuall obligation condescended to in some expedient by all godly men of both perswasions for mutuall edification , and for the preservation of all the churches in these dominions in truth , godlinesse , and peace , that we may not passe unchristian censures upon our christian brethren . let all private quarrels then fall to the ground , and let us mind the common interest of the lord iesus , and seriously promote it in our respective places in faith and love . and let all statesmen beware . that they do not fall into the same spirituall or civill evils which they themselves have condemned in the king and prelates . . beware of erastianisme which doth overthrow all church-government , both presbyterian and independent . . take heed of civill scepticisme which doth overthrow the fundamentals of publike faith , and publike rights , and plucks up all civill government , by the roots . . beware of familisticall polytheisme ; for the familists affirme that there are as many christs , as many gods manifested in the flesh , as there are saints on earth . but to us there is but one god , and one lord iesus christ ; it is enough for blind pagans to talk of many gods , and many mediatours . . beware of atheisme , the great monster of this age , compounded of socinianisme , familisme , libertinisme , and antinomianisme . the ephesians complaine of none but robbers of churches , and blasphemers , acts . . but we have cause to complaine of them , and apostates , idolaters , atheists , and what not ? . beware of a toleration of intolerable errours . reverend mr cotton is afraid that the antichristian whore will steale in at the back-doore of a toleration . the magistrates of england are engaged by the oath of god to root out whatsoever is contrary to sound doctrine , and the power of godlinesse . that man is seduced by a private spirit ( as you observe well in your orthodox book ) who lusteth after envy , after sects and divisions ; but the holy spirit is a catholike spirit , a spirit of catholike faith , and catholike love , an unreserved and universall love to all that beleeve and love the lord jesus christ. let us then all hold fast the wholesome forme of sound words in faith and love . for they who waver against the credit of their own testimony , are not ( as the civilians say ) to be heard or regarded , because they have lost their credit . we are reserved for some service in this declining age ; and therefore it doth become us to be orthodox saints , steady christians , that our posterity may imitate us , and see those glorious daies , which some conceive are come already , because they have attained a little vainglory in this age of vanity . the writers of this present time , who seeme to contradict one another concerning the light and glory of these unhappy daies , may as easily be reconciled as sophocles and euripides were concerning the goodnesse of women . sophocles being asked the reason why he did alwaies represent women in his tragedies as very good , whereas euripides did ever represent them as very bad ? answered , that be and euripides did not at all contradict one another ; for saith he , i do ever represent women just as they should be , and euripides just as they are . in like manner some writers represent these times just as they should be , and others represent them just as they are . but i must needs condemn those , who draw a crooked conclusion from the corrupt doctrine and manners of this untoward and crooked generation , and infer that there is no church of god in england , because antichristian and blasphemous seducers are multiplyed without number , and favoured in the land , though all the magistrates and godly of the nation are by one confederate body , obliged by solemn oath to root out idolatry , blasphemy , heresie , schisme , profanenesse , and whatsoever else is contrary to sound doctrine , and the power of godlinesse . . it is not denyed that there is a fry of achans in the land. . the sins condemned are inexcusable , and so are all the foster-fathers of them . . we pray that they who have given their power to the beast , may give it to the lamb. . all faithfull ministers do open heaven to the faithfull , and shut it against unbeleevers , as our master enjoynes us , mark. . . luk. . . and therefore we are true and faithful to the king of saints , and commonwealth of israel . . there are thousands in england whose hearts bleed at their eyes for the abominations of the land ; men that do seriously endeavour to save themselves & others from this untoward generation , according to peters direction , act. . . . the house of jacob was the church of god , and yet there were foule faults , incest , and murder found amongst his sons . the lord perswade and encourage the fathers of this nation to be as zealous against the sins of the nation , as jacob was against the sins of reuben , simeon and levi. i must go backwards here , as shem and japhet did . i have not time to mention other things , but let all such as have the power and bowels of fathers , take heed that they do not persecute or offend one of those little ones who beleeve in christ , much less undo one of those great ones , who have much of christ , and his spirit reigning in them . beleeve it sir , there are a company ( i put my self out of the number ) of select men in oxford ; i know not whether there be , all things considered , the like in the world againe , men able and willing to promote the common-wealth of true religion , publike liberty , and ingenuous learning for the common-weale and good of mankind in all nations ; for they are acquainted with all necessary arts , sciences , and languages , and dare throw the gauntlet to the proudest champions in the antichristian world. some few of these may perhaps be complained of by some weathercockes , who can rather turn then crow , some froward children who bite their mothers breasts , or vipers who would eate a way to their own preferment thorow their mothers bowels . it is not for want of pride or ignorance that these afflict your doores and eares with unnecessary complaints , which they prove just as erucius did his against roscius , who when he was asked who told him so , he answered , no body ; and when it was demanded how the accusation would be proved , answered , in truth i know not . what is this ( saith tully pro sexto roscio ) but to abuse the laws and judges , to object what you cannot prove , nay , do not so much as endeavour to prove ? it may be you will reply as hazael did , am i a dog that i should be accessary to any grievous or unrighteous decree ? you know what hazael did ; and you know that asa was a good man , and yet a persecutor . but i hope that as you have been zealous for the reformation , so you will be zealous for the preservation of the vniversity , which is the earnest desire and prayer of sir , your thankfull servant fr. cheynell . to the reader . i must entreat you not to mistake the printers oversights for my dictates . i was seldome here to overlook the presse , and can only glance over the book now with a running eye . i leave it to your candor and judgement to correct ordinary slips , but before you set your self to read , be pleased to correct these . places . in page . line . not is left out , and for in line . read both thus , [ not as the spirit of disobebedience acts in children of wrath , for we , &c. ] in the margin , page . b read thus , actus divini considerati secundumid quod sunt . in the margin , pag. . for pultum ocera read cultum opera . the god of wisdome blesse our endeavours . the grace of christ , the love of the father , and communion of the holy spirit is the best portion ; let us all beg it for our selves , our friends , and our posterity in these evill daies , and the lord send us a gratious returne of all our prayers at the throne of grace , that we may all find grace and mercy in this time of need . march . . chap. i. the godhead is spiritual , infinite , incomprehensible . we read of the eternal godhead in the book of the creature , rom. . . and therefore i prize philosophy because it is subservient to divinity ; nay that philosophy which manifests the eternal power and god-head of our great creator is indeed and truth , nothing else but natural divinity : this natural divinity is called the truth , rom. . . and it is a divine truth , because it doth declare 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , all that can be known of god by the light of nature , rom. . , . i subscribe to that of clemens alexandrinus : we ought not to swear allegiance to any sect of philosophers , whether stoicks , epicures , platonists or peripatetiques , but we must select and embrace whatsoever is true and faithfully delivered concerning god by any sect a ; and the truth selected out of all sects is not vaine philosophy , but natural divinity . there is something of the image of god & law of nature written in our hearts and consciences , as is evident by common experience and plain testimonies of the world of god , and therefore the scripture doth not condemn all philosophy , but vain philosophy , colos. . these natural notions of the eternal godhead should excite us to enquire farther after god as the apostle shewes in acts . ver . . because though our natural notions concerning god are true , yet they are such imperfect and obscure notions , or rather hints , that we are by reason of the corruption of our nature , very apt to abuse them , and therefore we must regulate them by the word of god. the b godhead is spiritual , and therefore invisible ; the professors of wisdome became fools , when upon a clear sight of some invisible things of god they changed the glory of god into a visible image made like unto corruptible man , and unreasonable creatures ; such images are both artificial and real lyes ; for by making images of god , these learned fools changed the truth of god into a lye , and then adored and worshipped their own lyes , rom. . , , . the godhead is infinite , and the immensity of gods perfection cannot be measured by any created understanding . god is great , and his greatnesse is unsearchable c , psal. . . the greatnesse of god is not a greatnesse of bulk and quantity , but of perfection and excellencie ; he is great in power , and his understanding is infinite , ps. . . and therefore his understanding is unsearchable , isa. . when men and angels search farthest into gods perfection , they do most of all discover their own imperfection , for god will make them know that the secrets of his wisdome are double to that which they behold , and that it is impossible by our most accurate disquisition to finde out the almighty unto perfection , job . , . but we may find him out unto salvation in the holy scriptures . if we sum up all that the philosophers and schoolmen can attain to in their discourses of this first principle , it will amount to no more then this ; men and angels can never comprehend that perfection which dwels in god ; for the perfection of god is infinite , and therefore ●ncomprehensible . let schoolers examine t●is brief account , deus est ●ns , ens entium , essentia essentiarum , ens purum , ens simplex , ens simpliciter simplex , ens absolutum , ens necessarium , ens absolutè necessarium . ens primum , aeternum , independens , perfectum infinitum , infinitè perfectum , & proinde immensum . let us therefore study , beleeve and embrace the holy scriptures , which may satisfie and save us . i confesse i have been very much taken with some discourses in aristotle's d metaphysicks concerning the spiritual and eternal efficacy of the first principle , first mover or prime understanding , whose very essence , substance , nature and being is a spiritual and eternal self-efficacy , from whence it was easie to demonstrate the self-sufficiency and all-sufficiency of this eternal understanding , and from thence to inferre that this eternal spirit , whose very being is efficacy ( or as we say a pure act ) should be effectually obeyed and sincerely worshipped with pure and spiritual worship . i shall not examine those passages which are usually cited out of plato , iamblichus trismegistus and others upon this subject , because it is clear to me that those glorious mysteries which they did either discourse or treat of were discovered to them by an hebrew light . e plato was not called the atticising moses in vaine , clemens alexandrinus and divers others have said enough of that , and saved me the labour of a learned digression upon that subject ; and it is conceived that christians have inserted such passages into the works of heathens . the platonists say lumen est umbra dei , deus est lumen luminis . the aposile saith god is light , and in him is no darknesse at all : that is , god is perfection it self without any imperfection at all , john . . god is a pure act , god is one single infinite perfection . and therefore as f seneca said , we had need compose our whole man into an argument of modesty when we discourse of the nature of god , lest we speak any thing rashly , or affirme any thing that is untrue . the works of god are great , and his thoughts ( decrees and counsels ) very deep , psal. . . who then is able to sound the depth of his natural perfection , whose immense perfection is like a sea ( if there were any such ) which hath neither banks nor bottome ; who can sound a bottomlesse depth , or define an infinite perfection ? god is near us , nay in us , and yet farre off from us ; there is an infinite distance between his excellency and our infirmity g : he is far off from our senses and from our understanding ; and therefore instead of begging longer time as the philosopher did , i will conclude as the wise man doth , eccl. . , . all this have i proved by wisdom : i said i will be wise , but it was farre from me ; that which is farre off and exceeding deep , who can finde it out ? heraclitus put forth a pretty riddle . if h you do not hope for something above hope , you shall never finde out that which can never be found . it is safer as the poet said , to beleeve and worship god then to pry into him . nam praeter ipsum quaerere acquires nihil . how much raymundus de sabunde , a. steuchus eugubinus , pacardus and others would have found without the help of the scripture , let such as are spiritually judicious judge . chap. ii. god is the first , eternal and independent being , the fountaine of all being and well-being , & therefore cannot but be , exist , and persist in being . it is a rule generally received in the schooles , that all creatures i have more of imperfection and nothingnes , then they have of being or perfection . but all being , the whole of being is in god. god is principium totius esse , the fountain of all being , and wel-being , the only self-being . god is the k first , eternal and independent being , and therefore can have no cause of his being without himself , or above himself , because he was before , and is above all causes , isa. . . god is the first and the last ; he is everlasting , and therefore can have no efficient or final cause ; and it is utterly impossible that god should have any matter or form , or any thing answerable to either , because it is impossible that any thing should set bounds to his boundlesse being , and infinite perfection . god is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith the philosopher , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith the divine , but we must ( as the schools state the point ) understand both sensu negativo , because god hath his being not from any other , but from himself ; and god is said to have his being from himself , because his very nature and essence are necessary l , and therefore we cannot conceive the divine essence to be void of existence ; it is utterly impossible that god should not exist , because the divine nature is a pure act , an absolute , necessary , eternall , infinite , independent , single being . we must not conceive that god was first in a naked power of being , and was afterwards reduced unto actuall being by his own effectuall power , as if his existence were really distinct from his essence , or did virtually flow from , and consequently depend upon his essence , as its proper cause . for it is manifestly absurd to conceive this pure , infinite and eternall being not to be in act , since it is a pure act. god doth declare the incomprehensible purity of his infinite and single being in that amazing and yet edifying text , i am that i am , m exod. . . as if he had said there is nothing in your god which is not god ; my attributes do not differ from my self , my being is absolutely necessary , every way perfect , altogether pure , single and infinite . i do therefore conclude as hierome , n that the very nature of god is being it selfe , and therefore he ever was and cannot cease to be ; he cannot borrow his being from any thing , who gives being and wel-being to all things . the absolute and independent necessity of the divine-being doth demonstrate its eternity , and therefore o all the differences of time are untied by the talmudists , to connote the eternity of god in that text , exod. . . according to that excellent commentary made by the apostle , rev. . . god is the almighty , which is , and which was , and which is to come . hence it is that some have thought fit to translate that text , exod. . . according to the full scope of the future amongst the hebrews , i am that i am that i was , and that i will be . for the future p amongst the hebrews , points at all differences of time past , present and to come ; but others observing the strict and proper signification of the future , translate it thus , i will be that i will be . the angel of the waters doth unite all differences of time in that gratefull acknowledgement , rev. . . thou art righteous o lord , which art , and wast , and shalt be , because thou hast judged thus . and iesus christ , ( who is one and the same god with his father , ) is the same yesterday , and to day , and for ever , heb. . . the rabbines upon exod. . . q expresse themselves after this manner , the blessed god said unto moses , say unto them , i that have been , and i the same now , and i the same for time to come , &c. or as others more agreeable to the chaldee paraphrase , i , he that is , and was , and hereafter will be , hath sent me unto you . but enough of that ; it is now time to conclude that this first and independent being cannot be measured in it self , because it is infinite , nor in its causes , for it hath r no causes , but is from it self , of it self , by it self and for it self ; for as the apostle saith , all things are of him , and through him , and to him ; to him be glory for ever . amen . chap. iii. god hath sufficiently and graciously revealed himself in his holy word for our edification and salvation . this incomprensible god , who is of himself and for himself , cannot be made known to his creatures but by himselfe : men and angels cannot know him any further then he is pleased to reveale himself unto them . the word of god is pure and perfect , it doth fully discover gods mind and our duty . the scriptures s direct us in all points of faith , in all parts of worship , and in all passages of our life and conversation ; there is the whole body of religion , and the only right way to salvation sufficiently and graciously revealed unto us by god himself ; for god is the author , object , end of true religion , and is the only happinesse and salvation of his chosen people , and therefore god alone can direct us how to serve and enjoy his own blessed self , in an acceptable and comfortable way , for his glory and our own everlasting satisfaction . the jesuites tell us that the scriptures are but a partiall rule , and that we must be beholding to some unwritten word or tradition for the proofe of some points , which are necessary to be known and beleeved for our everlasting salvation . some instance in the doctrine of the trinity , others in the worship of the holy ghost . the papists do generally acknowledge that it is necessary for the attainment o● salvation to beleeve the number of the persons of the trinity , and their consubstantiality , because no man can be saved who doth not believe in the father , son and holy ghost , in all three as in the only true god , one and the self same god blessed for ever ; but some of them deny that this mystery is sufficiently revealed in the written word , and therefore i shall make it my businesse to confute them , and all that adhere unto them in the following treatise . the saving knowledge of god in christ is revealed by the spirit speaking in the scriptures of truth ; nay father , son and holy ghost do all joyne in revealing to us the saving mystery of faith and godlinesse , that by the grace of christ , the love of god , and communion of the holy ghost , we may have a glorious fellowship with all three as one god , the only true god , whom to know is life eternall , john . . we are taught by the father to come to christ for salvation , john . . we are taught by the son , iohn . . heb. . . we are taught by the spirit , heb. . . rev. . . and iohn . . the spirit doth beare witnesse after an especiall manner to this saving truth : it is the spirit that beareth witnesse , because the spirit is truth : yet all three ( and therefore the whole trinity , the father , the son and the holy spirit , ) do joyn in bearing record , and their record is written , for it stands upon record in the gospel , and their record is a saving record , and there can be no other record produced to prove that christ is our saviour , iohn . , , , , . iohn . if we study the scriptures t , beleeve , apply them , worship and act according to them , we shall be saved by our faith in the written trinity ; in father , son and holy ghost , without the help of any unwritten tradition whatsoever ; for the holy scriptures are able to furnish the man of god unto perfection , and make the simple wise unto salvation , tim. . , , . u cyrill in his book of the trinity and person of christ , put forth not long since by wegeline , saith that he would not speak or think any thing of god , but what is written in his word . clemens alexandrinus x saith that we ought to make good every point in question by the word of god , because that is the surest , nay that 's the only demonstration ; he speaks of theologicall demonstration , nothing can be embraced with a divine faith , but that which is delivered to us upon divine testimony ; and we are to seek for the testimony of god , nowhere but in the written word of god , and therefore basil disputes after this manner , whatsoever is not in the written word of god is not of faith , and whatsoever is not of faith is sin , and therefore it is a sin to obtrude any doctrine upon the conscience as an article of faith , which is not written in the y word of god , putean is bold to say , that if basil his meaning was according to his words , he was a hugonot , that is as we use to say , a puritane . when i read what the papists write on this argument , i stand amazed at their blasphemies , and am unwilling to stain my paper with the repetition of them ; they who have read canus , hosius , costerus , eckius , gautierus , charronaeus , stapleton , and the rest of that rabble , will not wonder that the socinians call the doctrine of . persons and one god into question , when the papists who were baptized in the name of the trinity , & professe that they beleeve the equality of three distinct subsistences in the same divine essence , do yet notwithstanding in their writings grant as much as the socinians need prove , namely that the doctrine of the distinction and equality of persons in the same divine essence cannot be proved but by unwritten traditions , by the testimony of the church of rome , &c. and yet diverse papists undertake to defend the doctrine of the trinity against the socinians , though they know that the socinians do not at all value traditions or the testimony of the church of rome ; and therefore though divers papists write against the socinians , yet they do promote socinianisme by their vaine doctrine of unwritten traditions . stapleton is not ashamed to deny that it can be proved out of scripture that the holy ghost is god , or that he is to be worshipped . but salmeron z deserves commendation in this point ; the scriptures saith he , are therefore said to be written by divine inspiration , because they instruct us in divine mysteries , concerning the vnity of god , and trinity of persons . photius a in his bibliotheca shews , that ephraeni did not dispute of the consubstantiall trinity out of the testimonies of fathers , but out of the holy scriptures ; iustin martyr , athanasius , basil , irenaeus , cyrill , cyprian , tertullian , epiphanius , theodoret , and many other of the fathers did assert the doctrine of the trinity , and some of them did confute the valentinians , eunomians , sabellians , photinians , arrians , macedonians . samosatenians , &c. out of the holy scriptures . the nicene synod did urge scripture for the maintenance of the truth , which they declared in the confession of their faith ; and the synod which met at constantinople did the like , as is most evident to such as have perused those learned and ancient b records . athanasius confounded the arians by cleare testimonies of scripture , and in his book of the decrees of the nicene synod , he saith that the true disciples of christ , do clearly understand the doctrine of the holy trinity preached by divine scripture . i shall not trouble or amuse the reader by quotations out of cyrill , ambrose , hilary , augustine , nyssen , nazianzen , or any of those worthies but now mentioned , whose labours have been ever famous in the church of god ; yet i must not omit one pregnant proofe out of augustine , who appealed from the nicene and ariminensian synods , and challenged maximinus to dispute with him about the great point of consubstantiality out of the scriptures . bellarmine himself is forced to confesse that augustine had good reason to do so , because that point is cleare by scripture ; but then we must likewise consider what augustine saith upon this argument , that c the thing ( or sense of any word ) may be in scripture though the word it self be not to be found there , though the words trinity trin-unity , consubstantial , are not found in scripture , yet that which is signified by those words may be clearly proved by the holy scriptures . these three are one ; i and my father are one ; behold a trinity trin-unity , consubstantiality , and all quickly proved . that rule is of great concernment and very pertinent to the point in hand , which augustine delivers in his third book and third chapter against maximinus the arian . out of those things which we read in scripture we may collect some things which we do not read , and so both understand and beleeve the thing which is delivered in other words in scripture , then those which we are now forced to use , that we may confirme the orthodox christians , and refute the gain-sayers . but i am weary of this task , and therefore call upon my reader to joyne with me in searching the scriptures that we may find out the truth ; for reason cannot demonstrate or comprehend these mysteries of faith ; and the rule is , rationum fulcro dissoluto humana concidit authoritas . chap. iv. this single and eternall godhead doth subsist in father , son , and holy ghost , without any multiplication of the godhead . when d gregory nyssen undertook to confute the artificiall blasphemy of eunomius , he desired that the true god , the son of the true god , and the holy spirit would direct him into all truth . i have likewise implored the divine assistance of the father , son and holy ghost , that i may open this mystery of the single godhead in three distinct subsistences , with faith and prudence , perspicuity and reverence . i consider that the godhead is spiritual , and therefore i desire to avoid all carnal expressions in a treatise of this nature . there is a twofold knowledge of god , absolute , and relative ; the absolute knowledge of the eternal power and godhead is in part discovered by the works of god , as hath been shewen in the first chapter ; but the relative knowledge of god ( i speak of inward relations between the three subsistences ) is not , nay cannot be attained unto by the light of nature ; no example can illustrate , no reason angelical or humane comprehend the hidden excellency of this glorious mystery , but it is discovered to us by a divine revelation in the written word , and therefore our faith must receive , and our piety admire what our reason cannot comprehend . it is fit therefore that this grand mystery of the divine trinunity should be soberly explained , that it may be stedfastly beleeved , and reverently applyed in all evangelical administrations . we read of the godhead , the nature and subsistence of god in the holy e scriptures . . the godhead , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rom. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 coloss. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acts . i am not at leasure to play the critique upon the words , it is enough for my purpose simply to declare the truth in the most plaine and simple manner . . the nature of god is held forth to us in the holy scriptures , which forbid us to give divine honour to any of those things which are not gods by nature , gal. . for the apostle in that place reproves their idolatry , and tels them , that when they knew not god ( that is the only true god who is god by nature , because truly god ) they did service to them which by nature are no gods ; from whence it is easie to conclude that the only true god whom we ought to serve , is god by nature : and we read of the divine nature , pet. . . of which all that are regenerate are said to be partakers , because they bear his image ; for else it is evident that there is an infinite distance between god , & grace , which is not only finite , but imperfect also , and if it were perfected is but an accident ; nay , there is an infinite distance between the nature of god , and nature of man in respect of excellency , even then when the two natures are most intimately united as they are by an hypostatical union in the person of the lord jesus . . this only true god , who is god by nature , doth subsist . and if we will seek after him , we shall finde that he doth not subsist very far from any of us , act. . . but the godhead doth not subsist out of the father , sonne , and holy ghost . for all the fulnesse of the self-same godhead is in every one of the three : and therefore the name of god is attributed to every one of the three , in holy writ . . to the father . rom. . . rom . . . to the sonne . act. . . tit. . . tim. . . tim. , , . . to the holy ghost . act. . , . ps. . . , compared with heb. . cor. . , , heb. . . compared with pet. . . cor. . , . and when the name of god is specially attributed to the father ( in regard of order , and that gracious dispensation which is by consent of all three vouchsafed for our salvation ) the son and spirit are not excluded , as we shall prove at large in this very chapter . . the eternal godhead doth subsist in the father ; for we read of his subsistence , heb. . . christ is the expresse image of his fathers subsistence or person , as we do commonly translate the word : but i do not hear that any but grosse atheists have been so bold as to deny the subsistence of god the father ; and therefore i need not superadde any thing to so plaine a text. . the same godhead doth subsist in the lord jesus , who is equall to the father , because he doth subsist in the nature of god , phil. . . the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is best rendred subsisting , in that place ; because there is a comparison there between two subsistences or persons , the father and the son ; and therefore the son counts it no robbery to be equal with the father , because he subsists in the nature of god. he hath the same divine nature , the same godhead with the father & all the fulnes of the godhead dwells truly , really , bodily in the son ; for body is opposed to shadow . nay it may be rendred thus : the godhead dwels personally in the son : for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth many times signifie a person ; and therefore some learned men take 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be as much as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : all the fulnesse of the godhead dwells really in the subsistence or person of the son , col. ● . . christ is the illustrious brightnesse of his fathers glory , the lively character of his fathers subsistence or person , heb. . . christ is not the character of his own subsistence , but of his fathers subsistence ; and therefore the sonne hath a peculiar subsistence distinct from the subsistence of his father . christ is the expresse image of his fathers person , and therefore the person of the son is distinct from the person of the father ; for no person is the image or character of it self . concerning the word subsistence or person , i shall speak fully in the two next chapters , and make it evident that the divine subsistences or persons do infinitely excell the subsistences or persons of men and angels . in the mean time i shall clearly prove , that the godhead doth subsist in the son , and holy spirit . the godhead doth subsist in jesus christ , who was before the beginning , ioh. . . [ was ] doth note what is past ; & therefore had his being before the begining of time : and that his eternall being is a divine being , is clear , because eternal , and because it is not only said , that he was with god before the beginning , but he was god ; and therefore it doth clearly follow , that iesus christ is the same eternall god with his father ; for it is impossible that there should be more then one god , as i shall clearly demonstrate before i conclude this chapter . i wonder at the impudent blasphemy of some who pretend to be saints , in these dayes of errour and vanity ; and yet are bold to affirm , that they themselves are as well , and as truly god , as jesus christ ; because it is said that they have their being in god , act. . . are partakers of the divine nature , pet. . . and are one with christ , joh. . , , , . i shall intreat the men of this perswasion to consider that jesus christ is over all god blessed for ever , rom. . . god manifest in the flesh , tim. . . the blessed and only potentate , the king of kings , and lord of lords , who only hath immortality , &c. to whom honour and power everlasting is ascribed , tim. . . he is the great god , tit. . . the true god , joh. . . dares any mortall man lay claime to these titles and this honour ? to which of the saints or angels did god say at any time , thou art my sonne , the heire of all things , the illustrious brightnesse of my glory , and lively character of my person thy throne , o god , is for ever and ever , and all the angels of god shall worship thee , heb. . these things are so cleare and plain , that i am even almost ashamed to write more upon this argument ; and yet i am encouraged and even provoked to proceed . jesus christ was the wonderfull child ; a child , and yet a father , the father of eternity f ; a child , and yet a councellour , the wisest of all counsellours , for he is wisedome it self ; a child , and yet a god , a mighty god. isa. . . certainly this one text is sufficient to put them to the blush who presume to compare themselves with the lord jesus , the mighty god. iehovah g is a title proper and peculiar unto god , isa. . , . jehovah is the only saviour , the only god & psal. . . that men may know that thou whose name alone is iehovah , art the most high over all the earth . but the lord christ is jehovah ; and therefore the lord christ is god. jehovah sits on a throne in majesty and glory , isa. . , , , . but the lord christ is this iehovah , as the apostle assures us . ioh. . , the lord christ is that iehovah to whom every knee must bow ; as appears by comparing isa. . , , , , . with rom. . , , . and phil. . , , , . the like is cleare by comparing psal. . . , , . with heb. . , , . once more , compare num. . , . with cor. . , . & num. . . and hence it is that christ is so gloriously described , rev. . , , , . he is alpha and omega , the beginning and the ending , which is which was , and which is to come , the almighty . and therefore he is jehovah . for the apostle doth in that place , and so to the end of that chapter , insist upon these and the like expressions which do comprise in them the sense and meaning of that divine and glorious title of iehovah . i might farther insist upon this argument , and shew that the title of lord so often given to christ in the new testament , doth answer to the title of jehovah in the old testament . and as some reverend divines conceive , the apostles did purposely use the title of lord , that they might not offend the jewes with the frequent pronouncing of the word jehovah . thou shalt feare iehovah thy god , deut. . . deut. . . is rendred by the apostle , thou shalt worship the lord thy god , mat. . . and so deut. . . thou shalt love iehovah thy god , is rendred matth. . . thou shalt love the lord thy god. i hope no saint will presume to arrogate the title of iehovah to himself ; for he whose name alone is iehovah is the mighty god , the most high over all the earth . jesus christ is immanuel , god with us , matth. . . that god who took flesh and blood , tim. . . and that god who redeemed the church with his own blood , acts . . the ancients insist much upon that proof iohn . . all things that the father hath are mine , compared with iohn . . i and my father are one , and iohn . . if i do not the works of my father , beleeve me not ; for from hence they do conclude , that christ hath the same divine nature and godhead with the father ; they both have the same divine and essentiall titles & attributes , and perform the same inward operations in reference to all creatures whatsoever ; and therefore h they did farther inferre , that they had reason to use the word consubstantiall ; for though the word is not in scripture , yet the sense and meaning of it is orthodox and canonicall , because evidently deduced from these texts and some other scriptures which we have insisted on before . i shall adde one scripture more , to make it yet more clear ; compare iohn . . with iohn . . all i things that the father hath are mine . iohn . . father , all mine are thine , and thine are mine . iohn . . that is , whatsoever doth belong to the father as god , doth belong to christ ; for we speak not of personall , but essentiall properties , christ doth lay claim to all that is naturall , to all that belongs to the father as god , not to any thing which belongs to him as the father , as the first person of the blessed trinity . in the of iohn christ proves that the apostles were his apostles because they were his fathers apostles , and given by the father to him ver . . but he gives a more generall reason for it ver . . and all mine are thine , and thine are mine : it is a generall rule expressed in the neuter gender , and therefore cannot be restrained to the apostles , as the socinians would limit the speech of christ ; but it must be taken in its full extent ; but that i may give full weight and measure pressed down and running over , consider that the other text iohn . . hath a double note of universality , and therefore is very emphaticall for the proof of the point , all things whatsoever thut the father hath ( as god ) are mine k , but the father hath an eternall godhead , infinite power and majesty ; and therefore saith christ , they are mine . epiphanius disputing against the heresie of sabellius expounds this rule thus , all that the father hath is mine ; the father is god and i am god ; the father is life and i am life ; for whatever the father hath is mine . for the clearer demonstration of this truth , let us now descend to particulars . the attributes of god. the works of god. the worship of god , are all ascribed & given to jesus christ , that we may confesse and acknowledge him to be god , the true god , the mighty god , the self same onely god with the father and the holy spirit . the attributes of god are ascribed to the lord jesus . the eternity of god , iohn . . . in the beginning was the word ; [ was ] notes some former duration , and therefore we conclude that he was before the beginning , before any creation or creature ; for it is said that he was god in the beginning , and his divine nature whereby he works is eternall . heb. . . he is the first and last , revel . . . hence it is that he is called the first-born of every creature , because he who created all , and upholds all , hath power to command and dispose of all , as the first-born had power to command the family or kingdom , coloss. . , , . compare isa. . . with revel . . . and prov. . , . and with my margin . . jesus christ is omnipotent , phil. . . he is called by a metonymy the power of god , cor. . . he is the almighty , revel . . . he made all things , john . . coloss. . , . psal. . . compared with hebr. . . john . . he upholds all things , heb. . coloss . . . jesus christ is unchangeable , hebr. . . cited out of psal. . , . . christ is omniscient john . . he is the searcher of hearts , rev. . . he knows all things , iohn . . he is the wisedome of the father , cor. . . he doth of himselfe know the father , mat. . . and doth according to his own will reveal the secrets of his fathers bosome , and therefore is called the word , all the treasures of wisedome are in him , colos. . . the immensity of god belongs to christ ; for he is not contained in any place , who was before there was any place , and did create all places by his own power , iohn . , . whilst he was on earth in respect of his bodily presence , he was in the bosome of the father , which must be understood of his divine nature and person , iohn . . he did come down from heaven , and yet remained in heaven , iohn . . ii. christ doth performe the works of god , such proper and peculiar , such divine and supernaturall works as none but god can perform ; he did raise the dead by his own power at his own pleasure . john . , , . john . . he is called the resurrection and the life , because he is the authour of both : whatsoever the father doth , the son doth likewise . ioh. . , . he wrought miracles , he hath the same nature and power with the father , and therefore doth the same works : he doth regenerate our souls , pardon our sins , save our souls ; he hath appeased the wrath , and satisfied the justice of god , by his divine mediation ; he gives temporall , spirituall , eternall life . cor. . . iohn . . . iii. divine honour is due to jesus christ for , . all the glorious angels are commanded to worship him , heb. . . . all true christians are described by their calling on and believing in the name of christ , act. . . iohn . . . all are obliged to give the same honour to christ , which they are required to give to god the father , ioh. . . . examples every way warrantable , because agreeable to these precepts , are frequent in the word , act. . . . cor. . . rev. . . . baptisme is administred in the name and to the honour of christ , mat. . . , , . . at the day of judgement every knee must bow to him , and acknowledge him to be equall to his father , isa. , , , , . . compared with rom. . , , . phil. . , , , . . all that are justified do believe in him ; and they who do believe in him shall not be ashamed , rom. . , . pet. , , . . the apostolicall benediction so often repeated in the epistles . from whence i argue , since god will not give his glory to another , because he is true , isa. . . and cannot because he is just ; it followes , that though christ be a distinct person , yet he is not a distinct god from his father , but one and the same god with him , god blessed for ever . much more might be produced upon this argument : that which hath been said , is abundantly sufficient , if god set it home upon our spirits by his own spirit : but if men will not be perswaded by these scriptures , neither would they be perswaded though one should rise from the dead . in the next place i am to demonstrate the divine nature , person , titles , attributes , works , worship of the holy ghost . . the same eternall godhead doth subsist in the holy ghost , who is god blessed for ever . the holy ghost is a spirituall and infinite substance , subsisting with peculiar properties , and acting according to the counsel of his divine will. the apostle having distinguished betweene the spirit , and the gifts of the spirit , shews that the spirit it selfe , that one spiris l , that one and self-same spirit , doth work and distribute all those excellent gifts according as he pleases , cor. . . now , . these particularising and indigitating terms , that one , that same spirit . . the wi●● of the spirit . . the discriminating energ● or efficacy of the spirit , do all demonstrat● the subsistence of the spirit , & peculiarity 〈◊〉 his subsistence . when the spirit of truth 〈◊〉 come , he will guide iohn . . he saith no● it , but he , and therefore doth not speak 〈◊〉 an attribute , but a person , he &c. which is the more to be observed , because th● word in the originall which signifies spirit● is of the neuter gender , and yet our savior speaking of the spirit , saith he , to point out the peculiar subsistence or person of the spirit , when he the spirit of truth , &c. iohn . . and therefore we ought to take speciall notice of that expression ; and all those notes of particularity , cor. . applyed to the spirit , do shew that he is a particular , and undivided substance , one spirit , the same spirit , the self same spirit , one and the self same spirit , cor. . form the . v. to the . and that this spirituall particular undivided substance is a divine substance is evident , because it is said that the same spirit who doth work all in all is the same lord , and the same god. cor. . , . and lord in the new testament doth answer to iehovah in the old , as hath been proved above in this very chapter : when peter drew up a charge against ananias , he puts this question to him , why hath sathan filled thy heart to lie to the holy ghost ? thou hast not lyed unto men , but unto god , act. . , . the black and unpardonable sin is after a more speciall manner committed against the godhead subsisting in the holy ghost , and the peculiar office and dispensation of the holy ghost , then against the father or the son ; and that sin is in some respects pronounced the most grievous sin , mat. . . if the holy ghost were only the power of god , as socinians love to dream , that sin would not be so highly aggravated ; for it is not the highest and foulest aggravation of sin , to say it is committed against the power of god. the father , son and spirit have but one power , as they have one and the same nature ; and therefore the father is said to work in the son , and by the spirit ; and hence it is that christ is called the power of god , m cor. . . and the holy ghost is called the power of the most high , luk. . . because the power of the father , ( who is called the most high in opposition to the highest of creatures , ) doth reside in , is exercised and made manifest by the holy ghost , and especially manifested in that omnipotent work of the conception of our lord and saviour ; the very shadow of the holy ghost makes a virgin to conceive ; this miracle speaks him god. the holy ghost is jehovah , the great god , and king above all gods , as is evident by comparing , psal. . , , , , . with heb. . , . the spirit of iehovah is the god of israel , sam. . , . the people rebelled against jehovah , and tempted him in the wildernesse , deut. . . numb . . , . deut. . , . now that is meant of tempting and rebelling against the holy ghost , as well as against god the father and jesus christ , as is cleare , if you compare isa. . . heb. . , . with the places alledged . the holy ghost is that jehovah who made the new covenant with his chosen people , ierem. . . compared with heb. . , . the holy ghost is that jehovah who spake by isaiah the prophet ; compare isa. . , . with acts . , . we might argue in like manner , from levit. . . &c. compared with heb. . , . and severall other places , num , . . heb. . , pet. . . cor. . , . the omnipotence of the spirit is clearly proved , because he worketh all in all , according to the counsell of his will , and worketh miracles , which transcend not only the common course and order , but the whole power of nature , cor. . , , , . such are the raising of the dead , rom. . . the regeneration and sanctification of our souls , tit. . . cor. . . and therefore he is called the holy ghost , because the father and the son do according to divine dispensation sanctify us by the operation of the holy ghost . moreover the holy ghost did teach the prophets and apostles , and lead them into all truth , he overshadowed the virgin , &c. iohn . . acts . . pet. . . and pet . . the holy ghost is the great god and creatour of all things psal. . . . heb. . the holy ghost is omniscient ; for he knowes the deep things of god , and the secrets of men ; he inspired the prophets and apostles , and moved them to reveale the mysteries of faith and godlines , cor. . . . and pet. . . pet. . . rom. . . rev. . . the holy ghost is omnipresent , he dwels in all saints as in a temple , he repaires , adornes , beautifies his temple , and acts in every single saint , as the spirit of disobedience acts in children of wrath : we cannot flie from the presence of the spirit because he is omnipresent , psal. . . by what hath been already written , it is evident that the holy ghost hath the titles and attributes of god , he doth performe works proper to god ; and that devine honour is due unto him , i shall clearly prove because it is denyed by the blasphemous wits of this discoursing age . the holy ghost who spake by isaiah the prophet , is worshipped by the angels of god , as is most evident by comparing isa. . . . with acts . . the whole church of god is exhorted to worship the holy ghost as the great god , as jehovah , as our make ; to how down and kneel before him , that is , to give him divine worship both inward and outward , because he is our god , as appears by comparing , psa. . . . . with heb. . , . . the apostle gives divine honour to the holy ghost when he appeals to him as to the searcher of hearts , rom. . . and the holy ghost who speaks to the churches , joynes with the son of god ( who speaks to them also ) in searching of the heart and reines , revel . . . . . and all the churches are commanded to hearken to both as unto god blessed for ever . our soules and bodies are said to be the temples of god because they are the temples of the holy ghost ; and therefore we are commanded to worship and glorify the holy ghost with our souls and bodies ; for the spirit doth dwell in his temple that he may be worshiped in his temple . the temple is a profane place , if there be no worship there ; and it is , must be , pure , holy and spirituall worship , and sacrifice , such as the holy spirit delights in ; else the temple will be defiled , destroyed . compare , cor. . . , . cor. , , . cor. . . . and cor. . . the church is blessed in the name of the holy ghost as in the name of god , and the communion of the holy spirit is spirituall and saving as well as the speciall grace of christ , and love of the father , as appeares by that solemn apostolicall benediction , cor. . . and the beloved disciple proclames the spirit to be the fountaine of grace and peace as well as the father of jesus christ , and therfore doth beg grace and peace of the spirit of grace ( who doth purify and pacify our hearts ) for all the churches , revel . . . the holy ghost doth regulate all churches and church-affaires . acts . . acts . . acts . baptisme is administred in the name and for the honour of the holy ghost . matth. the holy ghost doth bestow upon us , and work in us those spirituall and glorious blessings which are sealed in or conveyed by baptisme , and therefore we are more especially baptized by the holy ghost . matth. . . iohn . ● . , for we are born of the spirit , regenerated , washed , renewed by the spirit , who purifies the soule as water doth the body , titus . , . the violation of the honour and worship of the holy ghost is most severely punished , mark . . hebr. . hebr. ● . . . and therefore there is speciall care taken in the holy scriptures both for the preservation and vindication of the honour of the holy ghost ; we must not grieve , vex , resist quench the holy ghost , that is , we must not displease him , we must not disobey him , we must obey his dictates , his motions , we must be quickened , taught , led , ruled , governed by him : we must attribute all the glorious titles to the holy ghost given him in scripture , of which we have so largely discoursed ; we must acknowledge him to be the spirit of truth , and therefore must beleeve in him ; the spirit of supplication , the spirit of grace and holinesse , and therefore love him and pray to him : we must either renounce our baptisme in his name , or else we must confesse that we are obliged to beleeve in him , reverence , love , obey , glorifie him with all inward and outward worship : for we are debtours to the spirit ▪ to live to the spirit , and glorifie the spirit of regeneration who works in us the instrument of justification , that there may be an effectuall application of christ to our souls ; though christ make the purchase , the spirit of adoption makes the assurance , he seals us up to the day of redemption , and therefore good reason have we to offer up our souls and bodies in a spirituall sacrifice to him ; for these temples were made for sacrifice ; rom. . , . pet. . , now if god who will not give his glory to another , because he is true and just , gives all this glory to the holy ghost , it concerns us to glorifie him . if there were not all this and a great deal more to be said for the honour of the holy ghost , yet it were an invincible argument to me if i could only say that the holy ghost is god , and therefore to be worshipped as god with divine worship ; the holy ghost is one with the father and the son , one god , and therefore all three are to be worshipped with the same divine worship . it were enough for such men as have not so much as heard whether there be any holy ghost , or no , acts . . to talk as the filthy dreamers and blasphemous hereticks of this rotten age usually doe , who belch out the language of hell against the spirit of grace ; and i cannot but wonder that subtile iesuites , arminians and socinians who pretend to study and search the scriptures , should say that there is nothing to be found in scripture concerning the worshipping of the holy ghost . that the spirit acts according to the counsell of his divine will , hath been sufficiently proved ; only it must be considered that as father , son and spirit have but one nature , so they have but one will. concerning the peculiar and personall properties of the holy ghost , i shall treat when i come to speak of the distinction of these subsistences . for conclusion of this chapter i am to prove that the godhead doth subsist in father , son , and spirit , all three without any multiplication of the godhead . the father and the son are but one god , iohn . . . i and my father are one . the father a , son and spirit , all three are but one god. john . . there is but one god. ephes. . . deut. . . isa. . . . isa. . . . nay there can be but one god ; there can be but one most perfect being , one infinite perfection ; the most perfect being is the most single being , and therefore father , son , and holy ghost are all three but one onely god ; they are consubstantiall , coequall , coeternall , they have one nature , minde , will , power , godhead : some b of the ancients who meant well , said there were three substances , but they meant three subsistences or persons , as hilary expounds them ; for , saith he , they did not intend to assert three different essences . hence it is , that such as were more wary in their expressions , did use the word subsistence , and said that there were three subsistences , but one substance or essence in this divine trinunity . this is the first of all the commandements , to acknowledge one only god , mark . . as there is but one mediatour to intercede , so there is but one god to justifie , and intercede unto for justification . tim. . . rom . . gal. . . it is one and the same god who commands heaven and earth , deut. . . isa. . . the gods of the heathens were false gods , dunghill-gods , or devill-gods : magistrates are but mortall gods ; they must die , and rise to judgment , and hold up their hand at the tribunal of jehovah , psal. . , . . psal. , . cor. . . i prove this point at large , because i perceive by mr. fry his sad account , we are much misconstrued in this weighty point , as if by acknowledging three distinct subsistences , we did create two new gods , and affirmed jesus christ and the holy ghost to be two distinct gods both from the father and from one another . but we are no c tritheites : we acknowledge a trinunity , as well as a trinity in opposition to the errour of the tritheites ; we believe the unity of the godhead ; and i never read of the trinity of the godhead in english , untill i read it in the title of mr. * fry his opinion , which he delivered to the house , and hath since printed and published to the world . d we do believe that god is one , most singly and singularly one , and an only one : the unity of the godhead is not a generical , or a specifical unity , but a most singular unity , which i need not call a e numerical unity , as some do ; i had rather call it the most single singular and perfect unity , as some profound divines do , who have told me what i have read in others , that i had need be very curious in the delivery of this weighty point . all the three persons have one and the same single and infinite godhead , and therefore must needs mutually subsist in one another , because they are all three one and the same infinite god. three consubstantial , coessential , coeternal , coequal persons , are distinguished , but not divided , are united , f but not confounded ; united in their g one nature , not confounded in their distinct subsistences ; nay though their subsistence is in one another , yet their subsistences are distinct , but their nature most h singularly the same ; nay the divine natur● is as i singular as any one of the single subsistences , and yet whatever is proper to the divine nature is k common to all three of these divine subsistences ; and the divine nature doth not subsist out of these three divine subsistences . but the more we deliver concerning the unity of the godhead , the more advantage do the socinians hope to gain for the justifying of their blasphemous dreams : for ●f this unity of the godhead be not only ●otionall but reall , and god is most singly and singularly one , and an onely one , as hath been proved ; why then say they , we will be bold to urge an invincible argument to prove that god the father alone is god , and therefore neither jesus christ nor the holy ghost is truly and properly god by nature . god the father alone is the onely true god ; but neither the son nor the holy ghost is god the father . ergo , neither the son nor the holy ghost is the only true god. for the proof of this proposition , that the father alone is the only true god , they cite some of those places which i have alleadged to prove the unity of the godhead ; but they lay most weight upon iohn . . behold , say they , a plain acknowledgment from the mouth of l jesus christ : christ doth acknowledge his father to be the onely true god , and therefore doth exclude both himselfe and the holy ghost ; for there is but one only god , and god the father alone is that only true god. these subtile hereticks are guilty of a pitifull piece of sophistry in the drawing up of this argument , which is more full of blasphemy then wit : for observe , . our saviour doth not say , [ that we may know m thee only to be the true god ] but [ that we may know thee the only true god : ] for as athanasius said well , we must know iesus christ to be the onely true god also ; because christ , and so the holy ghost also , is n one and the same god with the father ; all three persons are the only true god ; for though they o differ in subsistence , they do not differ in nature , they have all of them one and the same singular godhead , the self-same divine nature ; the father , son and holy ghost , are but one and the same infinite spirit , one jehovah , one god , who is the only true god , god blessed for ever . now it doth not follow that the father , son and spirit do differ essentially , because they differ personally : for these three are ●ne , john. . . one god , who is the onely ●rue god. the * father is the onely true god ; behold , the praedicate in that proposition is not personall , but essentiall , and ●very essentiall predicate belongs to all and ●very one of the three persons , because they have one and the same divine essence , and therefore the apo●●le saith these three are ●ne . . observe how the . of iohn and ● . verse is expounded by iohn himself , ● iohn . . and we know that the son of god is come , and hath given us an understanding that we may know him that is true , and we are in him that is true , in his son iesus christ. this is the true god and eternall life . now adde , iohn . this is life eternall to know thee the onely true god , &c. and then put all together thus , this is life eternall that they might know thee the onley true god and iesus christ whom thou hast ●sent . [ the onely true god ] for as iohn himself expounds this iesus christ is the true god and eternall life . iohn . . observe that iohn himself expound● this also of the p holy ghost ; for , father , son , and holy ghost are one onely god , ioh. . . these three are one ; and therefore i● doth not at all follow that the son and spirit are not the true god , because the father is the onely god ; for they are all three one and the same god , who is the onely god , the only true god. . observe that i do not ( as some learned men do ) onely affirm that the word [ onely ] is put there to q exclude false gods , but i say it doth also deny jesus christ , and the holy ghost to be different gods , other gods from god the father , because they are one and the same god with the father , as is evident in those two places iohn . . . cited before . those learned men doe well to exclude false gods , the socinians do ill to exclude the son and spirit who are the same god with the father ; [ onely ] doth exclude every false god ; but the son and spirit , are ( as the father is ) the onely true god , blessed for ever . the term [ onely ] doth not exclude any divine person , but it doth exclude all and every one of the creatures ; r because every divine person hath the same divine nature , but no creature is capable of the divine nature , unlesse we do understand it as pet. . . is to be understood , of the image of god , or having such an interest in the divine attributes , that god will exercise and put forth his wisdome , power , and all , for their everlasting good , and be himself their all sufficient reward , portion , and objective happinesse . and it is to be observed that the termes only and true , are both applied to the same part of the proposition , namely to the praedicate alone . . this is life eternall , to know thee : but the text saith , this is life eternall to know iesus christ also ; that is , this is the way and meanes for the obtaining of eternall life , and this is the s beginning of eternal life , to know , believe , love and obey jesus christ. but eternall life is perfected by knowing of god in heaven , not by faith but by sight . now t eternall life doth not consist in the knowledge , belief , or love of any meer creature ; and therefore the godhead of jesus christ is proved out of this very text , which they urge ( who deny his godhead ) to justifie their blasphemy in the denial of it . . eternall life doth consist in knowing of jesus christ , whom god hath sent to be our mediatour ; and this eternall life will be perfected in heaven , when the mediation of christ will have an end : and therefore it is the knowing of and believing in this mediatour as god satisfying for us , which makes us happy ; for he doth perfect the work of mediatour as god by his eternall spirit , that is his divine nature , heb. . . and by the bloud of god , act. . . by the sufferings of the lord of glory , cor. . . for he obtained eternall redemption for us by vertue of his eternall spirit , heb. . . . . to know jesus , that is , to know him as a saviour , as one that saves us from our sins , is to know him as a god , as one god with his father , as the true god & the only god ; according to that which we read isa. . , , , . that ye may know and believe and understand that i am he ; i even i am * iehovah , and beside me there is no saviour . and isa. . , , , , . there is no god else beside me . a just god & a saviour , there is none beside me . look unto me and be ye saved all the ends of the earth , for i am god , and there is none else . — to me every knee shall bow . — in jehovah have i righteousnesse . — in iehovah shall the seed of israel be justified . compare this with rom. . , and the socinians may as safely conclude that the●e is no other god but jesus christ , as they ma● conclude that there is no god but god the father , from the . of iohn . but they and we ought to conclude from these and the other scriptures mentioned before , that u iesus christ is not a different god from his father , but is one and the same god with him . these exclusive and restrictive terms [ one , and alone , &c. ] doe not then exclude any of those three who are one in nature and essence , though they differ in their manner of subsistence : for i cannot conclude from that ●ext , cor. . . to us there is but one god , the father , &c. that the father only is god ; no more then i can conclude from the words following in the very sam● verse [ and one lord jesus christ ] that christ only is lord , and so exclude the father from lordship as the socimans would exclude the son from the godhead . tim . , , . is urged by some to prove , that jesus christ only hath immortality : but they dare not conclude from thence , that god the father is not immortall . i read mat . . one is your master , even christ : but i must not conclude that the father is not our master ; for the father teaches , ioh. . . and the holy ghost was doctor , master , teacher even to the apostles themselves , ioh. . . ioh . . if that text tim. . , . be meant , as some conceive it is , of god the father ; yet i find the same titles given to jesus christ , rev. . . and therefore i conclude , that both are one and the same immortall god and king , ●im . . , , . joh. . . i read , cor. . . that the same god worketh all in all . & v. . that one and the self same spirit worketh all : but i dare not conclude from thence , that the spirit only is god , and that the father and the sonne work nothing at all . from these and many other such like expressions , we may safely conclude — . that these terms [ one , and only ] are not alwayes universally exclusive in the scripture sense , if all circumstances be duly considered and the scriptures rightly compared , cor. . . i only and barnabas ; the word [ only ] doth not exclude barnabas , but include him ; barnabas was joyned with paul ; but jesus christ is more nearly joyned with the father . ioh . . jesus was left alone ; but the woman was with him , all that were for her condemnation are excluded . king. . . there are two exclusive termes ; [ there was none followed the house of david but the tribe of iudah only ] and yet the tribe of benjamin adhered to david , as you may read in the next verse but surely the father , son , and holy ghost , are more closely united then the tribe of iudah was with the tribe of benjamin . deut. . . none should see the good land save caleb , but iosuah is joyned with him v. . and therefore he was not excluded . you see here is some union or conjunction still between the persons that are included ; but there is the highest union , nay , unity between the father , sonne , and spirit , because these three are one in nature , and that nature most simply single , and singularly one . . when the term only , or any the like term is applied to the divine nature , or to any divine * title , attribute , or work a , the father , son and holy ghost being one in nature , cannot be divided or separated by that exclusive terme , though there is a personal difference between them , and a speciall order and dispensation to be observed amongst them , as we shall hereafter prove . but the intent of the holy ghost is to exclude all that are not gods by nature , as the apostle speaks , gal. . . from the godhead , and from laying any claim to the naturall attributes of god , or pretending to do any work that is proper and peculiar to god. the true and living god is opposed to idols , thes. , . but jesus christ and the holy ghost are to be acknowledged and served as one● rue and living god with the father . the living god , the god of truth , and king of eternity , is opposed to those counterfeit gods , jer , , . and therefore when the apostle saith there is no other god but one , cor. . he tells you whom he doth exclude , such as are but conceited gods , so called and so reputed , equivocal gods , v. , . the lord jesus and the holy ghost are god by nature , the same god with the father , and therefore they are not excluded . in like manner , when it is said that iehovah alone did lead the people in the wildernesse , and cond●ct them unto canaan , that exclusive particle is put to exclude strange gods , such as were then idolized , but were indeed no gods , as is most evident , deut. . . so iehovah alone did lead him , and there was no strange god with him : but these strange gods who are here excluded , were no gods , as is cleare by comparing the . and . verses of the same chapter . i have already proved that the title of iehovah is given both to christ and the holy spirit , and therefore when it is said , iehovah alone did lead them in the wildernesse , the son and spirit are not excluded ; for the spirit did instruct and guide them in the wildernese , nehem. . . and the spirit did instruct their teachers also ; but they rebelled against the spirit isa. . . and iesus christ the angel of gods presence was present with them to guide them exod . . the b name of god , and the nature of god is in him , for he is to pardon sin , or punish as ●e pleases . our saviour is called the onely lord , and , the onely wise god. iude epistle . in the , and . verses ; but the father is not thereby excluded from being god , for he is the onely wise god also : ●im . and therefore by the same reason the father is the onley true god and the son and spirit are the very same onely true god also . when our saviour presses that text mat. . . thou shalt worship the lord thy god , and him only shalt thou serve ; he doth not exclude himself , or the holy ghost ; for both are to be worshipped with divine worship , as hath been already proved at large in this very chapter . c many other proofs might be produced from other scriptures , and divers other arguments colle●ed from the . of iohn , to prove that jesus christ is not excluded from being the same only god with his father . to know christ who is god , and annointed of god , heb. , psal. . to know christ whom thou hast sent ; e●go he was a divine person before he was sent to take the humane nature , and he had eternal glory with his father before the world was , iohn . . na● his calling of god father , makes him equall with god ; nay , he is not only equall to , but one with his father , ioh. . . ioh . . moreover , if the father have not a divine and eternal son how is he a divine and eternal father ? finally , if the father son , and holy ghost are not all three the same true god , there is no god , for these three are one , and therefore all three are one god , or else there is no god at all : from whence it will follow , that if we will be socinians , we must be atheists . the son and spirit have the same nature with the father ; and therefore if his nature be divine , so is theirs . chap. v. the manner of god's being or subsisting in the father , sonne and h. ghost , is the best manner of being that is or can be , and the single godhead is thereby thrice illustrious throughout the wo●ld . hitherto we have contended for the truth of this divine being or subsisting : now ●e shall demonstrate the excellency thereof . god is made known to us as the everlasting father of our lord iesus christ , and is to be adored & a worshipped as the father of our lord iesus , rom. . . ephes. . . cor. . if god had been the father of men and father of angels only , and not the father of our lord jesus , he would not have been so exceeding glorious as now he is : for angles have but a sinite excellency ; but when he begets a son equall to himself , without any change in himself ; and the begetting of this glorious person , is as eternal as the divine nature it self ; this mysterie is exceeding glorious and admirable , and like the godhead incomprehensible . moreover , the lord iesus christ his own son , rom. . . and his only son begotten by eternal generation , ioh. . . being the b illustrious brightnesse of the fathers glory , and the expresse character of his subsistence , is so exceeding glorious , that the most glorious angels above are commanded to adore and worship him , heb. . , , , . for to which of the angels said god at any time , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee ? and therefore when he brings his first-begotten , and his only begotten son into the world , he saith , and let all the angels of god worship him . behold how the godhead shines gloriously not only in one single person , but in father and son both , by this manner of subsistence ; that every tongue may confesse iesus christ to be god and lord , to the glory of god the father . and therefore the father is not lessened or robbed of his glory , by the glory of his coequal son , phil. . . . but there is a pious acknowledgment made of this glorious mysterie , which doth very much redound to the glory of god the father . for by this meanes god the father is acknowledged to be the first personall principle subsisting of himself , and by himself ; for he received not his subsistence from any other , and he gives subsistence unto two glorious persons equall with him●elf . the socinians seem to be very zealous for the glory of god the father ; and therefore they deny the godhead of christ and the hol● spirit , to the glory of god the father , as they pretend : but the scripture teaches us the contrary , namely to confesse the godhead of christ and the holy spirit to the glory of god the father for it doth exceedingly redound to the glory of the father , that he gives subsistence unto two glorious persons who are equall to himself , and yet receives no subsistence from them , or any other . for as the father hath life in himself , so hath he given to the son to have life in himself , joh , . there is a subsisting life given to the son by an eternal generation ; and the c father hath life in himself , and self-subsistence also . and yet on the other side , it is no dishonour to the son to be begotten of the father , and to receive subsisting life from the father ; for the son hath life in himself also , and being god of himself , quickens whom he will by his divine power even as the father doth ; for he hath the very same power and will which the father hath , because they have both one and the same divine nature ; and therefore the jewes did conclude a●ight , when they said , that our lord iesus made himself equall with god by saying he was the son of god , ioh . . it is no dishonour to jesus christ to d receive subsisting life in such a glorious way from the ●ather , as that he is equall with the father , nay one with the father , and therefore is to be worshipped with one and the same worship with the father , with divine and spiritual worship , inward and outward worship the worship of our bodies and soules , of our whole man. for all men are bound to honour the son , as they honour the father , joh. . . and let all socinians take speciall notice of what followes : he that honoureth not the son , honoureth not the father which hath sent him ; joh. . . ●et them not then pretend , that they dishonour the son ( by denying his godhead ) to the glory of god the father ; for the father will maintain and vindicate the honour of his first-begotten , and only begotten sonne . and let them diligently consider that text in the . epist. of iohn . whosoever transgresseth and abideth not in the doctrine of christ , hath not god ; he who abideth in the doctrine of christ , he hath both the father and the son. it is for the honour of our great ruler iesus christ , that he was begotten from the dayes of eternity , mic. . . finally , it doth much redound to the glory of the father and the son , that both do concur to give subsisting life to the coequal spirit by eternal spiration . the father and son do both breathe forth this glorious spirit . the spirit of elohim , of both persons , gen. , . the spirit that proceeds from the father , ioh. . . is sent by christ from the father , and the spirit is given by christ. e christ breathed upon the apostles , when he gave the holy ghost to them , to shew that the spirit was breathed forth by himself as well as from the father , ioh. . . and he is often called the spirit of the son. the holy ghost doth receive of that which is christs , as well as the fathers , ioh. . , . and christ is glorified by the spirit , ioh. . . as the father is glorified by christ. for christ receives from the father , & the spirit from christ , what they both reveale to the church of christ. nor is it any dishonour to the spirit to proceed from the father and the son in such a glorious way as to be equall with them , nay one with them ioh. . . for all the churches of christ are obliged by the first sacrament of christianity , to honour the holy ghost with their bodies and souls , which are his * holy temple as they honour the father and the son. the spirit of ●ehovah is the god of israel . sam . , . f the holy ghost , as he is one god with the father and the son , hath an infinite essence , which doth exist of it self ▪ though as he is the third person , he hath not subsistence from himself , but by emanation , procession , spiration from the father and the son ; and yet both concurre to build a temple to the holy spirit that he may be worshipped as god. these three , father , son , and holy ghost , do take mutual delight , content , and satisfaction in one another ; the distinction between them is not g absolute , but relative only they do mutually subsist in one another , and all of them subsist in the same glorious godhead , which godhead dwells equally in its fulnesse in all three , and is as truly the nature of the holy ghost , as it is the nature of the father and the son. and this divine nature is infinite , not h included in , or excluded from any place . the divine i works , whereby the glory of the godhead is so much manifested unto 〈◊〉 are performed by the godhead subsisting in the holy ghost as well as in the father and the son : for all the works of god upon or about the creature for their creation , sustentation or regulation are inseparably united ; as k ●ugustine often argues , and the schoolmen from him : all things are of the father * by the son and through the spirit , cor. . . iohn . . iohn . . gen. . . cor. . , . ephes. . . so that by the majesty of all three shining in the word and the joynt concurrence of all three in every work that is properly divine , the godhead is made thrice l illustrious thorowout the world , and yet the godhead remains singly and singularly one in all three subsistences . finally the m naturall and infinite perfection of the godhead requires this wonderfull communication of subsistence by the father as the first personall principle to the son , and by the ●ather and the son to the holy ghost . for it is most certain that god is not capable of any other being , or any other maner of being or subsisting then what he hath , for he hath the n best being that is , nay the best that can be , because the being of god and the manner of being or subsisting of the godhead in these three , father , son , and holy ghost , is infinitely perfect , and there can be no better being , or manner of being or subsisting then that which is perfect , infinite , and infinitly perfect . the father did not arbitrarily beget his sonne , nor did the father and the sonne arbitrarily concur in breathing forth the holy ghost , but the naturall and infinite perfection of the godhead did require this wonderfull communication of it self , because such is the naturall perfection of the divine nature or godhead , that it could not be fully communicated , unlesse subsistence were communicated by the father to the son , and by both to the spirit for their mutuall , eternall , infinite satisfaction and delight ; and therefore the father did not beget his son , nor did the father and son breath forth the spirit arbitrarily , but naturally and necessarily , though voluntarily for the eternall satisfa●●ion of all three susistences , that the whole godhead might be in every one of these three according to its infinite o perfection , and all three subsist in the unity of the godhead , and dwell in one another , mutually possess , love & glorifie one another from everlasting to everlasting , because all three are coessential , coequal , coeternal ▪ every one of the persons , the third as well as the first , being god by p nature , gal . . and not by the meere favour of any one or more of the coessentiall persons . and therefore both the generation of the son and breathing forth of the spirit must needs be q eternall , because both are naturall : for whatsoever is naturall unto god must needs be eternall : but because the father is the first r personall principle of subsisting life , all is from him by the son. cor. . . and all is referred back again to him as the first personall principle , even by the son , iohn . . in regard of the fathers self subsistence , his order of subsisting , and his communicating f subsistence to the son and holy ghost , though all things in the world are wrought by the spirit also as hath been shewen : and hence it is that the name of god is most s familiarly given to the fa●ther both in the old and the new testament , ●hough father , son and holy ghost are all equally god , nay are t one and the same god , who is the only true god blessed for ever . we may then look upon the son , admire and blesse the father , look upon the father and blesse the son , look upon father and son and blesse the spirit , look upon all three , admire and blesse , adore and love , u know , beleeve and obey all three coequal persons , subsisting in the same most single godhead , and have accesse to the father through the son , and by the spirit with reverence and confidence , zeal and love . chap. vi. the divine subsistence being the most excellent subsistence that is or can be , the word subsistence or person cannot be attributed after the same manner to god , angels and men. it is not my businesse at this time to make any metaphysicall distinction between the persons of men and angels ; b●● i desire to distinguish between created an● uncreated persons ▪ because uncreated persons subsist in one single and infinite ess●nce ▪ it may seem strange to some metaphysical wits that one person , and much more th●● three distinct persons should subsist in o●● single and undivided essence ; but these discoursing wits do not distinguish betwee● created and uncreated persons . . 〈◊〉 ground their faith on scholastical subtiltie● ▪ . do not study the holy scriptures wi●● humility and faith , and beg a blessing o● their studies by fervent prayer ▪ for they might read in the scriptures of a divin● person subsisting in the divine nature . phil . . being in the forme of god , &c. that is subsisting in the nature of god , because it presently follows , that therefore he thought it no robbery to be equall with god ; for persons that are coessentiall 〈◊〉 needs be coequall ; christ and his father do both subsist in the same divine essence , for christ is the expresse image of his fathers subsistence , and he and his father are one , one in essence , iohn . . heb. . . we find this interpretation was received in the time of a iustinian the emperour , and therefore it is not an interpretation lately coined . because it is said [ who being in the forme of god , ] the holy ghost doth demonstrate the hypostasis or subsistence of the word in the essence of god. and because it is said that he took upon him the forme of a servant , it signifies that god the word , [ that is god the son , ] is united with the nature , not the subsistence or person of man. he did subsist in the nature of god , but he did assume the nature of man , and therefore christ hath a divine subsistence , no humane person ; no humane b person subsists in the nature of man ; nor doth the person of an angel subsist in the nature of an angel ; but the divine person of christ doth subsist in his divine nature , nay all the three persons do subsist in the single and infinite nature of god. from whence i conclude that there is not onely a manifest , but an infinite difference between created and uncreated subsistences or persons ; and i speak of c persons , rather then personalities , because those abstract notions are not very well understood by the most discoursing men ; for even they acknowledge that d abstracts are not well , or not happily understood , unlesse you descend to the consideration of their subjects . my purpose therefore upon most mature deliberation , is , . to distinguish between created and uncreated persons . . to treat of uncreated persons rather then personalities , that is to treat of the three persons not abstracted from , but subsisting in the divine nature . i will not speak simply of the son , as a son in that abstract relation , or of the son as a person , or as the second person , by abstracting his personality from the divine nature in which he subsists ; but i desire to speak of iesus christ , as subsisting in the nature of god , according to that expression of the apostle , phil. . . who subsisting in the nature of god. for i am resolved to follow the scripture , and i do not think it safe to abstract the incommunicable subsistence of christ , from the divine nature in which he subsists , least i fall into vain speculations , as many learned men have done . now if you take in the divine nature of christ , ( and there is the same reason of all three persons , because all have the same divine nature ) there will be i say not only a manifest , but an infinite difference between the person of christ , and the person of the most glorious angel in heaven . they who have long studied the most refined and curious part of metaphysicks , when they come to discourse of the distinction between a singular nature and a person , are forced to confesse that they do confine their speech to created natures and persons , because e there is even almost nothing evident to them by the light of reason , concerning the divine nature and uncreated persons . and therefore on the other side , it well becomes me to confine my discourse to uncreated persons , because there is so vast a difference between them , and the most excellent of all created persons ; only something i must say of created persons , that by comparing them with uncreated persons , i may demonstrate wherein they agree , and wherein they differ . boetius relates , that when there was an epistle of the councell of chalcedon read , in which there was this orthodox position , that iesus christ is a single person , and yet there are two distinct natures in his single person ; boethius desired the learned men then present , to assigne the difference between a singular nature , and a person , and no man , saith he , was able to tell me the difference , or to declare what a person was . but though boethius smiled at the ignorance of others , yet he was not wise f enough to conceal his own ; for he defines a person thus ; a person g is the undivided substance of a rationall nature . i am not at leasure to reckon up the defects of this imperfect definitiō . vasquez is bold to say that aristotle knew not how to distinguish a person from a singular nature . and there is no doubt but very h wise men have erred grossely in this point for want of studying , ● ▪ the state of the soule in its separation from the body . . the humane nature of christ assumed without any humane person . . the difference between the divine nature , and persons which subsist in it . i believe aristotle did not study the first so exactly as he should have done ; and i am sure he knew nothing of these two last most considerable points . i shall not stand to shew the vanity of i laurentius valla , who seems to forget all his elegancies when he comes to discourse of a person , and drawes his arguments from the flourishes of an oratour , or the severall passions , humours , relations , conditions , or offices of men that are personated upon a stage ; and therefore this whiffler deserves to be hissed off from his stage , for he doth only make sport for atheists and familists by such ridiculous discourse . and he is sufficiently absurd , when he stoops so low as to say , that a person is a quality , and that there is a triple quality in god. and k scaliger shewed his critical skill in divinity to purpose , when he was so foolish as to say that a person doth not signifie a substance , but a quality . l bellarmine is orthodoxe in this point , and proves at large that the word person doth usually signifie a substance , in very approved authors both sacred and profane . well may we then say , that the church of god hath not offended the curious eares of such as are the great masters of language the oratours , civilians , grammarians and others , when they say that a divine person doth at least connote the substance or nature of god ; and the self-same substance being in all three persons , it doth not follow as gostavius , or mr. fry would have it , that there are three substances in the godhead , because there are three persons subsisting in the godhead ; for the substance or nature is the same in all three persons , father , son , and holy ghost . and we speak of the substance of the persons , when we describe them , not that we may shew wherein they differ , but that we may shew wherein all three persons agree . and if we should abstract the personality of these uncreated persons from their divine substance or nature , when we describe them , we should seem to rob them of their divinity even in the very description of them . we must not say that a divine person is a meer m relative propriety , or a pure manner of being , existing , or subsisting : for every person is god , and all three persons but one jehovah , one god. they do imprudently destroy the divine and coessential trinunity , who affirme the holy trinity to be nothing else but three proprieties or three manners of subsisting . for what is that consubstantial trinunity , of which the ancients speak , but the single and infinite substance or essence of three divine subsistences or persons ? if you leave out the divine essence or substance out of the definition , how is it a consubstantial or coessential trinunity ? the father , son , and holy ghost , all three do a naturally subsist in the same divine and undivided nature . i must therefore describe divine persons as divine persons , when i am to put a difference between them & uncreated persons ; and if i describe them as divine persons , i must not abstract their personal proprieties frō their divine nature , though what is b personal may in some sense be affirmed to be naturally due to that particular person . but besides those personal c proprieties or characters whereby the father , son and h. ghost do appear even to our weak understanding , to be three distinct subsistences ; the whole and undivided d godhead dwells in every one of these three subsistences , though it do subsist after a different manner in every one of the three . the father is god subsisting after that peculiar manner , which is proper to the father : now that peculiar manner of subsisting superadded to the divine nature , doth make a true distinction between the father , and the other two subsistences , but it makes no composition at all , either in the father , or in the godhead . hence e it is that divers profound and orthodox writers maintain , that a divine person is nothing else but the very divine essence it self modificated . give me leave to explain this abstruse notion a little , by giving an instance in the . personal principle , god the father . god the father is the first person of the godhead distinguished from the son and spirit ( who are one and the same god with him ) by his peculiar maner of subsistence , singular relation , & incommunicable properties . here is , as they love to speak , the f divine essence modificated with a peculiar manner of subsistence , a singular relation and incommunicable properties . what this peculiar manner of subsistence , singular relation , and incommunicable properties are , i shal demonstrate when i come to treat of the distinction of these divine subsistences in the very next chapter . i hope i need say no more to prove , that a divine person doth at least connote the substance , essence , nature of god ; and therefore it will not be safe to abstract the personality of an uncreated subsistence , from that single and infinite nature which is one and the same in all three subsistences . i do not find the most raised g metaphysical wits very forward to define or describe a personality ; but they speak of a person in concreto , of a subsistent rather then a subsistence ; and of a suppositum , rather then an abstract suppositality . the imperfect definition of boethius is commonly too commonly received in the schooles ; and he saith , a person is an undivided substance . they who have studied the point more exactly , and correct his definition , do all agree that a person is an undivided substance , an understanding substance , a complete , incommunicable , independent substance , which doth not depend upon any thing else by way of inhaesion , adhaesion , union , or any other way , for its sustentation . this is the general and h common opinion . i know there are some private opinions , as i may call them , concerning the formality of a person ; which i shall but point at , and easily confute with the light & gentle touch of a running pen. it is very absurd to say that a person is made compleat in his subsistence by any i accidents or any formality arising from an heap of accidents , because a person is the most perfect substance , and therefore cannot be made complete by any accidental subsistence ; there is a manifest contradiction in that ridiculous expression . k aristotle saith that singular substances do subsist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most properly , principally , perfectly ; to subsist by its self , is the most perfect kind of subsistence ; and that cannot be said to subsist by it self , which doth subsist by an heap of accidents . others say that a person is completed by a meer l negation , but subsistence is positive , though subsistence may be described by some expressions that are negative . the second person of the trinity doth supply and performe all that an humane person can performe to the humane nature of christ. now to say that the divine person of christ doth supply the room of a m negation , and do all that a negation can do , is to say it doth very little or nothing at all . finally , some say that a person is completed by the n existence of its nature . but it is cleare that a soule in the state of separation doth exist , and yet that soule is not a person , nay never was a person at the first instant of its creation or union . and it will be most absurd to say , that the humane nature was assumed by christ , and hypostatically united without or before the existence of that nature , because it was united before it had any humane subsistence , and consequently before it had any existence , if that subsistence be nothing else but existence , as these discoursers suppose . but it is high time to leave pursuing of these wanderers ; for it is cleare , that subsistence is a positive and substantial mode , because the most perfect manner of being , which we expresse as well as we can , when we say , a person doth subsist by it self , without union unto , or dependance upon any thing else for its sustentation ; nay , that it is uncapable of any such union , though it be for the present in a state of separation . and therefore the schoolmen usually say , quod subsistit per se , nec est nec esse potest in alio , ullo modo ; quia subsistere per se sumitur pro perfectissimo modo subsistendi per se. it is evident by what hath been said , that even created persons are defined by their substance or nature which is in stead of a genus when we define a person in concreto ; and when we speak o● the formality of a person , we say it is a substantial mode , and the most perfect manner of subsisting ; and therefore a created person is not completed by any quality or accident whatsoever . now if a created person be a substance , and the formality of a created person be substantial , i have no ground to abstract a divine person from the divine substance or essence , because a divine person cannot be separated from the divine nature ; as the humane nature may be from an humane person ; and though a praecisive abstraction doth not lay any ground either for a rational negation , or a reall separation ; yet if the divine nature be not considered and taken notice of in the description of every divine person , men will be apt to conceive that the divine nature and persons may be separated . the scripture doth not present any such abstract notion of the father , son , or holy ghost unto us , but teaches us to consider them as divine persons , that is , persons that have a divine nature ; for else we should make a a trinity of modes , no trinunity ; a b trinity without god or godhead , and give our adversaries cause to say what they have said , without cause , contrary to their own principles as well as ours ; e● trinitatem sine deo ! for even they themselves acknowledge the first person of the blessed trinity to be god. it is our wisest course therefore to describe every person as a divine person , as god , and acknowledge all three persons to be one and the same god , according to the scriptures . for we must not only consider three personalities , but three c persons , and the same single godhead in all three persons , and all three persons in the godhead . i must not treat of the first person simply as a father , but as a divine and eternal father , as god the father , rom. . . ephes. . . coloss. . . joh. . . for god is to be so considered as he is to be worshipped by us , and we are not to worship an abstract personality without reference to the godhead . we must consider what is common , as well as what is incommunicable ; we must treat of that which is absolute , as well as of that which is relative ; and whilest we speak of a trinity of persons , we must not forget the vnity of the essence , that so we may not hold forth a trinity of modes without d the godhead , or tempt weak heads to dream of a trinity of gods. judicious mr. calvin did not think fit to discourse much of created persons , and therefore described none but a divine person ; and he would not adventure to abstract an uncreated personality from the divine nature in which every of the three uncreated persons doth subsist . in our most accurate definition of any created nature , which we are best acquainted with , we judge it reasonable to take in that which the nature defined hath common with other natures , as well as that which is proper to it alone . and certainly it is very fit , in our description of every divine person , to take in the nature which is common to all three persons , and not only what is proper and peculiar to any one . i call a person ( saith calvin ) a subsistence in the essence of god. and then he descends to take notice of the relation of a divine person to the rest of the co-essential persons , and his distinction from them by some incommunicable property . it will be a very dangerous attempt then to treat of the divine persons in such abstract expressions as do only hold forth some curious notions about the relation of these persons to , and distinction from one another , without taking notice that all three persons 〈◊〉 coeternall and coequall , because coessential ▪ if we will discourse soberly of the godhead , we must speak of it as one single infinite perfection common to father , son , and holy ghost , to all three , and none other the single godhead , the whole godhead is i● every single person , and it is common to a● three in a singular and glorious way . for the divine nature is not communicated to these three , as a genus to its species , for it i● undivided and indivisible ; nor as a speci●● to its individua , for it is not multiplicable nor as a totum or whole to its parts , fo● the godhead hath no parts , it is impartible , and as hath been said , indivisible ; nay the godhead is not communicated so to any one person , as a created nature to● created person , which may be separate● from a created subsistence ; for the divin● nature cannot possibly be separated from all , or any one of the divine subsistence● or persons . and therefore we must no● discourse of the godhead in such a notional way , as if the godhead did exist out o● the three persons without any relative subsistence ; for that is clearly to dream of som● strange absolute god , who is neither father , son , nor holy ghost . when we describe the godhead according to our be● understanding , we dare not abstract it from the three persons ; but say , that ▪ the godhead is one single , spiritual , infinite essence , in which the father , son , and holy ghost do subsist . and when we describe a divine person , it is absurd to abstract the personality from the divine nature ; for how can you describe a divine person , if you do abstract his personality from his divinity . every single person is god , nay every single person is the godhead , the nature , the essence of god , considered with that subsistence , relation , and propriety which is peculiar to that person . every single person is god of himself , deus non est per alind deus . finally , ●ake all the three persons together , and ●hey are nothing else but one god ; and ●hey are one god , not absolutely consider●d in his abstract nature , but relatively considered with those peculiar relations , ●nd incommunicable properties whereby ●he three persons are distinguished from one another . when the a name of god is ●aken essentially or commonly in scrip●ure , we say it doth belong to all three persons , because it is spoken without any determination or restriction to any one particular person , as iohn . . god is a spirit , mat. . . mat. . . there is none good but god. these places must needs be interpreted of all three persons ; for it is certain , that christ did not by these speeches exclude himself or the holy spirit from being good , or being worshipped . and when the name of god is taken personally or singularly in scripture , we say it is understood of one person by a synechdoche , because though the other persons may be excluded from what is proper and peculiar to any one person , because it is personal , and therefore incommunicable , yet they cannot be excluded from any thing that is essential , because the same divine essence is common to all . now the title of god is essentiall ; and what hath been said of that , is true of all essential titles and attributes : but personal relations , properties , and actions , are all peculiar , as we shall shew at large in the next chapter . all that i need inferre from hence for the present is , that when we describe the divine nature , we should not abstract it from the three persons ; and when we describe a divine person , we should not abstract him from the divine nature . when the scripture speaks of created persons , it doth not abstract the personality from the singular substance or nature . when the apostle saith , cor. . . that thanks shall be given by many persons , he doth not mean many personalities , but many humane singular substances ; thanks should be given by a multitude of men , particular men . actiones sunt suppositorum , non suppositalitatum . in like manner when we read that christ is the character of his fathers person , heb. . . the word is subsistence ; the meaning is not , that the son is the character or expresse image of the fatherhood of the first person ; for christ doth not beget a son , as the father doth ; but christ is the image of the subsistent , ( that is ) of god the father , and not of the mere subsistence or personality , as it is abstracted from the divine nature . jesus christ hath two natures in one single person : now that person is a divine person , the second person of the godhead ; and if i describe the person of jesus christ , i may abstract his person from his humane nature , and not mention that nature , which doth infinitely differ from his divine person : but i must not abstract the person of christ from his divine nature , because he hath no other then a divine person , which cannot be separated from , ( and should not be described without consideration , and mention of ) the divine nature . for this second person is not barely considered as a person , or as a second person , but as a divine person , as the second person of the godhead , as the naturall , coessential , coequal , coeternal son of god as his own son , his first begott●● son , his only begotten son. rom. . . ioh. . . and therefore he must be considered as god , the true god. god blessed for ever , ioh. . . . . rom. . . ioh. . . and therefore he must be described as god 〈◊〉 himself ; for the son is iehovah , as hath been proved and we are obliged to believe in the son as well as in the father , ioh. . ● . iesus christ is one and the same god with the father . now papists and socinians wi●● both confesse , that the father is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 god of himself ; and therefore it will follow that the son * is god of himself . if the godhead of the son were begotten , and the godhead of the father unbegotten , there would be two distinct godheads in the father and the son , the one begotten , and the other unbegotten . take it thus the● in brief : the second person † of the godhead is the only begotten son of god subsisting i● the unbegotten nature of god ▪ because he is the naturall and coessentiall son of god the father , and therefore hath one and the same unbegotten nature with the father ; the subsistence of the son is begotten , but the divine nature of the son is unbegotten . the holy ghost is an infinite spirit , coessential with the father and the son , and not a mere subsistence proceeding from both ; and yet he is distinguished from both by his personal relation and incommunicable property . these grounds being laid for a foundation , it is easie to build on , and inferre — . that the father , son , and holy ghost , are not mere personalities , but divine persons . . a divine person is not a quality or any other accident , but an infinite substance subsisting after the most perfect , and glorious manner that is , or can be . . the divine nature being infinite , doth contain all manner of perfection within it self , both absolute and relative ; and therefore the relations which are between the divine persons , are naturall , perfect , divine . . the divine nature cannot be separated from all ▪ or any one of the divine persons . . these three divine persons are one and the same god , one infinite spirit ; and therefore they are coessential , coequal , coeternal . . these three divine persons are distinguished ( as shall be shewen in the next chapter ) but cannot be divided or separated either from the divine nature , or from one another , because they do al● three subsist in the divine nature , and in one another ; for they have one and the same single and infinite nature , and are one infinite spirit , the same omnipresent god. . the * word [ * subsistence ] is a consecrated word , which as we find upon record in the holy scripture , is fit to be made use of when we speak of that divine manner of being which the father , son and holy ghost have in the godhead and in one another . the heathen oratour could say , verbis consecratis utendum ; he meant words that were consecrated by the use and approbation of classical authors ; but i mean , words consecrated by the holy ghost . the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render subsistence , and by way of analogie , person ; hath many a other significations ; but when it is used on this occasion , upon this subject , we may after so many disputes about this argument , easily understand the proper , and consecrated importance of the word . we may take warning by the mistakes of others , and avoid those rocks on which others have suffered shipwrack . some who understand that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did signifie essence , were offended with such as said there were three hypostases in god ; because according to that signification of the word , to say that there are three hypostases in god , is to say that there are three essences in god and consequently , that there are three gods. it is readily acknowledged that the c word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth sometimes signifie the nature or essence of a thing , not the generical or specifical nature in their latitude and abstract universality , but the nature d truly existing , and subsisting in the world . this acception of the word may , all things duly considered and soberly expounded , be admitted , with some grains of allowance for the infinite difference which is between created , and uncreated subsistents . for if hypostasis be described in concreto , for which we have with invincible reason contended all along this chapter , then e hypostasis doth connote the divine nature , and signifies not an abstract subsistence , but a complete subsistent . when i say that jesus christ is the character of his fathers subsistence , i do not ( as i have formerly shewn ) understand it thus , that jesus christ is the character of his fathers abstract personality , but he is the character of god the father ; i take in the divine nature . but you must then consider that the glory of the trinunity must be preserved in this acception ; for there is not a new nature in every one of the three but the divine nature which is connoted in these three hypostas●s is the very same ; there is the glory of the mysterie which dazles the eye of carnal reason ; and therefore whatever we say on this argument , must be taken cum granosalis and expounded 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because of the infinite difference between a finite and infinite nature , and between created and uncreated persons , as i shall ( god willing ) shew at large before i conclude this chapter . three persons may , and do subsist in one and the same infinite nature : and therefore though e●ery f hypostasis doth connote the divine nature , yet all ● here connote one and the same infinite g nature in which all three persons do h subsist . to subsist , is ( as aristotle the great interpreter expounds it ) to have the most perfect manner of being by it self , that a substance the best of beings can attain to ; and it is very proper to say , that the father son and holy ghost have the most perfect manner of subsistence in the divine nature that is or can be . the divine i nature considered with all absolute & relative perfection in father , son , and holy ghost , doth most truly , properly , and perfectly subsist ; for there are three illustrious subsistences in that one undivided infinite nature ; and therefore the godhead thus considered , doth subsist k 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . singular substances have the most perfect subsistence . a spirit is the most perfect substance ; god is the most single and singular substance , and he is the only infinite ●pirit , the best of spirits , and therefore he must needs have the most perfect subsistence . every single person is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore i will be bold to inferre , that these three persons only do perfectly subsist by themselves , though in l one another ; for they have one independent , spi●itual , infinite nature , which is of it self , and is complete in it self , because infinite in perfection , and therefore contains all absolute and relative perfection in it self : but when we speak of the relative perfection , we speak of m three in one , because the relative properties are distinctive : and when we treat of the absolute perfection , we speak of one in three , one essence in three persons , who do all three subsist with their relative and incommunicable properties , in that most perfect and single essence . this is that divine trinunity which contains all absolute and relative perfection , and therefore hath the most perfect and excellent subsistence , that is , or can be , finally , though these three persons do mutually subsist in one another , yet they are said to subsist by themselves , . because these persons do not subsist in one another , as accidents do exist in a subject ; for accidents exist in another , because of their imperfection ; but these subsist in one another , because of their perfection , because they have the same single infinite nature , and are one infinite and omnipresent spirit . . they subsist mutually in one another ; the father subsists in the son , ioh. . , . as well as the son in the father ; and therefore this subsisting in one another doth not argue any imperfection , but doth demonstrate the infinite perfection of all three subsistents : but there is no mutuall inexistence of an accident in a subject , and a subject in that accident or any other . . these three subsistents have one and the same spirituall , n independent , infinite nature , which is complete of it self , and in it self ; and the whole creation doth not afford one example to illustrate , much lesse to parallel these three illustrious subsistences in one undivided nature . and it is impossible it should : for , this one undivided nature in which these three glorious persons do subsist , is an infinite nature , and there can be but one infinite ; and therefore the socinians seem to have lost what they do so much idolize , their reason , when they desire us to illustrate this mysterie by an example . . these three subsistents are coequal , because coessential . the fathers upon some of these considerations did agree to use the phrase of three hypostases and one essence , though the word hypostasis was not so plain and familiar at first , especially to latine eares , and therefore o hierome complains that some were too rigorous in imposing that word without expounding of it to such whose judgment was orthodox , though their skill but small in the greek . to conclude my discourse upon this word subsistence , be pleased to consider that we read of the nature of god , we read of the subsistence of the father , and we read that these three , father , son and holy ghost are one ; having these two words [ nature & subsistence ] in scripture , we are prompted by the spirit speaking in the word to explain this mystery thus ; the father , son and holy ghost are three in subsistence , but one in nature . no mystery can be explained with lesse violence and more sobriety ; for we are precise in keeping to the very words of scripture in explaining this grand mystery to the plainest of men ; and therefore they were sentenced of old that did not beleeve this plain truth . ix . we have no reason to be offended with the vse of the word person , when we treat of this argument , if we adde a fit epithet , and say the father is a divine person , or an uncreated person , and say the same of the son and holy ghost ▪ the word person signifies the most excellent kind of subsistent , an understanding subsistent , as is acknowledged by all the masters of language , sacred and prophane , as hath been proved ; and that place cor. . . is very cleare ; of all the derivations of persona , that pleases me p best , persona quasi per se una ; because it doth expresse the unity and excellency of a personall subsistence . per se notes the excellency , because subsistere per se notes the most excellent kind of subsistence . nay , the word q person doth expresse more excellency then the word subsistence alone , doth import , for it is proper to say that a beast doth subsist , but it is absurd to say that a beast is a person because a person is an understanding subsistent . but neither of these r words doth expresse the excellency of that subsistence which the father , son and holy ghost have in the godhead . and therefore we do not only say that these three are persons or subsistenc●s , but we say they are uncreated persons , divine subsistences , persons subsisting in the divine nature , persons of the godhead , that so we may take in all the excellency which these words subsistence and person do afford ; and then by other epithets superadd that excellency which is proper to father , son and holy ghost , and leave out all that imperfection which is in created persons and subsistences . the word subsistence is in the scripture ; heb. . . the word person is in scripture applyed to men , cor. . . who have a more excellent subsistence then beasts ▪ an understanding subsistence ; and therefore both s greek and latine fathers did at last agree to use the word person , because it signifies an understanding subsistent . and if you adde divine or uncreated person , then there is no danger of any mistake ; unlesse men will be so vain as to say the word t person doth sometimes signifie a visible shape , an outward form or appearance , the countenance or gesture of a man , or else some office , relation , or quality ; and say that we do make three shapes , countenances , &c. in the godhead ; as sabellius , servetus , and such bold atheists as have sucked in their poyson , are wont to say . we do therefore vindicate the church of god from these insolent and groundlesse aspersions , and freely declare what we mean by person , namely an understanding subsistent . every of the three divine persons hath an office , and hath a relation ; but no divine person is an office , or a mere u relation ; but the godhead doth contain all relative as well as absolute perfection within it self , as hath been said . * god , as represented to us in scripture , doth as it were take upon him the person of a displeased father , and sometimes of a well-pleased father ; but we do not say there are three such persons in the godhead : for one divine person may sustain the person of a well-pleased father at one time , and the person of a displeased father at another . and if any man will be so ridiculous us to conclude from thence , that then one person may be two persons ; i hope he will see his own vanity , and be sensible of the equivocation , by considering what hath been said already in this very chapter . when we say , god doth take upon him the person of a well-pleased father , we speak 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 after the manner of men ; just as when we speak of the eyes and hands of god , but we must be understood a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 after such a manner as becomes the infinite dignity and pure majesty of god. if men do not wilfully mistake , they may then know what we mean by person , when we say there are three uncreated persons in the godhead . the word person is in scripture ; and if it were not , yet as long as the thing signified by it is there , we have no reason to account that b word , or any other such like , an exotick word , because we find it very proper and pertinent to the point in hand , in the sense which we have so often declared , that there might be no mistake , but a full agreement in such an high and weighty point . c it is out of question , that we may expound the scripture by words and phrases which are not in those very letters and syllables to be found in scripture , as long as we do not affect a needlesse curiosity in inventing new and obscure phrases ▪ & a rigid superstition in defending them ; for that would not conduce to edification ; but beget or foment an endlesse contention . our expressions must be sober and plain ; grave and usefull , such as may hold forth the godly and prudent simplicity of the scripture . that is al that needs be said for the use of such words and phrases as are fit and necessary to be used in this and divers other obscure points . there are some that mistake the attributes of god for persons , and they make more then three persons ; and therefore i shall not go about to reckon up the innumerable absurdities which follow upon that one mistake . vno absurdo dato , mille sequuntur . i read , indeed , that sabellius conceived the father , son , and holy ghost , to be different attributes of god : but the orthodoxe christians desired him to remember that there were more then three divine ●ttributes , and pressed him to acknowledge , that a trinity of persons do subsist in the unity of the nature of god ; and then they would close with him and give the right hand of fellowship unto him . the fraud and subtilty of arius , sabellius , and the rest of the old heretiques , gave the reverend doctors of the chu●ch cause to use the words d trinity , coessential , consubstantial , and the like , that they might more clearly and fully manifest this profound and glorious mysterie : and they who did wrangle about these words , did indeed deny the mystery and thing it self ; and therefore did but manifest their pride , fraud , obstinacy , for the maintenance of their damnable heresie , when they quarrelled with those eminent writers , for making use of e unwritten words & phrases , upon so just and necessary occasion , that the written truth might be more clearly explained and fully defended . it is not in the judgement of any man , any fault at all , to make truth plain ; unlesse in the deluded judgement of such who are enemies to truth . now we have removed the rubbish , we begin to build . a divine person is a spiritual and infinit subsistent , related indeed to those other uncreated persons , which subsist in the same divine nature with it , but distinguished from those coess●ntial persons by its peculiar manner of subsistence , order of subsisting singular relation ▪ and incommunicable propertie . in these few line there is matter enough to fill many sheets , and i am to treat of the distinction of persons at large in the next chapter . a divine person is spiritual , for god is a spirit , the father of spirits , the spirit of spirits , an infinite spirit , and therefore hath life , the best of lives , nay is life it self in perfection , and therefore we read of the understanding and will of god ; an understanding life is the best life that we are acquainted with ; and the life of god is a subsisting life , every one of the divine persons is subsistent , and therefore , every one of them hath subsisting life . we may then safely conclude , that every one of the divine persons is a spiritual and infinite subsistent : i say subsistent , to shew that i do not abstract the subsistence of the person from the divine nature in which the person doth subsist ; herein all the three persons do agree . moreover , every divine person hath some relative perfection , for they are mutually related to one another . finally , every divine person hath some peculiar and incommunicable propertie . but if we come to treat of any peculiar manner of subsisting , or the order of subsisting , or that singular relation which is proper●o ●o every one of the three , or any certain ●ncommunicable propertie , whereby any one person is distinguished from the rest , ●hen we must leave treating of what is common to all three persons , and shew wherein these coessential persons differ , or whereby it doth appear to us , that they are distinguished . we will therefore for orders sake enquire , . what distinction there is between the divine nature , and the divine persons , father , son and holy ghost . . what difference there is between ●reated and uncreated persons . . how these three uncreated persons are distinguished from one another . this question concerning the distinction of the divine f nature and these three most glorious persons which subsist in it , is the most difficult point in all divinitie , ●nd therefore i humbly beg the assistance of all these glorious persons , that i may conceive and write judiciously and reve●ently of this profound and glorious my●●erie of faith. i remember that excellent ●peech of judicious calvin ; non minori ●eligione de deo nobis loquendum quam cogitandum sentio ; quicquid autem de deo a nobis cogitamus stultum est , & quicquid loquimur insulsum . what ever we think● or speak of our own heads concerning god , will be like our selves unsavourie , foolish and vain . no language is rich enough , no words are significant enough to declare this profound mysterie , which the understanding of men and angels cannot comprehend , nor the tongue of men and angels express ; if all the saints and angels in heaven and earth should sit in councel and communicate their notions to one another about this argument , they would acknowledge this mysterie to be not onely inexplicable and unspeakable , but unconceiveable and incomprehensible . . concerning the distinction which is between the divine nature , and a divine person , it is to be considered that i have most studiously declined the describing of a divine person in abstracto for the reasons mentioned above , and i might add many others ; but it is enough to say that the most cleanly abstraction doth but suggest an inadaequate conceit of a divine person ; and when you abstract the nature of god from the personalities , men are apt to dream of some strange god that is neither father , son nor holy ghost , and so to create a new god , or to conceive that the divine nature may , as the humane nature of christ doth subsist in alieno supposito . . they who denie the trinitie , must if they be not worse then turkes or socinians acknowledge , that god the father doth subsist , and therefore they are engaged to shew the difference between the essence and subsistence of the father , as well as we are , who believe the trinitie . but there is no greater a distinction between the person of the father , and the nature of the holy ghost , then there is between the person of the father , and the nature of the father ; for the nature of the father and the holy ghost is one , and the same divine nature , which is as impossible to be divided , or multiplied in two or three persons , as it is in one single and undivided person , because the divine nature is single and infinite , and the divine persons do mutually subsist in one another , and all three persons subsist in this single and undivided nature , which is indivisible , immultiplicable and most purely and singularly one and the same infinite perfection in all three persons , and there can be but one most single absolute and infinite perfection . . the divine nature is subsistent , necessarily and perfectly subsistent ; the most perfect manner of subsisting by and of it self is due to the most perfect nature . . the divine nature is not indifferent to subsist in the father , son and holy ghost , or out of them ; for in regard of its infinite perfection and actualitie it can neither subsist without , or otherwise then in the father , son and holy ghost ; because the divine nature cannot subsist without all , or any of that relative perfection , which shines in these three glorious persons , who do all subsist in the same divine nature , and yet mutually subsist in one another with all relative perfection . the reason is most clear , because the divine nature being infinite in perfection must needs contain and comprehend all relative as well as all absolute perfection . . god is not compounded ( as angels are ) of nature and subsistence ; for whatsoever doth belong to the perfection of god , doth belong to the nature of god , and therefore god doth not subsist by the superadding of any thing or manner of a thing , any . modus that is ( as the schooles speak ) extraessential , or really distinct , and separable from the essence and nature of god. and we have formerly shewen , that the essence of god is intrinsecally necessary , and infinitly perfect , and therefore the most perfect manner of subsisting by , and of it sel● is due to the most perfect nature . . although men and angels are not able to comprehend , much less express this incomprehensible mysterie , yet we may set satisfactorie bounds to our thoughts and discourses by the analogy of faith ; for the scripture saith that the father and the son are one , and that all three persons are one , and therefore we do conclude that as the infinite perfection and actualitie of the divine nature doth require three subsistences , because this infinite perfection doth contain all relative , as well as all absolute perfection , so doth the single and most singular nature of god , require that these three glorious persons subsist in the vnitie of the godhead . now we are sure that the one-nesse , or singlenesse of gods nature doth well agree with the infinitness of his nature , because there can be no multiplication of that which is infinites ; there cannot be two or three infinites , and therfore we must needs conclude , that these three subsistents are one infinite god subsisting with all absolute and relative perfection . this is the sum and substance o● all that can be said a parte rei as we use to speak ; but because we are not able distinctly to apprehend the absolute and relative perfefection of god , god doth make himself known to us in a way most suitable to our weak apprehensions in representing himself to be an eternal father , and then we are ready to enquire after and willing to heare of an eternal son ; now according to our weak manner of conceiving we must needs apprehend that there is a divine relation between the eternal father and his coeternal son , and conclude that these two are distinguished from , and in a well qualified sense opposed to , one another with a mere relative opposition , for there can be no contrarie opposition between the persons ; but this relative and friendly opposition assures us , that the father is not the son , and that the father did not beget himself , but did beget his son ; but then we consider again , that this son is an eternal son , and therefore is god , and we are sure god did not beget another god , for the power of god is not nay cannot be exercised about any thing repugnant to the nature of god , and nothing is more repugnant to the godhead then a pluralitie of gods ; and therefore we must conclude , that the father and son are one , and the same god ; now we are come to the mysterie which faith must receive , and reason admire . . we may best resemble all that difference which is between the essence of god and the divine subsistences , by considering the transcendent affections of ens simpliciter and the attributes of god , who doth infinitely transcend not only a praedicamental substance , but a metaphysical entity , as the most metaphysical men who are sound in the faith ▪ do honestly confesse . . concerning the transcendent affections of ens , which are unum , verum , & bonum ; we say , these three affections , and ens in latitudine , do not make foure things really distinct ; and yet we say they are reall and positive affections ; for our metaphysical science hath too much serious majesty , to be pleased with the pretty fictions of reason , when our understanding hath got leave to play , and recreate it self with its own artificial inventions . the thing is most cleare and evident to all at the very first proposal , because the things which god hath made , are not beholding to god only for their entity , and to us for their goodnesse ; for the things do not cease to be good , when our understanding ceaseth to work ; but the things are truly and really good , whether we think them to be so , or no. moreover we say , that these positive and reall affections of ens do not make any composition at all in ens transcendently considered , because then the most simple and uncompounded being would lose its being . for simplicity would be repugnant to entity , if that entity it self did involve any composition . and therefore it is agreed on all sides , that this proposition , ens simplex est ens , is a true proposition . finally , from what hath been said it is reasonably and commonly inferred , that entity , truth , goodnesse , and unity , make but one real thing , though they do all foure differ quoad modum significandi ; because the thing adaequately signified by all those foure words is but one real thing , namely the very entity of ens transcendently considered . for when i say , ens est unum , this praedicate vnum doth not superadde any new entity , but doth imply and connote the very entity of ens. nay more , if you ask these metaphysical men , what this transcendent unity is ; they will not answer , that vnity is indivision , but unity is the very undivided entity it self ; not that unity alone doth signifie simply and adaequately the same that ens doth in tota latitudine , as res or aliquid do ; for unity doth not signifie truth and goodnesse , which are the two other transcendent affections of ens , but ens in its complete compasse and adaequate signification doth import entity , truth , unity , and goodnesse also . truth is a single affection of ens , and therefore it doth signifie or rather connote entity under an inadaequate conceit or notion ▪ for it doth represent ens not in its full latitude , but as considered with respect to the understanding . if we may now make so bold as to compare the essence of essences with these metaphysical notions , we may in some weak measure resemble that difference which is between the essence of god and divine subsistences , at least in some few particulars : for if when we compare creatures with creatures , there appear to be some dissimilitude even in the most apt similitude , and no similitude runs ( as we say ) upon four feet ; it is not to be wondered at , if this comparison be rather a resemblance , then an illustration . when divine revelation hath gone before , and we have built upon that as the ground-work and foundation by a serious faith , these metaphysical notions may be subservient helps in a subordinate way . . the father , son , and holy ghost , do all three really , positively , truly subsist in the divine essence ; and yet these three subsistences , and the divine essence , do not make four , no nor two things really distinct ; even as entity , truth , goodnesse , and unity , do not make four things really distinct , as you heard but now , but are one reall thing and no more . . ens is not compounded of entity , and its three affections ; nor is god compounded of the godhead and three subsistences ; nor is any one person compounded of the divine nature and subsistence . . as truth is not goodnesse , nor goodnesse truth , nor either of them unity , and yet all three are entity ; so the father is not the son , nor is the son the father , nor is either of them the holy ghost , and yet all three are god , for they are all three but one god subsisting with all absolute and relative perfection , as hath been shewen . . every one of the three affections of ens , doth connote entity : every one of the three subsistences doth connote the godhead , the divine nature , as hath been proved at large . . not any one of the three affections of ens doth , nor do all three together super-adde a new entity ; not any one of the three subsistences doth , nor do all three together super-adde a new deity , a new divine nature , or godhead : for ens a is one ; ens est trinum , non triplex , trinum et unum ens trinunum : deus est trinus non triplex , trinus et unus , deus trinunus ; this instance doth in some measure resemble the mystery of the trinunity . . no affection of ens can be really separated from ens : nor can one of the divine persons be separated from the divine nature , or the divine nature from any one of the divine persons , or any one of the persons from either of the other two . . all the affections of ens are distinguished , but none divided : all the three subsistences are distinguished , but they cannot be divided . . truth and goodnesse which are two of the affections of ens , are distinguished by their severall and peculiar relations ; truth hath relation to the understanding , and goodnesse to the will : the father , son , and holy ghost are known to be distinguished by their severall and peculiar relations ; and if it be not unreasonable to say that there is in entity three affections , and two relations in ente simplicissimo , without any composition in , or multiplication of the entity , why should it seem unreasonable , or at least why should it seem incredible that there are three subsistences and severall relations in the godhead , without any composition in , or multiplication of the godhead ? . one affection , nay all the affections in abstracto , do but inadaequately represent ens , unlesse you take notice of the entity it self , as well as the three affections . one single subsistence , nay all three subsistences in abstracto , do but inadaequately represent god , unlesse you take notice of the godhead in which they subsist ; and therefore this praecisive abstraction of the subsistences from the divine nature , is but an inadaequate conceit of god , as hath been demonstrated above in this very chapter : for we must not dream of a trinity of modes , but assert and believe the glorious and coessential trinunity . the father is truly god , that god who is the only true god ; but the father alone doth not b adaequately represent god to us as he is described in the holy scriptures . it is true that the divine essence is by the subsistence of the father adaequately the father ; but as god is represented by that divine subsistence only , he is not deus trinunus , he is not father , son and holy ghost ; the father alone is not all those three witnesses who are one god. and therefore the acute socinians with their precise abstractions do but suggest an inadaequate conceit of god : that only true god whom we worship , doth not subsist only in the person of the father . we worship god subsisting with all absolute and relative perfection in father , son , and holy ghost ; for these three are that one god who is the only true god blessed for ever . this is the adaequate representation of god in the scriptures of truth . and we are resolved to regulate all our metaphysical notions by the holy scriptures , that we may make the highest of sciences to acknowledge the supremacie of that divine science which is nowhere to be learnt but in the word of god ; for the purest c reason must be elevated by the word and spirit of god , for the discovery of this mysterie . . these affections of ens represent the manner of that being which ens hath as it is transcendently confidered ; and the three divine subsistences do represent that manner of being which god hath as he is most d transcendently considered , namely as subsisting after the most glorious manner with all absolute and relative perfection . it is the manner of a transcendent entity to be one , and true , and good , and it is the manner of gods being to be one god in three subsistences ; these three are one single god , there is no composition or multiplication imaginable in this single and infinite being . i was bold to adventure upon this enquiry because so e many reverend learned orthodox and pious doctours of the church have declared that the divine essence differs from the divine subsistences as the manner of the thing doth from the thing it self ; and the persons differ from one another , tanquam modi a modis . i conceived that there was something more in the expression then was commonly known . moreover i considered that if there might be so great simplicity or singlenesse in a created and finite entity , notwithstanding there are three affections and two relations which do affect that entity , it seemed to me somewhat easie to beleeve that there are three subsistences in one infinite godhead without any composition in , or multiplication of the single godhead . finally i perceive that some youthfull towring wits are drawn away from the simplicity of the gospel by some froathy speculations presented to them as most sublime curiosities and f metaphysicall notions ; and therefore i humbly submit what hath been said to the judgement of the learned , and conclude this discourse with the same prayer wherewith augustine shuts up his books of the trinity , domine , deus unus , deus trinitas , quaecunque dixi in hoc libro de tuo agnoscant et tui ; si quid de meo , et tu ignosce & tui . o lord , who art one god , o god , who art a whole trinity of persons in the godhead , what ever i have said ( in this discourse ) of thine , let all that are thine acknowledge , what ever i have said of mine own , lord let it be pardoned by thee and thine . ii. concerning the attributes of god , we may observe that they are al perfect , glorious , infinite , because they do signifie and declare the infinite perfection , happinesse , majesty and glory of god ; and to speak higher yet , these glorious attributes though they be very many , are nothing else but the single undivided indivisible essence of god , we may be instructed , but are even g confounded with the glory of this mystery . there are three reasons why we do not readily apprehend this truth . . the defect of h words to expresse it , especially in english , but indeed the most rich and copious languages are onely happy in the confession of their penury when we come to treat of this argument , because the mystery of the godhead doth transcend all our eloquence , and teaches us to admire and adore with silence what we cannot expresse without a manifest demonstration of our ignorance . . the imperfect manner of signifying is easie to be observed in our most significant words , and therefore we must confesse that the excellency of god doth transcend the significancy of the most significant words in the most rich and copious tongues . the imperfection of our own i understanding , and of our manner of apprehending and judging of things whiles we are in the k body . if any man desire to know a reason why he cannot readily apprehend these divine mysteries , let him consider the perfection of the mystery , and the imperfection of his own reason , & he hath a sufficient reason , a reason from whence he may draw a most invincible argument against idolizing of his own reason , so far as to make his reason judge of the mysteries of faith . let us then prudently consider that we are not able to apprehend the l infinite and impartible essence of god but as it were by parts , by many incomplete and inadaequate conceits and apprehensions . the most profound and serious m schoolmen have fairely expressed this truth : there are not ( say they ) many attribut all perfections , nay there is but one perfection in god ; for all the essentiall attributes of god are nothing else but that single and undivided essence which is singularly and altogether the same essence in all three subsistences . nay , to speak properly the div●ne essence is one single infinite perfection , and we cannot say that perfection is in the essence of god ; but rather that the highest n perfection , even infinite perfection is the essenc● of god ; it is every way his essence , and no way at all distinguished from it . finally , if by attributal perfections you mean the conceits or signs of perfection , they say these signs do indeed signifie the divine essence , but the signs themselves are so far from being the essence of god , that they do not all of them signifie the same divine essence after the same way and manner of signifying ; for it is clear , that some of the attributal terms are affirmative , some are o negative , some are absolute , some connotative , and relative . for observe that , when the perfection of god is declared per viam negationis , by p negative expressions , as when we say god is immaterial , incorporeal , invisible , immortal , immutable , immense , and the like , we intend to remove all imperfection from the ●ssence of god , and leave his pure essence single and alone , because it is one single and infinite perfection ; we denie that there is any thing in god which might make him like to the creature in imperfection : for what ever there is which betokens matter , change , privation , or imperfection , we denie that to be in god , because god is one entire , infinite perfection , and therefore we say as q isidore clarius doth , that in these negatives there doth lay hid , not only a positive but an infinite perfection , and what is infinite , must needs be single ; you see still the perfection is a single perfection . and when the perfection of go● is declared per viam eminentiae , as the schooles speak , by attributing all perfection which we find in the creatures unto god , after we have removed all imperfection , we say the perfection r signified is most perfectly and properly in god ; but the manner of signifying of that perfection by attributes taken from the creatures , doth somewhat rellish of that imperfection , which is in the creature ; and therefore we say such attributes in respect of the imperfect manner of signifying do not clearly hold forth that single and infinite perfection which is in god ; hence it is that reverend divines have laid down so many rules as cautions to direct us in this weightie point . . a finite and compounded understanding cannot apprehend the glorious perfection of a single and infinite essence , but by distinct proprieties or attributes . . the essential attributes are all of them common to all the three persons of the godhead , and to them * onely . . these essential attributes are not distinguished from the divine essence , but are the very divine essence or godhead it self . . all these essential attributes are infinite and eternal , because they are the infinite and eternal essence of god. . these essential attributes do s not differ from one another , because the essence of god is single , uncompounded , undivided , indivisible , and one of these attributes doth essentially praedicate of the other . the power , wisdom , goodnesse of god , are single , eternal , immutable , infinite . . these essential attributes do differ from one another , onely according to our weak apprehension ; for our finite and compounded understanding not being able to comprehend what is single and infinite , doth frame different conceits of the properties of god , according to the different objects and effects of these attributes . now because our understanding doth ground all its conceits upon the several objects and effects of these attributes , we say , the difference is not purely rational , or a meer fiction of reason , but we call it a virtual or eminent distinction , framed by reason upon the grounds aforesaid , for the help of our weak understandings . for we must consider , that this virtual distinction is not a t real distinction ; because it doth not import , that the attributes of god are actually many , or really different ; but it signifies , that the infinite essence of god doth eminently contain all real perfections which are many indeed in the creatures ; but all perfection in god is but one single and infinite perfection , which single and infinite perfection in regard of its u eminency , and our weaknesse cannot be expressed by one single act , or by one formal and adaequate conceit of ours , because we do apprehend things according to those several objects about which they are exercised , and those several effects which are by their virtue and influence really produced . now x no effect in the world is adaequate to the infinite virtue and eminent perfection of the divine nature , and therefore we cannot apprehend the eminent and infinite virtue of the divine nature , but by considering of those many objects and manifold effects in the world , which do all represent the eminent and infinite virtue of the divine nature ; and hence it is that we call it a virtual and eminent distinction , whereas indeed it is rather an eminence y then a distinction , because the divine nature doth eminently contain all perfection in its infinite perfection , and the divine virtue doth manifest it self upon diff●rent objects and various effects ; and therefore our weak understanding frames different concei●s of it according to those different objects and effects , and consequently gives so many different attributes to god. and god hath so far condescended to our weakness in scripture , as to declare his single perfection by several names and attributes , answerable to those different objects and effects , in which the eminent and infinite virtue of god doth gloriously shine throughout the world . i have insisted long upon this virtual and eminent distinction , that i might by so many several expressions beat this grand mysterie into the heads of the meanest christians . . when one attribute of god is abstractly considered from the rest of the attributes , that abstraction must be purely praecisive , not exclusive ; i must not consider gods iustice alone , so as to exclude his mercie , or any other of the divine attributes , from being comprehended within the single and undivided perfection of the divine essence . when the justice of god is considered abstractly , and the abstraction is purely praecisive , a all the attributes of god are at least implicitely included within the abstract consideration of divine justice ; for divine justice is essential justice , infinite justice ; god is just by his essence , not by any virtue , or good qualitie ; and he that is just by his essence , is perfectly just , infinitely just ; you see that infinite perfection is implyed , and infinite perfection is essentially all perfection , and therefore all the other attributes of god are implyed , when i do consider one single attribute within an abstraction purely praecisive ; for there is the same reason of all other attributes of god ; because god is essentially good , wise , mercifull , &c. as well as just . . the attributes which are called communicable attributes , are as truly the single and undivided essence of god , as those attributes , which we call incommunicable ; for if we speak properly and strictly , no attribute of god can be communicated to a creature , any more then the divine essence it self , isa. . . matth. . . . tim. . . for all the attributes of god are his name , his perfection , his glorie , his essence , his godhead ; and if any of the attributes were communicated , the essence of god must be multiplied , divided , or distracted from it self ; the communicable attributes are infinite , and there cannot be more infinites then one , and therefore they must all signifie one single and infinite perfection . for if any of the attributal perfections were finite , then the perfection of god would be made up of many b finite perfections ; and god would not be c infinitely perfect in himself , of himself , and by himself , but by some finite perfections superadded to his essence , which is utterly repugnant to the single and infinite perfection of god. yet true it is , that some attributes of god are said to be communicable by d analogical accommodation , not in respect of the properties themselves , which are all infinite , but in respect of the effects of those properties ; there is something in the creature by the bountie of our creatour , and grace of our redeemer , which doth after a weak manner resemble the perfection of god , and therefore we are said to be partakers of the divine nature , . pet. . . when we bear the image of god in righteousnesse and holinesse of truth . for we are still to remember that god is to be known per viam eminentiae , when we make an eminent distinction between one divine attribute and another , or ascribe any of the perfections which are found in the creatures by way of attributal perfection unto god. for e god is not great in quantity , or good by a qualitie , but by his own infinite essence . we must remove all imperfection from god , that we may know him per viam negationis ; and therefore we say mercie and goodness are not f accidents in god , his understanding and his will are not faculties , his anger and hatred are not passions , his many attributes are but one single perfection ; the perfections which are in the creature are imperfect , but the perfection of god is infinite . finally we must consider god as the cause of all perfection in the creature , that we may know him per viam causalitatis . these grounds being laid , let us consider what great difference there doth to ou● weak understanding appear to be between the divine attributes , whether they be compared with the divine nature , or with one another , and yet that indeed and truth there is no real difference between the attributes and the divine nature , or between the divine attributes themselves , and we shall more easily conceive what great difference there is between the father , son and holy ghost without any essential difference between them . the holy scriptures speaking to our weak capacitie , describe god and his attributes after such a distinct manner to us , that we cannot but conceive , that there is some ground even in the word of god for this virtual and g eminent distinction between the attributes , as will-be most evident to any that observe the usual phrase and language of the scriptures in these and the like places , exod. . . . . tim. . . psal. . . . . . tim. . . . but it is as clear that god doth herein gratiously condescend to our weakness , because we know that the divine nature is ●●ngle , and infinite , and therefore doth con●ain in it all actual perfection eminently , ●nd all h possible perfection both singly and ●ctually , because all true and pure perfection is most formally included in the na●ure and essence of god ; and therefore this eminent distinction grounded on the phrase of scripture , and upon visible ob●ects and effects , gives us no ground at all ●o conceive , that the divine nature is not one single infinite perfection , because the scripture speaks distinctly of god , and of his several attributes , only to teach us to apprehend the impartible perfection of god by degrees rather then parts , because we cannot apprehend it altogether . our conceits of god are inadaequate , and collected by way of analogy from the perfection of the creatures ; but we must consider that what the creatures do performe by many and distinct qualities and acts , god doth performe by his owne essence which is one most single ▪ and most pure act . and therefore we conclude that this distinction is not really grounded upon god himself , upon his nature , or essence , but upon the effects of god. the objective conceits or things conceived , are not really or actually different in themselves , but virtually and ●minently in the several effects , egresses , terminations of gods eminent vertue , and single power , which is every way boundlesse and infinite , and therefore never works according to its full and adaequate vertue . the a scotists do indeed seeme to say more , because they say that this distinction of the attributes is formall and ex natura rei ; but then they come off againe in their explication of these termes , and say that their meaning is that they are distinguished formally , not actually , but virtually and eminently , and therefore we meane the same thing . for the divine essence is not only a single b unity , but the first unity , which is uncapable of any difference or number whatsoever ; only we cannot by a c single act comprehend gods single perfection , because our understanding is finite , and his perfection is infinite . but it will be said that the attributes of god have to our apprehension not only different , but contrary effects : the justice of god doth punish , and the mercy of god doth spare . the answer is easie : the effects are to our apprehension contrary , nay they are contrary in themselves , but the attributes are not contrary ; for the attributes do both belong to the same god , nay they are the same god ; and these attributes do not overthrow , but preserve one another . now we readily grant that the effects are really different , nay contrary ; but we deny that the attributes of justice and mercy are really different , or contrary in themselves . finally , we grant , that according to our manner of apprehension , it is very improper to say that the attribute of gods mercy is the attribute of his punitive iustice , because the termes are here taken in d sensu formali , as we use to speak , and therefore that manner of predication is improper ; yet if you take the termes in sensu identico , the thing is true , because mercy and justice are the same thing , the same essence . we may say that the same god , the same essence , which is mercy it selfe , doth punish ; but it is very improper and absurd to say that god doth forgive by his punitive iustice , because god who speaks distinctly of his own : attributes in his word , that he might help our weak understanding , will not give us leave to speak so confusedly of his glorious attributes , as to puzzle the understanding of our weak brethren . what i have said concerning the justice and mercy of god , might consideratis considerandis , be applyed to his other attributes ; and i might discourse in like manner concerning the understanding and will of god , concerning the acts and decrees of god , and enquire whether they are distinct from the essence of god ? that so we may the better understand the distinction which is between the divine subsistences and the divine essence , by comparing the divine attributes , acts , decrees , subsistences and essence altogether ; but i shall be brief in that . ix . the decrees of god , which we , according to our weak apprehension , are apt to conceive as many , are but one single and e pure act in god ; nay , to speak strictly , they are nothing else but f god himself decreeing ; for the divine essence is one pure and single act. in deo non distinguuntur esse posse & operari , the decrees and acts of god , his knowing , willing , &c. are not many in their owne absolute nature , for they are the nature of god considered as a pure and vital act ; and hence it is that we say the decrees of god ( in their absolute nature , or as they are considered with reference to gods owne uncreated truth and goodnesse ) are all essentiall and necessary , they did not begin to be , they cannot cease to be ; god did not begin to know or love himselfe , he cannot cease to know his owne almighty power , or to love his owne uncreated goodnesse . the decrees of god upon this account , and in this consideration , are not capable of g multipicity , or division , opposition or succession , dependance or order . for here is nothing but one pure , vitall , eternal , unchangable act , which is god himselfe , knowing and loving of himselfe for himselfe . take it all thus in brief , in a few short conclusions . . god is a pure act , and therefore he cannot but h act vitally ; he must needs understand , and will ; here is no such liberty or mutability as vorstius dreamt of , opposed to unchangable necessity ; for as god cannot cease to be because he is the first , necessary and independent being , and his necessity of being speaks his infinite perfection : so he cannot cease to act , because he is a pure act ; he must needs act vitally , who is life it selfe ; he must needs know and will because he is the best life , and purest act ; and this necessity speaks his purity and perfection also . . if this pure and vitall act be considered with reference to gods owne essence , they cannot be distinguished , because gods essence is a pure i act. the self-same divine essence is both the act , and object in these immanent actions , which do not passe out of god towards , and therefore have no relation at all to , or denomination from , any k external , object . god doth know and will all things within himself naturally , and necessarily ; it 's his nature to love himself ; here is no distinction imaginable . . personal acts ( such as the begetting of the son , and breathing forth of the spirit ) are not arbitrary , but necessary and natural acts , and therefore aeternal ; now acts that are absolutely necessary l sine potentiâ ad oppositum , as we use to say , being natural and aeternal , are nothing else but god acting in , and by some one or more of the three divine subsistences . nothing that is eternal can be out of god , and there is nothing in god that is not god , and therefore i need say no more of those personal acts in this place , because i am to treat of them at large in the very next chapter . . the intrinsecal acts of god which do connote some habitude and respect to some thing that is out of the godhead , are the will of god , or the essence of god considered after the manner of an act of his will , esentiâ ex se actuosa ( as the schooles speak ) concepta per modum actus volendi . if this act be considered in it self , it is nothing else but the will or essence of god , because it is an intrinsecal m and vitall act. but now if this act be considered as relative , and as related to some thing that is out of god ; we say this act is not necessary , but free in respect of all those things which god decrees to produce or permit in the world ; for god doth arbitrarily decree to permit or produce this , and not that , according to the counsel of his own will , it being as truly and fully in his power to permit or produce that , as this : both were alike possible , but this is made future , and will in the fullnesse of time be present in act by virtue of the free decree of god ; for all creatures are produced and do exist by the will of god. it is most evident that the will of god is the same whether it act upon himself or something that is out of the godhead . . the relation which is between the will of god , and the creature , whether in futurition , or existence , is extrinsecal . . the denominations grounded upon the termination , or relation of the will of god towards the creatures , is extrinsecal also . . these actions of god which are said to be rather from god , then in n god , as to create , govern , redeeme or the like , are called extrinsecal , and therefore the denomination of god from them must needs be extrinsecal . . we have no ground to conceive that the essence of god is compounded with extrinsecal terminations , relations , or denominations . . though the objects which god doth will are very different , and their production is successive , yet the will of god is the self same , and is one single and pure act : the power of willing and the act of willing are not distinct in god ; nay god doth will his own happinesse necessarily , and the happinesse of men and angels freely by the same will ; o necessity and liberty do not make distinct powers or wills in god. . there is no potentia executiva in god , and therefore all those conceits of vorstius concerning any change or composition in god by several acts or decrees are but meer dreames , and vain conceits , though they be now published to the world , not with less blasphemic then impudence in this licentious age . it is evident by what hath been said that the eminent virtue of god ( notwithstanding its several objects , egresses , terminations , relations , denominations and effects ) is one single and infinite perfection . this will be the constant result and conclusion of all sober debates , and christian discussions . for if the perfection of god be not single , then it must be compounded : but it cannot be compounded either of things that are finite , or of things that are infinite ; the perfection of god cannot be compounded of finite things , because it is infinite ; for many nay all finite things cannot make up one infinite ; and god cannot be compounded of many infinite things , because there can be but one thing that 's infinite , and that is god. and therefore since gods perfection is his essence , and his essence is single , uncompounded , undivided , indivisible , it must needs follow that whatsoever is in god , is god , and god is ( as hath been often shewen ) one single infinite perfection . this is our first principle , and last conclusion into which all our debates , and by which all our doubts about this argument may and ought to be resolved . x. the distinction between the divine nature and persons may be considered , . in respect of predication ; the divine essence is predicated of every person , because every one of the three subsistences is god , nay is the divine nature considered with this or that personal propriety and relation respectively . but one person is not predicated of another , the father is not the son , nor is the son the father , or the holy ghost . . in respect of communication , the divine nature is not onely communicable but communicated to all three persons ; but it is of the formal reason of a person to be incommunicable . . in respect of relation . the divine nature doth indeed eminently containe all absolute and relative perfection ; but the formal p relations whereby the persons are not onely distinguished from , but opposed to one another , cannot be essential under that consideration , because they are peculiar to the several persons , and not common to all three persons , as the essence and nature is . peculiar and distinctive relations are not essential , because the persons who are relatively distinguished , are not essentially distinguished . the divine nature of the father is q not his father-hood : for if it were , then every one of the three persons would be god the father , all three persons would be one person , which is a manifest contradiction . . in respect of generation and procession ; the divine essence doth not beget , nor is it be gotten , it doth not proceed ; and yet the father doth beget , the son is begotten , and the holy ghost doth proceed ; the person of christ is begotten , but his divine nature unbegotten . , in respect of number ; the persons are three , the divine nature most simply single , and singularly one . . in respect of order ; there is an order to be observed amongst the divine persons ; the father is the first personal principle , the son the second , and the holy ghost who is breathed forth by the father , and the son , is the third ; the scripture saith there are three , and doth commonly reckon them in that order ; and we have no ground to reckon the holy ghost before the son because he proceeds from the son ; but the divine nature being a single vnitie , and the first vnitie , is as uncapable of order as it is of number . xi . notwithstanding all these and some other distinct considerations , i shall be bold to make this peremptorie determination ; the three divine subsistences are not really distinguished from the divine nature , or essence . the scripture saith , christ and his father are r one , ioh. . . and that all three are one , . iohn . . essentially one , and therefore really one . i have said enough above to prove all three persons to be essentially one . the three persons are one god subsisting with all possible perfection , relative as well absolute in one pure act ex parte rei . the three divine persons do not differ from the divine nature , as an humane person doth from the humane nature singularly considered : for a singular humane nature may be separated from an humane person as is evident in the incarnation of our lord and saviour . but the divine nature cannot subsist in alieno supposito ; the nature of god cannot subsist in any other or any fewer then these three persons , who are one and the same god ; and therefore the divine nature doth not differ really from the persons , tanquam res à re , as we say , nor tanquam res à modo separabili ; they do not differ really either way ; nor do the persons differ really , that is realiter separabiliter from one another , as shall be proved , when we come to speak of the distinction of the divine persons in the next chapter . xii . the distinction between the divine nature and three divine subsistences is not a groundlesse conceit or a meer fiction of reason , because it is grounded on the s word of god. for our apprehension of god must be agreeable to that divine revelation , which god hath vouchsafed us of himself in scripture . now it is most clear and evident , by what hath been said in this whole discourse , that the holy scriptures teach us to conceive distinctly of some things in god , which are not really distinguished in him . and therefore mr. fry may do well to consider , and retract that rash censure which he passes upon this doctrine of god , when he saith that the doctrine of three distinct persons or subsistences in the godhead is a chaffie , grosse , carnal and absurd opinion , in the title and . page of his blasphemous book ; for this distinction is not onely grounded on a t phrase of scripture , but is eternal . xiii . the distinction between the divine nature and persons is an eminent distinction ; i have told you above , what we mean by that expression . the persons are the essence of god , and not any thing separated or divided from it ; every one of the three persons is a person of the godhead , nay every one of the three persons is the godhead considered with some particular property and relation ; and the godhead being absolutely single , we must conclude that the divine nature and a divine person is the same essentiall reall thing , though they are eminently distinguished by sundry considerations , as hath been shewen . but it is objected that every one of the three persons is a substance , and if there be three substances subsisting in the godhead under sundry formal considerations , then there will be three divine substances , three substantial relations and properties , and therefore the godhead will be compounded by these three substances , substantial properties and relations , or else there will be three substantiall and formall gods. to this grand objection , i make these few returns by way of answer . . every one of the three persons is a substance , a divine substance , but they are the same divine substance , because they are the same god : these three are one , they are unum , one divine substance , one god ; they are all three divine persons , but they are coessentiall persons , and u inessentiall persons of the same godhead . ii. the peculiar relations do distinguish , but they do not compound , for they do not super add any new entity , much lesse any new godhead , because all these relations are natural , eternal , and therefore they are god ; absolute and relative perfection in god , are but one single perfection . . the parts or extremes wherewith any thing is compounded must be really , or at least modally and separably distinct ; for all created natures and persons being compounded , are not only modally , but separably distinct . . the parts compounding must be united by some x efficient cause , and one of the parts must be a meere power or passive potentiality , that is capable of farther perfection ; and the other an act to make that power y perfect and complete . . there must be by vertue of this union and perfection some dependance , multiplicity and change . now it is clear that the nature of god in which the persons subsist is not capable of these imperfections ; for , . there are no compounding parts in god. . the persons are not made one person by their inessentiali subsistence , but remaine three distinct persons . . the persons are not separably distinct from the divine nature , or from one another . . the persons do not a perfect the divine nature , for it is infinitely perfect of it selfe , and the three persons are by vertue of the same divine essence essentially the same god , and really one , as hath been laid . the divine nature is not like a created nature , which is ( imperfectae actualitatis as we say ) so imperfectly actuated , as that it is capable of farther perfection ; for the divine nature hath no weak , imperfect , defective , passive potentiality in it , and therefore cannot be contracted , determined , actuated by any personal properties or relations . if god be essentially considered , he hath a singular existence of himselfe by his owne essence , and hath most perfect unity and quidditative or essential actuality , because his essence is the most perfect essence that is , or can be . if god be persosonally considered , he hath the most perfect personality that is , or can be , and every person hath a perfect , proper and peculiar subsistence , which is not capable of any farther perfection in esse personali . every person is complete in esse quidditativo per essentiam , in esse personali per propriam subsistentiam . i need say no more on that argument , because i have upon severall occasions said so much already . iii. the essence of god is not multiplyed by sundry considerations of the same essence . iv. the three formall considerations are not b essentiall , but personall considerations , and we grant that there are three formall persons in , and of the godhead ; but it will not follow from thence that there are three gods , for these three persons are one god. v. a. divine person may be presented to our most serious thoughts under a three-fold consideration , as learned c iunius observes . . the first consideration of a person is common or essentiall , because the same divine essence is common to all three persons ; when a person then is considered as god , we call this an essentiall or common consideration , because the persons are d no way distinguished under this first consideration , but are one thing , the choycest and chiefest of things , and are one with the most single and singular kind of unity : father , son and ●pirit are one jehovah , one god and the same god. . the second consideration is personall , and yet e absolute , whereby the person is considered as subsisting in the vnity of the divine essence . this consideration is more singular , because every person hath its proper and peculiar subsistence ; for the father doth subsist of himselfe , but the son hath subsistence from his father ; now the self-subsistence of the father is proper , peculiar , personall , that is , proper and peculiar to his person , and yet this self-subsistence is absosolute , for his self-subsistence is not his fatherhood , and therefore it cannot be esteemed relative . but though this consideration is more singular , because every person hath his peculiar subsistence , yet herein all three persons agree , that they do all three subsist in the unity of the same godhead , though every person hath his proper subsistence , & his peculiar way of subsisting ; here are indeed three subsistences under this consideration , and yet but one divine substance , essence , nature , godhead , because all three do subsist in the f vnity of the same godhead ; for we must still keep our eye fixed upon that text , these three are one . . the third consideration is relative in the order of one person to , and distinction of one person from another . g this distinction of persons is to be handled at large in the next chapter ; our point in question here in this chapter doth not concerne the distinction of one person from another , but the distinction of all three persons from the divine nature . now , they who speak most largely of the distinction between the persons , and say it is in some sense a h reall distinction , do yet confesse that the reall distinction which they treat of is not i essentiall , and therefore still here is an essentiall union of the three persons under all these three considerations . we do still make much of that text , and hold it fast for our direction and support , iohn . . vi. this argument will be best answered by shewing the vast difference between created and uncreated persons , and i have with a great deale of patience waded through all these perplex disputes , that i might make way for the clearing of this grand mystery , and glad i am that i am now got within sight of it , though i have had as hard a passage as hanibal had over or through the alpes , and yet i have made my way without fire , or vinegar . ii. concerning the difference between created and uncreated persons , we may observe that . all created persons have a finite and dependent nature . . they have a compounded nature . . they have a different nature . . they have a different understanding , will , power . . they have a different place and presence . . they have different accidents , and are distinguished by an heap of accidents . . humane persons with whom we are best acquainted , may differ in time also ; one humane person may subsist a long time after another is dissolved . having laid down these positions , let us now make the comparison , and observe the difference between created and uncreated persons . . all created persons have a finite and dependent nature , but the nature of all uncreated persons is independent and infinite ; this one difference is an infinite difference , and surely if there were no other difference , that wonld suffice to discover and overthrow all the arguments of socinians and familists . i do often admire that the acute socinians who pretend to be wholly ruled by reason , should have no more reason in them then to argue after this absurd manner . three humane persons are thus and thus distinguished , ergo if there be three divine persons , they must be thus and thus distinguished also , even just as humane persons are . is not this a grosse fallacy k , because of the imparity and infinite l inaequality ? if the divine persons must be called into question , let them be tryed by their peeres . they say they cannot comprehend this mystery ; i say the reason is because it is a mystery ; and if they cannot comprehend it , they may the better beleeve it to be incomprehensible . the single nature of these three persons is infinite , and if men wonder that they cannot comprehend what is infinite , it is because they do not consider that they themselves are finite . . the nature of these three glorious subsistences is independent ; the nature of all created subsistences is dependent m , and therefore it is no wonder if a dependent nature do subsist in its proper person , and depend upon its proper person for sustentation ; but the divine nature doth not depend upon the three subsistences for its sustentation or subsistence ; but all three persons do subsist in this independent and infinite nature . philip. . . subsisting in the nature of god ; so the scripture expresses it , and we must apprehend and beleeve these holy mysteries according to the holy scriptures , because no man hath seene god , and god is the only all-sufficient witnesse concerning his owne essence and subsistence , concerning himselfe ; and therefore we must not think or speak otherwise of god then according to the scriptures of truth , in which god hath sufficiently and graciously revealed himself , iohn . . matth. . . matth. . , . the scriptures direct us how to distinguish uncreated persons from created persons . our finite and dependent nature doth subsist in a created person , but uncreated persons do subsist in an infinite and independent nature ; there is a manifest difference . our nature indeed doth subsist in the divine and uncreated person of the son of god , but that is not according to the common course of nature , there is a peculiar reason and another mystery in that wonderful subsistence ; and yet even in that wonderfull mystery our dependent nature doth subsist in a person , which notes its dependance ; and our nature is more satisfied and quieted by subsistence in a divine , then in an humane person , because it hath a more glorious sustentation , and is more powerfully upheld by that divine and uncreated person . the divine person of christ doth subsist in his divine nature , and the humane nature of christ doth subsist in his divine and onely person . iii. all created persons have a compounded and divisible nature , but uncreated persons have a single undivided and indivisible nature . the socinians , arminians and vorstians of this age do not love to hear any discourse of the single nature of god , in father , son and holy ghost ; this doctrine , they say , is philosophical , scholastical , metaphysical , and therefore there is nothing which concernes faith , piety , or manners in it . but it is most clear and evident that all the glorious attributes of god are united by an eternal bond which cannot be dissolved , and we have invincibly proved , that they do all signifie but one single and infinite perfection . if you take away the singlenesse of gods being , you take away his incommunicable , unchangable , incomprehensible , independent and infinite perfection . this point is excellently discussed and opened by n damaseene . composition ( saith he ) doth beget strife , strife may well cause a separation , and separation dissolution , which all who know any thing of god , will acknowledge to be repugnant to the perfection of the godhead . the learned o doctours of old did consider that god is a most pure and perfect act , the first and independent being , that he is what he is by his owne essence , and not by participation . but p vorstius was bold to publish his dreames co●trary to the analogy of faith and unanimous judgment of the reverend doctours of the ancient church . the socinians in their q catechisme , the r arminians in their confession and apology are exceedingly too blame in this point . the socinians do expunge the single and infinite perfection of gods s spiritual nature out of their catechisme , that they may more securely deny the coessentiall trinunity of father , son and holy ghost ; and therefore i do insist upon this difference between created and uncreated persons , because if the doctrine concerning the single and infinite perfection of gods spirituall nature be overthrowne ; all the t fundamentals of the christian religion will be overturned . v god is jehovah , he is what he is by his owne essence , he can neither cease to be , or to be what he is ; for he cannot be any other thing , or any otherwise , then now he is , and ever was , exod. . , . revel . . . iames. . . psal. . . . gos is called light , and love , & life in scripture , to note the singlenesse of his being , because whatsoever is in him , is himself , and he himself is one single infinite perfection , he is light it self , and in him is no darknesse at all , john . . god hath not such an imperfect singlenesse of being , as we say , is in the x first matter of last difference and the like ; nor such a singlenesse as is in angels , or the souls of men , for theirs is but a comparative singlenesse , there is some kind of composition even in the most glorious angels . god is not compounded of a nature , y atrributes , and relations , as hath been shewen , nor is any of the divine persons compounded ; nor can the godhead be said to be compounded of three persons ; for though the persons be distinguished , they do not compound , nor can they be compounded . distinction connotes perfection , because it is opposite to confusion : but composition denotes multiplicity and imperfection ; we must then consider that . the essence of god is most z perfect , and therefore nothing can be added to it to make it more perfect , because it is infinitely perfect . . whatsoever is compounded may be dissolved into the parts whereof it is compounded ; the godhead cannot be dissolved , because it cannot be changed . . whatsoever is compounded , must needs be dependent both in being and in working . but god is a independent . ergo. . the parts compounding are b before the whole that is compounded ; but god is the former of all things , and therefore nothing can be before god. the divine essence cannot be later then it selfe , or later then any thing else , because it is the first and eternall being . now if neither of the nature or attributes c of these uncreated persons , nor the persons themselves be compounded , nor god compounded of the nature and persons ; here is another very great difference between created and uncreated persons , who have life , and are life it self , because they are one single perfection . iv. three created persons have three different natures , but these d three uncreated persons have the selfe same most single and singular nature . three created persons may have the same specifical nature , but they have not the same singular nature ; created persons in respect of their specificall nature which is universall , are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of like nature , but in respect of their singular nature they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but now these uncreated persons are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in respect of their e singular essence : look how many f created persons there be of the same species , so many singular substances there are of that species . for , a g finite nature cannot be communicated to severall proper persons of the same species without a multiplication of singular natures or substances , because every finite nature is imperfect and divisible . the humane nature is communicated to paul , peter and iohn : now these three persons are three men , for they have three distinct singular natures , though they have one universall nature ; and no wonder , for their nature is imperfect and divisible ; their universall nature is unum multiplicabile . but the nature which is common to these three divine persons is not universall but singular ; it is unum immultiplicabile , because the divine nature is infinite , and that which is infinite cannot be multiplyed ; the unity of the divine nature is reall h and most perfectly singular . the same singular nature , the whole nature being of bound lesse perfection is really and eternally communicated to all three persons without any division of the nature , separation of the persons or composition of nature and persons : the persons are distinguished , but not separated ; and if we speak properly and strictly , the divine i nature , as it is common to all three persons , is neither distinguished nor multiplyed ; for the nature is not distinguished from k it self , nor are the persons distinguished from one another by the nature , or naturall properties , but by personall properties , which are not naturally common to all three , as the attributes are ( which we call naturall , because they are essentiall , ) for these personall properties are naturally peculiar and incommunicable , and yet they do nor superadd any new nature ; because the divine nature doth containe all relative as well as absolute perfection in it ; and the godhead considered with all these incommunicable properties is but one single godhead , as hath been shewen : this is a transcendent l mystery indeed . v. created persons have a different understanding , a different will , a different power , because they have a different nature . but uncreated persons who have one and the same undivided and infinite nature , must needs have one and the same understanding , will and power . for , we cannot comprehend god as one pure vital act , but as his life is actuous m or active in his vnderstanding and will , in his essentiall and almighty power . now , what is n essential , that must needs be common to all three persons . whatsoever the father is as he is substance , as he is life , as he is eternity , as he is perfection , as he is god , the same is the son of god , and the holy ghost , as augusti● doth frequently discourse . when the o attribute or praedicate is essential , whatsoever is affirmed of the attribute or praedicate , that must needs be true of the subject , as the philosopher and all that have any reason in them , do unanimously conclude . the essentiall power of god is the very essence of god ; god doth act by , and of himself , and not by any faculty or power superadded to his essence ; christ is called the p power of god , and the holy q ghost is called the power of the most high . cor. . v. . . luke . to shew that they have the same essential power that the father hath christ saith , that none can take his sheep out of his hand , because none can take them out of his fathers hand ; for saith he , i and my father are one , john . , , . we have one nature , one hand , that is one power . for the hand of god can be nothing else but the power of god. and therefore since all the three divine persons are one god , because they have one and the same divine nature , th●se three are r one with the most perfect and singular manner of unity . finally , since the power of god is the essence of god , it must reeds follow that all three persons have the same power , because they have the same divine essence , and they have the self-same essence by nature , not by meere indulgence or grace . but then some who have a great mind to cavill , tell us that we do but equivocate when we say these three persons have the same essentiall power , because we do conceale the other member of the distinction , which is relative or s personall power . now it is impossible , say they , that these three should have the same personall or relative power , because the father doth beget a son as he is god the father , as he is the first personall principle , and not simply and absolutely as he is god ; but the son hath not power to beget himselfe , or to beget another son , because there can be but three divine persons , and there is but one of the three called a son in scripture . moreover , the son is begotten , and therfore his power is rather a passive then an active power . but the power of the father whereby he did beget his son is an active power . nor did the holy ghost breath forth himselfe by his owne power , for he did not proceed from himselfe , but from the father and the son ; and therefore though there be but one essentiall power , it should seeme that there are three personall or relative powers truly distinct in the godhead . this argument is the most plausible argument which is urged by them , and therefore it must be most warily answered . . we do not equivocate in this or any other point , but do readily acknowledge that god the father doth beget a son as he is god the father , and not simply and absolutely as he is god ; because this eternal generation points at a personall property considered after the manner of a vitall act. but then as this personal property and relation doth not differ really from the divine essence , so this personal power of begetting doth not differ really from the essentiall power , because god doth beget a son in the unity of his owne divine essence ; his son is t equall to him , and therefore not u essentially x different from him , john . . . john . . nulla fuit mutatio essentialis in filio , cujus essentia est immutablis . . we deny that there is an active power in the father , a and a passive power in the son in respect of generation , because a passive power notes materiality and imperfection ; but this eternall generation cannot be materiall , for god is a spirit infinitely more spiritual then the most glorious angel . pater genuit filium & filius genitus est — spiritualiter , immutabiliter . . the two words of begetting and being b begotten which are used in scripture do not point at two different powers , an active and a passive , but at two different persons ; the father who did beget , and the son who was never unbegotten , micah . . for he was of old , from the dayes of eternity . . it was not in the power of the father to forbeare the begetting of his son , because the son is ens c summe necessarium , as well as the father , the son is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , god of himselfe , and not god by participation , nor a different god from the father , but the same god with the father , and therefore an independent , eternall god , who did not begin to be god , who cannot cease to be god , but hath life in himselfe as well as the father , iohn . . and hath the self-same divine life , divine nature , divine power which the father hath ; and therefore the schools conclude well that the father and the son have the d same power , but with a different relation ; but these different relations do not superadd a new essence , a new divine nature ; and they who have the same essence , must needs have the same power , because the power of god is not distinguished from the essence of god , and the father doth communicate the same essence and power which the son receives . . there is the same reason of the son and holy ghost ; for these three are e equall , nay one , essentially one , one god with the most perfect kind of unity , as hath been shewen : and some that are metaphysical acknowledge that nothing is simply f one , but that which is most 〈…〉 and nothing is most singly 〈◊〉 but god , who hath nothing in himself but that which is himself . g aristotle discoursing of six kinds of unity saith that things may be said to be one ▪ . in respect of continuity , because they are one continued body . . in respect of their subject , as two accidents in the same subject . . because they are under the same genus . . because they are of the same species . . because they have the same definition ; but then he concludes that all these are but imperfect kinds of unity , if compared with the last unity , which is . when a thing is one in respect of its single and indivisible essence . h now the father and son are one , iohn . . the father , son and i holy ghost are one , iohn . . and they are one after the most perfect manner , they are one in respect of the most single and indivisible essence , because the divine essence is most single and perfectly one . and therefore since k essence and power are not distinguished in god , it followes undenyably that these three who have one essence , have one and the same power , but with different properties and relations . this truth will be more evident when we have discoursed of the distinction of these three divine persons , of which we are to treat in the next chapter . vi. created persons have a different place and presence , but uncreated persons are omnipresent , they cannot be separated or divided from one another in respect of place or presence , but do subsist in one another . the father did l beget the son in the unity of the divine nature , and the son doth subsist in the nature of god , phil. . . and all three persons subsisting in the m same single & omnipresent nature , they must needs subsist in one another . the divine nature of the father is in the son , and therefore the father is in the son ; the divine nature of the son is in the father , and therefore the son is in the father , and the like may be said of the holy ghost , for the divine nature of the holy ghost is in the father and the son. these three glorious persons are distinguished from one another , and yet they do subsist in one another . they do subsist in one another without any contraction n , commixtion , or confusion , as o damascen taught the schoolmen to speak ; when philip desired christ to show him the father , our saviour answers , he that hath seene me hath seene the father , john . . because he is the image of his fathers person , and the illustrious brightnes of his fathers glory ; nay , because the nature of his father is in him , and the person of his father is in him ; and therefore he calls upon philip to beleeve that his father is in him . iohn . ▪ beleevest thou not that i am in the father and the father in me ? as if he had said , i wonder you should not beleeve this truth , it is a special article of your faith if you be a christian : and it is a very plaine article , for you have some sensible arguments to confirme your faith in this point , both from my words , and from my works ; you may hear the father speaking in me , and see my father working in me . the words that i speak unto you , i speak not of my selfe , but the father that dwelleth in me , he doth the works . joh. . . and then he presses the point home upon him by a peremptory injunction in the . verse . beleeve me that i am in the father , and the father in me : or else beleeve me for the very works sake . philip might hear what was truly divine in the saving words of christ , and see what was divine in the miraculous works of christ , and by the words and works ( and spirit of christ making both effectuall ) he might be brought to beleeve this necessary point , that the nature of god the father , and the person of god the father is in christ. give me leave to insist upon this point , for there is more in it then we can well observe at first view , and therefore our saviour did presse this point home very frequently , and require that men would expressely beleeve it , iohn . . beleeve the works — but to what end ? why , that yee may know and beleeve that the father is in me , and i in him . this is the end of christs working so many miracles amongst them , to bring them to beleeve that he and the father did mutually subsist in one another . credite operibus , beleeve my works saith he , they speak me to be god , and the son of god , and therefore i am not guilty of blasphemy , because i say i am the son of god , and equall to god , for i am god , i and my father are one god ; and if you beleeve that i and my father are one god , you must beleeve that i am in the father , and the father in me . this is the summe and substance of our saviours discourse from the . verse of the tenth chapter of iohn to the . verse of that chapter ; and our saviour did enter into this discourse at the request of the jewes , who came round about him , and desired him not to hold them in suspence any longer , but to tell them plainly whether he were the christ or no. john . . all then who beleeve jesus christ to be the christ , the true messiah , the onely saviour , and an all sufficient saviour , must beleeve , confesse and acknowledge this truth , that the father is in christ , and christ in the father . from what hath been spoken it is clear and evident , that this is a point of life and death , as we say , a fundamentall point , a point necessary to salvation , and therfore our saviour did so often insist upon it . in the th . of iohn , our saviour tells them more then once , that he was not alone , and therefore his testimony of himselfe was not a single testimony , but his father who was with him and in him did bear witnes with him , and of him , john . . for i am not alone , but i and the father that sent me ; i am one that beare witnesse of my selfe , and the father that sent me beareth witnesse of me , v. . and he that sent me is with me , the father hath not left me alone , v. . this point is difficult to beleeve , that christ who is man is very god , the same god with the father , a different person from the father , yet subsisting in the father , who is the only true god ; but as rollock saith well , though this point be most a difficult , yet it is most necessary , and therefore we must beg the spirit of god that we may get above nature , and see the father in christ , and christ in the father , for the naturall man doth not relish , receive or perceive the things of god , cor. . , our saviour told his disciples , that when the spirit was poured out more plentifully upon them , then they should know him to be in his father . the father will give you another comforter even the spirit of truth , and at that day yee shall know that i am in my father , john . , , . and in the sixteenth of iohn the spirit had convinced the disciples of this weighty truth ; for they say , by this we beleeve that thou camest forth from god ; iesus answered them , do you now beleeve ? behold the houre cometh , yea is now come , that ye shall be scattered every man to his owne , and shall leave me alone , and yet i am not alone , because the father is with me , john . , , . in these and divers other places our saviour doth declare this truth unto us , that he is in his father ; and if it were not a weighty truth of very great consequence and high concernment , he would not insist so much upon it ; it is the mutuall in-subsistence , and coessential b omnipresence of the father and the son. and the spirit being c coessentiall with the father and the son , must needs be in them both , from whom he proceeds in the unity of the d divine nature ; for it is cleare that an infinite nature cannot be poured forth beyond it selfe , because it is boundlesse , and therefore when we read cor. . . what man knoweth the things of a man , save the spirit of man , which is in him ? even so the things of god knowes no man , but the spirit of god , ( we may safely e adde ) which is in god , because he did proceed in the unity of the divine f indivisible and boundlesse nature . the holy ghost hath the same nature with the father and the son ; and a nature of infinite and boundlesse perfection ▪ cannot be communicated to any thing that is not infinite , to any thing that is not it selfe , because there can be no other infinite thing but it selfe , there can be but one infinite , and every one of the three glorious persons is one and the same infinite god ; upon these grouds we may answer many questions . if you ask where god was before the world was made ? i answer , that he was then , just where he is now , in himselfe g . dic ubi tunc esset , cum praeter ●um nihil esset ; tunc ubi nunc , in se , quoniam sibi sufficit ipse . if you ask where the father was ; i answer , in the son ; if you ask where the son was ; i answer , in the father : if you ask where the spirit was , i answer , he was both in the father and in the son , and they both in him . god h was in all three persons , and all three persons in the godhead , and in one another , and so they do , and will remaine to all eternity , because they are coessentiall , because they are one omnipresent and eternall god. the godhead is not shut up in the narrow circle of the universe , the whole godhead is in the world , and the whole godhead is out the world , for the world cannot containe the true god , who did create , and doth uphold the world , and the single godhead cannot be divided ; and therefore we must not conceive that part of the godhead is in the world , and part of it out of the world , but the whole godhead is i every where , it is not included in any place , or excluded from any place ; the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot containe him , king. . . his perfection is higher then heaven , and deeper then hell , job . . from what hath beene said , it is most cleare , that since the essence of god is omnipresent , and the selfe same indivisible essence is in father , son and holy ghost , all three must needs mutually subsist in one another ; though the persons be distinguished , they cannot be k separated , divided or contracted ; and therefore this sixth difference between created and uncreated persons , is so remarkable , that i need not go about to prove that humane persons are separated as well as distinguished ; tot sunt humanitates quot homines ; and it is most certaine that angelicall persons have a limited presence , because they have a finite essince . but it is otherwise in divine persons , for the father works in the son , and by the spirit the father subsists in the son and in the spirit , and cannot be separated from these coessentiall and omnipresent persons , who do subsist with him ( as they are both from him ) in the unity of the godhead . i need say no more concerning angels then what is commonly said , angeli sunt alicuòi definitive ; sunt enim in suo vbi non per operationem vel circumscriptionem , sed per designationem definitivam , angels are naturally somewhere ; though they are not in any place by extension of parts yet their finite nature is contained within certaine bounds and limits . hence l it is that some learned men affirme that it is improper to say , that god is m somewhere because he is every-where ; somewhere is a definitive word . vii . created persons have many other different accidents besides place , of which we have spoken ; and ●ime or duration , of which we are to speak . it will not be necessary or usefull to discourse of every particular ; but that which i intend to insist upon under this head is , that created persons are distinguished from one another by an n heap of accidents , and therefore it will be sufficient for the making good of this seventh difference , to show that divine persons are not distinguished by a congeries , or heap of accidents , because there is no accident at all in god. for the being of god is infinitely perfect , and singularly single , as hath been proved ; and therefore it is infinitely below the single perfection of god to be compounded of a substance and accidents for the adorning or perfecting of his glorious being . relations are not accidents in god. the o reltion of one coessentiall person to another is agreeable to the essence of god ; it is a necessary relation which did never begin to be , and cannot cease to be . the relation of god to the creature cannot be reall , because it is such a relation as might not have been ; but there is no reall thing in god which might not have beene . . there can be no reall relation between two extremes , one of which two extremes is unchangeable , and the other might not have been . . god was not in any passive potentiality or power , before he did create the world , to receive any reall act , because he is really a p pure act ; and it is evident that a new reall relation is a kind of act wherof the pure , single , perfect and unchangeable essence is uncapable . . our weak understanding comparing god with the creatures , is apt to frame many denominations , which according to the manner of signifying , seem to import as if god were in potentiâ q ad multa ; yet if we do consider the thing signified , as we ought in a way agreeable to the pure , single and infinite perfection of god , we shall find that these are but extrinsecall denominations . this point is much beaten upon by the most acute schoolmen , and writers of metaphysicks , and therefore i need not insist upon it ; only observe that when i say created persons are distinguished by a heap of accidents , i do not mean that a person is made compleat in his subsistence by any accident , or an heap of accidents , for i have refuted that conceit , in this present chapter pag. . i hasten to the eighth difference . viii . humane persons with whom we are best acquainted , may exist in a very different time as well as in different places ; some lived before , some since the flood : some before the incarnation , others since the death and resurrection of our lord and saviour ; but herein all agree that time is the measure of them all ; their duration is very imperfect , their duration is not always contemporary , never coessentiall . but all three uncreated persons are coeternal , because they are coessential , because they have the same divine eternal essence : angels are said to have an eternall duration , but they are not y eternall in the same sense that the father , son and holy ghost are eternall . . because they were created , coloss. . . and therefore did begin to be , they have not ( as the schools say ) an interminable or interminated duration à parte ante . . if they had been created from eternity , yet they could not have beene esteemed coeternall with their creatour , who did create them out of nothing , and did not beget or breath them forth in the unity of his own divine essence . . there can be no lesse then an infinite difference between the finite , dependent , s changable , defective duration of an angel , and the infinite , independent , immutable duration of these three uncreated , and all creating persons , who are one independent , unchangeable , eternall , infinite god the eternity of the three glorious persons is interminable , indefectible , immutable . . if angels had been created from eternity , yet they would not have been essentially t or intrinsecally eternall , because their essence doth not include any repugnancy to an actuall beginning . . if angels had been created from eternity , yet god might have annihilated them afterwards , and then they had actually ceased to be . . although they were not actually annihilated , yet the very u possibility of being annihilated is enough to prove their duration terminable , changeable , defectible ; and therefore though they had been created from all eternity , they would not have been coeternall with their maker , nor would three angels have been coessentially coeternall with one another . . if angels had been created from eternity , they would have been eternall , not by any intrinsecall or naturall duration , as hath been proved ; and therefore they would have been eternall only by an x extrinsecall denomination , taken from the eternity of god. . upon consideration of the premises , many reverend doctours of the church conclude , that angels are eternall only à parte post ; and they are eternal à parte post , not by their own nature , but by the free favour and appointment of god ; and therefore there is an infinite difference between the duration of these three uncreated persons , and the duration of the most glorious angels in heaven . angels are y mu●able , and god is free agent both in respect of creation , and in respect of preservation ; and therfore god and angels are not coeternall as the peripateticks dreamt . god did voluntarily engage himself to create and preserve angels by his own decree ; and therefore that subordinate aeternity which they have à parte post , is vouchsafed unto them by the free and undeserved favour of god. for ( as a damascen saith well ) whatsoever had a beginning would soon have an ending , if he who gave a beginning to it by his infinite power should think fit to suspend his upholding and preserving influence , or put forth his almighty and irresistible power against it in a destructive way . i will not take this faire occasion to speak of the acts or motions of angels to make this difference seeme greater ; for that which hath been said is su●●●cient to make it evident that angels do not coexist with god the father with the same duration wherewith god the son and god the holy ghost do coexist with him ; because these three coessentiall persons are coeternall ; they are all three one god , who is his owne essence , his owne eternity ; the scripture calls the god of israel the eternity of israel , sam. . . and b aristotle calls him life it selfe , the best life , an eternall life , that hath neither beginning nor ending , nor succession ; and therefore it is evident that he did not beleeve god to be subject to c change or variation . god is ( saith d he ) a self-sufficient and eternall life . god is truly self-sufficient , because he is alsufficient , he is infinite in perfection , and therefore infinite in duration ; his infinite perfection and duration is nothing else but but his infinite essence ; and this infinite essence is the self-same in all three coessentiall , coeternall and coequall persons , as hath been proved . and therefore we have good cause to rejoyce and triumph in this glorious difference between created and uncreated persons . give me leave to sweeten this dispute with some devotion . we have an everlasting father , an everlasting saviour and an everlasting comforter : and we have good cause to lay a charge upon our immortall souls to blesse & praise all three coeternal persons , for their eternall love , our eternall redemption and salvation . praise the lord o my soule , while i live will i praise the lord ; whilst i have any being will i sing praises to my god , and put confidence in him , for with the lord there is plenteous and eternall redemption . but o put not your trust in princes , nor in those sons of men in whom there is no salvation , for their breath goeth forth , they returne to their first earth , and in that day all their thoughts and counsels perish . happy is he that hath the god of jacob for his help , whose hope is in the lord his god , which made heaven and earth , the sea and all that therein is , which keepeth truth for ever ; read and consider the six first verses of the . psalme ▪ there is a great emphasis in the sixth verse , which keepeth truth for ever . o let us declare it to the following generation that ●his god is our god for ever and ever , and he will be our guide even unto death , psal. . , . happy it is for us that we are redeemed by the pretious bloud of christ , who offered up himself by by his eternall spirit , his divine and eternal nature , heb . . that he might bring in everlasting righteousnesse , dan. . . obtaine eternall redemption , and purchase an eternall inheritance for us , heb. . . . happy , thrice happy it is for us that we are born of incorruptible seed , which will abide in us for ever : for we are born of the eternall spirit , who will perfect his work in us , and be our everlasting comforter . finally , all three uncreated persons will be our all-sufficient and satisfactory portion and reward for ever-more . ix . three created persons have different actions and operations , because they have different singular natures , different powers , &c. as hath been shewen in this very chapter . all actions of father , son and holy ghost upon the creatures are undivided , nay indivisible ; how personall actions ad infra differ , i am to declare at large in the next chapter , where i am to shew how these three glorious persons who cannot be divided , are truly distinguished from one another ; onely before i conclude this chapter , it will be requisite to note , that though the son cannot be said to beget himself , yet he is not passive in that eternall generation , as hath been proved above ; the divine nature which is communicated to the son by generation , is the nature of the son as well as of the father : the father doth necessarily beget the son in the power of that nature , and in the unity of that self-same single and indivisible nature ; and that divine nature which is communicated to the son , is not begotten by the father , but is of it self ; and therefore we say that christ is god of himself , though he be not a son of himself , but of the father by eternall generation , because the father is the first principle of subsisting life . i might proceed to treat of other differences : that common rule , actiones sunt suppositorum , is true of divine actions and uncreated persons ; but it is manifest that there are many actions of the soule of man , both when it is in a state of union with , and when it is in a state of separation from the body , which cannot be properly and truly called actions of a person , but i shall not descend so low , as to take notice of such differences . the nine differences which have been insisted on are all considerable . and from them all we may safely conclude that the word subsistence or person cannot be attributed after the same maner to god , angels and men . a divine person is a spirituall and infinite subsistent , which must not be considered as abstracted from , but as subsisting in the divine nature , and as related to those other coessentiall persons , from which he is sufficiently distinguished by some personall and incommunicable property ; and therefore subsistence is attributed to god after the most excellent and glorious manner . a person signifies the most excellent kind of subsistent , an understanding subsistent , as hath been shewen ; but then an uncreated person , a divine person doth infinitely excell and transcend the person of the most glorious angel in heaven ; and therefore we must remove all those imperfections from our thoughts , which are in created persons , when we meditate or discouse of these divine and uncreated persons , that we may think and speak according to the analogy of faith . chap. vii . the three vncreated , divine , and coessentiall subsistents are sufficiently distinguished , though they cannot be divided . we are now come to treat of that profound mystery , at which men and angels stand amazed . how can three be one ? ( saith the disputer of this world ) or one be three ? can one be distinguished again and again from himself ? o bold fools , ( saith athanasius ) why do you not lay aside your curiosity , and enquire no farther after a trinity , then to beleeve that there is a trinity ? the scripture saith there is but one god , and the scripture saith that the father , son and holy ghost are this one god ; and yet the scripture saith , that the father , son and holy ghost are three , three and yet one : three persons and yet one god. we have shewen above that the godhead cannot be multiplyed ; now we are to shew that the persons are distinguished , and what kind of distinction there is between these three divine and uncreated persons . . these divine and uncreated persons are sufficiently distinguished to our apprehension , who ought to judge , beleeve , speak , worship , according to the word of god. . these uncreated persons were truly distinguished from one another before there was any scripture , any world ; for the coexistencie and distinction of these glorious persons is eternall , and therefore this distinction cannot be grounded upon the mere phrase of scripture ; it is the true intent of god in severall plain expressions of scripture , to declare unto us the distinction of these divine and uncreated persons . i shall prove this point fully and clearly by certain steps and degrees . . these uncreated persons have distinct and proper names in the word of god. the father , the son , [ or the word ] and the holy-ghost [ or spirit ] now that we may not be tritheites or sabellians , let us consider that these three names do not signifie three different natures , and yet they do signifie three different persons , for it is evident that one person cannot be praedicated of another , the father is not the son , nor is the son the father ; the holy ghost is not either of them , nor is either of them the holy ghost ; and therefore they are three distinct persons of the godhead . . these uncreated persons are coequall , and therefore they are distinct ; it is most absurd to say that the same person is equall to himself . but the son is said to be equall to the father . philip. . therefore the son is not the father . we do usually say that the father , son and holy ghost are equall in power , to note a distinction of persons ; but then when we speak strictly , we do not say the power of the persons is equall , but we say the power of the persons is the same , to note the unity of their essence . we say the persons are equall in power . goodnesse , wisdome , &c. to note that one person doth not exceed another in degrees of wisdom , power , &c. because it is impossible that there should be any degrees in that which is infinite ; and the power , wisdome , &c. of all the three persons is the same infinite perfection , because all three have the same infinite essence . and therefore when we look upon power in a common notion , as referred to the divine essence which is common to all three persons , we say it is the same power . but when we look upon power in a singular notion as it is communicated after a singular manner to this , or that person , we say this person is equall to that in power , the father equall to the son , the spirit equall to both , to note the distinction of the persons , and not the distinction of the power , because the self-same almighty power is communicated to the severall persons in a severall way ; power is in the father of and from himself [ that is ] not from any other person ; the same power is communicated to the son , but it is communicated to him by eternal generation , and to the spirit by eternal procession ; the ●ame power then is communicated to different coequall persons in a different way , as we shall more fully declare before we conclude this seventh chapter . . the uncreated persons are sufficiently distinguished by their number . the nature of god is the first entity , the first unity , and therefore it is uncapable of number , because it is most singularly single , and actually infinite . it is not proper ( if we speak strictly ) to say that god is one in number ; we should rather say , that god is one , and an only one . deus non est unus numero , sed unicus . but the persons of the godhead are three in number : the scripture speaks expressely of three these three , iohn . . if any man in athanasius his time asked how many persons subsist in the godhead , they were wont to send him to iordan ; go say they to iordan and there you may hear and see the blessed trinity ; or if you will beleeve the holy scriptures , read the third chapter of matthew , the and . verses , for there ▪ . the father speaks in a voice from heaven , and owns his only begotten son , saying , this is my beloved son , &c. . the son went down into the water and was baptized . . the holy ghost did visibly descend upon jesus christ. in the fourteenth of iohn we have a plain demonstration of this truth . i [ saith the son ] will pray the father , and he shall give you another comforter , iohn . , . may we not safely conclude from hence that the spirit is a distinct person , another person from the father and the son ? for the text is cleare , the son will pray , and the father will give another comforter ; we know the holy ghost is not another god , he is the same god with the father and the son , and therefore we must confesse that it is meant of another person ; he shall give you another comforter , even the spirit of truth , verse , . and againe , in the . verse of the same chapter . but when the comforter is come whom i will send unto you from the father , even the spirit of truth . what can there be more expresse or cleare ? the scripture teaches us to reckon right , and we see the divine persons are reckoned three in number : one person is not another , there are diverse persons , there are three persons , the number numbred , the persons numbred are named by their distinct and proper names , the number numbring is expressely set down in sacred records . we are not more exact in any accounts then we are in reckoning of witnesses , whose testimony is produced in a businesse of great consequence , and high concernment . now in the great question about the messiah , witnesses are produced to assure us , that iesus christ the son of the virgin , and the only begotten son of god , is the true messiah , the only all-sufficient saviour of his people from their sins . and there are three witnesses named and produced for the proof of this weighty point . now , one person that hath three names , or two persons , and an attribute of one or both persons cannot passe for three witnesses in any fair and reasonable account ; we are sure god reckons right , and he reckons father , son and holy ghost for three witnesses , and he doth not reckon these three and the godhead for foure ( as they do who dream of a quaternity ) because these three are one and the same god blessed for ever . let us then be exact in observing , since the holy ghost is so exact in making of the account . in the eighth of iohn the pharisees object that our saviour did bear record of himself , and did conclude from thence that therefore his record was not true , iohn . . our saviour answers in the next verse . though i beare record of my self , yet my record is true ; for i am not alone , but i and the father that sent me . and it is written in your law , that the testimony of two men is true . i am one that beare witnesse of my self , and the father that sent me beareth witnesse of me . it is most clear and evident by this discourse that our blessed lord did make a fair legall just account ; for he cites the law concerning the validity of a testimony given in by two witnesses ; and then he reckons his father for one witnesse , and himself for another . i am one saith he , and my father is another ; i and my father make two sufficient witnesses in a just and legall account . there is another ( saith he ) that beareth witnesse of me , and i know that the witnesse which he witnesseth of me is true , iohn . there is another saith he ; he doth not meane another god ; for when he speaks of his power and godhead , he saith , i and my father are one , iohn . . christ and his father are one god , but christ and his father are two distinct persons , for they are reckoned as two distinct witnesses ; and one person must not be reckoned for two witnesses . there is another that bears witnesse , iohn . . and the father himself , v. . bears witnesse of me . well then , christ is one witness , the father is another , and the holy ghost is a third witness , iohn . . we see the holy ghost speaks as plainly in this point as we do when we teach a child to tell one , two , and three . for there are three that bear record in heaven , the father , the word and the holy ghost : and these three are one . if we peruse the scriptures diligently as we ought , we shall finde that these witnesses are three persons , who are one and the same blessed god. they are one in nature , though three in subsistence , to shew that these three persons are not to be reckoned as three men are , who have three distinct singular natures really divided and separated ; for these three glorious persons subsist in one another , and have one and the same single undivided and indivisible nature ; and they are three witnesses , three persons truly distinct , iohn . , . cap , ● , cap. , . iv. the divine persons are distinguished by their inward and personall actions . the father did from all eternity communicate the a living essence of god to the son , in a most wonderfull and glorious way ; now it is cleare that the father did not beget himselfe ; and therefore the son is another person truly distinct from the father , and yet equall to the father , because he is begotten in the unity of the same godhead , and hath life in himselfe , john . . the living essence of god who is life it selfe being communicated to him by an eternall generation . the unbegotten father is clearly distinguished from the only begotten son. but i dare not say as some do , that the father is active , and the son passive in this eternall generation because this generation is eternall . for b nothing which is eternall , can be truly said to be in a passive power to any thing , much lesse can it be said to be in a passive power to be . the son hath life in himselfe , is life it self , hath life essentially , and as he is the same essence with the father , is of himselfe , and hath all that is essentiall from that very essence ; but that essence is communicated to the son by the c father , and therefore the son is said to receive all from the father . but then we must consider that the son receives nothing from the father as from an externall cause but as from an intrinsecall principle rather the cause , for the son doth not depend upon the father as an effect upon its cause ; and i call the father d an intrinsecall principle of the sons subsistence , because the father doth beget the son of , and in himself in the unity of the same godhead ; their divine nature is one and the same , and their persons are coequall and coeternall ▪ because they are coessentiall . this is the very mystery of mysteries which corrupt and wanton reason derides , but prudent faith admires and adores . the socinians tell us , that they cannot beleeve , that the father did beget a son of his owne substance , because god is eternall and unchangeable ; the single essence of god is indivisible , and being most singularly one is incommunicable ; part of the divine essence could not be communicated ( say they ) to the son , because the essence is impartible , indivisible ; and the self same whole essence cannot be communicated , because it is most singularly one , and therefore incommunicable . essentia quae est una numero est incommunicabilis . to this grand objection i shall return a plain answer out of pure scripture , and deliver it in certain propositions or conclusions , that the answer may be more direct , cleare and satisfactory . conclusions concerning the eternal generation . . the father did beget his son ; the father himself bears witnesse to this truth , and his witnesse is full , and clear , and true . jehovah hath said unto me , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee , psal. . . nay , the father declares this truth to men and angels as a practicall truth that they may direct and regulate their worship according to this mystery . the apostle proves that christ is more excellent then angels , because he hath a more excellent name then they ; for , unto which of the angels said he at any time , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee ? and again , i will be to him a father , and he shall be to me a son , hebr. . , . here 's a double proof of the point , he hath a more excellent name , because he is the son of god in a peculiar sense , and hath the divine nature communicated to him , as shall be fully proved ere we conclude this point ; for the name of son is not an empty title , he hath the divine nature of his father in him . now that he is the son of god , is testifyed again , and again , saith the apostle , verse . and he begins the sixth verse thus , and again , &c. you see how he doth inculcate this point , how he beates upon it again and againe ; and the reason is , because this truth is fundamentall both of faith and worship , as is most evident in the sixth verse of that chapter . and again when he brings in the first-begotten into the world , he saith , and let all the angels of god worship him , hebr. . . you see this mystery of the unbegotten father , and the only begotten son is held forth to men and angels in order to worship that their worship may be directed to jesus christ as the son of the living god , and to god the father , as the father of our lord iesus christ. god declared this truth after a glorious manner from heaven , that it might be more diligently considered . and lo a voice from heaven , saying , this is my beloved son matth. . . when he was bapt●zed : and the like we read of when he was transfigured in the presence of the disciples in the holy mount. and the apostle doth take notice of these solemne declarations from heaven , and layes them down as fundamentals of the christian religion , pet. . from the . verse to the twentieth . all the glorious miracles wrought by our saviour , iohn . and his resurrection from the dead bear witnesse to this fundamental truth , that christ is the first begotten , and the only begotten son of the living god ; be pleased to compare , acts. . , . with romans . . and it will be evident that he was not made , but onely declared to be the son of god at the time of his resurrection . . the father did beget his son from all eternity before his works of old ; i ( saith the son who is the wisdome of the father ) was set up from e everlasting , when as the highest part of the dust of the earth was not made , when he prepared the heavens i was there , &c. prov. . from verse to the . his goings forth were of old from the dayes of eternity , micah . . iohn . . , . he was with god , he was god , before the beginning he had glory with his father before the world was , iohn . . relata f simul sunt . . the father did beget his son in the unity of the godhead ; the scripture speaks expressely that christ is the g proper or naturall son of god ; he spared not his own son , or his proper sonne ; rom. . . god is the father of christ , his own father , iohn . . the iewes did well understand the importance and force of that expression , for say they , in that he said god is his own father , he hath made himself equall with god ; and therefore that phrase doth import that he is the naturall and coessentiall son of god , else he could not be coequall with his father , iohn . philip. . . all those texts which prove that christ is god , and that there is but one god , do prove that christ is the naturall and coessentiall son of god. god hath but one coessentiall son , to whom he hath given to have life in himself , iohn . . because the divine nature , which is life it self is communicated to the son by this eternall and ineffable generation . it is proper to living creatures to communicate their nature by generation in their low and imperfect way ; but the great god who is not subject to imperfection , doth after the most glorious and perfect manner beget a son in the unity of his own living essence , who is therefore called the son of the living god , that is the naturall and coessentiall son of god , who hath the same divine life , nature , essence with the father ; and therefore peter is so highly commended for confessing that christ is the son of the living god ; blessed art thou , saith our saviour for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee , but my father which is in heaven ; upon this fundamentall truth , christ hath built the christian church as on a rock , matth. . . , . he who hath life in himself is the naturall and coessentiall son of the living god : he hath the same will , power , nature , essence , life with his father , iohn . , . iohn h . . iohn . . iohn . . the same single and infinite essence is in father , son and holy ghost ; the whole undivided and indivisible essence of god dwels in the son in its fulnesse and infinite perfection . coloss. . . . the father did beget his son without change or i motion after a most glorious and wonderfull manner ; there can be no change , motion , or succession in this eternall and most perfect generation . the essence of god is spirituall , iohn . . and therefore the son is not begotten of the fathers seed , or any materiall substance , because god is a single and pure act , who doth beget a son within himself essentially one with himself and therefore his sonne doth not subsist out of himself , john . . iohn . . for an infinite nature cannot be poured forth beyond it self . there can be no essentiall change in the son by this generation , because the generation is eternall , and the nature which is communicated by generation is unchangable ; the father did unchangably beget his son , and his son is unchangably begotten , there is no shadow of changing or turning either in the father of lights , or the son of righteousnesse , because they are one and the same unchangable jehovah , iames . malach. . . they are too k carnall and base who make an unworthy and odious comparison between the material generation of a weak man , and this more then spirituall and supernaturall generation . the eternall and unchangable father doth beget an eternall and unchangable son according to the perfection of his eternall , unchangable , infinite nature . the father doth beget his son naturally , and therefore in a way agreeable to his unchangable nature ; if the son were not necessarily begotten , his being would not be necessary , and then his essence would not be divine . v. jesus christ is truly and properly the onely-begotten son of god , and therefore the only naturall son of god. jesus christ is called the son of david according to his humane nature : but the lord of david , and the son of the living god according to his divine nature , as appeares by our saviours discourse with the pharisees , matth. . from the . verse to the . and the jewes sought to kill christ because he called god his proper father , as appears by the originall text ; for our english translation doth omit that most observable emphasis ; the words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , iohn . . and christ is called gods proper son ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rom. . . and the apostle gives the reason why he is called the proper son of god in a more excellent way then the most glorious angel is the son of god , because christ is begotten by the father , but the angles were only created by him ; observe the words of the apostle , for unto which of the angels said he at any time , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee ; so that the proper reason why he is called the proper son of god , is , because he is begotten of god ; there is the most excellent reason why christ is said to obtain a more excellent name then angels : christ was begotten in the unity of the godhead , and therfore he alone is properly the son of god with a supereminent excellency . the angels are not such excellent sons as christ is . . because christ is begotten of god , v. . . worshipped by angels with divine honour , worshipped as god , v. . . he hath the throne , scepter , kingdom of god , v. . . he hath the soveraign and proper title of god , v. . . the attributes of god , eternity , v , , , ● , . . he sits at the right hand of god , v. . all these excellencies are due to christ as the proper son of god , hebr. . wheras the angels the most excellent sons by creation are but ministring spirits . from the●e proper and excellent reasons we infer that christ is the only proper or naturall son of god , because he is the only-begotten son of god. we , saith iohn , beheld his glory as of the only begotten son of god. the word [ as ] is not assimilative , but declarative , and demonstrative in that place , for it doth declare to us that the glory of christ is agreeable to his divine nature , he being the only naturall son of god , because he is the only begotten son of god ; just as if when we see a king sitting in his royall robes on his throne , with a crowne on his head and a scepter in his hand , we should say now we see him as a king , that is , now he is like himselfe . his state is agreeable to his majesty ; even so was the glory of christ which the apostles beheld agreeable to the majesty of the only begotten son of god , iohn . . and therfore the word [ as ] was not inserted tanquam terminus diminuens to diminish the glory of the only begoten son of god ; for the word [ as ] is left out in the ▪ . verse of this very chapter , the only begotten son which is in the bosome of the father , iohn v. . the scripture doth abound with several expressions to the same purpose . but we are specially to observe that the only begotten son of god is propounded to us as the object of saving faith , and therefore this point ought to be diligently studied and considered by us . for so god loved the world , that he gave his only begotten son , that whosoever beleeves in him should not perish but have everlasting life , john . . the socinians observing how much it concernes us to stand stedfast , and not yeeld one whit of ground in this point , have tryed their wit to deceive and seduce us , and therefore they object . isaac is called the only son of abraham , gen. . . . to this we answer without any great study , that isaac was the only son which abraham had by sarah : he was the onely begotten son of the promise ; though ismael was the son of abraham by hagar , the bond-woman , in an unworthy and dishonourable way ; and therefore this example will not serve the turn , we reject it , for its impertin●ncy and dissimilitude . christ is the only begotten son of god , he is absolutely and simply considered his only begotten son , and not only in some respect as isaac was the only son of abraham christ ( as gregory nazianzen said ) is truly the son of god , he alone is the son , and the only son of the father , and his son in an only or singular way , and he is the son only , he is not the father also , or the holy ghost jesus christ is the proper naturall true son of god , begotten by the father without a mother in the unity of the godhead , from all eternity , equall to the father , one and the same god with the father , as the scripture sets it forth ; and therefore we conclude that he is simply and absolutely the only begotten son of god , a more excellent son then all the other sons of god , not only more excellent in degree , for gradus non mutat speciem ; but a super-excellent son , who doth differ from all his other sons , plusquam genere aut specie , because he is one god with the father . iesus christ is truly the son of god , because he is the true god , iohn . . begotten of the father , heb , . begotten without a mother , hebr. . . begotten from the dayes of eternity , micah . . . a son equal to his father , who begot him , iohn . . phil. . . the son of god , matth. . . the first begotten , and the only begotten son of god , the naturall and proper son of god ; for he is as the father is , god by nature , gal. . . and therefore naturally , necessarily , eternally begotten of the father in the unity of the godhead ; and therefore there is more then a graduall , nay more then a specificall or genericall difference between this and all other sonnes of god ; we see by all these various expressions , and by those divine and glorious attributes which are ascribed to christ in scripture , that god hath wonderfully declared his love to us in sending his only begotten to redeeme us according to that of the apostle , iohn . . in this was manifest the love of god towards us , because that god sent his only begotten son into the world that we might live through him . when our saviour called god his father , the iewes did very well understand that he meant it in a proper and peculiar sense , and therefore told him that he did make himself equall with god , iohn . . . and that being but a man he made himself god , iohn . . and though the jewes accused him of blasphemy , and endeavoured to stone him as they pretended for his blasphemy , yet our saviour doth not excuse his speech , or say he meant it in a metaphoricall sense , but doth defend it by many arguments both in the fifth and in the tenth chapters of saint iohn , though he did thereby endanger his life ; he saith he is equall to the father , nay one with the father , iohn . . iohn . . and when the high priest asked him whether he was the son of the blessed , mark . . our saviour answers ; i am : there 's a punctuall and positive affirmation of it , v. , . and you may easily know in what sense the high priest meant it , by his renting of his clothes , and condemning our saviour to death for blasphemy , v. . and yet our saviour did not endeavour to allay their heat and rage with any retractation ; he would not say that he spake metaphorically , for he spake properly , he meant that he was the proper and naturall son of god , who had the same nature and power with the father , and therefore was able to do , and actually did the same works with his father . and the iewes did understand him so , and therefore urged the law against him , and condemned him to death for blasphemy , iohn . . the iews answered him , we have a law , and by our law he ought to die , because he made himself the son of god. mark the reason , because he made himself the son of god ; if our saviour had not meant that he was the proper and naturall son of god , a son equall to the father , & one god with the father , the iews would not have accused him of blasphemy . moreover the iewes do generally hold that those words of the second psalme , this day have i begotten thee , are meant of the messiah , as rabbi salomon doth acknowledge in his commentary upon the place . whatsoever saith he is sung in this psalme , our masters have interpreted of king messiah ; but ( saith he ) and he whispers it as a secret ) in regard of the sound of the words , and for the refutation of hereticks ( for so the iew calls us christians ) we think fit to expound it of david himself . here 's a iew would faine conceal a confessed truth from christians , and there are some others it seems that would conceal this malitious concealment , for these words are expunged out of the great hebrew bibles set forth at basil , but they are to be found in the hebrew bibles set forth with the commentaries of the rabbins at venice by bombergius , or else i had not insisted upon the words ; i hope the detecting of this fraud may be very usefull , but i must hasten to some other arguments . the socinians t●ll us that there are five causes of christs sonship assigned in scripture , which arr all temporall causes , and therfore they see no reason why we should assert , or they beleeve this eternall generation of the son of god , since christ may be called the son of god upon another , and farre different account . we desire to know whether every one of these five causes be totall or perpetuall causes ; if they be every one a totall cause , then there will be as many sonships as there are causes , no lesse then five sonships ; for that rule is certaine , where there is a totall and sufficient cause in act , there the effect must needs follow . if they be partiall causes , then the causes which succeed in order , do not produce their complete effect , untill the last cause be in act ; this we premise , that the vanity of this invention may be more evident in the whole contexture of their discourse . i shall now give them leave to speak their mind freely , and fully . . the first cause of this divine sonship is ( as they conceive ) the conception of christ by the holy ghost , whereby ( say they ) christ is said to be begotten of god in an excellent and peculiar way ; and they urge that testimony of the angel , which stands upon record , luke . , to make good their conceit ; and the angel answered , and said unto her : the holy ghost shall come upon thee , and the power of the highest shall overshadow thee : therefore also that holy thing which shall be borne of thee shall be called the son of god. these words of the angel have reference to the prophesie of isaiah mentioned in the . verse of this first of luke . the words of isaiah are , behold a virgin shall conceive and beare a son , and shall call his name immanuel , isaiah . . they shall call his name iesus , matth. . . he shall be called the son of the highest , the son of god , luke . you see the words are different , and therefore we must have speciall respect to the thing signified . observe then . that the prophet did foretell two particulars . first , that a virgin should bear a son. secondly , that the son born of her should be called the son of god. the virgin doubts of the first particular , and enquires how that could be without the knowledge of a man ? the angel informs her , that she should conceive after a peculiar and admirable manner by the overshadowing of the holy ghost ; and from thence infers the second particular , that she should bring forth a son , who was to be called the son of god ; and he gives the very same reason which was given by saint matthew , because it was so foretold by the prophet isaiah , matth , . , , . for the particle [ therefore ] luke . . is not to be referred to the conception of christ as the cause of this divine sonship , but to the prophecy of isaiah recorded luke . . for all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet matth. . . . they shall call his name immanuel , god with us , and therefore he , the same person shall be called the son of god ; this is an higher reason then that which the socinians alleage . . the socinians put a fallacy upon us by assigning that to be the cause which is not the true cause , [ he shall be called ] that is declared and acknowledged to be the son of god. this declaration or manifestation of the son of god in the flesh was temporall , tim. . . but his generation was eternall , micah . . the son of god was sent , manifested , incarnate , in the fulnesse of time , gal. . . but he was the son of god before his incarnation , and therefore his incarnation is not the cause of his divine sonship , the effect cannot be before the cause , but the divine sonship of christ was before the world was . the holy ghost is never called the father of christ , and he could not be the principle of the subsistence or the word , and therefore not the cause of this divine sonship . the apostle states the point , and puts it past all dispute , rom. . , . christ was made of the seed of david according to the flesh , but determined and declared to be the son of god with power according to the spirit of holinesse by the resurrection from the dead ; from whence it followes directly that christ is not properly the son of god according to the flesh , but is in that consideration rather to be called the son of david as we observed above , because christ came of david as concerning the flesh ; but the eternall son of god , is god blessed for ever , rom. . . when the jewes said that our saviour blasphemed , because he made himself god , john , . christ askes them whether they did accuse him of blasphemy , because he said he was the son of god ? v. . whereby he declared that he was the son of god according to his person which is truly divine ; beleeve ( saith he ) that the father is in me and i in him , v. . the force of his answer is evident : i am in the father , and the father in me , and therefore i am a divine person ; i am the son of god , and therefore the divine nature is communicated to my person , i am begotten in the unity of the god. head , i am in the father , and therefore if it be no blasphemy for me to say that i am the son of god , it is no blasphemy at all to say that i am god , because the divine nature is communitated to the naturall and proper son of god ; there 's the proper reason why christ is called the son of god , because the divine nature was communicated to him by an eternal generation . ii. the second cause assigned by the socinians why christ is called the son of god , is the sanctification of christ , for which they cite iohn . , . behold say they the second cause of this divine sonship plainly set forth unto us , christ hath obtained an excellent portion of the spirit , he is sanctified and sent with a divine power into the world to save mankind . to which we answer , that here is the same fallacy obtruded again , because . christ was the son of god before he was sent into the world . . god did not give the spirit by measure to him , iohn . . . christ proves in that tenth chapter of iohn , that he is one with his father in power , and therefore in nature , as appears . because he doth the same works that his father doth , v. . . because he is in his father , and his father in him , v. . . because he is the naturall son of god , and therefore might truly call himself god , v. . . . because they themselves called magistrates gods , upon a cheaper account ; only in regard of their commission and office ; much more might he call himself god , because he was sanctified without measure , had an higher office and commission , being sent to do the work of god , to satisfie the justice of god , and save the elect of god , which he could not have done if he had not had the nature of god , and been thereby fully enabled to perfect this work of god. the argument is grounded upon the infinite distance , and imparity between the office of a mediatour , and the office of a magistrate ; between the only begotten son of god , who is one with his father , who begot him , and the sons of men who are but the deputies of god. iii. the third cause which they assigne of this divine sonship , is the speciall love of the father to this excellent son , matth. . . to this we answer , that god did not make christ his son because he loved him , but he loves him because he is his son , a son equall to himself , one with himself , the expresse image of his person , the illustrious brightnesse of his glory . that very place which they cite makes much against them : god doth from heaven own christ for his proper and naturall son in that very place , matth. . . god said not so to the best of angels , hebr. . . to which of the angels said he at any time , thou art my son this day have i begotten thee ? that one place is sufficient to discover the fraud of the socinians in this point . iv. the fourth cause which they assign is the resurrection of jesus christ , because when christ was raised from the dead he was as it were begotten again from the dead , acts . , . to which we answer , that christ was the naturall and proper son of god before his resurrection , only he was declared to be the son of god by his resurrection , according to that of the apostle , rom. . v. . declared to be the son of god with power according to the spirit of holinesse , ( that is his divine nature ) by the resurrection from the dead . christ was not made but declared to be the son of god by his resurrection . his divine sonship lay hid under the forme of a servant before ; only they who had spirituall eyes did discern it , iohn . . we have seen , and beheld the glory of the only begotten son of god. moreover it is observable that the apostle endeavours to make the mystery of christs divine sonship manifest in the thirteenth of the acts , not simply by his resurrection , but by the manner of his resurrection , and the state whereunto he was raised . . for the manner , he was raised by his own almighty and most glorious power in an irresistible way ; he did offer violence to all the forces of death and powers of the grave , because it was not possible that he should be holden of them , acts ● . . when he came to declare himself to be the son of god with power , rom. . . for the state whereunto he was raised , he did not rise to return to the grave again , as lazarus did , but he raised himself to an immortall life . and as concerning that he raised him up from the dead , now no more to return to corruption , acts . . rom. . . now , god by raising christ after such a manner , to such a state , did declare him to be his only begotten son , of whom david speaks in the second psalm , and therefore it was evident by the resurrection of christ , that god had fulfilled his promise by sending his only begotten son to be a saviour unto israel , that we might have forgivenesse of sins and all sure mercies by him who died for our sins , and rose again for our justification ; this is the scope of the apostles discourse in the thirteenth of the acts from the verse to the · the second psalm is cited here by accommodation to make good a remote and implicite consequence ; as those words , i am the god of abraham , isaac , &c. are cited to prove a resurrection by an implicit consequence , matth. . , . thou art my son , mine owne proper son , whom i own for my only begotten son by raising thee to a never dying life . the fifth cause which they assigne , is the exaltation of our lord and saviour to glory , and the conferring of a name and power upon him above all creatures ; for the apostle , as they conceive , speaks of this sonship , hebr. . . so also christ glorified not himself to be made an high priest , but he that said unto him , thou art my son , to day have i begotten thee . i cannot but admire that the acute socinians should cite every place where the second psalm is named , to prove that there are so many severall causes of the divine sonship of christ ; but i do more admire that they should cite this text of all the rest ; for if their fifth argument have any force in it , doth overthrow and disprove their four first arguments . if christ was not begotten before his exaltation to glory , then he was not the son of god before his exaltation ; for surely these men of reason , will easily grant that the effect cannot be before its proper and complete cause was in its causall actuality , or actuall causality . the words of god in the second psalm are so often repeated , to teach us to keep our eye constantly fixed upon the divine sonship of christ when ever we discourse of his conception , birth , resurrection , transfiguration , exaltation to glory , and conclude that the self-same person who was begotten of god from the dayes of eternity took our flesh , dyed for our sins , and rose for our justification ; for this is that great and fundamentall truth which runs quite thorow the gospel , that the son of mary who did and suffered all for us , is the proper , the naturall son of god , the only and all-sufficient saviour of his people from their sins . we must not part with this truth , for this is all our salvation . it was very proper for the apostle to speak of his divine sonship when ever he spake of him as a mediatour , as a priest , &c. because he could not have undertaken or gone thorow with any such office unlesse he had been the naturall and proper son of god equall to god ; and therefore we do readily grant , that the divine offices of christ do declare and make manifest the divine sonship , and nature of iesus christ , and this truth is most evident from the connexion of the seven and eight verses of the second psalm . i have with the more patience and content waded thorow this large and deep sea that i might come to the haven , where we desire to be ; that we might come to take harbour and sanctuary in the merit and satisfaction of jesus christ , who is the naturall and proper son of god. in the next place i am to prove the eternall procession of the holy ghost , whereby i shall make the distinction of the persons more cleare and evident , and therfore i hasten to the discussing of that mysterious , but usefull point . the holy spirit is not called a spirit because of his spirituall nature only , for the same spirituall nature is common to all the three blessed persons ; but he is called a spirit upon a special and peculiar reason because he is breathed forth by the father and the son. the holy ghost is called the spirit which is of god , cor. . ● . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the spirit who proceedeth from the father is sent by the son from the father , iohn . . the greek church acknowledges that the spirit doth proceed from the father by the son. all things that the father hath are mine , saith our saviour , iohn . . but the spirit did receive all from the father , and christ and his father are essentially one iohn . . the spirit is said to receive of the son , and to glorifie the son , john . . whatsoever things the father doth , the son doth ; and as the son can do nothing without the father , so the father can do nothing without the son ; not that there is a defect of power in either , but an unity of power and nature in both ▪ the divine nature of both the father and the son was communicated to the spirit by this eternall spiration , and therefore he is sent by both , and he receives of both , and he glorifies both , and he is the spirit of both the father and the son. he is called the spirit of the father , matth. . because he proceedeth from the father iohn . . and he is called the spirit of the son of god , gal. . . the spirit of christ , rom. . . the spirit of jesus christ phil. . . the spirit of christ , pet. . . because he receives of christ , is sent from christ , is breathed forth by christ ; the father and the son breath forth the subsistence of the spirit with one and the same spirati on . when christ breathed upon his disciples , he said , receive ye the holy ghost , to shew that he had power to dispose of the spirit , who did from all eternity breath forth the spirit . the holy ghost was breathed forth necessarily by both ; i say , necessarily , because eternally there was a double and eternall necessity of it both in respect of the persons breathing , and the person breathed . the spirit was not breathed forth as a creature , but as a divine person , a person of the godhead ; he was breathed forth by procession , and subsists in the unity of the godhead ; he proceeds from both , and yet in both ; for one divine person cannot subsist out of another , but all three subsist in the same undivided and infinite nature . but the socinians tell us that the holy ghost is nothing else but the power and vertue of god the father . to which we answer . that the spirit is the natural vertue of the father no more then he is the naturall vertue of the son , or of himself ; for the vertue of god is the essence of god ; the holy ghost is his own essence , and all three persons have one and the same essence ; the holy ghost who proceedeth from the father , is called the power of the father , luke . . because the spirit works as he proceeds in order ; the father works in the son and by the spirit . but the spirit who proceeds from the father is distinguished from the father ; the spirit did not breath forth himself , or proceed from himself . the h. ghost doth not speak of himself , john . . but the father speaks of himself , because he is of himself , he is begotten of none , proceeds from none of the divine persons , is sent by none of them . the holy ghost doth receive of christ , is sent by christ ; therefore the holy ghost is not the father , but clearly distinguished from him , iohn . , . iohn . . iohn . , , matth. . , . matth. . . cor. . . and in diverse other places . the father and the spirit are personally distinguished , but they are essentially one , iohn . . they are one in power , nature , will , and yet are three persons , three witnesses who deliver one and the same divine testimony ; the testimony of the holy ghost is as divine as the testimony of god the father . the witnesse of god is greater , verse . must refer to the witnesse of the father , word and spirit , verse . though the testimony of the father be specially insisted on in the following words ; for all the three witnesses in heaven give one and the same testimony , and that testimony is divine . the h. ghost is the spirit of god , and the spirit which is of god , the spirit of elohim , gen. . . the spirit of jehovah , isa. . . the spirit which is jehovah and the god of israel , as hath been proved at large in the fourth chapter from the . page to the fortieth . the distinction between the father and the spirit will be more evident when we come to treat of the personall properties ; the socinians are so confounded in this point , that they are forced to acknowledge that the holy ghost is no accidentall vertue , no finite substance , no creature , but the uncreated and substantiall vertue or power of god , because whatsoever is in god , is the substance of god ; as eniedinus confesses . and smalcius acknowledges that it may be granted that the holy ghost is god , because whatsoever is naturally in god may be called god. but i shall prove that the holy ghost is not only god , but a person of the godhead distinct from the father and the son. jesus christ is called the power of god , cor. . . and the holy ghost the power of god , luke . , luke , . the son is a distinct person from the father ; and the holy ghost is as the ancients used to call him , the personall vertue or power of the father proceeding from the father , by whom he doth declare and put forth his power ; and therefore the spirit is said to work and distrioute all gifts and graces as he will ; father , son and holy ghost have one and the same will and power ; still we must bottome upon that truth , these three are one , john . . that this procession of the holy ghost is mysterious , and for the manner of it unsearchable we do readily grant ; and therefore i shall not presume to define after what manner the holy ghost is breathed forth from the father and the son ; but we are sure that it cannot be any corporeall procession . the ancients did constantly distinguish between procession and generation ; but the eternall generation of christ being spirituall , the procession of the spirit must needs be spirituall ; for the spirit is not only essentially a spirit as the father , and god the son are , but he is personally a spirit . the more perfect and spirituall this procession is , the more evident it is that the spirit was breathed forth in the unity of the godhead . they who say the son doth proceed from the father ▪ use that terme [ proceed ] in a generall and very large signification : but then they say that the son did proceed by generation , the spirit by spiration thereby endeavouring to distinguish the manner of proceeding . . they say the son did proceed from the father alone , and therefore is aid to be sent by the father only ; but the holy ghost did proceed from the father and the son both , and therefore is said to be sent by the son as well as the father , luke . . iohn . . iohn . . iohn . . but christ is sent by the father only , because he is of the father only , and was not begotten of the spirit ; and the father is not sent by any because he is of himself ; hereby they endeavour to distinguish the principle of these divine processions . . the son did proceed as the second person , the holy ghost as the third person of the godhead , and hereby they endeavour to distinguish the order of these divine processions . we know this divine procession is . spirituall . . eternall , because divine . . immutable ; this procession is not a change of the spirit from not being to being , or from an imperfect being to a more perfect being . we know that procession cannot be a motion from one place to another , for the spirit is omnipresent , fills all places , and therefore cannot change its place . . necessary . the father and son did from all eternity breath forth the spirit in the unity of the godhead , not by any alienation of the godhead from themselves , but by an unspeakable communication of the same divine nature to a third person of the godhead ; and this communication is naturall , and therefore necessary it is , but not involuntary ; the father and son did not breath forth the spirit by any coaction or compulsion : and yet we cannot say that the father and the son did arbitrarily or freely breath forth the spirit as all three persons did create the world ; for they did create the world with such liberty and freedome as that they might not have created it ; but they did naturally and necessarily breath forth the spirit , and could not but breath him forth : this inward and personall act is naturall ; such is the perfection of the godhead that it must needs be communicated to all three persons ; and such is the coessentiall unity of the father , son and holy ghost , as that all three do necessarily and naturally subsist in the self-same entire and infinite godhead . true it is , that the will of god is the nature of god , but nature is a more comprehensive word , and therefore according to our manner of apprehension and in strictnesse of speech , it is more proper to say that the father and the son did breath forth the spirit by the perfection of their nature , then to say they breathed him forth of their own will , or by some arbitrary decree ; for then it will follow that there might have been but two persons of , and in the godhead , that the holy spirit doth exist and subsist contingently , and by consequent that the spirit is no person of the godhead . the acute samosatenian whom learned iunius confutes , desired to know whether the holy ghost was produced by an action of the will ; iunius answers ; if you oppose the will of god to the nature of god , we cannot say that the spirit doth proceed from the father and the son by their will but by their nature , because the father , son and spirit are coessentiall ; for as the father did beget his naturall son by his nature , so do the father and the son breath forth the coessentiall spirit by their nature ; nor is it safe to say , saith iunius , that the nature of the father doth breath forth the spirit by an action of his will , but rather according to that manner ( the infinite distance being observed between what is humane and divine ) after which the will doth proceed in man : and this saith he is but a weak resemblance of the schools , which we are not bound to defend . for the nature of god is pure , single , infinite , and therefore we must not follow those resemblances too farre which are grounded upon the distinction of the understanding and the will in creatures , because even that point is very disputable , and the most single and perfect nature of god doth infinitely transcend the perfection of angels . i beleeve you are , as i am , willing to get out of the dark . but enough of that , for we read that the saints are begotten by the will of god , iames . . but we must not conceive that christ is begotten , or the spirit breathed forth after the same manner as we are regenerated : the spirit is breathed forth in a connaturall and coessentiall way in the unity of the single and entire godhead ; but we are regenerated by the graces of god. the spirit doth proceed equally from the father and the son ; for the unity of the divine nature , and equality of divine persons cannot be maintained if that principle be denyed . peter lombard and his adherents did mince the point with a very dangerous distinction : that the spirit doth proceed principally from the father , and lesse principally from the son. but it is clear & evident that the holy ghost being a coessential person hath the self-same divine nature and essence entirely communicated unto him which is in the father and the son , without any alienation of it from them , or multiplication of it in him ; and therefore the spirit doth not proceed from the father and son as they stand in relative opposition , but as they are essentially and naturally one ; and therefore the spirit did proceed from both equally , aequè primò ac per se , as we use to say . the spirit doth receive from christ , iohn . , . but the spirit being god could not receive any thing but subsistence from the father or the son. the spirit doth glorifie the son , iohn . . no otherwise then the son as god doth glorifie the father : because the son did receive his subsistence from the father as the spirit receives his subsistence from the father and the son. we must carefully distinguish . between the generation of the son , and procession of the holy spirit , though as we have shewen above , the son doth proceed , if you take that word in a general notion . the most exact criticks wil not take upon them to distinguish between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . yet because we want words to expresse our selves , the reverend doctors of the church thought fit to appropriate procession to the holy ghost for distinction sake ; and the scripture saith that christ is the only begotten son of god ; god the father is never called the father of the h. ghost ; nor is the h. ghost called the son of god. moreover , the schoolmen have given advantage to the enemies of the trinity by discoursing of divine processions at large in a generall notion ; and for these reasons i did endeavorto distinguish the procession of the son from the spirit in this chapter , in respect of the manner , principle , and order of procession . . we must carefully distinguish between the eternall procession of the spirit , and the temporal mission of the spirit ; but the natural and eternal procession of the spirit may be evinced by the temporal mission of the spirit . the greek church doth acknowledge , . that the holy ghost is god ; and . that he is one and the same god with the father and the son ; and from hence we infer , . that the son did not send the spirit by way of command as if he were greater then the spirit . . that the son did not send the spirit by way of counsel and advice , as if he were wiser then the spirit ; and therefore the only reason why he did temporally send him , is , because the spirit did naturally and eternally proceed from him , and receive his glorious subsistence of him . i might discourse more largely upon this subject ; but i consider what athanasius , damascen , and divers other reverend divines who did long study these mysterious points , have after many perplexed debates acknowledged . the son ( say they ) was begotten ▪ and the spirit proceeded ; this we are sure of , because it is written ; if you enquire after the manner how the one was begotten , and how the other did proceed , we answer that the son was begotten ▪ and the spirit did proceed eternally , unchangeably , unspeakably . those places of scripture which are spoken of god in the old testament are said to be spoken of the son , and the spirit in the new testament , and therefore do by consent of both testaments , declare that the father , son and holy ghost are one and the same god ; for instance , the sixth of isaiah is spoken of jehovah , the god of israel , whom the mahumetans , sabellians and arrians do acknowledge to be the true god , but this is spoken of christ saith saint iohn , chap. . . these things said isaiah when he saw his glory and spake of him . but the holy ghost hath his share in this prophesie , acts ● . . therefore they who beleeve both ●estaments , must conclu●e that the father , son and the holy ghost are one and the same god. finally , the personall actions and properties of these three declare them to be distinct persons ; therefore it is easie to conclude that father , son and h. ghost are three distinct persons , and yet one and the same god. that the spirit is a person of the godhead , hath been proved in the fourth chapter of this book ; that he is a distinct person from the father and the son , is most clear by that which hath been said both in that chapter and in this ▪ and all those places might be heaped up which prove the personal appearance of the spirit , when he did assume the shape of a dove , and appeared as in tongues of fire , his teaching , leading , acting , ruling , comforting , distributing of gifts and the like , together with the several phrases of him in scripture , and frequent joyning him with the father and son as their equall in power and authority in bestowing all spiritual and eternall blessings do evince the same . the notes of distinction another , even the spirit ; these three , &c. the change of the gender in relative articles , which must necessarily be referred to the spi●it , is very considerable . but i have said more then enough upon this point , and therefore proceed to make the distinction of these three uncreated persons yet more evident . v. these uncreated persons are sufficiently distinguished by their order . the scripture doth most commonly place the father first in order , the son second , the holy ghost third , when all three are named ; and by the inward and personall actions ( which have been mentioned ) it doth appear , that , this is the naturall order of these uncreated persons ; for the son cannot be placed in order before the father , because he is naturally begotten of the father ; the holy ghost cannot be placed in order before the son , because he doth naturally proceed from the son : this is the proper and natural order . basil the great in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 complains that some in his time did place the son in order before the father , and the holy ghost before the son , that they might gain some advantage by that device . basil tels them that he had received order from the lord to baptize in the name of the father son and holy ghost , and therefore was resolved to preserve that order 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inviolable , notwithstanding any devices or attempts for to prevent it . when the witnesses in heaven are reckoned up in a businesse of the highest consequence , they are reckoned in this very order ▪ iohn . . the father , the word , and the spirit . but it is confessed that sometimes it is most agreeable to the scope and purpose of the holy ghost to place the son before the father ▪ as appears cor. . . gal. . . and hence it is likewise , that the holy spirit is sometimes placed before the son , as revel . . , . and sometimes before the father and the son , cor. , , . but the natural order doth not overthrow either the equality or coeternity of the persons , nor doth that order of enumeration which is pro instituto , overthrow the natural order , and both do sufficiently prove the distinction of the three uncreated persons . vi. the divine persons are sufficiently distinguished by their personal properties ; the property of the father is to subsist of himself , that is , to receive subsistence or subsisting life from none but himself . i shall not enter into that sad dispute whether this personal property be absolute or relative ? whether 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth not import something as * positive and absolute as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ? it is pleaded that the selfe subsistence of the father is not his fatherhood : and that that rule is beyond dispute , habere subsistentiam à se non dicit respectum ad aliud , vel al●um ; and therefore i humbly offer it to the consideration of the learned , whether that self subsistence whereby the first person is d●stinguished from the son and the spirit be absolute , or relative ? i will not take upon me to determine any thing in so deep a point , or suffer my reason to wax wild and wanton in discoursing of so great a mystery : and therfore though there be something hinted which may amount to a videtur quod sic in the behalf of the lesse common opinion in the ▪ age of this book : and it is clear that all three persons are nothing else but the godhead considered with all absolute and relative perfection , yet i conceive it safest to wave that point , and conclude with that learned divine , nos fidelem ignorantiae professionem temerariae assertioni praeferendam judicamus . whether then this self-subsistence be absolute or relative , it is enough for our present purpose to prove that the first person of the godhead is distinguished by his self-subsistence from the blessed son and holy spirit . the self-subsistence of the father is incommunicable , it is proper and peculiar to the first person to have subsistence from none but himselfe ▪ and to be the first personal principle which gives subsistence to the other two coessentiall and coequall persons . the son receives subsistence from the father , the spirit receives subsistence from the father and the son , as hath been proved above ; and therefore this self-subsistence doth make a very remarkable , and undeniable difference between the father and the two other uncreated persons . some learned men have from hence inferred , that because the father alone hath subsistence from himselfe , therefore the father alone is god of himself . but the consequence is absurd , for they do not distinguish between the essence of god & the peculiar subsistences , in the godhead . the essence of god is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and is one and the same in all , and every one of the uncreated persons : it is ( if i may so speak ) a self-essence and essence it selfe a self-deity , because every one of the persons is truly , properly , essentially god , god himselfe ; and therefore if the essence of the father be a self-deity , so is the essence of the son and spirit . the divine essence of the son is not begotten , caused , produced any more then the essence of the father ; the subsistence of the son is begotten , but not caused ; the divine essence is communicated to the son , but it is not begotton by the father ; for the father doth communicate that selfe same divine and entire essence , which is in himselfe , by begetting the personal subsistence of the son in the unity of the godhead from the dayes of eternity . christ is not god by grace , but by nature ; and the will of the father did not precede and produce the godhead in christ , but accompany and approve the naturall communication of the godhead to christ , even as his will doth approve his own natural and eternal goodnesse ; and therefore christ is both his natural son , as hath been proved , and the son of his love , coloss. . . genebrardus was too blame to fall foule upon calvin and beza , and other reformed writers whom he condemns as guilty of a new heresie called autotheanisme , because they said that christ was god of himself , but he was not the son of himself . calvin and beza did not deny that the godhead was from all eternity communicated to the son by the father ; onely they say , . that the godhead which is communicated is in it self , of it self truly , properly , essentially divine ; because the selfe-same godhead is in the father and son whole and entire in both . . because the godhead which is communicated , is not begotten ; the unbegotten godhead is communicated to the only begotten son by an eternall generation . ▪ because the godhead which is communicated , is not caused , produced , created by the father , as valentinus gentilis dreamt . and therefore genebrardus , canisius , gifford , stapleton , faber fevardentius , and the rest are extremely mistaken , when they say that calvin and beza deny that the father did beget his son in the unity of his own divine essence ; for the meaning of calvin was plainly this , the son hath the selfe-same divine nature with the father , they are coessential : one and the same god who is the only true god , god of himselfe , not god by participation , or creation , but god by nature and essence ; for calvin speaks in opposition to valentinus gentilis , who denyes the son and spirit to be coessentiall with the father , but saith the father did essentiate the son with another manner of essence then his owne divine essence , namely with a created and produced essence . gentilis saith , the father onely is truly god , because he only hath an increated godhead , and the son hath not the self-same godhead with the father . i had not said so much on this argument but that i find papists , arminians , socinians , and some bitter lutherans do all joyn their forces to abuse calvin , beza , viret , farrell , simler , volanus , gualter , bullinger , lavater , the orthodox helvetians , and many other reformed writers upon this argument . some say these reverend divines are guilty of heresie , blasphemy , atheisme , because they say christ is god of himselfe , though they clearly mean that he is one god with his father , and that the godhead which is communicated to the son by generation is an unbegotten godhead , a self-deity . if any one desire to read more upon this argument , he may consult valentinus gentilis , and all that write against him , especially calvin , and the rest of the reformed writers named but now : he may read the ancients , with whom arminius was not well acquainted ; for if he had read them , he would not have said that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not to be found in the writings of the fathers . they who are taken with platonical raptures may read dionysius , plato's corrivall ; maximus pachymerius and the rest , will give them some light therein . athanasius , basil , epiphanius , nazianzen , damascen , speak the same thing either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; to whom i might adde iustin martyr , anastasius and cyrill ; as for origen , i know his writings have been extremely corrupted by the iniquity of his antagonists , and yet there are many things that are excellent in him , which i am in charity obliged to conceive to be his genuine and proper judgement , and to impute many of his errors to the fraud , ignorance , or malice of such as made too bold with his works , or else to a kind of liberty of speaking , which good wits are not free from , when they have no adversary in sight who is like to call them to an account for their irregular phrases . bellarmine is as modest , as we could expect such a sophister to be ; only he did not take notice of the controversie between calvin and gentilis ; but we will pardon that error ; for we know the cardinal was not at leasure , and therefore did many times passe sentence upon the protestants for expedition sake before he had heard their cause . gregory de valentia is very ingenuous in this point , and makes a fair apology for the autotheans . if any desire to take a shorter cut , i shall refer them to three most eminent divines who have studyed this point exactly , and are very criticall both in state of the question , and their phrases , chamier , gomarus and voetius ; and now , i crave leave to proceed without beging pardon for this necessary digression , because i hope it may be very useful to learned men . it is now easie upon the due consideration of the premisses to state the point right . it is proper to the father to have , . the godhead without any communication of it to him from any other uncreated person . . to have subsistence from , and of himselfe as he is the first person , and the first personall principle of giving subsisting life unto the other two coessentiall persons . for the first uncreated person cannot receive subsistence from any person , because he is the first person in order , though all three be equall in respect of dignity and duration ; there can be no person in order before the first person to communicate his godhead , or give personall subsistence to him either by generation or spiration , and this must needs be a characteristicall and distinctive property which declares the subsistence of the father to be incommunicable . for though all three uncreated persons do subsist in the godhead , yet self-subsistence is proper to the father ; the father alone is the first personall principle of subsisting life ; the father is distinguished from the son , because the father is unbegotten , and because he did beget the son ; the father is distinguished from the spirit , because he did breath forth the spirit . but i have said enough of that when i treated above of the inward and personall actions . i need not take notice of their nice exception who say the father is not his owne father , and therefore cannot be said to be begotten of himself , or to have subsistence from himselfe ; yet because some take advantage thereby to censure the reverend doctours of the church , i shall stop the criticks mouths with one criticisme out of hesychius and suidas , to be begotten of ones self ( saith hesychius ) is to be begotten of none . god is said to be begotten of himself because he is unbegotten ; & suidas concurs , and doth either transcribe or subscribe . no man ever dreamt that the father did beget either his godhead , or his own personall subsistence : for the godhead were no godhead if it were begotten ; & we know the father is not his own father though synesius and some such poeticall wits who meant well have adventured upon such dangerous expressions . it doth imply a contradiction that any thing should be the cause of it self , or its own effect , for the cause is before the effect , and nothing can be before and after it self ; and there is a friendly opposition between correlates ; the father cannot be his own son. but notwithstanding all that hath been alleaged by these criticall disputants , still it holds good that the godhead was not communicated to god the father by any person created or uncreated , and the first person did not receive his personall subsistence from any other person by generation , spiration , or any other way . but i must not dwell upon this argument . vii . the uncreated persons are sufficiently distinguished by their personall and inward relations ; but we must not conceive that there are as many persons in the godhead , as there are relations ; for the father is related to the son and to the spirit ; and the son is related to the father and to the spirit ; and the spirit is related to the father and the son. but there is a friendly opposition evidenced by some relations which do help together with the actions , order and properties above mentioned to demonstrate some kind of distinction between the persons ; the son as he is a son , is relatively opposed to the father who begat him ; and so the spirit as proceeding by spiration is relatively opposed to the father and the son who did both joyne in breathing forth the holy spirit ; relations distinguish as proper , and opposite . i might discourse concerning the order of these persons in working , as well as of their order in subsisting ; something might be spoken of the peculiar manner of their working ad extra : and much might be said of the incarnation of the son to declare him to be distinct from the father and the spirit ; and something of the effusion of the spirit ; but i have said enough to evidence that these uncreated persons are distinguished ; what kind of distinction there is between them , i am now to show , and that i may be brief and plain in the opening of this weighty point , i shall lay down the truth clearly in some few propositions . . the father , son and holy ghost are not essentially distinguished : for christ and his father are one , john . . and all three are essentially one , john . . the synod of calcedon determined , that christ was coessentiall with his father according to his divinity , and coessential with us according to his humanity ; but the naturall union between us and christ doth only prove a specifical unity ; but christ and his father have one and the self-same divine and undivided essence . he must acknowledge more gods , who holds that the son and spirit have another or different kind of godhead from the father . the arrians did divide the nature of the trinity , and the sabellians did confound their persons ; but christians acknowledge and maintain that there are three persons , and but one single divine nature in the blessed trinity ; only the second person did assume the nature of man that he might heale our nature , and save our persons . . these three divine persons are not distinguished realiter separabiliter : that is , they are not so distinguished , as that they can be divided or separated one from another , as created persons and things may . these three coessentiall persons are omnipresent , they do all three subsist in the self-same omnipresent nature ; nay , they do all three subsist in one another , without any contraction , commixtion , or confusion , as hath been proved at large in the , . and the following pages of this book . these coessentiall subsiste●ts cannot be separated , or divided any more then their indivisible and infinite essence can be divided or multiplyed . these three uncreated persons are truly distinguished ; this proposition is fully proved already in this very chapter : i know it will be expected by some , that i should say that these three persons are distinguished really ; but i shall humbly desire them to consider , that some have by that expression taken occasion to exercise their wanton wits in cavelling against this deep and glorious mystery to the great prejudice of this weighty truth . if they be really distinguished , say some , then they differ essentially , or tanquam res & res , then they may be separated , say others , then there are three gods , say a third . it is too well known what sport atheists have made upon this advantage ; and truly it is much at one whether men do professe themselves atheists or tritheites ; for he who doth beleeve that there are three gods , may when he pleases , beleeve that there is no god at all . vorstius presses those that call the distinction between the persons reall after this manner ; if the three persons be really distinguished , then they are tres res , three reall things ; for the multiplication of persons is reall , and therefore the son being really distinct from the father , and the spirit from both , they must needs have three essences really distinct . and if they are tres res , then either three substances , or three accidents ; but the reformed divines cannot saith vorstius grant , that they are three accidents , because they deny that there is any accident in god ; and if they be three substances , then there are saith he three gods. valentinus gentilis and some ministers of transylvania reason much after the same manner . i know not whether master fry did ever read any of their writings , but sure i am he hath conversed with some of that perswasion , or else , his carnall reason is of neer kin to theirs . for upon this very ground mr. fry doth adventure to explode three distinct persons or subsistencies out of his creed , but he will never be able to explode them out of the godhead : he may sooner explode himself out of the number of christians ; for if he take away the divine person of christ , he takes away the foundation of christianity . but having shewed him his danger , i desire to satisfie his reason , awaken his faith , & settle his conscience in this weighty point : * if he will deny his carnall reason , and not require any example , to illustrate a mystery above reason , and beyond example : master fry will tell us news indeed , if he can make it good , that any ministers or members of the church of god in england do make iesus christ a distinct god from god the father . . he may do well to publish those reasons , which move him and the others he speaks of , to be of that opinion . . he doth acknowledge that these three , the father , the sonne , and the holy ghost are equally god , pag. . let him consider his own confession [ these three ] what are these three ? are they three gods ? no , that he doth abominate : are they three accidents , no , that is absurd ; are they three substances ? if so , then created or uncreated ; not created , for that he saith none will affirme : are they three uncreated substances ? no saith he , for then they would consequently be three gods , p. . i hope by this time he sees how easie it is to retort his owne argument ; and if this retortion may helpe him to answer it , i shall be glad that i have retorted it . his onely answer ought to be , i doe beleeve that these three are three subsistents in the same single and infinite godhead , phil. . . joh. . . joh. . . heb . . vorstius , valentinus gentilis , the transylvanians require some more curious answer ; but i shall be as plaine , and as briefe as the weight and depth of this mystery will permit me to be ; i remember that aristotle saith , he doth make a truth sufficiently plaine , who brings such proofes as the point in question will beare . now it is most evident that supernaturall mysteries cannot be expounded according to the rules of art. some returne this answer , that if by tres res , three reall things , you meane three persons ; there are three real persons in the godhead ; they are not made three by a fiction of reason , they are declared three by the plaine words of scripture ; but they were three before any scripture was written , even from the dayes of eternity . but if by tres res , three reall things , you meane three divine essences , we do deny that three persons are three divine essences , or three gods ; for these three persons are but one god blessed for ever . if you aske others , they will say that these three are one being , but they are three proper and peculiar manners of being subsisting in the same god-head . they have one essentiall subsistence say others , but they have three incommunicable manners of subsisting . some expresse it thus , these three are really distinct , but not essentially ; modally , but not separably ; truly , but relatively ; formally , and yet but personally . others that meane the same thing , say they are distinguished secundum esse personale , non secundum esse quidditativum . they then that say the persons are really distinct , should explain themselves warily according to some of these or the like safe expressions : namely that by really they doe not meane essentially . . they do not mean separably . . that by really they doe meane that the relations and personall properties , whereby the three persons are known to be distinguished , are reall relations and reall properties , and not fictions of reason . the relations are opposite , the properties incommunicable , and much might be said of the personall actions to the selfe-same purpose ; but i must hasten . some do adventure to call this distinction naturall , but that is a very dangerous expression , it must not passe without some favourable graines of allowance , nor can it then passe unlesse it be seasoned with some graines of salt , and be mollified with some faire and orthodox interpretation . by naturall distinction , they meane relative , because say they the relations which are between these uncreated persons are not onely real , but naturall also . the relation between god the father and his owne naturall son is a naturall relation , grounded upon a naturall and personall act●on ; namely , the eternall generation of the son. the greek fathers speake much of the familiar and proper emphasis of this naturall relation between the father and the son. by naturall distinction then they do not meane an essentiall distinction , as if the three uncreated persons did differ in nature ; but naturall , in that sound and orthodox sense recited above . i had rather leave my margin to relate the curiosities of others , then to perplex a meer english reader with any scholastical difficulties . i have said enough for the explication of those termes which are most usuall , and yet likely to give offence to such as do not understand the importance of them . i shall therefore conclude this point with fulgentius his commentary , which is an excellent contexture of some pertinent scriptures for the proofe of the point . when you read ( saith he ) of father , son and spirit , understand that there are three persons of one essence , omnipotence , eternity , &c. for our saviour saith , i am not alone , but i and the father that sent me ioh. , . and concerning the spirit he saith , and i will pray the father , and he will give you another comforter , even the spirit of truth , joh. . , . moreover he commanded his apostles to baptize all nations in the name of the father , son and holy ghost . and the equality of the persons proves the unity of the nature , phil. . . iohn . . and from hence he concludes that there are three persons , and not three natures in the blessed trinity . from what hath been said , it is evident that these three uncreated persons are truly distinguished , but they cannot be divided ; and it is not so safe to expresse the distinction of uncreated persons by termes of art ; they who say the distinction is naturall , reall , absolute , or relative , do deny that the distinction is essentiall , or that the persons are separable . they who speak most tenderly , say it is modall , formall , personall . they who say it is naturall in respect of personall relations and naturall actions , confesse that it is supernaturall and mysterious , because the unity of the godhead is unquestionable ; the trinity of persons subsisting in that godhead admirable ; both put together undeniable and inexplicable , and yet most necessarily and highly credible . they who say the persons are formally distinct , do mean that they are truly distinct ; they do not conceive that the distinction of the uncreated persons is grounded upon a meer fiction of reason , or upon the weaknesse of our apprehension , as if we did conceive one person to be three persons , because he is called by three names , as praxeas , sabellius , and some others dreamt . nor do they beleeve that this distinction of these three uncreated persons is only grounded upon the phrase of scripture : but they do acknowledge that there is a true and proper , not an improper and figurative distinction between these uncreated persons ; nay , they all confesse that this true and proper distinction is an eternall distinction ; it was from , and it will last to all eternity , and therefore is not grounded only upon some offices and externall dispensations which have respect unto the creature . chap. viii . the grand mystery of three divine and coessential subsistents in the single godhead is not problematicall , but fundamentall . all points of doctrine revealed in scripture are profitable , and precious truths ; and every man is obliged to receive , beleeve and embrace every truth made known to him in , and by the holy scriptures ; because all truths contained in scripture are of equall credit in respect of the authority of the revealer ; but all truths are not of equall necessity , weight and importance in respect of the nature and matter of the points revealed . there is a vast difference between the nature , matter , weight and importance of these two propositions ; . paul left his cloak , books and parchments at troas , tim. . . . jesus christ is god and man , the only mediatour between god and man , the only and all-sufficient saviour of his people from their sins . the first of these propositions cannot be refused , because it is grounded upon clear scripture , and he who rejects a point of the least concernment , which he knowes to be revealed in scripture , doth not indeed and truth beleeve and embrace any truth at all , no not truths which are of the highest concernment , upon the right ground and true reason , namely because god hath revealed them to us in the holy scriptures of truth . a fundamentall point is of such high concernment , that whosoever is ignorant of it is condemned for his meere negative infidelity ; and whosoever doth refuse to beleeve it , is condemned for his positive infidelity , because he rejects a truth delivered upon the authority of god , and a truth so highly credible , that it is necessary to be known , and beleeved for his own salvation . our faith , piety , hope , charity , salvation , are all grounded upon these necessary and fundamentall truths . those truths or points of doctrine are fundamentall , without the plaine and expresse knowledge whereof we can neither savingly beleeve in christ , nor rightly worship god in christ to the obtaining of eternall life . the grand mystery of three divine and coessential subsistents in the single godhead , is a fundamentall point . i desire to make this point very plain . . for the satisfaction of the weak . . information of the ignorant . . conviction of the obstinate . . edification of the meek and humble . it is most cleare and evident that it doth highly concerne christians to acknowledge . a deity against the atheists . . the unity of this deity against the pagans . . a trinity in this unity against turks , jewes , heretiques , both ancient and modern . we must . know. . beleeve . . acknowledge . . worship . . obey . . trust to , and depend upon three persons , and one god. our blessed lord in that excellent prayer of his which is most largely recorded , iohn . saith , that this is life eternall to know the father the only true god , and jesus christ , whom he hath sent , ver . . this text hath been opened and vindicated at large in this book already from the . page to the . and therefore i shall make quick work now , and desire you but to compare this text with iohn . . we are in him that is true , even in his son jesus christ. this is the true god , and eternall life ; both texts tell us that it is eternall life for to beleeve that the father and the son are the only true god , and therefore this is a fundamentall point ; and the scripture speakes expresly that these three , the father , the word , and the holy ghost are one , one god ; for the witnesse or testimony delivered by these three is the witnesse of god , joh. . . . but it is objected by some that the words , these three are one . joh. . . are not to be found in some ancient copies , and therefore it will not be safe to build a point of such weight and consequence upon such a weake foundation . to which we answer , it is true that these words are not to be found in the syriack edition , but they who speake most modestly , do acknowledge that the syriack edition is not authentick . learned heinsius is much offended with that edition , as appeares by his annotations upon , ioh. . . and if we consult the scriptures , and compare this text with the following verses , and with some other places of scripture , which are more plaine , and then adde the testimony and interpretations of the ancient and reverend doctors of the church , concerning the words in question , we shall be able to passe a right judgement upon the point in hand . . the equality of the number of witnesses suites very right , three witnesses on earth , and three in heaven . the opposition between the quality of the witnesses , witnesses on earth , and witnesses in heaven : and yet their sweet harmony and agreement in one testimony ; all six beare witnesse to one and the same truth . . the diversity of the very nature of those three who beare witnesse on earth , and the unity of their divine nature who bear witnesse in heaven , is very considerable , and it is excellently expressed in the variation of the phrase , these three are one , ver . . and these three agree in one ; namely , in one testimony , ver . . though their nature be different , yet their testimony is the same . but it is objected that the complutensian bible saith of the heavenly witnesses that these three agree in one , ver . . i humbly offer this satisfaction to pious and learned men ; that we have good reason to beleeve , that there is an imprudent addition in the complutensian bible , rather then an omission of so many ancient and approved bibles ; and therefore it is fit that that addition should be expunged out of that one copy , by the concurrent testimony of so many copies . moreover it is cleer by the joynt testimony of other copies , that the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are omitted in the ver . and the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belong to the eight verse , and therefore there is an inexcusable omission , and an imprudent transposition in that * corrupt edition . but then it is farther objected , that these words these three are one are wanting in some other greek copies ; for answer i proceed in my observations . . if we look upon the scripture account in other places , we shall find it exactly agreeable to the account in this place , ioh. . . in the eighth of iohn our saviour pleads that two witnesses in law were sufficient for the proof of any point , joh. . . and in the tenth verse saith he , i am one , and my father that sent me is another : they are two witnesses , and yet but one god ; i and my father are one , joh. . . one in power , and therefore one in nature . he speaks not of the spirit , because christ was not yet glorified , nor was the spirit yet manifested by that eminent ▪ and glorious mission and effusion which was to follow after the ascension of our blessed lord. but he did foretell that the third witnesse was to be sent from the father by the son , joh. . . but when the comforter is come , whom i will send unto you from the father , even the spirit of truth , which proceedeth from the father , he shall testifie of me . i might adde to these testimonies all other places of scripture , wherin all the three witnesses are named together , and then produce all the places which have been formerly cited in this booke to prove the coessential trin-unity of those heavenly witnesses . . the copulative [ and ] in the beginning of the verse , ioh. . . doth very fitly connect the whole seventh verse with the eighth , as they are printed in our ordinary translation . . hierome doth assure us that the words in question were expunged by the arrians , because these few words do hold forth an undeniable proofe of the divine and coessentiall trin-unity of these heavenly witnesses . and divers other learned and judicious men conceive that these words were blotted out in the time of constantius and valens the emperours who were sworn enemies of the blessed trinity , and professed patrons of arrianisme . . the hereticks did blot out those words , ioh. , . god is a spirit , as ambrose assures us : and therefore this practise of expunging such words in the scripture as did refute their errours was too common amongst the hereticks of old , as we might prove by witnesses enough , if that were our businesse . . these words , ioh. . . are to be found in copies of great antiquity and best credit . . this text is cited by the ancient fathers , by athanasius in his dispute with arrius at the counsell of nice , and arrius never denyed it for to be scripture , which certainly he would have done , if there had been any doubt made of it in the primitive times . it is cited by cyprian also in his book de vnitate ecclesiae . paxillus in his booke de monomachia proves by an induction of the learned doctors of the church both before and since athanasius , that the doctrine of the coessential trin-unity of these heavenly witnesses was generally received by all that were esteemed orthodox and pious in the church of christ. calovius also in his fides patrum ante concilium nicenum , gives in a catalogue for the satisfaction of all that desire resolution in this weighty point . . these three heavenly witnesses are one in power , nature and will ; all three bear witnesse to the same truth , and their testimony is divine , joh. . . and the truth which they bear witnesse to is a fundamentall truth , a saving truth , that we may beleeve on the sonne of god and have eternall life . joh. . , , . and if the authority of any one of these three heavenly witnesses be called into question , all may be questioned upon the same grounds , because their testimony is of equall authority ; their testimony is personall and divine ; and if the testimony and authority of these witnesses were not divine , our faith which is built upon their testimony and authority , would not be a divine faith. quale est testimonium , talis est fides . all three heavenly witnesses joyne with one consent and will in propounding this fundamentall truth , and therefore if we do not beleeve and embrace it , we give the lye to all the three witnesses in heaven , joh. . . and if we do beleeve that jesus is the naturall son of god , in and by whom all beleevers have eternall life , then we must acknowledge that jesus christ is one god with his father , the true god and eternall life , joh. . . christ is god attributivè , joh. . . subjectivè , act . . tim. . . this one proposition , that iesus christ is the naturall and proper son of god , is that fundamental confession of faith upon which the christian church is built , mat. . , , . thou art christ the son of the living god : this is the rock upon which christ hath so firmly built his church , that the gates of hell shal never prevail against it , or this fundamentall truth . we are all built upon christ , through the spirit for an habitation of god , eph. . , , . father , son , & holy ghost ; all three joyn in laying this foundation , and all three are one and the self-same great god , who is the only true god blessed for ever , as hath been fully proved already in this book , and therfore i may be the briefer in the discussion of this weighty point . the form of baptism doth contain in it a short creed , or rule of faith , mat. . . and when the ancient fathers speak such high things of the creed , they understand it of this short creed which is part of canonicall scripture , and not of that form which is commonly callled the apostles creed . in like manner when they expound eph. . . one lord , one faith , one baptism , they say , there is one faith and one baptism , because the sum of our faith is contained in the forme of baptism . when epiphanius hath reckoned up all the heresies in his anaceph . he opposes this one scripture , mat. . . to them all , to shew that he looked upon the doctrine of the trinity as a breviary or at least prime fundamentall of the christian faith , and eusebius pamphilus doth the like . i might produce many pertinent places out of irenaeus , tertullian , athanasius , basil , nazianzene , augustin & others to make good this useful observation , that the prime fundamentall of the christian faith is contained in the form of baptism , and founded on mat. . . it were easie to shew upon what occasion other * articles were added to the publique confessions of faith in the most renowned churches in severall ages . and it is as easie to prove that the doctrine of the coessential trin-unity was for the matter and substance , if not in expresse terms , in terminis terminantibus as we say , constantly maintained . in publique confessions of faith composed , explained , confirmed by the first generall councels , published by the decrees , and edicts of pious emperours , and ratifyed by their civil sanctions from time to time . i need not instance in the nicene creed , or that creed which was composed by athanasius who studied this point , defended & suffered for it above forty yeers : the confession published by the synod of constantinople doth not differ in substance from the other creeds concerning this grand mystery of the blessed trinity . i am not willing to expatiate upon this argument , because i should then be engaged to cite very many testimonies of the ancients , which would swell up my book beyond its due proportion . but if any man desire to read more upon this argument for his own satisfaction , and hath not so much time as to peruse the ancient records , he may read master parkers book de desc. ad inferos , more especially his fourth book ; the learned sermon of reverend doctor vsher , concerning the unity of faith , who gives a brief aud satisfactory account of the ancient confessions of faith with a special reference to baptism . doctor voetius , gomarus , and the rest who have written de symbolo apostolico , or of the mystery of the trinity . the jugling of the arrians is so plainly set forth in the most faithfull writers of ecclesiasticall story , that i need not relate how they made use of their interest at court , and all their carnal policy in every considerable place to pack councels , forge or corrupt creeds , seduce all sorts of men , who were led more by interest then scripture , and then to evade , or comply with subtile distinctions , mentall reservations , equivocations , and such unworthy shifts for to save themselves from censure in a time of reformation . . the catechismes of the ancients hold forth this doctrine ; the catechumeni were trained up in the knowledge of it . lucian who lived in trajans time , brings in a christian catechising the heathens in the doctrine of the trinity . . the forme of baptism strictly observed in the churches notwithstanding the great ignorance and contention in the east , and the grand apostacy in the west ; doth sufficiently prove that this doctrine of the trinity had taken deep root in the minds of men , and that they were by the providence and speciall grace of god very diligent and faithfull in communicating of it to their posterity from time to time . . the doxology , or as some call it , the hymn of glory doth evince the same , and therefore the arrians endeavoured to make an alteration in the doxology and instead of saying , glory be to the father , and to the son , and to the holy-ghost , they said , glory be to the father , by the son , and in the spirit ; from whence we may observe by the way , that if we suffer the fundamentall doctrine of our faith to be corrupted , we shall not be able to preserve the fundamentals of our worship pure , and uncorrupt . . the form of apostolicall benediction which stands upon record , cor. . . doth cleerly hold forth the doctrine of the trinity to be a fundamentall both of faith , and worship ; and all who desire the grace of our lord iesus christ , the love of god , the communion of the holy-ghost , for their everlasting comfort & salvation , must beleeve and adore all three as on● god blessed for ever . . all who beleeve in god are commanded to beleeve in christ as god , as one and the same god with the father . ye beleeve in god , beleeve also in me , joh. . . they are commanded to honour the son as they honour the father , joh. . and therfore the doctrine of the divine person of christ as coessential with his father is a fundamentall both of faith and worship . . the doctrine of the incarnation of the word , the naturall and proper son of god ; the doctrines of christs satisfaction , of our redemption , and justification by christ as an all-sufficient saviour , are fundamentall doctrines necessary to be known , beleeved and embraced for our eternall salvation ; for we know the blood of a meere man cannot give satisfaction to the justice of god for those grosse affronts , injuries and abuses which have been offered by man to the infinite majesty of god. the church of god is purchased with the blood of god , act. . . and if christ hath not redeemed the church with the blood of god , then the church is not redeemed ; your faith and our preaching are both vain , because you and we are yet in our sins ; for then god hath not received satisfaction for our sins , nor a sufficient ransome for our souls . if the son of god did not take flesh , then was not god manifested in the flesh ; then the whole mystery of godlinesse which should be without controversie great and precious in the eyes of christians , will be cheap , and vile , and of no account ; for the whole mystery of godlinesse , tim. . . depends upon the manifestation of god in the flesh ; now the divine person of the son took flesh ; the person of the father was not incarnate . . it is not enough to beleeve that the son of mary is risen from the dead ; we must beleeve that the son of god is risen , rom. . , . it is iesus our lord that rose for our justification , rom. . , . rom. . . . it is not sufficient to beleeve that there is a man sitting at the right hand of god ; we must beleeve that iehovah sits there , psal. . . mat. . , , . and the like must be said of our advocate , he must be such a one as can plead the worthinesse of his person , the merit of his obedience and sufferings , one who is able to save us to the uttermost , heb. . . ioh. . . one who can plead with some authority & majesty ; father , i will that they also whom thou hast given me , be with me where i am , ioh. . . he speaks with authority , i will : he speaks like a coessentiall and coequall person ; and it is for the glory of the father , to beleeve that the father is in the son , and the son in the father , that the son is lord , equal to the father . ioh. . , . phil. . ▪ . many arguments more might be collected from divers places of scripture cited above in the fourth chapter of this book , and i shall enlarge upon this argument in the ninth chapter . . the holy ghost is the same god with the father and son , the same object of divine faith and evangelical worship , the same author of the scriptures , and all-saving grace , mat. . . cor. . . . cor. . . through the son and by the spirit , we have accesse to the father , eph. . . all church administrations are to be performed in the power of the holy ghost , and are made acceptable by the merit of the lord iesus christ. if we will heare the spirit speaking in the scriptures to the churches , if we feel the spirit sanctifying of our hearts , if we do not desire to undermine the foundation of the christian church , and so overthrow the church of christ , if we do not renounce our christian faith , and our baptisme the sacrament thereof , if we do not reject the fundamentall blessing ( the best portion of our selves and little ones ) the grace of christ , the love of god and communion of the spirit , why then , i beseech you , as the apostle doth , for the lord iesus christs sake and for the love of the spirit , rom. . . and for the glory of god the father , phil. . . that you will beleeve , adore , embrace , love and obey the father , son , and holy ghost , as three divine and coessentiall subsistents in the single god-head , as one god blessed for ever , the adaequate object , and authour of your faith , hope , love and happinesse . i do not desire to obtrude any thing upon the acutest disputant as fundamentall that is curious or unnecessary . nay there are many things necessary for the maintenance of ●his truth , and refutation of contrary errors , when we are to deal with subtile hereticks , which i do not set before the common people as food fit to nourish them : and for that reason i do desire them , that they will look upon much of my sixth chapter , and of some other chapters in this booke , as ●t for the direction of young scholers in this weighty point ; for i find young wits apt to be seduced by logicall subtilities , or rather fallacies , metaphysical notions , poetical raptures , nice distinctions and vaine curiosities , from the simplicity of the gospel of christ ; and therefore i have taken some pains in divers chapters , but specially in the margine for the direction of hopefull youths , who have been too often entangled and ensnared by socinian fallacies , and at last tempted into loud and hideous blasphemies . we do therefore lay down these plain truths as necessary to be known and beleeved for the maintaining of saving communion with god. . that god is . for he who commeth unto god must beleeve that god is . heb. . . . that there is but one god. deut. . . . that the father son , and holy ghost are this one god ▪ because they are all three coessentiall subsistents in this most single godhead , cor. . . . phi. . . io . ioh. . . mat. . , . mat. . . act. . . cor. . . . cor. . . ioh. . ● . rev. . . . reverend calvin was not so morose and austere in this point as to contend about unnecessary words , or curious phrases , so there were such words used as did fitly and fully expresse the whole mistery of faith in this weighty point , and sufficiently refute the damnable errours of arrius and sabellius . if men will but acknowledge . that the father , son and spirit are one god and the selfe same god. . that the son , is not the father , nor the spirit the son ; but that these three are distinguished by speciall relations , incommunicable and unchangeable properties , so that there is a trinity of coessentiall subsistents in the selfe-same divine essence , we are all agreed . arrius would acknowledge that christ is god , bu● not consubstantiall , or coessentiall with his father , for he did deny christ to be the same god with his father . and in like manner the socinians will say , that they acknowledge and maintaine the true divinity of the son and holy ghost ; but they do deny that the son and spirit are one and the same god with the father ; and affirme , that the reformed churches who beleeve that all three persons have the selfe same god-head , do ascribe a false and imaginary god-head to the son and spirit , which the holy scriptures do no where acknowledge or declare . and this is the true reason why the orthodox doctors of the church have been so unanimous , especially of late yeares in maintaining this proposition , — pater , filius & spiritus sanctus sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the father , son & holy spirit are one and the self-same god. on the other side sabellius acknowledged , that the father son , and holy ghost are one god ; but if you say that the father , son and holy ghost are three different subsistents , then he cryed out as m. fry doth , that you acknowledge three gods ; the best way to avoid these ( saith judicious calvin ) is to say that there is a trinity of persons in one and the same essence of god. for we must needs acknowledge the unity of the divine nature , because we read that the father , son and spirit are one ; and we must acknowledge the trinity of these coessentiall subsistents or persons , because we read that they are three . now the trinity and unity make a coessential trinunity ; & if the unity of the god-head , and trinity of the subsistents , or persons be acknowledged , we shall not wrangle about curious phrases , or unnecessary words . the most judicious and moderate men amongst the orthodox doctors of the church agree in this . the learned and reverend doctor davenant in his judicious exhortation to brotherly communion betweene the protestant churches , teaches us how to distinguish between points that are fundamentall , and problems or propositions that are not fundamentall , and when he comes to reckon up fundamentals , he instances in the trinity , and expresses himself after this manner ; that god is one in essence , three in persons distinguished betwixt themselves ; that the son is begotten of the father ; that the holy spirit is the spirit of the father and the son ; that these three persons are coeternall and coequall . all these ( saith he ) are deservedly determined and ranked amongst the fundamentall articles . now if any should contend that all those things which are disputed of the school-men , of the manner of proceeding and begetting , are also fundamentall , and necessary to be determined on one side , verily he by this his rash judgement , would gaine no favour with christ. but it is objected by some , who do acknowledge christ to be god , that they have no reason to close with us , when we say , that iesus christ is coessentiall with god his eternall father , because we do impose a new word upon them , and so make a new fundamentall of our own inventition ; to which i answer : . that if we make an old truth plaine by a new word , they ought to forgive us that injury . . we explaine our new terme . . we save them the trouble of an artificiall and tedious deduction ; for as soon as they do but understand the word , they must necessarily imbrace the sense , and acknowledge that though the word seem new to them , yet the doctrine is old ; for if the persons be of a different divine essence , then there would be more gods then one . . we doe hereby secure them against the subtilty of pernicious hereticks who endeavour to seduce them into damnable heresies ; for if the father , son and spirit have not the same divine essence , then either there will be more gods then one , or else the son and spirit are no gods at all , but such petty inferiour gods as the socinians make them . . no man that hath a sound braine , and a single eye , can conceive that there are divers gods in the same essence , and therefore the expression is necessary and safe . the father , son and spirit are three coesential subsistents in the same single god-head , they are all three one and the selfe-same god , who is god by nature , the only true god blessed for ever ; in this faith we will live , and in this we will dye , as it becomes orthodox christians , who were b●ptized in the name of the father , son and holy ghost . chap. ix . this grand mystery of faith hath an effectuall influence into the practical mystery of godlinesse and power of religion . it is the great designe , and faithfull endeavour of sincere christians to attaine unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding to the acknowledgement of the mystery of god , and of the father , and of christ , colos. . . they who have but a forme of godlines 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a kind of painted powerlesse shaddow of piety may look upon the doctrine of the trinity as a school-point , a meer speculative doctrine which men receive by tradition from their fore-fathers ; but they who live in the spirit , and walke in the spirit , gal. . . have a life that is hid with christ in god , colos ; . . hid from formall men , as colours are hid from blind men ; and these spirituall christians do account the love of the father , the grace of christ , and the communion of the spirit to be their heaven upon earth ; they receive iesus christ , so as to live by him , walke in him , and live to him , colos. . . phil. . , ioh. . , cor. . . what is a godly life ? but a life of faith , and love , of joy and thankfulnesse , of self-denyall , and devotion ; of patience and obedience , hope and perseverance , victory , and triumph . this is the life of god , or that godly life , to which the ephesians were all strangers till they had learned the truth as it is in iesus , ephes. . , . and how come we to be quickned to this godly life ? but by being begotten of the father , iam. . , . borne of the spirit , ioh. . . and hearing the voice of the son of god , ioh. . , , when we have learnt of the father , and are drawne by the spirit , we come unto the son , who is the way , the truth , and the life , ioh. . , . ioh. . . and how is this spirituall life maintained , but by the supply of the spirit of iesus christ ? philip. , . let us take the whole frame of a godly life to pieces , and view every part and spring , and wheel and pin , and then put it together againe , and then we shall be able to judge what effectuall influence these three coessentiall persons ( considered as one and the same god , or as three distinct persons subsisting in the single god-head ) have into the practicall mystery of godlinesse , and power of religion . the doctrine of godlinesse containes . our faith in god. . worship of god. . obedience to god. . our faith in god. i have spoken of this grand mystery of faith , and shewn that it is necessary to be known and beleeved in the eight chapter at large ; but i shall now treat of it in a more practicall way . adam in his innocency was bound for to beleeve in the father , son and holy ghost , who are one almighty god , creator , upholder and governour of heaven and earth , self-sufficient and all-sufficient , blessed in , and of himselfe , the only cause , and adaequate object of the blessednesse of his creatures . adam was created by all three ; after the image of all three ; for god said , let us make man in our image , after our likenesse , gen. . . and therefore we cannot conceive , but that all three were revealed to adam , that he might know and beleeve in all three ; surely adam was better catechized then jews , turkes and pagans are in this great point , and therefore did know , beleeve and worship all three . there is no question but he entred into covenant with all three ; and therefore beleeved in all three ; i cannot beleeve that two of the divine persons had no worship or service from adam their creature before his fall ; and doubtlesse adam knew whom he beleeved , and whom he worshipped as his almighty creator , and all-sufficient god. adam under the first covenant was bound to beleeve in the second person as god , but not as god-man , the mediatour betwixt god and sin full man. adam did owe the right of subjection to all three , from whom he received the honour of dominion . the world was made for man , man for the honour and glory of father , son and holy ghost ; adams originall righteousnesse did incline and enable him to beleeve in all three ; and surely adam understood that severe rebuke which was given him presently after his fall , gen. . . and the lord god said , behold the man is become as one of [ us ] but because i will forbeare disputes , i will not proceed further upon this argument . the faith of christians delights to exercise it selfe upon god the father , son and holy spirit . god the father is pleased to be our tutor , to condescend so far as to teach us ; and oportet discentem credere ; schollers must beleeve their teachers . it is written in the prophets , and they shall be all taught of god ; every man therefore that hath heard , and hath learnt of the father cometh unto me , ioh. . . we must beleeve the record that god the father gives of his son , ioh. . . when we look upon god as the father of our lord and saviour iesus christ , & look upon him as our god and father in christ , these neer and deare relations do encourage us to beleeve him , and beleeve in him , to beleeve his truth , to beleeve his love ; his fatherly & tender bowels do perswade and even constraine us to fix our beleife and place our confidence in god the father . the heires of promise have good encouragement to beleeve their father , who gives them all they have and hope for , when he declares the immutability of his counsell in a faithfull promise , and confirmes it by an unchangeable oath , heb. . , . surely the father will not deceive his owne children of their inheritance which he hath made over to them by promise and oath ; this is the ground of all our hope and comfort ; we may safely cast anchor here , heb. . . . in the old testament , the covenant runs in the names of abraham , isaac and iacob ; but in the new testament it runs in the name of christ ; there we read the god of abraham , isaac and iacob ; but here we read , god our father , the god and father of our lord iesus christ , that is our god and father in christ , and for christ ; our father because christs father . grace be to you , and peace from god our father ; and blessed be the god and father of our lord iesus christ who hath blessed us with all spirituall blessings in heavenly things in christ , ephes. . , . we cannot but look up with faith and confidence to the father of our lord iesus christ and our father as the fountaine of all blessing , the fountain of grace and peace and glory . this deare fatherly relation of god to christ , and in christ to us , is sometimes darkly intimated and but hinted , and sometimes cleerly & fully expressed to encourage our faith. the disciples were very sad because they heard our saviour speak of going to his father : go saith christ , to my brethren and say unto them , ioh. . . what should mary say for their consolation ? was it enough to tell them my lord is alive , and calls you his brethren ? no , that were too darke an intimation , and therefore our saviour gives her her message in words at length ; go to my brethren , and say unto them i ascend unto my father , and your father and to my god , and your god , joh. . here 's an evangelical ground of faith , hope and comfort in the time of the saddest distresse . the great argument used to encourage poor trembling beleevers to come to christ when they have interrupted their fellowship with god the father , christ and the holy comforter by any grievous wounding sinne is this : if any man sin ▪ we have an advocate with the father , iesus christ the righteous . god is a father both to us and our advocate ; therefore renew the sense of your justification by faith at a ihrone of grace ; you see our faith is encouraged in the saddest tryals by this argument . the father of our lord iesus christ is the father of mercyes , and the god of all comfort , cor. . . the fountaine of grace and peace , rom . . gal. . . iesus christ make it his o●●inesse to perswade poor tempted soul●s to beleeve that his father loves them , and ●ears good wil to them . the father himself loves you , ioh. . and christ gave himselfe for to deliver us from sin and the world , death and hell , according to the will of god and our father , gal. . . and god so loved the world , that he gave his only begotten son , that whosoever beleeveth , &c. ii. god the son is the object of our faith , ioh. . ye beleeve in god , beleeve also in me ; even the very jews did beleeve in god ; they who are christians indeed beleeve in christ also . for this end the whole gospel was written that men might be perswaded to beleeve that iesus is the christ the son of god , joh. . , and that the belief of this grand point is necessary and effectual unto salvation is presently declared in the very same verse , & that beleeving ye might have life through his name i ▪ ● . . and this is the record that god hath given to us eternal life , & this life is in his son. he that hath the son hath life , and he that hath not the son hath not life . these things have i written to you that beleeve on the name of the son of god , that ye may know that ye have eternal life , and that ye may beleeve on the name of the son of god , ioh. . , , . and if god give us an understanding to know this , the knowing of , beleeving and living in iesus christ the son of god , the true god , will be effectuall unto life eternal . and we know that the son of god is come , and hath given us an understanding , that we may know him that is true : and we are in him that is true , even in his son iesus christ. this is the true god , and eternal life . ioh. . . it is for want of spirituall understanding if we do not discern that all our hopes of salvation are built upon the sonship & godhead of iesus ; we must beleeve in christ as he is the naturall & proper son of god as he is the true god , the self-same god with the father . . we must beleeve in christ as he is the naturall and proper son of god , because this is exactly answerable to that deare and fatherly relation of god the father , of which we have discoursed so largely in this chapter . for as we are encouraged to beleeve in god as the father of christ , so are we encouraged to beleeve in christ as the naturall son of god : and therefore i have purposely insisted on such scriptures as do evidently demonstrate this truth , that we are to beleeve on the name of the son of god and to have life through his name , joh. . , , , . joh. . . we are to beleeve in christ as a mediatour , that our faith and hope may be setled in god ; who by him do beleeve in god , that raised him up from the dead , that your faith and hope might be in god , pet , . . now the great encouragement to beleeve in christ as an all-sufficient mediator is this , iesus christ is the naturall son of god ; and therefore if christ will but present us to his father , we are confident that the son of god , his natural son , his proper son , his only begotten son will prevaile with his father for us ; his relation to god , and his interest in god doth assure us that the intercession of our high-priest will be irresistible , undenyable . christ glorified not himself to be made an high-priest , but he that said unto him thou art my son , to day have i begotten thee . as he saith also in another place , thou art a priest for ever , after the order of melchise dech , heb. . , . we must for the understanding of this scripture compare three places together , psa. ● . . . psa. . , , . heb. . , . the lord said unto my lord , sit thou at my right hand — thou art a priest — psa. . . . the lord said , thou art my son , ask of me , psal. . , . aske what thou wilt , i can deny thee nothing , thou art my son , it is thy birth-right to be a priest , and it is proper for a priest to aske , and intercede . other high-priests were men of infirmity , but the son who is consecrated and perfected for evermore , is able by his powerfull intercession , to save those to the uttermost who come unto god by him , heb. . , . nay all the offices of christ are grounded on his sonship ; his kingly power , psal. . i have set my king , &c. thou art my son , ver . , . his propheticall power is grounded on his sonship also , mat. . . and behold a voice out of the cloud , which said , this is my beloved son in whom i am well pleased : heare ye him . i have promised that ye shall be all taught of god , and therfore i send my own naturall son to teach and instruct you ; he is the great prophet and tutor of the church ; hear ye him , and beleeve in him ; for he is the true messiah who is to teach you all things , and i haue sent him on purpose for to instruct you . and this is the work of god that ye beleeve on him whom he hath sent , joh. . . but enough of this , because i have spoken something of it already in the seventh chapter of this book , and cleerly proved that christ could not have gone thorough with any of his divine offices , if he had not been the natural and proper son * of god , equal to god : read nathaniels creed , ioh. . ● . and pauls life of faith , gal. . ver . . . we must beleeve in christ as god , the self-same god with the father . when we know christ to be god , we must glorify him as god by beleeving in him . now i have by many undenyable arguments proved christ to be god , and therefore i may safely conclude that we ought to beleeve in him as god ; for cursed is he who beleeves in an arme of flesh . when peter preached to cornelius , he told them that jesus christ was lord of all , act . . iudge of all , ver . . and that all the prophets gave witnesse to him , that through his name , whosoever beleeveth in him , shall receive remission of sins , ver . . i need say no more but this : he that abideth in the doctrine of christ , he hath both the father and the son. the second epistle of iohn , the ninth verse , every tongue must confesse that iesus christ is lord to the glory of god the father , phil . . the father is glorifyed in the son. joh , . . and the son is to be glorifyed in all them whom the father hath given him , iohn . . and christ is to be glorified by their beleeving in him , joh. . . and the father himselfe loves them , because they beleeve in the son , joh. . . and he who honoureth not the son , honoureth not the father , joh. . . the great mystery of uniting the soule to christ by faith ( eph. . . ) and making of it one spirit with the lord jesus ▪ cor. . . is a main fundamentall of the mystery of godlinesse , as shall be proved cleerly before i conclude this chapter . iii. god the holy ghost is the object of a christians divine faith. the holy-ghost speaking in the holy scriptures doth teach us to beleeve not only in the father , and in the son , but in himself also . it is the spirit that beareth witnesse , because the spirit is truth , joh. . . there are three that bear witnesse in heaven , but here is speciall testimony given of the spirit , that we might be moved to beleeve the spirit , who is to testifie the whole truth concerning the father , the son and himself . it is the spirit ( saith he ) whose speciall office it is to bear witnesse , and therefore there is this speciall testimony given of him that the spirit is truth ; and then it follows , that the spirit is one with the father , and the son ; one in nature , one and the same god with them both . these three are one , joh. . . and the witnesse of god must without controversie be received , unlesse we will make god a lyer , as the apostle reasons the point from the th verse to the th . the spirit is truth , the spirit is god ; therefore the spirit is the object of divine faith ; he that tells a lye to the holy ghost , tells a lye to god , acts . , . he that then gives the lye to the holy ghost , gives the lye to god ; the testimony of the spirit is a divine testimony , cor. . . . the demonstration of the spirit , a divine demonstration , the power of the holy ghost , a divine power . paul saith his preaching was not with enticing words of mans wisdom , but in demonstration of the spirit and of power ; that our faith might not stand in the wisedome of men , but in the power of god. the wisdome , power , testimony of the spirit , are all of them divine ; the wisdome of the spirit is infallible , the power of the spirit is irresistible ; and therefore our most divine faith is built , and doth stand fast grounded and established upon the wisdome of the spirit , because the wisdome of the spirit is the wisdome of god , cor. . , . we read in the prophets , that all the children of god shall be taught of god , esay . . . of all three persons ; for the father teacheth , mat. . . ioh. . . and the son who came out of the bosome of his father , and yet remained in the bosome of his father teacheth , heb. . . but the father and the son , especially since the ascension of christ , and the effusion of the spirit , do teach the children of god all his elect by the holy spirit . and therefore the apostle shewing how god doth teach his elect after a more peculiar manner , so that even babes in christ , those whom he calleth little children , are preserved even in seducing times , and led into all necessary truths , notwithstanding all the diligence and subtilty of those many antichrists , who are industrious to deceive ; he saith , they have an unction from the holy one , and know all things ; all things necessary to be knowne and beleeved for the obtaining the remission of sins , &c. ver . . but more especially he shewes that the spirit doth teach them to continue in the son and in the father , ver . . and therefore in the doctrine concerning the father and the son , as it is more expresly set downe in the th verse of the second epistle of iohn . and then he shewes that the spirit should abide constantly in them , to give them cleer and certaine direction in all necessary points , iohn . . but the annointing which yee have received of him abideth in you , and ye need not that any man teach you : but as the same annointing teacheth you of all things , and is truth and is no lye , and even as it hath taught you , ye shall abide in him , or it . ye shall abide in christ and abide in the truth , which hath been taught you by the holy spirit ; and the teaching of the spirit is cleare and certaine ; for saith he , the spirit is truth and is no lye . here is the peculiar teaching of god ; the spirit teacheth us to beleeve in himselfe , aswell as in the father and the son. and the spirit was sent by the father in the nam● of the son for this very purpose . moreover it is evident that the spirit doth not only teach babes in christ , but he taught even the apostles of christ. but the comforter which is the holy ghost , whom the father will send in my name , he shall teach you all things , joh. . . nay the holy spirit did endite all the holy scriptures , and inspire the prophets , apostles and all the holy men of god in the writing of them . the scriptures were not written by the will of men , but by the motion of the holy ghost . pet. . . where the motion of the holy ghost is opposed to the will of men , to shew that the motion and will of the holy ghost is the motion and will of god. many other places and arguments might be superadded ; but for the better instruction of ordinary readers , i shall draw out my arguments into ranke and file . . the spirit is god. the testimony of the spirit is the testimony of god , cor. . . . the wisedome of the spirit , the wisedome of god ; and the power of the spirit the power of god , cor. , , . . the teaching of the spirit is the teaching of god ; ihe will of the spirit is the will of god , pet. . . cor. . . . . the spirit is the author of the scriptures , tim. . . pet. . , . revel . . . . the spirit is the interpreter of the scriptures , and his interpretation is cleer , certaine and infallible . the spirit discovers the hidden wisedome of god ; the wisedome of god in a mystery , the deep things of god , which could not have entred into the heart of man , if the spirit had not revealed them ; and therefore the deep things of god , ● cor. . . are called the things of the spirit of god ver , ● . and things which are spiritually discerned , and therefore they are such things as the spirituall man by the help of the spirit is able to perceive , discerne , receive , and to say with truth and comfort , now i have the mind of christ , now i know the things that are freely given me of god , because the spirit hath revealed them to me . consider the discourse of the apostle quite throughout the second chapter of the first epistle to the corinthians , and this point will be very cleer . . the spirit is the author of faith , he gives us supernaturall light , and spirituall eyes , cor. . , , . ephes. . , . he that beleeveth on the son of god hath the witnes in himselfe . the spirit is called the witnesse , ioh. . . . and the apostle assures us that none can say , with faith and full perswasion of heart , that iesus is the lord , till he hath been taught to say so by the holy ghost , cor , . . they who are sensuall and have not the spirit , iude ver . . do slight the testimony of the spirit ; because the world cannot receive the spirit , or the things of the spirit : it is a naturall mans pride and folly to account those things below him which are above him ; for he doth account spirituall wisedome foolishnesse , wheras indeed it is too excellent for him to understand because he is a meer naturall sensual man but these spirituall things are spiritually discerned ; he doth not receive them , he cannot know them , cor. . . this is the true reason why men do not beleeve in the spirit , and adore the spirit , because he is the spirit of truth , whom the world cannot receive , because it seeth him not , neither knoweth him , ioh. . ver . . but saith christ to his disciples , ye know him for he dwelleth with you and shall be in you , ioh. . in the selfe-same ver . and act. . . . the spirit is the supream judge of truth , even of controverted truths in matters of religion ; we need not speake of a private judgement of discretion , such as spirituall men may passe by the help of the spirit and word of truth ; nor of that publick and ministeriall judgement which may be passed in greater or lesser synods where pastors and elders are assembled by the ordinance of christ , and therefore may pray in faith for the direction and assistance of the holy ghost in all their ministeriall determinations . but i speak of the supremacy and soveraignty of iudgement , which belongs to the holy ghost . true it is , that christ is king and head of the church , and therefore he is our master , doctor , lawgiver . mat. . . iam. . . but the father hath sent the spirit in the name of christ to teach us the meaning of the word of christ , and to lead us into all truth and holinesse by the holy scriptures of truth . the spirit did indite the whole scripture ; and it is agreeable to the light of nature , that he who made the law should expound it . this holy spirit is a publick spirit , he governes the whole body of christ , the whole church , and speaks in the whole body of the scriptures & every part thereof , and if we do compare one place of scripture with another , we shall by comparing of spirituall things with spirituall , come to understand the saving wisdome which the holy ghost teacheth ; which things we speak ( saith the apostle ) not in the words which mans wisedome teacheth , but which the holy ghost teacheth , comparing spirituall things with spirituall , cor. . . the holy ghost speaking to us in plain places , doth discover to us all that is necessary to be knowne and beleeved for our eternall salvation , and doth thereby give us so much light as that we may sufficiently understand hard places , if we pray as we should , compare and search the scriptures as we ought in the spirit of faith , and modesty , iam. . . ioh. . . mat. . . ioh. . . rom. . . . and practise what we know before , ioh. . . phil. . , . for we shall at least learne so much wisedom as not to expound hard places of scripture in any sense that is contrary to the mind of the spirit cleerly delivered in plaine places of scripture . if we expound hard places according to the analogy of faith cleerly delivered in other places , though we should mistake in the application , yet the spirit doth so far interpose as to keep us from falling into heresie . and if we meet with no plaine places to expound an hard place by , there is then no danger of heresie ; because all things necessary to salvation are set downe cleerly in the plaine places of scripture . this conference of scriptures is an excellent means to bring us acquainted with all book-cases , the determinations which the spirit hath made in scripture , and left there upon record in those sacred rolls ( which are the treasury of the church ) for the direction of the saints . and whether we make use of this ordinance in our private reading , or in the publique ministry , the spirit doth deliver his judgement authoritatively and infallibly in the holy scriptures , and we may come to be acquainted with the mind and judgment of the spirit by both ordinances . thine eyes shall see * thy teachers , and thine eares shall heare a word behind thee saying , this is the way [ this and not that , behold a cleere direction ] walk ye in it , continue , and go forward in it , do not forsake it ; when we are wavering and even turning out of our way on one hand or the other , when ye turn to the right hand , and when ye turn to the left , then , even then doth the spirit resolve us , and put us out of doubt ; when we are disputing , and even yielding up the truth in a controversie , we have a cleer , certain , and infallible direction from the holy spirit , isa , , . the holy ghost doth exhort the jewes to compare the dimmer light of the prophers with the cleerer light of the apostles that so the sun of righteousnesse may shine in its strength with its healing beams into their hearts ; and then tels them that no prophecy of the scripture is of private interpretation , because prophets spake [ as the apostles also did ] not as the will of man did move , or the fancy of man direct ; but according to the mind and will of the holy ghost . and therefore since all the scriptures were endited , all are to be expounded by the holy ghost speaking in the scriptures thus compared ; for the holy ghost did move all the holy men , apostles as wel as prophets to write , and teach them what they should write . and though we have no extraordinary revelations now by a voice from the excellent glory for our direction , yet we have that which is better , the writings of the prophets and apostles to compare together ; the prophesies be darke , yet they are sure , more sure then those voices , which may be more easily counterfeited ; & though the prophesies be dark , yet the spirit who did endite them , will if you compare them with the writings of the apostles , give light to both , and deliver his judgement as cleerly in all necessary points as if it were written with a sun-beame ; this i take to be the scope of the holy ghost in that excellent discourse , pet. . from the sixteenth verse to the end of the chapter . and i have consulted the most judicious and experienced writers upon that place , though i cite but few in the margine , because i have not time to peruse them againe . true it is that we are not to beleeve every spirit , and therefore are permitted to try the spirits whether they be of god or no , joh. . . but in this tryall the holy spirit speaking in the scriptures is the suprem judge , and the holy spirit doth condemn all erroneous and fantasticall spirits , who forsake old truths , and pretend to follow new light. the holy spirit doth constantly teach the same truth in the holy scriptures ; for he doth not change his mind , or contradict himself . we ( saith the apostle ) having the same spirit of faith according as it is written , i beleeved and therefore have i spoken , we also beleeve and therefore speake , cor. . . the same spirit doth lead all the faithfull into all truth necessary to salvation , not absolutely , and at once , but by degrees . for we see the apostles themselves were for a time guilty of grosse errours mark . , . act. . . but the faithfull cannot obstinately hold and continue in such odious and damnable errours as do directly overthrow the foundation of faith ; and for the time in which they do erre , they hearken to their own spirits so farre as they are carnall , and do not as they ought , search , and pray , and wait for the direction of the holy spirit . it is not the spirit of faith which speaks in them , when they dissent from such as receive the publique testimony of the holy ghost speaking in the holy scriptures . and therefore the spirit teacheth us to try the spirits and doctrines of men by the scriptures , if they speak not according to this word , it is not because they have new light from the spirit , but because they have no light , no morning light , heavenly light conveyed unto them in that point wherein they dissent , or they have not as yet received it ; the spirit hath not as yet sealed that portion of truth to their consciences , or writ it in their hearts . for the spirit doth not whisper one thing in privat to my conscience , and declare the contrary in his publique testimony delivered in the word . behold ( saith the wisdome of god ) i will pour out my spirit unto you , i will make knowen my words unto you pro. . ▪ for this is the covenant of god , that his word and spirit should go together , and the spirit should deliver his publique testimony authoritatively as it becomes his supremacy and soveraignty in the holy scriptures . this is my covenant with them saith the lord , my spirit that is upon thee , and my word , &c. isa. . . and by attendance on the ministry of the gospel in the church of christ we receive the spirit , gal. . . by hearing the doctrine of faith preached in the gospel they received the spirit , and therefore the ministry of the gospel is called the ministration of the spirit , cor. . . and for these reasons we try the doctrines and spirits of men by the word of god , because the spirit who is the author of scripture doth every where agree with himself , and there is a friendly relation between the truth of the party witnessing , & the truth of the thing witnessed . we do readily acknowledge that the world doth look upon this publique testimony of the spirit in the word as a private testimony , and are apt to scoffe at them who receive it , as at men led by their own private spirit ; but the true reason is because this testimony of the spirit is not manifest to them who have not the spirit . but it is so manifest to them that have had this publique testimony sealed up to their consciences , that they will hold fast this testimony though it cost them their lives . i saw under the altar the soules of them that were slaine for the word of god , and for the testimony which they held . rev. . . the testimony which they held is no other then that publick testimony which the spirit delivers in the word , and had privately sealed up to their spirits . they were slaine for the word of god , and for the testimony which they held according to that word . they were martyred because they gave testimony of that truth , which they had learnt in the word of god. i am willing to dwell longer upon this subject , because it is fundamentum fundamentorum , and therefore we will for our better satisfaction descend from handling the point in . generall unto some very weighty points in particular , and shew how the spirit doth perswade the hearts and consciences of men to receive his testimony in particular controversies , which have been raised and disputed by men of great wit and spirit . in the great controversies between us and the papists , they do as divers hereticks have done before them , urge visions , miracles , traditions , successions , prudentiall motives , and sometimes councels , fathers , and for a fairer pretence , the holy scriptures . but when they are beaten off from their pretending to councels and fathers by our learned whitaker , iewel , abbot , vsher , rainolds , not to name chamier and other worthyes , what lamentable shifts do they make when they are pressed to stand to the publicke testimony and judgement of the holy ghost delivered in the holy scriptures ? we do therefore in compassion to their poor soules intreat them to hearken to the spirit of christ , and not to the spirit of antichrist ; because the right sense of the scripture expounded by the scripture is the sword of gods spirit where with all heresies whatsoever are overcome by all those good souldiers , who add the shield of faith to the sword of the spirit . but when men neglect the scriptures , and idolize humane inventions they spend their strength in vaine , and are like the blind men of sodome who wearied themselves to find the doore . the great point of the popes infallible supremacy can never be proved by the originall , universall and perpetuall tradition of the church of christ in all ages ; no , nor by the unanimous consent of all learned men now living in communion with the present church of rome . the sorbon doctors cannot beleeve that the popes of rome are not subject to the sins and passions of other men ; and if the succession of popes which they brag of were to be tryed by fame , celebrity , antiquity , consent ; it is most evident to all that are acquainted with pure antiquity , and impartiall history , that the supremacy of the popes and papacy would be sufficiently condemned ; but if the popes infallible supremacy come to be tryed by the holy ghost , speaking in the holy scriptures , the popes and papacy will be infallibly condemned by the supream judge . the learned * papists do not agree concerning the infallible propounder of fundamentall points ; for . some say that the popes proposall ex cathedrâ is sufficient ; but gal. . . . others say a councell without the pope . others , the pope and councell both together ; it seems the pope is not sent as peter , to strengthen his brethren , but his brethren must be sent for to strengthen him . . some say both together is not sufficient , either in point of manners , or matter of faith , unlesse the acceptation of the church vniversall be superadded . . we are not able to reckon up the number of those who deny the infallibility of the present church and pope of rome . . they cannot give us in a perfect inventory of all * written verities , unwritten traditions , and church-definitions , which the whole succession of popes have upon the credit of their infallibility determined to be necessary for all christians to know and beleeve . i need say nothing of the papall reservations , provisions , mandates , and all postnate dictates , and decrees which bishops & metropolitans , are by their* oath made to the pope at their confirmation , obliged to observe . nor will i trouble my reader with the distinction of supremacy of knowledge in resolving church questions ( because that they say belongs to the fathers , who excelled the popes in expounding of scriptures ) and supremacy of power to decide church causes . for this latter supremacy , is that which popes and cardinals and all must live by in the court of rome ; and the former supremacy is purposely claimed for the support of this . but it was a long time before the popes presumed to challenge the power of deciding all the greater causes of the church thorowout the world ; for the bishops of rome were at the first but bishops within their own city ; then metropolitans within their own province , afterwards arch-bishops or patriarks over metropolitans within their princely diocesse ; and last of all their pride and policy being crowned with successe did swell them up to be popes and lords over all the christian , or rather antichristian world . the ecclesiasticall and temporall supremacy or soveraignty of popes is condemned by reason and history , by fathers and councels as others have proved at large ; let us not therefore be put off with that ridiculous piece of sophistry , which is so common ; the pope is infallible and supream head of the church , and lord of the world , because the scriptures meane so ; and the scriptures meane so , because the pope saith so ; who doth not see that the scriptures are only put in for a meer stale ? and therefore the argument had been as strong if they had proved the popes infallible authority and princely supremacy , by an ipse dixit at first . the pope saith he is infallible , ergo he is so . i am not at leasure to heare what the pope who hath endeavoured to dethrone christ , and depose the holy ghost , saith in his owne behalfe at rome ; for if he once bring this great question to be resolved in his owne consistory , he will soon bring all causes to be decided there also where he himselfe is plaintiffe , witnesse and iudge ; only in prudence and modesty he hath entertained a company of cardinals ( who are to divide the spoiles with him ) for his grand inquest . the popes supremacy is unwritten , and therefore he is a fit judge to decide all controversies amongst the traditionaries , whose faith is not written in either testament . but since the pope doth strive with the holy ghost for the chair , and christ for the throne ; let us heare what christ and the holy ghost do both speake in the holy scriptures of truth , and we shall quickly decide this grand controversie , and many more . christ is the only pastour of his church , he is to continue so and have no successor . we find in holy scripture , that christ is the only head and saviour of his whole church , ephes. . . colos. . . he doth and will continue with his church alway , even unto the end of the world , to give life , sense and motion to it , and to rule and governe the whole , and every member of it , by the effectuall councell and working of his holy spirit . the apostles were but ministeriall heads , or principall members who had a preheminence over the inferiour members for perfecting of the saints by the worke of the ministry , cor. . . . first apostles : this eminent ministry or headship did belong to all the apostles , and not to peter only ; the power of remitting and retaining sins was given to the other apostles aswel as peter , io. . , . . we deny not peter to be the first apostle in time , as andrew was the first disciple ; and therefore peter is first reckoned , mat , . . nay we will not deny him to be most eminent in grace , and for both reasons grant him to be first in order : but we deny that he was chiefe in dignity or supream in power ; because we know the apostles had all equall power ; for christ sent them all as his father sent him : they had all of them power to open heaven to beleevers , and shut it against unbeleevers . the power of the keyes was given upon the confession which peter made in the name of al the rest , mat. . . . as he was wont to do , ioh. . . the confession was common to all , the promise common to all , the performance common to all , ioh. . , , . i need say no more but this . . the papists do entitle peter to that supream soveraignty which belongs to christ : but peter and the rest of the apostles were joynt foundations built on christ the only proper head and foundation , ephes. . . . they entitle the pope to that power which did belong to peter , but peter had no successour in his extraordinary and apostolick power , the pope is no apostle ; and when peter speakes of his ordinary power , he tells the elders that he is their fellow-presbyter . i who am also an elder exhort the elders , tim. . . but that peter was an ordinary bishop of one city , first of antioch for seven yeers , and then of rome for twenty-five , cannot be proved by scripture , no nor by any credible historian . i know they rely upon eusebius his testimony . but it is enough for me to reply , that eusebius his history doth dissent from his chronicle , and his chronicle doth dissent from scripture . . christ hath many ministers to preach his gospell , but he hath no catholick vicar besides his spirit , who can challenge the supream soveraignty of deciding controversies by an infallible sentence : it is the spirit that makes the word to be effectuall . cor. . . as christ workes by his spirit he hath no vicar ; for he himselfe is with his disciples alwayes to the end of the world , mat. . christ himselfe doth baptize with the holy ghost : he himselfe did open the heart of lydia . . the pope challenges this power over the gentiles , but paul was the apostle of the gentiles by the appointment of the holy ghost , and peters own consent , rom. . . act. . . gal. . . paul was chief and laboured more abundantly then any in this service . . peter did never claime or exercise any such power over the princes and kingdomes of the world as the pope doth , lu. . , . mat. . , . . if peter had desired and usurped any supremacy over the rest of the apostles , he had thereby degraded himselfe , and been last of all , mark . , . . if the vices of popes may make them supream or their errours infallible , we are able to prove that by fraud , violence and such like black arts , they have usurped a power over the consciences of men to lead them ●nto heresie , antichristianisme , atheisme ; for by endeavouring to prove their infallibility by the scripture , and then venting grosse errours as infallible truths upon the authority of the pope and church , they have tempted some to beleeve neither church nor pope nor scripture ; the pope hath told them that they had as good beleeve nothing as not beleeve all ; and therefore it is to be feared , that too many beleeve nothing at all . let us then to the law and the testimony , and let christ and his spirit be heard speake in them , and we will proceed to tryal with the papists upon what points they please . we will try all their new tutelar gods , whether angels or dead men , or their breaden god in the masse by the command . their picturing of god and worshipping of him by pictures by the second commandment . their superstitious benedictions , magicall incantations , exorcismes , and all those helps to salvation , which salt , wax , spittle , bells can afford , by the third commandement ; and so i might proceed to the holy-dayes , masses , &c. or try their popes usurpations , the cruelty of their inquisition , their allowance of fornication forbidding to marry , their equivocations , rebellious concupiscence by the second table we will by the gospell of christ try the doctrine of justification by workes , their publick prayers in an unknowne tongue , their denying of the testament of christs bloud to the people ; we will examine whether there be more sacrifices of christ then one ? whether they that dye in christ rest from their labours ? i might proceed to examine their doctrine , concerning the offices and benefits of christ ; concerning the nature and use of faith , and the doctrine of the sacraments , and the rest of the points in controversie between us and the papists . and truly when i do read such questions as these i cannot but thinke of those texts , tim. . . , . now the spirit speakes expresly , &c. the spirit doth so expresly condemne these seducing and erring spirits , that whosoever will be perswaded by the evident demonstrations of the spirit , and be over-ruled by his positive definitions in scripture , will confesse that the papists were very wise in offering to be tryed by unwritten traditions , or the pope and his adherents , in all points in question . it is clear that the popes have taught for doctrines the commandements of men . he that reades the epistles to the romanes and galathians , cor. . chap. the second chapter to the colossians , the second chapter of the second epistle to the thessalonians ; and the plainer places of the book of the revelation , will acknowledge the spirit doth speake expresly . the pope must therefore be beholding to his school-men to defend his doctrine , and to his canonists to keep up his discipline , and pretend no more to scriptures or pure antiquity for his justification . if the anti-scripturists would but hearken to the spirit speaking in the scripture , they would say the spirit hath magnified both law and gospel , and made them honorable , precious and glorious in our eyes . i will not insist upon those many convincing arguments whereby the scriptures are undeniably proved to be the word of god , but humbly desire all men to consider whether the true reason ( why those arguments do not effectually perswade obstinate men ) be not cleerly this , because men do undervalue the testimony of the holy ghost , and resist , vex , grieve , or quench the holy spirit , whose office it is to seale up this and all other saving truths to our consciences and hearts . true it is that the law of god is written in our hearts by nature , but our nature is corrupted , and we are blinded with pride , passion , prejudice , with selfe conceitednes and selfe-love , and therefore it is requisite that the wrath of god should be revealed from heaven against pleasing gainfull sins ; nay , unnaturall sins , rom . . to the end of the chapter . moreover , it is to be sadly considered that the gospell is not written in our hearts by nature , nor can it be found out by any artificiall demonstration , but it is discovered to us by divine revelation , rom. . , . i know many learned men have used the testimony of humane authors in a secondary and subservient way to confirme our faith in this point : but it is cleer that we must rest our faith upon the authority of god in this and all other points , or else our faith will not be a divine faith. god sweares by himselfe , because he is the greatest , and doth bear witnesse to himselfe in his word ; nay , to his word , in his word , because he is the truest , for he is indeed the prime truth , the onely infallible truth . and hence it is that the scriptures are called the testimonies of god , and the testimony of the spirit is so often produced , pet. . . act. . . ioh. . . it is no shame to adhere to the testimony of god in the weightiest point , psal. . , . hence it is that the penmen do so often shew their commission and cry thus saith the lord. and hence it is that god doth so often own the scriptures for his word . this is my word saith god , this came from my inspiration saith the spirit . tim. . . pet. . . this is my writing saith iehovah , i will own it , and stand to it . i have written to him the great things of my law saith god , hos. . . the scriptures are the oracles of god rom. . . they contain the counsel of god , act. . . god hath given us sufficient assurance that the law was written by his own finger , and all other books by his spec●al command and inspiration . all scripture is given by inspiration of god , tim. . prophecy●ame not in old time ; the word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it came not at any time by the will of man but holy men of god spake as they were moved by the holy ghost , pet. . . our saviour gives a full testimony to moses , david , the rest of the penmen of the psalms , and all the prophets ; luk. , . god hath sealed the testimony of the penmen by miracles on men and divels , we need not expect new miracles to confirm this old-testament & ancient gospel ; both are confirmed by the old miracles which stand upon record in both ; but if any man preach a new gospel , we may well call upon him for new miracles . nay the very preservation of the scriptures in despight of tyrants , heretiques and divels is a convincing miracle . in a word , the testimony of the penmen is sealed . by the oath of god , . by the blood of christ , . by the testimony of the spirit , . by the efficacy of the spirit . the testimony and efficacy of the spirit is that sweet subject which i am now more especially engaged to insist upon ; the testimony of the spirit to the heart and conscience of every true beleever in particular is a convincing testimony . but it will be said , that this is such an argument as none can take notice of and therefore altogether insufficient to perswade other men to beleeve , to whom no such testimony hath been vouchsafed . . i answer . this is an argument indeed whereby i cannot convince others : but this is an argument which makes all other arguments effectual to convince me . . the efficacy of the spirit in the word upon the hearts of enemies is very considerable . their minds are inlightned , their judgements convinced , their consciences awakened , terrifyed , their hearts smitten , because the very thoughts of their hearts are strangely & unexpectedly discovered , their souls embowelled , and their marrow as it were melted in their bones by this almighty spirit speaking , testifying , working in & with the word : the very letter kils them , the very savour confounds them , though bold athiests scoffe at the word , and do in their jovial fits blaspeme the spirit ; yet sometimes their hearts quake their joynts tremble , even as belshazzars did at the very sight of the hand-writing , when they do but glance their eye upon some startling text. their consciences do often joyne with the word and spirit against themselvs against their wils ; for though they be self-willed , yet they are after some soule-searching admonition self-confounded and selfe-condemned men , tit. . , . and though the malice of some men bee too strong for their wit , reason , and conscience ; yet it is not too strong for the spirit in the word ; all the powers of hel in them are over-powred by this good spirit ; all the strong-holds of sathan batterd , and they themselves so confounded , that they seeme to be even damned already , they thinke themselves in hell above-ground , when they are stung and bitten , they fall into the passion of the heart , and are taken with such hellish convulsion-sits that they do even foam at mouth , and gnash with their teeth , they are cut to the soule , and tormented in their conscience , they cry and howle and fight against the spirit , but all in vain ; for even they are out-witted and over-powred , who are not converted by this stinging efficacy of the almighty spirit . what shall we say to these things ? if idols have been overthrown , oracles silenced , divels convinced by the majesty of the spirit in the holy scriptures , and so over awed by the spirit that they have been forced to confesse , nay beleeve these truths at which they tremble ; then surely those bold theists are worse then devils who do not tremble at the word because they do not beleeve the spirit . . look upon a soule in its agony and pangs , in its throws and conflicts at its first conversion , or in its after-throws upon some sadrelapse , and observe how the wit is captivated , reason conquered , conscience confounded , heart broken , and will turned , nay all the powers of corrupt nature overpowred and overturned by the word and spirit of god ; and then you must needs cry out , o the divine efficacy of scripture , which turns a lyon into a lamb , a goat into a sheep ; a man , a beast , a divel into a saint , and perswades philosophers and courtiers , emperours and souldiers , publicans and harlots , mariners and politicians to embrace a religion , and run a course clean contrary to the carnall and divelish wisdome of their proud reason , contrary to the stubborn resolutions of their perverse wils ; in a word , contrary to their very nature , education , custome , contrary to dictates of policy and reasons of state , contrary to their passions , lusts , interests friends cōpanions . o victorious spirit ! what aileth what aileth thee , o thou man of war , and pride , thou secretary of nature , & advocate of the devil to h●ng the head and weep , to resigne thy estate , lay down thy commission , and thy armes , burn thy conjuring-books , and sacrifice thy dearest life in the maintenance of that truth which thou hast formerly contemned ? i must cry as he did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . this is the power of the word : behold the efficacy of the spirit in the word conquering and triumphing over the subtilty and obstinacy , the pride and malignity of carnal men . the promises of god are better then all the proffers of sathan : the divel shewes us the glory of the world : the scripture shewes us the vanity of the world , and the conscience is convinced by the word and spirit , that the reversion of heaven is infinitly better then the possessions of earth : all the kingdomes of the world and glory of them are not worth one dayes communion with jesus christ , nay one dayes comfort from the gospel and spirit of jesus christ. good reason have we then to beleeve the spirit . angels admire , and divels tremble at the majesty of the word , saints beleeve , obey , adore the majesty of the spirit speaking in the word of truth and life , of grace and glory . the familists might learn by this sad discourse to beleeve the spirit of god speaking in the word of god , and not beleeve their own natural , carnal , phantastical spirits which contradict the word and spirit of god. the familists did learn of the papists to call orthodox protestants scripture men , to scoffe at them as scripture-wise , and to say as stapleton and divers others do , that the most diligent conference of scriptures is the ready way to the most damnable errours . that the fountains of greek and hebrew are neither pure , nor necessary ; and the like . and yet howlet in his epistle to queen elizabeth did lay the sin of the family of love to the charge of the protestants . but dr. raynolds our learned champion in his conference with hart , doth vindicate the protestants , and make it evident that such as were godly and learned in the scripture , did detest harry nicolas that imp of sathan and master of the family of love , & therfore they could not lay the families sinto our charge as if we did foster that venemous vipers brood ( i keep to the doctors own expressions that you may see how the zeal of that meek moses was enflamed in this contest ) which did march into the field with papists to strengthen their hands against protestants . the anabaptists likewise might learn from hence to make the spirit speaking in the word the judge of their pretended revelations , if they were not too conceited of their own inventions , and apt to fall in love with the dreams of their own feaverish brain , with their weak arguments , but strong delusions . the arminians the constant enemies of the grace of god should consider that the pelagians the advocates of free-wil and corrupt nature , were confounded with those plain scriptures which were urged by the councels of carthage , milevis , orenge , and holy augustine in his fragrant works . the socinians the enemies of the onely true god , father , son , and holy ghost ; should consider that the arrians were overthrown by the scriptures in the nicene councel , and by the godly pastours of the church , who instead of broken scriptures ( which the arians urged with as much fraud as the devil did , mat. . ) produced plain scriptures and the whole series of both testaments , and so did invincibly refute their blasphemous errours . the libertines who claym a liberty of publishing damnable heresies and blasphemies under pretence of prophesying , might learn , that where the spirit of the lord is , there is liberty , true liberty , but no where else ; for he who protends to speak by the holy ghost , and yet denies iesus to be the lord , doth at once blaspheme christ and the holy spirit , and is an anti-spiritual lyar , an antichristian blasphemer , and hath neither father , son nor spirit dwelling in him . for he who speaks by the spirit doth acknowledge jesus to be the lord , cor. . . and he who denies the son hath not the father . who is a lyer but he who denies that iesus is the christ ? he is antichrist who denies the father and the son ; whosoever denies the son , the same hath not the father , jo. . , . in like manner , every spirit which confesseth not that iesus christ is come in the flesh , is not of god but of antichrist , joh. . , . this is that vorstian liberty which hath undone so many nations already , and is now idolized in england under the name of liberty of conscience , by such as have neither conscience nor liberty . reverend dr. sibbs did exceedingly cry out against this kind of liberty in his time . he would not have way given to vorstian lawlesse licencious liberty of prophesie : that every one so soone as he is big of some new conceit , should bring forth his abortive monster ; for then the pillars of christian faith will soon be shaken , and the church of god which is an house of order , will be●ome a babel , an house of confusion . the dolefull issues of which pretended liberty , we see in polonia , transylvania , and in countries neerer hand . i might proceed , but this is sufficient for a taste ; and if i should but name all the errours of this age and not confute them , i should abuse my reader , and therefore i desire to stop in time , and beseech all that are spiritually minded to hea●ken to the spirit speaking in the word . beloved beleeve not every spirit , but beleeve the holy spirit , who is the author of the scriptures , the author of faith , the iudge of controversies , the interpreter of the scriptures , the doctor and comforter of the elect , and he will lead you into all necessary truth for your present edification and everlasting salvation . the holy spirit will assure you that the scriptures of truth were all written by his own authority , and you may safely set to your seale , when you have received the infallible testimony of the holy ghost . we are witnesses of these things ( saith the ●postle ) and so is the holy-ghost also , act. . . we shall never receive the word , as the word of god , with joy , reverence , submission and assurance of faith , specially in times of ●ffliction and temptation , unlesse we receive the witnesse of the spirit , and ground our faith upon the wisdome and evident demonstration of the spirit . when we look upon the word of god , and consider , , the wonderfull consent of all those holy and selfe-denying men that penned it . . the marvellous fulfilling of all the strange prophecies in the fullnesse of time appointed by god. . the admirable providence of god in preserving the scriptures notwithstanding all the rage and malice of hereticks and persecutors . . the supernaturall miracles wrought for to confirm it . . the harmonious testimony that the church , martyrs , saints , have in all ages given to it . . the antiquity , majesty , efficacy of it . . the divine and heavenly matter contained in it , . mysteries above reason , cor. . . . commands contrary to our corrupt nature , sent to all nations , and even to the greatest and proudest of men . . threats beyond the strength of man to inflict ▪ or the capacity of man to comprehend an hard heart , a seared conscience , and yet a trembling spirit , a reprobate mind and sense , a spirit of madnesse , giddinesse , horrour or slumber , an everlasting worm , eternall fire , torments with the devil and his angels . . promises and rewards beyond the power of man to bestow , or wisdome of angels to comprehend , pet. . . ephes. . . . the fall , corruption , redemption , salvation of man wonderfully declared in the holy scriptures : the inward frame and disposition of mans heart , his secret thoughts and most intimate projects , his reserved wishes , desires , ends , and purposes undenyably discovered for his conviction , even to admiration and amazement , cor. . ● . then the reason of man is even confounded , the obstinacy of mans heart subdued , all the pride of humane glory stained , and the scriptures appeare to be the word of god. but now all these arguments and many more which i could name , will not be effectuall for our regeneration and conversion , untill the spirit be pleased to set all home upon the heart by his own irresistible efficacy , and seale this truth to the conscience by his own infallible testimony . but when the spirit speaks to and works upon our spirits , then we do assent and consent , to all the proposals of god ; our very thoughts are captivated and subdued unto the obedience of christ , cor. . . our conscience is convinced swayed and undeniably obliged to beleeve what is promised , allow what is commanded , our will made willing to chose both , the affections to embrace both , our whole man to follow after both according to the directions of god for performing what is commanded , and obtaining of what is promised , rom. . . . psa. . , , , , , , , . i must acknowledge my absolute total and universal dependance upon the infallible wisdome , infinite truth , power , majesty , greatnesse , and goodnesse of the holy spirit , and confesse that he hath soveraigne right and divine authority to reveale and prescribe whatsoever he pleases upon the rewards and penalties of everlasting life and death . and i am obliged to beleeve and embrace al that the spirit teacheth without any contradiction , though it seeme never so improbable to my carnall reason , and be really contrary to my corrupt affections , ends , and esianes . the spirit teaches me how to apprehend and judge of spirituall things after a spirituall manner ; for the spirit teaches me what to approve , and what i should disallow , phil. ▪ , , . i must choose what the spirit approves , and then prosecute what i have chosen with care , hope , desire , and embrace what i attaine to with love and delight , and in a word rest satisfyed with the love of the father , the grace of the son , and the communion of the spirit , as my al-sufficient and satisfactory portion for evermore , psal. . . psal. . . faith is that grace which enables and enclines us upon the divine testimony of the spirit to depend on christ for righteousnesse and life according to the tenour of the covenant of grace . the divine testimony of the spirit is the true ground of justifying faith ; but historicall faith which may be in devils jam . and temporary faith which may be in reprobates , luke . are not truly grounded on the testimony , wisdome , authority , revelation , or demonstration of the spirit . we read of a revelation of flesh and blood , mat. . . and the demonstration and revelation of the spirit . cor. . . . , . ephes. . . a man who hath nothing but sense and reason in him may have an historicall or a temporary faith ; but he who doth upon the divine testimony of the spirit beleeve that iesus is the christ , he is born of god , of the spirit of god , and hath the witnesse in himself , joh. . . , . for the regenerate and they only have a spirituall understanding in them to know him that is true when he is revealed unto them by the spirit of truth , joh. . . cor. , , . deut. . . for the demonstration of the spirit is not understood by us untill we are renewed in the spirit of our mind , so that we can look upon the divine truths testifyed by the spirit with a spirituall eye , and discern them after a spirituall manner , cor. . . and therefore the testimony of the spirit is not received but by our renewed spirits , rom. . . before we are regenerate , we receive divine truths only because we judge them reasonable , or because we find them in the scriptures , and we beleeve the scriptures upon an humane testimony , and therefore only with an humane , not a divine faith. but the spirituall man beleeves all upon the testimony of the spirit , and doth constantly beg the direction of the good spirit . o thy spirit is good saith david , teach me , lead me , quicken me by thy spirit , ps. . , . finally , this good spirit discovers to a man before he beleeves , . his want of christ , . the worth of christ. his want of christ by reason of . his hainous sins which are inexcusable , damnable . . his spirituall wants which are innumerable . . his present misery , and slavery , which are unspeakable , unsupportable . the worth of christ , because he is an all-sufficient saviour , and only saviour ; the spirit discovers the treasures of free grace , the mysteries of divine faith , which even angels admire , the unsearchable riches of christ , the fulnesse of god , able to satiate the soule with heavenly , glorious , everlasting happinesse , and even infinite content . then the soule is convinced by the spirit of god , not onely of the truth , but goodnesse of the covenant made by god with man in christ , and that there are better things laid up for beleevers in christ , then any are or can be bestowed by sathan upon his greatest agents , and dearest favourites , the darlings of the flesh and world , and upon this account the soule is perswaded by this demonstration of the spirit , to close with christ , and deny itself , to have no ability , wisdome , righteousnesse , will of its own , but to seek wisdom , righteousnesse , sanctification , and redemption in christ. cor. . . in a word to deny its own will , and take the will of christ for its rule and compasse , to do or suffer any thing for christ , to lose or sell all for him . the good spirit perswades us . to prize christ highly , even above all the kingdomes of the world , and glory of them . . to beleeve in christ stedfastly . . to love christ deerly , better then our selves , or dearest friends , better then worldly treasures , sensuall joy , or any carnall contentments whatsoever . . to follow christ fully that we may enjoy him eternally , as our crown , our happinesse , our heaven . and to this end and purpose to set up the word of god in our consciences as our only rule for to direct us . in all points of faith , . in all parts of worship , . in all passages of our life and conversation : that we may cast out the world , the devil , nay flesh and self and all to make roome for christ. now when the spirit hath by its own evidence , testimony , authority , wisdome and efficacy wrought faith in the soule , to carry it into the armes of iesus christ , christ doth bid it welcom , embraces , kisses it , and takes this young beleever by the hand , and puts him into his fathers bosome . and when we are thus brought to beleeve in father , son , and holy ghost , then we are fitted and prepared to worship and obey all three glorious persons as one god blessed forever . and therefore , i may now proceed to speak of the worship of all three , and then of our obedience to all three . . this grand mystery of faith hath an effectuall influence into our gospel-worship . he takes the name of father , son , and holy ghost in vain , and doth not make that holy use which he should of the titles , properties , workes and ordinances of all three , who doth not with knowledge , faith , reverence , sincerity and spirituall joy worship all three ; for this is true gospel-worship . and therefore , i would intreat my reader diligently to consider what i have delivered in the fourth , and fifth chapters of this treatise concerning the divine nature , titles , properties , works of all three in order to worship for the glory of the thrice illustrious , and yet single god head ; and then if he will study the scope of the first table of the holy law of god , and the substance of gospel-worship , he will acknowledge that every one who beleeveth in all three persons will find his faith obliging and inclining him to worship al three glorious persons as one god blessed for ever . . god the father is to be worshipped under the gospel as the father of our lord jesus christ , and our father in him . i have touched this point already , and because it is not much controverted by our grand enemies , i shall not insist long upon it . all the knowledge of god which we gain by the scriptures of truth , is revealed to us on purpose for our direction in the worship of god ; we must not worship god according to our own devices , but according to that discovery which god hath made of himselfe to us in his holy word , not onely in respect of his divine nature ( as when our saviour saith god is a spirit , and from thence concludes , that god is to be worshipped in spirit and truth , ) but in respect of the divine persons also . we are to worship god , as a creator , as the first of causes , last of ends , best of beings , to whom we owe our being , and our well-being ; but we must worship god the father as god , and look upon him as the father of our lord iesus christ , and as our father reconciled to us in christ ; this is that worship which becomes the gospel ; and therefore we ought to worship god the father considered after this evangelicall manner , that he may be glorifyed , we moved and affected with those endearing expressions , o god the father of our lord iesus christ , and our father in him . such expressions as these do beget in us , . holy boldnesse mixed with reverence . . christian confidence ; our father wil supply the wants of his children out of his rich treasure , for he commands heaven & earth . . filial love , and cheerefull obedience , which are even con-naturall to our new man upon due consideration of this sweet relation between god and us , ier. . . . a thankefull acknowledgement of gods fatherly bounty , even unto admiration ; behold what manner of love the father hath bestowed upon us , that we should be called the sons of god , joh. . . nay heyres of god , rom. . . what are we vile wretches , wormes and no men , yea by reason of our filthinesse , dogs , and devils , that we should be adopted into the family of god , married to the sonne of god , and made co-heyrs with the lord of glory ! when the spirit of a man is raised by such thankfull acknowledgements unto an holy admiration , then it is brought into a gospel frame , and by such high and sweet thoughts of gods fatherly love and bounty fitted for filiall and gospel-worship . but it will be said that the whole trinity is our father , and therefore all three persons are to be worshipped under that fatherly consideration , and in that deare relation . to which i answer , . that when the word father is attributed unto god essentially , though all creatures are excluded , yet all the three divine persons are included , because they are co-equal , they have one nature , will and worship ; they are one and the same god , and they are one father also in opposition to images , ier. . . to saints , is. . . doubtlesse thou art our father , though abraham be ignorant of us , and israel acknowledge us not . thou o lord art our father , our redeemer , thy name is from everlasting . and in opposition to all creatures , mat. . . and in the lords prayer , father , son , and holy ghost are all called upon as our father . . the word father is sometimes taken personally , and attributed to a single person of the god-head . more frequently , and more peculiarly to god the father , who is the first principle of subsisting life ( even in respect of his own naturall and co-essentiall son , as hath been proved at large in this treatise ) and is to be reckoned first in order ; and finally in regard of our adoption and the mysterious and divine oeconomy and dispensation vouchsafed for the salvation of man ; and yet these peculiar notions do not exclude the other persons from being god , as hath been proved above in the fourth chapter , nor do they exclude them from being our father in the common notion of father in opposition to creatures and idols ; nay all three persons have a fatherly care of us , and love to us , and therefore christ is called our father , isa. . . & heb. . , . and it is the proper office of the holy ghost to regenerate us , as it is of the father to adopt us ; but then the father doth adopt us in christ who is a father to us , though a son to god the father , and the holy spirit is the spirit of regeneration and adoption , and therefore all three co-essentiall persons are our father . . we may direct our prayers to any one person , as steven directed his to the lord jesus , act. . . lord iesus receive my spirit . . we may direct our prayers expressely unto two of the divine persons . now god himself and our father , and our lord iesus christ direct our way unto you , thes. . . . we may direct our prayers unto all three , as we do in the administration of baptisme : and in that fundamentall benediction cor. , . . when we direct our prayers to one of the divine persons , we exclude none , because the persons are in one another ; the father is in the son , and they are all three coessentiall , coequall ; they are one god , and therefore are to be worshipped with that selfe same religious and divine worship which is due to their single and undivided godhead . . when we direct our prayer to the father of our lord jesus christ , the terme father is taken in a peculiar notion , not in the common notion , and the apostle directs his prayer after this peculiar manner , eph. . . for this cause i bow my knees unto the father of our lord iesus christ , of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named . god the father looks upon us poore wormes as part of his family , nay , as his deare children whilest we are here on earth , as well as he looks upon his other children , the glorious saints ▪ who are made perfect in heaven . oh what a quickning consideration is this , to bring us upon our knees at a throne of grace before christs father , and our father , that we may have a childs portion , and be prepared for that place which christ is now preparing for us ! we are part of the family numbred amongst those of the best ranke ; we are children , and have the same father that christ and the saints in heaven have . iohn . . ephes. . . and therefore shall come to be coheires with christ and them . here is heavenly encouragement unto gospell-worship , and gospell-conversation . it is no wonder then if that gospell-worship be frequently performed to god under this endearing consideration and in this sweet and comfortable relation . the apostle wishes us grace and peace from god our father , and the lord jesus christ , rom. . . and in like manner cor. . cor. . . observe that solemn forme of thanksgiving . blessed be god , even the father of our lord iesus christ the father of mercies , and the god of all comfort , cor. . . oh how willingly and cheerefully do we run to the god of all mercies and comfort in a time of temptation and affliction ! cor. . . for the father discovers his bowels of mercy on purpose to invite us to him . the father himselfe loves you , iohn . . all spirituall glorious eternall blessings , our election , redemption , salvation , are ascribed to this father of all grace , mercy , comfort , glory . christ redeemes us according to the will of god and our father , gal. . . iohn . , ● . blessed be the god and father of our lord iesus , who hath blessed us with all spirituall blessings in heavenly things in christ according as he hath chosen us . ephes. . , ▪ . much more might be said to this purpose ; but this may suffice : it is now time to proceed to my next point , which is , that . divine worship is due to the second person of this coessentiall trinity , to jesus christ our lord and god. there is but one immediate formall proper adaequate and fundamentall reason of divine worship or adorability ( as the schooles speak ) and that is the soveraign supreme singular majesty , independent and infinite excellency of the eternall godhead . there is a peculiar and singular esteeme , faith , love , and worship due to father , son , and holy ghost , who are one god , the only true god. these three are the only object of religion , and therefore the only object of religious adoration . there is but one kind of divine worship , & that worship and all degrees of it is due to this one god , father , son , and holy ghost ; this truth is made good against the papists as well as against the socinians , and divers others , whom i need not name , the ubiquitists and arminians , by a cleare stating of the point in controversie , and invincible demonstrations to confirme the truth . first , for the cleare stating of this point we must look a little into the rise of this controversie , and consider how far it hath been discussed by learned men , and stated by such as are orthodoxe , and prudent men , since the socinians , ubiquitists , and arminians have endeavoured to make the question more perplexed , and the truth more obscure . the papists are deeply engaged to prove that religious honour may be given to a creature , at least in some degree : their distinctions are so well known that i need not to insist upon them . cardinall perron exceeds them all for sophisticall distinctions , which he who is at leisure may read in his fifth book , and twentieth chapter of his answer to king iames. but smiglecius being engaged against the socinians , states the point right ; he distinguisheth between christs naturall power , as he is the naturall and coessentiall son of god , and his delegated power which he hath as mediatour , and concludes that christ is to be worshipped as he is the naturall son of god with divine worship , because his naturall power is his divine nature . but ( saith he ) christ is not to be worshipped in the second consideration with divine worship . doctor rainolds in his book de idololatria romana hath abundantly refuted all that the papists bring to excuse their idolatry , and proves clearely , that it is idolatry to give religious honour to any creature ; i shall not therefore trouble my reader with any set-dispute upon that argument . the socinians tell us that the father is the only absolute supreme independent god , but christ is a dependent and subordinate god : and therefore may be worshipped as he is mediatour with a relative and subordinate worship , which they are not affraid to call divine worship . but they confess that they worship the father only as the supreme cause , the first efficient , and the last end : but they worship christ as the second or middle cause of our salvation , and the intermediate end of religion . the ground and formall reason of this subordinate worship is ( as they conceive ) christs mediatory office , the new subordinate godhead , and lordship over us bestowed upon him for his obedience unto death , which they say , is the mediate , as his exaltation is the immediate cause of this subordinate glory . the arminians in their apology , and other writings , endeavour to excuse and gratifie the socinians ; for they deny that our grand argument taken from the divine honour and worship of christ , doth sufficiently prove his nature to be divine , and christ to be one god with his father . this argument , say they , is not invincible , and irrefragable , nay , they call it a leaden argument , because this divine honour is given to him by his fathers gratification in time . some lutherans are very much to blame in this point ; for they say , that the divine majesty , worship , glory , omnipotence , omnipresence of the son of god are communicated to christ as man : but enough of that . divers learned , * orthodoxe , judicious doctours of the church have given the enemy too much advantage by their unwary expressions in this point : and the vigilant enemy hath taken that advantage and made a very vnhappy use of it , to the great prejudice of christianity . vno absurdo dato mille sequuntur ; error parvus in principio fit magnus in fine . i do therefore entreat the most accurate and nice reader at his best leasure to read iunius , chamier , polanus , polyander , pareus , camero , maccovius , cluto , beza , heidan , diest , zanchius , voetius , altingius , and other sate writers upon this point , who have observed every turn , ward , shift of the enemy , and have given a very faire account of all . for the present state of the question be pleased seriously to consider these plaine and weighty conclusions following . . divine excellency , infinite majesty , and perfection , is the formall and adequate ground and reason of divine worship . for by divine worship we do acknowledge and declare the infinite majesty , truth , wisdome ▪ goodnesse and glory of our blessed god. we do not esteeme any thing worthy of divine honour and worship which hath but a finite and created glory ; because divine honour is proper and peculiar to the only true god , who will not give his glory to any other who is not god. god alone is the adequate object of divine faith , hope , love , and worship ; because these graces are all exercised , and this worship performed in acknowledgement of his infinite perfection , and independent excellency ; and therefore no such worship can be due to any thing below god : but the most glorious and excellent creatures are all below god , and therefore that point is cleare . . the father , son , and holy ghost are one and the same god , as hath been proved in the fourth chapter of this treatise ; and therefore one and the same worship is due to all three , because they are coessentiall , coequall , coeternall ; they have one and the same divine nature , excellency , perfection , and essentiall glory ; and therefore the same acknowledgement is due to all three both from men and angels . there is not one kind of divine honour due to the father , and another to the son , nor one degree of honour due to the father , and another to the son ; for there can be no degrees imaginable in one and the same excellency , which is single because infinite ; and what is infinite doth excell and transcend all degrees and bounds . and if there be no degrees in the ground and adaequate reason of divine worship , there can be no ground or reason of a difference of degrees in the worship it selfe . the father and son are one , iohn . . one in power , excellency , nature ; one god , and therefore are to be honoured with the same worship , iohn . . all men should honour the son , even as they honour the father ; every tongue must confesse that iesus christ who is man , is god also , and therefore equall to his father . and it can be no robbery , no derogation to the fathers honour for us to give equall honour to him , and his coequall son , who subsists in the forme of god , in the nature of god , phil. . , . you see the divine nature , the infinite excellency of iesus christ , is an undeniable ground of this coequall honour , and therefore the worship due to christ as god , the same god with his father , is the very same worship both for kind and degree which is due to the father . . this divine honour was due to iesus christ , before there was any creature to give him his due . christ was * adorable , worshipable , that is worthy of divine worship before there was any man or angel to adore , to performe actuall worship , that divine worship which was due to him for his infinite excellency from all eternity . . when jesus christ was declared to the world , god did command even the most glorious angels to worship him , as his naturall and coessentiall son , who was begotten from the days of eternity in the unity of the godhead . for when he brought in his first-begotten , and only begotten son into the world , he said , and let all the angels of god worship him , heb. . . . if man had never fallen , never stood in any need of christs blood , yet all men would have worshipped the naturall and coessentiall son of god , as one and the same god with his father , and therefore with the same divine worship ▪ as soon as his godhead had been sufficiently revealed to them from heaven , or else that very neglect would have been their fall and ruine . . the office of christ , his discharge of his office , by his active and passive obedience , and glorious benefits which we receive thereby , are excellent motives to excite us to give that divine worship to jesus christ , which is due unto him for his owne infinite excellency ; but his infinite excellency , is the formall , proper and adaequate ground , reason and cause of all the divine worship which we performe to iesus christ , and that for these reasons . . because if man had never fallen , and christ had never died for mans redemption , this divine worship had been due unto him , for his infinite and eternall excellency , as hath been proved . . because the father and the spirit are not mediatours as christ is , and that office which is not common to all three persons cannot be the prime , immediate , proper , formall cause , ground or reason of that divine honour and worship which is due to all three as one god blessed for ever ; nay no office whatsoever can be the proper cause of divine honour . . because this divine honour was due to jesus christ from all eternity , before his incarnation , passion , &c. and therefore this divine honour is not bestowed upon him as a reward of his active or passive obedience ; for no worship or thing can be before its formall cause . . because jesus christ is a mediatour according to both natures , and therefore according to his humane nature as well as his divine nature ; but all the honour due to christ according to his divine nature was due from all eternity , and there is no divine honour due to him for and by reason of his humane nature , or any perfection which doth truly and properly belong to christ as man. he who was borne of mary , is to be adored with divine worship , but not for that reason , because he was borne of mary , but because he is god , the coessentiall and eternall son of god ; we must distinguish between the materiall and formall object of worship . . the materiall object of worship is christ , who is both god and man , the son of david , the son of mary , the son of god , the mediatour and saviour of his people from their sins . . the formall object discovers to us the prime formall adequate ground and reason of his divine worship ; the coessentiall and eternall son of god , who is one and the same god with the father and the holy spirit , he is worshipped for his infinite and divine excellency . christ is worshipped as god with this divine worship ; his mediatory office , servile suffering , cannot be the prime and immediate foundation , the ultimate and terminating object of divine worship due to the father son and holy ghost ; and therefore we must conclude that the formal & proper reason of the divine worship due & given to jesus christ our mediatour , is the divine nature & infinite excellency of our mediatour , which alone is of it self & for it self capable of divine worship . i should make a tedious digression if i should declare what great cyrill of alexandria , noble athanasius , the ephesine councell of old , and very learned and accurate writers of late have delivered upon this argument with great dexterity and circumspection . they would not be mistaken as if they did divide the two natures of christ , or remove any glorious adjuncts from the eternall word , the second person of the godhead ; and yet desire you to put a difference between that which christ assumed by the most free decree of god , and grace of hypostaticall union , and that which belongs to him as he is one god with the father and the holy ghost . finally , they intreat you to put a difference between the gratious motives to worship christ , and the prime , formall , adequate proper ground and reason of that worship , as i have done , and professe that they worship their whole mediatour with one entire worship which is not mixed but purely divine , and therefore is not founded upon any temporary office , service , benefit , nor any externall denomination or relation , but upon his infinite excellency , his eternall godhead . and if these considerations will not give men satisfaction , i hope to satisfy them farther yet before i conclude this chapter . for the point is to me very clear and plain . if jesus christ were worshipped as mediator , so that his mediatory office or actuall mediation should be laid as the first foundation , or assigned as the formall reason of our worship , then this fourth argument , which i am still improving and enforcing for the proofe of the point will plainly discover that the mediation of christ having respect to the humane nature , will make the humane nature at least in part the ground , reason and cause of this divine worship , which i leave to all sober divines to consider , before they admit . and it is farther to be considered that jesus christ as mediatour doth condesend to an office and imployment which doth subject him to god as an head : the head of christ is god , cor. . . and hence it is , that he is called the servant of god , in respect of that service which he was to performe as mediator , isa. . . . . . nothing is more cleare then that there are some offices to be performed by christ as a mediatour , which cannot be performed by christ as god , because they do import some subjection , as prayer unto god doth , though it is true that christ being the naturall son of god doth intercede after an authoritative manner . we may for the farther clearing of this point resolve that grand question , what the meaning of that request is , when we say lord iesus pray for me ; the great doubt is whether this request be presented to christ as god , or as man. the answer is , that if we look upon this petition as a duty performed by us , this duty of prayer is directed unto iesus christ as god ; for all divine worship is due to god alone , as hath been proved . but if we look not upon the duty of prayer , but the matter of this prayer : it is cleare that the busines which we recommend to christ is to be performed by him as man ; for it is proper to him as man to pray to the father ; yet because we desire him to intercede in an authoritative way to the father , we do likewise request him to intercede as it becomes the naturall and coessensiall son of god. and therefore if we look upon the whole businesse of intercession , we conclude that he doth intercede 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it becomes god-man ; because he is our mediatour according to both natures , divine and humane . but then we must remember to reserve what is proper and peculiar to each nature , for though we grant that there is a communication of all properties belonging to both natures unto the person of christ , yet we must not attribute any thing to the humane nature which is proper and peculiar to the divine ; and it hath been undeniably proved that divine worship is proper and peculiar to the divine nature . . the office of our mediatour hath a special respect to gods chosen people by gods most free decree ; but the relation and externall denomination arising from thence cannot be the prime , fundamentall and immediate ground , formal reason , or adequate cause of divine worship ; for if christ had not been god , he could not have been capable of that office , because nothing could satisfie the justice of god but the blood of god ; and what ever arises from the free decree of god , was not necessary in it selfe ; but sure i am , divine worship must be founded upon what is absolutely necessary and infinitely perfect ; and therefore not upon externall relations or denominations , but upon the godhead it selfe . . the actuall mediation of christ cannot be the prime and fundamentall ground of divine worship ; for christ was not only worshipable , but worshipped with divine honour before he did actually mediate as god-man . . the office of our mediatour is to bring us to himselfe , his father and holy spirit as to one god blessed for ever , in whom all our blessednesse doth consist ; and therefore our faith doth not rest simply and finally in christ as he is our mediatour god and man , but as he is one god with the father and the holy spirit . for by the ministry and mediation of christ as god-man , we are brought to beleeve in god , tht our faith and hope might be in god , pet. . . christ is god by nature , he is mediatour by institution , by a voluntary and gratious dispensation unto which he did condescend for our salvation . and upon this account learned iunius told the subtile samosatenian , that iesus christ as mediatour brings us to himselfe as god. and doctor voetius saith that christ as mediatour is an inferior cause , in whose name , and by whose mediaation we make towards god our chiefest good , in whom we beleeve , and whom we do worship and adore as the first cause and last end , john . . and christ is said to save them to the uttermost by his intercession who come unto god by him , heb. . . we worship christ and pray unto him , saith judicious pareus , as one god with the father and the spirit the only true god ; and this worship is absolute and divine ; for it is the absolute worship of the godhead . but then we call upon god in the name of christ , because he is our mediatour , and we desire for to be heard for the satisfaction and intercession of that person who is god-man . but the socinians conclude that if christ be not to be worshipped with divine honour as mediatour , then there is only a subordinate honor and worship due unto him . to which we answer , that christ may be considered four manner of wayes . . according to his godhead and divine person ; and it hath beene proved at large in this treatise , that there is divine honour due unto the godhead and divine person of jesus christ ; and this is his essentiall infinite glory , . christ may be considered as mediator according to both natures , as god-man ( by a gracious condescension and personall union ) and so we say there is a mediatory glory due unto him , which is more illustrious in regard of its manifestation since the alteration of his condition from a state of humiliation to a state of exaltation ; this glory doth out-shine all the glory of saints & angels in heaven , but it is different from that naturall and essentiall glory which is common to father , son , and holy ghost , as one god. for , that essentiall glory cannot be communicated to the humane nature , no not since its assumption , and christs exaltation . this mediatory honour is very glorious , because christ sits as a king at the right hand of the majesty on high , and every one must confesse that our royall mediatour is not onely man but god also ; yet we must acknowledge that since the exaltation of our king , the glory of his divine nature , his essential glory , is only more manifested wheras it was eclipsed before in the state of humiliation ; and the humane nature assumed is only more perfected and not transubstantiated into the divine . the humane nature is stil a creature , though it hath gained as much glory as it is capable of by the grace of personal union , and glory of exaltation ; and being a creature cannot be capable of divine and infinite perfection , which is the formall object of divine adoration ; even as the divine nature of our mediatour notwithstanding the personal union , is not capable of any humane imperfection ; for there is a preservation and distinction of the two natures , notwithstanding their intimate and inseparable union in one person . the natures are united , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the greek church of old . the actions performed by our royall mediatour , flow from a double principle in this single person , because this person doth consist of two natures , and each nature performes its proper worke ; the divine nature doth what is divine , and the humane nature what is humane ; and therefore though the person be but one , and the effect one , yet there are two different actions of two different natures united in one person for producing of one and the same glorious effect , and we are to give to each nature what is properly due unto it . finally the kingdom which is administred by our royall mediatour god-man , in a glorious way is but a dispensatory kingdom , not his natural kingdome , an inferiour and temporary kingdome , not his soveraigne essentiall eternall kingdome ; and therefore even in the very administration of it our mediatour god-man , is in respect of order , and that gratious dispensation unto which he condescended for our salvation , employed in a kind of subordinate way ; and when he hath accomplished that work for which he undertook this royall office , he will refigne this dispensatory kingdome , and become subject ( as man , and as head of that body which he hath purchased ) to his father , himself , and the holy spirit , as one god blessed for ever , that god may be all in all , cor. . . for as we are christs , so christ is gods , cor. . . in that safe sense and subordinate way which we have but even now declared , that the divinity of christ ( which humbled , and as it were emptyed itselfe in the administration of this subordinate , temporary and dispensatory kingdome , yet with the preservation of its naturall and eternall right ) may be more gloriously manifested by the full possession , use , and enjoyment of that naturall , divine , eternall kingdome , which doth belong to father , son and holy ghost . for all three co-essential and co-equal persons reign with the same power , majesty , and glory in the unity of the divine essence and common acts , in all , and over all , infinitely and immutably from everlasting , to everlasting ; although the naturall reign of jesus christ will not be so fully and gloriously manifested untill he hath resigned his dispensatory kingdome , and brought all his elect , notwithstanding all their wants , sins , infirmities , temptations , tryals , enemies , safe to heaven . this dispensatory kingdom is administred principally by the god-head , instrumentally by the man-hood , absolutely and perfectly by the person of christ acting in a divine way as god , and humane way as man , that the properties of each nature may be reserved as peculiar to each , even whilest he doth mediate , reigne and judge , according to both ; and therefore divine honour is still reserved as proper and peculiar to the divine nature of our mediator , who is god-man in one person . this definite and dispensatory kingdome is changeable , terminable ; it did begin with the first foundation , and will end with the perfection of the church of god. christ was a mediatour from all eternity in the a decree of god ▪ he was actually given to be a mediatour as soon as b necessity required , he was manifested in the flesh in the c fulnesse of time , and will d cease to be a king in this mediatory and dispensatory kingdom when he hath finished his work , and saved his church . now nothing is more cleare then this , that christ is now subject to his father in all respects , in which he shall be declared to be subject when he gives up his dispensatory kingdom ; and we are not to worship jesus christ with divine worship as he is subject to his father , but as he is equall to his father , as he is indeed one god with his father and the holy ghost . , christ may be considered as head of that body unto which he hath united himself , and which he hath purchased with his dearest bloud ; and so we know christ the head , and his body the church make up one christ mysticall . the glory of christ as an head is exceeding great , and is excellently described , ephes. . , , , . christ is set at gods own right hand in heavenly places far above all principality , power , and might , and dominion , and every name that is named not only in this world , but also in that which is to come . and hath put all things under his feet ▪ & gave him to bethe head over all things to the church , which is his body , the fulness of him that filleth all in all . now christ mysticall the head and body , whole christ mysticall is to be subjected to god , when the mediatory and dispensatory kingdom is resigned ; and therefore if you take christ ●s the apostle doth , cor. . . for the head and body , for christ mysticall , we say that head and members are to be subject to father , son , and holy ghost , as one god blessed for ever . . christ may be considered according to his humane nature ; and we are bold to say that there is an eminent and transcendent glory vouchsafed to the humane nature of christ by the grace of personall union , and the glory of its exaltation . the glory of christs divine nature was more manifested , but the humane nature of christ was fully perfected by his exaltation ; and therefore the humane nature was exalted in a peculiar sense . no nature not the nature , of the most glorious angell , was ever so highly preferred in these two respects . . in respect of personall union with the godhead , acts , . . in respect of royall mediation between god and man ; none but christ the son of mary was ever so highly honoured as to be taken into the society , and fellowship of the mediatory office with the son of god. for there is but one mediatour between god and men , the man christ jesus . tim. . . who is god as well as man. nec honorem a nobis deus nisi per deum accipit . but it is most evident that the humane nature remaines a creature still even after its assumption , and exaltation , and therefore we hold fast our first conclusion ; that the divine and infinite excellency of the coessentiall son of god is the prime and fundamentall ground , the formall reason and cause of that divine worship which is due to our mediatour jesus christ ; jesus christ our only saviour by doctrine , merit and efficacy , by confirmation and communication . true it is , that the majesty of god considered in it self is terrible , it is a light not to be approached unto , and therefore the word was made man , that we might have encouragement to come unto god , not only by the mediation of a man full of grace and truth , but by the mediation of him who is god blessed for ever : because a meere man , though free from corruption , and filled with grace could not by reason of such natural infirmities as are not sinfull , performe the office of a foundation , head , and spouse in upholding , quickning and preserving of his church , act. , . ephes. . . & thes. . . heb. . . . that jesus christ and the holy spirit are one and the same eternall god with the father , hath been proved at large in this treatise , and therefore divine honour and worship is due to christ & the holy spirit as well as to the father himself , because all three are co-essentiall , co-equall , and co-eternall . when the seven electours of the empire met at franckford about the election of maximilian the second , some of them being strict protestants went out of the place of worship when the mass began , because they would not be present at that idolatrous service , but came in again when they sang come holy ghost eternall god. we being then convinced by clear scriptures that christ and the holy spirit are one and the same god with the father , we must glorifie all three persons as one god blessed for ever . . we must not do any divine service to them who are not gods by nature . gal. . . but the three divine persons have the self-same divine nature , and therefore the very same divine worship and service both for kind and degree is due to all three co-essentiall persons . we must not conceive otherwise of god then he hath revealed himselfe in his word : for then we shall not worship the true god , but a meere phantasticall idoll of our own braine . ye worship ye know not what saith christ of the samaritans : ioh. . . the samaritans served their own gods , who were not gods by nature , but false gods. kings . . . . nor must we give father , son and holy spirit the only true god , any other kind of worship then what is prescribed in his word . israel is said to be without the true god when they were without the law , without a priest to teach them how to worship god according to his law. chron. . . now for a long season israel hath been without the true god , and without a teaching priest , and without law. the divine kind of worship prescribed both in law and gospell is spirituall worship , mark. , . heb. . . psal. . , . deut. . . cor. . . chron , . . phil. . . ioh. . , . . the worship of god is either natural or instituted worship . the instituted worship hath been changed , for it was different before the law , under the law , and under the gospell . but the naturall worship and service of god is perpetuall and eternall , it is to be continued in heaven , both by saints and angels for evermore . naturall worship is due to jesus christ and the holy spirit , because they have one and the self-same divine nature with god the father . angels are called upon to give this naturall worship to jesus christ. and let all the angels of god worship him . heb. . . instituted worship is subservient , as i may so speak to this naturall worship ▪ for when we worship god with those meane helps and actions which he himself hath appointed and ordained , we must worship him in spirit and truth . all ordinances of christ are meanes of grace to beget knowledge , faith , hope , love , self-denyal , gratitude , humility , sincerity , reverence , zeale , and all other graces in the soule , and to encrease them in us , that we may exercise all these graces upon every opportunity , and give god that natural , spiritual , divine honour , which is due unto his singular majesty , infinite excellency , independent perfection , and eternall godhead , in knowing , esteeming , admiring , beleeving , loving , obeying god that our soules may be delighted and satisfyed with god as the chiefest good , as the crown of all our joyes , an all-sufficient portion of our soules for evermore . this is the full scope of the first table of the law , and this is the summe of the gospel . if the first table of the law did discover to us . the object of worship , . the means of worship , . the time of worship ; and did not also prescribe , require , enjoyn . the manner of worship , we should be at a losse ; the law would not be a perfect rule . our worship would not be agreeable to the nature and will of god ; god would be defrauded of his naturall spirituall divine worship ; and therefore when our saviour doth deliver the full scope of all the foure first commandements by reducing them to one commandment , he saith , thou shalt love the lord thy god with all thy heart , with all thy soule , and with all thy mind , this is the first and great commandment , mat , . , . deut. . , . this spirituall worship is taught us in every commandement of the first table , if we look upon the inside and spirituall compasse of those commandements discovered to us by moses , the psalmes , prophets , and the new-testament . . in the first commandement we are not barely required for to take god for the object of our worship ; but to give him spiritual worship also ; because we are required in mind , heart , will , affection and the effects of all these to take the true god , father , son , and holy ▪ ghost , god in christ by the assistance of the spirit to be our god , to know , esteem , admire , trust , love , reverence , adore , and serve him with hope , humility , self-deniall , patience , joy and thankefulness , zeal● and constancy . this is the inside and spirituall compass of the first commandement . . in the second commandement we are required to worship god purely according to his will in every ordinance without any carnall imagination , or affections . the papists will grant that we are by the use of ordinances ( and as they dreame images also ) to carry our hearts to god and christ in obedience to the second commandement . the more learned papists will confess that it is a sin against the first commandement to terminate our worship in any image , because no image is iehovah . but they worship images relativè ( though not terminativè ) as visible helps to devotion to carry their hearts to god in worship ; and it is cleare that the jews and heathens of old intended no more , and therefore there is as much to be said for heathenish and iewish as there is for romish idolatry . this then is the great sin of the antichristian worshippers at rome ( who endeavour to defend this relative worship of images ) that they conceive , that the heart of man will be better carried to god and christ by humane inventions ( such as images , crucifixes , reliques , &c. ) then by divine institutions ; and this sin is called an hatred of god in the second commandement . and in the very letter of this commandement we are directed how to expresse our love to god , namely , by seeking of him , and closing with him in his own ordinances , and institutions with an ingenuous contempt of humane inventions in divine worship , and service ; and though legall ordinances are not only changeable , but actually changed and abolished ; yet there is something morall and unchangeable in this second commandement , which is attendance upon , and observance of the institutions and appointments of god. it is an immutable law that we should give god that worship which is due unto him , expresse our saith in him , and love to him by a spirituall use of such means and ordinances as he himself should from time to time appoint . the due acknowledgement of gods immensity , and infinite majesty in our attendance on the instituted means of worship is clearly opposed to the image-worship in the th . chapt of isaiah , and first chapter to the romans ; and therefore the inside and compass of this second commandement is spirituall , though the words of it are so comprehensive as to take in ceremoniall as well as evangelicall worship . for reverend divines have made it cleare , that though the second commandement be morall in regard of its substance and generall nature which containes the immutable law above mentioned , yet in regard of its particular application to those significant ceremonies , sacrifices and sacraments which god did appoint , we say , all ceremoniall institutions are referred unto , and comprehended under the second morall commandement of god. see mr. shepheard in his excellent treatise of the morality of the sabbath . pag. . , . . the third commandement prescribes a reverend use of all the titles , properties , works , and ordinances of god with spirituall understanding and affection , with faith , reverence , love , joy , sincerity and thankfulnesse in thought , word , and life . . in the fourth commandement we are not only required to rest , but to sanctifie a rest to jehovah . if then we find the titles , properties , works of jehovah given to christ and his holy spirit in the old and new testament , we must conclude that christ and his holy spirit are to be worshipped in the same ordinances with the same spirituall and divine worship , which is due to god the father . the scope of law and gospell is to bring us unto god by the mediation of christ and assistance of the spirit , that we may rest upon christ for justification , walk and grow up in christ in the progress of our sanctification for our everlasting satisfaction . our business therefore is to avoid those two dangerous rocks upon which so many split and suffer shipwrack in this tempestuous age , namely the rock of neglecting duties in the course of our sanctification , and the rock of resting in duties which overthrows our justification . we must labour by all means appointed by god to gaine a spirituall , practicall , experimentall knowledge of the love of iesus christ , a knowledge which surpasses all intellectuall knowledge , an affectionate knowledge which is felt in the heart , but cannot be comprehended in the braine . this is the right evangelicall knowledge , which prepares a man for spirituall and evangelicall worship , for heavenly communion with father , son , and holy ghost in all gospell dispensations , and gospell-conversation , that he may come to be enriched with the unsearchable riches of christ , and filled with all the fulness of god. for this cause ( saith the apostle , and well he might ) i bow my knees unto the father of our lord iesus christ ; mark the strain , it is purely evangelicall : that he would grant you according to the riches of his glory to be strengthened with might by his [ spirit ] that [ christ ] may dwell in your hearts : here are all the three co-essentiall persons ; but how may this be obtained ? and to know the love of christ which passeth knowledge : to know it in my heart , to beleeve it with my heart , to feele it in my heart , because the love of god is shed abroad in my heart by the holy spirit . but what shall i gaine by this ? why the apostle goes on ; that ye may be filled with all the fulness of god. ephes. . , , , . the great design of the apostle was to be found in christ , having the righteousness which is of god through the faith of christ ( without pleading his own righteousnesse , which is of the law ) for his justification ; and to have a spirituall and practicall knowledge of christ grounded upon a deep and affectionate experience of the vertue of christs death , and resurrection in his own soule , phil. . , . that he might be thereby encouraged and provoked to press forward in the course of sanctification , toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of god in christ iesus , v. . that his faith might act in all holy services . iustifying faith is the principle of evangelicall worship , and gospell-conversation . grace be to you , and peace from him which is , which was , and which is to come , and from the seven * spirits which are before his throne , and from iesus christ , who loved us and washed us from our sins in his own bloud : and hath made us kings and priests unto god , and his father ; to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever . amen . rev. . , , . the hearts of true beleevers are golden vials full of odours and incense , faith and love , sincerity and zeale , selfe-denyall and thankfulnesse , humility and godly reverence : and the beliefe of their redemption by the blood of christ moves them to acknowledge the divine power of their redeemer , and to give him divine worship . the angles , elders , people all joyne , even ten thousand times ten thousand , and thousands of thousands in this acknowledgement ; worthy is the lamb that was slaine to receive ●●wer , and riches , and wisdome , and strength , and honour , and glory , and blessing . and every creature which is in heaven , and on the earth , and under the earth , and such as are in the sea , and all that are in them heard i saying , blessing , glory , honour , and power be unto him that sits upon the throne , and unto the lamb for ever and ever . and the foure beasts said amen , and the foure and twenty elders fell down and worshipped him that li●eth for ever and ever , rev. . , , , , , , . we must be brought to the knowledge and faith of the son of god before ever we can be wise unto salvation . tim. . . isa. . . ioh. . , . gal. . . when once we come to beleeve the love of christ , then we love , adore , obey father , son , and holy spirit after an evangelical manner . all the fundamentall articles of our faith have reference unto christ as the foundation , because they are all such as concern his father , his spirit , his incarnation , mediation , or his church , and the benefits which the church receives from him . and in like manner all our worship is directed unto father , son , and spirit as one god by the mediation of christ , and assistance of th● spirit . eph. . . cor. . . pet. . ▪ ioh. . , . ephes. . . it is our * happiness our heaven upon earth to beleeve , adore , an● live to father , son , and holy spirit by maintaining an holy communion with all three a● one god , and our god , in the use of all ordinances and duties required of us . this is the mystery of godliness , the art of living unto god ; this is the lesson which all members of the church universall must learne ; the foure beasts ( who joyne with angels and presbyters in adoring the lamb ) are ( as learned mr. mede , and divers others conceive ) the catholike church of christ in the foure quarters of the world professing and embracing the doctrine of the foure evangelists ; these beasts are full of eyes , full of the knowledge of the mysteries of christ , and their spirituall experimentall knowledge moves them to worship iesus christ. mr mede makes this interpretation the key to open very many types in the book of the revelation , and doubts not but every one who doth seriously perpend the old castrametation in the wilderness , and compare it with the apocalypticall types , will subscribe to this interpretation . i know divers learned men do conceive that the foure beasts are foure angels , and some presume to name * the angels ; but i cannnot embrace their opinion , because i find that the chorus is made up of angels , beasts and elders ; and these three sorts are cleerly distinguished , rev. . ● . and i beheld and i heard the voyce of many angels round about the throne , and the beasts , and the elders that the angels do joyn with the beasts in worship is granted ; that the angels do protect these beasts with eyes in all quarters of the world , east , west , north and south , is likewise granted . but that the beasts are angels , that is it which is , and must be denyed , and therefore i do conceive that mr. mede is in the right , and the good man was sorry that he had not time to cleere that point at large ; and therefore i am the more willing to proceed upon this argument , and perform that service to the church , which he would have done with more dexterity . let us then consider , . that upon christs mediation his father gave him the heathen for his inheritance , and the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession ; aske of me and i will give thee the heathen , &c. psal. . . . let us consider that promise made to the church the mystical body of christ , is. . fear not , for i have redeemed thee , i have called thee by thy name , thou art mine ; — i am iehovah thy god , the holy one of israel thy saviour ; — since thou wast precious in my sight thou hast been honourable , and i have loved thee , — fear not , for i am with thee ; i will bring thy seed from the east , and gather thee from the west . i will say to the north give up , and to the south keep not back , bring my sons from farre , and my daughters from the ends of the earth , even every one that is called by my name . this is the substance of the seven first verses of isa. . behold the church universall gathered from all parts of the world , into one mysticall body , that all may be united unto christ the head by faith , and to one another by love , that so they may all joyne in beleeving , adoring and obeying the lord jesus , his father , and the holy spirit . . consider how these precious promises are fulfilled by gospel-dispensations and christian exercises . for by one spirit are we all baptized into one body , whether we be iews or gentiles , bond or free , and have been all made to drink into one spirit , cor. . . christ did grace the solemnity of his triumphant ascension , with that choice gift of the ministry , for the edifying and perfecting of saints , till we [ all ] even all the members of the church universall , come in the unity of the faith , and of the knowledge of the sonne of god , unto a perfect man , unto the measure of the stature of the fulnesse of christ , eph. . , , . christ mysticall is deficient untill the saints are gathered from all quarters into the unity of faith , and knowledge of the son of god , because this is a fundamentall point ; for christ built his church upon that fundamental confession , thou art christ the son of the living god , mat. . , . and other foundation can none lay , cor. . . and the superstruction must be agreeable to the foundation , that we may attain unto the measure of the stature of the fulnesse of christ , every part making some considerable supply for the increase of the body , by growing up in all things into christ the head , eph. . , , . christ is the only head and mediatour , and therefore iewes and gentiles both have accesse through christ by one spirit to the father , eph ▪ . . here 's an acknowledgement of the blessed trinunity made by the catholike church in gospel-worship . and the apostle directs his epistle to the church of god at corinth , with all that in every place call upon the name of christ our lord both theirs and ours , cor. . . and concludes his second epistle with the grace , &c. cor. . . . compare what hath been spoken with the song of angels , presbyters and saints full of eyes in the book of the revelation . these foure beasts were in the midst of the throne and round about the throne , revel . . . the forme of the throne is quadrangular , and one beast placed in the middle of every one of the foure sides . mr. mede shewes how these foure beasts observe what is done by god in the foure quarters of the world ; and how they speake in order upon the opening of the foure first seales , rev. . and the first verses ; and a voyce proceeds from the midst of the foure beasts , revel . . finally , the virgin-church , revel . . sings the same song that the foure beasts did , which is called a new song , sung in the praise of the lambe and his father ; and in some copies which are of credit , we read that the virgins had the * lambes name , as well as his fathers , written in their foreheads , revel , . . and they are the first fruits to god and to the lambe , revel . . . . this new song which is sung to the lambe and his father , containes in it the mystery of gospel-worship , because in it redemption , power , riches , wisdome , strength , honour , glory and blessing are ascribed unto him who sits upon the throne , and to the lambe , revel . . , , . worthy is the lamb that was slaine to receive power , &c. rev. . . they fall downe before the lamb , rev. . . and in the . ver . sing a new song , thou art worthy , &c. for thou wast slain , and hast redeemed us to god by thy bloud . . this pattern of gospel-worship comes from heaven ; the angels sing this song , and the saints , the followers of the lambe , they glorifie the lambe and his father on earth as the angels doe in heaven ; according to that request in the lambes prayer , the lords prayer , our father which art in heaven , let thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven . we receive this directory for gospel-worship from christ and his angels . . all the virgin-church , all that follow the lambe whither soever he goes , into all or any quarter of the world ; they , and they onely learn this song . . these redeemed virgins refuse to receive the beasts mark , they renounce the dragon and his angels , all his pomps , vanities , worship , and all the furniture of his worship , all the errours and idols of the false prophets , though they lose their trading , the comforts of their life , yea and life it selfe : this is the lambs mark . . these redeemed virgins make a publike profession of their faith in , and love to the lamb and his father ; they have the marke of both in their forehead , and they cry aloud , their voice is like the voice of thunder . rev. , , . rev. . . they are not ashamed or afraid to acknowledge father , son , and the holy spirit the only and adequate object of divine faith , and worship , and the sole cause of justification , sanctification , redemption , peace and glory ; for all this is held forth to us clearly in this book of the revelation ; and there is a speciall blessing promised to such as read and heare the words of this prophesie , and keep those things which are written therein . ●rev . . . and amongst other blessings they have the blessing of victory , and triumph vouchsafed them , they get victory over the beast , over his image , his marke , and the number of his name . rev. . . they defie the romane errours and idols , and are armed with faith and patience against this cruelty and tyranny of antichrist : they cannot be enticed by any rewards , seduced by any subtilties , terrified by any threats to embrace any doctrine , or forme of worship derogotary to the honour of the father , the lamb , or the holy spirit ; for the spirit doth in this book teach the churches to come in to christ , and defie the beast ; and the churches hearken to the spirit as the fountain of truth , grace , peace , and glory ; this is the mystery of gospel-worship , we must beleeve , love , adore , obey the father , the lamb , and the spirit of grace and peace , the doctour and comforter of all christian churches throughout all the foure quarters of the world , east , west , north , south , that so the promise isaiah . may be exactly fulfilled . rev. . , . a great multitude , an innumerable multitude of all nations cry . salvation to our god which sitteth upon the throne , and unto the lamb. the kingdoms of the world must become the kingdoms of the lord , and of his christ. rev , . . and when the divell and his angels who deceive the world , accuse the brethren , and blaspheme christ , are cast forth , then there is a loud voice in heaven : now is come salvation , and strength , and the kingdom of our god , and the power of his christ ; for the accuser of our brethren is cast down , &c. rev. . , . in a word , when the redeemed virgins and noble conquerours come to sing their triumphant song , that song doth contain the scope of the law , and the substance of the gospell ; for they are to sing the song of moses , and the song of the lamb. rev. . . and they who sing are such as do keep the commandements of god , and the testimony of iesus , rev. . . and the testimony of jesus is the testimony of the spirit , delivered in the word to the churches of christ , rev. . , . all three persons do deliver the same testimony , ioh. . . but the son and the spirit do most eminently joyne in delivering their testimony , rev. . , , . rev. . , , , , , , . rev. . . the spirit doth encourage them to beleeve his testimony , and follow the lambe : and the martyrs are slaine for the word of god , and for the testimony which they held , rev. . . and they overcome by the bloud of the lamb , and by the word of their testimony , rev. . . the testimony of the spirit , and the testimony of iesus , rev. . . and when the spirit hath encouraged them to love christ better then their lives , rev. . . and they have overcome by the testimony of the spirit and the bloud of the lamb , then the spirit doth pronounce them blessed . blessed are the dead which die in the lord — yea saith the spirit . rev. . . the church is begotten , instructed , perswaded , governed , upheld , comforted by the holy spirit , as babylon is the habitation of devils , and the hold of every foule spirit , rev . . it is the spirit which wooes the church , and perswades her to be the wife of the lambe , and to make her selfe ready for the marriage . and the spirit and the bride say come , rev . . and that we may look upon this whole prophesie as comming from the spirit as well as the lamb , the angel assures us that the testimony of iesus is the spirit of prophesie . rev , . . the love of the father , and the grace of the lord jesus is communicated to us by the holy spirit ; and therefore although the grace of the lord iesus is alone expressed in the close of this booke of the revelation , yet the love of the father , and communion of the holy spirit must needs be understood according to the prayer in the beginning of the book . rev. . , . grace , &c. . the spirit is worshipped in this book of the revelation , grace be to you and peace from the seven spirits , rev. . . it is not agreeable to the christian faith to pray unto angels , and beg grace and peace of them ; they do not hold the head , who worship angels . col. . , . angels are our fellow servants , and do forbid us to give that worship to them which is due to god only ; and they refuse to be worshipped because it is contrary to the testimony of jesus , rev. . . and i fell at his feet to worship him , and he said unto me , see thou do it not ; i am thy fellow servant , and of thy brethren that have the testimony of iesus ; worship god. this is the testimony of jesus , thou shalt worship the lord thy god , and him only shalt thou serve , mat. . . the book of the revelation doth containe divers cleare testimonies against worshipping of angels , i am of them ( saith the angel ) that keep the saying of this book ; worship god. rev. . . and therefore that place rev. . . must needs be understood of the holy spirit . for god will not give his glory to another , and good angels will not take it from him , but protest against this will ▪ worship , as idolatry . the holy ghost is called seven spirits by an usuall metalepsis of the effect for the cause : he doth pour forth various gifts : seven is a note of perfection , and the holy spirit , one and the same spirit is given to all the seven churches , every church hath so much of the holy ghost as is necessary ; and it runs as if every one of the seven churches had seven spirits , because every one hath enough of the spirit for their sanctification and salvation . the apostle therefore begging grace and peace from this co-essentiall trinunity , the father , the seven spirits , and iesus christ , doth sufficiently instruct us in this mystery of evangelicall worship . some object , that then the spirit will be set before the son ; but the answer is easie , that there is a metathesis in the words ; and it is observable that the son is sometimes named before the father . cor. . . and sometimes the spirit is named before the son , as rev. . . pet. , . and sometimes the naturall order is observed , the father is named first , the son second , and the holy ghost third ; the naturall order is not overthrown when the father is named after the son , or the spirit before the son : nor is the equality of persons overthrown when the naturall order is observed ; and therefore that objection is not considerable . naturall worship is due to the holy ghost because he hath the same divine nature with the father and the son. that divine faith is due to the spirit hath been proved at large . that divine love is due to him is cleare , rom. . . i beseech you for the lord jesus christs sake , and for the love of the spirit . the spirit is the author * and object of all those graces which are called divine ex parte objecti ; faith , hope and love , rom. . , , . in a word , instituted worship is due to the holy ghost by vertue of both sacraments . mat. . . by one spirit we are all baptized into one body : and have been all made to drink into one spirit . cor. . . cor. . . mat. . . ioh. . . in hearing of the word we must hearken to the spirit with the self-same attention , devotion as we do to the father and the son , heb. . , . compared with ps. . the holy ghost forbids us to harden our hearts against himself speaking in the word , acts . . we grieve the spirit when we resist the spirit , and will not put our seale to the word by a spirituall assent , and fiduciall consent , and hinder the spirit from sealing up our election and redemption to us . for though christ makes the purchase , yet the spirit makes the assurance , iohn . . . iohn . , . iohn . . in prayer we are to call upon the holy ghost , cor. . . rev. . . because the holy ghost is god , cor. , . act. . , . i cannot but wonder at them , who say , that holy and spirituall worship is not due to the holy spirit , when the truth is , we can give no worship at all to the father or the son untill we are enabled by the holy spirit . rom. . . cor. . . cor. . . cor. . . and when * by the communion of the spirit we have communion with the father and son in gospell-worship ; we are the temples not only of the holy ghost , but of the co-essentiall trinunity of father , son , and holy ghost , all three do dwell in us , walk in us , and abide in us . for when we receive the spirit of truth , he abides with us , dwels in us , perswades and enables us to love god the father , and the lord jesus , and then all three co-essentiall persons make their abode with us , as is clearely held forth to us . ioh. . , , . cor. . , . cor. . . ephes. . , . but if a man have not the spirit of christ he hath no saving interest as yet in iesus christ. rom. . . because he is not as yet the son of god by regeneration or adoption , he is not a member of jesus christ , he is not the temple of the holy ghost : he doth not worship this co-essentiall trinunity as he ought to do in spirit and in truth . he who hath the spirit in him , doth worship the spirit in spirit and truth , because the spirit is the power of the highest , ( even as christ is the son of the highest ) a personall power , luk. . , . compared . the spirit is the spirit of elohim , gen. . . the spirit of iehova , isa. . . the god of israel , sam. . , . the spirit of god , and the spirit which is god , cor. . . . acts . , . this point hath been sufficiently proved in the fourth chapter , and therefore i need say no more , considering that the socinians have no arguments which are considerable , when compared with these plaine places of the holy scriptures , and those many places and proofes which have been formerly produced in this treatise . if any desire to have their arguments ( such as they be ) answered at large , he may read mr. estwicks learned treatise concerning the godhead of the holy ghost , lately published . i proceed to the third part of godliness , which is obedience . . obedience is due to the father , son , and holy ghost , all three co-essentiall persons , because they are co-essentiall , because they are one god blessed for ever . . obedience is due to god the father . this truth is generally acknowledged by all that are not atheists ; the iews and socinians subscribe to it . if we do acknowledge god the father to be the father of our lord jesus christ , and our father in him , the inference will be immediate , cleare and strong , that we ought to honour and obey our heavenly father . for how shall god put us among his children , unless every one of us say unto him , my father , my father , i do obey thee , and will not depart from thee ? but i said , how shall i put thee among the children , and give thee a pleasant land , a goodly heritage of the hosts of nations ? and i said , thou shalt call me my father , and shalt not turne away from me . jer. . . and when god speaks to them as to children , they presently submit : return ye backsliding children , and i will heale your backslidings ; they presently reply , behold , we come unto thee , for thou art the lord our god , ier. . . a son honoureth his father — if then i be a father where is mine honour ? mal. . . mal. . . mat. . . mat. . . when god is considered under this endearing relation of a father , we yeeld ▪ a filiall obedience unto god , we performe a foederall obedience , a sincere and evangelicall obedience . i ( saith jehovah ) will be your god , i will be your father ; having these promises ( saith the apostle ) let us cleanse our selves from all filthinesse of the flesh , and spirit , perfecting holiness in the feare of god , cor. . , . cor. . pet. , , . as we are to worship god in this fatherly relation , mat. . . gal. . ● . so are we to obey him also ; whosoever shall do the will of my father , &c. mat. . . that all three co-essentiall persons are our father , hath been proved already in this very chapter , pag. , . and that god the father is our father in a peculiar consideration , pag. . and therefore i need not insist longer upon this point , since the scriptures are cleare , so cleare that even very cavillers confess this truth . christ himself as man obeyed the father , iohn . . . god the son is to be obeyed . this is my beloved son in whom i am well pleased , heare ye him . mat. . . heare him , beleeve him , obey him ; the godhead of christ is the formall reason of our obedience ; but all his benefits are sweet encouragements to us to performe our duty . be obedient as children , saith the apostle , and if ye call on the father , &c. passe the time of your sojourning here in feare ; for as much as ye know ye were not redeemed — but with the precious bloud of christ. pet. . , , , . why do the presbyters throw down their crowns at the feet of christ , and fall down before the lamb , but to testifie their subjection , and profess how ready they are to serve and obey jesus christ ? rev. . , . rev. . . christ is the author of salvation to them that obey him , heb. . . the life of a christian is a living unto christ , a life of faith , love , and obedience , gal. . . cor. . , . phil. . , . we are made new creatures in christ , that we may performe new obedience to christ , cor. . . he who serveth christ is acceptable to god , and approved of men . rom. . . we are under the law to christ. . cor. . . all manner of obedience , inward and outward is due unto the lord jesus christ. cursed is he that doth not prize and love christ above all the kingdoms of the world and glory of them , above all the comforts of life , and life it self , cor. . . luk. . , . mat. . , . phil. . , , . col. . , . eph. . . . eph. . , . and tit. . . compared together . . god the holy ghost is to be obeyed ; we are devoted to his service in baptisme ; our bodies and soules are temples consecrated to his honour and service ; the spirit doth conquer our carnall reason , mortifie our corruptions , and subdue our hearts unto the obedience of himself , as well as to the obedience of the father and the lord jesus . we are debtors to the spirit : we are his creatures ; the spirit of elohim did forme and fashion the rude mass , out of which all things were made , gen. . . the renovation of all things by continued propagation is ascribed to the spirit ; thou sendest forth thy spirit , they are created , and thou renewest the face of the earth . psal. . . our soules are breathed into us by this spirit of life . gen. . . iob . . the spirit of god hath made me , and the breath of the almighty hath given me life . the soule is enabled and adorned with all abilities by the spirit , that it may be qualified for all manner of service . in respect of counsell and government , numb . . . in respect of resolution and action . iudg. . . but that which is most endearing , is , that the spirit is the spirit of conviction , regeneration , conversion , sanctification , edification , and consolation . . pet. . . thes. . . gal. . . cor. . , . the spirit is the god of all comfort , it is his speciall office to comfort mourners . the spirit fitted the man christ to be our mediatour ; as is most evident , because . the spirit formed the nature of man of the substance of the virgin after an extraordinary manner , luk. . . compared with gal. . . for the service of the lord christ. . he sanctified the humane nature which christ assumed after such a perfect manner , that it was free from all sin in the very moment of conception , luke . . . he united this pure humane nature with the divine in the same person , the person of the son of god , luk. . . compared with heb. . . a body hast thou fitted unto me by the holy ghost . our saviour was annointed with the spirit above measure , that he might be a fit head and mediatour for us , that we and his whole church might receive of his fulnesse , graces answerable to his graces , ioh. . . ioh. . . ioh. . . isa. . . psal. . . compared together . act. . . luk. . , . mat. . , . ioh. . . if we consider how the spirit hath manifested his divine power in garnishing heaven and earth , iob. . . in annointing christ and christians . ioh. . . in ordering and regulating church-affaires , and enabling ministers for all church-service , that the elect might be gathered , converted , perefected , saved by the efficacy of the spirit in all ministeriall dispensations , we shall see reason enough to acknowledge the divine power of the spirit , by all spirituall and heavenly obedience . cor. . , , , , , , . isa ▪ . . . act , , . compared . if we harden our hearts against the precepts and exhortations of the spirit speaking in the word , if we vexe , grieve , resist and quench the spirit , we are in a ready way to that black and unpardonable sin of doing despight to the spirit of grace ; and therefore unlesse we meane to proceed to totall and finall disobedience , it highly concerns us to obey the holy spirit , and answer the many cals and motions of the spirit by sincere obedience , that our effectuall vocation may evidence our election , and the spirit may seale us up unto the day of redemption ; for the same spirit is the spirit of sanctification and adoption , the spirit of revelation , mortification , vivification , consolation . the spirit quickens , moves , enables , enclines , perswades us to beleeve in christ , and to love one another , to keep all the commandements of god ; now this spirit of faith , love , and obedience is the spirit of sanctification ; and if you find the spirit of sanctification in you , be of good comfort ; though the spirit of adoption seeme to withdraw , yet he is certainly present , nay , is not idle or silent , he speaks by his reall works , and sweet fruits ; for the spirit of sanctification is the spirit of adoption , it is one and the self-same spirit . this is his commandement , that we should beleeve on the name of his son jesus christ , and love one another as he gave us commandement . and he that keepeth his commandements dwelleth in him , and he in him , and hereby we know that he abideth in us , by the spirit which he hath given us , ioh. . , . and hereby we know that we dwell in him , and he in us , because he hath given us of his spirit . ioh. . . and therefore if there be a spirit of faith , love , and obedience in you , rejoyce in it , lift up your heart to god in thankfulness for it ; god be thanked that ye ( who were the servants of sin ) have obeyed from the heart that for me of doctrine which was delivered unto you by the holy spirit . rom. . . be much in supplication and thanksgiving , and the spirit of supplication will be a spirit of adoption , an oile of gladnesse ; heb. . . the spirit will teach you to cry abba , father , with comfort , gal . rom . the spirit will fill your soules with all joy , and peace in beleeving , and in obeying ; the joy of the spirit shall be your strength , the comforts of the almighty , even all the comforts of the kingdom of god ( which consists in righteousnesse , and peace , and joy in the holy ghost ) shall be all-sufficient to revive and support your dejected spirit . all your fears and discomforts shall be dispelled , your wants supplyed your wound , soares , infirmities healed , and you at last filled with all the fulnesse of god. mal. . . eph. . . beleeve in the spirit , obey the spirit , and ye shall be sealed with the spirit , eph. , . i beseech you by the tender mercies of god , by the meekness and gentleness of christ , by the joy , and for the love of the spirit , that you consider what hath been said , that ye receive this wholesome word as it is in truth the word of god , the word of the father , son , and holy ghost , but testified after a more especiall and immediate manner by the holy ghost that it may worke effectually in all you who beleeve it , thes. . . even unto spirituall and sincere obedience to father , son , and holy ghost ; and that it may be so , we must have a care to obey after the right manner ; for amazia was too blame , though he did that which was right in it self , because he did it not with a perfect heart . chron. . . let us imitate our saviour , who did all as he was commanded , ioh. . . let us have . high thoughts of the majesty and greatnesse of god. . sweet thoughts of the rich grace and infinite goodnesse of god. . an intire and an universall respect to all the commands , and every work of god , ioh. . , . every work which god hath given us to do , ioh. . . and ordained for us to walk in , eph. . for every command of god must have a divine authority over our consciences and hearts . psal. . . and then christ will account us his friends , iohn , . . a more especiall respect to the weightiest and greatest duties of religion , such as god hath more especially enjoyned : for instance , , the duties of inward worship and obedience , mat , . , . the most reserved and intimate duties of religion . . duties of judgment , mercy , and fidelity towards all men , mat. . . love to our enemies , mat. . . . . duties of our particular callings and speciall relations , publique duties , and family duties , especially such as are most private , mat. . . zach , . . . the great work of faith which is the summe of both testaments , because all judicious and zealous love , all sincere and uniforme obedience springs from faith , iohn . . this is the worke of god ; and unbeliefe is the work of the devill ; faith purifies our heart by applying the bloud of christ to our soules . heb. . . the weighty matters of law and gospel may be referred to those foure heads above mentioned ; observe that excellent scripture : god hath chosen the poore of this world [ rich in faith ] and heires of that kingdome which he hath promised to them that [ love him ] iam. . . faith and love will make us constant in the performance of all the other weighty matters required of us both in law and gospell , and we have proved at large that faith and love is due to all three persons . we must performe all our duties . as to a father , a divine father , as hath been proved . . in the name of christ. . in the strength of the spirit . . at the command , and for the glory of all three co-essentiall persons : for all things are of the father , by the son , and through the spirit . . with a willing mind , a perfect heart , a good conscience , and faith unfeigned . . with all self-denyall , diligence , constancy . . with an humble desire that we and our obedience may be accepted in and for christ according to the tenour of the covenant of grace . let us now put all together again , and observe what a sweet harmony , exact symmetry , and glorious uniformity there is in this whole mystery of faith , this mystery of the co-essentiall trinunity as reduced to practice by its effectuall influence into the mystery and power of godlinesse . beloved christians , i look upon my self as the least of saints , and greatest of sinners , unworthy to be accounted a member , but far more unworthy to be a minister of jesus christ , because i know more evill by my self then i know by any member of christ ; but i thank god our father , christ iesus our lord , and the co-essentiall spirit the same god , who worketh all in all , cor. . . that i have obtained mercy , and ability of all three for to be faithfull , and to be counted faithfull by them all ; for they have all three in some measure enabled me , for that they counted me faithfull , putting me into the ministry ; for i am a minister of that gospell , which is revealed from heaven by father , son and holy spirit , and i am a minister accordidg to the gift of the grace of god given unto me by the effectuall working of his power ; unto me i say , who am lesse then the least of all saints in this grace given , that i should preach the love of the father , the grace and unsearchable riches of christ , the sweet communion , peace and joy of the holy ghost , which is unspeakable and full of glory . be pleased then to take a view of the whole mystery of faith and godlinesse , and observe how this co-essentiall trinunity of father , son , and holy ghost , who are one god blessed for ever , is the adequate object , author , end of all religion . . look upon the grand mystery of our election unto grace , peace , and glory , and observe what practicall inferences may be drawn from thence to raise our hearts to admire , beleeve , love , worship , obey father , son , and holy ghost . elect according to the fore-knowledge of god the father through sanctification of the spirit , unto obedience and sprinkling of the bloud of iesus christ : grace unto you and peace be multiplied . blessed be the god and father of our lord iesus christ , &c. pet. , , , . god hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the spirit , and beliefe of the truth , whereunto he called you by our gospel to the obtaining of the glory of the lord iesus christ — now our lord iesus christ himself and god even our father , &c. thes. . , , here is the freewill of the elect ; but blessed be the god and father of our lord iesus christ , who hath blessed us with all spirituall blessings in heavenly places in christ according as he hath , chosen us in him before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and unblameable before him in love , &c. ephes. . , , . our thankfulnesse should be shewen for this free grace ▪ to all three persons in our thanksgiving , believing , obeving , as is cleare from these places and so our prayers should be answerable to our faith , love , and thankfulness ▪ and therefore it is observable that in the very same chapter the apostle makes his addresse after this modell , that the god of our lord iesus christ the father of glory may give unto you the spirit of wisdome , and revelation in the acknowledgement of christ , ephes. . . and so thes. , . rev. . , . cor. . . many other places may be urged which containe the mystery of faith , worship , and obedience , and if christ and his spirit be not alwaies named in them , yet the benefits of christ , the gifts , graces , fruits , comforts of the spirit ( which are named ) do direct us to both . moreover , when the name of god is used * indefinitely , all three persons must be understood to be comprehended in that essentiall title , because they are one and the same god. finally one person doth subsist in another , and the same honour is due to all three , because all three have the same divine nature , which is single because infinite , and therefore there is enough discovered to prevent all scruples in the upright-hearted , and cavils in the contrary-minded . read the third and fourth chapters of the epistle to the colossians , and there you will see a very pregnant proofe of this point . put on therefore as the elect of god holy and beloved bowels of mercies , kindnesse , humbleness of mind — above all these things put on charity ; let the peace of god rule in your hearts — do all in the name of the lord iesus , giving thanks to god and the father by him ; what ever you do , do it heartily as to the lord. and then the summe of all their requests is , that they may stand perfect and compleat in all the will of god. this takes in the full scope of law and gospell ; whatever belongs to faith , worship , or obedience ; whatever is just , and equall , or well-pleasing unto god. col. . . col. . . and the epistle to the ephesians runs parallel with this to the colossians . ye are elected and therefore ye must be holy before all three coessentiall persons by whom ye were elected ; ye must beleeve the word of truth as the truth is in iesus , that ye may be sealed with the spirit , and filled with all the fulnesse of god ; ye must bow your knees to the father of our lord jesus christ ; you must study the unity of faith , and of the knowledge of the son of god ; ye must keep the unity of the spirit , ye must grow up into christ in all things , ye must not grieve the holy spirit whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption , but maintaine a fruitfull fellowship with god in christ by the communion of the holy ghost ; for the fruit of the spirit is in all goodness and righteousnesse and truth ; ye must be filled with the spirit , giving thanks alwaies for all things unto god and the father in the name of our lord iesus christ ; ye must do whatsoever is right or equall , ephes. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this is right , just , and equall . put on the whole armor of god , take the sword of the spirit , the shield of faith , pray alwaies with all prayer and supplication in the spirit . peace be to the brethren , and love with faith from god the father and the lord jesus christ. grace be with all them that love our lord jesus christ in sincerity . i need make no inferences , the words are so plaine , that they prove the point in terminis terminantibus , as we use to say . consider the discourse of the apostle in the epistle to the romans , where the apostle hath even lost his reader in the depth of this mystery of the eternal counsel of father son and holy spirit ; he puts this question to all the busie disputants , who hath known the mind of the lord , or who hath been his counsellour ? and concludes that of him , and through him , and to him are all things , to whom be glory for ever . amen . we have mercy from him , faith and repentance from him by an effectual vocation according to his purpose of election . rom. , : . rom. . . . . , , , , . rom. . . rom. . , , , , , , . . we have mercy , grace and glory from all three , and therefore all honour and glory be to all three for ever amen . and the apostle doth beseech the god of patience , and consolation , the god of hope , and the god of peace , to fill them with all joy and peace in beleeving that they may abound in hope through the power of the holy ghost , who is the god of hope , comfort and peace ; for the kingdom of god doth consist in righteousnesse and peace , and joy in the * holy ghost . rom. . . and if wee serve christ ( who is god blessed for ever . rom. . . in these things , we shall be acceptable to god , and approved of men . rom. . . the fruits of the spirit in us are markes , because fruits of our election by god. the apostle writing to the church of the thessalonians , which is in god the father , and in the lord jesus christ , begs grace and peace for them from god our father , and the lord jesus christ ; remembers their work of faith , labour of love , and patience of hope in our lord jesus christ , in the sight of god and our father , and then concludes their election of god because the gospel came to them in power , and in the holy ghost ; for they received the word in much affliction , with joy of the holy ghost . the apostle exhorts them in every thing to give thanks , because it is the will of god in christ jesus , and bids them beware of quenching the spirit ; and beseeches the spirit , who is , undeniably , the god of peace , and by special office our sanctifyer and comfor●er , to sanctfy us wholly . the very god of peace sanctify you wholly , &c. and the apostle discourses in like manner in the second epistle to timothy ; god saith he , hath given us the spirit of power , of love , and of a sound mind , saved us and called us with an holy calling , according to his own purpose and grace , which was given us in christ iesus before the world began and tells us that every one who doth pretend to be elected , or presumes to call upon christ and claim an interest in him , must depart from iniquity , be sanctifyed that he may be meet for the masters use , and prepared unto every good work . i instance in some dark expressions , on purpose to shew that even in them there is by interpretation an acknowledgment , that we are elected by father , son and holy ghost to grace , peace and glory , and therefore ought to admire , beleeve , worship , love , obey all three persons as one , and the same god , blessed for ever ; we must be holy before them in faith and love . . if we consider our creation , we are created by father , son and holy ghost , as hath been proved ; and therefore we were created for the worship and service of all three . the spirit of elohim sate upon the waters , hatched the world and all the beauty and glory of it . . if we consider the vigorous providence of god , all things are preserved , upheld , maintained , ordered , governed , by father son and holy ghost , the holy-ghost governs the church , and over-rules the world also . . if we consider our fall , and therein our abominable sin , and the intolerable curse due unto it . . our sin which we committed in adam the first sin , it was a sin of cursed atheisme , divellish pride , unbelief , rebellion , apostacy , a sinning sin , because it did disable , pollute , infect , poyson both our souls and bodies with originall and damnable corruption ; all sins against father , son and holy-ghost proceed from this root of bitternesse . . the curse due to this sin is intolerable , unavoidable , it is the curse of an omniscient and omnipotent god ; a temporal , spiritual , eternall curse , the curse of the father , son and holy ghost . men and angels cannot help us , we cannot be pardoned , redeemed , sanctified , adopted , comforted , saved , but by the father , son and holy ghost ; still this doctrine of the coessentiall trinunity , must be preached and applyed for our spirituall and eternal good , as will appeare by our following discourse . . if we consider our effectuall vocation . the father cals us in christ , by his spirit speaking in law and gospel , and working powerfully upon our consciences and hearts : all three persons do joyntly performe this saving work ; shew which person can be spared . . our iustification is by the free-grace of the father manifested in the covenant of grace , by the righteousnesse of christ imputed by the father , and applyed by the spirit , our faith is grounded on the testimony of the spirit , and wrought by the efficacy of the spirit . . our redemption is by the father who gave us his son : by christ , who gave us himself ; by the spirit , who doth draw us unto christ , and puts us into the armes and bosome of our redeemer . we are redeemed from the guilt and punishment of sin more eminently by christ , but we are redeemed from the power and dominion of sin , from our vaine conversation , from this present evill world , and tyranny of sathan , not only by the death , resurrection and intercession of christ , but by the efficacy and power of the holy ghost ; and it is to be observed that though christ makes the purchase , yet the spirit makes and gives the assurance . . our adoption is by all three . the father doth adopt us in christ by the spirit of adoption . . the covenant of grace is made and confirmed by all three . . the church is gathered , instructed , preserved , saved by all three ; the church enjoyes and maintaines spirituall and heavenly communion with all three in all ordinances and duties , cor. . , . in hearing the word , father , son and holy spirit , do all teach us as hath beene proved at large , john . . cor. . . heb. . , . heb. . . . we are baptized in the name of all three , devoted , dedicated , consecrated to the service of all three , cor. . , . mat. . tit. . , . pet. . . matth. . . iohn . . rom. . , , , . we are adopted into the family of god , that we may be married to the son of god , and made co●heirs with christ in glory . . in the lords supper the father invites , and entertains us , gives us his son for our head , husband , saviour , feast and all ; christ gives us his body and blood to nourish us , and the spirit enables us to receive this spirituall nourishment after a spirituall manner , that we may thrive and grow thereby ; the spirit mortifies our lusts , strengthens our faith , renews our repentance , inflames our zeale , pacifies our conscience , purifies our heart , assures us of the favour and love of god , seals our pardon to us , and seals us up to the day of redemption . the love of the father , the grace of the son , the communion and peace of the spirit , is so plentifully vouchsafed to experimentall christians in this sacrament , that i may well subscribe probatum est . . in prayer and thanksgiving we do manifestly hold communion with all three . first , we pray to the father in the name of christ by the power of the spirit of supplication . ephes. . . cor. . . thes. . . rom. . gal. . thes. . . rev. . . secondly , our thankfull praises . eph. . . ephes. . , , . are presented to all three . . we keep a sabbath to father , son , and holy spirit ; all our fiduciall breathings after god , all our penitentiall meltings before god , our obedientiall closing with god , our pangs of love , raptures of zeale , extasies of joy , do arise and spring from the beliefe and consideration of the rich grace , tender mercies , and sweetest love of our deare father , our beloved saviour , and our sanctifying comforter . gal. . . col. . . ephes. . , , , , , . eph. . , , , . pet. . . every lords day , much more every sacrament-day should be a sealing day , a sanctifying day , an edifying , saving sabbath . god doth upon such daies take as wholy off from our own business , that we might make it our only business to serve and enjoy god by maintaining an holy communion with god in christ by the effectuall working of the holy ghost for a whole day together , that we may in the close of the day attaine the end of our sabbath-service which is a rest of complacency , sweet content , and full satisfaction in the armes and bosome of a father , a saviour , and a comforter ; this , this is to enjoy a christian sabbath . the heathens knew something of a sabbath . the jewish holy days were appendices to the fourth commandement , and therefore might be well taken off again , the morall commandement remaining entire . for it is granted , that they are taken off from the second commandement , and yet that remaines entirely morall ; and i beleeve it will be cleare to any man that studies the point that the jewish holy daies did belong most properly , and directly to the second commandement ; indirectly and but reductively to the fourth , because they were at most but appendices to the fourth commandement : but even jewish holy daies , and the most solemne services upon them did in their primary and principall institution , as wallaeus himself doth acknowledge ; point at christ and his benefits ; and the point is cleare by the epistle to the hebrewes , and more especially by the ninth and tenth chapters of that epistle , heb. . , , . heb. . , , , . luk. . , . cor. . . * the sabbath was instituted before the law was given on mount sinai , but the fall of man defaced the whole work of the first creation , and therefore it is no wonder if christ the lord of the sabbath require us to keep a sabbath in remembrance of the new creation by the work of redemption , which was actually finished by the resurrection of our blessed lord upon the first day of the week . for christ entred into his estate of rest in the day of his resurrection , though he did not enter into his place of rest in the third heavens till the day of his ascension , and the place is but accidentall in respect of the state of rest , and rest it self . the will of our lord was the instituting cause , the rest of our lord the moving cause . when god rested from the work of creation he was refreshed , exod. . . and when christ rested from the work of redemption he was refreshed , and his father took delight in the work of the new creation , which he could not take in the old creation , which was so defaced , that he did repent of it , gen. . but god will never repent that he sent his son to redeem , or his spirit to sanctifie his elect , but father , son , and spirit will be refreshed and satisfied with all the sweet fruits of this new creation and renovation by the death , resurrection , and spirit of the lord iesus . mat. . . ioh. . , isa , , , . rom. . . rom. . , . rom. . . heb , . , . the approved practice of the primitive christians declares the doctrine of the apostles , and the doctrine of the apostles shews what was the command of christ the lord of the sabbath concerning the sanctification of the first day of the week , which is therefore called the lords day , and the christian sabbath . the jewish sabbath was the holy day or sabbath of jehovah as creatour , and all three co-essentiall persons did create us . the christian sabbath is called the lords-day , since the lord christ hath been declared to be the son of god by his resurrection , rom. . . and the lord of all , rom. . . mat. . , . the ministry and sacraments under the new testament are appointed by christ , and therefore used by vertue of the second commandement though the outward worship be changed , & in like manner the sabbath appointed by christ must be observed by vertue of the fourth commandement though the day be changed , because this is the generall scope both of the second and fourth commandements that we ought to observe all the institutions of god from time to time . we are then obliged both by law & gospel to observe the lords day , & we may with confidence expect a blessing upon our observation of it ; for he who sanctified the day did blesse it also , that is , annexe a blessing to the sanctification of it ; read peter martyr upon the second of genesis , and the fourth commandement , when god rested from the works of creation he appointed a sabbath , although he did not rest from works of providence ; and in like manner christ hath appointed a sabbath upon his resting from the work of redemption by price , although he doth not rest from the work of redemption by power till all his enemies be vanquished and his elect saved . these grounds being laid it is most evident , that we are to keep a spirituall rest to father , son , and holy ghost upon the lords day . we are not only to draw neare to the ordinances , but to god , and christ in them by the power of the holy spirit , because all spirituall communion with god in christ is maintained by the power of holy ghost . cor. , . and our communion with god upon the lords day ought to be more immediate and eminent , more spirituall and heavenly than at other times . christians do enjoy god , not only in his creatures providences and works of their callings according to the variety of their occasions , but also in acts of immediate worship and service even upon the week daies ; but we are to do god some more eminent service on the lords day , we should not content our selves with week-dayes-prayers , and praises , our holiness and communion should be extraordinary upon this solemne day , and therefore . eminent for the degree of it ; there should be a sequestration of our minds and hearts from the world , and a consecration of them to the blessed trinity in the highest degree , and after the most immediate manner in all exercises of religion with admiration , confidence , love , reverence , delight , and thankfulness , that we may come as neare to god ( who comes down on purpose to meet us in his ordinances with a full blessing ) as it is possible for creatures that are cloathed with flesh . we must abstaine not only from servile works , but servile thoughts , cares , affections ; the sacrifice was doubled on the sabbath to shew that our holiness should be redoubled on that day , num. . . the sabbath was called holiness , exod. . . and the holy of jehovah , isa. . . to shew that we should be exceeding holy upon this holy day . we should be transported beyond flesh and the world , and have our conversation in heaven that day ; for the day requires some transcendent holiness . . our holiness and communion should be restorative ; for we contract much soile , abate the vigour of our graces by converse with the world upon the week days , and now there should be restauratio deperditi : we should sadly review our experiences , and failings all the week , and make up all our defects upon this acceptable day , this season of grace , when god sits in state , and scatters treasures of grace amongst hungry , and thirsty saints that are poor in spirit , and wait for spiritual alms at a throne of grace . . constant communion ; we should maintaine a continued and un-interrupted communion with god in private , as well as publike all the whole day together ; it is lawful for us on the week days to go about our worldly occasions after we have been at prayer , but we find that when we have been well warmed by family duties , we are apt to catch cold againe presently , when company or worldly businesses break in upon us , but we must keep our hearts in a sabbaths days frame all the lords day , yea , and at night also ; when our bodies are wearied in service , we must not be weary of service , but our hearts must be panting and working after more of god , and christ , and the holy spirit . . soule-satiating communion , we must take delight in our converse with god , enjoyment of christ , and walking in the spirit all the day . we must enter into the rest of our beloved , and take a sweet complacency in the fruition of god , in the glimpse of his glory , in the taste of his love , in the kisses of his mouth , in all the testimonies of his favor , in all the love-tokens sent us from heaven . the joy of the lord must be our strength , and in this strength we must go forth and mortifie our corruptious , resist temptations , and go about our worldly business all the next week with heavenly minds . i cannot stand to speak directly and fully to the particular duties of the sabbath ; or extraordinary duties of evangelical fasting , and christian feasting , for all which there should be a serious preparation , in all which there must be a prudent sequestration of our minds and hearts from the world , that theremay be an intire consecration of them unto god , and a sincere sanctification of all these times to father , son , and holy ghost , as it becomes the sons of god , the members of christ , and temples of the holy ghost . we should get oyle into our vessels , dress and trim our lamps , that we may meet the bridegroome of our soules in his appointed walkes , in his own ordinances and exercises . i should say something likewise of our penitentiall meltings before god ; thus in briefe then , when our conscience hath been wounded by the spirit of bondage , and is renewed by the spirit of regeneration , it will in due time be pacified by the spirit of adoption , but even then the soule will melt into teares , nay , then it melts most kindly , and laments most affectionately ; o i have sinned against the tender mercies of the bowels of god ; i have kicked my father upon the bowels ; i have made a sport and pastime of those sins , which let out the heart bloud of my dear saviour ; i have grieved , vexed , and even quenched the holy spirit my sweetest comforter ; i have sinned against all three , and so trebled all my sins ; i feare i have ( saith the soule in its agony ) even done despight to the spirit of grace , and trampled on the bloud of the son of god ; but i have learnt to submit , and beleeve , to rejoyce , and tremble , to weep , and waite ; for i waite upon a father , upon him whom my soule loves ; the spirit of faith and love hath taught me to come with a broken heart , and a bleeding conscience to a father , to a saviour , to a comforter ; i desire to keep the wound open by renewed confessions , and sprinkle the clensing bloud of christ upon it by a lively faith . oh it is soveraign bloud , and must be fiducially sprinkled by a speciall application ; and it is the spirit which makes this speciall application , and administers reviving cordials to broken hearts , and fainting soules in their swowning fits . * when the most ingenuous and refined sort of unregenerate men come to see , that notwithstanding all their civility and formality they are in the gall of bitterness by reason of their impenitence and unbeliefe , their opposition to the power of godliness , their undervaluing of the mercies of god , the love of christ , graces and comforts of the holy spirit , and feele these sins set home upon their hearts and consciences with stinging aggravations , they are even fired out of their naturall estate , and by the preventing grace of the spirit made sensible of sin , and hungry after grace and mercy . the dreadfull impressions of gods infinite majesty , and damning wrath make all the sensuall impressions of sin to be remembred with proportionable and self-condemning horrour . but when the most glorious treasures of gods sweetest mercies , and richest grace , folded up in his fatherly bowels , are opened to these ingenuous men , and the spirit hath touched their hearts to lament after christ ; then this ingenuous soule will cry out , oh what restless agonies , what stinging wormes , what unquenchable flouds of flaming brimstone , how many hells are there treasured up in one hell for such a wretch as i am , who have undervalued the riches of gods mercy , the love and merits of christ , the graces and comforts of the spirit ; heaven and earth may be astonished , men and angels amazed at my prodigious madness in undervaluing christ and heaven : in the midst of this agony and conflict , prudent astonishment , and spirituall horrour , the holy spirit urges invincible arguments which are sweetly compulsive to perswade and constraine the soule to long for christ. for when the spirit hath made the threats both of law and gospel effectual to humble us , he fils the soule with despaire of mercy if it continue in its former estate , in the gall of impenitence , and bond of unbeliefe , but withall it doth assure the soule that there is plenteous redemption , and eternall salvation treasured up in christ for penitent beleevers . then the spirit opens the mystery of free grace contained in a covenant sealed with the oath of god , and bloud of christ ; he reveales the eternity , excellency , sweetness , freeness , fulness , infiniteness of gods mercy and grace , christs love and merits as so many motives and encouragemets unto faith and repentance . the spirit sets a pardon and a crown before us , acquaints us with the all-sufficient righteousnes and unsearchable riches of christ , and his own free and effectuall grace , unspeakable comforts , and glorious joyes , and then convinces us that we want this grace to sanctifie us , this pardon and righteousnesse to justifie us , this crown , and these joyes to enrich and satisfie us . and upon this discovery the soule is encouraged to give credit to the holy ghost to beleeve the love of the father to depend upon christs satisfaction , and apply his righteousnes , to prize the love of the father , the merit of christ , the grace and comforts of the spirit above a world ; in a word , to sell all for christ , and give up all to christ , resolving to be ruled by himself and his spirit for evermore . now the soule hath a new life put into it , it hungers and thirsts for a more intimate communion with father , son , and holy ghost , and this hungry soule sucks whilest the breast is open till it hath filled it self with substantiall nourishment & reviving cordials . this devout soule becomes ( as chrysostome styled saint paul ) an insatiable worshipper of father , son , and holy ghost , it desires to grow in grace , to presse on towards perfection , to have father , son , and holy ghost to come sup with it , dwell in it , rule in it , that it may be enriched with the unsearchable riches of christ , and filled with all the fulness of god. this converted soule doth after these penitentiall meltings , fiduciall breathings after christ , and obedientall closing with father , son , and holy ghost , differ as much from it self ( when it was most ingenuous before its conversion ) as an angell doth from a divell . for the most ingenuous and refined sort of unregenerate men have nothing in them , which is more excellent then common grace , and common grace leaves them in the state of nature under the power of sin , and in the very suburbs of hell wholly at the command of sathan ; and if any man think otherwise , let him take heed that very thought doth not naile him fast to that unregenerate and cursed estate for evermore . beleeve it brethren , that historicall faith , and naturall wisdome do but excite some pang of self-love , which makes us very solicitous how we may stop the mouth of our convinced conscience with some kind of ingenuous civilities , and outward formalities without any penitent acknowledgment of our sinfull and cursed estate , any prudent esteeme of christ , whose bloud , merit , righteousness , and grace ought to be prized above a world . we never seeke christ in earnest till he hath first sought us , found us out , and brought us home by his preventing , quickening , saving grace . and when christ dwels conquering and reigning in the soule , the soule is not content with civilities and formalities with common grace , or some low degree of speciall grace , but it aimes at grace in perfection ; the heart is kindly broken by faith and love , the soule is humble , thankfull , zealous , mercifull , diligent , constant in serving christ , and christians upon all occasions . civill and formall men may by legall terrours be brought to some kind of devotion , they may by an historicall saith be brought to some kind of admiration of the gospel , to many good wishes and velleities , nay , to a reformation in many particulars , but because they undervalue the love of the father , the grace of christ , the communion of the holy ghost , and consequently the power of godlinesse , notwithstanding all their terrours , wishes , admiration , reformation , and hankerings after christ and heaven , they perish in their unbelief , because they never had any hungry and thirsty desires , restlesse desires after christ , ( such as would not be satisfied without him , ) wrought in their souls by the light of the gospel , power of the spirit , serious and seasonable offers of christ. they never come to a deliberate choyce and thankfull acceptance of christ to be their saviour , husband , priest , prophet and king ; but did indeed choose rather to be satans bondslaves , then christs spouse , they would not make a prudent exchange of satans fetters for christs yoake , and therefore are but dancing to hell with their fetters , in the fairest path that they can possibly find to the chambers of death ; they could never be perswaded to be content with christ alone as their al-sufficient portion , and therefore refused to sell all for him , and give up all to him , but did upon mature deliberation , and in coole blood reject christ , resist his spirit , refuse a pardon of sinne , and deed of heaven , purchased and sealed with the heart-blood of god ; and this very consideration will sting the conscience and torment the soule of these everlasting bedlams , when they lie in chains of darknes , cursing themselves to all eternity , and blaspheming god for torturing of them in the angry flames of hellish brimstone . but that this mystery may be yet more freely discovered ; take any man that is not guilty of the black and unpardonable sin of trampling on the blood of christ , and doing despight to the spirit of grace , and let him be one of the most desperate villains that ever served the devil , and i dare encourage this wretch , whom hell and satan do even gape and groane for , to go to christ for preventing grace , that the holy spirit may set home the curses of the law , and the more severe threatnings of the gospel , upon his obdurate heart in a saving way , and beseech him to knock early at heaven-gate , the sooner the better , because god gives christ and his spirit , a pardon and a crown , as fathers give lands to their children , only because they will give them , he gives all freely and royally . christ hath gifts for the rebellious also , god shews mercy and gives grace to them that do deserve neither grace nor mercy . and if the spirit do open the eyes and heart of this man , that the sense of his own devillish bruitishnesse may move him to enquire after god and christ , prov. . , , . and gives him present support from falling under the weight of his own sin , and gods curse into despair , after illumination , conviction , terrors , before he come to hunger after christ , submit to him , and close with him , as an al-sufficient saviour , and an only saviour ; this trembling soul may in the midst of cares , and hopes , and terrors , be encouraged and enabled by a spirit of regeneration , with all humility , joy and thankfulnesse to accept of christ , and rest upon him for righteousnesse and life , by a faith of dependance , adherence , recumbence , and to submit and melt with evangelical repentance at a throne of grace ; and when his heart is thus broken by faith and love , which do cast out unbelief , self-love and slavish fear which tends to despair ; this even now very black soule , but now purified by the spirit of regeneration , and revived by the spirit of adoption , sprinkling the blood of christ upon his conscience , and shedding the love of god abroad in his heart , will be encouraged to call god father , and christ saviour ; the father will meet , embrace , adorn him , wipe off his tears and filth , and kisse that prodigal mouth , which came from feeding with swine and kissing of harlots ; christ will bid this soule welcome , it shall be thrice welcome to this co-essentiall trinunity . for god who brought his pardoning mercy , preventing and effectuall grace to us when we looked not after him , will surely bid us welcome when we come unto him with a prudent care , a lively faith , a son-like reverence , a penitent indignation against our sin and lusts , melting affections , and yearning bowels towards him , and flaming zeale in his service , and for his cause . he who ran and called after us when we looked not after him will not reject us when we come unto him out of tender respect , and hearty love to him and his service ; he that hath the spirit , shall have son , and father also . let all churlish nabals , proud pharises , politick gallios , scoffing ishmaels , impenitent formalists , and unbeleeving atheists consider what hath been said , and look upon themselves as guilty of eternal death , let them heare with wonder and amazement , let them beleeve and tremble , and let all the enemies of the grace of god , pelagians , papists , &c. know that all preparatives are wrought by the word & spirit , and that it is one great preparative to abhor the thought of all meritoriousness in all or any of those preparatives which make way for the infusion of faith ; for faith is the free gift of god , and though there be many necessary preparatives to drive us to christ , yet there are no meritorious qualifications in us to bribe god , allure christ , or deserve grace . the spirit works when , where , and as he pleases , and he who doth not prize the love of the father , the grace of christ , and communion of the holy ghost above a world is not as yet acquainted with the mystery of faith , or the power of godliness , he hath neither father , son , nor spirit in him . chap. x. christians who have a lively sense and sweet experience of this grand mystery of faith , and practicall mystery of godliness , are afraid to hold communion with such as pretend to be spirituall christians , and yet deny the divine nature and distinct subsistences of christ and his holy spirit . it is observed by a great states man , that he who follows truth too neere at heeles , may have his teeth heat out ; but i had rather lose my teeth than not teach , and profess the truth . he who presses this point in this licentious age , wherein scepticks in the highest points are called seekers , and hereticks good christians , had need beg the promise of the father , that he may be endued with vertue from on high , that is , a magnanimous and more then an heroicall spirit to preach the truth . we must not feare the face of man in the cause of god ; if the devill might set up his church in england , wherein heresie is instead of a preacher , profaneness and ungodliness instead of ruling elders , yet i must be bold to say , that these seekers whom the reformers called libertines , are as the fathers called them , but nullifidians , and atheists , professed atheists ; for they are atheists , who will not beleeve and adore the only true god , father , son , and holy ghost ; and such are the seekers whom i am to deale with ; who deny the lord christ to be god ; and i shall easily discover that this is atheisme ; whether reigning atheisme or no , let the socinian seekers and deifyed atheists judge . whosoever transgresseth and abideth not in the doctrine of christ [ hath not god ; ] he who abideth in the doctrine of christ , he hath both the father and the son. the second epistle of iohn the ninth verse , who is a lyar but he that denyeth that iesus is the christ ? he is antichrist that denyeth the father and the son. whosoever denyeth the son , the same hath not the father , ioh. . , , . he who hath not the true god , father , son , and holy ghost for his god , is an atheist ; for if he do acknowledge a false god , a false god being no god , it must still bee granted that no man can bee excused from atheisme by his acknowledgment or worship of any thing that is not god ; i speak of such speculative atheisme as doth commonly run into practical atheism , and may consequently end in direct and down-right atheisme , or at least such affected atheisme , as will permit that radicall and seminall atheisme which was borne with them to sit quietly in their hearts as on a throne , so that they have no actuall belief of the true god which doth amount to an historicall beliefe ; much lesse any that can effectually over-power or dethrone their natural atheisme . and yet i beleeve these atheistical libertines can never fully blot out all the natural notions of a godhead written in their hearts by the finger of god , though many of them have made a very unhappy progress in this devillish study ; for the devils themselves have not attained to any atheistical 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the devils beleeve and tremble ; but enough of that ; the socinians are atheists interpretativè at the least . it is not enough for christian communicants to attaine to the first principle of natural theology , and confess that there is a god , but they must acknowledge the first principle of christianity , which is indeed supernatural divinity , and acknowledge , that father , son , and holy ghost are the only true god ; for else we go no farther then pharaoh that grand seeker did , when he asked , who is iehovah that i should obey his voice ? exo. . . or then the samaritans and athenians did , who worshipped they knew not what . ioh. . . act. . . the turks , the pagans , the jews do acknowledge that there is a god ; unless then we do intend to hold church-communion with pagans , jews , mahumetans , we must require somewhat more of those , whom we admit unto christian communion than a bare acknowledgment that there is a god , or that the father is god. for he who doth deny the godhead of the son , doth deny the father also , and consequently hath no god at all for his god , as hath been proved already from the ninth verse of the second epistle of iohn , and iohn . , , . he that honoureth not the son as highly as he honoureth the father , he doth not honour the father , who sent his co-equall son to give us life . ioh. . , . we must acknowledge the son to be equall to the father , for this redounds to the glory of god the father . phi. . . . we can have no christian and spiritual communion with god the father but in his natural son , and by their coessential spirit , as is manifest by comparing these texts together , ioh. . . cor. . . cor. . . rev. . , . mat. . , . ephes. . , . cor. . , , , , . and by the full scope of all my practical discourse in the ninth chapter of this treatise . this is life eternal , &c. iohn . iohn . , , , , , . when saint paul doth enlarge the bounds of christian communion as far as he can , he writes thus ; vnto the church of god which is at corinth , to them that are sanctified in christ iesus , called to be saints , with all that in every place call upon the name of iesus christ our lord , both theirs and ours . cor. . . we cannot maintaine any christian communion with such as deny the godhead of christ ; for they must ( as francis david , and david george , &c. did ) deny that christ is to be worshipped with divine faith and love , because ( as they blaspemously said ) he hath not the same divine nature with god the father ; or else they must say as socinus , who wrote against francis david , said , that christ is to be worshipped with divine worship ; and then they will if you put their principles together ( as you may see them together in that racovian alcoran the racovian catechisme ) be found to be even the very best o● them , but a pack of blasphemous idolaters , with whom we ought not to hold communion . for whilst they do blasphemously affirme , that christ is a meere man in glory , and the son of god only in a metaphoricall , not any proper sense , we must draw these conclusions , the best of the socinians maintaine , . that jesus christ our lord is but a meere man in glory , a very creature and no more : and therefore they are blasphemers ; and so are all they who say , that they are as much god as iesus christ ; for these are high swelling blasphemies , such as the deified atheists of the family of love ( with whom i feare mr. fry hath had too much acquaintance ) do usually vent to the great dishonour of christ and christianity . . that a meere man , a very creature is to be worshipped with divine honour ; and therefore they are idolators . master fry must prove , that he himselfe is to be worshipped with divine honour also , or else he cannot make good his proud assertions in his blasphemous pamphlet ; or else he must say as david george did , that christ is not to be worshipped with divine honour . now then the question is , what respect is to be shewn , or communion ought to be held with blasphemous and idolatrous hereticks , who are seducers also , and do zealously endeavour to poyson soules , as it doth well become apostatizing renegadoes ? they who are acquainted with ecclesiasticall writers , know what respect was shewne , or communion held with arians and others , who did deny the god-head of christ , though they did maintaine that christ was to be worshipped with divine honour ; i shall not tell long stories of cerinthus , ebion , photinus , arius , and their adherents ; but it is cleare and evident that the arians were condemned because they were a pack of blasphemous and idolatrous hereticks , seducers , apostates , upon the grounds which i shall presently relate and such as are above mentioned ; they did deny the divine nature of christ , and yet acknowledged that divine worship was due unto him . but i had rather produce proofs then tell-stories , and therefore i shall give you the true grounds and reasons why they are rejected from christian communion , and why even civill respect is denied to such , who upon mature deliberation , after more admotions then one , deny the godhead of christ , and the holy ghost . i shall begin with christian communion , because that makes most for my purpose . . these vaine men are rejected from christian communion for these reasons . . because they do not agree with christians in the common unity of the christian faith ; for all who are come into the unity of the faith , are come into the knowledge of the son of god. ephes. . and into the knowledge of the holy ghost , because these are the baptismall principles of the doctrine of christ. acts . , . heb. . , , . mat. . . ioh. . . cor. . , , , . cor. . . eph. . , , . . they do not agree with christians concerning the adequate object of divine and evangelicall worship . the father , son , and holy ghost are the adequate object of divine and evangelical worship , of divine faith , hope , & love . iohn . , . cor. . . rev. . . . mat. . . ioh. , , ioh. . . rom. . . cor. . , . cor. . , . cor. . , , . they may well go joyn with pagans , jews , mahumetans in worship , who say that christ is a meere man. mahomet did collect his alcoran with great dexterity out of such common principles as that he might take in iews and christians . and socinus he followed mahomets inctructions ; he saith , arians and calvinists may be both saved , so they do but live morally . barlaeus saith , that jews may be very pious towards god in their religion , though they do deny and reject jesus christ ; as videlius shews in his book de deo synagogae . and this , as barlaeus is pleased to call it , is accounted the most accurate divinity of the high flying mercuries : beza in his epistle to petrus statorius hath given our great wits a faire warning . i have read of one nuserus a minister in the palatinate , who did first fall away to the socinians , and deny the trinity , and afterwards turned to the turks , and did solemnly profess himself to be a mahumetan at constantinople . and the like is written by authors of good credit , concerning that schole master , who fell away to judaisme , and wrote letters from thessalonica , that the reason why he went off from the christian profession was because he could not digest the mystery of the trinity . we that are christians , worship the only true god , father , son , and holy ghost ; and therefore we must be true to our religion , and beware of such impostors , who would seduce us to worship a meere man instead of the great god , and our saviour jesus christ. my heart rises with just indignation against mr fryes blasphemous pamphlet , when i read there , that according to his understanding of the word subsistence he may be said to be god too , as well as iesus christ , pag. . i know he will wrangle about the word subsistence ; but that word is found in scripture , and applyed unto the father , heb. , . and we read of the being , or subsisting of the son in the ( forme , that is , the ) nature of god ; he thought it not robbery to be equall with god. sure master fry ought to think it robbery to make himself equall with christ in subsistence , when christ is equall to his father , and hath no humane , but a divine subsistence only , which doth uphold the humane nature which christ hath assumed ; and all christianity is built upon the divine subsistence of christ god-man as hath been shewn , and shall be yet more clearely manifested . in like manner , they that receive not the holy ghost , cannot be received by us whose happiness it is to beleeve , adore , obey the spirit , as hath been shewn at large . . they do not agree with christians concerning the substance of the gospel , and covenant of grace . whatsoever we receive in point of religion ought to be received upon the credit of all three persons , but more especially upon the divine testimony of the spirit of christ , the holy and eternall spirit sent down from heaven . pet. . , . corinth . . , , , . . they then who do reject the spirit , and deny his testimony to be divine , because his nature ( as they blasphemously maintain ) is not divine , do indeed reject both testaments , and therefore reject the whole gospel and covenant of grace . moreover this covenant is made by all three persons , for the covenant doth containe the love of the father , the grace of christ , and the communion of the holy ghost . the father of our lord jesus christ doth enter into covenant to be our father in the lord christ ; the covenant is established upon the satisfaction and righteousness of god-man ; and therefore they who deny the godhead of christ , must rest upon their own righteousness and obedience for justification , and salvation , as the socinians do , and then christ will profit them nothing , because they overthrow the new covenant and are fallen from grace . gal. . , . the covenant is sealed with the bloud of christ , who is not only the son of mary , but the natural son of god. this is the substance of the gospel , the same person is god and man , the son of mary is the true messiah , the lord christ , the only son of god , equall to his father , the head and saviour of the church , the true god , the blessed god , the great god , the mighty god we are redeemed with the bloud of christ , the bloud of god , the bloud of christ who is god. the covenant is to quicken and cure us . . to quicken us , for we were dead before the medicine came , and christ and his spirit raise us from death , and give us a spirituall life . . to cure us , for when our physitian hath restored us to life , he can more easily restore us to health . in the covenant god promises to give us himself , his son , and his spirit . the bond of the faederal and mystical union on gods part is the spirit , and on our part faith , which is wrought in us by the same co-essentiall spirit . and christ is the only mediatour of this covenant . . we have but one mediatour and surely of this covenant . tim. . cor. . . . this one mediatour is god and man in one person : the son of man. mat. . . the son of god ver . . rom. . , . rom. . . heb. . . ioh. . . acts . . ioh. . . ephes. . . joh. . . ioh. . . ioh. . . phil. . . he for whom are all things , and by whom are all things , even he himself and not another person ; he also himself took part of the same flesh and bloud whereof we are partakers , heb. . , . i hope by this time it is evident that the covenant is made in christ the natural and co-essentiall son of god , who is god and man in one person , and therefore we cannot close with them who will not close with this saving truth ; for this is an article of everlasting life . mat. . , , . ioh. . . ioh. . . ephes. . . i humbly intreat mr. fry to consider what hath been said , that he may repent and retract his unhappy opinion , namely , that the word subsistence holds forth no more of christ his being in the godhead then may be affirmed of every creature , that whatsoever the head did partake of , that did the members also . and that according to his understanding of the word subsistence , m● fry himself might be said to be god too as well as iesus christ , p. , . this is the unsavory breath of mr fry his blasphemous bellows printed at addle-hill in february . if his confutation be as publike as he thought fit to make his blasphemous errour , ( which he accounts but a molehill , pag. . ) he may thank himself . i might adde many other reasons , but i must be briefe . , i might argue from the very nature of christian communion , which is a christian and spiritual communion with the father , in the son , by the spirit ; but i have said enough of that already in this very chapter , and handled it practically and at large in the ninth chapter of this treatise . . i might argue from the sacraments of communion , and seales of that covenant of grace , which they who do deny the trinity overthrow , as hath been proved . . in baptisme we christians are devoted and consecrated to the beliefe , worship , and service of god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost , who are all three one and the same god , the only true god blessed for ever ; and therefore they who do not beleeve and worship god the son , and god the holy ghost as the same god with the father , do indeed renounce the faith and baptisme of christians ; they take away the adequate object of christian faith , and evangelical worship . god promises to be a father , saviour , and a comforter to us ; he seales his promise to us by baptisme and fullfils his promise by giving us his son for our saviour , and his spirit for our sanctifier and comforter ; for he shews himself to be a father to us in christ by sending the spirit of regeneration and adoption into our hearts ; we are regenerated by the spirit of god , adopted into the family of god , married to the son of god , that we may be heires and coheires with christ the king of heaven , and lord of glory ; and all this is to oblige and encourage us in the beliefe , worship , and service of father , son , and holy ghost . . in the sacrament of the lords supper we christians sanctifie the name of christ the natural son of god , and the name of the co-essential spirit ; the everlasting counsels of gods fatherly love , the riches of his free grace , all the treasures of the covenant and spirit of grace , all the sufferings of our crucified redeemer the lord of glory , are in this great ordinance evidently set before the eye of our faith , that by the grace of christ , assistance and fellowship of the holy ghost , we may have a more intimate communion with god ; for this sweet communion with the father of our lord iesus christ is by the communion of the bloud of god , ( acts . . compared with cor. . . ) and of the spirit of god. cor. . this is the grand ordinance for the highest , sweetest , strongest communion with the father in the son , and by the spirit that can be attained to whilest we are cloathed with flesh . the gospel is appointed both for the begetting and encrease of grace ; this ordinance is annexed to the gospel , that the gospel and this ordinance both together may ( by the power of christ and his holy spirit ) be effectual according to the counsel of gods will for bringing of lost sinners into a saving communion , nay , a growing , thriving communion with father , son , and holy ghost , that we may come to be enriched at last with the unsearchable riches of christ , and filled with all the fulness of god. . when we see the bread and wine consecrated and set apart for this holy use , we should consider the unspeakable love of god the father , setting his co-essential son jesus christ apart in his secret and eternall counsell for to be the surety and saviour of his chosen people : this is the great mystery , which the very angels desire to look into , and which will be the subject of all the praises and hallelujahs both of saints and angels to all eternity in the highest heavens . . when we see the bread broken and wine poured out , we must remember the love of christ , whose body was broken and bloud shed for our sins . . when the bread and wine is distributed and divided , we should meditate upon the application of christ crucified to every one of our own soules in particular ; now this speciall application is made by the assistance and communion of the holy ghost . and therefore this mystery of the co-essentiall trinunity must be acknowledged by all who are admitted to this sacrament , because this is the greatest confirmation of the great bond of the highest communion which we can have with father , son , and holy ghost , and with the most pretious christians , who are sound in faith and holy in life . we can never understand the presence , institution , and mind of christ in this ordinance , unless we beleeve the cursed condition of men in their naturall estate , the divine nature and person of christ , the greatness of the price that was paid for the satisfaction of gods justice , and appeasing of gods wrath , who did not spare his own co-essential son , but manifested his hatred against sin , and love to his elect in not sparing his son , but breaking his body and shedding of his bloud , that we might be redeemed by the bloud of god ; this is the mystery which is made sensible in the sacrament , and is really evident to the eye of faith , gal. . . and whosoever looks upon these great mysteries of the gospel as fancies , and doth not beleeve them to be reall things truly exhibited , really presented to beleevers in a sacramental , mystical , spiritual way in this ordinance , hath not yet learnt the truth as it is in jesus ; and is not prepared for such high communion . we christians do not come with hungry and thirsty soules longing after farther communion with christ for mortifying of our lusts , and encrease of all our graces by his spirit , untill we beleeve this grand mystery of faith ; and we are then experimentally acquainted with the mystery of godliness when we have been made drink into one spirit with christ and his members , when we look upon him whom we have pierced by our sins , and acknowledge him to be the natural and co-essential son of god ; there can be none of those fiduciall breathings after christ , penitential meltings before him , or obediential closings with him , as is evident by our ninth chapter untill we do in some measure beleeve this mystery of faith , and understand the substance of the covenant of grace , which is sealed in this sacrament by god , and must be actually renewed by every good communicant ; our meditations , faith , love , repentance , joy , thankfulness , will not be rightly placed or exercised , if this grand mystery of faith and godliness be rejected by us . . i might argue from all the offices of christ ; they who do not beleeve the divine nature of christ , do utterly disable jesus christ from being a mediatour , a priest , a prophet , a king , for the saving of his people to the uttermost . they who deny the divine essence and person of christ , do deny his satisfaction to be all-sufficient in our behalf . they depose christ from that spirituall and heavenly kingdom which he hath by nature ; and render him uncapable of that mediatory kingdom , which is delegated to christ , god man by the decree of the co-essentiall trinunity . but i have said enough of that in the former part of this book . i pass on to enquire what civill respect is due to such as do deny the divine nature of christ and his holy spirit ; that one text to my apprehension , ioh. . , . containes a very full and satisfactory answer ; whosoever transgresseth and abideth not in the doctrine of christ , hath not god ; he that abideth in the doctrine of christ he hath both the father and the son. if there come any unto you and bring not this doctrine , receive him not into your house neither bid him god speed . for he that biddeth him god speed , is partaker of his evill deeds . but that this point may be more clearly stated , and all mistakes prevented , be pleased to consider , . that such points of religion and worship as are necessary to be known and beleeved for the maintenance of christian , spirituall , saving communion with father , son , and holy ghost , are clearely delivered in the holy scriptures of truth . . that if men who were formerly unblameable in their life and conversation , be seduced into any errour which doth contradict , or subvert such fundamentall points , they ought to be instructed with the spirit of meekness in a christian and brotherly way . . they are to be admonished with all faithfulness and meekness of wisdom twice or thrice , that they may understand the importance of the truth which is denyed , the danger of the errour maintained , the sad consequences of both , that if their conscience be not feared , they may return from their beloved and damned errours . . if after all this meekness , patience , and forbearance , all christian instructions , and brotherly admonitions , they do ( as men that are judicially blinded for sinning against conscience ) . persist in their errour . reject and revile the truth of god in these high and necessary points . . fall from the grace of god , frustrate the grace and covenant of god , evacuate the death of christ , depose christ and his spirit from their throne and godhead . . seduce and poyson others . mat. . . . deny and overthrow the foundation of divine faith , hope , love , and justification by faith , and the adequate object also of all christian faith , evangelicall worship , and sincere obedience ; these bold atheists ( for they deny the only true god , father , son , and holy ghost ) may without any scruple be rejected from christian communion . for there is certainly some lust or other which hinders them from seeing the truth , or professing that they do see it , and therefore it may be taken for granted that these men are obstinate , self-condemned men , men that combine with their wills and lusts against their own conscience , and cleare shining scriptures . and therefore these men cannot complaine that they are punished for their conscience , when they are indeed punished for sinning against their conscience ; because they are condemned by their own conscience . but it will be said that there are scarce any such men to be found as i have described . to which i answer , be pleased but to consider what hath been delivered in this very chapter already , and compare it with the foregoing chapters , and with the many blasphemous pamphlets which do pass up and down without controule in this licentious age ( in which men adventure upon the very language of hell under pretence of exercising their christian liberty , and speaking according to their new light ) and this point will be too cleare . for we do already grant that no man ought to be troubled for following the dictates of his conscience rightly enformed , but for following of pernicious errours which are contrary to his own conscience , unless he be judicially blinded by god for his customary sinning against light of conscience in former times . . nothing is more common then for men to speak out of the abundance of that naturall atheisme which lurkes in their hearts contrary to the dictates of their naturall conscience . . though conscience may be quiet whilst men are exercising their wits to maintaine some errour which is contrary to those mysteries of faith , which transcend naturall reason , and are repugnant to the corruption of reason , especially , if they ( are engaged in multitud● of business , connived at by such as sit at sterne , and ) do thrive and prosper in the world ; yet conscience will find a time to speak when it may be heard , & then it will scourge these merc●rial vapourers with scorpions , and set all their errours and blasphemies in order before them with stinging aggravations , and prove them to be inward hereticks . . we must distinguish between speculative atheists , such as libertines and enthysiasts usually are ; and practical atheists , such as sensuall men are known to be ; for i am bold to call these hereticks atheists who deny the son and holy ghost to be god after frequent instructions , and wholesome admonitions in coole bloud and studied discourses ; for i do not speak of such as talke vainly and blasphemously also in the heat of disputation , or in a sudden paroxysme of temptation . but he who doth upon mature deliberation , after the application of so many gracious remedies ( with such meekness of wisdome as hath been said ) deny the godhead of christ after it hath been made plaine to him , that if he hold this errour he doth overthrow the foundation of the christian faith , and deny the adequate object of evangelicall worship , because he doth but beleeve in a creature , and so trust in an arme of flesh ; and that he doth worship a meere creature , and therefore is an idolater ; that a meere creature cannot satisfie the infinite justice of god for the sin of man , and consequently that we are not redeemed , and cannot be justified by christ , if he be ( as they blasphemously say he is ) a meere man in glory ; finally , that if all his faith be carnall confidence , and all his worship idolatry , it is impossible for him to be saved if he continue in that vaine faith and worship all his life . of such a man as this , who hath made a profession of christianity , and lived in an externall conformity , it is no breach of charity to say , he is a subverted and self-condemned heretick , an apostate-idolater , blasphemer , &c. and therefore we may safely reject him from christian communion , and deny all civill respect unto him : for it is to be feared he is of their strein who said , — mat. . — . this is the heire , &c. the princes and states of germany in their grivances , erastus and some others would have church-censures passed upon hereticks , apostates , &c. but they desired that profane persons and scandalous livers might be spared ; a doctrine fit to be preached amongst a cyclopes , men that have no sense or care of piety , a doctrine fit to usher in atheisme , or popery . for they say the b pope may be deposed for heresie , but not for a profane or scandalous life . c grotius on the other side , and some of his followers would have scandalous persons excommunicated , but those ( whom the reformed churches have convicted of heresie ) spared . but i feare that there are too many in england who would have all the poyson of erastus and grotius put together in a directory for church government , that men might hold what they list , and live as they please . what a strange syncretisme , what a promiscuous communion , what a church shall i say , nay , what an hell would there be in such an atheisticall communion as these mercuriall grandees affect . if we had but another cassander , and another acontius to compose a new confession of faith ; another erastus , and another grotius to joyne their malignity together to make a new directory for church government , the devill would then have good hopes to reigne visibly in england in hereticall , profane , and scandalous combinations . i beleeve some may wonder to read what i write of acontius ; but those words did not fall as a blot upon the man from my running pen , and therefore i am ready for more reasons then one to give a faire and an ingenuous account of this deliberate and premeditated censure . acontius came forth of italy ( as alciate , blandrate , gibrald , and both the socinus's , laelius , and faustus did ) and lived in the time of socinus the elder and younger also ; the elder socinus died . and printed nothing ; about three yeares after his death , acontius published his book of stratagems , in which he gives the right hand of brotherly fellowship to the socinians . when the followers of socinus did begin to seduce , up starts acontius and pleads for seducers . when the arminians do enlarge the bounds of communion so far , as to take the socinians into christian communion , they constantly urge the authority of acontius in their apology , and in their answer to the reverend professours of leyden . acontius thought fit to lay aside the ancient confessions of faith , and compose a new creed , which socinians may subscribe . he came into england under a faire pretence of being banished for christs sake ; but certainly his greatest danger was of being called into question for his intimate confederacy with such as were no great friends to iesus christ. iudicious pareus looked upon him as a sneaking solicitour for the socinians , and as fast a friend to them as bonfinius himself . the learned professours of leyden , peltius , videlius , voetius , and a whole synode of discerning reformers , have set a brand upon him . his book of stratagems printed in the yeare . was printed againe in the yeare . and as i remember , in the yeare , i find that he himself was living in the yeare . in the yeare . his book was printed here at oxford , but generally condemned by such as were learned and orthodox at that time in this university ; they thought it more fit for the fire , then the press . about the beginning of march . there was some part of his stratagems ( translated into english ) published in print at london ; i confess i was amazed at it , but could not learne who was the translatour of it . we were at that time required to look after all books that were pernicious or dangerous . and i did complaine to the reverend assembly sitting at westminster , that there was such a book lately published , dedicated to both houses of parliament . to the generall , and lieutenant generall of all the forces raised for the defence of the common-wealth , and recommended to the parliament , army , and city as a book fit to direct them how to distinguish truth from errour in that juncture of time . moreover , the translatour in his epistle to the parliament acknowledged , that the book never endeavoured to speak english before ; but if his essay did find acceptance , it was his intention to go in hand with the remaining books ; which all who have read , know , containes the quintessence of those poysonous dregs which are in his third book ( now englished ) not so generally observed by unwary readers . whereupon the reverend assembly chose a committee to peruse the book , and report their judgement of it to the assembly with all convenient speed . upon perusall of the book we found that the author was recommended by peter ramus , but we did not much wonder at that . . because the book is written with much art , and the malignity of it very closely couched . . there are many plausible pretences , faire insinuations , and divers religious expressions in it . the man was master of his passions as well as art , or else he had not been such an excellent agent and sollicitour in so bad a cause , and so compleat a courtier as indeed he was . . acontius spent a great part of his time in the study of the mathematicks , he was excellent in the art of fortification , and therefore peter ramus might set the higher price upon him . . he hath many excellent passages which are of great use against the papists . but that which we admired at , was , that a member of our own assembly should recommend the book . it was therefore desired that mr dury might be added to that committee . when mr dury came amongst us , and saw that he had given too faire a testimony to that subtill piece , he dealt as ingenuously with us as we had dealt with him , and assured us that he would be ready to make his retractation as publike , as his recommendation had been made without his consent , because he clearely saw that they practised upon his passionate love of peace to the great prejudice of truth , and that he was meerly drawn in to promote a syncretisme beyond the orthodoxe lines of communication . for in all syncretisms and interimismes between protestants and papists , or between the reformed , and the lutherans , the socinians were ever banished out of the lines of christian communication . and therefore dr voetius doth in the very same breath commend mr dury sor● leaving out the socinians in his proposals for peace , and condemn acontius for taking of them into his syncretisme ; his words are these , si percurrantur historiae , & sexcenti libelli ( ut vocantur ) pacifici ( quorum catalogi editi cum consultatione cassandri , & nuper cum libello iohannis duraei de pace ecclesiasticât inter evangelicos procurandâ ) non invenies communi pace quae petitur , aut praetenditur , anti-trinitanos comprehendi . fidem etiam faciunt illa , quae anno socinianis in poloniâ ad collationem de religione & oblita consilia pacis se offerentibus , vnus & solus tractatus acontii imprudentioribus nonnullis imposuit , &c. dr voet. de necessitate & util . trin. pag. , . that acute and learned divine doth in very many places set forth acontius in his right colours , and saith the arminians made great use of him , and that he was but one remove from a a socinian , or guilty of a socinian syncretisme at least , because he doth exclude the sabellians only , and doth not obscurely include the photinians within the còmpasse of his b catholike creed , in which there is a c snake lurkes , which doth not hisse , but sting ; for this moderate man did never say , that it was necessary for our salvation to know and beleeve that the father , son , and holy ghost are one and the same god who is the only true god blessed for ever . and yet it is his maine business and designe in his third book , which is now in english , and in his seventh , which i hope will never be englished , to shew what are the only points necessary to be beleeved for the attainment of salvation . but acontius is not very modest when he comes to pass sentence upon the ancients who were rigidly orthodoxe , and faithfully severe in requiring men to beleeve those grand articles of faith which are necessary to salvation . for when he discourses of the faith of the man sick of the palsie , he saith , credebat enim ( ut par est ) hominem eum qui iesus diceretur , &c. for he believed ( in all probability saith the translatour ) that that same man whose name was jesus came from god , and was in favour with god ; and therefore he hoped that by this meanes he might recover his health . but that he knew all those things which the church hath for a long time accounted as articles of faith necessary to be beleeved to salvation , how likely a matter it is , i leave it to every man to judge . there are likewise many other texts to the very same purpose . concerning the faith of abraham he speakes somewhat like an arminian , and an anabaptist , but concludes like a socinian , that abraham did beleeve . that he should be the father of many nations . . that the nations should be happy by his seed . . somewhat concerning the land of canaan . but ( saith he ) of those points of religion which it is judged every body is bound to know upon paine of damnation , we read not a word . yea , and the mystery of salvation it self by his seed is very closely and obceurely promised . i know acontius doth acknowledge christ to be the son of god , and to be god , and so do the socinians in some sense , as we have shewn : but then acontius qualifies all with a pretty diversion . many things ( saith he ) may be reckoned up , which that we might be saved , ought both to be , and to be performed : as that our sins were to be abolished , and that by a man void of all sin , and of infinite vertue and power , and he therefore to be the son of god , yea , god and the like . and then he presently mixes some things of lesse consequence , and concludes thus . doubtless that it may evidently appeare to us that these things are likewise necessary to be known , either we must have a plaine text of scripture that shall pronounce , whatsoever is necessary to be done , that also ( to attain salvation ) must necessarily be beleeved . — but there is no testimony of scripture that i know which pronounces , that what ever ought to be done ought to be beleeved . by this one taste you may plainly see , that though it should be granted necessary unto salvation , that christ should be god , abolish sin , &c. yet acontius will not grant that this is necessary to be beleeved for the attainment of salvation ; and therefore he left it out of his catholick creed , and syncretisme , and yet condemns the sabellians , who did not deny the godhead of christ , but said that he was one god ( and somewhat which they should not have said , or beleeved , that he was one person ) with god the father . you may hereby understand the modesty of the man and cry out as he did , ein modestiam satis peorfrictam , usque ad os impudentiae perfrictam . but if his seventh book ( which the translatour durst not adventure to english till he saw how this would take ) had been translated , i need not have said any more for the discovery of this subtill sir. judicious a pareus , and the synod of lublin were able to detect him for all his courtship and hypocrisie ; and d. b voetius doth assure us , that if the reformed churches had taken acontius his third and seventh books into their consideration , they would have rejected ▪ acontius from communion with them , unless he would have declared himself more plainly , and made it evident , that coming out of italy under pretence of reformation he had not brought the same errours with him which alciate , blandrate , gribald , or socinus the uncle , and the nephew brought from thence . they who are acquainted with ecclesiastical writers can readily declare what difficulties they wrestled with , and what persecutions they did undergo rather then they would consent to any syncretisme with the arians when it was obtruded , or yeeld to any agreement , when it was offered to them upon plausible and tempting conditions . they who have read the acts of the nicene , syrmiensian , and both the ariminensian councels , athanasius , hilary , epiphanius , nicetas , socrates , sozomen , theodoret , augustin , know this to be as cleare as if it were written with a sun-beame . was there not an anathema denounced against liberius by great hilary for yielding to such a syncretisme with the arians , as acontius did propound for an accommodation between christians and socinians ? pardon the harshness of that expression ; i am not in passion , or in haste , but follow the example of the orthodoxe doctors of the church , who did use the name of christians in opposition to the arians , to shew that they did not acknowledge the arians for to be christians , because they denied the true christ , who is god-man , the only mediatour and saviour of his people from their sins . melancthon and bucer were men of great prudence , modesty , and moderation , as well as piety and learning , but they never offered to conclude a peace with any of these new arians ; they would not admit any into christian communion with them , unlesse they would subscribe the confessions of faith received in the foure first general councels . they who deny the godhead of our saviour , and the holy ghost , are antichristian , antispiritual men ; their idolatry in worshipping christ , whom they look upon as a meere creature , their impiety in denying worship to the holy ghost , their horrid blasphemies to the dishonour of christ and christianity , their poysoning of soules , disturbing of christian societies , should be laid to heart by all christian magistrates , all ministers and members of jesus christ ; and therefore this acontian syncretisme is abominable . upon these and divers other considerations i was desired to make a report to the reverend assembly concerning the danger of translating and printing of acontius in english ; the heads of the report were briefly these . the report made to the reverend assembly . march . - . by mr cheynell . we humbly conceive , that acontius his enumeration of points necessary to be known and beleeved for the attainment of salvation is very defective . . because in the creed which acontius framed there is no mention made either of the godhead of iesus christ , or of the godhead of the holy ghost . and . although acontius doth acknowledge christ to be truly the son of god , yet he doth not in his creed declare him to be the natural son of god. that these points are necessary to be known and believed for the attainment of salvation , is in our judgement clearly expressed in the holy scriptures , joh. . , . compared with joh. . . we do therefore conceive , that acontius was justly condemned , because he maintains that the points of doctrine which he mentions , are the only points which are necessary to be known and beleeved , and did not hold forth or mention the points aforesaid as necessary to salvation . and we esteeme him to be the more worthy of censure , because he lived in an age when the photinian heresie was revived , and yet spared the photinians , though he condemned the sabellians . finally , acontius doth cautelously decline the orthodox expressions of the ancient church , in the foure first generall synods ; and doth deliver his creed in such general expressions , that as we conceive the socinians may subscribe it , and yet retaine the worst of their blasphemous errours . the promises being humbly presented , we leave it to the judgement of this reverend assembly , whether acontius his stratagems was a book fit to be translated into english , and recommended to the parliament , army , and city to direct them how to distinguish truth from errour in this juncture of time ? upon these few heads of the report i discoursed somewhat affectiontely , and freely , according to the weight and moment of the point in question . and thereupon the reverend assembly did unanimously desire the prolocutor to perswade me to print something about that argument , as soone as the heat of our employment at oxford was over for the satisfaction of the kingdom . i am very willing to obey the commands of that assembly famous for learning and piety , even to the admiration of those great schollers , whose hearts were once espoused to another interest . if the debates of that reverend assembly upon severall articles of faith were printed and published to the world , all ingenuous enemies of piety would blush at the remembrance of those bitter censures which have been passed upon men of whom this age is unworthy . but i must hasten , for my book begins to swell beyond its just proportion , and i am called away to another service , which cannot be performed at any other time . acontius hath invented very pretty diversions instead of excuses to abate our zeale against the most dangerous errours ; he saith , that hereticks do not intend to make christ a lyar ; the controversie between them and us is not concerning the truth , but concerning the meaning of the words of christ. to which i answer , that he who beleeves the words of christ in the sense of antichrist , and rejects the sense of christ , and his spirit , is not a christian , but is indeed and truth antichristian . * the sense of scripture is the scripture , and therefore if men be permitted in these great and weighty articles to impose a new sense upon the church of christ , they do clearely impose a new creed , a new gospell upon us , and deserve that anathema . gal. . , . though they should pretend to apostolical authority , or angelical purity . although we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you , then that which we have preached unto you , let him be accursed . as we said before , so say i now againe , if any man preach any other gospell unto you then that you have received , let him be accursed . grotius in the daies of his modesty refused to sollicite in the behalfe of the socinians , and professed that he did not know a man in the grand assembly in holland , that would not pronounce the socinians accursed . the distinguishing question , which was then put , was the old question , do you beleeve that christ is god by nature ? if you do not , you are an arian ; and if you be an arian , you are no christian. acontius reckons up some things as necessary to beleeve which are expressed in scripture , & some other things which are necessarily inferred from what is expressed , but he doth not reckon up the godhead of christ , or the holy ghost in his catalogue of things that are plainely expressed , or necessarily inferred , as is most evident by his whole discourse in his third book which is now in english. finally , the socinians take away the right foundation of faith , hope , worship , justification , as hath been proved , & lay a wrong foundation ; they bring in a new christ , a meer man , and a new gospel , a new iudge in the highest matters and mysteries of religion , their own reason , which they might infallibly know to be not only fallible , but corrupt . they deny the true causes and means of salvation , & the right application of them ; their impiety in not worshipping of the spirit ; their idolatry in worshipping one whom they esteeme to be a meere man , and refusing to be washed and purged with the bloud of the covenant , will justifie all that reject them and their confederates from christian communion . i am not at leasure to handle the magistrates duty in this point ; nor are many of them at leasure to consider all that is fit to be considered in that weighty point ; but for the present satisfaction of such as know not how to study in these busie times , i shall point at some unquestionable truths for the ending of that unhappy and fatall controversie in the church of christ. . there is no warrant given in the word to any minister of the state , or officer of the church to molest , oppresse , or persecute any man for righteousnesse sake ; he who doth persecute a man for following his conscience when rightly informed by the word and spirit of the lord jesus , doth certainely persecute the lord jesus christ. saul , saul , why persecutest thou me ? i am iesus whom thou persecutest ; it is a fit text to be preached on this twenty second of february . but i am now learning another lesson , which is to suffer persecution patiently for righteousnesse sake , and pray for such benefactours , who do besides their intention , and against their will , make christians happy by endeavouring to make them miserable in their outward man by an unexpected persecution . yet i could not but take notice of the seasonablenesse of this truth , and put down the day , the moneth , and the yeare , as the prophet did . ezek. . . and it came to passe in the sixth yeare , in the sixth moneth , in the fifth day of the moneth , as i sate in mine house , and the elders of iudah ( the princes of the people ) sate before me , &c. the great statesmen were at leasure now in the time of the captivity to hear the prophet ; if they would have heard , beleeved , obeyed before , they had never gone into captivity ; for the misusing of the prophets , and despising of their message was the sin against the most soveraigne remedy ; and when there was no other remedy , then god sent them away captive , &c. chron. . , . let all such consider this , who are poasting on in the high-way to captivity . . no man ought to be punished for following his mis-informed conscience , untill he hath been better informed and spiritually admonished ( as we have formerly shewn ) twice or thrice , and is so unconscionable as to despise good information , reject prudent and faithful admonitions contrary to the doctrine of godliness and all good conscience : for of such a man the apostle saith not only that he is perverted , but he is subverted , tit. . . . the ministers of god , the civill magistrates , and the ministers of christ , and all church-officers whatsoever must joyne together and uphold one another in the discharge of their several duties , that they may be in a capacity to revenge all disobedience , and execute the judgement that is written , rom. . . cor. . . i cor. . . deut. . , . . heretical seducers , blasphemous apostates , and idolatours ( of whom we have discoursed at large ) are wolves that subvert whole houses . tit. . . churches , gal. . , . act. . . states and kingdomes ; and therefore they must be driven from the sheepfold , lest the very vitals of christianity be corrupted , religion destroyed , many soules poysoned , god extremely dishonoured , the church and state endangered , as is fully declared unto us in the holy scriptures of truth . . god doth work by these legal terrours and executions of vengeance sometimes upon the party punished ; the false prophet converted by the spirit of god working in this great ordinance , doth in the day of his visitation confesse the justice and charity of those officers , who did stigmatize him with wounds in his hands . zach . . as m. cotton doth observe in the ninth chapter of his answer to mr williams , pag. , . moreover , it is most cleare that god doth make use of the magistrate as his minister and instrument for the overawing of the people by inflicting exemplary punishment on such as do speake lies in the name of the lord , blaspheme the name , truth , person of christ , and seduce ( or thrust ) men away from the only true god , father , son , and holy ghost . deut. . , , , , . the morall equity of this command is very evident for the punishing of such as do entice men from the true religion , because there is a reason given which is of general and perpetual equity . thou shalt stone him , because he hath sought to thrust thee away from iehovah thy god. it is now certainly as great a fault to seduce men from father , son , and holy ghost ; nay , a greater fault now , because it is a sin committed against clearer light . and it is of generall and publique concernment to have such great examples made in a nation to make the generality of men affected with an awfull regard of the truth , goodnesse , majesty , and justice of god. for this is gods ordinance to strike the people with such a reverence as shall at least restraine them from this sin . and all israel shall heare and feare , and shall do no more any such wickedness . deut. . . the lord is acquainted with the frame of our hearts and spirits , and he doth propound such remedies as are proper & suitable to our distempers ; and he who doth ordaine such remedies will make them effectual by his own spirit , who doth often sanctifie legal terrours , and outward afflictions , and makes them subservient to spiritual purposes , and therefore these outward weapons are spiritually used , and are of a spiritual efficacy according to the counsell of gods will. when the magistrate as a minister of god draws the sword in the cause of god for the honour of god , according to the ordinance of god expressed in the thirteenth of deuteronomy compared with the thirteenth of zachary , and the thirteenth to the romanes , the sword that is thus drawn is not the sword of gideon only , the sword of man , but the sword of god. and it is certainly most proper to restraine them by the sword , who will not be restrained by any other ordinance of god ; men that have seared consciences have strong passions ; and exemplary punishments will work effectually upon the passion of feare in a self condemned man , when no spiritual physick will work upon him , because all wholsome admonitions are rejected by him . carnall men are ready to pursue a new interest without any new light , or direction from the word of god , and there is no way to ballance these men who are swayed by worldly hopes , but by affrighting them with legall terrours from all those sins , unto which they are tempted by selfe interest in this tempting age , men that will not berusled by law or gospel , or conscience rightly informed by both but do indeed seare their consciences , and harden their hearts both against law and gospel , must be restrained by the sword , because they are unconscionable ; shame and feare will worke upon men that have any manner of ingenuity remaining in them . vi. we must distinguish between the object and the end of the magistrates power . . the immediate object of the magistrates power is externall , the body and outward goods of his subjects . . the immediate end of the magistrates power , is to preserve and promote the peace and welfare of a nation in its civill society ; but the ultimate end is for the support and furtherance of godlinesse and honesty . no christian magisrate ought to aime lower in any nation , unto which the means of grace hath been offered by the special providence and favour of god ; put all together and you have the adaequate end of the civill power of christian magistrates over all in their dominions , who have given up their names to jesus christ. the apostles themselves , and the churches planted by them , begged this favour of god for kings in their time ( when you know who they were that governed the world ) that god would so far over-rule their rulers , that the christians might lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godlinesse and honesty . tim. . . but it is readily acknowledged that there are some magistrates who are ignorant of truth and godlinesse , and therefore are not able to performe the whole duty of magistrates : but our next conclusion is ; vii . all magistrates ought to study the truth and worship of jesus christ , that they may be instructed in the principles of christianity , and made wise enough to discern between fundamental truths , and damnable errors , that they may not by following their own blind and erroneous consciences countenance heresie and apostacy , and persecute truth and fidelity . be wise therefore o ye kings ; be instructed ye iudges of the earth ; serve the lord with feare , and rejoyce with trembling ; kiss the son least he be angry and ye perish from the way , &c. psal. . , , . compared with deut. . , , , . and tim. . . and surely it is then no great task for any magistrate who hath given up his name to christ , to learne the principles of the christian religion , whereby he hopes for to be saved , that he may be able to judge and punish such blasphemous and seducing hereticks as endeavour to subvert the christian faith . viii . god doth freely reveale and communicate himself to all true-hearted magistrates who seek unto him in his own way for direction and instruction in those weighty points which they are bound to know both as servants , ( and as civill ministers ) of god for their own , and their subjects everlasting good . hezekiah did prevent the priests and levites , and for ought we read , the whole church also , in discovering the right way of reformation in matters of religion after that general apostacy in the days of ahaz ; read chr. . from verse . to verse . and it is generally conceived , that david was the first that did discover that great disorder in carrying the arke of god in a cart : read the fifteen first verses of i chron. , and take special notice of the , , , . verses . none ought to carry the arke of god but the levites , for them hath the lord chosen to carry the arke of god : and to minister to him for ever , &c. ix . christian magistrates have no other rule of civil righteousness prescribed unto them by god , then that which god gave by moses , and such as have expounded moses in the scriptures of truth . this one proposition fully explained and confirmed would put an end to this unhappy controversie between all judicious and ingenuous men . we cannot in equity extend the law of moses to such as never entred into any covenant with god , nor to any that are led away in their simplicity before they have been better instructed and admonished once and again ; nor to such as do in a christian and peaceable way dissent from their brethren in points of lesse consequence ; but we extend the law of moses to seducing apostates , blasphemous hereticks , and idolatours , who are obstinate against light and admonition , and poyson others , or endeavour to poyson them with doctrines which do subvert faith and holiness in heart or life , that they may be punished according to their several demerits . i need not say any thing of such disturbances of the civil peace as tend to the destruction of the lives or soules of men . hierome tells us that because arius who was but a sparke of fire in alexandria , was not quenched presently , he kindled a flame which devoured almost the whole christian world. and yet it is cleare that the church had done their part against him , for he was twice excommunicated out of the church of alexandria , as socrates , sozomen , and divers others of the ancient writers relate . and therefore when spirituall instructions , admonitions , censures , will do no good upon these self-condemned persons they are even ripe for civill censures . when the wolves come into the sheepfold , the sheep run to the shepheard ; the magistrate is a civil shepheard , ( as is confessed by all ) and the civil shepheard hath some dogs at his command to hunt away these wolves , at least out of the sheepfold , least they worry and destroy the sheep . x. a toleration of seducing apostates , blasphemous hereticks , and idolatours , by the civill powers , hath exceedingly strengthened the hands of antichrist , and been very prejudicial to the church of christ i am not at leasure now to relate the mischiefes which happened in the days of constantius , valens , iulian , and others , who were patrons of seducing apostates and blaspheming hereticks . iulian thought that a toleration of heresies , and a suppressing of the schooles of learning ( that none of the christians might be able to confute them ) was the most speedy and effectual course to blot the christian name from under heaven . for this sacrilegious liberty ( as * augustine doth well observe ) would soon overthrow the power of christianity . xi . the toleration of blasphemous heretikes , seducing apostates and grosse idolatours hath too often introduced a persecution of saints . apostates are of all others the most keen and bloudy persecutours , witnesse iulian. and when subtile seducers are tolerated , they will quickly be countenanced , employed , preferred ; and then woe be to all orthodoxe saints , i meane men ●ound in the faith , holy in life , and peaceable in their conversation . the toleration of seducers made the world turne arian , as ecclesiasticall writers shew ; and the toleration of seducers made the world antichristian , as mr. cotton proves . and how the christian world hath been , not onely shaken , but even broken by the arian , and e●tychian persecutions , by the insurrection of the macedonians in greece , and by the antichristian warres and persecutions for many hundred years , is evidently proved by sad and experimentall demonstrations . when king james did tolerate papists , he did persecute puritans , as they then called men that were seriously and invincibly pious . when seducers get head , they strengthen their party by force , aswell as fraud , and oppose such as dissent from their damnable errours , as the circumcellians did with clubs and swords , or as zedekiah did micaiah with his fists . muncer , becold &c. who were so tender and careful to preserve the tares , would not suffer the wheat to grow till harvest . xii . we must distinguish ( as judicious davenant did ) between tolerable and intolerable errours ; simple , and complicate errours , as others speak : there are corrigible and incorrigible heretikes , some hereticks are but perverted and they are teachable , others are subverted , men that are smitten with a spirit of obstinacy , impenitent and self-condemned men , condemned formally by their own conscience , or virtually by their proud and stubborn contempt of christian admonition , and their voluntary rejection of plaine truths , that they may enjoy their beloved errours and their haereticall lusts ; men whose lives are as full of atheisme as their assertions of blasphemy ; seducing heretikes , who endeavour to thrust away others from the beliefe or worship of the only true god , father , son , and holy ghost . the calvinists do not say that any one ought to be put to death for simple heresie ; as the reverend and learned professours of leyden shew in their censure of the arminian confession . and on the otherside the lutherans * grant that seditious blasphemous seducing heretikes idolators and apostates are when they grow incorrigible , to be punished with death , aswell as sorcerers , traytours or adulterers . let them name one of us ( saith a beza ) if they can , who saith that all heretikes ought to be put to death , or that calls every one heretike who dissents from him in some pro●itable , but not fundamentall points . servetus ( saith b mr. calvin ) might have saved his life , if hee had been a modest heretike . c master cotton approves the decree of the senate of geneva for punishing of servetus with death . no judicious protestant will affirme that errours are to be confuted with fire , and faggot , but with meeknesse of wisedome expressed in faithfull instructions and admonitions : our reasons are spirituall , and if the magistrate draw the sword in gods name , it is not to punish simple errour ; but to smite some intolerable errour , that is , twisted and complicated with blasphemy , apostacy , obstinacy , or some such sins as are eminent in seducing heretikes , and destructive to the soules , religion and peace of christians . some erroneous persons have the itch , and some the plague ; some of them are melancholike , and some of them are mad , and mad men must be bound , or at least not permitted to walk abroad without their keeper . the itch and the plague are both infectious , but they are not both alike dangerous ; and nothing is more clear in point of civill-government , then that magistrates should not suffer any to go about with plague-sores running on them . seducing apostates , blasphemous heretikes , and grosse idolators do not only subvert order and peace , but faith & piety , they infect , nay poyson souls . xi●i . the glory of god , the good of soules , the happinesse of christian societies are irresistible motives to quicken the magistrate to act ( against such dangerous persons as we have described according to the law of judgement , and their different demerits ) in faith and love. . in faith ; for the christian magistrate doth not act like himself , if he doth not performe acts of civill-justice in faith. and it is cleare that if there be no morall equity in any of the judiciall lawes in the old testament , and there are none at all extant in the new : the christian magistrate cannot performe any act of civill-justice in faith , but it is indeed too evident to be denyed , that all divine lawes which concern the punishment of morall transgressions , are of perpetuall obligation , and therefore still remaine in force according to their substance and generall equity , abstracted from speciall circumstances , typicall accessories , and the old formes of mosaicall politie , for . these divine lawes are not expired in their own nature . . they are not repealed by god. . the authority of the law-giver is the same under both administrations , old and new ; the consciences of christians aswell as jewes , are subject to his soveraigne and perpetuall jurisdiction . . the matter of the lawes is morall , and very agreeable to the dictates of nature , as doth appeare by the severall lawes and decrees of heathens . dan. . . ezra . . . , , . ezra . . . . . compared with numb . . , . levit. . , . deut. . , . zach. . , . seducing , poysoning , slaying of soules is by the law of nature and nations the worst of injuries . . the reason of these divine lawes is immutable , and that reason is sometimes expressed and declared : but it is not necessary that there should be any expresse ratification of every morall law in the new testament , which is plainly delivered in the old. . these divine lawes are independent on the will of man , and therefore indispensable mans authority . ii. the magistrate is to act in christian love and charity against these dangerous men . it is mercy to drive away the wolfe , and cruelty to spare him : there must be so much fatherly love shewen to the souls of christians to the ●●ttle flock , as to preserve them from wolves and foxes . hee who loves christ , the christian religion , the souls and peace of christians , will not beare the sword in vaine ; his head , heart , hand , bowels will keep time in working according to the written rule . xiv . the happinesse of civill societies aswell as church assemblies doth much depend upon the punishing of antichristian heretikes , seducing apostates , &c. according to the nature and measure of their offences . in all civil states whose acts are recorded in sacred or profane stories , the magistrates were to have a care not only of justice & honesty , but of that religion also which they estemed divine for the good & happinesse of their civil state , though it is no wonder if the heathens did misapply this zealous instinct of nature , to the maintenance of superstition and idolatry , of a false religion and false gods. socrates , theodorus and protagoras , famous philosophers , were all three condemned at athens by the law against irreligion . but let us look into christian states . when the means of instruction and reformation have been vouchsafed to a people that are in covenant with god , and they corrupt the truth and worship of god ; the lord doeth not onely punish degenerate churches , but even civill states , princes and people for this spiritual pollution . the turke was let loose from the river euphrates to punish the worshippers of imamages , rev. . . . the flourishing of religion , is the flourishing of the civill state ; and the decay of religion , the decay and ruine of the civil state according to the ordinary dispensations of god. when christ had rode through the roman state on the white horse of his gospel of grace , and was rejected , then followed the red horse of warre , the black horse of famine , and the pale horse of pestilence and other deadly plagues , rev. . from the . to the vers . can any christian state hope upon scripture grounds , that it shall enjoy honour , health , riches , peace , safety , settlement , if faith and piety be overthrowen by the indulgence of that state , if seducers bee permitted to poyson soules , to teach damnable doctrines , and perswade men to deny the lord that bought them , to deny his divine nature and subsistence , his offices and the efficacy of them ; nay , his very redemption by way of purchase , by way of proper and alsufficient satisfaction as the socimans do ? the patience and bounty of god acting as it were by praerogative is gloriously manifested in our dayes , but surely no christian state can be secured by a councell or an army which permits men to live without christ , without god in the world , without any spirituall communion with god in his coeternall son by his coessentiall spirit . woe be to us if we neglect so great salvation as is yet offered to us in this day of grace . xv. the church as a church hath no sword ; it doth therefore belong to the magistrate to smite with the sword , but the church may exhort the magistrate to doe his duty . kings . . xvi . we must distinguish between christian forbearance , vouchsafed to weak brethren , that they may live quietly in all godlinesse and honesty : and antichristian indulgence extended to blasphemous heretikes and seducing apostates , that they may live quietly in all ungodlinesse and dishonesty to the infection and seduction of others . the kings shall bee rewarded for burning ▪ and god praised for judging the seducing whore . but judicious mr. cotton . is afraid that the antichristian whore will steale in at the back-doore of a toleration . xvii . gospel-dispensations are as spirituall for the conversion of sorcerers , adulterers , murtherers , as for recovery of blasphemous heretiks and seducing apostates , and therefore they who plead for the toleration of these obstinate persons in hope of their conversion , doe indeed proclaime a generall pardon for all malefactours , save such only as sin against the holy ghost . xviii . they who permit men to deny supernaturall principles , do permit them to overthrow the gospel , which is not writen in our hearts by nature as the law is . and yet it should be considered that they who deny the gospel , do consequently sin against the light of nature , because they make god a liar by rejecting the testimony of g●d concerning his son. . ioh. . . they who did seduce men from the beliefe and worship of god as revealed in the old testament , were to die the death ; and yet the old testament is as divine and supernaturall a revelation as the new testament it self . and it is cleare that god did reveale himselfe in christ , even in the old testament , for there is much gospell in the law , and the prophets ; because all the law and the prophets bare witnesse of christ , and moses ( saith our saviour ) wrote of me . if then there be an indulgence granted to such as deny supernaturall truths , men may overthrow both the old and new testament , and be antiscripturists without controule : nay it wil if this absurdity be granted , clearly follow , that the magistrate may punish such severely who deny the truths which are wrote in aristotle , but must not touch them who deny all the supernaturall mysteries of faith written in the book of god ; blush ye heavens , and be ashamed o earth at the atheisticall libertinisme of this licentious age . seducers who did thrust men out of the way which the lord commanded them by his written word to walk in , were put to death , deut. . , . though they were directed by a supernaturall revelation , to walk in that way reverend mr. burroughs doeth often acknowledge in his irenicum , that such as professe christianity , are justly punished for sinning against the common light of christianity , for it is not conscience , but the devil in the conscience which moves christians to maintaine errours against the light of christianity , errours that are destructive to the christian religion ; and if any man hath a minde to be an advocate for the devil , i dare not be an advocate for him ; only i desire him to beware how he hearkens to the divell in samuels mantle , and beseech him to cry mightily to him who alone can cast out devills , to cast the devil out of his conscience , & place himself there as on a throne , that he may rule the conscience , and command the whole man by his word & spirit . xix . he that by seducing seeks to thrust men away from the beleife and worship of the only true god , father , son , and holy ghost , doth deserve to be punished for his very attempt and endeavour to subvert soules , though he doth not prevaile with one soule to depart from god. because he hath sought to thrust thee away from jehovah thy god deut. . . the very murtherous attempt of killing a soule by abusing , an ordinance of god , corrupting of religion , telling lyes in the name of the lord , fathering our own damnable lyes upon the holy ●pirit , is a capitall crime . xx. christians are in a worse condition then the jewes were , if men may seduce our wives and children into such opinions and practices as will certainly undoe their souls to all eternity , and wee must onely intreat them not to seduce our friends to hell , and the christian magistrate hath no power to punish these soule murthering seducers . this argument is affectionately pressed by sweet mr. burroughs in his book of heart divisions , pag. . . i have much more to deliver upon this weighty point ; but i remember what hugo said , that it is best at some time to say nothing , at every time to say enough , but at no time to say all . ma finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e tertul. apolog ▪ cap. . lactant. epiphan ▪ cicero l. . de finibus . de authoritate verborum jo. . . rob. stephanus senior , & iunior . ms optimae sidei . hieron . prob. in epist. cathol . hieron . epist. ad marcel . ult . bedae translatio laborat . cyprian . de unitate ecclesiae . tertul. praescript . antichrist . racoviens . vide cat. racoviens . scripta socini , moscorovii , crel●ii . volklii , smalcii , goslavii . alcuinū de trinitate in praefatione ad carolum magnum . schlusselbergium de haeresibus , stegmannum , junium , zanchium , gomarum , voetium de trinitate . a act. concil . nicen. nicer . the saur . orth. fid l. . & haeres . . epiph. haeres . . aug. de haeres . c. . b vide damasceni epistolam de trisagi● & l. . de orthod . fide c. . meursii lexicon graeco-ba●barum : baronii annal. ad annum § , . . suspectae fidei est trismegisti auctoritas . antichrist . romanus . vid optat. adversus parmen . lib. . arist. eth. l. . c. . vide max. tyrii dissertat . . alcin. de doctrinâ plat. cap. ultimo . causaub . proleg . in baronium , d. alting ▪ problem . tertium de theologiâ scholasticâ ab a. c. . ad . à lancfranco ad herenum , ab hereno ad lutherum . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . b cicero l. . ad . atticum . notes for div a -e periculosum nobis est tot nunc fides existere , quot voluntates , dum aut ita fides scribuntur ut volumus , aut ut volumus intelliguntur . hilarius . a verbis consecratis utendum quintil. the judgment of god upon scoffing atheists . in animâ dicuntur esse , quae sunt in eâ per modum quietis ; reliqua potius dicuntur esse ab animâ , quàm in animâ , vide bonavent . lib. . dist . . d. pocockii specime●n hist. arab. pag. . annot. pag. . & . d. pocock● annot. pag. . pag. . sunt ex al●shiisqui hominum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 statuerūt . vide d. pocockii annot. p. . apr. . . this act shall not extend to the revenues of any publik professor or reader in either of the vniversities . ad laudem & honorem sanctae & individuae trinitatis , ac fidei & christianorum augmentum . * see weemse vo . . expos . of the judiciall law , cap. . faithfull presbyterians described and commended . grounds of an happy union between godly men of both perswasions . si vultis vivere de spiritu sancto , tenete charitatem , amate veritatem , desiderate unitatem , ut perveniatis ad aeternitatem . aug. godly independents do acknowledge parochiall churches to be true churches of christ. statesmen and sword-men have kept godly presbyterians and independents at too great a distance upon reasons of state. caveats for men of both perswasions an expedient desired for an happy union between presbyterians and independents dum propter haec alter alteri anathema esse caepit , nemo penè christi est . hilarius . caveats for statesmen remonstr . decem. . . jer. . , , . catholike charity , c. . p. , . l. in test. dig. de testibus . gen. . . mat. . . notes for div a -e a proverbia etiam non christianis familiaria apud tertullianum , deus videt deus reddet , si deus voluerit , quod deus dederit , deo commendo , deus inter nos judicabit , &c. id ipsum de monstrant . summum illud & aeternum neque mutabile neque interiturum . tacitus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . thales 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . philemon . nec vero deus qui intelligitur a nobis alio modo intelligi potest quàm mens soluta quaedam & libera segregata ab omni concretione mortali , omnia sentiens & movens . cicero . plato in phaedro & lib. . de legibus . vide clem. alexand. lib. . stromat . gen. . jam. . . rom. . , . vide sis dicta poetarum apud stobaeum ab . h. grotio emendata . aquin. contra gent. r. de sabunde de theologia naturali . a. s. eugubinus de perenni philosophiâ . g. pacardum de theolog. naturali . p. mornaeum . aug. de civit. dei. theodoret . de curand . graec. affectibus clem. alexand. basilium , &c. b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , uti antiphanes socraticus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 xenophon . c tunc dignè deum aestimamus cùm inaestimabilē dicimus . haebreorum deum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocat lucianus . dion cassius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ineffabilem & inconspicuum . theologia notitias naturales excolit , & confirmat . deus elegit stulta mundi ad confusionem philosophiae . tertul. praescript . adversus haereticos theologia non subjicitur philosophiae sed praeficitur . catechismus negat philosophi●m non philosophia catechismum , lu●her . vera philosophia est naturalis theologia ; concurrit gemina patefactio , naturalis & supernaturalis , gemina authoritas , gemina lux . haec itaque loquendicausâ de ineffabilibus diximus ut fari aliquo modo possemus quod effari nullo modo possumus . vide aug. de trinitate lib. . c. . qui vult sapiens fieri in aristotele , stultificetur ante in christo. lutherus . tunc stultus plato cum suis discipulis , &c. tertul. d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . nihil praestantius deo ; ab eo igitur mundum regi necesse est . cicero . vide que operum initio extant apud hesiodum . si deus est animus nobis ut ca●mina ●●cunt , &c. e vide just. mar. protrep . lactan . euseb . de praeparat . evan. aug. de civit. d●i , de doct christiana hiera●ym . epistola ad magnum oratorem mar●il . f●cinum . alcin. de doctrina platonis . b●ssarion . va●es . de phil●● . sacr. l. s. fugubinum , lemnium , al●iedium , philonem iudaeum l●actan ium , isidorum , aug. contra academ . cor. ag●ip . de van. scien● . d. alting . problem . vo●tium select . di●p . p. . videlium r●t . theol. ricetum in exod. p . gat●k . lib. p. . amel. pl●ton , iustin. martyr . apol. . tertu● . apol. c. . f vid. senec . l. . natural . qu. de deo etiam vera dicere periculosum est . g excedit supereminentia deitatis humani eloquii facultatem . veri●●s enim cogitatur deus quàm dicitur : et veriùs est quàm cogitatur . august . de trinit . lib . h 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . heraclitus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. philemen . notes for div a -e i omnes creaturae plus habent non-entis . quā entis . k deus solus est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quia se , & per se est , a quo , in quo , per quem & propter quem sunt quaecunque sunt ; omnia quippe deus aut in tempore sustentat in ipsis , aut aeternùm in se. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l qui v●rè , necessariò & absolutè est essentia primò & per se est , imò a seipso , & per seipsum existit , & proinde non potest non existere . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . rev. . vide hieronym . epist . ad marcel . de x. dei nominibus . m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . sept. n vid. heronym . ad eph. c. . o omnia tempo●a conjuncti de deo dicta aeternitatem connotant . rev. . . p futurum trium temporum differentias ●n se continet . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . qui erat , qui est , & semper est , uti epiphanius contra archonticos . futurum perseverantiam essendi denotat & independentiam . q ainsw . on exod. . . d. riv. on the same place r 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . rom. . . notes for div a -e s dogmata theologica non sunt vera quia ecclesia ita testatur , sed quia deus ita testatur in scripturis aeternae veritatis . t vide nazian● . lib. . de theologiâ . epiphanium apostolicos redarguentem . chrysost. in cor. cap. . basilium in ethicis . u cyrillus lib. de trinit . & personâ christi . a wegel . edit . x vide clem. alex . stromat . lib. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . y vide basil . ascet. reg. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . nihil est de fide nisi quod deus per apostolos & prophetas revelavit , aut quod inde evidenter deducitur . bellarm. l . de verbo dei c. . z vide salmer . in epist. ad timoth. disput. . a phot. biblioth . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 b vide cyrill . de trinit . & pers . christi c. . theodoret. epit. divin . dogm . c. de spiritu sancto . damasc . orth . fid . l. . naz. orat . . in laudem heronis . athan. de decret . synod . nicen . eundem epist . ad serapion . & de sentent . greg. nyssen . dyons . contra eunom . tertul. adversus praxaean . theodoret. dialog . . cap. . nazianzen . orat . . de spiritu sancto . epiphan . contra sabel . basilium contra eunomium , sabellium , arium . cyprian . lib. . adversus judaeos ad quinirum , cap. . august . contra maximin . bellarm. de verbo dei l. . c. . c quod expresse non habetur in scripturis , potest tamen inde evidenter deduci . vocabulum in scripturis non legimus ; rem cui hoc vocabulum recte adhibitum est , fideique sensum invenimus . vide augustinum epist. . ubi contra pascentium arianum dispurat . eundem insuper in ioannem tract . . ambrosium lib. de fide contra , aria nos cap. . augustinum contra maximinum arian . theod. hist. lib. . c. . basil. contra eunom . c. . tractat. definit . tom. . athanas. notes for div a -e d greg. nyssen . contra eunom . lib. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. e job . . pro. . . isa. . . gal. . . phil. . . col. . . the subsistence of the godhead . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the three divine subsistences . . the subsistence of the father . . the subsistence of the son. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . vide d. davenant . in coloss. . . iesus christ is truly god. the divine titles of jesus christ , prove his person to be divine , and one of the natures united in his person to be divine . f isa. . . en infantem aeternitatis patrem , en parvulum optimum maximum , deum maximum . g christ is iehovah and therfore he is god. ehié jehovâ & quod ex eo contractum est i●h ab hajâ vel havâ ( esse ) derivantur , essentiam infinitam notant . nomen itaque jehovae ( cui reliqua duo sunt aequalia ) deo proprium est . gomarus oper . par . . disp . . de deo vero . iesus christ is immanuel h epiphan . contra apostolicos . vide cyril . lum in ioh. cap. . & . hiuro . in zach. . ambr. l. . de fide cap. . aug. contra pascen tium ; nemo igitur jam calumniaturde verbo ; et si enim verbum ipsum in lege scriptum non reperitur , res tamen reperitur , ego et pater unum sumus epist. . i 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . john . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . john . . vide d. glassium in explic orat . christi . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . k 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. epiph. contra sabellium divine attributes are ascribed to christ. eternity . micah . . from the dayes of eternity . iohn . . omnipotence . immutability . omniscience . immensity . prov. . . ioh. . . . matth. . matth. . . divine works . iohn . . horsum profuit personae dignitas , ut irae infinitae onus sustineret , & sufficiens 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esset . isa. . . act. . heb. . . . . divine honour due to christ. rom. . . cor. , . joh. . . psal. . . ro. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . cor. . v. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . rom. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . joh. . . the divine nature and person of the holy ghost . . divine titles . m christus est potentia dei 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . spiritus sanctus est potentia dei 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vide gomarum disp. de trinit . tom. . disp. . & . divine titles which prove the nature & person of the spirit to be divine . num. . heb. . . pet. . . cor. . . . cor. . . compared together cor. . , . . divine attributes . the omnipotence of the spirit . . divine works of the spirit . the omniscience of the spirit . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rom. . . cor. . . joh. . . the omnipresence of the spirit . rom. . tim. . . cor. . rom. . . cor. . ●● thes . vide basilium . lib. de spiritu sancto . vide nazianzen . orat. & testimoniorum examē de deita●e spiritus sancti inventes . petrum damianū lib. . epi cor. . , . rom. . . . pe● . . . cor. . , . eph. . . . vide aug. cont . maximinum . acts . isai . . ephe. heb , galath . . . . rom . . . thess. . . cor. . . matth. . . john . the unity of the godhead . a deus unus , t● inu●us , solus , unicus , simplicissime unús , unicissime unicus . the father son and holy spirit all three are but one onely god. john . john . unitatem essentiae contra arianos , trinitatem personarum contra sabellianos tuemur . tres substantias esse dixerunt , subsistentium personas per substantias edocentes , non substantiam patris et filije● spiritus sancti diversitate dissimilis essentiae separantes ex c●n●il . anti●chen . hilar. de synodo adversus arianos . c we do not only acknowledge a trinity , but a trinunity in opposition to the errour of the tritheites . vnum & trinum de monstrant trinunum deum simplicissimè unicum . i●h . . . hi tres sunt unus ille deus , trinunus deus , infinitum , hoc est , summe & absolutè perfectum , non potest esse nisi unum . si ●nus potest emnia , quid opus est pluribus diis ? omnia autem potest deus trinunus . deus est trinunus , est unus absolute , trinus relate ; unus quoad essentiam , trinus quoad subsistentiam . * see mr. fry his answer to the charge of blasphemy and errour &c. p. ▪ . d deus ita est unus , ut etiam ●it solus , & ita solus ut non possit esse alius . en naturam infinitam summē unam , & unicissimè unicā . e deus non tam unus numero dicendus est , quàm unicus . pater & filius sunt unum potius , quàm unus . ioh. . . sunt inquies unus deus , imò potius sunt idem unicusque deus . f personae coessentiiales & in se m●tuò subsistentes inconfusè uniuntur , & indivisè discernuntur . g 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . h natura divina est singularissima , & simplicissimè uni●a . i non minus individuum est essentia divina quàm persona . d. al●ing . problem . k natura divina est simplicissimè singularis , & tamen communis patri , filio & spiritui sancto . nec mirum , cùm ●it simplicissimè & perfectissimè infinita . cor. . , . tim. . eph. . l christus ipse dicit patrem suum esse illum unum solum verum deum eti●m respectu sui . seipsum namque ibidem nominat atque à patre distinguit . so●inu● in tract . de deo , christo , & spiritu sancto . catechis . racoviens . cap . p. . socin . libro quod evangelici &c. joh. . . john . . opened at large . m en structuram grammaticam [ ut cognoscant te illum solū verum deum ] non autem [ ut cognoscant solū te , illum veru● deum . ] n en structuram logicam , particula exclusiva solum non cohaeret cum subjecto , sed cum praedicato , pater est ille deus , qu● solus verus deus est . o distinctionem personalem concedimus , essentialem negamus . hi qui tres sunt personaliter , sunt unum essentialiter . * non enim sensus est , solus verus pater est deus , sed pater est sol●s ve●us deus praeter quem non est alius deus . deus est unus et trinus , sed nonsecundum idem , est unus essentiali●er trinus personaliter ; contradictoria enim non affirm●ntur de eodem , si ei tribuantur secundum idem . in essentia divina est alius et alius , non aliud et aliud , alius enim est pater , alius filius , alius spiritus sanctus , hi tres autem sunt potius vnum , quam v●us . i●han . . unus verò deus , non alius pater est ; alius non essentialiter , sed personaliter . vide augustinum de side ad petrum cap. . et de haeresibus . cap. . vide d. salomon , glassium in orat . christ. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 iohan. . p spiritus sanctus est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non relate quá persona procedens , sed absolute quá deus est per essentiam perfectissimam á se ipsâ existentem ; est enim spiritus elohim patri filioque coessentialis et coaequalis . gen. . . q particula exclusiva [ solum ] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non reliquarum trinitatis personarum sed fictitiorum numinum usurpatur , ita ut excludat ea tantum quae extra naturam divinam sunt , et á patre res essentiâ diversae sunt ; eadem autem natura divina est in patre , filio et spiritu sancto . r vt cognoscant te , qui es ille deus , qui solus verus est , quoniam illa est sola deitas vera , quae est in patre , & si● non excluditur filius , qui est in patre unus idem que deus cum patre & spiritu sancto . ioh. . . io. , . s vita aeterna hi● inchoati●● habetur cognoscendo deum per fidem , habetur autem in coelis perfecte cognoscendo deum per visionem . verba de 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vitae intelligenda . vid. cyril . lib. . in johan . hilar ▪ lib. . de tr●n . & lib. . contra iulian. ambr●s . lib. . de fide . t vita aeterna est solummodo in vero & aeterno deo , in summo bono , uti ambrosius cont . arianos . isa. . , , . compared with heb. , , . joh. . . act. . . * o iehovah justitia nostra . jer. . . ps. . , , . compared with ephes. . . isa. . , . compared with rom . , . u secundu● philosophum lolus . dem est quod non cum alio , & ideo tantummodo ●xcludit 〈◊〉 quod a●etatem d●cit ; filius auten● non est alius à p●re nessentia , sed tantu● in p●●sona . lyra us in lo●●m . vide aug. traect . . in ohan . athanas. d●sp●t . co●●a artum in concil . nicen. nazianz. orat . . ambros. lib de fide . basil. lib. . cont . eunomium . cyp●ian ● . . advers . iudaen sad quriaum . vide d. glassium in cap. . iohan. * vid. aug. de prae l●st . ●●nct . cap . q●icquid est ess●ntiae d●vine & d●nomin●●ionis ab● a , non ●nus de filio & ●piritu sancto , quam de ipso ●atre enuntiatur a o●n a trinitatis opera ad extra sunt inseparabilia . ex. . . b non en dei proprium in medio ejus h. e. est propr●um ejus atqueintimum . d. glassius de trinitate p. . christus nondum carne vestitus nomen ngeli assumpsi● , p opter familiarem cùm populocō municationem ; ●omen autem jehovae retinuit . jud. . . , , , ▪ . c. , , , . cap. . . . o● . , . gen. , . zach. ▪ , , . cor. . . calv. instit. lib. . c. . c isa. . . christus est deus in propitiatorio super cherubim manifestatus . rom. . . rex regum rev. . . qui fecit caelum , & terram . john . . heb. . , . coloss. . ergo christus etiam est deus ille solus , i●em unicus que cum pa●re deus . isa. . , . mal. . . jer. . , . & jer. . . rom. . , , . john . . notes for div a -e . the excellency of god the father . a en cultum propriè evangelicum , concord● , deum ac patrem domini nostri jesu christi concorditer colimus , uno ore uti christianos decet glorificamus . the excellency of god the son. b en patris hypostasin in filio refulgentem : en filii hypostasin eum à patre distinguentem . c vitam d●d●t pater filio ver ▪ subsist●ntem non alicnat . one , sed communicatione . john . . john . joh. . . john . . . d qui accipit vitā subsistentem , accipit vitam independentem : dare vitam non arguit ullam causalitatem , accipere vitam non arguit ullam dependent an● ; & pr●inde in deo non ●●noris perfectionis est esse filium , quam esse patrem . pater enim necessitate naturali generat filium , filius eandem naturam ●abet cum pat●e non ex gratiâ vel indolgentiâ patris ; non est enim precatio deus ; atura divina in filio est incausata , independens , & per 〈◊〉 eadem natura divina quae est in pa●re ; ipsa etiam subsistentia quam accipit filius est sibi naturaliter de bita . epist. joh. ver . . iii. the excellency of god the holy ghost . deus est personaliter spiritus sanctus . e temporalis operationis sigillum , aeternae spirationis fignum , johan . . * si ex lignis & lapidibus templum spiritui facete juberemur , quia cultus hic so●● deo debetur , clarum esset divinitatis ejus argumentum ▪ nunc ergo quanto clarius istad est , quod non templum illi facere sed nos ipsi esse debemus ? augustin . ad maximin . epist. . f subtractâ subsistentia spir●tus s●ncti de●s ●esincret esse personal●ter spiritus sanctus ; & proinde ista s●b●actio est impossibilis , imo ipsa etiam supposi●io su●ilis , quia tanta est tam essentiae divinae quàm personarum perfectio ut nec pauciores nec plures esse possint . g tres personae divinae non disti●guuntur secundum esse absolutum , sed per proprietates relativas d●gno●●untur ; & proinde distinctio est tantum respectiva , & modalis . h deus immensu est non voluntatis libertate sed naturae necessitate ; essentia divina est tota intra omnia , tota extra omnia , nusquam inclusa , nusquam exclusa , omnia continens , à nullo contenta . i deus ingenium nostr●●● ad 〈◊〉 one suspēsam tenet & 〈◊〉 nostra efficaci sen su penitus afficit , ut deficientes sub ejus magn●●u dine ad opera intimiora re ●piciamus ejusque re ficiamur bonitate aug. in ps. . k aug. de praedest . sanct. c. . * actiones sunt suppositorum . l 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , naz. orat● de bapt. . m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . n quiquid de naturale est perfectissimū est ; aequè necessariū est esse tres personas deitatis , quàm est , essentiam divinam esse unicā , & proinde aeque perfectum est unum atque alterum , quia utrūque naturale & proinde substantiale ; ipse etiam respectus inter personas divinasest substantialis , naturalis , mutuus , simultaneus , necessarius , aeternus , in singulis autem singularis . o divina essentia ad suam summam perfectionem sine personisesse ne quit , nec personar● una sine alterâ obintimam relationē . bisterfell contra crellium lib. . sect. . cap. . p qui naturá deus est , verus deus est : qui verus deus est , naturá deus est . q q●icquid deo naturale est aeternum est . r omnia à patre tanquam primo principio personali esse dicuntur , et proinde omnia ad ips●m ut primum principium personale re●erunt●r . s iohn . . john . rom. . . john . pet. . . . cor. . . eph. . . col. . . t trinitas non est conjunctio dei unius ( scil . dei patris ) cum duabus rebus creatis , filio nimirum spirituque unus deus est , unus est baptismus , una fides in patrem , filium , spiritum ; deum unum unicum unicissimum . u propius seipsum cognoscendum deus exhibet , quando in unica essentia tres nobis personas considerandas proponit . colonius . notes for div a -e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . phil. . v. . a justinian . edict . de fide. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . b solis personis divinis ob infinitam & simplicem essentiam convenit in essentiâ subsistere . nulla enim persona angelica vel humana subsistit in natura vel essentiâ . c persona propriè est quid concretum ex essentiâ intelligente & personalitate . d abstracta faelicius intelliguntur mentione subjectorum . intellectus potiùs de concretis omnia praedicit quàm de abstractis ▪ quia actiones sunt suppositorum . created persons . e de naturâ & personis divinis ex lumine rationis fer● nihil dici potest ; mysterium de deo trin-uno universam transcendit philosophiam . f vide ch●̄nitium ●e trinitate c. . g persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia ▪ boehbius l. de duabus naturis & una persona christi ▪ h philos. distinctionem naturae & personae vix intelligebant , quia nihil de mysterio incarnationis audiebant . i laurentius valla. lib. . elegant . in deo poni personam , quod verè deo sit triplex qualitas , tales qualitates statuo in deo & has dico esse personas . k vide sis soaligerum in oratione de verbo inepti satis inepte disserentem . in epist . p. . l bellarm. lib . de christo. cap. . an uncreated person . m nulla persona est purus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sive existendimodus , & mera proprietas , vel relatio ; triniratē imprudenter tollunt qui patrē filium & spiritū sanctum tres existendi modos definiunt ; sunt enim personae coessentia●es a ca●olus magnus apud genebrardū cap. . liturgiae ; pater prima , est divinitatis persona in quâ ▪ caeterae duae naturaliter manentes existunt . b quicquid patri proprium & peculiare est , patri sano modo naturale dicitur ; est enim perfectio rela●iva patri quà sic natur●liter debita , tanquam primo principio perso●al● . c ●aivinus personas divinas proprietates vocavit , sed nudas proprietates esse negavit . d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quicquid tribus commune est cum pr●prietate habet peculiari . proprietatibus dignoscuntur personae , non constituuntur , e vide bisterf . de uno deo , &c. lib. . §. . cap. . essentia divina est modo substantiali modifica●a ; subsistentia enim est modus substantialis , qui ab ipsa essentia divina separari nequit , imò persona divina est ipsam et essentia divina certo modo se habens . est enim persona divina ipsissima essentia modificata . persona autem non est essentia simpliciter , sed cum modo subsistendi considerata . vide d. alting . loc. com. part. . & problem . calv. inst. l. . c. . bezam . part . . quaest . & homil. prima adversus sacramentarios . zanchium de tribus elohim . melancton . loc. com. polanum in syntag. chamierum de trinitate . lib. . cap . f 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . persona divina est ipsamet natura divina peculiari modo se habens . g persona directè denotat subsistentiam , consequenter connotatnaturā . vasquèz . persona est individuum subsistens vivum , intelligens , incommunicabile , independendens , non sustentatū ab alio nec pars alterius . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . persona est suppositū intelligens persona in concreto naturam includit , quia persona naturam participat , & personalitas est substantiae sive naturae modus substantialis & separabilis , rarissime autem separatus . persona est substantia completa intelligens , per se subsistens ▪ incommunicabilis , & independens . h persona conficitur ex essentia & proprietatibus distinctivis ita ut quaelibet persona in se sit perfecta substantia . vide hilarii sermon . in f●st . s. trinitatis . i persona subsistit per se ; accidentia autem sunt in alio ; ex natura substantiali & accidentibus non potest fieri unum per se. vide ferrariens . contra . gen. . c. . k aristot. categor . cap. . l complementum personae dicit negationem unionis cōmunicationis & dependentiae tum aptitudinalis tū actualis , ut omnes partes tam integrantes quàm essentiales ipsaque etiam anima separata à ratione personae excludantur . vide joannem de neapoli in quodlibet . m vide suarez . disp. . sect. . n. . n existentia communicabilis non potest este subsistentia personalis . tria sunt in supposito ; natura , existentia , & subsistentia , sive personalitas . pantusa . natura humana existit in personâ divina sine propriâ personalitate , non sine propriâ existentiâ . vasquez . natura existens producitur non tantum in supposito proprio sed & in alieno , uti patet de natura humana in christo ; non est enim in christo duplex suppositum . caie●anus . subsistentia est modus positivus & substantialis incommunicabilis & independens , naturae intellectivae , integrae , & completae conveniens . anima rationalis separata habet modum per se , quem non habebat in corpore , sed est incompleta , & habet non tantum obedientialem sed & aptitudinalem dependentiam , quia ex naturâ suâ est forma materiae , & proinde non habet perfectissimum modum subsistondi per se. a non est trinitas modorum , sed personarum coessentialiū trinū itas . b quod excipiunt trinitatē igirur fore sine deo , ex eadem insulsitate nascitur . vide calv. instit. lib. . cap. . sect. . c nam deus ita se praedicat unic● esse ut distinctè in tribus personis considerandum proponat quas nisi tenemus , nudum & inane duntaxat dei nomen sine vero deo in cerebro nostro volitat . calvin . instit. lib. . cap. . §. . d vide calvinum melanct . oecolampadiū , bucanura , d. altingium , d. gomarum . wendelinum , bislerfeldium . persona divina est essenti . ae divinae subsistentia incommunicabilis . personam voco subsistentiam in dei essentiâ , quae ad alios relata , proprietate incommunicabili distinguitur . calv. instit. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . vide cyrillum exposit. fidei orthod . anastasium theopolit . damascen . de orth. fid . lib. . c. . , . persona divina est substantia spiritualis ad alios sibi coestentiales relata , & tamen ab illis incommunicabili proprietate distincta . the godhead is not to be abstracted from the persons or the persons from it the godhead described , not abstracted . de omnibus & sing●lis & solis his tribus personis tota deitas perfecta & omnibus numeris una dicitur . the strange god idolized by some ▪ the single godhead . how the three persons are one god. how the name god is used in scripture . a vox deus de eo proprie dicitur qui naturâ de●s est , & de eo quidem vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 communiter sine certae per●onae determinatione , vel , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de una aliquâ personâ ●er synecdochen . nomen deus sive absolute dicatur de to●â simplicique deitate , sive relate de unâ aliquâ personâ u●am eandemque essentiam designat ; quaelibet enim persona est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & in deo non distinguuntur esse & essentia ; tota de● as est ex se , & à se , & singulae personae sunt ipsissima essentia ●um distinctis relationibus personalibus considerata . created personali ▪ t●es not abstracted . how christ is the character of his fathers person . the person of christ is single and divine . christus non solùm officio deus est , ut blasphemant sociniani , sed naturâ deus est ; coessētialis enim filius est . con●equens est , si in deum credius , & in me cred●re debeatis , quod non esset consequēs si christas non esset deus . iohan . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non est patri peruliaris , sed tribus personis cōmunis . * the unbegotten nature of the only begotten son. † the second person of the godhead . the divine ●erson of the holy ghost . certaine conclusion● concerning divine persons . * the word subsistence explained . * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sumitur pro re per se subsistente , pro supposito intelligente , pro divinâ dei patris subsistenrià , heb. . . f●lius est imago personae patris , est enim filius essentiae ejusdem cū patre , non imago essentiae . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in scripturis frequēter sumitur probasi , seu fundamento quo aliquid nititur , cor. . . cor. . . heb. . . fundamentum in quo spes nostra & gloria nititur . fides etiam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicitur heb. . . ut hypostasis significat essentiam ; haereticoru● est tres hypostases as●erere in divinis . vide theodor. hist. eccles. lib. . c. . patrum consensum hac de re videas apo● damascenum , nazianz. &c. c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 significat naturam verè subsistentem & per se subsistentem hoc est modo perf●ctissimo subsistentem . d hypostatica emphaticis opponuntur , quia omnia hypostatica veram habent essentiam . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . aristot. e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est essentia divina charactere hypostatico insignita , sive proprio subsistendi modo distincta . magnum discrimen est inter personam & proprietatem personae : proprietas patris absoluta , est esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , respectiva esse pa●rem ; persona autem patris est deus filium gignens in unitate essentiae ingenitae . f 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 significat naturam absolutam communem : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 significat naturam subsistentem cum proprietatibu● relativis & distinctivis g personae divinae sunt per se subsistentes ; nihil autem per se subsistit sine subsistentiâ . h subsistentia divina est ipsamet essentia divina peculiari modo se habens ; unius autem essentiae sunt plures modi , sive respectus diversi juxta nostrum concipiendi modû scripturis conformem . singull autem modi singulas essentias non postulant in rebus creatis , & proinde ejusdem essentiae infinitae plures modi & re●pectus diversi esse possunt . i 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 apud craecos logicos personam significat , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non raro essentiam , sed vocum earum in theol. jam fixa est & limitata significatio , & proinde logicos istos nobis 〈◊〉 non licet . the divine persons do most perfectly s●bsist . k aristot ▪ categor . l clamamus , siquis tres hypostases , aut tria 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoc est tres subsisten●es personas non confitetur , anathenia ●it . hieronym . epist . how there are three in on● . & one in three . m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . athan●s . symb. naz. orat . sophron . act . . concil . oecum . sexti . damas. anasta● . syn. how the divine persons subsist by themselvs , and yet in one another . n hypostases dicuntur , nulla tamen est in divinis personis suppositio vel subjectio , sed coessentialis aequalitas . vide aquin . p. . q. . art . . o hieronymus epist. . novel . lum a me homine romano nomen exigitur — interrogamus quid per tres hypostases posse arbitrentur intelligi . tres personas subsistentes aiunt . respondemus nos ita credere . non sufficit sensus , expressum nomen efflagi●ant — & quia vocabulanon ediscimus haeretici judicamur hieron . epist . . si quis tres subsistentes personas non confitetur anathema sit . concerning the word person . p persona quasi per se sonan● fic non nemo . persona quasi per se una ; sic criticorū facile principes persona quasi à verbo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quasi cinctum quid , vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quasi habens aliquid circa corpus . q 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quamvis substantiam prim●m significat , tam animatam quàm inanimatam , p●●sona verò , tantùm substantiam singularem intelligentem qualis deus , angelus , homo . vncreated persons . r magnâ prorsus ●opiâ humanum laborat eloquium . dictum est tamen tres personae , non ut illud diceretur , sed ne taceretur omnino . non enim rei in , effabilis eminentia hoc vocabulo explicari valet . aug. lib. de trinitate cap. . s 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damascen . in dialog . cap. . nazianzen . orat . . in laudem athanasii . t vocibus non semper cum respectu suae originis , sed ex receptà consuetudine utendum . anti-trinitarians aequivocate in abusing the various significations of the word person . u persona significat relationē prout est subsistens in naturâ divinâ . aquin. p. . q . art . . in creaturis relationes sunt accidentales , & proinde accidentaliter insunt , relationes autem in deo sunt subsistentes , & ipsamet essentia divina , aquinas ibidem . pater non genuit meram nudamque relationem , sed correlatum , filium subsistentem , nec non coessentialem . * how a divine person is said to take upon him two severall persons . a locutiones impropriae dei essentiam non exprimunt , sed ejus notitiam tenuitati nostrae accommodant . vnwritten words hold forth the written truth . b voces tanquam consecratas omni jure judicamus , si earum conjugata , & synonyma in sacrâ paginâ reperiantur . si enim talibus vocibus sensum mentemque scripturae exprimentibus uti non liceret , nec explicare scripturam pro concione liceret , neque in alias linguas vertere . c temerè non sunt inventa nomina quae per evidentem consequentiam mentem domini in scripturis loquentis fideliter exprimūt ; cavendum est ne vocabula repudiando , ipsam repudiemus veritatem , superbaeque temeritatis simul & haereseos arguamur . persons are not attributes as sabellius dr●am't . vnwritten words hold forth the written truth . d cùm scriptura testetur tres dici quorum quisque in solidum sit deus , nec tamen plures esse deos , nimis morosum est de voce contendere , cùm res in aperto sit . colon. anal. paraphrast . calv. inst. pag. . in scripturis occurrit vox trinitatis numero namerante . iohan . . & numero numerato passim , ut in baptismo christi . matth. & in baptismo nostro matth. . e hi●ar . lib. de synodis . inane enim est calumniam verbi pe●timescere ubi res ipsa cujus verbum est non habeat difficultatem — expertus pridem sum & quidem saepius quicunque de verbis pertinacius litigant fovere occultum virus , ut magis expediat ultrò provocare , quàm in ●orum gratiā obscuriùs loqui . a divine person described . the description of a divine person explained and confirmed . three distinguishing questions propounded which are in their order to be stated and resolved . f vox nat●rae a ●ascendo derivatur , sed pro quavis essentiâ usurpatur ; vocibus enim non semper cū respectu suae originis , sed ex receptâ cōsuetudine utendum . hypostases in divinis non dicunt aliquam suppositionē vel subjectionē sed aequalitatem coessen●ialem . the difference between the divine nature ▪ and persons . the inac●●quade conce●t of a divine person the socinians engaged to state the point in question . divina natura salvâ omnimodâ perfectione dei non potest carere aliquâ personarum divinarum . deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura ; de deo loquentes utimur nominibus concretis ut significemusejus subsistentiam , & utimur nominibus abstract is ut significemusejus simplicitatem . quod ergo ●icitur deitas vel vita , velaliquid hujusmodi esse in deo referend● est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri , & non ad aliquam diversitatem rei . aqin . sum. p. . q. . art . . in corpore art. & resp . ad primum . est de essen iâ cujusliber personae divinae & cujuslibet personalitatis divinae esse ipsum esse per essentiam saltem a parte re● , quicquid sit de modo concipiendi nostro . vide suarez . metaph . d●sp . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the transcendent affections of ens. rationes praecedences minuunt , rationes subsequentes augent fidem . a ens est unum , verum , bonum . ens est essentiâ unicum , affectionibus autem trinū , trinum & unum , ens trinunum . unum est quod prius de unoquoque ente cognoscitur : verum quod proxime cognoscitur ; intellectus enim est prior potentia , quàm intellectus ; & verum dicit ordinem ad intellectum ; bonum ad voluntatem . denique si res sit ficta , non est bona ; & proinde bonitas quodammodo fundatur in veritate ; omnes autem tres passiones sunt à parte rei . entitas quoad significatum intrinsecum ; entitas est bonitas & è converso . b una subsistentia divina non plane prastat idem quod praestat altera ; est enim inter per●onas divinas differentia relativa numerica nec est essentia divina bis aut pluries id quod est , per tres subsistentias . nam per subsistentiam patris essentia divina est pater , non filius : per subsistentiam verò filii nec pater est nec spiritus sanctus : non itaque bis est pater , vel bis filius , vel bis spiritus sanct●s ; nec possibile est ut eodem respectu essentia divina sit pater , quo est filius . tanta autem est essentiae divinae perfectio , ut una subsistentia ipsi non possit esse adaequata . per subsistentiam itaque patris divina essentia adaequatè est pater , non verò adaequatè deus . vid. bisterfeld . lib. . sect . . cap. . c in quibus ratio estintegra , religionis nostrae mysteria cum ratione consentiunt : in quibus corrupta , cum ratione pugnant mysteria , ut rationem corrigant potius quàm superent . in omnibus enim mysteria supra rationem sunt omnino re , ratione , & ●odo . d deus est essentia univocè sive ens entium , transcendens transcenden●ium , & proinde essentias non solùm physicas , sed & metaphysicas omnes infinitè omnibus modis superat ; & proinde discrimina multa incidere ne mireris propter similium istorum inaequalitatem maximam . e veritatem convenienter naturae ex sacris scripturis asserimus ; exiguum autem lumen tam est simile maximo , ut prout natur●● unum sunt , ita conjunctione in unm transeant , & in majore ac perfectiore minus sorbeatur , vide i unium trinit . defens . f curandum est quod mentem errantium occupat , tumor rationis humanae ina●i philosophiae metaphysicae spe cie abre●tae ; unu● aut alterum scripturae locum in transcursu vellicat , ne sine christo aut scripturâ ( quod vel imperitis foret odiosum ) videantur esse : et proinde quia ratione humanâ intumescunt , ex ijs ipsis principi●s quae natura docet , et approbat , falsas esse ipsorum hypotheses , et argumentationes demonstravi . ab ijs quae nobis notiora sunt explicatio petenda est , et proinde explicatio metaphysica non contemnenda est ; quae enim docet natura minimè cum verbo dei pugnantia , docet deus . the attributes of god are the essence of god. g quanto diutius cogito , tanto mihi res videtur obscurior . cicero de simonide lib. . de natura deorum . h quam admirabilis est deus , cum omnibus linguis sit ind●cibilis , omnibus cordibus incogitabilis ! aug. de cognitine verae vitae . cap. . lombard . . sent . distinct . . homo imbecillitat●s soboles , ignorantiae alumnus , in tan●â mysteriorum caligine dei ignarus vocibus tenebrosis utitur ad lucem significandam ; in verbo veritatis tenebrae appellamu● , est cato in nobis tenebrarum interiorum subjectum , exterio●um illex : est peccatum in nobis depascens carnem ut hedera parietem , mentem obscurans , et voluntatem à vera luce abripiens tanquam unco carnifex . i paucae lectionis , nullius intellectionis mancipia , intellectione satis mutilâ perfecton●m metiuntur infinitam . k visio quae caelestis reip. cives beat , non fit per principia nobis connaturalia : ibi intellectio sine ratiocinatione , scientia sine disciplina , quies sine motu : istius coeli sol ipse deus est sine occasu & sine ortu . l intellectus finitus quod est simple● & infinitū unico simplicique actu non capit . m accipiendo perfectionem p●o re ip●a quae perfecta est , non sunt in divinis plures perfectiones attributales ; omnia enim in divinis quae sunt communia tribus non plurificantur , sed sunt unum simpliciter & una simplex essentia . biel . sent. dist . . quaest . . n propriè & de virtute sermonis loquēdo non est concedendum quod in deo vel divinâ essentiâ sit perfectio , sed perfectio summa est omnibus modis divina essentia ipsa ab eâ penitus indistincta . biel. . sent. dist . quaest . . o multi termini attributales affirmativi , negativi , absolu●i , connotative , & relativi ipsam ●andamque essentiam divinam simplissimam sed diversimode significant . p vide basil. lib. . contr . eunomium . q i●dor . clarius orat. . tom . . pag. . r attributa illa quoad rem significatam magis proprie deo quam creaturis attribuuntur ; accipiendo autem perfectiones attributales prosignis vel conceptibus ▪ perfectionem significāt , sed imperfecto modo significant , & proinde modus significandi creatu● is proprie conv●nit , perfectio significata deo convenit , sed secundum modum eminentiorem . vide th , pag. . quaest . . art . . . . zanch. de naturâ dei. cap. . quaest . . * omnes proprieta tes dei nō possunt creaturis communicari , quia sic multiplicaretur ess●n ia : necaliquae , quia sic divideretur . s attributa divina non distinguuntur actualiter in reipsa , neque à dei essentiâ neque inter se , quia perfectio divina est simplici●er infinita . vide irenaeum l. . contr . haeres . cap. . iust. mart. q. . august . de civ . dei l. . cap. . hen. quodlibet . l. . q. . durand . ocham . in . d. . q. . the eminent distinction ●f divine attributes . plures enim sunt conceptus objectivi virtualiter distincti qui respondent pluribus conceptibus formalibus realiter distinctis . conceptus autem objectivi non sunt varii realiter , actu , in se , sed eminenter & virtualiter in effectibus distincti . t perfectiones omnes creaturarum quatenus sunt in deo nihil aliud sunt , quam ipsamet creatrix essentia dei. vide august . lib. . gen. ad lit . cap. . lib. . de trinitate . anselm . monolog . cap. . . u deus solâ & suâ eminenti virtute omnes creatas perfectiones creaturis communicat , & quicquid est perfectionis in creaturis eminen●er continet . x nullus effectus est infinitus , & proinde nullus effectu● est divinae virtuti adaequatus . y em●nens & v●rtual●● dist●nctio in ●e , non est distinctio sed eminentia ; est ●amen respectu nostricon cipiendi virtutem eminentem secundum distinctos respectus ad diversa obj●cta & effectus distinctos . all the attributes are included in every attribute . a q●odlibet attributum divinum est infinitum simpliciter in genere en●is , & proinde essen●iam divinam & reliqua omnia essentialia attributa● in suâ essentiali ratione includit . vide caietan . de ente & essentiâ , cap. . quaest . . communicable attributes . b perfectio simplex & infinita non est ex multis & finitis perfectionibus conflata . c perfectiones quae sunt in creaturis distinctae sunt in deo simpliciter & unitè ; perfectio enim divina est infinita , & proinde simplex & uniciss●ma . d quicquid est perfectionis in creaturis deo attribuitur , salva analogiâ quae inter deum & creaturam perfectissimam semper intercedit . perfectio creata ut sicnon est formaliter in deo seclusis imperfectionibus creaturae ; nam seclusâ omni imperfectione non remanet formalis perfectio creaturae ut sic . vide suar. metaph. disp. . nomen analogum nullā naturā communem rebus analogis significat . e in his quae non mole magna sunt idem est majus esse , quo● melius esse . aug. trinit . lib. . cap. . f nulla perfectio creata est in deo formaliter secundum adaequatam rationem quam habet in creaturâ , sed eminenter tantùm , quia imperfectio includitur in intrinseca ratione & conceptu creaturae ; s●pientia creat● est accidens , sapientia creata est finita , & imperfecta . perfectio itaque est in deo formaliter secundum proprium conceptum dei. g distinctio non est pura fed eminens , quia formatur & fundatur in verbo dei quod distinctè de iis loquitur ad captum nostrum . d. alting . problem . part . . pr●b . . pag. . d. voet. pag. de unica & simplicissimâ dei essentia . vide. wallaeum . gomarum . h deus est ex seipso ens essentialiter summe perfectum & proinde ess●n●ia divina includi●omnem possibilem per●ectionem ; nam perfectiones illae , quae sunt in deotant●m eminenter prout in ipso , sunt formalissime de conceptu essentiali dei. vide suarez . met. disp. . sect. . ●dcir●o ne quae●amus qui sit , cū sit omnia , & super omnia , & p●aeter ●mnia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . vide iul. ● calig . exercitat . . p. . de d●o . a hanc distinctionē vocant rationis ratiocinatae virtualem aut emin●ntem . nonnulli autem distinctionē appellant ex natura rei formalem , non actu , sed virtute , aut eminenter . vide sis rhadam controvers . inter thomam & scotum part . . contro . . b quicquid in deo est essentiale unum est : à primâ autem unitate omnis differentia , omnisque numerus abesse debet ▪ c pluribus conceptibus formalibus inadae quatis realiter destinctis unam eandémque essentiam simplicissimam divisim vel potius gradatim concipimus . conceptus autem ejusmodi analogicè desumimus à rebus creatis , quae per multas distinctasque qualitates praestant ea , quae essentia divina per se. the justice of god is not contrary to the mercy of god. d istae propositiones falsae sunt in sensu formali quae significant aliquid deo convenire secundum eam rationem secundum quam verè non convenit ; ex . gr . misericordia divina punit , justitia divina miseretur : attributum justitiae punitivae est attributum misericordiae : intelligere est velle : voluntas intelligit : intellectus vult , voluntas est intellectus . verae autem sunt istae proposi●iones in sensu identico acceptae , quia essentia divina est simplicissima , & proinde res illa quae est voluntas intelligit ; res illa quae est misericordia punit . vide d. vo●tium . select . disput. p. . de unicâ & simplicissima dei essentia . the decrees of god. e deus in seipso semper agit intellectu & voluntate ut purus actus . f de actionibus dei quas decreta vocamus rotundè dicimus , decreta dei secundum perfectionem quam dicunt in deo esse necessaria , aeterna & essentialia . decreta autem quoad speciem , terminationem & extensionem ad externa esse libera , nec deo estentialia esse , nec ipsum deum . voluntas enim divina liberè terminatur ad creaturas sine ullâ sui mutatione , vel reali additione ; accedit autem externa quaedam denominatio , & respectus rationis ex parte dei in ipso decreto jam liberè terminato fundatus , ex parte creaturae in ipsa futuritione seu existentia illius . g voluntas & volitio divina una est & simplex ; nec multiplicitatē aut divisionem & distractionem , nedum oppositionem , nec prius & posterius aut successionem , nec dependentiam causalitatis & effectus aut cujuscunque alterius ordinis admittens ; haec autem omnia rebus volitis competere possunt ; res autem volitae à voluntate & volitione divin● realissimè & infinitè distinguuntur ; de rebus enim externis libere volitis loquimur . vide maccovium miscell . qu. disp. . . , , , . voetium . ubi supra . the acts of god. h actus divini considerati secundum id sunt , quod nil differūt ab essentia divina , & proinde nulla est in illis vel mutatio , vel libertas , sed summa necessitas . sicut enim deus non potest non esse , sic neque potest non velle , non intelligere . imo actus divini considerati secundum respectum quem dicunt ad objectum primum ac principale , ad ipsissimam nimirum dei essentiam , sunt etiam necessarii ; quia deus non potest non essentiam suam scire , & tanquam summum bonum amare . vitall acts considered with out reference to any object . vital acts considered with reference to gods essence . i vita divina est intellectu , voluntate , & potentiâ actuosa . deus novit seipsū ut primum & infinitū objectum , amat seipsum necessariò , necessitate naturae , sed absque coactione , quia non potest nolle gloriam suam , aut seipsum negare . k actus immanentes nullum dicunt respectum ad , quia non transeunt in objectum externum . personal acts. l actus personales sunt aeterni , & proinde horū est absoluta necessitas absque potentiâ ad oppositum . intrinsecal acts considered with reference to extrinsecal objects . m actus intrinseci in deo connotantes respectum ad extra sunt ipsa essentia dei concepta per modum actus , sed relativi , & quidem ad extra . omnia enim novit deus quae sunt extra se , substantias , & accidentia . gen. . . universalia , & singularia , psal. . . iob c. & cap. . magna & parva . matth. . . bona & mala . psal. . . genes . . . interna & externa . matth. . . praeterita . isa. . . futura . isa. . . praesentia : possibilia denique . sam. . . & impossibilia . tit. . . omnia etiam liberè vult extra se , quaecunque nimirum statuit vel permittere vel producere ; non enim quicquid potest facit . extrinsecal relations . extrinsecal denominations . extrinsecal actions . n actus excrinseci s●nt a deo effectivè , non sunt in deo subjectivé● the single essence . necessitie and libertie . o 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naturale & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 liberum nō constituūt diversas potentias in deo. no potentia executiva in god. the distinction between the divine nature and persons . p distinctio in deo nascitur ex relationibus pr opriis sive personalibus quales sunt paternitas , filiatio , spiratio , processio ; quaedam enim relationes sunt omnibus personis communes quales sunt identitas fundata super vnitatem essentiae , similitudo fundata super vnitatem attributorum , & aequalitas fundata super unitatem magnitudinis . q essentia & paternitas virtute & eminenter formalem distinctionem continent , quia ita se habent ac si formaliter distinguerentur . r ego & paterun●● sumus nempe ●ssentiâ , potentiâ & gloriâ . ergo christus dedu●it fidem nostram ad hoc fundamentum , ●mirum ut ipse sit unus cum patre deus — necesle habemus ut videamus in christo deitatem , in facie ejus personam patris , cum sit character personae ipsius ; in facie ejus gloriam dei , cum sit splendor gloriae ipsius : in manu ipsius manum & potentiam patris ; denique in illo ●otam dei patris majestatem . rolloc . in ioh. . . s credimus tres esse h●postases nobis in scripturâ significatas per nomina quae relationem significant . non est enim pater nisi filii , nec filius nisi patris , nec spiritus nisi spirantis . itaque relationes quidem ipsas habemus in divinis literis . chami●r . de canon● lib. . cap. . t haec distinctio habet fundamentum non tantum in effect is aut phraseologiâ scripturae , quia fuit ab aeterno . nam ab aeterno essentia fuit non tantùm communicabilis sed communicata , persona autem incommunicabilis ; persona filii , genita , essentia ingenita . the grand objection . the answer . u 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . peculiar relations do destinguish , but not compound . compositiô described by its severall requisites . x quae actuex naturâ rei distinguuntur , non possunt inter se uniri nisi per actionem causae efficientis : nulla autem causa essiciens prior deo est ; ergo . y essentia in creatis est divisibilis & perfectibilis ; persona enim creata actuat et perficit essentiam perfectibilem ; personalitates autem increatae non sunt actus naturae divinae ut sic & praecise consideratae eam perficientes vel informantes . a essentia in creatis est imperfectae actualitatis & proinde perfectibilis . essentia autem divina non habet se ad modum potentiae perfectibilis , nec persona divina ad modum actus naturam divinam infinitam simplicissimam perficientis . ratio quidditativa , & ratio relativa in deo tanquam diversae rationes formales à nobis concipiuntur , sed ambae illae rationes formales sunt in deo secundum ultim●m unitatem & actualitatem propriam . nihil enim perficit essentiam divinam in actu quidditativo praeter ipsissimam essentiam ; nihil perficit personam in esse personali praeter propriam subsistentiam , nihil perficit personam in esse relativo praeter propriam relationem : pater per ipsam paternitatem perficitur in esse relativo . b in deo est essentia & tres relationes , sed non sunt tres essentiae relativae . propri●ta . tes personales praecisè & formaliter sumptae non uniuntur inter se , & in se : nam unio in & cum essentiâ est in aliquo tertio . c vide junium contra bellarminum , controv. . lib. . praefat. ut res planior sit , id praemittendum est personae considerandae triplicem rationem esse ; communem in essentiâ quà deus est : singularem absolutam in persona quà subsistit in unitate essentiae ; & relativam in distinctione & ordine personae unius ad alteram . d ratione communis deitatis & communium essentialiumque attributorum , nulla distinctio cogitari debet , sed tantùm ratione personae & proprietatum personalium . e essentia notat naturam divinam cum proprietatibus communibus : persona notat naturam divinam cum proprietati bus dist inctivis , sive istae proprietates sint absolutae , sive sint relativae ; habere subsistentiam à seest quid absolutū : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est quid positivum nomen autem personae , nomen relativum communiter dicitur originationis aut originis respectum includens , quo pers●na divina à se , vel ab aliâ subsistentiam habere significatur . habere autem subsistentiam à se , quantum m●hi videtur non dicit respectum ad aliud , vel alium . f tres sunt in eadem naturâ divinâ indivisâ coexistentiâ coessentialiter subsistentes ; tres enim personae inconfusè uniuntur & indivisè discernuntur . g est aliquid in persona ab solutum quod est proprium , est aliquid in deo relativum quod est commune . identitas , similitudo , aequalitas , mutua praesentia personarum inter se propter inconfusam in se mutuò comprehensionem , sunt relationes ad intra omnibus personis communes ; relationes autē distinctivae sunt propriae . h omnis distinctio essentialis est realis , sed omnis distinctio realis non est essentialis . d. voetius . i personae divinae non differunt realiter essentialiter , nec realiter separabiliter , sed proprietatibus realibus personalibus ; tales autem sunt istae reales proprietates quae essentiae divinae non superaddunt novam entitatem . vide d. alting . problem . x. the difference between created and uncreated persons . . observations concerning created persons . . the infinite nature of uncreated persons . the difference between created and uncreated persons is infinite . k vide nazian , orat . de spiritu sancto . damasc . orthod . sid . lib. . c. . athanas. dialog . de trinitate & in mat. . nazian . orat de pace orat. , & . l absurdum est personas coessentiales & infinitas ad creatarum quae finitae & diversae essentiae sunt modulum redigere . m natura creata est dependēs ; persona creata est independens , quia non est in alio per dependentiam ab illo tanquam sustentante . cum humanitas christi consequuta fuerit personalitatem propriâ infinite perfectiorem , nonest cur propriam personal●tatem amplius appeteret . si enim adhuc inclinaretur ad propriam perso●alitatem , vi quadam detineretur in verbo , & ita status illius esset violentus , & quasi contra naturam . cajetanus . the third difference . n 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damascen . orth fid . lib. . c. . o vide iren●um lib. . cap. . athanas. in decret . synod . nicen . nazi●● . lib. de fide. cyrill . lib. . contra iulian. euseb. praeparat . evangel . lib. . c. . athenagoram , talianum , augustin . de trinit . & passim . p vorstius deum contemnendum pingit corporeum , visibilem , mutabilem , accidentibus subjectum , in quo sunt plures res , &c. vide eglisem . cris. & hypocris . bogerman contra grotium . synod . nat. dodrac . q racov. catechis . de cognitione dei cap. . r remonstrant . con●ess . apolog. p. . . s deus est spiritus . joh. . . jehovah exod. . . eheje . exod. . , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 apocal. . . summe perfectus genes . . . summeque unus . deut. . . & proinde omnem de deo compositionem imò & quasi compositionē de deo negamus . vide rhadā episcop . pact . controvers . in●ter thomam & scotum , part . . controv. . append . . pag. . , . t eglisem . contra vorstium . v maccov . mis. quaest . disp. . , , , . . vasquez . disp . . deus est liber ab omni compositione et●am improprie dictâ , qualis est ex essentiâ & esse , ex natura & supposito seu ex essentia & subsistentiâ , ex genere & differentia : & proinde liber ab omni distinctione in essentia su● . nam distinctionis & multitudinis transcendentalis personarum atque adeo modorum & relationum longe alia est ratio . d. voet. x mareria prima formae , differentiae ultimae , &c. simpliciter simplices dicuntur ; angeli sunt comparative simplices ; essentia autem divina est absolutè & 〈◊〉 simplex . en●● summum est 〈…〉 , & proinde essentiti● unitate unum , simplicissimè unicum . vide. d. vo●tium de natura dei sa●pl . y non de●emus proprietates dei ab essentia ejus vel cogitatione scpara●e , quia in essentiae forma & vir●ute omnes continentur , & deus sine proprietatibus ejus cogita●i non potest . d. wallaeus de deo. pag. . z essentia divina non est i● poten●iâ , quia est paras actus , non est perfectibilis , quia omnes perfectiones complectitur . a deus non depender à subjecto à ●a ●sis vel internis , vel externis , à principio quocunque priori aut superieri . b essentia divina non est in se composita , nec aliquid ipsi componibile , nec ipsa alicui componibili . essentia aeterna nec s●ipsâ nec ullâ realiâ posterior esse potest . c proprietates de● non minùs 〈◊〉 sunt quàm ejus essentia● 〈…〉 non essent ipsissima dei essentia sim●l 〈…〉 joh , . . est vita ; joh. . . the fourth difference . d unius personae in creatae tota est essentia divina , sed non solius . e singula sunt in singulis , & omnia in singulis , & singula in omnibus , & omnia in omnibus , ●num omnia . august . lib. . de trinitate cap. ultimo . nec major est essentia in tribus quàm in duabus , nec in duabus quàm in unâ , quia tota est in singulis . august . ubi supra . f tot sunt sustantiae singulares quot personae creatae . g essentia creata est finita , circumscripta , imperfecta , divisibilis , perfectibilis : per differentiam enim individualem sive personalem contrahitur , perficitur . essentia partibilis per partes & separatim inest singulis individuis angelicis & humanis . essentia autem divina est perfecta infinita simplex , & proinde eadem etiam numero & individuo ( quod aiunt ) tribus personis communis citra omnem multiplicationem , divisionem aut separationem ; eadem quippe natura singularis est tota in singulis personis divinis . h unitas specifica non est rei sed rationis extra men tem enim nostram non est unitas naturae humanae in personis diversis sed pluralitas . unitas autem essentiae divinae est realis , & singularissima , quia ita deus est unus ut etiam sit solus , & ita solus ut non possit esse alius . i persona multiplicatur & proinde distinguitur ; essentia autem divina nec distinguitur , nec multiplicatur . k unitas ad essentiam proprie pertinet , distinctio autem personarum non ad essentiam propriè & per se , sed ad rationem in essentiâ respicit . iunius contra error . samosat . essentiall attributes are common but personal attributes are incommunicable . l in omnibus mysteria supra rationem sunt re , ratione , & modo . the fifth difference betweene created & uncreated persons . m vita dei est actuosa intellectu , voluntate , & potentiâ . n quod essentiae proprium est hypostasibus commune est . o quicquid dicitur de praedicato essentiali , dici●ur de subjecto . p filius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicitur ab epiphanio contra marcellianos haeresi ▪ pag. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inquit basilius de filio contra eunomium lib pag. . q vide d. go●ari diatriben de christo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & d. voe●ii notas in select . disp. d. voetii par . . pag. . . . r omnes tres personae sunt coessentiales , & proinde essentialiter unum sunt ; tres enim persone non sunt tres essentiae , sed ipsissima & unicissima essentia , quia simplicissima . personae autem coessentiales sunt coaequiles ; licet enim filius & spiritus sanctus vitam , potentiam , omnia habeant à patre , omnia habent per naturam , nihil per gratiam . the grand objection . s potentia divina distinguitur in personalem & essentialē personalis est quâ pater generat filium , &c. essentialis est quae cōmunis est tribus personis . potentia patris videtur esse activa , quia pater est gignens ; generatio autem filii videtur esse passiva , quia filius est genitus psal. . . joan. . . there is no passive generation in the son of god. the divine essence of christ is not changed , or begotten . the answer . t nullu● horum alium aut praecedit aeternitate aut excedit magnitudine aut superat potestate august . lib. . de trinitate cap. ultimo . u ideo non est pater major filio , quia aequalem sibi genuit . originis enim quaestio ista est , quis de quo sit ; aequalitatis autem qualis aut quantus sit . aug. cont. max. l. . c. . x pater non genuit filium exse per seminalem rationem , nec extra se per physicam productionem , sed in se , hoc est in unitate essentiae genuit . philip. . . a potentia passiva est propria materiae , ex quâ producitur genitum . in deo autem nulla est generatio materialis . in passiva generatione genitum à non esse ad esse producitur ; filius autem semper actu exticit ; genitus non est gignente posterior , quia ab aeterno genitus . b generatio considerata respectu filii geniti est filiat●o sive proprietas filii ; generatio autē respectu patris est communicatio vitae subsistentis ; per hanc autem communicationem filius est unum cum patre ab aeterno . mich , . . non sunt itaque duae generationes sed duae personae gignens , & genita . vide d. alting . problem . xi . par . . c quod est in potentia gignentis , id non semper extitit , sed potest esse vel non esse . filius autem semper exticit imò non potest non esse , quia est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ens summe necessarium non minus quàm ipse pater . d eadem essentia quae in patre est paterni●as , in filio est filiatio ; eâdem potentiâ generat pater , filiusque generatur . habetitaque silius eandem potentiam quam pater , sed cum ali● relatione ; pate● ut commuicans , filius ut accipiens , johan . . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 generare est dare potentiam , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gènerari est acci●ere potentiam vide . aquin. sum. part . . qu. . art . . e non potest autem qui accepit ei qui de●it esse i●●qual●● , qu●● 〈◊〉 accepit ut esse●●qualis . aug. lib. . cont●a maximinum . cap. . f id solum 〈◊〉 unum est , quod simplicissimum est ; solus itaque deus s●mpliciter unus est in quo nihil omnino est quod deus non est . vide fonsecam in metaphys . aristot. lib. . cap. . qu. . sect. . g aristot. metaphys . lib. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . kinds of unity . all the three persons have the same power . h omnia habet filius à patre , sed pater & filius unum sunt : filius itaque nihil accipīt ab ilio , qui est a filio aliud ; filius enim est idem cum patre unicusque deus . i pater & filius spirando communicant vitam subsistentem spiritui sancto per quam spiritus sanctus est unum cum patre & filio . joan. . . spiritus itaque spiratus vitam accipit subsistentem , nec non potentiam coessentialem ; eandem itaque potentiam habet spiritus , sed cum diversa proprietate sive ratione personali . k patres dicunt essentiam generare ▪ hoc est essentia relative accepta , essentia cum modo & proprietate personali considerata generat , hoc est deus pater generat filium . the sixth difference . l essentia non generat essentiam quia est unica , simplicissima : persona non generat personam extra essentiam , quia essentia infinita extra se fundi non potest . m tota natura divina est in tribus personis , tota in singulis singularissime unica , servatis tum essentialibus essentiae , tum relativis personarum in unitate essentiae proprietatibus . n 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , propter in confusam in s● 〈◊〉 cōprehensionem & praesen●●● 〈…〉 circum incessionem ut satis barbare loquuntur . vide gomari diatrib● de trinit . inconfuse uniunt●r indivise discernuntur . the divin persons subsisting in one another o vide ●amascen lib. . orth. fid . cap . vide 〈◊〉 in sent , dist . q. . thom p. . q. . at● . . john . , . the nature and person of god the father is in christ. john . opened . john . . john . from the ● v. to the . john , . , . john . , , . john ▪ john ▪ . . . joh. ▪ the sixth difference betweene created & uncreated persons . a ut autem difficillimum sit hoc credere , & naturam longè ex●perat : ita necessarium est adeo ad salutem , ut sine fide illâ non sit salus . hinc sequitur quòd cum à naturâ alienum sit , & tamen necessariū , oportere nos ex naturâ exire & supra na turam efferri , ad hoc ut videamus deum in christo habitantem . rolloc . cō . in iohan. . v. , b deus est ubique totus in seipso : ●uōmodo ubique si in seipso ? ubique quia nusquam est absens : in seipso autem quia non continetur ab eis , quibus est praesens ; anq●●ā sine eis esse non possit . august . epist. . ad da●danum . c qui ubi que est in seipso est ; qui in seipso est , in omnibus sibi coessentialibus necessario est , volens tamen gaudensque . d naturae est in tribus personis non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tantùm , sed & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : per sona●um non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quasi vas esset in va●se , sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , neina●qualitas inveheretur . e spiritus dei dicitur esse in deo , cor. . . qui tamen est deus ipse , cor. . . nempe ad intimam inexistentiam trium personarum in seipsis exprimendam . d. wallaeus de simplicitate dei pag , . f in processionibus divinis nulla est partitio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quibus tribus modis res creatae producuntur , quia eadem natura singularis simplex , indivisibilis & infinita sine divisione vel multiplicatione communicatur . g 〈…〉 seip●●●bique est deus noster omnipraesentissimus , totus in mundo , totùs extra mundum totus super mundum , totus & unus in omnibus & singulis , nusquam inclus●s , nusquam exclusus , ubique immensus , non per essentiae multiplicationem , extensionem aut divisionem , sed per infinitatem simplicissimam . h ante omnia deus erat solus ipse sibi & lo●us , & mu●dus & omni● . uti tertulli●●us contra ●●ax . i essentia dei non miscetur cu●splen didis , n●c a sordidis contaminatur , sed in utero virginis fuit hypostatice unita cum carne nostrâ sine ullâ commix●ione , confusione , contamin●tione , vel diminutione . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . si homo tantummodo christus , quomodo adest ubique invocatus , cum haec hominis natura non sit , sed dei ut adesse omni loco possit ? tertulian . de trinitate . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . anastasius antiochenus . angeli sunt substantiae spirituales separaim & per se subsistentes , & proinde sunt alicubi definitive . k tres personae sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & non tantum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . tres homines quibus una competit definitio , sunt tantum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quia natura eorum est finita , & divisa ; non enim tota esten●ia patris crea●i sed par● tantum filio communicatur , & hypostase● eorum sunt separatae . non sunt itaque ejusdem naturae indivisae , ejusdem naturae singularis , & proinde licèt communi ratione homines dicantur , tamen reipsa non sunt unus homo . personae autem divinae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt propter unius communis , & tamen sing●laris naturae identi tatem , quam simul & pariter , & totam habent pater filius & spiritus sanctus . l immensa dei prae sentia non est accid●●s vel modus essentiae ejus sed ipsamet essentia . deus non est alicubi sed ubique ; quod est alicubi est in ubi definiti●o . vide aug. qu. lib. . qu. . & lib. . geres . ad lit . cap. . chrysost. homi● . . ad coloss. dan. as●en . nazian . orat . . basi● . hom. . hieronym . in isa. . m qui est ubique repletive non est alicubi definitive . vide scalig. exercit. . §. . the th . difference . n personae creatae differunt intelligentia voluntate , potentiâ , essentiâ , operatione , locorum intervallis imo propriâ accidentium congerie . vide gomarum de trinitate tom. . pag. . o personae divinae non dicuntur relativae propter essentias relativas , sed propter modos sive proprietates relativas , quae quidem proprietates non differunt realiter essentialiter , imo nec realiter separabiliter ab essentiâ divinâ . personae autem divinae sunt extra omne genus omnemque dependentiam . p vide metaphys . fonsec . lib. . cap. . sect. . q vide scotum , estium &c. in . sent . dist . . omn●s 〈…〉 respectiva concipitur in deo ad creaturam est tantùm secundum rationem , & modum concipiendi nostrum , quia divina natura est absoluta in se , & ab omni ordine creaturarum independens , sive creaturae existunt sive non . vide suarez . disp. . sect. . num . the eighth difference betw●ene created & uncr●ated persons is in respect of their different duration . y aecernitas proprie dicta est increata ; duratio itaque angelorum non est vera aeternitas . aeternum dicitur quod est extra terminum , & ex se incapax termini , quia in sua intrinsecaratione infinitatem in durando includit . angels are not coaeternall with god. s aliud est esse aeternum , aliud sempiternum , quia omne aeternum est immutabile . richard . victor . lib. . de trinitate . c. . ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem sicut ratio temporis motum . th. p. . qu. . art . c. t deus est aeternus , imo & sua aeternitas ; deus enim est infinita perfectio , & proinde simul , & ex se , atque immutabiliter habet totam perfectionem suam , ratione cujus ex se sit sufficiens ad coexistendum omni durationi , quantacunque illa sit ; & proinde sicut deus est sua essentia & perfectio , ita est sua aeternitat . vide suarez . metaph disp . sect. . th. p. . qu. , a. . u est in angelis potentia obedientialis ad corruptionem , quae natural●s dicipotest , quia in natura angelorum quae à creatore dependet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desinere posse ad nutum creatoris fundatur . omnis enim potentia naturalis est quae in rerum naturis fundatur . vide si● suarez . disp. . sect. . n ▪ . x si angeli ab aeterno creati essent à deo , non sequeretur eos esse deo coaeternos per durationem intrinsecam , sed potius ab aeterno esse , & aeternitati coexistere per denominationem extrinsecam à dei aeternitate sumptam ; durarent enim ex aeternitate , non tamen duratione quae sit aeternitas , quia aeternitas est duratio per se , & abintrinseco necessaria , independens , immutabilis , quae nullam variationem aut successionem admittit neque in esse , neque in propriis & internis actibus aut motibus ; vel per internam capacitatem , vel extrinsecam potentiam . angeli non sunt deo coaeterni , multo minus aequaeterni , sed sunt potius aeviterni quàm aeterni . y unum est primum , alia dependent igitur . ergo suâ naturâ omnia praeter unum corruptibilia . tame●si enim sunt entia absoluta a subjecto & a termino : tamen haud sunt absoluta à causa . sunt igitur per aliud , & ab alio ; at omne dependens ab eo , à quo dependet , si est voluntarium principium , mutari potest ; ergo ipsae quoque mentes immateriales etsi ponantur , à peripateticis coaeternae deo , tamen ut à primo pendent à primi nutu deponi possunt ab eâ essentiâ , in quâ sunt ab illo constitutae . vide scalig. exerc . . a damasc. orth. fid . lib. . cap. . & . iust. mart. qu. , . hieron . contra pelagium lib. . cyrill . . thes. c. angelus auem non potest destrui per physicam corruptionem , quia non componitur ex partibus physicis . viri itaque gravissimi ideo dicunt angelos natura incorrupti●iles esse , quia angelus non habet aliquid intra naturam sui corruptivum . b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . aristot . lib. . metaphys . cap. . c id enim deus est ( inquit aristoteles ) & proinde deum ipsam vitam esse intulit ; aeternitatem ae vum continuum , aeternumque vocat sine successione , sine terminis . d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . legimus etiam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 apud aristot. . de caelo text . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inquit phavorinus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , aevum semper existens , quod nunquam caepit , neque desinit . plutarchus insuper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 deo ●ribuit . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . deus est , secundum aevum immu●abile , qui u●us in uno nunc aeternitatem implevit . psal. . first verses . dan. . . heb. . . . heb. . . john . . pet. . , ▪ . the ninth difference betweene c●eated & unc●eated persons . christus est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ est enim filius à patre , deus à seipso . see mr. estwicks learned treatise in confutation of mr. bidle , pag. . notes for div a -e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . athan s. ad scr●pionem . trinitatis divinum dogma est ; in deo sic est ut dicit ; in scripturâ sic dicit ut est ; in ecclesiâ sic creditur ut scriptura dicit . iunius contra errores samosit . the divine persons distinguished by their proper names . negamus deum esse unicam personam tribus nominibus appellatam contra praxean sabellium , &c. negamus tres personas divinas esse tres deos contra tritheitas ad unum omnes . vide tertull. contra praxean . calvinum contra servetum . & aug. haeres . c. . the divine persons are equall , and therefore distinct . see the treatise of reverend mr. estwick in his refutation of mr. bidles argumēts pag . . . divine persons distinguished by their number . deitas est perfectio infinita simplicis sime unica unitas ad essentiam pertinet , distinctio vero personarum non ad essentiam propiè & per se , sed ad rationem in essentiâ pertinet . iunius contra errores samosat . john . pater auditur in voce , filius manifestatur in homine , spiritus dignoscitur in columbâ . august . matth . , . john ▪ , . john . verse . verse . verse . verse . john . john john . . . divine persons distinguished by inward & personall actions . a vita dei est essentia vivens , vita subsistens , quae vita ut in patre à nullo est , sic in filio à patre est b nihil simpliciter aeternum dici potest fuisse in potentiâ , & proinde generatio aeterna non est distinguenda in activam & passivā . c communicatio est essentiae objectivè , quia est id quod communicatur : patris autem activè , quia pater generando essentiam communicat . d filium à patre , imò ex ipso patre , & in ipso patre genitū intelligimus est enim filius consubstantialis , coessentialis , & proinde patri coaequalis . si filius sit par deo , par patri ergo est ei coaequalis : si unum cum patre , ergo etiam coessentialis , iohan. . . the grand objection . the plaine answer . psal. . . hebr. . . matth. . . matth. . . e revel . . . colos. . . primogenitus omnis creaturae phrasi heb●●a dicitur , qui ante omnes creat●ras genitus . f relata simul sunt : deus pater & deus filius sunt relata coaeterna ; pater aeternus generat filium coaeternum . g 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . iohan . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rom. . proprium opponitur alieno quod est extra essentiam act. . , vide d. alting expli . cacec . par . . q● . . pag. . h totam habet essentiam patris qui dicitomnia quaecunque pater habet mea sunt . iohan. . . nisi velint haeretici etiam patrem duntaxat partem essentiae divinae habere . et situt pater habet vitam in seipso , sic dedit filio habere vitam in seipso . iohan. . . i generatio divina est omnis materiae motus mutationis nec non successionis expers , k homo generat modo physico , spiritus creatus modo meta hysico , spiritus increatus modo plusquam hyperphy sico ; homo gignit filium à se efficienter , exse materialiter , extra se terminative . substantia producit accidens à se efficienter , in se subjective . deus non gignit filium efficienter , quia filius non dependet a patre tanquam effectus a causâ ; dependentia enim in esse de creaturis tant●m propriè dicitur , quarun essentia est sinita . deus non gignit in se subjectivè , nec extra se terminativè , nec ex se materialiter ; gignit autem in se & ex se immu●abiliter , & ●t ita dicam ●pestentialiter , quia genitus non est extra gignentem , sed in eo , & cum eo sabsistit in unâ uniicâque essentia indivisâ . particula [ ex ] johan . . . non significat materiam ex quâ , sed principlum à quo . generatio filii non est libera , sed necessaria ; filius enim deus est , & proinde ens summè necessarium . nomen silii dei est quidem nomen homonymū christo angelis nec non hominibus etiam commune : ratio autem nominis est plane ●iversa , quia christus prae angelis nomen excellentius sortitusest . angeli sunt filii dei ad imaginem dei creati ob gratiae collationē generationisimilen : sunt itaque filii dei impropriè per metaphoram . sancti filii dei dicuntur etiam sed metaphorice respectu regen●rationis nec non adoptionis ; solus itaque christus propriè dei filius est ; filius primogenitus quoniā ante ipsum nullus : filius etiam unigenitus , quia neque post ipsum alius à patre genitus . tota tamen filiorum dei familia in calis & in terrà ex ipso christo tanquam primogenito nominatur , ut videre est ephes. . v. . christo nomen dei , angelis nomen ministorum tribuitur , christus sedet ad dextram dei ut deus — christus itaque est solus filius dei naturalis . vide m●rt . smiglecii lib. de christo vero & naturali dei filio adversus impia dogmata valentini smalcii . et gomari analys . epist. ad hebraeos p. . nec non disput. . de patris & filii personis . pag. . . operum par . tertia . john . vindicated particula 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ●oh●n . . non est assimilativa , sed declarativa , assertiva , demonstrativa , rei veritatem exprimens . vide io. maccovii loc. com. disput . de fili● dei p. . particula quasi non est assimilativa , sed expressiva veri , &c ▪ vidimus gloriam ejus ut unigeniti à patre , id est qualis unigenitū dei decebat ad demonstrandam s●am deitatem . nam particula 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non similitudinis , sed causae nota est , rei ipsius veritatem . exprimens . vide d ▪ alting . explicat . cateche . par . . qu. . p. . object . sol. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. naz. orat . in laud● heronis verè filiū ▪ quod & solus ( sit filius ) , & solus ( patri filius ) & si●gulari modo fili us , & soli filius , non filius simul & pate● . magistri nostri quicquid hoc psalmo canitur de rege messia interpretati sunt : sed secundum verborum sonum , & ob refutationem haereticorum convenit , ut eum interpretemurde ipso davide , heb. bib . mag . cum com . rab. edit . a bombergio venetiis . rabbi salomon . com . in psalmum secundum . ● . the first false cause . fallacia non causae , quum non causa pro causâ ponitur . the second false cause . john . . . explained and vindicated . the third false cause . matt. . ● . caelitus clamavit pa●er hic est filius ille meus , u● testatum faceret hunc esse proprium suum naturalem fil●um , è numero aliorum filiorum eo ipso exemptum . the fourth false cause . genui ps. . prop●iè significat generationem aeternam . genui act . significat metonymi ce , hoc est genitu● patefeci ho●ie , cum te excitavi a ●m r●uis , r●m . . . explici●è dicuntur verba ista psal. . de generatione , implicitè & consequenter autem resurrectioni accommodantur ; consequenter inquam non ratione consequentis sed consequentiae . vide d. gomari analys . epist. ad hebraeos pag. . the fifth false cause . concerning the procession of the holy ghost . spiritus dicitur non respectu spiritualis essentiae , sed incommunicabilis subsistentiae , quia à patre & filio unà quasi spiranti●bus procedit . omnia quae 〈◊〉 unâ persona dicuntur , de ali●●●tiā dic●tur , excep●is relationibus opposit●s , quia nihil i● deo multiplicatur ni● relatio opposita ; spiratio●tem quâ pater spirat , non opponitur spirauoni ▪ quâ spirat filius . pater eni●●●nâ ead●que cum filio spiratione spirat . omnia quaecunque habet pater , ●adem etiam filius habe● , iohn . . iohn . . exceptis ●●●tum iis , in quibus ei oppon●t●r ▪ non opponitur autem pa●ri quod spirationem ; habet enim spiritus vitam subsistentem à patre nec non filio unicissima spiratione . vide d. alting . lo. com. pag. . d. maccovii disput. . de processione spiritus . d. brochmanum de s. sancto , qu. . stegman . photin . disp. . wendelin . christ. th. lib. . cap. . gomar . disp. de trinitate , tom. . disp. , . junium trin. defens . contra samosat . polanum , zanchium . synop. pur. theol. in what sense the h. ghost is the vertue and power of the father . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cor. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cor. . . cor. . ▪ . acts . . . cor. . , . rom. . ▪ . cor. ▪ . isa. ● . isa. . . vide eniedin . in explicat . loc . v. & n. t. p●g . . . ca●e chis . racov . cap. . ostorod instit. c. . smalcium in 〈…〉 . graweri . p. . smalcium contra wi●k . vesp . ad cap. . cor. . non omne quod procedit nascitur , quāvis omne procedat quod nascitur . vide august . contra maximin . lib. . cap. . . the manner of the divine processions . . the principle . the order . pater & filius spirando spiritū naturam divinam communicant spiritui , ita ut tribus deitatis personis communis sit : non est haec ali●natio sed communicatio . spiritus sanctus procedit nonvoluntate ut scholastici , & post eos catechismus romanus ambigue docuerunt , sed necessitate naturae qu●admodum & filius naturâ genitus est . paternon spirat sine filio , non ob defectum potentiae sed ob unitatem essentiae . spiritus procedit ab utroque subsistit in utroque quia est coessentialis utrique , iohan . . . & proinde haec aeterna spiratio non est contingens sed necessaria ; nec libera est nec involuntaria . neque enim necessitas haec vim infert , nec voluntas novum concilium desig●at ex deliberatione superveniens . vide athanas. basilium , cyrillum , nazianzenum , theodoretum , damascenum . vide gomarum , d. alting●um , maccovium , zanchium , tilenum , crocium , stegmanum , polan . syntag. lib. . de trinitate cap. . iunius cathol . doct. de trinitdefen . contra samosat . pag. spiritus sanctus procedit naturalite● , hoc est actione naturae , non autem voluntatis . periculos● dicitur spiritum procedere naturâ quidē sed per actionem voluntatis : non procedit actione voluntatis propriè , sed secundum actionem voluntatis procedere dicitur , id est secundum eamactionem , vel potius secundùm eum modum quo naturaliter procedunt voluntas & charitas . de hac re igitur possemus tacere , & rem scholasticis defendendam permittere , aut ad libros eorum reijcere . vide athanasium . dialog . de trimtate damasc. n. de fide orthod . modom curiositati imponat lector , nec molesta ▪ & perplexas disputationes cupidiùs quàm par sit sibi accersat . calv. instit . lib. . cap. . scriptura neutro antecedenti relativum masculini generis statim subjicit ▪ iohan . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : item johan . , . . eph. . , . the uncreated persons distinguished by their order . vide basilei magni epistolam quae in scribitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . edit . basil. gr. p ▪ . pater 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a doctoribus orthodoxis dicitur negative , quia à nullo est sed à ●eipso , & per seipsum ab omni aet●rnitate subsistit . * omnis proprietas increata per negationem explicata funda●ur in aliquâ perfectione positivâ vide genebrardum lib. . de trinitate solus pater est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 id est ànullo superiore numine essentiatus sed à seipso deus . val. gen. p●o the . . . & ultimâ . bellar. l. . de christ. c. . greg. valent . part . . disp . . quaest . . punct . . pag. . eadem essentia est in patre 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in filio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in spiritu sancto 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . hesychius suidas . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . vocis sono 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 negativus terminus est sed reipsa affirmat . d. gerrard de tribus elohim . cap. . sect. . pag. . the persons distinguished by their inward relations . spiratio non est fundamentum relationis personalis hoc est propriae & peculiaaris ; relatio autem distinguit vel quà propriavel quà opposita ; paternitas & spiratio , item filiatio & spiratio non opponuntur , non sunt proprietates peculiaries & incommunicabiles , & proinde non distingunt ; relationes dicunt , sed non personales proprias & oppositas . vide tho. part . . quest . . art . . an distinctio inter essentiam & relationem s●t realis , formalis , vel rationis . vide biol . . s●nt . dist . . qu. . & dist . . qu. . art . . vide basilium etiam contra eunomium . lib. . p. . what kind of distinction there is betweene these three divine and uncreated persons . trinitas est . unus solus immensus naturaliter deus , praeter quem non est alius deus . vide fulgentium de fide orthod . essentiam divinam exinanire ut distincti onem personarum demonstre mus est impium ; essentiam autē in ipsâ distincti one complecti absurdum . iunius contra samosaten . in illâ trinitatis naturâ sic totum unum est ut nihil ibi possit separari vel dividi : sic totum aequale est ut nihil ibi majus aut minus valeat inveniri . fulgentius lib. de fide orthodox . ad donatū . q●id quid est aliquid seu quod habet aliquam entitatem seu formalitatem inquit vorstius habet essentiam . consequetiam negamus . tum enim in creatis subsistentia & suppositalitas quia non sunt nihil sed aliquid haberent essentiam ; & consequenter essentiae esset essentia & hujus rursum essentia , & sic in infinitum . vide eglisemnium in crisi , pag. , . vide etiam bis●er●eldium , smiglecium , stegmannum , ●esterum in examine metaphys . phot●ianae . d. voetium de unica & simplic . dei natura , p. . wendelinum , &c. see m. fry his blasphemy and error blown up & down the kingdome with his owne bellowes , p. , . * si hic ratio quaeritur , non est mirabile : si exemplum poscitur , non est singulare , aug. ep. . & li. . de civ . dei. cap. . lib. . de trin. cap. . & iob. damas. orth● fid . lib. . cap. , m. fry his bell. . personae divinae realiter distinguntur quia scriptura alium dicit patrem , alium filium , alium spiritum sanctum . iohan. . . iohan. . . & quia relative opponuntur : atqui opposita , quà talia , non possu●t esse idem ; nō tamen distinguuntur essentialiter : omnis quidem distinctio essentialis est realis , sed non è contra . personae ita sunt realiter idem cum essentia divinâ ut tamen relative inter se opponantur ; ad haec non sint praedicata essentialia ; distinguuntur itaque ab essentia divinâ ex natura rei eminenter . vide d. voet deunicâ & simplicis . dei essentiâ , p. , , . aristotle ethic. lib. . pater filius & spiritus sanctus sunt tres res , & non sunt tres res diverso respectu : tres res respectu relationum oppositarum . non sunt tres res secundum essentiam . wendelin . christian , theolog. lib. . cap. . pag. . proprietates personales essentiam divinam nec componant , nec multiplicant , personas autem faeliciter distinguunt . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , justin martyr . non distinguuntur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoc est essentiâ , sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoc est formaliter , sivé 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 personaliter . vide dama●cen . lib. . de side orthod modi in divinis non sunt separabiles , sunt autem reales , & modi reales distinguunt realiter quamvis modaliter . nonnulli distinguunt inter esse patris , & esse patrē . inter esse quidditativum & esse personale . personalitas divina est realis ; distinguuntur itaque realiter quia distinguuntur personaliter . relationes in divinis non componunt sed distinguunt : relationes autem reales realiter distinguunt . proprietates reales propriè simul & realiter distinguunt . richardus bonavent . & ioh. de rip ; personas distingui dicunt per proprietates absolutas primò , & per relationes originis ex consequenti . discrimen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tantùm sinxerunt noëtiani . epiphan . haeres . . distinctio personarū naturalis essè videtur , licèt non sit essentia lis inter patrem & filium naturalem intercedit enim relatio naturalis . personae per nihil quomodocunque distinctum à personis primariò distinguuntur . frustra sunt autem qui ideo personas eodem modo distinctas esse somniant quo primò diversa distinguuntur ; illa enim essentialiter distinguuntur . vide biel. sent. dist . . & . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . vide greg. nyssen . contra eu - eunomium lib. . athanas . basil , eunomium cont . naz. d. alting . gomarum , gerrard . voetium , maccov . wendeli . glassium , rhadam , capreolū , becanum , eglis●mnium in crisi , meisuerum , iunium , calovium . vide fulgentium lib. de fide orthod . ad donatum . vide d. voetium de unica & simp. dei natura pag. . en mysterium quod nec capit ratio , nec demōstrat exemplum sola enim revelatione divinâ nititur , & proinde fide divinâ suscipiendum est & pieta●e suspiciendum . vide d. alting . de cognitione dei relativa . incomprehensibilis rei imaginem in rebus creatis frustra quaerin us . aug. lib. . de civ . dei cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ damas. orth. fid . lib. . c. notes for div a -e fundamentall points described . the joh. . . opened and vindicated at large . the grand exception . the answer . si syrum caeterosque sequimur , vel hiatus admittitur , vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 qnae imprimis elegans turbatur . mihi qui talem primò usurparunt in s●cris licentiam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 videntur . heinsius , in locum . bib. edit complut . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 v. . * merces satis fallaces vendit officina chr. plantini antverpiae in editione excusa & cum bib. ar. mont. vulgat . joh. . ▪ . joh. . joh. . . joh. . . joh. . . vide ambros . lib. . de spiritu sancto . cap. . jurati veritatis hostes lucem hanc non tulerunt ideoque eraserunt . vide heinsium in joh. . . athanas. tom. . pag. , . . cyprian lib. de unitate ecclesiae paxillus de monomachia . calovius lib. de fide patrum ante concilium nicenum . see mr. estwicks learned discourse of the godhead of the holy ghost . dr. alting his vindication of this text in his con●utation of the racovian catechism . irenaeus lib. . cap. . tertullian de praescript . c. & . athanas. epist. ad ubique orthodox & orat. c. g. sab & contra 〈◊〉 . * see dr. usher his sermon 〈◊〉 the vnity of the faith. basilius 〈◊〉 author lib●i de spiritu sancto lib. . cap. . g●eg . nyssen . de resur . orat. . epiphanius anacephal . euseb. pamphilus epist. ad palestin . augustin . contra ▪ donatist , lib. . cap. , & sermone in symbolum . hanc fidei normam — christus ascensurus reliquit . ait enim eunies baptizate &c. damascen . de fide orthod . lib. . cap. . concil . ancyran . de spiritu sancto . . didymus alexander . vide parkerum de desc. ad inferos dr. usher his learned sermon of the unity of faith. d. voet. de symbolo apostolico . d. gomarum de symbolo , de trinitate ▪ glassium , zanchium de trinitate . lucian . in philopat . divinitas christi est ipsum fundamentale hujus dogmatis ; est enim articulus fidei necessarius necessitate finis respectu communionis internae & invisibilis cum christo , hoc est cum dei gratiâ & gloriâ : nec non respectu communionis ecclesiasticae in visibili caetu . dogma de trinitate notat non tam negativam & elencticam theologiam quàm positivam ; & theses principales non tam modu● , & 〈◊〉 ho●um g●amatice , rhetorice , & logice dogma illud explicandi quàm ipsam rem explicatam , non tam formam ac modum per philosophicas & logicas notiones , distinctiones , & axiomata dogma hoc contra pseudo-rationa●●os quoscunque tutandi , eorum subtilitates persequendo , & ad absurdum redigendo . d. voetius de trinitate , pag. . vide cal. inst. lib. . cap. . sect. . & colonii anal. praph . instit. pa. . vide apologiam voidovij & ostorodi ad decret . in illustr . d. d. ord. belg. an . . non negamus dei gratiâ veram filij dei divinitatem , sed falsam imaginariam , & quam nusquam sacrae literae , agnoscunt . smalcius etiam zelum suum in propugnanda verâ divini●ate iesu christi praedicat in libro de divinitate christi cap. . dicit sabellius patrem , filium & spi●itum nihil in deo distinctum sonare . dic tres esse , vociferabitur te nominare tres deos. dic in una dei essentiâ personarum trinitatem : dixeris uno verbo quod scripturae loquuntur , & inanem loquacitatem compresseris . cal. inst . l. c. sect . . vide d. vo●t●um de necessitate , & utilitate dogmatis de ss . trinitate page , . d. crocium synt. nec non gomarum . learned d. davenant in his letter to m. dury . notes for div a -e cor. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . mercur . trismegist . god the father is the object of a christians faith . ioh. . . joh. . . act. . . mat. . joh. . . , . ver . mat. . joh. . . joh. . . joh. . ▪ joh. ▪ . joh. ▪ . joh. . . mat. . ▪ * act. . joh. . . gal. ▪ . joh. . . rom. . . act. ▪ , . joh. v. . phil. . , ioh. . ▪ ioh. . ▪ , verse● , ioh. . ▪ ioh. ● . ▪ ioh. . . god the h. ghost is the object of a christian's divine faith. ioh. . . pet. . . . act. . . act. . , ▪ cor. . ● , , . all three divine persons teach ; the father . mat. . . ioh. . . mat . . the son. ioh. . , mat . ioh. . . luk. . . act. . . the spirit teacheth after a more peculiar manner . ioh. . . cor. . , , . cor. . . cor. . . cor. . . gal. . . pro. . . isa. . . isa. . . psa. . . ioh. . ▪ ioh. v. . ioh. . act. . . . ioh. . . pet. . pet. ▪ ▪ cor. . . . ioh. . ▪ . cor. , ▪ , , . ioh. . ▪ cor. . . ioh. . . isa. . ▪ cor. . . cor. . . . . eph. . . . ioh. . . . cor. . . iude v. . cor. . . the true reason why men do● not beleeve in the spirit and adore the spirit . ioh. . ▪ cor. . . rom. . . judicium discretionis non arguit officium judicis . legislator judicat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . minister publicus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 christianus privatus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . vide reverend . dr. davenant de judice ac normâ fidei . cap. . p. . learned dr. reynolds confer . with hart c. . , , . vide aug. lib. de doctrinâ christiana & enchir. ad laurentium . doctrina nostra est publica , quia est doctrina spiritus sancti in scripturis publice loquentis . vide optatū contra parmen . lib. . in prin. & tertul ▪ de anima quis revelabit quod deus texit ? p●aestat per deum nescirc quia non revelaverit , quàm per hominem scire quia ipse praesumpserit . caeli mysterium doceat me deus ipse qui condidit , non homo qui seipsum ignoravit . ambr. ep. l. . ep. . ez ▪ . , , . ver . vide damas. de orth . fid . lib. . c. . in fraudem legis facit qui salvis verbis legi● sententiam ejus circumvenit . contra dig. leg. senatusque consultis . ama ecclesiasticas legere literas , & non multa invenies quae requiras ex me — ipso magis inspirante quam hominum aliquo commonente perdisces , aug. ep. . damasc● de orth . fid . lib. . cap. ▪ . aug. de doct. christ. lib . cap. , ▪ , & . lib. . cap. . aug. de trinitate lib. . cap. . & . & lib. . cap. . aquin ▪ part . . qu. . art . . aug. in epist . ioh. tract . . * nos ecclesiae ministerium in honore habemus , internas persuasiones sine externo verbo tanquam satanae ludibria cavemus ; ex scripturis sapimus , cum scripturis sentimus , propter scripturas credimus : whitaker de authoritate script . lib. . cap. . prope finem . & controv. . de script . interpret . qu. . cap. , . item de catechis . rudibus . cap , ▪ , , &c. isa. . , . verbum dei est lux , lucerna , lumen ad deum dirigens i● agendis , credendis , sperandis , amandis . psal. . psal. . pet. . ▪ . vide chamier . de veritate canonis , interior magister docet , christus docet , inspiratio ipsius docet . aug. tract . . in epist. iohan. non dicit meliorem sed certiorem aug. de verbis apostol● serm. . cap. . praevidens dominus iesus christus impios quosdam futuros qui miraculis ejus calumniarentur magicis artibus ea tribuendo , prophetas ante praemisit , aug tract . . in iohan. vide d. davenant . de judice & norma fidei , & d. gomarum . chamier de interpret . lib. canon . dr. reynold , in his learned conference with hart chap. . divis . . pag. . mr. hildersham in his lecture upon the psal. pag. . dr. alting . loc. com . erroneous and fantasticall spirits are condemned by the holy spirit . vide d. whitak . controv . . de script . interpret . qu. . cap. , & de authoritate scripturae lib. . cap. . in calce capitis . cor. ▪ ingenue fatemur non esse nunc novas revelationes expectandas , sive à summo pontifice sive a concilio sive ab ecclesiâ totâ . canus lib. . cap. . ma●k . , . act. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . aristot. ethic lib. . cap. . non eritijs matutina lux . isa. . . judices ejus lu●i vespertini , sacerdotes ejus polluerunt sanctum ; injuste egerunt contra legem . soph. . . omnis potestas judicis ministeria●is legibus adstricta est ; unicus autem ●ummus judex est , isa. . . iacobi . . qui quidem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 solus judicat . revelatio mihi in conscientiâ meâ facta est privata ex parte subjecti , publica verò ex parte objecti . pro. . . ecclesia instrumen taliter commovet sed non sola movet ; movent ipsae scripturae movet spiritus , & principaliter movent . whitakerus . isa. . . non potest deus nisi per deum intelligi , sicut nec honorem a nobis deus nisi per deum accipit — non cogitando aut dispatando veritatem homo assèqui potest , sed audiendo ab eo qui solus docere potest , hilarius de trinitate lib. . vide d. whitaker de sacra scriptura controv . . qu. . c. . judicium practicae discretionis a dono coele sli pendet , ex infuso lumine spiritus sancti oritur , non ex privato sensu aut phantasmate , & ad normam verbi exigitur simul & dirigitur . distinguit itaque d. davenantius inter iudicium discretionis , & iudicium praecipitationis . non ad enthysiasmos itaque fanaticos , vel asslatus anabaptisticos fideles remittimus . vide d. daven . de judice & normà fidei . mr. hildersham his lectures upon the psal. mr. ball in his larger catechism . dr. reynolds conference with hart. dr. whitaker above cited . et rev. d. reynold academiae oxon. procancellarii in concione de animali homine hoc anno . habitâ . aug. de unitate● ecclesiae , cap. . in johan . tra. . iren. adv haereses , lib. . cap. . . euseb. hi. eccles. lib. . cap. . socrat. lib. . cap. . theod. histo. lib. . cap. . aug contra max. arian . lib. . de bap● . con●ta donatistas , lib. . cap. . epist , . ad generosun . cor. . . ephes. . . . the popes infallible supremacy tryed by the holy ghost . read the protestation of learned protestants , repeated by bp. jewel , and doct. rainoldes in his conference with hart , cap. first division , pag . * vide frācis . pic. mirandul . theor. in expos . theor. ti . thom. waldens . tom. . de sacramentalibus , doct. . pag. . * vide formam juramenti prae stand ab episcopo electo in pontificali romano parte primâ . reservationes , provisione● , mandata apostolica totis viribus observabo , & faciam ab alijs observari . gratian. decret . distinct. . vide wolfgang laz. comment . reipub . rom. ● . cap. . concil . constan. cap. . theodos. & valent. epist. ad discor . in concil . chalced. act . theod. hi. ecel . l. . cap. . gregor . regist. l. . epist. . d. vsher , iewel , rainolds , whiker ▪ abbot , davenant , bilson , chamier , gomarus . vide. aenc . silv. de gestis basil . concil . lib. . laco . almain . de authoritate ecclesiae cap. . summi poncifices suas fimbrias nimis extenden●es alios papas adducunt in teste● . aske a thief or his fellow whether he be a thiefe . vide ● . nullus d. de testibus l. omnibus c ▪ co . . . . & . c. si testes . christ is the only head of his whole church , ephes. . . col. . . ioh. . . per pastorem unicum intelligimus christum non papā oecume●cum , ioh. . . . , , . sic per davidem intelligimus christum , eze. . , . . ezek. . . pet. . . heb. . cuncti claves regni caelorù accipiant ex aequo . hieronym advers . . vin . lib. . vt plato princeps philosophorum , ita petrus apostolorū hieron . adver . pelag . lib. . vide glos. extravagant . ioh. . potestas summa pap. six . . sac. cerem . eccles . rom. lib. . sect . . leo's sermons , epistles , rhemish annot , in mat. . . vide annot . romae excus . in cyprian . de aequalitate . apostolatus qui cum apostolis morientibus cessavit nec ad episcopos transijt . vide comarum parte . disp. . de petri apostoli & papae romani r●pug . dr. raynolds in his conference with hart chap. . division . pag. . , , . act. . act. . tit. . phil. . . pro apostolis filij nati sunt ; non pater unicus papa oecumenicus . vide aug. enarrat , in psal. . nec non in psal. . vna vetula potest esse perfectior ac major ipso papâ perfectione gratiae & amplitudinc virtutum . turrecrem in summa de eccles. lib. . c. . the law. the first table . the second table . the gospel . the grand pillars both of popery and the papacy . anti-scripturists . the true reason why men do not beleeve the scriptures to be the word of god ▪ the law. the gospel . the prime and infallible truth bears witnesse to it selfe . heb. . , . cor. . . cor. . . act. . . rev. . act. . . the familists . h. nicolas 〈…〉 the gosp●l of the ●ingdome . dr rainolds confe●●nce with hart cap. . divis . pag , . h●●lets epistle in queen elizabeth . the anabaptists . the arminians enemies of grace . vide epist. ad innoc. inter epist. august . epist. . & ▪ concil . arausican . secundum , august . tom. . contra pelagian . the socinians memies of god vide theodoret . hist. lib. . cap. . athanas. contra arian . basil contra eunom . nazianzen . hilar & aug. de trinitate & contra arian . cyrill alexand. tom. . part . . & . thesaurus &c. the libertines cor. . ▪ cor. . ▪ joh. , , . the enemies of the trinity are antichristian . dr. sibs his judgement concerning liberty of prophesy . dr , sibs his epistle before mr. baines his commentary upon the ephesians ▪ a● exhortation to beleeve the holy spirit . the spirit doth testifie that the scriptures are the ●ord of god. the testimony of the spirit supports our faith in time of temptation arguments for the holy scriptures . see mr. hildersham upon the psalme and the seventh verse , his . lecture . mr. ball his larger catechisme . master hieron of the dignity of the scriptures . reverend mr. white in his book newly printed called the way to the tree of life , the second and third chapters . ps. . the testimony of the spirit mak● all other arguments effectuall for our conversion unto true faith. vide scholasticos de dono discernendi credenda à non credendis . lombard . lib. . dist . . b●navent . sent . l. . d. . qu. . argentin . ib. aquin. secund . q. . a . q. a. . parisiēs . de legibus cap. ● . gerson . de exam . doct. p. . con . . mirandul . de fide & ordine credendi . vide sententiarios passim de dono intellectus , scientiae , & consilii . our absolute dependance upon the infallible spirit . theologi● est doctrina supernaturalis divinâ revelatione , non scientifica demonstratione tradita . johan . . johan . . . spiritus prophetis & apostolis imo & sibi ipsi in eis testimonium perhibuit . vide hen. gandaveni . sum. part . . ar . . q. . greg. homil. . in ezek. aug ▪ tract . . in ep. johan . hilar. lib. . de trin. prope . finem , & p. . . apprehension . . approbation . election . prosecution . fruition ▪ . satisfaction . psal. . . . . psal. . ▪ . psa. . . iustifying saith depends upon the testimony of the spirit . vide origen . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . simplicitas nec non majestas summa evangelii cum efficacia conjuncta philosophos , reges , mundum vicit . vide aug. l. . contra f●ustum . c. . gandav . sum . part . . art . . q ▪ . scotum . in . . dist. . q. . occham . p. . l. . c. . aug. l. . contra ep. fundamenti c. . whitta . disp. de sacra script . contr. . q. . c. . mr. white his way to the tree of life . vide chrysostom . homil . . in johan . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . biel. . sent dist . . qu. . art . l. majus lumen in scientiâ , majus robur in fide spiritus rationem dirigit , voluntatem determinat , fidem infundit●vide etiam aqu. secundae qu. . art . . & pag. . qu. . almain . in . sent . dis. . qu. unica . august . lib. . contra peti● . cap. . & retract . lib. . cap. . chrysost. homil. . ad . pop. antioch . tam certo scimus novum instrumentum esse divinum ac judaei sciebant vetus instrumentum esse divinum . joh. . . joh. . . joh. . . our want of christ. the worth of christ ▪ the truth and goodnesse of the covenant of grace . psal. . , , , , , . phil. . . we must prize and love christ above all things , and cleave to him for evermore . psal. . , . faith in all three persons . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . rom. . . eph. . . joh. . . heb . . pet. . . the worship of the divine trin-unity . the fourth and fift chapters of this treatise must be compared with this ninth chapter . god the father is to be wo●shipped with divine worship . see learned mr. r●ndoll his great mystery of godlinesse . dr. downham on the lords prayer . mr. burroughes of gospel-worship , and gospel-conversation . mr. thomas goodwin his triumph of faith. distinguendum est inter objectum considerationis , & objectum adorationis ; inter objectum , adorationis materiale & formale . pater enim quà pater abstractà ratione deitatis non est adorandus ; ipsa enim deitas est ratio formalis adorationis . eph. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ in what sense the whole trinity is our father . jer. . . isa. . . deut. . jer. . . christ is our father isa. . . heb. . , . the holy ghost is our father . god the father considered as our father in a peculiar way . evangelicall encouragement to gospell-worship . ioh. . . eph. . . tim. . . tim. . . tit. . . phile. . . rom. . . cor. . . cor. . . gal. . . phil. . . col. . . cor. . . . col. . . eph. . , . thes. . . thes. . . joh. . . pet. . . divine worship is due to iesus christ as god. the rise of this controversie . the papists . cultus latriae , duliae & hyperduliae precatio est directa vel indirecta . absoluta aut relativa ; suprema vel subalterna ; transitoria velfinalis ; oblatoria aut extra oblationem . card. perron . in responso ad regem m. britan. l. . c. . smigl . de monstris arrianorum . c. . vide sis caje●anū , suarez . valent. in thomam . part . . q. . art . . & . . the socinians . vide ●rellium de uno deo patre sect . . sect . , . socin . c. prae● . wie . volket . instit . l. . c. . socin . de adorat . christi cum christiano . franken . & fran. — dav. & antithes . francisci — davidis , ostorod . instit. cap. . the arminians . remonst . apolog. c. . & . p. . rhapsod . l. . c. . vbiquitists * securius locuti sunt viri gravissimi ante exor . tum arrium , nestorium pelagium , &c. sic & nonnulli qui inter reveren dissimos merito recensentur ante enatas controversias socinianas remonstranticas , &c. junius defens . trinit . contra samosat . p. . pag. . exam. grat. prosp. part . . sect . . chamier . tom . . l. . c. . polan . syntag. l. . c. . polyand . prima concert contra socin . c. . paraeus iren. c. . method controv . ubique c. . camer . tom . . praelect . pag. . maccov . misc . q. . disp. , , . clut . id. disp. . . . beza . col. momp . part . . pag. , . zanch. de . elohim cap. . l. . epist. . voet. de adorat . christi . roman . . . ad . lactant. instit. l. . c. . si honos idem tribuitur aliis , ipse comnino non colitur , cujus religio est illum esse unum ac solum deum credere . cyprian . ad fortunat. de exhort . mart . c. . tertul. de idol . c. . idololatria dei honorificentiam usurpat , & vendicat creaturae . ambros. in epist. ad ephes. c. . gr●g . nyss orat. in laudem bas. mag . gr. naz. orat. in christi nativit . aquin. in epist. ad ephes. cap. . lect . . the same divine worship is due to all three divine per●ons . there are no degrees in the ground of divine worship . joh. . iohn . phil. . , . * adorabilitas est attributum dei absolut●● , sive essentialis proprietas . adoratio autem supponit aliquam creaturae actionem . deus sine adorabilitate non est deus , fuit autem deus ab aeterno sine actuali adoratione . vide zanchium ●b . . de incarnatione . voetium qu. an christus quà mediator sit adorandus . the difference be●ween the motives to and formall reason of divine worship . unicum tantum est religionis & religiosae adorationis objectum , unus nempe verus deus , pater filius & spiritus sanct. vide molin . in novitate papis . riv. dec. ad pri . praecept . omnis ratio formalis in objecto naturâ prior est omni actione in objectum illud tendente : passio christi autem posterior est adorabilitate , imò & ipsa adoratione filii dei. maturam humanam assumpsit persona divina , & divinae suae naturae univit ; manet itaque unica christi persona duabus constans naturis . totam christi personam itaque adoramus , non totum personae ; natura enim assumpta est creatura : totum personae duas christi naturas significat . vide c● dd. prof. leidens●● censura confess . remonstr . cap. . in adoratione objectum formale & causa propria seu terminus ( ut scholae loquūtur ) est divina tantum natura quae hujus cultus per se tantum est capax . vide cyrilli thesaur . de incarnat . unig . c. . l. . in joh. c. . athan. contra arrianos orat. . dialog . . humanitas christi non adoratur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nec 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . adoratio mediatoris non resolvitur ultimò in munus mediatorium ▪ sed in deitatem . vide professor . leid . ubi supra . cap. . d. voetium de adorat , christi . p. . pareum irenic . cap. . cyrill . ad theodos ; de recta fide lib. . zan. de . . elohim . l. . cap. . the fourth argument empr●ved & enforced vide chamier . panstrat . tom. . lib. . c. junius defens . . de s. trinitate sect. . pag. , christus est aequalis patri secundu ●n deitatem personamque divinam , christus ut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lecundum voluntariam gratiae dispensationem pa●ri subjectus est — & pag. . propter certas causas se ul●rò demiserit salvo naturali jure ut dispensative inferius regnum procuret per gr●tiam . prayer directed unto christ as god. vide d. voetium de adoratione christi pa. . distingue ipsam petitionem formaliter ut est actus noster , à repetitâ . petitio dirigitur ad personam mediato●is & ea terminatur in quâ deitas habet se ut ratio formalis illius tendentiae seu motus cordis nostri in christum . res petita est actio christi mediatoris qua mediatoris , agenda sc. secundum naturam human●m quae est immediatum precationis subjectum . christus est deus naturâ , mediator autē instituto o eco nomico , & dispensatione voluntaria . nemo igitur deum patrem adit si●e mediatore : ac ne christum quidem , cum idem sit mediator & deus . junius de s. trinitate defens . . pag. . d. voet. de adoratione christi pag. . christus non est objectum formale fidei qua mediator , non est primum efficiens , & ultimus finis , — sed est causa inferior , tum procataractica , seu meritoria , tum instrumentalis & hac ratione collator bonorum , in cujus nomine , per quem & propter quem tendimus in summum bonum , deum s●l . inque eum credimus , in eum speramus , eum colimus & adoramus . joh. . . pareus in method . controv. ubique cap . christ considered foure manner of ways . as god. the essential infinite glory of christ. as mediatour . proprietates utriusque naturae toti personae in concreto verè competunt . filius hominis , qui est persona duabus constans naturis est omnipraes●ns , aeternus , adorabilis , adorandus , nempe secundum naturam divinam cujus haec sunt idiomata . adoramus deitatem incarnatam , ipsa autem deitas est proprium & absolutum divinae adorationis objectum . christus regnat secundum naturam divinam principaliter , secundum humanam instrumentaliter , secundum personam denique absolutissime in naturâ utraque qdsuum opus est consummantem . iunius de trinitate . humanitati christi nec per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nec per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 communicata sunt idiomata divina , quia idiomata divi●● sunt ipsissima deitas ; humanitas autem christi non fit deitas christi nec per gratiam unionis , nec per gloriam exal●●tionis . humana enim natura charismata accepit gloriosa , non idiomata divina . vide wendilin . christian. theolog. lib. . cap. . smiglec . de monstris novo●um arian . lib. . cap. . ●olan . syntag. lib. . cap. . agit christus secundum humanitatem ut instrumentum assumptum in unitatem personae . iunius de trinitate . omnia inquit paulus ecclesiam compellans , vestri sunt , nimirum ut corporis , vos autem christi ut capitis , christus verò dei ut patris qui misit ipsum , &c. — una est essentia , majestas & gloria dei patris & christi secundum christi deitatem , personamque divinam ; pater tamen christ caput est secundum dispensationem gratiae & naturae humana in christo veritatem . vide junium de sancta trinitate defens . . segmento septimo . nam si dispensativum hoc regnum nunquam traditurus esset , nunquam regni naturalis u●sum plenū esset recepturus . iunius ubi supra segmento . p. ▪ judicium respectu vario commune est sanctae trinitatis & christi singulare . commune respectu communis principij agentis , patris , filij & spiritus sancti ; singulare autem respectu christi ; . respectu principalis termini secundùm naturam divinam illius . . respectu naturae humanae ut instrumenti adunati in unitatem personae ( ut ita dicam ) singularissimum . iun. de trinitate , pag. , . agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est , verbo scilicet operante quod verbi est , & carne exequente quod carnis est . leo. epist. . ad flavianum . utraque natura suum confert ; divina quod divinum , & humana quod humanum est . wendelinus . a eph. . . b gen. . rev. ▪ . c gal. . , d cor. . , cor. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est apote lesma personale mediatoris mat. . , . collat . cum marc. . ▪ . & est potestas subordinata act. . . cor. . , . act. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sive omnipotentia est proprietas essentialis dei. vide dr alting . licet pater major est donantis auctoritate , tamen filius minor non est cui unum cum patre esse donatut . hilarius lib . de trinitate , pater filio tantum donat esse , quantus ipse est . idem . christ considered as head of the ●hurch . christ mysticall . quoties christi nomen inter argumentandum producitur duplex fallacia cavenda est . . vna utrum de personâ christi agatur in se an vero in mysterio . . altera si de personâ christi agatur inse , utrum secundum totum personae , an vero secundum hanc aut illam naturam . jun. de trinitate pag. . vide d. alting . loc. com . part . . de communicatione proprietatum . caput & corpus unus sunt christus . aug. christus ille mysticus ex personâ christi velut capitis omnia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & corpore ecclesiae per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 christi in ipsum adunato constans subjicietur patri . iunius . christ considered as man. the habituall and dispensative glory of the humane nature of christ. vide d. alting . loc . com . part . de communicatione proprietatum , nec non wendelinum . nec honorem a nobis deus nisi per deum accipit , &c. hilarius de trinitate . l. christus humanitatem non a naturâ habuit ab aeterno quia filius dei est , sed ex voluntate assumpsit ad dispensationem salutis nostrae ; atque haec humanitas non in se proprie gloriam divinam habet , sed ▪ in personâ ex unionis gratiâ : in se vero divinae proximam ex habituali gratiâ , angelorumque gloriam longissimè superantem . gloria itaque humanitatis est habitualis & dispensativa per personalis unionis gratiam . vide iunium de s. trinitate defens . . pag. , , , , , . christus est servator confirente socino . . annunciatione quia est propheta . . confirmatione vitae inculpa●ae exemplo , miraculis , passione , nec non resurrectione . . communicatio●e , quia credentibus pro data sibi potestate vitam aeternam communicat . nos autem , ulterius agnoscimus christum servatorem nostrum esse , . merito , quia pro peccatis nostris deo satisfecit , nobisque remissionem peccatorum , justitiam & vitàm aeternam acquisivit . efficaciâ dando fidem , resipiscentiam , remissionem , effundendo spiritum , donando vitam aeternam . merito ut sacerdos , effica●â ut rex . heb. . . act. . ▪ act. . vide hist. de maxim. . in rom. regem . elect. hist. simonii schardi . tom. . the object of divine worship . gal. . . thes. . , . acts . . cor. . . mat. . . the divine kind of worship . chro. . . divine worship is spirituall worship . instituted worship hath been changed . naturall worship is unchangedble . instituted worship is subservient unto natural worship . the benefit of divine institution ▪ the scope of the law and sum of the gospell . the scope of the foure first commandements . mat. . . . deut. , . the spirituall compasse of the first commandement . isa. . . deut. . jer. . . mic . . ps . , . chron. . . deut. . . mat. rom. . . psal. . . revel . . thess. . psal. . . the scope of the second commandement . deu. . , , ▪ . , . isa. . , , . act. . q●am siguram ponetis ●i qui spiritus est . hier. in isa. c. . damas. de imag. l. . & . vide● dr. rainold de idololatriâ l. . mr shepheard in his treatise of the morality of the sabhath . mr. balls larger catechisme . bishop jewels apology . aug. contra manich. lib. . c. . chrys. in epist. . ad cor. hom. . vvhat is meant by love and hatred of god in the second commandement . the immutable law of the second commandement . mr shepheard of the morality of the sabbath . the third commandement . the fourth commandement . the scope of the law and gospel . two dangerous rocks . beware of neglecting duty , or resting in duty . experimentall knowledge . eph. . . phil. ▪ , . phil. . , , . col. . , . gal. . . iustifying faith is the principle of evangelical worship rev. ▪ , , . rev. . , . . * bona theologia non fert ut gratia & ●ax evangelica ab ang●lis postuletur alcasar . col. . . rev . rev. . . the divine power of our redeemer is acknowledged by saints and angels the mystery of godliness the cathelike faith , and worship . see dr. usher his learned sermon of the unity of saith . * the christians heaven upon earth . rev. . cha . opened . the f●ure beasts . repraesentandis nimirum ecclesiis christianis juxta quatuor plagas mundi ; respondentque quatuor castri● israeliticis , eorundem animalium vexilliferis — in ecclesiis quas animalia repra●sentant , sunt homines oculatissimi , & scienti●e mysteriorum dei plenissimi . — quoties ecclesiae sacras synaxes faciunt , ●●ties . presbyteri p●o muneris ratione animalibus 〈…〉 dignus es domine , &c. presbyteros levitis & s●ce●do●ibus , quatuor animalia quatuor castris israeliticis respondere . &c. calvis apocal. ad cap. . pag. , , . * michael , gabriel , raphael , vriel . the foure beasts represent the church universal . formae quatuor animalium diversae collectionem novae ecclesiae ex quatuor orbis plagis diversisque nationibus , populis , linguis significant . pareus in com. in c. . apocalyp . the promise made to christ . the promisemade to the church universal . the fulfilling of these promises . the foundation of the catholick church . the coessentiall trinunity acknowledged by the catholike church in gospel-worship . thronusiste in medio presbytero●um & animalium positus est templum aut tabernaculum . quid aliud innuere volunt quatuor cornua altaris aurei in conspectu dei ? apoc. . . templum tabernaculi testimonii apertum in coelo . a pocal . . m. mede com. ad cap. . pag. , . * habentes nomen agni . primasius , aretas , andreas , syrus interpres , &c. vide m. mede com. ad cap. . pag. . novi cantici formula universum cultus evangelici mysterium continet . clav. apocal . mr. mede . pag. . rev. . . . revel . . . . , . . verses . revelat. . , , , , . verses . revelat. . , , . revel . . , , . idea cultus evangelici aliunde quā à caelitibus peri nequit . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 satanae angelos , pompam , pultum , ocera , omnemque apparatum ejus idololatricum respuo . rev. . . rev. . , . . the profession , fidelity , victory of the virgin-church rev. . rev. . . rev. . , . rev. . . rev. . the mystery of gospel-worship . rev. . , rev. . , . rev. . , . rev. . , . the subjection of the church universall to the lamb , and holy spirit . the scope of the law and substance of the gospell in the book of the revelation . the testimony of iesus , and the spirit . rev. . rev. . . the martyrs are conquerors by the testimony of the spirit and the bloud of the lamb. the virgin church is begotten , wooed , perswaded , governed , upheld , comforted by the spirit . the prophesie , blessing and communion of the spirit . cor. . rev. . . . compared with rev. . . the holy spirit is to be worshipped with divine worship . rev. . . opened at large . angel ▪ worship prohibited by christ . tertia interpretatio veterum & recētiorū● doctorum solae scripturae , & fidei christianae analoga est . d pareus com. in apoc. c. . isa. . . why the holy ghost is called seven spirits . gratiam precatur septem ecclesiis , quibus singulis unum eunde nqque spiritum sanctum quasi septem in solidum tribuit . the worship of the coessentiall trinunity . votum gratiae & pacis univocè concipit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 d. parei com. in apoc. c. . deus trinunus gratiae pacisqque causa adaequata integra . naturall worship is due to the holy ghost the creator of the new creature . * cor. . . tit. . , . pet. . . rev. , . rom. . , . john . . rom. instituted worship is due to the holy spirit . in the sacraments . in hearing of the word of god. rev. . , . . rev. . , , . in prayer . * by the communion of the spirit we have communion with the father and the son in gospell-worship . all three co-essentiall persons dwell in the temple of the holy spirit . he who is not the temple of the spirit is no son of god , or member of christ. the third part of evangelicall godlinesse . obedience is due to all three persons . obedience is due to god the father . filiall and foederall obedience . cor. . . tit. . . joh. . , . psa. . . psa . jer. . . mal. . , . mat. . mat. . . hos. . . ezek. . . joh. . . god the son is to be obeyed . mat. . . gal. . . heb. . . tit. ▪ . joh. . the subjection of presbyters to iesus christ. the life of a christian. all manner of obedience , inward and outward due to christ. mat. . ▪ . col. . , . tit. . . cor. . . rev. . . spirituall obedience due to the holy spirit . mat. . . act. . , , . cor. . . . cor. . . rev. . . we are debters to the spirit . the spirit is our creator . the spirit fits us for all services . the spirit of regeneneration and adoption . the spirit fitted the man christ to be our mediatour . christus est messias messiarum christus christorum . joh. . . dona ista absolutē & in se finita fuere , sicut & ipsa christi natura finita est ; nostri tamen respectu , sunt absque mensurâ . vide d. alting . exp . catech. part . . & pag. , . willfull disobedience to the spirit is a soule step towards the unpardonable sin . sincere obediense to the effectuall call of the spirit is a good evidence of our election . comfort for such as find the spirit of sanctification in them , though they do not feele or beare the spirit of adoption . we should rejoyce in , and be thankefull for our obedience to the spirit . rom. . . the right manner of obedience to god. psal. . , . zach. . , . . act. . heb. . . pet. , , . eph. . . joh. . . eph. . . act. . . joh. . , . magnes amoris amor . tim. . . james . joh. . , . cor. . . cor. . , . chro. . . tim. . . the whole mystery of the co-essentiall trinunity reduced to practice . the evangelicall ministry . the grand mystery of our election by father , son , and holy ghost reduced to practice . sicut ergo caetera praedicanda sunt , ut qui ea praedicat obedienter audiatur : ita praedestinationem suo tempore & loco praedicandam esse , ut qui obedienter haec audit , non in homine ac per hoc nec in seipso sed in domino glorietur . aug de ●ono persev . l. . c. . frustra ignorantium auribus ingeris nos liberum arbitrium condemnare ; imò verò damnetur ille , qui damnat . hieron . ad cresiphontem . eph. . , , , . ver . col. . . joh. . . tim. . . * quoties deinomen indefinite ponitur , non minus filium & spiritum , quàm patrem designat — retineatur u●itas essentiae & habeatur ratio ordinis . calvin instit . lib. . cap. . sect . . joh. . . joh. . . joh. . . joh. . . colos. . pia sanctorum vigilantia non est ex ipsorum arbitrio sed ex dono gratiae in ipsis per gratiae media exuscitato . colos. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . coloss . . . confitemur neminem immeritò perdi , neminem meritò liberari . prosp. the epistle to the ephesians . fides est medium ad salutem , & tamen ipsius electionis effectus . impius sensus qui putat beatiorem esse hominem , cui deus nihil dedecit , quam cui universa● in christo per spiritum sanctum secun●um electionem ●ratuitam 〈◊〉 i● . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mat. . matth. . , . electi sumus non meriti prae rogativâ , non fati necessi●are , non te●●ritate f●rtunae , sed alti●dine divitiarum sapientiae & scientiae dei quam non aperit sed clausam miratur apostolus . aug. prosper ▪ eulgentius . the epistle to the romans . amori patris aeterno , gratiaeque spiritus singulari nobi● in christo destinatae totum salutis adscriptum videmus in epistols ad romanos : contumeliam reddit justitia , honorem donat indebitum gratia . aug. epist. . epist. . de bono persev . ench. ad laur. pros. * ephes. . . the fruits of the spirit are marks of our election the first epistle to the thessalonians . quae sit liberae discretionis in concilio dei causa supra facultatem humanae cognitionis inquiritur & sine fidei diminutione nescitur , modo con fiteamur neminem immeritò perdi , neminē meritò liberari . the second epistle of timothy . tim. . . si omnes liberarentur , lateret quid peccato per justitiā deberetur ; si nemo , quid gratia largiretur . august . ep. . ii. our creation . gen. . . cor. . . job . . job . . ps. . john . . iii. providence . zec. . , . sam. . cor. . . luk. . . iv. the fall. cor. . . joh. . cor. . . rom. , . thess. cap. . . gal. . . titus . . , , . cor. , ephes. . , , . verses . gal. . , . act. . pet. . , , . verses . rom. . . , . eph. . . rom. . rom. . . gal. . . . hearing the word . baptisme . the lords supper . cor. . . cor. . , . cor. . . prayer . the lords day . the businesse of the lords day . eheu nec fictis lachrymis dolendaest ista profanatio quae sub praetextu libertatis christianae in diei dominici celebrationē tanquam torrens irrupit . sabbathū inter omnes mortales celebre . vide theophil . antioch . lib. ad attolycum . joseph . lib. . adversus appion . phil. iud. lib. de vitâ moysis . the iewish holy days . * vide aug. ep. . ad casulanum . chrysost. homil. . in cap. . gen. phil. iudae . lib. . de vitâ moysis . theod. trad quaest . in gen. see master white of the morality of the th . commanment . dr. twisse , mr. cawdry , and mr. palmer , mr. shepheard , dr. ames medulla theol. dr. lakes theses . the grounds of sanctifying the lords day . the iewish sabbath . isa. . . the christian sabbath . the evang●licall ministry . the scope of the second and fourth commandements . rabbi agnon dicit hanc benedictionem transire super sanctificantes sabbatum ante legem in sina datam . cognitio & celebratio dei creatoris , & consideratio seria operum creationis ac redemptionis ad ceremoniā referri nequeunt . d. waelleus de sabbatho . pag. . how the lords day is to be sanctified unto father son and holy ghost . how christians do enjoy god upon the week-days . eminent holiness and communion , read mr. shepherds excellent treatise upon this subject in his fourth part of the sanctification of the sabbath . restorative communion constant communion soule-satiating communion . extraordinary duties penitential meltings . * the sad condition of the most ingeneous sort of unreg●nerate men . motives to faith and true repentance . the great difference between an ingenuous man and a gracious man. how far an unregenerate man may be changed . the conversion of notorious sinners . the grea●est sinners are welcome to christ when they turne and submit to him . no meritorious praeparatives . notes for div a -e luk. . magnitudo animi ad praedicandum ●vangelium necessaria ex alto promittitur . d. a●ting . an etiam abnegatio christi quae fit corde in ep●cureismum prolapso sit peccatum in spiritum sanctum ? vide scultetum in ideis concionum ad cap . ad hebraeos . clamant d●ifica●i spiritus homunciones se nullum habere deum , sed usque adeo se sibi esse mortuos , ac deo unitos ut ipsimet deus effecti sint ; vide joh. ruys broch . in cap. . apologiae . nobilissimum marnixium in tract . contra enthysiastas , & calvinum de libertinis in gallia . merceunum contra deistas . de atheismo subtili & palliato , vide d. vedelium de deo synagogae . casp. barth . adversar . lib . cap. . cornel. à lapide comment ad act. . . sladum nec non eglisemnium contra vorstium . atheus est qui fidem & cultum dei directe aut indirecte à se aut ab al●●s removet . d. voetius de atheismo . vide john. junium in refutatione praelect . socini cap. . & d. rivet . in psal. . d. voet. de atheismo . ignorans quis sit deus ignorantiâ pravae dispositionis ; & contra sensum numinis congenitum verum deum negans , atheus certè , nec immeritò , ●●cendus est . nulli autem sunt athei qui certò persuasi sunt non esse deum . vide mersennum in gen. . à pag. . usque ad pa. . & voetium in ther site . sect. . cap. . & de atheismo parte secundâ , & parte quarta pag. . wigandum de arianis in polonia . facilis est ab atheismo s●ciniano in directum atheismum prolapsus . vide bedae notas in ephes. . . & d. vedelium de deo synagogae . atheismus interpretativè contradicens & directè blasphemans ferendus non est in civili hominum societate , quia bonum civile non consistit sine metu cultuque numinis . vide calvin . in psal. . de atheo blasphemante . vide arist. de coelo lib. . cap. . aug. in psal. . senec. epist. . . damas● . de orth. fid . lib. . c. . ciceron . de naturâ deorum . the father and his coequal son are to be honoured with equal honour . christian communion with the father in his natural son by their co-essential spirit . the largest bounds of christian communion . we can have no christian communion with such as deny the godhead of christ. vide epistolas martini seidelii silesii apud socinum de adoratione christiad versus christian — francken . & franciscum davidis . catechis . racov. the socinìans are blasphemous and idolatrous hereticks . the family of love . h. nicolaus familiae caritatis : pater dixit , ego sum deus . vide theodor . cornhert in specimine injustitiae deificati hen nicolai praefat. mr. fry his bellows . pag. . mr fry his proud blasphemy . the grand question concerning christian communion with blasphemous idolaters , seducing hereticks , and base apostates . vide gomarum , voetium , zanchium , polanum de trinitate . jod . coc● thesaur . cathol . lib. . goldast . in imperial . constit . tom. . elmenhorst . com . ad gennadium . the reasons why socinians are rejected from christian communion the common unity of the christian faith. the adequate object of divine and evangelical worship they who deny the trinity are apt to close with iews and turks . vide epistolas seidelii apud socinum de adoratione christi . videl . de deo synagogae . lib. . cap. . socinismus ex mahumetismo oritur , & in eundem resolvitur . stegman . photin . socinismus est recta ad judaismi , turcismi , nec non atheismi via . exempla dabant neuserus & pafradus viri non indocti , quorum ille minister in palatinatu , hic praeceptor classicus scholae marpurgensis . vide d. voetii antidota generalia adversus socin . pag. . . abrah . calovium● mr fryes blasphemy . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . phil. . . error personae fatalis error est . the substance of the gospel , and the covenant of grace . the contents of the covenant of grace . gal. . . cor. . . eph. . . socinismus est haeresis pestilentissima , divinitatem christi spiritusque abnegans , viamque per propriam vitae obedientiam ad coelum affectans . socinianism overthrows the covenant of grace . socinismus divinam christi essentiam , personam , satisfactionem negans , objectum fidei cultusque tollit , christianismum evertit . we are quickned and cured by christ , and his spirit according to the tenour of the covenant of grace . the spirit is given by covenant as a bond of union . christ god-man is the only mediatour of the covenant . christ is god and man in one subsistence or person . the high importance of this truth . mr fry in his bellows printed at addle-hill . pag. , , . the nature of christian communion cor. . . eph. . . the sacraments of communion christian baptisme . mat. . eph. . . cor. . . act. . , . cor. . cor. . . rom . gal. . , the lords supper . the growing , saving communion the mystery of the trinity is made even sensible to us in the h●ly sacrament . the special application the highest communion sacramental knowledge . sacramental mysteries are spiritual and yet real . joh. . , . sweet communi●n for hungry soules . the offices of christ. concerning civil respect . the question stated in some few conclusions concerning the rejecting of such as are unblameable in their life , when they grow obstinate in singing against conscience . tit. . , . he who persists in ● dangerous error after two admonitions wisely and faithfully dispenced , is condemned of himself , that is , of his own conscience . read reverend mr cotton his answer to mr williams p. , . and so m●o p. . ob. sol. no man ought to be punished till he sins against conscience . conscience will speak when it may be heard . quidisputat contra internum sensum & naturale conscientiae dictamen , est heraeticus interior . . atheists . vide beza● . a●not . ad eph. . . the. . , t it . . ps. . , . ●sal . psal. . job . , . cor. . , . a subverted heretick . tit. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is quite thrown ess from the foundation , and turned upside down . see mr cotton against mr williams , cap. . pag. . the punishment of subverted and self-condemned heretikes . tit. . , , . joh. v. , , . a atheismus dicitur synecdochice cyclopismus , quod cyclopum instar nullam pietatis , & honestatis curam habeant . d. voetius de atheismo . pag. . b aen. syl. de gestis concil . basil. l. . c grot. annot . in . luc. . . the atheistical syncrctisme . acontius detected . in the yeare . vide remonstran . apol. p. . & respon . ad profes . leydens . pag. . acontius translated into english and printed in england . the third book of acontius which is now in english , is very dangerous . acontius perused by a committee of the reverend assembly at westminster , march ● . why p. ramus did commend acontius . pet. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . colos . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . aliudest scribere uni , aliud omnibus . d. voet. tract . de necessitate , & utilitate dogmatis de sacrosancta trinitate . p. , . a voet. de atheismo parte . pag. . quamlongé autem abfuerit acontius ab occulto socinismo , aut saltem syncretismo cum eo , discipotest , quòd sabellianorum haeresin praecisé excludat , photinianorum verò minime ; imo eos symbolo suo ( lib. . p. . ) non obscure includ●t . b sabelliani ab acontio extra novum ipsius catholicum symbolum & communionem seu syncretismum collocantur , quia statuunt filium esse eandem personam cum patre . d. voet. de trinitate . pag. . c quod ad acontium dicimus eum meritò in hoc negotio suspectum esse — videantur modo l. . p. , . & lib. . p. . edit basil. . & judicetur quis anguis in herba latueri● , quod hic vir in fundamentalibus assertionibus nunquam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 trium personarum statuerit , nec adversarios samosarenum , photinum , arrium , eunomium , pneumatomachos , aut corum errores rejecerit , contentus solos , ●●los rejectos qui negarent filium non esse alium à patre . ● . voet de trinitate . pag. . read acontius in latine p. , . in english pag. . acontius in english pag . per hominem peccati omnis expertem , virtute immensa● pr●ptereáque dei filium itemque deum , & similia . acont . strat. pag. . acontius in english p. , . a pareus epist. ad n. n. martii . . . arminium vestrum sociniani in poloniâ expresse ut suum nuper nominarunt , unà cum quodam bonfinio , & acōtio clandestinis asseclis , quorum authoritate postularunt à fratribus orthodoxis fraternitatem , isti verò fortiter recusarunt . act a ad me m●sit synodus lublinensis . b siquidem innotuisset ecclesiis reformatis quod tectè innuit lib. . p. . . & lib. . pag. . edente jo. grassero . . b●s . utique in communione suâ illum non retinuissent , nisi a pertius declarasset , se ex italia praetextu reformationis non attulisse quod populares ejus alciatus , blandrata , gribaldus , socinus uterque , &c. d. voetius de trinitate . p. . vide acta concilii niceni , concil . syrmiensis , anno . utriusque ariminēsis , anno . athanasium de synodis oratione . contra arianos , & ad seraplonem disput . prima & secunda contra arrianos . epiphan . haeres . . & . anathema tibi liber● inquit hilarius . vide hilar. de synodis nicet . thesaur . orth. fid . lib. . haeresi . . socrat. hist. l. . c. . & . c. . . sozom. lib. . c. . epist. synod . sardic . apud theodoret. aug. de haeres . c. . serm . . baronii annales ad annum . & . photium in epist. philost . alcuinum de trinitate , gomarum , chamierum , voetium , zanchium de trinitate . vide melanct . loc com . examen theologicum . consilia . profess . leidens . in specimine exceptorum . vedel . in arcan . arm. pezel . in disp. de trinitate . schevica . de trinit . jun. in antapolog . jodoc . cocc . thesaur . cathol . l. . elmen . horst . in comment . ad gennad . ambros. praef. ad lib. de sacro sancto . goldast . in constit. imperial . t. . theod. hist. lib. . cap. . ecthes . heraclii de trinitate & fide catholica . edicta constantini . decreta ord. gen. . de combustione librorum socini & ejectione ostorodi & voidovii ex provinciis unitis . socinismum cum turcismo & judaismo comparant ▪ trelcatius senior ▪ gomarus , vedelius , voetius . anti-trinitarios 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appellat epiphanius . variatur fides , auge , tur vel diminuitur — non ratione primae v●ritatis , quae est unica inomnibus , sed ex parte credendorum , dispositionum , personarum , & temporum . reyn. pant. de fide cap. . qui trinitatem negat , negat baptismum . negat christianismum . tota enim ecclesia christiana quae deum in tribus personis colit , mysterium trinitatis in vero scripturarum sensu pro necessario habet ; arianos , photinianos , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & proinde socinianos damnat . vide censuram cl . theol. profess . in confes. remon . instit . c. . de sacro-sancta trinitate . frustra sunt qui loco patris filii & spiritus sancti unius veri dei idolum colunt . sociniani christum verum dei filium esse agnoscunt , verum deum esse negant . vide d. alting . loc. com . parte secundâ pag. . vide etiam acta concil . niceni . symb. nicen. symb. athanas. epistolam eusebii apud socratem lib. . hist. cap. . theodor. lib. . cap. . d. vedel . arcan . arminianismi . stegman . photin . smiglecium de naturali dei filio . symb. constant. apud theodor. lib. . cap. . epiph. in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . videl . de deo synagogae . d. voetium de atheismo , de symb. de sancta trinitate , ubi supra . pelt . harmon . praefat. melanct. loc. com . exam . theol. & consilia ejusdem . d. voet. de trinitate p. . acontius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 trium personarum in fundamentalibus assertionibus non statuit . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rom. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rom. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 joh. . . professionis nostrae pontifex est naturalis dei filius . heb. . , , . heb. . , . mat. . , . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ephes. . . mat. . . ephes. . . cor. . . ephes. . , , . heb. . , . joh. . . tim. . . & cap. ▪ . tim. . . rom. . . joh. . . compared with joh. . . phil. . . joh. . . . joh. . . cor. . . joh. . , , , . joh. . , . joh. . . regula fidei pusillis magnisque communis aug. epist. . vide sym. apud epiph. in haeresi . & quae de consil . chalced habentur apud evagrium lib. . hist. c. . praesertim de spiritu sancto . consulantur scholastici de iis , quae necessaria sunt necessitate medii vel finis . bannes in secundam secundae quest . . art . . greg. val. tom. . com . the. quest . . punct . . scot. suarez . ocham lorca , &c. vide aug. contra pelag. & celest. lib . c. . ecclesia una dicitur propter unitatem fidei . hieronym . in psal. . baptismus est sacramentum fidei aug. epist. . vide basil. de spiritu sancto lib . cap. . tertul. de praescript . cap. ▪ . iren. l. . cap. . ●arker . de desc . ad inferos . fides nostra secundū christi doctrinam est in patre & filio , & spiritu sancto . mat. . eph. . . concil . ancyran . de spiritu sancto . sym. antioch . apud socrat. l. . cap . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . concil . constant. epist. apud theod. l. . hist. cap. . sct d. vshers learned answer to the iesuits challenge , p. , . and his excellent sermon of the unity of faith , where he gives a satisfactory account of the faith of the eastern and western churches . mr rous his catholique charity . cap. , . d. voetius de symb. apost . d. potter his answ●r to charity mistaken . sect . lod . co● . thesaur . cathol . l. . art . . acta consilii niceni . athanas. de synodis , hilar. de synodis . epiph. haeres . . socrat. hist. lib. . cap. . baronii annales ad an , , . alcuinum de trinitate . nicet . thesaur . orthod . fid . l. . haeres . . videlium de deo synagogae . gomarum de trinitate . atheus est juxta religionem christianam , qui christum ut deum non colit . vide sis , orationem d. jac. arminii de componendo dissidio religionis inter christianos . arii symbolum explodendum statuimus ; nam si ab aeterno deus est pater , filius quoque patri coaeternus necessario statuitur . d. s. glassius de deitate filii . vide tilenum de deo patre & filio , d. sohnium de trinitate . zanchium , bezam , calvinum , junium , trelcatium seniorem , d. altingium , maccovium , synop. purioris theol. polanum , chamierum , libertinismus introducit socinismum , socinismus destruit christianismum . socinus , acontius , barleus , nec non semi-iudaizantes arminiani pietatem fovent parum christianam . vide stegmannum , voetium , videlium de prudentia veteris ecclesiae l. . cap. , . de deo synagogae , de arcanis arminianismi , de finibus arminianismi lib. . cap. , . comnenus reclamantibus orthodoxis dixit turcas colere verum deum , ut videre est apud nicetam choniatem in manuele com●eno lib. . qui quaerere deum se profitentur extra christum quem abominantur ut turcae & iudaei , neque verum deum , neque verum cultum habent . nam sine christo nec verus deus cognoscitur , nec colitur . d. rivet . comment . in hos. . p. . acontius his thîrd book of stratagems . * see d. reynolds his learned conference with hart. grotius in pietate ord. p. . &c. hic ego optima fide profiteor , neminem me nosse in omni hollandiae conventu , qui non istis opinionibus , & omnibus , & singulis dicturus sit anathema . christus est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , credis vel non ? si non , arianus es , christianus non es . vide etiam nicet . thesaur . orthod . fid. lib. . haeresi . athanas. ad serap . orat. . disp. . & . contra arianos . photium in epitome . philost . canones concil . nicen. epiph. haeres . . & . socrat. hist. l. . c. . baronii annales ad annum , & . anathema tibi liberi inquit hilarius . vide photii nomocan . tit. . c. . al●uinum de trinitate . whether seducing hereticks , and blasphemous apostates may be punished . no man is to be punished till he is unconscionable . act. . , the high-way to captivity . non tantùm 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sed & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; haereticus post unam alteramque admonitionem repellendus itaque est eversus haereticus , ut qui suopte judicio sit condemnatus . what kind of persons are to be punished . the morall equity of the command for punishing seducers : deut. . compared with zac. . and rom. . . the general equity of this ordinance . . the general concernment of it . . the spiritual efficacy of it according to gods decree . the magistrate must act as a minister of god according to the ordinance of god. vnconscionable men must be restrained by the sword. the object and end of the magistrates power . see reverend master whites way to the tree of life concerning humane authority . mr. cotton in his bloudy tenent washed white . cap. . magistrates must study fundamentall truths . godly mgistrates a instructed by god in all necessary truths . the rule of all christian magistrates deut. . . arius in alexandriâ una scintilla fuit , sed quia non statim oppressa est , totu● orbem ejus flamma de populata est . hieronymus . mirabatur se totus mundus factum arrianum . iulian the apostates designe . * julianus desertor christi , & inimicus , haereticis libertatem perditionis permisit , & tum basilicas haereticis reddidit , quando templa daemoniis . eo modo putans christianum nomen posse pertre de terris si unita●i ecclesiae , de quâ lapsus fuerat , invideret , & sacrilegas dissensio● nes liberas esse permitteret . epist. . toleration of heretikes in doctrine , and idolatours in worship made the world antichristian ; see reverend mr. cotton in his answer to mr. williams his bloudy tenent . chap. . pag . . the toleration of seducing apostates , hath often introduced a b●ter persecution of orthodoxe saints . vide athanas . apolog . socrat. hist. lib. . cap. . lib. . cap. . vict. de per. sec. vandal . lib. . euseb . in vitâ const. lib. ca. . sulpit. sever . sozon . ●v●gr . pau diacon . baron . annal . hieronym orat . de non crad . basil. heretikes are not pun●shed for simple errour . esterror amoris , est & amor erroris . errores sunt vel praeter , vel circa , vel contra fundamentum . est error pervertens est & error , animam subvertens , fidem ever . tens , pacem ecclesiae nec non reip. christianae perturbans . hereticidium autē ob simplicem & nudam hae . resin , nemo nostrûm simpliciter asseruit . d. profess . leyd . censur . c. . p. . calvin . epist. p. . calvin . retu● err : michaelis serveti inter opuscula pag. . scimus tres esse errorum gradus &c. pelargus in deut. . bullinger . beza &c. mr. rutherfurd against pretended liberty . pag. . * vide brochman . de magist. pal. cap. . qu. . dub . . meisner . philosoph . sobr . sect . ● . c●p . . haereticum leditiosum & blasphenium capitali supplicio dignam nemo ex nostris facile impugnabit . tota quaestio est de haeretico simplici . a ergo si potest , vel unum nominet qui aut omnes haereticus censuerit interfi●iendes , aut ita sibi pla●u●it ut alios omnes diversum 〈◊〉 pro haereticis habuerit . vide bezam contra ●elli●m , & monfortium ▪ et tract . de haer●●eis 〈◊〉 . b calv. in opuse . de serveto . c mr. cotton often in his 〈◊〉 to master williams his bloudy tene●t . p. ● . . irresistible motives to quicken magistrates to dloe their duty . what lawes are of perpetuall obligation . vide piscator . in exodum . see master palmer and mr. cawdrey of the sabbath . chap. . an indulgence to such as deny supernaturall principles , permits men to be anti-scripturists . mr. burroughes heart-divisions . pag. . the very attempt of killing a soule deserves death . see master . cottons tenent washed white . pag. . the distinction between real and nominal trinitarians examined and the doctrine of a real trinity vindicated from the charge of tritheism : in answer to a late socinian pamphlet, entituled, the judgment of a disinterested person, concerning the controversie about the blessed trinity, depending between dr. s--th, and dr. sherlock. sherlock, william, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the distinction between real and nominal trinitarians examined and the doctrine of a real trinity vindicated from the charge of tritheism : in answer to a late socinian pamphlet, entituled, the judgment of a disinterested person, concerning the controversie about the blessed trinity, depending between dr. s--th, and dr. sherlock. sherlock, william, ?- . [ ], p. printed for william rogers ..., london : . reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. attributed to william sherlock. cf. nuc pre- . table of contents: p. [ ]-[ ] created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng south, robert, - . -- judgement of a disinterested person, concerning the controversie about the blessed trinity. trinitarians. trinity -- controversial literature. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - rachel losh sampled and proofread - rachel losh text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the distinction between real and nominal trinitarians examined , and the doctrine of a real trinity vindicated from the charge of tritheism . in answer to a late socinian pamphlet , entituled , the judgment of a disinterested person , concerning the controversie about the blessed trinity , depending between dr. s — th , and dr. sherlock . london , printed for william rogers , at the sun , over against st. dunstan's church in fleet-street , . the contents . sect . i. concerning real and nominal trinitarians . page the late arch-bishop tillotson and dr. bull owned by him to be real trinitarians , p. dr. bull 's learned defence of the nicene faith asserts and proves a real trinity , p. sect . ii. this author's account of the doctrine of the realists and nominalists , concerning the holy trinity . p. the occasion of this distinction between real and nominal trinitarians and the use the socinians make of it , ibid. this author's account of the doctrine of the realists p. that there are three minds , spirits , substances , in the trinity , not the language of all realists , nor own'd by any of them in his sense , p. . &c. the difference between an individual and singular substance , p. his representation of the doctrine of the nominalists , p. the only difference between them and the realists , not in three substances and one substance , p. sect . iii. the authorities ( as ●he calls them ) of the nominals against a real trinity , examined , p. what the nicene council meant by the homoousion , or one substance of father and son , p. socrates's account of the dispute concerning the word homoousios , p. this author's mistake in making the arian homoiousios signifie the same substance in sort , or kind , or properties , p. the third council of constantinople , concerning two natural wills , and two operations in christ , ibid. in what sense this council owned but one will in the trinity , p. the doctrine of the council of lateran , concerning the trinity , p. in what sense they teach that the divine essence , neither begets , nor is begotten , nor proceeds , p. spanhemius's account of some late disputes about the trinity , and the judgment of the belgick synods , p. sect . iv. his three first arguments against a real trinity , p. all his arguments oppose a trinity of subsisting persons , ibid. one ( personal ) infinite mind or spirit , not the definition of the one god , p. concerning three wills , understandings , &c. in one god , p. his argument to prove , that the second and third persons in the trinity are not substance and spirit , but only properties , or immanent acts , ibid. his argument from the council of lyons answered , p. concerning the eternal generation and procession , p. in what sense the son is the wisdom of the father , p. what the fathers meant by that argument for the eternity of the son , that god was never 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , without his word , p. the judgment of cabassutius about this argument , p. concerning emanatory causes and effects , p. sect . v. the fourth and fifth argument against a real trinity answered , p. the difference between three divine persons , [ each of which is true and perfect god , ] and three gods , p. the charge of tritheism founded on an equivocal use of those terms , one god , and one person , p. whether the arguments for the unity of god , prove , that there is but one person , who is god , p. sect . vi. the defence this author makes for the nominals against the objections of the realists , p. the end of the contents . errata . page . marg. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. . l. . for or r. are . p. . l. . dele for . p. . l. . for aclls , r. calls . the distinction between real and nominal trinitarians , considered . sect i. concerning real and nominal trinitarians . this author calls himself a presbyter of the church of england ; and by what i have heard , i fear it is too true : i pray god preserve the church from such presbyters , who eat her bread , and betray her faith. his pretence for writing this pamphlet , is , the controversy between dr. s — th and dr. sherlock , about the b. trinity . i will say nothing of that matter , let the animadverter answer it to god and his own conscience ; this author has said enough about it , and i wish he had but used the same candour throughout , and then there would have been no need of this answer , but tho' it seems he was disinterested as to the contending doctors , he was deeply interested as to the cause of socinianism , to which he promised no small advantage from this dispute . and indeed it is too evident , what advantage our socinian adversaries have made , and hope still to make of this controversy . this has occasioned that scandalous distinction between real and nominal trinitarians ; which is such an open abuse upon the nominalists , that were i one of those whom he reproaches with that title , i could not bear it : for the plain english of it is no more but this ; those who believe a trinity , and those who believe no trinity ; for nominal trinitarians , as opposed to real trinitarians , can signifie nothing more . and could this author , and his friends , persuade the world , that the greatest part of our clergy , nay , the church of england it self , as he pretends , are but nominal trinitarians , their work were done ; for a socinian is a much more honourable name ; and when men agree in the faith , it is a vain thing to dispute about words ; and therefore this author is equally zealous to oppose the realists , that is , to overthrow the doctrine of a real trinity , and to persuade the nominalists , that tho' they differ in some peculiar forms of speech , yet there is no reason they should quarrel , for their faith is the same : and this i thought a sufficient reason to judge over again , the iudgment of this disinterested person . i shall pass over the account he gives of the history of this dispute , only observing , that dr. sherlock did not begin it ; he wrote against the socinians , without suspecting that he should meet with such furious and bitter assaults from another quarter , and yet after such great provocations as might move a very tame man , he has made no return , which unbecomes a true christian spirit in such cases . but there is one thing wherein this author has done the dean right , by acquainting the world , that he has not been the first broacher of this heresy ( as they call it ) of three distinct infinite minds and spirits in the vnity of the godhead . he reckons up several others of the same mind , some who appeared before , and some since his vindication , as dr. cudworth , dr. bull , the late archbishop tillotson , the present bishop of glocester , mr. how , mr. i. b. mr. bingham . and i could tell him of many more , as many as do sincerely believe , that god is a father , and has a true , real , subsisting son , and holy spirit . but yet he himself is sensible , and his socinian friends , or rather he himself , in some former pamphlets , has observed very material differences between the dean's hypothesis , and some of these learned men : he neither owns the platonick inequality of dr. cudworth , nor the sabellian composition and union of others , but asserts three real , distinct , coequal , coeternal persons ; not in one singular and solitary , but in one numerical nature and essence . but i believe the dean will heartily thank him for giving him the late archbishop and dr. bull , two such names as will command reverence , and shelter him from the imputation either of novelty or heresy , at least as to this point : and it is worth observing , from the example of these two great men , at what rate some persons judge of men and doctrines . the good archbishop , by his trinitarian adversaries , is charged with socinianism , and by his socinian adversaries with tritheism ; and yet he must have very ill luck , if he could stumble upon two such extremes . as for dr. bull , his learned and elaborate defence of the nicene faith , was printed at oxford , and received with universal applause , as it highly deserved : none of them to this day have charged him with the least heresy , and i believe will not yet venture to do it . and yet , as this writer confesses , and as every unprejudiced reader must own , the doctrine of the defence as to this point , is the very same with the dean's hypothesis , which these very persons have condemned as impious and heretical . so true is it , duo cùm faciunt idem , non est idem . all that this socinian intended by bringing dr. bull into the fray , was to follow the blow which the animadverter and the oxford decree had given to a trinity of distinct , proper , subsisting , living , intelligent persons , ( which is all that dr. bull , or the dean assert ) by their charge of tritheism ; which he hoped would be a sufficient answer to that otherwise unanswerable book , and together with dr. bull , would confute all the fathers at once , on whose authority he so much relies , and to whom he perpetually appeals ; for no christian must hearken to those men , whatever their authority be , did they really ( as they are unjustly charged ) preach three gods ; and thus he thinks he has got rid of all antiquity , and of the tritheistick trinity with it . but still this makes well for the dean , who will be contended to stand and fall with the catholick fathers , and will never desire to be thought more orthodox than they . that dr. bull asserts a real , substantial trinity , in as high and express terms as ever the dean did , is so plain throughout his book , that it is needless to prove it . all his arguments suppose this hypothesis , and are unintelligible without it ; and therefore i shall take notice but of one or two particular passages , whereon , as we shall presently see , this whole heavy charge of tritheism rests . he tells us , that hypostasis , both before and in , and after the nicene council , was used by the catholick fathers for subsistence , or a particular thing which subsists by it self , which , in intelligent beings , is the same with person : that in this sense , they taught father and son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to be two hypostases ; and father , son , and holy ghost , to be three hypostases . and that upon this account tertullian , to assert the subsistence of the son against those who denied him to be a distinct person from the father , affirms him to be substantiam & rem substantivam , substance , and a substantial being . and having by many irrefragable instances proved this use of the word to be very catholick , he adds , that probably this word hypostasis would still have been used in this sense , had not the arians abused it to countenance their heresy , expounding it to a more general notion of essence , nature and substance , and teaching , as the catholick fathers did , that the father and son were two hypostases ; but thereby meaning , that they were of a different nature and substance , unlike to each other : and that in opposition to them it was , that the sardican council taught , father and son to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one hypostasis ; that is , as they themselves expresly affirm , in the sense of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or one nature and essence . we may find a great deal more to this purpose in the same place , in his vindication of origen from the objections of huetius , who charges him with denying the father and son to be of the same essence and substance , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because he opposes those who denied the holy ghost to have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a substance of his own , distinct from the father and the son : whereas that learned man shews , that origen by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , meant no more than hypostasis , in which sense that word is often used among the ancients ; and therefore in opposition to those noetian hereticks , asserts father , son , and holy ghost , to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three hypostases , as hypostasis signifies rem singularem & individuam per se subsistentem , quae in iis , quae vita & intellectu gaudent , idem est quod persona : a singular and individual thing , which subsists by it self , which in beings that have life and understanding , signifies a person : so that three hypostases , are three substantial , self-subsisting , living , intelligent persons . and tho' the phrase , of three minds , three spirits , three substances , ought to be used very cautiously , and not without great necessity , when applied to the holy trinity , for fear of the arian notion of three substances , yet it is evident how far this learned man is from thinking such expressions to be impious and heretical : he expounds ▪ three hypostases to the very same sense ; and elsewhere quotes that passage of st. hilary concerning the synod at antioch , as truly catholick , where in opposition to the sabellians , they assert the divine persons in the trinity , to be tria in substantia , or tres substantias , three in substance , or three substances . thus when petavius accuses methodius for calling father and son , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , two creating and operative powers , he answers , that father and son might with less offence , and better reason , be called two powers by methodius , than two natures and substances , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 five 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as they are called by other fathers , who yet were always accounted catholick ; but such expressions as these must be understood only personally , and then they are orthodox : so that according to this learned man , two personal natures , substances , and powers , are catholick expressions ; and this is the very account which dr. sherlock in his defence , if he were the author of it , gives of three minds , and spirits , that he understood it personally , for three divine intelligent persons ; and therefore is as orthodox in these very expressions , as dr. bull , and those catholick fathers to whom he appeals . in another place , speaking of some modern divines , who allow the son to be of the father , considered as a son , but not as god ; that he receives his person , but not his essence or divine nature of the father ; he observes that we cannot conceive the person without the essence , unless by person in the divinity , we mean no more than the meer mode of subsistence , which is plain sabellianism . so that this writer has done dr. sherlock a greater kindness than he was aware of , and as it will quickly appear , has lost his own cause by it ; if dr. bull have truly represented the sense of the fathers , as all learned and unprejudiced men must own he has : for here are such a cloud of witnesses to the doctrine of a real , substantial , subsisting trinity , as no later authorities , whatever they are , can stand against . what i have now quoted , is only what first came to hand , but there is hardly any thing in the whole book , but what by immediate and necessary consequence , proves the real dictinction of proper , subsisting persons in the trinity ; that each person is by himself in his own proper person , as distinguisht from the other two , infinite mind , substance , life , wisdom , power , and whatever is contained in the notion and idea of god. instead of particular quotations for the proof of this , i shall only appeal to the titles of the several sections of that learned work , which i believe no man can make common sense of , without acknowledging a trinity of proper , substantial , subsisting persons . the first section concerns the preexistence of the son of god , that he , who afterwards was called jesus christ , did subsist before his incarnation , or nativity , according to the flesh of the blessed virgin , in another and more excellent nature than that of man ; that he appeared to the holy men under the old testament , as a kind of anticipation of his-incarnation ; that he always presided over , and took care of his church , which he was to redeem with his own blood ; that he was present with god his father before the foundation of the world , and that by him all things were made . this is the faith of christians , and this he proves to be the constant doctrine of all the catholick fathers for the first three hundred years , and so it continued to after-ages : now let any man consider , what a pretty kind of dispute this is , about the preexistence of the son , if he have no proper permanent existence of his own , but considered as a divine person , is only another name for the father , or an immanent act , like the transient thought , or transient act of reason in man. for if the son be not a distinct person from the father , and as proper a subsisting person as the father himself is , the question will amount to no more but this , whether god the father had a being before jesus christ was born of the virgin , or before the world was made ? or , whether he had any immanent acts of wisdom or reason , before he made the world ? or , whether he took the name of son upon himself , before he made the world , or made any creature to know him or his name . the christian fathers were wiser men than to talk at this impertinent rate ; and therefore they did believe , that god had a son in a true and proper sense ; a subsisting , living , omnipotent son , by whom he made the world ; who appeared in his own proper person to several of the patriarchs under the old testament ; and in the fulness of time , was incarnate of the substance of the virgin mary . the very question it self necessarily supposes this to make sense of it ; much more impossible is it to understand what the fathers say upon this argument , upon the sabellian or socinian hypothesis . the second section concerns the consubstantiality of the son with the father ; that the son of god is not of a created or mutable essence , but perfectly of the same divine unchangeable nature with his father , and therefore is true god of true god. now , what sense can be made of this , if the son be not as truly and properly substance in his own person , as distinguished from the person of the father , as the father is in his own person ? for , how can the son be consubstantial , or of the same substance with the father , if he be no substance at all ? especially since this learned man has proved , that the catholick fathers rejected the homoousion in the sabellian sense , for one singular substance of father and son , and that they assert , as common sense would teach us , that nothing is consubstantial to it self , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one thing is consubstantial to another . the third section concerns the co-eternal existence of the son with the father : now for father and son to coexist , necessarily supposes , that they both exist , and actually subsist by themselves ; for two cannot exist and subsist together , unless each of them actually subsist ; for as the fathers observe , nothing can properly be said to coexist with it self : for it can admit of no question , whether any one has been , as long as he has been : and therefore , since the co-eternity of the son has been a very serious dispute between the catholicks and the arians , it is certain , that both of them owned father and son to be two distinct persons , which did distinctly exist and subsist . the fourth section teaches the subordination of the son to the father ; that tho' the son be co-equal with the father , as having the same divine nature with the father , without any change or diminution ; yet he is subordinate to the father , as receiving the divine nature from him : that the father is god of himself ; the son , god of god. now if the son receive the divine nature by an eternal communication from the father , he must have it in himself , in his own person , and be a living , subsisting son , true god of god ; and if he be a true proper person , and subordinate to the father , he must be a distinct person , for no person can be subordinate to himself . these questions dr. bull has discoursed at large , with great variety of learning , and acuracy of judgment ; and it is a mystery to me , how those , who pretend to admire dr. bull , should quarrel with dr. sherlock ; or that those who pay any reverence to the catholick fathers , should quarrel with either of them . this socinian , as i observed before , was glad to draw dr. bull into the number of tritheists , but by that means he has drawn in all the catholick fathers too , and has now drawn together so many tritheists , as he will never know how to get rid of again : or to speak more properly , he has unanswerably confuted the charge of tritheism , and discovered the trick and mystery of it , by charging the catholick faith it self , and all the catholick fathers , the most zealous patrons and advocates of it , with tritheism . sect ii. this author's account of the doctrine of the realists and nominalists , concerning the holy trinity . the very name of socinianism is justly abhorred by all christians , who place all their hopes of salvation in the incarnation , sacrifice , and intercession of the eternal son of god : for if christ jesus , who is the saviour of mankind , be not the eternal son of god in humane nature , all those great assurances , which the gospel gives us , of god's love to sinners , in giving his own eternal son for us , of the expiation of our sins by the blood of the son of god , a price of inestimable value , and of all the blessings which we expect , both in this world and in the next , from the powerful intercession of a beloved son , and a meritorious high-priest ; i say , all these strong consolations dwindle into no more , than the word and promise of a great and extraordinary prophet , the death of a martyr , and the intercession of a beloved creature , and humble supplicant , who has no inherent power and authority to save us . our modern socinians are very sensible , what an invincible prejudice this is ; for few serious christians will be willing to part with their hopes of heaven , or to part with greater , infinitely greater hopes for less , or to think so meanly of their saviour , who is the object of their faith and worship , as to thrust him down into the rank and number of meer creatures . this the catholick church would never endure in the arians , who yet attributed a most excellent nature and glory to christ , next to god himself , superior to the highest orders of angels , as being before the world it self , and the maker of it , but yet not true and perfect god , as not having the same nature with his father , nor eternally begotten by him ; much less would they ever endure the thoughts of the photinian or samosatenian heresy , that is , of socinianism , which makes christ but a meer man , who had no being before he was born of his virgin mother . this , i say , being so invincible a prejudice against them , they have of late tried new arts , and have taken advantage of some very unhappy disputes , to impose upon unwary men , and to appear abroad with new confidence under a less frightful disguise . the late controversy about three infinite minds and spirits in the trinity , has given them the advantage of distinguishing between real and nominal trinitarians , or such trinitarians as believe a trinity of real subsisting persons ; and those who believe only one real person , who is god , with a trinity of names , or offices , or immanent acts and powers . the realists , they call trithiests , or such hereticks , as assert three gods. the nominals , they think very orthodox , and the church ; and tho' the nominals and socinians differ in some forms of speech , yet they say , and i think very truly , that there is no considerable difference in their faith , as they state it , and seem well enough inclined to exchange that odious name of socinians , for the more plausible and popular name of nominal trinitarians . and thus they can dispute as heartily as ever , and with more safety and honour , against the faith of the trinity , so they do but call it a real trinity ; and may dispute for socinianism as earnestly as ever , so they do but call it a nominal trinity . — en quo discordia cives . perduxit miseros ! — that this is the whole artifice of this present pamphlet , any one who reads it , may see with half an eye ; and i hope some men , if ever they can grow cool , will consider a little better of it : i do not so much intend gravely to dispute with this author , as to wash off his paint , and bring the controversy back again to its right owners , those truly opposite parties of trinitarians , sabellians and socinians . that those whom he calls the real trinitarians , are the only men who believe a christian trinity , and that the nominal trinitarians do not believe a trinity , is evident in their very names ; for a trinity , which is the object of our faith and worship , is certainly a real trinity , if it be at all ; and one would think , that a trinity , which is not a real trinity , should be no trinity at all : the zeal which the socinians express against a real trinity , is a good argument , that that is the true christian trinity which they and their predecessors have always rejected in contradiction to the catholick faith ; and the great fondness they express for a nominal trinity , is as good a proof , that it is no trinity at all . such a trinity as is reconcileable with socinianism , as all these men own a nominal trinity to be , can never be the christian faith , unless socinianism be christianity : which i hope , those men , whom this and some other late writers call nominal trinitarians , will not yet own ; and yet if socinianism be a contradiction to the christian faith , that must be the true catholick faith of the trinity , which most directly contradicts socinianism in the parting points , and that none but a real trinity does : so that it is in vain for them to hope to conceal themselves under some insignificant names ; let them deal fairly with the world , and dispute professedly against a trinity ; for a real trinity is neither better nor worse than a trinity ; and then let them produce their authorities and reasons to prove , that the catholick church , even the nicene council it self , never believed a trinity , and that the faith of a trinity is tritheism : this becomes men of candour and honesty , let their opinions be what they will ; but to sneak and sculk like men who have a mind to steal a cause , and are as much ashamed to appear in open light , as such kind of traders use to be , is mean and pilfering , and unworthy of their ancestors , who own'd themselves at noon-day , and bravely outfaced all the authority of the catholick church , and all the reason of mankind . that this is the truth of the case , and that they themselves look upon this distinction as no more than a jest , is evident from that account this writer gives of the doctrine of the realists and nominalists concerning the trinity . as to the explication , the party called realists say , the holy trinity , or the three divine persons , are three distinct infinite substances , three minds , three spirits ; they are three such persons ; that is , as distinct , and as really subsisting and living , as three angels , or three men are . each person has his own peculiar individual substance , his own personal and proper understanding , will and power of action ; an omnipotence , omniscience , and all other divine attributes , divers in number from the personal omnipotence , omniscience , &c. of the other two persons . in the creation , as also in the government of the world , they are to be considered as distinct agents , not as one creator , or one governor ; but only in this sense , that the father acts by the son through the spirit : of which the meaning is , that the father , in regard of his paternal prerogative , acteth not immediately , but by the son and spirit . this account , as far as it concerns the real subsistence of three distinct infinite persons in the unity of the god-head , does contain the true catholick faith of the trinity ; and yet he has both imperfectly and falsly represented the opinion of the realists . . he tells us , they say that the holy trinity , or the three divine persons , are three distinct infinite substances , three minds , three spirits . now any one would hence conclude , that this is the universal doctrine of all the realists , and that this phrase of three substances , minds , and spirits , is the parting point between the realists and nominals : that all who believe a real trinity , own three infinite minds and spirits ; and that no man can believe a real trinity , who does not own this . now this is manifestly false , as our late experience proves . the greatest number of realists ( as far as i can guess ) who believe a real trinity , a real subsisting father , a real subsisting son , and a real subsisting holy spirit , do yet reject those expressions of three infinite minds and spirits , which are liable to a very heretical sense , either arianism , or tritheism ; and therefore were very sparingly , and with great caution used by the catholick fathers , tho' they used three hypostases in the very same sense , and did not condemn three natures and substances when personally used , as we have seen above . and therefore the late dispute about three minds , does not in it self divide the contending parties into realists and nominals , as the socinians too hastily conclude , and think to carry their cause by it . very good catholicks may dispute such expressions , as we know they did the homoousion it self ; for one substance is as liable to an heretical sense , as three substances : for that may be sabellianism , and the other may be arianism or tritheism , and both of them rightly understood may be very orthodox ; but whether they are or no , must be judged by the sense in which they are used ; and the catholick fathers , like good christians , have easily yielded to each other in a dispute of words , when it has appeared that the difference has been only in words , not in the faith. what athanasius says upon a like occasion , is a very good rule to maintain christian peace and unity . to corrupt the faith is always unlawful , tho' we palliate it with the most popular and orthodox forms of speech : but a true and holy faith does not degenerate into impiety and heresy by some new improper expressions , while he who uses such words , has a pious and orthodox sense . but to proceed . tho' all realists do not agree about the use of those words , three minds or substances ; yet they all do , and all must agree in what follows , viz. they are three such persons , that is , as distinct , and as really subsisting and living , as three angels , or three men. they are so without doubt , if they be real proper persons ; for a person lives and subsists , and three persons must be really distinct , or they can't be three ; that is , the father's person is no more the person of the son , nor the person of the son the person of the father , than peter is john , or john is peter ; but then they do not subsist dividely , or separately , as peter and john do . he adds , each person has his own peculiar individual substance , his own personal and proper vnderstanding , will , and power of action ; an omnipotence , omniscience , and all other divine attributes , divers in number from the personal omnipotence , omniscience , &c. of the other two persons . now i except against nothing in this , but the phrases of peculiar and individual substance , and divers in number ; for peculiar and individual , i would say a singular substance . for tho' a singular substance in created natures is a peculiar and individual substance also , it is not so in the divinity . the catholick fathers always distinguish'd between one substance , and one singular substance of the godhead . to deny one substance , or the homoousion , was arianism : to assert one singular substance , was sabellianism ; for one singular substance is but one person , which denies a trinity of persons : but the divine nature and substance is both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one and common , and therefore not one singular substance , which can never be common ; and by the same reason , a personal substance , though it be singular , and appropriate to such a particular person , and therefore as incommunicable as the person is , yet it is not peculiar and individual in the common acceptation of those words , but the same one common undivided inseparable essence of the divinity , subsisting distinctly and singularly in each person . thus for the same reason , i will not say , that the personal omnipotence , &c. of the father , is divers in number from the personal omnipotence of the son , because it is the same one omnipotence , as it is the same one divinity , which subsists distinctly in each person ; but we may and must say , that the personal omnipotence of the father , is not the personal omnipotence of the son , no more than the person of the father , is the person of the son. but this disguised socinian has taken great care in representing the doctrine of the realists , to conceal their faith of the perfect undivided unity and identity of the divine nature in three distinct subsisting persons , which yet he knows they as sacredly profess , as they do the real distinction of persons , and is owned in as high terms by dr. sherlock himself , as by any of his adversaries , and is almost the only pretence of those many contradictions he is charged with , by such as will not understand a perfect distinction in perfect unity , which yet is essential to the catholick faith of a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity . but as for this author , whether he had thought such a distinction and unity reconcileable or not , yet when he undertook to represent the doctrine of the realists , he ought to have represented it whole and entire , and to have left it to the judgment of the reader : whereas he is very careful to observe that they say , the three persons in the trinity are three substances , three minds , and spirits ; [ which yet only some of them say , ] but takes no notice that these three distinct persons have one undivided nature and essence , which they all agree in : for this would have spoiled his objections of tritheism , and what he immediately adds about three creators and governors of the world , which they never owned , any more than three gods ; for tho' there are three who are omnipotent , and three who create , yet they are so inseparably united in nature , that they are but one agent , one omnipotent , and produce but one effect : as the catholick fathers concluded for this reason , that as the scripture teaches us , that there is but one god , and yet that the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god ; so it attributes the making and government of the world both to father , son , and holy ghost , and yet there is but one and the same world which is made and governed ; which proves , that though they act as distinctly as their persons are distinct , yet there is such an essential unity of will and power , and operation , from the indivisible unity of nature , that they are but one agent , and produce but one and the same effect . but still as for the main of the charge , that every distinct person in the trinity , has a personal substance , life , will , understanding , power , of his own , which is not the personal substance , life , will , understanding , power , of either of the other persons , is what all , who believe a real trinity , do and must agree in , whether they will agree to call these three substances , wills , understandings , &c. or not . nay , this is all that those very persons who assert three substances , three minds and spirits in the trinity , ever meant by it . own but each person in his own proper person , to be infinite substance , mind , spirit , and that neither person is each other , and they will consent to any other form of words , and not dispute the reason or propriety of them ; all that they contend for is a real trinity of true , real , proper persons ; and that they are certain cannot be , unless each person by himself , as distinct from the other persons , be substance , mind , spirit , will , understanding , power . this is the only trinity which socinus , crellius , slichtingius , and others of that party , have hitherto disputed against ; and therefore certainly they did apprehend , that the christians in their days , even all the divinity-chairs of europe , did assert such a trinity ; and those learned men who opposed them , did believe so too , or there must be very wise doings amongst them : tho' our modern socinians have now made a discovery , that these realists are not the true catholick trinitarians , but that the nominalists are the church ; and now they are grown friends with the church , and orthodox , beyond their own hopes ; and their business is only to defend the church against this new sect of real trinitarians . let it be so : but still they maintain the same doctrine that socinus did , and dispute against the same trinity which he disputed against , and therefore these real trinitarians are no new upstart sect , but their old adversaries , who will never be cheated by new names into an accommodation or comprehension with socinians . the plain state of the case is this : father , son , and holy ghost , are the christian trinity ; now the question is , whether this be a real trinity or not ; that is , whether the father be an eternal , infinite , living , omniscient , omnipotent , subsisting person , and did truly beget of his own nature and substance , a true , living , omnipotent , omniscient , subsisting son ; and in like manner , whether the holy ghost proceeds from father and son , a true , living , omnipotent , omniscient , subsisting spirit . this is the doctrine of those whom our modern socinians call realists , that is , of true and orthodox trinitarians ; and without asserting this , whatever they teach besides , a trinity is nothing but a name , and therefore such men may properly be called nominalists ; so that the realists only are trinitarians , the meer nominalists , whatever they are else , are no trinitarians ; and this new contrivance of opposing these real trinitarians , is neither better nor worse than opposing the doctrine of the trinity : and let but our people understand this , and we are where we were , and then the socinians may call themselves nominalists , or what they please . to proceed : he is as artificial and unsincere in his account of the nominalists , as of the realists . we must not conceive of the divine persons , say the nominalists , as we do of created persons . very right ! there is an unconceivable difference between them , as all realists acknowledge , they are perfectly distinct , but yet inseparably one ; they never did , never can subsist apart ; the same one undivided divinity subsists whole and perfect , and yet distinctly in each of them , and is as perfectly one in three , as any one thing is one with it self . and thus we allow what he adds to be a very great truth , and wish he himself would consider better of it : that the conception we ought to have of their personalities , or what they are as they are persons , is as different from the personalities of any created beings , as the perfections of the divinity are paramount to human or angelical perfections . this we are sensible of , and therefore do not presently cry out of nonsense and contradiction , when we are forced by scripture and reason to attribute such things to the divine nature and persons , as we can find no images or idea's of in created nature : for we know that creatures cannot be perfectly like to god , and consequently we ought not to oppose the idea's of nature to revelation . but the present question is not , whether father , son , and holy ghost , are such persons as created persons , as angels , or men are ; for it is certain there is an unconceivable difference between them ; but whether they may be called persons in the true and proper notion of the word person ; for one who does really and substantially subsist , live , will , understand , act , according to his natural powers : and whether there be three such subsisting , living , willing , understanding persons in the godhead , or only one : whether as the father hath life in himself , so the son hath life in himself ; and as the father knows the son , so the son knows the father ; and whether the spirit of life , and the spirit of holiness , and power , and the spirit that searcheth the deep things of god , be not a subsisting , living , knowing , working spirit ; and this is the reason , why the church calls them three persons , ( which the scripture does not call them ) because the holy scripture distinctly attributes life , will , knowledge , power , to these three , father , son , and holy ghost , which is the notion all men have of a person when applied to creatures ; and to talk of three divine persons , who are not subsisting , living , knowing persons , destroys the only reason for calling them persons . but he adds , as the doctrine of the nominalists , that god is but one being , but one substance , mind , or spirit , with one only will , understanding , energy , or power of action . but is not this , in a true catholick sense , the doctrine of the realists also , as i observed before ? but this is what this disinterested person would be at ; to distinguish the realists and nominalists by three substances and one substance of the divinity : and were this the whole truth , the realists would certainly be hereticks , and the nominalists might be the orthodox church : whereas the realists , as they own three real subsisting living persons , so they as constantly profess the homoousion , or one undivided substance and nature , subsisting and acting distinctly , but indivisibly and inseparably in three , which is a real perfect subsisting trinity in perfect unity : but the nominalists , truly so called , as they own but one substance in the divinity , so but one single person , which is their one god , and can find a trinity only in a trinity of names , or properties , or meer immanent acts. that there are many such nominalists among us , i fear is too true ; but i must say again , that the bare dispute concerning the use of those words , three eternal infinite minds and spirits , for three eternal infinite intelligent persons , no more proves those who reject such expressions , while they own each person by himself , to be infinite mind and spirit , to be meer nominalists , than the use of such expressions in a qualified catholick sense , ( as the catholick fathers have formerly used them , or other terms equivalent to them ) proves those who use them to be tritheists : and yet this is all our author pretends to justifie this distinction between realists and nominalists , viz. the controversy depending between dr. s — th and dr. sherlock . but i cannot pass on without making one remark on this , that dr. s — th , and those who have espoused that side of the question , are as much concerned to vindicate themselves from the imputation which this author has fixed on them , of being meer nominalists or sabellians , as dr. sherlock and his friends are , to vindicate themselves from tritheism ; and i confess , i think , a great deal more ; because in the heat of dispute , or through inadvertency , if it be not their settled principle and judgment , they have given more just occasion for such a charge . when one and the same person , with three substantial deaneries , shall be very gravely alledged as a proper representation of a trinity in unity ; when a meer mode of subsistence shall be given as a proper and adequate definition of a person , as applied to the trinity ; when a large book shall be writ on purpose to demonstrate , that there is and can be but one person in the trinity , in the true proper notion , as it signifies an intelligent person ; what can the most equal and impartial judge make of this , but downright sabellianism ? for , whether it be allowable to say , three minds and spirits or not , i 'm sure without owning three proper , subsisting , intelligent persons , each of whom is in his own person , infinite mind and spirit , there can be no real trinity . if their sense be more orthodox than their words , i do heartily beg of them for god's sake , and the sake of our common faith , so to explain their words , as to remove this scandal , as dr. sherlock has done , and not to charge a trinity of real , subsisting , intelligent persons , ( which is all he professes to own , or ever to have intended ) with tritheism , till they can give us something in the room of it more orthodox than a sabellian trinity , which the catholick church has always rejected with abhorrence . sect iii. the authorities of the nominalists against a real trinity , briefly examined . this socinian having given such an account as it is , of the doctrine of the realists and nominalists , as disinterested as he pretends to be , he professedly espouses the side of the nominalists against the realists ; that is , under a new name he follows his old trade of disputing against the trinity ; only with this advantage , that he now pleads the cause of the church , of his beloved church of nominalists , against these tritheistick hereticks , the realists : but when men consider , who this advocate is , it will do the nominalists no credit , nor any service to the cause ; for a socinian , tho' he change his name , will be a socinian still , that is , a professed enemy to the catholick faith of the trinity , and to the eternal god head and incarnation of our saviour christ ; and there is very good reason to believe , that what he opposes is the true catholick faith , and what he vindicates and defends is heresy . what agreement there is between the nominalists and socinians , and what an easie accommodation may be made between them , we shall hear towards the conclusion ; but this will not satisfie our author , that the present orthodox church ( which to the reproach of the church , and to the advantage of his own cause , he will have to be all nominalists , which is such an abuse as concerned persons ought to resent ; i say , not satisfied that the present church ) is on his side ; nothing will serve him less , than to prove , that this was always the faith of the catholick church : a brave and bold undertaking , but what his wiser predecessors , socinus , crellius , &c. would have laught at ; and which i doubt not but he laughs at himself , and will have cause to laugh , if he can meet with any persons soft and easy enough to believe him . he well and truly observes , that this question , what has been the doctrine of the catholick church in this point , must be decided by authorities or witnesses , and therefore he appeals to authorities , and those i grant the most venerable authorities and witnesses that can be had , even general councils . i wish he would continue in this good humour , and then i should not doubt but he would quickly change his side : but this is contemptible hypocrisy in a man , who despises all authorities , not only human , but sacred , when they contradict his own private reasonings , to appeal to authority : i can easily bear with men of weak understandings , but i hate knavery ; for truth needs no tricks : and how much socinians value fathers and councils is sufficiently known . he begins with the nicene council , which brought into the church the term homoousios ; by which is meant , that the divine persons have the same substance , or are of one substance : but then he says , it is disputed between the nominalists and realists , in what sense the council understood this one substance ; whether the same substance in number , the self-same substance ? so that there is indeed , but one divine substance : or the same substance for kind , sort , or nature , namely the same in all essential properties — so that in truth , there are three distinct ( or numerically different ) substances , which are the same only in nature and kind . this he makes the controversy between the church ( that is , his nominalists ) and the realists ; but this is far from being the true state of the controversy : all whom he calls realists , own , that father and son are but one and the self-same substance , communicated whole and undivided from father to son , so that the father is substance , the son substance in his own person , and both the same substance ; and the like of the holy spirit , that as marius victorinus says , they are ter una substantia , thrice one and the same substance ; and this is all that those mean , who venture to say , they are three substances ; for the dispute between those realists , who say there is but one substance of the divine persons , and those who own three , is not whether the son be true and real substance in his own person , as distinct from the person of the father ; for all but sabellians agree in this ; but whether considering the perfect unity and identity of nature and substance in three , it be orthodox to say , three substances , and not rather one substance , and three who subsist ; which is a more orthodox form of speech , and less liable to exception : and thus we allow , that the nicene fathers , by the homoousion , did mean one and the self-same substance of father and son , but so that the son is a true and proper son , a real subsisting person , substance of his fathers substance ; god of god , light of light , very god of very god , begotten not made , of one substance with the father , by whom all things were made ; which so expresly declares the sense of the council , that this author durst not so much as mention , god of god , light of light , &c. which can never be reconciled with his notion of one substance , which leaves no substance , nor any real subsistence to the son distinct from the father . it is a bold stroke , and worthy of our author , to make the nicene council determine for sabellianism , in the term homoousios ; but yet he has a little story , which he thinks proves it beyond exception , for which he quotes socrates : that historian tells us , that there happened a great quarrel in aegypt about the word homoousios , which he says was like fighting in the dark , without distinguishing friends from enemies ; for neither of them seemed to understand each other , as to those matters for which they reproached one another : this our author takes no notice of , for it would not serve his purpose ; it appearing from hence , that the accusations on both sides were causeless , and like dealing blows in the dark : but now our author begins . those fathers of the council that were against the term homoousios , ( but those fathers of the council are not in socrates , but only those who declined the term homoousios ; but the fathers of the council served his purpose better , and therefore he makes bold with the historian ) or of one substance , ( which the historian has not added neither ) accused such as were for it , as sabellians and montanists , ( but the historian says , did suppose that those , who received that term , did introduce the doctrine of sabellius and montanus , that is , that this was their design in using that term , which as he observed before , was their mistake ) calling them also blasphemous , because they seemed to take away ( by that word ) the real existence of the son of god : while on the other hand , they that stood for homoousios , believed that such as were against it , did introduce more gods , and therefore detested them , as reviving paganism . here our author leaves off ; but i shall go on with the history . eustathius bishop of antioch , accuses eusebius pamphili , as adulterating the nicene faith ; eusebius denies , that he in the least departed from the nicene faith , and accuses eustathius of sabellianism : and thus they wrote against each other as adversaries , and yet both of them taught , that the son of god was a true and proper person , and had a real subsistence of his own ; and that there was one god in three persons : that one would wonder whence it came to pass that they could not agree . from this story , our author thus reasons . this is a deciding-testimony in the case . for the realists will never be able to shew , that if by homoousios the council intended three distinct substances , three beings , minds , or spirits : how the fathers of the council could be accused of montanism and sabellianism ; for three intellectual infinite substances , three divine beings , spirits or minds , was the doctrine chiefly opposed by sabellius and montanus , as all confess : ( then by his own confession , his nominalists are sabellians , and all those fathers and councils which condemned sabellius were realists , and then we have got the nicene council again . ) and on the other hand , the council which contrived and defended homoousios , could as little censure those who were against it as introducers of tritheism and paganism , if it had not been supposed , that in opposing homoousios , they professed to believe three infinite substances in number , three divine minds , and spirits ; which is the very doctrine of the modern realists . . now in answer to this , i observe first , that the historian says all this was an angry mistake , ( as angry men are very apt to mistake , and to reproach each other with their own mistakes ) but neither of these parties were guilty of the heresies they were charged with ; neither the one were sabellians , nor the other tritheists ; now this i think proves the direct contrary to what he concludes from it : for if those who were charged with sabellianism for owning the homoousion were not sabellians , then it is certain , that they did not think , that the nicene council by the homoousion , or one substance , meant one singular substance , for that is sabellianism : and when those who professed the homoousion , and were no sabellians , charged those who rejected the homoousion , with tritheism , they must believe , that the nicene homoousion is neither sabellianism nor tritheism , but the middle between both ; such a unity and sameness of substance , as is neither a sabellian singularity , nor a tritheistick diversity and multiplicity of substances ; that is , where father and son are in their own persons , as distinct from each other , infinite substance , and yet but one substance , one of one , god of god , light of light. this is the medium which socrates tells us they both agreed in ; and therefore wondered how they should come to differ ; that the son of god was a true and proper person , and had a real subsistence of his own ; and that there was one god in three persons . . but if by homoousios the council intended three distinct substances , ( that is , according to our sense , three , each of which is true and perfect substance , and yet but one substance ) how could the fathers of the council be accused of montanism or sabellianism ? had he consulted dr. bull , he would have learnt the difference between these two ; but let that pass : he phrases this , as if he would insinuate , that the council it self was accused of sabellianism for this term ; which is false . but this word homoousios had sometimes been abused to a sabellian sense , tho' the council did not use it in that sense ; and some men might still conceal their heresy under the covert of an orthodox word ; for this reason , some who professed the nicene faith , yet disliked the homoousion ; and when this dispute had heated them , it was too natural to charge those , who from the authority of the nicene council defended the use of that word , with such secret heretical senses as they thought that word chargeable with : and this is the whole truth of the case , as socrates tells us ; and this is a very strange way to prove the sense of the council , from the groundless accusations of angry and jealous men . . but how could the council , which contrived and defended homoousios , censure those who were against it , as introducers of tritheism and paganism , which the historian witnesses that it did with great earnestness ? but socrates ( his historian ) says not one word of the council , but only of these angry . disputants censuring and accusing each other , and both unjustly ; but he would sain ascribe all this to the council , because it is not fathers , but councils he relies on ; of which more presently . but there may be a very good reason given , why those who rejected the sabellian unity and singularity of the divine essence , might yet charge those with polytheism who rejected the homoousion , or consubstantial ; and there may be two accounts given of it . . that they suspected them of arianism , in opposition to which , the council taught the homoousion ; one sense of which was such a sameness of nature , as is between father and son , which in creatures we call a specifick sameness , in contradiction to the arians , who taught , that the son was of a different nature and substance from the father , as different from god the father , as a created and uncreated nature differ ; and this is downright polytheism and paganism ; for this makes the son and holy spirit , how excellent soever their natures are , but meer creatures : and for this reason we know , the catholick fathers charged the arians with pagan polytheism and idolatry ; and the arians at that time were such zealous opposers of the homoousion , even while they concealed themselves under some other catholick forms of speech , that it was too great a reason to suspect those of arianism , who denied the homoousion , whatever they would seem to own besides : and when men are angry , less reasonable suspicions than these , are thought sufficient to form an accusation ; and this is one fair account of it : such men were thought secret arians , and therefore charged with polytheism . . but there was another notion of the homoousion , which the catholick fathers thought absolutely necessary to the unity of god , and consequently that the denial of it would introduce three gods , instead of three divine subsisting persons in the unity of the same godhead : and that is , that when the son is said to be homoousios , or consubstantial with the father , the meaning is , that he is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the very substance of the father , and not of any other created or uncreated substance : this st. basil is positive in , that two , who are of the same substance for kind , are not therefore consubstantial , as father and son , but are rather brethren , unless one be of the other : but now many true catholicks very much suspected this term , because it seemed to imply a division and separation of the father's substance ; for , how can the son be of the same substance with the father , without a division of the father's substance ? the nicene fathers answered , that the very name of son , and the natural notion of generation , did necessarily prove , that the son must be of the father's substance ; but then the absolute purity and simplicity of the divine essence , which is a perfect indivisible monad , proves , that this eternal generation of the son , can't be by a division of substance , as it is in human generations ; but is whole of whole , in an ineffable and incomprehensible manner , so as no creature can understand ; which is no great wonder , when we can understand so little of creature generations , especially when creation it self is as perfectly unaccountable as the eternal generation ; for we can no more understand , how the world was created of nothing , than how the son was begotten of his father's substance , whole and perfect , without any division or separation : that the whole divine essence is originally in the father , and communicated whole to the son , subsists whole and distinctly in both , and is one in both. this is that sense of the homoousion , which occasioned so many warm disputes between the catholicks themselves ; for this reason , that party which rejected the homoousion , accused those , who received it , of sabellianism , because they asserted , that there was but one and the same substance in father , son , and holy ghost , which was the heresy of sabellius ; and the heat of dispute would not suffer them to see how vastly the catholick homoousians and sabellians differ'd , tho' they both asserted but one substance : for the sabellians asserted but one single substance , which is but one real subsisting person ; and therefore made father , son , and holy ghost , but three names of the same person : but the catholicks asserted three real subsisting persons , who were substance , substance , and substance , and yet but one of one , the perfect same of the perfect same : vna substantia non unus subsistens ; one substance , not one that subsists ; and therefore generally rather called them three subsistences , than three substances ; not but that they owned each subsistence to be a substance , but they were in the common acceptation of the word not three substances , but one substance , really and actually subsisting thrice , which they allowed to be one , and one , and one , but not three . on the other hand , those who received the homoousion , accused those who rejected it , of polytheism and tritheism : for in truth , to deny that father , son , and holy ghost , are so of one substance , that the son receives his whole substance of the father , and that the holy ghost receives his whole substance of father and son , is to make them three absolute , independent , self-originated substances , which have no relation to each other ; three such as the father is , who is of no other but himself , and the catholick fathers always accused this of tritheism : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three fathers , was the same to them , as to say three gods ; and they vindicated the doctrine of a real subsisting trinity , against the sabellian and arian charge of tritheism , by saying , that they did not own three fathers , but only one father , one self-originated divinity , which communicates his own substance to the son ; and therefore they are not two gods , but god of god. but now these good fathers , tho' they were right in the notion of tritheism , and in the nicene notion of the homoousion , yet they wrongfully accused those , who rejected that term , of tritheism ; for they owned that the son was of the father ; that all that the son was , he was of the father ; that he was god of god , light of light , and therefore not an absolute self-originated god , but one god with the father ; but they did not like those terms of consubstantial , and one substance , and of the father's substance , as having something too material in their conception , and sounding harsh , as if the son were part of the father's substance ; which was objected against the homoousion in the nicene council it self , which yet disclaimed all such absurd senses , and received the term as the most infallible test against arianism : but tho' the authority of the council over-ruled the generality of christians ; yet some , who were truly catholick and orthodox in the faith , could not digest it ; and this was the true occasion of this dispute , and these mutual fierce accusations ; and let our author now make the best he can of it ; but instead of doing him service , he will never be able to defend himself against it . after all , our author was aware of a very terrible objection against his sense of the nicene homoousion , for one single sabellian substance and person ; viz. that the catholick fathers rejected and condemned this sense of it as heresy , even sabellianism ; and it is not probable that these fathers should not understand the sense of the council ; or that while they contended earnestly for the nicene faith , they should condemn the true nicene faith for heresy , as he owns they do . this would have put a modest man out of countenance ; but he takes courage , and huffs at these fathers and private doctors : particular fathers are but particular doctors ; 't is from general councils only we can take the churches doctrine . it is very provoking to see a man banter the world at this rate , with the utmost contempt and scorn of his readers : it is plain how great an admirer he is of general councils , and what he thinks of his readers , whom he hopes to persuade , that the catholick fathers , who made up the council , even athanassius himself , who had so great a part in it , did either ignorantly mistake the sense of the council , or wilfully pervert it ; especially when all the ante-nicene fathers owned the same faith , as he may learn from dr. bull ; and those catholicks , who after the nicene council , disputed the use of that term homoousios , yet agreed in the same faith , as i have already shewn . what follows is all of a piece . he expounds the arian homoiousios , or of a like substance , to signify the same substance in sort , or kind , or properties ; that is , specifically the same , but only differing in number , as father and son have the same specifick nature , but are two persons : and thence concludes , that the nicene homoousios which the arians at first refused , but afterwards fraudulently subscribed in the sense of homoiousios , must signify but one singular solitary substance , but one person in the sabellian sense : but who ever before heard , that the arian homoiousion signified a specifick sameness and unity of nature ? or , that the arians owned father and son to have the same specifick nature as adam and abel had ? the catholick fathers themselves , as , athanasius , hilary , basil , the two gregory's , &c. owned such a likeness of nature as this , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to be equivalent to the homoousion , and to be true catholick doctrine ; and this they asserted against the arians : but it is in vain to dispute with a man , who has either ignorance or confidence enough thus to impose upon his readers . his next appeal is to the sixth general council , which was the third of constantinople ; and when i met with this , i was not a little surprized to think what he would make of it . this council , as he himself tells the story , determined , that there were two natural wills , and two operations in the lord christ ; and the reason of this was , because they asserted two natures in christ , the divine and human nature ; and that each nature has a natural will of its own ; and therefore as there are two natures , there must be two distinct and natural wills in christ. this is a plain proof of the mystery of the incarnation ; that the divine nature in the person of the son was incarnate ; for there could not be two wills , unless there were two natures ( which was the foundation of this decree ) in christ : and this macarius himself in his confession of faith profest to own , both in opposition to nestorius and eutyches . now this catholick faith of the incarnation , which is so often and so expresly own'd by this council , is utterly irreconcileable with this sabellian unity of the divine nature and substance , without running into the patripassian heresy , that the whole trinity is incarnate : for if christ in one person hath two natures , be truly and really both god and man , and consequently has two distinct wills , a divine and humane will ; either as god , he must be distinct in nature and person from the father and the holy ghost ; or if all three persons of the trinity , are but one single solitary nature , and consequently but one true and proper person , all three , father , son , and holy ghost , must be incarnate , and suffer in the incarnation and sufferings of christ , which the catholick church condemned as heresy . well! but he tells us , that this council owned that there is but one will in the three persons of the trinity , and therefore consequently they can be but one true and proper person . this we own with the council , that there is but one essential will in the trinity , tho' each person has a personal will : but this he says , cannot be the meaning of the council , because the question was concerning natural wills , or powers of willing : this is all fallacy . a natural will is such a will as belongs to that nature , whose will it is : as a divine nature has a divine will , and a humane nature a humane will ; the power of willing is personal , and signifies a personal will : and it is evident , the council speaks of the first , not of the second : and not to multiply quotations , i shall give but one plain proof of it . theophanes askt macarius and stephen , whether adam had a reasonable soul ? they answer , yes . then he askt them , whether he had a natural will ? stephen the monk answers , that before the fall he had a divine will , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that he willed together with god , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : demetrius calls this blasphemy ; for if he was a co-willer , he was a co-creator also with god , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and others said , that this made adam , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , consubstantial with god ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; for he , who is a co-willer with god , is consubstantial also : and for this they alledge the authority of st. cyril , who tells us of christ ; that as he is consubstantial , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , so he wills together with his father ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and gives this reason for it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that one nature has but one will : now if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies one who wills with another , then there must be two who will ; and if these two are one will , it cannot signify personally , but essentially one : and if they be consubstantial , have one substance and one will in the same sense , we know what this council meant by one substance , no more one personal substance , than one personal will. his next authority is the council of lateran , under pope innocent iii. and though the christian world is not much beholden to that council , yet i cannot think , as i find a great many wise men do , that they have made any alteration in the substance of our faith , whatever they have done in the form of expression . that the trinity is una summa res , one supream being , was the doctrine of st. austin , from whom peter lombard had it ; and all the catholick fathers owned the trinity to be a most simple monad , ( which is the same thing ) when at the same time they asserted against the sabellians , three real , subsisting , distinct persons , each of which is the same whole undivided divinity , communicated whole and perfect from father to son , and from father and son to the holy ghost , without any division or partition of substance . and this is the doctrine of the lateran council ; that this one supream thing , is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , veraciter , truly and really , father , son , and holy ghost ; three united persons , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , tres simul personae , and each of them distinct from the others ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; ac singulatim quaelibet earum ; and therefore there is only a trinity , not a quaternity in god , as abbot joachim had objected ; and that each of these divine persons is this divine substance , essence , and nature . all this athanasius himself would have subscribed , who yet with the other catholick fathers rejected the notion of a singular and solitary divinity . they add , that this one supreme nature , substance , essence , ( which is father , son , and holy ghost ) neither begets , nor is begotten , nor proceeds : nor did ever any man in his wits assert , that the divine nature and essence , as common to father , son , and holy ghost , that is , that the whole trinity did either beget , or was begotten , or did proceed ; this belongs to persons , not to nature formally considered ; as they expresly teach , that the father begets , the son is begotten , and the holy ghost proceeds , so that there is a distinction of persons , and unity of nature ; that the father is alius , another , the son another , the holy ghost another ; but not aliud another thing : but what the father is , and what the son is , and what the holy ghost is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , they are all perfectly the same ; that according to the catholick faith , we may acknowledge them to be consubstantial ; for the father from eternity begetting the son , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , gave his own substance to him , as he himself witnesses . the father who gave them me is greater than all : nor can it be said , that the father gave part of his substance to his son , and retained another part himself ; for the hypostasis or substance of the father is indivisible , as being perfectly simple : nor can we say , that when the father begat the son , he so communicated his own substance to him , as not to have it himself ; for then he must cease to be an hypostasis , substance , and a substantial person himself . so that it is evident , that the son , when begotten , received the father's substance without any diminution of the father ; and thus father and son have the same substance ; and father and son and holy ghost are , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one and the same supreme nature and substance ; which they call , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the unity of sameness and identity : this is true catholick doctrine , and the very language of the nicene fathers . and if joachim rejected this essential unity of the trinity , and asserted a meer collective unity , as many christians are one church , as the council affirms he did , he was very justly condemned , and the nicene fathers themselves would have condemned him . the only thing which looks like an innovation in this decree , is , that whereas the catholick fathers allowed of those expressions , a begotten nature , begotten substance , begotten wisdom , begotten god ; and that substance begets substance , and wisdom begets wisdom , &c. this council denies , that this one supream divine essence , nature , or substance , which is the blessed trinity , does either beget , or is begotten , or proceeds , which some schoolmen think absolutely condemns those expressions , that substance begets substance ; and wisdom wisdom ; that the son is deus genitus , and natura genita , begotten god and begotten nature , and begotten wisdom ; which is to condemn all the catholick fathers , who used these expressions without any scruple ; nay , who thought that the mystery of the divine generation could not be secured without them . but i confes , i am of petavius his mind , ( though i find the learned doctor bull dissent from him ) that this council never intended absolutely to condemn all such expressions , when personally used ; for though the divine nature in a general notion , as common to all three persons , neither begets , nor is begotten ; yet the father begets the son by a true and proper generation , and a true and proper son ; and therefore that learned jesuit tells us , that the lateran council considered the divine nature absolutely , and in it self , and as abstracted from the three persons , not as subsisting distinctly in each person ; for so it is very catholick to say , that the divine nature in the person of the father begets the divine nature in the person of the son : for we cannot understand what a person is without its essence and nature ; and it is absurd to say , that the son receives his person from the father , without receiving that without which he cannot be a person : and the reason he gives , why they rather chose to say , that the father begets the son , than that essence begets essence , was to avoid the ambiguity of that expression , which might signify the production of another essence , as well as the generation of another person ; whereas this divine generation is the communication of the same eternal essence which is in the father to the son , which gives existence to a second person , not to a second nature : this is indeed very subtil , but there is some sense in it ; and while they acknowledge , that the son by an eternal generation receives a true divine nature from the father , and is in his own person true god , but yet not the father ; this is the old catholick faith , how new soever the expressions may be . thus i have done with his general councils ; and i hope every one sees how well he understands councils , or how honestly he deals with them . what concerns the church of england , needs no answer after what i have already said ; and the story of valentinus gentilis is much to the same purpose ; for he was so far from being a realist , that he was a down-right arian . but that he may not think himself and his nominalists so secure of all the divinity-chairs in europe , i will refer him to the learned spanhemius , to learn how it lately fared with some of them in the united provinces ; who were censured and condemned by various synods , and by the publick judgment and authority of several universities . the first proposition condemned was concerning the name of son , and his eternal generation of the father ; that this is not to be understood properly of a true and proper generation , as if the father , who begets , were a true and proper father ; and the son , who is begotten , a true and proper son ; but that these terms in scripture only signify , . that the second person has the same nature and essence with the first person , and did coexist with him from eternity : denying the manner of his having the same nature , by an ineffable generation , and the personal subsistence of the father , who begets , and the son , who is begotten , and consequently that true relation between father , and son , which the scripture constantly teaches , which gave just suspicion either of sabellianism , or tritheism . . that all these names ( of father and son , begetting , and being begotten , &c. ) respect the oeconomy of the covenant of grace , the manifestation of the second person in the flesh , as in the visible image of god , to execute the mediatory office , for which purpose he was given by god the father : in which sense , to beget , is the same with to manifest ; and to be begotten , to be manifested : this he says is coincident with the socinians ; and resolved into that fundamental error , that the true and proper generation of the son , though acknowledged ineffable , contradicts those natural ideas which are imprinted in our minds by god , and are the foundation of all assent , and all true and certain knowledge : and that we must not think that god has revealed any thing in his word , which cannot , and ought not to be examined by men , according to these ideas ; or that god proposes nothing in his word to be believed with a certain and firm assent , which a man of a sound reason cannot clearly and distinctly perceive , according to these ideas . and now let our author judge , whose character this is , and on which side these belgic synods and chairs have given judgment . sect iv. the arguments of the nominals , against a real trinity of proper subsisting persons , examined : and the three first arguments , answered . secondly , let us now briefly examine his reasons , which he thinks so demonstrative , that the ( so much talk'd of ) mathematical certainty is not superior to them : but i have heard some men brag much of demonstration , who have had nothing to say , that would amount to a good probability . now to make my answer plain and easy , i observe first , that all his arguments to prove the realists to be guilty of tritheism , and to assert three gods , are levelled against a trinity of distinct , real , subsisting , intelligent persons , as he himself owns ; for those invidious terms , of three substances , three minds and spirits , and wills , and understandings , signify no more than three , each of which in his own proper person , is substance , mind , spirit , will , understanding : so that all these arguments are against the catholick faith of a real trinity ; that is , to prove the doctrine of the trinity to be tritheism ; for that which is not a real trinity , is no trinity : and therefore these arguments do no more concern dr. sherlock , and some few others , whom this author would fain single out from the body of catholick believers , by the name of realists , than all other christians , who heartily believe in father , son , and holy ghost , and own christ jesus to be the eternal son of god , and true and perfect god himself . secondly , i observe , that all these arguments are no farther considerable , than as they directly oppose the catholick faith in its full latitude ; that is , a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity . the scripture assures us , that there is but one god , but teaches withall , that the father is god , the son god ; and the holy ghost god ; we believe god concerning himself , and his own nature and unity , because he best knows himself , and therefore we believe , that there is but one god , but not that there is but one person , who is god , for there are three in the unity of the same godhead , and each of them true and perfect god ; so that it is not enough for these demonstrators to prove , that there is and can be but one eternal divinity , or one god ; for we readily own it , and as heartily believe it as they do ; but we say withall , that this one divinity subsists distinctly and indivisibly , whole and perfect in three , and that therefore there is a trinity in unity : nor is it sufficient to prove , that in the trinity of the realists , there are three , each of which is by himself true and perfect god , and therefore that there are three gods ; for we own such three , but say , that these three are not three gods , but subsist inseparably in one undivided divinity , and therefore that there is a vnity in trinity . but if they would consute either the trinity or the unity , they must prove , that there are not , and cannot be , three real subsisting persons in one insinite undivided essence , and then they will effectually confute the scripture , and a trinity with it ; or they must prove , that though three such persons should subsist distinctly in one undivided essence , yet they are not one and the same divinity , or one god ; and then they will confute not only scripture , but common sense ; that three , which are one , are not one , or that one divinity is not one god : having premised this , let us now consider his arguments . . in the first place , he says , three infinite intellectual substances , or three eternal omnipotent minds or spirits , ( or which we have heard is the same thing , three infinite intelligent persons ) can never be but one god ; because 't is evident , nay confessed , that one such spirit , mind , or substance , is one ( absolute and most perfect ) god. — if the definition is multiplied , the thing defined is also therewith multiplied , — seeing then 't is the definition of one god , that he is one infinite ( intellectual , spiritual ) substance , one eternal , omnipotent , and omniscient spirit or mind ; therefore if we multiply our definition , by saying , three infinite ( intellectual , spiritual ) substances , &c. we thereby multiply the thing we pretended to define , namely , god ; which is to say , we affirm more geds , as many gods as such substances and spirits . here our demonstrator stumbles at the very threshold . i grant , that an infinite intellectual spiritual substance , an eternal , omniscient , omnipotent mind or spirit , is the definition of one , who is god , or of a divine person ; but i absolutely deny , that this is the definition of one god , that he is one eternal , omniscient , &c. personal mind or spirit , as he fallaciously and absurdly represents it ; and in so doing , instead of proving what he undertakes , he very modestly and humbly begs the question . he is to prove , that three infinite substances , minds , or spirits , are three gods : his argument is , because one infinite substance , mind , or spirit , is the definition of one god ; and if you multiply the definition , you multiply the thing defined , and therefore three infinite substances and minds must be three gods ; but how does he prove , that one infinite substance and mind ( personally understood as we understand it ) is the definition of one god ? for this is the thing in dispute , which certainly no trinitarian will grant him , and therefore ought to be proved . those who assert , as all trinitarians do , that three infinite intelligent persons , each of which is infinite substance , mind or spirit , are but one god , will not be so good-natur'd as to grant , that one infinite substance and mind ( or one divine person ) is the definition of the one god ; this would not be to dispute , but to beg the cause on one side , and to give it away on the other . but this may be thought perverseness , to put men upon proving what is self-evident : for , is not an infinite intelligent person , substance , mind , spirit , true and perfect god ? yes , most certainly ; but it is not the definition of the one god , but only of a divine person ; and the christian faith teaches us , that three such divine persons are but one god. the catholick fathers have given us another notion of one god , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one god is one divinity ; that is , an eternal , immutable , indivisible , omnipotent , omniscient , life , being , essence , nature : and the essential , undivided , unity , sameness , identity , of the godhead in father , son , and holy ghost , is the unity of god : for i take it to be more like a demonstration , than any i expect to meet with in this author , that where there is but one essential undivided divinity , there is but one god. now this i think may vindicate those obnoxious expressions as some think them , of three infinite substances , minds and spirits , from the charge of tritheism ; for since infinite substance , mind , and spirit , is not the definition of one god , but only of a divine person , to say , three infinite substances , minds , and spirits , does not multiply gods , but only divine persons . . his second argument is against three wills , three vnderstandings , three energies , or principles , or powers of action in one god : this he represents as monstrously absurd ; when as in truth , if it be absurd , the only absurdity is , that there should be three divine persons , that is , three , who have a personal will , understanding , power , of their own , in the unity of the same godhead : now the absurdity of this i cannot see , nor has he made the least offer to prove it . but the secret of all these monstrous absurdities , is this . he represents one god , to signifie only one single person , who is god , and then indeed , three wills , three understandings , three lives , of one single person , is as absurd and monstrous as one would wish ; but before he had charged the doctrine of a real trinity with such absurdities , he should first have proved , that one god signifies but one single person , and have exposed the monstrous absurdities of three persons and one god , and then we would have given him leave to have represented three personal wills , understandings , and lives , as absurd as he pleases ; but if it be not absurd to own three persons , i 'm sure it is very absurd to deny , that there are three , who live , and will , and understand , that is , in his language , three wills , understandings , and lives , in one god. . his third argument comes nearer the business ; for he undertakes to prove , that the second and third persons in the trinity , the son and the holy ghost , are not substance and spirit , but only properties , or immanent acts , or relative subsistences in the notion of the nominals : and his argument is made up partly of authority , and partly of his own reasoning upon it . his authority is the council of lyons in the year . which condemns those , who presume to deny , that the holy spirit does eternally proceed from the father and the son. — he adds , 't is evident at first sight to any learned man , who is conversant in these questions , and in the writers , who ( in several ages ) have managed 'em , what the fathers of this council meant , and what they aimed at in this decree or canon : for because they believed that the divine persons are not minds and spirits , but relative subsistences , or what is the same , immanent acts : therefore they could not but believe and define , that the second person is eternally generated , and therefore called the son ; that the third is an eternal spiration , and therefore called spirit . i can't think what to call this , and therefore shall say nothing of it , but only beg my reader 's pardon for giving it an answer . in the first place this council says nothing of the eternal generation of the son , and therefore this could not be what they aimed at , as he pretends . in the next place , the eternal procession of the holy ghost was not the thing in question , but his eternal procession from father and son , which the latin church professed , and therefore added the filioque to their creed ; but the greek church had disputed and condemned it , and that was one great design of this council to bring the greeks to consent to this addition : so that it was not the aeternaliter , but the filioque which the council had principal regard to in this decree ; not the eternal procession , but the procession from the father and the son ; so little did they think of what our author makes their chief design . but there is another clause in this decree which he has concealed , which proves , that they thought quite otherwise ; for they do not only condemn those , who deny that the holy spirit proceeds eternally from father and son ; but those also , who teach that he proceeds from father and son , as from two principles , and by two spirations , and not as from one principle , by one spiration . now had they believed the son to be a meer immanent act , such an unsubsisting reason and wisdom as is in man , had not this been a very wise dispute , whether this immanent act were a principle of spiration , either together with the father , or distinct from him ? but nothing is to be wondered at in an author , who will venture to say , that eternal generation , and eternal procession , is not reconcileable with the real personal subsistence of the son and holy spirit , but proves them to be meer immanent acts ; and that those , who own such an eternal generation and procession , must consequently believe so : for this is the only argument he has to prove the fathers of this council to have believ'd the son and spirit to be meer immanent acts , because they assert the eternal generation and procession ; whereas on the contrary it is evident , that all the catholick fathers , who asserted the eternal generation and procession , did as strenuously assert against the noetians and sabellians , the true and proper personality of the son and spirit . but let us hear how he proves , that if the son and spirit , the second and third persons , be distinct substances and spirits from the first , ( that is , if the son in his own person , as distinct from the person of the father ; be substance and spirit , and so of the holy ghost ) it were heinous nonsense to say , they were eternally generated , or eternally proceed . his argument is this : if the persons are substances and spirits , it must be said , that the second was compleatly and finally generated from all eternity ; the like also of the third person , else they should be incompleat substances , unfinisht spirits . — if they are spirits or substances , it can never be said that one is eternally generated , the other does eternally proceed : but the former was generated from all eternity , and the other actually and compleatly proceeded from all eternity . now supposing the reason of this to be unanswerable ; all that it amounts to is no more but this , that the catholick fathers , who attested the true and proper personality of the son , and holy spirit , were very absurd , and guilty of heinous nonsense , in saying , that the son is eternally generated , and the spirit eternally proceeds . these are nice speculations , which the arian controversy engaged them in ; but the nicene fathers contented themselves to affirm no more concerning the eternal generation , than that the son was begotten of his father before all worlds , god of god , light of light , very god of very god. and this notion of an eternal generation our author has no objection against , and we do not think our selves bound to answer for all the subtilties either of the fathers or schools ; nor to determine every curious question , which perverse and heretical wits can start concerning the divine generation and procession , which is above the comprehension of angelical minds , and which we know no more of , but that the son is begotten , and the spirit proceeds . and yet this reasoning is very absurd , when applied to an eternal and immutable nature . things , which have a beginning , which are made , which are successively and gradually perfected by art , are incompleat and unfinish'd , while they are a-making , and if they are always a-making , or always incompleat ; but a generation or procession , without a beginning , and without succession , must always be perfect , and always the same , if it be at all ; here is no new production , no making any thing , no transient action ; in which sence the catholick fathers denied the divine generation to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or action , but only an essential 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , habitude , relation between father and son , who both perfectly and eternally subsist , and co-exist with each other , but so , that the son is of the father , and the holy spirit of father and son : thus they were without any beginning , and thus they always are , and this is all they meant by an eternal generation and procession , and this the immutability of the divine nature forc'd them to own ; for though external acts and relations make no change in the divine nature , yet what is ad intrà does ; and therefore could we conceive any distinguishable moments in eternal duration , when god was no father , when he begot a son , and when he ceased to beget , this would make an internal change in the divine nature it self , which is inconsistent with perfect immutability . but the son always was and is of the father , and this is his eternal generation , and the holy spirit always was and is of father and son , and this is his eternal procession , and thus the divine essence always was and is the same , a trinity in unity , and this is the perfect immutability of god. and yet his philosophy is very absurd , when he argues from an eternal generation and procession , that therefore the son and holy spirit must be incompleat and unfinish'd ; for this will not be granted him even in created nature , much less in the divinity . they are no mean philosophers , who tell us , that the world may very properly be said to be perpetually created ; that what we call preservation , or upholding all things in being , is the very same act and power which at first gave being to them ; and such a permanent act is creation still , though no new production of any thing : but these men would scorn any one who should hence conclude , that there is no compleat or finish'd substance , no really subsisting substantial world : much more absurd is it , to conclude this of an eternal generation , which produces nothing new , nothing that ever began to be , and is the same that ever it was , without any succession . and he defends the nominalists just as wisely and philosophically , as he opposes the realists , as if his only design were to expose both . he says this eternal generation proves the son and holy spirit , to be only immanent acts in god , reflex wisdom , or the wisdom that resulteth from original minds eternal contemplation and knowledge of the divine nature and perfections , and the everlasting spiration of love that must proceed from the original and reflex wisdom of the deity . and here we have just such a trinity in the god-head , as there is in every particular man , his mind , and the immanent acts of wisdom or reason , and love , which all learned men know to be one kind of sabellianism . that the son is the wisdom and power of god , and that the peculiar character of the holy spirit is love , is the language both of scripture and fathers ; but not as immanent acts , but the living subsisting wisdom of the father , and living subsisting love , eternal and infinite persons , co-eternal and co-equal with the father : but it is a new language , unknown to scriptures and fathers , to call an immanent act of wisdom a son , and the minds producing such an act , its generating or begetting a son , and to call such an immanent act in god , the son of god , and god ; by which rule , every thought or act of reason in any man , is man , and the son of that man whose thought and act it is . and it as new philosophy to talk of immanent acts in god ; for there can be no immanent acts , but where there are powers and faculties , which is the imperfection of the creature-state , not incident to the perfect simplicity of the divine nature . but besides this , what does he mean by the eternal generation and spiration of an immanent act ; an immanent act ( according to all the accounts i ever met with of it , and as every man may feel in himself ) is not an abiding , as he calls it , but a transient act : it has no permanent stable nature , no subsistence of its own , but vanishes and dies assoon as generated , to speak in his language ; which is a necessary reason to remove all such immanent acts from god , in whom there is nothing vanishing , nothing successive : but if men will attribute immanent acts to god , ( reflex wisdom , as opposed to a living , subsisting , personal wisdom ) they must speak of them according to the known nature of such acts , and then an eternal generation of such an immanent act , which vanishes , assoon as generated , can signifie no more , than an eternal successive repetition ( which is a contradiction ) of the acts of reflex wisdom , that as one vanishes , another succeeds ; that though god has always this reflex wisdom , yet he has not always the same act of reflex wisdom , but produces it a-new every moment , which he calls an eternal generation : just as it is with men who may have the same thought for kind some time together , but yet every moment it is new produced : to talk of such an eternal son as this , and such an eternal generation , is heresie in philosophy , and in common sense , as well as in christianity , and it would be loss of time to expose it . i must no more omit than he , another surprizing argument whereby he proves , that the catholick church did believe , that the second person is the reflex wisdom of god , and the third divine love , because for this reason , as he tells us , this question has been very warmly debated whether the son is that wisdom , wherewith the father is wise. those fathers , who affirm this question , usually alledge these two arguments ; that the eternity of the son cannot be otherwise proved , but by this , that he is the eternal wisdom of the father ; and that otherwise we must suppose two wisdoms in god , which is so absurd to a late learned ecclesiastical historian , that he concludes his dissertation concerning this question , with these words : the father neither is , nor can be actually wise , but by the word or son. i. cabassutius notit . eccl. p. . correct . . let the reader now judge of all the rest by this . that this question was disputed i own : but he has assign'd a very false and a very absurd occasion for it ; for had this been the received faith of the catholick church , that the son is only the immanent act of reflex wisdom in god , what occasion had there been for this dispute , whether the son is that wisdom by which the father is wise ? that is , the personal wisdom of the father ; for who ever disputed , whether immanent acts were personal , or no ? and therefore this very dispute proves , that they did not believe the son to be a meer immanent act. but though they did dispute among themselves , in what sence christ is called the wisdom of god , and the power of god ; and whether christ be that wisdom , wherewith the father is wise , and in what sence the father may be said to beget his own wisdom ; and how the son can be said to be sapientia de sapientia , wisdom of wisdom , if the father in his proper person be not wisdom , but only the begetter of wisdom , with many other questions , as we see in st. austin , lib. vi. de trin. yet they never divided upon this point , but did universally agree , that the father in his own proper person is original mind , and wisdom ; and that the son in his own proper person is begotten wisdom , even the essential wisdom of god , not that personal wisdom wherewith the father is wise , but wisdom truly and properly begotten of original wisdom ; living , subsisting wisdom ; distinct in person from the father , who is original wisdom , but perfectly the same one undivided essence , and therefore not essentially two , but one and the same wisdom , which is the wisdom of the father : so that though there was some dispute about the true signification of such expressions , yet here was no division among the catholicks , who all agreed on that side of the question , which directly contradicts this author's catholick faith of immanent acts. the true occasion of this dispute , as st. austin tells us in the same place , was this ; that some of the fathers , i think he might have said all the nicene fathers , in their disputes with the arians and eunomians about the eternal generation of the son , or word , used this argument , that god was never 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without his word , or wisdom : not that they had no other argument to prove the eternity of the son , as this author represents it , but that they thought this a very good one : now the force of this argument seemed to be this , that god is always wise ; and therefore that person , who is the word and wisdom of god , must have always been with him , as eternal as god is : and to make this a good argument , the necessary consequence seemed to be , that the person of the son , who is the begotten word , and wisdom of the father , is the personal wisdom of the father , that wisdom wherewith the father is wise : and the difficulty of this was , how this begotten wisdom , which is a distinct person from the person of the father , should be that wisdom whereby the person of the father is wise : how they justified this argument , and yet avoided such absurdities , is too long now to account for ; those who please may consult st. austin for it ; but i hope every one sees that both the reason of this question , the nature of those difficulties , it was incumbered with , and their determination of the point , are all direct contradictions to what this author alledged it for . and now let us hear what our author 's learned cabassutius says , but what the world will say of him , when they hear what cabassutius says , let other guess . this learned historian takes notice of this dispute , and gives the same account of it which i have now done ; and vindicates that argument of the catholick fathers for the eternity of the son , because he is the wisdom of the father , that were he not eternal , the father could not be always wise , from the exception of st. austin . this he does by a distinction borrowed from aquinas ; that those , who taught the son to be the wisdom of the father , are to be understood * , not in a formal , but causal and illative sence . for though the son , as a son , is not that wisdom , wherewith the father is wise ( let out author first observe that ) yet he is necessarily united with it , and arises from it : so that the son is not the personal wisdom of the father , but is begotten of his father's wisdom , and inseparably united to it : and therefore is the wisdom of god , wisdom of the father's wisdom and inseparable from it ; which are two , one of one , and indivisibly and inseparably one. but let us hear his reason for this * : for the wisdom which is in the father , is not a habit , or faculty , or power , as it is in created beings , but a pure and simple act. what is now become of his immanent act , by which he tells us original mind must be wise ? for if he believes his learned historian , original mind is a pure simple act it self , and therefore not wise by immanent acts of reflex wisdom , which suppose habits and faculties and powers , and have no place in a pure simple act ; that if the son be only an immanent act of reflex wisdom , he will never find his second person in a pure and simple act. the historian proceeds † , every act of wisdom and understanding necessarily includes its terminus or effect , and that is what we call word , or in greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which st. cyril very well understood , where he tells us , that mind is never without its word ; and st. thomas saies , that tho' commonly things receive their denomination from their forms , as white from whiteness , man from humanity , yet sometimes they are denominated from their effects ; as a tree is called florid , from the flowers it produces , though that be not the form of it ; and thus the fathers rightly concluded against arius , that the father neither was nor could be actually wise without his word , and only begotten son : our author renders it , but by the word or son , directly contradictory both to the argument and words of cabassutius : for by signifies the formal cause , and is so intended by him , that the father is wise by the son , by that immanent act of reflex wisdom which he calls the son ( tho' one would wonder , how original mind and wisdom , should be wise by reflex wisdom , which is but a secondary wisdom , which supposes a first ; and therefore , as one would guess , could not make the first wise ) but cabassutius only says , that the father is not actually wise without the son , that is , as he explains it , without begetting that eternal word and wisdom , which is the person of the son. i shall make no remarks on this , let the world judge of the skill , or the honesty of this author . what he adds about emanations , is just to the same tune : the eternal generation of the substance of the father , was by the nicene council represented by light of light , and the co-eternity of the son with the father by the co-existence of emanatory causes and their effects , as of the sun and its rays , which are as old as the sun. the author , like other socinians , thinking of nothing but body , and bodily and corporeal emanations , falls presently a demonstrating ; let a. b. c. be three infinite substances , if b. and c. ( infinite substances ) emane from a. an infinite substance also : it is self-evident , that the two infinite substances must exhaust , and thereby in the end annihilate one infinite substance . this is a notable demonstration as to corporeal substances ; for if the whole flow out of it self , it is certain , it must cease to be what it was , and become another whole , if it be not a contradiction , that the same whole should flow out of it self , and become another whole , which in bodies could make no other change in a whole , but a change of place , for let a whole emane , ( if that be not nonsense , for a corporeal whole to emane ) and go where it will , it is it self , and the same whole still . and i think it is no better sense , to talk of exhausting an infinite substance ; for nothing can be exhausted , but what is finite , unless what is infinite can have an end : and an exhausting emanation of an infinite substance , is no better sense than the rest ; for it necessarily supposes an infinite substance with divisible parts , which may be separated from it self and from each other , which i take to be a contradiction to the very notion of infinity . it is certain , that such emanations , as exhaust their subject , can be only bodily emanations , for bodies only have divisible and separable parts , that i defie the most absurd , self-contradicting trinitarian in the world , to put so many absurdities and contradictions into one sentence , as he has done in this : one infinite substance ( whether corporeal or incorporeal ) can never eternally supply two infinite substances : the two infinite substances by continual emanations must needs dry up the one , that was their fountain . to talk of an infinite corporeal substance ( which he here supposes ) is absurd and unphilosophical , for nothing can be infinite which has parts ; for what is infinite by nature can never be finite ; and yet if such a supposed infinite body were divided in the middle , ( as all bodies may be divided ) this infinite corporeal substance would prove two finite substances , for each of them would have one end , where their substance was divided : to talk of such emanations from incorporeal substances ( which have no divisible parts ) as can dry up an infinite fountain , which must be by a partition and division of substances , is another contradiction ; and to dry up an infinite fountain , as i observed before , is another ; and to supply infinite substances by such emanations , which cannot be infinite , if they want any supply , is a fourth very good one . but allowing this author to rejoice in such refined speculations , i would desire to know , who those are who attribute the eternal generation of the son , and procession of the holy spirit , to such eternal , corporeal effluxes and emanations , as will endanger the exhausting and drying up the infinite fountain of the deity ? if there be any such men they are arrant hereticks , i assure him , for the catholick fathers abhorred the thoughts of all such emanations . they did not indeed scruple the use of such words , as emanation , probole , exition , and the like , whereby they signified that the son was truly and in a proper sense of his father's substance , and a real distinct person from the person of the father , but they expresly rejected all corporeal effluxes , all division and separation of the father's substance ; and taught that the son is begotten whole of whole , perfect god of perfect god , by a real communication , but not a transfusion of substance , not ad extra , without , as creature-generations are , but within his father ; as the word is inseparable from the mind , whose word it is . so that our author disputes here without any other adversary , but his own gross imaginations , and he may triumph securely , and demonstrate these corporeal , exhausting , dying emanations , out of countenance , and the realists no farther concerned , than to look on , and see the event of the combate , or to wish him better employed . if he would have effectually baffled these realists , he should have proved , that god could not communicate his own nature and substance to the son , whole of whole , without such an emanation of his substance , as divides it from it self , and separates one part of it from another , as it is in bodily exhalations : this would effectually have confuted a substantial generation ; for all men grant , that the divine substance can't be divided , and this was the objection of the arians against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the son 's being begotten of the substance of the father , but the catholick fathers asserted a real substantial generation , without a division of substance , and taught them to distinguish between the generation of body and spirit . and whoever considers , how a finite created mind can communicate its thoughts to another , which when perfectly communicated , are perfectly the same , whole and entire in both , and but one and the same thought , though in two minds ; may conceive , that an infinite mind , which is a pure and simple act , infinitely more simple and indivisible than thought it self , may be able to communicate its self more perfectly , than a finite mind can communicate its thoughts , and if it can , it must communicate it self whole and entire , and as indivisibly as a thought , and subsist distinctly , perfectly one and the same in two. sect . v. the fourth and fifth arguments against a real trinity answered . iv. to proceed , his next argument against the realists is this , that all explications , by which 't is endeavour'd to shew , how three infinite ( intellectual substances ) three almighty spirits and minds , may be one god , are manifestly deficient . now , suppose this true , that no man can give a perfect account of the unity of the divine nature in three distinct , infinite , divine persons ; must we therefore deny either the trinity or unity ( both which , we say , are expresly taught in scripture ) because we cannot fully comprehend so sublime and venerable a mystery ? they pay greater deference than this to the evidence of sense ; they will believe their senses , where their reason and philosophy is at a loss , nay , in such matters , as if they did not see them , they think they could demonstrate absolutely contradictious and impossible : and did men heartily believe the scriptures , why should they not as absolutely submit their reason to the authority of god , as to the evidence of sense ? but let them answer for this . but the whole strength of this argument , which he manages with great triumph and scorn , dwindles into the old socinian sophism , that one god signifies but one only person , who is god ; and that whatever other unity you ascribe to three persons , each of which is by himself true and perfect god , still they are three gods ; for since each of these spirits ( or persons , each of which is an infinite mind or spirit ) are said to be infinite , all-perfect , they must be said to be gods , mutually conscious , mutually inexisting , and the rest ; but no more one god , than they are one spirit : and therefore the realists may as well pretend that by these devices of theirs , they have contrived three infinite spirits into one person , or into one spirit , as into one god. and that a disinterested person ( i suppose he means such as himself ) and philosophers , and jews and pagans , he might have added sabellians , and socinians , and mahumatans , will call these three gods. now it is no wonder that this disinterested person thinks all our explications of the unity of god insufficient , when we so vastly differ about the notion of one god : that we are so far from proving three divine persons to be one god in his sense , that we reject his notion of one god , as judaism and heresie ; and herein we have the authority of the catholick church on our side . and here i would desire the reader to observe , that this argument is not meerly against that phrase of three minds and spirits and substances ; but against three persons , each of which is in his own proper person , mind and spirit and substance ; for three such persons , by this authors argument , are three gods , and can no more be contrived ( as he prophanely speaks ) into one god , than into one personal spirit . but yet since he graciously owns , that one infinite almighty spirit , is one god , what if we should prove these three infinite persons , each of which is mind and spirit , to be one and the same infinite eternal spirit : and yet this has always been the faith of the catholick church , st. austin is express in it , the father is spirit , and the son spirit , and the holy ghost spirit , but not three spirits , but one spirit ; that is , not personally , but essentially one , they are three persons , but one essence , essentially one spirit : and if god be perfect , pure , simple essence , the unity of essence , is the unity of god. this was the doctrine of all the catholick fathers , and this we must insist on till our modern demonstrators speak more home to this point , that one divine essence , one self-originated divinity , though subsisting in three distinct persons , is but one god. i can't discourse this at large now , that may be done , if there be occasion for it , another time , but at present i shall only give a brief account of the doctrine of the fathers , as to this point . they tell us , that there is but one self-originated divinity , but one father , and therefore but one god ; that this eternal unbegotten father , begets an eternal son of his own nature and substance , and in like manner , that is , in the same nature and substance the holy spirit eternally proceeds from father and son : so that there being but one nature , one divinity , communicated whole and entire and perfectly the same , without division of substance , there is but one divine nature , but one divinity distinctly in three : not one meerly as a species is one ( though they often allude also to a specific unity ) but one , as one individual , though not one singular , nature is one : as one which subsists wholly , indivisibly , and perfectly in three , is one ; which is one , and one , and one , by a perfect sameness , and identity of nature , and substance , but not three . that these three are inseparable from each other , never did subsist a part , never can ; but are in each other , which they call the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and circumincession , which makes the divinity one simple , indivisible monad : and here we may allow a place , ( and he never intended any other place for it ) to what dr. sherlock calls , mutual consciousness , which is the proper and natural in-being of three , each of which is mind and spirit : which is not barely a knowing each other by an external communication of thoughts and counsels , which is far from being an essential natural unity ; but such an inward vital sensation , as each person has of himself ; which after all the noise and clamour about it , seems to be a very sensible representation of the natural in-being and circumincession of the divine persons ; and as natural a demonstration of the unity of the divine essence , as self-consciousness must be acknowledged to be of the unity of a person . it is certain , without this they cannot be one energy and power ( wherein the fathers also place the unity of the god-head ) one agent , one creator and governour . but where there is such an inseparable union , such a mutual conscious sensation , there can be but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as greg. nyssen speaks , one motion of the divine will , though distinctly and without confusion in three : and this makes them one agent , one essential will , one essential wisdom , one essential power ; so that here is in the properest sence , but one omniscience , one omnipotence , one will , &c. and therefore but one god , though father , son , and holy ghost , are each of them in their own persons , omnipotent , omniscient , and whatever belongs to the idea of god. all this , indeed , does not make these three divine persons one person , and therefore not one god , in the socinian sense of one god , which is the only deficiency this author charges this account of the divine unity with ; and is wisely done of him , because he knows we reject this notion of the divine unity , and therefore here he is safe ; we assert that the unity of god , is not the unity of a person , but the unity of nature and essence ; and to confute this , he gravely proves , that three persons are not , and cannot be one person : but if he would have opposed us , he should either have shewn , first , that the account the catholick fathers give ( for for we pretend to give no other ) of the unity of god , does not prove , the perfect unity of the divine essence in three persons : or secondly , that one undivided divinity is not one god : or thirdly , that the same eternal essence cannot subsist whole and perfect , distinctly and indivisibly in three ; that is , that god cannot communicate his own nature and substance , without division and separation , to his son , and spirit ; or that god cannot have an eternal son , and an eternal spirit : if he can do either of these , we will very tamely and humbly follow his chariot ; in the mean time ( for i believe this will take up some time ) i will shew him the difference between three divine persons , each of which is true and perfect god , and three gods. . first , then one god in the socinian notion , is one infinite mind and spirit , one eternal divinity , in one only person : so one person , and one divinity , that no other person communicates with it in the same divinity , in the same one eternal essence and substance : now according to this notion of one god , three gods are three such eternal minds , substances , divinities , each of which in his own person , has a whole , perfect , undivided essence and divinity , which is not common to any other person : so that three gods are three absolute substances , essences , divinities , which have no essential relation to , or communication with each other . there can be no other notion of three gods , if as this author , and all the anti-trinitarians assert , one god is one absolute divinity in one person ; for then three gods must be three absolute divinities in three persons : now every one sees , what a vast difference there is , between three such gods , and the catholick faith of a trinity of person , in the unity of the divine essence . why , you 'll say , is not every person in the trinity , by himself , in his own person , true and perfect god ? yes , most certainly ; but he is not one absolute , separate divinity ; he has not a divinity so peculiarly his own , that no other person communicates in it ; there is but one undivided divinity in all three , and therefore there is a trinity in unity . but is not each person in the trinity infinite mind , spirit , substance ? nay , do not some realists venture to call them three minds , spirits , substances ? and what are such three , but three gods , if one infinite mind and spirit , be one god ? i answer : an infinite mind and spirit , is certainly true and perfect god ; but one personal infinite mind and spirit is not the one god , so as to exclude all other persons , unless he have one absolute , separate divinity also , so proper and peculiar to himself , that no other person does or can communicate in it ; for if more persons than one can perfectly communicate in the same one divinity , there must be more divine persons than one , and each of them perfect god , but neither of them the one god , in exclusion of the other persons , but all of them the one god as the one divinity . this , i think , the socinians will grant , that one divinity is but one god , and that one god is one absolute divinity ; and the reason why they assert the one god to be but one person , is because they think it impossible , that the same undivided divinity should subsist distinctly and perfectly in three ; but then before they had charged the faith of the trinity with tritheism , they should have remembred , that the persons of the trinity are not three such persons , as their one person is , whom they call the one god : and therefore though three such persons , three such minds and substances , as their one person , and one spirit is , who is the whole divinity confined to one single person , would be three gods , this does not prove , that three such persons as the catholick church owns in the ever-blessed trinity , who are all of the same one substance , and but one divinity , must therefore be three gods also . . three such persons as these , who are three gods , our author , and every one else , who understands any thing of these matters , must acknowledge to be three self-originated persons ; for god , in the full and adequate notion of one god , is a self-originated being ; and those , who assert , that the one god , is but one person , make him a self-originated person : now it is evident , that in this sense the three persons in the christian trinity are not three god's , for they are not three self-originated persons : the father alone is un-begotten , or self-originated , but the son is begotten of his father's substance , and the holy ghost eternally proceeds from father and son ; so that here is but one self-originated person , with his eternal son , and eternal spirit . and let this author try to make three gods of three , two of which are not self-originated persons . they might more plausibly dispute against the divinity of the son , and the holy spirit , from this topick , that they are not self-originated persons , than prove them to be a second and third god , by their perfect communication in a self-originated nature , which is the person of the father . for though a perfect communication of the divine nature makes a true divine person , who is true and perfect god , yet no person can be the one god , who is not self-originated ; and a self-originated person , who is a father , cannot be the one god , so as to exclude his son , who is of the same nature and substance with him ; nor the holy spirit , who by an eternal procession from father and son , perfectly communicates in the same eternal nature . . three such persons , as in a strict and proper notion are three gods , must be three separate persons , who have not only distinct , but separate natures , and substances , and have no internal union , or communication with each other ; and therefore are in a proper notion three principles , three agents , three wills , three lives , three omnipotents , &c. who always act a-part , and can never concur as one agent , in any one action ; cannot make and govern the same world ; have no relation to each other , no order , no union , as it is impossible three absolute , independent divinities should : but the catholick faith concerning the three divine persons in the trinity , is directly contrary to this , that as father , son , and holy ghost , are but one substance , one divinity ; so they are so perfectly in each other , that they have but one essential will , omnipotence , omniscience , are but one agent , one creatour and governour of the world. let this author , or any other adversaries , talk what they please , of the absurdity , nonsence , contradiction , of all this , which is not our present dispute , i stand to it , that they can never make tritheism of it ; for the three divine persons in the trinity , though each of them be by himself true and perfect god , yet as they are owned by the catholick church , and as we have now explain'd it , are not three such persons , as they themselves must confess , three persons must be , who are three gods. what i have now discoursed will help us to give a plain and short answer to those fallacies , whereby such disinterested persons , as this authour , charge the catholick faith of the trinity with tritheism ; for they manifestly equivocate both in the notion of one god , and of one person . by one god , they understand one who is true and perfect god , and every one , who is true and perfect god , is one , and now instead of all other demonstrations , they only desire you to number the persons of the trinity upon your fingers , and if you can but tell to three , you will infallibly find three gods : the father is true and perfect god ; there , say they , is one god : the son is true and perfect god ; there are two gods ▪ the holy ghost is true and perfect god ; there are three gods : quod erat demonstrandum . but do they think that all the catholick fathers knew not how to find three in the trinity , till they taught them to tell three upon their fingers ? and if they found three , but yet could not find three gods in the trinity , they might in modesty have thought , that something more than arithmetick , or telling their fingers , was necessary to make good this charge , and because they either are , or would seem to be ignorant of this , i will tell them what it is . in that dispute , whether there be only one god , or more gods than one ; by one god , in the first place , all men understand one divinity , one infinite , omnipotent , essence and nature ; for all the arguments relating to the unity of god directly prove no more than the unity of the divine essence : that god is but one person , as well as one divinity , ( as most men did , and as all men might reasonably conclude before the revelation of a trinity of divine persons in the essential unity of the god-head ) is not owing to any direct and positive proof , but to a common presumption : for since we have no example in created nature , of more than one proper person in one individual inseparable nature ; most men hence concluded , naturally enough , that one divinity was but one divine person also . but god , who understands his own nature best , has revealed to us in scripture , that there are three , father , son , and holy ghost , who equally and perfectly communicate in this one infinite and undivided essence , and therefore that there are three divine persons , and one god. and this has occasioned a confusion of terms , on which our socinian adversaries have grounded all their noisie triumphs : for now one god , and one person , signifie very differently in the mystery of the trinity , from what they do in common acceptation , and must of necessity do so . one god , in natural religion , before the revelation of this sacred mystery , signified one divinity , one infinite nature and essence , without any notion of more than one subsistence , and one personality ; and then consequently one person , who is this one god , must signifie one , who has this whole divinity , perfectly in himself , and exclusively to all other persons . but in the christian mystery ; one god , signifies also one perfect undivided divinity , but communicable whole and perfect , and indivisibly to more than one , and actually subsisting in three distinct persons , father , son , and holy ghost ; and therefore consequently , person also in this mystery , signifies one , who has the whole divine nature perfectly in himself , and therefore is true and perfect god , but has not the whole divinity incommunicably in himself , exclusively to all other persons , and therefore is not the one god , in the sense of one perfect incommunicable divinity , peculiar to himself , and communicated to no other person , nor subsisting in any other . and now let any man judge of the mean sophistry of our adversaries , who from their notion of one person and one god , which the catholick church with great reason rejects , charge the catholick faith of a real , subsisting , trinity , with tritheism , for they do not dispute ad idem , but impose upon men with an equivocal use of words . three such divine persons indeed , as they own , that is , each of which has a whole perfect divinity in himself , which no other person communicates , or can communicate in , must be in a proper notion , three gods , or three perfect , self-originated , separate , divinities ; but this does not prove ( and yet in the last result this is all the proof they offer at ) that three persons , who have but one comon divinity , though distinctly and perfectly subsisting in each of them , are therefore three gods ; for neither of these persons is so god , as to exclude the others from the same divinity , and therefore are not three divinities , not three self-originated divine essences , and therefore not three gods , according to the natural notion of tritheism : god , and god , and god , who have the same one divinity subsisting in them all , are not three gods , but one god , because one divinity . here it is they should attack us , and if they have any thing to say to this point , we are ready to join issue with them . fifthly , his last argument , which he places great confidence in , is very easily answered . it is this . that all the reasons used by philosophers , or divines , to prove that there is but one god , do as certainly and as clearly prove , that there can be but one infinite and all-perfect spirit . all this still is nothing but the same equivocation and fallacy , which i have already sufficiently answered : one infinite and all-perfect spirit may either signifie one person , who is infinite mind or spirit in his own person , and here we are ready to joyn issue with him , that all the arguments , which prove , that there is but one god , do not prove that there is but one divine person , but one , who is this one god : or it may signifie one divinity , which is essentially one infinite all-perfect spirit , but personally three ; and in this sense we agree with him ; for we assert one undivided essence essentially one in three , that is , we believe there is but one god , who is one in nature and three in persons . and this seems a pretty surprizing undertaking , to prove that the arguments for one god confute a trinity of real subsisting persons in the unity of the same god-head : it is certain , before he can do this , he must make three gods of these three divine persons ; for if they be but one god , the arguments for the unity of god , can never confute a trinity of persons ; and here i might reasonably leave this argument , till he has answered , what i have already said in this cause . but let us hear his arguments against polytheism , and see how he applies them . first , that created nature has nothing needless or in vain , much less can we suppose , that the uncreated divine nature hath ought , that is , superfluous or redundant — but now , is it not a superfluity , say they , to suppose more gods , when ( because one is sufficient ) more gods are needless , and wholly in vain ? i do not remember , that i have met with this argument in these terms , in any of the antient apologists for christianity : i think , it is a very bad argument against the being of any thing , but much more so , when applied to the divine nature . that nature does nothing in vain , has been allowed for a maxim among all philosophers , who have acknowledged a god , or that all things are made by a wise cause , the necessary consequence of which is , that nothing is made in vain , and this is the only proof , and the only reason of that maxim : but , that created nature has nothing needless , or in vain , is not a self-evident proposition , but must be proved by an induction of particulars , and is very hard to be prov'd in this way , because we understand so little of the designs , and contrivance and wisdom of nature ; that many who begin at this end of the question , reject a wise cause and maker of the world , because they think , they discover many defects , or many superfluities in nature , that is , many things which are needless or in vain : and this looks like an unfortunate beginning thus to mistake his maxim. but to allow him this : what philosopher ever pretended to prove by this argument , that such things either were , or were not , as they apprehended to be either defective , needless , or superfluous ? whether such things are , or are not , is pure matter of fact , and must be proved by such ways , as the nature of the thing admits ; matters of sense by sense , matters of revelation by revelation : and when men know , that such things are , and what they are , then they judge of them , whether they be vain and needless , defective or superfluous , or wisely made , as they begin at the right or wrong end of this question . those who are perswaded , that the world was made by a wise cause , hence conclude , that all things are wisely made , though there are many things which they do not understand the reason and philosophy of : others presuming upon their own skill in nature , pick many quarrels with it , and find few things , which thoroughly please them , and thence conclude that the world was not made by a wise cause , because they do not see the wisdom of it . but whatever truth or force , there be in this argument , it can relate only to created nature , to such things as are made , and are made to serve some particular end ; for then only a thing is vain and needless , when it is made so in whole , or in part , as to serve no wise end : but surely we must not dispute at this rate concerning an eternal , uncreated , self-originated nature , which was not made by any cause , and therefore has no end but it self : and yet this his argument , to prove two or three gods superfluous , needless , in vain , because one god is sufficient : sufficient for what ? why , to make and govern the world ; well! is god then only for the sake of creatures ? can a being , who was never made , who has no cause , no beginning , have any end but it self ? was one god a superfluous , needless being , before he made the world ? or was the world from eternity as well as god ? and does not an athiest , who can make and govern a world without a god , conclude from this very argument , that there is none , because he is a superfluous and needless being ? which shews , what a dangerous argument this is , when proposed in such loose general terms . god is indeed the maker and governour of the world , and we can prove , that the world could not be made and governed but by god , and that one god can make and govern the world , and there needs no more for this purpose , and the unity and harmony of the world , that is made , proves that there is but one maker and governour of it , and therefore but one god : such arguments as these , together with the notion of an absolute perfect being , which can be but one , were urged by the antient apologists , against the pagan politheism ; but to make god a superfluous or needless being , any farther than he has a respect and relation to creatures , which this argument against the plurality of gods supposes , is very irreverent to god , and liable to very ill consequences . it was never used in this sense by any of the antient fathers , and the first time petavius observes it is in abaelardus and edmundus cantuariensis : and that more cautiously expressed , and better qualified . secondly , his second argument is much of the same nature : the multiplicity of beings , of any sort , arises only from the weakness , imperfection , and unsufficiency ( in some regard or other ) of those beings ; which is such a wise reason for the multiplicity of beings , as i never in my life before met with . the reason why any imperfect beings are , is because they are made , for what is imperfect can't be without a cause ; and what ever is made must be imperfect , because it must have a finite and limited nature ; for an infinite nature is self-existent , and can't be made : and what is finite and limited , may be multiplied ; for there is nothing in its nature and idea to hinder it , if it find a maker ; and the wise maker of the world thought fit to make many creatures of the same kind : and now he may bring in his reasons , if he pleases , why god made so many creatures of the same kind , to supply mortality , or for mutual help or comfort , &c. but all these reasons relate only to such beings , as are made , and have a wise cause , and i perfectly agree with him , that god has none of these defects , and therefore none of these reasons can make it necessary that there should be more gods than one ; but then he should have remembred , that god was not made , and therefore not made for any end ; and this would have made him thought twice before he had added . to suppose more gods without assigning a final cause for such a supposition , is to imploy our fancy and invention ( to assign no cause ) not to exercise our reason : 't is to amuse our selves with conceits and chimera's , not to philosophize . you imagine more gods without giving a reason , whether final or declaratory . you ought to know that the proper name for this is whimsie . but i want a name for this argument , only i think it is neither reason nor philosophy , to talk of assigning a final cause , why there is a god , either one or more . a final cause is the reason and end , for which any thing was made ; but that which was not made , could be made for no end , and therefore it is absurd to talk of the final cause of a necessary and eternal being . but though he has managed these two arguments at such a rate , that no man has any reason to reverence him as an infallible dictator , either in philosophy or religion , yet we allow him , what he would have , that two gods are more than we have any need of , and that there is not the same reason for more gods than one , that there is for a number of creatures , of each kind ; and what then ? what then ? sure that is very evident , that there can no more be three all-perfect , all-sufficient spirits , than three gods : right ! not three such all-perfect , all-sufficient spirits , as are three gods ; but what does he think of three , each of which is an all-perfect , and all-sufficient spirit , and all three but one divinity , one god ? but one spirit , who is really all-sufficient and all-perfect , is enough to all purposes and intents whatsoever : i grant , one divinity is so ; but if this one divinity essentially and necessarily subsists in three , in father , son , and holy ghost , each of which is an all-perfect , and all-sufficient spirit , and yet but one whole undivided divinity , one all-perfect , all-sufficient being , these three are not more than enough , not redundant and superfluous in the divinity : and therefore he should have proved , that by the same reason , that three absolute , independent , self-originated divinities are superfluous and needless ; three divine persons , of the same one undivided divinity , are superfluous too . three divinities , three separate self-originated divine essences and natures , are superfluous ; but i hope one divinity , one divine nature and essence is not : and if three divine persons are essential to one undivided and inseparable divinity , i hope they are not superfluous neither : and this is the catholick faith : not three gods , or three divinities , but three persons in one infinite , undivided , nature and essence . three , which never did subsist , never did , never can act a-part , and therefore though three , are but one all-wise omnipotent agent ; and one omnipotent is not more than enough . but , none of these imperfections which are the reasons , why beings of the same kind are multiplied , are found in any one of these all-perfect , all-sufficient spirits . very true , but the same one whole perfect divinity is found in them all , and therefore though they are three , the divinity is not multiplied , but they are one god ; and this is all we are to account for : those who believe but one god , i hope , need not give a reason , whether final or declaratory , why there are more ; but if he expects a reason , why there are three living , subsisting , omniscient , omnipotent , persons in this one undivided god-head , a final reason i can give none , for i have learnt to give no such reasons of a necessary and eternal nature ; a declaratory reason , as he aclls it , i can give , because our saviour has assured us , that so it is , and has given command to his ministers to baptize in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost . thirdly , and this answers his third argument , that the works of creation , though they prove the being of a god , yet give us not the least intimation of more gods than one : we own the argument against a plurality of gods ; but now for the application : he says , this is as direct a proof against our professing more infinite and almighty mighty spirits . of one such mind or spirit , the works of creation are a clear demonstration , but they shew us not the least foot-steps or track of more such spirits and minds . [ or of three such divine almighty person ; ] and i know not how they should , when as the realists themselves profess , these three are but one essential wisdom , power , and goodness , and therefore but one maker and governour of the world. but he thinks , that if there were more than one such mind or spirit , or as we say , infinite person , who is an infinite and all-mighty mind , that also would have been made known to us , either by the works of creation or providence , that are visible to all , because all are concerned to know it . but though there were ( as we profess to believe ) three such divine persons in the unity of the god-head , yet he knows according to our principles , the works of creation could give no such notice of any distinction of persons in the god-head , because the father makes all things by his word and spirit , by an undivided and undistinguished wisdom and power , and when these divine persons have not distinct and separate parts in the creation , it is impossible , that this visible frame of nature should distinguish them ; and therefore this distinction cannot be learnt but by revelation . nor consequently were all men concerned to know this , till god thought fit to reveal it : it was sufficient in a meer state of nature to worship the maker of the world with an undistinguisht devotion : but the redemption of mankind by the incarnation and death of the son of god , and by the sanctification of the spirit , made the revelation of this mystery necessary ; and though the works of creation did not visibly distinguish the divine persons , yet the work of redemption does , father , son , and holy ghost , have their distinct parts and offices in this glorious work , and such as prove each of them to be a distinct person , and each person to be true and perfect god ; but this author will not stand the trial of revelation : for he tells us plainly , that the doctrine of the trinity ( for that is all he means by three minds and spirits ) is a point of so much importance , and so general concernment , that were it true , it must have been found , where all other necessary parts of religion are registered ; in the works of creation , or the methods of providence , or the congenit notions , which are inseparable from our rational natures . here he speakes out , and we thank him for it ; he hath done with all revelation , excepting where there is the least need of it , viz. such matters as may be known without a revelation ; and now he has pulled off his disguise , it is time for all christians to have done with him . he has hitherto concealed himself under the character of a nominalist , and according to his own rule he ought to shew us this nominal trinity registered in the works of creation , or the methods of providence , or those congenite notions , which are inseparable from our rational natures : and when he has done this , we will shew him a trinity of real proper subsisting persons . as for what he adds , that our saviour tells us , god is ( not three spirits ) but a spirit , it is like all the rest : spirit there , as in many other places , signifies the nature , not the person , and therefore these are not contradictory propositions ; god is a spirit , and there are three in the unity of the god-head , each of which is infinite mind and spirit . sect . vi. the defence this author makes for the nominalists , against the objections of the realists . this author having , as he thinks , sufficiently exposed the tritheistick trinity of the realists , proceeds to vindicate the nominalists from those exceptions , which are made against them : i need say little more to this , than to explain that defence he makes for them ; and leave the persons concerned to vindicate themselves from his vindication , which seems to me a very scandalous one . . the first objection is , that the explication ( of the nominalists ) is a bare-fac'd yielding the long-controverted question of the trinity , to the sabellians and samosatenians , and consequently to the socinians , who differ in nothing from noetus , sabellius , and paul of samosata ; ( they are near of kin indeed , but there is some difference between them . ) the god of the sabellians and socinians , and the god ( or pretended ) verbal trinity of the nominals , is perfectly the same : the latter have explained away the trinity to the former . the three divine persons of the nominals , do all make but one divine person of the socinians and sabellians . this is certainly true , ( as he explains the doctrine of the nominals , which , i hope , they can give a better account of ) but for fear some men should not believe it , he takes great pains to prove that it is so . now this is a very formidable objection : for if the nominals have revived sabellianism and socinianism , they have been condemned many hundred years since by all those catholick fathers and councils , who condemned noetus , sabellius , photinus , paulus samosatenus , and such like anti-trinitarian hereticks . and this justifies the realists , and undoes all that he has hitherto been doing ; for there is no medium between a real and a nominal trinity , a trinity of three real , living , subsisting , persons , and one living , subsisting person , with a trinity of names , offices , modes , or immanent acts , and therefore as far as the authority of the catholick church reaches , the condemnation of a sabellian and nominal trinity must justifie a trinity of real subsisting persons . and what now does he answer to this ? why he owns it , and says the socinians at length see it , and hope to make their advantage of it : that it is indeed an invidious objection , and that is the whole strength of it : invidious , i confess , it is , because all sincere christians abhor these names , and it would in a great measure put an end to this controversie , were our people satisfied , that a nominal trinitarian , and socinian , perfectly agree in renouncing the true catholick faith of the trinity ; though the nominalist still retains the name of trinity and persons , which the socinians have hitherto rejected , but are now willing to use them for peace sake , since they learn from these men , that they signifie nothing , and that the church never intended to signifie any thing real by them . this is what he tells us with great triumph : our english socinians claim in their writings , that they are the discoverers , that the feud between the church and them was ill-grounded . for that , in very deed , both ( the nominals , whom he calls the church , and the socinians ) say the same thing : as they pretend to this honour , so they are sufficiently paid , in that themselves have the whole benefit of it : they may enjoy thereby that peace and tranquillity , that ease and security from the laws themselves , which they before owed to the indulgence , or connivence of princes and magistrates . this now is very plain dealing , and i hope will be a fair warning to all serious christians , how they suffer themselves to be cheated out of their faith by the loud , groundless out-cries of tritheism , or imposed on by the old catholick names of trinity , and persons , without that catholick sense in which the church always used those words . and i think those persons to whom this author affixes the name of nominals , if they be not sabellians and socinians , ( which god forbid ) ought to vindicate themselves from this heavy imputation , and not only deny the charge , but so explain themselves , as to let us see , wherein their doctrine concerning the trinity , differs from the old condemned heresies of sabellius , photinus , and socinus : and i doubt not but this will produce a much happier agreement , and put an end to this scandalous distinction between real and nominal trinitarians . . but our author is much more troubled with the second objection : that the predications , or ( as others speak ) attributions given in holy scripture , and by the catholick church to the divine persons , seem not well to consist , or to be intelligible , on the hypothesis or explication of the nominals . his instance concerns the son or second person in the trinity , who is called god , and we say he was incarnate , and all things were made by him : in some places an omnipresence , in others omnipotence and omniscience are ascribed to him . but how can we ( with any tolerable propriety ) say , that a meer reflex wisdom is god , created all things , was incarnate , is omnipotent , omniscient , omnipresent ? or how can any of these things be affirmed of , or applied to our saviour , in regard of the incarnate or inhabiting logos , or reflex wisdom ? the which also how it should be incarnate , will be another unaccountable , unintelligible paradox . this is a very notable objection ; he has brought the nominals on , let him see how he can bring them off again . now , in the first place , he is not willing to own , that any such things as these are said of christ , and therefore tells us , we should do well to consider the interpretations of the texts , wherein these things are said , or seem to be said . and here he is at his old trade of admiring his critical interpreters , whom he prefers much before divines ; and of disparaging those copies we have of the scriptures : the mystery of which is , that some criticks give up some texts of scripture , out of wantonness and vanity , which the catholick church always thought good proofs of the divinity and incarnation of our saviour ; and he thinks it a better way to judge of the sense of scripture , by some new critical pointings , or the mistakes of some old copies , which may furnish them with various readings , than by the whole series of the discourse , and the traditional interpretations of the catholick church ; but i shall not dispute this matter now . he is certainly so far in the right , that the safest way of answering all this , is to deny it all ; and this is what he means , when he says , it were easie to make such an application of this reflection , as would ( perhaps ) offend many ; but would ( for all that ) be most true . now i would only ask the nominalists , how they like this way of answering these difficulties , by criticizing away all the proofs of the divinity and incarnation of christ ? this their pretended , but treacherous friend , says is the best and truest way , and he is a man of skill in these matters , and seems to be ashamed of any other answer but this , which will unavoidably entangle him in unaccountable and unintelligible paradoxes . i verily persuade my self , that many of those , whom this author calls nominals , abhor the thoughts of this , and therefore ought freely and openly to declare themselves in this matter , and not to suffer this bantering socinian to impose upon the world in their names . but if this answer don't please , our author has another for them , as good to the full : let us , says he , distinguish the two natures in christ , his divinity and humanity , and rightly understand the doctrine of the incarnation : this looks very promisingly ; for to acknowledge two natures in christ , and rightly to understand the doctrine of the incarnation , will rectifie all other mistakes : let us then hear what he has to say of this . as to the incarnation , every body knows , that the most learned interpreters , do not limit the incarnation to the person of the logos or son : but they say , the whole divinity , or as st. paul speaks , the fulness of the god-head ( was incarnate , or ) dwelt in christ. who these most learned interpreters are , i can't tell , unless he means the patripassion hereticks , for all catholick christians believe only the incarnation of the person of the son , and that neither the father , nor the holy spirit were incarnate in the incarnation of christ. but can we deny , that the whole divinity , the fulness of the god-head was incarnate , or dwelt in christ ? i answer , this is meer fallacy : for the whole divinity may signifie either essentially or personally : the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the one whole divinity is father , son , and holy ghost , the same perfect divinity , subsisting whole and indivisible in each of them , that they are all three but one divinity , or one god ; and thus the whole divinity was not incarnate in christ : but then , as christ in his own person is true and perfect god , so the fulness of the god-head was incarnate in him ; which is all st. paul means . but will this author in good earnest allow , that god was incarnate in christ , and that christ was in one person , both god and man ? hold there a little : they do not mean , he says , that god was so incarnate , or so dwells in the humanity of christ ▪ that he is not also every where else : and whoever said he was ? but is he so incarnate , as to be truly god-man in one person , as the soul and body are one man ? no! no! but only thus , christ is perfect god in respect of god in him ; because , or as god is perfect god in whatsoever place or person he is : god is perfect god in the least point of space , no less than in never so large a portion of extension : and this is all the mystery of the incarnation : and thus god , the fulness of the god-head , is as much incarnate in every man in the world , as he was in christ ; for god is every where , and is perfect god , where-ever he is . thus i have endeavoured to unmask this author , to let the world see , who they are that make their advantage of these disputes : his very expedients for peace shew how unwilling he is to have this controversie silenced , which should teach all the sincere lovers of the catholick faith , who heartily believe in father , son , and holy ghost , three persons and one god , not to lose the faith in a contention about words , nor give a handle to our enemies , to represent our faith as uncertain , various , or heretical , when under different forms of speech , we may , and i hope do mean the very same thing . the learned bishop of worcester , whose discourse in vindication of the trinity i have just now received , has undertaken this charitable work , and i hope his great judgment , learning , and authority , may tend very much , if not to make all men speak and think alike , yet at least to prevent their charging each other with such heresies , as they all abhor , and which their words fairly and candidly expounded , are by no means chargeable with , as that excellent person thinks , neither side is , and i wish with all my heart , he may be in the right : and this would soon qualifie our differences ; for did it once appear , that we all mean the same thing , the dispute about words would die of it self , and our common adversaries could no longer conceal themselves under a disguise , but must take their old name of socinians again . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e denique vocem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliquoties à priscis ecclesiae doctoribus , etiam qui concilium nicaenum antecesserunt , pro subsistentia , vel pro re singulari per se subsistente , quae in rebus intellectu praeditis idem est quod persona , usurpari multis exemplis constat . bull. defens . fid. ni●aen . p. . et hoc sensu sine offensione usurpari perseverasset ( ut arbitror ) vox 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nisi ariani ipsam abusi fuissent ad propagandam haeresin suam , pro natura & substantia in generaliori significatione accipientes , ac docentes patrem & filium duas esse hypostases , hoc est , naturas ac substantias diversas , à se invicem discrepantes . ibid. p. . p. . page . sed haec omnia catholicum sensum facile admittunt , adeoque postulant — ad primum quod attinet , potiori jure pater & filius , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a methodi● dicuntur , quàm 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 five 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ab aliis patribus appellantur , qui pro catholicis tamen & orthodoxis in hoc articulo habiti sunt . scilicet hae voces omnino personaliter , ut dici solet , accipiuntur ut supra ostendimus . bull. defens . p. . addo ego , personam hic sine essentia concipi non posse , nisi statueris personam in divinis nihil aliud esse , quàm merum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quod plane sabellianum est , p. . the judgment of a disinterested person . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ath. decret . syn. nic. p. . p. . considerations concerning the trinity . page . p. . socr. h. e. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . p. . labb . concil . tom. . p. . concil . t. . p. . p. . pet. de trin. l. . c. . quippe essentia neque sic gignit essentiam , ut ei absolutam existentiam tribuat , neque sic gignitur , ut existat , sed generare , cùm ad essentiam pertinet , est generando communicare , gigni est communicari . filius verè & propriè à patre gignitur ; essentia autem ejus non eodem modo gigni dicitur , sed generatione accipi ; vel gignere est dare substantiam , gigni est datam accipere . p●t . ibid. parcimus hoc loco celebribus in belgio theologis , quorum scripta nuper censuerunt , & reprobarunt dogmata variae synodi faederatae belgicae , sed & academica judicia , etiam publica auctoritate expressa . prior in hoc ordine suit franckeranus theologus , vir acri ingenio , dictione eleganti , cujus scripto non uno , etiam vernaculo hae videntur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . prima nempè , appellationem filii tributam secundae personae s. trinitatis , ut & generationem ex patre , non intelligendam esse propriè , ut fit ab orthodoxis , de vera aliqua generatione , aeternâ●ll●â quidem & ineffabili , secundum quam pater generans sit verè & propriè pater , & filius genitus sit verè sic propriè filius , modo tamen divinae naturae convenienti . nihil autem istis vocibus , patris & filii , generantis & geniti , innui aliud in scripturâ s. quam ; . quod secunda persona haebet eandem cum primâ personâ essentiam & naturam , illique ab aterno coëxtiterit : negato modo illo habendi per ineffabilem generationem , & sublatâ personali illâ subsistentiâ patris generantis & filii geniti hinc verâ relatione qualis perpetuò est , praecipuè in scriptis novi testamenti inter patrem & filium : unde vel sabellianismi , vel tritheismi cujusdam , oriri possit suspicio . nec dubia his minùs , fuerit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spiritus sancti quàm est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 filii . . quod respiciant illa ad oeconomiam testamenti gratiae , ad manifestationem in carne secundae personae , tanquam invisibili dei imagine & ad executionem officii mediatorii ad quod datus est à deo patre : quo sensu generare sit idem quod manifestare . gigni idem quod manifestari , patefieri , eitatis locis , prov. . . . . cant. . , &c. quae coincidunt ferè cum exceptionibus familiae socini ad verba , hodie genui te , omniumque 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse videtur : quod repugnet vera illa & propria generatio filii ineffabilis licet , ideis innatis à deo ipso inditis menti humanae quae sint principium omnis assensus , omnis verae ac certae cognitionis : nec censendum revelasse deum quicquam in verbo suo quod non ab homine ad ideas istas exigi possit & debeat , seu nihil proponere deum in verbo suo credendum assensu certo & fiduciali , quod non clare & distincte ab homine sana ratione uso secundum ideas innatas percipi possit . spanhem . elenchus controversiarum , p. . &c. p. . p. . spiritus sanctus aeternaliter ex patre & filio , non tanquam ex duobus principiis , sed tanquam ex uno principio , non duabus spirationibus , sed unica spiratione procedit . damnamus & reprobamus omnes qui negare praesumpserint . spiritum sanctum aeternaliter ex patre & filio procedere , sive etiam temerario ausu asserere , quòd spiritus sanctus ex patre & filio , tanquam ex duobus principiis , & non tanquam ex uno , procedat . conc. lugdun . page . page . * veruntamen non est caduca caeterorum , quos nominavimus , patrum adversus arium instantia , si debitam adhibeas distinctionem , qualem insinuat praeclarè s. thomas . p. q. . art . . ut non in formali , sed in causali & illativo , ut ita dicam , sensu sancti patres intelligantur , quamvis enim filius , quâ silius non sit illa sapientia , quâ pater est sapiens , necessario tamen cum illa conjungitur , ab eâque oritur . * sapientia quippe quae in patre est , non est habitus , aut facultas , aut potentia , qualis est in rebus creatis , sed est purus & simplex actus . † porro actus omnis sapiendi , intelligendíque ( verbum ) necessariò complectitur omnis intellectionis terminum inevitabilem , sine quo sapiendi aut intelligendi actus ne quidem animo concipi potest . terminus autem est ipsum verbum graecè denominatum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ut advertit cyrillus l. . in joan. c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nunquam enim mens erit sine verbo , quod & in l. . thesauri uberiùs explicat . et s. thomas , loco paulò antè allegato , res ait communiter denominari non solùm à suis formis , sicut album ab albedine , homo ab humanitate : sed etiam à termino , ut cùm arbor dicitur florida à floribus quos produxit , quamquam non sint arboris forma , sed effectus & terminus , atque ita optimè contra arium , patrem non fuisse actu sapientem , nec esse potuisse sine verbo ac unigenito filio , concludunt sancti patres . page . page . . page . page . page . page . page . page . page . a brief declaration and vindication of the doctrine of the trinity as also of the person and satisfaction of christ / accommodated to the capacity and use of such as may be in danger to be seduced, and the establishment of the truth by j. owen. owen, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a brief declaration and vindication of the doctrine of the trinity as also of the person and satisfaction of christ / accommodated to the capacity and use of such as may be in danger to be seduced, and the establishment of the truth by j. owen. owen, john, - . [ ], p. printed by r.w. for nath. ponder ..., london : . includes: "doctrine of the trinity : as also of the person and satisfaction of christ ...", with special t.p. reproduction of original in the university of illinois (urbana-champaign campus). library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng jesus christ -- person and offices. trinity -- early works to . truth. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - olivia bottum text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a brief declaration and vindication of the doctrine of the trinity : as also of the person and satisfaction of christ . accommodated to the capacity and use of such as may be in danger to be seduced : and the establishment of the truth . john . . search the scriptures . by j. owen d. d. london , printed by r. w. for nath. ponder , at the sign of the peacock in chancery-lane near fleetstreet . . imprimatur , rob. grove , r. f. d. episcop . lond. à sac. dom. feb. . / . to the reader . christian reader , this small treatise hath no other design but thy good , and establishment in the truth . and therefore as laying aside that consideration alone : i could desirously have been excused from the labour of those hours which were spent in its composure , so in the work it self , i admitted of no one thought , but how the things treated of in it , might , and ought to be mannaged unto thy spiritual benefit and advantage . other designs most men have in writing what is to be exposed to publick view , and lawfully may have so ; in this i have nothing but meerly thy good. i have neither been particularly provoked , nor opposed by the adversaries of the truth here pleaded for ; nor have any need from any self respect , to publish such a small plain discourse as this ; love alone to the truth , and the welfare of thy soul , have given efficacy to their importunity who pressed me to this small service . the matters here treated of , are on all hands confessed to be of the greatest moment ; such as the eternal welfare of the souls of men , is immediately and directly concerned in . this all those who believe the sacred truths here proposed and explained , do unanimously profess and contend for ; nor is it denyed by those by whom they are opposed . there is no need therefore to give thee any especial reasons to evince thy concernment in these things , nor the greatness of that concernment , thereby to induce thee unto their serious consideration . it were well indeed that these great , sacred , and mysterious truths , might without contention or controversies about them , be left unto the faith of believers as proposed in the scripture , with that explanation of them which in the ordinary ministry and dispensation of the gospel is necessary and required . certainly these tremendous mysteries , are not by us willingly to be exposed , or prostituted to the cavils of every perverse querist , and disputer ; those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; whose pretended wisdom , indeed ignorance , darkness and folly , god hath designed to confound and destroy in them and by them . for my part , i can assure thee , reader , i have no mind to contend and dispute about these things which i humbly adore and believe as they are revealed . it is the importunity of adversaries , in their attempts to draw and seduce the souls of men from the truth and simplicity of the gospel in these great fundamentals of it , that alone can justifie any to debate upon , or eristically to handle these awful mysteries . this renders it our duty , and that indispensibly , in as much as we are required to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered unto the saints . but yet also when this necessity is imposed on us , we are by no means discharged from that humble reverence of mind , wherewith we ought alwayes to be conversant about them ; nor from that regard unto the way and manner of their revelation in the scripture , which may preserve us from all unnecessary intermixture of litigious or exotick phrases and expressions , in their assertion and declaration . i know our adversaries would upon the matter decry any thing peculiarly mysterious in these things ; although they are frequently , and emphatically in the scriptures affirmed so to be . but whilest they deny the mysteries of the things themselves , which are such as every may become the glorious being and wisdom of god , they are forced to a●sign such an aenigmatical sense unto the words , expressions and propositions wherein they are revealed and declared in the scripture , as to turn almost the whole gospel into an allegory , wherein nothing is properly expressed , but in some kind of allusion unto what is so elsewhere ; which irrational way of proceeding , leaving nothing certain in what is or may be expressed by word or writing , is covered over with a pretence of right reason , which utterly refuseth to be so employed . these things the reader will find afterwards made manifest , so far as the nature of this brief discourse will bear . and i shall only desire these few things of him that intends its perusal . first , that he would not look on the subject here treated of , as the matter of an ordinary controversie in religion . — neque enim hic levia aut ludicra petuntur praemia ; lectoris de vita animaeque salute certatur ; they are things which immediately and directly in themselves concern the eternal salvation of the souls of men ; and their consideration ought alwayes to be attended with a due sense of their weight and importance . secondly , let him bring with him a due reverence of the majesty and infinite , incomprehensible nature of god , as that which is not to be prostituted to the captious and sophistical scanning of men of corrupt minds , but to be humbly adored according to the revelation that he hath made of himself . thirdly , that he be willing to submit his soul and conscience , to the plain and obvious sense of scripture propositions and testimonies , without seeking out evasions and pretenses for unbelief . these requests i cannot but judge equal , and fear not the success , where they are sincerely complyed withall . i have only to add ; that in handling the doctrine of the satisfaction of christ , i have proceeded on that principle , which as it is fully confirmed in the scripture , so it hath constantly been maintained and adhered unto by the most of those , who with judgement and success have managed these controversies against the socinians . and this is that the essential holiness of god , with his justice or righteousness , as the supream governour of all , did indispensibly require that sin should not absolutely go unpunished ; and that it should do so , stands in a repugnancy to those holy properties of his nature . this i say , hath been alwayes constantly maintained by far the greatest number of them , who have throughly understood the controversie in this matter , and have successfully engaged in it . and as their arguments for their assertion , are plainly unanswerable , so the neglect of abiding by it , is causelesly to forego one of the most fundamental and invincille principles in our cause . he who first laboured in the defence of the doctrine of the satisfaction of christ , after socinus had formed his imaginations about the salvation that he wrought , and began to dispute about it , was covetus , a learned man , who laid the foundation of his whole disputation in the justice of god , necessarily requiring and indispensibly the punishment of sin . and indeed the state of the controversie as it is laid down by socinus , in his book de jesu christo servatore , which is an answer to this covetus , is genuine , and that which ought not to be receded from , as having been the direct ground of all the controversial writings on that subject , which have since been published in europe . and it is in these words laid down by socinus himself . communis & orthodoxa ( ut asseris ) sententia est , iesum christum ideo servatorem nostrum esse , quia divinae justiciae per quam peccatores damnari merebamur , pro peccatis nostris plene satisfecerit ; quae satisfactio per fidem imputatur nobis ex dono dei credentibus . this he ascribes to covet . the common and orthodox judgement is , that jesus christ is therefore our saviour , because he hath satisfied the justice of god , by which we being sinners deserved to be condemned , for all our sins . in opposition whereunto he thus expresseth his own opinion . ego vero censeo & orthodoxam sententiam esse arbitror , iesum christum ideo servatorem nostrum esse , quia salutis aeternae viam nobis annuntiaverit , confirmaverit , & in sua ipsius persona , cum vitae exemplo , tum ex mortuis resurgendo , manifeste ostenderit , vitamque aeternam nobis ei fidem habentibus ipse daturus sit . divinae autem justitiae , per quam peccatores damnari meremur , pro peccatis nostris neque illum satisfecisse , neque ut satisfaceret , opus fuisse arbitror . i judge and suppose it to be the orthodox opinion , that jesus christ is therefore our saviour , because he hath declared unto us the way of eternal salvation , and confirmed it in his own person ; manifestly shewing it , both by the example of his life , and by rising from the dead ; and in that he will give eternal life unto us believing in him . and i affirm that he neither made satisfaction to the justice of god , whereby we deserved to be damned for our sins , nor was there any need that he should so do . this is the true state of the question ; and the principal subtilty of crellius , the great defender of this part of the doctrine of socinus , in his book of the causes of the death of christ , and the defence of this book de iesu christo servatore , consists in speaking almost the same words with those whom he doth oppose , but still intending the same things with socinus himself : this opinion as was said of socinus , covetus opposed and everted on the principle before mentioned . the same truth was confirmed also by zarnovitius who first wrote against socinus his book ; as also by otto casmannus who engaged in the same work ; and by abraham salinarius . vpon the same foundation do proceed , paraeus , piscator , lubbertus , lucius , camero , voetius , amiraldus , placaeus , rivetus , walaeus , thysius , altingius , maresius , essenius , arnoldus , turretinus , baxter , with many others ; the lutherans , who have managed these controversies , as tarnovius , meisnerus , calovius , stegmannus , martinius , franzius , with all others of their , way , have constantly maintained the same great fundamental principle of this doctrine of the satisfaction of christ ; and it hath well , and solidly been of late asserted among our selves on the same foundation . and as many of these authors do expresly blame some of the schoolmen , as aquinas , durandus , biel , tataretus , for granting a possibility of pardon without satisfaction , as opening a way to the socinian error in this matter ; so also they fear not to affirm , that the foregoing of this principle of gods vindictive justice indispensibly requiring the punishment of sin , doth not only weaken the cause of the truth , but indeed leave it indefensible . however i suppose , men ought to be wary how they censure the authors mentioned , as such who expose the cause they undertook to defend , unto contempt ; for greater , more able , and learned defenders , this truth hath not as yet found , nor doth stand in need of . j. o. the preface . the disciples of our lord jesus christ , having made that great confession of him , in distinction and opposition unto them who accounted him only as a prophet , thou art christ the son of the living god , mat. . , , . he doth on the occasion thereof , give out unto them that great charter of the churches stability and continuance ; vpon this rock i will build my church , and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it , v. . he is himself the rock upon which his church is built ; as god is called the rock of his people , on the account of his eternal power and immutability , deut. . , , . isa. . . and himself the spiritual rock which gave out supplies of mercy and assistance to the people in the wilderness , cor. . . the relation of the professing church unto this rock , consists in the faith of this confession , that he is christ the son of the living god. this our lord jesus christ hath promised to secure against all attempts ; yet so as plainly to declare , that there should be great and severe opposition made thereunto . for whereas the prevalency of the gates of hell in an enmity unto this confession is denyed , a great and vigorous attempt to prevail therein is no less certainly foretold ; neither hath it otherwise fallen out . in all ages from the first solemn foundation of the church of the new testament , it hath one way or other been fiercely attempted by the gates of hell. for some time after the resurrection of christ from the dead , the principal endeavours of satan , and men acting under him , or acted by him , were pointed against the very foundation of the church , as laid in the expression before mentioned . almost all the errours and heresies wherewith for three or four centuries of years it was perplexed , were principally against the person of christ himself , and consequently the nature and being of the holy and blessed trinity . but being disappointed in his design herein , through the watchful care of the lord christ over his promise ; in the following ages , satan turned his craft and violence against sundry parts of the superstructure ; and by the assistance of the papacy cast them into confusion , nothing as it were remaining firm , stable , and in order , but only this one confession , which in a particular manner the lord christ hath taken upon himself to secure . in these latter ages of the world , the power and care of jesus christ reviving towards his church in the reformation of it , even the ruined heaps of its building have been again reduced into some tolerable order and beauty . the old enemy of its peace and welfare falling hereby under a disappointment , and finding his travail and labour for many generations in a great part frustrate , he is returned again to his old work of attacqueing the foundation it self ; as he is unweary and restless , and can be quiet neither conquerour nor conquered ; nor will be so , until he is bound and cast into the lake that burneth with fire . for no sooner had the reformation of religion firmed it self in some of the europaean provinces , but immediately , in a proportion of distance not unanswerable unto what fell out from the first foundation of the church , sundry persons by the instigation of satan attempted the disturbance and ruine of it , by the very same errours and heresies about the trinity , the person of christ , and his offices , the person of the holy ghost and his grace , wherewith its first trouble and ruine was endeavoured . and hereof we have of late an instance given among our selves ; and that so notoriously known , through a mixture of imprudence and impudence in the managers of it , that a very brief reflection upon it will suffice unto our present design . it was alwaies supposed , and known to some , that there are sundry persons in this nation , who having been themselves seduced into socinianism , did make it their business under various pretences to draw others into a compliance with them in the same way and perswasion . neither hath this for sundry years been so secretly carryed , but that the design of it hath variously discovered it self by overt acts of conferences , disputations , and publishing of books ; which last way of late hath been sedulously pursued . unto these three is now a visible accession made , by that sort of people whom men will call quakers , from their deportment at the first erection of their way , long since deserted by them ; until by some new revolutions of opinions , they cast themselves under a more proper denomination . that there is a conjunction issued between both these sorts of men , in an opposition to the holy trinity , with the person and grace of christ , the pamphlets of late published by the one and the other do sufficiently evince . for however they may seem in sundry things as yet to look divers waies , yet like sampson's foxes , they are knit together by the tayle of consent in these fire-brand opinions , and joyntly endeavour to consume the standing corn of the church of god. and their joynt management of their business of late , hath been as though it were their design , to give as great a vogue and report to their opinions , as by any waies they are able . hence besides their attempts to be proclaiming their opinions under various pretences , in all assemblies whereunto they may intrude themselves , as they know without trouble , they are exceedingly sedulous in scattering and giving away , yea imposing gratis , and as to some ingratiis , their small books which they publish , upon all sorts of persons promiscuously , as they have advantage so to do . by this means their opinions being of late become the talk and discourse of the common sort of christians , and the exercise of many , amongst whom are not a few , that on sundry accounts , which i shall not mention , may possibly be exposed unto disadvantage and prejudice thereby , it hath been thought meet by some , that the sacred truths which these men oppose , should be plainly and briefly asserted and confirmed from the scripture ; that those of the meanest sort of professors , who a●e sincere and upright , exercising themselves to keep a good conscience in matters of faith and obedience to god , may have somewhat in a readiness , both to guide them in their further enquiry into the truth , as also to confirm their faith in what they have already received , when at any time it is shaken or opposed by the cunning sleights of men that lye in wait to deceive . and this comprizeth the design of the ensuing discourse . it may possibly be judged needless by some , as it was in its first proposal by him by whom it is wri●●●● , and that because this matter at present is by an especial providence cast on other hands , who both have , and doubtless , as occasion shall require , will well acquit themselves in the defence of the truths opposed . not to give any other account of the reasons of this small undertaking , it may suffice , that in publico discrimine omnis homo miles est . every mans concernment lying in a common danger , it is free for every one to manage it as he thinks best , and is able , so it be without prejudice to the whole , or the particular concerns of others . if a city be on fire , whose bucket that brings water to quench it ought to be refused ? the attempt to cast fire into the city of god , by the opinions mentioned , is open and plain , and a timely stop being to be put unto it , the more hands are orderly employed in its quenching , the more speedy and secure is the effect like to be . now , because the assertors of the opinions mentioned do seem to set out themselves to be some great ones , above the ordinary rate of men , as having found out , and being able publickly to maintain such things , as never would have entred into the minds of others to have thought on , or conceived ; and also that they seem with many to be thought worthy of their consideration because they now are new , and such as they have not been acquainted withall ; i shall in this prefatory entrance , briefly manifest that those who have amongst us undertaken the management of these opinions , have brought nothing new unto them , but either a little contemptible sophistry and caption of words on the one hand , or futulous , affected , unintelligible expressions on the other ; the opinions themselves being no other ; but such as the church of god having been opposed by , and troubled with from the beginning , hath prevailed against , and triumphed over in all generations . and were it not that confidence is the only relief which engaged impotency adheres unto , and expects supplies from , i should greatly admire that those amongst us who have undertaken an inforcement of these old exploded errours , whose weakness doth so openly discover and proclaim it self in all their endeavours , should judge themselves competent to give a new spirit of life to the dead carkass of these rotten heresies , which the faith of the saints in all ages hath triumphed over ; and which truth and learning have under the care and watchfulness of christ , so often baffled out of the world . the jews in the time of our saviours converse on the earth , being fallen greatly from the faith and worship of their forefathers , and ready to sink into their last and utmost apostacy from god , seem amongst many other truths , to have much lost that of the doctrine of the holy trinity , and of the person of the messiah . it was indeed suited in the dispensation of god , unto the work that the lord jesus had to fulfill in the world , that before his passion and resurrection , the knowledge of his divine nature as unto his individual person , should be concealed from the most of men . for this cause , although he was in the form of god , and thought it no robbery to be equal with god , yet he made himself of no reputation , by taking on him the form of a servant , and made in the likeness of men , that being found in the fashion of a man , he might be obedient unto death , phil. . , , . whereby his divine glory was veiled for a season , until he was declared to be the son of god with power , according unto the spirit of holiness , by the resurrection from the dead , rom. . . and then was glorified with that glory which he had with the father before the world was , john . . and as this dispensation was needful unto the accomplishment of the whole work which as our m●diator he had undertaken , so in particular , he who was in himself the lord of hosts , a sanctuary to them that feared him , became hereby , a stone of stumbling , and a rock of offence to both the houses of israel , for a gin and for a snare to the inhabitants of jerusalem , isa. . , . see luke . . rom. . . pet. . . isa. . . but yet notwithstanding , as occasions required , suitably unto his own holy ends and designs , he forbare not to give plain and open testimony to his own divine nature and eternal pre-existence unto his incarnation . and this was it , which of all other things most provoked the carnal jews with whom he had to do . for having , as was said , lost the doctrine of the trinity and person of the messiah in a great measure , when ever he asserted his deity , they were immediately enraged and endeavoured to destroy him . so was it plainly , john. . , , . saith he , your father abraham rejoyced to see my day , and he saw it and was glad ; then said the jews unto him , thou art n●t yet fifty years old , and hast thou seen abraham ? jesus said unto them , verily i say unto you , before abraham was i am : then took they up stones to cast at him . so also , john . , , , . i and my father are one : then the jews took up stones again to stone him ; jesus answered them , many good works have i shewed you from my father , for which of those works do you stone me ? the jews answered him saying , for a good work we stone thee not , but for blasphemy , and because that thou being a man makest thy self god. they understood well enough the meaning of those words , i and my father are one ; namely , that they were a plain assertion of his being god. this caused their rage . and this the jews all abide by to this day ; namely , that he declared himself to be god , and therefore they slew him . whereas therefore the first discovery of a plurality of persons in the divine essence consists in the revelation of the divine nature and personality of the son , this being opposed , persecuted , and blasphemed by these jews , they may be justly looked upon and esteemed as the first assertors of that misbelief , which now some seek again so earnestly to promote . the jews persecuted the lord christ , because he being a man , declared himself also to be god ; and others are ready to revile and reproach them , who believe and teach what he declared . after the resurrection and ascension of the lord jesus , all things being filled with tokens , evidences and effects of his divine nature and power , rom. . . the church that began to be gathered in his name , and according to his doctrine , being by his especial institution to be initiated into the express profession of the doctrine of the holy trinity , as being to be baptized in the name of the father , and the son , and the holy ghost , which confession comprizeth the whole of the truth contended for , and by the indispensible placing of it at the first entrance into all obedience unto him , is made the doctrinal foundation of the church , it continued for a season in the quiet and undisturbed possession of this sacred treasure . the first who gave disquietment unto the disciples of christ by perverting the doctrine of the trinity was simon magus , with his followers ; an account of whose monstrous figments , and unintelligible imaginations , with their coincidence with what some men dream in these latter daies , shall elsewhere be given . nor shall i need here to mention the colluvies of gnosticks , valentinians , marcionites and manichees , the foundation of all whose abominations lay in their mis-apprehensions of the being of god , their unbelief of the trinity and person of christ , as do those of some others also . in especial there was one cerinthus , who was more active than others in his opposition to the doctrine of the person of christ , and therein of the holy trinity . to put a stop unto his abominations , all authors agree that john writing his gospel , prefixed unto it that plain declaration of the eternal deity of christ which it is prefaced withall . and the story is well attested by irenaeus , eusebius , and others , from polycarpus who was his disciple , that this cerinthus coming into the place where the apostle was , he left it , adding as a reason of his departure , lest the building through the just judgement of god should fall upon them . and it was of the holy , wise providence of god , to suffer some impious persons to oppose this doctrine before the death of that apostle , that he might by infallible inspiration farther reveal , manifest and declare it to the establishment of the church in future ages . for what can farther be desired to satisfie the minds of men , who in any sense own the lord jesus christ , and the scriptures , than that this controversie about the trinity and person of christ ( for they stand and fall together ) should be so eminently and expresly determined , as it were immediately from heaven . but he , with whom we have to deal in this matter , neither ever did , nor ever will , nor can acquiesce or rest in the divine determination of any thing which he hath stirred up strife and controversie about . for as cerinthus and the ebionites persisted in the heresie of the jews , who would have slain our saviour for bearing witness to his own deity , notwithstanding the evidence of that testimony , and the right apprehension which the jews had of his mind therein ; so he excited others to engage and persist in their opposition to the truth , notwithstanding this second particular determination of it from heaven , for their confutation or confusion . for after the more weak and confused oppositions made unto it by theodotus coriarius , artemon , and some others , at length a stout champion appears visibly and expresly engaged against these fundamentals of our faith . this was paulus sa nosatenus bishop of the church of antioch about the year . a man of most intolerable pride , passion , and folly ; the greatest that hath left a name upon ecclesiastical records . this man openly and avowedly denyed the doctrine of the trinity , and the deity of christ in an especial manner . for although he endeavoured for a while , to cloud his impious sentiments in ambiguous expressions , as others also have done , ( euseb. lib. . cap. . ) yet being pressed by the professors of the truth , and supposing his party was somewhat confirmed , he plainly defended his heresie , and was cast out of the church wherein he presided . some sixty years after , photinus bishop of syrmium , with a pretence of more sobriety in life and conversation , undertook the management of the same design , with the same success . what ensued afterwards among the churches of god in this matter , is of too large and diffused a nature to be here reported . these instances i have fixed on , only to intimate unto persons whose condition or occasions afford them not ability or leisure of themselves , to enquire into the memorials of times past amongst the professors of the gospel of christ , that these oppositions which are made at present amongst us unto these fundamental truths , and derived immediately from the late renewed inforcement of them made by faustus socinus and his followers , are nothing but old baffled attempts of satan , against the rock of the church and the building thereon , in the confession of the son of the living god. now , as all men who have ought of a due reverence of god or his truth remaining with them , cannot but be wary how they give the least admittance to such opinions as have from the beginning been witnessed against , and condemned by christ himself , his apostles and all that followed them in their faith and waies in all generations ; so others whose hearts may tremble for the danger they apprehend which these sacred truths may be in , of being corrupted or defamed , by the present opposition against them , may know that it is no other , but what the church and faith of professors hath already been exercised with , and through the power of him that enables them have constantly triumphed over . and for my part , i look upon it as a blessed effect of the holy wise providence of god , that those who have long harboured these abominations of denying the holy trinity , the person and satisfaction of christ in their minds , but yet have sheltered themselves from common observation under the shades of dark obscure and uncouth expressions , with many other specious pretences , should be given up to joyn themselves with such persons , and to profess a community of perswasion with them in those opinions , as have rendred themselves infamous from the first foundation of christianity , and wherein they will assuredly meet with the same success as those have done , who have gone before them . for the other head of opposition made by these persons unto the truth in reference unto the satisfaction of christ , and the imputation of his righteousness thereon unto our justification , i have not much to say as to the time past . in general , the doctrine wherein they boast , being first brought forth in a rude mishapen manner by the pelagian hereticks , was afterwards improved by one abailardus a sophistical scholar in france ; but owes its principal form and poison unto the endeavours of faustus socinus , & those who have followed him in his subtle attempt to corrupt the whole doctrine of the gospel . of these m●n , are those amongst us who at this day so busily dispute and write about the trinity , the deity of christ , and his satisfaction , the followers and disciples . and it is much more from their masters who were some of them men learned , diligent , and subtle , than from themselves that they are judged to be of any great consideration . for i can truly say , that upon the sedate examination of all that i could ever yet hear , or get a sight of , either spoken or written by them , that is any amongst us ; i never yet observed an undertaking of so great importance managed with a greater evidence of incompetency and inability , to give any tolerable countenance unto it . if any of them shall for the future attempt to give any new countenance or props to their tottering errours , it will doubtless be attended unto , by some of those many , who cannot but know that it is incumbent on them , to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered unto the saints . this present brief endeavour is only to assist and direct those , who are less exercised in the waies of managing controversies in religion , that they may have a brief comprehension of the truths opposed , with the firm foundations whereon they are built , and have in a readiness to shield their faith , both against the fiery darts of satan , and secure their minds against the cunning sleights of men who lye in wait to deceive . and wherein this discourse seems in any thing to be too brief , or concise , the author is not to be blamed ; who was confined unto these strait bounds , by those whose requests injoyned him this service . the doctrine of the holy trinity explained and vindicated . the doctrine of the blessed trinity may be considered two wayes . first , in respect unto the revelation and proposal of it in the scripture , to direct us unto the author , object , and end of our faith , in our worship and obedience . secondly , as it is farther declared and explained , in terms , expressions , and propositions , educed from the original revelation of it , suited thereunto , and meet to direct and keep the mind from undue apprehensions of the things it believes ; and to declare them unto farther edification . in the first way , it consists meerly in the propositions wherein the revelation of god is expressed in the scripture ; and in this regard two things are required of us . first , to understand the terms of the propositions , as they are enunciations of truth ; and secondly , to believe the things taught , revealed , and declared in them . in the first instance , no more , i say , is required of us , but that we assent unto the assertions and testimonies of god concerning himself , according to their natural and genuine sence , as he will be known , believed in , feared and worshipped by us ; as he is our creator , lord , and rewarder ; and that because he himself hath by his revelation , not only warranted us so to do , but also made it our duty necessary and indispensible . now the sum of this revelation in this matter is , that god is one ; that this one god , is father , son and holy ghost ; that the father is the father of the son ; and the son , the son of the father ; and the holy ghost , the spirit of the father and the son ; and that in respect of this their mutual relation , they are distinct from each other . this is the substance of the doctrine of the trinity as to the first direct concernment of faith therein . the first intention of the scripture in the revelation of god towards us is , as was said , that we might fear him , believe , worship , obey him , and live unto him , as god. that we may do this in a due manner , and worship the only true god , and not adore the false imaginations of our own minds , it declares , as was said , that this god is one , the father , son , and holy ghost ; that the father is this one god , and therefore is to be believed in , worshipped , obeyed , lived unto , and in all things considered by us as the first cause , soveraign lord , and last end of all : that the son , is the one true god , and therefore is to be believed in , worshipped , obeyed , lived unto , and in all things considered by us as the first cause , soveraign lord , and last end of all . and so also of the holy ghost . this is the whole of faiths concernment in this matter , as it respects the direct revelation of god made by himself in the scripture , and the first proper general end thereof let this be clearly confirmed by direct and positive divine testimonies containing the declaration and revelation of god concerning himself , and faith is secured as to all its concerns . for it hath both its proper formal object , and is sufficiently enabled to be directive of divine worship and obedience . the explication of this doctrine unto edification suitable unto the revelation mentioned , is of another consideration . and two things are incumbent on us to take care of therein . first that what is affirmed and taught , do directly tend unto the ends of the revelation it self , by informing and inlightning of the mind in the knowledge of the mysterie of it , so far as in this life we are by divine assistance capable to comprehend it ; that is , that faith may be increased , strengthned and confirmed against temptations and oppositions of satan , and men of corrupt minds ; and that we may be distinctly directed unto , and encouraged in the obedience unto , and worship of god that are required of us . secondly , that nothing be affirmed or taught herein , that may beget , or occasion any undue apprehensions concerning god , or our obedience unto him , with respect unto the best , highest , securest revelations , that we have of him and our duty . these things being done and secured , the end of the declaration of this doctrine concerning god is attained . in the declaration then of this doctrine unto the edification of the church , there is contained a farther explanation of the things before asserted , as proposed directly , and in themselves as the object of our faith , namely , how god is one , in respect of his nature , substance , essence , godhead , or divine● being . how being father , son , and holy ghost , he subsisteth in these three distinct persons , or hypost●sies : and what are their mutual respects to each other , by which as their peculiar properties giving them the manner of their subsistence , they are distinguished one from another ; with sundry other things of the like necessary consequence unto the revelation mentioned . and herein as in the application of all other divine truths and mysteries whatever , yea , of all moral commanded duties , use is to be made of such words and expressions as it may be are not literally and formally contained in the scripture ; but only are unto our conceptions and apprehensions expository of what is so contained . and to deny the liberty , yea , the necessity hereof , is to deny all interpretation of the scripture , all endeavours to express the sense of the words of it , unto the understandings of one another ; which is in a word to render the scripture it self altogether useless . for if it be unlawful for me to speak or write what i conceive to be the sense of the words of the scripture , and the nature of the thing signified and expressed by them , it is unlawful for me also to think or conceive in my mind what is the sense of the words or nature of the things ; which to say , is to make brutes of our selves , and to frustrate the whole design of god in giving unto us the great priviledge of his word . wherefore in the declaration of the doctrine of the trinity , we may lawfully , nay we must necessarily , make use of other words , phrases and expressions that what are literally and syllabically contained in the scriptures , but teach no other things . moreover whatever is so revealed in the scripture , is no less true and divine as to whatever necessarily followeth thereon , than it is , as unto that which is principally revealed and directly expressed . for how far soever the lines be drawn and extended , from truth nothing can follow and ensue but what is true also ; and that in the same kind of truth , with that which it is derived and deduced from . for if the principal assertion be a truth of divine revelation , so is also whatever is included therein , and which may be rightly from thence collected . hence it follows , that when the scripture revealeth the father , son , and holy ghost , to be one god , seeing it necessarily and unavoidably follows thereon that they are one in essence , wherein alone it is possible they can be one ; and three in their distinct subsistences , wherein alone it is possible they can be three : this is no less of divine revelation , than the first principle from whence these things follow . these being the respects which the doctrine of the trinity falls under , the necessary method of 〈◊〉 and reason in the beheving and declar●ing of it , is plain and evident . . the revelation 〈◊〉 it is to be asserted and vindicated , as it 〈◊〉 proposed to be believed for the ends mentioned . now this is , as was declared , that there is one god , that this god , is father , son , and holy ghost , and so , that the father is god , so is the son , so is the holy ghost . this being received and admitted by faith , the explication of it is , ( . ) to be insisted on , and not taken into consideration untill the other be admitted . and herein lyes the preposterous course of those who fallaciously and captiously go about to oppose this sacred truth . they will alwayes begin their opposition , not unto the revelation of it , but unto the explanation of it which is used only for farther edification . their disputes and cavils shall be against the trinity , essence , substance , persons , personality , respects , properties of the divine persons , with the modes of expressing these things , whilst the plain scriptural revelation of the things themselves from whence they are but explanatory deductions , is not spoken to , nor admitted unto confirmation . by this means have they entangled many weak unstable souls , who when they have met with things too high , hard and difficult for them , ( which in divine mysteries they may quickly do ) in the explication of this doctrine , have suffered themselves to be taken off from a due consideration of the full and plain revelation of the thing it self in scripture ; until their temptations being made strong , and their darkness increased , it was too late for them to return unto it ; as bringing along with them the cavils wherewith they were prepossessed rather than that faith and obedience which is required . but yet all this while these explanations so excepted against , are indeed not of any original consideration in this matter . let the direct express revelations of the doctrine be firmed , they will follow of themselves , nor will be excepted against by those who believe and receive it . let that be rejected , and they will fall of themselves , and never be contended for by those who did make use of them . but of these things we shall treat again afterwards . this therefore is the way , the only way that we rationally can , and that which in duty we ought to proceed in , and by , for the asserting and confirming of the doctrine of the holy trinity under consideration ; namely , that we produce divine revelations , or testimonies , wherein faith may safely rest and acquiesce , that god is one ; that this one god , is father , son , and holy ghost ; so that the father is god ; so also is the son , and the holy ghost likewise , and as such are to be believed in , obeyed , worshipped , acknowledged as the first cause , and last end of all , our lord and reward . if this be not admitted , if somewhat of it ▪ be not particularly denyed , we need not , we have no warrant or ground , to proceed any farther , or at all to discourse about the unity of the divine essence , or the distinction of persons . we have not therefore any original contest in this matter with any , but such as deny either god to be one , or the father to be god , or the son to be god , or the holy ghost so to be . if any deny either of these in particular , we are ready to confirm it by sufficient testimonies of scripture , or clear and undeniable divine revelation . when this is evinced and vindicated , we shall , willingly proceed to manifest that the explications used of this doctrine unto the edification of the church are according to truth ; and such as necessarily are required by the nature of the things themselves . and this gives us the method of the small ensuing discourse , with the reasons of it . the first thing which we affirm to be delivered unto us by divine revelation as the object o● ou● faith is , that god is one . i know that this may be uncontroulably evidenced by the ●ight of reason it self , unto as good and quiet an assurance as the mind of man is capable of in any of its apprehensions whatever . but i speak of it now , as it is confirmed unto us by divine revelation . how this assertion , of one god , respects the nature , essence , or divine being of god , shall be declared afterwards . at present it is enough to represent the testimonies that he is one , only one . and because we have no difference with our adversaries distinctly about this matter , i shall only name some few of them , deut. . . hear o israel , the lord our god is one lord. a most pregnant testimony ; and yet notwithstanding , as i shall elsewhere manifest , the trinity it self , in that one divine essence is here asserted , isa. . , . thus saith the lord , the king of israel , and his redeemer , the lord of hosts , i am the first , and i am the last , and besides me there is no god ; is there a god besides me ? yea there is no god , i know not any ; in which also we may manifest that a plurality of persons is included and expressed . and although there be no more absolute and sacred truth than this , that god is one ; yet it may be evinced , that it is no where mentioned in the scripture , but that either in the words themselves , or the context of the place , a plurality of persons in that one sence is intimated . secondly , it is proposed as the object of our faith , that the father is god. and herein as is pretended there is also an agreement , between us , and those who oppose the doctrine of the trinity . but there is a mistake in this matter . their hypothesis as they call it , or indeed presumptuous errour , casts all the conceptions that are given us concerning god in the scripture , into disorder and confusion . for the father , as he whom we worship , is often called so , only with reference unto his son ; as the son is so , with reference to the father . he is the only begotten of the father , john . . but now , is this son had no praeexistence in his divine nature before he was born of the virgin , there was no god the father seventeen hundred years ago , because there was no son. and on this ground did the marcionites of old , plainly deny the father whom under the new testament we worship , to be the god of the old testament , who made the world and was wo●shipped from the foundation of it . for it seems to follow , that he whom we worship being the father , and on this supposition that the son had no praexistence unto his incarnation , he was not the father under the old testament , he is some other from him that was so revealed : i know the folly of that inference ; yet how on this opinion of the sole existence of the son in time , men can prove the father to be god , let others determine . he who abideth in the doctrine of christ , he hath both the father and the son , but whosoever transgresseth and abideth not in the doctrine of christ , he hath not god , john . whoever denyes christ the son , as the son , that is the eternal son of god , he loses the father also , and the true god ; he hath not god. for that god which is not the father , and which ever was , and was not the father , is not the true god. hence many of the fathers , even of the first writers of the church , were forced unto great pains in the confirmation of this truth , that the father of jesus christ was he who made the world , gave the law , spake by the prophets , and was the author of the old testament ; and that against men who professed themselves to be christians . and this bruitish apprehension of theirs , arose from no other principle but this , that the son had only a temporal existence , and was not the eternal son of god. but that i may not in this brief discourse digress unto other controversies than what lyes directly before us , and seeing the adversaries of the truth we contend for , do , in words at least , grant that the father of our lord jesus christ is the true god , or the only true god , i shall not further shew the inconsistency of their hypothesis with this confession ; but take it for granted , that to us there is one god the father , cor. . . see john . . so that he who is not the father , who was not so from eternity , whose paternity is not equally coexistent unto his deity , is no god unto us . thirdly , it is asserted and believed by the church that jesus christ is god ; the eternal son of god ; that is , he is proposed , declared and revealed unto us in the scripture , to be god , that is to be served , worshipped , believed in , obeyed as god , upon the account of his own divine excellencies . and whereas we believe and know that he was man , that he was born , lived , and dyed as a man , it is declared that he is god also ; and that as god , he did preexist in the form of god before his incarnation , which was effected by voluntary actings of his own ; which could not be without a preexistence in another nature . this is proposed unto us to be believed upon divine testimony , and by divine revelation . and the sole enquiry in this matter is , whether this be proposed in the scripture as an object of faith , and that which is indispensibly necessary for us to believe . let us then nakedly attend unto what the scripture asserts in this matter , and that in the order of the books of it in some particular instances which at present occurr to mind ; as these that follow , psalm . . thy throne o god is for ever and ever , applyed unto christ , h●b . . . but unto thy son he saith , thy throne o god is for ever and ever . psalm . , , . the chariots of god are twenty thousand , even thousands of angels , the lord is among them as in sinai in the holy place ; thou hast ascended on high , thou hast lead captivity captive , thou hast received gifts for men , yea , for the rebellious also , that the lord god may dwell among them , applyed unto the son , ephes. . . wherefore he saith , when he ascended up on high , he led captivity captive , and gave gifts unto men. now that he ascended , what is it but that be also descended first into the lower parts of the earth ; he that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens , that he might fill all things . psalm . . the lord said unto my lord , sit thou at my right hand ; applyed unto christ by himself , mat. . . psalm . , , . of old th●u hast laid the foundation of the earth and the heavens are the work of thy hands ; they shall perish but thou shalt endure , yea , all of them shall wax old like a garment , as a vesture shalt thou change them , and they shall be changed , but thou art the same , and thy years shall have no end . declared by the apostle to be meant of the son , heb. . . prov. . . to the . the lord possest me in the beginning of his wayes ; before his works of old : i was set up from everlasting , in the beginning or ever the earth was , when there were no depths , i was brought forth when there were no fountains abounding with waters , before the mountains were setled , before the hills was i brought forth ; while as yet he had not made the earth , nor the fields , nor the highest part of the dust of the world ; when he prepared the heavens i was there ; when he set a compass upon the face of the earth , when he established the clouds above ; and the fountains of the deep ; when he gave to the sea his decree that the waters should not pass his commandment ; when he appointed the foundations of the earth ; then i was by him as one brought up with him , and i was daily his delight , rejoycing alwayes before him ; rejoycing in the habitable parts of his earth , and my delights were with the sons of men. isa. . , , . i saw also the lord sitting upon a throne , high and lifted up and his train filled the temple ; above it stood the seraphims , each one had six wings , with twain he covered his face , with twain he covered his feet , and with twain he did flye : and one cryed unto another and said , holy , holy , holy is the lord of hosts , the whole earth is full of his glory . applyed unto the son , john . , . isa . , . sanctifie the lord of hosts himself , and let him be your dread ; let him be your fear , and he shall be for a sanctuary , but for a stone of stumbling , and for a rock of offence to both the houses of israel , for a gin and for a snare to the inhabitants of jerusalem , applyed unto the son , luk. . . rom. . . pet. . . isa. . . for unto us a child is born , unto us a son is given , and the government shall be upon his shoulders ; and his name shall be called wonderful , counsellor , the mighty god , the everlasting father , the prince of peace ; of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end . jer. . , . behold the day is come saith the lord that i will raise unto david a righteous branch , and this is his name whereby he shall be called , jehovah our righteousness . hos. . , , . he took his brother by the heel in the womb , and by his strength he had power with god ; yea , he had power over the angel and prevailed , he wept and made supplications unto him ; he found him in bethel , and there he spake with us , even the lord god of hosts , the lord is his memorial . zach. . , . for thus saith the lord of hosts , after the glory hath he sent me unto the nations which spoiled ye , and ye shall know that the lord of hosts hath sent me. mat. . . thou art christ the son of the living god. luk. . . the holy ghost shall come upon thee , the power of the most high shall overshaddew thee , therefore also shall that holy thing which shall be born of thee , be called the son of god. john . , , . in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god. the same was in the beginning with god ; all things were made by him ; and without him was not any thing made that was made . ver. . and we beheld his glory , the glory as of the only begotten of the father . john . . and no man hath ascended up to heaven , but he that ▪ came down from heaven , even the son of man which is in heaven . john . , , . then said the jews unto him , thou art not fifty years old , and hast thou seen abraham ? jesus saith unto them , verily , i say unto you , before abraham was , i am . john . . i and my father are one . john . . and now o father glorifie thou me with thine own self , with the glory which i had with thee before the world was . john . . and thomas answered and said unto him , my lord and my god. acts . . feed the church of god which he hath purchased with his own blood . rom . , . concerning his son jesus our lord , which was made of the ●eed of david according to the flesh , and declared to be the son of god with power , according to the spirit of holiness , by the resurrection from the dead . rom. . . of whom as concerning the flesh christ came ; who is over all , god blessed for ever . amen . rom. . , , . for we shall all stand before the judgement seat of christ ; as it is written , as i live , saith the lord , every knee shall bow to me , and every tongue shall confess to god. so then every one of us , shall give an account of himself to god. cor. . . and one lord jesus , by whom are all things , and we by him . cor. . . neither let us also tempt christ as some of them also tempted , and were destroyed of serpents ; compared with , numb . . . phil. . , . let this mind be in you which was also in christ jesus ; who being in the form of god , thought it not robbery to be equal with god. col. . , , . who is the image of the invisible god , the first born of every creature ; for by him were all things created , that are in heaven , and that are in earth , visible and invisible , whether they be thrones , or dominions , or principalities , or powers , all things were created by him and for him , and he is before all things , and by him all things consist . tim. . . without controversie great is the mysterie of godliness , god was manifested in the flesh . tit. . . looking for that blessed hope , and the glorious appearance of the great god and our saviour jesus christ , who gave himself for us . hebrewes the first throughout . chap. . . for every house is builded by some man , but he that built all things is god. pet. . . searching what , or what manner of time the spirit of christ which was in them did signifie . chap. . , . but christ also hath once suffered for sinners , being put to death in the flesh , but quickned by the spirit ; by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison which sometimes were disobedient , when once the long suffering of god waited in the dayes of noah . john . . hereby we perceive the love of god , because he laid down his life for us . chap. . . and we are in him that is true , even in his son jesus christ , this is the true god and eternal life . rev. . . i am alpha , and omega , the beginning and the ending , saith the lord , which is , and which was , and which is to come , the almighty . ver. . i am alpha and omega , the first and the last , and what thou seest , write in a book : and i turned to see the voice that spake with me ; and being turned , i saw seven golden candlesticks , and in the midst of the seven candlesticks , one like unto the son of man. ver. . and when i saw him , i fell at his feet as dead ; and he laid his right hand upon me , saying unto me , fear not , i am the first and the last . chap. . . i am he which searcheth the reins and hearts , and will give unto every one of you according to your works . these are some of the places wherein the truth under consideration is revealed and declared ; some of the divine testimonies whereby it is confirmed , and established ; which i have not at present enquired after , but suddenly repeated as they came to mind . many more of the like nuture and importance may be added unto them ; and shall be so as occasion doth require . let now any one who owns the scripture to be the word of god , to contain an infallible revelation of the things proposed in it to be believed , and who hath any conscience exercised towards god for the receiving and submitting unto what he declares and reveals , take a view of these testimonies , and consider whether they do not sufficiently propose this object of our faith . shall a few poor trifling sophisms , whose terms are scarcely understood , by the most that amongst us make use of them , according as they have found them framed by others , be thought meet to be set up in opposition unto these multiplyed testimonies of the holy ghost , and to cast the truth confirmed by them down from its credit and reputation in the consciences of men . for my part , i do not see in any thing , but that the testimonies given to the godhead of christ , the eternal son of god , are every way as clear and unquestionable , as those are , which testifie to the being of god , or that there is any god at all . were men acquainted with the scriptures as they ought to be , and as the most , considering the means and advantages they have had , might have been , did they ponder and believe on what they 〈◊〉 , or had any tenderness in their consciences as to that reverence , obedience , and subjection of soul , which god requires unto his word , it were utterly impossible that their faith in this matter should ever in the least be shaken , by a few lewd sophisms , or loud clamours of men destitute of the truth , and of the spirit of it . that we may now improve these testimonies unto the end under design , as the nature of this brief discourse will bear , i shall first remove the general answers which the socinians give unto them ; and then manifest farther , how incontrolable they are , by giving an instance in the frivolous exceptions of the same persons to one of them in particular . and we are ready , god assisting , to maintain , that there is not any one of them , which doth not give a sufficient ground for faith to rest on in this matter concerning the deity of christ ; and that against all the socinians in the world . they say therefore commonly , that we prove not by these testimonies what is by them denyed . for they acknowledge christ to be god , and that because he is exalted unto that glory and authority that all creatures are put into subjection unto him ; and all both men and angels are commanded to worship and adore him . so that he is god by office , though he be not god by nature . he is god , but he is not the most high god. and this last expression they have almost continually in their mouths . he is not the most high god. and commonly with great contempt and scorn they are ready to reproach them who have solidly confirmed the doctrine of the deity of christ , as ignorant of the state of controversie , in that they have not proved him to be the most high god , in subordination unto whom , they acknowledge christ to be god , and that he ought to be worshipped with divine and religious worship . but there cannot be any thing more empty and vain than these pretences . and besides they accumulate in them , their former errors , with the addition of new ones . for , first , the name of the most high god , is first ascribed unto god in gen. . , , . denoting his soveraignty and dominion . now , as other attributes of god , it is not distinctive of the subject , but only desscriptive of it . so are all other excellencies of the nature of god. it doth not intimate that there are other gods , only he is the most high , or one over them all , but only that the true god , is most high , that is indued with soveraign power , dominion and authority over all . to say then , that christ indeed is god , but not the most high god , is all one as to say he is god , but not the most holy god , or not the true god. and so they have brought their christ into the number of false gods , whilst they deny the true christ who in his divine nature , is over all god blessed for ever , rom. . . a phrase of speech , perfectly expressing this attribute , of the most high god. secondly , this answer is suited only unto those testimonies which express the name of god with a corre●ponding power and authority unto that name . for in reference unto these alone can it be pleaded with any pretence of reason , that he is a god by office ; though that also be done very futilously and impertinently . but most of the testimonies produc●d , speak directly unto his divine excel●encies , and properties , which belong unto his nature necessarily and absolutely . that he is eternal , omnipotent , immense , omniscient , infinitely wise , and that he is , and worketh and produceth effects suitable unto all these properties , and such as nothing but they can enable him for , is abundantly proved by the foregoing testimonies . now all these concern a divine nature , a natural essence , a godhead , and not such power or authority as a man may be exalted unto . yea , the ascribing any of them to such a one , implyes the highest contradiction expressible . thirdly , this god in authority and office , and not by nature , that should be the object of divine worship , is a new abomination . for they are divine , essential excellencies that are the formal reason and object of worship religious and divine . and to ascribe it unto any one , that is not god by nature , is idolatry . by makeing therefore their christ such a god as they describe , they bring him under the severe commination of the true god , jer. . . the gods that have not made the heavens and the earth , even they shall perish from the earth , and from under these heavens . that christ they worship , they say is a god ; but they deny that he is that god that made the heavens and the earth : and so leave him exposed to the threatnings of him , who will accomplish it to the uttermost . some other general exceptions sometimes they make use of , which the reader may free himself from the entanglement of , if he do but heed these ensuing rules . x. distinction of persons , ( of which afterwards ) it being in an infinite substance , doth no way prove a difference of essence between the father and the son. where there fore christ as the son , is said to be another from the father , or god , spoken personally of the father , it argues not in the least that he is not partaker of the same nature with him . that in one essence , there can be but one person , may be true where the substance is finite and lim●ted , but hath no place in that which is infinite . . distinction and inequality in respect of office in christ , doth not in the least take away his equality and sameness with the father , in respect of nature and essence , phil. . , . a son , of the same nature with his father , and therein equal to him , may in office be his inferiour , his subject . thirdly , the advancement and exaltation of christ as mediator to any dignity whatever , upon , or in reference to the work of our redemption and salvation , is not at all inconsistent with the essential honour , dignity , and worth which he hath in himself as god blessed for ever . though he humbled himself and was exalted in office , yet in nature he was one and the same , he changed not . fourthly , the scriptures asserting the humanity of christ with the concerments thereof , as his birth , life , and death , do no more thereby deny his deity , than by asserting his deity with the essential properties thereof , they deny his humanity . fifthly , god working in and by christ as he was mediator , denotes the fathers soveraign appointment of the things mentioned to be done , not his immediate efficiency in the doing of the things themselves . these rules are proposed a little before their due place in the method which we pursue . but i thought meet to interpose them here , as containing a sufficient ground for the resolution and answering of all the sophisms and objections which the adversaries use in this cause . from the cloud of witnesses before produced , every one where of is singly sufficient to evert the socinian infidelity ; i shall in one of them give an infiance both of the clearness of the evidence , and the weakness of the exceptions which are wont to put in against them as was promised . and this is , john . , , . in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god , the same was in the beginning with god. all things were made by him , and without him was not any thing made that was made . by the word , here , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , on what account soever he be so called , either as being the eternal word and wisdom of the father , or as the great revealer of the will of god unto us , jesus christ the son of god is intended . this is on all hands acknowledged , and the context will admit of no haesitation about it . for of this word , it is said , that he came into the world , v. . was rejected by his own , v. . was made flesh and dwelt amongst us whose glory was the glory of the only begotten son of the father , v. . called expresly jesus christ , v. . the only begotten son of the father , v. . the subject then treated of is here agreed upon . and it is no less evident that it is the design of the apostle to declare both who , and what he was of whom he treateth . here then , if any where , we may learn what we are to believe concerning the person of christ ; which also we may certainly do , if our minds are not perverted through prejudice , whereby the god of this world doth blind the minds of them which believe not , lest the light of the glorious gospel of christ who is the image of god , should shine unto them , cor. . . of this word then , this son of god it is affirmed that he was in the beginning . and this word if it doth not absolutely and formally express eternity , yet it doth a preexistence unto the whole creation which amounts to the same . for nothing can preexist unto all creatures but in the nature of god which is eternal ; unless we shall suppose a creature before the creation of any . but what is meant by this expression , the scripture doth elsewhere declare . prov. . . i was set up from everlasting before the beginning , or ever the earth was , john . . glorifie thou me with thine own self , with the glory which i had with thee before the world was . both which places as they explain this phrase , so also do they undeniably testifie unto the eternal pre-existence of christ the son of god. and in this case we prevail against our adversaries , if we prove any pre-existence of christ unto his incarnation , which as they absolutely deny , so to grant it , would overthrow their whole heresie in this matter . and therefore they know that the testimony of our saviour concerning himself , if understood in a proper intelligible sense , is perfectly destructive of their pretensions . john . . before abraham was , i am . for although there be no proper sense in the words but a gross ●quivocation , if the existence of christ before abraham was born be not asserted in them , seeing he spake in answer to that objection of the jews , that he was n●t yet fifty years old , and so could not have seen abraham , nor abraham him ; and the jews that were present understood well enough that he asserted a divine preexistence unto his being born so long ago , as that hereon , after their manner , they took up stones to stone him , as supposing him to have blasphemed in asserting his deity as others now do in the denying of it ; yet they seeing how fatal this prae-existence , though not here absolutely asserted to be eternal , would be to their cause , they contend that the meaning of the words , is , that christ was to be the light of the world before abraham was made the father of many nations . an interpretation so absurd and sottish , as never any man not infatuated by the god of this world could once admit and give countenance unto . but in the beginning , as absolutely used , is the same with from everlasting , as it is expounded , prov. . . and denoteth an eternal existence , which is here affirmed of the word the son of god. but let the word beginning , be restrained unto the subject matter treated of which is the creation of all things , and the praeexistence of christ in his divine nature unto the creation of all things is plainly revealed and inevitably asserted . and indeed , not only the word , but the discourse of these verses , doth plainly relate unto , and is expository of the first verse in the bible , gen. . . in the beginning god created heaven and earth . there it is asserted that in the beginning god created all things , here , that the word was in the beginning and made all things . this then is the least that we have obtained from this first word of our testimony ; namely , that the word or son of god had a personal praeexistence unto the whole creation . in what nature this must be , let these men of reason satisfie themselves , who know that creator and creatures , take up the whole nature of beings ; one of them he must be ; and it may be well supposed that he was not a creature before the creation of any . but , secondly , where , or with whom , was this word in the beginning ? it was saith the holy ghost , with god. there being no creature then existing , he could be no where but with god ; that is , the father as it is expressed in one of the testimonies before going , prov. . . the lord possest me in the beginning of his wayes before his works of old ; ver . . then was i by him as one brought up with him , and i was daily his delight , rejoycing alwayes before him ; that is , in the beginning , this word or wisdom of god was with god. and this is the same , which our lord jesus asserts concerning himself , john . . and no man , saith he , hath ascended up to heaven , but he that came down from heaven , even the son of man which is in heaven . and so in other places . he affirms his being in heaven , that is , with god , at the same time when he was in the earth ; whereby he declares the immensity of his nature , and the distinction of his person ; and his coming down from heaven before he was incarnate on the earth , declaring his preexistence ; by both manifesting the meaning of this expression , that in the beginning he was with god. but hereunto they have invented a notable evasion . for although they know not well what to make of the last clause of the words , that say , then he was in heaven when he spake on earth ; the son of man which is in heaven , answerable to the description of gods immensity , do not i fill heaven and earth saith the lord , jer. . . but say , that he was there , by heavenly meditation as another man may be ; yet they give a very clear answer to what must of necess●●y be included in his descending from heaven , namely his preexistence to his incarnation . for they tell us , that before his publick ministry , he was in his humane nature , ( which is all they allow unto him ) taken up into heaven , and there taught the gospel ; as the great impostor mahomet pretended he was taught his alcoran ; if you ask them , who told them so , they cannot tell ; but th●y can tell when it was ; namely , when he was led by the spirit into the wilderness for forty days after his baptism . but yet this instance is subject to another her misadventure ; in that one of the e●angelists plainly affirms that he was those forty dayes in the wilderness with the wild beasts , mark . . and so surely not in heaven in the same nature by his bodily presence with god and his holy angels . and let me add this by the way that the interpretation of this place , joh. . . to be mentioned after wards ; and those of the two places before mentioned , john . . chap. . . faustus socin●s learned out of his uncle laelius papers as he confesseth , and doth more than intimate that he believed he had them as it were by revelation ; and it may be so ; they are indeed so forced , absurd , and irrational , that no man could ever fix upon them by any reasonable investigation . but the author of this revelation , if we may judge of the parent by the child , could be no other but the spirit of error and darkness . i suppose therefore that notwithstanding these exceptions , christians will believe , that in the beginning the word was with god ; that is , that the son was with the father , as is frequently elsewhere declared . but who was this word ? saith the apostle , he was god. he was so with god , that is the father , as that he himself was god also . god , in that the notion of god , which both nature , and the scripture doth represent . not a god by office , one exalted to that dignity , ( which cannot well be pretended before the creation of the world ) but as thomas confessed him , our lord and our god , john . . or as paul expresses it ; over all god blessed for ever ; or the most high god , which these men love to deny . let not the infidelity of men excited by the craft and malice of satan s●ek for blind occasions , and this matter is determined ; if the word and testimony of god be able to umpire a difference amongst the children of men . here is the sum of our creed in this matter ; in the beginning the word was god ; and so continues unto eternity ; being alpha and om●ga , the first and the last , the lord god almighty . and to shew that he was so god in the beginning , as that he was distinct , one , in some thing from god the father , by whom afterwards he was sent into the world , he adds , ver . . the same was in the beginning with god. father also to evince what he hath asserted , and revealed for us to believe , the holy ghost adds , both as a firm declaration of his eternal deity ; and also his immediate care of the world ( which how he variously exercised both in a way of providence , and grace , he afterwards declares ) verse . all things were made by him . he was so in the beginning , before all things , as that he made them all . and that it may not be supposed , that the all that he is said to make , or create , was to be limited unto any certain sort of things , he adds , that without him nothing was made that was made ; which gives the first assertion an absolute universality as to its subject . and this he farther describes , v. . he was in the world , and the world was made by him . the world that was made , hath an usual distribution in the scripture , into the heavens and the earth , and all things contained in them ; as acts . . lord thou art god which hast made heaven and earth and the sea , and all that in them is ; that is the world , the making whereof is expresly assigned unto the son , heb. . . thou lord in the beginning , hast laid the foundation of the earth , and the heavens are the works of thine hands . and the apostle paul to secure our understandings in this matter , instanceth in the most noble parts of the creation , and which if any might seem to be excepted from being made by him , col. . . for by him were all things created that are in heaven , and that are in earth visible and invisible , whether they be thrones , or dominions , or principalities , or powers , all things were created by him and for him . the socinians say indeed , that he made angels to be thrones and principalities ; that is , he gave them their order , but not their being ; which is expresly contrary to the words of the text ; so that a man knows not well what to say to these persons , who at their pleasure cast off the authority of god in his word : by him were all things created , that are in heaven , and that are in earth . what now can be required to secure our faith in this matter ? in what words possible , could a divine revelation of the eternal power and godhead of the son of god , be made more plain and clear unto the sons of men ? or how could the truth of any thing more evidently be represented unto their minds ? if we understand not the mind of god , and intention of the holy ghost in this matter , we may utterly despair ever to come to an acquaintance with any thing that god reveals unto us ; or indeed with any thing else that is expressed , or is to be expressed by words . it is directly said that the word , that is christ , as is acknowledged by all , was with god ; distinct from him , and was god , one with him ; that he was so in the begining , before the creation ; that he made all things , the world , all things in heaven and in earth ; and if he be not god , who is ? the summ is , all the waies whereby we may know god , are his name , his properties , and his works . but they are all here ascribed by the holy ghost to the son , to the word ; and he therefore is god , or we know neither who , nor what god is . but say the socinians , these things are quite otherwise , and the words have another sense in them than you imagine . what is it i pray ? we bring none to them , we impose no sense upon them ; we strain not any word in them , from , besides , or beyond its native , genuine signification , its constant application in the scripture , and common use amongst men . what then is this latent sense that is intended , and is discoverable only by themselves ? let us hear them coyning and 〈◊〉 this sense of theirs . first , they say that by in the begining , is not meant of the beginning of all things , or the creation of them ; but the beginning of the preaching of the gospel . but why so i pray ? where ever these words are else used in the scripture , they denote the beginning of all things , or eternity absolutely , or an existence preceding their creation . in the beginning god created heaven and earth , gen. . . i was set up from everlasting from the begining ere ever the earth was , prov. . . thou lord in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth , heb. . . and besides , these words are never used absolutely any where for the beginning of the gospel . there is mention made indeed of the beginning of the gospel of jesus christ , mark . . which is referred to the preaching of john baptist. but in the beginning absolutely , is never so used or applied . and they must meet with men of no small inclination unto them , who will upon their desire in a matter of so great importance , forego the sense of words , which is natural and proper , fixed by its constant use in the scripture , when applyed in the same kind ; for that which is forced , and strained , and not once exemplified in the whole book of god. but the words they say are to be restrained to the subject matter treated of . well , what is that subject matter ? the new creation by the preaching of the gospel . but this is plainly false ; nor will the words allow any such sense ; nor the context : nor is any thing offered to give evidence unto this corrupt perverting of the words , unless it be a farther perverting of other testimonies , no less clear than this . for what is according to this interpretation the meaning of those words , in the beginning was the word ? that is , when john baptist preached , and said , this is the lamb of god , which was signally the beginning of the gospel , then he was . that is , he was when he was , no doubt of it . and is not this a notable way of interpreting of scripture , which these great pretenders to a dictatorship in reason , indeed hucksters in sophistry , do make use of ? but to go on with them in this supposition ; how was he then with god , the word was with god. that is , say they , he was then known only to god , before john baptist preached him in the begining . but what shall compell us to admit of this uncouth sense and exposition . he was with god , that is , he was known to god alone . what is their singular herein , concerning how many things may the same be affirmed ? besides , it is absolutely false . he was known to the angel gabriel who came to his mother with the message of his incarnation , luke . . he was known to the two angels which appeared to the shepherds upon his birth , luke . to all the heavenly host assembled to give praise and glory to god on the account of his nativity , as those who came to worship him , and to pay him the homage due unto him , luke . , , . he was known to his mother , the blessed virgin ; and to joseph ; and zachariah ; and to elizabeth ; to simeon and anna , to john baptist ; and probably to many more to whom simeon and anna spake of him , luke . . so that the sense pretended to be wrung out and extorted from these words , against their proper meaning and intendment , is indeed false and frivolous , and belongs not at all unto them . but let this pass . what shall we say to the next words , and the word was god. give us leave without disturbance from you , but to believe this expression which comprizeth a revelation of god proposed to us on purpose that we should believe it , and there will be , as was said , an end of this difference and debate . yea , but say they , these words have another sense also . strange i they seem to be so plain and positive , that it is impossible any other sense should be fixed on them , but only this , that the word was in the beginning , and was god , and therefore is so still , unless he who is once god can cease so to be . but the meaning is ; that afterwards , god exalted him and made him god , as to rule , authority and power . this making of him god , is an expression very offensive to the ears of all sober christians , and was therefore before exploded . and these things here , as all other figments , hang together like a rope of sands . in the beginning of the gospel he was god , before any knew him but only god. that is , after he had preached the gospel , and dyed , and rose again , and was exalted at the right hand of god , he was made god , and that not properly , which is absolutely impossible , but in an improper sense . how prove they then this perverse non-sense to be the sense of these plain words . they say it must needs be so . let them believe them who are willing to perish with them . thus far then we have their sense ; in the beginning , that is , about sixteen or seventeen hundred years ago ; the word , that is , the humane nature of christ before it was made flesh , which it was in its being ; was with god ; that is , known to god alone ; and in the beginning , that is afterwards , not in the beginning , was made god ; which is the summ of their exposition of this place . but what shall we say , to what is affirmed concerning his making of all things , so as that without him , that is , without his making of it , nothing was made that was made ; especially seeing that these all things are expresly said to be the world , vers . . and all things therein contained , even in heaven and earth , col. . . an ordinary man would think that they should now be taken hold of , and that there is no way of escape left unto them . but they have it in a readiness . by the all things here are intended all things of the gospel , the preaching of it , the sending of the apostles to preach it , and to declare the will of god ; and by the world , is intended the world to come , or the new state of things under the gospel . this is the substance of what is pleaded by the greatest masters amongst them in this matter , and they are not ashamed thus to plead . and the reader in this instance may easily discern what a desperate cause they are engaged in , and how bold and desperate they are in the management of it . for , first , the words are a plain illustration of the divine nature of the word , by his divine power and works , as the very series of them declares . he was god , and he made all things ; for he that made all things is god , heb. . . secondly , there is no one word spoken concerning the gospel , nor the preaching of it , nor any effects of that preaching , which the apostle expresly insists upon and declares afterwards , verse . and so onwards . thirdly , the making of all things here ascribed unto the word , was done in the beginning . but that making of all things which they intend , in erecting the church by the preaching of the vvord , was not done in the beginning , but afterwards ; most of it as themselves confess , after the ascension of christ into heaven . fourthly , in this gloss what is the meaning of all things ? only some things say the socinians . vvhat is the meaning of were made ? that is , were mended ? by him that is the apostles principally preaching the gospel ; and this in the beginning ; after it was past ; for so they say expresly that the principal things here intended , were effected by the apostles afterwards . i think since the beginning , place it when you will the beginning of the world , or the beginning of the gospel , there was never such an exposition of the word ; of god or man contended for . fifthly , it is said he made the world , and he came into it ; namely , the world which he made and the world , or the inhabitants of it , knew him not . but the vvorld they intend did know him ; or the church knew him , and acknowledged him to be the son of god. for that was the foundation that it was built upon . i have instanced directly in this only testimony to give the reader a pledge of the full confirmation which may be given unto this great fundamental truth , by a due improvement of those other testimonies , or distinct revelations which speak no less expresly to the same purpose . and of them there is not any one , but we are ready to vindicate it , if called thereunto , from the exceptions of these men ; which how bold and sophistical they are , we may in these now considered , also learn and know . it appeareth then that there is a full sufficient revelation made in the scripture of the eternal deity of the son of god ; and that he is so , as is the father also . more particular testimonies i shall not at present insist upon , referring the full discussion and vindication of these truths , to another season . we are therefore in the next place to manifest that the same , or the like testimony , is given unto the deity of the holy spirit ; that is , that he is revealed and declared in the scripture , as the object of our faith , worship , and obedience on the account , and for the r●ason of those divine excelleneies which are the sole reason of our yielding religious worship unto any , or expecting from any the reward that is promised unto us , or to be brought by them to the end for which we are . and herein , lyes as was shewed , the concernment of faith . when that knows what it is to believe as on divine revelation , and is enabled thereby to regulate the soul in its present obedience and future expectation , seeing it is its ▪ nature to work by love and hope , there it rests . now this is done to the utmost satisfaction in the revelation that is made of the divine existence , divine excellencies , and divine operations of the spirit as shall be briefly manifested . but before we proceed , we may in our way observe a great congruency of success in those who have denyed the deity of the son , and those who have denyed that of the holy spirit . for as to the son , after some men began once to dis-believe the revelation concerning him , and would not acknowledge him to be god and man in one person , they could never settle nor agree , either what , or who he was , or who was his father , or why he was the son. some said he was a phantasm or appearance ; and that he had no real subsistence in this world , and that all that was done by him was an appearance , he himself being they know not what elsewhere . that proud beast paulus sam●satenus , whose flagitious life , contended for a preheminence in wickedness with his prodigious heresies , was one of the first after the jews , that positively contended for his being a man and no more , who was followed by photinus and some others . the arians perceiving the folly of this opinion , with the odium of it amongst all that bare the name of christians , and that they had as good deny the whole scripture as not grant unto him a preexistence in a divine nature antecedent to his incarnation , they framed a new deity which god should make before the world , in all things like to himself , but not the same with him in essence and substance ; but to be so like him , that by the writings of some of them , ye can scarce know one from the other ; and that this was the son of god also who was afterwards incarnate . others in the mean time had more monstrous imaginations ; some that he was an angel , some that he was the sun , some that he was the soul of the world , some the light within men . departing from their proper rest , so have they hovered about , and so have they continued to do , until this day . in the same manner it is come to pass with them who have denyed the deity of the holy ghost . they could never find where to stand or abide ; but one hath cryed up one thing , another another . at first they observed that such things were every where ascribed unto him in the scripture , as uncontroulably evidenced him to be an intelligent voluntary agent . this they found so plain and evident , that they could not deny , but that he was a person or an intelligent subsistence . wherefore seeing they were resolved not to assent unto the revelation of his being god , they made him a created spirit , chief and above all others . but still whatever else he were , he was only a creature . and this course some of late also have steered . the socinians on the other hand , observing that such things are assigned and ascribed unto him , as that if they acknowledge him to be a person , or a substance , they must upon necessity admit him to be god , though they seemed not at first at all agreed what to think or say concerning him positively , yet they all coneurred peremptorily in denying his personality . hereon , some of them said he was the gospel , which others of them have confuted ; some that he was christ. neither could they agree whether there was one holy ghost or more ; whether the spirit of god and the good spirit of god , and the holy spirit , be the same or no. in general now they conclude that he is vis dei , or virtus dei , or efficacia dei ; no substance , but a quality that may be considered either as being in god , and then they say it is the spirit of god ; or as sanctifying , and conforming men unto god , and then they say , it is the holy ghost . whether these things do answer the revelation made in the scripture concerning the eternal spirit of god , will be immediately manifested . our quakers , who have for a long season hovered up and down like a swarm of flies with a confused noise and humming , begin now to settle in the opinions lately by them declared for . but what their thoughts will fall into be , concerning the holy ghost , when they shall be contented to speak intelligibly , and according to the usage of other men , or the pattern of scripture , the great rule of speaking or treating about spiritual things , i know not ; and am uncertain whether they do so themselves or no. whether he may be the light within them , or an infallible afflatus is uncertain . in the mean time , what is revealed unto us in the scripture to be believed concerning the holy ghost , his deity , and personality , may be seen in the ensuing testimonies . the summ of this revelation is , that the holy spirit is an eternally divine existing substance , the author of divine operations , and the object of divine and religious worship ; that is , over all god blessed for ever ; as the ensuing testimonies evince . gen . . the spirit of god moved upon the face of the waters . psalm . . by the word of the lord were the heavens made , and all the host of them by the spirit of his mouth . job . . by his spirit he hath garnished the heavens . job . . the spirit of god hath made me . psalm . . thou sendest forth thy spirit ; they are created . mat. . . baptizing them in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost . acts . . that scripture must needs have been fulfilled which the holy ghost by the mouth of david spake . acts . . peter said to ananias , why hath satan filled thy heart to lye to the holy ghost ? vers. . thou hast not lyed unto men but unto god. acts . , . well spake the holy ghost by esaias the prophet unto our fathers , saying , go unto this people and say — cor. . . know ye not that ye are the temple of god , and that the spirit of god dwelleth in you . cor. . . all these worketh that one and self-same spirit , dividing to every man as he will , . . and there are deversities of operations , but it is the same god which worketh all in all . cor. . . the grace of the lord jesus christ , and the love of god , and the communion of the holy ghost be with you all . acts . . take heed to the flock over which the holy ghost hath made you overseers . matth. . . all manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men , but the blasphemy against the holy ghost shall not be forgiven unto men . psal. . . whither shall i go from thy spirit ? john . . but the comforte● which is the holy ghost , whom the father will send in my name , he shall teach you all things . luke . . the holy ghost shall teach you in the same hour what you ought to say . acts . . and as they ministred to the lord and fasted ; the holy ghost said , separate me barnabas and saul for the work whereunto i have called them . vers. . so they being sent forth by the holy ghost , departed into , &c. pet. . . for the prophecy came not in old time by the will of men , but holy men of god spake as they were moved by the holy ghost . it is evident upon the first consideration , that there is not any thing which we believe concerning the holy ghost , but that it is plainly revealed and declared in these testimonies . he is directly affirmed to be , and is called god , acts . , . which the socinians will not say is by vertue of an exaltation unto an office or authority , as they say of the son ; that he is an intelligent voluntary divine agent ; he knoweth , he worketh as he will , which things if in their frequent repetition , they are not sufficient to evince an intelligent agent , a personal subsistence , that hath being , life and will , we must confess that the scripture was written on purpose to lead us into mistakes and misapprehensions of what we are under penalty of eternal ruine rightly to apprehend and believe . it declareth also , that he is the author and worker of all sorts of divine operations requiring immensity , omnipotency , omnisciency , and all other divine excellencies unto their working and effecting . moreover , it is revealed , that he is peculiarly to be believed in ; and may peculiarly be sinned against ; the great author of all grace in believers , and order in the church . this is the summ of what we believe of what is revealed in the scripture concerning the holy ghost . as in the consideration of the preceding head , we vindicated one testimony in particular from the exceptions of the adversaries of the truth , so on this we may briefly summ up the evidence that is given us in the testimonies before produced , that the reader may the more easily understand their intendment , and what in particular , they bear witnesse unto . the summ is , that the holy ghost is a divine distinct person , and neither meerly the power or vertue of god , nor any created spirit whatever . this plainly appears from what is revealed concerning him . for he who is placed in the same series or order with other divine persons , without the least note of difference or distinction from them , as to an interest in personality , who hath the names proper to a divine person only , and is frequently and directly called by them , who also hath personal properties , and is the voluntary author of personal divine operations , and the proper obj●ct of divine worship , he is a distinct divine person . and if these things be not a sufficient evidence and demonstration of a divine intelligent substance , i shall , as was said before , despair to understand any thing that is expressed and declared by words . but now thus it is with the holy ghost according to the revelation made concerning him in the scripture . for , first , he is placed in the same rank and order without any note of difference or distinction as to a distinct interest in the divine nature , that is , as we shall see , personality , with other divine persons , matth. . . baptizing them in the name of the father , and the son , and of the holy ghost , john . . there be three that bear witness in heaven , the father , the son , and the spirit , and these three are one , cor. . , , , . no man can say the lord jesus christ is the lord , but by the holy ghost ; now there are diversities of gifts , but the same spirit , and there are differences of administrations , but the same lord ; and there are diversities of operations , but it is the same god which worketh all in all . neither doth a denyal of his divine being and distinct existence leave any tolerable sense unto these expressions . for read the words of the first place from the mind of the socinians , and see what is it can be gathered from them . baptizing them , in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the vertue or efficacy of the father . can any thing be more absonant from faith and reason , than this absurd expression ? and yet is it the direct sense , if it be any , that these men put upon the words . to joyn a quality with acknowledged persons , and that in such things and cases , as wherein they are proposed under a personal consideration , is a strange kind of mysterie . and the like may be manifested concerning the other places . secondly , he also hath the names proper to a divine person only . for he is expresly called god , acts . he who is termed the holy ghost , ver . . and the spirit of the lord , verse . is called also god , ver . . now this is the name of a divine person on one account or other . the socinians would not allow christ to be called god , were he not a divine person , though not by nature , yet by ●ffice and authority . and i suppose , they will not find out an office for the holy ghost whereunto he might be exalted on the account whereof he might become god , seeing this would acknowledge him to be a person which they deny . so he is called the comforter , john . . a personal appellation this is also ; and because he is the comforter of all gods people , it can be the name of none but a divine person . in the 〈…〉 it is frequently 〈…〉 come , that he shall , and will do such and such things , all of them declaring him to be a person . thirdly , he hath personal properties assigned unto him , as a will , cor. . . he divideth to every man severally as he will ; and understanding , cor. . . the spirit searcheth all things , yea , the deep things of god. as also all the actings that are ascribed unto him are all of them such , as undeniably affirm personal properties in their principle and agent . for , fourthly , he is the voluntary author of divine operations . he of old cherished the creation , gen. . . the spirit of god moved upon the face of the waters . he formed and garnished the heavens . he inspired , acted and spake , in and by the prophets , acts . , . well spake the holy ghost by isaiah the prophet unto our fathers , pet. . . the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man , but holy men of god spake as they were moved by the holy ghost . he regenerateth , enlightneth , sanctifieth , comforteth , instructeth , leadeth , guideth , all the disciples of christ , as the scriptures every where testifie . now all these are personal operations , and cannot with any pretence of sobriety or consistency with reason be constantly and uniformly assigned unto a quality or vertue . he is , as the father and son , god with the properties of omniscience and omnipotency , of life , understanding and will ; and by these properties , works , acts , and produceth effects according to wisdom , choice , and power . fifthly , the same regard is had to him in faith , worship , and obedience , as unto the other persons of the father and son. for our being baptized into his name , is our solemn engagement to believe in him , to yield obedience to him , and to worship him , as it puts the same obligation upon us to the father and the son. so also in reference unto the worship of the church . he commands that the ministers of it be separated unto himself , acts . . the holy ghost said , separate me barnabas and saul for the work whereunto i have called them . ver. . so they being sent forth by the holy ghost departed , which is comprehensive of all the religious worship of the church . and on the same account is he sinned against , as acts . , , . for there is the same reason of sin and obedience . against whom a man may sin formally and ultimately , him he is bound to obey , worship , and believe in . and this can be no quality , but god himself . for what may be the sense of this expression : thou hast lyed to the efficacy of god in his operations ; or how can we be formally obliged unto obedience to a quality . there must then an antecedent obligation unto faith , trust , and religious obedience be supposed as the ground of rendring a person capable of being guilty of sin towards wards any . for sin is but a ●ailure in faith , obedience or worship . these therefore are due unto the holy ghost ; or a man could not sin against him so signally and fatally as some are said to do , in the foregoing testimonies . i say therefore unto this part of our cause , as unto the other , that unless we will cast off all reverence of god , and in a king of atheism , which as i suppose the prevailing wickedness of this age hath not yet arrived unto , say that the scriptures were written on purpose to deceive us , and to lead us into mistakes about , and misapprehensions of what it proposeth unto us , we must acknowledge the holy ghost to be a substance , a person , god ; yet distinct from the father and the son. for to tell us , that he will come unto us , that he will be our comforter , that he will teach us , lead us , guide us , that he spake of old , in and by the prophets , that they were moved by him , acted by him , that he searcheth the deep things of god , works as he will , that he appointeth to himself ministers in the church ; in a word , to declare in places innumerable , what he hath done , what he doth , what he will do , what he sayes , and speaks , how he acts , and proceeds , what his will is , and to warn us , that we grieve him not , sin not against him , with things innumerable of the like nature , and all this while to oblige us to believe that he is not a person , an helper , a comforter , a searcher , a willer , but a quality in some especial operations of god , or his power and vertue in them , were to distract men , not to instruct them , and leave them no certain conclusion but this , that there is nothing certain in the whole book of god. and of no other tendency are these and the like imaginations of our adversaries in this matter . but let us briefly consider what is objected in general unto the truth we have confirmed . first , they say , the holy spirit is said to be given , to be sent , to be bestowed on men , and to be promised unto them ; and therefore it cannot be that he should be god ; for how can any of these things be spoken of god. i answer , as these expressions do not prove him to be god , nor did ever any produce them to that purpose , yet they undeniably prove him to be a person ; or an intellingent voluntary agent , concerning whom they are spoken and affirmed . for how can the power of god , or a quality as they speak , be said to be sent , to be given , to be bestowed on men ; so that these very expressions are destructive to their imaginations . secondly , he who is god equal in nature and being with the father , may be promised , sent , and given , with respect unto the holy dispensation and condescension wherein he hath undertaken the office of being our comforter and sanctifier . thirdly , the communications , distributions , impartings , divisions of the spirit , which they mention , as they respect the object of them , or those on whom they were , or are bestowed , denote only works , gifts , operations and effects of the spirit , the rule whereof is expressed , cor. . . he workeeth them in whom he will , and as he will. and whether these , and the like exceptions , taken from actings and operations , which are plainly interpreted and explained in sundry places of scripture , and evidently enough in the particular places where they are used , are sufficient to impeach the truth of the revelation before declared , all who have a due reverence of god , his word and truths , will easily understand and discern . these things being declared in the scripture concerning the father , the son , and the holy ghost , it is moreover revealed , and these three are one ; that is , one god , joyntly to be worshipped , feared , adored , believed in and obeyed , in order unto eternal life . for although this doth absolutely and necessarily follow from what is declared and hath been spoken concerning the one god , or onenes● of the derty , yet for the confirmation of our faith , and that we may not by the distinct consideration of the three be taken off from the one , it is particularly declared , that these three are one , that one , the one and same god , but whereas , as was said before , this can no otherwise be , the testimonies given thereunto are not so frequently multiplyed as they are unto those other heads of this truth , which through the craft of satan , and the pride of men , might be more lyable to exceptions . but yet they are clear , full , and distinctly sufficient for faith to acquiesce in immediately , without any other expositions , interpretations , or arguments , beyond our understanding of the naked importance of the words . such are they , of the father the son , john . . i and my father are one . father , son and spirit , joh. . . three that bare witness in heaven , father , son and spirit , and these three are one , mat. . . baptizing them in the name of the father , son , and spirit . for if those into whose name we are baptized be not one in nature , we are by our baptism engaged into the service and worship of more gods than one . for as being baptized , or sacredly initiated into , or in the name of any one doth sacramentally bind us unto a holy and religious obedience unto him , and in all things to the avowing of him as the god whose we are , and whom we serve , as here we are in the name of the father , son and spirit , so if they are not one god , the blasphemous consequence before mentioned must unavoidably be admitted ; which it also doth upon the socinian principle , who whilest of all others they seem to contend most for one god , are indeed direct polutheists , by owning others with religious respect , due to god alone , which are not so . once more ! it is revealed also , that these three are distinct among themselves by certain peculiar relative properties , if i may yet use these terms . so that they are distinct , living , divine , intelligent voluntary principles of operation or working , and that in , and by internal acts one towards another , and in acts that outwardly respect the creation and the several parts of it . now this distinction originally lyeth in this ; that the father begetteth the son , and the son is begotten of the father ; and the holy spirit proceedeth from both of them . the manner of these things , so far as they may be expressed unto our edification , shall afterwards be spoken to . at present it sufficeth for the satisfaction and confirmation of our faith , that the distinctions named are clearly revealed in the scripture , and are proposed to be its proper object in this matter . psalm . . thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee . matth. . . thou art christ , the son of the living god. joh. . . we saw his glory , the glory of the only begotten of the father . ver. . no man hath seen god at any time , the only begotten son which is in the bosome of the father he hath revealed him . john . . for as the father hath life in himself , so hath he given to the son to have life in himself . joh. . . the son of god is come , and hath given us an understanding . joh. . . but when the comforter is come , whom i will send unto you from the father even the spirit of truth which proceedeth from the father , he shall testifie of me . now as the nature of this distinction , lies in their mutual relation one to another , so it is the foundation of those distinct actings and operations , whereby the distinction it self is clearly manifested and confirmed . and these actings as was said , are either such , as where one of them is the object of anothers actings , or such as have the creature for their objects ● the first sort are testified unto , psalm . . john . . chap. . . chap. . . cor. . , . prov. . , . most of which places have been before recited . they , which thus know each other , love each other , delight in each other , must needs be distinct ; and so are they represented unto our faith . and for the other sort of actings the scripture is full of the expressions of them ; see ▪ gen. . . zachariah . . joh. . . cor. . , , . cor. . . our conclusion from the whole is ; that there is nothing more fully expressed in the scripture , than this sacred truth is ; that there is one god , father , son , and holy ghost ; which are divine , distinct , intelligent , voluntary , omnipotent principles of operation , and working , which whosoever thinks himself obliged to believe the scripture must believe ; and concerning others , in this discourse , we are not solicitous . this is that which was first proposed ; namely , to manifest what is expresly revealed in the scripture concerning god the father , son , and holy ghost ; so as that we may duly believe in him , yield obedience unto him , enjoy communion with him , walk in his love and fear , and so come at length to be blessed with him for evermore . nor doth faith for its security , establishment and direction , absolutely stand in need of any farther exposition or explanation of these things ; or the use of any terms not consecrated to the present service by the holy ghost . but whereas it may be variously assaulted by the temptations of satan , and opposed by the subtle s●phisms of men of corrupt minds ; and whereas it is the duty of the disciples of christ to grow in the knowledge of god , and our lord and saviour jesus christ , by an explicit apprehension of the things they do believe , so far as they are capable of them ; this doctrine hath in all ages of the church , been explained and taught , in and by such expressions , terms , and propositions , as farther declare what is necessarily included in it , or consequent unto it ; with an exclusion of such things , notions , and apprehensions , as are neither the one , nor the other . this i shall briefly manifest , and then vindicate the whole from some exceptions , and so close this dissertation . that god is one , was declared and proved . now this oneness can respect nothing but the nature , being , substance or essence of god. god is one in this respect . some of these words indeed are not used in the scripture . but whereas they are of the same importance and signification , and none of them include any thing of imperfection , they are properly used in the declaration of the vnity of the god-head . there is mention in the scripture of the god-head of god , rom. . . his eternal power and godhead . and of his nature , by excluding them from being objects of our worship , who are not god by nature , gal. . . now this natural godhead of god , is , his substance or essence with all the holy divine excellencies which naturally and necessarily appertain thereunto . such are eternity , immensity , omnipotency , life , infinite holiness , goodness , and the like . this one nature , substance or essence , being the nature , substance , or essence of god , as god , is the nature , essence and substance of the father , son , and spirit , one and the same absolutely in and unto each of them . for none can be god as they are revealed to be , but by vertue of this divine nature or . being . herein consists the vnity of the godhead . secondly , the distinction which the scripture reveals between father , son , and spirit is that whereby they are three ●●p●stasis , or persons , distinctly subsisting in the same divine essence or being . now a divine person , is nothing but the divine essence upon the account of an especial property , subsisting in an especial manner . as in the person of the father , there is the divine essence , and being , with its property of begetting the son , subsisting in an especial manner as the father . and because this person hath the whole divine nature , all the essential properties of that nature are in that person . the wisdom , the understanding of god , the will of god , the immensity of god , is in that person ; not as that person , but as the person is god. the like is to be said of the persons of the son and of the holy ghost . hereby each person having the understanding , the will , and power of god , becomes a distinct principle of operation ; and yet all their actings ad extra being the actings of god , they are undivided , and are all the works of one , of the self same god. and these things do not only necessarily follow , but are directly included in the revelation made concerning god , and his subsistence in the scriptures . there are indeed very many other things that are taught , and disputed , about this doctrine of the ●rinity , as the manner of the eternal genera●●on of the son , of the essence of the father ; of the procession of the holy ghost , and the difference of it from the generation of the son ; of the mutual in-being of the persons , by reason of their unity in the same substance or essence ; the nature of their personal subsistence , with respect unto the properties whereby they are mutually distinguished , all which are true and defensible against all the sophisms of the adversaries of this truth . yet because the distinct apprehension of them , and their accurate expression , is not necessary unto faith , as it is our guide and principle in and unto ▪ religious worship and obedience , they need not here be insisted on . nor are those brief explications themselves before mentioned , so proposed as to be placed immediately in the same rank or order with the original revelations before infisted on , but only are pressed as proper expressions of what is revealed to increase our light and further our edification . and although they cannot rationally be opposed or denyed , nor ever were by any , but such as deny and oppose the things themselves as revealed , yet they that do so deny or oppose them , are to be required positively in the first place to deny or disapprove the oneness of the deity , or to prove that the father , or son , or holy ghost in particular , are not god , before they be allowed to speak one word against the manner of the explication of the truth concerning them . for either they grant the revelation declared and contended for , or they do not : if they do ; let that concession be first laid down , namely , that the father , son , and spirit are one god ; and then let it be debated whether they are one in substance and three in persons , or how else the matter is to be stated . if they deny it ; it is a plain madness to dispute of the manner of any thing , and the way of expressing it , whilst the thing it self is denyed to have a being : for of that which is not , there is neither manner , property , adjunct , nor effect . let then such persons , as this sort of men are ready to attempt with their sophistry , and to amuse with cavils about persons , substances , subsistences , and the like , desire to know of them what it is that they would be at . what would they deny , what would they disapprove . is it that god is one ; or that the father is god , or the son , or the holy ghost is so . if they deny , or oppose either of these , they have testimonies and instances of divine revelation , or may have , in a readiness , to confound the devil and all his emissaries . if they will not do so , if they refuse it , then let them know , that it is most foolish and unreasonable to contend about expressions and explanations of any thing , or doctrine , about the manner , respects , or relations of any thing , untill the thing it self , or doctrine , be plainly confessed or denyed . if this they refuse , as generally they do and will , which i speak upon sufficient experience , and will not be induced to deal openly , properly and rationally , but will keep to their cavils and sophisms , about terms and expressions , all farther debate , or conference with them , may justly , and ought both conscienciously and rationally to be refused , and rejected . for these sacred mysteries of god and the gospel , are not lightly to be made the subject of mens contests and disputations . but as we dealt before in particular , so here i shall give instances of the sophistical exceptions that are used against the whole of this doctrine ; and that with respect unto some late collections , and representations of them : from whence they are taken up and used by many who seem not to understand the words , phrases and expressions themselves , which they make use of . the summ of what they say in general , is , how can these things be ? how can three be one , and one be three ? every person hath its own substance , and therefore if there be three persons , there must be three substances ; and so three gods. answ. . every person hath distinctly its own substance , for the one substance of the deity , is the substance of each person , so it is still but one . but each person hath not its own distinct substance , because the substance of them all is the same , as hath been proved . . they say , that if each person be god , then each person is infinite , and there being three persons there must be three infinites . answ. this follows not in the least ; for each person is infinite as he is god. al● divine properties , such as to be infinite is , belong not to the persons on the account of their personality , but on the account of their nature , which is one , for they are all natural properties . but they say , if each person be god , and that god subsist in three persons , then in each person there are three persons or gods. answ. the collusion of this sophism consists in that expression , be god ; and that god ; in the first place , the nature of god is intended ; in the latter a singular person . place the words intelligibly and they are thus ; if each person be god , and the nature of god subsists in three persons , then in each person there are three persons ; and then the folly of it will be evident . but they farther infer ; that if we deny the persons to be infinite , then an infinite being hath a finite mode of subsisting , and so i know not what supposition they make hence ; that seeing there are not three infinites , then the father , son , and spirit are three finites that make up an infinite . the pitiful weakness of this cavil is open to all : for finite and infinite are properties and adjuncts of beings , and not of the manner of the subsistence of any thing . the nature of each person is infinite , and so is each person , because of that nature . of the manner of their subsistence , fini●e and infinite cannot be predicated or spoken , no farther than to say , an infinite being doth so subsist . but you grant , say they , that the only true god is the father , and then if christ be the only true god , he is the father . answ. we say , the only true god is father , son , and holy ghost . we never say , the scripture never sayes , that the father only is the true god , whence it would follow , that he that is the true god , is the father . but we grant the father to be the only trne god : and so we 〈◊〉 is the son also . and it doth not 〈◊〉 all thence follow , that the son is 〈◊〉 father . because in saying the 〈…〉 the true god , we respect not his paternity , or his paternal relation to his son ; but his nature , essence and being . and the same we affirm concerning the other persons . and to say , that because each person is god , one person must be another , is to crave leave to disbelieve what god hath revealed , without giving any reason at all for their so doing . but this sophism being borrowed from another , namely crellius , who insisted much upon it , i shall upon his account , and not on theirs , who as far as i can apprehend , understand little of the intendment of it , remove it more fully out of the way . it is proposed by him in way of syllogism , thus , the only true god is the father ; christ is the only true god ; therefore he is the father . now this syllogism is ridiculously sophystical . for in a categorical syllogism the major proposition is not to be particular , nor equipollent to a particular . for from such a proposition , when any thing communicable to more is the subject of it , and is restrained unto one particular , nothing can be inferred in the conclusion . but such is this proposition here , the only true god is the father . it is a particular proposition ; wherein the subject is restrained unto a singular , or individual predicate , though in it self communicable to more . now the proposition being ●o made particular , the terms of the subject or predicate are supposed rec●procal ; namely , that one god , and the father , are the same ; which is false : unless it be first proved , that the name god , is communicable to no more , or no other , than is the other term of father ; which to suppose , is to begg the whole question . for the only true god , hath a larger signification than the term of father , or son. so that though the only true god be the father , yet every one who is true god , is not the father : seeing then that the name of god here , supplyes the pla●e of a species , though it be singular absolutely , as it respects the divine nature which is absolutely singular , and one , and cannot be multiplyed ; yet in respect of communication it is otherwise , it is communicated unto more , namely , to the father , son and holy ghost . and therefore if any thing be intended to be concluded from hence , the proposition must be expressed according to what the subject requires , as capable of communication or attribution to more than one , as thus ; who ever is the only true god , is the father ; which proposition these persons and their masters , shall never be able to prove . i have given in particular these strictures thus briefly , upon these empty sophisms ; partly , because they are well removed already , and partly because they are meer exscriptions out of an author not long since translated into english , unto whom an entire answer may ere long be returned . that which at present shall suffice , is to give a general answer unto all these cavills , with all of the same kind , which the men of these principles do usually insist upon . i. the things , they say , which we teach concerning the trinity , are contrary to reason ; and thereof they endeavour to give sundry instances , wherein the summ of the opposition which they make unto this truth doth consist . but first , i ask what reason is it that they intend ? it is their own , the carnal reason of men . by that they will judge of these divine mysteries . the scripture tells us indeed , that the spirit of a man w●ich is in him knows the things of a man. a mans spirit , by natural reason , may judge of natural things . but the things of god , knoweth no man but the spirit of god , cor. . . so that what we know of these things , we must receive upon the r●v●lation of the spirit of god meerly ; if the apostle may be believed . and it is given unto men to know the mysteries of the kingdom of god. to some , and not to others ; and unless it be so given them they cannot know them . in particular , none can know the father , unless the son reveal him . nor will , or doth , or can , flesh and blood reveal or understand jesus christ to be the son of the living god , unless the father reveal him , and instruct us in the truth of it , matth. . . the way to come to the acknowledgement of these things , is that described by the apostle , ephes. . , , , , , . for this cause i bow my knees unto the father of our lord jesus christ , of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named , that he would grant ye , according to the riches of his glory , to be strengthned with might by his spirit in the inner man ; that christ may dwell in your hearts by faith ; that ye being rooted and grounded in love may be able to comprehend with all saints , &c. as also col. . . that ye might come unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding , to the acknowledgement of the mysterie of god , and of the father , and of christ. in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge . it is by faith and prayer , and through the revelation of god , that we may come to the acknowledgement of these things ; and not by the carnal reasonings of men of corrupt minds . . what reason do they intend ? if reason absolutely , the reason of things ; we grant that nothing contrary unto it , is to be admitted . but reason as it is in this or that man , particularly in themselves , we know to be weak , maimed and imperfect ; and that they are , and all other men , extreamly remote from a just and full comprehension of the whole reason of things . are they in such an estate , as that their apprehension shall pass for the measure of the nature of all things ; we know they are far from it , so that though we will not admit of any thing , that is contrary to reason , yet the least intimation of a truth by divine revelation , will make me embrace it , although it should be contrary to the reason of all the socinians in the world . reason in the abstract , or the just measure of the answering of one thing unto another , is of great moment : but reason , that is , what is pretended to be so , or appears to be so unto this or that man , especially in and about things of divine revelation , is of very small importance ; of none at all where it riseth up against the express testimonies of scripture , and these multiplyed to their mutual confirmation and explanation . . many things are above reason , that is , as considered in this or that subject , as men , which are not at all against it . it is an easie thing to compel the most curious enquirers of these dayes to a ready confession hereof , by multitudes of instances in things finite and temporary . and shall any dare to deny but it may be so , in things heavenly , divine , and spiritual ? nay , there is no concernment of the being of god , or his properties , but is absolutely above the comprehension of our reason . we cannot by searching find out god , we cannot find out the almighty to perfection . . the very foundation of all their objections and cavils against this truth , is destructive of as fundamental principles of reason , as are in the world . they are all at best reduced to this ; it cannot be thus in things finite ; the same being cannot in one respect be one , in another three , and the like , and therefore it is so in things infinite . all these reasonings are built upon this supposition , that that which is finite can perfectly comprehend that which is infinite . an assertion absurd , foolish and contradictory unto it self ! again , it is the highest reason in things of pure revelation , to captivate our understandings to the authority of the revealer , which here is rejected . so that by a loud specious pretence of reason , these men by a little captious sophistry endeavour not only to countenance their unbelief , but to evert the greatest principles of reason it self . . the objections these men principally insist upon , are meerly against the explanations we use of this doctrine ; not against the primitive revelation of it , which is the principal object of our faith , which how preposterous and irrational a course of proceeding it is , hath been declared . . it is a rule among phil●sophers ; that if a man on just grounds and reasons have embraced any opinion or perswasion , he is not to desert it , meerly because he cannot answer every objection against it . for if the objections wherewith we may be entangled , be not of the same weight and importance , with the reason on which we embraced the opinion , it is a madness to forego it on the account thereof . and much more must this hold amongst the common sort of christians , in things spiritual and divine . if they will let go , and part with their faith in any truth , because they are not able to answer distinctly some objections that may be made against it , they may quickly find themselves disputed into atheism . . there is so great an intimation made of such an expression , and resemblance of a trinity in unity , in the very works of the creation , as learned men have manifested by various instances , that it is most unreasonable to suppose that to be contrary to reason , which many objects of rational consideration , do more or less present unto our minds . . to add no more considerations of this nature ; let any of the adversaries produce any one argument or grounds of reason , or those pretended to be such , against that that hath been asserted , that hath not already been baffl●d a thousand times , and it shall receive an answer , or a publick acknowledgement that it is indissoluble . of the person of christ. the next head of opposition made by the men of this conspiracy , against this sacred truth ; is against the head of all truth , the person of our lord jesus christ. the socinians indeed would willingly put a better face , or colour upon their error , about the person of christ , then it will bear , or indure to lye on it . for in their catechism unto this question , is the lord jesus christ , purus homo , a meer man ? they answer ; by no means . how then ? hath he a divine nature also ? which is their next question : to this they say , by no means , for this is contrary to right reason . how then will these pretended masters of reason reconcile these things ? for to us it seems , that if christ have no other nature but that of a man , he is as to his nature , purus homo , a meer man , and no more . why , they answer , that he is not a meer man , because he was born of a virgin ; strange ! that that should be an argument to prove him more than a man , which the scripture and all men in their right wits grant to be an invincible reason , to prove him to be a man , and as he was born of her , no more . rom. . . concerning his son jesus christ our lord which was made of the seed of david according to the flesh , rom. . . whose are the fathers , and of whom as concerning the flesh christ came . gal. . . god sent forth his son , made of a woman , made under the law. but say they ; he was endowed with the spirit , wrought miracles , was raised from the dead , had all power given in heaven and earth ; for by these degrees , he became to be god. but all men see that the inquiry is about the nature of christ ; and this answer is about his state and condition . now this changeth not his nature on the one hand , no more than his being humbled , poor and dying , did on the other . this is the right reason we have to deal withall in these men . if a man should have enquired of some of them of old , whether melchizedeck were purus homo , a meer man ? some of them would have said , no , because he was the holy ghost ; some no , because he was the son of god himself ; and some no , because he was an angel ; for such foolish opinions have men fallen into . but how sottish soever their conceptions were , their answer to that enquiry would have been regular , beca●se the question and answer respect the same subject , in the same respect . but never any was so stupid , as to answer , he was not a meer man , that is by nature , because he was a priest of the high god , which respects his office , and condition . yet such is the pretence of these men about the person of christ to incrustate and give some colour unto their soul mis-belief ; as supposing that it would be much to their disadvantage to own . christ only as a meer man , though the most part of their disputes that they have troubled the christian world withall , have had no other design nor aim but to prove him so to be , and nothing else . i shall briefly , according to the method insisted on , first lay down what is the direct revelation which is the object of our faith in this matter ; then express the revelation it self in the scripture testimonies wherein it is recorded ; and having vindicated some one or other of them from their exceptions , manifest how the doctrine hereof is farther explained , unto the edification of them that believe . that there is a second person , the son of god , in the holy trin-vnity of the god-head ▪ we have proved before . that this person did of his infinite love and grace take upon him our nature , bumane nature , so as that the divine and humane nature should be come one person , one christ , god and man in one ; so that whatever he doth in , and about our salvation , it is done by that one person , god and man , is revealed unto us in the scripture , as the object of our faith. and this is that which we believe concerning the person of christ. whatever acts are ascrib●d unto him , however immediately performed , in , or by the humane nature , or in and by his divine nature , they are all the acts of that one person , in whom are both these natures . that this christ , god and man , is because he is god , and on the account of what he hath done for us as man , to be believed in , worshipped , with worship religious and divine , to be trusted and obeyed ; this also is asserted in the scripture . and these things are as it were the common notions of christian religion ; the common principles of our profession ; which the scriptures also abundantly testifie unto . isa. . . behold a virgin shall conceive and bare a son , and shall call his name emanuel ; that is , he shall be god with us , or god in our nature . not , that that should be his name whereby he should be called in this world ; but that this should be the condition of his person , he should be god with us ; god in our nature . so are the words expounded , mat. . , , . that which is conceived in her is of the holy ghost ; and she shall bring forth a son , and thou shalt call his name jesus ; for he shall save his people from their sins . now all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the lord by the prophet , saying , behold , a virgin shall be with child , and shall bring forth a son , and they shall call his name emanuel , which being interpreted , is god with us . his name whereby he was to be called , was jesus , that is a saviour . and thereby was accomplished the prediction of the prophet , that he should be emanuel , which being interpreted , is god with us . now a child born to be god with us , is god in that child taking our nature upon him , and no otherwise can the words be understood . isa. . . vnto us a child is born , unto us a son is given , and his name shall be called the migh●y god. the child that is born , the son that is given , is the mighty god ; and as the migh●y god , and a child born , or son , given , he is the prince of peace , as he is there called , or our saviour . john . . the word was made flesh . that the word was god , who made all things he had before declared . now he affirms that this word was made flesh . how ! converted into flesh , into a man , so that he who was god ceased so to be , and was turned or changed into flesh , that is a man ? besides that this is utterly impossible , it is not affirmed . for the word continued the word still , although he was made flesh , or made of a woman , as it is elsewhere expressed , or made of the seed of david , or took our flesh or nature to be his own . himself continuing god , as he was , became man also , which before he was not . the word was made flesh ; this is that which we believe and assert in this matter . see john . . and ver . . john . . chap. . . all which places assert the person of christ to have descended from heaven in the assumption of humane nature , and ascended into heaven therein being assumed ; and to have been in heaven as to his divine nature , when he was in the earth in the flesh that he had assumed . acts . . feed the church of god , which he hath purchased with his own blood . the person spoken of is said to be god absolutely ; the church of god. and this god is said to have blood of his own ; the blood of jesus christ , being the blood of him that was god , though not the blood of him as god ; for god is a spirit . and this undeniably testifies to the unity of his person as god and man. rom. . , . concerning his son jesus christ our lord , who was made of the seed of david according to the flesh , and declared to be the son of god with power , according to the spirit of h●liness , by the resurrection from the dead . rom. . . whose are the fathers , and of whom concerning the flesh , christ came , who is over all , god blessed for ever , amen . this is all we desire ; that we may believe without disturbance from the clamours of these men. namely , that the same christ , as concerning the flesh , came of the fathers , of david , and in himself , is over all god blessed for ever . this the scripture asserts plainly , and why we should not believe it firmly , let these men give a reason when they are able . gal. . . god sent forth his son made of a woman ; he was his son , and was made of a woman ; according as he expresses it , heb. . . a body hast thou prepared me ; as also , rom. . . phil. . , , . let this mind be in you , which was also in christ jesus , who being in the form of god , thought it not robbery to be equal with god ; but made himself of no reputation , and took upon him the form of a servant , and was made in the likeness of m●n . it is the same christ that is spoken of . and it is here affirmed of him that he was in the form of god , thought it no robbery to be equal with god ; but is this all ; is this jesus christ god only ? doth he subsist only in the form or nature of god ? no , saith the apostle , he took upon him the form of a servant , was made in the likeness of men , and was found in fashion as a man ; that his being truly a man is expressed in these words our adversaries deny not ; and we therefore believe that the same jesus christ is god also , because that is no less plainly expressed . tim. . . and without controversie great is the mysterie of godliness , god was manifest in the flesh , justified in the spirit , seen of angels . it is a mysterie indeed , under which name it is despised now and reproached ; nor are we allowed so to call it , but are reflected on , as flying to mysteries for our defence . but we must take leave to speak in this matter , according to his directions , without whom we cannot speak at all . a mysterie it is , and that a great mysterie ; and that confessedly so , by all that do believe . and this is , that god was manifested in the flesh . that it is the lord christ who is spoken of , every one of the ensuing expressions do evince , justified in the spirit , seen of angels , preached unto the gentiles , believed on in the world , received up into glory . and this also is the substance of what we believe in this matter ; namely , that christ is god , manifest in the flesh , which we acknowledge , own , and believe to be true , but a great mysterie ; yet no less great and sacred a truth notwithstanding . heb. . . for as much then as the children were partakers of flesh and blood , he also himself likewise took part of the same . ver . . for verily he took not on him the nature of angels , but he took on him the seed of abraham . and this plainly affirms his pre-existence unto that assumption of our nature , and the unity of his person in it being so assumed . john . . hereby perceive we the love of god , because he laid down his life for us . he who was god laid down for a season , and parted with that life , which was his own in that nature of ours which he had assumed . and that taking of our nature is called his coming in the flesh , which who so denyes , is not of god , but is the spirit of anti-christ , john . . these are some of the places , wherein the person of christ is revealed unto our faith , that we may believe on the son of god , and have eternal life . the method formerly proposed would require that i should take off the general objections of the adversaries against this divine revelation ; as also vindicate some peculiar testimonies from their exceptions . but because a particular opposition unto this truth , hath not as yet publickly and directly been maintained and managed by any that i know of among our selves , though the denyal of it be expresly included in what they do affirm ; i shall leave the further confirmation thereof unto some other occasion , if it be offered , and it be judged necessary . and this is that which the faith of believers rests in , as that which is plainly revealed unto them ; namely , that jesus christ is god and man in one person ; and that all his actings in their behalf are the actings of him who is god and man ; and that this son of god , god and man , is to be believed in by them , and obeyed that they have eternal life . what is farther added unto these express testimonies , and the full revelation of the truth contained in them in this matter , in way of explication educed from them , and suitable unto them , to the edification of the church , or information of the minds of believers in the right apprehension of this great mysterie of god manifested in the flesh , may be reduced to these heads . ( . ) that the person of the son of god , did in his assuming humane nature to be his own , not take an individual person of any one into a near conjunction with himself , but preventing the personal subsistence of humane nature in that flesh which he assumed , he gave it its subsistence in his own person , whence it hath its individuation and distinction ▪ from all other persons whatever this is the personal union . the divine and humane nature in christ have but one personal subsistence ; and so are but one christ , one distinct personal principle of all operations of all that he did , or doth , as mediator . and this undeniably follows from what is declared in the testimonies mentioned . for the word could not be made flesh , nor could he take on him the seed of abraham , nor could the mighty god be a child born and given unto us , nor could god shed his blood for his church , but that the two natures so directly expressed , must be united in one person ; for otherwise as they are two natures still , they would be two persons also . . each nature thus united in christ , is entire , and preserves unto it self its own natural properties . for he is no less perfect god , for being made man , nor no less a true perfect man , consisting of soul and body with all their essential parts by that natures being taken into subsistence with the son of god , his divine nature still continues immense , omniscient , omnipotent , infinite in holiness , &c. his bumane nature , finite , limited , and before its glorification , subject to all infirmities of life and death , that the same nature in others absolutely considered , is obnoxious unto . . in each of these natures , he acts suitably unto the essential properties and principles of that nature . as god , he made all things , upholds all things , by the word of his power , fills heaven and earth , &c. as man , he lived , hungred , suffered , dyed , rose , ascended into heaven . yet by reason of the union of both these natures in the same person : not only his own person is said to do all these things , but the person expressed by the name which he hath on the account of one nature , is said to do that which he did only in the other . so god is said to redeem his church with his own blood , and to lay down his life for us ; and the son of man to be in heaven , when he was in the earth . all because of the unity of his person as was declared . and these things do all of them directly and undeniably flow from what is revealed concerning his person , as before is declared . of the satisfaction of christ . the last thing to be enquired into , upon occasion of the late opposition to the great fundamental truths of the gospel , is the satisfaction of christ. and the doctrine hereof is such , as i eonceive needs rather to be explained than vindicated . for it being the center wherein most , if not all the lines of gospel promises , and precepts do meet , and the great medium of all our communion with god in faith and obedience , the great distinction between the religion of christians , and that of all others in the world , it will easily on a due proposal be assented unto by all , who would be esteemed disciples of jesus christ. and whether a parcel of insipid cavils , may be thought sufficient to obliterate the revelation of it , men of sober minds will judge and discern . for the term of satisfaction , we contend not about it . it doth indeed properly express and connote that great eff●ct of the death of christ which in the cause before us , we plead for . but yet because it belongs rather to the explanation of the truth contended for , then is used expresly in the revelation of it , and because the right understanding of the word it self depends on some notions of law , that as yet we need not take into consideration , i shall not in this entrance of our discourse , insist precisely upon it , but leave it as the natural conclusion of what we shall find expresly declared in the scripture . neither do i say this , as though i did decline the word , or the right use of it , or what is properly signified by it , but do only cast it into its proper place answerable unto our method and design in the whole of this brie● discourse . i know some have taken a new way of expressing and declaring the doctrine concerning the mediation of christ , with the causes and ends of his death , which they think more rational , than that usually insisted on . but as what i have yet heard of or seen in that kind , hath been not only unscriptural , but also very irrational , and most remote from that accuracy whereunto they pretend , who make use of it ; so if they shall publish their conceptions , it is not improbable but that they may meet with a scholastical examination by some hand or other . our present work , as hath been often declared , is for the establishment of the faith of them , who may be attempted , if not brought into danger to be seduced by the slights of some who lye in wait to deceive , and the clamours of others who openly drive the same design . what therefore the scripture plainly and clearly reveals in this matter , is the subject of our present enquiry . and either in so doing , as occasion shall be offered , we shall obviate , or in the close of it remove those sophisms that the sacred truth now proposed to consideration hath been attempted withal . the summ of what the scripture reveals about this great truth , commonly called the satisfaction of christ , may be reduced unto these ensuing heads . . that adam being made upright , sinned against god , and all mankind , all his posterity in him . gen. . . so god created man in hit own image , in the image of god created he him , male and female created he them , gen. . . and he said , who told thee that thou wast naked ? hast thou eaten of the tree whreof i commandeded thee that then shouldst not eat ? eccles. . . lo , this only have i found , that god made man upright , but he hath sought out many inventions . rom. . . wherefore as by one man sin entred into the world , and death by sin , and so death passed upon all men , for that all have sinned . ver. . therefore by the offence of one , judgement came upon all men to condemnation , ver. . by one mans disobedience many were made sinners . . that by this sin of our first parents , all men are brought into an estate of sin , and apostacy from god , and of an enmity unto him , gen. . . god saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth , and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart , was only evil continually , psal. . . behold , i was s●●●pen in iniquity , and in sin did my mother conceive me . rom. . . for all have sinned and come short of the glory of god , rom. . . the carnal mind is enmity against god , f●r it is not subject to the law of god , neither indeed can be ephes. . . having the understanding darkned , being alienated from the life of god through the ignorance that is in them , because of the blindness of their heart , chap. . . col. . . thirdly , that in this state all men continue in sin against god , nor of themselves can do otherwise , rom. . , , . there is none righteous , no not one , there is none that understandeth , there is none that seeketh after god ; they are all gone out of the way , they are together become unprofitable , there is none that doth good , no not one . fourthly , that the justice and holiness of god , as he is the supream governour and judge of all the world , require that sin be punished , exod. . . that will by no means clear the guilty , josh. . . he is an holy god , he is a jealous god , he will not forgive your transgressions nor your sins , psalm . , , . for thou art not a god that hath pleasure in wickedness , neither shall evil dwell with thee ; the foolish shall not stand in thy sight ; thou hatest all workers of iniquity , thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing . hab. . . thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil , and canst not look upon iniquity . isa. . . who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire , who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings ? rom. . . who knowing the judgement of god , that they which commit such things are worthy of death . rom. . , . is god unrighteous who taketh vengeance ? i speak as a man , god forbid ! for then how shall god judge the world ? thes. . . it is a righteous thing with god , to recompence tribulation to them that trouble you . heb. . . for our god is a consuming fire . from deut. . . fifthly , that god hath also engaged his veracity and faithfulness in the sanction of the law not to leave sin unpunished , gen. . . in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely dye . deut. . . cursed be he that confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them . in this state and condition all mankind had they been left without divine aid and help , must have perished eternally . sixthly , that god out of his infinite goodness , grace and love to mankind , sent his only son to save and deliver them out of this condition , matth. . . thou shalt call his name jesus , for he shall save his people from their sins , john . , . god so loved the world , that be gave his only begotten son , that whosoever believeth in him should not perish , but have everlasting life : for god sent not his son into the world to condemn the world , but that the world through him might be saved . rom. . . god commendeth his love towards us , in that while we were ye● sinners christ dyed for us , john . . in this was manifested the love of god towards us , because god sent his only begotten son into the world , that we might live through him , v. . herein is love , not that we loved god , but that he loved us , and sent his ▪ son to be a propitiation for our sins , . thes. . . even jesus which delivereth us from the wrath to come . seventhly , that this love was the same in father and son , acted distinctly in the manner that shall be afterwards declared ; so vain are the pretences of men who from the love of the father in this matter , would argue against the love of the son ; or on the contrary . eightly , that the way in general whereby the son of god being incarnate , was to save lost sinners , was by a substitution of himself according to the design and appointment of god in the room of those whom he was so save , cor. . . he hath made him to be sin for us , who knew no sin , that we might become the righteousness of god in him , gal. . . christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law , being made a curse for us . rom. . , . for scarcely for a righteous man will one dye , yet peradventure for a good man some will even dare to dye ; but god commendeth his love towards us , in that while we were yet sinners christ dyed us . rom. . . for what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh , god sending his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh , and for sin , condemned sin in the flesh ; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us . pet. . . who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree ; chap. . . for christ also hath once suffered for us , the just for the unjust , that he might bring us unto god. all these expressions undeniably evince a substitution of christ as to suffering in the stead of them whom he was to save ; which in general is all that we intend by his satisfaction ; namely , that he was made sin for us , a curse for us , dyed for us , that is in our stead , that we might be saved from the wrath to come . and all these expressions as to their true genuine importance shall be vindicated , as occasion shall require . ninthly , this way of his saving sinners is in particular , several wayes expressed in the scripture . as , . that he offered himself a sacrifice to god , to make attonement for our sins , and that in his death and sufferings . isa. . . when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin . john . . behold the lamb of god who taketh away the sins of the world , eph. . . christ hath loved us , and hath given himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to god for a sweet smelling savour , heb. . . was a merciful high priest in things pertaining to god , to make reconciliation for the sins of the people , heb. . , , , . but christ being come an high priest of good things to come , by a greater and more perfect tabernacle not made with hands , that is to say , not of this building , neither by the blood of goats and calves , but by his own blood , he entred in once into the holy place ; having obtained eternal redemption for us ; for if the blood of bulls , &c. how much more shall the blood of christ , who through the eternal spirit offered himself without spot to god , purge your consciences from dead works ? . that he redeemed us by paying a price , a ransome for our redemption . mark . . the son of man came to give his life a ransome for many . cor. . . for ye are bought with a price , . . tim. . . who gave himself a ransome for all to be testified in due time . tit. . . who gave himself for us , that he might redeem us from all iniquity , pet. . . for we were not redeemed with silver and gold and corruptible things . . but with the pretious blood of christ , as of a lamb without blemish and without spot . . that he bare our sins , or the punishment due unto them . isa. . . he was wounded for our transgressions , he was bruised for our iniquities , the chastisement of our peace was upon him , and with his stripes are we healed ; all we like sheep have gone astray , we have turned every one to his own way , and the lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all . . for he shall bear their iniquities . pet. . . who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree . . that he answered the law and the penalty of it ; rom. . . god sent forth his son in the likeness of sinful flesh , and for sin , condemned sin in the flesh ; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us . gal. . . christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law , being made a curse for us . chap. . , . god sent forth his son made of a woman , made under the law , to redeem them that were under the law. . that he dyed for sin , and sinners , to expiate the one , and in the stead of the other . rom. . . he was delivered for our offences . rom. . . when we were enemies , we were reconciled to god by the death of his son. cor. . . christ dyed for our sins according to the scriptures . cor. . . for the love of christ constraineth us , because we thus judge , that if one dyed for all , then were all dead , thes. . , . . hence on the part of god , it is affirmed that he spared him not , but delivered him up for us all ; rom. . . and caused all our iniquities to meet upon him , isa. . . . the effect hereof was , . that the righteousness of god was glorified , rom. . , . whom god hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood , to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins . ( . ) the law fulfilled and satisfied , as in the places before quoted . rom. . . gal. . , . gal. . . ( . ) god reconciled , cor. . , . god was in christ reconciling the world unto himself , not imputing their trespasses unto them . heb. . . he made reconciliation for the sins of the people . ( . ) attonement was made for sin , rom. . . by whom we have now received the attonement ; and peace was made with god , eph. . . for he is our peace , who hath made both one , that he might reconcile both unto god in one body by the cross , having slain the emnity thereby . 〈◊〉 made an end of sin , dan. . . to finish transgression , to make an end of sins , to make reconciliation for iniquity , and to bring in everlasting righteousness . the glory of god in all these things being exalted , himself well pleased , righteousness and everlasting redemption or salvation purchased for sinners , heb. . . in that the chastisement of our peace was upon him , and that by his stripes we are healed , he being punished that we might go free , himself became a captain of salvation unto all that do obey him . i have fixed on these particulars ; to give every ordinary reader an instance how fully and plainly what he is to believe in this matter is revealed in the scripture . and should i produce all the testimonies which expresly give witness unto these positions , it is known how great a part of the bible must be transcribed . and these are the things which are indispensibly required of us to believe , that we may be able 〈◊〉 and regulate our obedience according to the mind and will of god. in the explanation of this doctrine unto further edification , sundry things are usually insisted on , which necessarily and infallibly ensue upon the propositions of scripture before laid down ; and serve to beget in the minds of believers a due apprehension , and right understanding of them . as , . that god in this matter is to be considered as the chief , supream , absolute rector and governour of all ; as the lord of the law , and of sinners ; but yet so as an offended ruler . not as an offended person , but as an offended ruler , who hath right to exact punishment upon transgressors , and whose righteousness of rule requires that he should so do . . that because he is righteous and holy , as he is the supream judge of all the world , it is necessary that he do right in the punishing of sin , without which the order of the creation cannot be preserved . for sin being the creatures deduction of it self from the order of its dependance upon and obedience unto the creator , and supream lord of all , without a reduction of it by punishment , confusion would be brought into the whole creation . . that whereas the law and the sanction of it is the moral or declarative cause of the punishment of sin , and it directly obligeth the sinner himself unto punishment ; god as the supream ruler , dispenseth , not with the act of the law , but the immediate object ; and substitutes another sufferer in the room of them who are principally lyable unto the sentence of it , and are now to be acquitted or freed ; that so the law may be satisfied , requiring the punishment of sin , justice exalted , whereof the law is an effect , and yet the sinner saved . . that the person thus substituted was the son of god incarnate , who had power so to dispose of himself with will and readiness for it ; and was upon the account of the dignity of his person , able to answer the penalty which all others had incurred and deserved . . that god upon his voluntary susception of this office , and condescention to this work , did so lay our sins in and by the sentence of the law upon him , that he made therein full satisfaction for whatever legally could be charged on them for whom he dyed or suffered . . that the special way terms and conditions whereby and whereon sinners may be interested in this satis●action made by christ , are determined by the will of god , and declared in the scripture . these and the like things are usually insisted on in the explication or declaration of this head of our confession . and there is not any of them but may be sufficiently confirmed by divine testimonies . it may also be farther evinced that there is nothing asserted in them , but what is excellently suited unto the common notions which mankind hath of god and his righteousness ; and that in their practice they answer the light of nature , and common reason exemplified in sundry instances among the nations of the world. i shall therefore take one argument from some of the testimonies before produced in the confirmation of this sacred truth , and proceed to remove the objections that are commonly banded against it . if the lord christ according to the will of the father , and by his own counsel and choice , was substituted , and did substitute himself as the mediatour of the covenant , in the room and in the stead of sinners that they might be saved , and therein bare their sins , or the punishment due unto their sins , by undergoing the curse and penalty of the law , and therein also according to the will of god offered up himself for a propitiatory , expiatory sacrifice to make attonement for sin , and reconciliation for sinners , that the justice of god being appeased , and the law fulfilled , they might go free , or be delivered from the wrath to come ; and if therein also he paid a real satisfactory price for their redemption ; then he made satisfaction to god for sin . for these are the things that we intend by that expression , of satisfaction . but now all those things are openly , and fully witnessed unto in the testimonies before produced ; as may be observed by suiting some of them unto the several particulars here asserted . as . what was done in this matter , was from the will , purpose , and love of god the father . psalm . , , . heb. . , , . act. . . john . . rom. . . . it was also done by his own voluntary consent , phil. . , , . . he was substituted , and did substitute himself as the mediator of the covenant in the room and stead of sinners , that they may be saved , heb. . , , . chap. . . rom. . , . rom. . , . . and he did therein bear their sins , or the punishment due to their sins . isa. . , . pet. . . and this , . by undergoing the curse and penalty of the law , gal. . . or the punishment of sin required by the law , cor. . . rom. . . . herein , also according to the will of god , he offered up himself ● propitiatory and expiatory sacrifice to make attonement for sin , and reconciliation for sinners , ephes. . . rom. . . heb. . , , , . which he did that the justice of god being satisfied , and the law fulfilled , sinners might be freed from the wrath to come , rom. . . thes. . last . . and hereby also , he paid a real price of redemption for sin and sinners , pet. . , . cor. . last . these are the things which we are to believe , concerning the satisfaction of christ ; and our explication of this doctrine , we are ready to defend , when called thereunto . the consideration of the objections which are raised against this great fundamental truth , shall close this discourse . and they are of two sorts . first , in general , to the whole doctrine , as declared , or some of the more signal heads , or parts of it . secondly , particular instances , in this or that supposal , as consequences of the doctrine asserted . and in general , . they say , this is contrary to , and inconsistent with the love , grace , mercy , and goodness of god , which are so celebrated in the scripture as the principal properties of his nature , and acts of his will , wherein he will be glorified . especially contrary to the freedom of forgiveness , which we are encouraged to expect , and commanded to believe . and this exception they endeavour to firm by testimonies , that the lord is good and gracious , and that he doth freely forgive us our sins and trespasses . answer : first , i readily grant that whatever is really contrary to the grace , goodness and mercy of god , whatever is inconsistent with the free forgiveness of sin , is not to be admitted . for these things are fully revealed in the scripture , and must have a consistency with whatever else is therein revealed of god , or his will. secondly , as god is good and gracious , and merciful , so also he is holy , righteous , true and faithful . and these things are no less revealed concerning him than the other ; and are no less essential properties of his nature than his goodness and grace . and as they are all essentially the same in him , and considered only under a different habitude or respect as they are exerted by acts of his will ; so it belongs to his infinite wisdom , that the effects of them , though divers , and produced by divers waies , and means , may no way be contrary one to the other , but that mercy may be exercised , without the prejudice of justice , or holiness ; and justice be preserved entire , without any obstruction to the exercise of mercy . thirdly , the grace and love of god that in this matter the scripture reveals to be exercised , in order unto the forgiveness of sinners , consists principally in two things . . in his holy eternal purpose of providing a relief for lost sinners . he hath done it , to the praise of the glory of his grace , eph. . . . in the sending his son in the pursuit ▪ and for the accomplishment of the holy purpose of his will and grace . herein most eminently doth the scripture celebrate the love , goodness , and kindness of god ; as that whereby , in infinite , and for ever to be adored wisdom and grace , he made way for the forgiveness of our sins . joh. . . god so loved the world , as he gave his only begotten son , rom. . , . whom he hath set forth to be a propitiation through saith in his blood , rom. . , . god commendeth his love towards us , in that while we were yet sinners , christ dyed for us , titus . . john . , . herein consists that ever to be adored love , goodness , grace , mercy and condescension of god. add hereunto , that in that act of causing our iniquities to meet on christ , wherein he immediately intended the declaration of his justice , rom. . . ( not sparing him , in delivering him up to death for us all , rom. . . ) there was a blessed harmony in the highest justice , and most excellent grace and m●rcy . this grace , this goodness , this love of god toward mankind , towards sinners , our adversaries in this matter neither know , nor understand ; and so indeed what lyes in them , remove the foundation of the whole gospel , and of all that faith and obedience , which god requires at our hands . fourthly , forgiveness , or the actual condonation of sinners , the pardon and forgiveness of sins , is free ; but yet so , as it is every where restrained unto a respect unto christ , unto his death and blood-shedding , eph. . . we have redemption in his blood , even the forgiveness of sins , chap. . . god for christs sake hath forgiven you , rom. . , . god hath set him forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood , to declare his righteousness for the forgiveness of sins . it is absolutely free in respect of all immediate transactions between god and sinners . free on the part of god. first , in the eternal purpose of it , when he might justly have suffered all men to have perished under the guilt of their sins . . free in the means that he used to effect it unto his glory . ( . ) in the sending of his son ; and ( . ) in laying the punishment of our sin upon him . ( . ) in his covenant with him , that it should be accepted on our behalf . ( . ) in his tender and proposal of it by the gospel unto sinn●rs to be received without money or without price . ( . ) in the actual condonation and pardon of them that do believe . secondly , it is free on the part of the persons that are forgiven . in that ( . ) it is given and granted to them without any satisfaction made by them for their former transgressions . ( . ) without any merit to purch●se or procure it . ( . ) without any poenal satisfactory suffering here , or in a purgatory hereafter . ( . ) without any expectation of a future recompence ; or that being pardoned , they should then make or give any satisfaction for what they had done before . and as any of these things would , so nothing else can impeach the freedom of pardon and forgiveness . whether then we respect the pardoner or the pardoned , pardon is every way free ; namely , on the part of god who forgives , and on the part of sinners that are forgiven . if god now hath besides all this , provided himself a lamb for a sacrifice ; if he hath in infinite wisdom and grace found out a way , thus freely to forgive us out sins , to the praise and glory of his own holiness , righteousness and severity against sin , as well as unto the unspeakable advancement of that grace , goodness and bounty which he immediately exerciseth in the pardon of sin , are these mens eyes evil , because he is good ? will they not be contented to be pardoned , unless they may have it at the rate of dispoiling god of his holiness , truth , righteousness and faithfulness ? and as this is certainly done by that way of pardon which these men propose , no reserve in the least being made for the glory of god in those holy properties of his nature which are immediately injured and opposed by sin ; so that pardon it self which they pretend so to magnifie , having nothing to influence it but a meer arbitrary act of gods will , is utterly d●based from its own proper worth and excellency . and i shall willingly undertake to manifest , that they derogate no less from grace and mercy in pardon , than they do from the righteousness and holiness of god by the forgiveness which they have feigned ; and that in it both of them are perverted , and dispoiled of all their glory . but they yet say , if god can freely pardon sin , why doth he not do it without satisfaction ; if he cannot , he is weaker and more imperfect than man , who can do so . answ. first , god cannot do . many things that men can do ; nor that he is more imperfect than they , but he cannot do them on the account of his perfection . he cannot lye , he cannot deny himself , he cannot change , which men can do , and do every day . secondly , to pardon sin without satisfaction in him who is absolutely holy , righteous , true and faithful , the absolute necessary supream governour of all sinners , the author of the law , and sanction of it , wherein punishment is threatned and declared , is to deny himself , and to do what one infinitely perfect , cannot do , thirdly , i ask of these men , why god doth not pardon sins freely without requiring faith , repentance and obedience in them that are pardoned ; yea , as the conditions on which they may be pardoned ? for seeing he is so infinitely good and gracious● , cannot he pardon men without prescribing such terms and conditions unto them , as he knoweth , that men , and that incomparably the greatest number of them will never come up unto ; and so must of necessity perish for ever . yea , but they say , this cannot be ; neither doth this impeach the freedom of pardon . for it is certain that god doth prescribe these things , and yet he pardoneth freely . and it would altogether unbecome the holy god to pardon sinners that continue so to live and dye in their sins . but do not these men see that they have hereby given away their cause which they contend for ? for if a prescription of sundry things to the sinner himself , without which he shall not be pardoned , do not at all impeach , as they say , the freedom of pardon , but god may be said freely to pardon sin notwithstanding it ▪ how shall the receiving of satisfaction by another , nothing a● all being required of the sinner ; have the least appearance of any such thing ? if the freedom of forgiveness consists in such a boundless notion as these men imagine , it is certain that the prescribing of faith and repentance in and unto sinners antecedently to their participation of it , is much more evidently contrary unto it , than the receiving of satisfaction from another who is not to be pardoned , can to any appear to be . secondly , if it be contrary to the holiness of god to pardon any , without requiring faith , repentance and obedience in them , as it is indeed ; let not these persons be offended , if we believe him when he so frequently declares it , that it was so to remit sin without the fulfilling of his law and satisfaction of his justice . secondly , they say , there is no such thing as justice in god requiring the punishment of sin , but that that , which in him requireth and calleth for the punishment of sin , is his anger and wrath , which expressions denote free acts of his will , and not any essential properties of his nature . so that god may punish sin , or not punish it at his pleasure . therefore there is no reason that he should require any satisfaction for sin , seeing he may pass it by absolutely as he pleaseth . answ. is it not strange that the great governour , the judge of all the world , which on the supposition of the creation of it , god is naturally and necessarily , should not also naturally be so righteous , as to do right , in rendring unto every one according to his works ? ( . ) the sanction and penalty of the law , which is the rule of punishment , was as i suppose , an effect of justice , of gods natural and essential justice , and not of his anger or wrath. certainly never did any man make a law for the government of a people in anger . draco's laws were not made in wrath , but according to the best apprehension of right and justice that he had , though said to be written in blood . and shall we think otherwise of the law of god ? ( . ) anger and wrath in god express the effects of justice ; and so are not meerly free acts of his will. this therefore is a tottering cause , that is built on the denyal of gods essential righteousness . but it was proved before , and it is so elsewhere . ( . ) they say that the sacrifice of christ was metaphorically only so . that he was a metaphorical priest , not one properly so called . and therefore that his sacrifice did not consist in his death and blood-shedding , but in his appearing in heaven upon his ascersion , presenting himself unto god in the most holy place not made with hands as the mediator of the new covenant . answ. when once these men come to this evasion , they think themselves safe , and that they may go whither they will without controll . for they say it is true , christ was a priest , but only he was a metaphorical one . he offered sacrifice , but it was a metaphorical one . he redeemed us , but with a metaphorical redemption ; and so we are justified thereon , but with a metaphorical justification ; and so for ought i know they are like to be saved , with a metaphorical salvation . this is the substance of their plea in this matter . christ was not really a priest , but did somewhat like a priest. he offered not sacrifice really , but did somewhat that was like a sacrifice . he redeemed us not really , but did somewhat that looked like redemption . and what these things are , wherein their analog●e consisteth , what proportion the things that christ hath done , bare to the things that are really so , from whence they receive their denomination , that it is meet it should be wholly in the power of these persons to declare . but , ( . ) what should hinder the death of christ to be a sacrifice , a proper sacrifice , and according to the nature , end , and use of sacrifices to have made attonement , and satisfaction for sin ? ( . ) it is expresly called so in the scripture ; wherein he is said to offer himself , to make his soul an offering , to offer himself a sacrifice , eph. . . heb. . . heb. . , . . chap. . . and he is himself directly said to be a priest or a sacrificer , heb. . . and it is no where intimated , much less expressed that these things are not spoken properly but metaphorically only . ( . ) the legal sacrifices of the old law were instituted on purpose to represent and prepare the way for the bringing in of the sacrifice of the l●mb of god , so to take away the sin of the world. and is it not strange , that true and real sacrifices , should be types and r presentations of that which was not so ? on this supposition all those sacrifices are but so many seductions from the right understanding of things between god and sinners . ( . ) nothing is wanting to render it a proper propitiatory sacrifice , for , ( . ) there was the person offering , and that was christ himself , heb. . . he offered himself unto god. he , that is the sacrificer , denotes the person of christ god and man ; and himself as the sacrifice denotes his humane nature ; whence god is said to purchase his church with his own blood , act. . . for he offered himself through the eternal spirit ; so that ( . ) there was the matter of the sacrifice , which was the humane nature of christ soul and body ; his soul was made an offering for sin , isa. . and his body , the offering of the body of jesus christ , hob. . his blood especially , which is often synecdochically mentioned for the whole . ( . ) his death had the nature of a sacrifice : for ( . ) therein were the sins of men laid upon him , and not in his entrance into heaven ; for he bare our sins in his own body on the tree , pet. . . god made our sins then to meet upon him , isa. . . which gives the formality unto any sacrifices . quod in ejus caput sit , is the formal reason of all propitiatory sacrifices , and ever was so , as is expresly declared , lev. . , . and the phrase of bearing sin , of bearing iniquity , is constantly used for the undergoing of the punishment due to sin . ( . ) it had the end of a proper sacrifice ; it made expiation of sin , propitiation and attonement for sin with reconciliation with god , and so took away that enmity that was between god and sinners , heb. . . rom. . , . heb. . , . heb. . . rom. . . cor. . , . and although god himself pesigned , appointed , and contrived in wisdom this way of reconciliation , as he did the means for the attoning of his own anger towards the friends of job , commanding them to go unto him , and with him offer sacrifices for themselves which he would accept , chap. . . yet as he was the supream governour , the lord of all , attended with infinite justice , and holiness , attonement was made with him , and satisfaction to him thereby . what hath been spoken , may suffice to discover the emptiness and weakness of those exceptions which in general these men make against the truth before laid down from the scripture . a brief examination of some particular instances , wherein they seek not so much to oppose , as to reproach the revelation of this mysterie of the gospel , shall put a close to this discourse . it is said then , . that if this be so , then it will follow , that god is gracious to forgive , and yet impossible for him unless the debt be fully satisfied . answ. i suppose the confused and abrupt expression of things here , in words scarcely affording a tolerable sense , is rather from weakness than captiousness ; and so i shall let the manner of the proposal pass . ( . ) what is this should follow , that god is gracious to forgive sinners , and yet will not , cannot , on the account of his own holiness and righteousness , actually forgive any , without satisfaction and attonement made for sin ? the worst that can be hence concluded is , that the scripture is true which affirms both these in many places . ( . ) this sets out the exceeding greatness of the grace of god in forgiveness , that when sin could not be forgiven without satisfaction , and the sinner himself could no way make any such satisfaction , that he provided himself a sacrifice of attonement , that the sinner might be discharged and pardoned . ( . ) sin is not properly a debt , for then it might be paid in kind , by sin it self ; but is called so , only because it binds over the sinner to punishment , which is the satisfaction to be made for that which is properly a transgression , and improperly only a debt . it is added , . hence it follows that the finite and impotent creature is more capable of extending mercy and forgiveness , than the infinite and omnipotent creator . answ. god being essentially holy and righteous , having ingaged his faithfulness in the sanction of the law , and being naturally and necessarily the governour and ruler of the world , the forgiving of sin without satisfaction , would be no perfection in him , but an effect of impotency , and imperfection ; a thing which god cannot do ; as he cannot lye , nor deny himself . ( . ) the direct contrary of what is insinuated , is asserted by this doctrine ; for on the supposition of the satisfaction , and attonement insisted on , not only doth god freely forgive , but that in such a way of righteousness and goodness as no creature is able to conceive or express the glory and excellency of it . and to speak of the poor halving pardons of private men , upon particular offences against themselves , who are commanded so to do , and have no right nor authority to require or exact punishment nor is any due upon the meer account of their own concernment , in comparison with the forgiveness of god , ariseth out of a deep ignorance of the whole matter under consideration . . it is added by them , that hence it follows , that god so loved the world , he gave his only son to save it ; and yet that god stood off in high displeasure , and christ gave himself as a compleat satisfaction to offended justice . answ. . something these men would say , if they knew what or how ; for ( . ) that god so loved the world , as to give his only son to save it , is the expression of the scripture , and the foundation of the doctrine whose truth we contend for . that christ offered himself to make attonement for sinners , and therein made satisfaction to the justice of god , is the doctrine it self which these men oppose , and not any consequent of it . ( . ) that god stood off in high displeasure , is an expression which neither the scripture useth , nor those who declare this doctrine from thence , nor is suited unto divine perfections , or the manner of divine operations . that intended seems to be that the righteousness and law of god required the punishment due to sin , to be undergone , and thereby satisfaction to be made unto god ; which is no consequent of the doctrine , but the doctrine it self . . it is yet farther objected , that if christ made satisfaction for sin , then he did it either as god , or as man , or as god and man. answ , ( . ) as god and man , acts . . god redeemed his church with his own blood , john . . herein was manifest the love of god , that he laid down his life for us , heb. . . ( . ) this dilemma is proposed as that which proceeds on a supposition of our own principles , that christ is god and man in one person , which indeed makes the pretended difficulty to be vain and a meer effect of ignorance . for all the mediatory acts of christ being the acts of his person , must of necessity be the acts of him as god and man. ( . ) there is yet another mistake in this inquiry ; for satisfaction is in it looked on as a real act or operation of one , or the other nature in christ ; when it is the ap●telesma or effect of the actings , the doing and suffering of christ ; the dignity of what he did in reference unto the end for which he did it . for the two natures are so united in christ , as not to have a third compound principle of physical acts and operations thence arising ; but each nature acts distinctly according to its own being and properties ; yet so , as what is the immediate act of either nature , is the act of him who is one in both , from whence it hath its dignity . ( . ) the summ is ; that in all the mediatory actions of christ we are to consider , ( . ) the agent , and that is the person of christ. ( . ) the immediate principle by which , and from which the agent worketh ; and that is the natures in the person . ( . ) the actions , which are the effectual operations of either nature . ( . ) the effect or work with respect to god and us ; and this relates unto the person of the agent , the lord christ , god and man. a blending of the natures into one common principle of operation , as the compounding of mediums unto one end , is ridiculously supposed in this matter . but yet again it is pretended that sundry consequences irreligious and irrational do ensue upon a supposition of the satisfaction pleaded for . what then are they ? . that it is unlawful and impossible for god all-mighty to be gracious , and merciful , or to pardon transgressors . answ. ( . ) the miserable confused misapprehension of things , which the proposal of this , and the like consequences doth evidence , manifests sufficiently how unfit the makers of them are to mannage controversi●s of this nature . for ( . ) it is supposed that for god to be gracious and merciful , or to pardon sinners , are the same ; which is to confound the essential properties of his nature , with the free acts of his will. ( . ) lawful , or unlawful , are terms that can with no tolerable sense be used concerning any properties of god , all which are natural and necessary unto his being ; as goodness , grace , and mercy in particular are . ( . ) that it is impossible for god to pardon transgressors according to this doctrine , is a fond imagination , for it is only a declaration of the manner how he doth it . ( . ) as god is gracious and merciful , so also he is holy , and righteous , and true ; and it became him , or was every way meet for him , in his way of exercising grace and mercy towards sinners , to order all things so , as that it might be done without the impeachment of his holiness , righteousness and truth . it is said again , . that god was inevitably compelled to this way of saving men ; the highest affront to his uncontroulable nature . answ. were the authors of these exceptions put to declare what they mean by gods uncontroulable nature , they would hardly disentangle themselves with common sence . such masters of reason are they indeed , whatever they would fain pretend to be . controulable , or uncontroulable , respect actings and operations , not beings or natures . ( . ) that upon the principle opposed by these men , god was inevitably compelled to this way of saving men , is a fond and childish imagination . the whole business of the salvation of men according unto this doctrine , depends on a meer free soveraign act of gods will exerting it self in a way of infinite wisdom , holiness , and grace . ( . ) the meaning of this objection ( if it hath either sence or meaning in it ) is , that god freely purposing to save lost sinners , did it in a way becoming his holy nature , and righteous law. what other course infinite wisdom could have taken for the satisfaction of his justice we know not ; that justice was to be satisfied , and that this way it is done , we know and believe . . they say it hence follows , that it is unworthy of god to pardon , but not to inflict punishment on the innocent ; or require a satisfaction where there was nothing due . answ. ( . ) what is worthy or unworthy of god , himself alone knows , and of men not any but according to what he is pleased to declare and reveal . but certainly , it is unworthy any person pretending to the least interest in ingenuity or use of reason , to use such frivolous instances in any case of importance which have not the least pretence of argument in them but what ariseth from a gross misapprehension , or misrepresentation of a doctrine designed to opposition . ( . ) to pardon sinners , is a thing becoming the goodness and grace of god ; to do it by christ , that which becometh them , and his holiness and righteousness also . rom. . . ephes. . , . ( . ) the lord christ was personally innocent ; but he who knew no sin was made sin for us , cor. . . and as the mediator and surety of the covenant , he was to answer for the sins of them whom he undertook to save from the wrath to come ; by giving himself a ransome for them , and making his soul an offering for their sin . ( ) that nothing is due to the justice of god for sin , that is , that sin doth not in the justice of god deserve punishment , is ● good comfortable doctrine , for men that are resolved to continue in their sins whilest they live in this world. the scripture tells us , that christ paid what he took not ; that all our iniquities were caused to meet upon him ; that he bare them in his own body on the tree ; that his soul was made an offering for sin , and therei by made reconciliation or ationement for the sins of the people ; if these persons be otherwise minded , we cannot help it . . it is added ; that this doctrine doth not only disadvantage the true vertue and real intent of christs life and death , but intirely deprives g●d of that praise which is o●ing to his greatest love and goodness . answ. i suppose that this is the first time , that this doctrine fell under this imputation ; nor could it possibly be lyable unto this charge from any , who did either understand it , or the grounds on which it is commonly opposed . for , there is no end of the life or death of christ , which the socinians themselves admit of , but it is also allowed , and asserted in the doctrine now called in question . do they say , that he taught the truth or revealed the whole mind and will of god concerning his worship and our obedience ? we say the same . d● they say , that by his death he hare testimony unto , and confirmed the truth which he had taught ? it is also owned by us . do they say that in what he did , and su●fered , he set us an example that we should labour after conformity unto ? it is what we acknowledge and teach . only we say that all these things belong principally to his prophetical office. but we moreover affirm and believe , that as a priest , or in the discharge of his sacerdotal office , he did in his death and sufferings , offer himself a sacrifice to god , to make attonement for our sins , which they deny ; and that he dyed for us , or in our stead , that we might go free ; without the faith and acknowledgement whereof no part of the gospel can be rightly understood . all the ends then which they themselves assign of the life and death of christ , are by us granted ; and the principal one , which gives life and efficacy to the rest , is by them denyed . neither ( . ) doth it fall under any possible imagination , that the praise due unto god should be ecclipsed hereby . the love and kindness of god towards us , is in the scripture fixed principally and fundamentally , on his sending of his only begotten son to dye for us . and certainly the greater the work was that he had to do , the greater ought our acknowledgement of his love and kindness to be ; but it is said , . that it represents the son more kind and compassionate than the father ; whereas if both be the same god , then either the father is as loving as the son , or the son as angry as the father . answ. ( . ) the scripture referreth the love of the father , unto two heads . ( . ) the sending of his son to dye for us , john . . rom. . . john . . ( . ) in choosing sinners unto a participation of the fruits of his love , ephes. . , , ▪ . the love of the son , is fixed signally on his actual giving himself to dye for us , gal. . . ephes. . . rev. . . what ballances these persons have got , to weigh these loves in , and to conclude which is the greatest or most weighty , i know not . . although only the actual discharge of his office be directly assigned to the love of christ , yet his cond●scention in taking our nature upon him expressed by his mind , ephes . . and the readiness of his will , psalm . . doth eminently comprise love in it also . thirdly , the love of the father in sending of the son , was an act of his will , which being a natural and essential property of god , it was so far the act of the son also , as he is partaker of the same nature ; though eminently and in respect of order it was peculiarly the act of the father . ( . ) the anger of ●od against sin , is an effect of his essential righteousness and holiness which belong to him as god ; which yet hinders not , but that both father , and son , and spirit acted love towards sinners . they say again , . it robs god of the gift of his son for our redemption , which the scriptures attribute to the unmerited love he had for the world , in affirming the son purchased that redemption from the father , by the gift of himself to god as our compleat satisfaction . answ. ( . ) it were endless to consider the improper and absurd expressions which are made use of in these exceptions ; as here the last words have no tolerable sence in them according to any principles whatever . ( . ) if the son 's purchasing redemption for us , procuring , obtaining it , do rob god of the gift of his son for our redemption ; the holy ghost must answer for it : for having obtained for us , or procured , or purchased eternal redemption , is the word used by himself , heb. . . and to deny that he hath laid down his life a ransome for us , and to have bought us with a price , is openly to deny the gospel . ( . ) in a word , the great gift of god consisted in giving his son to obtain redemption for us . ( . ) herein he offered himself unto god , and gave himself for us ; and if these persons are offended herewithal , what are we that we should withstand god. they say , . since christ could not pay what was not his own , it follows that in the payment of his own , the case still remains equally grievous . since the debt is not hereby absolved or forgiven , but transferred only ; and by consequence we are no better provided for salvation than before , owing that now to the son , which was once owing to the father . answ. the looseness , and dubiousness of the expressions here used , makes an appearance that there is something in them , when indeed there is not . there is an allusion in them to a debt and a payment , which is the most improper expression that is used in this matter , and the interpretation thereof is to be regulated by other proper expressions of the same thing . but to keep to the allusion , ( . ) christ paid his own , but not for himself , dan. . . ( . ) paying it for us , the debt is discharged , and our actual discharge is to be given out according to the wayes and means , and upon the conditions appointed and constituted by the father and son. ( . ) when a debt is so transferred as that one is accepted in the room , and obliged to payment in the stead of another , and that payment is made and accepted accordingly , all law and reason require that the original debtor be discharged . ( . ) what on this account we owe to the son , is praise , thankfulness , and obedience , and not the debt which he took upon himself , and discharged for us , when we were non-solvent , by his love . so that this matter is plain enough , and not to be involved by such cloudy expressions and incoherent discourse , following the metaphor of a debt . for if god be considered as the creditor , we all as debtors , and being insolvent , christ undertook out of his love to pay the debt for us , and did so accordingly , which was accepted with god ; it follows that we are to be discharged , upon gods terms , and under a new obligation unto his love , who hath made this satisfaction for us , which we shall eternally acknowledge . it is said , . it no way renders men beholding , or in the least obliged to god , since by their doctrine he would not have abated us , nor did he christ the least farthing ; so that the acknowledgements , are peculiarly the sons , which destroyes the whole current of scripture testimony for his good will towards men. o the infamous portraicture this doctrine draws of the infinite goodness ; is this your retribution , o injurious satisfactionists ? answ. this is but a bold repetition of what in other words was mentioned before over and over . wherein the love of god in this matter consisted , and what is the obligation on us unto thankfulness and obedience , hath been before also declared . and we are not to be moved in fundamental truths , by vain exclamations of weak and unstable men. it is said , . that gods justice is satisfied for sins past , present and to come , whereby god and christ have lost both their power of inj●yning godliness , and prerogative of punishing disobedience ; for what is once paid , is not revokable ; and if punishment should arrest any for their debts , it argues a breach on god or christs part ; or e●se that it hath not been sufficiently solved ; and the penalty compleat sustained by another . answ. the intention of this pretended consequence of our doctrine is , that upon a supposition of satisfaction made by christ , there is no solid foundation remaining for the prescription of faith , repentance , and obedience on the one hand , or of punishing them who refuse so to obey , believe , or repent , on the other . the reason of this inference insinuated , seems to be this ; that sin being satisfied for , cannot be called again to an account . for the former part of the pretended consequence , namely that on this supposition , there is no foundation left for the prescription of godliness , i cannot discern any thing in the least looking towards the confirmation of it , in the words of the objection laid down . but these things are quite otherwise ; as is manifest unto them that read and obey the gospel . for ( . ) christs satisfaction for sins , acquits not the creature of that dependance on god , and duty which he owes to god , which notwithstanding that , god may justly , and doth prescribe unto him , suitable to his own nature , holiness and will. the whole of our regard unto god , doth not lye in an acquitment from sin . it is moreover required of us as a necessary and indispensible consequence of the relation wherein we stand unto him , that we live to him and obey him , whether sin be satisfied for , or no. the manner and measure hereof are to be regulated by his prescriptions , which are suited to his own wisdom and our condition . and they are now referred to the heads mentioned of faith , repentance , and new obedience . ( . ) the satisfaction made for sin , being not made by the sinner himself , there must of necessity be a rule , order , and law-constitution how the sinner may come to be interested in it , and made partaker of it . for the consequent of the freedom of one by the suffering of another , is not natural or necessary , but must proceed and arise from a law-constitution , compact , and agreement . now the way constituted and appointed , is that of faith , or believing , as explained in the scripture . if men believe not , they are no less liable to the punishment due to their sins , than if no satisfaction at all were made for sinners . and whereas it is added , forgetting that every one must appear before the judgement seat of christ , to receive according to things done in the body ; yea and every one must give an account of himself to god ; closing all with this , but many more are the gross absurdities and blasphemies that are the genuine fruits of this so confidently believed doctrine of satisfaction . i say it is ( . ) certain , that we must all appear before the judgement seat of christ , to receive according to the things done in the body ; and therefore wo will be unto them at the great day , who are not able to plead the attonement made for their sins by the blood of christ , and an evidence of their interest therein by their faith and obedience , or the things done and wrought in them , and by them whilst they were in the body here in this world. and this it would better become these persons to betake themselves unto the consideration of , than to exercise themselves unto an unparallel'd confidence in reproaching those with absurdities and blasphemies , who believe the deity and satisfaction of jesus christ the son of the living god , who dyed for us , which is the ground and bottom of all our expectation of a blessed life and immortality to come . the removal of these objections against the truth scattered of late up and down in the hands of all sorts of men , may suffice for our present purpose . if any amongst these men , who judge that they have an ability to mannage the opposition against the truth as declared by us , with such pleas , arguments , and exceptions , as may pretend an interest in appearing reason , they shall , god assisting , be attended unto . with men , given up to a spirit of railing or reviling , though it be no small honour to be reproached by them who reject with scorn the eternal deity of the son of god , and the satisfactory attonement he made for the sins of men , no person of sobriety will contend . and i shall further only desire the reader to take notice , that though these few sheets were written in few hours , upon the desire , and for the satisfaction of some private friends , and therefore contain meerly an expression of present thoughts , without the least design or diversion of mind towards accuracy or ornament ; yet the author is so far confident that the truth , and nothing else is proposed and confirmed in them , that he fears not but that an opposition to what is here declared will be removed , and the truth reinforced in such a way and manner as may not be to its disadvantage . finis . an appendix . the preceding discourse , ( as hath been declared ) was written for the use of ordinary christians ; or such as might be in danger to be seduced , or any way entangled in their minds , by the late attempts against the truths pleaded for . for those to whom the dispensation of the gospel is committed , are debtors both to the greeks , and to the barbarians ; both to the wise and to the unwise , rom. . . it was therefore thought meet , to insist only on things necessary , and such as their faith is immediately concerned in ; and not to immix therewithall , any such arguments or considerations , as might not , by reason of the terms wherein they are expressed , be obvious to their capacity and understanding . unto plainness and perspicuity , brevity was also required , by such as judged this work necessary . that design we hope is answered , and now discharged in some usesul measure . but yet because many of our arguments on the head of the satisfaction of christ , depend upon the genuine signification and notion of the words and terms wherein the doctrine of it is delivered , which for the reasons before mentioned could not conveniently be discussed in the foregoing discourse , i shall here in some few instances , give an account of what farther confirmation the truth might receive , by a due explanation of them . and i shall mention here but few of them , because a large dissertation concerning them all , is intended in another way . first , for the term of satisfaction it self ; it is granted that in this matter it is not found in the scripture . that is , it is not so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or syllabically , but it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the thing it self intended is asserted in it , beyond all modest contradiction . neither indeed is there in the hebrew language any word that doth adequately answer unto it ; no nor yet in the greek . as it is used in this cause , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is properly sponsio or fide jussio , in its actual discharge , maketh the nearest approach unto it . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used to the same purpose . but there are words and phrases both in the old testament , and in the new , that are equipollent unto it , and express the matter or thing intended by it : as in the old are , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this last word we render satisfaction , numb . . , . where god denyes that any compensation , sacred or civil , shall be received to free a murderer from the punishment due unto him ; which properly expresseth what we intend . thou shalt admit of no satisfaction for the life of a murderer . in the new testament ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and the verbs ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , are of the same importance ; and some of them accommodated to express the thing intended , beyond that which hath obtained in vulgar use . for that which we intended hereby , is , the voluntary obedience unto death , and the passion or suffering of our lord jesus christ , god and man , whereby , and wherein he offered himself through the eternal spirit , for a propitiatory sacrifice , that he might fulfill the law , or answer all its universal postulata , and as our sponsor , undertaking our cause , when we were under the sentence of condemnation , underwent the punishment due to us from the justice of god , being transferred on him ; whereby haveing made a perfect and absolute propitiation or attonement for our sins , he procured for us deliverance from death , and the curse , and a right unto life everlacting . now this is more properly expressed by some of the words before mentioned , than by that of satisfaction ; which yet nevertheless as usually explained , is comprehensive , and no way unsuited to the matter intended by it . in general , men by this word understand either reparationem offensae , or solutionem debiti : either reparation made for offence given unto any ; or the payment of a debt . debitum is either oriminale , or pecuniarium ; that is , either , the obnoxiousness of a man to punishment for crimes , or the guilt of them , in answer to that justice and law which he is necessarily liable and subject unto ; or , unto a payment or compensation by , and of money , or what is valued by it ; which last consideration , neither in it self , nor in any reasonings from an analogie unto it , can in this matter have any proper place . satisfaction is the effect of the doing or suffering , what is required for the answering of his charge against faults or sins , who hath right , authority and power to require , exact , and inflict punishment for them . some of the schoolment define it , by voluntaris radditio aequivalentis indebiti ; of which more elsewhere . the true meaning of to satisfie , or make satisfaction , is tantum facere aut pati , quantum satis sit juste irato ad vindictam . this satisfaction is impleaded , as inconsistent with free remission of sins ; how causlesly we have seen . it is so far from it , that it is necessary to make way for it , in case of a righteous law transgressed , and the publick order of the universal governour and government of all , disturbed . and this god directs unto , lev. . . the priest shall make an attonement for him , and it shall be forgiven him . this attonement was a legal satisfaction ; and it is by god himself premised to remission or pardon . and paul prayes philemon to forgive onesimus , though he took upon himself to make satisfaction for all the wrong or dammage that he had sustained , epist. v. , . and when god was displeased with the friends of job he prescribes a way to them , or what they shall do , and what they shall get done for them , that they might be accepted and pardoned , job . , . the lord said unto eliphaz , my wrath is kindled against thee and against thy two friends , therefore take unto you now seven bullocks and seven ramms , and go to my servant job , and offer up for your selves a burnt offering , and my servant job shall pray for you , for him i will accept ; lest i deal with you after your folly . he plainly enjoyneth an attonement , that he might freely pardon them . and both these , namely satisfaction and pardon , with their order and consistency , were solemnly represented by the great institution of the sacrifice of the scape goat . for after all the sins of the people were put upon him , or the punishment of them transferred unto him in a type and representation with quod in ejus caput-sit , the formal reason of all sacrifices propitiatory , he was sent away with them , denoting the oblation or forgiveness of sin , after a translation made of its punishment , lev. . , . and whereas it is not expresly said , that that goat suffered , or was slain , but was either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hircus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a goat sent away , or was sent to a rock called azazel in the wilderness , as vatablus and oleaster , with some others think , ( which is not probable , seeing though it might then be done whilest the people were in the wilderness of sinai ; yet could not by reason of its distance , when the people were setled in canaan be annually observed ; ) it was from the poverty of the types , whereof no one could fully represent that grace which it had particular respect unto . what therefore was wanting in that goat , was supplyed in the other , which was slain as a sin offering , v. . . neither doth it follow , that on the supposition of the satisfaction pleaded for , the freedom , pardon , or acquitment of the person originally guilty and liable to punishment , must immediately and ipso facto , ensue . it is not of the nature of every solution or satisfaction , that deliverance must ipso facto follow . and the reason of it is , because this satisfaction by a succedaneous substitution of one to undergo punishment for another , must be founded in a voluntary compact , and agreement , for there is required unto it , a relaxation of the law , though not as unto the punishment to be inflicted , yet as unto the person to be punished . and it is otherwise in personal guilt , than in pecuniary debts . in these the debt it self is solely intended , the person only obliged with reference thereunto . in the other , the person is firstly and principally under the obligation . and therefore when a pecuniary debs is paid , by whomsoever it be paid , the obligation of the person himself unto payment ceaseth ipso facto . but in things criminal , the guilty person himself , being firstly , immediately and intentionally under the obligation unto punishment , when there is introduced by compact , a vicarious solution in the fubstitution of another to suffer , though he suffer the same absolutely which those should have done for whom he suffers ; yet because of the acceptation of his person to suffer , which might have been refused , and could not be admitted , without some relaxation of the law , deliverance of the guilty persons cannot ensue ipso facto , but by the intervention of the terms fixed on in the covenant or agreement for an admittance of the substitution . it appears from what hath been spoken , that in this matter of satisfaction , god is not considered as a creditor , and sin as a debt , and the law as an obligation to the payment of that debt , and the lord christ as paying it ; though these notions may have been used by some for the illustration of the whole matter ; and that not without countenance from sundry expressions in the scripture to the same purpose ; but god is considered as the infinitely holy and righteous author of the law , and supream governour of all mankind , according to the tenor and sanction of it . man is considered as a sinner , a transgressor of that law , and thereby obnoxious and liable to the punishment constituted in it , and by it , answerably unto the justice and holiness of its author . the substitution of christ was meerly voluntary on the part of god , and of himself , undertaking to be a sponsor to answer for the sins of men , by undergoing the punishment due unto them . that to this end there was a relaxation of the law , as to the persons that were to suffer , though not as to what was to be suffered . without the former , the substitution mentioned could not have been admitted . and on supposition of the latter , the suffering of christ could not have had the nature of punishment properly so called . for punishment relates to the justice and righteousness in government of him that exacts it , and inflicts it . and this the justice of god doth not , but by the law. nor could the law be any way satisfied , or fulfilled by the suffering of christ , if antecedently thereunto its obligation or power of obliging unto the penalty constituted in its sanction , unto sin , was relaxed , dissolved , or dispensed withall . nor was it agreeable to justice , nor would the nature of the things themselves admit of it , that another punishment should be inflicted on christ , than what we had deserved , nor could our sin be the impulsive cause of his death : nor could we have had any benefit thereby . and this may suffice to be added unto what was spoken before , as to the nature of satisfaction , so far as the brevity of the discourse whereunto we are confined , will bear , or the use whereunto it is designed doth require . secondly , the nature of the doctrine contended for , being declared and cleared , we may in one or two instances manifest how evidently it is revealed , and how fully it may be confirmed or vindicated . it is then in the scripture declared , that christ dyed for us ; that he dyed for our sins , and that we are thereby delivered . this is the foundation of christian religion as such . without the faith , and acknowledgement of it , we are not christians . neither is it in these general terms , at all denyed by the socinians . it remains therefore , that we consider , ( . ) how this is revealed and affirmed in the scripture : and ( . ) what is the true meaning of the expressions and propositions wherein it is revealed and affirmed ; for in them , as in sundry others , we affirm , that the satisfaction pleaded for , is contained . . christ is said to dye , to give himself , to be delivered , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 &c. for us , for his sheep , for the life of the world ; for sinners , john . . chap. . . rom. . . cor. . , . gal. . . heb. . . moreover he is said to dye 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for sins , cor. . . gal. . . the end whereof every where expressed in the gospel , is , that we might be freed , delivered , and saved . these things as was said , are agreed unto , and acknowleded . . the meaning and importance , we say of these expr●ssions , is ; that christ dyed in our room , place , or stead , undergoing the death or punishment which we should have undergone in the way and manner before declared . and this is the satisfaction we plead for . it remains therefore , that from the scripture , the nature of the things treated of , the proper signification and constant use of the. expressions mentioned , the exemplification of them in the customs and usages of the nations of the world , we do evince and manifest , that what we have laid down , is the true and proper sense of the words , wherein this revelation of christs dying for us is expressed ; so that they who deny christ to have dyed for us in this sense , do indeed deny that he properly dyed for us at all ; what ever benefits they grant , that by his death we may obtain . first , we may consider the use of this expression in the scripture , either indefinitely , or in particular instances . only we must take this along with us , that dying for sins and transgressions , being added unto dying for sinners or persons , maketh the substitution of one in the room and stead of another , more evident , than when the dying of one for another only , is mentioned . for whereas all predicates are regulated by their subjects , and it is ridiculous to say , that one dyeth in the stead of sins , the meaning can be no other , but the bearing or answering of the sins of the sinner , in whose stead any one dyeth . and this is in the scripture declared to be the sense of that expression , as we shall see afterwards . let us therefore consider some instances . john . . the words of caiaphas counsel are , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it is expedient for us , that one man should dye for the people , and that the whole nation perish not : which is expressed again , chap. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , perish for the people . caiaphas feared , that if christ were spared , the people would be destroyed by the romans . the way to free them , he thought was by the destruction of christ ; him therefore he devoted to death , in lieu of the people . as he vnum pro multis dabitur caput . one head shall be given for many . not unlike the speech of otho the emperour in xiphilin , when he slew himself to preserve his army ; for when they would have perswaded him to renew the war after the defeat of some of his forces , and offered to lay down their lives to secure him ; he replyed , that he would not ; adding this reason , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it is far better , and more just that one should perish or dye for all ; than that many should perish for one ; that is , one in the stead of many , that they may go free ; or as another speaks ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . eurip. let one be given up to dye in the stead of all . joh. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . they are the words of st. peter unto christ ; i will lay down my life for thee ; to free thee , i will expose my own head to danger , my life to death ; that thou maist live and i dye . it is plain that he intended the same thing with the celebrated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of old , who exposed their own lives , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) for one another , such were damon and pythias , orestes & pylades , nisur & eurialus . whence is that saying of seneca , succurram perituro ; sed ut ipse n●n peream ; nisi si futurus ero magni hominis , aut magnae rei merces . i will relieve or succour one that is ready to perish ; yet so as that i perish not my self ; unless thereby , i be taken in lieu of some great man , or great matter . for a great man , a man of great worth and usefulness i could perish , or dye in his stead , that he might live and go free . we have a great example also of the importance of this expression in those words of david concerning absolom , sam. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who will grant me to dye , i for thee , or in thy stead ; my son absolom . it was never doubted , but that david wished that he had dyed in the stead of his son ; and to have undergone the death which he did , to have preserved him alive . as to the same purpose , though in another sense , m●zentius in virgil expresseth himself , when his son lausus interposing b●tween him and danger in battel , was slain by aeneas . tantane me tenuit vivendi nate voluptas , vt pro me hostili paterer succedere dextrae quem genui ? tuane haec genitor per vulnera servor ? morte tuâ vivam ? hast thou o son , fallen under the enemies hand in my stead ; am i saved by thy wounds ; do i live by thy death ? and the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used by david doth signifie , when applyed unto persons , either a succession , or a substitution ; still the coming of one into the place and room of another : when one succeeded to another in government , it is expressed by that word , sam. . . kings . . chap. . . in other cases it denotes a substitution . so jehu tells his gurad , that if any one of them let any of baals priests escape , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , kings . . his life should go in the stead of the life that he had suffered to escape . and this answereth unto 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the greek , which is also used in this matter ; and ever denotes either equality , contrariety , or substitution . the two former senses , can here have no place ; the latter alone hath . so it is said , that archelaus reigned , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; mat. . , . in the room or stead of herod his father . so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , matth. . . is an eye for an eye , and a tooth for a tooth , and this word also is used in expressing the death of christ for us . he came , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . matth. . . to give his life a ransome for many ; that is , in their stead to dye . so the words are used again , mark . . and both these notes of a succedaneous substitution are joined together , tim. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and this the greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to buy any thing , to purchase or procure any thing , with the price of ones life . so tigranes in xenophon , when cyrus askt him what he would give or do for the liberty of his wife whom he had taken prisoner ; answered , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; i will purchase her liberty with my life , or the price of my soul. whereon the woman being freed , affirmed afterwards , that she considered none in the company , but him who said , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that he would purchase my liberty with his own life . and these things are added on the occasion of the instances mentioned in the scripture , whence it appears , that this expression of dying for another , hath no other sense or meaning , but only dying instead of another , undergoing the death that he should undergo , that he might go free . and in this matter of christs dying for us , add that he so dyed for us , as that he also dyed for our sins , that is , either to bear their punishment , or to expiate their guilt , ( for other sense the words cannot admit ) and he that pretends to give any other sense of them than that contended for , which implyes the whole of what lyes in the doctrine of satisfaction , erit mihi magnus apollo ; even he who was the author of all ambiguous oracles of old . and this is the common sense of mori pro alio , and pati pro alio , or pro alio discrimen capitis subire ; a substitution is still denoted by that expression , which sufficeth us in this whole cause ; for we know both into whose room he came , and what they were to suff●r . thus entellus killing and sacrificing an ox to eryx in the stead of dares whom he was ready to have slain , when he was taken from him , expresseth himself ; hanc tibi eryx meliorem animam pro morte daretis persolvo . he offered the ox , a better sacrifice , in the stead of dares , taken from him . so fratrem pollux alternà morte redemit . and they speak so not only with respect unto death , but where ever any thing of durance or suffering is intended . so the angry master in the comoedian , verberibus caesum te dave in pistrinum dedam usque ad necem . eâ lege atque omine , ut si inde te exemerim , ego pro te molam . he threatned his servant to cast him into prison to be macerated to death with labour , and that with this engagement , that if he ever let him out he would grind for him ; that is , in his stead . wherefore without offering violence to the common means of understanding things amongst men , another sense cannot be affixed to these words . the nature of the thing it self will admit of no other exposition than that given unto it ; and it hath been manifoldly exemplified among the nations of the world . for suppose a man guilty of any crime , and on the account thereof , to be exposed unto danger from god or man , in a way of justice , wrath , or vengeance , and when he is ready to be given up unto suffering according unto his demerit , another should tender himself to dye for him that he might be freed , let an appeal be made to the common reason and understandings of all men , whether the intention of this his dying for another , be not , that he substitutes himself in his stead to undergo what he should have done , however the translation of punishment from one to another may be brought about and asserted . for at present we treat not of the right , but of the fact , or the thing it self . and to deny this to be the case as to the sufferings of christ , is as far as i can understand , to subvert the whole gospel . moreover , as was said , this harh been variously exemplified among the nations of the world ; whose actings in such cases , because they excellently shadow out the general notion of the death of christ for others , for sinners ; and are appealed unto directly by the apostle to this purpose , rom. . , . i shall in a few instances reflect upon . not to insist on the voluntary surrogations of private persons , one into the room of another , mutually to undergo dangers and death for one another , as before mentioned , i shall only remember some publick transactions in reference unto communities , in nations , cities , or armies . nothing is more celebrated amongst the ancients than this ; that when they supposed themselves in danger , from the anger and displeasure of their gods , by reason of any guilt or crimes among them , some one person should either devote himself , or be devoted by the people , to dye for them , and therein to be made as it were an expiatory sacrifice . for where sin is the cause , and god is the object respected , the making of satisfaction by undergoing punishment , and expiating of sin by a propitiatory sacrifice , are but various expressions of the same thing . now those whoso devoted themselves , as was said , to dye in the stead of others , or to expiate their sins , and turn away the anger of the god they feared by their death , designed two things in what they did . first , that the evils which were impendent on the people and feared , might fall on themselves , so that the people might go free . secondly , that all good things which themselves desired , might be conferred on the people ; which things have a notable shaddow in them of the great expiatory sacrifice concerning which we treat , and expound the expressions wherein it is declared . the instance of the decii , is known ; of whom the poet , plebeiae deciorum animae , plebeia fuerunt nomina ; pro totis legionibu● hitam●n , & pro omnibus auxiliis , atque omni plehe latins . sufficiunt diis infernis . the two decii , father and son , in imminent dangers of the people , devoted themselves , at several times , unto death and destruction . and saith he ; sufficiunt diis infernis ; they satisfied for the whole people ; adding the reason whence so it might be ; pluris enim decii quam qui servantur ab illis . they were more to be valued , than all that were saved by them . and the great historian doth excellently describe both the actions , and expectations of the one and the other in what they did . the father , when the roman army commanded by himself and titus m●nlius , was near a total ruine by the latines , called for the publick priest , and caused him with the usual solemn ceremonies , to devote him to death , for the deliverance and safety of the army : after which making his requests to his gods , ( dii quorum est potestas nostrorum hostiumque ) the gods that had power over them and their adversaries , as he supposed , he cast himself into death by the swords of the enemy . conspectus ab utraque acie aliquanto augustior humano visu , sicut coelo missus , piaculum omnis deorum irae , qui pestem ab suis aversam in hostes ferret . he was looked on by both armies , as one more august than a man , as one sent from heaven , to be a piacular sacrifice ; to appease the anger of the gods , and to transferre destruction from their own army to the enemies , liv. hist. . his son in like manner in a great and dangerous battel against the galls and samnites ; wherein he commanded in chief , devoting himself as his father had done , added unto the former solemn deprecations ; prae se , agere sese , formidinem ac fugam , caedemque ac cruorem , coel stium , infernorum iras , lib. . that he carryed away before him , ( from those for whom he devoted himself ) fear and flight , slaughter and blood , the anger of the coelestial and infernal gods . and as they did in this devoting of themselves design , averuncare malum , deûm iras , lustrare p●pulum , aut exercitum , piaculum fieri or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , expiare crimina , scelus , reatum , or to remove all evil from others by taking it on themselves in their stead ; so also they thought they might , and intended in what did , to covenant and contract for the good things they desired . so did these decii , and so is menaeceus reported to have done ▪ when he devoted himself for the city of thebes in danger to be destroyed by the argives . so papinius introduceth him treating his gods , armorum superi , tuque , ô quifunere tanto indulges mihi phoebe mori , date gaudia thebis , quae pepegi , & toto quae sanguine prodi gus emi . he reckoned that he had not only repelled all death and danger from thebes , by his own , but that he had purchased joy , in peace and liberty for the people . and where there was none in publick calamities , that did voluntarily devote themselves , the people were wont to take some obnoxious person , to make him exercra●le , and to lay on him according to their superstition , all the wrath of their gods , and so give him up to destruction . such the apostle alludes unto , rom. . . cor. . , . so the massilians were wont to explate their city by taking a person devoted , imprecating on his head all the evil that the city was obnoxious unto , casting him into the sea with th●se words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be thou our expiatory sacrifice ; to which purpose were the solemn words that many used in their expiatory sacrifices ; as herodotus test●fieth of the aegyptians , bringing their offerings , saith he , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; they laid these imprecations on their heads ; that if any evil were happening towards the sacrificer , or all egypt , let it be all turned and laid on this devoted head . and the persons whom they thus dealt withall , and made execrate , were commonly of the vilest of the people , or such as had rendred themselves detestable by their own crimes ; whence was the complaint of the mother of m●naeceus upon her sons devoting himself , lustralemne feris , ego te puer inclyte thebis , d●votumque caput , vilis seu mater alebam ? i have recounted these instances to evince the common intention , sense , and understanding of that expression , of one dying for another ; and to manifest by examples , what is the sense of mankind , about any ones being devoted and substituted in the room of others , to deliver them from death and danger ; the consideration whereof , added to the constant use of the words mentioned , in the scripture , is sufficient to f●●nd and confirm this conclusion . that whereas it is fr●quently affirmed , in the scripture , th●ir christ dyed for us , and for our sins , &c. to deny that he dyed and suffered in our stead , undergoing the death whereunto we were obnoxious , and the punishment due to our sins , is ; if we respect in what we say or believe ▪ the constant use of those words in the scripture , the nature of the thing it self concerning which they are used , the uncontrolled use of that expression in all sorts of writers , in expressing the same thing , which the instances and examples of its meaning and intention among the nations of the world , is to deny that he dyed for us at all . neither will his dying for our good or advantage only , in what way or sense soever , answer or make good , or true , the assertion of his dying for us , and our sins . and this is evident in the death of the apostles and martyrs ; they all dyed for our good ; our advantage and benefit was one end of their sufferings , in the will and appointment of god ; and yet it cannot be said , that they dyed for us , or our sins . and if christ dyed only for our good , though in a more effectual manner than they did , yet this altereth not the kind of his dying for us ; nor can he thence be said properly , according to the only due sense of that expression , so to do . i shall in this brief and hasty discourse , add only one consideration more about the death of christ to confirm the truth pleaded for . and that is that he is said in dying for sinners , to bear their sins , isa. . . he shall bear their iniquities , v. . he bare the sins of many ; explained , v. . he was wounded for our transgressions , he was bruised for our iniquities , the chastisement of our peace was upon him , pet. . . who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree , &c. this expression is purely sacred . it occurreth not directly in other authors , though the sense of it in other words do frequently . they call it luere peccata ; that is , delictorum supplicium ferre ; to bear the punishment of sins . the meaning therefore of this phrase of speech , is to be taken from the scripture alone , and principally from the old testament , where it is originally used ; and from whence it is tranferred into the new testament in the same sense , and no other . let us consider some of the places . isa. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used , vers . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and our griefs he hath born them . the word signifies , properly to bear a weight or a burden , as a man bears it on his shoulders ; bajulo , porto . and it is never used with respect unto sin , but openly and plainly it signifies the undergoing of the punishment due unto it ; so it occurrs directly to our purpose , lam. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 our fathers have sinned and are not ; and we have born their iniquities ; the punishment due to their sins . and why a new sense should be forged for these words , when they are spoken concerning christ , who can give a just reason ? again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used to the same purpose . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vers . . and he bear the sin of many . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is often used with respect unto sin ; sometimes with reference unto gods actings about it , and sometimes with reference unto mens concerns in it . in the first way , or when it denotes an act of god , it signifies to lift up , to take away , or pardon sin ; and leaves the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where with it is joyned under its first signification , of iniquity ; or the g●ilt of sin , with respect unto punishment ensuing as its consequent . for god pardoning the guilt of sin , the removal of the punishment doth necessarily ensue ; guilt containing an obligation unto punishment . in the latter way , as it respects men or sinners , it constantly denotes the bearing of the punishment of sin , and gives that sense unto 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , with respect unto the guilt of sin as its cause . and hence ariseth the ambiguity of those words of cain , gen. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 denotes an act of god , if the words be spoken with reference in the first place to any acting of his towards cain , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 retains the sense of iniquity , and the words are rightly rendered , my sin is greater than to be fogiven . if it respect cain himself firstly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assumes the signification of punishment , and the words are to be rendred ; my punishment is greater than i can bear , or is to be born by me . this i say is the constant sense of this expression , nor can any instance to the contrary be produced . some may be mentioned in the confirmation of it . numb . . . your children shall wander in the wilderness forty years , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and shall bear your whoredoms , v. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ye sh●ll bear your in quities forty years ; that is , the punishment due to your whoredoms and iniquities , according to gods provideneial d●aling with them at that time . lev. . . he that eateth it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shall bear his iniquities , how ? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that s●ul shall be cut off . to b● cut off for sin , by the punishment of it , and for its guilt , is to bear in quity . so chap. ● , . for a man to bear his iniquity , and to be killed , slain , or put to death for it , are the same . ezek. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the soul that sinneth it shall dye ; the son shall not bear the sin of the father . to bear sin , and to dye for sin , are the same . more instances might be added , all uniformity speaking the same sense of the words . and as this sense is sufficiently indeed invincibly established by the invariable use of that expression in the scripture , so the manner whereby it is affirmed that the lord christ bare our iniquities , sets it absolutely free from all danger by opposition . for he bare our iniquities when 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the lord made to meet on him , or laid on him , the iniquity of us all , isa. . . which words the lxx . render , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the lord gave him up , or delivered him unto our sins . that is , to be punished for them ; for other sense the words can have none ; he made him sin for us , cor. . . so he bore our sins , isa. . . how ? in his own body on the tree , pet. . . that when he was , and in his being stricken , smitten , afflicted , wounded , bruised , slain , so was the chastisement of our peace upon him . wherefore to deny that the lord christ in his death and suffering for us , underwent the punishment due to our sins , what we had deserved , that we might be delivered , as it everts the great foundation of the gospel , so by an open perverting of the plain words of the scripture , because not suited in their sense and importance to the vain imaginations of men , it gives no small countenance to infidelity and atheism . finis . a modest examination of the authority and reasons of the late decree of the vice-chancellor of oxford, and some heads of colleges and halls concerning the heresy of three distinct infinite minds in the holy and ever-blessed trinity / by william sherlock ... sherlock, william, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a modest examination of the authority and reasons of the late decree of the vice-chancellor of oxford , and some heads of colleges and halls ; concerning the heresy of three distinct infinite-minds in the holy and ever-blessed trinity . by william sherlock , d. d. dean of st. paul's , master of the temple , and chaplain in ordinary to his majesty . london : printed for w. rogers , at the sun against st. dunstan's church in fleetstreet . mdcxcvi . a modest examination of the oxford decree , &c. no man has truer honour and reverence for that great and learned body of the university of oxford , nor has paid more just civilities and respects to any of the heads or members of it , as i have happened to be acquainted with them , than my self ; which makes it very uneasy to me , that there should be the least appearance of any quarrel or disrespect on either side . i can despise a thousand jacobite stories , even with all the additional comments and flourishes of a malicious animadverter ; and justify my neglect and silence , to my self , who am most nearly concerned in it : for many of those stories i can only deny , because i know nothing of them , but only this , that according to my principles and inclinations , it was morally impossible that i should say or do such things : and what i do remember any thing of , is falsly reported ; and yet cannot be rectified without betraying the privacies of conversation , as my accusers have done , and reflecting sharply upon some who have been old friends , whatever they are now ; which are such hateful vices , and so destructive to the innocent freedoms of conversation , that nothing but absolute necessity can justify or apologize for the least approaches to them . but the charge of heresy is of a different nature , especially considering my profession , character , and station in the church , which will not admit of a complemental silence : that if it should be thought too bold and daring to enter the lists with these oxford heads , that force and necessity which they themselves have put upon me , and which a very modest man neither can nor ought to resist , i hope will excuse it . but how come i to be concerned in this decree , which only censures one of their own members , for some passages in a sermon about the trinity ; which , as it is said , gave just occasion of offence and scandal to many ? how many were offended , i can't tell ; whether they had just cause of offence , shall be examined presently ; but how much soever they were offended , they did not think it deserved such a censure : for when a warm zealot promoted a petition to the vice-chancellor for a censure , he could persuade but one master of arts to subscribe it . but though this decree was occasioned by this oxford preacher , yet every one knew as soon as they saw it or heard of it , that it was aimed against me : i 'm sure these gentlemen knew very well what work there has been made with three distinct infinite minds or spirits . the animadverter had railed himself out of breath , and then calls for a decretum oxoniense to help him ; which was the wisest thing he could do ; for his reason will never do any hurt ; but such a decretum might furnish him with new topicks of railing . it happen'd as luckily for the purpose as if it had been contrived , that this preacher used some of the same expressions which i had done , and which the animadverter had charged with tritheism , viz. three distinct infinite minds and spirits . this was an opportunity not to be neglected , to obtain his desired decree : dr. south sollicited the cause with such zeal and importunity , as could not be resisted ; and , as i am informed , prepared the way for it in a furious sermon the sunday before , wherein he upbraided them , as being afraid to condemn heresy , deism , socinianism , tritheism , lest they should fall from ecclesiastical grace , and the door of preferment should be shut against them ; which was a very civil complement both to them and to the governors of our church . some of the wisest heads among them , and who were most concerned in a decree of heresy , were absent ; others absented themselves ; and some who were present in the convention , dissented , alledging , that their proceedings were irregular , and not according to their statutes . but some of the animadverters complexion and interest , with great zeal over-ruled the rest , and the decree was past , and printed in latin , in these words : in conventu d. vice-cancellarii & prefectorum collegiorum & aularum vniversitatis oxon. die vicesimo quinto novembris . a. d. . cum in concione nuper habitâ coram universitate oxon. in templo s. petri in oriente , ad festum ss . simonis & judae proxime elapsum , haec verba , inter alia , publice prolata & asserta suerunt , viz. [ there are three infinite distinct minds and substances in the trinity . ] item [ that the three persons in the trinity are three distinct infinite minds or spirits , and three individual substances . ] quae verba multis justam offensionis causam & scandalum dedêre : dominus vice-cancellarius & praefecti collegiorum & aularum , in generali suo conventu jam congregati , judicant , declarant , & decernunt , praedicta verba esse falsa , impia , & heretica ; dissona & contraria doctrinae ecclesiae catholicae , & speciatim doctrinae ecclesiae anglicanae , publice receptae . quapropter praecipiunt & firmiter injungunt omnibus & singulis , eorum fidei & curae commissis , ne ●ale aliquod dogma , in concionibus , aut aliàs , in posterum proferant . ex decreto domini vice-cancellarii & prefectorum ben. cooper not. publicus & registrarius vniversitatis oxon. whoever drew up this decree , some criticks say he need not brag much of his skill in latin , having transgressed the plain rules of grammar , in using eorum fidei & curae , for suae . but this latin decree did not satisfy the animadverter , but for the benefit and edification of english readers , he ( as is easy to guess ) translates it , and adds a notable title , and a notable remark to it . the title is , an account of the decree of the vniversity of oxford , against some heretical tenets . the remark by way of postscript is , it may be noted , that the propositions above-mentioned are dr. s — k's in his discourse of the trinity , and the defenders of it , and wrote against by the animadverter , &c. which is as good english as the other is latin : and yet this did not satisfy him , till he had published this oxford decree against dr. sherlock in one of the weekly prints . spectatum admissi ! certainly he thinks there is no standing against this oxford decree ; and therefore in the first place let us briefly examine the authority of it . he calls it , the decree of the vniversity of oxford ; which is a mere sham ; for some heads of colleges and halls were never yet thought the vniversity of oxford : but that great and learned body , if they will vindicate their own rights , are more concerned in this than i am . the decree of an oxford convocation is indeed decretum oxoniense , or a decree of the university of oxford : this is what the animadverter called for , and this he would persuade the world he has ; but let the oxford convocation look to this , which may prove an ill president . but i am inform'd ( for i confess i know not their statutes my self ) that this decree of the heads of colleges and halls , is so far from being the decree of the vniversity of oxford , that it is no judicial nor authoritative decree at all ; not so much as for censuring a preacher , much less for declaring and decreeing heresy . their statutes refer such censures to the vice-chancellor , and six heads , doctors of divinity , and to one or both the professors of divinity ; but give no such authority to the general meeting of the heads , much less to heads , who are no divines , nor doctors in divinity ; and some such there were in this meeting . so that this pretended decree of the vniversity of oxford , is no more than the private opinions of some heads ; and if that be so venerable an authority , i will undertake any day in the year , to procure a meeting of twice as many , as wise and learned men , to censure their decree . but supposing their authority to be just and regular , there is another very proper question , how far their authority extends ? whether to the declaring and decreeing heresy ? whatever the convocation of the university may challenge , this was never before pretended to by the heads of colleges and halls . all the authority i can learn their statutes give them in such cases , is to summon the preacher , who has said any thing in his sermon contrary to the doctrine of the church of england , and to require a publick recantation from him , or to forbid him ever to preach again in the vniversity : whereas nothing of all this was done ; the preacher not summoned to this meeting , nor his name , as far as i can learn , once mentioned in it ; no recantation enjoined , no prohibition of his preaching again : but instead of this , which was their proper business , they declare and decree heresy , which so many masters of arts might have done with as good authority , where ever they had met . and they ought , ( notwithstanding all their zeal against heresy ) to have advised with men of skill , how far such an irregular and unstatutable proceeding might affect them . the authority of declaring and making heresy , may be of such pernicious consequence to the peace of any church , that it is not fit to be intrusted with any body of men less then a national synod ; for otherwise we may have as many different and contrary religions , as there are declarers and decreers of heresy . in the statute eliz. ca. . we find the power to order , determine , or adjudge any matter or cause to be heresy , restrained only to such as heretofore have been determined , ordered , or adjudged to be heresy by the authority of the canonical scriptures : or by the first four general councils : or by any other general council , wherein the same was declared heresy by the express and plain words of the said canonical scriptures : or such as hereafter shall be ordered , judged , or determined to be heresy , by the high court of parliament of this realm , with the assent of the clergy in their convocation . and if the king could not grant a greater authority than this to his high commissioner for ecclesiastical affairs , it is not likely that any other body of men have it ; and my lord cook says , that this is a direction to others , especially to bishops in their adjudgng heresy , instit. pa. . and how they have observed this law in their decree , they had best consider . oxford reasons have formerly had a very just veneration paid to them , and will have so still , whenever they are penned with the same strength and clearness ; but they have a greater opinion of their authority , than i can find the rest of the world has , if they think by a meer decree , without pretending to give the least reason for it , to silence all disputes , and to bear down all reasons , and all authorities on the other side but since these heads are pleased to take part in the quarrel , which one would have thought they need not have done , had they not suspected the success of their animadverting champion ; i accept this exchange with all thankfulness . as for the animadverter , he might for me have writ on as long as he pleased , and have railed and triumphed as much as he pleased , and the world might have judged of him , and his performances , as they pleased : his last book i have read nothing of , and could never persuade my self to read all his first book ; there is such an evil spirit and such venom in his writings , as is enough to give an unchristian tincture to those who read them : he resolved never to answer any one but my self ; and i resolved never to read what he writ ; and thus there was some hope to see an end of this matter , when he grew weary of writing , or his bookseller of printing . but now i hope to meet with no new animadverters , who shall all fare alike with me ; but with men of ingenuity and candor , good learning , and good tempers , who will reason without sophistry and misrepresentations , weigh authorities in an equal balance , and contend for truth , not for victory ; and then it is indifferent to me whether i overcome , or am overcome ; for truth is better than victory , and will make an honest man triumph in being conquered . having thus considered the authority of this decree , which the animadverter so much glories in , let us now examine the decree it self . these words , three distinct infinite minds , and three substances , as applied to the three persons of the ever-blessed trinity , are singled out in this decree , and parted from the body of the sermon , without any thing to explain in what sense the preacher used them ; and therefore we must conclude , that these words are absolutely condemned , as false , impious , and heretical : that though a mind in this place signifies an intelligent person ; and substance a substantial person ; and three infinite intelligent persons , and three infinite substantial persons , is the catholick faith ; as i doubt not to make appear ; yet three distinct infinite minds , and three substances , when they are used in no other sense , than for three intelligent and substantial persons , must be condemned as impious and heretical . these are wonderful nice criticks , to make the same doctrine , owned and acknowledged to be the same , in one form of words to be truly catholick and orthodox , and in another form of words , which do and are intended to signify the same thing , false , impious , and heretical : this is a strange magical power of words ; hoc est corpus in the mouth of a popish priest , never were pretended to make a more miraculous transubstantiation . i wish it at last appear that these gentlemen do really believe three infinite intelligent persons , and three substantial persons in the trinity ; for let them distinguish as subtilly as they please , an intelligent person is a mind , and a substantial person is a substance , and three are three ; of which more presently . there may indeed be a very heretical sense put upon these words : to say , that there are three infinite minds or persons ( for the heresy is the same , whatever the word be ) wholly divided and separated from each other , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; three absolute principlees , independent on each other , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; three unbegotten ones , without any relation to each other , as father , son , and spirit ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : three substances in the arian notion , for three distinct kinds and species of substance ; or three natures and essences specifically different : all this , i say , is false , impious , and heretical , and has been condemned as such by the catholick church . and could they have affix'd any such sense as this on the preacher's words , they would have done well to have shewn it ; and then they had done very justly and religiously , in condemning such an impious sense of these words : but to condemn words , in themselves very orthodox , as impious and heretical , without giving the least intimation wherein their impiety and heresy consists , is a new way of proceeding , which they never learnt from any of the ancient councils . but party - shibboleths always do the best execution , the less they are understood . the charge is drawn up as fully and emphatically as it is possible . . that these aforesaid words are false . . that they are impious . . heretical . . contrary to the doctrine of the catholick church . and . in particular contrary to the doctrine of the church of england , as publickly received . this they judge , declare , and determine ; and had they proved it too , they had done all at once ; but now the hardest part still remains ; and men who will not take their bare word for it , will judge all over again . and i hope it will give no offence to that great and learned body of the university of oxford , to examine the rash and hasty judgment of some of the heads of their colleges and halls . in order to this , i shall briefly premise some few plain observations , the more effectually to shew the rashness and injudiciousness of this decree . as . that no form of words is to be condemned as false , impious , and heretical , which do not necessarily and manifestly contain a false , impious , and heretical sense : words may be new , unusual , inconvenient , and want the stamp of ecclesiastical authority , which are not false , impious , or heretical . these are very different crimes , to broach new words , and new heresies , when the words themselves are not manifestly heretical . and certainly such men ought to have understood this , who take upon them to be judges of heresy . nay , dly . such new forms of speech as are liable to an heretical sense , are not therefore to be rejected , if they are of use to secure the true catholick faith , and those who use them declare the orthodox sense wherein they use them . all learned men know , that the homoousion it self was charged with as many heresies as any other word can well be : some charged it with sabellianism ; others with a division and partition of the divine substance ; as if the son 's being begotten of his father's substance , and so being consubstantial , or of one substance with him , signified such an efflux and emanation as divided the father's substance , and communicated part of it to the son : but when the catholick fathers rejected these perverse and heretical senses of the word , and declared in what sense they used it , in opposition to the arian heresy , and that it was the most significant word which could be used to that purpose , and which those subtle hereticks , who equivocated in all other forms of words , could by no means elude , the nicene council received it into their creed ; and eusebius of caesarea , and some others , who at first scrupled the use of that word , subscribed to it , when they were satisfied of its orthodox signification . it is reasonable for all men to consider this , who pretend to find heresy in words , whether those who use them , own that heretical sense which they charge upon them ; for otherwise they may as well condemn the homoousion , as false , impious , and heretical , as three distinct infinite minds and spirits , if they have no regard to the sense of those who use these words , nor to the end for which they are used . . and if we will ever allow of unscriptural words to explain and secure the catholick faith , ( which none but secret or open hereticks ever quarrel'd at ) there may be the same reason and necessity for it in our age , that ever there was in any age of the christian church ; and then it is as justifiable now , as ever it was . the church never had authority to make a new faith , but always had , and always will have , authority to declare and explain the true catholick faith in such words as are most aptly expressive of it , and necessary to countermine the arts and evasions of hereticks . this apology the nicene fathers made for putting the homoousion into their creed , as st. athanasius declares at large , in his book de decretis synodi nicaenae . the arians made a shift to reconcile their heresy to all other forms of words , by the homoousion detected their hypocrisy and heresy : this was too plain and express to be evaded by equivocal senses , and therefore they could never be reconciled to it ; and the catholick fathers thought that a very necessary reason for the use of it . now if such expressions as these , three distinct infinite minds and spirits , or three substances , be as necessary in our age to detect and oppose sabellianism , and to secure the catholick faith of a real , substantial trinity , ( which is all that is intended by them ) as the homoousion was at the time of the nicene council , to detect and oppose arianism ; this will justify the use of such expressions , how novel soever they may be thought ; and what necessity there is for this in our age , will appear presently . . it is a sufficient justification of any unscriptural forms of words in articles of faith , that though the express words are not found in scripture , yet all that is , and that is intended to be signified by those words , is found in scripture ; for no words can be false , impious , and heretical , which contain the true catholick faith , as taught in scripture : thus athanasius and the other nicene fathers answer that arian objection against the homoousion , that it is not to be found in scripture ; that though the word is not in scripture , the faith signified by that word is ; and thus st. augustine particularly defends it in his dispute with pascentius . . no expressions can be said to be contrary to the doctrine of the catholick church , which have been used by catholick fathers , either in the same or in equivalent terms , and contain that doctrine which the catholick fathers always taught . having premised this , let us now examine the censure , which these oxford heads have made of these propositions : there are three infinite distinct minds and substances in the trinity ; item , that the three persons in the trinity are three distinct infinite minds or spirits , and three individual substances . that is , i suppose , as much individual substances , as they are individual persons . it is evident , that all this relates only to the notion of the trinity , and to the notion of a divine person , and of three divine persons in the trinity ; and therefore the unity of the godhead is not concerned in this , which belongs to another question , how these three are one ; of which more when i examine the heresy charged on these words . . but the first charge is , that they are false : i wish they had told us what in them is false ; but since they have made no distinction , we must suppose they mean that all these words are false . is it false then , that each person in the ever-blessed trinity is by himself in his own person a distinct , infinite mind , spirit , or substance ? is not god the father an infinite mind or spirit ? is not god the son , the substantial word and wisdom of the father , an infinite mind or spirit ? is not god the holy ghost , that eternal spirit , which knoweth the things of god , as the spirit of a man knoweth the things of a man , an eternal mind or spirit ? or is not an infinite mind and spirit a substance , the most real perfect substance ; that is in the world , which gives substance and subsistence to all other things ? is not the father considered as an infinite mind and spirit , distinct from the son and the holy ghost ; the son distinct from the father and the holy ghost ; the holy ghost distinct from the father and the son ? to deny any thing of all this , is downright sabellianism , and destroys a real substantial trinity , which is as essential to the christian faith , as the unity of the godhead is . the only quarrel then , that i can imagine , against these words is this ; that tho the father be a distinct infinite mind , and the son a distinct infinite mind , and the holy ghost a distinct infinite mind , yet according to the catholick form of speech , we must not say that there are three distinct infinite minds , but one infinite mind or spirit or substance : now i grant that in the sense of the homoousion , or consubstantiality , this is very true and orthodox , in which sense st. jerom condemned tres substantias or three substances ; and st. austin , who allowed that the father is a spirit , the son a spirit , and the holy ghost a spirit , yet denied , that there are three spirits , but one spirit ; but when we apply this to persons , it is gross sabellianism to say , that there are not three personal minds , or spirits or substances , but only one mind spirit , or substance ; for then there can be but one person too , for one personal mind is but one person . let us consider what a mind is , and how we can know whether there be but one , or more distinct minds . the substance of a mind i know nothing of , no more than i do what the naked substance of body or matter is ; but the true notion of a mind is a thinking being , and therefore where ever we find the acts of knowledge , understanding and will , there is a mind ; and where there are distinct personal acts of knowledge and will , there are distinct personal minds . now if we believe the scripture , the father knows the son , and the son knows the father ; the father wills , and the son by a distinct personal act , wills with the father , and what the father wills ; the father works , and the son works , and sees all that the father doth , and doth the same things . thus the fathers proved against the sabellians the real and substantial distinction of persons in the unity of the godhead , from those distinct personal acts which are attributed in scripture to father , son , and holy ghost ; which having a mutual relation to each other , require distinct persons for their subjects ; and since all the instances they give ( as may be seen in tertullian against praxeas , novatian in his book of the trinity , athanasius against the sabellians , st. hilary , st austin , and all that have writ on this argument ) are acts of a mind , as well as of a person , they must prove ( if they prove any thing ) distinct minds as well as persons ; for if one singular solitary mind may be the subject of such distinct acts as necessarily suppose more than one , one person may be so too ; and then there is no possible way left to confute sabellianism , or to prove a real trinity of distinct substantial persons . it is very evident , that both the sabellians , and the catholick fathers in this controversy understood the same thing by person , which we do by mind or spirit : by person the sabellians meant such a person as is true and perfect god ; and therefore the most real substance , an infinite mind and spirit ; and for this reason they rejected three persons for fear of three gods , which always was , and is still the objection against a real substantial trinity ; for there is no danger , that three names , or notions , or modes , should be a trinity of gods. notwithstanding this , the catholick fathers allow their notion of a person , and prove against them such a trinity of persons as they rejected , each of which is true and perfect god. now since person is the catholick word , which long ecclesiastical use has made familiar , i should by no means allow of any other word in this mystery , could we retain the old catholick faith , together with the word : but when men make no more of a person , than a meer mode , and a trinity of modes in one singular nature , and substance , must pass for a trinity of divine persons , which was the heresy of sabellius , who contended for one singular solitary nature or subsistence in god , and was not much concerned by what name you called the three , so they were not three substantial subsisting persons ; for he never dreamt that there could be three real substantial persons in one singular nature ; i say , when this heresy is reviv'd under a new name , we are under a necessity of saying in more express words , what the fathers meant by person , if we will retain the catholick faith , as well as the word . would men but give themselves a little liberty of thinking , they would see how impossible it is to find a medium between a real trinity and sabellianism , however disguis'd . the three persons in the blessed trinity are either three substantial persons , or they are not ; to deny them to be substantial is sabellianism , whatever else we call them : there must be either one singular solitary substance in the deity , or three distinct personal substances : the first is the fundamental article of the sabellian creed , and a direct contradiction to the doctrine of the trinity , for one singular , solitary nature or substance , is but one person ; for which reason the sabellians so earnestly contended for it , and the catholick fathers so vigorously oppos'd it : and if we own three distinct substantial persons in the trinity , we must own three distinct personal substances ; for a distinct substantial person must have a distinct substance of his own , proper and peculiar to his own person : that though the father and the son are of one substance , as the son is begotten of the substance of the father , and consubstantial with him ; yet the personal substance of the son is no more the personal substance of the father , than the father is the person of the son , or the son the person of the father : and therefore there is a manifest sabellian fallacy in it , which it is impossible to make sense of , to say , that the father is an infinite mind , the son an infinite mind , and the holy ghost an infinite mind ; that the father is substance , the son substance , the holy ghost substance , and yet that there are not three personal minds , or three personal substances , but one singular mind and substance ; for this is to be one and three in the same sense ; which is not mystery , but contradiction . there has been a nice dispute about the singular and plural predication , when we speak of god ; that since in the unity of the godhead there are three and one , what it is we may call three , and what one : this is the whole pretence , as far as i can guess , for the oxford censure , that minds and substances are spoke of in the plural number . now this seems to me to be a very plain case , that if in the ever blessed trinity there be three and one , that wherein they are three may be said to be three ; but that wherein they are but one , must be said to be but one ; for otherwise three are not three , nor one one ; which must either destroy the faith of the trinity , or of the vnity . that there are three persons , and one god , is the catholick language ; and therefore three belongs to the persons , and one to the godhead : and therefore whatever is absolutely essential to the notion of a distinct person , may be number'd and distinguish'd with the persons ; for whatever is included in the notion of a person , though it be number'd with the persons , no more affects the unity of the godhead , than a trinity of persons does . if then a person be a mind , a spirit , a substance , three such persons must be three as distinct minds , spirits , or substances , as they are distinct fersons ; and three such personal minds , spirits , or substances , are as reconcileable with the unity of the godhead , as three substantial persons ; for the three belongs to the persons , who are three , not to the godhead , which is but one ; of which more presently . as for that phrase of three individual substances , it seems more obnoxious , because individual may signifie , and does in common use , more than barely distinct , even a separate substance , as all other individuals are ; and an individual carries with it a relation to a species ; and though the ancient fathers do indeed mention frequently a specifick unity of nature in the godhead , they did not confine the unity of the divine nature to this , which is a meer logical and notional unity : the divine nature is no species , for it is but one , and therefore the unity of the godhead is the most real , essential , indivisible , inseparable unity . but how incautious soever the expression is , the preacher seems to have had no ill meaning in it ; and therefore this might have been corrected , but not so heavily censur'd , especially since boethius his definition of a person might have led him to it , rationabilis naturae individua substantia , the individual substance of a rational nature : and if this may be allow'd a good definition of a divine person , whatever belongs to the definition of a person , may be number'd and distinguished with the persons . . thus much for the first charge , that these words are false ; the next is much heavier , that they are impious . now there are but two things wherein the impiety of any doctrine can consist , either in teaching some wickedness , or in reproaching and blaspheming the deity . now what wickedness does this doctrine of a real substantial trinity , a trinity of three infinite personal minds , teach us ? unless to worship father , son , and holy ghost with the most humble and devout adorations , be impiety . this indeed it does teach us , and this we do , and this no other notion of a trinity can teach us , or justifie us in doing : for is any other trinity but a real substantial trinity , the object of a religious adoration ? can we without impiety , distinctly worship , as we do in our litany , three distinct persons , who are not each of them distinctly in their own persons , infinite mind and spirit ? is a mode , a posture , a somewhat , without any name or notion belonging to it , the object of religious worship ? is it possible in the nature of the thing , for any man , who believes but one singular , solitary , divine nature , to worship three with a distinct worship , without any conception of a real , substantial , distinction between them ? can any man honour the son , as he honours the father , as a distinct object , and with distinct acts of worship , who does not believe the son to be as truly and substantially a divine person , as the father is , and as distinct a person from the father , as adam and abel were distinct persons , tho not separate persons , as they were ? men may please themselves with subtil distinctions , but they can never distinguish themselves nor others out of their sense and feeling ; and i appeal to all mankind , whether distinct acts of worship do not require distinct objects , as really distinct as their worship is ? whether they can distinctly worship , three names , or modes , or somewhats , when there is but one real substantial subject or suppositum of them all ? if they can , their devotion is as airy , subtil , and unintelligible , as their distinctions are . does this doctrine then of a real substantial trinity , of three infinite personal minds , reproach or blaspheme the deity ? i do not now dispute with the antitrinitarian hereticks , who are professedly so , who charge the doctrine it self with blasphemy , but with those who profess to believe a trinity , but charge the doctrine of a real , substantial trinity with impiety ; and therefore shall confine my self only to them . is it any reproach then to the ever blessed trinity to affirm , that each person is by himself a distinct infinite mind ? is an infinite mind then a term of reproach and blasphemy ? does not an infinite mind signifie all the perfections of a deity ? and is this blasphemy ? i beseech you against whom ? against father , son , or holy ghost ? and is not each of these divine persons a distinct infinite mind ? or is it blasphemy to say , what they are ? or when each of these divine persons is a distinct infinite mind , is it blasphemy to say , that three divine persons are three distinct infinite minds ? that is , will the three divine persons of the ever blessed trinity , when each of them is , and is owned to be a distinct infinite mind , think themselves reproach'd to be call'd three ? and if the divine persons will not think themselves blasphem'd by this , there is no danger that the divine nature should : for the divine nature is whole and entire in each divine person , and there is no danger but three distinct infinite minds must have the same one divine nature , for infinite , infinite , and infinite , are but one and the same infinite nature . but as i take it , the danger of blasphemy is on the other side : for if they deny the three persons of the trinity to be three distinct infinite minds , which of these divine persons , father , son , or holy ghost , will they deny to be an infinite mind ? for when we know him , we must strike him out of the trinity , as not being true and perfect god : or if they allow person to signifie the same thing , when applied to the father , to the son , or to the holy ghost , then neither of these persons is a divine infinite mind , or each of them is , and then there are three , as there are three persons , or there is never a divine infinite mind among them all ; the consequence of which is so blasphemous , that i know not whether i may venture to say it , for fear the animadverter should serve me , as he has done once already , to make these consequences my own doctrine : but yet i will tell these gentlemen , what a bolder man , than i am , would venture to say upon this occasion , that if a divine person , as a person , and as distinct from the other persons , be not an infinite mind , there is an end of the christian trinity , in which every person is true and perfect god , which no person is , who is not an infinite mind ; and therefore if any one person , considered in his distinct personal capacity , be not an infinite mind , he does not belong to the christian trinity ; and if all the persons are in this respect alike , that not any one of them , in his distinct personal capacity , is a distinct infinite mind , then there is no trinity at all ; and if they will find a god , when they have renounced a trinity , it must be one singular divine nature , which they themselves will not allow to be a person : and thus we have lost a trinity , and lost a god , who is a person . this is plain sence , and i fear , neither thomas , nor scotus , can help them out . but let us suppose ( and i am sure they ought to be thankful for such a supposition , for their notion of a person will not admit it , unless they understand one thing by a person when apply'd to the father , and another when apply'd to the son , and holy spirit ; but i say , let us suppose ) that the divine nature is originally in the person of the father , or that the father is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the unbegotten , self originated god , as he certainly is , and therefore a divine substantial person , who is essentially god : now the very name of father is a relative term , and signifies that he has a son , begotten of himself ; and let any man consider which sounds most like blasphemy , both against the father and the son , to say , that the father begets a son , who is his own perfect likeness and image , the express character of his own substance ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) of the same substance with himself , but distinct in substance , as father and son are , true and perfect god , as his father is , without any other the least difference , but that one is the father , and the other the son ; or to say , that the father begets no substance at all , but only a mode , or a relation without a relative , in his own substance : that the father begets filiation , not a son , but sonship ; is not this to ridicule the divine generation , and to make sport for atheists and hereticks : if god begets no substance , he begets nothing real , nothing substantially distinct from himself , and therefore no substantial person ; and then neither god is a true and real father , nor the son a real son , which overthrows the whole mystery of our redemption , by the incarnation , death , and sufferings of the son of god : for god was not incarnate , if the divine nature was not incarnate : and if there be but one singular divine nature and substance in the deity , though they could find a trinity of persons in this one singular nature , the incarnation of this one singular nature is impossible , without the incarnation of the whole trinity . men may wrangle as long as they please about these matters , but it is a manifest contradiction to say , that the divine nature is incarnate in the son , and is not incarnate in the father and the holy ghost , when there is but one singular divine nature and substance in them all ; which is to say , that the same one singular nature is incarnate and is not incarnate ; and is , and is not , is a contradiction , or there never can be a contradiction . and now i leave it to all impartial judges on which side the impiety lies . . the third charge is heresie : but if it be neither false , nor impious , i hope there is no heresie in it neither : however , they would have done well to have given this heresie a name , that we might have known where to find it , who were the first authors of it , in what age of the church it began , and by what general councils it was condemn'd : for i can find no heresie in these censur'd words , but the heresie of a real substantial trinity , the heresie of three substantial persons , or of three personal minds and substances ; and i do not find any mention of this heresie in the ancient records of the church , unless those who called themselves catholicks were these hereticks ; for this was always their doctrine , as some of our modern orthodox zealots , and heresie-makers confess , and know not how to excuse them from heresie upon this account . well! if this be the case , we must be contented to be hereticks with all the ancient fathers , and the four first general councils : but these gentlemen should have remembred , that the church of england requires them to expound scripture , as the ancient catholick doctors expound it , and receives the four first general councils , where this heresie is in great perfection ; and it had not been amis , if some body had minded them , that the laws of england , as i observ'd before , forbid the declaring any doctrine to be heresie , which is not condemn'd for heresie in the four first general councils . but let fathers and councils , canons , or acts of parliament say what they please , they have a greater and more venerable authority than all of them : the animadverter has told them it is heresie , and has told them what heresie it is , no less than the heresie of tritheism . now i confess , i am much to seek what this heresie of tritheism is . it is not paganism , for the heathens did not stint themselves in the number of their gods ; they were polytheists , not tritheists , even the platonists themselves , though they own'd a trinity , a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or one divinity , which extended it self to three , which was essentially distinguish'd from all created nature , and from all their creature gods ; but they worshipped many gods besides , as the rest of the pagan world did . tritheism was never charg'd upon any men but the worshippers of the holy and ever blessed trinity , and it was charg'd upon them from the beginning by pagans and hereticks . the fear of this made noetus and sabellius deny three real substantial persons in the trinity , and made arius deny the true eternal divinity of the son , and holy spirit : but the catholick fathers despis'd this charge , and owned three distinct real substantial persons , each of them by himself to be true and perfect god , but not three gods , but one god : for thus the scripture had taught them to believe and speak , that there is but one god , and there are three , father , son , and holy ghost , who have all the perfections of the deity distinctly in themselves . so that this tritheism is a christian heresie if it be one , and was never charged upon christians by christians for several ages , but only by hereticks . the most orthodox christians were always most charg'd with it ; and some to avoid this charge , turn'd hereticks , and were condemn'd for such by the catholick church . it is true , in the declining monkish ages of the church , we sometimes hear of these tritheists ; but it is a very dark part of story , and i never cou'd find a satisfactory account what their opinions were , or why they were call'd so : it is not improbable but that they might fall into the hands of some malicious animadverter , who by zeal and faction might procure a new name and heresie to be decreed them ; for there is no new thing under the sun. but this has made me apt to suspect , that those who have been charg'd with tritheism , for professing the faith and worship of the ever blessed trinity , have been the most orthodox believers ; and that those who have so minc'd the matter as to escape the charge of tritheism from hereticks , have been hereticks themselves : a real substantial trinity , in which each person is by himself perfect god , has always been charged by hereticks with tritheism , for three , each of whom is true and perfect god , they say are three gods ; and yet this is the true christian trinity : but though men may laugh at a trinity of modes , you shall never hear them charge it with tritheism ; and what hereticks , who own but one personal god , cannot charge with tritheism , is no christian trinity ; that is , has not three persons , each of which is true and perfect god : so far are those gentlemen mistaken , who think it a piece of art and prudence to avoid all expressions which hereticks charge with tritheism ; for then they must renounce all words , which contain and express the ture catholick faith. at least i think , this should warn all men , who are not disguis'd atheists and infidels under the profession of christianity , to have a care of ridiculing father , son , and holy ghost , to be reveng'd of these tritheist hereticks , as the animadverter profanely does , who so often scoffs at me for my three gods , who never own'd any other god than father , son , and holy ghost , and pities the socinians as an unequal match for me , because they have but one god , and i have three ; nay compares father , son , and holy ghost to pagan gods , when he tells the world , that i curse him by my gods ; which is a manifest and impious allusion to goliath's cursing david by his gods. can he think that the dispute about three modes , or three minds in the unity of the godhead can justifie such blasphemies as these , against father , son , and holy ghost ? or is this to be suffered in a christian church ? whether i curse him or not , ( and i thank god , i curse no man , but pray for my worst enemies ) he may justly fear that such blasphemies will bring the curse of the ever blessed trinity on him ; and that will be no jeast . no man , who believes but one divine nature , which is originally in the father , and is substantially communicated by the father to the son , as a distinct subsisting person , by an eternal and ineffable generation ; and to the holy ghost by an eternal and substantial procession from father and son , can be a tritheist , whatever inconvenient expressions he may use , unless the doctrine of the trinity it self be tritheism . but let us consider the reason of this charge a little more particularly . they ask us , whether an eternal and infinite mind be not ture and perfect god ? yes , most certainly ; and for this reason we must assert , that the son is an eternal infinite mind , because he is true and perfect god. but if one infinite mind is true and perfect god , are not three infinite minds three gods ? this is easily answer'd , as far as we are concern'd to answer these men , only by changing minds for persons . is not an eternal , infinite person true and perfect god ? and if every eternal person , as a distinct person , be true and perfect god , are not three such distinct persons three gods ? the objection is the same ; and let them but answer for themselves , and they answer for us . but if each distinct person , and each distinct mind is true and perfect god , why may not the term god be number'd and distinguish'd as persons and minds are ? why may we not say that there are three gods as well as that there are three persons , or three minds ? this is the true difficulty , which as much affects the doctrine of the trinity it self , as any terms or expressions about it , whether three persons or three minds : nay though we give no name to these three , the difficulty is the same ; for if we own three , each of whom is true and perfect god , why are not these three three gods , when each of them is distinctly and by himself , true and perfect god ? now not to dispute this matter with the socinians , which is not my present business , there is a very plain account to be given of this to those who acknowledge a trinity ; why we may say that there are three infinite minds and spirits , each of which is true and perfect god , and yet must not , and ought not to say , that there are three gods. the reason , why we may say , that there are three distinct infinite minds , is , because there are three , each of whom is a distinct infinite mind , and three , each of whom is a distinct mind , are three distinct minds ; but the reason , why we must not say , there are three gods , is not , because there are not three , each of whom is distinctly , and by himself , true and perfect god , as every infinite mind is , for that is sabellianism ; but because there is but one and the same divinity , or godhead , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in them all ; and therefore though there are three distinct persons , or minds , each of whom is distinctly , and by himself ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) god , yet there are not three gods , but one god , or one divinity : and if they will not allow , that the same one divinity or godhead , may be entirely , and indivisible and inseparably in three distinct persons or minds , there is an end of a trinity in unity , of three persons and one god. for if the whole divine nature cannot subsist intirely , indivisibly , and inseparably , and yet distinctly in three , either there cannot be three , each of whom is distinctly and by himself god , or there cannot be one god ; whereas the scripture notion of the unity of god , is not such an unity as is only is one person , for then it could not enjoyn the faith and worship of father , son , and holy ghost ; but such an unity as can be between three , when the same one divine nature , is wholly and intirely communicated by the eternal father , to the eternal son , and by father and son to the eternal spirit ; without any division or separation ; and that which is communicated whole and intire , without division or separation , makes no number , for it is but one still . a mind , and mind , and mind , must be three minds , or persons , by reason of their distinct subsistence , which belong to them as three ; but god , and god , and god , as some of the antient father speak , are not three gods , but one god , because the same one divinity ( totus ex toto , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as both the latin and greek fathers speak , concerning the generation of the son ) is whole , intire , indivisible , inseparable , in all three ; and three distinct , whole , inseparable , sames , how hard soever it may be to conceive , as to the manner of it , is the most natural and intelligible notion of three and one ; and this is the catholick notion of a trinity in unity . i forbear prosecuting this any farther here , because i shall do it at large elsewhere . . the next charge is , that it is disagreeing and contrary to the doctrine of the catholick church . i am truly sorry for this , because it must unavoidably reflect on their skill in antiquity , and the doctrine of the catholick church ; but if the animadverter has imposed upon them in this too , they must thank themselves , and take what follows : i shall not multiply testimonies in this cause at present , because i have a treatise by me , which is near finished , upon this very subject , to give an account of the judgment of catholick fathers , and councils concerning a real and substantial trinity , and what their notion of thritheism is . the matter appeared to me so plain , and demonstrable , that i began to be weary of it , as an unnecessary work ; but this decree has convinc'd me of the contrary , and i now thank god , that i am so well prepared to justifie the true antient catholick faith , against the pretences of those , who judge of the doctrine of the catholick church by inspiration or prophesie , without knowing what the catholick fathers have said about it . as confident as these heads are , of the doctrine of the catholick church ; those , even of their mind , who have looked into the fathers , are not willing to stand to their judgment in this cause : some of the ante-nicene fathers , they give up to the arians , and they know not what to think of the nicene fathers themselves ; they spoke incautiously , and bordered very near upon tritheism ; nay , some of them , they think , were down right tritheists ; and they are in the right , for they were all so to a man , in this modern notion of tritheism , that i was glad to find , they would own the doctrine of the catholick church , and put the cause upon that issue . the present dispute is about three distinct infinite minds , and substances in the trinity , whether this be the catholick doctrine , or catholick language ; now , i suppose , if it appear , that they owned three distinct substances , both name and thing , there will be no dispute about three minds , for the substance of the deity can be no other , than infinite mind . now this is a wonderfull dispute , when the school-men themselves own the three divine persons to be three substances , though they say , they are ( not meer relations without a subject ) but relative substances , and we say so too : that their substances , as their persons , subsist in an inseparable union , and relation , to each other : but relative substances , substances , which are not absolute and independent , but essentially related to each other , as father , son , and holy ghost , are substances still , and three distinct substances , as they are distinct persons . but this is not our present inquiry , what the doctrine of the schools is , but what was the doctrine of the primitive fathers . now it is evident beyond all possibility of denial , that the catholick fathers , one and all , did assert three substantial persons in the trinity , against the heresie of sabellius , who owned but one substantial person , with three names , according to his different appearances : now besides , that it is impossible to make sense of three substantial persons , without three personal substances , for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must signifie three substances ; had not these fathers understood it in the sense and notion of three substances , they had not opposed sabellius , whose fundamental principle was the one singular , solitary , substance of the deity . they asserted indeed one substance of the deity against arius , but it was only in that sense , in which arius denied the one substance : he owned the son to be a substantial person , who had a distinct substance of his own , and this the nicene fathers never quarelled with him for ; but he denied , that the substance of the son was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the substance of the father but perfectly of a different kind and nature , as not begotten of his father's substance , but made by his power . in opposition to this heresie , the fathers taught , not one singular substance in god , which is sabellianism , but such an oneness of substance , as we know not how to express otherwise , than by a specifick sameness and unity , tho' that does not answer the compleat notion of the divine unity ; but this is one way the fathers commonly express it , by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and genus , and such like words , as among us signifie the specifick unity of nature ; and therefore they tell us , that by the homoousion they only meant , that the son was so of the same one substance with the father , that he is god of god , light of light , very god of very god ; that is , true and perfect god , as his father is true and perfect god , considered in his own person , as distinct from his father ; that he is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 created out of nothing , as all creatures are , but is truly begotten of the substance of his father , and in that sense consubstantial , or of one substance with him , as all other sons are consubstantial with their fathers . now had not this been a very wise dispute on both sides , if the catholicks , as well as the arians , had not allowed , that the son had a substance of his own , proper and appropriate to his own person , and as distinct from the personal substance of the father , as the person of the son is distinct from the person of the father , to contend whence he had his substance ; of the substance of the father , or created out of nothing , when he has no substance at all of his own , proper and peculiar to him as a son ? one would think these two extremes of sabellianism and arianism , both which were rejected with equal abhorrence by the catholick fathers , might satisfie any man what their judgment was about a trinity in unity . for if these fathers understood both these heresies , and rejected them both , asserted three substantial persons , in opposition to sabellius , and one substance , in opposition to arius , the catholick faith must lie between these two extremes ; and yet it is demonstrable that there is but one medium between them . if it be haeresy to say , that there is but one personal substance in the deity , as sabellius asserted , then three distinct substantial persons must have three distinct personal substances : for this is the direct contradiction to the sabellian heresie of one substance ; if the arians deny'd one substance , not in the sabellian notion of one substance , but as one substance signifies perfectly the same divine nature in father and son , then one substance , as it is asserted by the nicene fathers , in opposition to the arians , must signifie not one personal substance , but one divine nature , which is perfectly alike , and the same in father and son. i challenge any man living ( always excepting the wonder-working animadverter ) to shew me any medium between the one substance , or the one person , of sabellius , and the three substances of different natures and species of the arians , but only the true catholick faith , of three substantial persons , or three personal substances , of one and the same nature , both for kind , and by generation and procession . the reason of the thing is plain and evident , which is the most i intend at present ; for i shall reserve authorities , as i intimated before , for a particular treatise , which , if god permit , shall soon follow this ; and therefore st. hilary , and the alexandrian synod , under the great athanasius , after the catholick bishops were recall'd from banishment , and restor'd to their sees by julian the apostate , shall serve now . the dispute is concerning one substance , and three substances , in the deity ; and it may be resolv'd into these three questions . . whether the son , as begotten of his father , have a substance and nature proper to his own person , which is not the personal nature and substance of the father . . whether three such persons , who have , each of them , a pesonal nature and substance of his own , may be call'd three substance . . in what sence then they are one substance ? whoever reads st. hilary de syn. adv . arianos , will find all these questions fully and expresly resolv'd , i shall give but some few instances of each . as for the first , he tells us , * that life in the father is substance , and life in the son which is begotten of the father , is essence or substance ; and that life begotten of life , is essence born of essence ; and owns this as a universal maxim , which holds true in all births : that that which is born receives a nature of its own from the nature , † which begets , and subsists in its own nature ; ‖ that the begotten nature receives its nature from the nature , which begets : and giving an account why wisdom says * that she was both created and begotten : the first he tells us , is to exclude all corporeal passions from the divine generation ; that the nature of the father suffers no change or diminution in the generation of the son , no more than in the works of creation ; and by being begotten is signified , that the son receives his nature not by creation , but by birth ; and has a legitimate and proper substance of his own begotten nature from god the father . once more ; in one of these oriental creeds , they anathematize those who make the * eternal substance of the only begotten son of the father to be the unbegotten substance of god , thereby making the son to be the father . this st. hilary explains and approves , and acquaints us with the † occasion of this decree , viz. the catholicks asserting the eternal generation of the son , that he was begotten before all time , and in no time ; some hereticks took advantage of this , to deny that there is any begotten substance of the son , but only the unbegotten substance of the father , and that under the denomination of the son , the father , who is undegotten , and but one singular person , is both father and son to himself : for to be born in no time seems to signifie , not to be born at all : this he calls the heresie of vnion , or sabellianism , which this decree condemns , whereas , as he adds , to be eternal , without any temporal beginning , and to be unbegotten , are two very different things ; that which is eternal may be begotten , tho' not in time ; but that which is unbegotten , is the sole eternal author of its own being , and all that he is . this i think is home to the purpose , to deny that the son has a begotten substance , proper and peculiar to himself as a son ; or to say , that the son has no other substance but the unbegotten substance of the father , is sabellianism ; and which ought farther to be observed , to say , that the father and son have not a distinct substance of their own , but that the unbegotten substance of the father is the substance of the son , makes father and son but one person : which shews that these fathers and st. hilary never dreamt of three persons in one singular substance . now if the three persons in the trinity are really distinct in substance , and it is heresy to say , that the unbegotten substance of the father is the substance of the son , any man would wonder , what haeresie it should be to say , that there are three distinct personal substances in the trinity . but to put this matter out of doubt , st. hilary in the next place expresly vindicates the synod of * antioch for attributing a proper substance to each divine person , and affirming , that they are three in substance , which he renders by three substances , whereby he says , they did not mean three diverse substances of different kinds and natures , but three substances , in opposition to the sabellian heresie ; which reviv'd again after the nicene council , and gave these three names to the father , and by a trinity of meer names , without a subsisting cause or subject for each name , destroyed the truth and reality of father , son , and holy ghost ; and therefore they said , there were three substances , thereby meaning three subsisting persons ; not dividing and separating the substance of the father , the son , and the holy ghost , by a diversity and dissimilitude of essences . so that st. hilary thought , that three substances , when they are not used in an arian sense , to fignifie a diversity of nature , but only to signifie three substantial subsisting persons , in opposition to sabellius , are very catholick words , and contain a true catholick sense : in this sense , and for the very same reason we use these expressions of three distinct infinite minds , and three substances : and i hope these heads will not take it amiss , if one st. hilary have more authority with me than all they together . . as for one substance , which was taught by the nicene council , and inserted into their creed , st. hilary very plainly and frequently tells us , in what sense we are to understand it : that there is one substance of the same kind and nature , in genere naturae , & secundum proprietatem naturae ; not one substance , as that signifies one subsisting person ; but as it signifies perfectly the same nature , in every thing alike , without the least difference or variation , that the * homoousion signifies one nature perfectly alike , and the same by natural propagation ; because the essence of the son is from no other cause , but the essence of the father ; and therefore father and son may both be said to be of one nature or substance . and for the sake of the charge of tritheism , which the anim adverter makes such a noise with , it will be necessary to observe , that st. hilary gives the same account of the unity of the godhead , as he does of the unity of the divine substance aud indeed they must be one in the same sense , for one divine substance is one god. * the sardican synod anathematiz'd those who said there were three gods : and st. hilary gives this account of it , that speaking properly , the divine substance or nature will not admit of the plural number , to say , that there are more gods than one , excepting when , the title of god is given to men or angels , by way of honour , not of nature : but in the nature of god , there is but one god ; yet so that the son is god , because he has the same nature , without any unlikeness or difference , with his father ; and when there is god of god , it cannot be but that each of them must be god , because their nature is not distinguish'd by a different kind or species ; and when he is anathematiz'd , who says there are two gods , and he also is anathematiz'd who denies the son to be god , it is manifest that the same name of god , and one god , is apply'd to both of them , upon account of the same nature , without the least difference or diversity . * and adds , that least the doctrine of one god should seem to teach that there is but one singular subsistance of one solitary god without his son ; the same synod condemns those also , who under pretence of owning but one god , profess only one singular and solitary god the father , under the name of father and son ; whereas the father who begets , and the son who is born , are to be acknowledg'd one god , upon account of the same nature in both , without the least difference or variation . were it not to shorten this discourse , i could easily furnish my readers with numerous quotations to the same purpose , out of st. hilary , ( to whom i now confine my self , and particularly to his book de synodis , that these authorities may be the more easily found all together ) to prove , that the catholick notion of one divine substance , and one god , does not signify one personal substance , nor one singular solitary god , who is but one person ; but there is one divine substance , and one god , as the same divine nature is communicated whole and entire by the father to the son , and by father and son to the holy spirit , without the least difference , or change , or separation : which i shall explain more at large elsewhere . thus much for st. hilary , who has always been allowed a credible witness of the catholick faith ; for which he suffered banishment under constantius , and is now condemned for a heretick by the oxford heads . but it is more wonderful to me , that men who understand what hypostasis signifies , and in what sense it was used by the nicene fathers , should condemn the phrase of three substances in the trinity , as false , impious , and heretical , when 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or three hypostases , which is the catholick language , is neither better nor worse than three substances . in the nicene council it self , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are used in the same sense , and both signify substance : and petavius owns , that all the ancient fathers used hypostasis in no other sense , but to signify substance ; and then three hypostases are three substances . and when afterwards they more nicely distinguished between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , they still used hypostasis in the notion of substance , that which did actually subsist ; which is therefore often rendred by the latins extantia . but to set aside other observations , the alexandrian synod under athanasius is sufficient to put an end to this dispute . when the catholick bishops were recalled from banishment by julian , several of them stopt at alexandria , and met in council to advise about the broken state of the church : among other things that fell under consideration , there had a dispute happened among the catholicks themselves , concerning the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , whether they ought to say , that there is but one substance in the trinity ; or , that there are three substances ; for so it is plain that both sides understood hypostasis in the notion of substance . to compose this difference , the synod called both parties before them , and examined them in what sense they used these words . as for those who said there were three hypostases in the trinity , they asked them , whether by this they meant , as the arians did , three hypostases of a different kind and nature , subsisting by themselves absolutely and independently , as perfectly divided and separated from each other , as other creatures , and as the children of men are ; or as those things which have different natures , as gold , and silver , and brass ? or whether by three hypostases they meant , as some other hereticks did , three principles , or three gods ? all this they professed they had neither said nor thought . and being asked again , why they then used those expressions of three substances ? they answered , because they believed in the holy trinity , not a trinity of names , but a real subsisting trinity ; a father , who really and actually is , and subsists ; a son , who in truth and reality is a substantial subsisting son ; and the holy spirit , who actually is , and subsists : that they never said , there are three gods , or three principles , but owned the holy trinity , and but one godhead , one principle , and the son consubstantial to the father ; and the holy spirit neither a creature , nor of a different nature , but genuinely and inseparably of the same nature with father and son. all this was approved of as very orthodox . and then the synod examined those who affirmed , that there was but one substance in the trinity , what they meant by it ? whether they understood it , as sabellius did , to deny the real subsistence of the son and holy spirit , to make an unsubstantial son , and an unsubsisting spirit ? this they also denied ; and told the synod , that they thought hypostasis signified the same with ousia , essence , substance , nature : and therefore they owned but one hypostasis or substance , because the son is of the substance of the father , and by reason of the identity of nature between father and son ; for they believed but one divinity , and one divine nature ; and not one nature of the father , and another different nature of the son , and of the holy spirit . this explication also was approved by the synod ; and thus this matter was reconciled : those who taught three substances in the trinity , and those who believed but one substance , when they had given their several explications , were both owned by the synod , and owned each other for catholick christians , and both condemned arius and sabellius ; though the synod thought it better to adhere strictly to the words of the nicene creed ; but soon after they distinguished between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and then three hypostases ( still in the notion of three substances ) and one nature , was the catholick language ; which st. basil gives a large account of , ep. . of which more elsewhere . so that athanasius , and those glorious confessors for the nicene faith , in the alexandrian synod , owned three substances in the very same sense in which we now use those words , to contain the true catholick faith ; and if they knew what the doctrine of the catholick church was , our oxford heads are out in their guess . . the last charge is , that three distinct minas and substances is especially contrary to the doctrine of the church of england , publickly received . what they may mean by publickly received , i can't tell ; there may be some doctrines too publickly received in the church of england , which are not the doctrines of the church ; and i doubt sabellianism is one of them : but if they mean by publickly received , the doctrine of our articles and creeds ; this is the very same with the doctrine of the catholick church . we make profession of the nicene faith every week , and that asserts a real and substantial trinity , if athanasius understood it . the only pretence , i can guess , they had for this charge , if they thought of any themselves , must be the form of the athanasian creed , which will not permit us to say that in the plural number of all three divine persons , which it allows us to attribute distinctly to each distinct person in the singular number ; we may say , the father is almighty , the son almighty , and the holy ghost almighty , but must not say that there are three almighties , but one almighty . but will they hence frame an universal rule , that nothing must be said of the holy trinity in the plural number , considered as three ? we will not attribute any thing to the holy trinity in the plural number , which this creed forbids ; we will not say , there are three almighties , three eternals , three omnipotents , three infinites , three gods , or three lords ; but this creed does not forbid us saying , there are three minds , or three substances ; nay , it teaches us to say , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which as you have already heard , in the language of the nicene age , and more expresly in after ages , signified three substances , and therefore must do so in this creed . the reason given in the creed against this plural praedication is , because there is but one god , and therefore such terms , as immediately and directly multiply the deity and godhead , must not be exprest plurally ; and thus the plural praedication of any divine perfections in the abstract does ; three omnipotents , three infinites , three eternals , which are equivalent to three omnipotencies , three infinities , three eternities ; and they to three deities , and three godheads , or three divine natures ; but though we cannot distinguish between the person , and the divinity , or divine nature of that person , for there is no composition in god , or in a divine person , as there is in creatures ; yet when the same divine nature , communicated from the father to the son , and from father and son to the holy spirit , subsists distinctly , tho inseparably whole and entire in three ; and that which really and actually subsists , is mind and substance , with respect to these three subsistencies , they are and must be three minds and substances , though with respect to the sameness and identity of the divine nature , which is whole , and entire and inseparable , and therefore but one in all , they are but one , not three gods. this is all the sense i can make of that known distinction between substantives and adjectives in a plural praedication ; that we may say , there are three who create , but not three creators ; three , who are omnipotent , but not three omnipotents , &c. that in these adjective praedications , we consider the divine person , mind or substance , as a subject of jahaesion , and these divine perfections as essential properties or attributes , which may and must be numbred with the subjects in which they are ; but substantives have a more absolute sense , and include pure nature , without relation to different subjects ; and therefore to use them plurally , is to multiply nature , to make more than one infinite , eternal , incomprehensible , omnipotent nature , and consequently to multiply gods. but from this very distinction we learn , that there are three suppositums or subjects ( and then they will easily be owned to be three minds and substances ) to which all the perfections of the deity belong ; for when these divine perfections are praedicated adjectively , they must suppose a subject to which they belong ; and they being such perfections as can be only in a mind , they must suppose three distinct minds to which they belong . thus i have considered , with all possible brevity , every particular of this charge ; and if these decreeing and heresy-making heads will be just to me , they must own , that as they and the animadverter had ordered the matter , it was impossible for me to do otherwise , unless i would have been trampled on by every scribler : this is a good human reason ; but i had a better reason for this than any thing meerly personal : they have condemned the true catholick faith , even the nicene faith , which is the faith of the church of england , for herefy , and they have exposed this faith to the scorn and triumph of the socinian hereticks , who already make their boast , that they have a decree against the real trinit arians ; and they only want another against the nominal ones , and then their work is done to their hands ; tho i think , they have decrees enow against them ; even all the fathers and councils which condemned sabellius , condemned them , and if all this be not enough , the common sense of mankind , of which every plowman is a judge , condemns them : for three persons , who are not three distinct minds and substances , is not greater herefy , than it is nonsense . in short , we have had these gentlemen's decree ; and now we expect their reasons , which it had been much better they had thought of first , and then we should have escaped their decree . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e judicant , declarant , & decernunt , praedicta verba esse falsa , impia , & heretica ; dissona & contraria doctrinae ecclesiae catholicae , & speciatim doctrinae ecclesiae anglicanae , publice receptae . * quod vita in patre hic intelligitur substantia significata ; vita quoque in unigenito , quae ex patre generata est èssentia intellecta — quod enim in utroque vita est , id in utroque significatur essentia & vita quae generatur ex vita , id est , essentia quae de essentia nascitur — natae & gignentis essentiae , id est , vitae quae habetur & data est . — † quia omnis nativitas quaecunque est , in naturam suam ex naturâ gignente consistit . ‖ ex natura enim generante naturam sumpsit genita natura . * sed quia dei filius non corporalis partitudinis est genitus exemplo , sed ex perfecto deo perfectus , deus natus est , idcirco ait creatam se esse sapientia ; omnes in generatione sua corporales passiones excludens ; at verò ut ostenderet , non creationis in se , sed nativitatis naturam esse , subjecit & genitam , ut cùm creatam se & genitam confitetur , absolutam nativitatis suae intelligentiam praestaret , dum indemutabilem patris naturam in creatione significat , & legitimam & propriam ex deo patre genitae suae naturae ostendit esse substantiam . * et siquis intemporalem unigeni●i filii de patre substantiam , ad innascibilem dei essentiam referat , quasi filium patrem dicens , anathema sit . † dedisse superior definicio occasionem haereti●is videbatur , cùm tempus nativitatis filii negaretur , quia nef●s esset si pater esset in tempore : in tempore autem esset , si filius tempori subderetur : ut per hanc opportunitatem temporis abnegati , sub filii nuncupatione pater , qui innascibilis esset , singularis atque unicus , ipse sibi & pater & filius praedicaretur , quia ubi nascendi tempus excluditur , illic opinio videtur innascibilitatis admitti , ut natus non putetur , cujus nativitas non sit in tempore . idcirco ne per hanc occasionem temporis abnegati haeresis unionis irreperet , & haec impietas damnatur , quae audeat intemporalem nativitatem ad unicam & singularem innascibilis essentiae referre substantiam , cùm aliud sit intemporalem esse ; aliud sit esse non natum ; quorum unum habeat ( licet extra tempus ) nativitatem , aliud ipsum sibi , ad id quod est , solus atque idem autor aternus sit . * hisque nominibus ( patris , & filii , & spiritus sancti ) non simpliciter , neque otiosis propositis , sed significantibus diligenter propriam uniuscujusque nominatorum substantiam & ordinem & gloriam , ut sint quidem per substantiam tria — volens igitur congregata sanctorum synodus impietatem eam perimere , quae veritatem patris , & filii , & spiritus sancti , nominum numero eluderet , ut non subsistente causa uniuscujusque nominis , triplex nuncupatio obtinerer sub falsitate nominum unionem — idcirco tres substantias esse dixeruntꝰ subsistentium personas per substantias edocentes , non substantiam patris , & filii , & spiritus sancti diversitate dissimilis essentiae separantes . * idcirco autem unius substantiae , non utunus subsistat aut solus , sed ut ex substantiâ dei natus , non aliunde subsistat , neve in aliquâ dissidentis substantiae diversitate subsistat . aut aliud hic testatur homousion , quàm ut una & indissimilis duum sit secundum naturae propaginem essentia , quia essentia filii non sit aliunde ; quae quia aliunde non est , unius recte esse ambo creduntur essentiae , quia substantiam nativitatis filius non habeat , nisi de paternae autoritate naturae . credamus & dicamus esse unam substantiam , sed per naturae proprietatem , non ad significationem impiae unionis ; una sit ex similitudine , non ex solitudine . * anathematizat namque eos , qui tres deos dicunt , quia secundum naturae veritatem , numerum nuncupationum substantia ista non recipit , nisi ut in hominibus & angelis solet — caeterùm in natura dei deus unus est , ita tamen ut & filius deus sit , quia in eo natura non differens sit ; & cùm deus ex deo sit , non potest non uterque deus esse , quorum per generis differentiam non discernatur essentia . numerus autem nominis in nuncupatione respuitur , quia non est in naturae qualitate diversitas , cùm igitur anathema sit duos deos dicens , & anathema sit filium deum denegans , absolute ostenditur unius ad uttumque nominis unitatem de proprietate in differentis esse substantiae . * tamen ne rursum unius dei praedicatio , unicam ac sine progenie suâ solitarii dei velit affirmare substantiam , statim etiam hanc condemnat temeritatem , quae quia deus unus est , unum ac solitarium deum patrem , habentem in se nomen patris & filii confitetur . cum in generante parre & nascente filio , deus unus esset ob indifferentis ab invicem naturae substantiam praedicandus . cùm in damnatione sit , patrem & filium duos deos dicere , & rursum anathema sit , filium deum negare , substantiae diversae alterius ab alterâ opinio in praedicandis diis duobus excluditur , non enim est alia praeter illam dei patris , ex qua dei filius deus intemporalis est natus , essentia . non enim religiosa unitas nominis ex indifferentis naturae essentia constituta personam genitae ademit essentiae , ut unica ac singularis dei essentia per unionem nominis intelligatur : cùm utriusque essentiae nomen unum ; id est , deus unus , ob indiscretae in utroque naturae indissimilem substantiam praedicetur . athanasii ep ad antiochenses t. . p. et concil . t. p. . a view of that part of the late considerations addrest to h.h. about the trinity which concerns the sober enquiry, on that subject : in a letter to the former friend. howe, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing h estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a view of that part of the late considerations addrest to h.h. about the trinity which concerns the sober enquiry, on that subject : in a letter to the former friend. howe, john, - . , [ ] p. printed for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . attributed to howe by wing and nuc pre- imprints. advertisements: [ ] p. at end. errata: p. . reproduction of original in the union theological seminary library, new york. includes bibliographical references. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng nye, stephen, ?- . -- considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity. antitrinitarianism -- england -- controversial literature. theology, doctrinal. trinity -- apologetic works. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a view of that part of the late considerations addrest to h. h. about the trinity . which concerns the sober enquiry , on that subject . in a letter to the former friend . london , printed for tho. parkhurst , at the bible and three crowns , at the lower-end of cheapside , . a view of the late considerations addrest to h. h. about the trinity . you see , sir , i make no haste to tell you my thoughts of what hath been publish'd since my last to you , against my sentiments touching the h. trinity . i saw the matter less required my time and thoughts , than my other affairs : and so little , that i was almost indifferent whether i took any notice thereof or no. there is really nothing of argument in what i have seen , but what i had suggested before , and objected to my self , in those very discourses of mine , now animadverted on ; which not having prevented , with me , the opinion i am of , can as little alter it , and should as little any man 's else . but a little leasure , as it can , without extortion , be gained from other occasions , i do not much grudg to bestow on this . i find my self concern'd in the late considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity — in a letter to h. h. the author is pleas'd to give me the honour of a name , a lank , unvocal one . it is so contrived , that one may easily guess whom he means ; but the reason of his doing so i cannot guess . is it because he knew himself , what he would have others believe ? but i suppose he as well knew his own name . if he knew not the former , he ran the hazard of injuring either the supposed author , or the true , or both . i could , i believe , make as shrewd a guess at his name , and express it as plainly . but i think it not civil to do so ; because i apprehend he hath some reason to conceal it , whereof i think he hath a right to be the judg. but i will not prescribe to him rules of civility , of which that he is a great judg , i will not allow my self to doubt . yet i will not suppose him to have so very diminishing thoughts of our saviour , as not to acknowledg and reverence the authority of that great rule of his , which he knows gain'd reverence with some who called not themselves christians , [ whatsoever you would that men should do to you — &c. ] nor can divine what greater reason he should have to hide his own name , than to expose mine , or make the person he indigitates , be thought the author of the discourse he intended to expose . since no man can imagine how , as the christian world is constituted , any one can be more obnoxious for denying three persons , than for asserting three gods : which latter his impotent attempt aims to make that author do . for his censures of that author's stile , and difficulty to be understood , they offend me not . but so i have known some pretend deafness , to what they were unwilling to hear . there is indeed one place sob . enq. p. . in the end of sect. . where must should have been left out , upon the adding afterwards of can ; that might give one some trouble . in which yet , the supposal of a ( not unusual ) asyndeton , would , without the help of magick , have reliev'd a considering reader . and for his complements , as they do me no real good , so , i thank god , they hurt me not . i dwell at home , and better know my own furniture , than another can . for himself , i discern , and readily acknowledg , in him , those excellent accomplishments , for which i most heartily wish him an advocate in a better cause , without despair he will yet prove so ; when i take notice of some passages which look like indications of a serious temper of mind , as of choosing god , and the honour of his name , for our portion and design ; and that he lives in vain , who knows not his maker , and his god , with the like . but on the other hand , i was as heartily sorry to meet with an expression of so different a strain , on so awful a subject , of making a coat for the moon . that precept which josephus inserts among those given the jews , doth for the reason it hath in it , abstracting from its authority , deserve to be considered . it seems to import a decency to the rest of mankind , whose notions of a deity did not argue them sunk into the lowest degrees of sottishness and stupidity . good sir , what needed ( think you ) so adventurous boldness , in so lubricous a case ! it gains nothing to a man's cause either of strength or reputation with wise and good men. a sound argument will be as sound without it . nor should i much value having them on my side , whom i can hope to make laugh at so hazardous a jest. i can never indeed have any great veneration for a morose sourness , whatsoever affected appearance it may have with it , of a simulated sanctimony or religiousness ; but i should think it no hardship upon me to repress that levity , as to attempt dancing upon the brink of so tremendous a precipice . and would always express my self with suspicion , and a supposed possibility of being mistaken , in a case wherein i find many of noted judgment and integrity , in the succession of several ages , differing from me . but go we on to the cause it self , where he pretends , . first to give a view of the sober enquirer's hypothesis . . and then to argue against it . as to the former . he doth it , i am loth to say , with less fairness than from a person of his ( otherwise ) appearing ingenuity , one would expect . for he really makes me to have said more than i ever did , in divers instances ; and much less than i have expresly said ; and that he cannot have so little understanding as not to know was most material to the cause in hand . he represents me p. . col . . saying the persons are distinct essences , numerical natures , beings , substances ; and col . . that i hold them to be three spirits ; when in the close of one of those paragraphs , viz. calm discourse , p. , . i recite the words of w. j. in the unity of the godhead there must be no plurality or multiplicity of substances allowed : and do add , nor do i say that there must . and p. , . i do not positively say there are three distinct substances , minds , or spirits . i would ask this my learned antagonist , have saying , and not saying , the same signification ? and again , when calm discourse , p. . my words are , i will not use the expressions , as signifying my formed judgment , that there are three things , substances or spirits in the godhead ; how could he say , i hold the three persons to be three spirits ? is any man , according to the ordinary way of speaking , said to hold what is not his formed judgment ? if he only propose things whereof he doubts , to be considered and discust by others , in order to the forming of it , and by gentle ventilation to sift out truth , it the rather argues him not to hold this or that . and i think much service might be done to the common interest of religion , by such a free mutual communication of even more doubtful thoughts , if such disquisitions were pursu'd with more candour , and with less confidence and prepossession of mind , or addictedness to the interest of any party whatsoever . if it were rather endeavoured , to reason one another into , or out of , this or that opinion , than either by sophistical collusions to cheat , or to hector by great words , one that is not of my mind . or if the design were less to expose an adversary , than to clear the matter in controversy . besides , that if such equanimity did more generally appear , and govern , in transactions of this nature , it would produce a greater liberty in communicating our thoughts , about some of the more vogued and fashionable opinions , by exempting each other from the fear of ill treatment , in the most sensible kind . it being too manifest , that the same confident insulting genius , which makes a man think himself competent to be a standard to mankind , would also make him impatient of dissent , and tempt him to do worse , than reproach one that differs from him , if it were in his power . and the club or fagot-arguments must be expected to take place , where what he thinks rational ones , did not do the business . this only on the by . in the mean time that there is a trinity in the godhead , is no matter of doubt with me ; but only whether this be the best way of explaining and defending it . if this be not the best , or sufficient , some other will , i believe , or hath been found out by some other . of which i have spoken my sense not only indefinitely , calm disc. p. . but particularly of the more common way ; not that i did then , or have yet thought it the best , but not indefensible , p. , . and i must now sincerely profess , that the perusal of these very considerations gives me more confidence about this hypothesis , than i allowed my self before ; finding that the very sagacious author of them , of whose abilities and industry together , i really have that opinion , as to count him the most likely to confute it of all the modern antitrinitarians , hath no other way to deal with it , than first , both partially and invidiously to represent it ; and then , rather to trifle than argue against it . he first paints it out in false and ugly colours , before he comes to reasoning . and then , when he should reason , he says nothing that hath so much as a colour . it seems to me an argument of a suspected ill cause on his side , that he thought it needful to prepossess the reader with the imagination of i know not ( and i believe he knows not ) what gross ideas , as he romances , belonging to this hypothesis . because from those words , prov. . then was i by him , as one brought up with him , and daily his delight ; the author speaks of the delicious society , which these words intimate , the eternal wisdom , and the prime author and parent of all things , to have each with other . for my part , i have little doubt but this ingenious writer is so well acquainted with the gust and relish of intellectual delight , that he chose to expose his adversary by using that odd expression of gross ideas so causlesly , in accommodation only to the genius of some other men , whom he thought fit to humour , rather than his own . nor can he be so little acquainted with the paganish theology , as not to apprehend a vast disagreement between this and that , and a much greater agreement between the paganish notion of the deity , and his own . for the questions which he supposes me to put , and makes me answer as he thinks fit , by ( misapplied ) passages of that discourse , i hope it will appear they were either prevented , or answered at another rate . at length he says , the butt-end of this hypothesis , &c. i like not that phrase the worse for the author's sake , of whom it seems borrowed , whose memory greater things will make live , when we are forgot . but let him proceed — the butt-end of this hypothesis is the true strength of it . but that true strength he hath either had the hap not to observe , or taken the care not to represent , i. e. from what is so often inculcated in that discourse , the necessary existence of two hypostases of and in the first , and of an omnimodous simplicity groundlesly supposed in the divine being , he hath kept himself at a wary cautious distance , when he might apprehend there was its strength . therefore i cannot also but observe , that as he hath mark'd this hypothesis , with ( most undue ) ill characters ; so he hath maimed it too , of what was most considerable belonging to it , that he might expose it by the former means , so as to make it need much defence ; and that by the latter , it might seem quite destitute of any defence at all . and now when ( not without some untoward disfigurations ) it hath thus far ' scap'd his hands , and is ( in none of the best shapes ) set up only to be beaten down ; the argument he first attacks it with is the inartificial one of authority . and yet his argument from this topick , is only negative , that the opinion he would confute wants authority , that the enquirer was the first that ever dreamt of it . and that no learned divine of any perswasion will subscribe to it : q. d. 't is false , and impossible to be true ; the enquirer only proposing what he offer'd , as possible for ought we know , is not otherwise oppos'd than by asserting it to be impossible . this therefore he must say , or he saith nothing to the purpose ; and why now is it impossible ? because no body said it before . so , then , was every thing that any man first said ; but afterwards , by being often spoken , it might , it seems , at length become true ! for any learned divines subscribing to it , i suppose he intends that in the strict sense . and so the enquirer never said he would subscribe it himself , otherwise than that his judgment did more incline to it , as liable to less exception than other ways of defending the doctrine of the trinity , or than denying it , which he thought least defensible of all . but now supposing one should find learned divines of the same mind , ( and perhaps some may be found more confident than he ) i would ask the considerator , whether he will therefore confess a trinity a possible thing ? if not , he deals not fairly , to put the enquirer upon quoting authorities to no purpose : or that he would have them conclude him , by whom he will not be concluded himself . he seems indeed himself to have forgot the question ( with which afterwards he charges the enquirer ) as it is set down sober enquiry p. . whether a trinity in the godhead be a possible thing ? this was the question , not what john , or thomas , or james such a one thought ? but while he pretends to think no body else is of the enquirer's mind in the particular point he is now speaking to , i. e. the delicious society the divine hypostases are supposed to have with each other ; give me leave freely to discourse this matter . i would fain know what it is , wherein he supposes the enquirer to have overshot his mark : or of what makes he here so mighty a wonderment ▪ it can be but one of these two things : either that there are three divine persons in the godhead really distinct ; or , that they have ( if there be ) a delicious society or conversation with each other . will he say the former is a singular opinion ? or that 't is novel ? was there never a real trinitarian in the world before ? doth he not , in his own express words , sort the enquirer with one , whom he will not deny to be a learned divine , p. . of these his present considerations , col . . [ the author of the propositions , and mr. h — w , as he calls the enquirer , are honest men , and real trinitarians . ] by which former character he hath , i dare say , ten thousand times more gratify'd his ambition , than by calling him learned too . and i believe he will as little think this a novel opinion , as a singular one . nor shall i thank him for acknowledging it to have been the opinion of the fathers , generally , not only ante-nicene and nicene , but post-nicene too , for some following ages , unto that of p. lombard , so obvious it is to every one that will but more slightly search . for my part , i will not except justin martyr himself , whom i the rather mention , both as he was one of the more antient of the fathers ; and as i may also call him , the father of the modalists ; nor his notion even about the homoousian-trinity , as he expresly stiles it . for tho it will require more time than i now intend to bestow , to give a distinct account of every passage throughout that discourse of his , yet his expression of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must not be so taken , as if it were to be torn away from its coherence , and from it self . when therefore he says the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the being unbegotten , begotten , and having proceeded , are not names of the essence , but ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) modes of subsistence ; he must mean they are not immediately names of the essence , but mediately they cannot but be so . for what do they modify ? not nothing . when they are said to be modes of subsistence , what is it that subsists ? we cannot pluck away these modes of subsistence from that which subsists , and whereof they are the modes . and what is that ? you 'll say the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the one essence , which he had mentioned before ; and that one essence is , 't is true , as perfectly one , as 't is possible ; for what is of it self , and what are from that , to be with each other , i. e. that they are congenerous , as the sun and its rays ( according to that heb. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the effulgency of glory ) or as mind , and ( where there is nothing else but substance ) consubstantial thought or word . therefore this oneness of essence must be taken in so large and extensive a sense , as that it may admit of these differences . for so he afterwards plainly speaks , if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; if the one ( the father ) hath his existence without being begotten , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , another ( the son ) by being begotten , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but that ( the holy ghost ) by having proceeded , here it befals us to behold differences ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) or the things that import difference . there must be a sense , therefore , wherein he understood this essence to be most truly one ; and a sense wherein he also understood it to have its differences , and those too not unimportant ones , as being unbegotten , and being begotten , signify no light differences . and in what latitude of sense he understood the oneness of essence , whereof he had before spoken , may be seen in his following explication , when what he said he would have be ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) more manifest ; he makes adam's peculiar mode of subsistence to be that he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not begotten , but made by god's own hand ; but for them that were from him , he intimates theirs to be , that they were begotten , not made . if then you enquire concerning the same essence that was common to him and them , you still find that man is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the subject , whether of formation , as to him , or of generation , as to them . and who apprehends not in what latitude of sense the humane nature is one , which is common to adam , and his posterity ? tho the divine nature is incomparably more one , which is common to the father , son , and spirit , as we have formerly insisted , and shall further shew it cannot but be , in all necessary , and continually-depending emanations . yet i might , if there were need , again ( as to this part ) quote the considerator to himself . for i suppose he will not disown the considerations in . in which , pag. . col . . are these words , dr. cudworth by a great number of very pertinent and home-quotations , hath proved that his explication ( i mean that part of it which makes the three persons to be so many distinct essences , or substances ) is the doctrine of the principal , if not of all the fathers , as well as of the platonists . and 't is added , and i ( for my own part ) do grant it . upon the whole then , i reckon that as to this first part , we stand clear not only to the rest of the world , but with this author himself , that to be a real trinitarian is not so unheard-of a thing , or what no learned divine of any perswasion ever dreamt of before the enquirer . but now for the second part. the delicious society supposed to be between ( or rather among ) the three persons . is this a dream ! and so strange a one ! why , good sir ! can you suppose three persons , i. e. three intellectual subsistences , perfectly wise , holy , and good , co-existing with , inexisting in one another , to have no society ? or that society not to be delicious ? he says , how can it be ? i say , how can it but be ? herein i am sure the enquirer hath far more company than in the former . for whether the three persons have all the same numerical essence , or three distinct ; all agree they most delightfully converse . will he pretend never to have read any that make love ( as it were intercurrent between the two first ) the character of the third ? in short ; is it the thing he quarrels with as singular , or the word ? at the thing , supposing three persons , he can have no quarrel , without quarreling with the common sense of mankind . for the word , he hath more wit and knowledg of language than to pretend to find fault with that . for let him but consult expositors ( even the known criticks ) upon the mentioned place prov. . ( whom , in so plain a case , i will not be at the pains to quote and transcribe ) and take notice whether none read those words , fui in deliciis . therefore i believe the considerator will be so ingenuous , as to perceive , he hath , in this part of his discourse , grosly overshot , or undershot , or shot wide of his own mark , if indeed he had any , or did not ( letting his bolt fly too soon ) shoot at rovers , before he had taken steady aim at any thing . in short , all this dust could be rais'd but with design only , because he could not enlighten his readers , to blind them . but now when he should come by solid argument to disprove the hypothesis , by shewing that three individual divine natures , or essences , can possibly have no nexus , so as to become one entire divine nature , and , at the same time , ( which this hypothesis supposes ) remain still three individual divine natures and essences , he thinks fit to leave it to another to do it for him , who , he says , if he cannot prove this , can prove nothing . and when we see that proof , it will be time enough to consider it . in the mean time i cannot here but note what i will neither , in charity , call forgery in the considerator , nor , in civility , ignorance , but it cannot be less than great oversight ; his talk of these three , so united as to become one : the enquirer never spake ( nor dreamt ) of their becoming one , but of their being naturally , necessarily , and eternally so . then he comes to put the question , as ( he says ) it is between the enquirer and the socinians . and he puts it thus , how three distinct , several , individual , divine beings , essences , or substances , should remain three several individual substances , and yet , at the same time , be united into one divine substance called god ? one would have thought , when he had so newly wav'd the former question , as wherein he meant not to be concern'd , he should presently have put a new one , upon which he intended to engage himself . but we have the same over again , even with the same ill look of an equivalent phrase unto [ becoming ] [ united ] into one , to insinuate to his reader , as if his antagonist thought these three were de novo united , not in , but into one. which he knew must have a harsh sound , and as well knew it to be most repugnant to the enquirer's most declared sentiment . nor will it be any presumption , if i take the liberty to set down the question according to the enquirer's mind , who have as much reason to know it , as he ; and i am sure it will be more agreeable to the tenour of his discourse now referr'd to , whether the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the divine being , may not possibly , for ought we know , contain three natures , or essences , under the names of father , son , and holy ghost , so far distinct , as is necessary to found the distinct predications or attributions severally given them in the holy scriptures , and yet be eternally , necessarily , naturally , vitally so united , as notwithstanding that remaining distinction , to be one god. and let us now see what he hath to say ; first , to the enquirer's illustrations of it , as possible . secondly , what he brings to prove it impossible . as to the former part . he first falls upon what the enquirer had said concerning the vegetative , sensitive , and intellective natures in our selves . and upon this he insists so operously , as if the whole weight of the cause had been laid upon it , and seems to think the enquirer had forgot the question , when he mentioned it ; because he says , those are only distinct faculties , not persons , or substances ( tho persons were not in his question ) without ever taking any notice of the enquirers waving it , with these words , that he would content himself with what was more obvious . but this is is all art. to raise a mighty posse , and labour to seem to those that he believed would read what he writ only , not what the other did , most effectually to expugne what he saw was neglected , tho not altogether useless , as we shall see anon . in the mean time , it is observable how needlesly he slurs himself in this his first brisk onset . he says , no man ever pretended — that the vegetative , sensitive , and intellective faculties ( or powers ) are so many distinct , individual persons , substances , or essences , we grant , &c. what did no man ever pretend that these three distinct natures , the vegetative , sensitive , intellective , were , in man , three distinct substances , or souls , concurring by a certain subordination in him ? what necessity was there , that to heighten his triumph , in the opinion of his credulous followers , he should , with so glorious a confidence , put on the vain and false shew of having all the world on his side ; and herein either dissemble his knowledge , or grosly bewray his ignorance in the meer history of philosophy . and most imprudently suppose all his readers as ignorant , as he would seem ! what , did he never hear of an averroist in the world ? doth he not know that physician and philosopher , and his followers , earnestly contended for what he says no man ever pretended to ? or that divers other commentators upon aristotle , have some abetted , others as vehemently oppos'd them in it ? not to insist also that some thought the intellectus agens , and patiens to be distinct substances , belonging to the nature of man , as others had also other conceits about the former ? and if he look some hundreds of years back , as far as the time , and extant work of nemesius , bishop and philosopher ( as he writes himself ) of the nature of man , ( who liv'd in the time of gregory nazianzen , as appears by an epistle of his writ to him , and prefixt to that little book of his ) he will find that author takes notice there were divers that took man to consist of mind , soul , and body , and that some did doubt whether the mind super vening to the soul , as one to the other , did not make the latter intelligent . and in several other parts of that work ( easy , if it were necessary to be recited ) he speaks it as the judgment of some , that the unreasonable nature in man did exist by it self , as being of it self an unreasonable soul , not a part of the reasonable , accounting it one of the greatest absurdities , that the unreasonable soul should be a part of that which is reasonable . and he carries us yet much farther back , referring us to plotinus , in whom any that will , may read much more to that purpose in many places . it matters not whether this opinion be true or false , but a great mistake ( or misrepresentation ) it was , to say no man ever pretended to it . and be that as it will ; if all the readers will suspend their judgments , that a trinity in the godhead is impossible , till the considerator shall have prov'd , by plain demonstration , the concurrence of three such spirits ( a vegetative , sensitive , and intellective ) vitally united in the constitution of man , is a thing simply impossible , i believe he will not in haste , have many proselytes . i , for my part , as his own eyes might have told him , laid no stress upon it ; but only mentioned it in transitu , as i was going on to what is obvious , and in view to every man , the union between our soul and body . nor was i sollicitous to find this an exact parallel , as he fancies i was obliged to do . what if there be no exact parallel ? will any man of a sober mind , or that is master of his own thoughts , conclude every thing impossible in the uncreated being , whereof there is not an exact parallel in the creation ? if any man will stand upon this , come make an argument of it , let us see it in form , and try its strength . [ whatsoever hath not its exact parallel in the creation , is impossible in god , ] &c. he will sooner prove himself ridiculous , than prove his point by such a medium . 't is enough for a sober man's purpose , in such a case as we are now considering , if we find such things actually are ( or might as easily be , as what we see actually is ) among the creatures , that are of as difficult conception , and explication , as what appears represented in the enquirers hypothesis concerning a trinity . 't is trifling to attempt to give , or to ask a parallel exact per omnia . it abundantly serves any reasonable purpose , if there be a parallel quoad hoc , viz. in respect of the facility or difficulty of conception . and tho the vegetative , sensitive , and intellective natures be not so many distinct substances , a trinity is not less conceivable in the divine being , than three such natures , or natural powers , in the one humane nature . and whoever they be that will not simplify the divine being into nothing ( as the excellent author of the propositions speaks ) must also acknowledg the most real perfections in the divine being , tho not univocal , but infinitely transcendent to any thing in us . and are they no way distinct ? let any sober understanding judg , will the same notion agree to them all ? is his knowledg , throughout , the same with his effective power ? then he must make himself . for who can doubt he knows himself ? and is his will the self-same undistinguishable perfection , in him , with his knowledg ? then the purposes of his will must be to effect all that he can . for doth he not know all that he can do ? and the complacencies of his will must be as much in what is evil , as good , even in the most odious turpitude of the vilest , and most immoral evils ! for he knows both alike . i know what is commonly said of extrinsecal denominations : but are such denominations true , or false ? have they any thing in re correspondent to them , or have they not ? then some distinction there must be of these perfections themselves . if so , how are they distinguisht ? and there appears great reason , from god's own word , to conceive greater distinction of the three hypostases in his being , than of the attributes which are common to them , as is said , sob . enq. pag. . in reference whereto , it is not improper or impertinent to mention such differences , as we find in our own being , tho they be not distinct substances . less distinction in our selves may lead us to conceive the possibility of greater in him , in whom we are wont to apprehend nothing but substance . what he adds concerning the union of soul and body in our selves , ( which he cannot deny to be distinct substances ) is , from a man of so good sense , so surprisingly strange , and remote from the purpose , that one would scarce think it from the same man ; but that he left this part to some other of the club , and afterwards writ on , himself , without reading it over ; or this was with him ( what we are all liable to ) some drowsy interval . for when he had himself recited as the enquirer's words , or sense , if there is this union between two so contrary natures and substances , as the soul and body , why may there not be a like union between two or three created spirits ? he , without shadow of a pretence , feigns the enquirer again to have forgot the question , because soul and body are not both intelligent substances . and why , sir , doth this argue him to have forgot the question ? 't is as if he expected a man to be at the top of the stairs , assoon as he toucht the first step. in a series of discourse , must the beginning touch the end , leaving out what is to come between , and connect both parts ? what then serve mediums for ? and so farewel to all reasoning , since nothing can be proved by it self . he expected , it seems , i should have proved three intelligent natures might be united , because three intelligent natures might be united ! but say i ( and so he repeats ) if there be so near union between things of so contrary natures as soul and body , why not between two or three created spirits ? the question is , as he now states it himself , why may not three intelligent substances — be united ? and hither he ( with palpable violence ) immediately refers the mention of the union of soul and body ; and says he , why sir , are body and soul intelligent substances ? and , say i , but why , sir , are not the three ( supposed ) created spirits intelligent substances ? and now , thinks he , will my easy admiring readers , that read me only , and not him , say , what a baffle hath he given the enquirer ? what an ignorant man is this mr. — to talk of soul and body , as both intelligent substances ? but if any of them happen upon the enquirer's book too , then must they say , how scurvily doth this matter turn upon himself ? how inconsiderate a prevaricator was he that took upon him the present part of a considerer , so to represent him ? and i my self would say , had i the opportunity of free discourse with him in a corner , ( which because i have not , i say it here ) sir , is this sincere writing ? is this the way to sift out truth ? and i must further say , this looks like a man stung by the pungency of the present question . if soul and body , things of so contrary natures , that is , of an intelligent and unintelligent nature , can be united into one ( humane ) nature , why may not three created spirits , all intelligent natures , be as well united into some one thing ? it appears you knew not what to say to it ; and would fain seem to say something , when you really had nothing to say , and therefore so egregiously tergiversate , and feign your self not to understand it , or that your antagonist did not understand himself . the enquirer's scope was manifest . nothing was to be got by so grosly perverting it . is there no argument but à pari ? might you not plainly see , he here argued à fortiori ? if contrary natures might be so united , why not much rather like natures ? when you ask me this question , do not body and soul remain two substances , a bodily , and a spiritual , notwithstanding their concurrence to the constitution of a man ? i answer , yes . and i thank you , sir , for this kind look towards my hypothesis . if they were not so , the mention of this union had no way serv'd it . you know 't is only union , with continuing distinction , that is for my purpose . i doubt you nodded a little , when you ask'd me that question ; and i do annuere . but when the discourse was only of a natural union , what , in the name of wonder , made you dream of a christmass-pye ? had you writ it at the same time of year i am now writing , i should have wondered less . but either you had some particular , preternatural appetite to that sort of delicate ; or you gave your fancy a random liberty , to make your pen write whatever came to your fingers end , and that whirl'd you unaware into a pastry , and so , by meer chance , you came to have your finger in the pye. or you thought to try whether this wild ramble might not issue as luckily for you , as dr. echard's jargon of words fortuitously put together ( to ridicule hobbes's fatal chain of thoughts ) at length ending in a napkin ; which was mightily for your turn , in your present case . but upon the whole matter ▪ when you let your mind so unwarily be in pati●nis , your cookery quite spoil'd your philosophy . otherwise , when you had newly read those words in the sob . enquiry , ( as i find you had ) pag. . [ waving the many artificial unions of distinct things , that united , and continuing distinct , make one thing , under one name , i shall only consider what is natural ] you would never have let it ( your mind , i mean so fine a thing ) be huddled up , and sopt , with meat , plums , sugar , wine , in a christmass-pye ; or have thought that the union of an humane soul with an humane body was like such a jumble as this . i believe when some among the antients made use of this union of soul and body , ( as i find they have ) to represent a very sacred , viz. the hypostatical one , they little thought it would be so debased ; or that any thing would be said of it so extravagant as this . and , if we design doing any body good by writing , let us give over this way of talk , lest people think , what i remember cicero once said of the epicureans arguing , that they do not so much consider , as ( sortiri ) cast lots what to say . but now 't is like we may come to some closer discourse . we see what is said to the enquirer's elucidation of his hypothesis to represent it possible , which by meer oversight and incogitance ( as i hope now appears ) was too hastily pronounced an oversight , or incogitancy . . we are next to consider what he says to prove it impossible . and so far as i can apprehend the drift of the discourse , what he alledges will be reduced to these two heads of argument . viz. that three such hypostases ( or subsistents , as i have chosen to call them ) can have no possible nexus , by which to be one god. . because they are all supposed intelligent . . because they can neither be said to be finite , nor infinite . he should not therefore have said the hypothesis was meer incogitance and oversight ; for he knows i saw , and considered them both . ( in the sob . enquiry it self ; the former pag. , . the latter pag. , . with pag. , . ) and thought them unconcluding then , as i still think . nor do i find the considerer hath now added any strength to either of them . but i shall , since he is importune , go to the reconsideration of them with him . and . as to the former , i cannot so much as imagine what should make him , confessing ( which he could not help ) the actual union of an intelligent and unintelligent being , deny the possible union of intelligent beings . he seems to apprehend many dangerous things in it , that if he cannot reason , he may fright a man out of it , and out of his wits too . it will infer associating , discoursing , solacing . but where lies the danger of all this ? or to whom is it dangerous ? he says it introduces three omniscient , almighty beings , as i expresly call them , associating , &c. but he cites no place where , and i challenge him to name any persons among whom , i so expresly called them . he may indeed tell where i blam'd him for representing some of his adversaries , as affirming three almighties , and denying more than one ; but that is not expresly calling them so my self . and he may know in time 't is one thing expresly to call them so , and another to put him ( as he is concerned ) to disprove it . ay , but it will further infer tritheism . it will make three gods. and if this be not to make three gods , it can never be made appear that the pagans held more gods — yes , if there be no natural , vital nexus , if they be not united in one , of which the pagans never talkt : or , if they be co-ordinate , not subordinate , as dr. cudworth speaks . and i add , if that subordination be , not arbitrary , but by necessary , natural , continual emanation of the second from the first , and of the third from both the other ; so as that their goings forth may be truly from everlasting , as is said of the one , and may as well be conceived of another of them . i would have the trinitarians be content with the reproach of falling in , quoad hoc , with plato ; and not envy their antagonists the honour of more closely following mahomet . and , sir , there is more paganism in denying this , and the divine revelation upon which it is grounded , than in supposing it . no. but there can be no such nexus . conversation , consociation , mutual harmony , agreement , and delectation — cannot be conceived , but between beings so distinct and diverse , that they can be one in no natural respect , but only in a civil , or oeconomical . this is loud , and earnest . but why can there not ? setting aside noise and clamour , i want to know a reason , why intelligent beings may not be as intimately , and naturally united with one another , as unintelligent , and intelligent ? and if so , why such union should spoil mutual conversation and delight ? perhaps his mind and mine might not do well together ; for he cannot conceive , and i , for my part , cannot but conceive , that most perfect intelligent natures , vitally united , must have the most delightful conversation , harmony , and agreement together ; and so much the more , by how much the more perfect they are , and by how much more perfect their union is . whereas then i expect a reason , why intelligent beings cannot be capable of natural union , and no other is given me , but because they are intelligent . and again , why such beings naturally united cannot converse , and no other is given me , but because they are naturally united , i. e. such things cannot be , because they cannot be . by how much the less such reasons have to convince , they have the more to confirm me , that the hypothesis i have propos'd is not capable of being disproved . and for my increased confidence i must profess my self so far beholden to the considerator . this , in the mean time , i do here declare , that i see not so much as the shadow of a reason from him , why three spiritual , or intelligent beings cannot be naturally and vitally united with each other , with continuing distinction , so as to be really and truly one thing . if they cannot , i would know why ? i. e. why they cannot as well , or much rather than the soul and body , so as to be one entire man. if they can ; such a created union is acknowledged possible ; which is all that part of our discourse contends for . and 't is enough for our present purpose ; for this will be an union of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. of things of the same nature , the soul and body are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. things of very different natures . and it sufficiently prepared our way , as was intended , to advance further , and add , that if such a created or made union be possible , it cannot be understood why a like uncreated or unmade union should be thought impossible . and if it be possible , the noisy clamour , that a trinity in the godhead is impossible , or that it will infer tritheism , must cease , and be husht into everlasting silence . or if it shall still be resolved to be kept up , to carry on the begun humour , can only serve to fright children , or unthinking people ; but can never be made articulate enough , to have any signification with men of sense . for when the father is acknowledg'd on all hands to be the original , or fountain-being , existing necessarily , and eternally of himself ; the son existing by eternal promanation necessarily of , and from , and in the father ; the holy ghost of , and in them both ; these , because they all exist necessarily , cannot but be each of them god , and , because they exist in necessary , natural , eternal union , cannot but be one god. and he that shall attempt to make tritheism of this , will sooner prove himself not the third part of a wise man , than from hence prove three gods. we may truly and fitly say the father is god , the son is god , the holy ghost is god. but that form of speech , the father is a god , the son is a god , the holy ghost is a god , i think unjustifiable . the former way of speaking well agrees with the homoousiotes of the deity , the substance whereof is congenerous . you may fitly say of three drops of the same water , they are each of them water . but if you should say they are each of them a water , one would understand you to mean they were all drops of so many different sorts of water . i do upon the whole judg the substance or essence of the three hypostases to be as perfectly one , as can possibly consist with the emanation of some from other of them . but now next . in his way to his second topick of argumentation , he is guilty of a strange sort of omission , i. e. he twice over says he will omit , what he greatly insists upon , as a mighty matter , that this ( meaning the enquirer's hypothesis ) is heresy among those of his own party , whether they be the nominal , or the real trinitarians , who all agree , that each of the divine persons is perfect god , in the most adequate and perfect sense ; and this too , as such person is considered sejunctly , or as the athanasian creed speaks , by himself , &c. to this i only say , in the first place , that , if this weigh any thing , it ought in reason to be as heavy upon him , as me ; for i believe the same people that will call this account of the trinity heresy , will call his denial of it heresy much more . but if he be not concern'd at that , i am the more obliged to him , that he hath a kinder concern for me than himself . and if he really have , let it ease his mind to know , that let the opinion be heresy never so much , i , for my part , am however resolv'd to be no heretick , as he , and they may well enough see , by the whole tenour of that discourse . but yet i humbly crave leave to differ from him in this , as well as in greater matters . i am apt enough indeed to think that the nominal trinitarians will judg the opinion of the real trinitarians to want truth ; and the real will , perhaps , more truly judg theirs to want sense . but neither the one , nor the other will say that each of the divine persons is perfect god , in the most adequate and perfect sense . for both cannot but agree that god , in the most adequate and perfect sense , includes father , son , and holy ghost ; but they will none of them say that each , or any of the persons is father , son , and holy ghost . and i am very confident , he that shall so represent them , will betray them by it into such inconveniencies , and so much against their mind and intent , that if ever they did trust him , as i believe they never did this considerator , to express their sense for them , they never will do it more . as for athanasius himself , whose creed he mentions , tho he often speaks of an equality of the persons in point of godhead ; yet he also often , tom. . p. . most expresly excepts the differences ( which i take to be very important ) of being unbegotten , begotten , and proceeding . and which is a difference with a witness , in his questions and answers ; he asks how many causes are there in god ? [ ( q. . ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ] and answers , one only , and that is the father . and then asks [ q. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] how many effects , or things caused ? and answers two , the son and the spirit . and adds , the father is call'd a cause , because he begets the son , and sends out the spirit . the son and spirit are said to be caused , because the son is begotten , and doth not beget ; the spirit is sent forth , and doth not send . now can he be thought all this while to mean an absolute equality ? and whereas he uses the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which our author renders sejunctly , or by himself , that he may make it seem opposite to what is said by the enquirer , pag. . i , for my part , say , as athanasius doth , that each of these persons is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , singly god , and lord ; but i say not , as he doth not ; and he denies what the sober enquiry denies , in the mentioned place , that any one of the persons sejunctly , is all that is signify'd by the name of god , which words this author slily leaves out , for what purpose he best knows . but his purpose , be it what it will , can no longer be served by it , than till the reader shall take the pains to cast back his eye upon pag. . of the sober enquiry . and i must here put the considerator in mind of what i will not suppose him ignorant , but inadvertent only , at this time ; that one may be sejoin'd , or abstracted from another two ways , or by a twofold abstraction , precisive , or negative . that we may truly say of the father , son , or holy ghost , that the one of them is , or is not god , abstracting from both the other , according as you differently abstract . if you abstract any one of the persons from both the other by precisive abstraction , and each of them is god or lord , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or singly considered ; but if by negative abstraction you sever any one from the other , so as to say the one is god , and not the other , or any one is all that is signify'd by the name of god , i deny it , as before i did ; for so you would exclude the other two the godhead ; which is but what was expresly enough said sob . enquiry , pag. . the father is god , but not excluding the son and the holy ghost , the son is god , but not excluding — &c. and if ( as this author quotes ) we are compelled by the christian verity so to speak , i wonder it should not compel him , as it is christian verity , or at least as it is verity , as well as the rest of christians , or mankind . why hath he only the privilege of exemption from being compell'd by truth ? athanasius his word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , we are necessitated ; and if the considerator's own translation grieve him , he might relieve himself by considering that all necessity is not compulsive . and because he hath brought me to athanasius , i shall take the occasion to say , i cannot apprehend him to have any sentiment contrary to this hypothesis . his business was against the arians , or the ariomanites ( as he often called them , as symbolizing also with manes . ) and because with them the controversy was , whether the son and spirit were creatures , in opposition hereto he constantly asserts their consubstantiality with the father , never intending ( for ought that appears ) that their being was numerically the same with his ; but of the same kind , uncreated , coessential , coeternal with his own . for so he expresly speaks in his other ( or additional ) questions , i. e. asking ( quest. . ) how many essences 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. how many sorts of essence ( as the answer will direct us to understand it ) do you acknowledg in god ? the answer is , i say , one essence , one nature , one form ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) and adds , one kind , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which sufficiently expounds all the rest . he acknowledged no different kinds of essence or nature in the godhead , but that one only , which was eternal and uncreated ; agreeably to what he elsewhere says against the followers of sabellius . 't is impossible things not eternal — beings not partaking godhead , should be ranked , or put in the same order with the godhead . afterwards speaking of the father and the son , he says , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the one is such ( not the same ) as the other , the other such as he . and that the son was not to be conceived under another species ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) nor under a strange and foreign character ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) but was god as the father . and i appeal to any man's understanding and conscience , if that great author believ'd a numerical sameness of essence , common to the three persons , what should make him blame the sabellians for making the son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , when by the latter in that case , he must mean the same thing as by the former ? in the forecited questions , he expresly says we were to acknowledg in the deity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three individuals . answer to quest. . ubi priùs . and elsewhere he as distinctly asserts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three things . and what could he mean by three things , not three deities , ( as he often inculcates ) but he must certainly mean three entities , three essences ; for by three things , he could not possibly mean three non-entities , or three nothings . his great care plainly was to assert the true deity of the son and spirit , or their preeternity , or that it could never be said ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) there was a time when they were not , which he inculcates in an hundred places , still insisting that one deity , one essence was common to them , but still with distinction ; and as warmly inveighs against sabellius and p. samosatensis , as against arius every whit . and that which puts his meaning quite out of doubt , speaking how the father , son and spirit , tho of one and the same sort of essence , are three hypostases , he plainly says the nature wherein they partake is so one , as the humane nature is one in all men. we men , saith he , consisting of a body and a soul , are all ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) of one nature and substance , or essence ; but we are many hypostases . and to the same purpose [ dial. . de trinitate ] his anomoeos comparing the father , son and spirit , to a bishop , presbyter , and deacon , he brings in the orthodox saying , they have all the same nature , being each of them man ; as an angel , a man , and an horse , have different natures . in the mean time , because men are not inseparably , and vitally united with one another , as the divine persons are , and cannot but be , by reason of the necessary , eternal , perpetual emanation of the two latter from the first , they cannot admit to be called one man , as the three persons in the godhead , are and cannot but be one god. inasmuch as these three divine persons partake real godhead ( as existing necessarily each of them ) they are each truly god : but because they partake it in necessary , eternal , vital union ; and so that the first is the radix , the second perpetually springing from the first , and the third from both the other , they are therefore together one god as branches , tho really distinct from each other , and the root , are altogether notwithstanding but one tree , and all omoousial , or consubstantial to one another ; which is an illustration familiar with the the antients . and if there be any , now a days , that will call this heresy , ( tho as i said , i will be no heretick however ) yet if i must make a choice , i had rather be an heretick with the ante-nicene and nicene fathers , and post-nicene , for ought appears to the contrary , through some following centuries , than be reputed orthodox with p. lumbard , &c. whom a german divine , not of meanest account , calls one of the four evangelists of antichrist . but having now done with what he said he would omit , but did not , ( tho he might to every whit as good purpose ) we come to what he overlooks not , because ( he intimates ) he cannot . and let us see whether he looks into it , to any better purpose , than if he had quite overlook'd it . he is indeed the more excusable that he overlooks it not , because ( he says ) he could not . in that case there is no remedy . nor do i see how he well could , when the sober enquirer had once and again so directly put it in his view , and , as was said , objected it to himself . but he thinks , however , to make an irrefragable battering ram of it , wherewith to shiver this doctrine of the trinity all to pieces , and he brings it into play with the two horns before mentioned . the father , he says , for instance , is either infinite in his substance , his wisdom , his power , his goodness , or he is not . with the like pompous apparatus , and even in the same terms , i find a series of argumentation is by a noted sceptick adorned , and set forth against the being of any god at all . if there be any divine being , 't is either finite or infinite , &c. and he reasons upon each head , as the matter could admit , and probably thought as well of the performance as our author doth of his . but let us see how much to the purpose our author uses it in the present case . the enquirer had represented three really distinct subsistents in the godhead as possible , for ought we know , not presuming to determine herein , this way or that , beyond what is plain in it self , or plainly revealed . and so still he thinks it may be , for ought he knows ; for he professes not to know any thing to the contrary . yes ( saith the considerator ) but i do . no doubt , if any man. but say i , how know you ? i know , saith he , they can neither be finite , nor infinite , therefore there can be no such thing at all . but , say i , do you know what infinite is , or can you comprehend it ? yes , very well , says he ; for i have an infinite all-comprehending mind . what a cyclopick understanding is this ? nay , and he pretends he can comprehend the very being of god ( otherwise all religion must cease ) after he had granted , we ( including himself ) cannot comprehend the least spire of grass . and yet that being of god is nothing else with him , but existence , ( i. e. not to be nothing ) which he there vafrously inserts , but very imprudently ; for every one sees he said it only to avoid the purpose he was to speak to , and so said it not to any present good purpose at all ? as if it had been the bishop's word , and all one with god's being . 't is true that his being includes his existence : but hath he therefore a clear , distinct and adequate conception what god is , because he , indistinctly , conceives a being , vulgarly signify'd by the name of god , doth exist ? bring the matter to creatures , and because he knows , as he may by the sight of his eye , that such a creature exists , doth he therefore understand its nature ? existence is to be extra causas , and this is common to all creatures ; as to be necessarily , and without a cause , is peculiar to god. if therefore existence , and their being be all one , all creatures are the same , and differ not from one another ; for to be extra causas is that wherein they all agree . and extend it further , as existence is to be , in rerum naturâ , abstracting from being caused , or uncaused ; and so god , and creatures will be all one . and see whether this will not make all religion cease too ? but if he say , tho existence abstractly taken , distinguishes not god from creatures ; yet his existence doth distinguish him . very true ; but that leads us back to the consideration of his being , of what sort that is . which therefore , if he had pleased , he might as well have let stand before as it was ; and might have considered that existence , and that which doth exist , are not of the same import . or that it is not all one , to say that god doth exist , and what he is that doth exist . but it will be worth the while to examine a little further this author's comprehension of infinites . he says it is to have a clear , distinct , and adequate conception of them , so he comprehends the infinite attributes of god. his eternity , i. e. that duration , by which he is without all beginning , and end . this tells us what it is not . but doth it tell us what it is ? q. d. an infinite duration is a boundless duration : a grammatical definition ! or rather a meer translation of latin into english. and so he might teach a meer latinist what boundless is , by turning the english back again into latin. and greatly hath he edify'd his disciple ! as much as he should , without such change of language , by saying invasion is invasion . and doth he give any better account of infinite wisdom and power ? are his conceptions of them clear and distinct . 't is possible to know much , and not be very wise . i do not think that therefore , which he gives , a very good account of wisdom . again , knowing is doing somewhat . he speaks not now of making this or that , but more generally of doing any thing . nor doth any one know any thing , but what he can know . therefore his wisdom is power ; for so is an ability to know , power , as truly , as an ability to do any thing else . here is confusion , therefore , instead of distinction . and to the comprehending any thing , i should think it as requisite a man's conception be true , as distinct . now when he pretends to have distinct conceptions of god's infinite wisdom and power , if also his conceptions be true , those infinite attributes are distinct . i am sure he comprehends them not , if , whereas he clearly conceives them distinct , they are not so . but if they are distinct , they are distinct , what ? substances ? or accidents ? if the former , according to him , distinct divine substances must be distinct gods. if the latter , let him weather the difficulties as he can of admitting accidents in the divine being . either way , he must as little pretend to believe an omnimodous simplicity there , as the enquirer . but would he then have him give better and fuller conceptions of these infinite attributes , or rather of the infinity of them , which is his present business ? no , no , that is none of the enquirer's part . he pretends not to comprehend infiniteness . 't is enough for one , among mortals , to offer at ( that ingens ausum ) so great a thing ! when again he says his conception of the infinite divine wisdom , power , &c. is adequate , telling us they are those properties whereby god knows , and can do , whatsoever implies not a contradiction to be known , and done : i ask , but doth he comprehend in his mind all those things which it implies not a contradiction for him to know and do ? if not , what is become of his adequate conception ? he may so comprehend all that the most learned book contains , because he knows the title , or something of its cover ; and he hath a very adequate conception of all that is contained in the universe , because he hath some general notion of what is signify'd by the word world. let him then pretend as long as he please to comprehend infiniteness , no sober man will believe him , and the less , because he pretends it . if he put his mind upon the trial , and deal justly and truly when he hath try'd , i would ask him , let him put the notion of infiniteness upon what he pleases , space , for instance , whether , as he thinks away any whatsoever bounds of it , new ones do not immediately succeed ? and let him think away those , whether still he doth not presently conceive new ? yes , but he can divert and think no more of it , i. e. he can think ▪ what infinite is , by not thinking ! and yet if he did understand infinites never so well , it would be no small spite to him if a man did but assert the infiniteness of one of the persons ( the father ) , and only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the other two , as knowing their intimate union with him , makes his wisdom , power , &c. as truly theirs , as if it first resided in themselves ; his argument is quite undone by it to all intents and purposes . but i shall however , farther state and weigh this case of [ knowing , or not knowing , three such hypostases cannot be infinite . ] and . shew what might cast a thinking man upon , supposing they may be all infinite for ought one knows . . then consider the difficulty that is in it . . as to the former . that the father virtually ( or eminently rather ) comprehends all being , created and uncreated , there is no doubt . nor again , that what is from him , by perpetual , natural , necessary emanation , cannot but be homoousial to himself , the athanasian differences only supposed , of being unbegotten , and begotten , &c. but how to understand these is the difficulty ; i. e. how the same numerical nature is both begotten , and no● begotten ; nor will i determine it . let them do it that can better . i , for my part , as i have said , assert nothing in this matter , only have proposed to be considered what may be thought possible herein . but if any would set themselves to consider this matter , i would have them take the difficulty they are to consider , entirely , and as it truly is in it self ; that they may not be short in their reckoning . and to that purpose to bethink themselves what is the proper character ( as athanasius , and before him justin martyr phrase it ) or modus of the son ( for instance ) that 't is to be begotten . this methinks should bear very hard upon the meer modalists , who hereupon must say , that to be begotten is the only thing begotten , and so consequently that to be begotten , is the thing that is peculiarly said to be incarnate , and that suffered , &c. for they must assign that which distinguishes the son from the father , otherwise they will make the father be begotten , which is somewhat harder than to be patripassians , or to make him to have suffered . but it must also be upon the matter even the same difficulty , to say , the same numerical nature , with the modus , is begotten . for then the same numerical nature must still be both unbegotten , and begotten , which is very hard . and if they reply , yes , but under a distinct modus . well ; but what is that distinct modus ? and when they find it is but to be begotten , they must be hugely abashed , as one of less deep thought than they would think . for so , the nature being common both to the father and the son , all that is peculiar to the begotten , from the begetter , will still be but to be begotten , i. e. when the question is askt , what only is begotten ? the answer will be but as above , to be begotten . it hath hitherto , therefore , been only enquired , whether it will not seem easier to suppose each subsistent to have its own singular nature , tho homoousial , as , the two latter being by emanation from the first , it cannot but be ? which hath been often inculcated , and is plain in it self . meer arbitrary productions may be very diverse from their original , but purely natural , especially emanative , cannot be so . and then the only considerable difficulty which remains is this now before us , viz. the finiteness or infiniteness of these three hypostases : 't is plain they cannot be all finite . but here our present adversary places his principal pains , and labour , to prove , what he knows no body will deny , that they cannot be so . and hence he carries away glorious trophies , that three , or three thousand finites , will never make one infinite . — spolia ampla — ! but how knows he they are not all infinite ? that , in short , which he hath here to say , is but this , and can be no more than this , till his thoughts have run through and compass'd the never-utmost range of infiniteness , viz. that he knows they are not , he knows not what ! but how can he soberly say that ? how can he either affirm or deny of another what he doth not understand ? is this his demonstration of the impossibility of a trinity in the godhead ? suppose the father infinite , cannot the other two be infinite also , for ought he knows ? how doth he know they cannot ? by the same medium , by which he knows it , he may make other mortals know it too , if he think fit to communicate it . which , from so mighty confidence , especially when he pretends it to be so easy , i have hitherto expected , but in vain . is it because the first is infinite , therefore the two other cannot be so ? i am sure he ought not to say so , whatever others may , or whatsoever the truth of the thing is ( which we shall enquire into by and by ) for he hath over and over acknowledg'd more infinites than one . as when he ascribes infinite comprehension to the mind of man ( as hath been noted , pag. . of these considerations ) he doth not indeed say the mind is simply in it self infinite , but it is so in respect of its comprehension , which comprehension must therefore be infinite . how agreeable or consistent these terms are , the infinite comprehension of a finite mind , we are not to consider ; let him take care for that , who can easily make light of such trivial difficulties as these . but in the mean time this infinite comprehension is an infinite something , not an infinite nothing ; and then so many minds , so many comprehensions , and so many infinites . no doubt he includes his own mind ; and 't is possible he may think some other minds as comprehensive as his own . and ought not to think it impossible , supposing an uncreated , eternal word , and spirit , in the deity , that they may be infinite , as well as the comprehension of his own and some other minds . besides what he seems to grant of infinite guilts , and punishments due , tho he doth not grant the sacrifice of christ to be an equivalent for them . all shews he thinks there may be many infinites , and even in the same kind . but tho to him , to whom it is not easy to guess what would be difficult , this would seem a very vincible difficulty ; it is of much greater importance , that we may do right to truth , to consider it , as it is in it self . and i acknowledg it ( as i have said over and over ) to be in it self , a great difficulty , as all sober men have been wont to do , that have had any occasion to employ their thoughts that way . but my part herein hath less of difficulty in it ; which is only to expect , and examine , what another will attempt to prove from this topick , not to assert any thing my self . my opponent takes upon him boldly to pronounce , there cannot be three distinct hypostases in the deity . why ? say i. because saith he , that will suppose each of them infinite , which cannot be . i say , why can it not be ? he perhaps may tell me , if any one be infinite , nothing can be added thereto , or be without its compass , much less can there be another infinite added to the former . i only now say , you talk confidently in the dark , you know not what . and so as to involve your self in contradictions , do what you can . . in saying nothing can be added to what is infinite . . in pretending to know , if any thing can be added , how much , or how little can . . in saying nothing can be added to , or be without the compass of , what is infinite . for then there could be no creation , which i cannot doubt him to grant . before there was any , was there not an infinitude of being in the eternal godhead ? and hath the creation nothing in it of real being ? or will you say the being of the creature is the being of god ? i know what may be said ( and is elsewhere said ) to this , and 't will better serve my purpose than his . . in pretending to know what can , or cannot be added . or that , in the way of necessary eternal emanation , there cannot be an infinite addition ; tho not in the way of voluntary , or arbitrary and temporary production . the reason of the difference is too obvious to need elucidation to them that can consider . but for your part ( i must tell my antagonist ) you have concluded your self , even as to that which carries the greatest appearance of impossibility , come off as you can . you say , a body of an inch square , is not only not infinite in extension , but is a very small body ; yet it hath this infinite power , to be divisible to infinity . so , i suppose , you must say of half that inch , or a quarter , or the thousandth part of it , much more of two , or twenty , or a thousand inches . you say , indeed , this body it self is not infinite . nor will i insist upon the trite and common objection against you . how can any thing be divisible into parts which it hath not in it ? which yet men have not talkt away , by talking it often over . still haeret lateri — nor of an infinite power 's being lodged in a finite ( and so minute a ) subject . but , in the mean time , here are infinites upon infinites , an infinite power upon an infinite power multiplyed infinitely ; and still these infinite powers greater and less than other , as either the inch is augmented , or diminished . and he saith the mind of man hath the property of infinite or eternal duration . therefore so many minds , so many infinites . and he must suppose the infinite duration of some minds to be greater than of others , unless he think his own mind to be as old as adam's ; or do not only hold their preexistence , but that they were all created in the same moment . which if he do , i am sure he can never prove . and so , for ought he knows , there may not only be many infinites , but one greater than another . what therefore exceeds all limits that are assignable , or any way conceivable by us , as we are sure the divine being doth , it is impossible for us to know what differences that vast infinitude contains . and we shall , therefore , but talk at random , and with much more presumption than knowledg , when we take upon us to pronounce it impossible , there should be three infinite hypostases in the godhead . especially considering that most intimate vital union that they are supposed to have each with other , in respect whereof , the son is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , inexisting in the father ( as athanasius's phrase is ) agreeably to the language of scripture , joh. . . and elsewhere . and which , by parity of reason , is to be conceiv'd of the holy ghost too , who is also said to search all things , even the deep things of god , cor. . . in respect of which union , and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which may thence be collected , whatever of real perfection , wisdom , power , goodness , &c. is in any one , is each ones as truly as any ones , all being originally in the father , as the first and everliving fountain of all . as was said , sober enquiry , p. , . but whereas the considerator urges , if the father be infinite in his substance , in his wisdom , his power , his goodness , he is god in the most adequate and perfect sense of the word . i say , well , and what then ? if therefore he mean the son and the holy ghost must be excluded the godhead , let him prove his consequence if he can . and he may find the answer to it , sob . enquiry , pag. . i shall not transcribe , nor love , when i have writ a book , to write it over again . his notion may fit pagans well enough , or those who are not otherwise taught . christians are directed to understand that the deity includes father , son , and holy ghost . their equality i acknowledg with the mentioned athanasian exception ; notwithstanding which , that they equally communicate in the most characteristick difference of the deity , from all creatures , viz. necessity of existence , is conceivable enough . to sum up all , the considerator i understand , even by the whole management of his discourse , and specially by the conclusion of that part wherein the enquirer is concern'd , to have most entirely given up this cause , as ever did any man. the enquirer's only undertaking was to maintain the possibility of a trinity in the godhead , in opposition to his former , daring assertion , of its being impossible , and nonsense . he now , in conclusion , says , the enquirer saw there must be a nexus ; intimating , if there can , that he hath gain'd his point ; but , 't is added , he durst not venture to say what it was . to which i must say , that this is most uncautiously said , i will not say , deceitfully , tho i know 't is said untruly ; and he might have known ( or remembred ) too , that he ( the enquirer ) often spoke of it , as a necessary , natural , eternal , vital , and most intimate union . he further says , he only explains it by the union of soul and body . which again , . is so great a misrepresentation , that i wonder he would say it here , when he himself but two or three pages off recites as the enquirer's words , [ if god could unite into one , two such contrary natures , let any man give me a reason why he might not ( much more ) first make , and then unite two , and if two , why not three spirits , &c. ] is this only to explain it by the union of soul and body ? but by the way that [ first make , and then unite ] was none of the enquirer's , but appears thrust in to make what was manifestly possible , seem impossible . sic notus — let two substances be created entire , with no natural propension to each other , they are capable of no natural union , without change of their natures . who sees not , it were a contradiction to suppose them , the same still , and not the same ? but suppose them created with mutual aptitudes to union , and united , what should hinder but they may continue united , without being confounded ? . and 't is said impertinently , as well as untruly ; for what if he had not explain'd it at all , is it therefore impossible , which it belonged to him to prove , or he did nothing ; and he hath done nothing towards it . i have askt him before , and now i put it again seriously to him , whether he do in his conscience believe this a good argument [ such an union , i. e. natural , necessary , &c. hath no pattern or parallel in the creation ; therefore it is impossible in the nature of god ? ] for what he adds , that the soul and body in a man are not united into one substance or essence , nor possibly can be ; the cause indeed depends not on it , but lies remote from it . methinks however it is very feat , and shews him pinch't , that he can be brought to this ! hath a man no substance ? is he a shadow ? or hath he no essence ? is he a non-entity ? or is his essence a body ? then a body is a man. or is his essence a spirit ? then , a spirit is a man. if he say either of these , i wish he would tell us the quantity of those propositions , that we may know whether he means that every body is a man , or every spirit is a man ? i am sure where the essence is , there must be the essentiatum . or whether soul and body united , make nothing different from either , or both disunited ? or whether a man be only such a thing as a pye ? or why might not a pudding serve as well , if made up of several ingredients ? he hath greatly indeed oblig'd mankind for such an honour done them ! if indeed the cause depended on it , he would have good store of philosophers to confute , and all that have any concern for their own kind , before he could disprove the possibility of the supposed union in the deity , and you have nothing for it but his bare word : which ( at least , without the addition of his name ) will not do the business . nor , if he could also bring us a demonstration against the union of soul and body , can he thereby prove such an union as we suppose in the godhead impossible . the case is quite another . the union of the soul and body was never by me called essential ; for i well know , if they were essentially united , in the strict sense they could never be disunited . but 't is commonly call'd a substantial union , and i called it natural in respect of the principle , nature , in contradistinction to art. as for the supposed union we speak of in the deity , that , being necessary , original , eternal , it must be essential , or none ; but with such distinction as before was supposed . for it was union , not identity , that was meant , which union , with such distinction , till they be proved impossible , the enquirer's cause is untoucht . and is certainly to any such purpose , not in the least touch'd by the considerator . whether there be any such union that may admit to be called essential among the creatures , doth neither make nor marr . we have never said there was , nor doth the stress of the cause lie upon it . i find indeed an ingenious , merry gentleman animadverts upon a postscript writ against the sober enquiry , and upon a letter in answer to it , who at a venture calls all essential union , essential contradiction , and substantial nonsense . who this is , i will not pretend to guess , only i guess him not to be the same with the considerator , for this , besides other reasons , that he calls the author of the considerations a great man ; and i scarce think he would call himself so . his wit , and sportful humour , i should have liked better in a less serious affair . for this heboldly pronounces , in immediate reference to the trinity it self , ( that the world might know he hath a confidence , at least , equal to his wit ) i can easily abstain from asserting that any created unions are to be called strictly essential , because then they must be simply indissoluble . and i see not but whatsoever things the creator hath united , he may disunite , if he be so pleased . yet one might have expected this author to have been a little more civil to him whom he stiles the late famous dr. more , who hath publisht to the world his express sentiments in this matter , that created spirits have real amplitude , made up of indiscerpible parts , essentially united , so as not to be separable , without annihilation of the whole . one would think he should not have treated him so , as to make his essential union , substantial nonsense . but there are those left in the world , who have that veneration for the doctor , as to think it no indecent rudeness to this gentleman , not to put his judgment in the ballance against the doctor 's , or to distinguish between his calling it nonsense , and proving it so . but if any wonder that they who think there is no such thing as an essential union among creatures , do yet think there may be in the uncreated being , they will shew themselves mighty wise in their wonder , i. e. in wondering that the creatures are not god. and if they further hereupon enquire , why we will then make use of unions not essential , among creatures , to illustrate that which is supposed essential in the uncreated being , and expect very particular , distinct accounts of every thing so represented ; they will shew themselves as wise in their expectations , i. e. that they think nothing can serve to illustrate , unless it be like in all respects . that question still returns . is every thing to be judg'd by any man of sense impossible in god , whereof he hath not given distinct and explicit accounts , and illustrations from somewhat in the creatures ? and another will be added , is there any thing originally in god , not essential to him ? but when the world is so full of instances of substantial unions , without confusion , or identification , that he cannot so much as name me a created substance , that he can be sure exists absolutely simple , i am sure it can be no contradiction to suppose that there may be uncreated , necessary , eternal union , without confusion or identification ; and that it would be , as he phrases it , essential contradiction , or substantial nonsense , to say that things united necessarily ( tho distinct ) can possibly ever admit of separation . and if our modern anti-trinitarians ( for i will not call them by the inept name of unitarians , which as rightfully belongs to them whose adversaries they are pleas'd to be , as to themselves , and therefore cannot distinguish the one from the other ) would allow it to be their method to understand the doctrine of the orthodox antients , before they decry and hoot at it , they would find that as they allow sufficient distinction of the sacred hypostases ; so the union they assert , is not such as identifies them , but only signifies them to be inseparable . so speaks athanasius himself , we think not as the sabellians , that the son is of one and the same essence with the father , but consubstantial — nor do we assert three hypostases separated as with men , bodily , lest with the gentiles , we should admit polytheism , &c. so do liberius and he agree in sentiment . the one says , the son is not separated from the father's hypostasis . the other , we hold not the son divided from the father , &c. and upon the most impartial , faithful , and diligent search and consideration , i do solemnly declare there needed nor more of rationality , or intelligibleness in this doctrine , to keep it from being ridicul'd , as contradictious , and non-sense ; but only less prejudice , and more modesty in the opposers of it , with more reverence of the divine majesty , upon this ( obvious ) apprehension , that if it be true , it must be sacred , divine truth . this author would fain have me with him to the play-house , whither really i have no leasure to accompany him , nor much temptation ; for i perceive it hath fill'd his mind with ideas not useful to my purpose ; nor , i think , to any good one of his own . if there he learned to jest away that which should be the best part of himself ; and of which socrates , dying , told his friends it would be gone far enough out of their hands , and for that which was left behind , they might bury , or do with it what they pleased . if there he was taught to ridicule the holy apostle's distinction of ( an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) an inner and an outer man ; and when he hath thrown the former of these out of his notion of himself , for my part , i must think of that which is left , that the silly indian is the less silly creature of the two . and besides , as he is too much given to play , to mind any thing of serious discourse , so i find he is not throughout honest in his play neither ; but that even when he pretends to sit out , and be but a spectator , only taking care that there be fair play , he falls in himself , and plays booty . nor do i find he hath any thing of argument in his discourse , which hath not been considered already in the discourse i have had with the considerator . i therefore take leave of them both together , and of you too , sir , being in great sincerity your affectionate humble servant , the enquirer . errata . pag. . l. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . advertisement . the letter to the clergy of both vniversities , came not to my sight , or notice , till some hours after the last sheet of this discourse was brought me from the press ; i have not time therefore to say much to it , nor yet should say more than i do had i never so much . the author seems to think what he was now doing , as to the enquiry , superfluous , because he said it was so fully done by an ab●er hand , &c. in the mean time he was ●n ill case , that he was neither able to write to any purpose , nor be silent : a most deplorable double impotency ? but he hath notwithstanding his modesty , shown a double ability , to invent and make an hypothesis of his own fingers ends , and then most dexterously to combat that shadow . three inadequate gods , is indeed ( to use his own phrase ) his own invention , constantly disavow'd by the enquirer , who , with the generality of trinitarians , calls the three subsistents in the godhead , god ; being each of them necessarily existent , but none of them alone exclusively , a god. what art he hath is shewn in fighting this his own figment . as also that of parts of the deity , other than conceptible , which no man can avoid . so we have his dream of a third part of a god , about which he so learnedly raves in his dream , as to disprove , as effectually , any god at all . for i appeal to what sense he hath left himself , whether power alone be god exclusive of wisdom and goodness ? then 't is an inadequate , or a not compleat notion of god , then by his profound reasoning , not eternal . no more are father , son , and holy ghost parts , unless you be enamoured of the bull , impartible parts , that never were parted , nor ever can be . as what are necessarily united ( tho unconfounded ) cannot without nonsense and contradiction , be said to be parted . his fiction , that what is from the eternal father by necessary emanation , cannot be eternal , but must have a beginning , is of the same stamp . he did not need when he writ , to have abandoned all logick and common sense , that would have told him relata sunt simul naturâ . his so confidently taking it for granted on all hands , that all infinites are equal , shews his little compass of thought , and how unacquainted he is with the difficulties of a controversy , wherein yet he will be so over-meddlesome . qui pauca respicit , &c. but who so bold as — ? i leave him to compound that difference with his abler considerator , whether one inch and two inches be equal ? and so bid him good night . finis . books written by the reverend mr. john howe . . the blessedness of the righteous : the vanity of this mortal life , on psal. . ver . . and psal. . . . delighting in god. . living temple . . self-dedication discoursed in the anniversary thanksgiving of a person of honour for a great deliverance . . of thoughtfulness for the morrow . with an appendix concerning the immoderate desire of fore-knowing things to come . . of charity in reference to other mens sins . . the redeemer's tears wept over lost souls , in a treatise on luke . , . with an appendix , wherein somewhat is occasionally discoursed concerning the sin against the holy ghost , and how god is said to will the salvation of them that perish . . a funeral sermon for that faithful and laborious servant of christ , mr. richard fairclough , ( who deceased july . . in the sixty first year of his age. ) . a sermon directing what we are to do after a strict enquiry whether or no we truly love god. . a funeral sermon for mrs. esther sampson , the late wife of henry sampson , dr. of physick , who died nov. . . . the carnality of religious contention . in two sermons preach'd at the merchants lecture in broadstreet . . a calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a trinity in the godhead . . a letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the defence of dr. sherlock's notion of the trinity in unity , relating to the calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject . books printed for tho. parkhurst , at the bible and three crowns , the lower end of cheapside . a body of practical divinity , consisting of above one hundred seventy six sermons on the lesser-catechism composed by the reverend assembly of divines at westminster : with a supplement of some sermons on several texts of scripture . by thomas watson , formerly minister at st. stephen's - walbrook , london . a paraphrase on the new testament , with notes , doctrinal and practical . by plainness and brevity fitted to the use of religious families , in their daily reading of the scriptures ; and of the younger and poorer sort of scholars and ministers , who want fuller helps . with an advertisement of difficulties in the revelations . by the late reverend mr. richard baxter . six hundred of select hymns and spiritual songs collected out of the holy bible . together with a catechism , the canticles , and a catalogue of vertuous women . the three last hundred of select hymns collected out of the psalms of david . by william barton , a. m. late minister of st. martins in leicester . spiritual songs : or songs of praise to almighty god upon several occasions . together with the song of songs , which is solomon's : first turn'd , then paraphased in english verse . by john mason . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . lib. . jud. antiq. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , cap. . enn. . lib. . cap. , , , &c. quaestiones aliae . contra sabellii gregales . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . tom. . p. . edit . paris . tractat. de definitionibus , tom. . . ubi vid. plura . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. sext. empir . adversus mathematicos , lib. . considerations on the lord bishop of worcester's sermon ; p. , . these considerations , p. , . considerations , pag. . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . liber . epist. ad athan. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . rescript . ath. ad liberium . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a trinity in the godhead in a letter to a person of worth : occasioned by the lately published considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity by dr. wallis, dr. sherlock, dr. s--th, dr. cudworth, &c. ... howe, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing h estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a trinity in the godhead in a letter to a person of worth : occasioned by the lately published considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity by dr. wallis, dr. sherlock, dr. s--th, dr. cudworth, &c. ... howe, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by j. astwood for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . advertisement: p. -[ ] at end. attributed to john howe by wing. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng wallis, john, - . -- considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a trinity in the godhead : in a letter to a person of worth. occasioned by the lately published considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity : by dr. wallis , dr. sherlock , dr. s — th , dr. cudworth , &c. together with certain letters ( hitherto unpublished ) formerly written to the reverend dr. wallis on the same subject . london , printed by j. astwood for tho. parkhurst at the bible and crowns at the lower end of cheapside , near mercers . chappel , . a calm discourse of the trinity in the godhead , &c. sir , i intend not this discourse shall be concern'd in what this author hath said of the several explications given by the persons named on his title-page . the only thing it is design'd for , is the discoursing with him that single point which he refers to in his th . and th . pages , and which in this controversie , is on all hands confessed to be the cardinal one , viz. whether a trinity in the godhead be possible or no ? i put not the question about three persons ; both because i will not , in so short a discourse as i intend to make this , be engaged in discussing the unagreed notion of a person ; and because the scripture lays not that necessity upon me , ( tho' i do not think the use of that term , in this affair , either blameable or indefensible . ) but i shall enquire whether the father , the son ( or word ) and the holy ghost cannot possibly admit of sufficient distinction from one another to answer the parts and purposes severally assigned them by the scripture , in the christian oeconomy , and yet be each of them god , consistently with this most inviolable and indubitable truth [ that there can be but one god. ] this author concludes it to be impossible in the mentioned pages of his discourse , and thereupon seems to judg it necessary that two of them be excluded the godhead , as many others ( some going the arian , some the photinian , more lately called the socinian way ) have done before him . he acknowledges pag. . col . . there may be [ some secret revealed by god , because it was above humane capacicity to discover it ; and sometimes also to comprehend how it can be ] but adds [ there is a vast difference between my not being able to conceive how a thing should be , and a clear apprehension , and sight that it cannot be . ] what he says thus far is unexceptionable , and i heartily concur with him in it . but for what he subjoyns , ( wherein he might have spoken his mind of the matter in controversie with as much advantage to his cause , without reflecting upon his adversaries , as if they considered these things either with no intention , or with no sincerity , not allowing them even the never so little of the one or the other ) that [ three distinct almighty and alknowing persons , should be but one almighty , or but one all-knowing , or but one god , a man ( who considers with never so little intention and sincerity ) clearly sees that it cannot be . in short , that it is not a mystery , but ( as dr. south speaks ) an absurdity and a contradiction . ] this is that i would consider with him , if he will affix these words of his [ a man who considers , &c. ) clearly sees it cannot be ; and it is an absurdity and a contradiction ] to the question as i have set it down above . in the mean time he cannot be ignorant that as he hath represented the matter , he hath here either not truly , ( or at least not fairly ) given the sense of any of them whom he pretended to oppose . for when by those words , but that three divine persons , or that three distinct almighty and allknowing persons should be but one almighty , but one allknowing , or but one god , he would slily insinuate to his unwary and less attentive reader that the same men held three almighties , and but one ; he well knows , and elsewhere confesses ( tho' he might suppose that some readers would not be at leisure to compare one place of his writings with another , but hastily run away with the apprehension , that such as were not of his mind spake nothing but nonsense and contradictions ) that not only his later opposers since p. lumbard , as he speaks , but divers much more ancient , as athanasius , and the rest of the nicene fathers , &c. deny'd three almighties , tho' they affirmed each of the persons to be almighty , understanding omnipotency ( as they do omnisciency ) to be an attribute not of the person , as such , but of the essence , as such , which they affirm to be but one , i. e. that they are each of them almighty , by communication in one and the same almighty essence . and if their sentiment be so very absurd , he needed the less to fear representing it as it is . and the other who seems to grant three almighties , doth never say there is but one almighty ; tho' such say too there is but one god , placing the unity of the godhead in somewhat else , as he hath himself taken notice ; which is remote from express self-contradiction also . but i shall concern my self no further about the one or the other of these ways of explaining the doctrine of the three persons . only shall enquire concerning the possibility of such a trinity in the godhead as was above expressed , requiting the uncharitableness of this author , in imputing carelesness or insincerity to all , that think it possible , with so much charity , as to believe he would not ( against the plain tenour of scripture ) have rejected the doctrine of the trinity ( as he professes to do that of the incarnation ) if he had not thought it every way impossible . and here i premise . that the present undertaking is not to shew that the father , son and holy ghost are three , and but one , in the same respect , which i would adventure ( in this authors words ) to say , no man that considers with never so little intention and sincerity , would offer at . but when they are supposed to be but one , in respect of deity , they are thought to be three in some other respect . . that what i now design is only to represent this matter as possible to be some way , and in the way here proposed for ought we know , not as definitely certain , to be this way or that . the former is enough to our present purpose , i. e. if any way it can be conceived , without absurdity or contradiction , that these may be three with sufficient distinction to found the distinct attributes which the scriptures do severally give them , so as some things may be affirmed of some one , and not be affirmed of the other of them , and yet their unity in godhead be conserved , our point is gained ; and the clamour of this ( and every other ) opposer ought to cease , for our asserting what every one that considers clearly sees cannot be . now , so much being forelaid , that we may proceed with clearness and satisfaction of mind [ if we would understand whether it be possible that these three may be sufficiently distinguished for the mentioned purpose , and yet be one in godhead , or in divine being ; we are to recollect our selves , and consider what we are wont , and find our selves indispensably obliged to conceive of that ever blessed being , and what is with less certainty or evidence said or thought of it . therefore , i. we cannot but acknowledge that whereas we do with greatest certainty and clearness conceive of it as an intellectual being , comprehensive ( with that ) of infinite and universal perfection , so we do ( most expresly , tho' this be imply'd in universal perfection ) conclude it a being most necessarily existent ; which god hath himself been pleased to signifie to us by the appropriated name i am , or i am what i am . hereby is this most excellent of beings infinitely , distinguished from all creatures , or from the whole creation . all created being is meerly contingent , i. e. ( according to the true notion of contingency ) dependent upon will and pleasure . so he hath himself taught us to distinguish ; and with such distinction to conceive of the creation , rev. . . thou hast made all things , and for [ or by , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] thy pleasure [ or will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] they are , or were created . whatsoever being is necessarily existent , the excellency of its nature being such , as that it was necessary to it to exist , or impossible not to exist , is god , or is divine being . [ notwithstanding what some have imagined of necessary matter , we might adventure to affirm this universally of all necessary being that it is divine , taking it to be plainly demonstrable , and to have been demonstrated beyond all contradiction , by the learned dr. cudworth , and many others long before him . and doubt not to evince ( tho' that is not the present business ) that supposing the imagination of necessary matter were true , this sensible world could never possibly have been made of it , by any power whatsoever ; the only pretence for which it is imagined . but if any have a mind to make this a dispute , to avoid being unseasonably involved in it at this time , it will serve my present purpose to assert only , whatsoever intellectual being is necessarily existent is divine . and on the other hand , whatsoever being is contingent , i. e. such as that it depended on a meer intervening act of will , ( viz. even the sovereign and supream will ) whether it should be or not be , is created , or is creature . ii. whatsoever simplicity the ever blessed god hath by any express revelation claimed to himself , or can by evident and irrefragable reason be demonstrated to belong to him , as a perfection , we ought humbly and with all possible reverence and adoration , to ascribe to him . but such simplicity as he hath not claimed , as is arbitrarily ascribed to him by over-bold , and adventurous intruders into the deep and most profound arcana of the divine nature , such as can never be proved to belong to him , or to be any real perfection , such as would prove an imperfection , and a blemish , would render the divine nature less intelligible , more impossible to be so far conceived as is requisite , as would discompose and disturb our minds , confound our conceptions , make our apprehension of his other known perfections less distinct or inconsistent , render him less adorable , or less an object of religion , or such as is manifestly unreconcileable with his plain affirmations concerning himself , we ought not to impose it upon our selves , or be so far impos'd upon , as to ascribe to him such simplicity . it would be an over-officious and too meanly servile religiousness to be aw'd by the sophistry of presumptuous scholastick wits , into a subscription to their confident determinations concerning the being of god , that such and such things are necessary or impossible thereto , beyond what the plain undisguised reason of things , or his own express word do evince . to imagine a sacredness in their rash conclusions , so as to be afraid of searching into them , or of examining whether they have any firm and solid ground or bottom . to allow the schools the making of our bible , or the forming of our creed , who license ( and even sport ) themselves to philosophize upon the nature of god with as petulant , and irreverent a liberty , as they would upon a worm , or any the meanest insect , while yet they can pronounce little with certainty even concerning that , hath nothing in it either of the christian or the man. it will become as well as concern us , to disencumber our minds , and release them from the entanglements of their unproved dictates ; whatsoever authority they may have acquired , only by having been long , and commonly , taken for granted . the more reverence we have of god , the less we are to have for such men , as have themselves expressed little . iii. such as have thought themselves obliged by the plain word of god to acknowledge a trinity in the god-head , viz. of father , son , and h. ghost , but withall to diminish the distinction of the one from the other , so as even to make it next to nothing , by reason of the straits into which unexamined maxims have cast their minds , concerning the divne simplicity ; have yet not thought that to be absolute or omnimodous . for the allowing of three somewhats in the divine nature ( and what less could have been said ? ) cannot consist with absolute simplicity in all respects , inasmuch as they cannot be three without differing , in some refpect , from one another . since therefore there is a necessity apprehended of acknowledging three such somewhats in the godhead , both because the word of god ( who best understands his own nature ) doth speak of three in it so plainly , that without notorious violence , it cannot be understood otherwise , and because it affirms some things of one or other of them , which it affirms not of the rest ; it will therefore be necessary to admit a true distinction between them , otherwise they cannot be three , and safe to to say there is so much , as is requisite to found the distinct affirmations , which we find in gods word , concerning this or that , apart from the other ; otherwise we shall , in effect , deny what god affirms ; and modest to confess that how great the distinction is , with precise and particular limitation , we do not know nor dare be curious to determine or enquire : only that as it cannot be less , than is sufficient to sustain distinct predicates or attributions ; so it cannot be so great , as to intrench upon the unity of the godhead . which limits , on the one hand , and the other , god hath himself plainly set us . iv. therefore since we may offend very highly by an arrogant pretence to the knowledge we have not , but shall not offend by confessing the ignorance which we cannot ( and therefore need not ) remedy . we should abstain from confident conclusions in the dark , and at random , especially concerning the nature of god ; and for instance from saying , we clearly see a sufficient distinction of father , son , and spirit , in the godhead cannot be , or is impossible . it expresses too little reverence of god , as if his being had any , or so narrow , limits as to be presently seen thorough ; an over-magnifying opinion of our selves , as if our eye could penetrate that vast and sacred darkness , or the glorious light ( equally impervious to us ) wherein god dwells ; too great rudeness to the rest of men , more than implicitly representing all mankind besides as stark blind , who can discern nothing of what we pretend clearly to see . and it is manifest this cannot be said to be impossible , upon any other pretence , but that it consists not with the unity of the godhead , in opposition to the multiplication thereof , or with that simplicity , which stands in opposition to the concurrence of all perfections therein , with distinction greater than hath been commonly thought to belong to the divine nature . for the former we are at a certainty : but for the latter how do we know what the original , natural state of the divine being is , in this respect ? or what simplicity belongs to it ? or what it may contain or comprehend in it , consistently with the unity thereof ; or so , but that it may still be but one divine being ? what distinction , and unity ( conserved together ) we can have , otherwise , an idéa of , without any apprehended inconsistency , absurdity or contradiction , we shall rashly pronounce to be impossible ( or somewhat imperfectly resembled thereby ) in the divine being , unless we understood it better than we do . some prints and characters of that most perfect being may be apprehended in the creatures , especially that are intelligent ; such being expresly said to have been made in the image of god. and if here we find oneness , with distinction , meeting together in the same created intelligent being , this may assist our understandings in conceiving what is possible to be ( in much higher perfection ) tho not to the concluding what certainly is , in the uncreated . v. waving the many artificial unions of distinct things , that united , and continuing distinct , make one thing , under one name , i shall only consider what is natural , and give instance in what is nearest us , our very selves ; tho the truth is , we know so little of our own nature , that it is a strange assuming when we confidently determine what is impossible to be in the divine nature , besides what he hath told us , or made our own faculties plainly tell us is so ; ( and what he hath made any mans faculties to tell him , he hath made all mens that can use them . ) but so much we manifestly find in our selves , that we have three natures in us very sufficiently distinguishable , and that are intimately united , the vegetative , sensitive , and the intellective . so that notwithstanding their manifest distinction , no one scruples when they are united , to call the whole the humane nature . or if any make a difficulty , or would raise a dispute about the distinction of these three natures , i for the present content my self with what is more obvious , not doubting to reach my mark by degrees , viz. that we are made up of a mind , and a body , somewhat that can think , and somewhat that cannot ; sufficiently distinct , yet so united , that not only every one ( without hesitation ) calls that thing made up of them one man ; but also every one that considers deeply , will be transported with wonder by what more-than-magical knot or tye , two things so little a-kin , should be so held together , that the one that hath the power of will and choice cannot sever it self , and return into the same union with the other at pleasure . but , vi. since we find this is a thing actually done , the making up of two things of so different natures into one thing , that puts the matter out of doubt that this was a thing possible to be done , 't was what god could do , for he hath done it . and if that were possible to him , to unite two things of so very different natures into one thing ; let any colourable reason be assigned me why it should not be as possible to him , to unite two things of a like nature . i. e. if it were possible to him to unite a spirit and a body , why is it less possible to him to have united two spirits ? and then i further enquire , if it were possible to him to unite two , would it not be as possible to unite three ? let reason here be put upon its utmost stretch , and tell me what in all this is less possible than what we see is actually done ! will any man say two or three spirits united , being of the same nature , will mingle , be confounded , run into one another , and lose their distinction ? i ask , supposing them to pre-exist apart , antecedently to their union ; are they not now distinguished by their own individual essences , let them be as much united as our souls and bodies are , why should they not as much remain distinct by their singular essences ? there is no more hazard of their losing their distinction , by the similitude of their natures , than of our soul and body's transmuting one another by their dissimilitude . i know not but the dictates of so vogued an author with many in this age , as spinosa , may signifie somewhat with some into whose hands this may fall ; who ( with design bad enough ) says , that , from whence one might collect the remaining distinction of two things of the same nature in such a supposed union , were the more easily conceivable of the two , i. e. than of two things of different natures . for in his posthumous ethicks , de deo , he lays this down in explication of his second definition , [ cogitatio aliâ cogitatione terminatur . at corpus non terminatur cogitatione , nec cogitatio corpore . ] some may regard him in this , and it would do our business . for my patt , i care not to be so much beholden to him ; for it would , at the long run , overdo it ; and i know his meaning . but i see not but two congenerous natures are equally capable of being united , retaining their distinction , as two of a different kind , and that sufficiently serves the present purpose . however , let any man tell me , why it should be impossible to god so to unite three spirits , as by his own power to fix their limits also , and by a perpetual law inwrought into their distinct beings to keep them distinct , so that they shall remain everlastingly united , but not identifyed ; and by vertue of that union , be some one thing ( which must , yet , want a name ) as much , and as truly , as our soul and body united do constitute one man. nor is it now the question , whether such an union would be convenient or inconvenient , apt or inept ; but all the question is whether it be possible or impossible ; which is as much as we are concerned in at this time . but you will say , suppose it be possible , to what purpose is all this ? how remote is it from the supposed trinity in the godhead ? you will see to what purpose it is by and by . i therefore adde , vii . that if such an union of three things ( whether of like , or of different natures ) so as that they shall be truly one thing , and yet remain distinct , tho united , can be effected , ( as one may with certainty pronounce , there is nothing more impossible , or unconceivable in it , than we find is actually done ) then it is not intrinsecally impossible , or objectively ; it is not impossible in it self . no power can effect what is simply , and in it self impossible . there is therefore no contradiction , no repugnancie , or inconsistencie , as to the thing , nor consequently any shadow of absurdity in the conception hereof . whereupon , viii . if such an union with such distinction be not impossible in it self , so that by a competent power it is sufficiently possible to be effected , or made ; we are to consider whether it will appear more impossible , or whether i shall have a conception in my own mind any thing more incongruous if i conceive such an union ( with such distinction ) unmade , or that is original and eternal , in an unmade , or uncreated being . for we are first to consider the thing in it self , abstractly from made or unmade , created or uncreated being . and if it pass clear of contradiction or absudity , in its abstract notion , we are so far safe , and are not liable to be charged as having the conception in our minds of an impossible , absur'd , or self-repugnant thing . so that clamour and cry of the adversary must cease , or be it self absurd , and without pretence . this now supposed union with such distinction , must if it be judg'd impossible , as it is in our thoughts introduc'd into unmade being , can no longer be judg'd impossible , as it is an union of distinct things , but only as it is unmade , or is supposed to have place in the unmade eternal being . ix . this is that then we have further to consider , whether , supposing it possible that three spiritual beings might as well be made or created in a state of so near union with continuing distinction , as to admit of becoming one spiritual being , to be called by some fit name ( which might easily be found out , if the thing were produc'd ) as that a spiritual being , and a corporeal being may be made or created in a state of so near union with continuing distinction , as to become one spiritual-corporeal being , called by the name of man ; i say , whether supposing the former of these to be as possible to be done , or created , as the latter , which we see done already ; we may not as well suppose somewhat like it , but infinitely more perfect to be original , and eternal in the uncreated being ? if the first be possible , the next actual , what pretence is there to think the last impossible ? x. i might add , as that which may be expected to be significant with such as do seriously believe the doctrines both of the incarnation , and the trinity ( tho' i know it will signifie nothing with them , who with equal contempt reject both ) that the union of the two natures , the humane ( made up of an humane body and an humane soul , which are two exceedingly different natures ) with the divine ( which is a third and infinitely more different from both the other ) in one person , viz. of the son of god , cannot certainly appear to any considering person more conceivable or possible , than that which we now suppose ( but assert not ) of three distinct essences united in the one godhead , upon any account , but this only , that this is supposed to be an unmade , eternal union , the other made and temporal ; which renders not the one less conceivable than the other , as it is union , but only as in the several terms of this union it is supposed eternally to have place in the being of god ; whereas that other union , in respect of one of its terms is acknowledg'd de novo to have place there . in short , here is a spiritual created being , an humane soul ( setting aside for the present the consideration of the humane body , which united therewith made up the man , christ ) confessed to be in hypostatical union with the uncreated spiritual being of god , not as that being is in the person of the father , nor as in the person of the holy ghost , for then they should have become man too ; but as it was in the person of the son only ; why shall it be thought less possible that three uncreated spiritual beings may be in so near an union with each other as to be one god , as that a created spirit ( and body too ) should be in so near union with one of the persons in the godhead only , as therewith to be one person ? will it not hereby be much more easily apprehensible how one of the persons ( as the common way of speaking is ) should be incarnate , and not the other two ? will not the notion of person it self be much more unexceptionable , when it shall be supposed to have its own individual nature ? and why is a natural , eternal union of uncreated natures ( with continuing distinction , or without confusion ) sufficient unto the unity of the godhead , less supposable , than a temporal contracted union with created natures ( without confusion too ) that shall be sufficient to the unity of a person ? will it be any thing more contrary to such simplicity of the divine nature as is necessarily to be ascribed thereto ? or will it be tritheism , and inconsistent with the acknowledged inviolable unity of the godhead ? xi . that we may proceed to speak to both , let these things be consider'd with seriousness and sobriety of mind , as to our selves ; with all possible reverence towards the blessed god , and with just candour and equanimity towards other men. and first we must leave it to any ones future representation ( not being hitherto able to discern any thing ) what there is in all this that is here supposed any way repugnant to such simplicity , as god any where claims to his own being , or that plain reason will constrain us to ascribe to him , or that is really in it self any perfection . we are sure god hath not by his word taught us to ascribe to him universal absolute simplicity ; or suggested to us any such notices as directly and evidently infer it to belong to him . nor hath seem'd at all intent upon cautioning of us lest we should not ascribe it . the word we find not among his attributes mentioned in the holy scriptures . the thing , so far as it signifiies any general perfection , we are sure belongs to him ; but the scriptures are not written with visible design to obviate any danger of our misconceiving his nature , by not apprehending it to be in every respect most absolutely simple . it doth teach us to conceive of him as most powerful , most wise , most gracious ; and doth not teach us to conceive all these in the abstract , viz. power , wisdom and goodness to be the same thing . yet we easily apprehend by reflecting upon our selves , that , without multiplying the subject , these may all reside together in the same man. but our difficulty is greater to conceive what is commonly taught , that these , without real distinction , or with formal only ( as contradistinguished to the difference of thing from thing ) are in the abstract affirmable of god , that he is power , wisdom , goodness . that to his being belongs so absolute simplicity , that we must not look upon these as things really distinguishable , there , from one another , but as different conceptions of the same thing . we must conceive of things as we can , not as we cannot ; and are only concern'd to take heed of unreveal'd , and undemonstrable , and peremptory conceptions concerning that glorious most incomprehensible and ever-blessed being ; to beware of too curious prying into the nature of god ( when it vvas so penal to look unduly into , or even to touch that only-hallovved symbol of his presence , his ark ! ) beyond what he hath reveal'd expresly , or we can most clearly , by generally received light , apprehend . when we knovv there is a knovvledge of him so reserved from us , vvhereof our minds are so little receptive , that it seemed all one , vvhether he told us , he did dvvell in thick darkness , or in inaccessible light . 't will be a reproach to us , if we shall need to be taught reverence of him by pagans ; or that such a document should need to be given us for our admonition , as that very ancient inscription in one of their temples imported , i am whatsoever was , is , or shall be , and who is he that shall draw aside my vail ? xii . if we should suppose three spiritual necessary beings , the one whereof were meer power ( or furious might ) destitute of either wisdom , or goodness ; another meer wisdom ( or craft rather ) destitute of either goodness or power ; a third meer goodness ( or fond and fruitless kindness ) destitute of either power or wisdom , existing separately and apart from each other . this triple conception would overthrow it self , and must certainly allow little ease to any considering mind . nor could any of these be god. but if we conceive essential power , wisdom , and goodness concurring in one spiritual necessarily existent being , in which are each of these , not only , by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , usually acknowledged in the three persons , totally permeating one another ( which signifying but meer presence , as we may express it , is in comparison , a small thing ) but really and vitally united , by so much a nearer , and more perfect union than hath ever come under our notice among created beings , of partly corporeal , partly incorporeal natures , by how much beings of purest sprituality may be apter to the most intimate union , than when one is quite of a different nature from the other , and as whatsoever union is suposeable to be , originally , eternally , and by natural necessity , in the most perfect being , may be thought inexpressibly more perfect than any other . and if , hereupon , we further conceive the most entire , perpetual , everlasting intercourse and communion of these three , so originally united , that what is conceivable of perfection , or excellency in any one of these , is as much the others , for whatsoever exercises or operations , as his own ; i cannot apprehend what there is of repugnancy , contradiction , or absurdity in this supposition ; nor any thing that , by any measures he hath given us to govern our conceptions of him , appears unbecoming , or unworthy of god. there is , 't is true , less simplicity , but more perfection ascribed hereby to the divine being , intirely considered ; and more intelligibly , than if you go about to impose upon your self the notion of most absolute omnimodous simplicity therein . there would be yet more absolute simplicity ascribed unto an eternal being , if you should conceive in it meer power exclusive of wisdom , and goodness — and so of the rest ; but infinitely less perfection . and , if that would avail any thing , i could easily produce more school-men , than one , of no small note , concurring in this sentiment that [ simplicitas , si sumatur in totâ suâ amplitudine , non dicit perfectionem simplicitèr . ] but i count it not worth the while . xiii . and let it be here again observed , i speak not of this , as any certain determination , that thus things are in the deity ; but as a possible supposition of what , for ought we know , may be . if any say this gives us the notion of a compounded deity , or of a composition in it ; i only say the term , composition , seems to imply a pre-existing component that brings such things together , and supposes such and such more simple things to have pre-existed apart or separate , and to be brought afterwards together into an united state . whereupon i peremptorily deny any composition in the being of god. and let any man from what hath been hitherto said or supposed , inferr it , if he can . imagine this of the godhead , and you shall , we acknowledge , conceive most untruly , most unworthily , most injuriously of god ; and what is most absolutely impossible to agree to the divine being . and for this reason only , that i know of , that carries any shadow of importance in it , many have been so apt , without the least warrant from any revelation god hath given of himself , to ascribe to him an unintelligible simplicity ; apprehending they must otherwise admit a composition in his most sacred essence , i. e. the putting of things together that were separate , to make it up ; which must suppose it a new production , that once was not , and from an imperfect state by the coalition of things once severed , to have arrived to the perfection we ascribe to the divine being ; which sort of being cannot , without the most absurd and blasphemous contradiction , ever admit to be called god. but if we suppose most perfect , essential , power , wisdom , love , by original , eternal , and most natural necessity to have co-existed in that being most intimately united , tho' distinct ; that seemingly important reason , will appear but a shadow , and accordingly vanish as such . and indeed this is no more than what , in effect , such as discourse upon this subject do commonly say ( tho' perhaps some may less consider the ducture and sequel of their own professed sentiments ) when they speak of the incomprehensibleness of god's essence , and how impossible it is a finite mind should form or receive a full and compleat idéa of it ; or when they therefore say , that any conceptions we can have of the wisdom , goodness , or any other attribute of the divine being , are still but inadequate conceptions ; whereby they must mean , when we consider for instance the wisdom of god that we not only fall infinitely short of conceiving all that belongs to the divine being , in that kind , but that there is also infinitely more belonging thereto , in other kinds , than it is possible that conception can contain or express . and when we have the conception in our minds of the divine wisdom , do we not apprehend there is really somewhat else in the divine being , whereof that term hath no signification ? or will we say his wisdom and his power are really the same thing ? ( as they must either be the same , or divers things : ) if we say they are the same , we must , i doubt , confess our selves to say what we do not understand , especially when , in the abstract , we affirm them of one another , and of god ; and accordingly say that wisdom is power , and power is wisdom , and the one of these is god , and the other , god. i know a formal distinction is commonly admitted , i. e. that the conception of the one is not included in the conception of the other . but are these different conceptions true or false ? if false , why are they admitted ? if true , there must be somewhat in the nature of the thing corresponding to them . but if we say they are distinct , but most intimately , and eternally united in the divine being , by a necessary , natural union , or that it is not impossible so to be , what we say will , i think , agree with it self , and not disagree with any other conception we are obliged to have concerning the blessed god. in the mean time , i profess not to judge , we are under the precise notions of power , wisdom and goodness , to conceive of the father , son , and holy ghost ; nor that the notions we have of those , or any other divine perfections , do exactly correspond to vvhat , in god , is signify'd by these names ; but i reckon , that vvhat relief and ease is given our minds by their being disentangled from any apprehended necessity of thinking these to be the very same things , may facilitate to us our apprehending the father , son , and spirit to be sufficiently distinct , for our affirming , or under standing the affirmation , of some things , concerning some one , without including the other of them . xiv . but some perhaps will say , while we thus amplify the distinction of these glorious three , we shall seem to have too friendly a look towards , or shall say in effect , what dr. sherlock is so highly blam'd for saying , and make three gods. i answer , that if with sincere minds we enquire after truth , for its own sake , we shall little regard the friendship or enmity , honour or dishonour of this or that man. if this were indeed so ; doth what was true become false , because such a man hath said it ? but it is remote from being so . there is no more , here positively asserted than generally so much distinction betweeen the father , son , and spirit , as is in it self necessary to the founding the distinct attributions , which in the scriptures are severally given them [ that when the word or wisdom was said to be with god ( understanding it , as the case requires with god the father ) in the creation of all things , we may not think nothing more is said than that he was with himself ; that when the word is said to be made flesh , 't is equally said the father was made flesh , or the holy ghost ; that when the holy ghost is said to have proceeded from , or have been sent by the father , or the son , he is said to have proceeded from himself , or have sent himself . ] but , in the mean time this is offered without determining precisely , how great distinction is necessary to this purpose . it is not here positively said these three are three distinct substances , three infinite minds or spirits . we again and again insist , and inculcate , how becoming , and necessary it is to abstain from over-bold enquiries , or positive determinations concerning the limits , or the extent of this distinction , beyond what the scriptures have , in general , made necessary to the mentioned purpose ; that we may not throw our selves into guilt , nor cast our minds into unnecessary straits , by affirming this or that to be necessary , or impossible in these matters . xv. the case is only thus , that since we are plainly led by the express revelation god hath made of himself to us in his word , to admit a trinal conception of him , or to conceive this threefold distinction in his being , of father , son , and spirit ; since we have so much to greaten that distinction , divers things being said of each of these , that must not be understood of either of the other ; since we have nothing to limit it on the other hand , but the unity of the godhead , which we are sure can be but one , both from the plain word of god , and the nature of the thing it self ; since we are assured both these may consist , viz. this trinity , and this unity , by being told there are three — and these three ( i. e. plainly , continuing three ) are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one thing ; which one thing , can mean nothing else but godhead ; as is also said concerning two of them , elsewhere , ( there being no occasion , then , to mention the third ) i and my father are one thing . we are hereupon unavoidably put upon it to cast in our own minds ( and are concerned to do it with the most religious reverence and profoundest humility ) what sort of thing this most sacred godhead may be , unto which this oneness is ascribed , with threefold distinction . and manifestly finding there are in the creation made unions , with sufficient remaining distinction , particularly in our selves , that vve are a soul and a body ( things of so very different natures ) that often the soul is called the man , ( not excluding the body ) and the body , or our flesh called the man ( not excluding the soul ) we are plainly led to apprehend that it is rather more easily possible there might be two spirits ( so much more agreeing in nature ) so united , as to be one thing , and yet continuing distinct ; and if two , there might as well be three , if the creator pleased . and hence are led further to apprehend , that if such a made union , with continuing distinction be possible in created being , it is for ought we know , not impossible in the uncreated ; that there may be such an eternal unmade union , with continuing distinction . and all this being only represented as possible to be thus , without concluding that thus it certainly is ; sufficiently serves our purpose , that no pretence might remain of excluding the eternal word ; and the eternal spirit , the godhead , as if a trinity therein were contradictious and impossible , repugnant to reason , and common sense . where novv is the coincidency ? xvi . nor is there , hereupon , so great a remaining difficulty to salve the unity of the godhead ; when the supposition is taken in , of the natural , eternal , necessary union of these three that hath been mentioned . and it shall be considered , that the godhead is not supposed more necessarily to exist , than these three are to coexist in the nearest and most intimate union with each other therein . that spiritual being which exists necessarily , and is every way absolutely perfect , whether it consist of three in one , or of only one , is god. we could never have known , 't is true , that there are such three coexisting in this one god , if he himself had not told us . what man knoweth the things of a man , but the spirit of a man that is in him ? even so the things of god none knoweth but the spirit of god. in telling us this he hath told us no impossible , no unconceivable thing . it is absurd , and very irreligious presumption to say this cannot be . if a worm were so far capable of thought , as to determine this or that concerning our nature ; and that such a thing were impossible to belong to it , which we find to be in it , we should trample upon it ! more admirable divine patience spares us ! he hath only let us know that this is the state of his essence ( whereof we should have been otherwise ignorant . ) this is its constitution , ( q. d. ita se habet comparatam ) thus it is in , and of it self , that there are three in it to be conceived , under the distinct notions of father , son and spirit , without telling us expresly how far they are distinct , in terms of art , or in scholastick forms of speech . but he considered us as men , reasonable creatures ; and that when he tells us there are three existing in his being , of each of which some things are said , that must not be understood spoken of the other , and yet that there is but one god. we are not uncapable of understanding , that these three must agree in godhead ; and yet that they must be sufficiently distinct , unto this purpose , that we may distinctly conceive of , apply our selves to , and expect from , the one and the other of them . and the frame of our religion is therefore ordered for us accordingly , i. e. for us to whom he hath revealed so much . others , to whom such notices are not given , he expects should deport themselves towards him , according to the light which they have , not which they have not . xvii . but an hypothesis in this affair , which leaves out the very nexus , that natural , eternal union , or leaves it out of its proper place , and insists upon mutual consciousness , which , at the most , is but a consequence thereof , wants the principal thing requisite to the salving the unity of the godhead . if two or three created spirits had never so perfect a mutual perspection of one another , that would not constitute them one thing , tho' it probably argue them to be so ; and but probably ; for god might , no doubt , give them a mutual insight into one another , without making them one ; but if he should create them in as near an union , as our soul and body are in vvith one another ( and it is very apprehensible they might be created in a much nearer , and more permanent one , both being of the same nature , and neither subject to decay ) they vvould as truly , admit to be called one something ( as such a creature might vvell enough be called , till a fitter name were found out ) notvvithstanding their supposed continuing distinction , as fitly , as our soul and body united , are , notvvithstanding their continuing distinction , called one man. and i do sincerely profess such an union , vvith perpetual distinction , seems to me every vvhit as conceivable , being supposed unmade , uncreated , and eternal , as any union is among creatures , that must therefore be a made thing , or a temporal production . and vvhereas necessity of existence ( most unquestionably of an intellectual being ) is a most certain , and fundamental attribute of deity : the father , son , and spirit being supposed necessarily existent , in this united state , they cannot but be god , and the godhead by reason of this necessary union cannot but be one ; yet so , as that when you predicate godhead , or the name of god of any one of them , you herein express a true , but an inadequate conception of god ; i. e. the father is god , not excluding the son , and h. ghost ; the son is god , not excluding the father and the h. ghost ; the h. ghost is god , not excluding the father and the son. as our body is the man , not excluding the soul ; our soul is the man , not excluding the body . therefore their union in godhead being so strict and close , notwithstanding their distinction , to say that any one of them is god , in exclusion of the other two , would not be a true predication . 't is indeed said the father is the only true god ; but that neither excludes the son , nor the h. ghost from being the true god also ; each of them communicating in that godhead which only is true . it had been quite another thing , if it had been said , thou father only , art the true god. xviii . the order moreover , is this way also very clearly preserved and fitly comply'd with of priority and posteriority ( not of time , as every one sees , but nature ) which the names father , son , and spirit do more than intimate . for the father ( usually called by divines the fons trinitatis ) being by this appellation plainly signify'd to be first in this sacred triad ; the son , as that title imports , to be of the father ; and the spirit to be of , or from , both the other . let these two latter be considered as being of , or from the first , not by any intervening act of will , by which it might have been possible they should not have been so ; but by natural , necessary , eternal promanation ; so as that necessity of existence is hereby made as truly to agree to them as to the first , which is acknowledged the most fundamental attribute of deity . this promanation is hereby sufficiently distinguisht from creation ; and these two set infinitely above all creatures , or the whole universe of created beings . nor is there hereby any place left for that unapt application of a son and grandson deriving themselves from the grandfather , or two brothers from one father . and altho' it be also true , and readily acknowledged , that there are numerous instances of involuntary productions among the creatures , and which are therefore to be deemed a sort of natural and necessary productions ; yet that necessity not being absolute , but ex hypothesi only , i. e. upon supposition of their productive causes , and all things requisite to those productions , being so , and so , aptly posited in order thereto , all which depended upon one sovereign will at first , so that all might have been otherwise , this signifies nothing to exempt them out of the state and rank of creatures , or invalidate this most unalterable distinction between created being , and uncreated . xix . but if here it shall be urged to me that one individual necessarily existent spiritnal being alone is god , and is all that is signifyed by the name of god ; and therefore that three distinct , individual , necessarily existent , spiritual beings must unavoidably be three distinct gods : i would say , if by one individual , necessarily existent , spiritual being , you mean one such being , comprehending father , son and holy ghost taken together , i grant it . but if by one individual , necessarily existent , spiritual being , you mean either the father , son , or holy ghost , taken sejunctly , i deny it ; for hoth the other are truly signify'd by the name of god too , as well as that one. i therefore say , the term individual , must in this case now supposed ( as possible , not as certain ) admit of a twofold application ; either to the distinct essence of the father , or of the son , or of the holy ghost ; or to the entire essence of the godhead , in which these three do concur . each of these conceived by it self are ( according to this supposition ) individual essences , but conceived together , they are the entire individual essence of god. for there is but one such essence , and no more , and it can never be multiplyed , nor divided into more of the same name and nature . as the body , and soul of a man , are one individual body , and one individual soul , but both together are but one individual man : and the case would be the same , if a man did consist of two , or three spirits so ( or more nearly ) united together , as his soul and body are . especially if you should suppose ( which is the supposition of no impossible or unconceivable thing ) that these three spirits which together ( as we now do suppose ) do constitute a man , were created with an aptitude to this united coexistence , but with an impossibility of existing separately , except to the divine power which created them conjunct , and might separate them so as to make them exist apart ; which yet cannot be the case in respect of three such uncreated spiritual beings , whose union is supposed to be by natural , eternal necessity , as their essences are ; and are therefore most absolutely inseparable . xx. or if it should be said , i make the notion of god to comprehend father , son , and holy ghost , and a godhead besides common to these three . i answer ; nothing i have said or supposed implies any such thing ; or that the notion of god imports any thing more of real being , than is contained in father , son , and holy ghost , taken together , and most intimately , naturally , and vitally , by eternal necessity , united with one another . as in a created being , consisting of more things than one taken together and united ; a man for instance , there is nothing more of real entity , besides what is contained in his body and his soul united and taken together . 't is true that this term , a man , speaks somewhat very divers from an humane body taken alone , or an humane soul taken alone , or from both , separately taken ; but nothing divers from both united , and taken together . and for what this may be unjustly collected to imply of composition , repugnant to divine perfection , it is before obviated . sect. . if therefore it be askt , what do we conceive under the notion of god , but a necessary , spiritual being ? i answer that this is a true notion of god , and may be passable enough , among pagans , for a full one . but we christians are taught to conceive under the notion of god , a necessary spiritual being , in which father , son , and spirit , do so necessarily coexist , as to constitute that being ; and that when we conceive any one of them to be god , that is but an inadequate , not an entire and full conception of the godhead . nor will any place remain for that trivial cavil , that if each of these have godhead in him , he therefore hath a trinity in him ; but that he is one of the three who together are the one god , by necessary , natural , eternal union . which union is also quite of another kind than that of three men ( as for instance , of peter , james and john ) partaking in the same kind of nature ; who notwithstanding , exist separately , and apart from each other . these three are supposed to coexist in natural , necessary , eternal , and most intimate union , so as to be one divine being . nor is it any prejudice against our thus stating the notion of the godhead , that we know of no such union in all the creation , that may assist our conception of this union . what incongruity is there in supposing , in this respect , as well as in many others , somewhat most peculiarly appropriate to the being of god ? if there be no such actual union in the creation , 't is enough to our purpose , if such a one were possible to have been . and we do know of the actual union of two things of very different natures so as to be one thing , and have no reason to think the union of two or more things of the same sort of nature , with sufficient remaining distinction , less possible or less intelligible . xxi . upon the whole , let such an union be conceived in the being of god , with such distinction , and one would think ( tho' the complexions of mens minds do strangely and unaccountably differ ) the absolute perfection of the deity , and especially the perfect felicity thereof , should be much the more apprehensible with us . when we consider that most delicious society which would hence ensue , among the so entirely consentient father , son , and spirit , with whom there is so perfect rectitude , everlasting harmony , mutual complacency , unto highest delectation ; according to our way of conceiving things , who are taught by our own nature ( which also hath in it the divine image ) to reckon no enjoyment pleasant , without the consociation of some other with us therein ; we for our parts cannot but hereby have in our minds a more gustfull idea of a blessed state , than we , can conceive in meer eternal solitude . god speaks to us , as men , and will not blame us for conceiving things so infinitely above us , according to the capacity of our natures ; provided we do not assume to our selves to be a measure for our conceptions of him ; further than as he is himself pleased to warrant , and direct us herein . some likeness we may ( taught by himself ) apprehend between him and us , but with infinite ( not inequality only , but ) unlikeness . and for this case of delectation in society , we must suppose an immense difference between him an all-sufficient , self-sufficient being , comprehending in himself the infinite fulness of whatsoever is most excellent and delectable , and our selves , who have in us but a very minute portion of being , goodness , or felicity , and whom he hath made to stand much in need of one another , and most of all of him . but when , looking into our selves , we find there is in us a disposition , often upon no necessity , but sometimes , from some sort of benignity of temper , unto conversation with others ; we have no reason , when other things concur , and do fairly induce , and lead our thoughts this way , to apprehend any incongruity in supposing he may have some distinct object of the same sort of propension in his own most perfect being too , and therewith such a propension it self also . xxii . as to what concerns our selves , the observation is not altogether unapposit , what cicero treating of friendship , discourses of perpetual solitude , that the affectation of it must signifie the worst of ill humour , and the most savage nature in the world. and supposing one of so sour and morose an humour , as to shun and hate the conversation of men , he would not endure it , to be without some one or other to whom he might disgorge the virulency of that his malignant humour . or that supposing such a thing could happen , that god should take a man quite out of the society of men , and place him in absolute solitude , supplyed with the abundance of whatsoever nature could covet besides ; who , saith he , is so made of iron , as to endure that kind of life ? and he introduces architas tarentinus reported to speak to this purpose . that if one could ascend into heaven , behold the frame of the world , and the beauty of every star , his admiration would be unpleasant to him alone , which would be most delicious , if he had some one to whom to express his sense of the whole . we are not , i say , strictly to measure god by our selves in this ; further than as he himself prompts and leads us . but if we so form our conception of divine bliss , as not to exclude from it somewhat , whereof that delight in society , which we find in our selves may be an imperfect faint resemblance , it seems not altogether disagreeable to what the scriptures also teach us to conceive concerning him , when it brings in the eternal wisdom , saying , as one distinct from the prime author , and parent of all things , then was i by him , as one brought up with him , and daily his delight . xxiii . however , let the whole of what hath been hitherto proposed be taken together , and to me , it appears our conception of the sacred trinunity will be so remote from any shadow of inconsistency or repugnancy , that no necessity can remain upon us of torturing wit , and racking invention to the uttermost , to do a laboured and artificial violence ( by i know not what skrews and engines ) to so numerous plain texts of scripture , only to undeify our glorious redeemer , and do the utmost despite to the spirit of grace ! we may be content to let the word of god ( or what we pretend to own for a divine revelation ) stand as it is , and undistorted , speak its own sense . and when we find the former of all things speaking as we or us . when we find another [ i ] possessed by the lord , in the beginning of his way , before his works of old ; so as that he says of himself ( as distinct from the other ) i was set up from everlasting , from the beginning , or ever the earth was — and when he prepared the heavens i was there , &c. when we find the child born for us , the son given to us , called also the mighty god , and ( as in reference to us he fitly might ) the everlasting father . when we are told of the ruler that was to come out of bethlehem-ephrata , that his goings forth were from everlasting . that the word was in the beginning with god , and was god — that all things were made by him , and without him nothing was made , that was made . that this word was made flesh — that his glory was beheld as the glory of the only begotten son of the father , full of grace and truth . even that same he that above was said to have been in the beginning with god , and to be god. that when he who was said to have come down from heaven , was , even while he was on earth , at that time , said to be in heaven . that we are told by himself , he and his father are one thing . that he is not only said to know the heart , but to know all things . that even he who according to the flesh came of the israelites , is yet expresly said to be over all , god blessed for ever . that when he was in the form of god — he humbled himself to the taking on him the form of a servant , and to be found in fashion as a man. that 't is said , all things were created by him , that are in heaven , and on earth , visible and invisible , thrones , dominions , principalities , powers , — and that all things were created by him , and for him ; than which nothing could have been said more peculiar or appropriate to deity . that even of the son of god it is said , he is the true god and eternal life . that we are so plainly told he is , alpha and omega , the first and the last , he that was , and is , and is to come , the lord almighty , the beginning of the creation of the searcher of hearts . that the spirit of god is said to search all things , even the deep things of god. that lying to him is said to be lying to god. that the great christian solemnity , baptism is directed to be in the name of the father , son , and holy ghost . that it is so distinctly said , there are three that bear record in heaven , the father , the word , and the spirit , and that these three are one thing . i cannot imagine what should oblige us so studiously to wiredraw all this to quite other meanings . xxiv . and for the leaving out of this last mentioned text in some copies , what hath been said ( not to mention divers others ) by the famously learned dr. hammond upon that place , is so reasonable , so moderate , so charitable to the opposite party , and so apt to satisfie impartial and unprejudic'd minds , that one would scarce think , after the reading of it , any real doubt can remain concerning the authentickness of that th . verse in joh. . wherefore now taking all these texts together ; with many more that might have been mentioned , i must indeed profess to wonder , that with men of so good sense , as our socinian adversaries are accounted , this consideration should not have more place and weight , viz. that it being so obvious to any reader of the scriptures to apprehend from so numerous texts , that deity must belong to the son of god , and that there wants not sufficient inducement to conceive so of the holy ghost also ; there should be no more caution given in the scriptures themselves to prevent mistake ( if there were any ) in apprehending the matter accordingly . and to obviate the unspeakable consequent danger of erring in a case of so vast importance . how unagreeable it is to all our notions of god ; and to his usual procedure in cases of less consequence ! how little doth it consist with his being so wise and so compassionate a lover of the souls of men , to let them be so fatally expos'd unto so inevitable , and so destructive a delusion ! that the whole christian church should thorough so many centuries of years , be even trained into so horrid and continued idolatry by himself who so severely forbids it ! i cannot allow my self to think men of that perswasion insincere in their professing to believe the divine authority of the holy scriptures , when the leader and head of their party , writ a book , that is not without nerves in defence of it . but i confess i cannot devise , with what design they can think those scriptures were written ! or why they should count it a thing worthy of infinite wisdom to vouchsafe such a revelation to men , allowing them to treat and use it as they do ! and that till some great socinian wits should arise years after , to rectify their notions in these things , men should generally be in so great hazzard of being deceived into damnation , by those very scriptures , which were professedly writ to make them wise to salvation ! xxv . nor is it of so weighty importance in this controversie , to cast the ballance the other way , that a noted critick ( upon what introducement needs not be determined ) chang'd his judgment , or that his posthumous interpretations of some texts ( if they were his interpretations ) carry an appearance of his having changed it ; because he thought such texts might possibly admit to be interpreted otherwise , than they usually were , by such as alledged them for the trinity , or the ( disputed ) deity of the son or sipirit , or that the cause must be lost , upon his deserting it , or that he was still to be reckoned of the opposite party ( as this author calls it ) and that such texts as we most rely'd upon , were therefore given up by some of our own . and it is really a great assuming , when a man shall adventure to pronounce so peremptorily , against the so common judgment of the christian church , without any colour of proof , that our copies , are false copies , our translations , our explications false , and the generality of the wisest , the most inquisitive , most pious , and most judicious assertors of the christian cause , for so many continued ages , fools , or cheats for owning and avowing them ; for no other imaginanable reason , but only because they make against him ! how will he prove any copies we rely upon to be false ? is it because he is pleased to suspect them ? and is an interpretation false , because the words can possibly be tortur'd unto some other sense ? let him name me the text , wherein any doctrine is supposed to be delivered that is of meerly supernatural revelation , of which it is not possible to to devise some other meaning , not more remote , alien , or unimaginable , than theirs , of most of the disputed texts . nor indeed do we need to except that natural sentiment it self , that there is but one god , ( which this author takes such pains to prove , as if he thought , or would make other men think , we deny'd it . ) for tho' it is so generally acknowledged , doth he not know it is not so generally understood in the same sense ? against whom doth he write ? doth he not know they understand this oneness in one sense , he , in another ? they in such a sense as admits a trinity , he in a sense that excludes it ? but ( for such things as did need a superadded verbal revelation ) how easie is it to an inventive , pervicacious wit , to wrest words this way or that . xxvi . the scriptures were writ for the instruction of sober learners ; not for the pastime of contentious wits , that affect only to play tricks upon them . at their rate of interpreting , among whom he ranks himself , 't is impossible any doctrine can with certainty , be founded upon them . take the first chapter of st. john's gospel for instance , and what doctrine can be asserted in plainer words , than the deity of christ , in the three first verses of that chapter ? set any man of an ordinary , unprepossest understanding , to read them , and when he finds that by the word is meant jesus christ ( which themselves admit ) see if he will not judge it plainly taught , that jesus christ is god , in the most eminent , known sense . especially when he shall take notice of so many other texts , that , according to their most obvious appearance , carry the same sense . but it is first , thorough meer shortness of discourse , taken for granted , and rashly concluded on , that it is absolutely impossible , if the father be god , the son can be god too ( or the holy ghost ) upon a presumption , that we can know every thing that belongs to the divine nature ; and what is possible to be in it , and what not ; and next , there is hereupon not only a license imagined , but an obligation , and necessity , to shake heaven and earth , or tear that divine word that is more stable , into a thousand pieces , or expound it to nothing , to make it comply with that forelaid presumptuous determination . whereas if we could but bend our minds so far to comply with the plain ducture of that revelation god hath made unto us of himself ; as to apprehend that , in the most only godhead there may be distinctions , which we particularly understand not , sufficient to found the doctrine of a trinity therein , and very consistent with the unity of it ; we should save the divine word , and our own minds , from unjust torture , both at once . and our task , herein , will be the easier , that we are neither concerned nor allowed to determine , that things are precisely so , or so ; but only to suppose it possible that so they may be , for ought that we know . which will i am certain not be so hard , nor so bold an undertaking , as his , who shall take upon him to prove , that any thing here supposed is impossible . indeed if any one would run the discourse into the abyss of infinity , he may soon create such difficulties to himself , as it ought not to be thought strange , if they be greater than any humane understanding can expedite . but not greater than any man will be intangled in , that shall set himself to consider infinity upon other accounts ; which yet he will find it impos'd upon him unavoidably to admit whether he will or no. not greater than this author will be equally concern'd in , upon his doing that right to truth , in opposition to the former leaders of his own party , as to acknowledge the omnipresence of the divine essence , p. . which he will find , let him try it when he will. nor yet so great , nor accompanyed with so gross , so palpable and horrid absurdities , as he will soon be encountred with , should he retract his grant , or entertain the monstrously maimed , and most deformed , impious , conceit of a finite , or limited deity ! xxvii . yet also in this present case , the impossibility to our narrow minds of comprehending infinity , is most rationally improveable to our very just advantage . it ought to be upbraided to none as a pretext , or a cover to sloth , or dulness . 't is no reproach to us that we are creatures , and have not infinite capacities . and it ought to quiet our minds , that they may so certainly know they have limits ; within which , we are to content our selves with such notions , about indemonstrable , and unrevealed things , as they can , with greatest ease to themselves , find room for . i can reflect upon nothing in what is here proposed , but what is intelligible without much toil , or much metaphysicks . as matters , of so common concernment , ought , to our uttermost , to be represented in such a way that they may be so . we need not be concern'd in scholastick disquisitions about union ; or by what peculiar name to call that which is here supposed . it 's enough for us to know there may be a real , natural , vital , and very intimate union , of things that shall , notwithstanding it , continue distinct , and that shall , by it , be truly one . nor do we need to be anxiously curious in stating the notions of person , and personality , of suppositum and suppositality , tho' i think not the term person disallowable in the present case . nor will say what that noted man ( so noted that i need not name him , and who was as much acquainted with metaphysicks as most in his age ) published to the world above twenty years ago , that he counted the notion of the schools about suppositum a foolery . for i do well know , the thing it self , which our christian metaphysicians intended , to be of no small importance in our religion , and specially to the doctrine of redemption , and of our redeemer . xxviii . but i reckon they that go the more metaphysical way , and content themselves with the modal distinction of three persons in the godhead , say nothing herein that can be proved absurd or contradictious . as to what is commonly urged , that if there be three persons in the deity , each person must have its distinct individual essence , as well as its distinct personality . i would deny the consequence , and say , that tho' this be true in created persons ( taking person in the strict metaphysical sense ) it is not necessary to be so in uncreated . that the reason is not the same betvveen finite things and infinite ; and would put them to prove , if they can , that the same infinite essence cannot be whole and undivided in three several persons ; knowing there can be nothing more difficult urged in the case , than may against the divine omnipresence ; which irrefragable reasons , as well as the plainest testimony of scripture will oblige us to acknowledge . but i think , tho' this hypothesis abstractly considered , and by it self , is not indefensible ; it doth not altogether so well square with the christian oeconomy , nor so easily allow that distinction to the father , son , and holy spirit , which seems requisite to found the distinct attributions that are severally given them in the holy scriptures . xxix . to conclude , i only wish these things might be considered , and discoursed with less confidence , and peremptory determination ; with a greater awe of what is divine and sacred ; and that we may more confine our selves to the plain words of scripture in this matter , and be content therewith . i generally blame it in the socinians ( who appear otherwise rational and considering men ) that they seem to have formed their belief of things , not possible to be known but by the scriptures , without them ; and then think they are by all imaginable arts , and they care not what violence , ( as socinus himself hath in effect confessed ) to mold and form them according to their preconceived sense . common modesty , and civility , one would have thought , should have made schlictingius abstain from prefixing , and continuing that as a running title to a long chapter : articulus evangelicorum de trinitate cum sensu communi pugnat , engrossing common sense to himself and his party , and reproaching the generality of christians , as not understanding common sense . they should take upon them less , and not vaunt , as if they were the men , and wisdom must dye with them . for this author , i congratulate his nearer approach to us , from those who were formerly leaders of his party , in the doctrines of gods omnipresence , and the perceptiveness , and activity of separate souls . he writes with sprightliness and vigour . and , i doubt not , believes really , what he writes with so little seeming doubt . and because his spirit appears to be of a more generous , exalted pitch , than to comport with any thing against his judgment , for secular interest and advantage . i reckon it the greater pity it should want the addition of what would be very ornamental to it , and which he wishes to two of the persons , to whom he makes himself an antagonist , more of the tenderness and catholick charity of genuine christianity , p. . col . . to accompany those his abilities and learning , which would not thereby be the lesser ( as he speaks ) nor the less conspicuous . i believe few would have thought him to see the less clearly , if he had been content to see for himself , not for mankind . and if he had not talkt at that rate , as if he carried the eyes of all the world in his pocket , they would have been less apt to think he carried his own there . nor had his performance , in this writing of his , lost any thing of real value , if in a discourse upon so grave a subject , some lepidities had been left out , as that of dulcinea del toboso , &c. and to allude to what he says of dr. cudworth , his displeasure will not hurt so rough an author as arnobius , so many ages after he is dead , if he should happen to offend him , by having once said , dissoluti — est pectoris in rebus serijs quaerere voluptatem — &c. but for all of us , i hope we may say without offence to any , common humane frailty should be more considered , and that we know but in part , and in how small a part ! we should , hereupon , be more equal to one another . and when it is obvious to every one , how we are straitned in this matter , and that we ought to suppose one another intently , aiming to reconcile the scripture-discovery , with natural sentiments , should not uncharitably censure , or labour to expose one another , that any seem more satisfi'd with their own method than with ours . what an odd and almost ludicrous spectacle do we give to the blessed angels that supervise us ( if their benignity did not more prompt them to compassion ) when they behold us fighting in the dark , about things we so little understand ; or , when we all labour under a gradual blindness , objecting it to one another , and one accusing another that he abandons not his own too weak sight , to see only by his ( perhaps ) blinder eye . thus , sir , you have my sense what i think safe , and enough to be said in this weighty matter . to you , these thoughts are not new , with whom they have been communicated and discoursed heretofore , long ago . and i believe you may so far recollect your self , as to remember the principal ground was suggested to you , upon which this discourse now rests ; [ viz. necessity of existence , and contingencie ; emanations absolutely independent upon any will at all ; and the arbitrary productions of the divine will , ] as the sufficient and most fundamental difference between what is uncreated and what is created ; and upon this very account , as that which might give scope and room to our thoughts , to conceive the doctrine of the trinity , consistently with the unity of the godhead ; and so , as that the son , tho truly from the father , and the holy ghost tho' truly from both , shall yet appear infinitely distinguished from all created beings whatsoever . so much you know was under consideration with us above twenty years ago ; and was afterwards imparted to many more ; long before there was any mention or forethought , within our notice , of such a revival of former controversies , upon this subject , as we have lately seen . this occasion , now given , hath put me upon revolving anew these former thoughts ; and upon digesting them into some order , such as it is , for publick view . if they shall prove to be of any use , it appears they will not be out of season ; and it will he gratefull to me to be any way serviceable to so worthy a cause . if they shall be found altogether useless ; being evicted either of impertinency , or untruth , it shall not be ungratefull . for i thank god , i find not a disposition in my mind to be fond of any notions of mine , as they are such , nor to be more adventurous , or confident , in determining of things hid , not only in so profound , but in most sacred darkness , than i have all along exprest my self . i ought indeed to be the more cautious of offending in this kind , that being the thing i blame , the positive asserting this or that to be impossible , or not possibly competent to the nature of god , which by his own word , or the manifest reason of things doth not plainly appear to be so . much more which his word doth as plainly as it is possible any thing can be exprest by words , ascribe to him . the only thing i assert is , that a trinity in the godhead may be possible , for ought we know , in the way that i have proposed . at least it is so , for any thing that i do as yet know . and so confident i am of the truth , and true meaning of his word , revealing a trinity in his eternal godhead , that i strongly hope , if ever it shall be proved to be impossible upon these terms that i have here set down ; by the same , or by equal , light , the possibility of it some other way , will appear too . i. e. that not only a trinity in the unity of the godhead is a possible thing ; but that it is also possible that the father , son and holy ghost may be sufficiently distinguished to answer the frame and design of christianity : and that will equally serve my purpose . for so however , will the scandal be removed , that may seem to ly upon our holy religion , through the industrious misrepresentation which is made of it , by scepticks , deists or atheists , as if it were made up of inconsistencies and absurdities , and were fitter to be entertained with laughter than faith : and being effectually vindicated , it will be the more successfully propagated , and more chearfully practised ; which is all that is coveted and sought by sir , your very respectfully , humble servant , &c. postscript , having the copies of some letters by me , which i wrote to dr. wallis between two and three years ago , upon this subject ; i think , sir , it is not improper , and perhaps it may be some way usefull , to let them accompany this to your self . and here i shall freely tell you my principal inducement , ( taking notice in some of the doctor 's printed letters ; of others to him , contained in them ) to send him ( incognito ) one also ; but with that reason against printing it , which you find towards the end of the first letter . it was really the apprehension , which had long remained with me , that the simplicity , which ( if the notion of it were stretch'd too far ) not the scriptures , but the schools have taught us to ascribe to the being of god , was that alone which hath given us difficulty , in conceiving a trinity in the onely one god. it is not the unity , or oneliness of the godhead ; but the simplicity of it , as the school-men have stated it , that hath created the matter of dispute . unity , you know , denies more of the same ; simplicity denies more in it . concerning the former that there could be no more gods than one , we are at a point ; the reason of the thing it self , and the holy scriptures so expresly asserting it , leave it out of dispute . all the doubt is about the latter . not whether such a thing belong to the nature of god ; but concerning the just explication of it : as it is a real excellency , not a blemish ; and not meerly a moxal , but a natural excellency , there can be no doubt of its belonging to the divine nature ; but if you understand it as exclusive of all varietie therein , you find not any express mention of such an attribute of god in the scriptures . they are silent in the matter . it hath no authority , but of the schools . that and the reason that can be brought for it must give it its whole and only support . it is the only thing that must open , and give way , to admit the doctrine of the trinity ; and it is the only thing that needs to do so . for we none of us assert a trinity of gods ; but a trinity in the godhead . it is the only thing that can to the adversaries of the trinity with any colourable pretence seem opposite to it . and which therefore i thought the only thing that remained to be sifted and examined , if they will state it in an opposition thereto . what so mighty and invincible strength of reason it had , whence alone either to shock the authority ; or pervert the plain meaning of the holy scriptures , discompose the whole frame of christian religion , disturb the peace of the church , perplex very thinking minds , subvertt the faith of some , and turn it into ridicule with too many . i reckon'd the dr. ( as i still do , notwithstanding the contempt this author hath of him ) a person of a very clear , unmuddied understanding . i found him , by what he express'd in his first letter of the trinity , not apt to be awed by the authority of the schools , nor any bigot to them , as having declined their notion of a person , and fixing upon another , ( less answering , as i apprehended , the scheme and design of christianity ) i thought it easie , and reputable enough to him to add , what might be requisite in this matter , without contradicting ( directly , or discernibly ) any thing he had said . i gave him the opportunity of doing it , as from himself , without seeming to have the least thing to that purpose suggested to him by any other . i had my self , i think , seen and considered the main strength of the school-mens reasonings concerning that simplicity , which they will have to be divine ; and , for ought i do yet know , have competently occurr'd to it in this foregoing letter , and partly in what you will now find i wrote to him . but what there is of real infirmity , or impertinencie to this case ( as it is , and ought to be represented ) in their arguings , i reckon'd he would both see and evince more clearly than i. therefore i greatly desired to have engaged him upon this point ; but i could not prevail . and am therefore willing that what i writ then with design of the greatest privacy , should now become publick . not that i think it hath so great value in it self ; but that perhaps it may furrher serve to excite some others more able and more at leasure to search and enquire into this matter ; and either to improve , or disprove what i have essayed . and which of the two it is , 't is all one to me . for i have no interest or design , but that of truth , and the service of the christian cause . i was so little apprehensive of any such future use to be made of these letters , that i kept no account of the dates , except that one of the two latter ( which both only refer to the first ) i find by the copy i have in my hands , to have been sent decemb. th . . i remember it was a long time , and guess it might be or weeks , e're i heard any thing of the first , after i had sent it . probably it might have been sent in october , or the begining of november before . i at length heard of it very casually , being in an house in london , whither the doctor 's eighth letter was nevvly arrived ( then no secret ) in order to impression . i then found this my first letter was lightly toucht , but mistaken ; vvhich occasioned ( it being a post-night ) my second . that was followed by the third , the next post after , when i had a little more time wherein to express my mind , tho' i still concealed my name , as it is yet fittest to do , my main business in my letter to you lying with a person , who ( blamelesly enough ) conceals his . these two latter of my letters to the dr. produced some alteration in that paragraph of his th . letter , which relates to my first . but yet no way answering the design for which i writ it . you have them now together exactly according to the copies i have by me , excepting one or two circumstantial things fitly enough left out , or somewhat altered . and they had all slept long enough , if this occasion had not brought them to light . but before i give them you , let me suggest some things further to you concerning the foregoing letter to yourself . you may apprehend that some will think it strange ( if not an inconsistency ) that i should suppose it possible an absolute onmimodous simplicity may not belong to the divine being , when yet i absolutely deny all composition in it . and i apprehend too some may think so , at least a while ; but such as have considered well , will not think so , and such as shall , i presume will not long . for , . if i had deny'd the simplicity of the divine nature , had the inference been just , that therefore i must grant a composition ? how many instances might be given of one opposite not agreeing to this or that thing , when also the other doth as little agree ! and most of all doth the transcendent excellency of the divine nature exempt it from the limiting by-partitions to which creatures are subject . take reason in the proper sense for arriving gradually by argumentation from the knowledge of more evident , to the knowledge of obscurer things , and so we cannot say the divine nature is rational . but is it therefore to be called irrational ? faith and hope agree not to it . are we therefore to think infidelity or despair do not disagree ? it is indeed more generally apprehended , we can scarce have the notion of any thing that strictly , or otherwise than by some very defective analogy , agrees to him , and to us . some pagans , and some christians from them ( not in derogation , but ) in great reverence to the high excellency of the deity , not excepting the most common notion of all other , even that of being it self ; but making his being and substance to be superessential , and supersubstantial . 't is out of doubt that whatsoever perfection is in us , is not the same thing in him formally , but in an unconceivable transcendent eminency only . do therefore their contraries agree to him ? . i am far from denying the simplicity of the blessed nature of god , which i ascribe to him in the highest perfection which it is capable of signifying . i most peremptorily affirm not only all the simplicity , which he expresly affirms of himself ; but all that can by just consequence be inferr'd from any affirmation of his ; or that can by plain reason be evinced any other way . whatsoever is any real perfection , &c. sect. . 't is true while i affirm such a simplicity as excludes all composition , in the sense already given , i affirm not such as excludes all variety . not such as excludes a trinity , which he so plainly affirms , and with such distinction , as his affirmations concerning it imply , and make requisite . i further judge that tho the scriptures do not expresly ascribe simplicity to the being of god , as a natural excellency , they say that which implies it , as such , to belong to him ; as when they bring him in saying of himself i am what i am . this must imply his nature to exclude every thing that is alien from it self . i take it , as it signifies ( besides a moral ) a meer natural excellency , to import a most perfect purity of essence . and i understand that to be purum , which is plenum sui , and quod nihil habet alieni . i do therefore take the natural simplicity of the divine being to exclude the ingrediency of any thing that can infer in it , conflict , decay , change , disturbance or infelicity in the least degree ; and to include whatsoever infers the contraries of all these ; serenity , tranquillity , harmony , stability , delight , and joy , in highest perfection ; as necessity of existence also doth ; and that for all this , it by no means needs to exclude a trinity , but to include it rather . but i judge humane ( and even all created ) minds very incompetent judges of the divine simplicity . we know not what the divine nature may include consistently with its own perfection , nor what it must , as necessary thereto . our eye is no judge of corporeal simplicity . in darkness it discerns nothing but simplicity , without distinction of things . in more dusky light the whole horison appears most simple , and every where like it self . in brighter light , we perceive great varieties , and much greater if a microscope assist our eye . but of all the aerial people that replenish the region ( except rare appearances to very few ) we see none . here want not objects , but a finer eye . 't is much at this rate with our minds in beholding the spiritual sphaere of beings , most of all the uncreated , which is remotest , and furthest above , out of our sight . we behold simplicity ! and what do we make of that ? vast undistinguisht vacuity ! sad , immense solitude ! only this at first view . if we draw nearer , and fix our eye , we think we apprehend somewhat , but dubiously hallucinate , as the half-cur'd blind man did , when he thought he saw men like trees . but if a voice which we acknowledge divine speak to us out of the profound abyss , and tell us of gratefull varieties and distinctions in it ; good god! shall we not believe it ? or shall we say we clearly see that is not , which only we do not see ? this seems like somewhat worse than blindness ! now follow the letters . letters to dr. wallis , sent in . letter i. sir , i could much please my self in revolving in my own mind the very respectful thoughts and veneration i have long had for you , and in conversing with the grateful and entertaining idéa which i have not abitrarily , but by your irresistible imposition received ; and retained of you many years , on the account of your former most useful and acceptable performances , and which is both renewed and heightened greatly by your late , clear , prudent , and piously modest discourses ( both letters and sermons ) of that awful mystery [ the trinity in the godhead . ] but as i can neither satisfie my self of the fitness of making an encomium of you the matter of a letter to your self ; so nor can i hope to please you by doing a thing in it self so inept , and so insignificant to you . i shall better do both , if i shall offer any thing to you concerning this mentioned subject , your further consideration whereof may prove a further benefit to the world. in what you have already said concerning it , you have used that great caution , and so well guarded your self , as not so far as i can apprehend , to give an adversary in this single point , the least advantage . that which i would in the general , humbly offer , is , whether you have said so much as with safety might be said , and as the case may require , for the gaining of a just advantage to the common christian cause . we design , in fight , not only to keep our selves safe , but to overcome , and not in praelio only , but in bello . in wars , indeed of this sort , both our own safety and victory , are less to be valued than truth . which , being of a piece , can be injured in no part , without some dammage to the whole frame of congenerous truth . and as it is very possible , while an enemy is withstood attacking some one fort , a greater loss may not be provided against elsewhere ; it may so fall out in affairs of this kind too , that the care of defending some one truth may be accompany'd with a present not attending to the jeopardy of divers others . the nearer we approach an adversary ( within just limits ) in these rational decertations , the less he can have to say against us . but being well resolved our selves about the main point of disagreement , we then take care not to come so near , as to fall in with him , pass into his tents , and give away our main cause . i am ( worthiest sir ) far from assuming so much to my self , or detracting so much from you , as to give a judgment that this really is done in your discourses about the trinity . i only submit it to your own most penetrating judgment , what may be further requisite and possible in this matter , to take away any appearances hereof , and prevent ill consequences that may too easily ensue . i have , for my own part , long impos'd it upon my self to abstain from any positive conceptions concerning the godhead , beyond what i find expresly contain'd in the divine revelation , or what the reason of things , either antecedently thereto , or consequentially thereupon , doth most evidently perswade and require ; and do greatly approve the same caution , which i cannot but observe with you . but desire it may be weigh'd whether such measures may not , and must not lead us further . as for the word person , you prudently profess not to be fond of it , the thing being agreed , thô you also truly judge it a good word , and sufficiently warranted . for the notion signify'd by it , you all along seem to decline that of the schools , or the metaphysical one , which , you know , makes it to be a rational ( or intelligent ) suppositum ; and to take up with ( what i think i may , wanting a fitter , i. e. a more comprehensive word , call ) the civil notion of it ; which will allow the same man to be capable of sustaining three or more persons , supposing his circumstances or qualifications to be such or such , as to that purpose you speak both in your letters and sermons . now whereas you have also told us , letter . that by personality you mean that distinction ( whatever it be ) by which the three persons are distinguished each from other ; that which , with great submission , and most profound respect to you , i propose to your further consideration , will be capable of being resolved into these two enquiries . . whether only such a distinction of the divine persons , as this amounts to , will be sufficient to found the several attributions which the holy scriptures give distinctly and severally to them , and to preserve the scheme of christian religion entire , which is wont to be deduced from these sacred writings . . whether some further distinction may not be admitted as possible , consistently with the salved unity of the godhead . as to the former , . whereas you think the word person to be a good word , and sufficiently warranted by scripture , heb. . . where the son is called the express image of his father's person ; alledging that so we render the word hypostasis which is there used , and do mean by it what you think to be there meant ; i desire you would please to consider whether the word hypostasis , according to the common use of it will admit to be so taken , as you explain your self to mean by the word person . for thô the latine word persona , as you say , according to the true and ancient sense , may well enough admit to be so taken , as that the same man might sustain three persons , i offer it to your re-consideration , whether ever you have observ'd the word hypostasis , in any sort of authors , when it signifies any person at all ( for i know that it frequently signifies somewhat else than a person ) to be taken in that sense . and whether one hypostasis so taken as it uses to be when it signifies a person , may not be capable of sustaining three of those persons which you here describe . and whether , according to this sense you mean not god to be only one such hypostasis . . be pleas'd further hereupon to consider how well it agrees with this supposition of god's being but one hypostasis , or intelligent suppositum , so frequently to speak , as the holy scriptures do of the father , son or word , the spirit or holy ghost , as three distinct i's or he 's . the lord possessed me ( as the divine word or wisdom is brought in speaking ) in the beginning of his way . — i was set up from everlasting , prov. . , . when he prepared the heavens i was there , vers . . — then was i by him , vers . , &c. the word — was with god , joh. . . he was in the world , vers . . we beheld his glory , vers . . and of the spirit , he dwelleth with you , joh. . . the holy ghost whom the father will send in my name , he shall teach you all things , vers . . and whom i will send you from the father , he shall testifie of me , chap. . . and when he is come , he will reprove the world — ch. . . and the observation seems to me as weighty , as it is usual , that , in some of the mentioned chapters , the somewhat hard synthesis of construing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( even where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not the nearer suppositum , but , in one place , a very remote one , ( and one would think too remote to be referr'd to ch . vers . , . ) is rather chosen to be used than that the spirit should not be spoken of as a distinct he , or rather than he should be called it , ( which could not so fitly notifie a person . ) if the same man were a king , a general , and a father , i doubt whether that would give sufficient ground to his being called he , and he , and he. . but the distinct predicates spoken of the three sacred persons in the godhead seem much more to challenge a greater distinction of the persons than your notion of a person doth seem to admit . that of sending , and being sent , spoken so often of , the first in reference to the second , and of the first and second in reference to the third , as not to need the quoting of places . if the same man were a king , a general , and a judge , methinks it would not well square with the usual forms of speaking among men ( and god speaks to men as men ) to say , that , as the first , he sends the two latter , that is himself . and one would think our being required to be baptized in the distinct names of the father , son , and holy ghost should signifie some greater distinction . as also that three are said to bear witness in heaven . i doubt that in a cause wherein our law requires two or more witnesses , the same man that should be a father , a brother , and a son , would scarce thereupon be admitted for three witnesses . and how the incarnation of the son can be understood according to your notion of person , without the fathers and holy ghosts incarnation also , i confess i cannot apprehend . your notion of a person contradistinct to the scholastick notion , as was said before , seems to leave the godhead to be but one hypostasis , or person in the latter sense . how then are we to conceive of the hypostatical union ? the assumed nature will be as much hypostatically united with the father , or the spirit , as with the son. . and doth not this civil , or meerly respective notion of a person , the other being left , fall in with the antitrinitarian ? will it not make us unitarians only , as they affect to call themselves ? would any of them who ( as you are pleas'd to take notice letter . p. , . ) say , none but a mad-man would deny there may be three persons in god , have been so mad ( not yet professing themselves converts ) as to say so , if they had not suppos'd their cause not hurt by this notion of a person ? for , ( as you well say , letter . ) we need not be fond of words , so the thing be agreed , so have they equal reason to say , we need not be afraid of words , if in the sense you agree with us . and with one sort of them i only desire you to consider how great an appearance the asserting only of three persons , in the one sense , quitting the other , will carry off an agreement ? and have they not all the advantage left them which they seek in arguing against the satisfaction made by our saviour from the necessity of an alterity , that in the business of making satisfaction there must be alter atque alter , one who satisfies , and another who is satisfy'd . i do very well know , what instances are brought of humane rulers making satisfaction for delinquents , but there is no parity in the cases . they being themselves debtors to the governed community , as god is not , who hath with most undoubted righteousness made all things for himself . . and consider whether by your notion of a person you forsake not the generality of them , who have gone , as to this point , under the repute of orthodox ? who no doubt have understood by three persons , three intelligent hypostases ; tho' they have differ'd in thinking , some of them , that only a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was the genitum or spiratum as to the two latter ; ( a notion that is either too fine , or too little solid , for some minds to grasp , or take any hold of . ) others that the divine nature might it self be some way said to be communicated to them . but i pass to the ii d enquiry : whether some further distinction may not be admitted as possible ? the only thing that straitens us here , is the most unquestionable unity or unicity ( as we may call it ) of the godhead . which , if it cannot be otherwise defended , i must yet for my part , notwithstanding these hardships ( and i know no man with whom i could do it with more inclination ) fall in with you . but i must crave it of you so far to fall in with you know not who , as to apply your clearer mind , as , i do my more cloudy one , to consider whether it can or no ? you will here say further than what ? and what would i have further ? to the former of these , i only say , further than the asserting , in very deed , but one hypostasis in the godhead , distinguished no otherwise into three , than by certain relative capacities , like those which may among men be sustain'd by one and the same man ; and which distinction , as you after add , is analogous to what , in created beings , is called distinctio modalis . to the latter , i desire you to observe what i generally propose , not that we may positively assert any further determinate distinction as certain and known ; but only whether we may not admit some further distinction to be possible , in consistency with the unity of the godhead . i do equally detest and dread to speak with rash and peremptory confidence about things both so mysterious and so sacred . but may we not modestly say , that if to that oeconomy which god hath represented himself in his word , to bear , and keep afoot , towards his creatures , any further distinction than hath been assigned is necessary , it is also possible , and may be , for ought we know ( if indeed we know nothing to the contrary . ) what is impossible we are sure cannot be necessary . but god himself best , and only knows his own nature , and what his own meaning is in the representation he hath made to us . if we sincerely aim to understand his meaning , that we may bear our selves towards him accordingly , he will vvith mercifull indulgence consider our shortor mis-apprehensions . but vve need not say there is not this or that distinction , if really vve do not knovv there is not . while vve knovv so little of natures inferiour to our ovvn , and even of our ovvn nature , and hovv things are distinguished that belong to our selves , vve have little reason to be shy of confessing ignorance about the nature of god. therefore i most intirely agree to the tvvo conclusions of the ingenious w. j. vvherevvith he concludes his letter . but in the mean time ( and pursuantly enough thereto ) cannot but doubt the concludingness of his very acute reasonings against , at least , some of the expressions of that learned person ( dr. sherl . ) vvhich he animadverts upon , as , i perceive you also do p. . of your th letter . and even w. j. himself : for vvith a pious modesty he tells us — concerning infinite natures he presumes not to determine . letter , p. . what he objects against that authors having said the divine persons are three beings really distinct ( vvherein i instance , not intending to run thorough that elaborate letter ) that then there must be three distinct essences — seems to me a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i doubt not the author vvill easily admit it . but what will be the consequence ? that therefore there are three deities ? that cannot be his meaning , nor be consequent from it , if he only mean that the deity comprehends in it three such essences . if indeed he think those three beings are as distinct as peter , james , and john ; what is said by w. j. against him , i think irrefragable , that then they are no otherwise one , than peter , james and john ; and by him against himself ; for peter , james and john are not mutually self-conscious , as they are asserted to be , which mutual self-consciousness , since it is supposed to make the three divine persons one , cannot be supposed to leave them so distinct , as they are with whom it is not found . as to what is observed of the defective expression of this unitive principle by the word consciousness , that bare consciousness , without consent , is no more than bare omnisciency . sure it is not so much . for consciousness doth not signifie omnisciency . we are conscious to our selves , yet are not omniscient . but i reckon , ( as i find he also doth ) that even consent added to consciousness , would yet leave the expression defective , and still want the unifying power which is sought after . for it would infer no more than a sort of moral union , which in the kind of it , may be found among men , between whom there is so little of natural union ( speaking of the numerical nature ) that they are actually separate . but now may we not suppose ( as that which is possible , and actually is , ( for ought we know ) what may be fundamental to both consciousness and consent , a natural union even of the numerical natures ? such an union would not infer an unity , or identity of these natures , essences , substances , or beings themselves . for as w. j. hath well argued , letter , p. , . substances upon union are not confounded or identify'd , or brought to unity of substance , but continuing numerically distinct substances acquire some mutual community or communication of operations , &c. and deferring the consideration a while what this would signifie towards the unity , notwithstanding , of the godhead , shall take notice how accommodately to our present purpose w. j. speaks in what follows , where instancing in the chief unions that are known to us , he says , our soul and body are two substances really distinct , and in close union with one another . but notwithstanding this , they continue distinct substances under that union . in like manner the humane soul of christ is in union with the logos , or second person of the trinity , which we call an hypostatical union . but neither doth this union make an unity of substance . for the two substances of the divine and humane natures continue distinct under that union . 't is true , he addes , which must not be allowed in the unity of the godhead , where there can be no plurality or multiplicity of substhaces . nor do i say that it must , i only say do we know , or are we sure there is no sort of plurality ? but if we are sure that there are temporal unions ( i. e. begun in time ) as in our selves for instance , of two substances that make but one man , and in our saviour an humane nature and divine that make but one emmanuel . how do we know but that there may be three in the godhead that make but one god ? and the rather , because this being supposed , it must also be supposed that they are necessarily and eternally united , and with a conjunct natural impossibility of ever being , or having been otherwise , whereof the absolute immutability of god must upon that supposition most certainly assure us . and such a supposed union will be most remote from making the deity an aggregate . and for any thing of composition , i reckon we are most strictly bound to believe every thing of the most perfect simplicity of the divine being which his word informs us of , and to assent to every thing that is with plain evidence demonstrable of it . but not every thing which the schools would impose upon us , without such testimony or evidence . for as none can know the things of a man , but the spirit of man which is in him , so nor can any know the things of god , but the spirit of god. nor can i think the argument concluding from the imperfection of a being , in which distinct things concur that were seperate , or are de novo united , to the impersection of a being , in which things some way distinct are necessarily and eternally self-united . nor can therefore agree with w. j. that we are to look ( universally ) upon real distinction as a mark of separability ; or that clear and distinct conception is to us the rule of partibility . for tho' i will not affirm that to be the state of all created spirits ; yet i cannot deny it to be possible that god might have created such a being , as should have in it distinct ( assignable ) parts , all of them essential to it , and not separable from it without the cessation of the whole . but now , as the accession of the humane nature to the divine in the hypostatical union infers no imperfection to the divine , so much less would what things we may suppose naturally , necessarily , and eternally united in the godhead infer any imperfection therein . i easily admit what is said by w. j. letter pag. . that we have no better definition of god , than that he is [ a spirit infinitely perfect ] but then , being so far taught by himself my conception of him , i must include in it , this trinal distinction , or a triple somewhat which he affirms of himself , and without which , or any one whereof , he were not infinitely perfect , and consequently not god , and that all together do make one god. as you most aptly say of your resemblance of him , a cube , there are in it three dimensions truly distinct from each other , yet all these are but one cube , and if any one of the three were wanting , it were not a cube . set this down then for the notion of god , that he is a spirit infinitely perfect , comprehending in that omnimodous perfection a trinal distinction , or three persons truly distinct , each whereof is god. what will be the consequence ? that therefore there are three gods ? not at all , but that each of these partaking divine nature give us an inadequate , and all together a most perfectly adequate and entire notion of god. nor would the language of this hypothesis being prest to speak out ( as he says in his letter ) be this — these are not fit to be called three gods ; but not possible ( with any truth ) to be so called . and whereas he after tells us these three being united by similitude of nature , mutual consciousness , consent , cooperation under the greatest union possible ; and in that state of union do constitute the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the entire all-comprehensive godhead , and adds , this looks somewhat like a conceivable thing . to this i note two things : . that he makes it not look like so conceivable a thing , as it really may do . for he leaves out the most important thing that was as supposable as any of the rest , and prior to a meer similitude , viz. a natural union of these ( supposed ) distinct essences , without which they are not under the greatest union possible ; and which , being supposed necessary , and eternal , cannot admit these should be more than one god. . i note that what he opposes to it ( so defectively represented ) is as defective , that the christian trinity doth not use to be represented thus , &c. what hurt is there in it , if it can be more intelligibly represented than hath been used ? but his gentle treatment of this hypothesis , which he thought , as he represents it , not altogether unintelligible , and which with some help may be more intelligible , became one enquiring what might most safely , and with least torture to our own minds , be said , or thought in so awful a mystery . it however seems not proper to call this an hypostatical union — much less to say it amounts to no more . it amounts not to so much . for an hypostatical or personal union would make the terms united ( the unita , the things or somewhats under this union ) become by it one hypostasis or person ; whereas this union must leave them distinct persons or hypostases , but makes them one god. in the use of the phrase hypostatical or personal union the denomination is not taken from the subject of the union , as if the design were to signifie that to be divers hypostases , or persons , but from the effect or result of the mentioned union , to signifie that which results to be one person or hypostasis . as the matter is plain in the instance wherein it is of most noted use , the case of the two natures united in the one person of the son of god ; where the things united are not supposed to be two persons , but two natures so conjoyn'd , as yet to make but one person , which therefore is the negative result or effect of the union , viz. that the person is not multiply'd by the accession of another nature , but remains still only one . but this were an union quite of another kind , viz. of the three hypostases , still remaining distinct , and concurring in one godhead . and may not this be supposed without prejudice to its perfection . for the schools themselves suppose themselves not to admit a composition prejudicial to the perfection of the godhead , when they admit three modes of subsistence , which are distinct from one another , and from the godhead , which they must admit . for if each of them were the very godhead , each of them ( as is urged against us by you know who ) must have three persons belonging to it , as the godhead hath . and your self acknowledge three somewhats in the godhead distinct , or else they could not be three : i will not here urge that if they be three somewhats , they must be three things , not three nothings ; for however uneasie it is to assign a medium between something and nothing , i shall wave that metaphysical contest . but yet collect , that simplicity in the very strictest sense that can be conceiv'd , is not , in your account , to be ascribed to god , either according to his own word , or the reason of things . it may here be urged , how can we conceive this natural union ( as i have adventur'd to phrase it ) of the three persons , supposing them distinct things , substances , or spirits ? is such an union conceivable , as shall make them be but one god , and not be such , as shall make them cease to be three distinct things , substances , or spirits ? we find indeed the mentioned unions of soul and body in our selves , and of the two natures in christ consistent enough with manifest distinction ; but then the things united are in themselves of most different natures . but if things of so congenerous a nature be united , will not their distinction be lost in their union ? i answer , . that a spirit and a spirit are numerically as distinct , as a body and a spirit . and , . that we may certainly conceive it as possible to god to have united two or three created spirits , and by as strict union as is between our souls and bodies , without confounding them ; and i reckon the union between our souls and bodies much more wonderful than that would have been . why then is an unmade , uncreated union of three spirits less conceivable as that which is to be presupposed to their mutual consciousness ? i shall not move , or meddle with , any controversie about the infinity of these three supposed substances or spirits , it being acknowledged on all hands that contemplations of that kind cannot but be above our measure . and well knowing how much easier it is to puzzle oneself upon that question , an possit dari infinitum infinito infinitius , than to speak satisfyingly , and unexceptionably about it to another . and tho' i will not use the expressions , as signifying my formed judgment , that there are three things , substances , or spirits in the godhead ( as you that there are three somewhats ) yet , as i have many years thought , i do still think that what the learned w. j. doth but more lightly touch of the son , and the holy ghost being produced ( which term i use , but reciting it , as he doth ) not by a voluntary external , but by an internal , necessary , and emanative act , hath great weight in it . in short my sense hath long lain thus , and i submit it to your searching and candid judgment , viz. that tho' we need not have determinate thoughts , how far the father , son , and holy ghost are distinguished ; yet we must conceive them in the general to be so far distinguished , as is really necessary to the founding the distinct attributions which the scriptures do distinctly give them . and that whatever distinction is truly necessary to that purpose , will yet not hinder the two latters participation with the first in the godhead , which can be but one , because that tho' we are led by plain scripture , and the very import of that word , to conceive of the father as the fountain , yet the son being from him , and the holy ghost from them both , not contingently , or dependently on will and pleasure ; but by eternal , natural , necessary promanation , these two latter are infinitely distinguisht from the whole creation . inasmuch as all creatures are contingent beings , or dependent upon will and pleasure , as the character is given us of created things , rev. . . thou hast made all things , and for thy pleasure they are and were created . but that whatever is what it is necessarily is god. for i have no doubt but the dreams of some , more anciently , and of late , concerning necessary matter , and the sophisms of spinosa and some others , tending to prove the necessity and identity of all substance are ( with what they aim to evince ) demonstrably false . the summe of all will be this , . that we can be more certain of nothing than that there is but one god. . we are most sure the father , son , and holy ghost are sufficiently distinguished to give a just ground to the distinct attributions , which are in scripture severally given to them . . we are not sure what that sufficient distinction is ( wherein i find you saying with me over and over ) but whereas you rightly make the word person applicable to god , but in a sense analogous to that which obtains of it with men ; why may it not be said it may be fitly applicable , for ought we know , in a sense analogous to that notion of it among men , which makes a person signify an intelligent hypostasis ; and so three distinct persons , three distinct intelligent hypostases . . but if that sufficient distinction can be no less , than that there be in the godhead , three distinct intelligent hypostases , each having its own distinct singular intelligent nature , with its proper personality belonging to it , we know nothing to the contrary , but that the necessary eternal nature of the godhead may admit thereof . if any can from plain scripture testimony , or cogent reason evince the contrary , let the evidence be produced . in the mean time we need not impose upon our selves any formal denial of it . . if the contrary can be evidenced , and that hereupon it be designed to conclude that there can be but one intelligent hypostasis in the godhead , and therefore that the son , and the holy ghost are but creatures , the last refuge must be to deny the former consequence , and to alledge that thô the same finite singular nature cannot well be understood to remain entirely to one , and be communicated entirely to another , and another , the case will not be the same speaking of an infinite nature . sir , if what is here said shall occasion to you any new thoughts that you shall judge may be of common use , i conceive there will be no need of publishing my letter , but only that you be pleased to comunicate your own sentiments , as from your self , which will have so much the more of authority and usefulness with them . the most considerable thing that i have hinted , is the necessary promanation of the son , and holy ghost , that must distinguish them from contingent beings , and so from creatures ; which if you think improveable to any good purpose , as it hath been with me a thought many years old , so i suppose it not new to you , and being now resumed by you , upon this occasion , you will easily cultivate it to better advantage than any words of mine can give it . but if you think it adviseable that any part of my letter be published , if you please to signifie your mind to that purpose in one line to marked — — it will come sealed to my view , and will give opportunity of offering my thoughts to you , what parts i would have supprest , which will be such only , as shall leave the rest the fuller testimony of my being , poirets method of proving a trinity in the godhead , tho' it call it self mathematical or geometrical , is with me much less convictive , than the plain scriptural way . sir , your most sincere honourer and most respectful humble servant , anonym . letter ii. sir , your eighth letter happening to come to my view before it was printed off , i have the opportunity of taking notice to you that it quite misrepresents the intent of the letter to you subscribed anonymous , which it makes to be the defending or excusing some expressions of dr. sherlock's ; which indeed was the least considerable thing , if it were any thing at all in the design of that letter , and not altogether accidental to it . the true design of it was , that there might be a clearer foundation asserted ( as possible at least ) to the doctrine of the incarnation and satisfaction of the son of god. nor can the fortè quod sic , here be solved by the fortè quod non , the exigency of the case being such , as that if more be possible , it will be highly requisite ; and that it cannot well be avoided to assert more , unless it can be clearly evinced that more is impossible . nor yet is it necessary to determine how much more is necessary . but not only the commonly receiv'd frame of christian doctrine , doth sem to require somewhat beyond what the meer civil or respective notion of the word person imports ; but also the plain letter of scripture , which says heb. . . that the son is the express image of the fathers hypostasis , which seems to signifie there are two hyyostases , and other scriptures seem to say enough , whence we may with parity of reason collect a third . now that letter intimates , i think , sufficient matter of doubt , whether hypostasis doth not signifie much more than person , in your sense . the principal thing that letter humbly offer'd to consideration [ i. e. whether , supposing a greater distinction than you have assign'd be necessary , it may not be defended , by the just supposal that the promanation of the second or third persons ( or hypostases rather ) howsoever divers they are , is by natural eternal necessity , not contingent , or depending upon will and pleasure , as all created being is and doth ] is altogether waved . that letter was written with design of giving you the occasion of considering what might be further requisite and possible to be asserted for the serving of the truth , and with that sincerity and plenitude of respect to you that it might be wholly in your own power to do it in such a way , as wherein not at all to disserve your self . which temper of mind is still the same with reverend sir , your most unfeigned honourer , and humble servant , anonym . decemb. . letter iii. worthy sir , i am very loath troublesomely to importune you . but the very little time i had for the view of your th . letter , before i wrote mine by the last post not allowing me fully to write my sense as to that part which concern'd my former letter ; i take leave now to add , that my design in it ( as well as the profest design of the letter it self ) was to offer you the occasion of employing that clear understanding , wherewith god hath blest you , above most , in considering whether a greater latitude cannot be allow'd us in conceiving the distinction of the three in the godhead consistently with the unity thereof , than your notion of a person will extend to . and if it can , whether it ought not to be represented ( at least as possible ) to give a less exceptionable ground to the doctrines of the incarnation and satisfaction of the second person , in order whereto it seems to me highly requisite . this was that i really intended , and not the vindicating the sentiments of that author , which you might observe that letter animadverts upon . the scripture seems to allow a greater latitude , by the ground it gives us to apprehend three hypostases ; which so much differ from the notion you give of persons , that one hypostasis may sustain three such persons as you describe . the only thing that seems to straiten us in this matter , is the usual doctrine of the schools about the divine simplicity . i confess i greatly coveted to have had your thoughts engag'd in sifting and examining that doctrine ; so far as to consider whether there be really any thing in it , cogent and demonstrable that will be repugnant to what is overtur'd in that letter . and i the rather desir'd more room might be gained in this matter , apprehending the unitarians ( as they more lately affect to call themselves ) might , upon the whole , think you more theirs , than ours ; and while they agree with you concerning the possibility of such a trinity as you assert , may judge their advantage against the other mentioned doctrines , no less than it was . my desiring that letter of mine might not be printed , was most agreeable to what i intended in writing it ; that was , only to suggest to you somewhat ( very loosly ) that i reckon'd you more capable than any man i knew , to cultivate , and improve , to the great service of the common christian cause . and that you might seem to say , what you might , upon your own search , find safe and fit to be said , as meerly from your self , without taking notice that occasion was given you by any such letter at all . had i design'd it for publick view , it should have been writ with more care , and with more ( expressed ) respect to you . but if upon the whole , you judge there is nothing in it considerable to the purposes it mentions , my further request is , you will please rather to suppress that part of your letter which concerns it ( for which i suppose there is yet opportunity ) and take no notice any such letter came to your hands . i am , reverend sir , your most respectful , humble servant , anonym . decemb. . . summary propositions , collected out of the foregoing discourses , more briefly offering to view the substance of what is contained in them . . of the unity of the godhead there can be no doubt , it being in reason demonstrable , and most expresly , often , asserted in scripture . . that there is a trinity in the godhead , of father , son , or word , and holy ghost is the plain , obvious sense of so many scriptures , that it apparently tends to frustrate the design of the whole scripture-revelation , and to make it useless , not to admit this trinity , or otherwise to understand such scriptures . . that therefore the devising any other sense of such scriptures ought by no means to be attempted , unless this trinity in the godhead can be evidently demonstrated to be impossible . . that the impossibility of it can never be demonstrated from the meer unity of the godhead , which may be such , as to admit these distinctions in it , for ought we know . . nothing is more appropriate to the godhead than to be a necessarily existent , intelligent being ; since all creatures whether intelligent , or unintelligent , are contingent , depending upon the will of the necessary , intelligent , being . . if therefore the father , son , and holy ghost do coexist in the godhead necessarily , they cannot but be god. . and if the first be conceived as the fountain , the second as by natural necessary ( not voluntary ) promanation from the first , the third by natural , necessary ( not voluntary ) spiration , so as that neither of these latter , could have been otherwise ; this aptly agrees with the notions of father , son , and spirit distinctly put upon them , and infinitely distinguishes the two latter from all creatures that depend upon will and pleasure . . whatever distinction there be of these three among themselves , yet the first being the original , the second being by that promanation necessarily and eternally united with the first , the third by such spiration united necessarily and eternally with both the other , inasmuch as eternity , and necessity of existence admit no change , this union must be inviolable , and everlasting , and thereupon the godhead which they constitute , can be but one. . we have among the creatures , and even in our selves , instances of very different natures , continuing distinct , but so united , as to be one thing ; and it were more easily supposeable of congenerous natures . . if such union with distinction be impossible in the godhead , it must not be from any repugnancy in the thing it self , since very intimate union , with continuing distinction , is in it self no impossible thing ; but from somewhat peculiar to the divine being . . that peculiarity , since it cannot be unity ( which because it may admit distinctions in one and the same thing , we are not sure it cannot be so in the godhead ) must be that simplicity commonly wont to be ascribed to the divine nature . . such simplicity as shall exclude that distinction , which shall appear necessary in the present case , is not by express scripture any where ascribed to god ; and therefore must be rationally demonstrated of him , if it shall be judg'd to belong at all to him . . absolute simplicity is not a perfection , nor is by any ascribed to god. not by the socinians themselves , who ascribe to him the several intellectual and moral excellencies , that are attributed to him in the scriptures , of which they give very different definitions , as may be seen in their own volkelius at large , which should signifie them not to be counted , in all respects , the same thing . . that is not a just consequence , which is the most plausible one that seems capable of being alledg'd for such absolute simplicity , that otherwise there would be a composition admitted in the divine nature , which would import an imperfection inconsistent with deity . for the several excellencies that concur in it , howsoever distinguished , being never put together , nor having ever existed apart , but in eternal , necessary union , tho' they may make some sort of variety , import no proper composition , and carry with them more apparent perfection than absolute omnimodous simplicity can be conceived to do . . such a supposed possible variety even of individual natures in the deity , some way differing from each other , infers not an unbounded liberty of conceiving what pluralities therein we please or can imagine . the divine revelation , which could only justify , doth also limit us , herein , mentioning three distinct i's or he 's , and no more . . the several attributes which are common to these three , do to our apprehension , and way of conceiving things , require less distinction ; no more , for ought we know , than may arise from their being variously modify'd , according to the distinction of objects , or other extrinsecal things , to which they may be referr'd . we that so little know how our own souls , and the powers and principles that belong to them do differ from one another , and from them , must be supposed more ignorant , and should be less curious , in this . finis . books printed for , and sold by tho. parkhurst at the bible and three crowns at the lower end of cheapside , near mercers chappel . a body of practical divinity , consisting of above sermons on the lesser catechisme compos'd by the reverend assembly of divines at westminster : with a supplement of some sermons on several texts of scripture . by thomas watson , formerly minister of st. stephens walbrook , london . theological dicourses , in two volumes : the first , containing eight letters and three sermons concerning the blessed trinity : the second , containing sermons on several occasions . by john wallis , d. d. professor of geometry in oxon. an account of the blessed trinity , argued from the nature and perfection of the supream spirit , coincident with the scripture doctrine in all the articles of the catholick creeds , together with its mystical , federal , practical uses , in the christian religion . by william burrough , rector of cheynis in bucks . the confirming work of religion , or its great things made plain by their primary evidences and demonstrations , whereby the meanest in the church may soon be made able to render an account of their faith. by r. fleming , author of the fulfilling of the seriptures . now published by daniel burgess . the rod or the sword , the present dilemma of the nations of england , scotland and ireland , considered , argued and improved , &c. a family altar erected to the honour of the eternal god ; or a solemn essay to promote the worship of god in private houses , together with the best entail , or dying parents living hopes for their surviving children , grounded upon the covenant of gods grace with believers and their seed . by oliver heywood , minister of the gospel . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e joh. . joh. . cor. . . joh. . . p. . of these considerations . prov. . gen. . prov. . isa. . mic. . joh. . joh. . joh. . joh. . rom. . phil. . col. . joh. . rev. . chap. . chap. . god. cor. . acts . joh. . a second letter concerning the holy trinity pursuant to the former from the same hand : occasioned by a letter there inserted from one unknown / by john wallis. wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a second letter concerning the holy trinity pursuant to the former from the same hand : occasioned by a letter there inserted from one unknown / by john wallis. wallis, john, - . w. j. [ ], p. printed for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . the text of a letter from w.j. to wallis, with wallis's reply. "i have, since yours, received ... a letter directed to me, subscribed w.j., but i know not from whom ..."--p. . reproduction of original in cambridge university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a second letter concerning the holy trinity . pursuant to the former from the same hand ; occasioned by a letter ( there inserted ) from one unknown . by iohn wallis . d. d. london , printed for tho. parkhurst at the bible and three crowns in cheapside near mercers-chapel . . a second letter concerning the sacred trinity . sir , i understand by your letter ( of sept. . ) that you have printed a letter of mine concerning the trinity ; and have sent me some copies of it to oxford . but i am not there to receive them ; and so have yet seen none of them : ( but your letter thither was sent me thence by the post. ) i have , since yours , received ( by the same way ) a letter directed to me , subscribed w. j. but i know not from whom . i suppose it is somebody in london , to whom you have presented a book , for which he returns me thanks . that letter to me was thus , ( with the post-mark at london , se. . from whence i supply the date , which in the letter was wanting ) for the reverend dr. wallis , professor of geometry , at oxford . sir , i received the honour of your letter ; and return you humble and hearty thanks for it . 't is writ in my opinion , in a modest , peaceable , and christian stile : and i wish it may please others as well as it doth me . i am afraid however , that it will not give satisfaction to the scholastick athanasian trinitarian . for they are so particular , and withal so positive , in the explication of the greatest of mysteries , as if they understood it as well as any article of their christian faith. your explication of personality , gives no distast to me , when you say ( page . ) they are distinguished by personality : and , by personality i mean , that distinction whereby they are distinguished . yet i 'm afraid the high-flown school-trinitarians will say , this is trifling , and idem per idem . though to me it hath this good sense , that we know there is a distinction betwixt them , which we call personality ; but we can affix no notion to this personality , which is common to it with other personalities , either humane or angelical ; and therefore we can only say , it is that distinction whereby the three hypostases are distinguished . but you still use a greater latitude , as to the notion of these persons , or personalities , when you call them somewhats ( page . ) that , you say , which is pretended to be impossible by the anti-trinitarians , is only this , that there be three somewhats , which are but one god ; and these somewhats we commonly call persons . this i take only to signifie , that the true notion , and the true name of that distinction is unknown to us , yet the distinction is certain . but the deep-learned school-trinitarians , who decide all things to an hairs breadth , will , i imagine , ridicule this expression . a late learned and ingenious author , you know , hath gone much further in his determinations about this point . he makes your three somewhats , not only three persons , but three substantial beings , ( page . ) and three infinite minds , ( page . ) and the contrary , he says , is both heresie and non-sense . three infinite minds , is the same as three infinite spirits . and , by infinite , the author understands here , not infinite in extension , but in perfection . so that the three hypostases are three spirits , whereof each is infinite in perfection . then , saith the anti-trinitarian , they are three gods. for what better notion , or what better definition , have we of god , than that he is a spirit infinitely perfect . and , if there be three such , there are three gods. in like manner , three substantial beings really distinct , are three substances really distinct . and if each of these substances be endued with infinite perfection , it will be hard to keep them from being three gods. we do not well know what particular explication of the trinity those persons gave , whom the ancients call tritheites . but this we know , that the great offence which is taken at the christian doctrine of the trinity , by the iews and mahometans , is , from the appearance of polytheism in that doctrine . which appearance , methinks , is rather increased than lessened by this explication : and , consequently , the scandal which ( to them ) follows upon it . but the learned author hath an expedient to prevent polytheism , notwithstanding the real distinction of his three infinite spirits . which is , by making them mutually conscious of one anothers thoughts and actions : whereby , he says , they would be so united , as to make but one god. that , methinks , doth not follow , that upon this mutual consciousness they would be but one god. that which follows is this , that they would be three gods mutually conscious . for there is no reason why this mutual consciousness should make their godhead cease , if without this they would be three distinct gods. no union amounts to identity . it came in my way to mind you of this more punctual and demonstrative explication of the trinity , as it 's said to be , that you might not expect that every one should be of your mind , nor approve of your modesty as i do . your similitude and comparisons , are as just as the nature of the subject will admit . the great defect of the first , seems to be this ; that it cannot be said of any one dimension , that it is a cube , or a body : whereas it is said of every person , that he is god. your second comparison interferes again with the learned author above-mentioned . for he says , ( page . ) 't is a mistake to think that knowledge and power , even in men , is not the same thing ; whereas you suppose them distinct , and , upon that , ground your similitude . i cannot but be of your mind in this particular also . for power belongs to the * will , and knowledge to the understanding . and 't is plain , that we know many things that we cannot do : and , on the contrary , we can do many things , and know not how they are done . it may be the ingenious author would be hard put to it to tell us how he pronounces his own name ; that is , what organs of speech are moved , and how ; by what museles and nerves ; and what the whole action is that intervenes betwixt the inward thought and the outward sound ; or betwixt the first cause and the last effect . or , if he be so good an anatomist and philosopher as to understand all this , at least his little son , or little daughter , who can pronounce the same as well as himself , know not in what manner , or by what means they do it . so , fools and children can move their hands , fingers , and all the members of the body , as well as philosophers : though they do do not know , in what method , or by what mechanism , they are moved . these things are the effects of will , independently on knowledge . and 't is as plain , on the other hand , that we know how many things are to be done , which yet we cannot do , for want of strength or force . i can lift a weight of two or three hundred pounds , but i cannot lift one of five or six hundred ; though i understand as well how the one is moved as the other . and a brawny porter shall raise that of five or six hundred , though he understand staticks less than i do . i can bend a stick , but cannot bend a bar of iron : though i use just the same method , and understand as much how the one is done as the other . and innumerable instances of like nature shew , knowledge and force to be different things . but this , sir , i say only in your defence . your conclusion also agrees very well to my sense . and i think them exceedingly to blame , that presume to measure these infinite natures , and all their properties , by our narrow understandings . the anti-trinitarians generally are no great philosophers , yet they take upon them as if they were the only masters of reason : and in the most sublime and mysterious points , will scarce allow revelation to be of greater authority than their judgment . but however , on the other hand , ( though i never felt any inclination or temptation to socinian doctrines , yet ) i cannot heartily join with you in the damnatory sentences ; neither would i have us spin creeds , like cobwebs , out of our own bowels . in the name of god , let us be content with what is revealed to us in scripture concerning these mysteries ; and leave the rest to make part of our heaven , and future happiness . to strain things to these heights , makes still more divisions in the church . we that now have school-trinitarians , and scripture-trinitarians ; and either of them will have their plea , and pursue their interest ; till , by zeal for opinions which are disputable , we have destroyed christian charity and unity , which are indispensable vertues and duties . i am , sir , with sincerity and respect , london , sept. . . your obliged humble servant , w. i. if you know from whom it is , pray thank him from me for his civilities therein . and you may please to tell him , that he doth understand me aright , and puts a true sense upon my words : by personality , i mean that distinction ( whatever it be ) whereby the three are distinguished ; but , what that is , i do not pretend to determine . and if i should guess ( for it will be but guessing ) how it may be ; i should not be positive , that just so it is . ( upon the same account , that it is not thought prudent in a siege , to inlarge the line of defence too far . ) there is a distinction ( this we are sure of ) between the three : this distinction i call personality : and by this word i mean that distinction , whatever it be : but , what this distinction is ( or what degree of distinction ) i cannot well tell . if this be trifling , i cannot help it , ( nor , if they please to ridicule it : ) but , to me , it seems to be good sense . if others will venture to determine it more nicely than i have done ; they perhaps may understand it more distinctly than i pretend to do ; but will give me leave to be ignorant ( therein ) of what the scripture doth not tell me . of the damnatory sentences ( as he calls them ) i had said nothing . nor do i think , that the author of the athanasian creed did intend them in that rigour that some would put upon them . and , if it be well considered how there they stand , he will find them annexed ( at least so they seem to me ) only to some generals which he thought necessary , ( as , that we ought to hold the catholick faith , that the trinity in unity is to be worshiped ; that the son of god was incarnate ; ) not to every punctilio in his explications . which are but as a comment on these generals , how he thought they were to be understood , or might be explained . which explications i take to be true , and good ; but not within the purview of those clauses : and that a man may be saved ( even in the judgment of that author ) who doth not know , or doth not fully understand , some of them . his true meaning therein , seems to me to be but this ; that the doctrine therein delivered ( concerning the trinity , and the incarnation of christ , ) is the sound orthodox doctrine ; and such as ( for the substance of it ) ought to be believed by those who expect salvation by christ. certainly his meaning never was , that children , and idiots , and all who do not understand the school-terms , or perhaps have never heard them , should be therefore denied salvation . as to what he objects to me , that it cannot be said of any one dimension , that it is a cube , or a body ; whereas it is said of every person , that he is god : he might observe , that i had already obviated this objection . for though we cannot say ( in the abstract ) that length is a cube , ( and so of the rest ; ) yet ( in the concrete ) this long thing ( or this which is long ) is a cube ; and so , this which is broad , or this which is high , is a cube : iust so ; we do not say ( in the abstract ) that paternity is god ; but ( in the concrete ) the father is god ; ( and so of the other persons . ) the personality is not said to be god , but the person is . which fully answers that exception . what he cites of a learned author falls not within the compass of what i undertook to defend ; ( and that learned person will excuse me , if i do not pretend to understand all his notions ; and leave it to him to explain himself . ) but what i have endeavoured to defend , is as much ( i think ) as we need to maintain in this point . where that author calls it a mistake to think that knowledge and power ( in the same man ) are not the same thing : i suppose ( not having the book at hand ) he means no more but this ; that though they differ indeed ( to use the school-language ) ex parte rei , yet not ut res & res , but rather ut modus & modus ; that is , not as two things , but as two modes of the same thing . and if he should say the like of length , breadth , and thickness ; i would not contend about it : for , even so , it will serve my similitude well enough . if that of the three persons be more than so : it is then ( i think ) such a distinction as to which ( in our metaphysicks ) we have not yet given a name . but of this , i determine nothing ( because i would not spin the thread too fine : ) and content my self to say , it is that of the three personalities in one deity ; without determining , how great that is . and i may the rather be allowed thus to forbear ; because i find , even in matters of ordinary conversation ( such as those but now mention'd ) the school men are not well agreed , what things shall be said to differ ut res & res , and what only ex parte rei . much more therefore may i be allowed a like latitude of thought in the present case . i add no more but that i am yours , john wallis . soundess , sept. . . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e dr. sherlock . * i should rather say , to the executive faculty ; or , power of doing . a sermon concerning the unity of the divine nature and the b. trinity by john, lord archbishop of canterbury. tillotson, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing t estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : or : ) a sermon concerning the unity of the divine nature and the b. trinity by john, lord archbishop of canterbury. tillotson, john, - . [ ], p. printed for b. aylmer ..., and w. rogers ..., london : . marginal notes. this item can be found at reels : and : . reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. item at : incorrectly called t in umi wing reel guide. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng bible. -- n.t. -- timothy, st, ii, -- sermons. trinity -- early works to . sermons, english -- th century. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - olivia bottum text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a sermon concerning the unity of the divine nature and the b. trinity . by john lord archbishop of canterbury . london : printed for b. aylmer , at the three pigeons in cornhill : and w. rogers , at the sun over-against st. dunstan's church in fleetstreet . . a sermon concerning the unity of the divine nature , and the b. trinity , &c. tim . ii. . for there is one god. the particle for leads us to the consideration of the context and occasion of these words , which in short is this . the design of this epistle is to direct timothy , to whom st. paul had committed the government of the church of ephesus , how he ought to demean himself in that great and weighty charge . and at the beginning of this chapter he gives direction concerning publick prayers in the church ; that prayers and thanksgiving be made for all men , and for all ranks and orders of men ; especially for kings and all that are in authority , that under them christians might lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty . and this he tells us was very suitable to the christian religion , by which god designed the salvation of mankind ; and therefore it must needs be very acceptable to him that we should offer up prayers and thanksgivings to him in behalf of all men : for this , saith the apostle , is good and acceptable in the sight of god our saviour , who will have all men to be saved , and to come to the knowledge of the truth . and then it follows in the next words , for there is one god , and one mediator between god and men , the man christ jesus , who gave himself a ransome for all : as if he had said , this universal charity of christians , in praying for all men , must needs be very acceptable to him to whom we put up our prayers , god the father , who sent his son for the salvation of all men : and to him likewise by whom we offer up our prayers to god , and is among us christians the only mediator between god and men , in virtue of that price and ransome which he paid for the redemption of all mankind : i say , for this reason it must needs be very acceptable to him that we should pray for all men , because he dyed for all men , and now that he is in heaven at the right hand of god intercedes with him for the salvation of those for whom he dyed : there is one god , and one mediator between god and men , the man christ jesus , who gave himself a ransome for all . which words , though they be brought in to prove more immediately that it is acceptable to god our saviour , that we should put up prayers to him for all men , because he desires the salvation of all men , and hath sent his son to purchase the salvation of all men , by the sacrifice of himself ; and in virtue of that sacrifice to be the only mediator between god and us : i say , though this be the immediate scope and design of these words , yet they are likewise a direction to us , unto whom we ought to address our prayers , namely , to god ; and by whose mediation and intercession we ought to put up our prayers to god the father , namely , by his son jesus christ , who is constituted the only mediator between god and men. there are several propositions contained in this and the following verse ; but i shall at present confine my self to the first , namely , that there is one god , that is , but one , as st. paul elsewhere expresseth it , there is none other god but one. and moses lays this as the foundation of the natural law , as well as of the jewish religion , the lord he is one god , and there is none besides him , that is , besides jehovah , whom the people of israel did worship as the only true god. and this the prophet isaiah perpetually declares in opposition to the polytheism and variety of gods among the heathen . i am the first , and i am the last , and besides me there is no god. and again , is there any god besides me ? there is no god , i know not any : he , who hath an infinite knowledge and knows all things , knows no other god. and our b. saviour makes this the fundamental article of all religion , and the knowledge of it necessary to every man's salvation , this , says he , is life eternal , to know thee the only true god. the unity of the divine nature is a notion wherein the greatest and the wisest part of mankind did always agree , and therefore may reasonably be presumed to be either natural , or to have sprung from some original tradition delivered down to us from the first parents of mankind : i mean , that there is one supreme being , the author and cause of all things , whom the most ancient of the heathen poets commonly called the father of gods and men . and thus aristotle in his metaphysicks defines god , the eternal and most excellent , or best of all living beings . and this notion , of one supreme being , agrees very well with that exact harmony which appears in the frame and government of the world , in which we see all things conspiring to one end , and continuing in one uniform order and course ; which cannot reasonably be ascribed to any other but a constant and uniform cause ; and which to a considering man does plainly shew that all things are made and governed by that one powerful principle , and great and wise mind which we call god. but although the generality of mankind had a notion of one supreme god , yet the idolatry of the heathen plainly shews that this notion , in process of time , was greatly degenerated , and corrupted into an apprehension of a plurality of gods ; though in reason it is evident enough , that there can be no more gods than one ; and that one , who is of infinite perfection , is as sufficient to all purposes whatsoever , as ten thousand deities , if they were possible , could possibly be ; as i shall shew in the following discourse . now this multitude of deities , which the fond superstition and vain imagination of men had formed to themselves , were by the wiser sort , who being forced to comply with the follies of the people endeavoured to make the best of them , supposed to be either parts of the universe which the egyptians , as plutarch tells us , thought to be the same with god ; but then the more considerable parts of the universe they parcelled out into several deities ; and as the ocean hath several names , according to the several coasts and countries by which it passeth ; so they gave several names to this one deity according to the several parts of the world which several nations made the objects of their worship . or else , they adored the several perfections and powers of the one supreme god under several names and titles , with regard to the various blessings and benefits which they thought they received from them . thus the indian philosophers , the brachmans , are said to have worshipped the sun as the supreme deity ; and he certainly is the most worshipful of all sensible beings , and bids fairest for a deity ; especially if he was , as they supposed , animated by a spirit endued with knowledg and understanding . and if a man , who had been bred in a dark cave , should all on the sudden be brought out at noon-day to behold this visible world ; after he had viewed and consider'd it awhile , he would in all probability pitch upon the sun as the most likely , of all the things he had seen , to be a deity . for if such a man had any notion of a god , and were to chuse one upon sight , he would without dispute fix upon the sun , and fall down before him and worship him. and macrobius manageth this as his main plea for the idolatry of the heathen ; that under all the several names of their gods they worshipped the sun : and this diversity of names was but a more distinct conception and acknowledgment of the many blessings and advantages which mankind received from him , and a more particular and express adoration of the several powers and perfections which were in him. and this was the very best defence , and all the tolerable sense which the wisest among the heathen could make of the multitude of their deities . and yet whilst they generally owned one supreme being that was the principle and original of all things , they worshipped several subordinate deities as really distinct from one another . some of these they fancied to be superior to the rest and to have their residence in heaven ; by which marsilius ficinus supposes plato to mean no more but the chief of the angels . these were called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , dij superi and dij caelestes , superior and heavenly gods : the scripture terms them the host of heaven , meaning the sun , moon and stars , which they supposed to be animated , or at least to be inhabited by angels , or glorious spirits , whom they called gods. other of their deities were accounted much inferior to these , being supposed to be the souls of their deceased heroes ; who for their great and worthy deeds , when they lived upon earth , were supposed after death to be translated into the number of their gods. and these were called semidei and deastri , that is , half gods and a sort of gods : and as the other were celestial , so these were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a kind of terrestrial spirits that were presidents and procurators of human affairs here below , that is , a middle sort of divine powers that were mediators and agents between god and men , and did carry the prayers and supplications of men to god , and bring down the commands and blessings of god to men. but in the midst of all this crowd and confusion of deities , and the various superstitions about them , the wiser heathen , as thales , pythagoras , socrates , plato , aristotle , tully , plutarch and others , preserved a true notion of one supreme god , whom they defined an infinite spirit , pure from all matter and free from all imperfection : and all the variety of their worship was , as they pretended in excuse of it , but a more particular owning of the various representations of the divine power and excellencies which manifested themselves in the world , and of the several communications of blessings and favours by them imparted to men : nay , tertullian tells us , that even when idolatry had very much obscured the glory of the sovereign deity , yet the greater part of mankind did still in their common forms of speech appropriate the name of god in a more especial and peculiar manner to one , saying , if god grant , if god please , and the like . so that there is sufficient ground to believe that the unity of the divine nature , or the notion of one supreme god , creator and governor of the world , was the primitive and general belief of mankind : and that polytheism and idolatry were a corruption and degeneracy from the original notion which mankind had concerning god ; as the scripture-history doth declare and testify . and this account which i have given of the heathen idolatry doth by no means excuse it . for whatever may be said by way of extenuation in behalf of the wiser and more devout among them , the generality were grossly guilty both of believing more gods , and of worshipping false gods. and this must needs be a very great crime , since the scripture every where declares god to be particularly jealous in this case , and that he will not give his glory to another , nor his praise to graven images . nay , we may not so much as make use of sensible images to put us in mind of god , lest devout ignorance , seeing the worship which wise men paid towards an idol , should be drawn to terminate their worship there , as being the very deity itself ; which was certainly the case of the greatest part of the heathen world. and surely those christians are in no less danger of idolatry , who pay a veneration to images by kneeling down and praying before them ; and in this they are much more inexcusable , because they offend against a much clearer light ; and yet when they go about to justify this practice are able to bring no other nor better pleas for themselves than the heathen did for their worshiping of images , and for praying to their inferior deities , whom they looked upon as mediators between the gods in heaven and men upon earth . there is but one objection , that i know of , against the general consent of mankind concerning the unity of god ; and it is this , that there was an ancient doctrine of some of the most ancient nations , that there were two first causes or principles of all things ; the one the cause of all good , and the other of all the evil that is in the world : the reason whereof seems to have been , that they could not apprehend how things of so contrary a nature , as good and evil , could proceed from one and the same cause . and these two principles in several nations were called by several names . plutarch says that among the greeks the good principle was called god , and the evil principle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the devil . in conformity to which ancient tradition the manichees , a sect which called themselves christians , did advance two principles , the one infinitely good , which they supposed to be the original cause of all the good which is in the world ; the other infinitely evil , to which they ascribed all the evils that are in the world. but all this is very plainly a corruption of a much more ancient tradition concerning that old serpent the devil , the head of the fallen angels , who by tempting our first parents to transgress a positive and express law of god brought sin first into the world and all the evils consequent upon it ; of which the scripture gives us a most express and particular account . and as to the notion of a being infinitely evil , into which this tradition was corrupted , after idolatry had prevailed in the world , besides that it is a contradiction , it would likewise be to no purpose to assert two opposite principles of infinite , that is of equal force and power , for two infinites must of necessity be equal to one another ; because nothing can be more or greater than infinite , and therefore if two infinite beings were possible they would certainly be equal , and could not be otherwise . now that the notion of a principle infinitely evil is a contradiction will be very plain , if we consider that what is infinitely evil must in strict reasoning , and by necessary consequence , be infinitely imperfect ; and therefore infinitely weak , and for that reason , though never so malicious and mischievous , yet being infinitely weak and foolish , could never be in a capacity either to contrive mischief or to execute it . but if it should be admitted that a being infinitely mischievous could be infinitely knowing and powerful , yet it could effect no evil ; because the opposite principle of infinite goodness , being also infinitely wife and powerful , they would tye up one anothers hands . so that upon this supposition the notion of a deity must signify just nothing , because by virtue of the eternal opposition and equal conflict of these two principles they would keep one another at a perpetual baye ; and being just an equal match to one another , the one having as much mind and power to do good as the other to do evil , instead of being two deities they would be but two idols , able to do neither good nor evil . and having , i hope , now sufficiently cleared this objection , i shall proceed to shew how agreeable this principle , that there is but one god , is to the common reason of mankind , and to the clearest and most essential notions which we have of god : and this will appear these two ways . first , by considering the most essential perfections of the divine nature . secondly , from the repugnancy and impossibility , the great absurdity and inconvenience of supposing more gods than one. first , by considering the most essential perfections of the divine nature . absolute perfection which we ascribe to god , as the most essential notion which mankind hath always had concerning him , does necessarily suppose unity ; because this is essential to the notion of a being that is absolutely perfect , that all perfection meets and is united in such a being : but to imagine more gods , and some perfections to be in one and some in another , does destroy the most essential notion which men have of god , namely , that he is a being absolutely perfect , that is , as perfect as is possible : now to suppose some perfections in one god which are not in another , is to suppose some possible perfection to be wanting in god , which is a contradiction to the most natural and the most easie notion which all men have of god , that he is a being in whom all perfections do meet and are united : but if we suppose more gods , each of which hath all perfections united in him , then all but one would be superfluous and needless ; and therefore by just and necessary consequence not only may , but of necessity must be supposed not to be ; since necessary existence is essential to the deity ; and therefore if but one god be necessary , there can be no more . secondly , from the repugnancy and impossibility , the great absurdity and inconvenience of the contrary . for suppose there were more gods , two for example ; and if there may be two there may be a million , for we can stop no where : i say , suppose two gods ; either these two would be in all perfections equal and alike , or unequal and unlike : if equal and alike in all things then , as i said before , one of them would be needless and superfluous , and if one why not as well the other ? they being supposed to be in all things perfectly alike ; and then there would be no necessity at all of the being of a god ; and yet it is granted on all hands that necessary existence is essential to the notion of a god : but if they be unequal , that is , one of them inferior to and less perfect than the other , that which is inferior and less perfect could not be god , because he would not have all perfection . so that which way soever we turn the thing and look upon it , the notion of more gods than one is by its own repugnancy and self-contradiction destructive of it self . before i come to apply this doctrine of the unity of god , i must not pass by a very considerable difficulty , which will most certainly arise in every mans mind ; without taking particular notice of it , and endeavouring to remove it , if i can . and it is the doctrine of the b. trinity , or of three real differences or distinct persons in one and the same divine nature . and though this be not a difficulty peculiar only to the christian religion , as by the generality of those who urge this objection against christians hath been inconsiderately thought ; for it is certain , that long before christianity appeared in the world , there was a very ancient tradition , both among jews and heathen , concerning three real differences or distinctions in the divine nature , very nearly resembling the christian doctrine of the trinity , as i shall have occasion more fully to shew by and by : yet it cannot be denied , but that this difficulty doth in a more especial manner affect the christian religion ; the generality of christians , who do most firmly believe the trinity , believing likewise at the same time , more stedfastly if it be possible , that there is but one god. to us , saith st. paul , that is , to us christians , there is but one god. but how can this possibly consist with the common doctrine of christians concerning the trinity , god the father , son , and h. ghost , to each of whom they attribute , as they verily believe the scripture does , the most incommunicable properties and perfections of the divine nature ? and what is this less in effect than to say , that there are three gods ? for the clearing of this difficulty i shall , with all the brevity i can , offer these following considerations ; which i hope , to an impartial and unprejudiced judgment , will be sufficient to remove it , or at least to break the main force and strength of it . i. i desire it may be well considered , that there is a wide difference between the nice speculations of the schools , beyond what is revealed in scripture , concerning the doctrine of the trinity , and what the scripture only teaches and asserts concerning this mystery . for it is not to be denied but that the schoolmen , who abounded in wit and leisure , though very few among them had either exact skill in the h. scriptures , or in ecclesiastical antiquity and the writings of the ancient fathers of the christian church : i say , it cannot be denied but that these speculative and very acute men , who wrought a great part of their divinity out of their own brains as spiders do cobwebs out of their own bowels , have started a thousand subtleties about this mystery , such as no christian is bound to trouble his head withal ; much less is it necessary for him to understand those niceties which we may reasonably presume that they who talk of them did themselves never thoroughly understand ; and least of all is it necessary to believe them . the modesty of christians is contented in divine mysteries to know what god hath thought fit to reveal concerning them , and hath no curiosity to be wise above that which is written . it is enough to believe what god says concerning these matters ; and if any man will venture to say more , every other man surely is at his liberty to believe as he sees reason . ii. i desire it may in the next place be considered , that the doctrine of the trinity , even as it is asserted in scripture , is acknowledged by us to be still a great mystery , and so imperfectly revealed as to be in a great measure incomprehensible by human reason . and therefore though some learned and judicious men may have very commendably attempted a more particular explication of this great mystery by the strength of reason , yet i dare not pretend to that , knowing both the difficulty and danger of such an attempt , and mine own insufficiency for it . all that i ever designed upon this argument was to make out the credibility of the thing from the authority of the h. scriptures , without descending to a more particular explication of it than the scripture hath given us ; lest by endeavouring to lay the difficulties which are already started about it new ones should be raised , and such as may perhaps be much harder to be removed than those which we have now to grapple withal . and this i hope i have in some measure done in one of the former discourses . nor indeed do i see that it is any ways necessary to do more ; it being sufficient that god hath declared what he thought fit in this matter , and that we do firmly believe what he says concerning it to be true , though we do not perfectly comprehend the meaning of all that he hath said about it . for in this and the like cases i take an implicite faith to be very commendable , that is , to believe whatever we are sufficiently assured god hath revealed , though we do not fully understand his meaning in such a revelation . and thus every man who believes the h. scriptures to be a truly divine revelation does implicitely believe a great part of the prophetical books of scripture and several obscure expressions in those books , though he do not particularly understand the meaning of all the predictions and expressions contained in them . in like manner , there are certainly a great many very good christians who do not believe and comprehend the mysteries of faith nicely enough to approve themselves to a scholastical and magisterial judge of controversies , who yet if they do heartily embrace the doctrines which are clearly revealed in scripture and live up to the plain precepts of the christian religion , will i doubt not be very well approved by the great and just , and by the infallibly infallible judge of the world. iii. let it be further considered , that though neither the word trinity , nor perhaps person , in the sense in which it is used by divines when they treat of this mystery , be any where to be met with in scripture ; yet it cannot be denied but that three are there spoken of by the names of father , son , and h. ghost , in whose name every christian is baptized , and to each of whom the highest titles and properties of god are in scripture attributed : and these three are spoken of with as much distinction from one another as we use to speak of three several persons . so that though the word trinity be not found in scripture , yet these three are there expresly and frequently mentioned ; and trinity is nothing but three of any thing . and so likewise though the word person be not there expresly applied to father , son , and h. ghost ; yet it will be very hard to find a more convenient word whereby to express the distinction of these three ▪ for which reason i could never yet see any just cause to quarrel at this term . for since the h. spirit of god in scripture hath thought fit in speaking of these three to distinguish them from one another , as we use in common speech to distinguish three several persons , i cannot see any reason why , in the explication of this mystery which purely depends upon divine revelation , we should not speak of it in the same manner as the scripture doth : and though the word person is now become a term of art , i see no cause why we should decline it , so long as we mean by it neither more nor less than what the scripture says in other words . iv. it deserves further to be considered , that there hath been a very ancient tradition concerning three real differences or distinctions in the divine nature ; and these , as i said before , very nearly resembling the christian doctrine of the trinity . whence this tradition had its original is not easie upon good and certain grounds to say ; but certain it is that the jews anciently had this notion : and that they did distinguish the word of god , and the h. spirit of god , from him who was absolutely called god , and whom they looked upon as the first principle of all things ; as is plain from philo judaeus , and moses nachmanides , and others cited by the learned grotius in his incomparable book of the truth of the christian religion . and among the heathen , plato ; who probably enough might have this notion from the jews , did make three distinctions in the deity by the names of essential goodness , and mind , and spirit . so that whatever objections this matter may be liable to , it is not so peculiar a doctrine of the christian religion as many have imagined , though it is revealed by it with much more clearness and certainty : and consequently , neither the jews nor plato have any reason to object it to us christians ; especially since they pretend no other ground for it but either their own reason , or an ancient tradition from their fathers : whereas we christians do appeal to express divine revelation for what we believe in this matter , and do believe it singly upon that account . v. it is besides very considerable , that the scriptures do deliver this doctrine of the trinity without any manner of doubt or question concerning the unity of the divine nature : and not only so , but do most stedfastly and constantly assert that there is but one god : and in those very texts , in which these three differences are mentioned , the unity of the divine nature is expresly asserted ; and where st. john makes mention of the father , the word , and the spirit , the unity of these three is likewise affirmed , there are three that bear record in heaven , the father , the word , and the spirit ; and these three are one. vi. it is yet further considerable , that from this mystery , as delivered in scripture , a plurality of gods cannot be inferred without making the scripture grosly to contradict it self ; which i charitably suppose the socinians would be as loth to admit as we our selves are . and if either councils , or fathers , or schoolmen , have so explained this mystery as to give any just ground , or so much as a plausible colour for such an inference , let the blame fall where it is due , and let it not be charged on the h. scriptures ; but rather , as the apostle says in another case , let god be true , and every man a liar . viithly and lastly , i desire it may be considered , that it is not repugnant to reason to believe some things which are incomprehensible by our reason ; provided that we have sufficient ground and reason for the belief of them : especially if they be concerning god , who is in his nature incomprehensible ; and we be well assured that he hath revealed them . and therefore it ought not to offend us that these differences in the deity are incomprehensible by our finite understandings ; because the divine nature it self is so , and yet the belief of that is the foundation of all religion . there are a great many things in nature which we cannot comprehend how they either are , or can be : as the continuity of matter , that is , how the parts of it do hang so fast together that they are many times very hard to be parted ; and yet we are sure that it is so , because we see it every day . so likewise how the small seeds of things contain the whole form and nature of the things from which they proceed and into which by degrees they grow ; and yet we plainly see this every year . there are many things likewise in our selves , which no man is able in any measure to comprehend , as to the manner how they are done and performed : as the vital union of soul and body : who can imagine by what device or means a spirit comes to be so closely united and so firmly link'd to a material body , that they are not to be parted without great force and violence offer'd to nature ? the like may be said of the operations of our several faculties of sense and imagination , of memory and reason , and especially of the liberty of our wills : and yet we certainly find all these faculties in our selves , though we cannot either comprehend or explain the particular manner in which the several operations of them are performed . and if we cannot comprehend the manner of those operations which we plainly perceive and feel to be be in our selves , much less can we expect to comprehend things without us ; and least of all can we pretend to comprehend the infinite nature and perfections of god , and every thing belonging to him. for god himself is certainly the greatest mystery of all other , and acknowledged by mankind to be in his nature , and in the particular manner of his existence , incomprehensible by human understanding . and the reason of this is very evident , because god is infinite , and our knowledge and understanding is but finite ; and yet no sober man ever thought this a good reason to call the being of god in question . the same may be said of god's certain foreknowledge of future contingencies which depend upon the uncertain wills of free agents : it being utterly inconceivable how any understanding , how large and perfect soever , can certainly know beforehand that which depends upon the free will of another , which is an arbitrary and uncertain cause . and yet the scripture doth not only attribute this foreknowledg to god , but gives us also plain instances of gods foretelling such things , many ages before they happen'd , as could not come to pass but by the sins of men , in which we are sure that god can have no hand ; though nothing can happen without his permission : such was that most memorable event of the death of christ who , as the scripture tells us , was by wicked hands crucified and slain ; and yet even this is said to have happened according to the determinate foreknowledg of god , and was punctually foretold by him some hundreds of years before . nay , the scripture doth not only ascribe this power and perfection to the divine knowledge , but natural reason hath been forced to acknowledg it , as we may see in some of the wisest of the philosophers . and yet it would puzzle the greatest philosopher that ever was , to give any tolerable account how any knowledg whatsoever can certainly and infallibly foresee an event through uncertain and contingent causes . all the reasonable satisfaction that can be had in this matter is this , that it is not at all unreasonable to suppose that infinite knowledg may have ways of knowing things which our finite understandings can by no means comprehend how they can possibly be known . again , there is hardly any thing more inconceivable than how a thing should be of it self , and without any cause of its being ; and yet our reason compels us to acknowledge this : because we certainly see that something is , which must either have been of it self and without a cause , or else something that we do not see must have been of it self and have made all other things : and by this reasoning we are forced to acknowledg a deity , the mind of man being able to find no rest but in the acknowledgment of one eternal and wise mind as the principle and first cause of all other things ; and this principle is that which mankind do by general consent call god. so that god hath laid a sure foundation of our acknowledgment of his being in the reason of our own minds : and though it be one of the hardest things in the world to conceive how any thing can be of it self , yet necessity drives us to acknowledge it whether we will or no : and this being once granted , our reason , being tired in trying all other ways , will for its own quiet and ease force us at last to fall in with the general apprehension and belief of mankind concerning a deity . to give but one instance more ; there is the like difficulty in conceiving how any thing can be made out of nothing ; and yet our reason doth oblige us to believe it : because matter , which is a very imperfect being and merely passive , must either always have been of it self ; or else , by the infinite power of a most perfect and active being , must have been made out of nothing : which is much more credible , than that any thing so imperfect as matter is should be of it self : because that which is of it self cannot be conceived to have any bounds and limits of its being and perfection ; for by the same reason that it necessarily is and of it self , it must necessarily have all perfection , which it is certain matter hath not ; and yet necessary existence is so great a perfection , that we cannot reasonably suppose any thing that hath this perfection to want any other . thus you see , by these instances , that it is not repugnant to reason to believe a great many things to be , of the manner of whose existence we are not able to give a particular and distinct account . and much less is it repugnant to reason to believe those things concerning god which we are very well assured he hath declared concerning himself , though these things by our reason should be incomprehensible . and this is truly the case as to the matter now under debate : we are sufficiently assured that the scriptures are a divine revelation , and that this mystery of the trinity is therein declared to us . now that we cannot comprehend it , is no sufficient reason not to believe it : for if this were a good reason for not believing it , then no man ought to believe that there is a god , because his nature is most certainly incomprehensible . but we are assured by many arguments that there is a god ; and the same natural reason which assures us that he is , doth likewise assure us that he is incomprehensible ; and therefore our believing him to be so doth by no means overthrow our belief of his being . in like manner , we are assured by divine revelation of the truth of this doctrine of the trinity ; and being once assured of that , our not being able fully to comprehend it is not reason enough to stagger our belief of it . a man cannot deny what he sees , though the necessary consequence of admitting it may be something which he cannot comprehend . one cannot deny the frame of this world which he sees with his eyes , though from thence it will necessarily follow that either that or something else must be of it self ; which yet , as i said before , is a thing which no man can comprehend how it can be . and by the same reason a man must not deny what god says , to be true ; though he cannot comprehend many things which god says : as particularly concerning this mystery of the trinity . it ought then to satisfy us that there is sufficient evidence that this doctrine is delivered in scripture , and that what is there declared concerning it doth not imply a contradiction . for why should our finite understandings pretend to comprehend that which is infinite , or to know all the real differences that are consistent with the unity of an infinite being ; or to be able fully to explain this mystery by any similitude or resemblance taken from finite beings ? but before i leave this argument , i cannot but take notice of one thing which they of the church of rome are perpetually objecting to us upon this occasion . and it is this , that by the same reason that we believe the doctrine of the trinity , we may and must receive that of transubstantiation . god forbid : because of all the doctrines that ever were in any religion , this of transubstantiation is certainly the most abominably absurd . however , this objection plainly shews how fondly and obstinately they are addicted to their own errors , how mishapen and monstrous soever ; insomuch that rather than the dictates of their church , how absurd soever , should be called in question they will question the truth even of christianity it self ; and if we will not take in transubstantiation , and admit it to be a necessary article of the christian faith , they grow so sullen and desperate that they matter not what becomes of all the rest : and rather than not have their will of us in that what is controverted , they will give up that which by their own confession is an undoubted article of the christian faith and not controverted on either side ; except only by the socinians , who yet are hearty enemies to transubstantiation , and have exposed the absurdity of it with great advantage . but i shall endeavour to return a more particular answer to this objection ; and such a one as i hope will satisfy every considerate and unprejudiced mind , that after all this confidence and swaggering of theirs there is by no means equal reason either for the receiving or for the rejecting of these two doctrines of the trinity and transubstantiation . first , there is not equal reason for the belief of these two doctrines . this objection , if it be of any force , must suppose that there is equal evidence and proof from scripture for these two doctrines : but this we utterly deny , and with great reason ; because it is no more evident from the words of scripture that the sacramental bread is substantially changed into christ's natural body by virtue of those words , this is my body , than it is that christ is substantially changed into a natural vine by virtue of those words , i am the true vine ; or than that the rock in the wilderness , of which the israelites drank , was substantially changed into the person of christ , because it is expresly said , that rock was christ ; or than that the christian church is substantially changed into the natural body of christ , because it is in express terms said of the church , that it is his body . but besides this , several of their own most learned writers have freely acknowledged , that transubstantiation can neither be directly proved , nor necessarily concluded from scripture : but this the writers of the christian church did never acknowledge concerning the trinity , and the divinity of christ ; but have always appealed to the clear and undeniable testimonies of scripture for the proof of these doctrines . and then the whole force of the objection amounts to this , that if i am bound to believe what i am sure god says , though i cannot comprehend it ; then i am bound by the same reason to believe the greatest absurdity in the world , though i have no manner of assurance of any divine revelation concerning it . and if this be their meaning , though we understand not transubstantiation , yet we very well understand what they would have , but cannot grant it ; because there is not equal reason to believe two things , for one of which there is good proof , and for the other no proof at all . secondly , neither is there equal reason for the rejecting of these two doctrines . this the objection supposes , which yet cannot be supposed but upon one or both of these two grounds : either because these two doctrines are equally incomprehensible , or because they are equally loaded with absurdities and contradictions . the first is no good ground of rejecting any doctrine , merely because it is incomprehensible ; as i have abundantly shew'd already . but besides this , there is a wide difference between plain matters of sense , and mysteries concerning god ; and it does by no means follow that , if a man do once admit any thing concerning god which he cannot comprehend , he hath no reason afterwards to believe what he himself sees . this is a most unreasonable and destructive way of arguing , because it strikes at the foundation of all certainty , and sets every man at liberty to deny the most plain and evident truths of christianity , if he may not be humor'd in having the absurdest things in the world admitted for true . the next step will be to persuade us that we may as well deny the being of god because his nature is incomprehensible by our reason , as deny transubstantiation because it evidently contradicts our senses . dly . nor are these two doctrines loaded with the like absurdities and contradictions : so far from this , that the doctrine of the trinity , as it is delivered in the scriptures , and hath already been explained , hath no absurdity or contradiction either involved in it , or necessarily consequent upon it : but the doctrine of transubstantiation is big with all imaginable absurdity and contradiction . and their own schoolmen have sufficiently exposed it ; especially scotus , and he designed to do so , as any man that attentively reads him may plainly discover : for in his disputation about it he treats this doctrine with the greatest contempt , as a new invention of the council of lateran under pope innocent iii. to the decree of which council concerning it he seems to pay a formal submission , but really derides it as contrary to the common sense and reason of mankind , and not at all supported by scripture ; as any one may easily discern that will carefully consider his manner of handling it and the result of his whole disputation about it . and now suppose there were some appearance of absurdity and contradiction in the doctrine of the trinity as it is delivered in scripture , must we therefore believe a doctrine which is not at all revealed in scripture , and which hath certainly in it all the absurdities in the world , and all the contradictions to sense and reason ; and which once admitted , doth at once destroy all certainty . yes , say they , why not ? since we of the church of rome are satisfied that this doctrine is revealed in scripture ; or , if it be not , is defined by the church , which is every whit as good . but is this equal , to demand of us the belief of a thing which hath always been controverted , not only between us and them , but even among themselves , at least till the council of trent ? and this upon such unreasonable terms , that we must either yield this point to them or else renounce a doctrine agreed on both sides to be revealed in scripture . to shew the unreasonableness of this proceeding , let us suppose a priest of the church of rome pressing a jew or turk to the belief of transubstantiation , and because one kindness deserves another , the jew or turk should demand of him the belief of all the fables in the talmud , or in the alchoran ; since none of these , nor indeed all of them together , are near so absurd as transubstantiation : would not this be much more reasonable and equal than what they demand of us ? since no absurdity , how monstrous and big soever , can be thought of , which may not enter into an understanding in which a breach hath been already made wide enough to admit transubstantiation . the priests of baal did not half so much deserve to be exposed by the prophet for their superstition and folly , as the priests of the church of rome do for this sensless and stupid doctrine of theirs with a hard name . i shall only add this one thing more , that if this doctrine were possible to be true , and clearly prov'd to be so ; yet it would be evidently useless and to no purpose . for it pretends to change the substance of one thing into the substance of another thing that is already and before this change is pretended to be made . but to what purpose ? not to make the body of christ , for that was already in being ; and the substance of the bread is lost , nothing of it remaineth but the accidents which are good for nothing , and indeed are nothing when the substance is destroy'd and gone . all that now remains is to make some practical inferences from this doctrine of the unity of the divine nature . and they shall be the same which god himself makes by moses , which text also is cited by our saviour , hear , o israel , the lord thy god is one lord ; and thou shalt love the lord thy god with all thine heart , and with all thy soul , and with all thy mind , and with all thy strength : and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self . so that according to our saviour the whole duty of man , the love of god and of our neighbour is founded in the unity of the divine nature . i. the love of god ; the lord thy god is one lord , therefore thou shalt love him with all thy heart , &c. this is the first and great commandment : and it comprehends in it all the duties of the first table as naturally flowing from it . as that we should serve him only , and pay no religious worship to any but to him. for to pay religious worship to any thing is to make it a god and to acknowledge it for such : and therefore god being but one we can give religious worship to none but to him only . and among all the parts of religious worship none is more peculiarly appropriated to the deity than solemn invocation and prayer . for he to whom men address their requests , at all times , and in all places , must be supposed to be always every where present , to understand all our desires and wants , and to be able to supply them ; and this god only is , and can do . so likewise from the unity of the divine nature may be inferr'd , that we should not worship god by any sensible image or representation : because god being a singular being there is nothing like him , or that can without injuring and debasing his most spiritual and perfect and immense being be compared to him : as he himself speaks in the prophet , to whom will ye liken me , saith the lord , and make me equal ? and therefore with no distinction whatsoever can it be lawful to give religious worship , or any part of it , to any but god : we can pray to none but to him , because he only is every where present , and only knows the hearts of all the children of men ; which solomon gives as the reason why we should address our supplications to god only , who dwelleth in the heavens . so that the reason of these two precepts is founded in the unity and singularity of the divine nature , and unless there be more gods than one , we must worship him only , and pray to none but him : because we can give invocation to none but to him only whom we believe to be god ; as st. paul reasons , how shall they call on him in whom they have not believed ? ii. the love likewise of our neighbour is founded in the unity of the divine nature , and may be inferr'd from it : hear , o israel , the lord thy god is one lord , therefore thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self . and the apostle gives this reason why christians should be at unity among themselves ; there is one god and father of all , and therefore we should keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace , that is , live in mutual love and peace . the prophet likewise assigns this reason why all mankind should be upon good terms with one another , and not be injurious one to another , have we not all one father ? hath not one god created us ? why do we then deal treacherously every man against his brother . and therefore when we see such hatred and enmity among men , such divisions and animosities among christians , we may not only ask st. paul's question , is christ divided ? that we cannot agree about serving him ; either all to serve him in one way , or to bear with one another in our differences : i say we may not only ask st. paul's question , is christ divided ? but may ask further , is god divided ? is there not one god , and are we not all his offspring ? are we not all the sons of adam , who was the son of god ? so that if we trace our selves to our original , we shall find a great nearness and equality among men : and this equality that we are all gods creatures and image , and that the one only god is the father of us all , is a more real ground of mutual love , and peace , and equity in our dealings one with another , than any of those petty differences and distinctions of strong and weak , of rich and poor , of wise and foolish , of base and honourable , can be to encourage men to any thing of insolence , injustice , and inequality of dealing one towards another . because that wherein we all agree , that we are the creatures and children of god and have all one common father , is essential and constant ; but those things wherein we differ are accidental and mutable , and happen to one another by turns . thus much may suffice to have spoken concerning the first proposition in the text , there is one god : to him , father , son , and h. ghost be all honour and glory , dominion and power , now and for ever . amen . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e cor. . . deut. . . isai. . . v. . adversus marcionem , l. . c. . cor. . . serm. ii. l. . joh. . . eph. . . deut. . . mark ▪ . , , . isai. . . kings . . rom. . . eph. . . mal. . . a short history of valentinus gentilis, the tritheist tryed, condemned, and put to death by the protestant reformed city and church of bern in switzerland, for asserting the three divine persons of the trinity, to be [three distinct, eternal spirits, &c.] / wrote in latin, by benedictus aretius, a divine of that church, and now translated into english for the use of dr. sherlock ... valentini gentilis justo capitis supplicio affecti brevis historia. english aretius, benedictus, d. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a short history of valentinus gentilis, the tritheist tryed, condemned, and put to death by the protestant reformed city and church of bern in switzerland, for asserting the three divine persons of the trinity, to be [three distinct, eternal spirits, &c.] / wrote in latin, by benedictus aretius, a divine of that church, and now translated into english for the use of dr. sherlock ... valentini gentilis justo capitis supplicio affecti brevis historia. english aretius, benedictus, d. . south, robert, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed, and sold by e. whitlock ..., london : . reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. translated by robert south? cf. brit. mus. general catalogue. "the contents of the chapters" (i.e. summary of contents): p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng gentilis, valentinus, d. . trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - olivia bottum text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a short history of valentinus gentilis the tritheist . tryed , condemned , and put to death by the protestant reformed city and church of bern in switzerland , for asserting the three divine persons of the trinity , to be [ three distinct , eternal spirits , &c. ] wrote in latin , by benedictus aretius , a divine of that church ; and now translated into english for the use of dr. sherlock . humbly tendred to the consideration of the arch-bishops and bishops of this church and kingdom . london , printed , and sold by e. whitlock , near stationers-hall , . to the most reverend the archbishops , and the right reverend the bishops of the church of england . my lords , i here present your lordships with a short account of the proceedings of an eminent protestant reformed church and state , against a noted tritheist , for asserting three eternal spirits in the blessed trinity ; induced thereto by the late fatal growth of tritheism in our church ; first vented and asserted in the same and yet higher terms by dr. sherlock , in his pretended vindication of the doctrine of the ever blessed trinity , in the year . and since that by one j. b. minister of folkstone in kent , and styling himself , a presbyter of the church of england ( to the extream disgrace of it ) , in a book written in defence of the said dr. sherlock , and his tritheistick notions upon the same article , in the year . and since that also openly preached in the very face of the whole university of oxon , by one mr. joseph bingham , then a fellow of university-colledge there , on the th of october , in . and lastly , maintained , and with great and even foaming vehemence , preached up in one of the most eminent cathedrals in england , by one of the prebendaries of the same , first on the th , nov. . and since that on the th of january . whose name , together with the heterodoxyes then and there delivered by him , are ready to be produc'd , as there shall be occasion . so that your lordships can need nothing further , either to alarm or convince you , that the enemy has been sowing his tares amongst us , while you see them so plentifully coming up even under your eyes . as for dr. sherlock , he has over and over declared , and lately again renewed * the same declaration , viz. that the three divine persons are three distinct infinite eternal minds or spirits ; and that it is heresie and nonsence to judge otherwise ; ( for he , it seems , may take upon him to declare heresie without a reprimand . ) and as for presbyter i. b. of folkstone , he asserts the very same in print . and not only so , but likewise , to the flagrant scandal of our church , * professedly owns and prefers genebrard 's tritheistick doctrine of the blessed trinity , as better and more orthodox than that of calvin and his followers , whom he charges with denying the nicene faith , as to that part of it [ god of god ] ; which yet bellarmine himself ( as much as he hated calvin ) vindicates him from , in his d book de christo , and . chap. to whom we may further add beza , brentius and zanchius , with several other eminent divines of the reformation , all of them , with the utmost calumny reviled and condemned by this genebrard ; while on the other side he positively * vouches the horrid opinions of gentilis for sound and catholick : and besides all this , at one stroke charges all the reformed churches , both of france and germany , sometimes with sabellianism , and sometimes with arianism , as the reader will perceive by the quotations here tendred him on the * side . this genebrard , i say , is the person followed and defended by dr. sherlock's defender , j. b. and that as to his doctrine of the trinity ; as may be more particularly and fully declared in another place . but in the mean time , how these encomium's , bestowed by a presbyter of the church of england , upon such a furious tritheistick papist ( in so foul a manner , traducing the doctrine of most of the protestant divines and churchis , about the blessed trinity , ) will sound in the ears of the reformed churches abroad ( whom we have been so long professing to court ) is left to the bishops of this reformed church to judge : for some indeed have shewn themselves very zealous to quit a great part of our ecclesiastical constitution , in order to our union with those churches beyond sea ; ( tho i confess i could never yet hear , that those churches alledged the rites and ceremonies of our church as any bar to their communion with it . ) but howsoever they do , or may stand affected to us , i dare undertake , that our quitting all the ceremonies hitherto enjoyned and received amongst us ( as ancient , decent , and inoffensive , as they certainly are ) will not be half so powerful to draw them to us , as the asserting three distinct infinite , eternal minds or spirits in the blessed trinity ( or countenancing those who assert them ) will be effectual to make them abhor , loath , and fly from our communion . and when they are once gotten to such a distance from us , i fear we shall hardly get them back again , but by quitting our church-livings and preferments to them , and then we shall be throughly reformed indeed . that tritheism therefore is in a thriving condition amongst us , cannot be denied , nor so much as questioned . and the causes of it are manifestly these two : first , the great and advantagious station held by that person in the church , who first broached it here : and secondly , the connivence which has ever since attended him in the assertion of it . the first of which has created him several dependencies amongst some poor empty retainers , acted . by hope and hunger ( as hunger and emptiness generally go together ; ) who to serve their interest by his favour , easily turn proselytes to his opinions ; it being not imaginable that they should open their mouths so wide for him , but to have them fill'd by him . but such mischiefs must always be expected from heterodoxy in high place ; which is never so formidable for what it holds , as for what it has to give . for this still made the pope an over-match for a council , and may at any time give an overgrown heretick the vantage ground of truth . tho miserable , no doubt , must the state of that church needs be , where men shall wear her favours , so much to the prejudice of her faith. as for the other reason of the fatal spreading of this poyson , viz. the connivence and encouragement attending the person who first vented it ; i shall not stick to affirm , that he who asserts any thing contrary to the received doctrine of the church , ( how much soever he may be favoured or abetted , dignified or distinguished ) is a scandal to the gown he wears , and an insufferable reproach to the church he wears it in . i very well know , that the judicial proceedings of the church and senate of bern against that wretehed thitheist gentilis , are no rule for us to proceed by , who have laws of our own , which allow of no such severity ( as i am far from desiring that they should . ) nevertheless , tho they are not a rule for us to proceed by , they may very well be a rule for us to judg by , so far at least , as to conclude , that what upon the maturest deliberation , was accounted capital in one reformed church ( and that a very great one too ) cannot without scandal continue uncensured and unrebuked in another ; which yet this detestable tritheism has done for several years ; and not only so , but the publisher and assertor of it , has been hitherto so far from any thing like censure , or rebuke , that he has been advanced , countenanced and abetted to the utmost : and some talk of no less matters than his being mounted shortly to the episcopal chair and dignity ; tho some again think that it would be a very odd sight , in a christian church , to see a tritheist in a bishoprick , and holding his tritheism with it in commendam ; for let this happen when it will , i dare undertake that the promotion of the man will be the degradation of the office. however , this is certain , that the wounds which this man has given this poor church , are deep and dangerous , and have been kept bleeding so long , that now they begin to fester and threaten some further mischief ; and it is too late to dally any longer with the cure. for , my lords , your lordships cannot but know that tritheism is worse , and more reproachful to christianity , not only than sabellianism , but even than socinianism it self , as being contrary to all natural , as well as revealed religion , by destroying the grand , leading and fundamental article of both , viz. the unity of the godhead ; which socinianism ( how much soever it impugns and denies the revealed article of three distinct persons in the godhead ) does not encroach upon . and yet in a further degree is it worse than arianism ; for tho arianism denies the essential deity of the son , making him only a glorious deified creature , or the first-born of the creation , yet it still preserves the unity of the divine essence entire and unmultiplied ; which the assertion of three distinct infinite , eternal minds or spirits unavoidably multiplies , and by consequence destroys . whereas the unity of the godhead is the very foundation and corner stone of all true religion , and as essential an article of the christian faith , as that of a trinity of persons it self ; both of them together making up that great depositum , which god has committed to us to keep inviolably , and to defend resolutely ( and in a word ) to save , as well as to be saved by . and therefore . my lords i shall recommend this important matter to your lordships , much in those words of mordecai to esther . who knows but that you are come to such high place , power and dignity in our church for such a time as this ? and that god is now trying whether you will make good the zeal you have so often professed for our religion heretofore , by doing something signal , great , and worthy of those professions now . in a word , i look upon your lordships as persons of that sincerity and clearness of principle , that if you believed this doctrine of three distinct , infinite , eternal minds , spirits and substances in the ever blessed trinity , to be true , you would boldly and openly profess it , which since you do not , why should not so scandalous a corruption of our faith , receive a check by some mark of your lordships disapprobation ? hitherto i am sure there has been a profound silence in this matter ; and i heartily wish , the enemies of our religion may not pass that nicking reflexion upon it , tacent , satis laudant . for in good earnest it is very hard that heresy should over-run a church , only because we must not call it heresie . but this is not the worst of our case neither . for a certain socinian writer ( by a spirit of prophecy coming upon him from some above ) * positively tells the nominal trinitarians ( as he calls those who assert a trinity of divine persons , in opposition to that of three distinct , infinite minds , spirits , or substances ) that it will not be long before they be told by their superiors in the church , that it will concern them to be quiet ( that is , i suppose , to write against dr. sherlock and his tribe no more ) lest they themselves be censured as sabellians . now this , upon my word , is very home , and sounds dreadfully indeed ; and having been written about the middle of august last , le ts us into a farther understanding of the late letter sent to the vice-chancellor of oxon , and shews , that there were reprimands preparing for us long before that scandalous sermon was preached there , and consequently before the oxford censure could be thought of . and now if this be really so , is not our church , think we , in a blessed condition ? viz. that first , the assertors of its received doctrine are to be censured ; next , that they are to be censured by their superiors in and of the same church . and thirdly , that they are to be censured as sabellian hereticks . and lastly , that the socinians must be made privy to this design , while our clergy knows nothing of it . what a dismal aspect , i say , must all this needs have upon our church and clergy ? but as for the charge of sabellianism , which we are here threatned with , i hope it will be proved against us , before we are censured for it ; and then we desire no greater security against such a censure . for does not sabellius hold only one single subsistence in the godhead , and no more ? and can those then be sabellians who hold three distinct subsistences in the same ? and does not sabellius allow only a trinity of names , as of father , son and holy ghost , and that founded in a trinity of offices , as that the father is the creator of all things ; the son the redeemer of mankind ; and the holy ghost , the sanctifier of the church ? the assumption of which names and offices having been a free effect of god's will , might by consequence ( had god so pleased ) never have been at all ; since nothing in the divine nature could make it necessary . but what is this to us , who maintain three such subsistences in the divine nature , as are eternal , necessary and inseparable ( even by the divine power it self ) both from the said nature , and from one another . i protest i cannot tell whether there be more malice or ignorance in such a charge ( as often as some have the face to make it . ) but such is the nature of malice , that while it opens mens mouths , it commonly shuts their eyes . in the mean time i would have this pert , medling socinian know , that the assertors of a trinity of persons against three distinct , infinite minds or spirits are neither grown so hoarse with appealing to universities and bishops , nor yet so weary and ashamed of so doing , but that in case such a censure should pass upon them from those superiors he speaks of , they would have the courage to appeal still ; not indeed to them , but from them , and that to the whole nation , and to all the protestant churches and universities in christendom . but , if what this socinian has so boldly and positively said and printed of them , be false ( as for their own sakes i trust it is ) i hope these superiors will consider what may be the consequence of sitting down tamely under such a slander . however , let matters go as they will , the assertion of three divine persons , in contradiction to three distinct , infinite , eternal minds , spirits or substances in the ever blessed trinity , is certainly the cause of god , and he will not desert it , though others should . the university of oxford has appear'd very considerably in this matter already , and would have appeared yet further , and done much more had she not been hindred from doing what she was ready and desirous to do ; there being nothing which that great and learned body so ardently wished , and pressed for , as a liberty to have declared it self authoritatively against those scandalous propositions in full convocation . but if , in the mean time , there is any failure or defect ( as some contend there is ) in the late censure so worthily passed upon the forementioned propositions , by that venerable meeting of the vice-chancellor , the bp. of the diocess , and other heads of colleges and halls there , it is to be hoped , that your lordships , to whom the care of our religion more immediately and peculiarly belongs , will vouchsafe to supply the said defect by the greater authority of your episcopal censure : for if so gross a piece of paganism as that which holds [ three distinct infinite eternal minds or spirits in the godhead ] , having been first vented by one in so considerable a place and dignity in our church , and to this very day persisted in , and moreover defended ( to his poor utmost ) by one calling himself a presbyter of the church of england ; and after that preached publickly before one of our universities ; and lastly , maintained from the pulpit in one of our greatest cathedrals twice , shall continue uncensured and uncontrouled by the governours of our church ; a● 〈◊〉 upon these terms , will be apt to look 〈◊〉 ecclesiastical authority as serving 〈◊〉 else but to upbraid the non-ex●… 〈◊〉 it is further referred to your lordships , seriously to consider , how foreign churches ( which will certainly hear of it , ) will resent it ; and how reproachfully it will reflect upon our own ; which i account a church as well reform'd as the best of them ; and that without the help of a further reformation . may god direct and assist your lordships counsels and proceedings in so near and arduous a concern of our opposed religion . for the eyes of the world are upon you , and their ears open to hear what you will do . and as all who wish your lordships and the church well , hope that you will acquit your selves in so weighty an affair , sutably to your high character and post in the church , so their next satisfaction will be , that your lordships have had this matter humbly , fairly and dutifully laid before you , whether your lordships shall think fit to do anything in it or no. so begging your lordshipp's paternal blessing , i am , my lords , your lordshipp's most humble , and obedient servant , n. n. advertisement , concerning the publication of the following history . i have here presented the reader with this history , just as i find it published by aretius , though i am not ignorant , that several parts and passages of it will seem foreign to the purpose , i produee it for . however , i thought it more adviseable to lay it before the reader intire and unaltered ; as the likeliest way to render it the less liable to exception , which any abbreviatures , or decurtations might probably subject it to ; especially with some sort of readers , who will be but too ready to take occasion to cavil where the least pretence or shadow for it can be laid hold of . i am not here concerned to make an exact parallel between the heresie of valentinus gentilis , and the opinion of dr. sherlock , as to all the particularities and circumstantials of each ; it being enough for my purpose , that they agree , and are the same , as to the main of both ; ( viz. ) the assertion of three eternal spirits in the blessed trinity : but my chief design is to shew the noble concern of a protestant city and senate in vindicating so high an article as that of the trinity against this heretical tritheistical innovation upon it . and accordingly i have given the reader not the entire history only , but also the epistle prefixed to it , and dedicatory of it to the lords of the senate , that so it may appear to all , that it was not written and published at the sole will and pleasure of a private man , but by the order and authority of the governors of the place , thereby owning and avowing their proceedings against this heretick , to the whole world : and i cannot but , in honour to them , wish that all christian governours and governments would shew the same magnanimous zeal and courage in the defence of their faith ; though i confess , i wish not , that they should do the same way . a brief account of valentinus gentilis : containing some passages of his life and just execution . together with an orthodox defence of the article of the holy trinity against his blasphemies . to the most honourable and noble lords , nicholas à diessbach , nicholas a graffenried treasurer : and petermannus ab erlach , most worthy senators of the republick of bern , and his most honoured lords and patrons , health through iesus christ. to discourse modestly of god , and matters relating to him , is no small part of religion . for since the nature of god is incomprehensible , his power infinite , and his name inexpressible , no thought can comprehend his infinite power , no eye approach so glorious a light , no tongue can declare it : and for this reason the more sound philosophers have been very sparing in their discourses upon this subject . plato is commended for his modesty in this case ; who , tho' he is not afraid to stile god , the creator of the world , a lover of mankind , and the provident curator of all things , ( forasmuch as he is a most wise being , and doth not slight and despise the work of his own wisdom ; ) yet notwithstanding all this confesseth , that the eyes of men are too weak , to see through matters of divinity . aristotle was satisfied with placing some one first mover in the heavens . but he dares not say one word about the nature of god. others thought fit wholly to omit this question . the judgment of simonides on the case is commonly known ; who being ask't by hiero about the nature of god , prolong'd the time a good while , by requesting more days for deliberation , and at last return'd this answer , the more i think on 't , the less i understand of it . after such a manner did the excellency of this divine nature exercise and tire the liveliest wits without the church , that they were at last forc'd to acknowledge the inscrutability of the majesty thereof : and on the other side they perceiv'd such a blindness and decay of strength in human nature , as rendred it utterly incapable of raising it self to such a degree of purity without a peculiar dispensation from above . and tho' within the church this doctrine of god has always remain'd more uncorrupted and perspicuous ; yet nevertheless the most religious have thought it a great piece of wisdom , to confess their own weakness in this affair ; and have therefore been contented with those discoveries , god has been pleas'd to make of himself , and have desisted from any farther search into this sublime mystery . hence in the invocation of him this phrase is made use of ; god of abraham , god of isaac , god of jacob , god of our fathers , &c. and when iacob made too curious an enquiry after the angel's name , he was repell'd by the rays of the divine majesty , and reprimanded by a voice ; wherefore is it , that thou askest after my name ? moses also upon his asking after the name of god , who sent him to the children of israel , received only this answer , i am that i am ; and say , i am hath sent me unto you . we ought therefore in this business also to take notice of the apostle's advice , not to think , above what we ought to think , but to think soberly . for it 's most certain , when we cast our thoughts on things relating to god , our understanding sees as little , if not less , than the owl at noon-day . but since there is a necessity still of man's being instructed concerning god , and this instruction is to be receiv'd from the church alone , 't is the best way to keep strictly to one form of speaking , drawn from the prophetical and evangelical writings ; because the church has taken these from god's own mouth ; whence the apostle calls the scripture 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or inspired . and this the church kept pure and undefiled , till a parcel of ambitious men rose up , who laying no restraint on their wild fancies , made a very ill use of the simplicity of the scripture , and began to affix new interpretations to texts . to keep these fellows within their bounds , and to shew that their opinions were contrary to scripture , 't was necessary , that better men should limit the sense of things in other words . wherefore since . words were to be interpreted by words , and phrases by other forms of speech , they referr'd themselves and their writings to the scriptures . forasmuch as no one can speak better of god , than god doth of himself . and therefore , when we are to speak of him , it 's our duty to consult him first speaking of himself . moreover as it 's impious to deny the use of scripture-forms of speaking ; so it 's downright malice to condemn those that are commonly receiv'd , so long as reason proves not , that they maintain any thing against scripture . in ecclesiastical histories and acts of synods there are abundance of examples ( were they pertinent to be mention'd here ) of this nature . our age has seen one in valentinus gentilis ; who , that he might destroy the unity of the divine essence , in his explication of the three persons , quarrell'd first with the receiv'd terms , such as are the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the persons . for as long as they were made use of , he saw 't was impossible to maintain three spirits distinct in essence and degree . this small treatise shews the unanimous determination of the church concerning this doctrine , together with the rise of that corruption . my lords , i present this history to your lordships , because you presided at the tryal ; and it was to your grief that you heard this corruption of the true doctrine was brought into the church : and since the account might prove useful to the world , 't was not fit it should be made publick so much upon my private will , as your lordship 's publick commands . the lord jesus christ govern you by his good spirit , that you may lead long and happy lives in these honourable stations , to the defence of the orthodox doctrine , and the interest of your country . amen . m. d. lxvii . cal. junii . my lords , your lordships most humble servant , b. aretius . the contents of the chapters . chap . how and where valentinus gentilis fell into those new opinions , and what great mischief he did by spreading of them . chap. . upon what account he was brought to bern. chap. . concerning his writings , and the heads of his accusation . chap. . whether he ought to have been heard as plaintif . chap. . containing some propositions taken out of his books of the trinity , which we judge to be false . chap. . an account of his errors , about the article of the blessed trinity . chap. . of these words , trinitas , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and what they do properly signifie . chap. . what was the opinion of arius , and wherein gentilis and he do agree . chap. . concerning the generation of the son of god , and how we ought to understand the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . chap. . whether or no it be proper to the father to be call'd the one only god. chap. . the iudgment and consent of scripture , with respect to this article . chap. . gentilis's censure of the fathers and their writings . chap. . the iudgment of justin , martyr , and philosopher . chap. . the iudgment of st. ignatius . chap. . the iudgment of tertullian . chap. . concerning the fathers , especially st. austin . chap. . concerning the communication of attributes , or properties . chap. . containing some of gentilis's notorious blasphemies . chap. . of the vile scandals he hath falsly thrown upon the doctrine of our church . chap. . of the cheats and impostures whereby he indeavor'd to impose upon good ( well-meaning ) people . a brief account of valentinus gentilis , &c. chap. i. how , and where he fell into those new opinions , and what great mischief he did by spreading of them . valentinus gentilis , a campanian , having lest his native countrey cosentia , travell'd through naples , sicily , and italy , and at last arriv'd at geneva . there were at that time in the italian church [ of that city ] several persons out of all parts of italy , who came thither upon very different accounts ; but were mostly such , as being banish'd out of their own country for the sake of religion , had made this their place of refuge . amongst them were several 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , inventers of new doctrines . such was g. blandrata a physician , who had newly began to attack the doctrine of the trinity ; but as yet all he did was in private only , and by way of letters to some familiar acquaintance . the dispute was concerning the commonly received terms , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , trinitas , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. at the same time m. gribaldus an eminent lawyer , and paulus alciatus a milanese were engag'd in carrying on the same design . gentilis was no sooner come to town , and heard of the controversie , but he wholly applied himself to the study of it . and in a short time he and his friends became so great proficients in it , as boldly to assert , that the reform'd churches were still agreed with the papists in that abominable and grievous error , of subscribing to the article of the trinity : for by that doctrine of theirs , they as well as the papists , did not defend a trinity , but rather a quaternity . that a true trinity ought to consist of three eternal distinct spirits , differing from each other essentially rather than personally . this was what these innovators did then unanimously profess ; but falling afterwards into different factions , they ran into several contradictory and extravagant opinions : and being call'd to account for their doctrines at geneva , they all made a shift some way or other to get off ; by what particular means , i shall not now concern my self ; my chief design being to give a brief account of gentilis only . who though he had undertaken to defend the same opinions with blandrata , gribaldus , and alciatus , yet shortly after made his recantation , and by an exemplary pennance , publickly abjur'd his novel doctrines . this happen'd in the year ; to testifie the truth of which there is extant a narrative of the whole proceedings . but having thus solemnly renounc'd his own opinions more for fear of death , than out of any real sense of their impiety , and still retaining a strong desire , of defending them , it was not long , e're despising the sacred obligations of his oath , and committing the most horrid perjury , he fled from geneva . near which place was the town of fargiae , where m. gribaldus lived , with whom he associated himself : and in the same place was alciatus , and with him a certain schoolmaster , and tutor to gribaldus's children ; amongst whom ( after the coming of gentilis ) there were frequent conferences and disputes about the same controversies ; by all which gentilis was mightily confirm'd in his notions : and so leaving them , he went to lyons , where he was furnish'd with plenty of books by one baptista lucensis , and there made collections out of the fathers in order to confirm and establish his new opinions . and seeing both the latin and greek fathers were universally quoted by the orthodox , he made it his business to consult the most ancient of them . but the collections he made , were only some miserable , imperfect , broken quotations out of ignatius's epistles , iustin martyr , and tertullian ; nay , so impudent was he , as to ransack the alcoran for authorities , and quote even mahomet himself . and then he very roundly condemn'd and exploded all the rest of the fathers , such as st. austin , st. ierome , st. basil , chrysostome , damascene , and whoever else had plainly express'd their thoughts concerning the trinity in a different way from him . nay , he wholly rejected some books in iustin martyr and tertullian , and question'd the authority of others . and because so grand an affair could not be successfully manag'd without writing , he set himself upon that also ; and in a short time wrote a book , entituled his antidotes , wherein he endeavour'd to vindicate himself against his adversaries of geneva , and to answer the objections , which the ministers of the italian congregation there , had produc'd against his opinions . the book , which he made was not publish'd , but was found lying by him in mss. being now furnish'd with new arguments and reasons , he went to grenoble , where his dear friend gribaldus was then publick professor . and besides all this he was now fall'n into a distemper , which forc'd the needy gentleman to seek out for a place , where he might be kindly receiv'd , and find a comfortable retirement and subsistence during his sickness . whilst he was under cure , his principles began to be known abroad , upon which account he was commanded by the magistrates to exhibit a confession of his faith , which he so cunningly contrived , by abusing the reform'd churches , and in particular mr. calvin , that it was admitted for orthodox by the * papists . but he said nothing at all to the purpose as to the main point and business of the controversie . from thence he went to chambrey a neighbouring town , but being disturb'd in this place also , he return'd to fargiae . by this time his doctrines began to make a noise in the world. for geneva , being not far off , was able to give an ample testimony of the whole proceedings . and he himself was well enough known by his rambling about at lyons , chambrey , grenoble , and in dauphiny . the town of fargiae is in the presecture of gaium , and belongs to the illustrious lords of bern. the governour of which place being advertis'd of the arrival of this pestilent fellow , order'd his officers to apprehend him , and bring him to gaium ; where he was put into custody , but after some time , was releas'd out of prison , tho' still bound to his good behaviour . but notwithstanding all this , he still continued industriously to propagate his errors , denying that his opinions did in any wise interfere with the publick peace . and here he play'd a fresh prank . for when the governour had demanded of him a confession , with design to send it to bern , there to be examin'd by the clergy ; what did gentilis do , but sent it to the press , pretending the governour 's command for so doing : to this confession he added some propositions with many seurrilous reflections upon st. athanasius . nor was this enough , but he must likewise abuse the name and authority of the governour , by dedicating his book to him , which so highly incens'd the governour , that could he have laid hold of the offender , he would immediately have thrown him into gaol again . hence he went back to lyons , where the provost of the city put him into prison for the very same doctrine , and kept him there almost two months , but at last he gain'd his liberty by much such another trick as before . for he so soften'd his book of antidotes and confession , that they rather seem'd libels against mr. calvin , than treatises against the trinity ; and so he got free . the next summer he went into poland , being invited thither by blandrata and alciatus , who look'd upon him as a fit instrument to raise innovations in the churches of poland . here he stay'd for above two years , to the great mischief both of church and state. and had not divine providence confounded the designs of these men , by setting them at variance amongst themselves , 't is probable the wounds they had given religion might have proved more dangerous to the church . for blandrata and gentilis turn'd arians , and alciatus a mahometan ; and others ( as their wild fancies led them ) embrac'd more monstrous and extravagant opinions . and thus having disturb'd the peace of the church , they now began to quarrel amongst themselves : and that this is true , the present unhappy state of poland does sufficiently testifie . the followers of blandrata were arriv'd to such a pitch as to avow and openly defend the doctrine of arius . they condemn'd the council of nice , and the creed made by it ; ridicul'd and exploded the terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . some denied the incarnation of the son of god , and others impugn'd the immortality of the soul ; a third sort asserted , that our saviour had his beginning and existence from the virgin mary , a fourth allow'd of polygamy ; and a fifth sort became patrons of the extravagancies of mahomet . these are the sad effects of those spirits of error , which satan ( by the just judgment of god ) sends to delude the old , decaying world. how great the distractions and confusions were that follow'd the publication of these erroneous doctrines , we may easily gather from the king's proclamation , strictly commanding all such strangers as were setters up of new doctrines , immediately to depart the kingdom ; by which edict , gentilis , amongst the rest , was driven out of poland . being expell'd poland , his next journey was into moravia , where he join'd with the anabaptists . from thence he went to vienna ; every where , as he travell'd , dispersing his new invented notions . but still continuing unsettled , indeed being able to stay no where , he began to think of returning into savoy , believing , as he said , the churches there to be the most moderate , and less infected of any whatever ; and , besides this , he was in hopes to find gribaldus , and the rest of his accomplices alive , from whom he might receive assistance ; mr. calvin ( whom he always found a most zealous adversary to all his novelties ) being now dead . all these considerations put together , made him look upon savoy , at this time , as the most secure place of retirement , after so many dangerous adventures . but as the wise providence of god had ordain'd he should by his own folly blindly run on upon ruin , he came to gaium , where the very same governour , he had formerly affronted , was then by an extraordinary commission , continued governor of that province . to him gentilis made his application , and begg'd of him the favour of a publick disputation : the governour 's answer was , he should be sure to have justice done him : and thereupon committed him to prison . thus was this subtle , cunning heretick , who had been so insufferably troublesome to so many churches , brought into such straits , that he was never afterward able to extricate himself . this i thought necessary to be at large premised , that the reader might the better be inform'd , how he came to fall into these strange absurdities ; and in what places he dispers'd them ; what a disturber he had been of the peace of the church ; how oft he had brought himself by these practices into very dangerous circumstances ; and yet still by some crafty evasion or other , made a shift to escape , till at last divine justice brought him to condign punishment . chap. ii. upon what account he was brought to bern. the senate of bern were soon acquainted with his confinement at gaium , which happen'd on the d . of iune , . and understanding , ( . ) that he maintain'd and taught the same errors he once had abjur'd ; and , ( . ) that thereby he had involv'd himself in a grievous perjury ; ( . ) that he had condemned our church as still subject to papal slavery ; when at the same time he himself , tho' in a popish country , could publish such a confession , as easily procur'd him liberty . ( . ) that he had actually endeavour'd to undermine the doctrine of the trinity . ( . ) that poland had been mightily disturbed by him and his accomplices . ( . ) that the ring-leaders of the faction ( who formerly did all profess the same opinion ) were now altogether by the ears ; one an arian , and another a mahometan , &c. ( . ) that their doctrines were publickly condemn'd throughout germany , their errors animadverted upon from the pulpit , and their opinions , both by writing and disputations , in all the schools were every where rejected and exploded . the senate upon these accounts ordered him to be brought to bern. besides all this , he was to give the governour of gaium satisfaction for the book , which he published and dedicated to him . nay more , gentilis himself , perceiving the governour did so highly resent the affront , which he had offered him by the said dedication , made his appeal to the senate at bern , whither he was brought the th . of iuly . chap. iii. concerning his writings and the heads of his accusation . at bern he continued under confinement for some time , without having any thing else done to him . at last , by command of the senate , the papers , which were found about him , were examined . the first was a book wrote with his own hand , and dedicated to sigismund king of poland , consisting of sheets and leaves . in this book was contained the whole system of his doctrine , and principles ; tho he affirmed he had one much more compleat , transcribed by blandrata . in the epistle dedicatory , which is very long , he courts the favour , and begs the protection of his majesty , both for himself and his cause . then repeats the confessions he made at geneva , before his recantation ; the last of which confessions having been confuted by them of geneva , he subjoins to it , by way of defence , his book of antidotes , which he formerly composed at lyons . then he falls upon refuting the th . chapter of the first book of calvin's institutions ; and , in the same place , utterly condemns the doctrine of the trinity , as it had hitherto been delivered and taught in all churches whatever . next to that he produces several propositions out of st. austin ; especially out of his fifteen books of the trinity , which together with their incomparable author , he rejects and exposes with all * imaginable scurrility . after that he produces several nice passages out of the scripture , the fathers , and the alcoran , in defence of his doctrine . and last of all annexes his annotations upon athanasius to the end of the book . secondly , there were found some verses wrote with his own hand , being nothing else but a bitter scurrilous libel against the blessed trinity , and its worshippers . thirdly , a book in italian , with another in latine of the same strain , concerning the incarnation of christ. fourthly , a printed book under a false name , dedicated to the governour of gaium , with a preliminary discourse to the clergy ; which though it carries antwerp in the title page , yet was indeed printed at lyons . out of all these papers were collected several articles , with the heads of an indictment to be preferr'd against him , which are all reducible to these four particulars . first , that he dissented from us , and all the orthodox in the doctrine of the trinity . secondly , that he had thrown many scandalous and unheard of imputations upon our church , and charg'd her with heresie . thirdly , that his writings contain many impious blasphemies , frequently us'd by him in his disputes concerning the trinity ; and that in his behaviour he could not abstain from the like impudent scurrility . fourthly , all the cheats and impostures were notoriously evident , which he commonly us'd in disguising his opinions , in working out his own deliverance , and seducing others , to the danger of their lives : but of this in its proper place . when these things were urg'd against him , namely , that first , he had entertain'd intolerable erroneous notions about the trinity . that secondly , he had falsly charg'd us with several errours , which none of us did ever defend , nay , more would never permit any body else that did harbour or maintain such notions . that thirdly , his writings were fill'd with many horrid blasphemies , reflecting not so much on the persons of his adversaries , as on the sacred subject in dispute , and lastly , that by his shuffling and impertinent digressions , he so mightily perplex'd and obscur'd the cause , as gave too just reason to suspect he did industriously seek for evasions . we therefore desir'd him fairly and honestly to give in his answer to each particular that should be asked him . here gentilis made a long speech about the infirmity of his body , the craziness of his head , and the weakness of his memory ( which was now so mightily decay'd , that he could scarce remember the actions of one whole day , and therefore being in such a condition , might not perhaps be able to give a reasonable answer to all their interrogatories ) with many more of the like idle excuses , to avoid being brought to the bar as a malefactor , and gain the priviledge of being heard as plaintiff , which unless they granted him , he protested he could not have justice done him in so weighty a cause . chap. iv. whether he ought to have been heard as plaintiff . this exception of his must first be answer'd : but let any honest man judge , what grounds he could have for such a declinatory plea , besides the crafty design of prescribing such a form of tryal , so advantageous to himself , that he was sure to have none , or at most but very few prosecutors , and withal to gain the privilege of arraigning whom he pleas'd . to make this case more plain and intelligible , i shall here take the trouble of repeating those arguments , he propos'd in his own defence upon this occasion . first , he pleaded that his coming to town was voluntary , and on purpose to treat with the honourable senate concerning the same business he was now indicted for . secondly , he urg'd his being an assertor of the sovereignty of god the father , and a zealous defender of the truth of the gospel against false and heterodox expositors . thirdly , he pretended that he was not yet convicted of any such erroneous doctrines , [ as were laid to his charge : ] and lastly , thought it was very hard he should be bound to give in his answer before he knew who were to be his accusers . in answer to which he was desir'd first to consider his present circumstances ; that he was under confinement , and prisoner to a christian magistrate ; which was no proper qualification for a plaintiff , but rather the sign of an offender . in the next place he was told , it was but just and equitable for him in the quality of a prisoner , to hear first the charge that lay against him , or the causes of his confinement , and then fairly to give in his answers , and clear himself , if he desir'd to be released ; but that nothing could be more repugnant to the practise of all courts , than for a person in chains to turn prosecutor . first , as for his pretence of coming thither voluntarily , that was thought to be an excuse not at all material , since malefactors do by the just judgment of god frequently of their own accord thrust themselves into places most dangerous and fatal to them . and though it be true , that he came voluntarily to gaium , yet being there apprehended , and for certain reasons committed to prison , he still continued a prisoner , and under that quality it was , that he was convey'd to bern. secondly , equally impertinent were his vain pretensions of vindicating the sovereignty of god the father , and of asserting the truth of the gospel against false expositors ; since we were not yet satisfied of the legality of his call. nor could we give any credit to those extraordinary horrours and unusual convulsions he pretended to have twice felt , when at prayers in geneva ; as if he had been instigated by the secret impulses of the holy ghost to pronounce the ministers of that church , defenders of quaternity . thirdly , as to his errors and false doctrines , we were of opinion that he needed no farther conviction , than his own abjuration of them at geneva , where he underwent publick penance , when sentence was given against him in the following words , ( viz. ) 't is the iudgment of the court , that you valentinus gentilis , undergo the following punishment . first , that you shall be stript close to your shirt , then barefoot and bareheaded shall carry in your hand a lighted torch , and beg god's pardon and ours on your knees , by confessing your self maliciously and wickedly to have spread abroad a false and heretical doctrine ; but that you do now from your heart detest and abhor those abominable , lying , blasphemous books , you compos'd in its defence ; in testimony whereof you shall cast them with your own hands into the flames , there to be burnt to ashes ; and for more ample satisfaction we do enjoyn you to be led through all the streets of this city , at the sound of the trumpet , and habited as before ; and do strictly command you not to depart this city without permission , &c. therefore seeing he had so publickly condemn'd the same doctrines which he now endeavoured to revive , and after so singular a manner done pennance for them ; which yet he now endeavoured to revive , it would be absurd to admit of their defence by such a faithless shuffling advocate . besides , he could not be ignorant what a grievous perjury he had committed by going out of geneva without permission , contrary to the oath he had once took ; this last charge was so notorious , that he could give no other answer , but that he was sorry for it . fourthly , to the last exception , of his not knowing who were to be his accusers , our answer was , we would . produce the same persons who had formerly impleaded him , when he made his recantation at geneva . and . those who had banish'd him with the rest of his heretical accomplices out of poland ; and if these were not enough , we had in store the churches of germany , by whom his opinions were condemned , as savouring of arianism . and lastly , we had the * decreta of several universities , whereby his doctrine was exploded , and himself by name condemn'd for an heretick ; particularly alexander alepius , of the university of lipswick , was present , ready to testifie against him ; so that it seems one of the strangest things in the world for him to pretend ignorance of his accusers , when he had in all places found , so many and so considerable adversaries . now all this being so notorious , that the most frontless impudence could not deny one syllable of it , i think nothing can be more plain , than that he ought not to be admitted as plaintiff , and that upon these accounts . first , as having once already renounc'd the doctrine he now went about to defend . secondly , because he was guilty of perjury in the same case . thirdly , as being indicted by so many known accusers . fourthly , because he had endeavour'd to undermine one of the prime articles of our faith , an article so essential to the very being of christianity , that in the worst and darkest times of popery , it still continued pure and uncorrupted . and lastly , because the leading assertors of this new doctrine had not yet agreed upon their principles : for according to his own confession , blandrata turn'd arian , alciat a mahometan , and himself and gribaldus were still of different opinions . for when our confession was tender'd him , to which gribaldus had formerly subscrib'd , he disapprov'd and condemn'd it , withall affirming gribalaus to have committed a grievous . sin by subscribing it . upon these accounts he was debarr'd from being a plaintiff ( whether justly or not , let the world judge ) and commanded to give in a particular answer to the articles preferr'd against him . chap. v. containing some propositions taken out of his books of the trinity , which we judge to be false . and now we desire the whole church of god , and the piety of all succeeding ages to judge of the following positions , wherein he does either by an impudent prevarication scandalize and bespatter us , or , which is far worse , impiously blaspheme god. and first , he calls the trinity a mere human invention , not so much as known to any catholick creed , and directly contrary to the word of god. secondly he affirms , that the father alone is that one only god , set forth to us in the holy scriptures . thirdly , that the son is not of himself , but of the father , to whom he is subordinate as to his maker , [ or essentiator . ] fourthly , the father , son and holy ghost are not only three distinct persons , but have also three distinct essences or substances . fifthly , the son was begotten by the father , according to his substance , and differs from the father as a subordinate spirit . sixthly , there are in the trinity three eternal spirits , each of which is by himself god. seventhly , that these three spirits differ from each other in order , degree , and propriety of essence . chap. vi. an account of his errors about the article of the blessed trinity . the adorable mystery of the trinity is the constant subject that runs thrô all his writings : a subject which he handles after such a rate , as that he seems neither to have thought nor wrote of any thing else , for the space at least of years last past . in all which his principal design is to advance such a distinction in the divine essence , as might make the three persons three distinct spirits of different order and degree . as when we say , the father of our lord iesus christ is a person in the individual trinity , gentilis will have this to be false , and that we ought to say , the father of our lord iesus christ is that one god [ is god alone . ] again , when we say father , son and holy ghost are one god eternal , he here accuses us of heresie , telling us , the father alone is god of himself , [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ] not begotten , [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ] maker of all things [ essentiator . ] but that the son was made [ essentiatus , ] or received his being from another ; is indeed god , but not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and so likewise the holy ghost ; and by consequence that they are not one but three eternals . again , when we affirm that one god is to be worshipp'd in trinity , and trinity in unity ; this pious plain proposition he calls mere * cant , and perfect sophistry ; and plainly affirms , pag. . of his antidotes , that there are three spirits really subsisting . there are , says he , antid . fol. , and . therefore three , because * three eternal spirits . and explains himself , pag. . they are ( says he ) three eternal spirits distinguish'd by a gradual and due subordination : and though he grants the father , son , and holy ghost to be three persons of the same nature , yet he adds , they are distinct in order , degree , and propriety ; to explain which , he affirms , that it is proper to the father , to be styl'd the one only god , by which explication the son and holy ghost are manifestly excluded from the unity of the godhead . but he fancies there is a kind of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , self-existence , which belongs to the father only , that cannot be attributed to the son. hence it is , he styles the father 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. god of himself , as he is more eminently , truly , and properly god ; but the son is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ a secondary and different sort of god ; ] whence he infers , that the son is not of himself , but of god the father , who alone is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , god of himself , p. . and p. . that god the father is in the scriptures call'd the only god , invisible , most high , and the god of christ or of the word incarnate . again , p. . the son is subordinate [ essentiatori ] to him that gave him being ; and so he makes the father essentiator , and the son essentiatus ; and ( by consequence ) the father to be properly god , and the son only a subordinate inferiour god. whereas we on the contrary do admit of no degrees in the godhead , and do positively assert , that the essence of god is but one single essence , not subordinate ( or capable of superiority and inferiority . ) however to bring himself clearly off here , he saith , that when he affirms , the father is the one only god , this ought to be referred wholly to his self-existence , not to his numerical substance . but who can't easily discern , that this pitiful shift is too weak to support his tottering cause ? for still this absurdity will remain ; to wit , that the son is not self-existent ; and which is yet a plainer contradiction , 't will follow that the son with the father is one god , and yet that the father alone is this one god ; likewise that the essence , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the godhead , is common to all three persons , and yet self-existence , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is peculiar to the father . farther , when we say , and yet they are not three gods , but one god , he cries out upon this as an abominable errour , forasmuch as these words , one god , are to be understood of [ and applied to ] the father only exclusive of the son. antidote . he pretends , that we ought not to say these three are one god [ unus deus ] but only unum . for that all three have indeed but one godhead , but yet are not all three one god. and shortly after he adds , the father alone is the one god , and shews , pag. . that , the word one belongs not to the unity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of substance or essence , but to the self-existence , to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the father . and then concludes , pag. . that christ is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or god of himself ; and scornfully upbraids us with wresting the term , unus , proper only to the father , to signifie the unity of essence belonging to the three persons , contending that we ought to say , the father , son and holy ghost are unum , but they are by no means unus , or one god. therefore when we say , [ and yet not three eternals , but one eternal ; ] gentilis will have this to be a grand mistake ; for that they are three eternal spirits , which cannot be one or unus . thus i have briefly , and with what plainness i could , collected his tenets out of his own writings , which likewise he has frequently own'd and endeavour'd to defend in common discourse and conversation . in short , the sum of what he asserted , is briefly this ; that the father is one god , the son another god , and the holy ghost a third god ; that they are all one , ( unum ) yet not unus deus [ one god ] but three subordinate spirits ; that the father only is properly to be call'd , the one god , who alone is of himself , and strictly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . here it is to be observ'd , that when we say one god , that expression may be understood two ways . first , one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in essence : secondly , one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in name only . the first acceptation he utterly rejects , or else he could never defend * three distinct intelligent substances . the latter he allows of , and recommends by a very pompous exposition , as that these three spirits are * one in consent , in will , in nature , in power , in dominion , in operations , &c. and to this sense he wrests whatever is said in scripture concerning the unity of the godhead . but the universal consent of the catholick church teaches us quite otherwise ; namely , that god is one in essence , which one essence subsists in three persons . in this sence hath the church hitherto expounded the apostles creed . i believe in god. but what god do you believe in ? why , in the father son and holy ghost . thus the nicene creed added the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , [ of the same substance ] to express the identity of substance in opposition to the blasphemies of arius . and the creed of athanasius in express terms tells us , we must confess the father , son , and holy ghost not to be three gods , but one god , neither confounding the persons , nor dividing the substance . and in this trinity ( saith he ) none is afore or after other , none greater or less than another , but the whole three persons are coeternal and coequal ; so that in all things a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , is to be worshipped . by denying of this , gentilis hath been the occasion of introducing several dangerous and insufferable errours into the church . chap. vii . of those words , trinitas , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and what they do properly signifie . now because he quarrels with the word trinity as us'd by us , and every where confounds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( using promiscuously the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , substantia , essentia , persona , and hypostasis , ) we will therefore briefly explain their proper significations . for there is not an arranter piece of sophistry , than to use words in a different sence from that , wherein they have usually been received and taken ? 't is true indeed , we ought not to be over nice in our expressions ; and wrangle about words , when we are agreed as to the thing ; but what madness is it to coin new terms , and cry down the old without any reason or necessity ? it is in my opinion equally adviseable to retain the language , as well as to imitate the manners of our wise forefathers . but to come to the business : the word trinity in this question does not signifie an abstracted number , as when we say in latin ternio , quaternio , [ in english three or four units ] but it denotes an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , something really existing ; thence it is that the trinity was call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . conformably to which the greek fathers , gregory nazianzen , st. basil , damascen , and also the latins , do generally speak of the trinity . and therefore gentilis is much in the wrong , when he concludes , because the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , and the trinity likewise god , therefore there are four persons of the godhead ; and whoever asserts this , must likewise assert a quaternity , not a trinity . we do absolutely deny the consequence . for no body says that the trinity as distinct from , and without the persons of the father , son , and holy ghost , is god * for the very being of the trinity [ and of the godhead too ] is in these three persons , and without them there can be neither godhead , nor essence of the godhead . but the true consequence had been this , the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , and these three are one , therefore there is in the godhead a trinity of persons ; nor by asserting of this do we in any wise set up a new god or idol . but to proceed , the word [ trinity ] was not without very good reason brought into the church . for the bishops assembled with athanasius at alexandria [ as we are told by sozomen , l. . c. . hist. trip . ] to defend and establish the decree of the nicene council concerning the consubstantiality of the father , son , and h. ghost , in opposition to the turbulent arians , sixt upon the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or trinity , thereby intending to signifie the three persons of the same substance , not dividing the substance , nor confounding the persons . and ever since the word has been made use of by all orthodox councils , as well as by the greek and latin fathers . nay , the scripture it self speaks to the very same purpose , iohn . cap. . there are three that bear record in heaven , the father , son , and holy ghost , and these three are one. and so likewise in the baptism of christ , mark . mat. . and in the institution of baptism , mat. . there is plain mention made of three persons . 't is therefore an impudent and a frontless rash censure , to call the trinity a meer human invention , utterly unknown to the orthodox creeds . the nicene , alexandrian , and ephesine creeds , are all confessedly orthodox , and yet all make use of the word trinity . but here he replies , they never acknowledg'd the trinity to be a god. i must profess , i can't tell what he would be at with his deus trinitas : if by it he understands a fourth person , it is one of his own making ; and we may justly explode both him and his fancy ; and he well deserves the name of impious libertine , that in a matter of so great importance dares fly to these wicked cavils ; but if by deus trinitas he understands deus trinus , or a trinity in the godhead * 't is plain he has asserted a notorious falshood , since we have already prov'd both councils and fathers to have us'd the word trinity in this sence , and that a trinity in the godhead was no novelty to them . thus our crafty adversary would sain father upon us the notion of a deus trinitas , distinct from , or without the father , son , and holy ghost . but 't is all perfect calumny ; and god forbid the church of christ should be ever guilty of such a blasphemous position . i think it needless to dwell any longer upon the explication of the word trinitas , since we have evidently demonstrated [ whatever valentinus vainly pretends to the contrary ] that by a trinity we understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , something real , or really subsisting ; and that the catholick creeds have not been unaccustom'd to the word . after the same lewd manner he plays upon the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , often styling them an impertinant iargon . but he ought to have consider'd , that it is not the least excellence in the art of teaching , to be able to give things their proper appellations ; and that nothing can be a more evident sign of a malicious , narrow spirit , than to wrap up our knowledge in a cloud of ambiguous dark expressions , especially in treating of a subject so highly mysterious , that no human understanding is able sufficiently to explain it . for whatever we can say of god is too mean , and falls much below the dignity of his immense and glorious majesty . so that the ancients did wisely observe , that we could much easier tell , what god was not , than what he was . and that saying of iustin martyr well deserves our notice , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. i. e. 't is extreamly difficult to conceive aright of god , but to express or declare him fully is impossible ; and therefore 't was piously said by evagrius , socr. lib. . hist. trip. c. . that the ineffable mystery of the trinity , was rather in silence to be ador'd , than dogmatically to be * explained . thus we call god a substance , tho' in propriety of speech he cannot be so styl'd : for a substance is capable of being defin'd , but god is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , boundless , and not to be circumscrib'd within any limits of words . therefore i think we ought to handle such a subject , with the greatest humility and reverence , and to be extreamly cautious , how we make use of any expressions , but such as are receiv'd , common , and most applicable to it . because god is in the scripture styl'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as in the hebrew iehovah from eijeh , so in the like signification from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; as from deus they call'd the divine essence deitas ; so likewise did they express the deity by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the greeks do otherwise use the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to signifie riches , goods , or possessions , as in that , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; i. e. of your goods or money : and by philosophers 't is us'd to signifie that which is contradistinguished to an accident , viz. a substance . but amongst divines , and particularly in this controversie , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is put to signifie the divine essence . it was indeed long controverted , whether this word ought to have been rendred into latin by essentia or substantia ; but the generality have thought essentia to be the most proper translation , and therefore do by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 express the common nature of the godhead in the trinity . 't is likewise the common opinion of st. austin , lib. . de trin. that it is more properly rendred by essentia . but , says he , whether you take it for essence , which is the proper , or for substance , which is the corrupted translation of the word , it still denotes something absolute not relative . so again , lib. . de trin. c. . i call that essence which the greeks term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and presently after , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. one essence , but three subsistences . and in the same book , cap. . est tamen sinè dubitatione substantia , vel fi meliùs haec appelletur essentia , quam graeci 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocant . st. ierom in some places retains the word usia , as in his book against lucifer . in others he translates it by substantia , as in his epistle to damasus . sufficiet ( says he ) nobis dicere unam substantiem , tres persones subsistenies perfectas , aequales , cooeternas . in the same place he renders it essentia , as deus essentiae nomen verè tenet ; and again , nomen essentiae sibi vendicat propriè deus . as to the word hypostasis in profane authors , it signified the same that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does ; witness st. ierom in his epistle to damasus . and socrat. in . lib. c. . hist. tripartit . tells us out of irenoeus grammaticus , that the more modern philosophers took 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to express the same thing , and this signification it retain'd amongst the divines too for some time . socrates makes use of it , fol. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that he was not of a different hypostasis or substance , but the same with the father . but at that time a person was call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as in the same author , lib. . c. . another while 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were taken for synonymous terms , as in that passage of socrates , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. confessing the son to be an hypostasis and subsisting in god , and that there is one god in three persons or subsistences . at last they did upon very good grounds limit the signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to person only , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 became equivalent terms , as in latin persona & subsistentia ; so that a substance with [ personal ] properties was call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . in the time of st. ierom the controversie about this word was still on foot , which makes him call it a novel expression ; and therefore seeing some call'd substance hypostasis ; and others were us'd to say three hypostases , i. e. three persons , he asks damasus his advice what to do in the business . si jube as ( says he ) non timebo tres 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicere . and 't is plain from the hist. tripar . that the fathers were very cautious in the using of these expressions , and seldom did it , unless in a case of great necessity . upon this account it was that the bishops assembled with athanasius did industriously let fall the dispute about 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , resolving to make use of those words only against sabellius ; and were therefore concern'd lest that for want of words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or substance , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or subsistence , might be mistaken one for the other . ruffinus says the same , lib. . c. . at present some translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by substance , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by subsistence ; others more significantly term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 person ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essence , for as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is in greek derived 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , so in latin essentia comes ab esse . however i think , 't is no great matter which way it be taken , so that the sence be the same . so then the common nature or essence of the godhead is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; according to which god is one , but the persons are term'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . in this sence they are said to be three hypostases , that is , subsistences , or they are three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or persons ; or as the greeks , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three persons in one substance . iustin martyr and others call them tres 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & tria 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but gentilis in his explication of the trinity does not only confound the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but goes yet farther , and places the distinction of the three persons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or their substance . when we told him , that this was plainly against the sence of the scripture , and consent of antiquity ; his answer was , that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was not to be found expresly in scripture ; which was as much as arius himself could have said : for st. ierom against lucifer tells us , that this was the very argument valens and his followers us'd to turn the word * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of the church , and at the same time to condemn the confession of the nicene council . but we have already shewn how this word was taken up in opposition to sabellius ; and tho' our author would fain be thought an indifferent person between arius and sabellius , yet he seems most to espouse the cause of arius . chap. viii . what was the opinion of arius , and wherein gentilis and he do agree . but since it is yet disputed by many , what was the heresie of arius ; it will therefore be worth our while briefly to enquire into his opinions . especially since matters are now come to such a pass , that men dare openly avouch , that he was not condemn'd for allowing the father only to be god , but rather for asserting the son of god to be a mere creature . here are then two propositions , ( viz. ) first , that the son of god was a creature . arius asserted this , but gentilis doth not . secondly , that the father alone is the one most high god , who dwells in light inaccessible . this gentilis does affirm , but arius seems not to have asserted it . gentilis takes a great deal of pains in stating the difference between these two positions , to avoid ( if possible ) falling in with arius . however if his assertion be true , and it belongs only to the father to be styl'd the one only god , i cannot for my part see any reason why he and arius should keep at such a distance . for according to gentilis he would have said nothing but truth , seeing he was never call'd in question by the fathers , for calling christ the son of god ; since that assertion of his was true and undoubtedly orthodox . but if the difference be only in words , and the sense of both propositions be the same , there needs no proof , that they agree in their notions . to make this appear , let us enquire in what manner arius his opinion has been deliver'd down to us . we find in theodor. l. . cap. . alexander bishop of alexandria making complaint , that arius and achilles denied the divinity of christ. his words are these , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. denying the divinity of our saviour , and making him of the same nature with all other men ; and presently after , they attribute to him ( says he ) a temporal beginning . for thus speaks arius himself . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. there was a time when the son of god was not , &c. his opinion is related after the same manner , hist. trip. lib. . cap. . deus , say they , non semper pater fuit , non semper fuit dei verbum , sed fuit , quando deus non pater fuit , dei autem verbum ex non existentibus factum fuit , &c. i. e. god was not always a father , nor did the word always exist , but there was a time , when god was not a father , and the word was made out of nothing . to the same purpose nicephorus , lib. . cap. . deus non semper pater erat , sed erat cùm deus pater non erat . non semper igitur dei verbum erat , sed ex non existentibus factum est . qui enim erat deus , illum , qui non erat , ex non existente fecit , &c. you may see more to this purpose in the same book , lib. . c. . from all which it does appear , that arius did in the first place divide the essence of god , making one essence of the father , and another of the son , and after that assigning only a temporal original to the son ; and therefore he so earnestly condemn'd the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that he might carry his point for the separation of essence . and deny'd the co-eternity of the son , that he might thereby establish the notion of his temporal original . from hence follow'd more monstrous absurdities , viz. that the son of god was a mere creature ; and that he was made out of nothing . for they were very well satisfied , that the essence of god being the most simple , and withal the most perfect of any , could admit of no gradual division , and therefore they assign'd the son a separate essence . and now 't is easie to discover , wherein he and gentilis agree . arius said , that there was one essence or substance of the father , and another of the son : gentilis distinguisheth the father from the son not only in person or hypostasis , but in essence or substance also . nor doth it at all alter the case , in that he saith , the word was begotten of the substance of the father ; and is consubstantial with him : in which , 't is confess'd , he differs from arius , but nevertheless introduces a separation of substance . arius then says , the son was made out of nothing : this man tells us he was not made out of nothing , but out of the substance of the father . but in this they both agree , that [ quoad essentiam ] as to his substance the son is numerically distinct from the father . we are told by niceph. lib. . c. , . that philoponus a famous philosopher drove on the same argument . for by dividing the indivisible nature of god , into more persons , he ascrib'd it to them severally , as to individuals , and distributed it to those three subsistences of a supersubstantial nature . he was likewise a great champion of the monophysites , who , by reason there was but one hypostasis or person in christ , asserted that he had but one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or nature also , which was made of both the divine and humane , as on the contrary nestorius from the two natures of christ concluded , that he likewise must necessarily have two hypostases or persons . again , arius asserted , that the father only was eternal , but that the word had a beginning ; which likewise was the opinion of the philosophers philoponus and themistius ; see niceph. lib. . c. . gentilis tells us , the son of god was begotten by a precedent act of generation ; which if true , then must his being begotten have succeeded in order of time . to prove this he doth with his usual confidence quote that passage of tertullin . non ideo pater & judex semper , quia deus semper . nam nec pater potuit esse ante filium , nec judex ante delictum . fuit autem tempus cum ei delictum , & filius non fuit , i. e. god is not therefore always a father and a judge , because he always was god. for he could not be a father before he had a son , neither could he be a judge , before there was a criminal . but there was a time , when neither criminal nor son did exist . in this opinion he agrees with tertullian , and by consequence is a partizan of arius . for it signifies not a farthing , from whom this sentence is quoted , whether from tertullian or any body else , since it 's plain it gives us the true sentiments of arius . from what has been said , it appears , that arius and he are of the same opinion in these two particulars , ( viz. ) . in dividing the substance or essence of the godhead . and. . in making the act of generation in order of time antecedent to the existence of the son , which exactly agrees with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of arius . chap. ix . concerning the generation of the son of god , and how we ought to understand the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . in the next place gentilis appeals to those texts of scripture , wherein the generation of the son of god is reveal'd to us , as iohn . we saw his glory , the glory as of the only begotten of god ; and psal. . thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee ; which place is cited by st. paul , act. . and the apostle heb. . then gentilis farther concludes , that begotten is therefore distinguish'd from unbegotten , because the one hath always a beginning , the other hath none . again , that the father is therefore call'd ingenitus [ unbegotten ] because he derives his original from none ; but all things had their beings from him . but the son is therefore said to be begotten , because he had his beginning from the father ; upon which account the father is styl'd the essentiator being , and the son the essentiated spirit . this is his way of arguing ; and , i think , any one , that has but half an eye , may plainly see how arius his argument lies couch'd under it . for whosoever hath read nicephorus , theodoret , and the other ecclesiastical writers , cannot be ignorant , that this was the very argument arius and his followers made use of . in answer to which , we freely allow and acknowledge the generation of the son of god , and readily grant that the father is unbegotten , the son begotten ; but moreover we assert that this generation was without beginning of time , and is of such a nature , as transcends the capacities and apprehensions of all mortal men. for the word was in the beginning , and all things were made by him ; which word is afterwards call'd the only begotten son of god. of the same word the prophet speaks , when he says , the dew of thy birth is of the womb of the moruing ; which passage the jews themselves confess to have been spoken with respect to the eternal generation of the messias . therefore gentilis his argument is by no means conclusive ; this way of generation being wholly inexplicable , and without any beginning of time ; by consequence there is no prius nor posterius , no succession in it , but the whole coeternal together . how audacious then is the mind of man , that dares pry into and endeavour to explain these hidden things of god ? if neither ear hath heard , nor eye seen , neither hath it enter'd into the heart of man to conceive those things , which god hath prepared for them that love him , how much more ought that mystery of the eternal son of god , and that of his eternal generation , rather to be ador'd than fathom'd ? but let us see , how the ancients express'd their thoughts about this matter . theodoret , in book . cap. . tells us , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. that god did not beget his son in time , nor after a certain season or period : and in the same place he calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an immutable filiation . again he confesses , the son of god was begotten , but it was , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in an unspeakable , inexpressible , inconceiveable , undeterminable manner , by which words it plainly appears , that the ancients look'd upon this as a very great unfathomable mystery . they did likewise call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , thereby to shew that his generation was without beginning , as may be seen in damascene and in theodoret , in the place above cited . and socrates in his . l. c. . has a passage importing the very same thing . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , says he , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. by a mode of generation inexpressible and unconceiveable by any created nature . from all which i think we may well conclude , the manner of the generation of the son of god to be truly ineffable , incomprehensible , and undeterminable . whereby it follows , that the word was begotten out of all time , and before all time ; that the son was always with the father ; that god always was a father ; and that there never was any time , wherein the son was not . as for any other ways of explaining this generation , the catholick church , and all christian writers , iustin martyr , irenoeus , and others , have constantly rejected and exploded them . a few of which i shall just glance upon . some would have the son to descend from the father 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by division ; this seems to have been the opinion of philosophers , who parted the divine essence into several persons ; just as if out of the same mass of gold you would cleave two or three bars , or as you would divide any one totum into two or three parts . sic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . others were for having it to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. by germination , as we see scions bud out from trees . others thought it might be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by efflux or emanation , as children are naturally begotten of their parents . others call'd it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( i. e. ) by eructation , as may be seen from arius his epistle in theod. l. . c. . and lastly there were others , who believ'd it to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or by alteration of substance . see socr. book . c. . all these ways were rejected by antiquity , and the arians too , tho' for a different reason ; namely , that they might hereby explode the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or consubstantiality . of which see nicephor . l. . c. . their argument ran thus ; the son of god is not born of the father , neither 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nor yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ergo he is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or of the same substance with the father , because what is such , must be so some of these ways . to which we answer , that there is another way or method , which they have past over , and which alone the catholick church hath approved of ; that is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or by immanence , or else 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by communication of his whole nature to the son , who is therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , consubstantial with the father . and to manifest the coeternity , the fathers still call'd it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , unspeakable , and incomprehensible . which phrases are certainly most ancient , since we find them in iustin martyr [ an author immediately after the first century ] , who frequently condemns and refutes those other expressions , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the parting , as it were , of the divine essence of the father ] or , as their followers were pleas'd to term it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he condemns those likewise who affirm the son to have been born either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : the former i take to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or germination , the latter to signifie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or efflux ; tho' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do import the same . thus much i thought necessary to repeat concerning the manner of the generation of god the son ; that it might the better appear , what terms and expressions were us'd by the ancients , and withal how boldly and rashly this unsearchable mystery is treated of by the men of the present age. now , as it doth not follow , that because he that begets , is one , and he that is begotten , is another , therefore the substance or essence of the father is one , and the substance or essence of the son is another ; so neither doth it follow , that because he that begets is one , and he that is begotten , is another ; therefore the word , which was begotten , must have been in time after him , that did beget him ; this being nothing else but quibbling about the ambiguity of a word , as the arians of old were us'd to do . for upon the whole we do not deny , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is proper to the father , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proper to the son , provided the words be taken in their due sence . and therefore , to avoid all mistakes about them , let it be observ'd , that first , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth signifie one that hath no manner of original at all ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 denotes him that is begotten of a father . in this sence the father alone [ in himself ] is said to be unbegotten 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because there is not any thing from whence he derives his original ; and in the same manner the son may be said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in as much as he was begotten by the father after an ineffable manner ; and in this sence these terms may very well be applied without any absurdity ; we may safely call as well father as the holy ghost 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , since neither of them had a father ; and the son only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as being begotten of the father . secondly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or rather 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , may signifie the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. not created . in this sence the philosophers call the elements 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because they are the first principles ; and in the same manner the creator is distinguish'd from his creatures ; he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and they are styl'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : and in this sence 't is plain , that christ cannot be call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he being not made , i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as is the whole indivisible divine nature * . lastly , if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be oppos'd to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in respect of time , i. e. as that which never had a beginning , but was from all eternity , is oppos'd to that which came after , and had its beginning in time ; in this sence 't is plain all the three persons in the godhead must be ingenite ; since none of them had their beginning in time , but were before all time . and therefore these propositions , the son is begotten , and only the father is unbegotten , are not simpliciter * , or absolutely to be granted , since in one respect the son also is unbegotten , i. e. without beginning . chap. x. whether or no it be proper to the father to be call'd the one only god ? let us in the next place take into our consideration , that supremacy or soveraignty of the father , whereof gentilis so mightily boasts himself to have been an assertor ; and sticks not to say , that there have been none yet ( that he knows of ) who have been put to death for asserting the glory and soveraignty of the father . that the prophets , apostles , and h. martyrs , underwent persecutions , death , and all manner of extremities , for the glory of the son , but that he can find no martyrs for the supremacy of the father . our next enquiry then must be , what this sovereign prerogative is , which belongs to the father , and cannot by any means appertain to the son. his answer is this , that the father is the one only god , which the scripture hath revealed to us . i appeal to all good christians whether this be not the highest indignity and blasphemy against the glory of our blessed saviour , so to appropriate the title of god to the father only , as at the same time sacrilegiously to rob and despoil christ of his divinity . he tells us , that whenever the scripture speaks of the one god , it is to be understood of the father only ; and therefore ( says he ) christ cannot be truly or properly god ; for whatever agrees properly to any thing uni & soli , cannot be accommodated [ or communicated ] to any thing else ; which if true , then , according to gentilis , christ will not only differ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ in essence or substance ] from the father , but likewise cannot at all be styl'd god. and therefore thô he had the confidence openly to avow the first position , namely , that the father and the son were two species essentially distinct ; and was grown so hardy in his impudence , as without shame or blushing , stifly to maintain such a distinction ; yet perceiving the latter ( viz. that christ ought not to be call'd god ) did contain such open blasphemy , as must necessarily give the greatest offence and scandal to all good christians , he was willing to allow that christ might be call'd god [ thô not strictly , yet ] by communication of the divinity ; which admirable salvo of his is still clogg'd with an errour as absurd ▪ namely , that christ is of a later existence than the father . the father ( says he ) was from all eternity and without beginning , the son was born in time , and had a beginning . the father is god per se , or of himself , the son only by communication [ from the father ] just as a king may admit his eldest son into a part of the government . the father is the one only god , but the son neither the one , nor the only , but a different god. here it ought to be observ'd , that the scripture doth sometimes speak of god distinctly , i. e. with respect to a certain person of the trinity ; as when st. iohn says , the word was with god , where 't is plain he means the father . so again , when christ upon the cross cries out , my god , my god , why hast thou for saken me ? he directed that invocation to the father , mat. . but st. iohn expresly says of the son , and the word was god. after the same manner st. thomas speaking of the son , calls him , my god , and my lord. ioh. . & in acts . st. peter saith to ananias , thou hast not lied unto men , but unto god , i. e. to the holy ghost . at other times the scriptures speak of god absolutely , & secundùm essentiam , whereby we are to understand the whole godhead , from which none of the persons is excluded , [ or as it comprehends all three persons ] as ioh. . god is a spirit . we are god's labourers , we are god's husbandry , we are god's building . . cor. . the wisdom of the world is foolishness with god. with what god ? with the father only exclusive of the son ? no , no. the word [ god ] is here , as in many other places , taken essentially , as it belongs to all three persons . but all this signifies nothing with gentilis , who will have the scripture every where to speak of god distinctly , and therefore must of necessity exclude christ from the unity of the divine essence , and propriety of the godhead ; and lastly , make him of later existence than the father . but this is not all ; his presumption and arrogance carries him farther , to make two distinct sorts of martyrdom . he thinks it a common ordinary piece of service to dye for the glory of the son ; and has therefore found out a new and more exalted one ; namely , to suffer for the glory and soveraignty of the father . 't is certainly a grievous errour , to think of worshipping or honouring the father , and to neglect the son ; yet a greater to exclude the son from this honour : but the most grievous of all , to pretend to honour the father by degrading and dishonouring the son. for god is to be worshipp'd in the manner , as he has manifested himself ; but he has plainly told us , ioh. . that he who honoureth not the son , honoureth not the father : and ioh. . the father bears witness from heaven , that he is glorified in the son. wherefore let us keep to this certain perpetual form of honouring the father , i mean , by honouring of him in the son , through whom alone he is well pleas'd with us ; for , without the son , no honour can be acceptable unto god the father . such subtile delusions doth the devil make use of , to overthrow the glory of christ , under the specious pretext of vindicating the soveraignty of the father ; a service , which god never requir'd , either from the prophets , apostles , or any other holy men of old. but 't is plain , this method of honouring the father tends to the disgrace and dishonour of christ ; and , that with a very little more trouble , gentilis may reconcile himself with both iews and turks . chap. xi . containing the iudgment and consent of scripture with respect to this article . these false doctrines of gentilis have ever been condemn'd by the universal consent both of scripture and the true church ; which consent is plainly and in short , as follows , viz. the essence of god is but one , in which one essence the scripture sets forth to us three hypostases or subsistences , to wit , of the father , of the son , and of the holy ghost ; so that we acknowledge neither three gods , nor any division * of the essence [ of god. ] the son and the holy ghost are so consubstantial with the father , that they with him are one , true , eternal , infinite god. nor is the appellation or title of the one most high god proper only to the father exclusive of the son and holy ghost . this , i say , is the judgment and consent of the scripture and the true church . for god is to be worshipp'd in the same manner , that he hath reveal'd himself , and so the church hath always worshipp'd him ; but he hath declar'd himself to be one , i. e. a being in substance or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one , subsisting by himself , eternal , wise , good , &c. but hath manifested himself in three persons or hypostases . that his essence is but one , will appear from many plain testimonies , as deut. . hear , o israel , the lord thy god is one god. cor. . we know that there is but one god. eph. . there is one god. deut. . the lord [ jehovah ] he is god , and there is none else besides him . therefore he hath declar'd himself to be but one. but that he hath likewise reveal'd himself as subsisting in three persons , is plain from mark . and mat. . where , in the baptism of christ , the father , son and holy ghost are expresly mention'd : and so likewise in the institution of baptism , mat. . mark . nor can we be put off by that evasion of gentilis , whereby he refers all this only to the agreement and consent of the persons . we do not deny that there is such a consent of will ; * but we say , that besides this , there is an unity of essence . wherefore this doctrine doth remain more firm and unshaken , than a rock of marble ; namely , that god has declar'd himself to be one in essence , subsisting in three persons ; so that a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , is to be worshipped . and this is the only true way of worshipping god. and in this sence the church hath still interpreted the scripture and the apostles creed . i believe in god , who is one ; that is to say , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in essence ; where presently after is added , by way of explication , an enumeration of all the persons , that it might appear , who that one god almighty was ; namely , the father , son , and holy ghost . consequently gentilis his exposition must be false , who makes this distinction ; i believe in god the father , and restrains the word god to the father only . i say this is a sophistical exposition arising from a mistaken distinction . neither have the nicene , nor athanasian creeds , or any of the orthodox , ever understood it in this sence . wherefore the son and h. ghost are the true and one god with god the father , and are so set forth to us in scripture , as often as mention is made of the one true god , iehovah , or lord of israel . mark . christ saith to the rich young man , none is good save god only ; where if we admit gentilis his opinion to be true , the argument must run thus ; none is good , but one that is god ; but the father only is the only god , therefore the father only is good. for christ speaks exclusively , why callest thou me good ? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . one god , is the proper appellation only of the father ; therefore the father only is good. nor will he be ever able to extricate himself out of this labyrinth , unless he doth affirm , that christ may be said to be good also by communication , but the father only to be properly and originally good ; which is intolerable blasphemy , for it distinguisheth christ from his goodness , as well as from his divinity . but the true way of arguing would have been thus : he that is properly and of himself , good , must necessarily be the one true , and only god ; ( which we gather from christ's own words , none is good but the one god. ) but the son and h. ghost are properly and per se good , therefore they with the father are that one only true god ; from whom all things in the world , which we call good , do derive their goodness , and hold it at his pleasure . all the cavils about the father alone 's being the one only god do wholly vanish , and are dispell'd by this one argument . besides this , there are several other testimonies to be found in the scripture ; as in isaiah . the one god is said to be the first and the last ; which noble character gentilis understands to have been given only to the father , but he is confuted by st. iohn , who revel . . , . gives the very same titles to christ ; from whence we may conclude , that christ is also comprehended under this character of the one god. nor shall we ever be convinc'd of the contrary , from his saying , that christ was call'd the first and the last only in respect of the creatures . again , the word in the new testament is call'd not a fictitious , but a true god , joh. . but there is but one true god , the author both of the old and new covenant , therefore the word is comprehended under the character of the one god , who is the author of the covenant . again , this one and only god is call'd the true and only saviour , is. . . but if we believe gentilis , the word in the new testament is not the one and only god , by consequence , neither will the word be our saviour , which is not only false , but blasphemous also . for ioh. . andrew says , we have found the messias [ speaking of christ or the word . ] therefore the minor , which was of gentilis's making , is false . again , there is no other god [ elohim ] besides the lord [ iehovah ] but the word ( according to gentilis ) is not that one only lord [ iehovah ] therefore he is not the true elohim or god : which conclusion is abominably absurd , and by consequence so is that proposition also of gentilis , from whence it follows . lastly , the word is in the new testament call'd a creator , colos. . ioh. . but that is a propriety of the only one god , therefore the name of the one only god belongs to the son also . from these and the like places of holy scripture , it 's easie to demonstrate how absurd and how impious a doctrine it is to assert , that , the father only [ exclusive of the son ] is call'd the one only god : seeing , on the contrary , it has been the constant faith of the church , that the father , son , and holy ghost , are that one , true , and only god reveal'd to us in the scriptures ; i say , one god 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or in essence subsisting in three persons . nor need we trouble our selves with that soveraignty of divine essence or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , since in the trinity there is a perfect equality , none is greater or less than [ none is afore or after ] another . unus & idem deus pater & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ejus semper assistens humane generi ; as says irenoeus , lib. . c. . but that soveraignty , which we oppose and deny , introduceth an inequality of prius & posterius , of majus & minus , or of order and majesty in the divine essence , and therefore is justly exploded . in the mean time we are not ignorant , how christ in respect of his human nature , and his office of mediator , is inferior to the father , and is also so styl'd in holy scripture . but this is nothing to the purpose , since the inequality , we expose , is not in the persons , but the essence of the deity . chap. xii . containing gentilis his censure of the fathers and their writings . we have now shewn our doctrine of the trinity to be agreeable to the sence of scripture , and the orthodox creeds . we have made it plain , how gentilis by new and forc'd expositions doth wrest the meaning of scripture to establish his notions , and with like improbity doth expound the creeds also . for not daring to deny the authority of the apostles creed , he hath by a wrong punctation falsly interpreted it , he safely despises and rejects the other creeds , and treats the fathers with the same respect . he upbraids athanasius with corrupting the nicene creed , and blushes not to call athanasius his own creed mere impertinent jargon , pag. . st. augustin he calls a dogmatical pedant , and others of them he bespatters with a great many more such complements . but however , lest he should seem to have no part of antiquity on his side , he flies to all the ancients , and * right or wrong hales them in to vouch for him . but his principal friends are iustin martyr , ignatius , tertullian , irenoeus and hilary . yet he hath not so great a veneration for them neither , but he can upon occasion despise , reject and discard them also ; so that upon the whole , he seems to claim nothing as his peculiar talent , so much as that excellent qualification which the greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a subtile craftiness to distinguish his cause , by wresting the law. wherefore we will now demonstrate and maintain our doctrine out of those very fathers he admits for authentick ; whereby it may easily be observed , how craftily he does abuse both their authority and judgments [ in order to the establishing his own opinion . ] chap. xiii . containing the iudgment of justin , martyr and philosopher . iustin martyr , an excellent writer , and who liv'd near the times of the apostles , is very orthodox , as to the article of the trinity , unless it be when his words are maliciously wrested to the new way of expounding scripture . for the better understanding therefore of this father , we must observe that his writings were compos'd upon different occasions . in his disputing with trypho the jew , he was to prove against the jews , that besides god the father , ( whom the jews acknowledge to have been the creator of all things ) there is another person , namely , the son of god , who is also the true god. nor in this doth he at all divide the substance , or essence , but distinguishes betwixt the persons or subsistences [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] . these passages are abus'd by gentilis , to establish his notion of a distinct essence . but that this was never the mind of iustin , will appear from his other writings against the gentiles , where he resolutely maintains , that there are not many , but one god. which any , that have carefully read this author , must necessarily know to be true . it appears then , that iustin took upon him to prove these two propositions : first , against the gentiles , that there was but one god , and not many , as the heathens did vainly imagine : and , secondly , that this god , who was but one in essence , did yet subsist in three persons . that the true , eternal god is but one , he proves from their own poets and philosophers , [ the gentiles being ignorant of the scriptures ] and particularly cites that verse out of orpheus : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and farther , to shew that the son was comprehended within the unity of the godhead , he brings another verse out of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the same poet , viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and elegantly interprets the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there mention'd to be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , word [ or son ] of god. from whence he concludes that those ancient poets did design to instruct us in the knowledge of the one god. now if it be prov'd out of orpheus , that he own'd but one only god , notwithstanding that he speaks of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as two distinct persons , it will then follow that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the one and only god. and however gentilis may wrest the author's words , contrary to his meaning , it is plain , that this epithet , namely , the one only god , belongs to the son. for , as i now said , he [ iustin ] does according to orpheus , infer the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from this propriety . besides , the same iustin martyr does expresly affirm of the son , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . nothing can be more plainly said of the divinity of the son of god. for [ says he ] he was not barely call'd angel and lord. but he himself only is said to be the angel and to be god. what is become then of that propriety of the father , whereby he is call'd the one only god , seeing you are here told that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or son is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. the only god ? again , when god says , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i am that i am ; iustin gives us the reason of this expression , namely , that he did not say this with respect to the son , as if he would so distinguish him from himself , but in contradiction to those who are not gods ; from whence it follows , that the son is not excluded from the self-existent deity : but this was said , that men might know that they did formerly serve not those which were , but those which were not gods. as to the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , iustin tells us the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to be understood of the true god. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , saith he , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for , says he , the pronoun , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , denotes or expresses the true and very god. therefore this makes nothing for the separation of the father and the son. for he presently after calls the son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the inseparable word of god. how then dare we be so bold as to make him distinct in essence from the father ? nay , make them two distinct numerical essences , and so too as that the one should be propagated by the other ? it is certainly a very impudent piece of presumption , amidst such an universal consent ; for us nicely to pry into these divine mysteries , which so vastly transcend our weak capacities : wherefore iustin very admirably closes this subject with that wise saying of mercurius , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. let us next consider his dialogue against tryphon the jew , that so we may see how pertinently gentilis does from thence prove his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or second essence ; of which , 't is certain , iustin never so much as dream'd . we must know then , that trypho acknowledg'd one god , the creator of heaven and earth , but did not allow the son and holy ghost to be god. wherefore it lay upon iustin to prove , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was true god , who assum'd unto himself human nature , made after the image of god. upon this account it is , that he often says , that the word was true god , which assum'd unto himself human nature ; and therefore that the name of god did belong to another [ viz. to the son ] besides the father ; that so both might be one god , seeing trypho himself affirm'd , that there could not be more gods. wherefore iustin does directly oppose the opinion of gentilis , but not so as to make two numerical divine essences , and to change the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . his words are these , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; i. e. there is another besides the creator of the universe , who both is , and is call'd god and lord. again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. this god , who is said and recorded to have appear'd to abraham , iacob , and moses , is another from him , who made all things , in number , i mean , but not in mind . thus he makes two numerically different hypostases in one essence . but gentilis , either through ignorance of the greek tongue , or out of his own malicious design , has mistaken this place , by thinking that iustin did here call the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another god. iustin himself explains his meaning in several other places ; where speaking of the son , he says , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. he is call'd god , and both is , and will be god. nay , farther he plainly calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , god of himself . for expounding that place in exodus . concerning the angel of the lord that appear'd in the burning bush , he says , that this angel was the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and presently after has these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. the scripture calls him this very being , thereby denoting that he is lord and god. from which expressions it evidently follows , that the son is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for in the first place it calls him the angel of the lord and minister of god , but immediately after styles the very same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the lord himself , and god himself . therefore the angel which appear'd unto moses , is in iustin's opinion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , god of himself . let us next see , what way iustin supposes the son to have been begotten . god , says he , did from all eternity beget of himself a certain rational energy or operation [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] which is call'd the glory of the lord , the son , the wisdom , the angel , god , lord , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the word . but then this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , says he , is not such an one as we see propagated by us . for we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by uttering of a word do make it ; which yet is not of our own substance , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ of another nature ] ; but the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 begotten of god is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ of the same substance ] . and to the same purpose he says afterwards , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 begotten of the father 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. by his energy and will is true god ; but he is not the true god , if he is begotten 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. by dividing or parting of his substance or essence , since things that are so divided remain not the same they were before division . from whence 't is as clear as the sun , that iustin's opinion was that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. of the very same substance with the father that begat him . again , we may gather that the son always was with the father from these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. the begotten was always with the father before [ the creation of ] all things , and with him did the father converse [ from all eternity ] . therefore there was always a father , and always a son , and they always were , are , and will be one god. or else 't would be improper to say , the word was inseparable from the father 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as the light is inseparable from the sun in the firmament . therefore when iustin says the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. the word , or that which was begotten , is numerically distinct from him that did beget him , he must be understood with respect to the number of persons , not of essences , for they are indeed two persons . and if we do not understand iustin with respect to the persons , we shall make him contradict himself , who so often urges the [ essential ] unity of the father and the son. nay , he would say the same with arius , who made use of this argument to prove the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 between the father and the son , because he that did beget was one , and he that was begotten was another . therefore he that was begotten differs from him that did beget , and that in number too ; but yet in number personal not substantial ; that is to say , they differ in subsistence , not in substance or essence . the same father in his apology to the roman senate , has these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . we worship ( says he ) god , [ viz. the father ] the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or word begotten by the eternal and ineffable god , and love him , who was made man for our sakes , that being made partaker of our possions and infirmities he might also heal them . in which words he distinguishes between the persons of the father and the son , and shews that the office of mediator , the mystery of the incarnation , and the redemption of mankind , which is the true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , belong properly to the son. then he shews , what form of invocation the christians did use , which was unknown to the romans ; namely , that they call'd upon or pray'd to the father in the name of the son , by whose merits they receiv'd redemption . all these passages gentilis wrests to another sence , and utterly rejects all the rest of his writings ; but especially his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. his exposition of the faith , where there is express mention made of a trinity . for citing the place of st. paul , ephes. . in whom you also are builded together for an habitation of god through the spirit , iustin adds , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that god , christ , and the holy ghost , one godhead , did by their energy or operations dwell in us . and presently after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. there is one name deliver'd down unto us , which jointly agrees to the father , son , and holy ghost . and again , he expresly mentions and proves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , the sameness or identity of essence . again , in the trinity , says he , we understand an unity , and in the unity we acknowledge a trinity . and again , we have deliver'd to you the doctrine of one godhead in three perfect subsistences , &c. now these and the like passages being so very plain , that it was impossible to elude their force , gentilis has chosen rather to deny this whole treatise , viz. the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , than change his judgment . and therefore 't will be needless to produce any more quotations , since , i think , it fully appears , from what we have said , what was the judgment of iustin martyr the philosopher in this particular . chap. xiv . containing the iudgment of st. ignatius . st . ignatius was contemporary with polycarp , and disciple to st. iohn , asis evident from eusebius in his chronicon . st. ierom says that he wrote several epistles , and reckons some of them . yet it is certain , that several spurious pieces have been attributed to him . however , i shall not now dispute their authority ; but supposing , with gentilis , that they are all genuine , let us see how far they do countenance his opinion . gentilis endeavours to prove from these epistles , that the son is in essence distinct from the father ; or , to use his own expression , that they are two * eternal spirits distinct in numerical essence . we , on the contrary affirm , that st. ignatius never so much as dream'd of any such thing , but taught that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or word , was one and the same god with the father , yet so , that they are in themselves personally distinct . in his epistle to the magnesians he says , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was not a pronounced , but a substantial word . and for what he says a little after , that he is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a begotten substance , thô it must be confess'd that this is an harsh expression , yet on the contrary it plainly appears , that he there meant nothing else by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but that which doth really subsist , i. e. an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; a subsistent being ; to which he opposes a vocal sound , which presently vanishes . in the same epistle he says of the son , that he declar'd the one and only true god to be his father ; and speaking of the doctrine of our lord , that he reveal'd to the world the true god his father . but what 's all this to a distinction of essence ? in his epistle to the tarsenses he says ▪ that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was not he who is god and father over all , but his son ; which amounts to no more than this , that the son was not the father ; which was the heresie of the patripassians , who did thus confound the persons . in his epistle to the philippians , he cites this place out of the cor : . there is but one god [ father ] of all things ; and presently after , there is but one god and father ; not two or three , one who is [ and there is no other besides him ] the only true god. but afterwards he adds , by way of explication , therefore there are not three fathers , nor three sons , nor three holy ghosts , but one father , and one son , and one holy ghost ; and proves this trinity from the institution of baptism , in the name of the father , son , and holy ghost ; not into any one that had three names , nor yet into three that were made men , but into three of the same majesty ; for there is one only who was made man , neither the father , nor the holy ghost , but only the son ; who was not so by estimation , or in appearance only , but in truth and reality ; for the word was made flesh and dwelt therein : so that here st. ignatius does plainly oppose the patripassians , and such like hereticks , but does not in the least favour [ or patronize ] gentilis his notion . in the very same epistle disputing against the patripassians , he writes thus : and again , how doth it appear unto you , that christ was not born of the virgin mary , but that it was he [ the father ] who is god above all , and almighty ? who then was it that sent him ? tell me who was he that rul'd over him ? whom did he obey , or whose law did he fulfill ? you , who would have him yield to no one's command or power , do separate christ from him that begat him ; you make the unbegotten to have been begotten , and him that was without beginning to have been nailed to the cross. which is all said by him in direct opposition to the patripassians or sabellians . in the same epistle , he brings in christ disputing against the devil : i know , says he , and have known one only god , whom i do not refuse to obey , but thou hast prov'd an apostate and rebel to him ; for i am not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. contrary to god , but i acknowledge his soveraignty , and do not refuse to worship him , whom i know to have been the author and lord of my nativity , and only preserver ; for i live in and through the father , &c. but these are the words of christ incarnate , who owns himself in respect of his humanity , to be inferior to the father . for if these words were to be understood with respect to the divine nature , how could christ be said to live propter patrem , or rather [ per. ] seeing he [ as god ] is self-existent , or hath life in himself , and power to lay it down . in his epistle to the philadelphians , he exhorts them to union , and draws his arguments from the unity of the flesh and blood of christ , from the mystical union of the bread and wine ; and likewise from the unity of the father and the son. his words are these : because there is one father unbegotten , and one only begotten son , god the word and man , and one holy ghost , the spirit of truth ; also one gospel , one faith , one baptism , and one church . by which words he only urges them to unity and concord in the church . hence he makes this conclusion , therefore it behoov'd them as a chosen people , a royal priesthood , and an holy nation , to be perfected in love and concord . to the same purpose is what he says in this epistle against ebion , who made christ a meer man , and therefore he shews , that christ was god begotten of the father ; which contains no absurdity in it , unless violently wrested [ by a faithless exposition . ] in his epistle to polycarp : here , says he , is the race , here the crown , wait for christ the son of god , who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , without time , and yet born in time. thus damascene , and others , call the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ignatius adds , that as god he was impassible , [ not capable of suffering ] but that as man he was passible , and did suffer for our sakes . and what can gentilis say against this ? will he say , that christ , as god , did suffer ? and that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as such , had properly flesh and blood ? st. ignatius is of another mind , and doth plainly and orthodoxely distinguish the two natures under [ or in ] the one person of christ. the one of which , namely , the divine , is properly and per se impassible ; but the other , viz. the human , is properly passible . gentilis confounds these proprieties of the two natures , and affirms that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 had himself all these affections . christ , indeed , has properly flesh and bones , and blood , being truly and properly incarnate . but the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or divine nature in christ , has no such properly in it self . in his epistle to the antiochians he says , that we ought not to deny christ under pretence of asserting one god , and brings several testimonies out of scripture , as deut. . isai. . gen. . & . which do all speak of one god , and at the same time express different persons ; as when moses saith , the lord rain'd [ fire and brimstone ] from the lord ; and yet in other places saith , there is but one god , which unity doth not exclude the son and holy ghost ; whom he , on the contrary , includes with the father in the unity of the godhead . so that a trinity of persons doth not at all interfere with the unity of essence . and at the end of that epistle , he truly distinguishes the properties of the persons . may he protect and defend you ( says he ) who is the only unbegotten god , [ speaking of the father ] through him who was begotten before all ages , i. e. through the son , whose property it is to be begotten . but here gentilis objects the last clause of this epistle , viz. valete deo & christo , as if these were different , and the father alone was call'd god , but christ dominus or lord , so as to be excluded from the communion or fellowship of the only god. in his epistle to the ephesians , he commends them for being one body , and adds this argument for their union : for , says he , there is one lord , one faith , one baptism , one god and father of us all . but it is not ignatius's opinion , that the father was the only one god ; no more doth it appear from the following sentence of his , medicus noster est solus verus deus , deus ingenitus . for if these epithets were to be understood of the father only , the son would not then be our physician : but st. ignatius distinguishes the persons here only by their proprieties ; for a little after he calls christ our physician , impassible in a passible body . chap. xv. concerning the iudgment of tertullian . tertullian , without doubt , is to be read with a great deal of caution , as gentilis himself confesses ; and therefore it is the easier for him either to pass by and reject his authority , as he pleases , or else to extol and commend it , as occasion serves . but tertullian , as in many other places , so particularly in his book against praxeas is very orthodox , where he expresly says [ of the persons in the trinity ] that numerum sine divisione patiuntur ; they allow of number without division : and afterwards , ubique teneo unam substantiam in tribus cohoerentibus ; i do always acknowledge one substance in the three thus united . gentilis says , that in these and the like places tertullian spoke waveringly , and will have them refer to montanus his paraclete ; which , notwithstanding all this , are very orthodox . but on the contrary , we say that tertullian against hermogenes did not only speak doubtfully , but did actually make use of the phrases and expressions of arius ; when he says , there was a time when the son of god was not ; which saying must of necessity be extreamly well lik'd by gentilis , as that which doth make the son posterior to the father in the order of the godhead . but it is plainly an arian expression , the same with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which we have already mention'd out of nicephorus , lib. . cap. . but tertullian doth often recollect himself , and not only makes use of proper expressions , but seems likewise to be orthodox enough in his notions , as in the same treatise against hermogenes he says , divinitas gradum non habet utpote unica ; the divinity or godhead can admit of no degrees , as being but one . these and the like passages do sufficiently demonstrate , that tertullian acknowledg'd no separation , no division in the godhead ; but yet , in respect of the different persons , he did allow of a numerical distinction . and thus much we thought fit to take out of iustin martyr , ignatius and tertullian ; these being the fathers to whom gentilis lays so great a claim , as if they were wholly patrons of his opinion . i shall not concern my self much with any of the others , since the opinions of hilary and irenaeus are too well known , to give any one just occasion to suspect , that they were favourers of this pestilential error ; and those passages gentilis quotes out of them are answer'd by the authors themselves . nor shall i at present bring any quotations out of the many other both greek and latin writers , since gentilis rejects all their authorities . chap. xvi . concerning the other fathers , especially st. austin . gentilis then , without any distinction , rejects all other both greek and latin writers , and who cannot but wonder at the daring confidence of such a fellow ? here we have a censorious * upstart , who like another aristarchus , boldly arraigns and condemns all antiquity , unless they will acknowledge three eternal distinct spirits in the divine oeconomy ; and all the three hundred and eighteen fathers assembled in the nicene council , must be herded amongst the hereticks , because they confess'd but one god eternal . he prefers arius before them all , would he but have admitted the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as newly explain'd by himself . but i will not oppose him with fallible human authority , seeing we may easily consute this blasphemous error out of the scripture it self . and arius , whose wicked spirit seems now to revive in , or to rest upon this monster of iniquity , was condemn'd of old , and confuted not by human authority , but from the holy scriptures and consent of the church . my design being historically to make it appear , that this wicked man has set up a new interpretation of holy scripture , and to gain his point the easier , has , without any modesty or civility , taken liberty to rail at and calumniate , not only the fathers , but likewise all the orthodox councils . however , he ought either to have submitted to such approv'd authors , and to the consent of the church , or else to have confuted them out of the word of god. this he does not , but cites some few places of scripture , upon which he puts a new interpretation ; and when we deny this to be the true meaning of them , and assert , that the church of god did never understand those places in such a manner , and for proof of it appeal to all the authentick writers both amongst the greeks and latins , he cries out , that we are a parcel of dogmatical pedants and hereticks , and presently flies over to arius , and the bishops , which follow'd him , as if there were a better interpretation of scripture amongst them , than there is in athanasius , and those who approv'd of his confession of faith. he treats st. austin in a very scurrilous manner , no ways deserv'd by so excellent a writer . he charges him , as well as us , with holding a quaternity , a notion he never was so phantastick as to dream of . he styles that reverend father an enthusiastick writer , a magician , and a sophister , such calumnies as he never receiv'd at the hands of his most mortal enemies . the trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , he calls an imaginary being , an ens rationis , and st. austin's goddess , which is downright abominable blasphemy . and notwithstanding all this , our crafty scribler , to reconcile himself to st. austin , and wipe off the odium such rude expressions must necessarily bring upon him , at last gravely pronounces this oracular saying , that he believes , were st. austin now alive , and could enjoy but this clear light of the gospel , he would , with his own hands , throw his books of the trinity into the flames . a thing very likely indeed ! that st. austin shou'd take example from this vile man , and perjure himself as he hath done . but of this enough . chap. xvii . concerning the communication of attributes , or proprieties . the scripture speaking of the son of god , doth attribute that to one of his natures , which doth properly belong to the other , as ioh. . no one hath ascended up into heaven , but the son of man , who is in heaven . christ , indeed , as he was the son of man , could not then be in heaven when he spoke these words , nor did he take his flesh from heaven . but all this is proper to the divine nature only , and may be truly affirm'd of whole christ , by reason of the personal union of the word with man. by a like form of speech we say , that god suffer'd and died for us , which are very improper expressions , [ if strictly taken ] since god cannot properly be said to suffer or to dye ; and therefore we use to add , by way of explication , that it was in carne assumptâ , in the flesh that he assum'd . this way of speaking the ancients call'd communicatio idiomatum , or the communication of properties ; others call'd it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , damascene styles it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; as if we should say , by way of exchange , or mutual distribution , whereby we attribute that to the human nature , which is proper to the divine ▪ as to be in heaven before the incarnation ; or when , contrariwise , that is attributed to the divine nature , which is proper only to the human , as to dye and to suffer ; or else we affirm that of the whole person , which is truly and properly said , because christ in his human nature did dye , thô not in his divine . nor is this way of speaking in any wise improper or absurd : for don't we , in respect of us mortals , upon the very same account say , that such a man is dead , thô this cannot be properly said of the whole man ; for man is mortal only in respect of his body , his soul is immortal , and survives after death . yet because the union of soul and body is that which makes the man one , hence it is that we affirm that of the whole man , which only agrees to one part of him . so we say of christ , that he suffer'd and is dead ; which properly do not at all belong to the divinity , but agree to christ as he is man , who is withal the same god , and one and the same christ. here gentilis cries out , that we divide christ , and make a separation in him , and yet allows that there are some properties , which agree to the word only , before he took our nature upon him . such is that , iohn . no one hath ascended up into heaven , but he that came down from heaven , the son of man which is in heaven , &c. and iohn . before abraham was , i am . and heb. . by whom also he made the worlds . now if , as gentilis grants , these expressions can only agree to the word before he was made flesh , i think it is plain , that they are improperly attributed to the human nature ; and by consequence , we rightly explain them by a communication of properties [ or idioms ] . and that we do not divide christ , nor make or maintain here any separation , is clear from the doctrine of our church , wherein we do plainly acknowledge two natures in christ , and yet without any confusion of the natures , the personal union making one and the same christ , the son of god and the blessed virgin. we likewise distinguish the natures by their properties , but do not divide or separate them , and by this means preserve whole and entire all the offices of the person of christ. we say it is proper to the human nature to weep , to be hungry , to sleep , to suffer to dye , to be circumscribed in a place , &c. on the other hand it is proper to the divine nature , to be impassible , to make the worlds , to be with the father from all eternity , before abraham was , &c. we say that the offices of christ are to redeem mankind , to intercede for them , to govern his church , and whatever else may be said to belong to christ , either as prophet , priest , or king. now gentilis being able to deny nothing of all this , 't is clear , that he quarrels with the plainest expressions meerly out of heat and desire of contention ; and doth therefore unjustly style this orthodox doctrine , such impertinent trifles as deserve to be hiss'd out of the church ; which he hath not only done in his epistle dedicatory to the king of poland , but hath also , without any just or sufficient reason , maliciously calumniated the same in the th book of his antidotes . but there is yet at the bottom of all this , something still more monstrously heretical ; for he often affirms , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 had truly and properly flesh and blood , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was truly and properly nail'd to the cross ; and that the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did properly suffer . now had this been said of christ , it had been without controversie true ; but since 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth signifie only the divine nature in christ , which is united to the human nature in the person of christ , he must necessarily think , that either a spirit hath flesh and bones , which our saviour himself hath positively deny'd , or else that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was incorporated , or rather turn'd into flesh ; or as the monophysites did affirm , both the natures were made into one ; unless he will confess with us , that 't is an improper way of speaking to say that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did suffer or dye ; whereby that is attributed to the divine nature , which is proper only to the human , by reason of the hypostatick union of both natures in christ , which is what we call communicatio idiomatum . chap. xviii . containing some of gentilis's notorious blasphemies . another remarkable instance of this man's impiety , may be taken from that scurrilous , impudent , blasphemous language he hath so freely bestow'd upon this most sacred mystery ; a mystery , that we ought rather in humility to adore , than nicely to pry into . it must be consess'd , that even good men do sometimes disagree in their explication of things , and are not always of the same mind in their interpretations of scripture ; but yet they do it without railing , without opprobrious language , and much more do they abstain from the blacker crimes of irreligion and blasphemy . 't is no good sign of a religious disposition , to scandalize and bespatter the subject in dispute ; and yet however , gentilis has been so liberal of his railery , that had he rak'd even hell it self , he could not have met with more dirty noisome expressions , nor more offensive to any judicious person . he sticks not to call the trinity an idol ; the tow'r of babel ; a new idol , which we have erected above the father ; a tripersonate mock-god ; a diabolical , fictitious person ; a fictitious propriety and sophistical person in a new god. and pag. . an imaginary phantastick person . pag. . he calls the trinity , trium horrenda confusio & execrabilis mixtura . and pag. . says , that we have invented this new god , the trinity , out of our own heads . pag. . he styles it a fourth idol , which deserves to be thrust down into hell. and pag. . calls the first person in the undivided godhead a magical phantom , an empty spectrum , that has begotten another imaginary person , or meer relation . antid . . he calls the deus trinitas , nomen monstrosum . and pag. . he will have it be nothing but magical persons and proprieties . again , a magical propriety in a new idol . pag. . the three persons he calls three magical impostures ; and the one god he styles a fourth unknown idol . in his printed book , fol. . he calls the trinity a meer human invention , diametrically opposite to the truth of the gospel ; the belief of a trinity is perfect sophistry . and again , the trinity is deus trinomius , a god only under three names ; which last he seems to have borrow'd from sabellius . again , fol. . the trinity is call'd a new god , indefinite , tripersonate , a god , which none of the prophets or patriarchs ever knew of ; which christ never revealed , nor the apostles ever preach'd . he styles our blessed saviour christus tergeminus , p. . of his printed book ; and in his epistle to the sons of the church tells them , christ was transform'd into one , which was not the son of god. pag. . he calls him the son of the father ; that is , says he , of a meer empty relation * : then calls him a tripartite metamorphos'd christ. god the father he calls a fruitless , idle , unknown god. but perhaps it will be said , that these railleries were design'd only against us , not against the mystery it self . it is true , indeed , that gentilis does generally endeavour to throw his scandals upon us , and bespatter our doctrine with these abusive terms ; yet it can't be deny'd , but that he is so profane , as in a vast many places plainly to condemn the word trinity , although he makes use of it himself , as is clearly prov'd by his epistle to the king of poland ; where , in the sixth page , he complains , that there were several monstrous and * profane terms brought into the church , such as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , person , essence , unity , trinity , whereby all the holy mysteries of religion were overturn'd , and the knowledge of the eternal god , with his son , and holy ghost , was quite lost . in this charge he was led on by gregorius paulus , who calls these two phrases , viz. the one essence of god , and one god in three persons the inventions and cunning contrivance of the devil . but however , since the phrases these men endeavour to explode , have been the constant language of the church , i think it needs no other demonstration , to prove that gentilis is not only profane in his expressions , but makes use also of diabolical stratagems [ to overthrow the establish'd doctrine ] of the church . but the last and most plausible argument , which they use , is this : gentilis complains to king sigismund , that luther , zuinglius and bucer , were wholly taken up in demolishing the outworks of antichrist ; and that , amongst so many thousand reformers , only philip had attempted any thing in this glorious undertaking ; and that too so indirectly , that he seem'd rather to threaten its ruin , than to have given it any deadly wound . to the same purpose gregorius paulus says , that god began by luther to demolish the church of antichrist at the roof , not at the foundation , left the noisome stench of the ruins should have stifled them . and all this is , because they left the doctrine of the trinity unattacked ; therefore they are said by them to have begun at the outworks , and the roof , not at the principal fort and foundation of antichrist . thus these witty gentlemen are pleas'd to sport amongst themselves . yet , after all , it is certain , that their quarrelling with these words is only to find some means to escape ; and therefore it is , that they fall so foul upon the blessed labours of those good men. then they interpret every thing as they please , and take the liberty of condemning whatever makes against them ; and hence it is , that they endeavour to refine and new model the language and expressions of the church , which being a task far above their weak abilities , [ rather than seem to be nonplust ] they despitefully scatter such horrid expressions and bitter calumnies , as no good christian can hear without horrour and astonishment . his book to the king of poland is fraught with such elegancies and ornaments as these , and his common discourse was wont to be set off with the like embellishments ; so that he seems to please himself , and hopes to raise his reputation by this means . chap. xix . of the vile scandals he hath falsly thrown upon the doctrine of our church . gentilis is very dextrous in forging of false accusations , for he unjustly charges our church with several crimes he will never be able to prove against her ; as first , that we do impudently deny christ to have been the son of god. secondly , that we have unadvisedly brought a new god into the christian religion . thirdly , that we affirm that god did not beget his son of his own substance . if cardinal cusanus said any such thing , let him look to it , the reform'd , or evangelick churches , are not bound to answer for his errors . fourthly , that we made a triple god contrary to the authority of the scriptures . abundance more of such sort of stuff is contain'd in his antidotes ; all which i here industriously avoid . for what good man can hear with patience such a rascally fellow thus sawcily abusing and undermining the christian religion ? hence it is , that he gives us the titles of opposers of god ; iudaïzing hereticks ; and as bad as turks ; and passes the same complements upon the churches of savoy also , which yet he acknowledges to be the most uncorrupted , and best reform'd , of any he knew . he compares us with the turks and iews for denying ( as he says ) with mahomet , that god did beget his son. but who can say that he ever heard amongst us , that we devis'd another god superior to the father of christ ? who amongst us ever taught or affirm'd any such thing ? hence he took that specious pretence of a quaternity , a thing that was never seen or heard of , much less worshipp'd in our church . he accounts our faith to be meer sophistry , and our selves novices and sophisters ; yet gives no reason for it . thus this crafty fellow comically sports with us ; but the true reason is , because we deny his three eternal spirits , and do say , with athanasius , there is one eternal , one almighty ; but that the three persons are three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. only three subsistences . and when we say , deus est trinus , or there is a trinity in the godhead , he starts up as . if he were mad , and cries out , that we make the trinity a fourth god ; as if we asserted any deus trinitas besides , or without the father , son , and holy ghost . but this is certainly too gross and palpable a calumny , for we own the trinity only to relate to these three persons ; and besides , or without them , there is neither god , nor trinity . of the same strain is his calumny of our defending an unknown god , superior to the father of christ ; and making three christs out of one . we acknowledge and defend the god , that was known and reveal'd to our fathers , but do set up no unknown god. we know there is but one christ , in whom two natures do conspire to make one person ; and therefore we judge it to be impious and heretical , to say there are three christs [ or that christ is tergeminus . ] but that scandal is of a blacker dye , of our dividing christ , and transforming him into another , which is not the son of the living god. let this blasphemer shew us any other christ besides that son of god , and let him make it out , where , and how , we do divide christ. of the same nature are those impostures he charges us with , of conjuring up a new christ the son of a new relation , and then deceitfully believing him to be the son of god. we believe in the son of god as reveal'd in the scriptures , but acknowledge none of gentilis's impostures . we constantly assert , without any deceit , [ or fraud ] three persons in the godhead ; nor do we divide the substance , but do distinguish between the persons . he hits us in the teeth with * sabellianism , whilst we do more justly charge him with the blasphemy of arius . the doctrine of our church doth plainly prove , that there is nothing in it agreeing with sabellius ; whereas he blushes not openly to defend arius , and to prefer him before all the fathers of the nicene council . and however cautious he may seem to be , in his keeping the middle way between arius and sabellius , yet i am perswaded his opinions are as bad as either of theirs . chap. xx. of the cheats and impostures , whereby he endeavour'd to impose upon good ( well-meaning ) people . inow come to the last chapter ( or last head of his accusation ) wherein i shall make it appear , by what sly artifices gentilis endeavour'd to impose upon [ or cheat ] every one he had to do with . for , indeed , he has shewn himself to be exactly such an one as the poet has comically describ'd mercury , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; one that had got an excellent knack of changing his name . first then , he prefix'd to the confession he publish'd , a forg'd preface , under the name of theophilus the printer to the sons of the church . this he compos'd himself , and wrote it with his own hand , wherein he extravagantly commends to the reader the vast treasure contain'd in that little book ; a book , says he , so excellent , that it were to be wish'd all churches might have the happiness to enjoy the use of it and , the better to set off his unmerchantable ware , he makes as if the printer were vastly desirous of having the rest of gentilis his writings made publick ; and despises the bulky volumes , and vast , tedious , paradoxical books of other authors , if compar'd with gentilis his works . but this ( methinks ) is a trick no ingenuous or honest man would have been guilty of in a matter of such moment . christ , the prophets , and apostles , never made use of these little artifices to recommend their writings to posterity . it was wisely said of king solomon , let another praise thee , and not thine own mouth . and we have a proverbamong our selves , which says , that they must needs have bad neighbours , who are forc'd to commend themselves . but the truth is , he was afraid , that had he not under a feign'd name commended it himself , the book would certainly have met with no body else that would have been so kind , as to give it a good character . secondly , he was asraid to discover the place where it was printed . for thô the book had been published at lyons , yet he craftily pretends it was done at antwerp . but these were but civil lies he made use of the better to disperse his pernicious principles . thirdly , he begins his confession with the same probity ; it was by your command , honoured sir , &c. for the better understanding of which cheat , i desire all good men to take notice , that the truth of the whole business is this : gentilis being under custody , was commanded in that quality to exhibit a confession of his faith to the governour of gaium , which he design'd should be examin'd by the clergy of that province : but in the mean time , gentilis , whose character was not yet fully known , nor his confession examin'd , was , by the intercession of some friends , dismiss'd out of prison upon his good behaviour , the governour all the while , not in the least suspecting he had kept a copy of his confession to himself . but as soon as he was dismiss'd , he immediately dispers'd his confession , as if he had been commanded by the governour so to do . the governour did , indeed , command him , as being a suspected heretick , to exhibit a confession , but never gave him orders to publish such a blasphemous libel under the protection of his name . all that gentilis could ever say in defence of this notorious forgery , was only this ; that as the governour never did command him , so neither did he ever forbid him to publish it . but what reason , i pray you , had he to prohibit him , when as he never suspected , that he would have had the impudence to publish it . but fourthly , we have already told you , and that from his own mouth , how he publish'd such confessions of the trinity , both at grenoble and lyons , as were admitted for orthodox by the * papists themselves . and yet he has the impudence to accuse us for joyning with them in the defence of a quaternity , and for submitting to the grievous errors of the greek and latin fathers in this doctrine . certainly there cannot be a more malicious and deceitful representation of this doctrine , than this wicked man has given out . so that i may more truly call his false accusations impostures , sophistry , magick , and much worse names . fifthly , at his return out of poland , he presented to the governour of gaium a draught or form , for having a publick disputation , which i shall here present the reader with , as it is transcrib'd verbatim from his own original ; that so all honest men may see , what sort of spirit it was that govern'd him through the whole transaction . the instrument , which he caus'd to be publish'd under the governor's name , ran in the following form . to all and singular the pastors , teachers , deacons and elders , of the reform'd and evangelick churches , dispers'd through savoy and france , to whom these letters shall come , or to whom they shall be read , health and peace in the lord. forasmuch as we have read and consider'd the above-written propositions , that are opposite to each other ; and having heard the iust and reasonable petition of valentinus gentilis an italian , humbly requesting , that this weighty controversie might be decided barely from the word of god ; the illustrious governor of gaium has , upon these considerations , thought fit to transmit copies of the doctrine asserted by both parties , into several places of france , and savoy , more particularly to lyons and geneva , to the intent , that if there be any of mr. calvin 's disciples , who will take upon him to defend the assertions of his master , he may come to gaium within the space of one week , there to dispute with gentilis , upon this condition , that whosoever shall not be able to demonstrate the propositions , he undertook to maintain , to be true , out of the plain word of god , shall be look'd upon as a notorious impostor , and assertor of a false religion , and shall * suffer death for the same . but if there be none that shall appear within the time here prescribed , the illustrious governor , with the whole senate of gaium , are resolv'd , as is most fitting , publickly to declare , that the abovenam a gentilis is truly orthodox in his opinions concerning the most high god , and his son iesus christ , &c. i desire all good men to observe , what an advantagious way of disputing ( for himself i mean ) our adversary has here prescribed . for gentilis's propositions are first presumed to be pious and sound ; then there is only eight days time allow'd for the disputants to come together ; whereas 't was almost impossible for the challenge to be sent to them in so short a time . but that is particularly to be taken notice of , that no body was to dispute but under penalty of losing his life , if conquer'd . is not this , i pray you , an evident sign of a seducing and diabolical spirit ? and when he was charg'd with this base contrivance , his answer was , that he did it only that he might have the fewer opposers . but this bloody spirit sufficiently betrays it self , that would involve religion in murder and false opinions ; but that ( thanks be to the good providence of god ) the ruin he design'd against others , fell upon his own pate . and last of all , when he was to have taken his tryal , and to have desended his doctrine , he did , by a remarkable piece of knavery , endeavour to obtain the privilege of a plaintif , and to be heard as such , thereby to avoid being try'd as a criminal ; and when that could not be granted him , he propos'd his doctrine so ambiguously , and rais'd scruples about matters , altogether impertinent to the controversie , as whether there was one most high god ; and whether christ was the son of god , and the like ; which no body did ever deny . but he was still oppos'd in this , that christ was to be excluded from the unity of the eternal god ; and that three eternal spirits , distinguish'd by numerical essence , ought to be allow'd . and now let all good men judge , what we ought to think of this blasphemy ; and how justly he was punish'd with death , who durst challenge others to dispute with him for their lives . but it is now high time to rid my hands of this business . in short then , after that we had us'd all manner of means with him , even from the th of august to the th of september , ( but all to no purpose , he still persevering obstinate in his opinions ) he was at last condemn'd to dye by the honorable senate . and because it may be acceptable to the reader , i shall here rehearse the sentence of condemnation , which was pronounced against him in the following words . whereas valentinus gentilis , a native of cosentia , in the kingdom of naples , after eight years preparation to attack the doctrine of the trinity , did begin openly to teach , that there were in the trinity three distinct spirits , differing from each other in numerical essence : amongst which ( three spirits ) he acknowledges the father only to be that infinite god , which we ought to worship , which is plain blasphemy against the son ; and , besides this opinion , has broach'd several other dangerous errors , for which he was apprehended by the magistrates of geneva , and being fully convicted of them , there made his recantation , and did publickly confess , detest , and * abjure , these his wicked opinions ; and moreover , bound himself by oath not to depart out of that city without leave of the senate , yet notwithstanding all this , violated the sacred obligations of his oath , by stealing away from thence , and by relapsing into the erroneous opinions he had once abjur'd , and re-assuming their defence with greater heat and earnestness , both by disputing and writing books in opposition to the plain and express testimonies of scripture ; and hath been guilty of the vilest scurrility , and most horrid blasphemies , against the son of god , and the glorious mystery of the trinity . and lastly , since his being made prisoner to this honorable senate , hath , notwithstanding that full and sufficient instruction which hath been given him , still continued obstinate in his perverse and heretical opinions : this honourable senate , to prevent disturbances , and to root out such pestilent errors , have adjudg'd him * to be beheaded . as he was led out to execution , the obstinate wretch did not cease to glory in his unruly and pertinacious stubbornness , and expecting praise from it ( as the devil's martyrs use to do ) never lest off crying out , that he died a martyr for the glory of the most high god ; but that we * were all sabellians , and held one god under three names ; but that he did acknowledge no god 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and thô we frequently answer'd him , that the things he laid to our charge were all * false and slanderous ; that all the noise he made about this most high god was only mere sophistry , and that his asserting more gods than one was downright impiety , yet we could work nothing upon him . for he still continued to repeat his old blasphemies , until he saw there was no help for him , but that he must be forc'd to lay down his neck to the block ; then he began to faulter , and said , he should be very willing to agree with us , if so be we would but own christ to be the son of god ; when we told him , this was what we never deny'd ( for what otherwise would have become of our faith ? ) then again did he discover his falshood and treachery , as having still been us'd to appropriate the appellation of god to the person of the father only ; and in this horrid blasphemy he still persever'd , the whole assembly ( that stood by ) praying to god that he would change his mind , and we continually exhorting him to repentance , he had * his life taken from him by the just judgment of god ; and so his life and his blasphemies ended together . and thus i have given thee ( good reader ) a brief and faithful account of this shatter'd history . and must now beg thee to joyn with us in our prayers to god , that he would , in his mercy , turn away such scandalous offences from his church ; that he would give his people vigilant and able ministers , who may sincerely love sound doctrine , successfully rebuke gainsayers , and know how to divide the word of truth rightly , to the glory of his name , and the good of his church , through jesus christ his only and coeternal son. amen . the reader , by comparing the preceding history with what here follows , will perceive that the principal proposition of valentinus gentilis , is in sence perfectly the same with those condemned by the late oxon censure ; as also asserted by dr. sherlock . at a meeting of the vice-chancellor and the heads of colleges and halls of the university of oxford , on the th day of november , in the year of our lord . whereas in a sermon lately preached before the university of oxford , in the church of st. peter in the east , on the feast of s. simon and iude last past , these words , amongst others , were deliver'd and asserted , viz. [ there are three infinite distinct minds and substances in the trinity . ] item [ that the three persons in the trinity are three distinct infinite minds or spirits , and three individual substances . ] which gave just cause of offence and scandal to many persons : the vice-chancellor and heads of colleges and halls , at their general meeting this day assembled , do judge and declare the said words to be false , impious , and heretical ; contrary to the doctrine of the catholick church , and particularly to the received doctrine of the church of england : and do therefore strictly forbid all manner of persons , under their care and charge , to preach or publish any such doctrine for the future . by order of mr. vice-chancellor . ben. cooper notarie publick and register of the university of oxon. this sentence , it is confessed , may , and , not improbably , will be confirmed , and sarther enforced , by the more authentick sentence of the whole university in convocation : in the mean time , it has certainly had this good effect , that it has unkennelled the wolf , who quickly shew himself after it . so that being hereby bereaved of all his shifts , meanings , and subterfuges , and sheeps cloathing besides , the university has him now in full chase , and , 't is hoped , will not give the chase over , till it has run him down . some of the grosser errata of the press are thus to be corrected . s for f frequently . pag. . l. . for produee r. produce . p. . l. . for i am r. i am. p. . in the margent , for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - men , l. . for pennancae r. penance , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a. p. . l. . for personies subsistenies r. persones subsistentes , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. , r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with one accent , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , l. . for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. and then the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * see dr. sherlock's examination of the oxford censure , p. . i am not afraid ( says he ) to commend genebrard and petavius before calvin and his followers , who denied the nicene faith of [ god of god ] . see pag. . of his preface against tritheism charged , &c. note , that this book of genebrard has not the numeral mark upon every page , but only upon every leaf of it . * unus ille spiritus essentialiter est tres spiritus personaliter geneb . contra schegkium de trinitate , fol. . p. . and again , tres sunt aeterni spiritus quorum unusquisque per se deus est , fol. . p. . * tres personas ( says geneva to schegkins ) uni essentiae affigis ut synagogis gallicis & germanicis placeas , quos jam omnes sabellians scelere contaminatas atque conspurcatas docui . geneb . fol. . and again , illud est quod ecclesiam à te vestrisque synagogis separat , quas omnes arrtano vel sabelliano scelere irretitas meridie ipso clarius demonstravi , & clarissie demonstrabo in opere quod contra istum apostatam zanchium parturio . fol. . p. . ☞ * when the nominal trinitarians have call'd till they are hoarse , weary and asham'd , to universities and bishops to espouse their cause , and censure the real trinitarians , &c. all their appeals notwithstanding , it will not be long e're they are told by their-superiors in the church , that it is expedient for them to be quiet , lest themselves be censured as sabellians answer to dr. bull , p. . col . . ☞ notes for div a -e ☜ ☞ see dr. sherl . taking the same course since ; as appears from these words . the truth is , that which has confounded this mystery ( viz. of the trinity ) has been the vain endeavour to reduce it , to terms of art , such as nature , essence , substance , subsistence , hypostasis , and the like . vind. trin. p. . l. the last , and page . l. the first . notes for div a -e so that dr. sherl . may find sevaral 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , much antienter than himself . ☞ so says philoponus , joachim , and dr. sherlock , with the rest of the tritheistick tribe . calvin says that he had most perfidiously for sworn himself thrice . but tritheists must be allowed to have more skill in dealing with an oath , than other men. see calvin's narrative of gentilis , in his opuscula , p. . st. hilary . * particularly by genebrardus . see the account given of him by calvin in his opuscula . as dr. sherlock , and his tritheistical followers now do in england . andtherefore not preached from thence before their universities ; nor written against by one only amongst them , and no more . * much like dr. sherlock's modest examination , &c. so does dr. sherlock . * and those i suppose passed in their respective convocations . ☞ ☜ ☜ the fourth and sixth are dr. sherlock's doctrine expresly . * perhaps he meant gypsie-cant and meer gibberish . * so that we see , three eternal spirits are but an old story , and vented long before the year . * dr. sherlock defends the very same . * he might have added in mutual consciousness too . let dr. sherl and his party give a satisfactory answer to this , if they can . * or that the godhead subsists by it self , out of the persons , but actually and wholly in the persons , and not otherwise . ☜ * or a trinity which is god. * what ? not explained by self-consciousness and mutual consciousness ? which , we are told , makes a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , a plain , easie , and intelligible notion , and solves all difficulties about it . sh. vin trin. * since condemned and equally exploded by dr. sherl . theod : l. . c. . ☜ augustin lib. . de trin. cap. . vide erasmi observat. * which may be communicated indeed , but yet not made , nor created , according to this latter sence of the word . * viz. in all the senses of the word . ☞ * nor multiplication . * and of mutual consciousness too . isaiah . * iust , no doubt , as his successor dr. sherlock intends to do in the account he has promised us , out of the fathers , of his tritheistick hypothesis of distinct infinite minds in the blessed trinity . * the true tritheistical dialect . * and at this day we have such another amongst us . ☞ ☞ pag. . p. . p. . p. . * did the father beget a mode and call it his son ? says dr. sh. vin. trin. p. . * dr sherlock perfectly agrees with him in this assertion . * dr. sherlock 's constant charge upon such as deny three distinct infinite minds or spirits in the trinity . * viz. such as genebrard a sorbon doctor , who , to his eternal infamy , both defended gentilis , and asserted three distinct eternal spirits in the trinity . see his answer to skegkius de trinitate , fol. . p. . * so that gentilis suffered just according to his own . conditions . ☜ the sentence of condemnation passed upon gentilis . * viz. three distinct eternal spirits ; for so it is in the th proposition , set down in the th chapter and in the th also , where he says the father , son , and h. gh. tres sunt aeterni spiritus qui unus esse non possunt . * valentinus gentilis a great abjurer . * this genebrard very learnedly calls crematus est , fol. . and ultricibus flammis traditus , fol. . dr. sherlock's language all along . * our answer to him is and ought to be the same ; tho' ( god be thank'd ) the tongue of a tritheist , be it never so false , is no slander . * how much better does it fare with tritheism in england ? which , tho' it lost its head at bern , lifts up its head ( as high as pauls ) here . some considerations concerning the trinity and the ways of managing that controversie gastrell, francis, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing g estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. 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[ ], p. printed and sold by e. whitlock ..., london : . written by francis gastrell. cf. dnb. reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng sherlock, william, ?- . -- vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion some considerations concerning the trinity : and the ways of managing that controversie . london , printed ; and sold by e. whitlock , near stationers-hall . mdcxcvi . the preface to the reader . this discourse was written some time ago for the private satisfaction of the author , who thought that a proper season for an impartial enquiry into the doctrine of the trinity , when several persons of different opinions in that point had just before appeared in the controversie about it , and their printed papers being canvas'd over again in conversation , had produced many new remarks upon the same subject . which advantages , together with what he had formerly read , having , as he judged , given him a pretty full comprehension of the matters in dispute , he took the following method of re-examining that part of his faith , and justifying what he believed to his own reason and conscience . some persons to whom he communicated what he had writ , advised him to print : which he had done before now , upon the judgment of a great and learned man of the church , lately dead , who was pleased to approve the papers , without knowing to whom they belonged : but occasion being given him to fore-see some little objections , which might , probably , at that particular time , have in some measure obstructed his good intentions in printing them , he thought fit to defer the publication of them till a more convenient opportunity , such as he judges this to be , when the controversie of the trinity is managed in such a manner as to offend a great many , and satisfie very few ; and the church is like to suffer very much by the too adventurous attempts made by some to vindicate her doctrines . those who pretend to explain the distinction in the godhead by modes , offices , relations , and the like , are censured as saying too little , and coming much below the characters of distinction to be found in scripture ; though , at the same time they use these terms , they acquaint us that they use them in a different sense from any they are taken in , when applied to creatures , and in a sense importing greater difference , but such as is not conceivable by human understanding . and some of those who call the three divine persons three infinite minds , spirits , or substances , would not be thought to mean by these expressions , that the three persons in the godhead are as much distinguished from one another as three men , or three angels are ; but that the distinction betwixt them is so great , that no other terms can reach it , though these do somewhat exceed what they would signifie by them : which distinction , less than these expressions , in the common use of them , do import , and higher than any other can come up to , is acknowledg'd likewise to be inconceivable . which being observed by the author of this discourse , he thought it more advisable to use no new terms with a design of explaining what , by the confession of persons of different sides in the dispute , is not to be rendred more conceivable . and , to justifie his opinion in this matter , he has endeavoured to prove that no new terms can be used to any such purpose . and this , he thinks , he has made very evident by the account he has given of what we can distinctly conceive , and what we can confusedly believe of the doctrine of the trinity ; which ought carefully to be distinguish'd in all disquisitions upon subjects of this nature . as for those who will allow only a pure nominal distinction in the godhead ; or that apply the terms son and holy ghost to meer created beings , he has only the language and design of scripture to oppose to them ; which seem to him utterly irreconcileable to such notions , and he hopes those general reflections he has drawn from thence will make this appear : so to others . but the opinion of those who make the persons in the godhead as distinct as three men , or three angels , he is sure , both from revelation and reason , is false : and that advancing any such explications of the trinity , as will fairly bear this construction , is of such dangerous consequence , that he hopes he has done some service to religion by proving , that three persons in the godhead as distinct as three men , or three angels , is not only an incomprehensible notion , but an impossible thing ; which implies a manifest contradiction to the plainest and surest principles of knowledge . having given this short account of the author , and his performance in this discourse , i have only this further to acquaint his readers with , that he desires they would believe him to be a sincere man , that has a serious regard for religion and no other aims behind what he professes : for , whatever his arguments are , he is sure his design is good : and , that his reasoning may appear so too , he would be glad that they who take up these papers would give them the reading over , before they pass any judgment upon what is advanced in them ; for , the discourse being written in the demonstrative way , where the main conclusions are establish'd by a long train of preparatory proofs , no true judgment can be made but upon the whole together . may it please god to make these endeavours of the author successful to satisfie and unite the minds of men in their belief of the doctrine of the trinity ; or may he direct some abler persons to find out more effectual methods of establishing the primitive faith , and settling the present peace of the church . some considerations concerning the trinity , &c. there 's no part of the christian faith has produced so many disputes and controversies , such a numerous variety of opinions and sects , as the doctrine of the blessed trinity . if we consult the large catalogues of primitive heresies , we shall find the far greatest number of them nothing else but so many several modes and ways of explaining the common undivided nature and essence of the trinity , and the different offices and operations of each person . how far the uncertainty of our faith in these points , the many absurd and blasphemous expositions that have been made of them , and the warm and indiscreet management of contrary parties , have contributed to the prejudice of religion , and the scandal of its professors , has been a common observation and complaint in all christian ages . and several expedients have been proposed for the redressing of this mischief , but all attempts of this kind have hitherto miscarried . the principal reason of which i humbly conceive to be this : that those who have laboured in this good design , have for the most part proceeded upon wrong measures . now , the methods that have been generally and chiefly insisted upon , are three , which are all improper , or insufficient , and have therefore proved ineffectual , as will plainly appear upon a particular examination of each . . first then , there are some who are for reverencing the mystery of the trinity without ever looking into it at all , who think it not to be the subject either of dispute or enquiry ; imagining every thing of this high and transcendent nature is proposed to us only as a tryal and exercise of our faith ; and the more implicit that is , the fuller do we express our trust and relyance upon god. nay , farther , there are those who do not scruple to say , the more contradictions the better ; the greater the struggle and opposition of reason , the greater is the triumph and merit of our faith. but there 's no likelihood of suppressing any of our doubts or disputes in religion this way : for besides the natural propension of the soul to the search of truth , and the strong and impatient desire we have to know as much as ever we can of what immediately concerns us , 't is generally and very justly look'd upon both as the priviledge and duty of man to enquire and examine before he believes or judges ; and never give up his assent to any thing but upon good and rational grounds : and therefore 't would be a very hard thing to perswade the world to stifle and restrain so many powerful motives of action : but should they be farther prevailed upon to go directly contrary to their reason , 't would be much more difficult to conquer the uneasiness of the reluctance . and indeed 't is well the difficulties of subduing the understanding are too great to be master'd ; for a slight reflection will serve to convince us , that the necessary consequences of a blind resignation of judgment would be far more fatal to christianity than all our present divisions . what blasphemies and contradictions may and have been imposed upon mens belief , under the venerable name of mysteries ? and how easie are villainous practices derived from an absurd faith ? this is matter of common observation , and has brought a just scandal upon a large party of christians , and given occasion to men of light , undistinguishing capacities , to deny and scoff at the saving truths of the gospel , because they were accompanyed with a ridiculous mixture of errors . no doubt therefore we may , and ought carefully to examine the faith and principles we design for the rule of our lives , and endeavour to understand all our religion so far , as to be able to justifie it , both to our selves and unbelievers . we ought indeed to proceed with all the caution and humility imaginable , and take a just estimate of our task and abilities : but to deny us the liberty either of using or obeying our reason , is a suspicious as well as an unjust restraint . . there are others , who call the doctrine of the trinity an incomprehensible mystery , and yet are at a great deal of pains to bring it down to a level with humane understanding ; and are all very earnest to have their own particular explications acknowledged as necessary articles of faith : but the number and disagreement of the expositors plainly discover the vanity of such pretences . this has proved so unsuccessful a way , that instead of uniting the different judgments of christians in one point , it has broke the controversie into a thousand more : for zeal and opposition raising up a great many assertors of the common belief , and every one looking out for some new terms and modes of speech , which should be fuller and more expressive than those in question , the differences and disputes were by consequence proportionably multiplyed . for the terms and forms of speech made use of being capable of several sences , and each of them attended with other accessory idea's , mistakes must necessarily arise , and divers new thoughts be suggested to such whose heads were employed upon the same subject : and thus it came to pass , that defences and vindications of the orthodox faith produced more heresies . wherefore in all such matters as these , which are too big to be grasp'd , we had better sit down contented with what we have firm hold of , than tire our selves with vain endeavours to take in more . 't would certainly be the truest , and the safest way , strictly to confine our selves to scripture expressions , and never speak of supernatural things , but in the language of revelation ; which being the proper standard of all other words that shall be used on these occasions , 't is in vain to shift the measure , when there 's never another to be found which can or ought to reach farther . it may , however , sometimes be necessary to change this method , and introduce new terms to secure the true faith against the false interpretations of such as pervert scripture . for if hereticks will make use of new expressions to contradict the received doctrine , we must have new terms to express the same truth in , in opposition to their heresie . and in this case the church may very reasonably require her members to shew their steady continuance in the ancient faith , by the use of such terms as plainly infer their denyal of any later erroneous inventions set up against it . . there are a third sort of men in the world , who pretend , that there is no mystery proposed to us as an object of faith ; and in order to make this of the trinity appear to be none , they bring a cloud over the whole bible , and with strange forc'd criticisms and allegories give the very plainest texts such an unusual mysterious turn , as neither the language will bear , nor is any ways consistent with the design or character of the holy writers . but this is a very odd preposterous method of explaining scripture , by darkening a great part of it to illustrate the rest , and as ridiculous a project of healing divisions , as pulling down a whole side of standing wall to mend a breach . and after all , the socinian hypothesis seems to me to have more of mystery , and contradiction to natural reason in it , than what is objected to the catholick doctrine . i am not for clogging the faith , nor multiplying mysteries ; yet we ought not presently to deny what we do not understand , but soberly , and impartially consider how much we are able to comprehend , and how far we are obliged to believe , what we do not . the method therefore i design to observe in the following discourse , shall be different from any of those now mentioned . i shall not go about to press men to a blind veneration , or presumptuous belief of any thing without examination ; or in defiance to reason : i shall not offer to impose any new arbitrary explications of my own upon other mens consciences , but confine my self wholly to the usual warranted forms of expression . i will not wrest and strain scripture to help out a private notion , nor do any thing to betray the just rights and priviledges of our common reason ; but carefully endeavour to distinguish how far the doctrine of the trinity is a mystery , and how far a mystery may become an object of faith. from whence i hope to make it appear , that nothing hard or unreasonable is required of us by our church for the belief of this article . in order to which , i shall rank all my reflections upon this subject , under these three heads of enquiry . i. what it is that perplexes and obscures our faith in the trinity . ii. what is sufficient for christians to believe concerning this point ? iii. what ill consequences can attend such a faith. first then , i am to enquire , what it is that perplexes and obscures our faith in the holy trinity . for before i enter upon a distinct and particular consideration of the doctrine it self , 't is necessary to point out some of the principal causes which have occasioned so many false , absurd , and ineffectual expositions of it . and they are these four : the prejudice and bigottry of men indiscreetly pious . the vanity and design of such as value themselves upon inventing new notions , or laughing at the old ones . the not discerning or considering the bounds and limits of our knowledge . and lastly , an imprudent choice of improper ways of expression . the two first of these have a general influence upon all religious controversies , but are more especially concerned in this : for there 's never more room for superstitious and rigorous impositions , nor fairer advantages for cavilling , and drawing absurd consequences , than where a mystery is the subject of debate . there are some who are apt to be concerned , and cry out , as if the very foundations of all religion were overturning , when any particular scheme or notion they are fond of , is called in question . on the other side , i have no small reason to believe there are several who strike at christianity it self , under the pretence of bringing down the value of mysteries . and indeed if we consider the general temper of mankind , 't is no wonder that there 's more superstition and infidelity in the world than true religion : for believing every thing , and believing nothing , a sudden veneration or contempt of whatsoever is proposed to us , equally gratifie the lazy inclinations of the soul , which loves an easie undisturbed course of thoughts , and is very difficultly brought to endure the labour of attention and enquiry . nay , of those who seem to have conquer'd this trouble , there are few who lay themselves out in a free and impartial search of truth , but are wholly employed in the pursuit of some notion they have before-hand taken up , and are resolved to maintain : they are already determined what to believe , and only seek out arguments to justifie or recommend their opinions to others . how far these general reflections are applicable to the present case , has been hinted already in the beginning of this discourse , where 't is very discernible from the ways and methods made use of for settling the doctrine of the trinity , that prejudice and vanity , a false zeal , and an ill-grounded contempt have had a large share in the management of this controversie . another reason why our endeavours of expounding this point have been vain and unsuccessful , is the want of discerning or considering the bounds and limits of our knowledge ; from whence it comes to pass , that oftentimes we strive to soar above our pitch , and imagine we understand some things better than really we do . but especially men of abstracted thinking are very apt to deceive themselves with false idea's , and are firmly perswaded they conceive things distinctly , which they have but a confused notion of . as for instance ; it has been delivered down , as the constant faith of a long succession of eminent philosophers , that the whole substance , nature , and essence of the soul is wholly and entirely in all the body considered together , and wholly and entirely in every single particle of it . and this is a notion which at first view has a great appearance of truth and clearness , and is such as the understanding readily closes with : but if we would strictly and distinctly examine our selves , what we mean by those terms , i believe we should be able to give but a very obscure account of our opinion ; and at last , be forced to confess we understand no more than this by them , that the soul is the principle of all the operations performed in the body . but so it sometimes happens , that we are transported too far in our enquiries after hidden truths , till we are lost in speculation , and vainly think to fathom the depths of knowledge and wisdom , without considering the shortness of our time . whereas we ought rather to examine , and find out the bounds of our thoughts , know the just extent and compass of our understanding , and then rest satisfied with what we are capable of , without desiring to know more than we can , or pretending to know more than we do . but further , the doctrine of the trinity has suffered very much by the discourses made about it upon another account ; and that is , that some of the authors of such discourses have imprudently made choice of improper ways of expression : either perplexing plain revelation too much with philosophical terms and niceties , or exposing the faith to contempt , by homely indecent similies , and disproportionate comparisons . now , to keep clear of all those rocks i have discovered others to have split upon , i have endeavoured , what i could ; to deliver my self from prejudice and confusion of terms , and to speak justly and intelligibly : and not being yet prepossest in favour of any particular explication , the better to preserve my freedom of examining the subject in hand , i have purposely forborn to search the fathers , schoolmen , or fratres poloni , or read over any later treatises concerning this controversie while i was composing the present essay , resolving to consult nothing but scripture and my own natural sentiments , and draw all my reflections from thence , taking only such which easily , and without constraint offered themselves . . and thus having cleared the way , and removed every thing which i thought might obstruct or misguide my enquiries , i come , in the second place , to consider the doctrine it self ; and faithfully and impartially to examine what is sufficient for christians to believe concerning the trinity , or , which is all one in this case , what is necessary to be believed : for certainly he believes enough , and cannot in reason be taxed for a narrow defective faith , who believes as much as is required of him . for the better proceeding in which enquiry , i shall lay down this as an evident truth , which every man will grant me , that nothing is necessary to be believed , but . what 's possible to be believed ; and . what 's plainly revealed . but here i would be understood , as to the last part of the assertion , only of such matters which are known to us no other way than by revelation . for in several other cases , i confess , we may be obliged to believe meerly upon humane testimony : nay , even revelation it self , as it is a matter of fact , claims our assent upon no higher a ground . but further , i shall take this for granted too in a protestant country , that scripture is the only standard of all necessary revealed truths : neither in the present instance is there any room for a traditionary faith. for besides that , all the fathers and ancient writers ground their expositions of the trinity wholly upon scripture , i cannot conceive that the subject is capable of a plainer revelation , as i shall endeavour to shew more fully in the following discourse . we are therefore , in the first place , to consider how far 't is possible to believe a trinity ; and next , to examine what the scripture requires us to believe in this matter . now , there are two conditions requisite to make it possible for us to believe a thing . . that we know the terms of what we are to assent to . . that it imply no contradiction to our former knowledge ; such knowledge i mean which is accompanied with certainty and evidence . first then , we can believe a thing no further than we understand the terms in which it is proposed to us : for faith concerns only the truth and falshood of propositions ; and the terms of which a proposition consists must be first understood before we can pronounce any thing concerning the truth or falshood of it ; which is nothing else but the agreement or disagreement of its terms , or the idea's expressed by them . if i have no knowledge at all of the meaning of the terms used in a proposition , i cannot exercise any act of my understanding about it , i cannot say , i believe or disbelieve any thing , my soul is perfectly in the same state it was before , without receiving any new determination . if i have but a general confused notion of the terms , i can give only a general confused assent to the proposition . so my faith will always bear the same proportion to my knowledge of the subject-matter to be believed . to make this plainer by an instance , suppose i am required to believe that a. is equal to b. if i don't know either what a. or b. stands for ; or have no notion of equality , i believe nothing more than i did before this was proposed to me ; i am not capable of any new determinate act of faith. all that i can believe in this case can amount to no more than this , that something has some respect to something else ; that the matter i am required to believe , is affirmed by a person of great knowledge and integrity , who ought to be credited in what he says , and therefore the proposition here laid down is probably true in that sense the author means . and what am i the wiser for all this ? what addition is there made to my faith or knowledge by such a proposition ? but farther , suppose i know that a. and b. stand for two lines , and that by equal lines is meant lines of the same length ; such knowledge can produce only a general confused belief , that there is some certain line imaginable just of the same length with some other line : but if by a. and b. are meant two right lines , which are the sides of a given triangle , and i take a mathematician's word for it , without demonstration that they are equal , or of the same length , this is a particular distinct act of faith ; by which i am satisfied of the truth of something which i did not believe or know before . from whence it follows , that terms and simple idea's must be clearly and distinctly understood first , before we can believe any thing particular of the respects and relations they bear to one another , which is the only proper object of faith. another condition necessary to render a thing capable of being believed is , that it implies no contradiction to our former knowledge . i cannot conceive how 't is possible to give our assent to any thing that contradicts the plain dictates of our reason , and those evident principles from whence we derive all our other knowledge . as for example : i do not see how any authority of revelation can overthrow the truth of this proposition , that the whole is bigger than any of its parts . for first , i cannot more clearly and distinctly perceive any external impressions made upon my soul , nor be more certain that such impressions proceed from god , than i can perceive and be assured that the idea's i have of whole and part bear this relation to one another . secondly , the nature and constitution of things makes it impossible that this proposition should be false ; for such and such things or notions being supposed , such and such habitudes and respects must necessarily result from them . so long therefore as i have the same idea's of whole and part , and the same faculties of perception , i shall always perceive the same relation betwixt them : and if my idea's of whole and part were changed , or a new texture and frame of soul given me , i should indeed perceive different : relations betwixt these new idea's ; but this would by no means destroy the truth of my former conceptions , 't would still be certain , according to the idea's i had before of whole and part , that the whole was bigger than any of its parts : which idea's will always unalterably have the same relation to one another . but thirdly , was it possible this proposition could be false , considering only the nature of the things themselves , the nature of god furnishes us with other arguments of the truth , and certainty of it . and st . it is not consistent with the justice , wisdom , or goodness of god , to require us to believe that , which , according to the frame and make he has given us , 't is impossible for us to believe : for however some men have advanced this absurd paradox , that god can make contradictions true , i am very certain , that upon an impartial trial of their faculties , they would find 't were perfectly out of their power to believe explicitly , and in the common sense of the terms , that a part can be bigger than the whole it is a part of . but dly , admitting it possible for us to be deceived in such propositions which have a constant , uniform , and universal appearance of truth and evidence , this would destroy all manner of certainty and knowledge , and leave us wholly in darkness , ignorance , and despair ; or , which is more injurious to the divine goodness to imagine , under an absolute necessity of being deceived : for 't is not only impossible for me to believe , that such a proposition as this , that the vvhole is bigger than any of its parts is false ; but i cannot deny my positive express assent to it as true : the light and evidence in this case is so clear and strong , that i am not at liberty so much as to suspend my judgment . dly , 't is blasphemy to think , that god can contradict himself ; and therefore right reason being the voice of god , as well as revelation , they can never be directly contrary to one another . now to apply all this to the present case ; suppose i am required to believe , that one and the same god is three different persons : i only suppose it here , because i have not yet proved how far , and in what sense , we are obliged to believe a trinity . if this , i say , be the proposition i am required to give my assent to , 't is plain , by what has been proved before , that i can believe it no farther than the terms , of which it is made up , are known and understood , and the idea's signified by them consistent . in order therefore to form a determinate act of faith in this point , i must carefully examine my self what notions i have of god , of vnity and identity , distinction and number , and person . as to the notion of a deity , 't is true indeed i have not a full and adequate idea of god , neither is my soul capable of it ; but what conceptions i have of his nature and perfections , are , according to my apprehension , so far clear , as to enable me truly and justly to determine which of those distinct idea's , i have in my mind , are applicable to him , and which are not . and such a knowledge of the divine nature as this , is a sufficient direction of my faith in any proposition concerning god , where i clearly understand all the idea's attributed to him . in the next place therefore , i am to consider what notions i have of vnity and identity , distinction and number . and here i confess i am at a loss how to deliver my self , these being some of our first and most simple idea's which are so clear of themselves , that i cannot find clearer to explain them by . for this is certain , that every man is conscious to himself , that he has a power of perceiving and comparing his perceptions , and consequently must know when any thing is presented to his mind , whether it be perceivable at one entire view , and whether the object have one uniform appearance or not : he must be also sensible in a succession of idea's , when the same appearances are repeated again , and how often the representation is varied . however , notwithstanding the clearness of these notions , with respect to what passes in our own minds , we are not able to make true and distinct judgments of the unity or multiplicity of things without us : for it does not follow , that what is represented to the soul at once , under one idea or appearance , should , according to the reality of things , be one undivided nature , neither can it be inferred , that what is represented to the soul under different idea's are so many distinct real beings : for there are some idea's purely of the soul 's own making , and not copied from any external patterns , where there are a great many particular real beings , of different kinds and natures , comprehended under one representation : thus all the hills , plains , rivers , trees , and towns , &c. which the eye can reach from such or such a point , we put into one picture , and call it a landskip or prospect . thus does the soul enlarge its view to all the works of god and nature ; it takes in the whole creation at a thought , and calls it world. on the other side , the real natures , and essences of things , which are allowed to consist in a simple undivided vnity , are not conceivable by us at once , but at different views , by different partial conceptions , which the soul afterwards compounds and calls by one name . thus when we endeavour to comprehend the nature and essence of what we call man ▪ we form , at different times , several confused notions of substance , body , life , sense , and reason ; every one of which is a complicated idea , and to be resolved into a great many others more simple and distinct : as for instance , i must form a great many idea's of particular actions , and the modes , differences , and relations of them , before i can have any tolerable knowledge of what reason is ; and so for the rest . all therefore that we understand of the unity of things without us , is this : when we perceive any object in a continued position , bounded and fenced out from other things round about it , all within such terms and limits we call one : and then again , observing a great many different actions , produced in and by such an object , we judge all these actions and operations to proceed from one common principle , in some such manner as streams from a fountain , or several lines from the same centre . and whatever we thus judge to be one , tho' a great many thoughts and conceptions go to the forming of such a judgment , we endeavour , as well as we can , to represent to our selves under one idea or appearance , tho' the representation be often very confused and indistinct . and this we do , as supposing it wholly and uniformly conceivable at one single view , were it not for the imperfection of our faculties : which supposition is not without good ground ; for this we have plain experience for , that when any visible object is of such a magnitude , or in such a situation that the eye cannot receive the whole image of it at once , we take it in at different times , from different points of sight ; and yet for all this , we find no more reason to doubt of the real unity of such an object , than of any other , whose image came into the soul entire at one act of vision ; for we easily conceive there may be other organs of sight , which would reflect the whole object together : and from thence we conclude further , that there may be also some other mind more perfect than ours , which perceives that as one simple idea which we cannot apprehend , but by a union of several different conceptions : from whence it follows , that the most perfect mind , which is god , is the only true and proper standard of all unity and distinction . the summe of all my thoughts is this : what is meant by one or more , the same or different idea's is better to be conceived by inward reflexion , than can possibly be explained by words . such an idea , which is not distinguishable into different appearances , i call a simple idea . when i have any thought or perception , which is resolvable into several idea's , i call this a complex or compounded notion . and hence i term any being simple or compounded , according as it is perceivable by some mind , under one simple appearance , or a complex idea . whether my idea's are agreeable to the real natures of things , or those original fatterns in the mind of god , i cannot certainly know ; but when they are the same , and when they differ from one another , i plainly perceive , tho' i cannot always judge of the identity or distinction of things , according as they are represented to my understanding , under the same or different appearances : for here i should be sometimes mistaken too , as 't is plain i often must , if i judged of the real unity or multiplicity of things by my own idea's . the notions we have of the unity of things without us , come the nearest that can be imagin'd to our idea's of point , and continued extension ; one of which represents simple unity , the other compounded ; the one we apply to what we call spiritual beings , the other to material : for 't is certain the conception we have of body , can never furnish us with any idea of simple unity . by a spirit then we mean something without extension , and consequently indivisible , capable of performing some such kind of actions , which do , in some manner or degree , resemble those we are conscious of : but what that is , from whence i suppose such actions to proceed , i have not the least conception of ; for all that i conceive , is only several idea's of different particular actions , which no more express the idea of that principle from whence they spring , than the idea's of several particular lines express the idea of that point they are drawn from . all that we can perceive or imagine of corporeal vnity , is nothing else but a connexion or joint position of several bodies , which , according as it is more or less perceivable , according to the simplicity or multiformity of the figure resulting from it , and the easiness or difficulty of separation , makes several degrees of vnion , which all receive the common denomination of vnity . now as extension , by reason of its perpetual divisibility , cannot give us a true notion of simple vnity , so neither can i have any distinct knowledge of vnion or composition , abstracted from all considerations of extension . i do not understand how a mind and body are united , any otherwise than that i perceive such and such spiritual actions produced within the compass of such a body which i call one : neither am i able to comprehend the union or separation of two spiritual beings , without considering them as in the same or different localites ; for i have not distinct idea's of several spiritual natures , nor , if i should perceive the several operations of different spirits , could i distinguish the several individual beings , or principles , they proceeded from : for who is there that , if all the thoughts and motions of the souls of several men were communicated to him , could tell which proceeded from which ? nay , we cannot tell what difference of actions is sufficient to determine the different kinds of principles they proceeded from ; neither can any co-operation , or consent of actions , make us conceive a spiritual vnion , without conceiving the same term of action too . for suppose two souls were so exactly framed alike , that they always thought and will'd the same things at the same times , and were conscious of each other's thoughts and actions , if they were put into different bodies , 't is plain we could not properly say they were united or made one : and again , supposing they were in the same body , we could not possibly conceive them to be two , any otherwise than we knew them capable of a separate existence ; that is , if we examine our thoughts honestly , of a separate vhi , in different bodies , or elsewhere : not that i think local presence , or determination , is any way contained within the idea of a spiritual being , but it helps us to conceive it better , and discourse more distinctly about it . and , if we observe it , there are several cases where our conceptions and judgments must necessarily differ . these then are all the kinds of vnity and distinction i can possibly imagine ; namely , in idea , principle , and position . whatever else is called unity , is more properly termed agreement , the very notion of which implies a distinction in some of the fore-mentioned kinds . identity is nothing else but a repetition of vnity , as number is of difference , with the judgment of the understanding upon it . what personal vnity and distinction are , will be easily understood by explaining the word person , which signifies one of these two things ; either a particular , intelligent being , or an office , character , or some such complex notion applicable to such a being . in the first sense one man , or angel , is one person , and several men or angels are several persons . in the second sense of the word there may be so many persons as there are different combinations of the actions , relations , and circumstances of intelligent beings . and thus having given an account of the meaning and signification of the terms in which we are required to express our faith , we are next to examine , how far , and in what sense we can believe this proposition , that one and the same god is three different persons . now 't is certain , that if those before-specified are all the notions we are able to frame of vnity and distinction , then god must be one and three in some way or manner there laid down , or else in some other way or manner not conceivable by human understanding . first then , let us see how and in what manner god can be one and three , according to those notions our souls have framed of vnity and distinction . and here 't is granted on all hands , that nothing can be one and three in the same manner and respect : we cannot conceive a thing to be in one determinate position or vbi , and in three separate vbi's all at once ; we cannot conceive that one principle or nature should be but one , and yet three different principles or natures too ; or that any object should be truly and adequately represented to any mind or understanding under one idea , and truly and adequately represented under three different idea's . 't is impossible to believe any thing of this kind , because it implies a plain contradiction to the clearest and most certain knowledge we can have of unity and distinction ; so that if one may be three in the same respect 't is one , then one and three must stand for other idea's than we conceive when we pronounce these words ; and if so , they ought to have other names , and not be called one and three . since therefore we cannot say , that god is one and three in the same respect ; in the next place let us enquire , in what different respects this may be affirmed of him . now , as to the vnity of god , this is easily believed and acknowledged , as being very agreeable to all our other notions of the deity . the chief difficulty lyes in assigning the distinction : in attempting which , the best and clearest way of proceeding will be by going over the several kinds of distinction before-mentioned . i will begin with that of position : and here 't is plain at first sight that we cannot possibly conceive god under any difference of position ; we cannot exclude omnipotence from any imaginable point of space : 't is the limited powers and faculties of created beings which are the foundation of all local distinctions : and therefore when we endeavour to represent god to our thoughts in this manner , we consider him as omnipresent ; and i can no more conceive three omnipresents , than i can conceive three straight lines drawn between the same points . but though there can be but one undivided omnipresence , may there not be three infinite beings co-equal to one another , and commensurate to one infinite space ? this is far above my conception too : infinite swallows up all my thoughts . whatever idea we apply this term infinite to , i think it impossible to apply it to another of the same denomination : as for example ; if i apply it to power , i cannot consider it as applicable to more than one infinite power : for infinite power includes all the possibilities of action ; so that to conceive more than one infinite power , would be to conceive more power than is possible ; which is a gross and palpable absurdity . and therefore we cannot conceive three infinite beings distinct from one another , any more than three infinite powers , or three infinite spaces , because all distinction implies some limitation , and limitation is a contradiction to infinity . we can indeed conceive infinite power , as in some manner bounded by infinite wisdom , justice , mercy , or the like ; but in no wise as limited by any other power . we cannot therefore conceive one infinite being as bounded by another infinite being ; for then we should conceive infinite power limited by another power , and the like of all other attributes , which are the same in both : for the notion of an infinite being includes in it all the imaginable kinds of infinite perfection . but if we say , there are three infinite beings , and all the perfections of each are coincident , what ground can we have for such a distinction ? not so much , to use the former instance , as for that of three straight lines between the same points ; for there the different times of describing the same line may in some manner help us to form a confused conception of different lines : but 't is not in the power of the soul to represent to its self three eternal beings of coincident perfections . here 's nothing for the imagination to lay hold of , no manner of ground to deceive our selves into a confused belief of such a distinction . and therefore i do not see how 't is possible for us to believe there are three distinct principles or natures all of the same infinite perfections , which together we call god. and if there be but one omnipresent , infinitely perfect being , how can he be truly and fully represented to any mind under three different idea's ? the truth of an idea consists in its agreement and conformity to the original it represents ; and if so , how is 't possible there should be three idea's exactly and adequately conformable to the same original , and yet different from one another ? either these differences found in the idea's are not in the real pattern , and then the representation is false ; or they are , and then the unity of the object is destroyed . 't is true , indeed we do often apply different idea's to the same individual object ; but these are either partial and inadequate conceptions of the nature and essence of it ; or expressive of something accessory and extrinsecal to the nature of the thing , such as modes , circumstances , and relations . those partial conceptions we frame of the divine nature are what we call the attributes of god : which , how different soever from one another in our thoughts , are all necessarily included in the simple idea of god ; and therefore cannot be the ground of such a distinction as we are now enquiring after . for when i say , that god is holy , wise , or powerful , i only say that explicitly and in part , which i said implicitly and in full , when i pronounced the name of god ; and the meaning of such propositions is no more but this , that a holy , wise , powerful being , of all other infinite perfections is holy , wise , powerful , &c. all which perfections , though considered separately under different appearances by our imperfect faculties , being really but one simple idea , can be applyed to but one single person in the first sense of the word person , as it signifies a particular intelligent being , nature , or principle ; and that for the reasons just now mentioned concerning the conformity of idea's with their patterns . from whence it follows , that according to the notions we are capable of framing of vnity and distinction , which i have particularly examined , with reference to the holy trinity , all the personal distinction we can conceive in the deity must be founded upon some accessory idea's extrinsecal to the divine nature ; a certain combination of which idea's makes up the second notion signified by the word person . and if we fairly and impartially examine our own thoughts upon this subject , we shall find , that , when we name god the father , we conceive the idea of god so far as we are capable of conceiving it , as acting so and so , under such respects and relations ; and when we name god the son , we conceive nothing else but the same idea of god over again under different relations ; and so likewise of the holy-ghost . but if this be all that is meant by trinity in vnity , three persons , and one god , where is that stupendious mystery so much reverenced and adored by some ? what becomes of the great difficulty and obscurity complained of by others ? what is it that has puzled the understandings , and staggered the faith of so many learned and inquisitive men in all ages since this doctrine was first delivered ? this is an invincible prejudice against the account now given , and indeed against any other explication whatsoever that has nothing in it hard to be understood , or believed : for how can it be imagined that what has passed for a mystery these sixteen hundred years , should now at last be comprehended as plainly as a common ordinary notion ? but if this account of the trinity be too easie , and falls far short of those high expressions of distinction found in scripture ( as i think it does ) and no other grounded upon any notions our souls have framed of vnity and distinction can be true or consistent ( as i have before particularly proved ) then it necessarily follows , that god must be one and three in some way or manner not conceivable by humane understanding . and what we are to believe in this case is the subject of my next enquiry ; which i am perswaded may very easily and quickly be resolved : for if we are fully satisfied from revelation , that these terms , one and three , may , and ought to be affirmed of god , but not in any sense of the words we are here in this present state capable of conceiving . and moreover , if it be true , as i have already shewn it is , that we can believe a thing no farther than we understand the terms in which it is proposed to us ; 't is plain from hence that all we can possibly believe in the matter of the trinity is , that one and the same god is three in some way or manner we are not able to comprehend . and if we are sure we cannot comprehend what this distinction is whereby god is three , in vain do we look out for terms to express something which we have no manner of conception of . whatever words we use , whether person , hypostasis , or any other we can invent , or languages furnish us with , they all signifie the same thing ; that is , some kind of distinction we do not understand . and we may rack our thoughts , tire our imaginations , and break all the fibres of our brain , and yet never be able to deliver our selves clearer . all therefore that we can know of the trinity by reason , can amount to no more than an obscure confused knowledge , which we are forced to express in general and abstracted terms , because we are sure no other reach our thoughts , though these are not sufficient to explain all we mean by them . nor is this to be wonder'd at , that we should have confused notions of things which no particular idea's our minds are furnish'd with can render clearer to us : for if we consider the degrees and limits of our knowledge , and take a strict survey of our whole stock of thoughts , we shall find there are very few things that we know fully and distinctly . most of our notions differ only as more or less confused , more or less general . there is a certain scale of knowledge , wherein every thing is so fitted and proportioned to our faculties , that we cannot descend below such a determinate pitch in our conceptions or explications of any object proposed to us . as for instance ; suppose a blind-man has a desire to know what colour is ; 't is certain he can never form a true distinct idea of it ; but yet he is capable of a general confused knowledge , which wants but one degree of particularity to be clear and perfect conception . he may know that colour is not any substance , but some mode or determination which owes its existence and support to some other being ; that it is not extension , or any other accident or quality perceivable by any of the senses he enjoys : he may further be made to understand , that it is some kind of sensation , produced by the impression of other bodies upon that part of a man's which is called the eye , which other men perceive though he does not . now 't is plain that such a man knows a great deal of the nature of colour , more by far than another blind-man who has not made the same enquiries and reflections about it ; and so much as will secure him from having any other idea imposed upon him for that of colour , which is so distinguished and circumstantiated to him , that , should he now receive his sight , he would presently acknowledge the marks before described to him . and yet after all , it may be truly said , while he continues blind , he has no manner of idea of colour , because he has no distinct idea of that particular kind of sensation to which his general idea's are applyed . and therefore he can go no lower in his explications of the notion he has of colour : for if he explains it by any sensation which he receives from his other senses , the idea's he has then in his mind are indeed more particular and distinct , but the judgment he makes upon them must be utterly false , whereas before , his knowledge was only general and confused , but yet true . i have made choice of this plain , familiar instance of sense , to shew the unreasonableness of those who in higher speculations complain that the terms brought to explain them are too general and abstracted ; and demand a further explication of what we cannot possibly know beyond such a degree of particularity , which the terms already made use of , do express . in vain therefore , and unjustly , are we urged to explain the doctrine of the trinity more particularly , when we have brought it down to the utmost particularity we are capable of conceiving , and at the same time freely acknowledge , we don't know it so distinctly as 't is capable of being known . for then only is the use of general abstracted terms to be condemned , either when the subject we are upon will admit of a more particular and sensible explication ; or , if it will not , when by too much refining and abstracting , we deceive our selves , and think some terms we have found out make the thing clear to us , tho' we have not really more distinct conceptions of it than we had before , and at the same time these very terms make it more obscure and difficult to others . and this is what i remarked before as a prejudice to be avoided in an impartial search after truth . but so long as we acknowledge we have only a general confused notion of the trinity , or such a three-fold distinction in the godhead , as is consistent with the unity of the divine nature , we may be allowed to explain this notion in general abstracted terms ; because we lay no greater a stress upon the terms than they will truly bear , and require only a faith proportionate to our knowledge ; that is , a general confused faith , which we expect a clearer and more distinct revelation of hereafter . and thus i have dispatched the first branch of my discourse , wherein i proposed to consider how far 't was possible for us to believe a trinity . ii. i come now to my second general enquiry , viz. what it is the scripture requires us to believe in this matter ? for a distinct resolution of which question , i shall observe the following method : first , i shall barely and positively lay down the doctrine of the trinity , so far as i judge it expresly contained in scripture . secondly , i shall endeavour to prove the truth of what i assert . thirdly , i shall consider the particular additional explications that have or may be given of the scripture-account of this article . . in speaking to the first , it must be allowed , that there is no such proposition as this , that one and the same god is three different persons formally , and in terms , to be found in the sacred writings either of the old or new testament : neither is it pretended that there is any word of the same signification or importance with the word trinity , used in scripture , with relation to god. there is one text which plainly enough affirms , without the help of inference or deduction , that god is three and one : but this being a disputed passage , and no where else repeated in the same or the like terms , i shall not insist upon it . nor do i think such a trinity as we profess to believe , stands much in need of the support of this text ; the matter and subject of our faith in this point being frequently , largely , and circumstantially mentioned ; and , as it appears to me , interwoven into the very design of the scriptures . now the summ of all that the scriptures plainly and expresly teach concerning a trinity , is this : that there is but one only god , the author and maker of all things ; but that one god ought to be acknowledged and adored by us , under those three different titles or characters of father , son , and holy ghost . which terms , whatever they signifie , according to my judgment , upon a fair and impartial consideration of all circumstances that can determine their sense , are evidently applied to god in many places of holy writ ; and consequently are truly and properly applicable to him . . the proof of which assertion is the second thing i undertook . but here i find my self forestalled by the successful endeavours of a great many learned men , who have carefully and nicely examined every text that can be brought , either for the establishment , or confutation of the doctrine of the trinity . i shall not therefore trouble my reader with a particular detail of all their arguments ; but only acquaint him truly and fairly what were the chief motives which influenced and disposed me to make such a judgment as i have , just before , declared . now the reasons which determined my opinion in this matter , were such as freely offered themselves upon an unprejudiced reading of scripture , and considering the design , connexion , and analogy of those writings : and i am apt to believe , if any man else took the same method , and considered things togegether , and not only in loose texts and passages , the first result of his thoughts would be the same , viz. these terms , father , son , and holy ghost , must all be so understood , as to include the same god in their signification ; and that any other sense or explication of the words , would be attended with greater difficulties . but this being a reflexion which is founded upon the agreement and coherence of all the parts of scripture , 't would be a very improper and ineffectual design to go about to confirm the truth of it from some particular passages . omitting therefore all those texts , which are a great many , where any of these terms , father , son , or holy ghost , appear to be directly affirmed of god , according to a fair construction of the words , i shall only observe two or three passages from the history of our saviour and his gospel , which , to my apprehension , do as strongly prove what i have advanced as the most formal expressions , and are less liable to be perverted by the criticisms of language . the first observation i have to make , concerns the common forms of baptism , salutation , and blessing , used in several places of the new testament . now these are matters no way controverted : that our saviour commanded his disciples to go and teach all nations , baptizing them in the name of the father , son , and holy ghost . that st. paul makes use of such salutations as these : the lord be with you ; the grace of our lord jesus christ be with you all ; grace be to you , and peace from god the father , and from our lord jesus christ : and particularly closes his second epistle to the corinthians with this 〈◊〉 and fuller blessing ; the grace of the lord jesus christ , and the love of god , and the communion of the holy ghost be with you all . from whence i infer , that all these terms , father , son , and holy ghost , signifie god ; because i cannot possibly conceive 't is agreeable to the nature of the christian religion , that the ministers of it should teach , baptize , or bless the people in any other name but god's . it cannot be imagined but the people must equally believe in those , in whose names they are baptized or bless'd : they must believe that those , who are call'd upon to bestow graces and blessings upon them , are able to give what they are called upon for . and whatever is meant by baptizing in the name of the father , son , and holy ghost , it seems very plain that these three are all equally concerned in what 's done in that sacrament . whether by this form of baptism be signified on the minister's part , the authority or commission by which he acts in his administration ; or whether on the part of the person baptized , be meant any acknowledgment or confession , submission or dedication of himself ; or whether this phrase in the name , or , as in the greek , into the name , does imply all this , and more , the whole force and importance of the expression , does in the same extent belong to father , son , and holy ghost . the power and authority here received , is derived from all three : they are all to be acknowledged as authors of our salvation ; all infallible , and to be believed in what they teach ; have all the same title to our submission and obedience , and are joint-parties in that covenant we make in baptism . the inference from hence is very plain and easie : that if any one of these terms signifie god , they must all three signifie god ; and if all three signifie god , they must all three signifie one and the same god ; for god is but one. now that the one supreme god , the lord and maker of all things , is here meant by the word father , is a thing not questioned ; and therefore son , and holy ghost , are terms expressive of the same divine nature . should we but suppose the contrary , that by son was meant only a meer man , or some heavenly being , of highest rank under god ; and by holy ghost was signified only some created spirit , inferior to the son , or the power , efficacy , love , favour , or vertue of god how strange would such a form of baptism appear ? i baptize thee in the name of god , peter the apostle , and the power or love of god ; or , i baptize thee in the name of god , michael the archangel , and raphael a ministring spirit . there needs no more but a bare mention of such an exposition to shew the falshood of it : what absurd consequences may be drawn from it , i shall leave to every man 's particular reflexion . another thing which mightily confirmed me in this belief , that the father , son , and holy ghost , so often named in scripture , are one and the same god , under those three different appellations , was this , that the son , who is the same with him that is in other places called the lord , and the lord jesus christ , and sometimes only jesus , or christ , was worship'd with a religious worship by those that followed him and embraced his gospel : for if he that was called the son of god , or christ , was thus to be worship'd , it plainly and evidently follows from hence , according to all the notions we have of god and religion , either from nature or revelation , that the son was also god , the same true and only god with the father . and if the son be allowed to be god as well as the father , it will be easily admitted that the holy ghost is so too , who appears in scripture invested with all the same characters of divinity : for father , son , and holy ghost , are as consistent with the vnity of the godhead , as father and son only ; and besides , there 's greater difficulty in conceiving the son to be god , than the holy ghost , because of his humane nature . but that he was god manifest in the flesh , is , i say , apparent from the divine worship that was pay'd to him : for that god only is to be worship'd , is an evident principle , as well as an indispensable duty ; and i can as soon believe a thing to be , and not to be , as that any thing that is not god should be worshipped as god. now that christ received the honour and worship due to god only , is plain from abundance of places of scripture , where we find he was not only adored with all the outward expressions of reverence and devotion , but confess'd and acknowledged to be god by an application of the divine attributes to him , such as agree only to god , and are incommunicable to any other , as might be proved at large if it had not been done already : but this being fully insisted upon by others , i shall only name two passages to this purpose ; the one , phil. . . the other , act. . . which , if there were no other , are of themselves sufficient to shew what the faith of the first christians was : for who , but one that believed that christ was god , could say with st. paul , i can do all things through christ that strengthneth me ; or , with st. stephen , at the instant of death , cry out , lord jesus receive my spirit . from these , and many other texts , it seems plain to me , that christ was worshipped , and acknowledged as god ; and that therefore he ought so to be worshipped , and acknowledged , we have all the same reasons to believe , as we have that the scriptures are true ; the establishment of a false worship being a thorough disproof of the authority that commands it . supposing therefore the truth of the scriptures , there 's no way of eluding this argument , but by giving another interpretation to all those places which seem to ascribe divine honour to christ ; which can no otherwise be done , than by framing a particular dialect for this purpose , and giving new significations to words , when applied to our saviour , which they never had before , when used upon other occasions . i shall not enter upon a particular proof of this , but pass on to another argument i observ'd from scripture , which gave me further assurance of the divinity of the son , and consequently of the truth of the whole proposition before advanced ; and that is , the character of jesus christ considered meerly as a man. now 't is certain , that the man christ jesus , the son of david , according to the flesh , is represented by all the evangelists , as having his conversation in this world with all lowliness , and humility , and with perfect holiness , and unblameableness of life . and it is not imaginable , that a person of this character should have suffered any titles to have been given him , any honour or respect to have been pay'd him , which were not strictly and indispensably due to him ; much less have taken the honour and worship , peculiar to god only , to himself , if he had not been infallibly conscious that of a truth god dwelt in him . i cannot possibly conceive that one , who declined all appearance of grandeur , dominion , and authority , should have allowed of any thing that look'd like worship , or adoration , or might have been mistaken for it ; or that he , who knew he was believed to be the son of god , in such a sense which some thought blasphemy , would not have undeceived his followers , and justified himself to his enemies , had he not really been what 't was blasphemy to have pretended to be , if he were not . i might easily pursue these reflections a great deal further , and bring more arguments to confirm the truth of what i have asserted , that these names or titles of father , son , and holy ghost are applyed in scripture to the one true god ; but i judge it altogether unnecessary , not only because it has been fully made out already in several set discourses upon this subject , but because it is so plainly and expresly revealed , that i am verily perswaded every man that reads would believe , were it not for the additional explications such a belief is charged with . . which is the next thing to be considered : and indeed here lyes the whole difficulty of the matter , the main stress of the controversie . for that god should be called father , son , and holy ghost , is as easily to be believed , as that he should be called adonai , elohim , and jehovah ; that the same thing should be signified and expressed by several names , is no such incredible mystery : but if we allow that these terms , father , son , and holy ghost , are all applyed to god in scripture , 't is not thought sufficient to say , that these are three several names which signifie god ; but we are further required to believe that god is one and three , the same god , but three different hypostases or persons ; and that one of these three hypostases or persons , is both god and man. these are the hard sayings which puzzles some mens understandings , and make them chuse rather to wrest and pervert the plainest texts , than admit such seemingly inconsistent consequences . here therefore i shall examine , what grounds there are in scripture for such an exposition : and what we are obliged from thence to believe when we express our faith in this particular manner . first then , as to these forms of expression , that god is one and three , &c. it is to be observed , that these names , father , son , and holy ghost , are applyed to god in scripture in a different way from what any of his other names are : for the other names of god signifie only partial conceptions of the divine nature , such as self-existence , power , &c. and are all contained within the same idea of god ; and so are indifferently used upon any occasion to express the whole idea of god to which they belong , which is the same under every denomination . these therefore cannot be the foundation of any distinction in the godhead : but father , son , and holy ghost , according to our way of conceiving things , signifie something extrinsecal and accessory to the divine nature , as much as we know of the divine nature by reason , the whole idea of god being conceived as full and compleat before the application of these terms ; and though all of them are separately and together affirmed of god , yet each of them in so peculiar a manner , that there are several occasions where when one of these terms is used with relation to god , 't would be improper to use either of the other . from whence it follows , that these three names of god , father , son , and holy ghost , must denote a three-fold difference or distinction belonging to god ; but such as is consistent with the vnity and simplicity of the divine nature . for each of these names includes the whole idea we have of god and something more ; so far as they express the nature of god , they all adequately and exactly signifie the same ; 't is the additional signification which makes all the distinction betwixt them . what particular kind or manner of distinction this is , is not expressed in scripture ; but since the church has thought fit to assign a name for it , that of person seems to me as proper and agreeable to the whole tenor and design of the holy writings , as any other that could have been chosen for that purpose . for father , son , and holy ghost , whether we consider the primitive sense and intention of the words , the general and constant use of them , or the particular connexion and circumstances in which they are mentioned in scripture , have plainly a personal signification ; each of them , without any figure of speech , being determined to signifie some intelligent being acting in such a manner as is there related . there needs no proof of this , the plain distinction of persons imported by those terms being the chief argument made use of to shew that they cannot all be applied to god , but must necessarily signifie three distinct beings : but that they are all applyed to god in scripture , has been proved already ; and therefore father , son , and holy ghost may be considered as persons or personal characters , which do not imply any distinction of being or nature . the greeks are supposed to have meant the same by hypostases as we do by person ; this word being sometimes the very translation of the other ; and if so , there 's the same ground for the use of both : but if they meant any thing else , they could hardly have so good warrant for it from revelation . now , that one of these persons or hypostases should be both god and man , there is this foundation in the scriptures for . he who is there called the son of god , did certainly appear in the likeness of men , being in all respects , sin only excepted , truly and properly man ; as his birth , necessities , sufferings , and death sufficiently testifie . 't is certain also that the same jesus christ , who was called the son of god , and was made in the likeness of man , is affirmed by st. paul , phil. . , . to have been in the form of god , when he took the nature of man upon him . but besides this and many other texts to the same effect , 't is plain , from what before has been proved , that god did suffer himself to be worshipped and adored in and by the man christ jesus : the least that can be inferred from which is , that god was more immediately and peculiarly present in christ , than ever he is said to have been any where else : as in the heavens , jewish temple , between the cherubims , in prophets and holy men , who spake as they were moved by the spirit of god. what created object was ever allowed to intercept the worship paid to god , or share with him in it ? were the heavens , the temple , the cherubim or prophets to be adored ? nay , has not god taken a particular care to preserve men from idolatry , by forbidding them to worship him in or by any sensible representation ? did not the apostles , who worship'd christ , forbid others to worship men of like passions with themselves , commanding them to direct all their devotion to the living god , who made heaven and earth ? how then can we suppose that christ was only a meer man , or some other creature , and not rather believe that he had the fulness of the godhead dwelling in him bodily ? but here it is objected ; how can god and man be united ? and to this i must fairly answer , that i cannot tell . i have confessed already in the account i have given of those notions of vnity and distinction , that i have not any just or distinct conceptions of the vnion of spiritual beings , either with bodies , or with one another : but this i will venture to say , that i can as well conceive god and man together under one idea , at one view , as i can conceive a soul and body so united . all that i know of the vnion of soul and body is ; that there is some intelligent power that makes use of the organs of my body , and acts in conjunction with the motions there produced . and i may as well consider god united to man , when he so acts by the ministry and operation of man , that the actions of god seem conveyed to us the same way as the actions of one man are to another . had those who upon some occasions spake by the extraordinary assistance of a divine power been constantly so directed , and assisted , how would they have distinguished the motions of their souls from the impressions of god ? and why then should not we think such an extraordinary power as this as much united to such men , as that common ordinary power we call the soul is to those bodies in which it acts and exerts it self ? some have been of opinion , that what we call the soul , is nothing else but a constant regular inspiration , or a determinate concurrence of god almighty with such and such motions and capacities of matter : but whether this be so or no , as most probably it is not , it seems to me very plain from scripture , that such a power which we ascribe to god , did as constantly and regularly act in and through christ , as the human soul is perceived to do in any other man : as appears from his absolute security from all manner of sin and error , from his constant knowledge of the thoughts and designs of men , and the will and decrees of god ; and from his readiness and ability to work miracles at any time , and upon any occasion . all which are manifest tokens of an uninterrupted presence and concurrence of the deity : especially if we consider the calmness and evenness of spirit observable in our saviour , entirely free from all the transports of over-ruling impressions , 't is a further argument that he did not receive the spirit of god at times , or by measure ; but was as conscious of all the divine perfections in himself as a man is conscious of his own thoughts . such are the grounds we find in scripture for those particular explications of the trinity before-mentioned . in the next place , we are to enquire what the scriptures necessarily oblige us to believe in this point . but before this question can be resolved , there are two things to be premised : . that whatever articles of faith are absolutely necessary to salvation , all persons of every rank and condition are equally obliged to believe them . there is not one religion for the peasant , and another for the scholar : we have the same general rule to walk by , though particular obligations may be greater or lesser , fewer or more , according to different circumstances and relations . and whatever principles and duties are of general necessity , ought to be so plainly revealed , as to be easily understood by ordinary capacities upon a fair and careful examination . . that in order to this end it seems to have been the design of the scriptures to represent god in a sensible manner ; though at the same time they take care to assure us that god is in his own nature a being of different perfections not conceivable by human understanding : and is thus represented only in condescention to our weakness , for the help and assistance of our devotion . so that all expressions of this kind , where god is the subject , are to be understood in a higher and more spiritual sense , but still with some analogy to what they properly and usually signifie . thus , to use a common instance , when 't is said , that god looks down and beholds what 's done among the children of men ; that he hears the cries of the righteous , and the blasphemies of the wicked , 't is not to be imagined that he sees as man sees , that he makes use of any organs of sense ; but 't is thus expressed to give us more lively notions and impressions of the certainty of god's vniversal knowledge ; to assure us that god more plainly , fully , and infallibly knows whatever is done in all the earth , than we are capable of knowing those things which fall within the reach of our senses . this being premised , it seems very plain to me that the doctrine of the trinity is not to be look'd upon as a nice abstracted speculation designed for the exercise of our understandings ; but as a plainer revelation of god's love and good will towards men , and a greater motive and incitement to piety than any we had before this doctrine was delivered . had man stood confirmed in his original righteousness , and there had been no need of redemption , 't is highly probable god had never been considered by man in his state of probation under any such distinction as is now revealed to us ; and therefore i should think those different titles and relations by which god has been pleased to express that eternal distinction in the godhead to us , should be chiefly considered by us with reference to the great work of man's salvation . thus far then the scriptures require us to believe ; that the one only supream god upon his fore-knowledge of man's fall , did from all eternity purpose and decree to redeem mankind into a capacity of salvation , by the death and constant mediation of a man chosen and enabled for this work by the fulness of the godhead dwelling in him : and in consideration of his passion and intercession , to impart such gifts , graces , and spiritual assistances , as would be sufficient to render this redemption effectual to the saving of much people . and moreover we are to believe that god has accordingly executed this his gracious design towards us : by sending into the world christ jesus , the man who before he had ordained , should in the fulness of time be born , and suffer for our sins ; in and by whom , as has already been shewn , god acted in a wonderful manner , was worshipped and adored , and acknowledged in all his attributes ; and with whom he abideth in the fulness of power and glory for ever : and , since his death and reception into heaven , by a plentiful effusion of spiritual graces and influences ; by which means a great many have embraced the gospel of christ , and become heirs of salvation , and more from henceforth to the end of all things shall daily be added to the church of god , be supported in the faith , and be made partakers of the purchased inheritance reserved in heaven for those that are sanctified by the spirit of god. now , with respect to this great design of saving mankind , and the order and method of the divine wisdom in the execution of it ; to give us as full and distinct apprehensions as our souls are able to conceive of the misery of our sinful condition , the difficulty of deliverance , and the unspeakable mercy of god in restoring us to the happiness we had justly forfeited ; and to raise our souls to the highest pitch of veneration , love , and gratitude we are capable of expressing for such an inestimable blessing ; god has been pleased to reveal himself to us under several personal characters and relations : such as father , son , and holy ghost ; saviour , mediator , and comforter . by which names , and all other expressions consequent thereupon , we are directed to consider some such kind of distinction , and subordination of offices and relations in god , as the terms made use of do commonly import . thus when god is pleased to represent his love to mankind , in the highest image of nature ; that of a father sacrificing an only well-beloved son , the exact transcript and resemblance of himself , perfectly innocent , and obedient to his will in all things , we are to believe that , by the sufferings , and death of christ , god has given greater proofs of his love towards us than any man is capable of doing to another ; and that such an action of an earthly parent suggests the nearest and likest conception we can possibly frame , of what our heavenly father has done for us ; tho' at the same time we must acknowledge it comes infinitely short of expressing the riches and fulness of his mercy and loving-kindness . and the same use and spiritual improvement is to be made of all other revelations of this nature . and thus we have seen how far we are capable of conceiving a trinity , and what the scriptures expresly oblige us to believe concerning this point . all that is beyond , lies far out of our reach and comprehension , and no particular explications can add any thing to our faith ; for the terms made use of for that end , being in use before this doctrine was taught , must either signifie the same they did before , or not : if the same , where 's the mystery ? if not , what do they signifie ? something that we cannot explain but in words used already , and then the question will return again . the same difficulty would attend new terms invented on purpose ; for either they would have no meaning at all affixed to them , or else they would be understood in the sense of some other in use before . and therefore , had the very same terms and forms of expression been found in the scriptures , as are now in our creeds , the revelation of the trinity had been no plainer , nor we obliged to believe any farther than the present language does import : for upon a fair and distinct examination both of scripture and reason , it plainly appears , that what 's already revealed amounts to as much as we are capable of conceiving , and does besides imply something more which we can not comprehend ; and 't is not in the power of language to make us understand any thing better : for 't is utterly impossible to frame any notions above our own level . and should god be pleased to stamp some new idea's upon the minds of men ▪ they could not be conveyed to others by the help of words , or any other signs , but only by the same divine impressions : so that whatever idea's the apostles , and inspired writers , might have of a trinity by immediate infusion , the terms they have made use of can give us but this imperfect discovery of them , that they were such as we are not able to comprehend without the like assistance . this then is the utmost we are required to believe , or are capable of believing , concerning the doctrine of the trinity , viz. that these three different terms , father , son , and holy ghost , are all applied in scripture to the one only supreme god ; that all the actions , offices , and relations , which are in scripture ascribed to any of these names , ( excepting those proper to the humane nature of christ ) are there plainly attributed , and do truly belong to one , and the same divine nature ; that there are such frequent and evident assertions of the vnity of god in scripture , and yet such plain expressions of distinction , signified by these terms , father , son , and holy ghost , as imply a consistency of unity and distinction in the godhead . that this distinction , whatever it be , is not the same with that we conceive betwixt the attributes of god , which are partial conceptions of his essence , nor a meer difference of name , office , or relation , such as is signified by the like terms , when applied to men , ( tho' these are all the differences we can expresly conceive , as applicable to the divine nature ) but some other distinction , which we have but a confused perception of , and cannot comprehend or explain by any particular idea's ; which unknown inexplicable distinction is the foundation of all these differences expresly conceived by us . and since the church has thought fit , for the sake of unity and peace , and for the suppressing all private disputes and interpretations , to appoint set forms to express this our faith in , i think the athanasian creed as rational an explication of the trinity as can well be made . the worst that the enemies of this doctrine can say of it , is , that it is an unnecessary multiplication of terms , and too nice an endeavour to explain what cannot be explained ; but not that 't is false , or absurd ; nothing being there asserted in any sense inconsistent with the vnity of god , or the principles of right reason : all such meanings and significations of any terms or expressions in that creed being very improper , as they are there applied , and utterly disclaimed by the church that enjoins the use of it . nor can it be esteemed an unreasonable imposition , that we should be obliged to profess our faith of something which cannot be conceived , but confusedly and indistinctly ; nor expressed , but in general and obscure terms . for where 's the hardship of being required to believe as far as we can believe ? god is incomprehensible in his nature and perfections , but are we not obliged to believe there is a god who is incomprehensible ? are we not obliged to believe there are joys in heaven , which it has not enter'd into the heart of man to conceive ? and , to repeat a former instance , may not a blind man be obliged to believe what a friend of unsuspected integrity tells him of the general nature of colour , tho' he is not able to form a particular idea of it ? and , if these things cannot be denied , what difference can be assigned why we should not be under as great an obligation of believing the trinity , tho' we are not able to conceive it distinctly ? a threefold distinction in the godhead , consistent with the unity of god , is as plainly revealed in scripture as any other article of faith : nor are those general abstracted terms we find in our creeds , to be condemn'd as meer useless and perplexing niceties ; for tho' they are not sufficient to make us understand the trinity fully and distinctly , yet they are proper limitations to exclude all the false and unworthy apprehensions of this doctrine , which pretenders to a more particular explication might introduce . iii. and now what dangerous consequences can possibly attend such a faith as this ? 't is true indeed , the adversaries of the trinity have drawn up a heavy charge against this doctrine , and taken a great deal of liberty in their discourses about it : but the principal objections that have been made by any of them are but three ; to which all the rest may be reduced : and these i shall endeavour to shew , by the account before given , are very frivolous and unjust . . the first pernicious consequence the doctrine of the trinity stands charged with , is , the introduction of a plurality of gods : but 't is very plain from what we have said in the former part of this discourse , that 't is utterly impossible to believe a trinity in any such sense as implies a plurality of gods : for according to the notions i have there shewed we have of the nature and attributes of god , 't is undeniably certain to every man's experience , that we cannot conceive more than one god : all our endeavours to comprehend more are only repetitions of the same idea . let those therefore take care to answer this accusation , who , under pretence of giving a more rational account of what we are to believe in this point , set up created subordinate gods to be partners with their maker in the glory and worship due to him . besides , we do explicitly declare , that there is but one god at the same time we make profession of our faith in a trinity , or three persons . . in the next place , therefore we are accused of believing contradictions ; and consequently of destroying all the certainty of natural knowledge : which fence being down , there 's no error so gross or absurd but may be obtruded upon us ; and transubstantiation has as good a pretence to be an article of our faith as the trinity . but i need not make any particular answer to this objection , having proved at large already , that we neither do nor can believe a trinity in any sense that contradicts the plain and evident principles of natural reason . we do not believe there can be more gods than one , that one can be three in the same respect 't is one ; or that one god can be three persons in the same sense three men are three persons ; or any other proposition that 's inconsistent with those natural notions which are the foundation of all our other knowledge . but the patrons of transubstantiation cannot make this plea , who in this one particular deny those very principles which upon all other occasions they rely upon with the greatest assurance . did they only affirm , that christ was present in that sacrament in some way or manner they could not comprehend , but in no way repugnant to the plain and necessary dictates of well-informed sense , and right reason , there might be then some resemblance found betwixt this doctrine and that of the trinity ; but at present the comparison is palpably and notoriously unjust . . but thirdly , 't is further objected , that though the doctrine of the trinity , as we explain it , could not be proved to contain down-right contradictions ; yet at least it must be counted and esteemed as a mystery , and the imposition of mysteries for articles of faith , is a thing of very ill consequence . in answer to which charge , it is to be observed , that as in the doctrine of the trinity , so in most other objects of faith and knowledge , there 's something that we plainly and certainly understand , and something that we cannot possibly comprehend : thus a man by inward reflection is infallibly conscious of his own thoughts , and he judges , whatever he perceives within himself , to proceed from one common principle , which he calls his soul ; and which , from the nature of its operations , he is fully perswaded is something of a different kind from his body , tho' it always acts in consent with it : but what this soul is , or in what manner united to his body , he is not able to conceive ; and therefore the doctrine of the human soul , taken all together , may as justly be stiled a mystery , as the trinity . we ought not then to be offended at the word mystery , since , if we strictly examine our thoughts , we shall find that almost every thing we pretend to know , comes under that name , even those things we have the greatest assurance of , our very souls and beings . this being observed , we may consider the trinity either with respect to what may be understood of it , or what cannot : so far as we are capable of conceiving a trinity , 't is no mystery , and consequently no oppression of our faith ; and so far as it cannot be comprehended , it does not bind us to any explicit act of faith : as is plain from what has been said before concerning the nature of faith , and the persons obliged to believe this article : for all things necessary to salvation are to be believed by all sorts of men ; and nothing can be believed any farther than the terms in which it is proposed are understood : but a mystery cannot be brought down to the lowest capacities , and be delivered in terms that are plainly and distinctly understood , for then it would be no longer a mystery : so far therefore as we are obliged to believe , is no mystery ; for whatever terms i am bid to believe a thing in i cannot comprehend , i can mean no more but that i believe it to be in some manner i cannot comprehend : and i am sure there 's no difficulty or danger in believing that there are some things which we are not able to find out , or comprehend . these are the reflections which offered themselves upon a careful and impartial consideration of this subject . but here i fore-see it may be asked , what do we understand more of the trinity now than we did before ? what new hypothesis is here advanced to solve all the difficulties of that doctrine by ? in answer to which objection , i have this further to add for the justification of the foregoing discourse . first , that the principal design of my enquiries was , to know , what god required us all to believe in order to our salvation , not how far the soul of man was capable of discovering the deep things of god : for i am fully perswaded ; that there may be things necessary to be believed , and yet we not obliged to believe them in that distinct particular sense in which some learned . men have explained them ; though their hypothesis should be very rational and consistent , and perhaps really true . and therefore could there be any new way found out of making the trinity conceivable by human. understanding , i do not think we should be under any obligation of believing that particular exposition of it : for besides the difficulty of such abstracted notions , even in their plainest dress , with respect to mean capacities , which are all equally concerned in necessary articles of faith , it cannot be imagined that we should be obliged to believe more than the christians who lived before us were ; that more should be necessary to our salvation than was to theirs : and 't is certain their faith was sufficient and effectual for obtaining eternal life , who could not possibly believe what we suppose to be but lately discovered . but dly , considering that we were permitted with humility and reverence to exercise our souls in the search of divine knowledge ; and moreover that we ought as christians , as well as men , to give a reason of the faith we profess , and defend it against all false and unjust imputations ; i have also made it my business to enquire , how far we were capable of forming distinct conceptions of a trinity ; and upon enquiry found that after a faithful tryal of our faculties , and a strict examination of all the simple notions which make up the proposition to believed , we cannot arrive at greater knowledge in this point than our fore-fathers have done ; and that so much of the doctrine of the trinity as was a mystery to them , is like to be so to the end of the world. which if i have as fully and sufficiently proved to others as i am convinced of it my self , i shall not think my time or labour lost upon this subject . for next to understanding a thing throughly is to know we cannot understand it ; next to resolving a problem in mathematicks , is to demonstrate it cannot be done . our souls are as much at rest , our desires as quiet , and all our designs and pursuits as much at an end when we despair of victory , as when we actually conquer . and therefore if these be the true and proper limits of our faith and knowledge which i have assigned ; if i have given a just account of what we are required to believe concerning the trinity ; how much 't is possible for us to believe of it , and how far we are capable of having distinct conceptions about it ; 't is in vain to search for new notions and hypotheses , which may probably puzzle or deceive our understandings , but can never lead us farther into the knowledge of the trinity . but i will not pretend to measure the abilities of other men by my own : i shall only say this more , which i am sure i can truly affirm , that i have taken all the care imaginable to deliver my judgment impartially and sincerely , and have not dared to impose any thing upon others , which i do not believe my self , or is any ways inconsistent with the principles of right reason . post-script . these papers were in the press , and every word in the book , and preface , as they stand now , was written before his majesty's injunctions came forth : the author is glad to find that he has not transgress'd 'em ; the authority and reasonableness of which he pays such a submission to , that if he had not prescribed to himself the same rules in writing , that be now sees enjoyned by his superiours , he wou'd have shewed his obedience to 'em , by suppressing what he had written . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e acts . ver . . a vindication of the sermons of his grace john archbishop of canterbury concerning the divinity and incarnation of our b. saviour : and of the lord bishop of worcester's sermon on the mysteries of the christian faith, from the exceptions of a late book, entituled, considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity : to which is annexed, a letter from the lord bishop of sarum to the author of the said vindication, on the same subject. williams, john, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a vindication of the sermons of his grace john archbishop of canterbury concerning the divinity and incarnation of our b. saviour : and of the lord bishop of worcester's sermon on the mysteries of the christian faith, from the exceptions of a late book, entituled, considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity : to which is annexed, a letter from the lord bishop of sarum to the author of the said vindication, on the same subject. williams, john, ?- . nye, stephen, ?- . considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity. burnet, gilbert, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed for ric. chiswell ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. attributed to john williams. cf. nuc pre- . half title: a vindication of the archbishop tillotson's sermon, concerning the divinity and incarnation of our b. saviour, &c. errata: p. [ ] created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng tillotson, john, - . stillingfleet, edward, - . -- mysteries of the christian faith asserted. jesus christ -- divinity -- early works to . trinity -- early works to . incarnation -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - melanie sanders sampled and proofread - melanie sanders text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a vindication of the archbishop tillotson's sermons , concerning the divinity and incarnation of our b. saviour , &c. imprimatur , lamb. nov. , . ra. barker . a vindication of the sermons of his grace john archbishop of canterbury , concerning the divinity and incarnation of our b. saviour : and of the lord bishop of worcester's sermon on the mysteries of the christian faith : from the exceptions of a late book , entituled , considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity . to which is annexed , a letter from the lord bishop of sarum to the author of the said vindication , on the same subject . london : printed for ric. chiswell , at the rose and crown in st. paul's church-yard . mdcxcv . to his honoured friend , james chadwick , esq. the present i here make you being a vindication of my late lord of canterbury , and the cause he seasonably appeared in , and successfully defended , the dedication of it seems of right to belong to you , who besides the happiness of a near alliance and a long and inward acquaintance , had a just esteem and veneration for him. it was not without his grace's direction and encouragement that i entred upon this work ; and had he lived to have perus'd the whole , as he did a part of it , ( a few days before his last hours ) it had come with greater advantage into the world , and much more to my own satisfaction , as having passed the trial of that exact and impartial judgment which he was wont to exercise in matters of this nature . but however it may fall short in that particular , such as it is , i here present it to you , not doubting ( though it may not deserve it for its own sake ) but you will accept it in remembrance of so excellent a friend , and as a testimony of all due respect from , sir , your affectionate servant , j. williams . the preface . the subject which the author of the considerations undertakes , is a prime article of the christian faith , and so requires seriousness and decorum in the management of it : and the persons to whom he declares himself an adversary , are not only of an eminent order and station in the church , but also such as have approved themselves in their writings to be of that learning and judgment , that temper and moderation , that their adversary cannot but pay some reverence , in expressions at least , to their persons for it . but notwithstanding this , as if he had a distrust in his cause , and durst not venture it abroad into the world upon the strength of its own reason and authority , he soon endeavours to prepossess his unwary readers with such insinuations as he thinks will make them , if not of his own party , yet suspect the sincerity of the other . for would you know who those are that he proclaims war against ? they are one while a poor sort of weak people at the best , that , he saith , neither have nor can defend their cause , but have given it up to the socinians : but if you would indeed know who they are , in their proper colours ; they are the great pensioners of the world , that are bribed with great rewards . they are of a church , whose fears and aws are greater than their bribes . another while they are great men indeed that defend the doctrine of the trinity against them , but 't is that they must maintain it , p. . so that set aside preferments , fears and aws , and without doubt these great men , and the whole church and nation ( as he would have it believed ) would socinianise , and become their proselytes . would one think that this person had ever read the character his grace has given his predecessors in that controversy , who used generally to lay aside unseemly reflections , & c. ? would one think this to be the person that in the page before said , that the archbishop instructed the socinians themselves with the air and language of a father , not of an adversary or judge ? or rather , has he not given us reason to think he would have these doubtful expressions construed to the disadvantage of him whom he therein pretends to commend ? or does he think , that after all , he has wiped his mouth , and comes off with some decorum , that he asks pardon , if there be any thing here said , not respectful enough . solomon saith , as a mad man who casteth firebrands , arrows , and death , so is the man that deceiveth ( or as the septuagint reads it , traduceth ) his neighbour , and saith , am i not in sport ? for can any thing blacker be said , than that because of the preferments on one side , and the fears and aws on the other , these great men defend the doctrine of the trinity , and defend it because they must . all that can be said is , that in his opinion these are fatal biasses ; in his opinion , i say , who after all his pretence to a freedom from these biasses which the great pensioners of the world are under the power of , cannot so smother it , but upon occasion it will break forth : o , saith he , let the church-preferments be proposed as the reward of only learning and piety , and then mighty things shall be done , and it shall be soon seen how many eyes this liberty would open . surely he must have too fatal an inclination this way himself , that can think so ill of mankind , and of such who are known to have been tried when time was , but despised his sort of bribes and fears too , when armed with power and authority ; when they , with a bravery becoming their learning and integrity , dar'd to own ( in his phrase ) not only an inconvenient but a dangerous truth , p. . surely this is a sort of treatment that these venerable persons might not have expected from one of that denomination , that used to argue with decency . but what may not be expected from him , who has the confidence to tell the world , that the ancient unitarians did generally reject the gospel , and other pieces now attributed to st. john , and said they were written by the heretick cerinthus ? p. , &c. and because he thought himself obliged rather to vindicate those beloved predecessors of his ( as he would have it ) than those divine books ; he pretends particularly to set down their reasons in order ; of which matter , though ( as he tells us ) he will affirm nothing ; yet , saith he , i should be glad to see an answer to their exceptions . after which , i hope these great men will think it no disparagement to suffer the utmost indignity in such company as that of the divine evangelist . but of this more in its proper place . but why doth our author thus lead up the van , and bring up the rear of his answer to these venerable persons , with this popular topick of church-preferments , and church-fears ? was there never a time when the church of god professed the same tenets which our church defends , without any of those great rewards to bribe them ; and when on all sides they were beset with the aws and fears of a furious and embitter'd adversary ? was there not a time when his unitarians possess'd some of the greatest preferments , when ( as our author tells us ) they had their paulus patriarch of antioch ; and photinus metropolitan of illyricum ; and that their followers abounded every-where , & c. ? p. . and i may tell him as a secret , was there not a time when the power of these fatal biasses was abroad , that their metropolitans were not wont to treat the trinitarians with the air and language of a father , but of an adversary , and a tyrannical judge ? what else was the meaning of the commotions , violences , and outrages us'd in those days , when fire and faggot were even among them in fashion ; when bishops were deposed , exiled , slain , and the whole empire in a combustion by those infamous practices ? surely ( as our author saith of his adversaries ) if those persons had believed as they said , they could never think it necessary to use the precaution of such mighty aws and draconick sanctions , to maintain a truth so obvious , as they pretend , to every unprejudiced , and every honest man , p. . this , i doubt me , is in his words a thorny and ungrateful subject . and he may thank himself for giving the occasion ; and me for not tracing it further . for which , as i am not conscious to my self of having done them any wrong ; so i don't think it fit to conclude my preface , as he doth his , with asking his pardon . errata . page . l. . dele from and to perswasion . p. . l. : r. uncouth . p. . l. ule . r. paraphrase . p. . l. . r. what if . p. . l. . for usually r. really . p. . l. . after place make a ( , ) l. . for and r. and , l. . after created make a ( t ) a vindication of the sermons of his grace the archbishop of canterbury , concerning the divinity and incarnation of our b. saviour , &c. sect . i. of the deity of our saviour . the author of the considerations having taken a liberty of dispersing the matter before him without any just order , doth accordingly often repeat things of the same kind ; making some ventures upon a point in one place , and taking it up again in another ; so that his reader is often rather amused than satisfied . tho withal , he takes occasion to quicken his matter ( which would otherwise have proved nauseous and heavy ) with several part remarks and reflections . but being my design is not like a man of mystery ( as he scoffingly represents it ) to darken the cause , or to cast a mist before the eyes of the reader ; i shall gently lead him by the hand , and endeavour to put what i have to say , into that order , that whatever force is in it , the reader may soon discover ; or what defects may be in it , he may be able to detect . this author allows his grace to be open and ingenuous in declaring his opinion of the trinity ; and is pleased to allow him a right to alledge particular scriptures to prove the divinity of our saviour . and whether he has proved it or not , is the point in controversy . before i proceed to which , i shall briefly state the point , and shew what are the distinct opinions of the orthodox , the arians , and socinians , concerning it ; for into one of these , is the whole to be resolved . the orthodox hold , that christ the word , and only begotten of the father , was truly and really god from all eternity ; god by participation of the divine nature and happiness together with the father , and by way of derivation from him , as light from the sun ; and that he made all creatures , and so could no more be a creature , than it is possible for a creature to make it self . thus a. bp. p. , , . the arians conceive , that sometime before the world was made , god generated the son after an ineffable manner , to be his instrument and minister in making the world. and this son is called god in scripture , not in the most perfect sense , but with respect to the creatures whom he made . so our author , p. . a socinus held , that the son was not in being till he was the son of the virgin ; and that therefore he was a god , not in nature , but by way of office , mission , or representation , as moses , and others , are called god in scripture . so our author , p. . b against these two last , his grace directed his discourse , and took them up in order ; and in the first place founded his argument upon the first chapter of st. john's gospel . here his adversary labours with all his might to put by the force of those arguments . doth the archbishop reason from the context ? if you will believe this author , this text is alledged impertinently by him for the trinitarians , which it doth not favour , no , not in the least . that his grace can raise the expressions no higher than arianism , p. . that as for the historical occasion assigned by his grace , there is no historian ( he is sure , no ancient historian ) assigns it . and that many of the ancients did believe that cerinthus was the true author of the gospel imputed to st. john ; and that the ancient unitarians did reject the gospel , epistles , and revelation now attributed to him , p. , . this is the sum of what he has said ; all of which will be comprehended under the following heads . . i shall consider the authority of st. john's gospel , and other writings ascribed to him . . i shall consider the authority of those vnitarians who , he saith , rejected those writings . . if st. john proves to be the author of the gospel , i shall consider the occasion upon which he is said to have written that book . . i shall defend the orthodox explication of it , given by the archbishop . . i shall consider the authority of those writings , which are usually ascribed to st. john , viz. the gospel , three epistles , and the revelation . it 's much , that we should be put upon the proof of this at this time of day , and by one that professes himself to believe the christian religion ; of which inconsistency , i think it 's much more difficult to give an account , than of the writings of that apostle , called in question by his dear friends , the ancient vnitarians . it is certain , that there was not the least occasion given him from the point in dispute to enter upon this matter , where both sides agreed , or would be thought to be agreed about the authority of the book they reason from : and which he saith , is with great colour alledged for the arian doctrine , p. . and that socinus's explication of it , would perfectly agree to the lord christ. but i must confess , he has given too great reason to suspect , that he is in this point of the same mind with the ancient vnitarians ; and would allow cerinthus , or simon magus , or any of the like rabble , to be author of those writings , rather than that divine apostle . but as he wisely observes , that those ancient vnitarians that had rejected them ; yet , because they saw it begun to grow into credit among the other denominations of christians , many of which had been seduced by the platonick philosophers that came over to christianity ; therefore they were careful to show them , that it was capable of a very allowable sense ; and that it doth not appear , that either st. john , or cerinthus , intended to advance a second god , p. . a that is , in plain and honest english , they themselves did not at all believe those to be the works of st. john ; but because there was no going against the stream , and that among the other denominations of christians these were universally received , they would then swim with it ; and then whoever was the author , whether st. john or cerinthus , was no trinitarian . and if they could have made this out to the satisfaction of the adverse party , and there had been nothing wanting but their approbation of the aforesaid works to have made the christians of other denominations intirely theirs ; then they that at first held , that cerinthus , and not st. john , was the author ; and towards an accommodation , came so far , as to say for convenience sake , st. john , or cerinthus , to remove all rubs out of the way , and to have compleated the design , would without doubt have intirely come over so far to them , whatever they themseves thought ; and they would have consented that st. john , and not cerinthus , was the author . but alas ! that was too hard a task , for st. john himself would not bend and comply , and could not be made a vnitarian . in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god , &c. was as stable as a rock ; and therefore if st. john would not be for them , they would not be for him . and then all the vnitarians with one consent reject the gospel , epistles , and revelation , and give the honour from st. john to cerinthus , who should be said to write them , to confirm this heretick's cabalastick and platonick notions about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or word , and his jewish dreams about the millenary kingdom , p. . now which part our author will take to , whether that of the ancient vnitarians , who , he saith , were contemporaries to the first fathers of the church , and were older than any of those fathers whose works are now extant ( if we will believe him ) ; whether , i say , he will take to them and reject these books , or whether forsake his friends , and side with those fathers whose works are now extant , and the rest of the catholick church in receiving them , i am not able positively to determine ; for he holds us in suspence and saith , he will affirm nothing in the matter , but should be glad to see a good answer to the exceptions against these books , which we receive as st. john ' s , that were made by the ancient unitarians . i do not think my self obliged to enter into the merits of that cause , unless he will yield those books of st. john to be for the trinitarians , and therefore calls their authority in question : but when he professes st. john not to favour , no not in the least , the trinitarian doctrine , and to be wholly socinian , what need is there to prolong the time and postpone the consideration of the main cause , and that i must be put upon the proof of this , and hew my way through all those formidable arguments of the unitarians against st. john's writings , before i must be admitted to argue the point in debate ? which is , as if when his grace had said , that the first chapter of genesis might as well be interpreted of a new moral creation , as the first chapter of st. john ; before he would allow me to proceed to the proof of this , he should require me to shew that moses wrote the book of genesis , and oblige me to answer all the arguments of abenezra against it . but how impertinent soever this may be , yet to shew my self a fair adversary , i will return him his complement ( since i have time for it ) that he shall not ( as he saith to his grace ) put that question , which i will not satisfy , if i can , and reasonably may . let us then see ( for he has undertaken to shew us them ) what were the allegations of the unitarians out of eusebius , but especially out of st. epiphanius , who hath written very largely of this matter ( as he saith ) . for these arguments this author refers us to eusebius and epiphanius , but as for eusebius , he says nothing of these arguments our author cites him for ; and as for what are in eusebius , they are not the allegations of the unitarians , but of some of the otherwise orthodox against the apocalypse , as i shall shew . as for epiphanius , our author saith , he hath written very largely of this matter : but if he has , it had become him to have observ'd that it was because of the answer he has given to the arguments which the alogi ( in our author 's english , the unitarians ) alledged against st. john's writings , in which that historian is very particular ; and not to propose them as if they had stood the shock of several ages , and to this day wanted a reply ; for after this manner he introduces them , i should be glad to see a good answer to the exceptions of the unitarians , against the books which we receive as st. john's . but perhaps in his esteem what epiphanius hath said , is not a good answer ; and as impertinent and ridiculous as that he makes for him in the case of thyatira , of which more anon . it 's time now to examine them . object . . the unitarians said , that it was the current opinion and general tradition , that cerinthus , and not st. john , was author of the gospel , epistles , and revelation , that go under st. john's name : for as to the revelation , it was scarce doubted by any to be the work of cerinthus ; and as such , was wrote against by divers learned men of the catholick persuasion , as 't is now called . a. the answer epiphanius gives to that clause about cerinthus , is , how could cerinthus be the author of that which was directly opposite to him : for cerinthus would have christ to be a meer and late-born man , whereas st. john saith , the word always was , and came from heaven , and was made flesh . now i conceive this answer of epiphanius to be good , unless they would have cerinthus to contradict himself . as to the other clauses of our author's objections , ( for they are not in epiphanius ) nothing is more false , than that it was the current opinion and general tradition that cerinthus was the author of all those writings ; and that the revelation was scarce doubted by any to be his , and was wrote against , as such by divers of the catholick persuasion : for , . there were some books of st. john , of which there never was any question in the christian church , which eusebius calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , such is his gospel , which irenaus , and eusebius from him , say he published , while at ephesus , at the instance of the asian bishops , and as such is often quoted by the fathers . this sandius , a late author of the unitarians acknowledges , who saith , the gospel was always accounted canonical . such again is the first epistle of st. john , which , saith eusebius , is admitted by the present as it was by the ancient christians without dispute . so st. jerom ; upon which grotius saith , that it was never doubted to be st. john's . so sandius again . . those books that were not so generally receiv'd as st. john's , were yet for the most part receiv'd as canonical . such were the d. and d. epistles ; of which some would have another john , call'd john the presbyter , to be the author , as st. jerom saith , and grotius from him ; but for the most part it was believed to be st. john the evangelist * : against which ( it seems ) the ancient unitarians had nothing particularly to object ; for else we should have learn'd it from our author . of this sort is the apocalypse ; of which , saith our author , it was scarce doubted by any to be the work of cerinthus . eusebius indeed saith , some do question it : but who and how many were they on the other side that did not doubt of either its authority or author , even such as justin martyr , irenaus , tertullian , &c. † some of which interpreted it , ( as st. jerom saith ) and say that st. john wrote it when in patmos . but i shall refer our author for the rest to grotius and sandius ; the latter of which charges them with blasphemy that would attribute it to cerinthus . lastly , saith our author , the revelation was as the work of cerinthus , wrote against by divers learned men of the catholick persuasion . a. dionysius alexandrinus was of the number of those that questioned whether st. john the evangelist were the author ; and for this indeed he offers several reasons , but of so little force , that if our author hath seen them , as he has not so he could not have the confidence to propose them in behalf of his ancient unitarians . but whatever that father thought of the author , he allowed the book to be divine . there were indeed some others of the catholick persuasion , that dionysius spoke of in the same book , ( as eusebius eccles. hist. lib. . cap. . relates ) that would have the apocalypse wrote by cerinthus ; but they were few , and such as were troubled with a sort of millenaries , followers of nepos an egyptian bishop , ( of repute for his learning , faith , and knowledge of the scripture ) who for their opinion quoted the apocalypse . and it seems , as the ancient unitarians rejected st. john's writings , because they favour'd the divinity of our saviour ; so those ( otherwise orthodox ) would , it 's likely , have rejected the apocalypse , because it favoured ( as they thought ) the cause of the millennium . upon the whole it appears , that it was the current opinion and general tradition , that st. john , and not cerinthus , was the author of the works attributed to that evangelist . object . . they objected , he saith , ' that this gospel is wholly made use of by the cerinthians and valeminians , the two chief sects of the gnosticks , and for this he quotes irenaeus , as well as epiphanins . a. what is this brought to prove ? will it prove cerinthus to be the author of that gospel ? then it may as well prove valentinus to be the author of it , as cerinthus , since the valentinians wholly made use of it , as well as the cerinthians . or will it prove that the gospel is a valentinian , a cerinthian , or gnostick gospel ? then so would the other scriptures be such as the sects were that quoted them , that corrupted and wrested them , to serve their purpose . and thus irenaeus tells us the gnosticks did , as he gives instances enough , haer. l. . c. , , . nay , cerinthus himself owned the gospel of st. matthew , at least part of it ; will it therefore follow that the doctrine of cerinthus was favoured in that gospel , or might be proved from it ? but his grace saith , this gospel was wrote against cerinthus ; and then , saith our author , how came the cerinthians to use it ? a. they used it as the other hereticks used that and other scriptures . and irenaeus applies this to another purpose ; for , saith he , by this means they give testimony to us . and this they might so much the rather do , as the evangelist makes use of several terms of theirs ( as his grace and grotius have shewed ) such as life , light , fulness , which the followers of cerinthus ( who were willing to catch at any thing , as appears from irenaeus ) finding there , would challenge for theirs ; and this our author himself intimates , when he thus expounds irenaeus , that they , the gnosticks , greedily used this gospel as a proof of their eons . object . : ' the other three evangelists suppose all along that our saviour preached but one year , and therefore they reckon but one passover ; but ( the pretended ) st. john counts three years , and three passovers ; which , saith our author , ' seems to me an unaccountable contradiction ; and yet it is granted on all bands , some finding a th year and passover . answ. it is an unaccountable contradiction indeed , if the other three evangelists had said , that our saviour preached but one year , and that there was but one passover , when st. john saith there were three passovers , and consequently three years , or thereabouts . but the question is , whether the three evangelists gave any such account ; i am certain they do not . and if one will but consider the occurrences in the time of our saviour's preaching , as it 's impossible ( morally speaking ) it should all be done in one years time ; so he that will but consider the way of computation , as epiphanius hath done haer. . . will see that what st. john saith must needs be true . but what then will become of the other evangelists ? must they be excluded out of the number of the canonical ? no surely . but we are to consider when each evangelist begins , and what he takes in hand to pursue , of which epiphanius gives a very good account . and if we take this course , we shall find the latter evangelists often to supply the omissions of the preceding . and so st. john , who lived the longest , and wrote last of them , doth in the case before us , and distributes the time of our saviour's ministry into annals , or passovers , after the jewish way of computation , beginning his account from our saviour's baptism , and connecting it to john the baptist's imprisonment ( where the other evangelists begin ) by which means the history is made compleat , and the evangelists are found to agree , as eusebius , and st. jerom observe . the omission of which , by the other evangelists , makes it no more a contradiction , than when st. matthew begins the genealogy of our saviour with abraham , st. luke carries it to adam , and st. john makes him to exist before the world. omissions are no contradictions , and such as these no unaccountable omissions . and as for that single passeover , the other three speak of , it was not , as that was a chronological character of time , circumscribing the whole space of our saviour's ministry ; but a remarkable point , denoting the special season he suffer'd in , with relation to the great type under the law , and for which he is sometime called our passover . this , i say , no more describes the compleat time of his ministry , than it will follow that because pontius pilate was then said to be governor of judea , that he was governor but one year only . object . . ' the other evangelists agree , that immediately after his baptism our lord was led into the wilderness to be tempted forty days . but cerinthus , who knew not the series or order of our saviour's life and miracles , says in the gospel , which he has , say they , [ viz. the ancient unitarians ] forged for st. john , that the next day after his baptism , our saviour spake with andrew and peter , and the day after went to galilee , and on the third was at a wedding in cana , and after this departed with his mother and brethren to capernaum , where he abode some time . a. our author saith , the next day after our saviour's baptism , he spake with andrew , &c. i answer , . there is no mention at all of our saviour's baptism in that chapter , but the history of that being particularly relalated by the other evangelists , st. john supposes it , and refers to it , v. . john bare witness — this is he of whom i spake , that is , formerly ; and when that was , st. matthew . . shews , which was just before his baptism . . accordingly , all the way there is an observable difference of phrase between st. john and the other evangelists . matthew saith , he it is that cometh after me , that is , he that is to come . st. john saith , ver. . there standeth one among you , he it is that coming after me , [ as i have said . ] so ver . john seeth jesus coming ; — he spake of him , as one then known to himself , but that was not till his baptism , ver . . so again , ver . . this is be , of whom i said , [ formerly ] ver. , . john bare record , saying , i saw the spirit , — and it abode upon him . the phrases , said , saw , bare record , abode , do shew that it was a certain time past , which he refers to . from whence it appears , ( . ) that the phrase , the next day , has no reference to our saviour's baptism ( for that st. john is not relating ) but to the discourse then in hand ; as the same phrase , ver. . had . ( . ) that there was a distance of time between our saviour's baptism , and that time that john the baptist had the discourse with the pharisees at bethabara , ver . , , . which was the day before he met andrew , ver . . . it 's not at all unreasonable to suppose , that our saviour's temptation in the wilderness , &c. did fall in with that time ; for after his baptism he immediately went into the wilderness , mark . . and john the baptist may well be supposed to have spent that time in preaching and baptizing near to jordan , and in the parts adjoyning to it ; all which st. john omits , as having been before recorded by the other evangelists , as well as our saviour's baptism . but the learned reader may consult epiphanius , haer. . , &c. and petavius's notes upon it . and i will refer our author to schlictingius's note on john . . object . . ' he has feigned an epistle , as from st. john , to the bishop and church of thyatira , &c. but it 's certain and notorious , say the unitarians , that there was no church at thyatira , till a long time after st. john's death . 't is a very ridiculous answer made to this by epiphanius , who being sensible ( because he was of asia ) of the truth of this objection , is forced to be content with this vain elusion , that st. john writes prophetically of this church . a. . it 's far from being certain , that there was no church , and if st. john be of any authority , it 's as certain there was a church there , as in the other six cities , for it 's in the same stile ; and it may be as well said , there was no church at ephesus , as at thyatira , if the way of writing is to be regarded . . it 's not probable that there should be no church there , when churches were planted all about , and that it 's granted all the other six were churches then in being . . if i understand epiphanius , he is far from granting it : all that he saith , is , ( . ) supposing it to be so * , what will follow ? why , ' these very persons are forced from the things which they object against it , by their own confession , to assent to the truth ; that st. john foretold things to come by divine inspiration , concerning the corruption of that church , and those false prophetesses that should arise in it ninety three years after our lord's ascension . ( . ) he positively saith , there was a church there in st. john's time ; for saith he , st. john foresaw that after the time of the apostles , and of st. john , the church would fall from the truth into error , even that of the cataphryges , of which were the pretended prophetesses , priscilla , maximilla , and quintilla . so again , he wrote by prophecy to those christians , that then were there in thyatira , that a woman , who would call her self a prophetess , should arise among them . so that our author is as wide of the sense of epiphanius , as his unitarians were of the truth , that would so many years after affirm there was no church at thyatira in st. john's time . i suppose our author took it up at the second hand ; for i perceive pererius , and perhaps others , mistook epiphanius . it seems that the church there had been either destroyed by persecution , or corrupted by the cataphryges , out of which condition it having recovered a hundred and twelve years after , ( as epiphanius saith ) the alogi ignorantly concluded there never had been a church there till that time ; or however , made use of this pretence to countenance their impious design of overthrowing the authority of that book : a design that our author hath shewed himself too great a well-wisher to , by so formal a repetition of those sorry , and so often baffled objections ; and by adding what force he ( under the name of the ancient unitarians ) could to support them . which brings into my mind an unhappy passage in serm. . of the archbishop , concerning the doctrine of socinus , and his uncoucht way of managing of it . it was only to serve and support an opinion which he had entertained before , and therefore was resolved one way or other to bring the scripture to comply with it : and if he could not have done it , it is greatly to be fear'd , that he would at last have called in question the divine authority of st. john's gospel , rather than have quitted his opinion . it was evidently so in the case of the alogi or ancient unitarians ; and what doth our author want of it , that thus rakes into the dirt of that generation , and would have them the best part of the christian church ? but that remains to be consider'd . ii. who are the ancient unitarians , that our author at all times speaks so venerably of , and that thus rejected the books usually ascribed to st. john ? this name of the unitarians and ancient unitarians , is a title much made use of , of late ; and it is a term of latitude , that to those that know not the difference , adds much to the number ; for under that , they would comprehend all that deny a trinity , or think not alike of it with the catholick church , whether arians , or photinians and socinians ; though at the same time they disagree , as well among themselves , ( as i shall shew ) as with us , and particularly in the point in question , viz. the authority of st. john's gospel , &c. our author often speaks of the ancient unitarians ; and if we would know how ancient they are , he tells us , they were contemporaries to the first fathers of the church , and were older than any of those fathers whose works are now extant , p. . that is , st. clemens himself contemporary to st. paul. now whom should we so soon fix upon for his ancient unitarians , as cerinthus and ebion , for they were ancient , as contemporaries with the first fathers of the church ; and were both of them unitarians , as they both held that our saviour was a meer man ? but here our author interposes , and because he confesses he has met with these two names in the church history ; and when he did , to be sure finds no passable character of them ; therefore he will not have ebion a person , nor cerinthus a unitarian ; and for the proof of the latter , offers no testimony ( the way for proving matter of fact ) but an argument of his own ; for , saith he , if cerinthus held the unity of god , and denied the divinity and pre-existence of our saviour ( as his grace and the moderns suppose ) neither it should seem , would the unitarians have reckoned him a heretick , nor have rejected the books which they supposed to be his ; namely , the gospel , epistles , and revelation , now attributed to st. john. as if a person might not be orthodox in one point , and heretical in others ; and the unitarians might not reckon cerinthus a heretick ( who held jesus was not born of a virgin , but was the real son of joseph and mary , and that christ descended upon jesus after his baptism , and leaving him again , returned to heaven ; and so it was jesus , and not christ that died ; with more of these whimsical dreams ) though he agreed with them in denying the divinity and pre-existence of our saviour . the matter of fact is beyond all contradiction , that cerinthus was a unitarian , as church-history would have informed any smatterer in it , ( as irenaeus , eusebius , epiphanius , &c. abundantly testify ) but it is his own argument that is , in his pharse , obscure and puzzling . but he is not so willing to part with ebion , the name i mean , and will have it given by some to the first christians , because of their poverty ; and then because the ebionites were unitarians in one sense , therefore they must be hereticks in none . but herein he is as unsuccessful as in his former attempt ; for besides their agreement with the unitarians in denial of christ's divinity , they held the observation of the law of moses necessary , were circumcised , and rejected st. paul as an apostate , &c. both of these then must be unitarians , and ancient unitarians ; but then comes a very obscure and puzzling part of his history ; for whatever cerinthus himself thought , yet our author tells us , that the gospel of st. john was wholly made use of by the cerinthians , his followers . and then though these were unitarians , yet being not of the number of those that wholly rejected st. john's writings , we are much at a loss to find out those of them that were older than any of those fathers whose works are now extant . i doubt we must come a step lower , and from being older than those fathers of the church , whose works are now extant , they will prove at the most contemporaries with , if not after several of them , about the close of the d. century , as is computed . our author himself points to them , and they were the alogi . so termed by epiphanius , because they denied christ to be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the word , and the son of god ; and would have him a meer man. but now though these are unitarians , and the most like to the socinians of all the ancient unitarians , if not the only ones that are so ( as sandius would have it , p. , , &c. ) though they agree with his character again , that they rejected all the works commonly ascribed to st. john ; yet they seem to be the only unitarians that did anciently agree in disowning the authority of all those books ; and then it will follow , that the unitarians were not more ancient than those fathers , whose works are now extant ; though he saith , it is certain and confess'd by them all , that the ancient unitarians from the apostolick times to the nicene council , or thereabouts , did reject them . so that i see no remedy , but if he will be positive in it , that he must be contented to let the cerinthians as well as the ebionites , pass for unitarians , to make his sect thus ancient as the apostolick times : but how he will do to find out those that did thus professedly reject all those writings of st. john before them , and from the apostolick times to them ; and yet were older than such fathers of the church , as clemens romanus , polycarp , ignatius , &c. some of whose works are now extant ; i must leave to his consideration . thus much shall suffice to have said about the authority of st. john's writings , and particularly of his gospel . but there is another point yet to be debated ; which is , iii. to consider what was the occasion upon which st. john wrote his gospel . this is one of the first things his grace doth take into consideration ; as the knowledge of this seem'd to him to be the only true key to the interpretation of this discourse of st. john and the neglect of which was one of the grounds of socinus's great and fatal mistake , as he saith . how ! socinus mistake ! rather let st. john's gospel , and all his other works , labour and sink under the exceptions of the ancient unitarians ; and lye by the walls till the world can give a good answer to them . rather let st. john take up words by chance ( as our author saith , p. . ) and use the words life , fulness , only begotten , as they came in his way , without any design , than the great socinus should be blamed . st. john , indeed , may be said to use words by chance ; but sociinus , formed , and thought , and concluded , and understood ; and according as he formed , and thought , and concluded , so it must be meant . he was the man that saw plainly , ( as he words it again , p. . ) and if his grace , in vindication of st. john , and in compliance with the ancient historians , will adventure to interpret him from the occasion of his writing , he deserves to be treated with contempt . the serene republick owns none of these titles , bishop and archbishop , &c. thus scoffingly and boyishly doth he introduce this serious argument . o he ! says his grace , how strangely has this man [ socinus ] mistook for want of the light of ancient history ! thus he interprets scripture by scripture , and by reason and wit , not by the fathers and the old historians of the chruches party , &c. i could find in my heart to transcribe what his grace has wrote upon this case ; his words are these : it was the great and fatal mistake of socinus , to go to interpret scripture merely by criticising upon words , and searching into all the senses that they are capable of , till he can find one , though never so forced and foreign , that will save harmless the opinion which he was resolved beforehand to maintain , even against the most natural and obvious sense of the text which he undertakes to interpret . just as if a man should interpret ancient statutes and records , by mere critical skill in words , without regard to the true occasion upon which they were made , and without any manner of knowledge and insight into the history of the age in which they were written , p. . . and that this was the way socinus took , our author 's own account of it will manifest , 〈◊〉 , where he chalks out the method his great master observed , in interpreting that evangelist , and that is , by laying down certain propositions , which he resolved to accommodate all to ; such was the unity of god : and therefore , saith he , when the word is called god , it must be meant in a sense of office : and whereas it is said , all things were made by him ; those things must be the spiritual world , &c. and then farewell fathers , and historians , occasions , and scripture too , rather than the reason and wit of socinus be called in question . well , but supposing that our author is content to have the historical occasion of st. john's writing inquired into ; yet , as for that assign'd by his grace , it was , he saith , below the gravity of the apostle to confute the wild gnosticks , &c. and if you will take his word for it , he adds , i am of opinion , that there is no historian ( i am sure there is no ancient historian ) who assigns that historical occasion of st. john's writings , even the gnosticks and their eons , mentioned by his grace . in short , he hath not very justly blamed socinus , for not knowing an historical occasion , which is mentioned in no historian , p. . this is very positive , no historian , no ancient historian , and mentioned in no historian . we have gained before ( if it be worth the while to prove it ) that cerinthus and ebion ( supposing him for the present a person ) did deny the divinity of our saviour , according as his grace represented it . the next thing is to shew , that these their opinions was an occasion which st. john took for the writing his gospel , in the judgment of the ancient historians , and fathers of the church . here our author interposes , and saith , the account given of this matter by the ancient , is very different from this of his grace . for they say , according to our author 's antique translation , that the other evangelists having committed to writing only the gests of our saviour , during one years space : therefore the apostle john , being thereto requested , declared in a gospel according to him , the time that was passed over by the other evangelists , and what was done by our saviour therein * . it is very true , that the one of these is different from the other ; but tho they are different , they are not contradictory and inconsistent . for then , not only the archbishop would contradict himself , who elsewhere gives the same account , and tells us from eusebius that st john wrote his gospel last , and that on purpose to supply the omissions of the other evangelists † ; but the fathers also would contradict one another , and often themselves ; who sometimes give the one , and sometimes the other , and sometimes both as the reasons of st. john's writing , ( as i shall presently shew ) . by which way of arguing , epiphanius , eusebius , and st. jerome , &c. will closh one with another ; when the first of these saith , st. john wrote his gospel * by the impulse of the holy ghost ; and the other says , it was at the instance of the asian bishops . but now , as these two may well be accommodated , and are consistent ; so it is in the account given by the ancients of the occasion of st. john's writing the gospel ; therefore st. jerom † joyns them together , and after he had said , that st. john wrote it in confutation of cerinthus , and other hereticks ; adds , there is also another cause , and then falls in with eusebius . so irenaeus expresly * so epiphanius . and thus sandius doth acknowledg , that against the heresy of cerinthus and ebion , , st. john ( as we have it by tradition ) wrote his gospel . thus far then we are safe , and have the suffrage of antiquity on our side , that st. john wrote his gospel against the heresies of cerinthus and ebion . and indeed , by our author's reply to this part , we may guess , that when he met with these two names in the church-history , he met with nothing against it . for thus he goes on . first , as to ebion , concerning him , it is , saith he , doubted by the criticks , whether there was any such man : nay , a little after , he is got above the criticks , and positively affirms , that ebion never was . now , supposing his modern opposers , and among them the archbishop , for want of consulting the indexes of names in church history , had mistaken ; yet , how will that confute his modern opposers , who use to quote irenaeus , epiphanius , &c. for their assertion , that st. john wrote against the ebionites ? for tho ebion never was , yet the ebionites were an early sect , and as early as they make him . but saith he , this name was given to the first christians , because of their poverty , according to the signification of the word . a. then indeed st. john was in the wrong for writing against these first christians , whom st. paul refers to , as our author would have us understand , cor. . . or at least , all those fathers were mistaken that would have st. john write against the heresy of the ebionites , or that reckon that among the number of heresies . for what heresy is there in simple poverty ? but if they that would have the name an appellative , say it was not because of their poverty , but because they thought , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , poorly and meanly of our saviour , as they would have him the son of joseph and mary , as some of them ; or of mary , as others ; but all of them agreeing that he was a mere man. so eusebius . what if ebion at last is found to be a person ? so it 's affirmed by tertullian , praescript . c. , &c. hieron . in isai. c. , & . hilarius epist. de trin. l. . origen in matth. , &c. so epiphanius expresly , ebionites were so called from ebion ; whose followers , saith he , would be so called from their being poor like the apostles : but , saith that father , this is a fiction of their own ; for ebion was a proper name . as for cerinthus , all that he has to say , is , that the gospel of st. john could not be wrote against cerinthus , because cerinthus was said to be author of it . but this is to reason about matter of fact. it 's plain , the ancients , to whom our author appeals , did assert , that it was written against cerinthus ; and it 's as plain , that cerinthus held these opinions , against which st. john is supposed by them to have written . to which he has nothing to reply , but that cerinthus is said to be the author of it ; but that i have already consider'd before . thus far then , i hope , 't is pretty evident , that there are historians and ancient historians , that do assign the same historical occasion of st. john's writings , as is assigned by his grace . but it 's likely he will reply , that these words of his , no historian , and to be sure no ancient historian ever assigns that occasion mentioned by his grace , are to be limited to the gnosticks . whatever he may say , yet i doubt few readers will suppose it ; for he has so artificially mingled all these together , that what he affirms may be applied to all ; and yet , it examined , he can restrain it to this or that particular . and therefore , that i may shew how little he is acquainted with this argument , or how little he consults truth and candor in it , i shall consider it with respect to the gnosticks . he cannot deny , but that the terms , word , light , fulness , only begotten , are the phraseology of the gnosticks , or else he must never have read irenaeus ; which also are used by st. john. now the question will be , whether st. john hath used them by chance , as our author imagines ? or that in opposition to these dreams , st. john shews all these titles did truly belong to our saviour , and to which there is a perpetual allusion , as his grace affirms . i verily believe , that if a gnostick had accidentally light upon that chapter , as the platonick amelius is said to have done , he would no less have been convinced there was this allusion to their hypothesis , than that philosopher was that the evangelist did platonize . hence it was , that the following gnosticks would have confirmed their conjugations and eons from thence . but saith he , it was below the gravity of the apostle to confute the wild gnosticks , and their chimerical eons . why so ? when this sect so far prevailed , that during the lives of the apostles , it grew to a great height , to the great prejudice and disturbance of the christian religion , as his grace observes ; for whose purity and preservation it became even this great evangelist to be concerned . and tho our sage philosopher may call them , chimaera's and sickly dreams , ( as in truth they were ) and so too trivial a subject for the apostolical pen to write of ; yet , when we consider how far those heresies spread , how long they continued , and what mischief they did ( as may be seen in irenaeus , tertullian , epiphanius , &c. ) we may agree to what epiphanius saith upon this occasion . neither , saith he , let any one contemn these dogmata , as full of folly ; for foolish people are perswaded by foolish things . nay , prudent persons may decline from the right way , if the mind be not exercised in the way of truth ; as that father gives an instance of himself , when likely to be perverted by the gnosticks . but lastly , saith our author , i am of opinion , that there is no historian , i 'am sure no ancient historian , who assigns the historical occasion of st. john ' s writings , even the gnosticks and their eons , mentioned by his grace . i answer , that what has been before said is sufficient , when there is a perpetual allusion to the phrase and opinions of the gnosticks ; and very often in the apostolical epistles , as has been observed by many learned persons . but to put this past dispute , besides what is elsewhere , let our author turn to irenaeus , and he will find that ancient author expresly affirming , that st john wrote his gospel against the error of cerinthus ; and a little after , that st. john took away all ground of dissention ; and by the words , the world was made by him , he confuted the gnosticks . so that if our author was of that opinion , it was without any ground . iv. it 's high time we now proceed to enquire into the sense of st. john. the ancient unitarians finding ( as i have observed ) the gospel of st. john not reconcilable to their opinion of christ's being a meer man ; like alexander , at once cut the gordian knot , which they could not fairly untie ; and rejected this and other pieces now attributed to that evangelist , as uncanonical and heretical . but an after-generation ( whom our author dignities also with the same title of ancient unitarians ) more wary than the former , seeing that author , whoever he was , to grow into credit among the other denominations of christians , were careful to shew them , that it was capable of a very allowable sense , as our author saith , p. . a. and this seems to be the case of socinus and this his defender , who must not quit st. john , and with the ancient unitarians , call his gospel the fiction and forgery of cerinthu , ( as our author saith they did ) for it has been too long in credit with the other denominations of christians , to admit of such despiteful usage and violence : and therefore they will undertake to shew them it 's capable of a very allowable sense ; but by such pitiful and wretched shifts , by such precarious and arbitrary suppositions , ( as his grace rightly terms them ) and an invention which no indifferent reader of st. john , that had not been prepossessed and biass'd by some violent prejudice , would ever have thought of , p. , , &c. and this will appear , if we try it by any of those ways by which the sense of an author is to be obtained ; such as the occasion , the phraseology , the scope , design and context . as for the occasion , if the authors alledged above , are of any authority , it 's so far unquestionable . as for the phraseology , that is to be understood by the common use of the words , or the subject , or science they relate to ; and accordingly were these phrases in st. john applied in their proper and ordinary signification , as not only the orthodox christians , but even the arians , and amelius the platonist did understand them , ( as his grace observes from eusebius ) and our author is forced to confess as much ; for in the account he gives of the historical occasion ( viz. of socinus's new project ) he thus introduces it , socinus finding it to be the first of all god's declarations , i am the lord thy god. &c. he understood in the beginning , to be in the beginning of the gospel state ; and the word was a god in a sense of office ; and the world he made , a spiritual world. now what is this , but to carry off the words from a plain literal to a figurative sense , and so to acknowledge their doctrine is not favoured by the phraseology of it ? but supposing it to be so , yet , saith our author , socinus observed , that the scriptures abound with such metaphors and figures even when they speak of god , as when god is said to have eyes , arms and bowels , &c. to denote the sight , power and mercies of god. p. . a. it 's granted ; but withal , as he saith , the scriptures therein trust to the judgment of the most common readers , and question not but the most ordinary capacity will so understand them . but then how comes this to pass , that from the time of st. john downwards , not the most common and ordinary , nay , the most accurate readers , and extraordinary capacities , were ever so happy as to make this discovery before the fortunate socinus ? and why were not they as well able to find out in this discourse of st. john the ministerial deity of our saviour , the beginning of the gospel state , and the spiritual world , ( the only key , it seems , to unlock the sense of that divine writer ) as they were by the hands , eyes and bowels of god , to understand his power , sight and mercies ? it 's evident that the most ordinary capacities did , generally speaking , by these corporeal members , understand the abovesaid attributes of the deity to be described . and it is also evident that for socinus's explication of that evangelist , the most famed expositors , and much more common readers , no more thought of it , than the ancient navigators did dream of that new world , which columbus two ages ago was so happy as to discover . so that it evidently appears , that there is not the same reason to interpret the phrases , in the beginning , and the word was god , and all things were made by him , in a metaphorical and figurative sense , as there is for the understanding the corporeal organs of speech and action , &c. after that manner , when applied to god : but that rather they must be understood properly and literally , as the orthodox , the arians , and all others have understood , and his grace has expounded them . but hold , saith our author , ' his grace himself , when he comes to interpret the particular expressions , can raise them no higher than arianism , ( viz. that the son was generated some time before the world ) though he alledged them to prove trinitarianism . p. . b. well , supposing this , yet if his exposition hold so far good , the socinian hypothesis , that will not allow our saviour to have any existence before his nativity of the virgin mary , will then be utterly overthrown . but what doth our author mean ? when he affirms or denies , as he pleases , what irenaeus , eusebius and epiphanius say ; they are books few understand , and fewer have : but methinks he should be a little more cautious when he uses the same liberty in a book published but the last year , and that has the good hap to be generally well received and read . how then can he say that his grace can raise - the expressions no higher than arianism ? when it 's the first of his corollaries , viz. the word here described by st. john , is not a creature . and then follows , this conclusion is directly against the arians , who affirmed that the son of god was a creature . p. . and there is not a branch of those verses which the archbishop doth not alike interpret . thus he saith of christ the word , that is , the eternal son of god. p. , . in the beginning , that is , he did exist before any thing was made , and consequently is without beginning , and eternal . p. , &c. was god , that is , from all eternity . p. , &c. but perhaps , he will say , this his grace has attempted , but not prov'd . that remains to be tried by what he has to object against it ; and then he only offers somewhat as a reply to his graces's exposition of the phrase , in the beginning , leaving all the rest that was said in exposition and defence of the other phrases of the evangelist , to continue as they were ; and if we may judge of what he could have said of the rest , by what he has said of this , it must needs have been very insignificant : for thus he argues . . in the beginning , is interpreted without beginning , which two are distinctly contrary . p. b. a. i answer ; this is not directly laid down as the interpretation of that phrase , but is rather the consequence of what his grace had said just before , as the preceding quotation shews , in the beginning , that is , he did exist before any thing was made , and consequently is without beginning , and eternal . . granting he had thus explain'd the phrase , in the beginning , to be without beginning , yet they are not directly contrary . to have a beginning , and to be without beginning , are directly contrary , and more than so , a contradiction . but to be in the beginning , and to be without beginning , are so far from being contrary , that they are very well consistent , for else god himself would not have been in the beginning . thus it is , gen. . . in the beginning god created the heaven and the earth . by which phrase is shewed , that the heaven and earth had a beginning , and so were not in the beginning , ( for then they had been before they began to be ) and so it could not be said , in the beginning were the heavens and the earth ; for then they had , as god , been without beginning . but it 's said , in the beginning god created them , that is , he that himself had no beginning gave a beginning to them . after this manner doth the wi●●man express it , in the place quoted by his grace , on this occasion , the lord possessed me [ wisdom ] in the beginning of his way , before his works of old . i was set up from everlasting , from the beginning , or ever the earth was , prov. . , . so that to be in the beginning , was to be before his works of old ; to be without a beginning , and from everlasting . . he objects , though he [ archbishop ] cannot find the coeternity in the words of st. john , yet he can interpret his own interpretation of his words , so as to make out the coeternity : for he saith , in the beginning , that is , the son-already was , when things began to be ; and by consequence , the son was without a beginning ; for that which was never made , could have no beginning of its being . and then he smartly returns upon him , how , sir , is that a good consequence , or any consequence at all ? for supposing the son was when the world began to be , which is not yet six thousand years ago , will it follow , that therefore he was absolutely without a beginning , or was never made ? &c. answ. if his grace had left this consequence to stand upon its own foot , without offering any proof for it ; yet any one but competently acquainted with the scripture-phraseology , would not have questioned the reason and force of it ; and if not with respect to his adversary , yet for a salvo to his own ignorance , would have forbore his how , sir , is that a good consequence , or any consequence at all ? but i much question his ignorance ; for his cautious adversary , that had been us'd to write with a due guard as well as strength , took care to prevent this objection , and fortify his consequence with the best authority , that of scripture . for thus he goes on immediately after the words quoted by this author , ( and so he is the more inexcusable ) the son already was when things began to be , and consequently is without beginning , &c. and so the jews used to describe eternity , before the world was , and before the foundation of the world , as also in several places of the new testament . and so likewise solomon describes the eternity of wisdom , the lord , says he , possessed me in the beginning of his way , before his works of old , &c. so that if the consequence be not good , or if it be no consequence at all , the scripture is to be blamed , and not his grace for following it in a line of argumentation . according to the scripture way of speaking , that which was before the world , is accounted eternal : and therefore what was in the beginning had no beginning ; and so the whole cause of arianism , that would have christ to be part of the creation , though before the world was , must unavoidably miscarry ; which was the case in hand , and what his grace undertook to prove . but this was fit to be conceal'd ; for otherwise our author would have had as little to say to the archbishop's explication of the phrase , in the beginning , as he has to the other phrases of the evangelist . therefore he chuses rather to wind off with a bare repetition or two , to the socinian hypothesis , to try whether he can with better success encounter his adversary upon his own principles , than upon those of the arian . p. . a. b. socinus being a person of a sharp and piercing wit , soon perceived that the arian scheme was not consistent with st. john ; for since there was nothing in the world but creator and creature , that which was the creator ( as the arians did admit the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or word to be , and as st. john's words , if literally understood , do import ) could not be the creature . and therefore , either he must , with our author's ancient vnitarians , forgo st. john's authority , or find out some other explication than had yet been thought of ; and that constrain'd him to fly to a ministerial god , and a spiritual world , as the archbishop had shewed , sermon ii. all that our author has to say upon the socinian account , is with reference to a double charge brought against it ; and that is , the unreasonableness and the novelty of this explication . as to the first of these , his grace saith , sermon ii. p. . according to this rate of liberty in interpreting scripture , it will signify very little or nothing , when any person or party is concerned , to oppose any doctrine contained in it ; and the plainest texts for any article of faith , how fundamental and necessary soever , may by the same arts and ways of interpretation be eluded and rendred utterly ineffectual for the establishing of it . for example , if any man had a mind to call in question that article of the creed , concerning the creation of the world , why might he not , according to socinus his way of interpreting st. john , understand the first chapter of genesis concerning the beginning of the mosaical dispensation ; and interpret the creation of the heaven and the earth , to be the institution of the jewish polity and religion , as by the new heavens and the new earth , they pretend to be understood the new state of things under the gospel , &c. it is certain that it was not phrase of st. john misled socinus , or gave him any occasion for his novel interpretation , but a pre-conceived principle ( as has been before observed ) ; for indeed the phrase of st. john bears such a conformity to that of the first of genesis , that one seems to be a key to the other ; and in the beginning god created the heavens and the earth , is so like to in the beginning was the word , — and all things were made by him ; that one is naturally led to think that as they in words seem to relate to the same state of things , so that the word that thus was in the beginning , and made all things , was truly god ; and that the whole phraseology of it is as properly and literally to be understood in st. john , as in genesis ; and that the one can no more admit of a moral and allegorical interpretation , than the other . this is so pertinently alledged by his grace , and the parallel so lively represented by the bishop of worcester , in a discourse there referred to , that our author seems perfectly at a loss whether to grant or deny it ; and so from admitting the case as it is proposed , would advance another scheme of it ; for thus he saith , ' let his grace put the case , as it usually is , and i am content to join issue with him upon the instance he hath here given . the first chapter of st. john speaks of a certain person , namely of the lord christ , who is confess'd to have been a man , and yet it saith of him , all things were made by him , — so if the first chapter of genesis imputed the creation there spoken of to moses ; if it said , in the beginning moses created the heavens and the earth , it would be not only absurd , but absolutely necessary , to interpret the chapter allegorically and figuratively ; and to say that the heavens and earth are the jewish polity and religion , the church and the discipline thereof , &c. now this answer of his contains somewhat absurd , somewhat untrue , and is also besides the case . . it contains somewhat absurd , which is , to conceive that it 's possible for moses an inspired writer , to have delivered himself after that manner ; and that when he was to write of the first institution of the jewish polity and religion , he should thus describe it , in the beginning moses created the heaven and the earth ; and the earth was without form , &c. and moses said , let there be light and there was light , &c. and yet our author , to salve socinus's wild interpretation of st. john , is contented to grant this ; we , saith he , say it , we affirm it , that if the first chapter of genesis imputed the creation to moses , it ought to be so interpreted . . it contains somewhat untrue , as when to make out his parallel , he saith , the first chapter of st. john speaks of a certain person the lord christ , who is confessed to have been a man , and yet it saith of him , all things were made by him . for he knows very well , that the person there spoken of , is not confessed by any of his adversaries to have been a man , when that is spoken of him , that all things were made by him . for then he was the logos , the word , the only begotten son of god ; and was not a man , or made flesh , till about four thousand years after the creation . . the case as he puts it , is not the case put by the archbishop ; which was to this effect , supposing such a one as spinosa , that would have the world not to be created , but to have been ab aeterno , finding the book of genesis to be in such credit with his countrymen the jews , and the several denominations of christians , that it was not to be gainsaid ; he is therefore careful ( as our author saith some of the ancient unitarians were in the case of st. john's gospel ) to shew that it is capable of another and an allowable sence ; and so in order to their satisfaction expounds it , of the jewish polity and religion , of spiritual heavens , and an intellectual light ( in our author's phrase ) . now the question upon this is , whether spinosa might not as speciously thus expound the first of genesis for the advantage of his hypothesis , as socinus did the first of john to serve his design ? and that any one that compares the one with the other , genesis and st. john , will be able to discern . indeed as absurd as the supposition of his concerning moses is , it might as allowably be said of him , as christ the word have that said of him in st. john , if the word was no more than moses , a ministerial and temporary god , and had no more been in the beginning than moses . and then the book of genesis might as well have begun in the same phrase with moses , as st. john with the word ; after this manner , in the beginning was moses , and moses was with god , and moses was god [ or a god , as he will have it ] . the same was in the beginning with god. all things were made by him , and without him was not any thing made that was made . such pitiful and sorry shifts are those drove to that first resolve upon an hypothesis , and then are to seek how to maintain and defend it . the only point remaining with our author is , that the evangelist , who was a jew , speaks here of the messias , in the usual stile and language of the jews , who were want to say , and say it in almost all their ancient books , that the messias should make a new world , he should abolish paganism and idolatry from among the nations ; and thereby ( as the prophets also speak ) create a new heaven and a new earth . answ. i acknowledge the scripture sometimes calls a political or moral change in a church or people , by the term of new heavens and new earth : but , in our author's way of speaking , it trusts to the reader 's judgment and common sense , in a matter that it 's not well possible for him to doubt in , or to question what are the heavens and earth there spoken of , as isaiah . , . . . peter . . &c. but here is no intimation given in the evangelist , that the phrases should be translated from a natural to a spiritual sence ; nor can it possibly be without great violence , as their own explication of it will shew : for they are forced to understand christ to be personally the word in one clause , and the gospel to be the word in the other , as socinus doth , in the beginning was the word , christ ; and the word , that is the gospel , was with god. or for the avoiding of that difficulty , others of them make christ to ascend actually , personally , and bodily into heaven before his ministry ( though the scripture speaks not one word of it ) that they may put a colour upon the phrase ; the word was with god , as his grace has shewed sermon ii. p. . of which more anon . but now if we take the words in their natural and proper sence , there are several other places to confirm it , as his grace has shewed , p. , &c. and which it shall suffice for the present to refer to . the next thing to be considered is , the novelty of this exposition of st. john by socinus , of which saith the archbishop , it is quite to another sense , and such as by their own confession was never mentioned , nor i believe thought of by any christian writer whatsoever before him . sermon ii. p. . which he more largely prosecutes , p. , &c. what saith our author to this ? suppose this ; why may we not own that time and long consideration do improve all sorts of sciences , and every part of learning , whether divine or humane ? i do not think it to be any diminution of socinus , that it may said of him , and of this context , he hath rescued it from that darkness in which it long lay . a. this observation of his had in reason been prevented , if he had well weighed what his grace had said upon it , who thus pursues his argument . . that the literal sense was so obvious , that the orthodox , and even the arians and platonists ( as amelius ) agreed in it . but here our author , like a flying tartar that dares not in a pursuit look behind him , throws a spiteful dart at his adversary . as to friend amelius , i think it sufficient to say , that the credit of the trinitarian cause runs very low ; when an uncertain tale of an obscure platonist , of no reputation either for learning or wit , is made to be a good part of the proof that can be alledged for these doctrines . this is spoke at all adventures ; for if he had read eusebius * upon it , he would have found the platonist to have deserv'd a better character , and neither the person to be so obscure , nor the relation of it such an uncertain tale , as he would represent it † . but he that can make historical occasions out of propositions , and will prove matter of fact by reasoning upon it without authority , may be allowed to make characters at his pleasure , and stamp what he will upon a quotation . let him however take or refuse friend amelius , it 's a small part of the proof depends upon that tale ; the use made of that in concurrence with the judgment of the orthodox and arians , was , that not one of them ever imagined that there was any other world alluded to in that place , than the natural and material world , nor other beginning than that of the creation . . his grace goes on ; surely it ought to be very considerable in this case , that the most ancient christian writers , ignatius , justin martyr , &c. and even origen himself , are most express and positive in this matter , &c. and if this interpretation of socinus be true , it 's almost incredible that those who lived so very near st. john's time , and were most likely to know his meaning , should so widely mistake it . and then that the whole christan world should for so many ages together be deceived in the ground of so important an article of the faith ; and that no man did understand this passage of st. john aright before socinus . this very consideration alone , if there were no other , were sufficient to stagger any prudent man's belief of this misrepresentation . . and as his grace goes on , that which makes the matter much worse , is , that the religion which was particularly design'd to overthrow polytheism , and the belief of more gods , hath according to them been so ill taught and understood by christians for so many ages together , and almost from the beginning of christianity , as does necessarily infer a plurality of gods. an inconvenience so great , as no cause , how plausible soever it may otherwise appear , is able to stand under the weight of it , p. . and which the reader may there see admirably enforced . for which reasons it cannot well be suppos'd , that either time or long consideration , would place a man in so advantagious circumstances , that he should beat out that track , which all christians for years together , were not able before him to descry . but after all , this shall be no diminution to socinus , as our author will have it . but tho in words he will not allow it a diminution , yet he in fact betrays it ; and after all , is not willing to own the charge . for thus he argues , why doth his grace say , that not only all the fathers , but all christians have for this fifteen ages , agreed in his interpretation of this context ? have there been no christians in the world for years , but only the arians and trinitarians ? this is a little too gross , for he knows full well , that this is not asserted by the archbishop ; therefore he makes another attempt . or was socinus the first ( for that ( it may be ) was his grace's meaning ) who departed from the arian and trinitarian sense of the context ? what an obscure writer doth he make his grace to be , when he is , as it were , forced to come again and again upon the enquiry , and at length to conclude with , it may be it was his meaning ? and yet at last he is so unfortunate as to mistake it . for his grace doth no more say , that socinus was the first man that departed from the arian and trinitarian sense of the context , than he saith , that not only the fathers , but all christians have for fifteen ages agreed in it . for he knew full well , that there were cerinthians , and ebioniter , and photinians , and others , that went under the general name of christians , that differ'd as well from the arians as the orthodox , and would allow our saviour no other existence , than he had as the son of mary , and so could not with consistence to their principle , expound st. john , as the orthodox and arians expounded him . but let his grace speak for himself , viz. not only all the ancient fathers of the christian church , but , so far as i can find , all interpreters whatsoever for fifteen hundred years together did understand this passage of st. john in a quite different sense , [ from socinus ] namely of the creation of the material , and not of the renovation of the moral world. and however our author would evade and molify it , his grace had proved it beyond contradiction by the confession of his great oracle socinus , and his advocate schlictingius , that own the true sense of these words was never before rightly explained * . and indeed , what our author himself alledges , is a tacit confession of it ; for he produces nothing from paulus or photinus , or the ancient vnitarians , of the word that was god by office , or of the beginning of a gospel state that word did exist in , or of a spiritual world he made , or of the word 's being with god in the revelation of the gospel , or of the personal word 's being with god before his ministry to receive that revelation : but on the contrary , he tells us that according to them , the word was god , as his generation was divine , and was from the beginning with god , in god's decree and intention ; and that the world was not made by him , but for him ; a quite different explication from that of socinus . thus far then it 's evident , that his grace has sufficiently shew'd the novelty of the socinian explication of st. john's gospel . this was a tender point , and what our author had no mind to touch upon , but something must be said , for else the cause would have suffer'd , and he had lost the opportunity of shewing his reading about their patriarch paulus , and their metropolitan photinus , ( titles , it seems , owned in their commonwealth of learning ) and the whole provinces possessed by their followers , p. . but if our author is of any credit , they did not only possess whole provinces , but ages too , the two first undoubtedly ( as he suggests ) . and saith he , we are ready to dispute it in the presence of the learned world , that the fathers mentioned by his grace were less of the mind of the trinitarians , than of ours . they held the doctrine that was afterwards called arianism , p. . b. . a. the first false step he makes , is , that he takes it for granted , that his grace allows the two first ages of christianity to be for the socinians , or at least not against them . for , saith he , if of seventeen ages , we have ( as we have undoubtedly have ) the two first , much good may do his grace with the other fifteen . he must not deny us the two , nay , the three first , generally speaking . it seems his grace must not , nor indeed can deny him if he insists only upon the last fifteen ages as his period , for then he quits the two first . but now any indifferent reader will soon see , that when his grace speaks of fifteen hundred years , it 's with respect to the ages intercurrent from the apostles to the time of socinus , whose exposition he charges with novelty . [ so p. , , &c. ] and who lived in the last century . the second false step , is his way of proof , which is this , we will [ saith he ] wrest it from all the world , that the apostolick creed , which was the only creed of the three first ages , is wholly vnitarian , and perfectly contradicts that interpretation of the beginning of st. john's gospel , which his grace seeks to advance , p. . how that is , we must seek further , viz. p. . b. where he takes it up again . in the apostles creed , the lord christ is uncontestably spoken of , as having no existence before he was generated in the womb of the blessed mary , by the spirit of god. not to insist upon that , that it was the only creed of the three first ages , it will require a more than an obstinate resolution to wrest it out of the possession of the trinitarians , who both from the distribution of the creed under its three general heads , do assert a trinity , and from the character given to our saviour of being the only son of god , do maintain his divinity . but for this , being he has offer'd no proof , i shall refer him to bishop pierson upon that point , which he has at large explained and defended . . his next false step is , that whereas his grace particularly names ignatius , justin , athenagoras , irenaeus , tertullian , and origen , as of the same mind with himself ; this author affirms , that contrariwise they held the arian doctrine ; where yet he fails in his main point , which was to clear socinus's explication , and his doctrine , from novelty : but instead of that , all he attempts is to shew that the ancient fathers were for the arian doctrine ; which is to say they were not for the socinian : and yet even there he fails again ; as has abundantly been proved by dr. bull ; and which i shall look upon as unanswerable , till i see the book he promises us in answer to it . having all this while been employed in vindication of the authority of st. john's gospel against the ancient vnitarians that questioned it , and our author that proposes their arguments ; and in vindication of the orthodox exposition of it , against the arian on one side , and the novel one of socinus on the other ; i shall now proceed to the consideration of those texts of scripture which the archbishop occasionally made use of for the explication of st. john ; and they are , heb. . . and col. . . his grace has alledg'd heb. . . several times in his sermons , twice in his first , for the explication of st. john , and col. . . and thus far our author goes along with him in the bare quotation ; but he manifestly wrongs him , when he thus triumphs as he goes off from the text ; would a man build the belief of more gods than one , contrary to the whole current , and most express words of the rest of scripture , on a text so uncertain as this is ? p. . b. i say he manifestly wrongs him ; for he knows very well , that his grace agrees with the current and express words of scripture , in asserting the unity of the godhead ; and so could never attempt to build the belief of more gods than one , upon any text whatsoever , unless he would contradict himself . what is it then his grace alledges this text for ? why , it is to justify st. john , when he saith , that all things were made by the word ; and consequently the word that made all things must be god. the proposition is st. john's , the consequence is indeed his grace's , but what will necessarily follow , as he has proved it from heb. . . i perceive our author needs to be remembred upon occasion : for tho this is the use his grace makes of that quotation in sermon first , yet our author is to know there is a second sermon , where his grace doth not criticise upon words , and shew how they may be expounded this way and that way , and leave it , in our author's phrase an uncertain text ; but fully shews , that this verse , and col. . . must necessarily be understood of the old creation of the natural world and not of the moral world , and the renovation and reformation of the minds and manners of men by the gospel . and this he not only at large confirms , but also gives a particular answer to the comment of schlictingius and crellius upon it ; sermon ii. p , &c. now our author in reason should have interposed to the behalf of these his deserted friends , and have given a just reply to their adversary ; but his business is rather to propose , and repeat , and make some sudden fallies , than grapple with his opponent , and come to downright blows . the first adventure he makes is , that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which we render worlds , more usually and properly signifies ages ; and it s so translated by st. jerom ; and therefore divers of the most learned criticks understand this text of the gospel ages ; of which the lord christ is ( under god ) the undoubted author . a. it seems the learned criticks go different ways , and our author dares not lay too much on their side , that understand this of the gospel-ages ; for he saw that the phrase , he made the ages , was harsh , and as unusual as it is usual for the greek word to signify ages : and which is worse , that the word ages in the jewish and scripture-stile , ordinarily signifying the age before and the age under the messias , it must follow , that the lord christ must be the undoubted author of both the ages ; of that from the foundation of the world to the gospel , as well as that from the gospel to the end of the world : and if so , he must have been existent before the ages ; for else how could he be the author of them ? this he that has been so conversant in the learned criticks of the trinitarians , cannot be ignorant of : and because i have not a list of them at hand , i shall for the present refer him to dr. hammond on luke . p. &c. whether he foresaw this or no , i cannot divine ; but however , he has another answer in reserve . for thus he goes on ; but , saith he , let us say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is world , yet grotius gives very good reasons why we ought to render the word thus , for whom he made the worlds ; i. e. god made the world for the messias , or with intention to subject it to him in the fulness of time . a. but supposing it may be so rendred , yet there is no such salvo for verse . where it 's said of christ , ( as the archbishop hath unanswerably proved ) thou , lord , in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth , &c. . the greek phrase , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is the very same with what is used , john . . all things were made by him ; where the ordinary translation is allowed ; and as far as the phrase will go , it may as properly be applied to our saviour , as the efficient , as the final cause , i. e. that the world was made by him , as for him : and that it is here to be understood of the former , his grace has shew'd . . the apostle , col. . . uses these two distinctly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for him . but to this our author has somewhat to say . for the archbishop having made use of that place of st. paul to confirm what he had before produced out of st. john , the opponent thinks himself bound in honour to attack him : but in his usual way : for whereas his grace had spent about twelve pages in both his sermons upon the explication of this text , and in answer to the most considerable objection against it ; our author replies , he urgeth that text. — he observes moreover , that in the foregoing verse the lord christ is called the first-born of every creature . and he seeks to prove , i think he has proved it , that first-born here is as much as to say heir or lord of every creature . p. . b. a. he speaks as coldly , as if he durst not trust his reader with his adversary's arguments , or so much as suggest for what reasons or upon what grounds the archbishop urged that text. only he grants , that when his grace had shewed that by first-born was principally meant an heir , he softly answers , i think he has proved it . and if he has , he has so far wrested none of the least of the texts produced both by the arians and socinians , out of their hands . arebb . p. , . but he goes on , if i may call omitting so . i will omit , that the greater number of criticks and more learned interpreters , of his grace's own party , and among them , athanasius himself , translate and interpret that text , not of real creating , but of the modelling of all things . a. . i hope he will admit those to be criticks that are in the critici sacri , or those whom mr. pool has inserted into his synopsis ; but if we may pass a judgment upon the learned i●erpreters by them , we shall be far from finding a number , and i believe it will be a number of one , if he will be so favourable to us as to allow grotius to be one of his grace's party . as for athanasius , i had the curiosity to consult him ( though it 's too hard a task to put upon his reader to turn over two folios to search for a quotation ) but could find no such explication of the apostle , as he suggests . but on the contrary , from that place he shews that all things were created by him , and so he could not be a creature . so in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and his synod . nicenae decret . a. . he saith he will omit this , that is , as i thought , give it up ; but i find rather it is that he will not be obliged to defend it : he finds the archbishop had made the point of a moral creation a little too hot to be maintain'd ; but being it 's what he himself has a great liking to , he goes on to say all he can say , in hopes his reader may think as favourably of it as himself . but he comes off as to himself , as i said , i will not insist on this concession . he therefore comes to another retrenchment , and that is the account given of it by st. chrysostom ( as he will have it ) in the opus imperfectum , who reads it thus ; for him were all things created . so saith he , the sense is , all things were originally created by god for the lord christ ; namely , to subject them , in the fulness of time , to him , and his law. a. as for what he saith of the opus imperfectum of st. chrysostom , whoever was the author of it , it 's granted by the learned that it is not st. chrysostom's . but let it be whose it will , i am pretty confident that there is no such exposition of that phrase in the book ( though it consists of homilies . ) and besides the turning it over , i am confirm'd in it from what is said there , homil. . upon that , who is my mother , &c. i , who before the constitution of the world , created the world , know no such worldly parents , &c. indeed this version of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for him , is merely to serve the hypothesis that he is advancing . for when he can apply it to a moral creation , he admits it , as john . . and so it 's necessary to be understood here , v. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by him to reconcile all things to himself . and accordingly as the apostle begins , so he ends the verse with the same phrase ; by him were all things created ; and as one would think to prevent all cavil , uses phrases as distinct as the efficient and final cause , for so he closes the verse , all things were created by him , and for him ; by him , as the efficient ; and for him , as the final cause . but here our author would fain find out an evasion , and that is by translating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to him ; and then it shall be , all things were created for his use , and to his service . and if any one should ask what is the difference ? he answers immediatly , that the latter , to his service , is exegetical and explanatory of the former , for his use . this , he saith , is probably design'd by the greek , and yet he knows how ( by a peculiar rule of logick ) to crowd more into the conclusion than is in the premisses , and out of what , in his own opinion , is but probable , to infer a necessity ; for thus he concludes , the greek word being probably design'd as exegetical : therefore the sense of necessity is , for him , and to him , i.e. for his use , and to his service . just as if i should say , it 's probable that he never read the opus imperfectum , that calls it st. chrysostom's ; and therefore it 's certain he has not . to conclude , tho he would as to this text fairly , if he can , get rid of this moral creation , and athanasian spiritual modelling of things , for a reason he knows ; yet he is still within the inchanted circle ; for at the last his probable explication leaves him there ; and what was it else when he says , all things were originally created by god for the lord christ , namely , to subject them in the fulness of time to him , and his laws ? and how doth that differ from the modelling and changing all things in heaven and earth , to a new and better estate ? on the earth , by abolishing paganism , and idolatry , &c. and in heaven , angels and heavenly powers being put under his direction , &c. as he tells us in the column of those things that are omitted . lastly , it 's not probable that his is the just explication of this place , and that for a reason or two . . because the apostle discourses this afterwards , v. . having made peace through the blood of his cross , by him to reconcile all things to himself ; by him , i say , whether they be things in earth , or things in heaven . for the clearer understanding of which , i shall take liberty to set before the reader the connexion of a few verses . the apostle , v. speaking of our saviour , in whom we have redemption through his blood , &c. proceeds to shew who this redeemer was , and that in a two-fold capacity . first , in respect of his divine nature , who is the image of god , the first-born or heir of the whole creation : and then gives the reason of such his preheminence , and why he bestows so great a title upon him ; and that is v. , . for by him were all things created , &c. from thence he proceeds to discourse of him as to his human nature , and the station he is in , v. . and he is the head of the body &c. and this done v. . he returns to the point where he set forth , v. . and accordingly his lordship's explication is very easy and natural , p. . who is the image of god , the heir and lord of the whole creation ; for by him all things were created . . this author's account of this place is not probable ; for christ's being the head over all things , was not till his death and resurrection , when his mediatory kingdom began ; whereas our author says , that all things were originally created by god for the lord christ ; and without doubt as for his use and to his service , so for the advantage of them that were under his government and direction . but what a v●st solitude was there , a chasm of years before his birth and being ? and in what a condition was the whole world of intelligent beings , till our saviours resurrection and ascension ? what service could he challenge from them , when he himself lay in the embrio of nothing ? and what advantage could they have from him that was to come into the world for the redemption of mankind , , &c. years after ? where was the paganism and idolatry he in that dismal interval abolished ? where the angels and heavenly powers that were put under his direction , and by him employed in defence and succor of the faithful ? what was it to those unhappy souls , born so many ages before his time , under the constellation of paganism and idolatry , that some thousands or hundreds of years hence should arise the lord christ , who in the fulness of time was to be actually set above all thrones and dominions , &c. and in whom as in their head , all things should be united and consist ? as our author words it . of the pre-existence of our saviour . that the word described by st. john had an existence before his incarnation , and his being born of the virgin , was a conclusion his grace inferred from the phrase , in the beginning . serm. . this he confirmed by several texts of scripture , which he ranked under the two following heads . serm. . p. . . those which expresly assert the son of god to have been , and to have been in heaven with god , and partaker with him in his glory , before his incarnation and appearance in the world. . those which affirm that the world and all creatures were made by him . of the first sort are joh. . . . . . . . . . . . . joh. . . in which it 's said of our saviour , that he came down from heaven , was with god , was before abraham ; that he had a glory with the father before the world was . to those which say our saviour was in heaven , and came down from heaven , our author returns some general answers , ( as for method's sake i shall consider them . ) first , he answers in general , that these texts , in their most literal sense , amount to no more than this , that the lord christ is a messenger , really come forth from god to men . as much is true of every prophet , and the very same is used concerning st. john baptist , joh. . . there was a man sent from god , whose name was john. answ. . if these texts amount to no more than this , that the lord christ is a messenger from god to men , then can no more be concluded from thence , than that he was no more a prophet , and no more with god , and no more sent from god , than other prophets , or than john the baptist. and if as much as this is true of every prophet , then it may be said of every prophet , and of john the baptist as well as our saviour , that he ascended into heaven , and came down from heaven , and was with god , and had a glory with him before the world was , &c. but where do we find the scripture to express it self after this manner of any but our saviour , no not of moses , as much a friend of god , and conversant with him , as he is affirmed to be ? . if these texts amount to no more than this , that christ is a messenger from god to men , then how will our author be able to make use of any of these texts for that new doctrine of theirs , concerning christ's ascension into heaven , before he began his ministry ? for if as much is true of every prophet , then our saviour no more ascended than other prophets ; and then what becomes of his express proof for such an assertion ? secondly , he answers again , how little these texts are to his grace's purpose , would have been obvious to every reader , if he had set down some few of the many texts which so plainly expound to us what is meant thereby . joh. . . i am not come of my self . joh. . . i am come in my father's name . joh. . . i came not of my self , he sent me . joh. . . my doctrine is not mine , but his that sent me , &c. a. these texts would have not been to his grace's purpose , if they prove no more than that our saviour was a messenger sent from god to men , and which is as true of every prophet . for if our saviour no more came from god than other prophets ( as far as these texts will then signify ) he was no more pre-existent than they . but these texts are to his purpose if they expresly say , that christ actually came down from heaven to declare the will of god to men ( as our author in the next paragraph , forgetting himself , doth affirm . ) for if that be allowed , then all the difficulties his grace has urged against their imaginary doctrine of our saviour's ascension into heaven , before his ministry , will return upon them , and require an answer . as for what he adds from these latter texts , would our saviour have said he came from god , is sent by god , to deliver a doctrine which is not the messenger 's , if he had himself pretended to be god ? a. this , i am sure is nothing to the purpose ; for what is this to the pre existence of our saviour , the present subject of the discourse ? but however , what inconsistence is there in this , for our saviour to say , the doctrine is not mine , but his that sent me , tho he himself be god , and partake of the same nature with the father , when he is the only begotten of the father , and was also man ? why is this any more inconsistent , than to have it said , that he is god , and yet the man christ jesus ; that he was in the beginning with god , and yet born in the fulness of time ; that he knew all things , john . . . . and yet knew not the time or day of judgment ? mark . , &c. these things are consistent upon the principles of the orthodox or trinitarians , that hold the word to be god and man ; but not upon theirs that hold , that he is man and not god. . he answers again in general , that his grace propounded to prove the pre-existence of our saviour , by the texts that expresly say our lord christ ascended into heaven before he began his ministry , and then came down from heaven to declare the will of god to men. that is , be propounds to prove the trinitarian doctrine , but really proves the doctrine of the unitarians . a. . if this be so , his grace was mightily mistaken , to attempt the proof of this point by such texts as expresly say the contrary . a great and inexcusable over-sight , if it were true . but where are those texts that expresly say , that our saviour ascended into heaven before his ministry ? it was a prejudice socinus would infuse into his reader , that there is but that one text of st. john . to prove the pre-existence of our saviour before his incarnation , which the archbishop has disproved , p. . but here it holds ; for his texts that he saith expresly prove what he asserts , shrink all into one , viz. no man hath ascended into heaven , but he that came down from heaven . . where is it expresly said in that , or any other text , that our saviour ascended into heaven before his ministry ? it is not so expresly said , that our saviour ascended into heaven , but that servetus understood it spiritually , and saith that it was so express'd , because his spirit was from the beginning in heaven , and that his words were heavenly . but it 's neither there , nor any where expresly said , that our saviour ascended into heaven before his ministry , and then came down from heaven to declare the will of god to men. that is wholly a fiction of a case , as his lordship has sufficiently proved . our author , indeed , would represent it , as if his grace had only found fault with them for this their opinion ; and after the having bestowed a few hard words upon it , and call'd it an arbitrary and precarious supposition , ( tho he himself understands the text in a literal sense ) should then give it up . but that this is a fiction of their own , i may say again , his lordship has sufficiently proved ; and so much the more reason have i now to say it , as his adversary has not dared so much as to take to task any one argument or paragraph relating to it . for with what strength doth his grace argue against it from the exact history of our saviour's life , from the importance of the matter ( if true ) , from the silence of the evangelists , and especially of st. john ? how doth he argue against it from the weakness of the socinian attempts to prove it , and for which in effect they have nothing to say ? how from the inconsistency of it with scripture ? and that whereas st. john saith , the word was in the beginning , and then was made flesh : they say , that he was first made flesh , and then a great while after was in the beginning with god. how , lastly , doth he argue from the disagreement in the several parts of this their interpretation ; as it may be worth the reader 's while himself to observe * ? all this our author has prudently pass'd over ; but that he may seem to say something , and have a fair opportunity to complement where he wants a reply ; he forms a question for his grace , ( for it 's a charge , and not a question , archbishop , p. , . ) he demands , saith he , when did this ascension of our saviour into heaven happen ? his grace had indeed charged it upon them , that they themselves cannot agree precisely when ; and without doubt he wanted a fair account of it . but our author unfortunately pitches upon that time for it , which his adversary had beforehand prevented . for thus he answers , st. john hath resolved this question in these words of his gospel , [ in the beginning the word was with god ] i. e. in the beginning of his ministry , just before be enter'd thereon ; the lord christ was with god by ascending ( as himself expresly and often saith ) into heaven . this account of it is very precise . but to this his grace had already made two exceptions . . that this is not consistent with their own explication of the phrase , in the beginning , that is to say , when the gospel first began to be published ; which was by authority from him ( he having ascended into heaven , and came from thence to declare the will of god to men , as our author saith ) but that was not began to be published , till after he had been with god ( in their sense . ) and therefore if the word was at all with the father , so as to ascend from earth to heaven , it must not have been in the beginning , but before the beginning . . he sheweth , this is not reconciliable to another opinion of theirs , which is , that christ was not god but by office and divine constitution , and that he was not so constituted and declared till after his resurection , and his being advanced to the right hand of god ; but if in the beginning , is in the beginning of the gospel-state , then the word was god in the same beginning that he was with god , and so must be god by office , before he enter'd upon his office of publick ministry , and consequently long before his resurrection . but if he was so constituted not till after his resurrection , he was not god in their sense of the beginning , and so consequently was not with god , nor did ascend into heaven before he began his ministry . so that there is no manner of proof , either for the matter , or the time of this legendary doctrine of theirs , concerning our saviour's ascension into heaven before he began his ministry , if the aforesaid arguments hold good . but that which our author presses most , ( without regarding the arguments against it ) is the literal sense of the phrase , no man hath ascended , &c. in which , he saith , the archbishop doth understand it . but this is no more true that his grace so understands it , than that it 's expresly and often said in scripture , that our saviour ascended into heaven before his ministry , ( as our author affirms ) unless it be when his grace undertakes to prove that such an ascension never was . but supposing it were literally to be understood , yet will it not serve their purpose . for then , according to the letter of it , our saviour must have come down from heaven before he ascended thither . if it had been worded , that no man hath come down from heaven , but he that hath ascended into heaven , then he would have ascended first , and after that have descended : but when it 's said , no man hath ascended into heaven , but he that came down from heaven , ( if the manner of speaking is to be our guide ) then he must have came down before he ascended , after the way the apostle speaks , ephes. . , . now that he ascended , what is it , but that he also descended first , &c. i say , the order of words then shews , that his descent must have been before his ascension ; which is diametrically opposite to the socinian hypothesis , and is not to be accommodated but by the orthodox sense of it , viz. that he that in the beginning was with god , and had a glory with the father before the world was , in the fulness of time was made flesh , and came down from heaven , to fulfil and declare the will of god to men . and then it orderly follows , no man hath so ascended into heaven , and no man hath been there to understand the will of the father , but he that first came down from heaven , and is in due time to ascend thither ; as if he had said , ( to transcribe the paraphrase of a very learned person ) from me alone are these things to be learned , for none can go up to heaven to fetch the knowledge of them from thence , but i came down from heaven to reveal the will of god * , &c. the second sort of texts which speak of our saviour's existence before his incarnation , are these , father glorify thou me with thine own self , with the glory which i had with thee before the world was , john . . and before abraham was , i am , &c. john . . to the first our author replies , that according to st. austin and grotius , this is to be understood of god's decree , after this manner , let me now actually receive that glory with they self , which i had with thee in thy decree and purpose before the world was . and if we may take his word , he saith , that he has sufficiently confirmed this interpretation in the second edition of his brief history of the unitarians . he very seasonably refers us to his second edition , ( which i have not seen ) for in the first it exceedingly wants some confirmation . all that he has to say there , is , that we in scripture are sometimes said to have that which we have in god's decree . from whence he infers , therefore so also we may understand , that christ had glory before the world was . an inference very cautiously worded , therefore we may understand , &c. and it was not without reason , as i shall immediately shew . a. . i grant that the scripture doth often represent things after this manner , so that that which is to be hereafter , is spok●n of as if it was actually present and existent , as isaiah . . he is despised and rejected of men . and in like manner we are reputed to have that which we have by promise , as in the place he quotes , cor. . . we have a building of god , &c. but then as decrees and promises do in the nature of them respect the future , so there must be some reason for this manner of speaking , which without such reason would be absurd . now , the reason of such forms of speech , is to represent the certainty of the thing , that it being thus appointed and promised by almighty god , it shall as certainly be fulfilled in its season , as if it was now actually present . but set aside such reason , and such forms of speech will be absurd ; as for example , if i should say , all generations that shall be to the worlds end are now in being , and have been ever since the world was . but there is no such reason for such an interpretation here , for this respects the time past . . tho we should be said to have that which we are decreed to have , yet we cannot be said to have it before the world was ; as for instance , we cannot be said to have a building of god before the world was ; for that is to have it before we were . we may be said by the foresaid prophetical scheme of speech to have what we that are in being , shall have in its proper time ; but we are not said to have it , or to have had it before the foundation of the world. god indeed may be said to give before the world , by virtue of his decree and intention so to do , because he always was , is , and ever will be , and to him all things are present in their causes , over which he has an absolute power . but tho we may be said to have , with respect to the time to come , as well as present ( in the cases aforesaid ) yet we cannot properly be , nor are in scripture said to have it before the world was , because we are born in the world. thus god may be said to give us grace or salvation before the world began ; in the place he cites , tim. . . but we are not said to have a building of god before the world was . and so when it 's said , father , glorify me with thine own self , with the glory which i had with thee before the world was ; as it doth suppose our saviour to have been in being , and to have had a glory with the father before the world , so he cannot be said to have it in decree before the world was . . and that the words are not capable of such an interpretation will further appear from the phrase , with thee , which answers to that which went before , with thine own self ; and if the latter doth signify the actual enjoyment of that glory , then so doth the former . indeed , the phrase with thine own self , and with thee , ( for they are both one ) doth suppose the person that is with god to be in being . as it was when god is said to be the god of abraham , isaac , and jacob ; thereby is implied , that those holy patriarchs are alive , according to our saviour's reasoning , god is not the god of the dead , but of the living , matth. . . and if to be the god of abraham , did imply that abraham was in being ; then surely , if it had been said of abraham , that he was with god , it must also imply that abraham actually was . for he could no more be said to be with god , and not be ; than god could be said to be his god , and he not alive . and accordingly it might as well be said of abraham , that god was his god in decree and intention , as abraham might be said to be with god , and yet be no otherwise so than in god's decree . so absurd is it , with our author , to allow our saviour to have had no being before the world was , and yet to say he was with god before the world , which is in the same breath to say he was not , and yet he was . a difficulty our author , with those he follows , found to be so great , that they chose rather to give a new interpretation of the phrase , in the beginning , john . . ( as has been before shew'd ) and so to allow the word to have then been actually with god ; rather than to maintain , as some others before did , that the word was with god in his decree , contrary to the plain and evident meaning of that phrase . . i may add , if the sense of this prayer of our saviour is , father , glorify me with thine own self , with the glory which i had with thee in thy decree and promise before the world was ; then ( according to what our saviour saith , ver . . the glory which thou hast given me , i have given them , the like glory being promised to and decreed for all the faithful ) every good man may use the same prayer with our saviour , and say , father , ●lorify me with thine own self , with the glory which i had with thee before the world was . but i suppose st. austin , ( who our author saith was for this decretal sense ) would not have presumed to do so . i confess i have done more than in strictness i was obliged to , when he refers us to another book of his , and to another edition of that book ; but i am apt to think this answer will serve for either meridian . the second text produced by the archbishop , is john . . before abraham was , i am : the obvious sense of which words ( saith his grace ) is , that he had a real existence before abraham was actually in being , p. . but on the contrary , the socinians say , that he was before abraham was , in the divine foreknowledge and decree . this his lordship took to task , and shewed , that this is nothing but what might have been said of any other man , and even of araham himself ; and that our saviour had then no preference or advantage above abraham . and then argues from the words i am , as the proper name of god , whereby is signified the eternal duration and permanency of his b●ing . which he confirms by several other places . to this our author has nothing to reply ; but would insinuate as if his grace had only proposed the place , without any manner of proof ; for after this ridiculous manner doth he represent it : his grace will not hear of this [ about the decree ] ; we cannot help it ; but we know the reason to be , because he taketh it as a ground of his interpretation of this text , that our saviour was ( not only in god's decree , but ) in actual existence before his progenitor abraham ; but that is the point which his grace had to prove , not to suppose as a ground of interpretation . this person writes , i perceive , for a party , and presumes his readers will never consult the books he pretends to answer ; for else he would not so boldly venture thus to impose upon the world , and to tell us that his grace only supposes , but does not prove what he proposes ; and accordingly he himself slips over the argument , and runs from it as far as he can . . he replies , here again i must mind his grace , that none of his proofs , in their utmost stretch , run higher than arianism . a. proofs : he should have call'd them suppositions , if he had not forgot himself . but what if those proofs run no higher than arianism ? they are sufficient : for all his grace was under any obligation at this time to prove , was our saviour's pre-existence , against the socinians , serm ii. p. , &c. ( having in his former sermon maintained the point of our saviour's deity , against the arians , &c. ) and if he has proved that , he has gained the point under consideration . all that our author has further to say , is , to give us his opinion of this text over and over , and ushers it in with a magisterial authority : but if we can , let us make both arians and trinitarians sensible what is the meaning of these words , before abraham was , i am , from the circumstances and context . but if i may not too much incur his displeasure , by laying aside his supposals for the present , i will venture to propose the case as the evangelist relates it , and then discourse with him upon it . in vers. . our saviour replied upon the jews , your father abraham rejoiced to see my day ; and he saw it and was glad . to this they captiously object , thou art not yet fifty years old , and hast thou seen abraham ? that is , was 't thou coexistent with him , and born in his time , who has been so long dead ? whom makest thou thy self ? [ ver . , . ] to this our saviour answers , verily , verily , i say unto you , before abraham was , i am . which text , according to our author , is elliptical and imperfect , and wants somewhat to supply it : which he thus attempts , i was long before abraham ' s time in the decrees and promises of god. now supposing it so to be , why must it thus be supplied ? o , saith he , it cannot be true in any other sense , being spoken of a son and dependant of abraham . supposing that to be spoke of such a one , why may it not as well fall upon the former as latter part of the clause , and so be read , before abraham was the father of the gentiles , ( signified in isaac ) i am , or i was in the world ? or why may it not be said , before abraham was , i was in being ? for though our saviour was a descendant of abraham according to the flesh , yet he was the begotten son of god ( as none of abraham's posterity was ) that was in the beginning , and before the world with god ; and so he might literally say before abraham was , i was or am . but supposing we admit his explication , that before abraham was , i was in god's decree . would this prove what was to be proved , that he that was not fifty years old , had seen abraham , or that he was co-existent with abraham ? suppose we take it as he would have it , independent of what it was to p●●●● what a mean 〈◊〉 was it for our saviour to alledge , i was 〈◊〉 abraham , namely , in god's decree ? for , might not the jews then reply , so abraham was before adam , and so both abraham and adam were before the world ? might they not say , so were we then before abraham ; abraham before himself , and we before we were they , might they not say , is any thing before another 〈◊〉 art thou before abraham , or abraham before us , since all would then be co-existent alike in decree , being the decrees are alike eternal ? might not our saviour as well have said , i have seen abraham , reserving to himself , in the book of genesis ; as say , before abraham was , i was , reserving to himself , in the book of god's decree ? lastly , if our saviour had said , before abraham was , i was in god's decree , or had been so understood , where was the blasphemy for which the jews would have stoned him ? it is apparent that the jews presently understood him being a title known to all , and known to belong only to god , as well known ( by reason of that noted place it relates to in exodus ) as jehovah , and so immediately they took up stones to cast at him . but his grace hath not so done with this text , but goes on to fortifie it with other parallel places , as to the phrase and signification , p. . as hebr. . . the same yesterday , to day , and for ever . and revelat. . , . i am alpha and omega , the beginning and the ending , which is , and which was , and which is to come , the almighty , rev. . , . this our author declines , and instead of proposing it as it lay in his grace's sermon , he takes up the latter of these places in the close of his discourse upon this head after this manner , the last of his grace ' s texts to prove the pre-existence and divinity of our saviour , is rev. . . p. . b. though out of its place , i am content to take it as he proposes it ; and especially because i may hope now , if ever , to make a convert of him ; for thus he answers , when his grace proves that these words are spoken , not of god , but of christ , i will thank him , and give him the cause . fairly offered , and fit to be accepted . in the first place , i take it for granted , that i need not remind him of what his grace has observed , that these expressions are the common description which the scripture gives of the eternity of god , whose being is commensurate to all the several respects of duration , past , present , and to come . for this is the reason why our author denies this to belong to our saviour , since that would be to ascribe such a being to him , as is commensurate to all these durations . therefore with his usual assurance , he affirms , that they are not spoken of our lord christ , seems to me as clear as meridian light , from what is said v. . from him which is , which was , and which is to come , and from jesus christ. where we see plainly , that jesus christ is distinguished as a different person from that almighty who is , and who was , and who is to come ; therefore he cannot be intended in the description , v. . answer . i suppose that he intends this as a general answer to the several places of the revelation quoted by his grace ; and then it 's as much as to say , that since jesus christ is distinguished from him who is , and was , and is to come , v. . therefore he cannot be intended at v. . nor . nor ch. . , . that is , that these expressions , which are the common description the scripture gives of the eternity of god , are never applied in any of those places to our saviour : but if it appears that they are at any time applied to our saviour , his argument is utterly ruined , and it will unanswerably follow , that if jesus christ is , and was , and is to come , then he is alike eternal as the father , and partaker of one and the same nature with him . . how doth it follow that jesus christ is distinguished as a different person from him who is , was , and is to come ; therefore he cannot be intended in the description at ver . . ? for he may be a different person from the almighty father , who is described by that character , v. . and yet as the son have the same property essential to the divine nature ascribed to him . this we contend for , and this i shall endeavour to prove . i shall begin with v. . i am alpha and omega , the beginning and the ending , saith the lord , which is , and which was , and which is to come , the almighty . all the question is , who is the lord that thus saith of himself , i am alpha and omega , & c ? for this we must consult the context , and then the character will appear to be his that cometh with clouds , v. . that made us kings and priests unto god and his father , v. . the first begotten of the dead , the prince of the kings of the earth , that loved us and washed us in his blood , even jesus christ , v. . so that he is no less the alpha and omega , than he is the prince of the kings of the earth . but let us go on with that divine writer , whom we find after the same manner describing our saviour , v. . i am alpha and omega , the first and the last . and that it 's given as a character belonging to him , is evident , for he is the same that commanded st. john to write , and whose voice he heard , the son of man that he saw in the midst of the seven candlesticks , v. , . so again , v. . he that saith of himself , i am the first and the last , is the same with him that saith of himself , v. . i am he that liveth and was dead , and behold i am alive for evermore . so again , he saith of himself , chap. . . these things saith the first and the last , which was dead and is alive . and as st. john begins , so he ends this prophetical book , cap. . . i am alpha and omega , the beginning and the end , the first and the last ; viz. the same with him that saith , ver . , & . behold , i come quickly ; — jesus that sent his angel to testify these things , v. . from all which laid together it is very manifest , and as clear as the meridian light , that these phrases are applied to our saviour , that he is the beginning and the ending , which is , and which was , and which is to come , the almighty . but how can the being of a creature be commensurate to all the several respects of duration , past , present , and to come ? and what a presumption would it be in a creature that had a beginning , to say of himself , i am alpha and omega , the first and the last ? so that our author must in the conclusion side with his antient vnitarians and deny the revelation to be canonical ; or be as good as his word , and give his adversary the cause , and write a retractation . the last place our author touches upon ( omitting several other material texts cited by his grace ) is job . . , . that which was from the beginning , which we have heard , &c. which he thus expounds ( calling into his aid grotius and vorstius , in his opinion two the ablest interpreters the church has yet had . ) . the word of life , that is , the gospel . . eternal life , i. e. the immortality therein promised . . from the beginning , that is , they were always intended and purposed by him , but not manifested till reveal'd in the gospel . . we have seen and handled , is to signifie their knowledge of it was most assured and absolute . for the hebrews are wont to declare the certainty and clearness of things by terms borrowed from the senses . ans. though the hebrews are wont to express the certainty and clearness of things after that manner ; yet i don't find that the scripture is wont to speak thus of the gospel , viz. the gospel which was from the beginning , which we have seen with our eyes , and our hands have handled , and which was with the father . but i find that saint john in his gospel speaks of our saviour in the like terms , for thus he saith of him , in the beginning ( which is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here , as his grace observed p. . and grotius before him ) was the word , and the word was with god , v. . in him was life , v. . we beheld his glory , and he is said to be manifested , joh. . , . and joh. . , . now what can be more evident than that when the author is the same , the phrase the same , and more agreeable to the subject under consideration , that it should be alike understood in one book as the other , and so that which we have heard , and seen , and looked upon , and handled , and was with the father , should be the son , and not the gospel of god ? but saith our author , grotius and vorstius think otherwise ; and he goes on , i know not why his grace overlook'd this interpretation of two of the most learned and judicious criticks of this or any other age . answer , i answer in his phrase , i marvel much how our author should know that his grace overlook'd it , for it 's likely that he might not have the same opinion with this writer of these two great men , so as to think them the ablest interpreters the church has yet had : vorstius for many reasons , and grotius for his posthumous notes ( i should rather call them adversaria ) come not up to that character . besides his grace knew very well what both the antient and learned and judicious criticks of latter ages , thought of this text. in the number of the former is tertullian , adv . praxeam . c. . amongst the latter is erasmus ; and even grotius is inconsistent with himself , when he goes off from the gospel to the miracles that attested it , in his explication of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which we have looked upon . before his grace leaves the argument of our saviour's deity , he takes notice of a usual plea of the socinians , that they glory they have reason clearly on their side in this and the other point of the b. trinity ; and that the difficulties and absurdities are much greater and plainer on our part than on theirs , a.b.p. . to each of these his lordship made a distinct reply , and shew'd particularly as to the doctrine of the trinity , that tho' it was above , yet it was not contrary to reason ; that though there were difficulties , yet no absurdity in it . this our author thought fit to pass over in silence . as to the latter , his grace undertook to prove that the opinion of our adversaries hath greater difficulties in it , and more palpable absurdities following from it , than any they could charge upon the orthodox . as when they say , that the son of god is a meer creature , not god by nature , and yet truly and really god by office , and by divine appointment and constitution ; to whom the very same honour and worship is to be given which we give to him who is god by nature . p. . in which his grace observes two difficulties and absurdities . . that they hereby bring idolatry by a back-door into the christian religion , as they give divine worship to a mere creature , and as they willingly admit two gods , the one by nature , and the other by office. . that they cannot vindicate themselves in this point in any other way , than what will in a great measure acquit both the pagans and papists from the charge of idolatry . this our author saith , is not an uncommon imputation on the socinian doctrine , and thus far he is in the right , for besides modern writers , the stream of the fathers charge the arians with idolatry as they worship christ , whom they suppose to be a meer creature . thus athanasius , gregory naz. and nyssen . st. basil , epiphanius , &c. and this charge our author doth rather avoid than deny ; for which purpose he divideth the vnitarians into two sorts : such as give christ no divine worship : of these he saith , it is certain we have wrote no book this seven years , in which we have not been careful to profess to all the world , that a like honour or worship ( much less the same ) is not to be given to christ-as to god. and then he will by all means have this charge of worshipping our saviour , to be a soul calumny thrown on them by the trinitarian preachers . do the trinitarians think , saith our hussing controvertist , they may devise a religion for us , and then come up into their pulpits to declaim against the schemes that are purely of their own invention ? in good time we shall have a pulpit socinianism , as there was in the late reign a pulpit popery ; for this author writes in the very way and phrase of misrepresentation and representation . but after all , is this a misrepresentation ? did never any vnitarians or socinians give honour and worship , a like and even the same to christ as to the father ? is that charge a device of the trinitarians ? our author will undertake for himself , for that is the we in this book , the author of the history of the vnitarians , the author of the criticisms on mr. milbourn , &c. and so for seven years backwards . we , saith he , have wrote no book this seven years , in which we have not been careful , &c. but were there no years before the last seven , that can be looked into ? he knew what the arians , and what socinus and his followers held and do hold . but he and his , for whom we want a name , ( for they are in this neither arians nor socinians ) unless we will call them francisco-davidists , are herein very reserved and cautious , that they may not give the same nor alike honour to our saviour as to god. indeed if they were of another mind before the seven years past , they have done well to change it , to ease themselves of a troublesome charge of giving divine worship to a mere creature , as did the arians and socinians ; and of as troublesom adversaries as socinus found franciscus david to be , that would not allow divine worship to be given to christ , because he was a creature , and that by so doing they should be guilty of idolatry . but after all his suming , and his talk of a devised religion , and declaiming pulpits , and schemes purely of their own invention , he is forced to own that there is a second sort of vnitarians that give divine worship to our saviour ; and that 's an objection in his way . but his grace will say perhaps , why ? do you not pray to christ ? and to close the objection , do you not then give the like , nay the same honour to christ as to god ? his answer to this is well worthy our observation . . there are indeed some vnitarians who pray to the lord christ. but why some ? did not the numerous arians , and did not socinus , and generally all called after his name do so ; and did they not think themselves obliged so to do , inveighing against those that did not ? . he adds by way of excuse , they pray'd to him indeed , but it was to him , as that mediatory king , who is ( say they ) appointed by god to succour us in all our straits and wants . but is not this to equal him with god , to whom alone we are taught to direct our prayers ? nay , is not this to attribute to him the divine properties of omniscience and omnipotence , when he is supposed to know and succour us in all our straits and wants ? no , saith he , for they own that his knowledge either of our wants or prayers is only by revelation from god ; and his power by which he relieves us , is wholly of god's giving . but is not prayer a part of divine worship , and peculiar to god ? and don't they then equal him to god , when they pray to him ? and is not that idolatry , to give to a creature the worship belonging to the creator ? and can any divine appointment make that not to be idolatry , which in its nature is so ? ( as the protestants use to maintain against the church of rome ) . and besides , don't those socinians that worship our saviour , affirm that they worship him as god ? thus socinus himself pleads , vt pro deo ac domino suo venerentur , tom. . p. . that they worship him as their god and lord. and much more to the same purpose . and what is it to worship him as god , but to give him divine worship ? the second difficulty and absurdity his grace charges upon them , is a plurality of gods , the one by nature , the other by office , a creature-god , a god merely by positive institution . all that he has to say to this , is , will he deny positively and directly , that the lord christ is a god by representation and office ? and then steals off with , let his grace give it under his hand , that the lord christ is not a god in these senses . a. this is much as if when charged with idolatry for giving divine worship to christ , if a mere man , he should say , will his grace deny positively and directly , that christ is a man ? for though he denies not christ to be a man , yet he affirms , that christ , if no more than a man , is not to be worshipped with divine honour . so tho he should not deny christ to be a god by representation and office , yet he affirms that one who is so and no more , cannot be the true god , nor be worshipped as god ; for that would establish a plurality of gods. but his grace on the other hand took not himself concerned , nor doth the case require , that he should positively assert , that christ is a god by representation ; for that is more than our author himself dares to do , who faintly enough concludes , that as moses is called a god , so also christ may be called a god by mission , representation , and office. now how unreasonable a thing is this , that he should put it so hard upon his grace , to deny positively and directly , what this author himself dares not positively and directly affirm ? for he cautiously saith ( for fear a proof should be required ) , so also may christ be called a god. but our author is too sparing and modest in his expressions , for the socinians are not backward to acknowledge , that our saviour is true god , and that there are more true gods than one ; and that to say there is one only supreme independent god , and to worship one god by nature , is judaical , and a renouncing of the christian religion . vid. smalcius exam. cent. err. & refutatio smig . de novis monstris , &c. to conclude , his grace had said , that the socinians cannot vindicate themselves in this point any other way , than what will in great measure acquit both the pagans and the papists from the charge of idolatry . this our author calls a thunder-clap ; and truly by his own pleas he makes good the imputation . for , . he saith , they pray to christ as a mediatory king , who is appointed by god to succor us in all our straits : and of this kind were the dii medioxumi among the heathens ; and so are the mediators of intercession , the saints and angels , in the church of rome , who they say are appointed by the supreme god to hear and succour us . . he saith , that the knowledge our saviour hath either of our wants or prayers , is only by revelation from god ; and his power is wholly of god's giving . so the romanists say , that the saints have their knowledge of our state , either by revelation , or in speculo trinitatis , in the glass of the trinity ; which is much the same . . our author saith , the worship given to christ is not the same which is given to god. so the church of rome hath their superior worship , latria , which they give to god ; and an inferior , dulia , which they give to saints . . our author saith , though these socinians pray to christ , yet they don 't hereby equal him to god. this is the very plea made by the church of rome for the worship they give , and the prayers they offer to saints and angels . from all which we see how much modesty as well as truth there is in what his grace observes , that they cannot vindicate themselves in this point any other way , than what will in a great measure acquit both the pagans and the papists from the charge of idolatry . sect . ii. of the incarnation of our blessed saviour . after a discourse of several pages , which our author declines , his lordship proceeded to the most usual and considerable objections of his adversaries against the doctrine of christ's incarnation . as , object . . they say , that this union of the divinity with the humane nature , is , if not altogether impossible , yet very unintelligible . to this his grace replies , that there is no impossibility , is evident from the union between the soul and body of a man , p. , and . against this our author makes two exceptions . except . . in a personal vnion of a soul with a body , the vnion is between two finite and commensurate things ; which is not only possible , but very conceivable . but in the pretended personal vnion of god to man , and man to god , the vnion is between finite and infinite . answer . here our author over-runs the point , when he considers the personal union of a soul and body , merely as a union between two finites ; for instances between such , the world is full of : whereas the difficulty is , as the union is between soul and body , that is , spirit and matter , which are two extreams , and so incommensurate ; and yet notwithstanding they are not only vitally united , but they both retain their distinct natures and properties , as his grace observes . under which notion , the personal union between two such unequals is as difficult to conceive ( were it not that we are sure that it is ) as the personal union between the divine and humane natures in our saviour . but our author pursues his point . for , saith he , the personal union of god to man is between finite and infinite ; which cannot be without admitting one of these things ; either that finite and infinite are commensurate ; which every one knows is false : or , that the finite is united only to some part of the infinite , and is disjoyned from the rest of it ; which all trinitarians deny and abhor ; because if so , jesus christ should not be perfect god , but only god in part . answer . by this way of arguing our author may as well undertake to prove , that there is no such thing as a personal vnion between the soul and body ; for , that cannot be imagined without admitting one of these two things ; either that soul and body are commensurate and equal , and alike extended , which every one knows is false : or , that body and soul are united as to some part only , which is disjoyned from the rest , and that is of a spirit to make it material . what more plain , if his argument be true , than that there can be no personal union between the soul and body , such distant extremes ? so that you may as soon expect that the soft and impalpable air should be united to a thunderbolt , or a speculative thought to a milstone , as that there can be a union between things so incommensurate and unequal , as a body and a soul are . but if notwithstanding such conceived difficulties , soul and body are thus found to be united ; then is it alike consistent that the two natures in our blessed saviour be united in one person . again , by the same way he may go on and prove that immensity is no perfection of the divine nature ; and that it 's impossible god should be every where , and essentially present . for immensity ( if it be ) has a relation to place , that is , infinite to finite : but such a relation cannot be in god , without one of these two things , that finite [ place ] and infinite [ immensity ] are commensurate , which every one knows is false : or , that the finite [ place ] has a relation to some part of the infinite , and is disjoyned from the rest of it ; and so the divine essence is particle and divisible , which all deny : the difficulty we see presses as hard upon the personal union of soul and body , and god's immensity , as upon the union of the divine and humane natures in our saviour ; and which he must deny , or give up his argument . indeed it is not for us to talk metaphysically of the divine nature , till we understand our own ; nor of the nature , kinds and modes in higher matters , till we understand the connexion and union of parts in a pebble or a bubble : left by such an attempt we run our selves into heresie , a dangerous and inevitable rock , as our author represents the case ; or into his downright nonsense , of uniting two understandings , or persons , by the abolition of one of them . except . . the vnion of soul and body may be personal , that is , may constitute or make one person : because it is not the vnion of two persons , but only of one person ( the soul ) to a thing which is otherways without life , reason , memory , or free-will — but in the ( pretended ) vnion of god with man , there are two distinct , and very different lives , reasons , memories and free-wills , which utterly destroy the notion of a personnl vnion . for a personal vnion supposes but one life , one reason , one memory , one free-will . because if these things which constitute a person are found more than once , there is no longer one person but two , and consequently no personal vnion in the sense in which we are arguing . answer . i deny that two lives , or two understandings , or two free wills , do necessarily make two different persons or beings , when there is a subordination between them ; for then they receive their denomination or title from the supreme . as we usually say there are three sorts of life , vegetation in plants , animality in brutes , and rationality in men ; now if one of these is alone , that gives denomination to it , as a plant is called a vegetable . but when the vegetative life is united to the animal , it loses that character , and the creature then is called an animal , and is so called as if there was no principle in it of vegetation . and the rational ( though there be vegetation and animality ) is so called , as if there was no vegetation or animality . that is , when there are several powers one in subordination to another , they make not several beings ( as they would do if alone ) but the supream gives the denomination to the whole . and thus it is in the case before us , where there are two natures , the divine and humane ; two lives , the immortal and mortal ; two understandings , an infinite and a limited ; two wills ; and yet not two persons : because the understanding and will of the inferior ( the humane nature ) is subordinate to the superior ( the divine ) and so the person is as much one , as if there had been but one nature , one life , one understanding , and one will. as to our author's history of apollinarius , nestorius , and eutyches , ( were i disposed to make excursions ) i could present him with the rhapsody and bedrole of the opinions of those he calls vnitarians , from cerinthus and ebion downward to socinus , and of the violences and outrages of the arians against the photinians and orthodox ; and of the rancour of the photinians against the arians and orthodox : but that i shall refer to a more proper occasion . object . . 't is a thing incongruous , and much beneath the dignity of the son of god , to be united to humane nature . to this his grace makes a large reply , and amongst other things saith : the lower any being , be he never so high , condescends to do good , the glory of his goodness shines so much the brighter . to this passage alone our author returns an answer , if i may call a representation so , and in requital i shall return him the reverse of his comparison , mutatis mutandis . if christ by the just interest he has in the favour of his father , procures the pardon of sinners , and to keep them for the time to come from the like bad courses , should obtain the grant of eternal happiness , and then give them such counsel and precepts , as might best dispose them to a new course of life ; — would not this care and benignity be sufficient , unless the son of god himself came , and be content to be cloathed with the rags of humanity , and to be bound and buffetted , imprisoned , arraigned , condemned and crucified for them ? in his judgment , such a scene would have more of folly than goodness . and he concludes , therefore much less is it to be supposed of god , than of a wise man. this needs no farther animadversion , the impiety of it is a sufficient reply . object . . the incarnation is not necessary , saith he . for our opposers grant this , that the pardon of sin might have been offer'd to mankind by a prophet in the name of god ; so that there was no apparent cogent necessity , no extraordinary and indispensable cause for it ; and so must be allowed an unaccountable , causeless debasement of the divine majesty ; and seeing no such cause is assigned , saith he , we have leave to believe it never was . a. the objection is of our author 's own forming ; and there are two uses he makes of his adversary's concession ( which for the present we will take as he represents it . ) . that if there was no apparent cogent necessity , no indispensable cause for the incarnation , it must be an unaccountable and causeless debasement . . seeing no such cause is assigned , therefore they have reason to believe it never was . as to the first , it 's a gross mistake ; for there may be a good and sufficient cause for that , which there is no cogent and indispensable , and much more no apparent necessity for : he tells us , that the gospel and pardon of sin might have been offer'd to mankind by a prophet in the name of god , and so there was no apparent and cogent necessity for christ's incarnation . and surely if the offering pardon by a prophet was sufficient , there was no apparent , cogent , and indispensable necessity for christ's coming into the world ; and then ( according to our author's way of arguing ) christ's coming into the world is as unaccountable , and causeless , as he would have his incarnation to be . . as to the second : seeing no such cause is assigned , therefore the son of god was never incarnate . a. i answer , by this way of arguing , christ was never crucified , any more than he was incarnate . for if there was no indispensable cause for it , it might have been omitted ; and there was no indispensable cause for it , where the teaching of a prophet was sufficient . and without an indispensable cause , our author has taught us the wisdom of god would not stoop to such a humiliation ; and consequently , our saviour was no more crucified than he was incarnate , if our author argues right . under the covert of this objection , our author takes to task the reasons which his grace offers for our saviour's being incarnate ; and excepting the case of mysteries ( which i shall reserve for another place ) our author frames one general answer to them all , viz. ' that these considerations do not prove the incarnation expedient in the age of augustus ; for they were much more forcible in the time of adam , than of augustus . for in the last , god could propound only to reclaim men from their idolatries , errors and impieties ; but if he had been incarnate in the age of adam he had prevented them . and if these are good arguments , 't is morally impossible , either that there was in the age of augustus , or ever shall be an incarnation . he concludes , i think i may say , this is an accurate and just reasoning : it being founded on this maxim of common prudence , that what was more expedient to be done at first than afterwards , would have been at first , if it had been at all expedient to be done . a. the reasons given of christ's incarnation , viz. the reclaiming mankind from their idolatries , errors and impieties , are the same with the reasons for christ's coming into the world : and where the reasons are the same , they are to be tryed in the same way . let us therefore put christ's coming into the world , into the room of his being incarnate ; and we shall find it as requisite ( if our author's argument be of any force ) that he should have come into the world from the beginning , as that he should have been incarnate from the beginning ; and as morally impossible he should have been born in the age of augustus , as that he should have been incarnate in his time . for these reasons were much more forcible in the age of adam than of augustus . for by so late a nativity as the age of augustus , god could propound only to reclaim men from their idolatries , &c. but by being born in the very time of adam , he had prevented the idolatries of years . — if these be good arguments for christ's nativity , ' t is morally impossible , either that there was in the age of augustus , or that there ever shall be a saviour born into the world. the same argument will also affect the gospel , and make it necessary , that it should have been as completely published in the age of adam as of augustus . this is a home charge indeed , a charge of a great overfight and neglect in almighty god , for want , it seems , of attending to a maxim of common prudence , viz. of doing what was more expedient to be done at first than afterwards . for according to our author , the whole design of salvation by christ was mis-timed , and the fulness of time for it was in the age of adam , and not of augustus . this he accounts acurate and just reasoning ; and i suppose the next news we hear , will be amendments upon the gospel ; and a set of chronological tables to rectifie us in these matters . and to that work i leave him . for i suppose he will not expect from his adversaries , that they should prove to him , that the time of augustus was better than that of adam , for our lord's appearance in the world ; or to give him the reasons , why almighty god chose the time of augustus for the nativity of our saviour , and the publishing the gospel by him , rather than the time of adam . a vindication of the lord bishop of worcester's sermon concerning the mysteries of the christian faith , from the exceptions made against it , by the author of the considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity . if the author of the considerations had a mind to have writ upon a noble argument , this learned adversary gave him a fair occasion to try his skill , by proposing the two different hypotheses concerning the salvation of mankind by jesus christ , and shewing the agreeableness of the one , by his assuming our nature , and suffering in our stead , to the revealed will of god. which he confirms , as it 's most plain and easie , and agreeable to the most received sense of the words ; as it suits with the scope and design of the whole new testament ; hath been generally received in the christian church ; and best agrees with the characters of those persons from whom we receive the christian faith , viz. christ jesus and his apostles . upon the last of these his lordship more particularly discourses . but instead of taking his adversary to task about this weighty subject , our author chuses rather to fall upon some other points , where he may have a greater scope for the gratifying his roving fancy ; not caring to be tyed up by the rules and measures of strict argumentation ; and therefore for the fitting to his purpose what he had to say , he passes over the other , under the character of a great many heads , too troublesome for a reader 's view , whereas the chief of all ( as he will have it ) lies in these three . . god may justly require of us to believe what we cannot not comprehend . . those who reject the mysteries of faith , do themselves advance greater mysteries than those they declaim against . . the manner and way of salvation the church teaches , tends more to the benefit of mankind , than the way of salvation by christ taught by the socinians . of these three propositions our author thus passes his judgment . the first is true ; but not to the purpose . the second is home to the purpose , but not true . the third is neither true nor to the purpose . when he elsewhere read this character of a certain book , without doubt he thought the cadence of it very pretty , and might be divertive for his reader , whether it were right or wrong , and fit for his purpose or not . but because i am apt to suspect the exactness of such turns of fancy , i shall make bold to examine them , and see how his character and the heads of discourse he applies it to , will agree . the first , saith he , is true , but not to the purpose . the contrary of this used to be accounted true by his predecessors in the same way ; socinus himself , as his lordship shewed [ serm. p. . ] denied the divine prescience , because he could not comprehend it ; and the incomprehensibleness of a doctrine used to be a mighty argument amongst the socinians , against the truth of it , as might be shewn . but our author is of another mind , as he tells us , for the present : and if his lordship could by prescience have foretold his mind , and foreseen he would have replied upon him , he might have spar'd to himself ( as he gravely observes ) the pains of these ten pages in his sermon , in which he seeks to prove , that there are many things we do not comprehend . but his lordship is not to be blamed for want of that prescience , which the acute socinus would not allow to god himself . and to say the truth of it , he thought he had wrote against a socinian point , but our author can tell him , he utterly mistakes ; perhaps his lordship had not read the notes on the creed of aibanasius , nor the trinitatian scheme of religion , nor the answer to mr. milbourn , ( books our author recommends ) nor the history of the last seven years ; for it 's likely he might there have found the index expurgatorius to socinus , and his successors ; and the alterations made in this refining age in their grosser doctrine , without which they will tell him he writes against imaginary socinianism . but our author within the compass of three pages changes his mind . in page . all the works of god are incomprehensible , and we cannot comprehend the least spire of grass . but pag. . he cannot understand why his lordship and many others are so positive , that we cannot comprehend an infinite attribute , as eternity . now i should have thought that the works of god , and a spire of grass are as comprehensible as an infinite attribute . he tells us , contradictions are by all confessed to be impossibilities ; and so i take comprehensible and incomprehensible to be ; it remains therefore upon him to shew that they are possible ; and-that while it is not possible for a spire of grass to be comprehended , that yet eternity may . he bears a little too hard upon his readers , to suppose their memory or attention will not hold out three pages together ; and that he may have the liberty to affirm and deny , and contradict himself ( as shall best serve his end ) without offence to their understanding . but perhaps , the heat of writing and controversie was the occasion of this inadvertency . the first of these , the incomprehensiblenss of god's works , is left in it's place to try its fortune , and to subsist upon its own credit . but when he maintains the comprehensibleness of an infinite attribute ( he might have said infinity , for that is a divine attribute ) because it sounds not so well , and these men that have taught the world , that to do contradictions would not be a perfection , but an imperfection in the divine nature , may have also taught them , that infinity cannot be comprehended by a finite understanding , nor god be comprehended by a creature ; because of this he takes himself concerned to make good his paradox , by setting up such a notion of comprehension as he conceives may support it : and that is , that to comprehend a thing , is to have a clear , distinct and adequate conception of it . and he adds , may we not have such a notion of an infinite attribute ? i think we may . let us suppose for the present , his definition of comprehension to be good and right ; may we not then have as clear , distinct , and adequate conception of a spire of grass , or any of god's works , as of infinity and eternity ? and then how comes he before to acknowledge the truth of that saying of his lordship's , that we cannot comprehend the least spire of grass ? but how true soever his notion of comprehending may be , he mistakes in the application , when he saith , vve may have a clear , distinct , and adequate conception of an infinite attribute . now we used to say ( till the days of discarding mysteries came on ) that only god can comprehend his own essence , and nothing less than infinite could have a clear , distinct , and adequate conception of infinite . for 't is evident we have not a clear , distinct , and adequate conception of that which we can give no adequate definition of . but we can give no adequate definition of infinite ; and therefore-are forced to speak of it by way of negation , and rather say what it is not , than what it is . thus he himself describes god's eternity , viz. 't is that duration by which he is without all beginning and end. which is by no means , a clear , distinct , and adequate definition of it . for first duration applied to eternity , is what is usually call'd a contradiction in adjecto : for saith our author , it is of the nature of a duration to consist in a succession ; but in eternity is no succession . for what succession was there before the creation of the world ? and yet there was the same eternity then as now . so that to describe eternity by duration , and to cut that indivisible into parts by succession , is to make a temporary eternity , which methinks sounds as ill as an eternal moment . secondly , it s by no means an adequate definition of eternity , because it consists of negatives , without all beginning and end. a greater proof cannot be given of the inadequateness of our conception , than thus to go through the world of beings , and assertions , and to say it is not this , and it is not that , and yet we are never the nearer to tell what the thing really is . as if i would ask , what is an infinite attribute ? and he should answer , a perfection without bounds . what is a spirit ? a being that hath no flesh and bones . what eternity ? a duration without beginning or end. do we understand infinity , a spirit , or eternity , the better for all this ? as suppose when the word spirit is applied to god , angels , and souls departed ; will the abovesaid definition give me any clear , distinct , and adequate conception of it , and assign the difference between what it is in god , and what in a creature , or what at all ? a mistake then it is in the thing , as well as a contradiction in him ; and the reason of this blunder ( next to a carping-disposition of mind , watchful to take all advantages ) is , that he was not aware of the difference between apprehend and comprehend , and confounded existence with essence , that the thing is , with what the thing is . and of both of these he himself has given us a remarkable instance . for the bishop having said , if nothing is to be believed but what may be comprehended , the very being of god must be rejected too . p. . our author upon it makes this observation , ' that the attributes of god are incomprehensible , i have often heard ; but never till now what his lordship adds ' in the next place , purely from himself , if nothing , saith he , is to be believed , &c. but why is this purely from himself ? for this admirable reason , subjoyned by our author , to comprehend the being or existence of god , is only this , to comprehend that god is : and if we cannot comprehend that , all religion ceases . but how came that word existence in ? to comprehend the being or existence of god is only this , &c. for his lordship has no other word than being , which plainly there refers to the nature , and not the existence of the almighty . so in the paragraph just before , it is madness to pretend to comprehend what is infinite : and in the close of the same paragraph , as long as they believe an infinite and incomprehensible being , it is nonsense to reject any other doctrine which relates to an infinite being , because it is incomprehensible . so that it 's god , as an infinite and incomprehensible being , that his lordship is discoursing of ; not of his existence , but his essence and nature . and yet we are not at an end of these difficulties , were we to consider his existence . to return to the bishop's first proposition ( as recited by our author ) viz. god may justly require of us to believe what we cannot comprehend . to what purpose is this ? for our author saith , he [ the bishop ] utterly mistakes , in thinking that we deny the articles of the new christianity , or athanasian religion [ concerning the trinity , the deity , and incarnation of our saviour , &c. ] because they are mysteries , or because we do not comprehend them ; we deny them , because they are contradictons , impossibilities , and pure nonsense , p. . b. surely this new christianity , this athanasian religion , is no other than babylon in the revelation , that had mystery wrote on her forehead , that was the mother of harlots , and abominations of the whole earth ; and deserves to be treated in like manner , if she vends imposture and contradictions under the name of mysteries , as he represents it . but in defect of a royal authority to consummate the sentence , there is a terrible scourge , a book wrote by a learned friend of theirs , that hath wrought wonders , and with the like success as the whips were shew'd to the sicilian slaves , to their utter discomfiture . so that the merchants of these wares have their markets spoiled , or much hindred , if he is to be believed . and yet after all , if we may guess at the book by his sample out of it , it 's as gentle as one could wish ; and falls in with his adversaries . for what doth he say , but what they have said before him ? as , . there are in religion some mysteries , and incomprehensible secrets . . we are not to give the venerable name of mystery to doctrines contrary to nature's and reason's light. . the ordinary meaning of mystery in scripture , is not something in it's own nature dark and obscure , but something intelligible , and kept secret in past ages , and was revealed in gospel-times . but for all this , may not the word mystery be applied to such things as are in some measure known , but in much greater unknown to us ( as his lordship saith ) ? and when our author's friend doth say , the ordinary meaning of mystery in scripture , is for what was a secret , but now made known ; it supposes that he was sensible it was also sometimes there us'd for what was in its own nature dark and obscure . i thought to have pursued this argument , but i the rather pass it , because it 's under the consideration of a learned pen. amongst the instances that are incomprehensible , his lordship begins with eternity ; and saith , that he is apt to think , there is no greater difficulty in the conception of the trinity , and incarnation , than there is of eternity . a bold saying ! and he deserves to be expos'd for it . difficulties the bishop calls them , but our author will have it contradictions , and many contradictions in the trinity and incarnation ; and insinuates that his lordship would himself have call'd his difficulties in eternity , contradictions , if he durst ; for thus his adversary goes on , he dares not call them contradictions ( though as he states them they are undeniable contradictions ) because if they were confess'd to be contradictions , he would be forced to deny an eternity . and it is not long before we are told the bishop denies that also . there are two difficuties his lordship observes in the eterternity of god. the first is , ' that if god was for ever , he must be from himself ; and what notion can we have in our minds concerning it ? our author represents this , as if it was the bishop's design to argue against god's eternity , after this manner , i am sorry an eternal god must be a contradiction . had he no way to defend his new mysteries , but by espousing the cause of the atheists ? &c. a calumny as black as hell ! for , is there any word leaning this way ? what! to prove that there are contradictions in the notion of eternity , or that an eternal god is a contradiction ! doth not his lordship both affirm there is great reason to believe the eternity of god , and in the same breath effectually prove it , and confute those atheists whose cause this slanderer would have him to espouse ? but this is his usual way of prefacing an argument ; the reason for it lies open enough . but where is the contradiction ? at last it proves one of his own making . for , saith he , what makes him [ the bishop ] say , god must be from himself , or self-originated ? for then he must be before he was . for god to be before he was , is a contradiction . but i do not see how it follows , that if he is from himself , he must be before he was ? for he may be from himself , and yet be necessarily and eternally existent . this 't is likely our author saw , and therefore to clinch his argument , he joyns an alias to the phrase , from himself , and then it is from himself , or self-originated . and now he has put a pretty varnish upon it ; for self-originated , if strictly taken , implies an origine or beginning from himself : and ( as he saith ) all origination of what kind soever is inconsistent with an eternal being . if his lordship had said , god had his beginning or origination from himself , or in his adversarie's phrase were self-originated , there had been some colour for him to have inferred , then he was in being before he was . but to be from himself , is no more liable to such an inference , than when we say he is self-existent , or in the word used by the fathers , ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , god of and from himself , that is , so as to have no cause nor beginning . the second difficulty his lordship proposed about god's eternity , is , how god should co-exist with all the differences of times , and yet there be no succession in his own being ? — and succession being not consistent with the absolute perfection of the divine nature , therefore god must be all at once what he is . this our author saith , is a great many contradictions , and proposes no less than five queries upon it , which he gives his lordship time till dooms-day to answer . for thus he closes them , the notion of the trinity , and this notion of eternity , will be vindicated both in a day . however we will try if the day for it be not already come ; and for trial's sake , i will venture to offer them again to the reader , as they stand in his treatise . q. . what is the difference between an eternal moment , ( which every one discerns is a contradiction in the very terms ) and between possessing eternal life all at once , which is his lordship's definition of eternity ? a. the difference is as great , as between contradiction and truth . an eternal moment is a contradiction ; for a moment is a moveable point , and passes as soon into not being , as it came into being . it was not , it is , and immediately is not ; and so nothing more opposite in the nature of it to eternity . but eternity admits no succession , no divisibility , no moments , no past , no future , no motion , no change , and consequently must be all existent together , and all at once : for there is no mean between succession , and all at once ; and since succession is imcompatible with eternity , eternity must be all at once . and if god did not possess himself all at once , he could not be eternal . q. . seeing it is of the nature of all duration to consist in a succession , else it were not duration but a moment , i ask whether it be not unavoidable , that if almighty god possesses eternal life all at once , he must have passed into some durations before they are ? the duration , for example , in which the day of judgment shall be , is not actually come . but if god possesses eternity all at once , he is already entred upon that duration , that is , he is entred upon it before it is . a. if it be of the nature of all duration to consist in a succession , then there can be no more duration than there is succession in an eternal being : and consequently , 't is a gross absurdity to conceive of god , as entring upon a certain duration , and passing into some duration , which is to conceive of him as a temporary being , and that began to be , ( for so it is in all succession ) and not as one that is eternal . q. . seeing it is a contradiction , and therefore impossible , that any being should possess a duration before such duration is ; i desire to know of his lordship , how it can be an imperfection ( as he affirms ) in the divine nature , not to do that which implies a contradiction , &c. a. 't is true , that it is a contradiction , and therefore impossible for a creature , to whom duration and succession belong , to possess a duration before such duration is . but it is a contradiction , and therefore impossible for god to possess any duration ( which consists in succession ) because he is eternal . for him to possess a certain duration and succession , would be to suppose him in duration a , before he removed to duration b , and when he is in duration b , to have left duration a. eternity in god , is with respect to time , what immensity is to place ; and so he is all at once , as he is at once in all places ; and as notwithstanding the innumerable divisions in place , god is no more divided , than he was before place was created . so , notwithstanding the manifold distributions of time , god is no more in one duration than in another , but is now the same eternal undivided being , when there is a before , a present , and an after in time , as he was before there was any time , duration or succession . q. . how is it more an imperfection to pass from not being , into such a duration , to such a being in it , than 't is an imperfection to pass from not operating in such a duration , to operating in it ? this last all men must confess to be true of god ; for none will dare to say , god made all his works at once . a. to pass from duration to duration , and from not being in such a particular duration to a being in it , is no other than succession which ( as has been shew'd ) is utterly inconsistent with the nature of god , who is eternal . to pass from not operating in such a duration , to operating in it , is to suppose there was a duration before god did operate in it , which is manifestly absurd . for duration is a continuance of time ; but what duration was there in eternity , before there was any time , or god began to operate and make the world ? again , to argue from the works of god to his nature , is to circumscribe him to time and place , as they are . and he may as well argue , that god began to be , when he began to operate , as to argue from succession in the creatures , or a succession of god's operation in the creatures , to a succession in himself ; and that he cannot be all at once , because he did not make all his works at once . q. . what shadow of imperfection is it to pass from one duration to another , when the person so passing , carries with him all perfections into every duration ? a. if this were so , the almighty would want one perfection of his nature , which is eternity . for he can no more carry his eternity with him into the various successions of duration , than he can pass from place to place , and carry his immensity with him . 't is the upshot ( i will not say the design ) of these his queries to overthrow the eternity of god , under colour of disproving the notion of the platonists and boethius , the school-men and the doctors , and professors of mysteries in our times , ( as he derives its pedigree , and is pleased to give their character ) viz. that eternity is a possession of all at once : and so turns all the bitter invectives upon himself , with which he so virulently , and without any pretext endeavours to wound his adversary . for what else is the effect of his doctrine of succession in god , and passing from one duration to another ? for where there is succession , there was a beginning , unless he will make the first moment in his succession to be eternal , which he knows is a contradiction in terms . the two remaining difficulties which his lordship offers to our consideration , and to shew how incomprehensible things are , are the spirituality of god's nature , and his prescience . to the former he makes no other reply , than to disavow ( if it is so ) what was charged upon some of their way about god's corporeity . as to the latter , nothing will serve his turn , but that the bishop opposes the vnity of god ( that envied doctrine ) by finding contradictions in his eternity and foreknowledge . but what if the bloody charge fall upon socinus , who found the difficulties , and as he thought , the contradictions in the doctrine of god's prescience to be so great , intrenching upon the freedom of humane actions , and making god the author of sin ; that he thought it the better way wholly to deny it . but this our author is very careful to suppress . . proposition . the difficulties , saith his lordship , are in point of reason more insuperable in the socinian way than ours ; of which he gives several instances that may be called mysteries . . the mystery on the part of the orthodox , is the eternal son of god's being with the father before the world was made by him . the mystery on the other side is , ' that although jesus were born six months after john baptist , yet he was in dignity before him . now this , saith the bishop , is a mystery ; forasmuch as it cannot be conceived that the evangelist should , in lofty expressions , and profound language , prove a thing which was never disputed . it is st. john that is referr'd to , and if he may be esteemed the author of that gospel , yet our author cannot find that profound language and lofty expressions in him . the sense indeed , saith he , is sometimes profound , but the expression is always mean. so little judgment had friend amelius , when at the first reading he thought the barbarian ( as he call'd that divine evangelist ) to platonize ; and in his profound language to imitate his great master . indeed our author rather thinks of a character befitting a rhetorician , orator , or poet , than a philosopher or divine writer . as if because the evangelist had not an elevation of conceit or expression , like or above the greek or roman orators , or poets , his language could not be profound , nor his expressions lofty . . saith he , if the language were profound , it would not follow , the sense intended must be a mystery . but it would follow , that st. john that wrote of such sublime things , after that manner , would not take pains to prove what was never disputed , viz. that although christ were born six months after john baptist , yet he was in dignity before him . at last , by head and shoulders , he brings in a paraphrase of the socinians on the beginning of st. john , which has already been consider'd ; but because i am not willing to be behind-hand with him , i shall repay it with another , borrowing some help towards it from his own exposition , viz. in the beginning of the gospel , the word jesus christ being about years old , was then in being and alive : and about that time was rapt up into heaven , as st. paul was , which we are piously to believe , being the scripture is silent in it . and after a very short stay there , but so long as it may be said , he was with god , this word came down again from heaven , which we are upon the same consideration to believe , as his former ascension . and then or some time after , perhaps at his resurrection , he was constituted a god , not an eternal god , but a man god , a creature-god , a finite temporary god , that dates the beginning of his deity from the term aforesaid . and being thus a god , he made a new world , as the eternal god made the old. and though he had nothing in him of the divine nature , ( for that god could not give him ) nor any of the incommunicable attributes of the deity , omnipotence , omnipresence , omniscience , and such like . ( wherefore ' t is better to use the words christ , lord and saviour , than god , because there may be no small inconvenience with respect to the vulgar ) yet he was to have the same honour given him by angels and men , which they gave to the father , the eternal , omnipotent , omnipresent , and omniscient god. and to encourage them in this , they are to know , that faustus socinus had cause to think , that his unkle laelius had , by many prayers obtained from christ himself a very dextrous and admirable interpretation of a difficult place in st. john. now this i take to be an unintelligible mystery , and fit to be put to that , that although christ jesus were born six months after john , yet he was in dignity before him . but here he saith they have on their side the principal criticks of the trinitarians , particularly erasmus and beza , who understand the phrase , for he was before me , john . . of a priority of dignity and excellence , not of a priority of time . admit this for the present , then the sense of that place will amount to this , he that cometh after me , is preferr'd before me ; for he was preferr'd before me : or , he that cometh after me , is more excellent than me ; for he was more excellent than me . thus st. chrysostom expounds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is preferr'd before me , by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , more excellent , more honourable . . the mystery on the orthodox side is , that a divine person should assume humane nature , and so the word be made flesh. the mystery on the other side is , ' that an attribute of god , his wisdom or power , is made flesh ; that is , for an accident to be made a substance . in answer to this our author saith , . by the word we do not understand god the son ; the rather , because no such person is once mentioned in all holy scripture . answ. if that were a reason sufficient why the word in that proposition , the word was made flesh , should not be understood of god the son ; then 't is as much a reason why the word in the first verse should not be understood of god the son : but if notwithstanding that no such person is once mentioned in scripture as god the son , yet the word in verse . is to be understood of a person ; then notwithstanding that , verse . may as well be understood in like manner of the personal word . but is no such person ever mentioned in scripture , as god the son ? what is the word but the son of god , and when the word and the son are the same , what is the difference between god the word , and god the son ? and when the son is called god in scripture , what is the difference between god the son , and the son that is god ? . but what do they understand by the word , when the word is said to be made flesh ? he answers , the power and wisdom of god. now if so ; where then is the fault , when the bishop charges it upon them as a mystery beyond all comprehension , that they say that an attribute of god , his wisdom or power , is made flesh ? here he comes in again with his , we do not mean hereby , as his lordship would insinuate , that the wisdom or power of god was turned into flesh , or man. now this is more than his adversary charges them with : but what do they mean ? why , we mean , saith he , as the trinitarians thereby also mean , that the word was incarnate , tabernacled in flesh , abode on the man christ jesus in more ample manner , and much larger measure , then on former prophets . answ. if they mean , by made flesh , as the trinitarians themselves also mean ; then they must mean , that the wisdom and power of god is incarnate , and took upon it the flesh and nature of man ; or else they do not mean by that phrase as the trinitarians do . but suppose we give him back again what he has granted , and allow that they do not mean as the trinitarians mean , when they say , the word was incarnate ; but that they mean , the word abode on the man christ jesus ; that is , the word , power , or wisdom , abode on the word christ ; yet how comes he from the word 's tabernacling in flesh , or was made flesh , to interpret it , abode in christ. methinks there is much of mystery in this . but i have not yet done ; for tho he saith , the language and expression of st. john is always mean , yet i apprehend st. john to be consistent with himself , and to write intelligibly . but our author brings all this into question , by a forced interpretation , and setting up his own meaning against that of st. john ; as will appear to any indifferent man , from the connection and order of this chapter ; whether it be the part before verse . or that which follows . before ; for thus the evangelist proceeds , in the beginning was the word , — and that word was the true light. — and the word was made flesh. so that the word that was made flesh , was the same that was the true light , and that was in the beginning . and therefore if by the word that was made flesh , is to be understood the power and wisdom of god , then so it is to be understood when the word is said to be in the beginning , after this manner ; in the beginning was the power of god , and the power of god was with god , and the power of god was god. let us consult the words following the clause , [ the word was made flesh ] and it will be yet more evident ; the word was made flesh , and dwelt among us , and we beheld his glory , the glory of the only begotten of the father , &c. john bare witness of him , and cried , saying , this was he of whom i spake ; &c. so that the same word that was made flesh , dwelt among them ; the same word that was made flesh , and dwelt among them , and whose glory they saw , was the only begotten of the father . the same word that was made flesh , and dwelt among them , was he of whom john bare witness . now if the whole tenor of that discourse , before and after , belong to the personal word , then so doth the clause between ; or else he will make st. john write so as no intelligent writer can be supposed to write . . the mystery on the side of the orthodox , is , that the son of god ' came down from heaven , and took our nature upon him . the mystery on the other side is , ' that christ should be rapp'd up into heaven . this mystery of theirs our author will have to be no more difficult than st. paul's being caught up into the third heaven . and so far he is in the right ; for that was no more impossible than this , and christ might have ascended before his ministry , as well as after his resurrection . but this is not the mystery that his lordship lays his hand upon ; but it is this , that in a matter of so great consequence , and so remarkable a part of history ( if it had been true ) the scripture should be wholly silent ; that when it is so punctual in the relation of moses's converse with god at the giving of the law , and of our saviour's forty days temptation in the wilderness , and his transfiguration , &c. that there should be no more said of this ascension of our saviour , than of the virgin mary's assumption , tho ( as they would have it ) it was to receive instructions in the will of god concerning the gospel-dispensation ; and when he was constituted and made a god , ( as some of them say . ) this is a mystery . but i acknowledge that the invention of this is a new mystery ; it being apparent , that it was by them thought necessary to make some tolerable sense of these words , he came down from heaven , as his lordship observes of this before . as for the mystery on the other side , we acknowledge it to be so , but not for the reason he gives , because to descend or ascend belongs only to limited and finite beings . since notwithstanding that , god in scripture is said to go down , that that is not to be understood of a local descent , but of a manifestation of the deity . and the son of god is said to come down from heaven when he became man , because he took the humane nature into union with the divine ; and where the humane was , there was also the divine . . the mystery on the orthodox side is , that god should become man by taking our nature upon him . the mystery on the other side is , ' that man should become god , &c. in the-former , an infinite is united to a finite ; in the latter , a finite becomes infinite . our author saith , the bishop found it necessary to misinterpret their doctrines , before he could find mysteries in it . a. but surely he doth not misreport their doctrine , when he saith , that they make a man to be god. our author is very tender in the point , and saith he may be called a god ; and saith , that it cannot be satisfactorily proved , that any authentick copies of the bible do give to him the title , god. but socinus , and his followers , are not sparing to call him a true god , and to give him divine worship as such ( as has been shewed ) ; and i question whether our author can say more about the authentick copies than sandius , which has been sufficiently confuted before he published his brief history , . as for what our author saith concerning the case of moses , magistrates and angels being called god : i ask , whether any of them may be called a true god. for if moses was , for example , as much a god as christ , he might have , and challenge the same divine worship as is given , and is due to christ. . the mystery on the side of the orthodox is , ' that christ suffered for our sakes ; as a voluntary sacrifice of expiation of the sins of mankind , and not for his own sake . the mystery on the other side is , to make him suffer as one wholly innocent ; which is , to make the most innocent persons as apprehensive of suffering as the most guilty . here our author interposes , and saith , his lordship seems not to understand the state of the question , because he had said , ' t is more reasonable to believe that jesus christ suffered for our sakes , than for his own . whereas he suffer'd for both ; for his own sake , to obtain a glorious reward , &c. answ. it is plain , that when his lordship saith , christ suffer'd for our sake , and not for his own ; he means thereby , not for his own sake , as he did for ours ; for our sins , and not for any of his own : so it immediately follows , we are all agreed , that the sufferings of christ were far beyond any thing he deserv'd at god's hands . . he saith , the unitarians never denied , as his lordship here fancies , that jesus christ made himself a voluntary sacrifice for expiation of the sins of mankind . answ. let us suppose this , what is it then they deny ? they deny , he saith , that this sacrifice was by way of true and proper satisfaction , or full and adequate payment to the justice of god. a. that there might be a sacrifice of expiation where there was no full and adequate payment to the justice of god , is true , because it is not possible , saith the apostle , that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins . but the case is not the same in this sacrifice , ( for that which is denied to the former , is yet granted and given to the sacrifice of christ , heb. . , . ) which may not improperly be called a satisfaction and payment ; and if so , in regard of the dignity of the person , may be said to be full and adequate ; since as sins are called debts , so sinners are debtors to the justice of god's law , in respect of which we are said to be redeemed by the blood of christ , as captives or condemned persons were redeemed by silver and gold , pet. . , . but yet we are not come to the bottom of their doctrine ; for when we might reasonably have thought the controversy to be at an end ( since they grant that christ was an expiatory sacrifice for our sins ) they take all away again by an explication that makes the sacrifice no sacrifice , and the expiation no expiation . for he thus determines the point . . we say this sacrifice ( as all other sacrifices ) was only an oblation or application to the mercy of god. or as it follows , he suffered for our sakes , that he might recommend us to the mercy and forgiveness of god. a. i have said before , by this account of an expiatory sacrifice , the expiation is no expiation ; for the definition here given of an expiatory sacrifice , is this , that ' t is only an oblation , application , or recommendation of a person to the mercy and forgiveness of god. now that can be no definition of a thing , which is as well applicable to a thing of another nature , as to the thing defined : and that is the case here , for according to this definition of an expiatory sacrifice , intercession would be such a sacrifice . for it may be thus described , intercession is only an oblation , application , or recommendation of another to the mercy and forgiveness of god. so that in effect , an expiatory sacrifice is no other than an intercession . and then indeed we , and i think mankind ( except our author , and those of his way ) have been under a great mistake , that have been taught , that sacrifices of expiation were instead of the offender , in whose sufferings he was reputed to suffer , and upon whose sufferings and penal death , he was supposed to be in a respect discharged . . the mystery on the part of the orthodox is , that the son of god took upon him the form of a servant for our advantage . the mystery on the other side is , that a meer man should be exalted to the honour and worship which belongs only to god. as to the former our author replies , t is more reasonable to suppose with the unitarians , that god hath admitted us to conditions of pardon and favour , for his own mercy's sake , and in contemplation of the unblemish'd life , and voluntary sufferings and sacrifice of christ jesus ; than to suppose with his lordship , and his party , that god himself took on him the form of a servant , and suffer'd in our steads , to reconcile us to himself . answ. . he might as well suppose , that 't is more reasonable that god should admit us to conditions of pardon and favour , for his own mercy's sake , than for the sufferings and sacrifice of christ. for what needed such a sacrifice , and the son of god to be exposed to such extremities , when god could have pardoned men for his own mercy's sake , as well without these sufferings of christ , as without a satisfaction . . what he supposes is very absurd that god should admit us to conditions of pardon , upon the contemplation of the voluntary sacrifice of christ ; and yet that he did not suffer in our stead , nor to reconcile us to god. for substitution , or to die in the stead of another , is of the nature of an expiatory sacrifice : and he might as well say , christ is our intercessor without mediating for us ; as that he was our sacrifice , and not be sacrificed for us ; or be a sacrifice for us , and yet not suffer in our stead . . 't is not more reasonable to suppose god admitted us to conditions of pardon for his own mercy's sake , than it is to suppose that he suffer'd in our steads , and to reconcile us to god : for that is not unreasonable which hath god for its author . but will he say , the difficulty is not yet solved ; for 't is god's reconciling us to himself , and suffering for himself , and paying to himself the debt of the debtor , and satisfying the wrong done to himself ? which saith he is a mock-satisfaction , such a ridiculous so●ne , that begets laughter or contempt in considering men . surely he means such as himself , that writes considerations . our author is so used to forget himself , to leave out , put in , or alter , that he can no more flip an occasion , ( how small soever ) than those that are used to another way , can let go an opportunity , though it be but a a petty-larceny . thus he saith , his lordship and his party suppose that god himself suffer'd in our steads , as well as took on him the form of a servant . now to say the truth , his lordship had not this scene in his eye under mystery the th ; for in that he is speaking of the incarnation of our saviour , when he took on him the form of a servant ; but it was in mystery the th that he spoke of christ's sufferings and sacrifice . his lordships words are , the son of god took upon him the form of a servant ; so that he was so far from saying , god suffer'd in our stead , &c. that he did not so much as say , the son of god suffer'd in our stead , ( though it be true . ) but will he say , is not this all one , when he that suffer'd and died , is , in our opinion , god as well as man ? i answer no , with respect to his observations . for restore son of god to its place ( as it is in his lordship ) instead of god , and then we shall see the difference . as : 't is more reasonable to suppose with the unitarians , that god hath admitted us to terms of pardon for his own mercy's sake , &c. than that his son should suffer in our stead , to reconcile us to god. . it 's an incomprehensible mystery , that god should rather chuse to send his son to suffer for us , than to forgive us . . 't is a paradox , for the son of god to pay the debt of the debtor to god , and to satisfy for the wrong done to him. how is the scene changed upon this ? and where doth the absurdity lie ? while indeed he put god in the place of the son of god , it look'd somewhat speciously ; but restore the term son of god to its place instead of god , and the pretended absurdity lies apparently at his own door . but may he urge , don't you acknowledge the son of god to be god ? and then it may be as well said , god himself suffer'd in our stead , &c. as the son of god suffer'd , &c. i answer , god ( as that signifies the divine nature in christ ) could not suffer : all that we say is , that the person that took upon himself the form of a servant was god , and not man , before such an assumption of humane nature : that when he assumed that nature , he was god as well as man ; and that person who was god suffer'd in humane nature , but the godhead or god no more suffer'd and died when christ died , than the manhood could be omnipresent and immortal , because the godhead was so ; or the soul die , when the man is said to die . . i answer further , that the son of god is not the father ; and that there being such an incommunicable personality , if i may so speak , those things belong to the son that could not belong to the father . and as the father was not incarnate but the son , so the son became responsible , and paid the price of our redemption to the father ; and therefore it was the act of the son that was god , and not of the godhead , as common to three persons to reconcile us to god. as to the mystery on their own side , the worship of a meer man , it has been already consider'd , only he should have had some moderation in his charge , when he saith his lordship might as well have accus'd them of sodomy or witchcraft , as of giving proper divine worship to a creature , to the man christ jesus ; when his party owns it , and he himself makes a feeble excuse for it . for , saith he , if it is a mistake , 't is simple error , not mystery , much less idolatry . now , methinks , 't is an unintelligible mystery , that there should be a proper divine worship , peculiar to god ; and yet there be no idolatry in giving the same to a creature . 't is an incomprehensible mystery again to say , the giving proper divine worship to a creature , is not idolatry . 't is a mystery again , that the church of rome should be charged with idolatry , for giving divine worship to creature-mediators , and yet in these persons 't is simple error . 't is a mystery again , that christ should be esteemed by them a god , and so constituted by god , and yet there be no small inconvenience with respect to the vulgar to have him so called . 't is a mystery again , that st. paul blames them who do service to such as are not gods : and yet if god himself had set them up , and given them the name above every name , and they had not mistook in the kind , nor exceeded in the degree of that service they did to them , they should not have been blamed . and so the saints and angels might have been made objects of worship as well as christ , and the virgin mary might have been established queen of heaven , and a hyperdulia accordingly given to her . so that he has made as pretty a defence in this part for the creature-worship of the church of rome , as their heart can wish , and as he has made for transubstantiation in the next part. d proposition is , the way or manner of saving sinners by christ , taught by the church , is more for the benefit of mankind , than the socinian hypothesis . this i shall be as short upon as he ; and till i see an answer to what his lordship has said , and was also said by the archbishop upon that argument , i shall rest contented , and not think the proposition evertheless true or pertinent , for his saying ' t is neither true , nor to the purpose . to the reverend dr. williams . reverend sir , i understand that you are now about a vindication of the late archbishop of canterbury's sermons concerning the trinity , in answer to the animadversions that were made upon them . i am very glad so great an argument is in so good a hand : but since the animadverter gave a late discourse of mine a share of the same book , i think it may be proper , that somewhat in justification of what i writ , should accompany this performance of yours : and because every man is naturally more the master of his own thoughts than another , though in other respects he may be much superior to him ; i shall therefore give you a particular account of what occurs to me , with relation to my discourse on this subject , and shall leave it to you , either to publish it with your book , in the same simplicity in which i am forced to write at this distance from my books and collections , or which will be much to the advantage of what i am to offer to you , though it may put you to a little more trouble , i leave it to you to draw such things out of this paper as seem of the greatest weight , and mix them with your own composition . by this they will appear with those solid characters of true judgment and learning , by which all your writings are distinguished . i shall without any farther preamble , enter upon the matter that is before me ; and shall in the first place offer you some general considerations , before i come to what is more particular and critical . the foreign writers of this author's persuasion , have indeed in their way of writing , set a pattern to the world : their stile has been grave and modest , free from reflection or levity . they have pursued their point with a strain that deserves great commendation . but those , who have taken great liberties with them , have said , that this was only an artifice to soften the horror that their opinions were apt to give ; and to possess the world with such favourable thoughts of their persons and doctrines , as might both remove prejudices , and dispose all men to believe well of those who seemed full of a christian spirit ; and they have been apt to suspect , that as their numbers and their hopes might encrease , they would change their stile , and raise their spirits . this writer has done what lay in him , to justify those suspicions . it seems he thinks the party is now so strong , that the hard words of nonsense , contradiction , and absurdity , may be let fly liberally ; though upon so grave a subject , modester words would have imported full as much , and would have had a much better appearance . he loves also to divert himself as oft as he can : i had in the general part of my discourse said , that since there may be mysteries in the divine essence that are far beyond all our apprehensions ; therefore if god lets out any hints of any such to us , we are to receive them in such a plain sense as the words do naturally bear . from hence he runs division upon the word hint ; and studies to make the whole appear ridiculous : though when i come to treat of the proofs that ought to be relied on in this matter , i had laid this down for a ground , that in so sublime a point , there ought to be a greater fulness of express words , than for bare precepts of morality , or more easily received notions : and that we ought not to suppose , that if god intended to reveal any thing to us that should pose our vnderstandings , he would only do it in hints , or in words and expressions of doubtful signification , and that therefore those who denied mysteries , had a right to demand full and copious proofs of them . the taking notice of this would have been more sincere , but some of the mirth into which hints led him , would have been spoiled by it . i mention no other strains of this sort , though he does often with the same candour and modesty endeavour to make those he writes against look ridiculous ; which is pursued so flatly , that one would think that the civil and more artificial words with which he begins his considerations , were writ by another pen , but were in the management spoiled by his own . to pass over his many indecent reflections , especially when nothing of that sort was used , to give a provocation or colour for such returns ; there is another imputation of a much higher nature , which deserves a severer expostulation . he frequently reflects on the aws , and other biasses , and interests , that he apprehends are the considerations which engage men to persist in the persuasions which he writes against . this is , with a slight disguise , to say , that because the law would turn men out of their benefices , if they owned the contrary doctrine , therefore to save these , they not only speak and write , but worship god in acts that are plainly against their consciences . this is often repeated , though perhaps more broadly in the other considerations , than in those that relate to my self . i reckon my self to be equally involved with my brethren in the imputation ; and will therefore answer it with the solemnity that so grave a matter requires : i call god to witness , how unjust , as well as black , this accusation is . if i did not sincerely believe this doctrine , i should think it a horrid prevaricating with god and man , to make confessions which i do not believe , and to join in acts of worship which i think idolatrous . no man of conscience can think himself clear of so criminal an imputation by holding his peace , when those confessions of faith are made ; his standing up to them , nay , his continuing in the communion of the church that uses them , is a plain avowing of them : and he must live and die in a state of damnation , who can make those professions , and continue in such solemn acts of worship , when all this is a lying both to god and man. the blackest part of the charge of idolatry which we lay on the church of rome , is a mild thing compared to this , if true . here is not only material , but formal idolatry committed in the highest instances possible , if we worship one as the great god , whom we believe to be but a mere creature . a man who can upon any consideration whatsoever , sell himself at this rate , can have neither conscience nor religion ; no sincerity , nor true piety : if this insinuation carried only a personal reflection on our selves ; though the injustice of it be very great , yet it might be more easily passed over , if it were not for the great advantage it gives to atheistical and prophane minds , who are inclined enough to think that all the professions of religion which men make , are only matters of custom or of interest : these are now fortified as much as the credit of this writer can amount to . when some persons of whom the world has not otherwise had very ill impressions , are represented as over-aw'd and biass'd by interest , to go against their conscience , and to lye daily to god , and deceive the world by false professions ; no wonder that religion it self should pass for a cheat , if things of this nature could be generally believed . men who could sell and stifle their consciences at this rate , might as well deliver themselves up to all immoralities , and should make no scruple to go over to all the corruptions of the church of rome , where they might make the better bargain , and be much less guilty than this writer would make us seem to be . god , who knows the sincerity of our hearts and of our professions , will i hope both clear us from so base an imputation , and forgive those who either lay it on us themselves , or do too easily believe it upon the suggestions of others . as in this , so in several other respects our socinians seem to be serving the designs of the atheists . this writer is not contented to weaken the credit of the books that are believed to be s. john's ; but studies to make the whole bible pass for a vitiated and corrupted book ; and that these corruptions are as ancient as epiphanius's time ; because that father speaks of some places that were found in the copies that had not been corrected ; upon which he concludes , that some have been modelling the common bibles far above twelve hundred years . this is the very plea of the mahometans , who do not deny the bulk of the christian religion , which is acknowledged in the alcoran , they only say that the new testament is much altered from what it was at first , the christians having put in and left out a great deal of it : or to use this writers word , they having modelled it anew . if this be as true , as it is boldly assorted , there is indeed very little regard due to that volume , about which he thinks there has been so much dishonest dealing ; and that for so many ages . the opening this matter , he thinks would rase the very foundations of babylon ; he might have rather said of the christian religion . for if the books that are the text of it are so mangled , what certainty is there left about any part of it ? he does not seem to design this as a service to the church of rome ; where the currant doctrine is , that no submission is due to the scriptures , but as they are attested and explained by the church ; tho' the great pains he takes to excuse transubstantiation , looks very kindly towards them . the true consequence of this must be , that the scripture may ( perhaps ) contain many good things : but that we are sure of nothing concerning it ; since it has had so strange a sate upon it for so long a time . this is to be answered only by attacking him as a downright deist , by proving that we have the scriptures genuinely conveyed down to us . the attempts of a mercenary critick on this head ought not to pass upon us ; who know how little regard he has to any religion . no doubt there was anciently great care taken to compare the manuscripts of the bible . in some copies , marginal notes and glosses might have been mixt with the text ; and copied out as a part of it : and that might be discovered by other more correct copies . this is all that can be gathered from epiphanius's words ; how much further soever an impious critick may endeavour to stretch them . there is no harm done by attacking our translation ; or by shewing the various readings of some copies , and endeavouring to establish the true reading , from ancient copies or quotations : but it strikes at the whole , to accuse all the copies now extant , as having been long vitiated by fraud , and on design . i shall offer you but one other general consideration , on that part of this writers book , in which he thinks he has the greatest advantage given him because there have been some different methods taken , in explaining , the trinity , in which some seem to have adhered so much to the vnity of the deity , that their trinity seems unconceivable ; while others have asserted such a trinity as seems inconsistent with vnity , he represents us all as so divided and broken , that we agree in nothing , but in the maintaining of some terms and phrases against them : in which we have very different apprehensions from one another . this seems to give scandal to some good minds , as well as advantage to bad ones : and therefore it ought to be well explained . there is then a great difference to be made between that which is a part of our religion , and those conceptions by which we may more distinctly set it forth , both to our selves and others . to make this more sensible by instances that are forreign to this matter : many protestants have different apprehensions concerning the manner of christ's presence in the sacrament ; some asserting consubstantiation , others a real presence , and others only a figurative one : but all agreeing , that this is a sacred institution of christ's , accompanied with a divine vertue and blessing , to those who worthily receive it , by which the benefits of the death of christ are conveyed to them ; they are all of the same religion , who do agree in this , tho' they have different methods of apprehending and explaining the matter . in like manner , as to the decrees and providence of god ; some think that all arises from the antecedent and fixed acts of god ; whereas others believe that a foresight of all future events is to be considered as antecedent to those acts : upon these two supposions , there seem to be very different ideas formed of the power , wisdom , justice , goodness , and truth of god , and yet all who confess a providence , who adore it , submit to it , and depend upon it , are of the same religion ; for in these consists religion with relation to providence . religion being the sense that we have of god and divine matters , by which our minds go towards him , in acts conform to it . therefore all those who do worthily receive the sacrament , or sincerely acknowledge providence , have the same religion upon these heads , how different soever their explanations of them may be . so as to this great point , all those who worship god as one , and who do also worship the son , and the holy ghost , together with the father , as god , have truly the same religion , the same acts of piety and adoration ; tho' some of them may have different ways of explaining either the vnity of the essence , or the trinity of the persons . if this is well weighed , i hope it will put an end to the insultings of some , and the offences of others . i confess the less men go into explanations , it will be the better , and the less liable to censure : unless it be to offer such illustrations , as rather shew how a thing may be explained , than affirm how it ought to be explained : and therefore since god is unsearchable , and past finding out , to perfection , the best method is to consider what is the clear meaning of these texts of scripture , that declare any of those depths to us , and to judge of them according to the plain importance of the words , examining that by the context , the stile and phraseology of the scriptures , and by all the other indications by which we may find out their true meaning . this leads me to the first remark that i shall make on this writer's considerations which fall on me , and on that part of my discourse that relates to mysteries in general . he yields that there may be great difficulties in some things , of the truth of which we do not doubt ; but then , says he , we are well assured that these things are truly so : whereas some ambiguous words of scripture cannot give us such an assurance concerning pretended mysteries . but all that i aimed at in this part of my discourse was , that if any such things should happen to be revealed to us in the scriptures , that then we should be bound to believe them , notwithstanding all objections to the contrary : as we believe the objects of sense and reason , tho' we cannot answer all those difficulties that arise about them ; for if we are once sure , that such books are come from god , and that they are faithfully handed down to us ; then , unless we will submit to an infallible tribunal , we must trust our own reasons with the finding out of the true and plain meaning of them : when that is found out , we are as much bound to believe it , as we can be to believe any of the objects of sense : since this is laid down for a truth , contested by none , that god is the god of truth , and cannot lie . there lies no exception against any part of this discourse ; since it runs all upon the supposition , that the thing is clearly revealed in the scripture ; and that yet there lie as unanswerable difficulties against it , as against those truths which our senses or reasons do attest to us . the excursion made by him to excuse transubstantiation , is not so much meant in favour of it , as in opposition to these ( pretended ) mysteries ; but indeed it is so little to the purpose , that it seems to me not to deserve to be examined . my words are not faithfully reported by him ; for whereas i had said , that we had the fullest evidence of sense against it , in an object of sense ; he has left out fullest , and then diverts himself by shewing how the evidence of sense may be mistaken ; as in an our that appears crooked in water , with other instances of the like force ; whereas all this had failed , if he had considered the importance of the word fullest , that is , an evidence given with all the exactness , and after all the corrections that sense can lay before us . sense it self has led us into a whole theory of refractions , according to the medium through which we see an object pass : what he says about accidents , is too slight to be remarked : we see the same objects in the same manner after their pretended transubstantiation , that we saw before it ; therefore either our senses are not infallible in their strictest application to their proper objects , or they are as true after transubstantiation as they were before it . the inference after all that he would draw from what he says upon this head , shall be easily acknowledged by me ; that where the evidence of reason is as plain and full against an object of reason , as the evidence of sense is here concerning an object of sense , that there we have very good ground to reject it . if it were pretended that god were both one and three in the same respect , the evidence of reason against this is so clear , that i acknowledge that no authority whatsoever ought to induce us to believe it : but if it is revealed that the same being is both one and three , then since the notion of vnity is capable of such difference , since also that of diversity is of the same largeness , and since the same being may be one in one respect , and more in another ; this opposition between such vnity and such trinity , is no proper object of reason , nor can reason give us a full evidence , much less the fullest against it . i think there remains nothing to be considered on this head , except the scorn with which he treats me ; which i thank god i can very easily bear , and will make no returns . he might after all , treat those matters for which so many persons of worth and learning have so particular a veneration , with more modesty . it seems he thought a boldness of expression , and a scorn of his adversaries , would have some effect on ordinary readers ; which very probably it may have ; but better judges will put another construction upon it . i wish him a better temper , and so i leave him , to come to the main argument on which i had chiefly relied . i will only say this for an introduction to it , that the best rule of criticism is to consider the whole thread , strain , and phraseology of a book , and not to descant upon the various significations that the words themselves taken severally may be capable of . the not considering this aright , seems to have given the occasion to all the odd comments of the socinians . the name jehovah was the peculiar designation that was appropriated to god in the old dispensation . this the seventy have rendred quite through their whole translation , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and through the whole new testament this is the designation that is given to christ , sometimes with , and sometimes without the article , and other emphatical words : from which , since the greatest part of the new testament was particularly and in the first place addressed to the jews , great numbers of whom read the old testament at that time most commonly in greek ; this conformity of stile seems very plainly to demonstrate , that christ was the true jehovah ; or at least that the true jehovah dwelt in him . in answer to this , he denies that jehovah was the peculiar designation of god , and sets up an argument for this , of which i had made no use , and then he pretends to answer it ; for after he has quarrelled with our translation of a verse in the psalm , and has laid aside some other translations of those words , he at lasts settles on this as the true one , thou whose name is jehovah , art alone the most high over all the earth . i will at present accept of this translation ; for it yeilds all that i pretend to , that jehovah was the known name of god in that dispensation . i will not enter into the rabinical niceties concerning it , as whether it signified the essence or eternity of god , or whether it imported only god's being in covenant with them , and the truth and stability of his promises : whatsoever might be the proper signification of the word jehovah , it was at first delivered to moses in such a manner , that there was no need to go to any of the psalms to find out that it was the name by which god made himself particularly known to the jews . that whole discourse with moses in exodus , is spoken by god in the first person : i am the god of thy father , — i have seen , — i am come down , — i will send thee : here is no intimation of a message carried by an angel , but plainly the contrary : and when moses asked how he should answer them that should ask him what was his name ; god said unto him , i am that i am . these words come very near the formation of the word jehovah ; and it is plain by what is said three chapters after that , i am the lord , or jehovah ; and i appeared unto abraham , and unto isaac , and unto jacob by the name of god almighty ; but by my name jehovah was i not known to them . it is clear , i say , that by that first apparition to moses , the name jehovah was then understood : and it is expresly said , this is my name for ever , this is my memorial throughout all generations . to all this he may object , that in the beginning of that vision it is said , that an angel of the lord appeared to moses in a flame of fire : from which it may be inferred , that all that is set down there , was said by this angel , who speaks in the name of god , and assumes his person as being sent by him ; and that therefore this name may be given to any one who speaks in the name of god. but that vision of the angel will import no more , but that an angel appeared in the fire ; and by that moses was led to go towards the bush , and then god himself did immediately speak . this agrees with the whole context , and puts no force on any part of it : whereas it is a very violent strain to make an angel thus speak as if he were the great god , without any intimation given that he only spake in his name . this agrees with that general remark of the jewish writers , who observe that when ever the sheckinah appeared , angels accompanied it . this a grees also with what is said often in the new testament , that the law was given by angels , though it is said as plain as words can make a thing , that god himself appeared ; that is , that by an immediate act of his own power , he made all those glorious representations to be seen , and the voice of the ten commandments to be heard . to this also belong those words of christ concerning his appearing at the last day , in his own glory ; in his father's glory ; and in the glory of his angels : together with all that is said of angels appearing with him at the final judgment : the charge given to st. paul , before god , the lord jesus , and the elect angels , does also agree with this . so that the angel that first appeared to moses , was only one of the attendants on this sheckinah , or manifestation of god himself . any name that is given to a place , into the composition of which jehovah enters , such as jehovah isidkenu given to jerusalem , is too slight a thing to be stood upon . it is therefore plain , that jehovah was a name peculiarly appropriated to god in the old testament , which the seventy do always render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . so since christ is all through the new testament called by the same name , this argument has great force ; nor is it shaken by the giving the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as a common compellation to other persons ; as we say sir , or lord ; which , as is not to be denied , occurs frequently in the new testament ; but the use of it in a particular discourse , where it is restricted to that person , cannot be compared to a constant stile of calling christ simply , and without limitation , lord , the lord , my lord , or our lord , as the designation that belonged properly to him . soon after the new testament was written , domitian would be called dominus simply . now this was looked on as a strain of insolence beyond what the former emperors had assumed : for though the word dominus , as applied to some particular thing , implied no more , but that such a thing belonged to such a person ; yet the term dominus without a restriction , imported that all the romans were his slaves , and that he was the master of all their properties . the same is to be applied to the use of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : in a limited sense it signifies not much ; but in so large and so general a sense , it must be understood to be equivalent to the common use of that word in the septuagint translation . st. paul rejects their being called the servants of men with a just indignation : and yet if christ is but a man , and at the same time the lord of all , he was no better than the servant of a man. so i think this argument is not weakned by any thing that this writer has offered against it . i had brought a confirmation of it from the prophecy of haggai , of filling the second temple with glory : nothing was built upon the addition of his glory ; so that this writer might have concluded , that there was no design , but only the want of exactness in using it . filling with glory , was that upon which the force of this argument was laid . i shall not enlarge here to shew , that by glory in the old testament , the sheckinah is generally to be understood . st. paul thought so ; for in one place reckoning up the priviledges of the jews , he says theirs is the glory , and the covenants ; and in another place describing the holiest of all , he speaks of the cherubims of glory . so that by glory with relation to the temple , that immediate manifestation of god , could only be meant : this is also confirmed from the word fill , which cannot be applied to any building or decoration , but must be meant of somewhat that was to be shed abroad in the temple . all this will appear very plain if we consider the last words of the book of exodus , where this phrase is first used . the tabernacle was set up with every thing relating to it , according to the directions that god had given to moses ; and then it is said , that a cloud covered the tent of the congregation , and the glory of the lord filled the tabernacle : which is again repeated in the next verse . these words are also repeated when the history of the dedication of solomon's temple is given ; it is said , that the cloud filled the house of the lord ; and in the next verse it is repeated , that the glory of the lord had filled the house . this gives the true key to the understanding of haggai's prophecy , which must be explained according to the mosaic phrase : this gives the key likewise to understand those words of the fulness of the godhead that dwelt bodily in christ , and of our receiving of his fulness . but to apply that prophecy , as this writer does , to the rebuilding the temple by herod , agrees no ways with the words that accompany it , on which i had chiefly built ; of his giving peace in that place , and of his shaking the heavens , and the earth , and all nations : to that he has not thought fit to make any sort of answer ; and yet either these are only pompous words that signify nothing , or they must signify somewhat beyond any thing that can be ascribed to what herod did . that which is the only key by which we can be led into the sense of those words , i mean the words of exodus and kings , does in no sort belong to it : whereas the prophecy was literally accomplished by christ's coming into the mountain of the house , if the sheckinab lodged in him in a more eminent manner than it had done in solomon's temple . so , i think , no part of this argument is shaken . to this i shall add another remark , which in some sort belongs to this matter , though in his book it stands at some distance from that which i am now upon . he insults much upon the advantage he thinks he has , because in a place of the romans , it is in our bibles , god blessed for ever ; whereas he thinks god is not a part of the text. i will not at present enter upon the discussion of that , but shall only observe , that the force of the argument from that place , lies chiefly upon the word , blessed for ever . after the jews began to think that the name jehovah was so sacred , that it was not to be read , instead of it they used this circumlocution , the holy , and the blessed , sometimes both together , sometimes the one , and sometimes the other . this was a practice in use in our saviour's time : one of the evangelists says , that the high priest asked , if christ was the son of god ; the other reports it , that he asked if he was the son of the blessed : and st. paul in that same epistle speaking of the creator , adds blessed for ever ; a form of speech that among them was equivalent to jehovah ; and therefore when he says the same of christ , it was a customary form of speech , importing that he was jehovah . so whether the word god was in the original text , or not , the place is equally strong to this purpose . the next argument that i insisted on , was the worship that is paid to christ in the new testament ; which as it has in it self great force , so it seemed to have the more weight upon this account , because it must be confessed , that the jews who could not be unacquainted with the worship of the christians , never objected that to them , if we believe the apostles to have writ sincerely : they mention their other prejudices , and answer them , but say nothing of this : which shews , that if they are allowed to be candid writers , there was no such prejudice then set on foot . and yet if christ was worshipped in the arian , or socinian hypothesis , this was so contrary to the fundamental notions of the jews at that time , that we cannot imagine that they could pass it over , who were concerned on so many accounts to blacken the christian religion , and to stop its progress : therefore there being no other notion in which this worship could give them no offence , but that of the godheads dwelling bodily in him ; and since they were not offended at it , we cannot conceive that there was then any other idea of this matter , but this , which was both suitable to their doctrines , and to the practice of their ancestors during the first temple . this seems to be such a moral argument , as goes farther to satisfy a man's mind , than even stricter proofs will do : as some presumptions do convince men more effectually than the most positive evidence given by witnesses . to all this he has thought fit to say nothing but in these words ; there are abundance of exceptionable things in that discourse , to which i have neither leisure nor inclination to reply , as some others ( perhaps ) would . a man who is at leisure to write against any discourse , should give himself the leisure to consider the most important things that are in it , especially if they seem to be new. as for his inclinations , i will not be so severe as to judge of them ; though what he has said to question the authority of the new testament , as we now have it , gives a handle to a very heavy suspition , that he thought this was not to be answered , but by a more explicite attack made upon the whole new testament , than he thought fit to adventure upon at present . he goes on alledging some instances where god and creatures seem to be mixed in the same acts and expressions : the people worshipped the lord and the king. st. paul is adjured before god , christ , and the elect angels . the people greatly feared the lord and samuel ; and they believed the lord and moses . from which he infers , that both kings and prophets were worshipped and believed without any idolatry . if we had no other warrants for the worship of jesus christ , but such general words , i should easily acknowledge that there were no great force in them : the falling down to him prostrate , and worshipping him while he was here on earth , and the believing what he then said , will not infer adoration : but the prayers offered up to him now that he is in heaven , the command of honouring the son , even as the father is honoured ; the worship that angels and saints in heaven offer to him , are such evident . characters of divine honour , that we have lost all the notions of idolatry , if these things can be offered to a creature . this writer would indeed reduce all this to as narrow a point as can be ; as if christ did only in the vertue of his death , offer up on our behalf a general intercession ; for he doubts whether there is any special intercession made for us or not . the story of st. paul's conversion is plainly contrary to this : st. paul praying to him when he was in his temptation by the messenger of satan , and the answer he obtained , do very clearly shew christ's immediate hearing and answering of prayer ; which is urged by socinus himself with great force against those who did not worship the lord jesus . st. stephen died worshipping him , and praying , lord jesus receive my spirit ; and , lord lay not this to their charge . these are such express authorities of a spiritual worship , which do so fully explain the meaning of that general rule , that all men should honour the son , even as they honour the father ; that the invocating and worshipping of christ is as fully set forth in the new testament , as any one part of the christian religion whatsoever . invocation must import both omniscience , and omnipresence , as well as omnipotency . we call on him as supposing that he is near us , that he hears us , and both will and can help us . now this writer had best consider how all this can be offered to a meer creature . the honour or worship that we give to the father , is the acknowledging his infinite perfections , together with the tender of our homage to him . this cannot be offered to a creature , without manifest impiety : nor can any such worship become ever the matter of a divine precept ; because there is an essential incongruity between these acts and a created object ; and by consequence , there is an essential immorality in them . now that all idolatry should be so severely forbid in the new testament , and yet so grosly practised in it , must be indeed a very strong argument against the whole christian religion , if christ was a meer creature , which cannot be excused by any softenings whatsoever . but since this is a consideration so much insisted upon , it may be proper to open it with its utmost force : when the new testament was writ , there were four sorts of men that could only be considered by the pen-men of it ; st . the jews , to whom it was to be offered in the first place . they were strongly possessed against all the appearances of idolatry ; and had never prayed to moses nor elijah , the chief of their prophets . dly . the gentiles , they were abandoned to all the several sorts of idolatry , from all which they were to be reclaimed , and to be taught to serve and worship none but the living god. dly . the false christians , that began early to corrupt christianity , and to suit it with judaism and paganism : they set themselves against the apostles , and studied to raise their own credit , by derogating from theirs . the th . were the true christians , who were generally weak and ignorant , who needed milk , and were not capable of hard or sublime things . with respect to all these , we ought to believe that such a point , as at first view might offend the jews , and harden the gentiles in their idolatry ; as might give advantage to false christians , and be a stumbling-block to the true ones , was to be plainly and simply delivered ; not in pompous expressions , or figures that might seem to import more than was meant by them ; but in measured and severe words . the nature of man carries him too easily to idolatry ; so that this inclination was to be resisted and not complied with ; and yet st. john begins his gospel with a solemn set of phrases , that are as it were the frontispiece and introduction to it : which if the exposition of these men is to be admitted , must be only a lofty saying of ordinary matter in very high-flown expressions . such likewise must be the second chapter to the philippians , with a great deal more of the same strain . if it was meant by all this to worship christ as the true jehovah , that is , as having the eternal word , and the fulness of the godhead dwelling in him , then the matter was properly expressed , and suitably to the doctrine and practice of the old testament , and was delivered in a phrasiology agreeing with it . but if a new doctrine was introduced concerning a man that was made a god , that was so called , and was to be worshipped as such , here was such a stumbling-block laid in mens way , and so little care taken either to restrain those excesses into which humane nature is apt to run , or to explain the scruples and difficulties that must naturally arise upon it ; that it seems to be scarce conceivable how any can entertain this , and yet retain any value for that religion ; i must confess i cannot ; and it is so natural for a man to judge of others by himself , that i do not think others do it , or indeed can do it . i mentioned some other passages of the new testament , and i did but mention them , because others have examined them so critically , that nothing was left for me to say upon them . but to all these this writer opposes a very specious thing ; he says there is not one of all those passages , but some one or other of the most learned assertors of the trinity , has translated or interpreted them to another sense : upon which he takes occasion , according to the modesty of his stile , to reproach me for my confidence ; he thinks , that assuredly i will be ashamed of such rhetorications . it is certain , that when a great many passages look all one way , though every one of them singly might not come up to a full proof ; yet the combination of them all shews such a phraseology running through the scriptures , that the conjunction of them all together , gives a much fuller satisfaction to the mind , than any one of them , or indeed all of them taken severally could do : many circumstances about a fact concurring , grow up to a proof ; which any one , or indeed all of them , in their own nature , could not amount to : and therefore if such a stile runs through the scriptures , that at every step a man feels himself straitned , and that he must disintangle himself by the subtilties of criticism , and these often very much forced ; a book full of such passages , may be called a book of riddles , darkly writ to puzzle ordinary readers : but it will be hard to maintain a reverence for such writings , to esteem them inspired by god , and delivered to plain and simple readers as a lamp , or light for their instruction , that by them the man of god may be made perfect . the concurrence of those passages , the thread of them , and the stile of the whole , has a force beyond what is in every one of them apart . if therefore all criticks have not been equally certain of the force of every one of them , this will not weaken the argument from them all together . criticks are like other men , apt to overvalue their own notions , and to affect singularities ; some to raise the strength of those arguments which seem clearest to them , may be willing to make all others look the weaker ; others may study to lessen the credit of such writers , against whom they may have , on other accounts , some secret resentments ; and so they may undermine those arguments on which they had chiefly built . the first great critick that begun the weakning of most of the arguments drawn from texts of scripture on this head , i mean erasmus , did not understand the hebrew so well as he did the greek ; so that he considering the greek phraseology more than that which had arisen from the hebrew and siriack , might often mistake . therefore the diversities among criticks concerning particular places , does not weaken the force of those inferences that are drawn from them ; much less the evidence that arises out of the whole , when laid all together . he thinks i would have done a generous thing if i had acquainted the english reader with the doubtfulness of that passage in st. john ' s epistle , of the three that bear witness in heaven . i cannot oblige any man to read all that i have writ , and so do not charge him for not doing it : i have done that more fully than any that i yet know of , and that in a book , which of all those that i have yet writ , was the most universally read by the most different sorts of people : nor has my doing that so copiously , and in a book of such a nature , scaped some severe , but unjust censures . i will not lye for god , nor suppress a truth that may become an honest man to own . thus i have gone over all that seemed material , and to need explanation , on the first head concerning the divinity of the son of god. i must only explain one thing , with which he concludes those his considerations . i had illustrated this matter by the indwelling of the cloud of glory , and had explained from that , the fulness of the godheads dwelling bodily in christ : from thence he fancies this to be nestorius's doctrine , and that it is also theirs , who own that god ( by his spirit or energy ) was in the lord christ in a very especial and powerful manner : and so he pretends that they submit to my doctrine . i can assure him , that both the spirit with which he writes , and the doctrines which he espouses , are such , that i reckon this the heaviest of all the imputations that he has laid on me ; but it is as just and true as the rest are . we do not certainly know what nestorius's doctrine was , if it was no more than that he did not allow the term of the mother of god to be due to the blessed virgin , as some pretend ; and that all that was further charged on him , was only a consequence drawn from that ; this was no heinous thing : but whatever nestorius himself might be , the opinion charged on him , and condemned by the church , was , that the eternal word in christ , was only of the nature of an assisting power , like the spirit of prophecy in the prophets ; but that it was not so united to him , as to make one person with his human nature . in this sense i have fully condemned that doctrine ; for as the soul is united to the body , and dwells in it , in another manner than a man dwells in a house ; and as the soul actuates the body , in another manner than a man actuates such tools as he works by ; so the union of the human and divine nature in christ is represented in scripture as the compounding one person , as much as in other men the union of soul and body makes one man. if he submits to this doctrine , i shall be glad of it ; for then he submits to a doctrine which , i think , is very expresly revealed in scripture : but for any indwelling , like that of the spirit of prophecy , even in the eminentest degrees imaginable , the epistle to the hebrews does so plainly carry this so much higher , to a thing of quite another nature ; and states such an opposition between christ and all prophets , even moses himself , like that of a son and a servant , that i think the reading that with due attention , will soon satisfy a man , that this indwelling is a vital one , like that of the souls dwelling in the body , and not an assisting one , like inspiration , or the gift of tongues , or of miracles . when christ commanded all to be baptized in the name of the father , son , and holy ghost ; he plainly mentioned three : if therefore i , to adhere to scripture terms , had avoided the frequent use of any other word but the three , i thought how much soever this might offend others , who might apprehend that i seemed to avoid mentioning of trinity , or persons ( which yet i shewed flowed from no dislike of those words , but merely that i might stick more exactly to scripture-terms ) yet i had no reason to think that men of the other side would have found such fault with this . father , son , and holy ghost , are the three of whom i discourse ; so instead of repeating these words at every time , i shortned it by saying the blessed three : now it is a strain particular to this writer to enlarge on this . i go now to the second head , concerning the death of christ : here this writer affirms that , which if it flows from ignorance , as in charity to him i hope it does , then certainly he ought not to have writ concerning a matter , to the history of which he was so great a stranger . he says , that the doctrine which i propose concerning the propitiation by the death of christ , as an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the world , has been the very doctrine of the socinians , which they have owned from the beginning in all their books . to seem to justify this , he sets down some of my words , leaving out , with his usual candour , those that were most critical ; for whereas i had said , that christ had suffered on our account and in our stead ; he leaves out these last words , and in our stead ; which are the very words on which the controversy turns , as is well known to those who have studied it to any degree ; the turn being whether christ died nostro bono , or nostro loco : and whereas i had added , that upon the account of christ's death , god offered the world the pardon of sin ; he leaves out that which was most critical here , upon the account of it ; nor does he mention that with which i concluded the period ; and he ( god ) will have us in all our prayers for pardon , or other favours , claim them through that death , and owe them to it . such an unfaithful recital of my words , gives no advantageous character of the rest . it is indeed a strange degree of assurance to make us believe , that the socinians have at all times owned this doctrine ; since not only all their first writers denied it , and the racovian catechism is express to the contrary ; but after grotius had managed the controversy merely in order to the asserting the expiatory vertue of the sacrifice of christ's death , without insisting on the metaphysical notions which had been brought into it ; yet crellius not satisfied with this , endeavoured to answer that whole book , and adhered still to the first notions of socinus . i do not deny , but that since that time some of their followers have come off from them , and have acknowledged the expiatory vertue of that sacrifice : therefore though i have no mind to encrease the number of controversies ; and am very glad when any do forsake their errors , especially such heinous ones ; yet it is a peculiar strain of confidence to say , that this was their doctrine from the beginning . as for the niceties with which the primitive church was not acquainted , and which were not started before anselm's time in the end of the xi th . century , concerning the antecedent necessity of a satisfaction , and the subtleties that the schoolmen did afterwards devise concerning equivalents ; i do not think they belong to this matter , as it stands revealed to us in the scriptures , and therefore i did not insist on them . it is no part of the doctrine of our church ; and dr. outram's learned performance on this subject , has been so universally applauded and acquiesced in , that i thought all men were satisfied from thence , what is the doctrine generally received among us . our articles are the only standard to judge of our doctrine , as far as they go ; but they have determined nothing in this matter , but rest in the general notions of expiation and of reconciling us to god. i have now done with all that part of the late book which falls to my share ; and have made those explanations and reflections upon it , that seemed necessary . i have said this once for all , and shall no more return to it , upon any new provocation whatsoever : such crude and bold attempts , are oftener to be neglected than answered . these men are at best the instruments of the deists , who design by their means to weaken the credit of the christian religion , and of those books that are the standards of it . i hope they do not know whose work they are doing , nor what ends they are serving . i pray god give them a better discerning , and more serious tempers . i wish you may be happily successful in your attempts to undeceive them , as well as in all your other labours , in which you lay out your time and studies so worthily for the service of the church ; for which great is your reward in heaven . i pray god to bless and prosper you in them ; and am with a very particular esteem , reverend sir , your affectionate brother , and most humble servant , gi . sarum . westminster , feb. . the contents . of the authority of st. john's writings . pag. an answer to the objections of our author's ancient unitarians , against the authority of st. john's writings , particularly the gospel and the revelation . of the name unitarians . of ebion and cerinthus . , of the alogi in epiphanius . of the occasion of st. john's writing his gospel . of socinus's exposition of the beginning of st. john's gospel . the unreasonableness and novelty of that exposition . the archbishop's exposition of hebr. . . and col. . . vindicated . of the pre-existence of our saviour . of christ's coming down from heaven ; and the modern socinian exposition of christ's personal ascent into heaven before his ministry . ibid. a vindication of his grace's exposition of john . . john . . revel . . . and john . . of the difficulties and absurdities in the socinian hypothesis . of the incarnation of our saviour . of the argument for the incarnation , taken from the personal union of soul and body . ibid. of the humility of our saviour in his incarnation , and of the fulness of time for it . a vindication of the bishop of worcester's sermon . of things incomprehensible . of the author's self-contradiction . ibid. of god's eternity , and his being of himself , and possessing all at once . several queries about god's possessing all at once , answer'd . socinian mysteries . the bishop of sarum's letter to j.w. of the socinian way of managing controversies . of this author's way of calumniating . his charge of the corruptions in the sacred text consider'd . of the different opinions concerning the trinity ; and that the trinitarians may notwithstanding be said to be of the same religion . the name jehovah peculiarly appropriated to god , and yet given to our saviour . of the name lord ; and of the shechinah among the jews . haggai a. , . and rom. . . explain'd and vindicated . ibid. of the worship given to our saviour . of some modern criticks . of nestorius's doctrine . of the end for which christ died . books lately printed for richard chiswell . memoirs of the most reverend thomas cranmer , archbishop of canterbury . in three books collected chiefly from records , registers , authentick letters , and other original manuscripts . by john strype , m. a. fol. . dr. john conant's sermons . published by dr. williams . . vo . of the government of the thoughts . by geo. tully , sub-dean of york . the second edition . vo . . a commentary on the first book of moses called genesis . by simon lord bishop of ely. to . . the history of the troubles and trial of the most reverend william laud , lord archbishop of canterbury ; wrote by himself during his imprisonment in the tower. to which is prefixed , the diary of his own life faithfully and entirely published from the original copy ; and subjoyned a supplement to the preceding history ; the archbishop's last will ; his large answer to the lord say's speech concerning liturgies ; his annual accounts of his province delivered to the king , and some other things relating to the history . published by henry wharton , chaplain to archbishop sancroft , and by his grace's command . folio . bishop of sarum's sermon at the funeral of archbishops tillotson . — his sermon preached before the king at st. james's chappel on the th of february , / being the first sunday in lent , on cor. . . the possibility , expediency , and necessity of divine revelation . a sermon preached at st. martins in the fields , january . . at the beginning of the lecture for the ensuing year founded by the honourable robert boyle , esq ; . by john williams , d. d. ( the second sermon is in the press ) . a sermon of holy resolution , preached before the king at kensington , december . . by his grace thomas , lord archbishop of canterbury , elect. advertisement . feb. . / . there will be published several sermons and discourses of the most reverend dr. john tillotson , late lord archbishop of canterbury , by order of his administratrix ; faithfully transcribed from his own papers , by dr. ralph barker , chaplain to his grace ; which are disposed of to richard chiswell , and his assignees . if any person pretend to publish any other , except those already printed , they are to be lookt upon as spurions and false . the first that will be published , are his sermons of sincerity and constancy in the faith and profession of the true religion . which are in the press , and will be finished in easter term next . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e eccles. hist. l. . c. . & . iren. l. . c. . euseb. l. . c. . hieron . eccles . script . sandius de script . eccles . * euseb. l. . c. . † iren. l. . c. . & . euseb. l. . c. . tertull. advers . marcion . c. . hieron . script . eccles. origen . homil. in principio . ephiphan . haer. . . philostrius ●ar . haer. . , . v. wolzegen in loc . * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . which the latin translator has not reached . * euseb. l. . c. . † serm. . p. . * haer. . . † script . eccles. * advers . haer. l. . c. . v. epiphan . haer. . , , . haer. . iren. l. . c. . l. . c. . haer. . . adv. haer. l. . c. . adv. haer. l. . c. . * praepar . p. . † v. sandius , p. , . * v. archb. serm. . p. . * serm. . p. , &c. * lightf . third part of the harm , in loc . p. . cons. p. , . p. . cons. p. . cons. p. , . cons. . . cons. p. . cons. p. , cons. p. , . p. . p. . cons. p. , . ps. . . ex. . from v. . to the end . v. , , , . v. , , . ex. . , . ex. . . acts . gal. . heb. . mat. . mat. . mark . luke . mat. . mat. . tim. . . jer. . . cons. p. . suct . in dom. gal. . cons. p. , . rom. . heb. . ex. . kings . . , . hag. , , , . col. . john . rom. . cons. p. . mat. . mark . from p. . coll. . cons. p. ibid. chron. . . tim. . . sam. . . ex. . ibid. acts . . cor. , , . acts , . cons. p. . ibid. cons. p. . heb. , , , . mat. . cons. p. , . cons. p. . in lib. cur deus homo . an eighth letter concerning the sacred trinity occasioned by some letters to him on that subject / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) an eighth letter concerning the sacred trinity occasioned by some letters to him on that subject / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . p. s.n., [london : ] caption title. imprint suggested by wing. dated at end: novemb. , . errors in paging: p. - , - misprinted - , - . reproduction of original in the union theological seminary library, new york. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity. theology, doctrinal. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an eighth letter concerning the sacred trinity ; occasioned by some letters to him on that subject . by john wallis d. d. &c. since my publishing seven letters , and three sermons , concerning the sacred trinity ; i have received , on that occasion , several letters from divers persons , ( some known , some unknown , ) concerning that subject . mostly by way of gratulation and approbation of what i have done . and where some expressions therein are not just the same with mine ; they are much to the same purpose , and not at all contrary to what i undertook to maintain . one of them ( from an unknown person ) subscribed a. b. was written ( it seems ) by a countrey gentleman , not a professed divine : who though he do not pretend to be much versed in school-divinity ; yet is , i find , not a stranger to it . it was left for me at my booksellers , with an intimation , that the author was willing to have it printed . and i left it again with the bookseller for that purpose ; though it hath been delayed hitherto . which ( because the author did desire it ) is as followeth . a letter to the reverend doctor wallis occasioned by his several letters touching the doctrine of the trinity , &c. reverend sir , 't is gratitude and acknowledgement directs these lines to you . i have been so fortunate to meet with your several letters in affirmance of the doctrine of the blessed trinity , &c. and cannot but confess my self not only confirmed , but much enlarged in my notions about that doctrine by the so plain and pressing reason of your discourses . but lest i should seem fond of my own understanding , and fancy to my self that i do comprehend more touching these matters than i indeed do , i shall humbly offer to you my method of thoughts , and submit the same to your grave judgment and allowance . the metaphysicians i remember teach us that one way to know the deity is by way of eminency , is there any good or perfection in the creature ? then , say they , god that is the great author and cause of all things , must be so in a more eminent and high degree . the attributes of god are competent to man ( whom he made after his own image ) in some measure , but in god they are in the highest and superlative degree . now besides these eminences and perfections in the deity , there are three more particular and more transcendent eminences , wherein and whereby god hath manifested himself to and for the good of mankind . god almighty was pleased in his infinite mercy to determine that mankind should be rescued from that state of sin , which the defection of our first father brought us into , and be brought back into a state of salvation . but how he should bring about and effect this great work , is out of the reach of humane contemplation , and can no otherwise be known , than as god himself hath been pleased to reveal and discover the same to us in the scriptures . now the scriptures intimate to us three several manifestations of the deity in this great work of our salvation . the first is that of a father . that god the father of heaven and earth , who created the world by his power , and preserveth it by his providence , so loved this world , that he sent his only begotten son to be our saviour and mighty redeemer . the second is that of a son. that jesus christ the only begotten son of god , undertook this great work of man's redemption , and to that purpose came into the world , and became man , a second adam , who by his holy life , and absolute and perfect obedience to the will of god , did expiate and make atonement for the disobedience of the first . the third is that of the holy ghost , who by his inward operations and gracious influences , doth incline and prevail with man to embrace the redemption purchased for him upon the terms of the gospel . now in respect of these three several manifestations of the deity , there is said to be a trinity of persons in the vnity of the godhead , and the same god in respect of one of these manifestations of himself , is called god the father ; in respect of another is called god the son ; and in respect of the third is called god the holy ghost . that there are these three more eminent manifestations of the deity , and under these denominations , of father , son , and holy ghost , is most plain in the scriptures . but the great doubt is whether these be three personalities in the deity . and this doubt ( i take it ) ariseth from a misunderstanding and mistaking the true sense of the word persona . for this word persona , i think the philosophers are short in their definitions of it . boethius defines it to be naturae rationalis individua substantia . this other philosophers dislike as too scanty , because it is applicable to man only , and doth not include spiritual beings . and therefore they to inlarge it , and make it more comprehensive , call it substantia particularis , intelligens & incommunicabilis , &c. but for my part i cannot but like boethius his definition best , and think him so far in the right , in that he makes the word persona only applicable to man ; for so doubtless it is in its true and proper signification ; and it is applicable to spirits by a metalepsis only and transumption of the word . and herein the philosophers are too short in their definitions of persona , that while they done so much upon the word substance , they forget that accidents are a more necessary ingredient in its true definition . the word persona in relation to man , doth not only signifie individuality , and denote a particular or single man , but it doth imply those qualities also whereby one man differeth from another . by the word quality her i do not mean the single predicament so called , but all the other predicaments except that of substanee , it being those whereby the naturae rationalis substantia is individuated . 't is quantity that differs the person of taller stature from the lower . 't is quality that differs the learned from the vnlearned person . 't is relation that differs the father from the son. 't is the ubi or locality that differs john of noke from john at style . and so of the other predicaments . i would therefore propose the adding a few words to boethius his definition , and then i think it will be well enough . let it then be thus , viz. persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia taliter qualiter ab aliis differens . thus defined it relates to man only , and so to one man as he differeth from another by accidental individuation . for though 't be true that every person is a single substance , yet 't is as true that they are accidents that do determine the personality . and as the specifick differences do constitute the species , so predicamental accidents do constitute the individual . thus rationality doth constitute the species of man , and differs it from that of the brute . and thus wisdom , fortitude , &c. do differ this particular man from another , and make him to be this person and not another . nor can we have any certain notion of naked substances , or otherwise conceive of them than as they are clothed with and variegated by accidents . to this purpose also is the true sense and meaning of the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which strictly translated is in latine subsistentia . now subsistentia doth not only import the esse of the substance , but the modus essendi : and what is that doth modifie substance but qualities and accidents ? the fundamental mistake therefore in this great point hath been in making the word substance so more than necessary in the definition of persona , and concluding from thence that there cannot be three persons but there must be three several substances . whereas in truth there may be in the same one particular man , diversly qualified and circumstanticated , diverse personalities . thus in the man melchisedeck . melchisedeck king of salem may be said to be one person , and melchisedeck the priest of the most high god another . so in david , in respect of his double qualification of a king and a prophet . thus much for what i conceive to be the true notion of persona . now to consider this word persona as it hath been applyed to the godhead . and here i must say again , as i said before , that this word persona is used only in a borrowed sence , and for want of another word that might more appositely and fully signifie what is intended by it . god cannot properly be said to be a person . there are no accidents in him . all his attributes are essential to him . that wisdom that is finite in man and accidental to him , is infinite in god and essential to him . and so of all the other attributes and perfections of the deity , that are in an imperfect and low degree competent to man. in this borrowed sence therefore it is that this word persona is applyed to the deity ; and in respect of those three eminent manifestations of the deity there are said to be three persons in it . not that the word person , and distinction of personalities in respect of men doth bear a full analogy to the difference of personalities in the deity , for in this as in all other contemplations of god , we must expect to fall short and not comprehend . but that the consideration of the different personalities amongst men may help us in some imperfect measure to conceive of that trinity that we adore in the vnity of the godhead . object . but here i expect an objection , that if in respect of these three manifestations of the deity there are said to be three persons , why are there not said to be more persons in the godhead than three , even as many as there are divine attributes , for so many are the manifestations of the deity to us . answ. there is not so much reason to imagine more personalities in the godhead than these three , as that there are these three and no more . for although it be true that every attribute doth import the deity , and can be predicated of nothing else but the deity , yet every single attribute doth not ( if i may so speak ) import the whole deity . his infinite wisdom doth not necessarily import or administer to us the notion of his infinite power . and so of the other attributes . but these three several manifestations of the godhead , that are called three persons , are such wherein the whole deity ( as i may say ) doth exert it self , and appear in all its attributes , and therefore i call them three more transcendent eminences or manifestations of the deity . thus i do conceive this trinity of persons in the godhead in some sort intelligible , without any necessity of thinking that these three persons must be three several substances , and consequently three gods. and i must confess i cannot but think this great dispute a meer wrangling business , and a contest more about words than things . for at the same time that our adversaries are so fearful of multiplying the deity by dividing the substance , we tell them that we believe in one god only , and that these three persons in the godhead are but one god. so that all the dispute is whether to say there are three persons in the deity doth necessarity imply that there are three substances , which we declare we do not mean nor intend by it . and for my part if they will as fairly declare that they believe these three several manifestations of the deity , viz. of god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost , as held forth to us in the scriptures , i would willingly compound with them for the word person , and comply with them in the use of any other word they shall find out that may better or as well express what we mean by it . i come now to the other great objection of our adversaries touching the hypostatical vnion . how the divine and humane nature could be united in the same person , and this person be at the same time both god and man , and this without multiplying or dividing the deity , or without confining the omnipresent to the scanty tenement of an humane body . how this god-man should be born of a virgin by the overshadowing of the holy ghost , and humane nature propagated without the natural help of a man. these things seem so utterly impossible to these men of great reason , that therefore they must not , cannot be ; and the scriptures themselves must rather be mistaken or false , than that can be true which they think cannot . bvt when they argue thus from impossibility , i wonder their curiosity doth not question the creation it self , how it was possible for god to make all things of nothing . and for the hypostatical vnion , methinks before they question that so strictly , they ought to give a better account than yet can be given of the vnion of the soul of man with his body . and when they question the being born of a virgin , may they not as well question how the first woman was made of the rib of a man : one as well as the other being supposed to come to pass by the divine power . bvt because i am apt ( with you ) to suspect how far the scriptures are of authority amongst these reasoning men , i will adventure to propose to them one consideration touching the hypostatical vnion to shew that it is not so inconceivable a thing to humane reason as they would have it . let them but consider the several degrees of beings that god hath made in the world. the trees and plants to which he hath given vegetation . the brutes to which besides vegetation , he hath given animal life ; senses and appetites to discern and endeavour after what is necessary to the preservation of their beings . then to step further and consider man , to whom , besides all these , god hath given a rational mind and soul. and to step yet further , let them consider those higher beings the angels , what pure intellectual beings they are , and what degrees of perfection god hath given them , beyond what he hath given to man. i say when we consider these , what necessity is there of limiting and confining god almighty here ? may we not as reasonably think , that if in his infinite wisdom he so thought fit , he might as well make a being yet more perfect ? why is it not as conceiveable , that , ( to bring about his own eternal purposes ) he might actuate the humane nature by the divine power , and make a man in whom even the perfections of the deity should reside ? is the principle of essentiality and vitality any whit divided in or from the deity by giving life and being to those creatures ? is the eternal mind any whit multiplied or divided by giving a rational soul or mind to man ? nor is the infinite and eternal spirit of the world , multiplied or divided by creating and giving being to those glorious spirits the angels . what necessity then to think that the godhead must be either multiplied or divided , or in any wise varied by acting the divinity in the humane nature ? oh rebellious mankind , that hast offended thy creator ; but more ungrateful , that wilt not accept his mercy upon his own terms , and believe it exhibited in that manner that he himself has revealed it ! is it not that god , whose justice is infinite , that is offended ? is it not the same god , who is also infinite in goodness and mercy that is appeased ? what room for his mercy , without derogation to his justice , unless there be satisfaction ? and what satisfaction can be competent to the offended deity ? were men or angels fit to mediate , or could they make a satisfaction ? surely not . 't is his infinite mercy only that can appease his justice . there is mercy with him , that he may be feared , yea mercy rejoycing over judgment . now because it is inconceivable to man how the offended deity should make a satisfaction to it self , god almighty is pleased thus far to condescend to the capacity of humane nature as to tell us in what manner he hath done it . viz. that he hath sent his only begotten son into the world to be born of a woman to live a life of righteousness for our instruction and example , and to dye the death of sinners to satisfie for our defection . and further , that our original taint might not prevail over and misguide us into actual transgressions , he hath sent his holy spirit amongst us to lead us into the ways of truth and righteousness . this he was pleased to promise after the fall , by his prophets in the times of the old testament , and has now performed it to us in the times of the new. now , is it fit for us to object against this manifestation of his mercy to us , and glorious contrivance of our redemption , because we cannot comprehend the mystery of it ? that surely was ne're meant to be within our fathom . in the days of the old testament when god was pleased to command the adoration and duty of his people , he manifested himself to them under several appellations , whereby he put them in mind of his mercies to them and their duty to him . i am ( says he ) the god of abraham , the god of isaac , and the god of jacob. and so in the prologue to the decalogue — i am the lord thy god which brought the out of the land of egypt , out of the house of bondage , &c. intimating thereby to them the great mercies he had shewn in his miraculous preservation of the patriarchs , and people of isreal . so now in the days of the new testament god almighty has been pleased to manisest himself to us under other denominations and appellations , viz. those of god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost ; intimating thereby to us in what manner be hath made good his promised mercy , and brought about the great work of our redemption , and that under those appellations and manifestations of himself he will now be worshipped in the times of the gospel . but for us to understand the great mysteries of our salvation in this manner offered unto us , ( viz. that the trinity in the vnity of the godhead , and that of the incarnation of our blessed saviour , &c. ) was certainly never intended by god almighty . and shall we doubt what god himself tells us because we cannot comprehend it ? when god said to the people of israel ; i am the lord thy god which brought thee out of the land of egypt , &c. had it been fit for them to have enquired how he brought them out of egypt , and to have ravelled into all the miracles he wrought for that purpose , and to have brought them to the touch of their understandings , and to have doubted the truth thereof , or the power of god that did them , because they could not reconcile them to their own reason ? yet thus ill certainly do they use god almighty , who will doubt the manner of our salvation , because they cannot understand the mystery . alas , vain men , that will not believe what god himself has reveal'd , because it will not bear the test of their weak reason ! do they think the wisdom and power of the almighty are to be bounded by the scanty limits of their vnderstanding ? that were for what is finite to comprehend infinity . god were not god if that were so . and these very men , who value themselves so much upon their reason , that they think they ought to understand the very arcana of heaven , would , i doubt not , be ready enough by the same strength of reasonng , to disown that deity that they could comprehend . thus i have presumed ( reverend sir ) to trouble you with this draught of my rude notions about this matter , which i hope you will excuse , they coming from a private countrey-gentleman , unread in polemick divinity , and particularly in this dispute , and in whom these thoughts were occasioned by the perusal of your late papers , i am , sir , may th , . yours most humbly , a. b. this letter being for substance , much to the same purpose with what i had undertaken to maintain ; and the expressions not much different , and in nothing contrary to it : i shall not detain the reader with any long discourse upon it ; because it speaks sufficiently for it self . it hath been suggested to me by another anonymous ; that , we knowing so little of the infinite divine nature , there may possibly be greater distinction between the three ( which we use to call ) hypostases , or persons , than ( what he calls ) the civil or relative acceptation of the word person ; ( and we may as well prejudice the truth , by affirming too little , as by affirming too much . ) and it is very true ; there may be , for ought we know , ( and perhaps there is ) more than so , ( nor have i any where denyed it : ) but , how much that more is , we cannot tell . sure we are , not so as to be three gods ( or more gods than one : ) and i choose to say ( with st. austin ) that these three are one spirit ( as we say , they are one god , ) not three spirits . the true ancient import of the word person ( when first applied to the trinity ) implies no more than as i explained it : which was a full answer to the anti-trinitarians popular argument ( from the modern gross acceptation of the word person , in english , ) as if three divine persons , must needs be three gods , because three persons amongst men doth sometimes ( not always , nor did it anciently so , ) imply three men. and , when we say , these three persons are but one god ; 't is manifest that we use this metaphor of persons ( when applyed to god , ) as borrowed from that sense of the word person , wherein the same man may sustain divers persons , or divers persons be the same man. i have seen , more than once , an address from edward earl of clarendon , chancellor of the vniversity of oxford , to edward earl of clarendon lord high chancellor of england , ( in a claim of privilege , to remove a cause from the court of chancery , to that of the vniversity . ) yet these two chancellors were not two men , nor two earls of clarendon ; but one and the same , sustaining two persons , ( one addressing to the other . ) and if this do sufficiently answer that popular cavil ; 't is as much as 't was brought for . if it do otherwise appear , that the distinction between these three divine persons be more than so ; ( but yet more god's than one ; ) that may well enough be , though this metaphor do not necessarily imply so much . 't is certain , that three persons , neither according to the true import of the words , nor according to the intent of those who so speak , doth not imply three gods : but three persons which are one god , or one god in three persons . i have also a third letter from w. i. much to the same purpose with what he had written in his two former . ( and therefore i do not think it needful to insert it here ; nor do i see that he desires it . ) it is , he tells me , to take his leave of me , as not meaning to give me any farther trouble in this kind . 't is full of divers expressions of respect , thanks , and approbation ; and he doth insist ( as in his two former he had done ) upon these two things ; not to be too positive ( in these matters ) beyond what the scripture tells us ; and , not to lay the like stress upon our argumentations from thence , as on what we find thore . in both which ( as before i did ) i do fully agree with him . because , in matters of pure revelation , we know no more than what is revealed : and , because 't is very sure , that ( even in natural things ) men do oft mistake in their argumentations , from principles which they think to be true and clear ; ( else it could not be that divers men , from the same principles , should infer contrary conclusions : ) and because we find it difficult , sometimes , to reconcile some things , which yet we cannot well deny to be true . and , if it be so , even in natural things : much more may it be so in things of an infinite nature . so that herein ( i think ) he and i do not disagree . yet would i not infer from hence ( nor doth he ) that we must therefore be scepticks in all things , because it is possible that in some things we may mis-take . for it is one thing to be infallible ; another thing not to err. a man who is not infallible , may yet argue truly ; and where he doth so , his argument is conclusive . and we may accordingly rest in it , and insist upon it , more or less , according to the degree of evidence . for things equally true , are not always equally evident ; nor equally necessary to be known . where the evidence is not clear ( and the matter not needful for us to know ) we are not to be too positive in our determinations , ( but rather be content to be ignorant farther than god is pleased to reveal : ) but where it is , ( and the things be of moment ) we must hold fast that which is true , and not suffer our selves to be easily wheedled out of it . which , i suppose , is his opinion as well as mine . for he seems to interpose this caution ( particularly ) as to that hypothesis ; to which ( as before he had done ) he doth suggest some new difficulties : but , wherein i am not concerned . that god is trin-unus , he doth profess . and the word person he doth not dislike . but thinks it safe not to be too positive in determining precisely how great that distinction of persons is . in all which , i do concur with him . now as to the word person ( though i am not fond of words , where the sense is agreed ; ) i am not willing to quit it , because i do not know a better to put in the room of it : and because , if we quit the word , which the church hath with good reason made use of , for so many hundred years ( without any just exception made to it : ) those anti-trinitarians , who would have us quit the word , will pretend , that , in so doing , we quit the doctrine too . that we do not , by person ( when applyed to the sacred trinity ) understand such a person , as when applyed to men ; and , that by three divine persons , we do not mean three gods : hath been so often said , and so fully , by those who believe the trinity ; that those who cavil at it , cannot but know it : but by person in the deity , we mean only what bears some analogy , with what amongst men is said of several persons ( even without being so many several men ; which the true sense of the word person doth not import , as hath been often shewed : ) as do the words , beget , begotten , sending , proceeding or going-forth , and many more ; which all are metaphorical expressions , taken from what amongst men is wont to be said of persons , ( for , of whom , but persons , are such expressions used ? ) and they who use to cavil at it , may as well do it when we talk of the foot of a stool , the arm of a chair , or the head of a staff ; and perswade us , that when we so speak , we do believe a stool , a chair , a staff , to have life and sense , because a foot , an arm , a head ( properly taken ) have so and they may as well cavil at the word sacrament ( which is a name that we have given to that of baptism and the lord's supper ; ) attributes , ( which is a term we give to some of the divine perfections : ) creed , ( by which we mean an abstract of some principal things that we believe : ) and a great many such other words that we find occasion to make use of : whereof yet there is no danger , when it is defined and determined what by such word , in such discourse , we mean ; even though , in some other discourses , such word may signifie otherwise . 't is well known , that a cone in euclide doth not signifie just the same as in apollonius ; nor a triangle in euclide , just the same as in theodosius , and others , who write of sphericks : but when we meet with these words in euclide , we must there understand them as they are defin'd by euclide ; and when in others , so as they are defin'd by those others . and so when we speak of persons in the deity , we must be so understood as we there define : that is , for somewhat analogous , but not just the same , with what is meant by it , when applyed to men ; and , particularly , not so distinct as to be three gods. and , for the same reasons , i am not willing to part with the athanasian creed ; lest those who would have us so do , should then say , we have parted with the doctrine also . they , upon pretence , that some expressions in it , though true , are not absolutely fundamental ; would fain wheedle us out of all . they might as well say , that , because some words might be spared in what we call the apostolick creed , or nicene creed ; or some other words put in ; therefore those creeds should be laid aside also . and when they quarrel with the preface of it , ( whoever would be saved , ought to hold the catholick faith ; and the catholick faith is this ; ) as if it were intended thereby , that every syllable in it were so fundamental , as without knowing whereof , a man could not be saved : ( which no man can reasonably think to be so meant by the penners of it ; since that thousands were saved ( even in their opinion ) before that was penned ; and others since , that never heard of it ; ) is mere cavilling . for no more can reasonably be thought intended by it , but that this is found doctrine , which , for the substance of it , ought to be believed by those who would be saved : like as if i should say , who ever would be saved , ought to believe the word of god ; and this is the word of god , ( pointing to our bible ; ) no man ( who is not mad ) would think my meaning to be , that no man could be saved who did not know that one of iob's daughters was named iemimah ; or that zeruiah was mother ( not father ) to those who are called the sons of zeruiah . as to that question ( which i meet with in some of the letters ) why just three persons , and no more : the answer is short and easie ; because the scripture tells us of three , but of no more . ( and , had not the scripture told it us , we had not known of these three . ) we are baptized into the name of ( and therefore into the faith of ) the father , son and holy ghost ; ( as if this were the first christian creed . ) we are told , there are three that bear record in heaven ; and , these three are one : ( not , that there are more such than three : ) and to these three ( somewhats ) we give the name of persons ; meaning , by the word persons , these three . and if by persons in the deity we mean but these three ; then there are but three in the deity whom we call persons ; or , whom we mean by that name . there is another ingenious person ( a stranger to me ) who hath written to me divers letters on this occasion , ( full of gratulation , approbation and applause : ) but in one of them he moves a question concerning a passage in one of mine ; where i say , we have no notions in our mind , other than what we derive , mediately or immediately , from sensible impressions of finite corporeal beings : and tells me , that it seems to him , that the notion of one infinite essence should be excepted . and that he hath formerly vindicated des cartes against mr. hobs , who had affirmed , that there is no conception in a man's mind , which hath not at first totally , or by parts , been begotten upon the organs of sence : and again , that a man can have no thought representing any thing not subject to sense . but , in a following letter , he declares himself fully satisfied , ( and that my sentiments do not really differ from his , ) when i had sent him this answer , viz. as to what you say of my affirming , that we have no notions in our mind , other than what we derive , mediately or immediately , from sensible impressions of finite corporeal beings : when you consider it again , i believe you will be of my mind . if you can suppose a man in such circumstances , as never to have seen , or heard , or felt any thing : i doubt whether he would have any thoughts of god , more than an embryo yet unborn , ( who hath the same soul , that he will after have ; but hath , i doubt , as yet , no notions of a god. ) sure i am that we attain it by other steps . the heavens declare the glory of god : but not without being seen , or at least heard of , or some way made known to us by sensible impressions . the invisible things of him ( even his eternal power and godhead ) are clearly seen ; but it is by the creation of the world ; being understood by the things that are made . but if we neither see , nor hear of , nor have any notion of the things that are made ; how shall we thence derive the notion of a god ? and there must be many notions , antecedent to that of one infinite essence , ( which must be derived from sensible impressions of corporeal beings . ) we must have the notion or conception of ens , esse , finis , finitum , non-finitum , vnum , non-nullum , non-multa ; before we can have the notion of one infinite essence . and those antecedent notions , i think , we do derive ( mediately or immediately ) from what we see , hear , feel , or some way apprehend by the help of our sences . as to des cartes ; there must be a great many notions , or simple apprehensions , which he must presume , before he can come to the complex notion of deus est. and a great many illative notions ( from natural logick ) before he can argue , cogito , ergo sum . he must at least have a notion , or simple apprehension , of what is meant by cogito , and of what is meant by sum , and of what by ego : and then a complex notion , that what is not , cannot think : and then this illative notion ( from natural logick . ) but , i think , therefore i am . and , i doubt , he cannot come at all this , without some use of his senses . and , even after all , it seems to me , that to be is a notion more simple ( and therefore antecedent ) than to think ; and therefore soone to be apprehended by it self , than by consequence from that . but it is not now my business to dispute against des cartes . onely to shew , that sensitive notions are subservient to our notions of a god ; and , from these our understandings do , by steps , ascend to these . upon this answer , he owns my sentiments to be the same with his , &c. that ( in a natural way ) the humane intellect hath no operation , but what is occasioned , or suggested by sensible objects . but he thinks , i perceive , ( and so do i , ) that from these notions occasioned or suggested by sensible objects , our intellect , or reason improved , may ascend , by steps , to a discovery of something concerning god , which , in corporeal objects it cannot find ; in which we both agree . now the best means we have for the forming of such notions concerning god , is chiefly by one of these two ways ; that of eminency , and that of negation . whatever of good , or excellency , we find in the creature , we conclude that in god ( who is the fountain of all excellency ) there is somewhat analogous thereunto , but much more eminent . and whatever of imperfection we find in the creature , we conclude , that in god ( who is infinitely perfect ) there is nothing of this imperfection . and , from both , we conceive a notion of somewhat in god , which is more great than is possible for us fully to comprehend : but , what that somewhat is , we cannot fully understand , now , these being the steps , by which we form these notions ; we know no better way to express these conceptions , than by metaphors taken from such objects , from whence these notions take their rise , or some such figurative expressions . ( and it was with this prospect that i mention'd that observation . ) and , in the same way , god is pleased ( in scripture ) to express himself to us ; by somewhat analogous ( not just the same ) with what we meet with in the creature ; as when it speaks of god's eyes , ears , hands , feet , &c. of his seeing , hearing , striking , going , &c. so when the father is said to beget ; the son to be begotten ; and both these to send out , and the holy ghost to proceed , or go forth from them . all which expressions are such , as we commonly apply to what we call persons . and in what sense those are to be understood concerning god ; in such sense they are fitly called three persons . and those who in such sense cavil at the word person ; would no doubt ( if there were not somewhat else in the wind ) as well cavil at those other words . but because , so to do , were directly to affront the scripture ( whose words they are ) they do not think fit so to speak out , whatever they think . when christ saith , of himself and the father , john . . i came forth from the father , and am come into the world ; again , i leave the world , and go to the father : of himself and the holy ghost , ver . , . if i go not away , the comforter will not come unto you ; but if i depart , i will send him unto you ; and when he is come , he will reprove the world , &c. of himself and the other two , iohn . . and . . the comforter which is the holy ghost , whom the father will send in my name , he shall teach you all things , and bring all things to your remembrance whatsoever i have said unto you . and again , when the comforter is come , whom i will send you from the father , even the spirit of truth which proceedeth from the father , he shall testifie of me : what could be said , as of three persons , more distinctly ? and if the scripture speak of them as three persons ; why should we scruple to call them so ? but these three persons are but one god. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . these three are one ; vnum ( not unus ) one thing , iohn . . and john . . i and the father are one ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( unum sumus ) we are one and the same thing ; and therefore one god. and , that there is no other god but one , is known to be so often said that i need not repeat it . but 't is not so much the word person , is the deity of christ , which these men are offended at ; and all their cavils at the word person , ( and the athanasian creed , ) are but to undermine our saviours deity . of this i have said enough elsewhere , and need not here repeat it . the lord our god is one lord , deut. . . that is , the lord god of israel is one lord ; or iehovah the god of israel is one iehovah . there are not more iehovah's than one : and this one iehovah is the lord god of israel . and isa. . , . i the lord ( jehovah ) am the god of israel : i am the lord ( jehovah ) and there is none else . there is no god beside me : ( no god beside the lord god of israel . ) so in kings . . and many other places to the same purpose . now our christ , is this lord god of israel , luke . , . many of the children of israel shall he ( iohn the baptist ) turn to the lord their god , ( to the lord god of israel ; ) and he ( john baptist ) shall go before him , ( this lord god of israel ) in the spirit and power of elias . now no man doubts but that it is our christ , whose fore-runner john baptist was ; and before whom he was to go in the spirit and power of elias . therefore our christ is this lord god of israel : this one iehovah . 't is true that the greek septuagint's translation of the old testament doth not retain that word , but doth every where wave the word iehovah , and puts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 instead of it . and accordingly , the new testament ( which mostly follows the language of that , the only greek translation then in use ) doth so too . but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( which they substitute for iehovah ) is so oft applied to christ ( even in those places cited out of the old testament wherein iehovah is used ) that none can be ignorant of it . and though we have not there the word iehovah , yet we have as full a periphrasis of it as can be desired . 't is well known ( and owned by all ) that the two proper names of god , iah and iehovah , are derivatives from the verb hajah or havah which signifieth to be , ( which whether we take for one and the same root , or two roots of one and the same signification , is not material ; the letter iod and vau in hebrew being so oft used promiscuously , or one changed for the other : ) and therefore the noun verbal must needs import a being . and it hath been further observed long since by hebricians , that the name iehovah hath moreover the peculiar characteristicks of the three times , ( past , present , and future , ) ie the characteristick of the future tense ; ho , of the present tense or participle ; and va of the preter tense , ( which i did forbear to mention formerly , lest they should throw it off as a criticism ; till i had a fresh voucher for it , so good as dr. pocock in his late commentary on ioel. chap. . . ) and we have all this in that character of god ( indefinitely ) rev. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , from that being , who is and hath been , and shall be for the time to come . and it is particularly applied to christ , at ver . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i am alpha and omega , saith the lord god ( jehovah elohim ) which is , which was , and which is to come , the almighty . which is a full account of the name iehovah ( here translated , as elsewhere , by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) with a discant upon it , importing his being , with the three diversities of times , ( past , present , and future , ) and his omnipotence superadded . that being which now is , which ever was , and which ever shall be , the lord god , almighty . ( so rev. . . and rev. . . ) and in rev. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( so beza , and so dr. pocock reads it , and so ours translate it . ) and much to the same purpose is that rev. . , , . rev. . . ( and elsewhere ) i am alpha and omega , the beginning and the end , the first and the last ; he that liveth and was dead , and behold i live for evermore . so rev. . , . rev. . , , who liveth for ever and ever . which fully answers that title , the living god , whereby the true god doth so oft distinguish himself from other gods ; as ier. . . and elsewhere frequently . but i have said so much formerly to this point , that i shall now add no more . i had almost forgotten one piece , ( wherein i find my self mentioned ) intituled , a suit for forbearance , &c. it aims chiefly at two things . one is against arging ( on others ) too strict an vnion , wherein christianity , as delivered by our lord and his apostles , hath left a latitude and simplicity : but herein i think , he hath no cause to blame me ( nor do i see that he doth ) he doth not find me to trouble him with cramping scholastick terms . i know not how i could speak more tenderly than to say these three are three somewhats , ( not three nothings ; ) and if he please to sport himself with that , he may . and , that 't is convenient , to these somewhats , to give a name ; and , that i know no better name than persons ; and , therefore , that we may still say ( as we were wont to do ) three persons and one god ; even though by person , i do not require men to fancy just such a person , as what we so call amongst men. like as by father , son , beget , &c. i do not understand ( in god ) just such as what these words signifie amongst men. and i do not know how he could wish me to speak more tenderly , or more agreeing to the christian simplicity , wherein it is delivered by our lord and his apostles . the other is ; he thinks it not adviseable in things sufficiently setled by just authority ( as is that of the trinity ) to revive a controversie long since determined , and draw the disputatious saw : because , to litigate about a fundamental , is to turn it into a controversie . and herein , i am so much of his mind , that i would not have advised to start the controversie , about what we have been in quiet possession of , for so long a time . and i am ready to own , that it is an art of our adversaries the papists , to perswade the world that we have no better ground for the doctrine of the trinity , than they have for transubstantiation ; ( for they care not what they overthrow , if thereby they may advance their own ends : ) and , that atheistical and irreligious men will be glad of any opportunity to ridicule religion . but if others will make it their business to run down religion ; and profess to the world , there is nothing but authority to define it ( which they despise ; ) and no reason or scripture for it , more than for transubstantiation : i think we are not obliged to stand ( all of us ) so silent , as if we had nothing to say for it , or yielded up the cause . there is a middle way ( for the promoting what he calls a purer and more scriptural divinity . ) between a rigorous imposing all the scholastick cramping terms ; and , a giving up the cause . a modest defence of what the scripture teacheth us , ( without excursions into a rigorous pressing of extravagant niceties of our own inventions ) may be of good subserviency , to shew , that the doctrines of our religion are not inconsistent with right reason . what he tells us of some body who had been heretofore master of the temple , that did express himself to this purpose , the substance of god , with this property , to be of none , doth make the person of the father ; the very self same substance in number , with this property , to be of the father , maketh the person of the son. the same substance having added to it the property of proceeding from the other two , maketh the person of the holy ghost . so that , in every person , there is implyed , both the substance of god , which is one , and also that property which causeth the same person really and truely to differ from the other two. this , i say , would pass with me well enough . and if he please so to express himself , i should not quarel with it . again ; if i should express it thus , that god considered as the original or fountain of being ( who himself is and gives being to all things else ) may be called god the father , ( or the god and father of all : ) and the same god , as the fountain of wisdom or knowledge ; be called god the son , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the word , wisdom or reason ; the true light , that lighteth every man that cometh into the world , ) gods wisdom resulting from his essence or being : and the same god , as the fountain of power , might or action ; be called god the holy ghost ; ( gods power of acting , proceeding from his essence and wisdom also : ) and this eternal , all-wise , and almighty god , is one god : perhaps he would not much mislike this . or , if he should ; i would not quarel with him on that account ; or be positive that it must just be so . we know that christ is called the wisdom of god ; the son of god ; the son of the highest : and the holy ghost is called the power of the highest . and we know that , amongst our selves , knowledge results from the essence of our soul ; and action proceeds from both. 't is said also , that in him we live , and move , and have our being . ( from god we have our being , our rational life , and our motion : in whose image and likeness we are created . ) yet would i not be positive ( much less would i require every one to be of that opinion ) that the personalities in god must needs be these . i am content to rest here , that these three , father , son , and holy ghost ( whatever name you call them by ) differ in somewhat ( more than what we commonly call the divine attributes ) yet not so as to be three gods ( or more gods than one ; ) but are one and the same god. and so far we be safe . nor is there any danger ( that i can see ) in giving the name of persons to these three : nor know i a fitter name to give them . and this , i think , is as much as need be said , as to all those letters , which , on this occasion , have come to my hand , since the publishing of those already printed . there being nothing in all these which is contrary to what i therein undertook to defend . ( nor should i have said thus much , if the author of the letter here inserted had not desired to have it published . ) and now i hope to trouble the press no more upon this occasion . novemb. . . yours , john wallis . finis . a seventh letter, concerning the sacred trinity occasioned by a second letter from w.j. / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a seventh letter, concerning the sacred trinity occasioned by a second letter from w.j. / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . [ ], p. printed for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng w. j. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a seventh letter , concerning the sacred trinity ; occasioned by a second letter from w. i. by iohn wallis , d. d. professor of geometry , in oxford . london : printed for tho. parkhurst , at the bible and three crowns , in cheapside , . a seventh letter concerning the sacred trinity . in a postscript to my sixth letter ( which should have been printed with it ; but came , it seems , too late , after all the sheets were printed off , ) i gave notice , that i had received from london the night before ( march . ) another letter from w. i. of a like import with his former ; but somewhat fuller . that , what in it did directly concern me , was but expressions of thanks , respect , and approbation . for which i knew not how otherwise ( than by such a way ) to return him my acknowledgment : because he did neither signifie who he is that writes ; nor do i know any in london , to who 's name the letters w. i. do belong . that , there were reflections in it , on some expressions of a learned author : which expressions i do not see that i am at all engaged to defend : and did therefore wave them . that , to say , the three divine persons , are three intelligent beings ( three substantial beings , three spirits , ) really distinct , ( though mutually conscious , ) is more , he thinks , than that learned author needed to have said ; ( and i think so too : ) and that it is more safe , to be less positive and particular , as to what the scripture leaves in the dark . and his answer ( i think ) would not have been less valid , ( against those he undertakes to answer , ) though such expressions were omitted . that , i did forbear to publish that letter without his order ; because i was loth to engage the learned writer thereof in a publick dispute against that learned author , unless he please . since which time ; considering , that the postscript came too late to be printed with that letter of mine ; and , that the letter of this reverend divine ( for such i take him to be by the contents of it , ) seems to be penned with that care and caution , as if he were willing to have it publick ; and without any intimation of dislike for my having published his former letter in like circumstances : i have thought not amiss ( nor unagreeable to his mind ) to publish this also . which is as followeth : ( supplying the date from the post-mark at london , denoting what day it was given-in to the post-office there . ) for the reverend dr. wallis , professor of geometry , at oxford . london , march . - . sir , your repeated letters , give me a just occasion of repeating my hearty thanks to you . and i hope you will give me leave to join both my good wishes and endeavours to promote that moderation which you seem to aim at , in stating the mysterious truths concerning the trinity . methinks we might be easily perswaded to this ; by the difficulties which all men find in conceiving those mysteries : especially the consequences which some make from them ; and impose upon us as certain and sacred truths . sir , because i would have you lose as little of your time as may be in reading my letters ; i will enter immediately upon the subject proposed ; and consider , not some lesser niceties , but the two main points in the doctrine of the trinity ; and the difficulties which our vnderstandings represent to us in the conception of them . the two main points are these : the unity of the godhead , notwithstanding the distinction of three persons : and the equality of those three persons , notwithstanding their derivation one from another . concerning the divine persons ; the hypothesis which we referred to formerly ( and shall still follow ) asserts these three things . first , that they are three beings ( or three intelligent beings ) really distinct. secondly , that they are three substantial beings , really distinct. thirdly , that they are three infinite minds , or three holy spirits , really distinct. and to these , i think , we may of course add a fourth character , that they are three compleat beings , really distinct. they are not inadequate or partial beings . for a spirit infinite in perfection , as each of these is represented , can want nothing to compleat its being or perfection . let us now , if you please , run over these characters ; and observe the most obvious difficulties , that occurr to our minds in the conception of them . for the first , three beings really distinct . according to the plain tract of humane reason , every real being hath its essence ; ( that is the basis it stands upon , as distinguished from non-entity , or a fictitious being ) . and every distinct being hath its distinct essence : i mean , numerically distinct . and therefore , according to this principle , there ought to be three distinct essences in the godhead , seeing there are three beings , there , really distinct . furthermore ; if you give one single essence to three beings really distinct , you must either divide it , or multiply it . either each of these beings must have a piece of this essence ; and then you divide it : or each must have the whole ; and then , being but one whole , you cannot give it to three without multiplying of it . this is still made more difficult to conceive , when the author allows these three to be as distinct as peter , james , and john. for if they be as distinct as peter , james and john ; they are one but as peter , james and john. for every degree of distinction takes away a degree of vnity : as every degree of heat , takes away a degree of cold. we proceed to the second character . the three divine persons , are three substantial beings , really distinct . that is , in plain english , are three substances really distinct . as a spiritual being is a spirit ; a corporeal being , a body : so a substantial being is a substance ; ( putting onely two words for one. ) and the author must understand it so ; because he makes them three spirits afterwards : and therefore they must be three substances . besides , what are they , 'pray , if not substances ? they cannot be modes , or bare relations . i know some platonists call them super-substances . or , if you will think them lower , and call them semi-substances , ( as some philosophers do their substantial forms : ) all this is but playing with words . for there is nothing represented to our faculties , but as substances , modes , or relations ; excepting what is meerly notional . and the learned author must not debar us the use of the word substance , under pretence that it sounds corporeally . for two creeds make use of it : and the scripture it self , upon a fair interpretation , heb. . . to proceed therefore . here are three substances really distinct , whereof each is a god ( pag. . l. . p. . l. . ) and yet there is but one god. this is very hard to conceive , as contrary to all our idea's of number and numeration . 't is true , we may conceive these three substances , in strict vnion one with another , notwithstanding their real distinction . but union is one thing , and unity is another . for vnity excludes all plurality and multiplicity ; which vnion doth not , but rather supposes it . vnity also , in simple natures , excludes all compositions : which vnion , on the contrary , always implies , in one kind or other . accordingly ; substances , upon vnion , are not confounded or identified , or brought to vnity of substance : but , continuing numerically distinct substances , acquire some community or communication of operations : namely , of such actions and passions as they are respectively capable of . let us consider instances of these things , in the chief unions that are known to us . our soul and body are two substances really distinct , and in close vnion with one another : but , notwithstanding this , they continue distinct substances under that vnion . in like manner , the humane soul of christ is in vnion with the logos , or second person of the trinity , which we call an hypostatical union : but neither doth this vnion make any vnity of substance ; for the two substances of the divine and humane natures , continue distinct under that vnion . which must not be allowed in the vnity of the godhead , where there can be no plurality or multiplicity of substances . the learned author does acknowledge ( p. , . ) that these three substances , if they were separate , would be three gods : but being inseparate and inseparable , they make but one. this is again uneasy to conceive , that substances really distinct , should not be separable . for the notion of a substance , is , of that which may subsist by it self : and what mark have we of separability but real distinction ? things that are only modally or notionally distinct , we allow cannot subsist separate : but if they be really distinct , as substances , why may they not be separated really ? when we have proved , the real distinction of the soul and the body , as two substances ; we think we have sufficient ground to assert the separability of the soul from the body . and from the same reason , we assert the parts of matter to be separable , as being really distinct substances , let their vnion be otherwise what it will. for , if our faculties be true , what things we clearly conceive really distinct ( ut res & res ) may ( possibly ) be separated . clear and distinct conception being to us the rule of partibility . but however ! suppose , if you please , this vnion indissoluble ; this does not change it into vnity . if the soul of man was made to be in perpetual conjunction with matter , as some platonists affirm : that doth not make matter and the soul , one and the same substance ; nor matter cease to be matter , or the soul a spirit . so , if you suppose these three divine substances to be under an indissoluble vnion ; that doth not make them cease to be three substances , but , it makes them , three substances in an indissoluble vnion . what the learned authour says concerning matter and extension , may be returned upon him in reference to the godhead . ( p. . l. , . ) he supposes extension to consist of parts , if they be only assignable parts , whether they can be divided or not : so , say we , ( according to this opinion ) the godhead may consist of several substances , if they be only assignable substances , whether they can be divided or not : and you may as distinctly assign , by your vnderstanding , three substances in the godhead , that of the father , that of the son , and that of the holy ghost ; as you may assign three parts in a physical atome , by a. b. c. lastly , there is no substance lost or destroyed in this or any other vnion , dissoluble , or indissoluble : therefore , as to substances , they are the same , whether in conjunction or separation . we come unto the third character . ( pag. . . . see also p. . ) the three divine persons are three infinite minds , or three holy spirits : and yet but one god. this rises still higher than the former as to its vnconceivableness . it seems to say and unsay the same thing , with the same breath . an infinite spirit is compleatly a god , as to essence and attributes : therefore three such are three gods. omnis mens infinitè perfecta est deus ; tres sunt mentes infinitè perfectae ; ergo tres sunt dii . where is the fourth of this syllogism ? this character seems to assert three infinites : whereas the athanasian creed , which stands at the highest pitch of any , is yet very tender and cautious in giving the number three to any thing but the persons . it will not allow three eternals , nor three incomprehensibles , nor three almighties : but , three infinites include all these . an infinite spirit ( as i said before ) is a god , ( i mean , infinite in perfection , as our authour doth , ) and three spirits , whereof each is infinite in perfection , are three gods : as , three creatures , whereof each is a rational animal , are three men. both these propositions go upon the same ground , namely , that the definition , and the thing defined , are reciprocal and of the same extent . now as we have no better definition of a man , than that he is a rational animal ; so neither have we a better definition of a god , than that he is a spirit infinitely perfect . and as so many animals rational , so many men ; so likewise , so many spirits infinitely perfect , so many gods. i speak this according to the use of our faculties . for , what the true and precise state of things is , in themselves , when the question is concerning infinite natures , i do not presume to determine . but thus much , i think , we may safely determine , that in such cases where our faculties are at a loss , the safest way is to keep close to revelation and the words of scripture . and that 's the conclusion i drive at . lastly , to put a plain question , which will come into every one's mind : here are three spirits infinitely perfect ; either they are gods , or they are creatures ? they must be one of the two. when we speak of a spirit infinitely perfect , we describe an absolute , compleat , entire being . which must be of some denomination , either a god , or a creature ; for we know nothing of a middle nature betwixt these . possibly they will answer this by a distinction ; namely , that they are three gods considered separately ; but considered collectively and in vnion , they are but one god : and seeing they cannot be really separate , it would be improper to call them three gods. but , pray , why not as properly three gods , as three infinite spirits ? seeing these terms , a spirit infinitely perfect , and a god , are terms equivalent or identical . what partiality is it then to allow the one , and not the other ? and if these infinite spirits be inseparable , why do you grant the number three to that name , and not to the name of gods ? seeing they are both the same thing , and equally inseparable . we observed before , that this learned authour is liberal in his threes ; three intelligent beings , three infinite minds , three holy spirits , three divine glories , three majesties ; but not three kings . 't is the name , it seems , is scrupled , rather than the thing . sir , i will add no more upon these heads . but will consider now the grand principle which is designed to take off all these difficulties ; and that is , mutual consciousness ; whereby all these threes are made one ; and reduced to a perfect numerical unity . i need not spend time in telling you what the author means by mutual consciousness , nor how he applies it to the present case : you know them both sufficiently . but methinks this vnitive principle is defectively expressed , by the word consciousness . for bare consciousness , without consent , is no more than bare omnisciency . as god is conscious of all our thoughts , good or bad ; and of all the devils thoughts ; without vnion , as without consent . if a good and bad angel were made mutually conscious of one anothers mind , they would not thereupon become one , being still of different wills and inclinations . it may be the author will say , consciousness involves consent , as he says , knowledge involves power , or is the same with it . but , besides , that i cannot well reconcile the author to himself in this point , ( see p. . l. , . compared with p. . ) i have given you instances in a former letter to the contrary . to which you may add , if you please , this further consideration : if knowledge be the same thing with power , then actual conception is the same thing with actual execution . and if so , then you and i may sit quietly in our studies , and , with our thought and pen , build palaces , and take towns and cities . for we know the methods of both , and can distinctly conceive them and delineate them . and as these are not the same thing in us , so neither can we conceive them , in all respects , the same in god. for , from all eternity , god had a clear idea of the frame of the world , and of the manner of producing it : therefore , if gods conception or knowledge had been the same with his power , the world had been produced from eternity . but to proceed , let us give this principle its full strength , consciousness and consent : they would not together make a perfect vnity of operations in the deity , much less of substance . we noted before , that vnity and vnion are different things . and this is more apparent now , when three spirits are to be united into one. for how that can be done without some sort of composition , is an unconceivable mystery . you may indeed conceive these three spirits , singly and separately , as simple beings : but if you conceive these three simple beings united into one ( without annihilation of any one ) that one must be a compound being , according to our conceptions . then , as to vnity of operations : besides the energies peculiar to the father and the son , this author allows ( p. . ) that every one of these three minds , notwithstanding their vnion , hath some distinct consciousness , not common to the other two : therefore the godhead , which consists of these three minds , cannot be one as a single mind is one ; where there is an intire community and sameness of consciousness , in all operations . in my opinion , if this hypothesis were prest to speak out , the plain language of it would be this ; there are three divine substances , three holy spirits , infinitely perfect , and , in truth and reality , three gods : but , for some reasons , not fit to be called so . these three beings , by similitude of nature , mutual consciousness , consent , cooperation , are under the greatest vnion possible ; and , in that state of vnion , do constitute the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the intire all , comprehensive godhead . this , i confess , books something like a conceivable thing : but the christian trinity does not use to be represented thus . for this amounts to no more than a kind of hypostatical vnion of three divine spirits . sir , i will trouble you no further upon the first general head , the distinction of the persons . i proceed now to consider the equality of the persons . which i will dispatch in a few words . the first argument against their equality may be this ( pag. . l. . &c. ) the father is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , self-existen● , self-originated : whereas the other two are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , existent and originated from another . now this cannot but make , according to our faculties , not only some difference , but also some inequality . for 't is a fundamental perfection to be self-originated : and what is not so , is not equal to that which is so . you will say possibly , though the son and holy-ghost are produced of the father , yet 't is not in such a way as creatures are produced . that is , by a voluntary external act ; but this , by an internal , necessary , and emanative act. we will allow your distinction ; and admit that the son and holy-ghost have a different origin from that of common creatures . but this does not remove the difficulty . it shews indeed a great difference and inequality betwixt any of the divine persons , and bare creatures : but it does not shew any equality amongst the divine persons themselves . 't is true , the dependance which a creature hath upon the creator for its being , is of another kind and degree from that of the son or holy-ghost . but however , they are derivative beings , in some way or other , and dependent upon the father . and we cannot but conceive some inequality betwixt an original and a derivative , a dependent and independent being . secondly , that act whereby the son is generated by the father , is some energy and perfection : nay , 't is an energy of the highest perfection ; because the result of it is the most perfect being that can any way be produced ; or the noblest and greatest product in things . creation , or that energy that produceth a creature , hath not a term or effect so noble or so great , as that energy whereby the son is generated : and consequently it is not so great a perfection to create a world , as to generate the divine logos . this being so ; there is , you see , not only self-origination in the father , which is not in the son : but also an active perfection of the highest degree possible , in the one , which is not in the other . and therefore we cannot in either respect , conceive these two beings equal . besides , if you make them all three equal , and all infinite ; they will be co-ordinate , ( i mean internally , & as to perfection of nature : for , external subordination , as to oeconomy , signifies nothing in this case . ) and are no more one , than three individuals of the same species are one ; that is , than peter , james and john are or may be one. and this , i think , was the doctrine of the tritheites , or very near it . lastly , you may please to reflect upon the various sentiments and expressions of the ancients , concerning the dignity and preheminence of the fathers , ( which you know are noted by petavius ( de trin. lib. . c. . & l. . c. . § . . ) and consider their consistency or inconsistency with perfect equality . sir , as i do not write this with any disrespect to that treatise , ( which contains many excellent things : ) so neither to represent absolute truth or vntruth : but the difficulty of our conceiving things of an infinite nature . from which consideration i would willingly infer two conclusions . first , that we ought to keep close to scripture in these mysterious doctrines . secondly , that we should not impose consequences humanely made , with the same rigour as divinely revealed truths . the anti-trinitarian system is not at all suited to my genius . yet i would not stretch our trinitarian doctrine so far , as to set it at a distance from scripture as well as from reason . secret things belong unto the lord : but those things that are revealed , belong to us and our children . deut. . . and the angels , it may be , think us as foolish and ridiculous , for pursuing these notions , as we think our selves wise and learned in such pursuits . i am , sir , with all sincerity , your most humble servant , w. i. to this letter , i reply as followeth . to the reverend w. j. sir , i am obliged to you for the kind and respectful character , which you are pleased to afford me in both your letters . i am not at all displeased ( but thank you for it ) with a like moderation in yours ( to what you commend in my letters ) as to the mysterious truths concerning the sacred trinity : and do fully close with what you say in the conclusion , that the angels may think us as foolish and ridiculous , for pursuing these notions further than they are revealed , as we think our selves wise and learned in such pursuits : like as you or i should laugh at a blind man ( who had never seen ) that should undertake to conceive in his mind , and express to us in word , ) a distinct and perfect notion or idea of sight , light , and colours . he may hear the noise or sound of those three words ( supposing him , though blind , not to be deaf also , ) and may believe that they signifie somewhat . but , what that somewhat is , he cannot tell ; having never had an idea thereof in his mind , nor a perception thereof by his senses . and if you or i ( from that notion which our selves have of it ) would explain it to him : we could do it no otherwise than by the use of such words ( in a sense analogical ) as do properly belong to somewhat of which he hath ( from experience ) some idea . sight , we might say , is a certain kind of sense or feeling in our eyes ( which we have not in our hand , feet , or other parts of our body , ) whereby we can ( as it were ) feel with our eyes , the shape , figure , bigness and proportion of a body at a distance ; as we might , with our hands if within our reach . whereby he might apprehend , that there is some kind of resemblance between seeing and feeling ; but , what indeed it is to see , he cannot comprehend . light , we might tell him , is a necessary requisite to such a feeling with our eyes , as that for want of it ( which want we call darkness ) we can no more so feel , or discover , by our eyes , such shape , figure , or bigness ; than we could , with our hands , that ( suppose ) of a piece of money locked up in a box which we could not open ; but , by the admission of such requisite , we are inabled so to feel it with our eyes , as we might with our hands , if the box were opened whereby we might come to handle it . colour , we might tell him , is somewhat of such a nature , as that , on a plain board ( or the like ) on which by our hand we can feel nothing but smooth and uniform ; by it may be represented ( to be so felt with our eyes ) as great variety of shapes and figures , ( suppose , of a horse , a bird , a ship , a house , or any shape whatever ) as by our hand we might , if we had such shapes formed in wood or stone ; and the different motions of such . but , after all this , it is not possible for this blind man , to have that idea or notion in his fancy , of sight , light , and colour , which we have who see. and it is much more impossible for us ( who have no notions in our mind , other than what we derive , mediately or immediately , from sensible impressions of finite corporeal beings ) to have a clear and perfect notion , of the nature , unity , distinctions or attributes of an infinite spiritual being ; or otherwise to express them than by some imperfect analogies or resemblances with things we are conversant with ; and by words in a borrowed sense from such . i do therefore fully agree with you in your two conclusions ; namely , that it is safe and prudent to keep close to scripture in these mysterious doctrines ; ( since we know nothing of them otherwise than as there revealed : ) and , not to impose consequences of humane deduction , with the like rigour as divinely-revealed truths . for , even in common affairs , when things are represented onely by the analogy or resemblance which they bear to some other things ; it is seldom that the similitude is so absolute between them , but that there is some dissimilitude likewise . much more when the distance is so great as between finite corporeal beings , and what is infinite and incorporeal . so that we cannot always argue cogently from one to the other . and therefore the words nature , essence , vnity , distinction , father , son , person , beget , proceed , ( and the like , ) when applied to god in a borrowed sense from what they properly signifie as applied to creatures , must not be supposed to signifie just the same , but somewhat analogous to that of their primary signification ; nor consequences thence to be deduced with the same rigour . it would be mere cavilling for any to argue , that , because knowledge and strength are separable in man ; therefore , what in god we call by those names , are so in god ; and that , consequently , it may be possible for the all-wise god , not to be almighty ; or the almighty god , not to be all-wise . so , if we should argue from the manner of our locality or duration , to god's vbiquity without extension , and his eternity without succession ; the inferences must needs be lame and inconsequent . with other inferences of like nature . and , ( even without proceeding to infinites ) if we suppose a spirit , or the soul of man , to be void of parts and local extension , and therefore ( as the phrase is ) tota in toto & tota in qualibet parte of that space or matter to which it is compresent : and should yet argue ( as you do in a like case ) if one single spirit be compresent with three or more really-distinct parts of space or matter ; we must divide or multiply it : either each of these extensive parts must have a piece of that spirit ; and then you divide it : or , each must have the whole , and ( there being but one whole ) you cannot give it to each , without multiplying it : such inference upon such a supposition ( which supposition i am loth to think impossible , ) must needs be lame . yet such are commonly the cavils of those who study to pick quarrels with the doctrine of the trinity as delivered in scripture . and ( in particular ) though , amongst men , three persons are sometimes ( not always ) so used as to import three men ; we may not thence conclude , that the three divine persons , must needs imply three gods. or , if the word persons do not please , ( though i think it a fit word in the case ; we can spare the word , without prejudice to the cause , ( for 't is the notion , rather than the name , that we contend for , ) and content our selves to say , they be three somewhats which are but one god. or , we may so explain our selves , that , by three persons we mean three such somewhats as are not inconsistent with being one god. and hitherto , i suppose , that you and i do well enough agree . now , as to what you observe concerning the learned author ( dr. sherlock ; ) i shall begin where you end : and agree with you , that the treatise ( to which you refer ) contains many excellent things . the strength and weight of his arguments , as to those to whom he undertakes answer , doth not depend upon those expressions against which you object : but his arguments against those , are of equal force , though these expressions were spared . as to those expressions of his , by you noted , that the three divine persons are three beings ( three intelligent beings , three substantial beings , three holy spirits , ) really distinct , even as distinct as peter , iames , and iohn ; and one god onely as they are mutually conscious : i was ( i confess ) unsatisfied therein ( as you are ) from the first ; looking upon them as expressions too hardy for one to venture upon , ( and so i find are most others with whom i have discoursed about them : ) and wish he had declined them . yet i did not think it necessary for me to write against them ( though i did not like them ) but chose rather to wave them , and express my self otherwise . ( for it would be endless if i should make it my business to write books against every one who hath some expressions which i cannot approve , amongst many others wherein i think he doth well . ) nor shall i aggravate the objections which you have urged against them ; but leave them as they are . i might perhaps mollifie some of his expressions , by putting a softer sense upon them than at first view they seem to bear ; ( for i find some men , in such matters , do use words at a very different rate from what others do : ) but i have not ( where now i am ) the book at hand ; and have read it but once ( a good while since ) when it first came out : and therefore am not willing to say much without book , least i should miss his sense , or not perform it to his mind . that learned author may , if he think fit , so vindicate or explain those expressions as he shall judge convenient : or he may ( which i had rather he should ) decline them , without prejudice to his main cause ; ( which , in my opinion , he may as well defend without them : ) and thereby less expose himself to the cavils of the anti-trinitarians ; who are catching at every colourable pretence of objecting , though not against the main cause concerning the trinity , if but against some expressions of those who maintain it . thus far , i think , he and both of us do agree ; namely , that there is a distinction between the three , more than meerly notional , and even more than that , between ( what we commonly call ) the divine attributes ; yet not so as to be three gods , or more gods than one : ( which is as much as we need maintain against the anti-trinitarians : ) and , that the word person is no unfit name to denote that distinction . and thus far we may close with him , notwithstanding some other inconvenient expressions . and if it be agreed that these three ( thus distinguished ) are but one god ( each communicating in one and the same numerical essence , ) then they are all equal ( as to that common internal essence , and the common attributes thereof : ) and then an external subordination , as to oeconomy ( you grant ) signifies nothing in this case . now , sir , if you look back upon your own discourse : you will find , that the whole edge of your arguments is directed against those expressions , three beings , three substances , three spirits ; ( and i do acknowledge , that , as to these , the arguments seem to me sharp enough , and to do their work . ) but if , instead of these , he say ( as i think he should ) that the three persons are one being , one substance , one spirit , ( like as he says they are one god ) that edge will be taken off * . that ( i conceive ) which did impose upon him in this point , is the forced sense , which , in our language , we sometimes put upon the word person , for want of another english word ( answering to homo ) which might indifferently respect man , woman , and child : and a like forced sense put by the school-men upon the word persona , for want of a latin word which might equally relate to men and angels ; as signifying an intelligent being . whence he was induced to think , that three persons must needs be three intelligent beings . whereas persona , in its true and ancient sense ( before the school-men put this forced sense upon it ) did not signify a man simply ; but , one under such , and such , and such circumstances , or qualifications . so that the same man ( if capable of being qualified thus , and thus , and thus , ) might sustain three persons , and these three persons , be the same man. now if ( as he says of himself elsewhere in a like case ) he have not been taken to be a fool : yet a wise man may sometimes , upon second thoughts , see reason to change his opinion ( as in that case he did ) or rectify his expressions . and if then he consider , how much easier it will be ( and less obnoxious to exceptions ) to maintain his hypothesis thus rectified : he may think i have done him no ill offices thus to suggest . having thus given you my thoughts of this hypothesis : if you press me further ( as between our selves ) to tell you , what degree of distinction ( as in our metaphysicks they are wont to be reckoned up ) i take this to be , between the three divine persons : i think we need not much trouble our selves with such niceties . and if i do tell you ; it is only ex abundanti , as what doth not much concern the main question in hand ; ( which is safe enough without it : ) nor that i so prescribe therein , as to require others to express their sentiments just as i do . the degrees of distinction commonly mentioned in our metaphysicks , are such as these : distinctio rationis ratiocinantis , ( which is purely notional , and depends meerly on our imagination : ) destinatio rationis ratiocinatae ( which is otherwise said to be secundum inadaequatos conceptus ejusdem rei : ) distinctio modalis , ( either ut res & modus , or ut modus & modus , ) which is otherwise said to be ex parte rei sed non ut res & res : and distinctio realis , or ut res & res . though , in the names of these several degrees , all writers do not always speak alike . one perhaps by a distinction ex parte rei , may mean the same which another means by distinctio realis : and so of the rest . and these thus marshalled are but a contrivance of our own . they might , for ought i know , have been made more or fewer if the contriver had so thought fit . but these degrees of distinction , i take to be primarily fitted to our notions of created beings . and are not intended as applicable to god , otherwise than by analogy ; as other words properly fitted to created beings are wont to be so applied . and therefore i should choose to say , that ( in strictness of speech ) our metaphysicks have not yet given a name to these distinctions : nor do i know any need of it . the divine attributes , we use to say , are distinguished ratione ratiocinata , or as inadaequati conceptus ejusdem rei . and it is well enough so to say , to those that have not a mind to be captious ; but are willing to understand figurative words in a figurative sense . but , to those that have a mind to cavil , i would speak more cautiously , and say , it is , in god , somewhat analogous to what we so call in created beings . and , that of the divine persons , somewhat analogous , in the deity , to what , in created beings , is called distinctio modalis , or distinctio à parte rei , sed non ut res & res . if it be asked , what that distinction is which is thus analogous : i say , that i cannot tell . you must first tell me ( and enable me to comprehend ) what is the full and adaequate import of the words father , son , beget , proceed , &c. when applied to god , in a sense analogous to what they signify as to created beings . if you cannot tell me , precisely , what they are : how should i tell you , how they differ ? but what need we trouble our selves with these niceties , or names of these degrees of distinction ? ( which , when we have all done , will by divers men be diversly expressed . ) i think it is enough to say , the distinction is greater than that of ( what we call ) the divine attributes ; but not so as to make them three gods. or , that they be so three , as yet to be but one god. and i am content to rest there . i am , sir , yours to serve you , i. wallis . apr. . . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * augustin . epist. . spiritus est deus ; & pater spiritus est , & filius , & ipse spiritus sanctus ; nec tamen tres spiritus , sed vnus spiritus ; sicut non tres dii , sed vnus deus . the present state of the socinian controversy, and the doctrine of the catholick fathers concerning a trinity in unity by william sherlock ... sherlock, william, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. 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likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng socinianism. trinity. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - rina kor sampled and proofread - rina kor text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the present state of the socinian controversy , and the doctrine of the catholick fathers concerning a trinity in unity . by william sherlock , d. d. dean of st. paul's , master of the temple , and chaplain in ordinary to his majesty . london : printed for william rogers , at the sun against st. dunstan's church in fleetstreet . mdcxc viii . the preface . i have little to say to the reader , having sufficiently explained the design of this treatise in the first section . those who remember how this controversy has been of late managed , may possibly expect , what they will not find , some sharp resentments of the ill usage i have met with , and as sharp returns ; but i write not to revenge my self , but to explain and vindicate the truly ancient , catholick and apostolick faith of a trinity in unity , which requires a composed and sedate mind both in the writer and reader . for this reason i have thus long delayed the publication of this treatise , the greatest part of which was printed two years since , that those who will ever grow cool , might have time to recover their temper : and did i not hope that the publication of it at this time would tend more to quiet mens minds , to stop the mouths of hereticks , and to secure the catholick faith , than a passive silence , it should never see the light , how much soever my own reputation might suffer by it . but i persuade my self , that the authority of the catholick church , and of the catholick fathers , is not at so low an ebb , even in this age , as to be easily despised ; and therefore their explications , their arguments , their answers to the objections of hereticks , will have their due weight ; and i have not gone one step further . i appeal to the catholick fathers , and am contented to stand or fall by their sentence . i have not wilfully misrepresented their sense in any thing , and have taken all possible care not to mistake it ; and as far as human authority is concerned , here i must leave the matter , for i know of no further appeal . the contents . chap. i. sect . i. the present state of the socinian controversy ; and how to reduce the dispute to the original question . page . sect . ii. how to reduce this dispute concerning the trinity to scripture-terms . the form of baptism the rule and standard of faith. ibid. that these names , father , son , and holy ghost , are more easily understood , and give us a truer idea of a trinity in vnity , than any artificial terms . , &c. sect . iii. that the title of god attributed in scripture distinctly to father , son , and holy ghost , gives us the best account of their nature , and must determine the signification of ecclesiastical words . this particularly explained with respect to those terms , nature ▪ essence , substance , hypostasis , existence , subsistence , person , &c. , &c. sect . iv. these names , father , son , and holy ghost , prove the real distinction of persons in the trinity . , &c. sect . v. these names , father , son , and holy ghost , prove the vnity , sameness , identity of nature and godhead , explained at large . sect . vi. concerning the vnity of god. in what sense the catholick church believed in one god. ibid. tritheism an old sabellian and arian objection against the trinity . how answered by the catholick fathers . , &c. chap. ii. an examination of some considerations concerning the trinity . sect . i. concerning the ways of managing this controversy . what ways the considerer dislikes . , &c. what way he took , viz. consulting scripture and natural sentiments . sect . ii. concerning the traditionary faith of the church with respect to the doctrine of the trinity . what the catholick church is , from whence we must receive this traditionary faith. ibid. what evidence we have for this tradition from the ancient heresies condemned by the catholick church . of what authority the traditionary faith of the catholick church ought to be in expounding scripture . sect . iii. what is sufficient to be believed concerning the trinity . his requisites to make it possible for us to believe a thing . sect . iv. concerning his state of the question , that one and the same god is three different persons . his examination of these terms , god , unity , identity , distinction , number , and person . and . of the notion of god. sect . v. his notions and ideas of unity , distinction , person . his sabellian notion of a person ; that there is but one single person in the trinity , as person signifies properly , a particular intelligent being . this he proves from his notions of vnity and distinction ; the vnity and distinction of ideas , of principle , and of position . what he means by an obscure confused knowledge , and a general confused faith of the trinity . sect . vi. what the scripture requires us to believe concerning the trinity . his sabellian notion of one god , to be adored under three different titles and characters . ibid. his scripture-proof of this examin'd . , &c. his attempt to reconcile this with god's being one and three . , &c. and with the incarnation of the second person of the trinity . his account of the vnion of god and man. what end the belief of the trinity and incarnation serve , not as a matter of faith and speculation , but as an artificial representation of god's love to man. chap. iii. an account of the sabellian heresy , and by what arguments the catholick fathers opposed it . the several kinds of sabellianism . those who made father , son , and holy ghost , to be only three names , appearances , and offices , of the same person . and here the question was , not whether the son was a person , and the holy ghost a person , but whether they were distinct persons from the father . by what arguments the catholick fathers opposed this heresy . . that the son is distinguished from the father , only as a man's word is distinguished from himself . and by what arguments the catholick fathers opposed this heresy . . some made god a compound being , and father , son , and holy ghost the three parts of this one god. by what arguments the fathers opposed it . ibid. chap. iv. concerning the homoousion , or one substance of father , son , and holy ghost . sect . i. the true sense of the homoousion , from those misrepresentations which were made of it , and the answers which were given by the nicene fathers to such objections . sect . ii. some rules for expounding the homoousion . sect . iii. what the nicene fathers meant by the homoousion . sect . iv. a more particular inquiry into the full signification of the homoousion , with respect to the specifick vnity of the divine nature . sect . v. that by the homoousion the nicene fathers did not meerly understand a specifick , but a natural vnity and sameness of substance between father and son. damascen's distinction between one in notion , and one in reality . ibid. this appears from their notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and the catholick fathers lay the foundation of this sameness and consubstantiality of nature in the eternal generation of the son of the substance of the father . to which they added , that the son receives his whole substance from the whole substance of the father , totus ex toto . concerning this mysterious and ineffable generation , whole of whole . st. austin teaches , that the divine nature and essence must not be considered either as a genus or species , nor the divine persons as individuals . what medium there is between the vnity of singularity , and a specifick vnity of nature . the difference between three divine persons , and three individual human persons . sect . vi. a more particular inquiry what the catholick fathers meant by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the sameness and identity of substance in the holy trinity . petavius's attempt to prove , that both the greek and latin fathers taught the singularity of the divine nature . ibid. his notion of singularity considered . his apology for the fathers , who , as he says , taught a specifick vnity , rejected . his authorities for the singularity of the divine nature examined . by the sameness and identity of nature the fathers did not mean singularity , but such a sameness as is between three real subsisting persons , without the least change and variation . that the fathers resolved the vnity of god into this sameness and identity of nature . some examples in nature of the distinction betweeen alius and aliud . how the fathers proved the vnity of god in opposition to polytheism from the sameness and identity of nature . that these arguments do not conclude against a trinity of divine persons . gregory nyssen vindicated from tritheism , and his answer to ablabius explained . the philosophy of the ancients about numbers . the distinction between the vnity of number and the vnity of nature opposed to the charge of tritheism , and a confutation of a sabellian singularity . in what sense the schools asserted the singularity of the divine substan●e . sect . vii . concerning the distinction of persons in the vnity and identity of the div●ne essence . the general account of this . that both the fathers and schools , by a divine person understood the divine essence and substance , and nothing else . this proved from that ambiguity with which the fathers are charged in the use of these terms , essence , nature , substance , hypostasis , &c. that these terms , essence , &c. are distinctly applied to each person of the holy trinity . and all those terms , which are more peculiarly appropriated to signify the divine persons , were always used by catholick writers in the notion of substance , and never thought catholick in any other sense , as person , hypostasis , suppositum , &c. that a divine person is nothing else but the divine nature , proved from the absolute simplicity of the divine nature , which admits of no composition , as both fathers and schoolmen own . according to the doctrine , both of fathers and schools , the divine essence and substance , as subsisting distinctly in three , is proper and peculiar to each , and incommunicable to one another . whether the divine essence either begets , or is begotten , and how the fathers and schools may be reconciled . sect . viii . concerning the divine relations . the true notion of relative substances , or subsisting relations , explained from the doctrine of the schools . ibid. these divine relations secure the perfect vnity of the divine essence . what is meant by an absolute substance , and what by relative substance . ibid. this applied to the doctrine of the trinity . three absolute substances are always distinctly and separately three ; three relative substances may be essentially one in the same one individual nature . this account the fathers give of the vnity of the divine essence . concerning the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that they do not signify personal relative substances , but singular absolute substances . the divine relations prove the sameness and identity of nature in three . these divine relations give us an intelligible notion of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the inseparable vnion of the divine persons , and their mutual 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inexistence in each other . this mutual inbeing , can be understood only between the relatives of the same individual essence and substance . and this gives an account of the vnity of operation . concerning the mutual consciousness of the divine persons . the doctrine of relations necessary to give us a sensible notion of a trinity in vnity . sect . ix . a more particular inquiry into the difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or nature and person , with an account of some catholick forms of speech , relating to the ever blessed trinity . the faith , and the philosophy of the ancients of a different consideration . ibid. all the heresies relating to the doctrine of the trinity and incarnation attributed to this one mistake , that essence and hypostasis are the same . this by some charg'd upon aristotle's notion of a first substance . ibid. the distinction of nature and person in creatures considered aristotle's first substance , and what the fathers call hypostasis , is in creatures the same thing . what the fathers mean by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in every hypostasis . no real difference between aristotle and the fathers in this matter . ibid. the fathers by a common nature did not mean one numerical subsisting nature common to all the individuals . for what reason they reject 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a particular singular nature . hypostasis is nature with its peculiar accidents subsisting by it self ; that these accidents and personal properties do not make , but only distinguish persons . the hypostasis or person is the common nature subsisting by it self . this proved from the humanity of our saviour . how improper all these terms are to explain the trinity in vnity . how the catholick fathers accommodated these names of essence and person to the explication of this mystery . the common nature , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one divinity , is the divinity of the father , common to the son , and spirit , by a perfect communication , whole of whole . the true notion of one individual nature . ibid. essential internal productions are in the individual vnity of nature . the distinction between nature and persons , for that is the true state of the question , not how nature and person is distinguished in each single divine person ; but how one individual nature is distinguished from three persons in the individual vnity of nature . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 explained . this applied at large for the explication and vindication of several catholick forms of speech concerning the trinity in vnity . , &c. the conclusion , with a short application to the socinians . errata . page . l. . d. all . p. . marg . r. quae . p. . l. . r. enow . p . l. , . r expressions . p. . l. . r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . marg . r. ex i●demutabilis . p. . l. . identity , p. . l. . ● . man's r. man. p. . l. . marg . r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . r. identity . p. . l. . marg . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. . l. . r. an angel. p. . l. . marg . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . de trin. l. . marg l. . de trin. l. . & l. videri . p. . l. . r. his . p. . l. , . r. where-ever . p marg . l. . r 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the curious reader may observe ●ome other mistakes , which i hope will not disturb the sense . the present state of the socinian controversy . chap. i. sect . i. the present state of the socinian controversy ; the unreasonableness of it ; and how to reduce the dispute to the original question . the faith of the holy trinity is so fundamental to the christian religion , that if christianity be worth contending for ▪ that is : for if god have not an eternal son , and an eternal spirit , the whole mystery of our redemption by christ , and of our sanctification by the spirit , which in its consequences is the whole of the gospel , and distinguishes it from all other religions , is utterly lost . those various heresies relating to the divinity , person and offices of christ and the holy spirit , which began to appear even in the apostolick age , and have ever since under several forms and disguises disturbed the peace of the church , is proof enough , how much the great enemy of mankind thinks himself concerned by all possible means to corrupt this faith ; and that great , unwearied , unconquerable zeal , wherewith the catholick fathers have always defended this faith , shews of what importance they thought it ; and therefore it is no wonder , and ought to give no scandal to christians , that these disputes are again revived among us with as much fury and insolence as ever ; for there never was a more unhappy season for the enemy to sow his tares . but that which is most to be lamented is , that the lukewarmness of some , and the intemperate zeal of others , have given greater scandal to the world , and more shaken the faith of christians , than all the opposition of our adversaries could have done . i need say no more , the case is too well known , and the evil effects too visible among us . i will make no new quarrels , if i can help it , but sincerely endeavour to prevent the mischiefs of what has already happened , as far as is nec●ssary to secure the faith of christians , and to wrest those weapons out of our enemies hands , which some professed friends have unwarily furnished them with . to do this , i shall endeavour in the first place to restore this controversie to its original state , and take off those vizards which make it appear very frightful to ordinary christians . this dispute about the holy and ever blessed trinity , has of late been dressed up anew with some old school-terms , which how proper soever they may be to give learned men a more distinct idea and conception of that adorable mystery , only amuse common christians , and confound them , instead of teaching them better . this , as it was at first occasioned by hereticks , who denied or corrupted the christian faith , which forced the catholick fathers to use some unscriptural term● , which by degrees improved into great subtilties , and disturbed the church with very nice and wrangling disputes ; so our modern socinians at this day place the main strength of their cause in these disputes , and think it a sufficient confutation of the faith of the ever blessed trinity , that the trinitarians themselves cannot agree about the sense of person , hypostasis , substance , nature , essence , nor in what sense god is one and three ; but advance very different , and , as they think , contrary hypotheses , to reconcile the unity of god with the distinction of three persons in the godhead . as if there were no difference between what is fundamental in this faith , and such metaphysical speculations : as if no man could believe in father , son , and holy ghost , without determining all the disputes of the schools . learned men may dispute these matters , and things may so happen as to make such disputes necessary ; but the faith of christians may be secured , and heresies may be confuted , without them . the faith is plain and certain , even all that is necessary to the purposes of religion ; but men may leap out of their depths , where they can find no footing ; and when such questions are asked , as no man can certainly answer , it is very likely , that they will be answered very different ways , and upon very different hypotheses ; and there is no great hurt in this neither , while these different hypotheses are neither made new articles of faith , nor new heresies , but serve only for hypotheses , to give a probable answer to such questions as ought never to have been asked ; and to stop the mouths of hereticks , when they charge the catholick faith with nonsense and contradiction . to distinguish rightly between these two , will set this controversy upon its true ancient bottom ; which will spoil the triumph of our adversaries , and possibly may rectify the mistakes , and allay and qualify the intemperate heats and animosities of those whom a common faith ought to make friends . sect . ii. how to reduce this dispute concerning the trinity , to scripture terms . the catholick fathers have always appealed to the form of baptism as the rule and standard of faith ; that as we are baptized , so we must believe , in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost . this is a plain simple faith , which every christian may understand , and which every christian must profess , that there is an eternal father , who has an eternal son , and an eternal spirit , of the same nature ▪ and inseparably united to himself ; and that this father , son , and holy ghost , are the joint object of the christian faith and worship . this is the true christian faith , and this is all that we are concerned to defend against our adversaries ; and would men stick to this , without engaging in philosophical disputes , which we know little or nothing of , and which the scripture takes no notice of , we should soon find how weak and impotent all the attempts of hereticks would prove . whatever disputes there are about the signification of those words nature , essence , substance , person , hypostasis , subsistences , relations , &c. there is no dispute about the signification of father , son , and holy spirit ; we have natural idea's belong to these words , when applied to creatures ; and when god is pleased in scripture to represent himself to us under th●se characters , if we must understand any thing by them , we can understand nothing else , but what the words signify all the world over : only allowing for that infinite distance there is between god and creatures , which requires us to abstract from all material and creature imperfections . we must not think that god begets a son as men do , by corporeal passions , or division of his substance ; or that he begets a son without himself , or separate from himself ▪ or that because a creature-father is always older than his son , therefore god can't beget a son co●ternal with himself ; for all these circumstances do not belong to the essential notion of a father , but of a creature-father : but then it is essential to the notion both of father and son , that the father communicates his own nature to the son , and that the son receives his nature and being from his father ; that father and son do truly and really subsist by themselves , though they may be , and when we speak of god the father and his son , are inseparably united to each other : that the son , with respect to his nature , is perfectly the same that his father is : the son of a man , as true and perfect man as his father is ; and therefore the son of god , as true and perfect god. by these arguments the catholick fathers confuted both the sabellians , who made father , son , and holy ghost , but three names ; and the arians , who denied the consubstantiality of the son , or that he had the same nature with his father , for both these heresies destroy'd the essential notion and idea of father and son ; which includes in it both a real distinction and sameness of nature ; that they are as really two , but infinitely more one and the same , than any other father and son in nature are . now i cannot see , but that as these names and characters are better understood , and liable to less dispute ; so they convey to our minds a more distinct conception of god the father and his eternal son , than any other artificial terms . were there no controversy about nature , essence , person , substance , hypostasis , yet they immediately convey no idea of god the father and his eternal son to my mind , much less give me a more distinct conception , than these terms father and son do : for they neither acquaint me what god is , nor what father and son is ; and as the schools themselves assert , cannot be univocally , or in the same sense spoken of creatures and of god , who is super-essential , above all praedicaments and terms of art ; that is , nature , essence , substance , hypostasis , person , do not , and cannot signify the same thing , when spoken of god , as when applied to creatures . and this has occasioned all those disputes concerning the use and signification of these words , when applied to god ; which indeed is no reason for wholly discarding these terms , which the perverseness and importunity of hereticks has forced the church to use , and which have now been so long used , that the ecclesiastical sense of these words is very well known to learned men , if they would be contented to use them in that received ecclesiastical sense in which the catholick fathers have always used them ; but yet it is a reason not to clog the faith of ordinary christians with them , who are not skilled in metaphysical and abstracted notions ; and it is a reason to reduce the controversy , as much as possibly we can , to scripture terms ; when these artificial and metaphysical terms divide even the professors of the catholick faith , and give too just occasion to the vain boasts and triumphs of hereticks . to represent this matter plainly , i observe , that all all those unscriptural terms which the catholick fathers made use of for the explication of this adorable mystery , were intended for no other purpose , but to give us some distinct ideas and conceptions of what the scripture teaches concerning the father , the son , and the holy ghost , by using such terms as signify something in creatures , which bears some , though a very imperfect , anology and resemblance to what we are to conceive of god. and therefore the fathers justifie the use of such words , by shewing , that all they mean by them is contained in scripture , and reject any words , and any such sense of artificial words , as cannot be justified by scripture : which , by the way , is a more infallible rule than all metaphysical subtleties , to find out in what sense the fathers used such words , by observing to what scripture-notions they apply them , and how they justifie their use from scripture , when they are disputed . if this be the truth of the case , as it certainly is , then the catholick faith does not depend upon the use of these terms , for it was before them ; for they were intended only to explain and illustrate the catholick faith , and to comprise scripture-notions in terms of art , which must be acknowledged to be of great use , and was by experience found to be so in the disputes with ancient hereticks , while the fathers agreed in the sense of these terms . but when these terms themselves are become the great matter of dispute ; and men who , as is to be hoped , agree in the catholick faith , cannot agree about the propriety and signification of such terms , nor how they are to be applied and used , whether in the singular or plural number , whether substantively or adjectively , in recto or obliquo ; and our adversaries abuse such disputes to the reproach of the catholick faith , as a perplex'd , uncertain , contradictious riddle and mystery , which men can know nothing of , or can never agree in ; it becomes absolutely necessary at present to take this controversy out of terms of art , and to let our adversaries see , that our controversy with them is not concerned in these disputes : that it is not about the signification and use of such words as essence , nature , substance , person , &c. but , whether the supreme , eternal , self-originated father , have not an eternal son , eternally begotten of himself , and an eternal spirit , the spirit of the father and of the son , eternally proceeding from them : and whether this eternal son , and eternal spirit , are not true and perfect god. in this all sincere trinitarians do heartily agree with each other , and are ready to join issue upon this state of the controversy , with all their adversaries , of what denomination soever . and if we can prove from scripture , that god has an eternal son begotten of himself , and that this eternal son is true and perfect god , as the father is ; and that the father and son have an eternal spirit , who is true and perfect god , as father and son is ; i hope this is a sufficient confutation of socinianism ; and yet all this may be proved , without concerning our selves in any metaphysical disputes : and therefore such disputes as these , though they give opportunity to our adversaries to make some flourishes , and to cast mists before peoples eyes , are not of that moment as they would represent them ; they neither prove socinianism to be true , nor the catholick faith of the trinity to be false or uncertain . i do not intend at present to dispute this point with the socinians , whether the son and the holy spirit ( for there is no dispute about the father ) be not each of them true and perfect god : this has been proved often enough already , to the satisfaction of all sober enquirers , who pay a just veneration to scripture ; and shall be done again , when a fair occasion offers : but the question under debate now is , whether we cannot explain and defend the doctrine of the trinity , without the use of ecclesiastical or scholastick terms ; and whether the disputes of divines about the use and signification of such terms , proves any d●sagreement in the faith , when they all consent to the scripture explications of it . the great dispute is about the distinction and unity of the godhead , and by what terms to express this wonderful distinction , and wonderful vnion , as some of the fathers call it . all sincere trinitarians do agree , that god is vnus & trinus , one and three ; but we having nothing in nature like this , we know not by what names to call it : those who have most critically examined the force of words , find them all upon some account or other defective , or improper for this purpose : that st. austin well said , that in these sublime mysteries we can no more express what we conceive of them in words , than we can conceive of them as they are . when we profess to believe that there are three in the unity of the godhead the next question is , what three they are ? that is , by what common name to call them , which may be multiplied with them , or spoken of them in the plural number ; which st. austin thinks not easily found . the greeks called them three hypostases , which signifies three individual substances : this seemed hard to the latins , who acknowledged but one substance in the godhead , and therefore they called them three persons ; though this did not satisfy st. austin , who looked upon person as an absolute , not a relative term , and therefore the plural predications would not agree with his rule , quae ad se dicuntur ; that what is predicated absolutely , must be predicated only in the singular number : and in truth , if this be a good rule , it is a demonstration that there can be no common name for these three ; for whatever is a common name for them all , must be absolutely predicated of each of them : and therefore st. austin could give no other reason why we say three persons , and not three essences , or three gods , but only this , that since we acknowledge there are three , it is fitting to agree upon some common name to denote the trinity by ; and ecclesiastical use had given this signification to the word person . but then besides this , the great dispute is , what is meant by a person , when applied to the three in the blessed trinity : some adhere to the old approved definition of a person , that it is the individual substance of a rational nature ; which is the very definition of the greek hypostasis , as boetius owns . others are afraid of this ; for if every person be an individual substance , and there are three persons , they know not how to avoid the consequence , that then there are three individual substances in the trinity . and consequently , since we can have no other notion of the divine substance , but infinite mind and spirit , there must be three infinite minds and spirits in the godhead , which they think infers three gods. and therefore they will not allow a person to be a substance , at least not an individual substance , but a mode , or at most a mode of subsistence , or relation , or property , or a person , in the tragedian or comedian sense of a person , as one represents and personates another ; or to signify an office or magistracy , and so one man may be as many several persons as he has offices . i can't answer for all these different significations of the word person , as applied to this sacred mystery , especially as they are used by some modern writers ; for i believe there is no such material difference between the fathers and the schools , as some men imagine ; of which more hereafter : but as to my present purpose , i must profess , i can see no necessity why we must find out a common name for the three in the blessed trinity , when the scripture has given us no common name for them ; much less why we should dispute eternally about the propriety and use of such words , to hazard the catholick faith , at least the honour and reputation of it , together with the peace of the church . if i am asked not only who but what the three in the ever-blessed trinity are ? i know no better answer to make , than what the scripture has taught me , that they are god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost ; which signifies all that can be express'd by any artificial and unscriptural words ; is an answer liable to no exceptions or misrepresentations , and in which all must agree , who believe a trinity ; and it shames and silences all those disputes which are often occasioned by other words , though never so wisely and reasonably chosen . this answer shews us what their nature is , what their distinction is , and what relation they stand in to each other ; which is the most perfect knowledge we can have of the ever-blessed trinity in this world . sect . iii. that the title of god , attributed in scripture distinctly to father , son , and holy ghost , gives us the best account of their nature , and must determine the signification of ecclesiastical words . . as for the first , the design of some common name for these three , is to form some common notion and idea of them , in which they all agree : and is any thing else so common to them ? is there any thing else which is common to them , but the name and nature of god ? can any thing else give us so true and perfect a character and idea of each of them , as this does ? when we say the father is god , the son is god , the holy ghost is god , we attribute every thing to each of them , which signifies any perfection ; for the idea of god comprehends all possible perfections : and we reject every thing which has the least signification of imperfection ; we abstract our minds from all material and creature-images , which names common to creatures are apt to impose upon us ; and when we are forced to apply any such names to god , we learn from hence in what notion to understand such words , when applied to god. men may very subtilly distinguish between the formal conceptions of nature , essence , substance , hypostasis , existence , subsistence , person , personality , suppositality , and the like , and neither understand god nor creatures much the better for it : but let them but tell us what they mean by these terms , and then every child can tell whether they belong to father , son , and holy ghost , or not : for as far as they are included in the notion of god , and signify true divine perfections , so far they belong to all three : for if the father be god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , then father , son and holy ghost , each of them by themselves are whatever is included in the notion and idea of god , excepting their relations of father , son , and holy ghost , whereby they are distinguished into three . as for example : if by nature , essence , substance , existence , subsistence , however they may differ in their formal conceptions , they only mean a true and real being , who actually , perfectly , compleatly is what it is ; god is essence , substance , subsistence , in the most perfect sense of all ; for he is all being ; his name is iehovah ; which as learned men most probably conclude , signifies a plenitude and perfection of being , which is such a perfection as includes all other perfections in it ; for perfect being is every thing which perfectly is . this is the peculiar name and essential character of god , and of god only : god is , that is , is eternal , essential , immutable life and being ; in which sense the apostle tells us , that he only has immortality . creatures are , but are not essential life and being : being is not included in the formal conception or definition of any created nature . man is a reasonable creature , was a true definition of human nature , before any man was created ; and would be so for ever , though all mankind were annihilated . and therefore we may reasonably enough in creatures distinguish between nature , substance , existence , subsistence ; if by nature we understand that idea or pattern according to which they are made ; and by substance , that which is made , whatever it is , whether matter or spirit , which is the subject of those moral or natural perfections which belong to the idea of such a creature ; and by existence and subsistence , their actual being which they receive from their maker , with regard to their compleat or incompleat manner of existence . but now we can form no idea of god without perfect life and being ; for whatever else , according to our imperf●ct manner of conceiving , is contained in the idea of god , is nonsense and contradiction without it : infinite wisdom , infinite power , and infinite goodness , is the idea of nothing , without eternal and necessary being ; and an infinitely perfect nothing is a contradiction in the very notion . but infinite , perfect , life , and being , includes all other perfections , and is the most simple and comprehensive idea of god ; for whatever perfectly is , is whatever is any real perfection . so that there is no foundation , nor any occasion , for such distinctions , of essence , nature , substance , existence , subsistence , in god ; for his essence , nature , substance , is his being ; and his being is perfect existence and subsistence . these terms differ in their formal conceptions , when applied to creatures ; but in essential life and being , these cannot be formally distinguished ; for we cannot conceive existence or subsistence , as superadded to nature , as we do in creatures ; because necessary essential being , is the divine nature : nor can we distinguish between essence , nature , and substance , because there is no distinction in god between the subject , and its faculties and powers , which is the foundation of that distinction in creatures . men , who do not love to use words without any notion belonging to them , find themselves extremely puzzled to fit any distinct ideas to these words when applied to god. when the fathers and schoolmen apply these terms to god , they take care to shew how differently they are used when applied to god , from what they signifie when applied to creatures : they assert the most absolute simplicity of the divine nature without the least composition , and indeed expound all these terms to the sense of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & esse , to signify the most absolute being , or the most perfect is , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , who is simple , perfect existence : one. st. austin , whose authority is sacred in the schools , will furnish us with sayings enough to this purpose . nothing is more certain with him , than that in god , to be , to live , to understand , or whatever else we can attribute to god , is all the same , is perfect being , or essence : and therefore he owns the impropriety of those terms , substance , and subsistence , when applied to god. but notwithstanding this , that god is the most pure simple being , without any imaginable composition , yet since we cannot comprize all that is necessary for us to know of god , in one simple uncompounded thought , we must unavoidably conceive the idea of god by parts , under different formal conceptions , such as his wisdom , his power , his goodness , his truth and faithfulfulness , &c. for such distinct representations as these , god makes of himself in the holy scriptures ; they are what we can distinctly apprehend , and are absolutely necessary for the government of our lives , and to know what we are to expect from god. but such distinctions as we can frame no distinct conceptions of , as are apt to corrupt our notions of god with corporeal representations , and perplex our minds with endless and inextricable difficulties , ought to be cautiously used , and carefully explained , to prevent all mistakes , and to reduce them to such plain and simple notions , as come nearest to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence . and now , i suppose , it will admit of no dispute , whether the father , who is god , be essence , substance , subsistence ; or whether the son , who is god , be essence , substance , subsistence ; and so in like manner the holy ghost . for this signifies no more than to be in the most perfect and absolute sense of being , which is the first and most simple idea of god , absolute essence and being . so that if the father is , the son is , and the holy ghost is ; each of them is essence , substance , subsistence , in the most perfect and absolute sense of these terms : for if each of them is , and each of them is god ; each of them is , only in that notion of being , which is included in the idea of god , which contains the most absolute perfection of being ; that is , all that is absolutely perfect . and will any trinitarian deny , that the father is , the son is , and the holy ghost is ? and then i know not what other dispute there can be about this matter ; if the father be god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , then the father is , the son is , and the holy ghost is , in the most perfect notion of being , and that is all that is meant by essence , substance , subsistence , when spoken of god. in the same manner we may examine the signification of the word person , which has occasioned no small dispute . we say that there are three persons in the godhead , father , son , and holy ghost ; and each of these divine persons is in himself true and perfect god. now if we must call these divine three , three persons , ( which long use and custom has made reasonable , and in some measure necessary ) the most certain way to determine the signification of person , when applied to god , is to consider in what sense one who is true and perfect god , may be called a person ; for god is the scripture name and character which is distinctly attributed to father , son , and holy ghost ; and therefore that must give the signification to all other words of human use and institution , as far as relates to this mystery . these words person and hypostasis , were very anciently used , without any definition to determine their signification , till they became matter of dispute . boetius has given us a definition of person ; which has been generally allowed of ever since , that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature . let us then examine whether this definition can belong to a divine person , to one who is true and perfect god. as for substance , boetius tells us , that it is essential to the notion of person ; for a person cannot subsist in accidents , ( much less in modes , which are less than accidents ) ; and it is certain no other notion of person can belong to one who is god : for a person who is god , must be substance in the most perfect and absolute sense ; that is , as i have already explained it , perfect being and essence : as st. austin expresly tells us , that in god , to be , and to be a person , is the same thing ; and that when we say the person of the father , we mean nothing else but the substance of the father ; and thus it is with respect to the whole trinity . it is certain st. austin never dream'd of defining a person , much less a divine person , by a mode : for to make a person , who is god , and therefore the most perfect being , a mode , which if it be any thing , is next to nothing , no substance , but a meer modification of substance , is both new divinity , and new philosophy , unknown either to fathers or schoolmen . but meer substance can't make a person , unless it be a living , understanding substance , the substance of a rational nature : and this must be the notion of a person , when applied to god ; for god is pure infinite mind and intellect , the first and supreme life and intellect ; in whom , to live , to understand , and to be , is the same thing ; as i observed before from st. austin ; and if a divine person signifies one who is god , every person in the godhead is supreme absolute life and intellect : and this is what we must understand by a person , when we say , that the father is a person , the son a person , and the holy ghost a person ; for no other notion of a person can belong to any one , who is true and perfect god. there is another term of great consideration in this definition , which still remains to be explained , and that is individual , that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature ; which boetius opposes to vniversal substances , which are nothing else but the abstracted notions of generical or specifick substances ; which have no real and actual subsistence , and therefore are not properly substances , but only the ideas of substances , and therefore are not persons neither ; for substance and person are only in singulars and individuals , which subsist by themselves . thus human nature considered in general as common to all mankind , has no actual subsistence , and therefore is not a human person , but it subsists only in particular men , and that makes every particular man a human person ; for the person of the man , is nothing but the man himself . and so st. austin tells us it is in the holy trinity ; the person of the father , is the father himself ; and the person of the son , is the son himself ; and if father , son , and holy ghost , are three , they must be three persons ; for each of them is himself , and not the other ; and three selfs are three persons ; i , and thou , and he , are personal pronouns : i my self , thou thy self , he himself ; by which argument the catholick fathers prove against the sabellians , that father , son , and holy ghost , are three persons , by these personal pronouns , which the scripture applies to them ; as our s●viour speaks of himself in the first person , i and my father ; of his father in the second person , i thank thee , o father ; of the holy ghost in the third person , when he the spirit of truth shall come . now i , and thou , and he , must signifie three distinct persons , or three selfs : person indeed , as st. austin observes , is not a relative term , but is spoken ad se of the thing it self : for if person were a relative , then as we say , the father is the father of his son , so we must say , the person of the father is the person of the son , which is absurd ; but yet person must be praedicated plurally according to the number of selfs ; for as many selfs as there are , so many persons are there ; for selfs make numbers , because one self is not another . three singular intelligent selfs , singulares intelligentes , as melancton calls them , is the proper notion of three persons ; and in this sense , father , son and holy ghost , are three persons , if each of them be true and perfect god. for god is certainly himself . if the father be god , the father himself is god ; if the son be god , the son himself is god ; if the holy ghost be god , the holy ghost himself is god. this is the plain express doctrine of scripture , and what every man may understand , and what every one who believes a trinity must profess , and no man needs believe more . sect . iv. these names , father , son , and holy ghost , prove the real distinction of persons in the trinity . ii. these names , father , son , and holy ghost , especially when the name god is attributed to each of them , that the father is god , the son god , the holy ghost god , proves a real and substantial distinction between them ; for these are opposite relations which cannot meet in the same subject : for a father cannot be father to himself , but to his son ; nor can a son be son to himself , but to his father ; nor can the holy ghost proceed from himself , nor in this sense be his own spirit , but the spirit of the father and son , from whom he proceeds . and therefore the father is not the son , nor the holy spirit ; nor the son the father , or holy spirit ; nor the holy spirit either father or son : and yet , if each of them be god , each of them perfectly is , or is perfect being , and therefore are as perfectly distinct , as three which perfectly are , and are not one another . to talk of three distinct beings , substances , minds , or spirits , may be misrepresented by perverse wits , to the prejudice of the divine unity , though the catholick fathers , besides hypostasis , did not scruple to use the same , or other equivalent expressions , concerning the holy trinity , when they disputed against the sabellians ; yet if we believe a trinity , whether we will or no we must acknowledge three ; each of which perfectly is , or is perfect being , and no one is the other : for if we deny this , we must either deny , that the father is , or that the son is , or that the holy ghost is ; and to deny either of these , is to deny a trinity . and if it be objected against this , that according to st. austin's notion , ( though it was not peculiarly his , but common to all the greek and latin fathers , nay to the schoolmen themselves , and must be owned by all men of sense ) that esse , vivere , intelligere , sapere , velle , bonum esse , magnum esse , &c. to be , to live , to understand , to be wise , to will , to be good , and to be great , or whatever else we can attribute to the divine nature , is but unum omnia , all one and the same in god : i say , if it be objected , that the consequence of this is , that to say , that in this sense of is , the father is , the son is , the holy ghost is , is equivalent to asserting three distinct substances , minds , spirits , lives , understandings , wills , &c. in the trinity , i cannot help it . st. austin was never yet charged with tritheism . let them either deny what st. austin and the rest of the fathers teach about this matter , and try if they can defend the absolute s●mplicity of the divine nature without it ; or let them deny , if they think good , that the father is , the son is , and the holy ghost is , in this notion of perfect and absolute being ; or try if they can find such a medium between perfect is , and is not , as can belong to any being which is true and perfect god ; or allow ( which is the true solution of it ) that is , and is , and is , essence , and essence , and essence , are but one eternal is , one eternal essence , as they are but one god : of which more presently . i always was of opinion , that these terms in the plural number , ought not to be familiarly used , because few men can conceive of them , as they are worthy of god ; and therefore the fathers were v●ry cautious in using them , which they very rarely did , but when they were extorted from them by the perverse importunity of hereticks ; but i cannot see how it is possible to deny three selfs , or three is's in the u●ity of the godhead , without denying a trinity ; and if each of these three be himself and not another , and each of them is , and is by himself ; this is the least we can say of the ever blessed trinity , and this is all with respect to their distinction , that we need say of them . so that if father , son , and holy ghost , be so in a true and proper notion , are in truth and reality what these names of father , son , and spirit , signify : that the father is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a true , proper , natural , father ; the son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a true , proper , genuine , son ; and the holy ghost , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in a true , proper sense , the spirit of the father and the son , as the catholick fathers always professed ; they must be as truly and perfectly distinct , as father and son are . the only question then is , whether these names , father , son , and holy ghost , signify naturally and properly when spoken of the holy trinity , or are only metaphorical and allusive names ; though what they should be metaphors of , is not easy to conceive , and as absurd to conceive , that there should be any metaphors in god , who is all perfect essence and being . the divine nature and perfections , which we cannot conceive of as they are , may be expressed by metaphors taken from some thing which is analogous in creatures ; upon which account we read of the hands , and eyes , and ears , and bowels , and mouth of god. creatures may serve for metaphors , for shadows , and images , to represent something of god to us , but the reality of all is in god. so that we may allow father and son in some sense to be metaphorical names , when applied to god ; not that god the father is not in the highest and most perfect sense a father ; and his son a most proper , natural , genuine son , but because the divine generation is so perfect a communication of the divine nature and being from father to son ; that human generations , creature-fathers and sons , are but obscure , imperfect images and resemblances of it . when any thing is spoken metaphorically of god , the metaphor and image is always in the creatures ; the truth , perfection , and reality of all in god. and if this be a certain and universal rule , then if god be a father , if he have a son , an only b●gotten son , begotten eternally of himself , not made , nor created , but begotten ; though this eternal generation be infinitely above what we can conceive , yet it is evident , that god the father is more properly and perfectly a father , and his son more properly and perfectly a son , than any creature-fathers or sons are . but , i think , this will admit of no dispute , if we own , that god has a son , who is himself true and perfect god ▪ for a son , who is perfect god , is god of god. that he is a son , proves that he receives his nature from his father , for this is essential to the notion of a son ; that he is perfect god , proves the perfection of his generation from the perfection of his nature : for to be perfect god , of perfect god , is to receive the whole , perfect , undivided nature of his father , which is the most perfect generation that is possible , for a whole to beget a whole . and if god the father , and his son , be truly and perfectly father and son , they must be truly and perfectly distinct ; that is , they are in a proper sense two , and by the same reason , father , son , and holy ghost , are three : and we need no other proof of this , but the very names of father , son , and holy ghost , if we understand them in a proper and natural sense . sect . v. these names , father , son , and holy ghost , prove the unity , sameness , identity of nature and godhead . iii. these names of father , son , and holy ghost , as they signify and prove a real distinction between these three , so they also signify and prove the unity , sameness , identity of nature , and godhead : which reconciles the faith of the trinity with the faith of one god : the same one divine essence and godhead , being and subsisting , whole , perfect , and entire in each of these divine three . i shall explain and confirm this matter more at large hereafter ; and therefore at present shall only briefly represent this notion , and the reason of it . one eternal self-originated divine nature , is one divinity and one god ; and nothing can destroy the unity of god , but what destroys the unity of the divine nature , by division or multiplication : and if this be the true notion of the unity of god ( and if it be not , i would desire to know , why this is not , and what is ) then the unity of god may be preserved in three , each of whom is true and perfect god , if the same one divine nature , or divinity , subsists distinctly in them all : and the very characters and relations of father , son , and holy ghost , do necessarily infer and prove , the same one divinity in them all : and therefore the christian trinity is so far from contradicting , that it establishes the faith of one god : as to explain this in a few words . all christians agree , that god , whom we call the father , is an eternal self-originated being , who had no beginning of being , and received his being from no other , and that there is no other self originated being , but himself . this is the notion which all mankind have of one god , that there is one infinite , eternal , self-originated being or nature ; and if there be ( as it is certain there is ) but one such nature and divinity , there can be but one god. and this is established in the christian faith , which owns but one god the father , who is therefore in scripture , in a peculiar manner , called the one god , and the only true god. thus f●r all christians are agreed ; but here our arian and socinian adversaries stop : for how can the son be god , and the holy ghost be god , if the father be the only self-originated being , and the one true god ? now the very notion of a son answers this difficulty , or at least proves , that so it is , however it may exceed our finite comprehension . it is essential to the notion of a son , to be of another , of him , whom we call his father , and to receive the same nature from him . man begets a man , and god begets god ; but there is an infinite distance between these two , as there is between god and creatures . when man begets a man , he does not communicate his own whole entire numerical nature to his son , but with part of his own substance communicates the same specifick nature to him , or a nature of the same kind ; and therefore a man and his son are two men , as having two particular natures , though specifically the same . but if we believe , that god has a son , begotten by him of himself , i say , not created out of nothing , nor made of any other prae-existent nature or substance , but eternally begotten of himself , we must acknowledge , that the father and the son are perfectly one , excepting that one is the father , and the other the son. all men , who know any thing of the divine nature , know , that god is the most pure , simple , uncompounded being ; and if god , who has no parts , and cannot be divided into any , begets a son , he must communicate his whole , undivided nature to him : for to beget a son , is to communicate his own nature to him ; and if he have no parts , he cannot communicate a part , but must communicate the whole ; that is , he must communicate his whole self , and be a second self in his son. now a whole , and a whole of a whole , are certainly two , but not two natures , but one nature , not meerly specifically , but identically one ; for it is impossible that a whole , which is communicated without division , or separation , should have the least imaginable diversity from it self , so as to become another nature from it self ; for a whole of a whole must be perfectly and identically the same with that whole of which it is ; for a whole can be but one. this is that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ sameness and identity of nature , which the fathers assert , and whereon they found the unity of the godhead . and this is the meaning of that distinction of the schools , between unum numero , and re numerata , one in number and in the thing numbred . two must always be allowed to be two in number , as father and son are , though they are but one in re numeratâ , in the sameness and identity of nature , as christ tells us , i and my father are one ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the neuter-gender , which must relate to nature , not to number . to distinguish or multiply natures , there must be some real or notional diversity and alterity between them , as boetius observes : but a whole can never differ in the least from the whole of which it is , no more than the same whole can differ from it self ; and it is this sameness and identity , which is called a numerical unity of nature , and is peculiar to the divine nature , there being nothing like it in creatures : not that the divine nature considered as in the father , is the same in number with the divine nature as communicated to , and subsisting distinctly in the son ; for then the father and the son can't be two ; for the person of the father and his divinity , or divine nature , is the same ; and the person of the son , and his divine nature is the same ; and if this oneness relate to number , there can be but one person , as there is but one nature : but a numerical unity of nature does not exclude a number of persons , each of whom has the whole divine nature perfectly and distinctly in himself ; it does not exclude the actual and perfect communication of the same divine nature to more than one , but only excludes all imaginable diversity and alterity ; and what is not aliud , is unum ; that which is not another thing , another different nature , is but one : that is , the divine nature is numerically one , in opposition to any other absolute , self-originated divinity , not in opposition to the eternal communications of its self to the son and holy spirit . if the divine nature , as actually and distinctly subsisting in three , be as perfectly one , as the idea of god is one , as any specifick notion , suppose of human nature , is one ; then it is identically and numerically one and the same . and indeed this is the true reason why the catholick fathers so often represent the unity of the divine nature by allusions and metaphors signifying a specifick unity ; because the divine nature , as subsisting in father , son , and holy ghost , is as perfect●y one and the same , as the specifick notion and idea of any nature is , which abstracts from all the diversities and differences which are found in individuals . which one observation will help us to expound several disputed passages in the fathers , as i could easily shew , were that my present business . father , son , and holy ghost , though they have one undistinguished , undiversified nature , and therefore are one in nature ; yet are three in number , because they have this one undivided , undistinguished , undiversified nature , after a different manner , which the greeks called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the manner of existence , or the manner how they come to be , which though it sounds very harshly when applied to that which has no beginning of being , ( as most other expressions do , when applied to god , and criticized on by perverse and comical wits ) must be allowed in such a qualified sense as is proper to an eternal being , or we must deny eternal generation and procession , which is , though not the beginning , yet a communication of being : and thus the fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or mode , or manner of existence , and being is , that he is self-originated , and receives his being from no other ; the son 's is , that he is eternally begotten of the father , and receives his nature and being without any beginning , from the father ; the holy ghost's is , that he eternally proceeds from father and son ; and this is all the distinction that is between them : they have but one undivided , undiversified nature ; but these opposite relations necessarily prove them three in number , as i have already shewn ; though the divine essence , the res numerata , is but one ; it being communicated from father to son , and from father and son to the holy ghost , whole of whole ; which makes it perfectly one and the same undivided , undiversified , essence , subsisting distinctly , but not separately , in three . that this is the true notion both of the fathers and schools , and all that the wisest schoolmen meant by the singularity of the divine essence and nature , which they acknowledged to subsist in tribus suppositis , or personis , whole and entire in three distinct persons or subjects , may appear in due time , when men have recovered their temper so far , as to be capable of hearing reason , and of understanding plain sense . but my only design at present is to shew , that these relations in the ever blessed trinity , of father , son , and holy ghost , vindicate the faith of the trinity from the imputation of tritheism . three gods must signifie three absolute , independent , self-originated d●vinities , three such as we acknowledge the person of the father to be , who is infinitely p●rfect , and is of himself ; and all the catholick fathers acknowledge , that three fathers would be three gods : three such absolute beings , though equally perfect , and every way alike , would be three divine self-originated natures , or three individuals of the same specifick nature ; that is , three gods , as three individuals of human nature are three men . but father , son , and holy ghost are not three absolute divine natures , nor three individuals of one specifick nature , but are three singulars of one individual nature , communicated whole and entire from father to son , and from father and son to the holy ghost : so that there is but one and the same divine nature in all three , and therefore but one divinity , and one god ; unless one and the same divine nature can be three gods. to number three , each of whom is himself true and perfect god , does not prove three gods , unless you can multiply and number natures too ; for one divine nature is but one god ; but three gods must have three appropriate , and incommunicable divine natures ; which the very relations of father , son , and holy ghost , deny in the christian trinity . there is but one self-originated divinity in the person of the father ; and the very name of son proves that he is not of himself , but has , and is , all that he has , and is , from the father , and is all that the father is : h● i● g●d ●f g●d ; now god of god , is another , and is true and perfect god , but is not another god , because he receives all from his father , has the same divine nature that his father has , has nothing but what his father has , and has all that his father has ; t●tus ex toto , whole of whole ; which is but one undivided , undiversified , one numerical whole , one god. this seems to be the true reason why st. austin , and after him the schoolmen , lay such stress upon the relations in the trinity , to salve the unity of the divine nature . for by relations the schools mean , relationes subsistentes , subsisting relations , or relatives , not relations without a subject ; which st. austin rejects as absurd : for nothing can be predicated relatively which has not some being and substance of its own to be the foundation of that relation : a man who is a master , a man who is a servant , must be a man , or he could not be the subject of any relation , either of master , or servant ; and thus , as he adds , father must signifie a positive being , something that he is himself , or else there is nothing to sustain a relation to another ; and the like must be said of the son and spirit . now these relations in the trinity , of father , son , and spirit , though each of them have the whole divine nature and substance , do yet prove that there are not three absolute independent divinities , but only one divine nature and substance : as st. austin speaks of father and son , utrunque substantia , & utrunque vna substantia ; they are both of them substance , and both of them one substance ; for the son must receive his whole being from his father , and therefore have the same one nature and substance that his father has ; which proves , that a trinity of relatives can be but one god , because they can have but one divine nature in them all . but this is beyond my present design . thus i have given a short view of the catholick faith of the holy and ever blessed trinity : we are b●ptized into the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost ; and if we are christians , we must believe in father , son , and holy ghost , and we need not believe nor understand any more than what these names , when applied to god , do plainly and necessarily signify . this i have explained as easily and familiarly as possibly i could , that ordinary christians , who are not skilled in school terms or subtilties , may know what they are to believe , and see the plain reasons of it . this is what all christians , who sincerely believe a trinity , are agreed in ; that there is an eternal father , who has an eternal son , and an eternal spirit , of the same nature with himself : that the father is god , god of himself ; the son is god , god of god , true and perfect god , begotten of his father from all eternity ; that the holy ghost is god , true and perfect god , eternally proceeding from father and son : that the father is not the son , nor the son the father , nor the holy ghost father or son ; but they are three , truly and really distinct from each other : but that father , son , and holy ghost , have all the same one divinity , communicated from the father to the son , and from father and son to the holy spirit , and therefore are but one god. all this , as i have shewn , is necessarily included in the names and relations of father , son , and holy ghost ; which if they be not empty names , but signify any thing real , must signify all this . and what is there unintelligible in all this ? such a distinction , and such an unity as is signified in the very names of father , son , and holy ghost , necessarily prove that god is three and one : if the father is himself true and perfect god , the son himself true and perfect god , the holy ghost himself true and perfect god , and the father is not the son , nor the son the father , nor the holy ghost either father or son , then there are three , each of whom is in himself true and perfect god , and that is a divine trinity : and if the father communicates his whole nature without division or separation to the son , and father and son communicate the same whole nature to the holy spirit , they are in the most perfect notion one , there being one and the same whole entire perfect divinity in all three . a whole , a whole , and a whole , are three in number , but are but one identical nature ; for a whole of a whole must be the same whole ; and in this unity of nature consists the unity of the godhead . i grant a whole of a whole is very unconceivable to us ; and so is the notion of an eternal self-originated being , and of creation , to the full as unconceivable , as the eternal generation of a whole from a whole : but this is a difficulty in the notion of an eternal generation , not of a trinity in unity : if god begets a son , as the scripture assures us he has an only begotten son , he must communicate his own nature to him ; and besides the testimony of scripture , that all the father has is the son 's , his whole nature and divinity , reason assures us , that god being a pure simple being , without composition or parts , if he communicate his nature to his son , he must communicate it whole and entire , without division or separation ; and if this be so , it is certain , that father and son , he who begets , and he who is begotten , are two ; and it is as certain , that the same whole divinity , communicated by the father to the son , is but the same one divinity ; and one divinity , though actually subsisting in three , can be but one god , not three gods. it is certain , this is the most perfect unity that can be , between three who are truly and really the same , and yet distinct ; for they can n●ver be more one , than to be three same 's , and three wholes ; for the communication of a whole may make a number , but cannot distinguish or multiply nature . sect . vi. concerning the unity of god. but our socinian adversaries , and some who would not be thought socinians , have espoused such a notion of one god , as makes the faith of a trinity absolutely irreconcilable with the faith of one god. by one god , they mean one who is god ; but the faith of the trinity owns three , each of whom is by himself true and perfect god ; and i grant it is as absolutely impossible to reconcile these two , as it is to reconcile contradictions ; for to say that there is but one who is god , and to say that there are three , each of whom is god , is a manifest contradiction ; and yet without saying this last , we must deny a trinity . it is in vain to think to solve this with words without sense : if there is but one who is god , we must either make father , son , and holy ghost , three names , or modes , or manifestations of the same one numerical divine person ; which was the ancient , exploded , anathematized heresy of noetus and sabellius ; or we must make the son and holy spirit to be mere creatures , if we allow any personality to them , as arius , macedonius , paulus samosatenus , and such like hereticks , and our modern socinians do . but we , with the scriptures and the catholick church , reject this notion of the unity of god , which is to assert the unity , but to deny a trinity . and because this seems to be so prevailing a notion at this time , i shall shelter my self as well as i can , under the authority of the catholick fathers , and the catholick church . that there is but one god , was always the faith of the catholick church , as appears from all the ancient creeds ; but then they did not believe in one god , as one god signifies one divine separate person ; which is never expressed in any christian creed , but in one god the father , who has an only begotten son , and an eternal spirit , in the unity of the same godhead . there is no christian creed , which teaches the belief of one god who is not a father ; and if the one god be a father , he must have a son of his own nature and substance ; and the son of god , consubstantial with god the father , must be god the son. this is what tertullian tells us , that there is one god , with his oeconomy , that is , with his only begotten son , and eternal spirit . the catholick church so believed in one god , as to acknowledge three persons , father , son , and holy ghost , each of which is truly and really god , as they must necessarily do , if they believed a trinity : and upon this account they were charged with tritheism , or with asserting three gods , because they owned a trinity of divine substantial persons , really distinct from each other , each of which is truly and perfectly god. so that this is no new charge against the asserters of a real and substantial trinity ; and the ancient christians had no regard to it ; for tritheism in this objection signified no more than the b●lief of the trinity , or of three divine persons in the unity of the godhead , which is the true christian faith. as to shew this briefly : in answer to this objection against the belief of a real substantial trinity , from the unity of god , they tell us it is judaism and heresy , to place the unity of the godhead in the unity of a person ; to teach that there is but one divine person , as there is but one god. we may find enough to this purpose in tertullian against praxeas , and athanasius against the sabellians ; in st. hilary , st. austin , and many others . athanasius commends the iews for opposing the polytheism and idolatry of the gentiles : but then he charges them with as great impiety themselves , in denying the son of god , by whom all things were made , and in accusing those of polytheism who worship the father by the son. — and he exhorts his readers to separate themselves from those iudaizers who corrupt christianity with iudaism , who deny god of god , and teach one god in the iewish notion of it : in which he taxes the sabellians , who taught that the word of god is like the word and wisdom of a man , within him , in his heart and soul ; and therefore that god and his word are but one person . st. hilary frequently takes notice of this corruption of the evangelical faith , as he calls it , under the pious profession of one god , to deny the only begotten god , to deny christ to be born god , or to be true god , but only a powerful creature , thereby to preserve the faith of one god , which they think the birth of god does overthrow . in which he distinctly charges the sabellians and arians ; the first for making god but one person , for fear of introducing a trinity of gods with a trinity of persons ; the other for making christ a mere creature , though the first and most powerful creature , for fear of making a second god , should they have owned him to be god of god , of the same substance with the father . in opposition to this , he tells us what the true faith is , which they have learned from divine revelation , neither to preach two gods , nor one solitary divine person ( for so solus must signify in this place ) ; and undertakes to prove both from the evangelists and prophets , that when we profess our faith in god the father , and god the son , we must neither own god the father and god the son to be one person , as the sabellians did , nor two different substances , as the arians did : for when god is born of god , this divine nativity will neither admit a unity of person , nor a diversity of nature : for father and son , he who begets , and he who is begotten , must be two persons ; and the son who is begotten of the substance of his father , must be consubstantial with him . it were easy to multiply quotations to this purpose , both out of these and numerous other ancient writers ; but this is proof enough , that the primitive fathers would not be frighted out of the true catholick faith of a real and substantial trinity , by the loud clamours of tritheism ; but rejected such a notion of one god , as confined the godhead to one single solitary person , as iudaism , and an anti-trinitarian heresy . for we know in what sense the iews owned but one god ; viz. in the very sense that the socinians and all anti-trinitarians do ; that is , that there is but one who is god , but one divine person ; and in this sense these ancient fathers rejected it . but besides these general sayings , they industriously confute this notion of the unity of the godhead , which confines it to one single person ; that the one god is so one , that there is and can be but one divine person , who is true and perfect god. the scriptures both of the old and new testament do expresly teach , that there is but one god ; this the ancient hereticks perpetually objected against the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity : and st. hilary observes , what danger there is in answering this objection , if it be not done with great caution : for it may be equally impious to deny , or to affirm it . for the true catholick faith of one god lies between two such contrary heresies , as are ready to take advantage one way or other , whatever answer you give . if you own that there is but one god , without taking notice , that this one god has an only begotten son , who is true and perfect god , the arians take advantage of this against the eternal godhead of the son : if you say , that the father is god , and the son god , and yet there is but one god , the sabellians hence conclude , that father and son are but one person , as they are one god. but in opposition to both these heresies , he tells us , that though the catholick church did not deny one god , yet they taught god and god , and denied the unity of the godhead both in the arian and sabellian notion of one god. and consequently , that they professed to believe god , and god , and god , though not three gods , but one god ; yet in that very sense which both ancient and modern hereticks call tritheism . there is no dispute but the scripture does very fully and expresly teach us , that there is but one god. hear , o israel , the lord our god is one lord , . deut. . which our saviour himself approves , . mark . and the scribe expounds . well master , thou hast said the truth , for there is one god , and there is none other but he : and this is often confirmed both in the old and new testament : but then the fathers think that they have an unanswerable argument to prove , that by one god , is not meant , that there is but one who is god , because the same holy scriptures which teach us , that there is but one god , do attribute the name , and dignity , and power , and all the natural perfections of god , to more than one. st. hilary explains this argument at large ; the sum of which in short is this : that we must learn the knowledge of god from divine revelation ; for humane understandings , which are accustomed to corporeal and bodily images , are too weak of themselves to discern and contemplate divine things ; nor is there any thing in our selves , or in created nature , that can give us an adequate notion and conception of the nature and unity of god : we must believe god concerning himself , and his own nature , and yield a ready assent to what he reveals to us . for we must either deny him to be god , as the heathens do , if we reject his testimony ; or if we believe him to be god , we must conceive no otherwise of him , than as he himself hath taught us . this is very reasonable , if we believe upon god's authority , to believe all that god reveals , and to expound the revelation by it self ; not to put such a sense upon one part of the revelation , as shall contradict another ; but to put such a sense upon the words , as makes the whole consistent with it self . as in the present dispute concerning the unity of god. the scripture assures us , that there is but one god , and we believe that there is but one god. excepting the valentinians , and such kind of hereticks , all christians , both catholicks , and hereticks , agree in this profession . but the question is , in what sense the scripture teaches that there is but one god ? whether this one god signifies one single divine person , or one god with his only begotten son and eternal spirit , who have the same nature and divinity ? the arians and socinians embrace the first sense of the words , that one god is one divine person , and for this reason will not own christ , or the holy spirit , to be true and perfect god , because there is but one god , and three divine persons , they say , are three gods. now unless we will pretend to understand the divine nature , and the divine unity , better than god himself does , we must refer this dispute to scripture ; and if we have the same authority to believe more divine persons than one , that we have to believe but one god , then the unity of god in the scripture-notion of it , is no tritheism , nor any objection against the belief of a trinity ; for there may be but one only god , and yet three divine persons in the unity of the same godhead . this is st. hilary's argument , and it is a very good one , that moses himself , who has taught us , that there is but one god , has taught us to confess , god and god ; that we have the same authority to believe the son of god to be god , that we have to believe one god. and therefore , though we do , and must believe one god , we must not so believe one god , as to deny the son of god to be god , for this is to contradict moses and the prophets . this argument he prosecutes at large throughout the iv th and v th books of the trinity , and alledges all those old testament proofs for the plurality of divine persons , and for the divinity of christ ; which , whatever opinion some modern wits and criticks have of them , have been applied to that purpose by all christian writers from the beginning of christianity ; and were that my present business , might be easily vindicated from the cavils and exceptions of hereticks . st. paul tells us , that there is one god the father , of whom are all things , and we in him ; and one iesus christ , by whom are all things , and we by him , cor. . . st. hilary finds this god of whom are all things , and this lord by whom are all things , in the mosaical history of the creation . and god said , let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters , and let it divide the waters from the waters ; and god made the firmament , and divided the waters , &c. . gen. , . where , as he applies it , the father commands , and the son , his almighty word , makes all things . so the psalmist tells us of the father , he spake , and it was done ; he commanded , and it stood fast , . psal. . or as it is in the th psal. . he commanded , and they were created . and by whom they were created , st. iohn tells us ; in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god. all things were made by him , and without him was not any thing made , that was made , joh. , . this he thinks proves a plain distinction of jubentis dei , & facientis dei , god that commands , and god that does ; for common sense will not allow that they should be one single solitary person , much more reason have we to distinguish them , when both the old and new testament distinguish them . but whatever dispute this may admit , that account moses gives of the creation of man , he takes to be an unexceptionable proof of a plurality of divine persons ; and god said , let us make man in our image , after our likeness . — so god created man in his own image , in the image of god created he him , . gen. . . now if we understand these words as spoken by god , in the same sense as we should and ought to understand them , had they been spoken by men , ( which st. hilary lays down as a principle , that god speaks to us as we speak to one another , and expects to be understood by us according to the common use and acceptation of such forms of speech ) then let vs make man in our image , after our likeness , cannot signify a singular and solitary person ; for such a form of speech naturally imports a plurality of persons , and a common nature and likeness . no single solitary person speaks to himself to do any thing , but only wills and chuses what to do , and exec●●es his own purposes ; much less does he speak to himself in the plural number , which in common use signifies some companions and partners in the work . let vs make , cannot signify one single person , nor can our image admit two persons of an unlike and different nature , when the image is but one and the same ; and therefore this must prove , that there are more divine persons than one , and that they have all the same divine nature . were god but one single and solitary person , this would be a most unaccountable form of speech ; and there can be no pretence to put such a harsh sense on the words , unless we certainly knew that there was no other divine person , but he who spoke ; but then if instead of knowing this , we certainly know the contrary ; that when god made the world he was not alone , but had his eternal substantial wisdom , the person of the eternal word with him , by whom he made the world , this puts the matter out of doubt : and this st. hilary proves fr●m that account which solomon gives of wisdom , prov. , &c. the lord possessed me in the beginning of his way , before his works of old . i was set up from everlasting , from the beginning , or ever the earth was . — then i was by him , as one brought up with him , rejoicing always before him : and therefore the father was not alone , and did not speak to himself when he made the world ; his own wisdom , a divine eternal person , co-operating with him , and rejoicing in the perfection of his works . but besides this , he proves at large , that the angel which so often appeared to abraham , hagar , iacob , to moses in a burning bush , and is in express terms called god , the judge of the world , the god of abraham , and isaac , and iacob , was not a created angel , nor god the father , and yet was true and perfect god , even the son of god , who in the fulness of time became man ; and adds several passages in the psalms and prophets , which plainly own a divine person , distinct from god the father , to be true and perfect god. i need not tell those who are acquainted with the writings of the ancient fathers , that they all insist on the same arguments to prove the same thing ; that there is not in any one point a more universal consent amongst them , which is too venerable an authority to be over-ruled by criticism ; it being no less than a traditionary exposition of scripture from the apostolick age. but i am no further concerned in this at present , than to shew what notion the catholick fathers had about the unity of god. these fathers did not fence against the objection of tritheism , by distinguishing away the divinity of the son , and of the holy spirit , by making the son god ex accidenti , & secundum quid ; for they knew nothing of an accidental or secundum quid god ; which i must own sounds to me very like blasphemy and contradiction ; that when this name god , signifies the most necessary and absolutely perfect being , any person to whom this name does naturally and essentially belong , should be god by accident , or only in a limited and qualified sense : but without fearing the charge of tritheism , they with moses and the prophets own another divine person distinct from the father , but as real and substantial a person , and as truly and perfectly god , as the father is : insomuch that tertullian , when he had alledg●d that t●xt , . psal. , . which the apostle to the hebrews applies to christ , . heb. thy throne , o g●d ▪ is for ever and ever , the scepter of thy kingdom is a right scepter . — therefore god thy god hath anointed thee with the oyl of gladness above thy fellows ; was not a●raid to add , ecce duos deos ! behold two gods ! that is ▪ two divine p●rsons , each of whom is by himself truly and essentially god ; for notwithstanding this , he would not say there are two or three gods , and gives his reason for it : he owned a plurality of gods , even tritheism it self , in that sense of the word tritheism which the arians and sabellians objected against the faith of the trinity , as three gods signify no more than three divine substantial persons , each of whom is truly and perfectly god , as having distinctly in himself the whole and perfect divine nature ; but this he and the other fathers deny to be tritheism ; they are god , and god , and god , but not three gods : and they think it a sufficient proof , ( as any man would , who believes the scripture ) that this is not the scripture-notion of tritheism , because the same scripture which teaches us that there is but one god , attributes not only the name and title of god , but the divine nature and perfections , to more persons than one. and this is the only answer that need be given , and the best answer that can be given to this objection of tritheism ; for god knows his own nature , and his own unity best : and it is enough for us to acknowledge god to be one , as the scripture teaches him to be one ; that is , that there is but one god , but that this one god has an eternal only begotten son , and an eternal spirit , in the unity of the same godhead . this is the account tertullian gives us of those expressions , when the scripture asserts that there is but one god , and that there is none besides him . for without denying the son , we may truly affirm , that there is but one only god , whose son he is . for though he has a son , he does not lose his name of the one and only god , when he is named without his s●n ; and so he is , when what is said , is appropriated to him as the first pers●n ; for in the order of nature , a●● of ou● conceptions , the father is befo●●●he son , and therefore must be named b●●ore him : so that there is but one god the father , and besides him there is no other ; which does not deny the son , but another god ; which rejects the multitude of false gods which the heathens worshipped ; but the son , as being inseparably united to him , is included in the unity of the father's godhead , though not named ; which as he well observes , he could not be , without making another god of him . had the father said , there is no other god besides me , excepting my son , this had made the son another god , a new separate divinity ; and would have been as improper , as if the sun should say , there is no other sun besides me , excepting my rays . the sum of which is this : that the title of the one and only god , and besides him there is no other god , does in a peculiar manner belong to the father , who is the one only god with his son and spirit ; but this does not exclude the son or spirit from being true and perfect god ; for they are not other gods from the father , but have the same divinity , and are inseparably ●mited to the father , and therefore are included in the ●●ity of the godhead , without being named ; whereas th●●r being named would have excepted them out of the unity of the godhead , and made other gods of them : and though the son when he is named al●ne , is called god , this does not make two gods , because he is god only by his unity with his father . st. hilary gives much the same account of it ; that when the scripture teaches that there is one god , and no other god besides him , this does not exclude the son of god from being true and perfect god , because the son is not another god : he being of the same substance with god the father , god of god , and inseparably united to him : another god does not signify another divine person , but another divinity , another separate and independent principle and fountain of deity . and besides this , st. hilary endeavours to prove at large from several texts of the old testament , that this very expression , of one god , and no other besides him , is applied not only to the father , but to the son , and is very justly applicable to each of them , because each of them have a personal and incommunicable unity . the father is the one god , and there is none besides him ; for he is the only deus innascibilis , the only god , who is god of himself , without any communication of the divine nature to him from any other divine person . the son is the one god , and there is none besides him ; that is , the deus vnigenitus , the only begotten god ; and there is no other begotten god but he : so that each of them is the one god : for between one and one , that is one of one , there is no second nature of the eternal d●ity . i shall not dispute these matters now , which will be more proper in another place ; it is enough at present , that we learn from them what sense these fathers had concerning the unity of god ; viz. that it is not the unity of a s●ngle person , so as to exclude all other persons from the name and nature of god , but a unity of nature and principle ; that there are not two different divinities , nor two principles of divinity , which have no communication with each other ; but that there is one self-originated being , who communicates his own nature , without division and separation to his eternal son , and by and with his son to his eternal spirit . thus st. hilary concludes this dispute , that to confess one god , but not a solitary god ( that is , not one single solitary person ) is the faith of the church , which confesses the father in the son : but if out of ignorance of this heavenly mystery , we pretend that one god signifies one single divine person , we know not god , as not owning the faith of god in god. this is plain sense which every christian may understand , and what every one must believe who wi●l be a christian : we must believe in father , son , and holy ghost , that the father is not the son , nor the son the father , nor the holy ghost either father or son ; and that each of these three is in himself , as distinguished from the other two , true and perfect god ; but though they are three , and each of them true and perfect god , yet they are not three gods , because there is but one and the same divinity in them : the same individual numerical divine nature , being whole , perfect , undivided in them all ; originally in the father , by generation in the son , and by procession in the holy ghost , as i have already explained it , which is the most perfect unity we can conceive between three wholes , or three , each of which have the same whole undivided nature distinctly in themselves . if this will not be allowed to be such a unity as is included in the notion of one god ; that the natural notion of one god is of one only who is god , which is contradictory to the belief of three , each of whom is in himself true and perfect god ; the answer the catholick fathers give to this ( as i have now shewn ) ought to satisfy all christians ; that this is not the scripture-notion of one god , that there is but one , who is god ; because the same holy scriptures which teach us , that there is but one god , do also teach us , that there are three in the unity of the godhead . that not only the father is god , as an infinite , eternal , self-originated being , and upon this account in a peculiar manner called the one and only true god ; but the son also is true god , and the holy ghost true god , by the communication of the same divine nature to them . now god knows his own nature and unity best , and if he declares himself to be but one god , but yet requires us to believe his eternal son to be true and perfect god , and his eternal spirit to be true and perfect god ; it is certain that the divinity of the son , and of the holy ghost is very reconcilable with the unity of god. for as far as revelation must decide this dispute , we are as much obliged to believe , that the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , as we are to believe , that there is but one god. those who will not acquiesce in this , must appeal from scripture to natural reason , which is a very absurd and impudent appeal ; for the plain sense of it is this , that they will believe their own reason before the scriptures , in matters relating to the divine nature and unity , which all wise men acknowledge to be so much above human comprehension : that is , that they know the unity of god better than god himself does ; or , which is the same thing , that they will never believe any revelation to come from god , or any thing , how express soever the words are , to be the meaning of the revelation , any farther than their own reason approves it : of which more elsewhere . and yet i dare appeal to any man of a free and unbiass'd reason in this cause , what is that natural notion we have of one god ? is it any thing more , than that there is and can be but one eternal self-originated being , who is the principle or cause of all other beings ? and does not the scripture , do not all trinitarians , with the whole catholick church , own this ? do not all the christian creeds teach us to profess our faith in one god the father , from whom the son and the holy spirit receive their godhead ? thus far then scripture , and reason , and the catholick faith agree : does reason then deny , that god can beget of himself an eternal son , his own perfect image and likeness ? if it does , then indeed scripture and reason contradict each other : but i believe these men will not pretend to prove from reason , that god could not beget an eternal son ; and if this cannot be proved by reason , as i am certain it never can , then reason does not contradict scripture , which teaches us that god has an only begotten son : and if god have an only begotten son , reason will teach us that the son of god must be true and perfect god , and yet not another god , because he has one and the same nature with his father . this is all that any christian need to believe concerning this matter , and all this every christian may understand ; and all this every one who sincerely believes the faith of the holy trinity , does and must agree in : those who do not , i will at any time undertake to prove to be secret hereticks , and enemies to the christian faith : and as for those who do , i will never dispute with them about some terms of art , and the propriety of words , in a matter which is so much above all words and forms of speech . and here i leave this matter upon a sure bottom ; and here we are ready to join issue with our socinian adversaries . our only controversy as to the doctrine of the trinity with them is , whether the son , and the holy spirit , each of them , be true and perfect god : if we can prove this , which has been the faith of the catholick church in all ages , we need dispute no other matters with them ; nor can any disputes among our selves give any support to their cause . a dispute about words may look like a difference in faith , when both contending parties may mean the same thing ; as those must do , who sincerely own and believe , that the son is true and perfect god , and the holy ghost is true and perfect god , and that neither of them are the father , nor each other . and therefore those different explications of the doctrine of the trinity which the socinians of late have so much triumphed in , and made more and greater than really they are , and more sensless too by their false representations , can do them no real service among wise men , tho it may help to amuse the ignorant . if any men have subtilly distinguished away the catholick faith , they may take them to themselves , and increase their party by them : but if this were the case , as i hope it is not , it is no objection against the catholick faith , that some men openly oppose it , and others , at least in some mens opinions , do secretly undermine it . there is reason to guard the christian faith against all inconvenient or dangerous explications , which seem to approach near heresy , if this be done with due christian temper and moderation ; but i hope the disputes of the trinitarians are not so irreconcilable , but that they will all unite against a pestilent and insolent heresy , which now promises it self glorious successes only from their private quarrels . chap. ii. an examination of some considerations concerning the trinity . sect . i. concerning the ways of managing this controversy . before i put an end to this discourse , it will contribute very much to the better understanding of what i have said , and give a clearer notion of the use of it , to apply these principles to the examination of a late treatise , entituled , some considerations concerning the trinity . the author i know not ; he writes with temper ; and though he takes the liberty to find fault , he does it civilly , and therefore he ought to meet with civil usage , and so he shall from me , as far as the bare censure of his principles will admit . i was , i confess , startled at the first entrance , to find him own the vncertainty of our faith in these points ( concerning the trinity ) ; for if after the most perfect revelation of the gospel that we must ever expect , and the universal tradition of the catholick church for above sixteen hundred years , this faith is still uncertain , it is time to leave off all enquiries about it . as for the many absurd and blasphemous expositions that have been made of this doctrine ; if by them he means the ancient heresies which infested the church , they are so far from rendring our faith uncertain , that ( as i shall shew him anon ) the very condemnation of those heresies by the catholick church , gives us a more certain account what the true catholick faith was . i agree with him , that the warm and indiscreet management of contrary parties , has been to the prejudice of religion , among unthinking people , who hence conclude the uncertainty of our faith ; and it concerns good men to remove this prejudice , by distinguishing the catholick faith from the disputes about ecclesiastical words , and the catholick sense of them ; and i hope i have made it appear this may be done , and then the faith is secure , notwithstanding these disputes ; and as for any other offence or scandal , let those look to it , who either give or take it . this considerer dislikes all the ways and methods which have hitherto been taken to compose these disputes . . he dislikes those who are for reverencing the mystery of the trinity , without ever looking into it at all ; who think it proposed to us only as a trial and exercise of our faith ; and the more implicit that is , the fuller do we express our trust and reliance upon god. now if by not looking into it at all , he means not enquiring what they are to believe concerning the trinity , nor why they believe it ; this i acknowledge is a very odd sort of faith ; but i believe he cannot name any such men whose avowed principle this is : an implicit faith is only meritorious in the church of rome , but then an implicit faith is to believe without knowing what or why ; but these ignoramus or mystery-trinitarians ( as some late socinian considerers have insolently and reproachfully called them , and whom our author ought not to have imitated ) never teach such an implicit faith as this , much less admire the triumph and merit of faith in believing contradictions , and the more the better . under all the appearance of modesty and temper , these are very severe and scandalous reflections upon some of the wisest and greatest men amongst us , and which this considerer had little reason for , as will soon appear . the doctrine of the holy trinity is the most fundamental article of the whole christian faith , and therefore an explicite knowledge and belief of it is essential to the christian profession , and thus all protestant divines teach ; and whatever voluminous disputes there may be about it , the true christian faith of the trinity is comprized in a few words , and the proofs of it are plain and easy : for the scriptures plainly and expresly teach us , that there is but one god ; and that the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god ; that the father is not the son , nor the son the father , nor the holy ghost either father or son ; as i have already explained it : this we all teach our people to believe upon the authority of scripture ( which is the only authority we can have for matters of pure revelation ) , and expound those texts to them which expresly contain this faith , and vindicate them from the cavils and perverse comments of hereticks : and this , i think , is not to reverence the mystery , without ever looking into it at all , when we look as far as we can , till revelation bounds our prospect : and this is to look into it as far as god would have us , and as far as is necessary to all the purposes of religion ; that is , as far as the knowledge of this mystery is of any use to us . now when this is done , there are a great many wise men who think we ought to look into this mystery no further ; and there seems to be a very good reason for it ; viz. because with all our looking , we can see no further . there are indeed some curious questions started about reconciling the unity of god with the belief of a trinity , in which there are three , each of whom is by himself true and perfect god ; for if there be but one god , how can there be three , each of whom is true god ? now whatever answer may be given to such kind of objections and pretended contradictions , these learned men think there is no reason to clog the christian faith with them , nor to disturb the minds of ordinary christians with such subtilties : that the authority of god who has revealed this , and the acknowledged incomprehensibility of the divine nature , is a sufficient answer to all objections ; and as ridiculously as a witty man may represent this , that is the truest faith , not which can believe contradictions , but which can despise the pretence of contradictions , when opposed to a divine revelation ; for that resolves faith wholly into divine authority , which is the true notion of a divine faith. to say that this will not suppress any of our doubts or disputes in religion , is a manifest mistake ; for such a profound veneration for the authority of god , would silence them all : and whatever is the natural propension of the soul to the search of truth , natural reason will tell us , that there are a thousand things which we can know nothing of , and that it is in vain to search after them ; but that the divine wisdom is unsearchable , and therefore god is to be believed beyond our own knowledge or comprehension ; and when we are agreed about the truth and certainty of the revelation , that will silence all our disputes about what is revealed , and set bounds to our enquiries . and i never knew before , the danger of submitting our reason to faith , of a blind resignation of judgment ( as he is pleased to call it ) to a divine revelation , for that is the matter in debate . blasphemies and contradictions may , and have been imposed upon mens faith , under the venerable name of mysteries ; but such blasphemies and contradictions were never revealed in scripture , and therefore belong not to the present enquiry , which only concerns believing what we allow to be revealed , without looking any farther into it . we allow all men to examine the truth and certainty of the revelation , and to examine what is revealed ; but here we must stop , and not pretend to judge of what is revealed , by the measures of human reason , which is so inadequate a rule for divine and supernatural truths . this is all very plain ; and if he will allow the truth of this , he must confess , that what he has said upon this first head is nothing to the purpose . it is a very popular thing to decry mysteries , and to cry up reason , but to be very cautiously imitated , because it is generally found that such men are either no great believers , or no very deep reasoners . . in the next place he tells us of a very strange sort of men , who call the doctrine of the trinity an incomprehensible mystery , and yet are at a great deal of pains to bring it down to a level with human vnderstanding ; and are all very earnest to have their own particular explications acknowledged as necessary articles of faith. an incomprehensible mystery is what human reason cannot comprehend ; to bring an incomprehensible mystery down to the level of human vnderstandings , is to make it comprehensible by reason ; and those are notable men indeed , who undertake to make that comprehensible by reason , which at the same time they acknowledge to be incomprehensible : it is to be hoped this considerer does a little mistake them : men may be-believe the trinity to be an incomprehensible mystery , and yet speak of it in words which may be understood , which does not pretend to make the mystery comprehensible , but to deliver it from nonsense , jargon , and heresy ; that is , not to explain the mystery , which is and will be a mystery still , but to secure the true christian doctrine of the trinity , which they desire may continue an article of the christian faith still . there are , he tells us , a third sort of men who are for no mystery ; that is , the socinians ; and i was glad to find them censured and rejected , but wonder'd how they came to be numbred among those men who have laboured in this good design of explaining the trinity , and reconciling the disputes about it . well : all these methods have proved ineffectual ; let us then ( to omit other matters ) enquire what course our considerer took to make himself a fit and competent judge of this controversy : take the account of it in his own words ; i have endeavoured to deliver my self from prejudice and confusion of terms , and to speak justly and intelligibly : and not being yet prepossess'd in favour of any particular explication , the better to preserve my freedom of examining the subject in hand , i have purposely forborn to search the fathers , schoolmen , or fratres poloni , or read over any later treatises concerning this controversy , while i was composing the present essay , resolving to consult nothing but scripture and my own natural sentiments , and draw all my reflections from thence , taking only such which easily and without constraint offered themselves . thus des cartes made a new philosophy , and this is the best way that can be thought of to make a new faith. this has an appearance of great indifferency and impartiality , but it is a great mistake when men boast in this as a virtue and attainment , and an excellent disposition of mind for the examination of matters of faith. i never in my life yet saw any one example to the contrary , but that when men who had been educated in the christian faith , and tolerably instructed in the meaning and the reasons of it , could persuade themselves to be thus perfectly indifferent whether it were true or false , but this indifference was owing to a secret byass and inclination to infidelity or heresy . it is in vain to pretend such an absolute freedom of judgment , without being perfectly indifferent which side is true or false : for if we wish and desire to find one side of the question true , and the other false , this is a byass , and our judgment is not equally poiz'd . and certainly in matters of such vast consequence as the christian faith , and especially that great fundamental article of the holy trinity , such an indifferency as this is , can never recommend either an author or his writings to sober christians . will this considerer then own , that it was indifferent to him when he undertook this design , whether the doctrine of the trinity should upon examination appear true or false ? if it were not , the socinians will tell him that he had not preserved a freedom of judgment , and then he did well in not consulting the fratres poloni , for he had condemn'd them without hearing ; or if he were persuaded concerning the doctrine of the trinity , was it indifferent to him whether the sabellian , or arian , or true catholick notion of a trinity , contained in the nicene and athanasian creeds , were the true faith ? that is , was it indifferent to him , whether the ancient heresies condemn'd by the catholick church , or that faith which the catholick church has always own'd and professed , be the true faith ? for my part , i confess , i am not thus indifferent ; i will never shut my eyes against plain conviction , which is all the freedom of judging which is allowable ; but my prejudices are , and i hope always will be , on the side of the catholick faith. no wise man can be thus indifferent . and we shall find this considerer was not so very indifferent ; for the main principles he reasons on , are some popular mistakes and prejudices , which he seems to have espoused without due consideration . but let us allow him to be as free and unprejudic'd as he pleases , i cannot think that he took a good method to understand this sacred mystery . he laid aside fathers , schoolmen , and other later treatises concerning this controversy , and consulted nothing but scripture , and his own natural sentiments . to consult scripture is indeed a very good way , and absolutely necessary in matters of pure revelation , which can be certainly known no other way ; but the fathers at least are very good guides , and have very great authority in expounding scripture ; and our natural sentiments , otherwise called natural reason , is a very bad , a very dangerous expositor of scripture in such supernatural mysteries , and has no authority in these mattters ; and how our considerer has been misled by his natural sentiments , will soon appear . a few words might serve for an answer to the considerer ; but since this is the great pretence of socinians and other hereticks , to set up scripture and natural reason , against scripture and the traditionary faith of the catholick church ; and our considerer and some other unwary writers chime in with them , it will be very necessary to shew how this betrays the catholick faith , and makes reason and criticism the supreme judge of controversy ; and then men may dispute on without end , and believe at last as they please . the considerer tells us , i take it for granted in a protestant countrey , that scripture is the only standard of all necess●ry revealed truths : neither in the present case is there any room for a traditionary faith. for besides that all the fathers and ancient writers ground their exposition of the trinity wholly upon scripture , i cannot conceive that the subject is capable of a plainer revelation ; as i shall endeavour to shew more fully in the following discourse . what this last clause means , we shall understand better hereafter ; but his denying a traditionary faith , is very extraordinary ; for if we can prove from the most authentick records , what the constant belief of the catholick chu●ch has been , especially in the first and purest ages of it , this i take to be a traditionary faith ; nor is it the less traditionary because the fathers and ancient writers sound their expositions of the trinity wholly upon scripture : for if this be true , then we have a traditionary faith of the trinity , and a traditionary exposition of the scripture , for the reason and proof of that faith , both in one ; which i take to be a greater authority , and safer guide , than mere scripture and our natural sentiments : and though protestants allow scripture to be the only standard of faith , yet he might have remembred , that the church of england requires us to expound scripture as the ancient fathers expound it . but this wholly is a mistake ; for the primitive fathers pleaded tradition as well as scripture against the ancient hereticks , as two distinct , but agreeing testimonies ; as this author might have known , would he have been pleased to have consulted irenaeus and tertullian de praescriptionibus , with divers others . what he means by a plainer revelation , i cannot tell ; it makes it somewhat plainer , to know what the catholick faith has always been , and what the catholick interpretation of scripture has always been ; which is the plainest and strongest answer to wit and criticism , and natural sentiments , when they contradict this traditionary faith. but to discourse this matter more particularly , i shall enquire , . what that catholick church is , from whence we must receive this traditionary faith. . what evidence we have of this tradition concerning the trinity , in the catholick church . . of what authority this ought reasonably to be in expounding scripture , sect . ii. concerning the traditionary faith of the church , with respect to the doctrine of the trinity . first then , let us consider what that catholick church is , from whence we must receive this traditionary faith. now since christ gave the supreme authority of preaching the gospel , and planting churches , to his apostles , those only must be reckoned the true apostolick churches , from which we must receive the true christian faith , which were planted by the apostles , or by apostolick men , and lived in communion with them . it is not sufficient to prove any doctrine to be the true primitive faith , that it was preached in the apostles days , but that it was the faith of the apostolick churches , which were planted by the apostles , and received their faith from them ; for that only is the primitive and apostolick faith. and therefore though arians and socinians could prove their heresies to be as ancient as the apostolick age , ( as we grant something like them was ) this does not prove theirs to be the true christian faith , if it were not the faith of the apostolick churches . and this was very visible in those days , what these churches were which were planted by the apostles , and lived in communion with them , and is very visible still in the most authentick records of the church . for the hereticks which sprang up in that age , separated themselves from the apostles , and thereby made a visible distinction between the true apostolick churches , and heretical conventicles : and in after-ages they either separated themselves , or were cast out of the communion of the church . this st. iohn accounted a great advantage to the christian church , and an infallible proof of false doctrine and heresy , as it certainly was at that time ; for if the apostles taught the true faith , those who separated from the apostles , and preached another gospel , which they never learnt from them , must be hereticks ; ioh. . , . little children , it is the last time ; and as ye have heard that antichrist shall come ▪ even now there are many antichrists ; whereby we know that it is the last time : they went out from us , but they were not of us ; for if they had been of us , they no doubt would have continued with us ; but they went out , that they might be made manifest , that they were not all of us . the separation of hereticks in that age was a visible renouncing the apostolick faith and communion ; and therefore how many heresies soever started up , it was still visible , where the apostolick faith and tradition was preserved ; and this was of admirable use to preserve the faith of the church sincere and uncorrupt : for had these hereticks continued in communion with the apostles and apostolick churches , and secretly propagated their heresies , and infected great numbers of christians , without dividing into distinct and opposite communions , it would have been a great dispute in the next age , which had been the true apostolick faith , when the members of the same churches , which all their time lived in communion with the apostles , should preach contrary doctrines , and pretend with equal confidence , apostolick tradition ; which the greatest hereticks might very plausibly have done , had they always lived in communion with the apostles : but they went out from us , says st. iohn , that they might be made manifest , that they were not all of us ; that the world might know how to distinguish between catholick christians , and hereticks ; and between the true catholick faith , and the corrupt innovations of perverse men . and this i take to be a good reason to this day , why we should keep the communion of the church sincere and uncorrupt , and not set our doors open for arians and socinians , and all sorts of hereticks to mix with us ▪ for though , since the c●mmunion of the church has b●en so broken and divided by schisms , and factions , and h●resies , it is no proof of the true apostolick faith , merely that it is the faith of such a church , ( though the church of rome still vainly pretends to such authority ) yet it would soon ruin the christian church , and the christian faith , to have no distinction preserved between true apostolick churches , and the apostolick faith , and the conventicles of hereticks , the impure off-spring of cerinthus and ebion , of photinus or arius . and therefore i cannot but abhor that accommodating-design which some men have expressed so warm a zeal for , to comprehend away the faith of the holy trinity , in some loose general expressions , without any particular determined sense , and to purge our liturgies of every thing that savours of the worship of the blessed trinity , that arians and socinians may join in communion with us : which is a plausible pretence , under the notion of christian charity and communion , to betray the christian faith : not expresly to renounce it , but to bury it in silence , as a useless and church-dividing dispute . i am satisfied this holy faith can never be confuted ; but could these men prevail , it might soon be lost. but to return : this is a sure foundation for our enquiries into the faith of the primitive church , to know what the primitive church is ; for otherwise we may mistake old heresies for the primitive faith. but those churches which were planted by the apostles or apostolical men , and received their faith from them , and lived in communion with them , are the true primitive and apostolick churches , and their faith is the true primitive apostolick faith ; and what that was , iustin martyr and irenaeus assure us ; the faith and worship of father , son , and holy ghost : and what their faith was as to all these three divine persons , is evident from the writings of those ancient fathers , who preserved the succession and communion of these apostolick churches . but this is not what i intend at present ; but from hence it appears , that those ancient heresies which were rejected and condemned by the apostolick churches , as soon as they appeared , could not be the apostolick faith. these hereticks separated from the apostles , and apostolick churches , and therefore could not receive their faith from them ; nor did they pretend to this , while the apostles lived , though they forged new gospels , and acts , and revelations for them when they were dead . and thus all the heresies of simon magus , menander , cerinthus , ebion , valentinus , and all those other divisions and subdivisions of hereticks , who denied or corrupted the doctrine of the divinity of our saviour , or his incarnation , are all rejected from the apostolical faith ; for these hereticks did not receive their doctrines from the apostles and apostolick churches , as they themselves owned by their separation from the apostolick churches ; and these churches gave testimony against their corruptions , as soon as they were known ; and there is no need of any other confutation of them , if we allow the doctrine of the apostles to be the only infallible rule of faith. this is the argument from prescription , which tertullian insists so largely on , and is frequently urged by irenaeus , and other catholick writers ; which is not , as some mistake it , an argument merely from antiquity ; for though the true faith was ancienter than any heresies , yet some heresies had antiquity enough to make them venerable , if that alone would do it ; but the argument was from the tradition of the apostolick churches , which were planted by the apostles , and had preserved an uninterrupted succession from them , and all the world over taught the same faith , without any material change or variation : whereas none of these heresies , how ancient soever they might be , could pretend to such an original , were never taught by the apostles , or any apostolical men , nor were received or owned by any churches planted by them . and this is an unanswerable argument , as long as we can reasonably suppose the tradition of the catholick faith , and the communion of the church , was preserved entire , which it visibly was , at least till the first nicene council ; and during all this period , had we no other ways to know it , we might learn the faith of the catholick church , by its opposition to those heresies which it condemned . dly . and this is the only evidence which i shall at present insist on for the catholick tradition of the faith of the holy and ever blessed trinity ; for we may see the plain footsteps of the ancient catholick tradition concerning father , son , and holy ghost , in those ancient heresies . simon magus was the first heretick we read of , and may be very justly accounted the father of many of the ancient heresies , having led the way , and sown the seeds and principles of them . now if we believe that account which epiphanius gives of him , this wicked impostor pretended himself to be god , both father and son , and affirmed that his lewd woman , who was called sometimes helena , sometimes selene , was the holy ghost . these names and distinctions of father , son , and holy ghost , he could not possibly learn from any persons , but only from the christian church , in which he was baptized in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost . and therefore we may observe , that before his baptism he only pretended to be some great one , and the deluded people thought him to be the great power of god , . acts , . but when he was baptized , and soon a●ter apostatized from the christian faith , the devil , whose great power he was , set him up for the god of the christians , both father and son. and though he blasphemously attributed these titles of god the father and son to himself , and wickedly corrupted this faith , by making the father and son but one person under different appearances ; that he appeared to his countreymen the samaritans as god the father , and to the iews as the son ; yet there had been no pretence for this , had not the christian church owned jesus christ , the son of god , to be true and perfect god. for had the father been god , and the son a mere man , it is certain father and son could never be the same person : and besides the wickedness and impudence of the impostor , in pretending himself to be father and son , it had been ridiculous to pretend this to christians , had he not known that the catholick faith taught the son to be true and real god , as well as the father ; and then if he could persuade them that he was god the father , he might with the same ease persuade them that he was god the son too , under a different appearance . thus when he pretends that his wicked strumpet was the holy ghost , by whom he created the angels , which created the world ; the very prophanation of this holy mystery shews what the faith of the church in that age was concerning the divinity of the holy ghost ; for he could have no other inducement to make his woman , whom he calls the holy ghost , such a divine power , but because he knew the christian church believed the holy ghost to be god , and the spirit of god , as he made her to be his divine creating intelligence . another heresy concerning the person of christ , attributed divinity to him , owned him to be the son of god , though not of the maker of the world , ( who they said was but an inferior angel ) , but of the unknown and incomprehensible father ; and that he appeared indeed in the world like a man , but was no true and real man. now what should put such a wild conceit as this into their heads , had they not known this to be the catholick faith , that jesus christ was the son of god ? their eyes could not see him to be god , but they saw him to be a man , and yet they deny him to be a man , and teach that he was the son of god , in the form and apparition of a man : which is a plain indication what the catholick faith was , that christ was both god and man. this they could not believe , that the son of god would so unite himself to human nature , as to become true and real man ; and yet they thought it so evident that he was the son of god , or at least saw that this faith was accounted so sacred , that they would not venture to deny that , and therefore chose to deny his humanity , and make a mere apparition of him . but then on the other hand , cerinthus and ebion thought it too evident to be denied , that he was a true and real man ; and therefore they taught , that iesus was a man , and no more than a man , born as other men are , of ioseph and mary . but then it is worth considering , how they came to make this the distinguishing doctrine of their sect , that christ was but a mere man , if the apostolick churches , whom they opposed , and from whom they separated , had not taught , that he was more than a man , that he was god as well as man. was there ever any dispute either before or since , concerning any other man in the world , who was owned to be a man , whether he were a mere man or not ? when one sort of hereticks deny christ to be a man , and another deny him to be god , and both of them in contradiction to the apostolick faith , it is a very strong presumption at least , what the true catholick apostolick faith was , that christ was both god and man. and yet cerinthus himself , though he makes jesus to be a mere man , owns christ to be a divine person , and that this christ descended on jesus at his baptism , in the form of a dove , and rested on him , or dwelt in him , and wrought miracles by him , but left him at his crucifixion , and flew up again to heaven . so that , according to cerinthus , from the time that jesus was baptized , till he was crucified , the divinity was very nearly and intimately united to him ; not that he was god and man in one person , as the catholick faith teaches , but yet that jesus christ was a divine and human person , though christ was one person , and jesus another . and therefore as the nicene creed ( which we find also in the ancient oriental creeds ) teaches us to believe in one god the father almighty , maker of heaven and earth , and of all things visible and invisible ; not to exclude christ from being the maker of the world , but in opposition to those hereticks who would not allow the supreme god , who is the father of christ , to be the maker of the world , but attributed the creation of this world to one or more inferior angels ; so they add , and in one lord iesus christ , the only begotten son of god , in opposition to those who made christ and jesus two persons . and yet in this very heresy we may see what the ancient catholick faith was , that jesus christ was god and man ; as cerinthus himself owned , though he would not unite christ and jesus into one person , nor make the union inseparable . the valentinian heresy , though dressed up after the mode of the pagan theology , was a manifest corruption of the christian faith , under a pretence of a more perfect knowledge of divine mysteries ; and we may still see the broken remains of the catholick tradition of the trinity among them . their pleroma , by which they seem to understand the fulness of the deity , as st. paul uses that phrase , col. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the fulness of the godhead dwelt in christ bodily . i say , this pleroma consisted of several aeons or divine persons , which were propagated from the unknown and incomprehensible father in gradual descents , and all together made up the compleat and perfect deity ; which were more or fewer , according to the various fancies of hereticks . now from these wild conceits we may in some measure learn what the catholick faith was : that the godhead was not confined to one single and solitary person , but that there is such a foecundity in the divine nature , as communicates it self to more persons than one . for had it been the known and received faith of the christian church , that there is but one person in the godhead , as well as but one god , there had been no pretence for these hereticks , who called themselves christians , and boasted of a more perfect knowledge of the christian faith , to have invented such a number of aeons , which they included within their pleroma , as the several emanations of their deity . and we may observe , that most of the names which they gave to their several aeons , are scripture-names and titles , which the pagan theology knew nothing of , and which they could learn no where , but from the christian church . basilides , i think , was one of the first who gave us any distinct account of these aeons , which was new modell'd by valentinus , and other succeeding hereticks ; and his first and supreme aeon , as epiphanius tells us , was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the unbegotten one , who only is the father of all , and by others is called the propater , and the unknown , invisible , incomprehensible father . now though the heathens very familiarly call their supreme god , the father of gods and men , with respect to his creating power ; yet as the notion of father is founded in a substantial generation , as these hereticks plainly understood it , so it is the peculiar character of god under the gospel , who is the father of our lord jesus christ , his only begotten son. it is certain the first person in the godhead was never called the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the one that is unbegotten , but to distinguish him from one who is begotten ; the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the only begotten ; who is god also , but god o● god. and it is observable what tertullian tells us of heracleon , that he made his first ae●n to be illud quod pronunciat , which some criticks not understanding , think to be a defect in the copy ; but the sense is plain , that his first aeon is he that pronounceth , or speaketh ; by which he represented the eternal generation of the word : so that his first aeon is the pronouncer or speaker , that is , the father of the eternal word , which st. iohn tells us was in the beginning , was with god , and was god : which shews that this is nothing else but a disguized corruption of the catholick faith , concerning the eternal generation of the word from the eternal unbegotten father . to confirm this , i observe farther , that most of the names which they give to their other aeons , are such names , titles , or characters , as the scripture gives to christ , or the holy spirit , which they have multiplied into so many distinct persons or aeons , such as the mind , word , prudence , power , and wisdom ; truth , life , light , the only begotten , the paraclete , and the like . valentinus indeed , as epiphanius observes , did model his thirty aeons according to hesiod's genealogy and number of gods , and with some manifest allusions to them ; but yet he retained as many scripture-names as he could , the better to reconcile unwary people to his fabulous genealogi●s , as the hidden and mysterious sense of scripture . and it is impossible such fables should ever have obtained any credit , had they not been grafted on the catholick faith , and pretended to improve it with new degrees of light and knowledge . when these heresies were pretty well silenced , up start noetus and sabellius , who ran into the other extreme . the valentinians had corrupted the doctrine of the trinity , by multiplying three divine persons into thirty aeons , besides all their other pagan and fabulous conceits about them : this offended these men , as downright polytheism ( as indeed it was no better ) ; and to avoid this , they reject a trinity of real and substantial persons , for a trinity of names ; that father , son , and holy ghost , are but three names of the same person , who is sometimes called the father , at other times the son , or the holy ghost , with respect to his different appearances or operations : or they made the son and holy ghost not two persons , but two personal attributes in god , his wisdom , or power : or they made the trinity but three parts of one compounded god , as a man consists of body , soul , and spirit ; which of late have been revived among us , under different names . after these men , arose arius and his followers , who out of great zeal also for the unity of god , framed a new and more subtile heresy : they were sensible that father and son were not two names , but two real distinct persons , and therefore they attributed the whole entire divinity to the father , and made the son not to be god by nature , but the most perfect and excellent creature , as perfect an image of god , as any creature can be , but not consubstantial with god , nor coequal and coeternal with him . all these heresies were rejected and condemned by the catholick church in their several ages , as soon as they appeared , and were taken notice of : and this is one very good way to learn what the catholick faith was , from its opposition to those heresies which the catholick church condemned , and from the corrupted remains of the ancient faith which appeared in them . for these hereticks were originally christians , and professed themselves christians , and therefore did not wholly renounce the christian faith , but grafted their heresies on it . as to confine my self to the subj●ct of the present dispute , what we are to understand by father , son , and holy ghost , whether three distinct , real , substantial persons , or not ; each of whom is distinctly by himself true and perfect god , but in the unity of the same divine nature and godhead . now that this was the received faith of the catholick church , we may learn both from the valentinians ▪ sabellians , and arians . though the valentinians , as i observed before , had corrupted the doctrine of the trinity , either with the platonick philosophy , as that it self had been corrupted by the iunior platonists ; or with the pagan theology ; yet the propagation of their aeons in different degrees and descents from the first supreme aeon , the unbegotten one , and the invisible and incomprehensible father , as they stile him , shews what they thought the catholick faith was , concerning the eternal generation of the son , and procession of the holy spirit , which they took to be a substantial generation and procession ; and accordingly in imitation of this faith , asserted a substantial 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or emanation of one aeon from another ; and which is more , none of the ancient fathers who wrote against this heresy , as far as i have observed , ever quarrel with them upon this account . nay tertullian , though he abominates these heresies , owns this probole or emanation in a true catholick sense ; and tells us , that these hereticks borrowed this word from the catholick faith , though they fitted it to their heresy : and challenges any man to say whether the divine word be not produced by the father ; and if it be , here , says he , is the prolation or emanation , which the true catholick faith owns . and adds , that the fault of this heresy was not their producing one aeon from another , but that besides the number of their fictitious aeons , they did separate these emanations and aeons from their author ; that the aeons knew not the father , nay , desired to know him , but could not know him ; and was e'en dissolved with passion and desire ; whereas in the catholick faith there is the most inseparable union of the son with the father , and the most intimate and perfect knowledge of him . so that tertullian allows of a real and substantial production of the person of the son from the person of the father ; as the valentinians pretended of their aeons ; and asserts , that these hereticks learnt this from the catholick faith of the trinity : and that the church must not reject this probole , prolation , or emanation , in an orthodox , catholick use of those words , because hereticks abuse them , to countenance their own heresies . as for the noetians and sabellians , ( for however they explain the doctrine of the trinity , whether by three names , or three powers , or three parts , while they teach , that the one god is but one single person , the heresy is the same ) it is impossible the catholick church should reject this heresy , without asserting three distinct , real , substantial persons in the unity of the godhead , each of whom is as true and perfect god , as each of three men , peter , iames , and iohn , is a true , perfect , distinct man ; though these three men are not uni●ed , as the three divine persons are . the occasion of this heresy was , that they thought that three real distinct persons in the godhead were three gods ; and therefore , though being profess'd christians , and consequently baptized in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost , they durst not deny father , son , and holy ghost , yet neither would they own three divine persons , but turned them into three names , or three parts of one person ; which has much more sense in it than three modes ; though three modes of the same person , let them call them three personalities if they please , is the same heresy , if there be but one suppositum ; as one man may be the subject of three , or three and twenty modes , and be but one human person still . noetus and sabellius did certainly apprehend , that by father , son , and holy ghost , the catholick church understood three distinct , substantial , divine persons , or else why should they charge them with tritheism upon this account , and turn three persons into three names , or three parts of one and the same god , to avoid the imputation of three gods ? and if this had not been the belief of the catholick church , what meant their zeal against this heresy ? for all the wit of man can't find a medium between sabellianism , and three divine substantial persons . a trinity must be three somewhats , as it has been lately called ; and then it must either be one suppositum or person , under three names , or three modes , or compounded of three parts ; or be three distinct suppositums and persons . now if this had been the catholick faith , that the trinity is but one suppositum or person , under three names or modes , &c. i cannot imagine why the catholick church should have quarrell'd with these hereticks , or they with the catholick church , unless they both mistook one another : but if the sabellians and catholicks understood themselves and each other , and did intend to contradict each other , we certainly know what the catholick faith was : for there is nothing contradicts a noetian and sabellian trinity , but a trinity , of distinct , substantial , divine persons . and novatianus well observes , that these hereticks did acknowledge the divinity of christ ; that whoever christ was , it was evident from those characters given of him in scripture , that he was true and perfect god : and because the father is true and perfect god , and christ true and perfect god , for fear of owning two gods , they make the father and the son to be but one and the same person . the arians denied the eternal godhead of christ , and made a creature of him , though the most excellent creature , the minister and instrument of god in making the world ; and the reason of this heresy was the same ; viz. for fear of a plurality of gods , should they allow christ to be true and perfect god. and this still is a plain evidence what they thought the catholick faith to be ; not only that christ was true and real god , but that he was truly and really a distinct person from god the father ; so distinct , that if they should acknowledge him to be true god , he would be a second god ; which they thought contradicted the faith of one god. well : though they would not own him to be true god , yet they own him to be a distinct person from the father , as distinct as god and a creature are distinct . do the catholicks now quarrel with the arians , that they have made a substantial person of the son ( as in reason t●ey ought to have done , had th●y not believed the son to be a distinct substantial person ) ; this dispute we hear nothing of ; but the only dispute was concerning the consubstantiality of the son with the father ; and that proves , that they did own the son to be a substantial person ; for were he not in a true proper sense a person , and a substantial person , he could not be consubstantial with the father . nay , st austin expresly tells us , that arius agreed with the catholicks against the sabellians , in making the son a distinct person from the father ; and if so , the catholicks taught , that the son was as distinct a person as arius did , though not a separate and created person , as he did . now when arius would have reduced christ into the number of creatures , though he made him the first and most excellent creature , created before the world , and god's minister in making the world , as like to god as a creature can possibly be , but not of the same nature with god ; the catholick church would not bear this , but in a most venerable synod collected from most parts of the christian world , condemn this as contrary to the faith always received and owned in their several churches . thus far , at least , the tradition of the church was sacred and venerable , and the concurrent testimony of all these several churches , was a more certain proof of the apostolick faith , than all the wit and subtilty of arius : for wit may patronize new errors , but cannot prove that to be the ancient apostolick faith , which the church had never received from the apostles , nor ever heard of before . this i take to be a very sensible proof what the faith of the christian church was , from the times of the apostles till the council of nice ; and consequently , what that faith was which the church received from the apostles : and this abundantly satisfies me , that whatever loose expressions we may meet with in some of the fathers , before the arian controversy was started , and managed with great art and subtilty ( though i know of none but what are capable of a very orthodox sense ) , it is certain that they were not arians , nor intended any such thing in what they said . for had arianism been the traditionary faith of the church , it must have been known to be so ; and then how came the church to be so strangely alarm'd at the first news of it ? or what shall we think of those venerable fathers and confessors in that great council , who either did not know the faith of the church , or did so horribly prevaricate in the condemnation of arius , when they had no other apparent interest or temptation to do so , but a warm and hearty zeal for the truly ancient and apostolick faith ? it is certain arius never pretended catholick tradition for his opinion , but undertook to reform the catholick faith by the principles of philosophy , and to reconcile it to scripture by new-coin'd interpretations ; though in this he fail'd , and found the great athanasius an over-match for him . it is not with faith , as it is with arts and sciences of human invention , which may be improved in every age by greater wits or new observations ; but faith depends upon revelation , not invention ; and we can no more make a new catholick faith , by the power of wit and reason , than we can write a true history of what the apostles did and taught , out of our own invention , without the authority of any ancient records : men may do such things if they please , but one will be heresy , and the other a romance . and yet this is the bold and brave attempt of secinus and his disciples : they are so modest indeed , as not to pretend antiquity to be on their side ; they can find no other antiquity for themselves , but in cerinthus and ebion , who separated from the catholick church , and were rejected by them ; and it does not seem very modest , to set up such men as these , against the universal consent of the first and purest ages of the church . the socinians , who know very well what the charge of novelty signifies in matters of religion ; that a new faith is but another name for new heresies ; though they reject the doctrine of the fathers , and the catholick tradition of the faith from the apostolick age , yet they appeal to scripture and natural sentiments , as the greatest and best antiquity , in opposition to apostolick tradition . this is our considerer's way , which he prefers before a traditionary faith ; and by the same reason the socinians may oppose it to a traditionary faith : and if we must always expound scripture by our natural sentiments , this author had best consider whether he can prove a trinity by natural reason ; or fairly reconcile the natural notion of one god , with the catholick faith of the trinity , or of three , each of whom is true and p●rfect god , from the mere principles of natural reason ; for if he can't , he must not in his way find a trinity in scripture : but of this more hereafter . . let us now , in opposition to this pretence , consider of what authority the traditionary faith of the catholick church ought to be , in expounding scripture . the holy scripture , at least in pretence , is allowed on all hands to be a compleat and authentick rule of faith ; but the question is , since men differ so much in expounding scripture , what is the safest rule to expound scripture by ; whether the traditionary faith of the church , or our natural sentiments , or natural reason ? i do not mean , that we must learn the critical sense of every text from catholick tradition ; for we have not in all points such a traditionary exposition of scripture ; though even in this respect , we shall find that the catholick fathers have unanimously agreed in the interpretation of the most material texts relating to the doctrine of the holy trinity , and the divinity and incarnation of christ. they sometimes indeed alledge such texts , especially out of the old testament , as our modern criticks will not allow to be proper and apposite ; but even this shews what their faith was ; and yet these very expositions , which have been so anciently and unanimously received ( though they may appear at this distance of time too forc'd and mystical ) have too sacred and venerable an authority to be wantonly rejected . we may learn from christ and his apostles , what mysterious and hidden senses were contain'd in the writings of the old testament , such as it is very probable we should never have found in them , had not christ and his apostles explained their meaning : and the nearer any writers were to the apostolick age , the more they were addicted to these mystical interpretations ; which is a good reason to believe that they learnt it from the apostles themselves . but this is not what i now intend ; my present argument reaches no farther than this ; that if we can learn what the doctrine of the catholick church concerning the holy trinity , and the divinity and incarnation of christ has always been : then . it is very reasonable to conclude , that they received this doctrine from the apostles , it being the faith of those churches which were planted by the apostles , received their faith from them , and always lived in communion with them . . this makes it reasonable to believe , that this very faith is contained in the writings of the new testament ; for , i suppose , no man questions , but that the apostles taught the same faith by writing , which they did by preaching ; and then this is a demonstration against all such interpretations of scripture as contradict the catholick faith ; whatever fine colours wit and criticism may give them . nay , . it is a certain proof , that these primitive christians , who received these inspired writings from the apostles which now make up the canon of the new testament , did believe that the same faith which the apostles and apostolical men had taught them by word of mouth , was contained in their writings ; for they could not possibly have believed both what the apostles taught , and what they writ , if their preaching and writings had contradicted each other . we know what the faith of the primitive church was , and we know they received these apostolical writings with the profoundest veneration , as an inspired rule of faith ; and had we no other presumption of it but this , we might safely conclude , that they found the same faith in these writings , which the apostles had before taught them by word of mouth . but besides this , we find that all the catholick writers appeal to the scriptures , and prove their faith from them ; and the authority of such men who were so near the fountain of apostolick tradition , must be very venerable . . i shall only add this , that since we know what the catholick faith was , and how the catholick fathers expounded scripture , if the words of scripture will naturally and easily admit that sense , much more if they will not admit any other sense without great force and violence , let any man judge which is most safe and reasonable , to expound scripture as the catholick faith and catholick fathers expound it , and as the scripture most easily and naturally expounds it self , or to force new senses and old heresies upon scripture , which the catholick church has always rejected and condemned . this , i hope , may satisfy our considerer , that he did very ill in rejecting a traditionary faith , and venturing to expound scripture by his natural sentiments , which is a very unsafe rule in matters of pure revelation , of which mere natural reason is no competent judge . sect . iii. what is sufficient to be believed concerning the trinity . thus far , i fear , our considerer has been a little unfortunate ; or if it do not prove a misfortune to him in forming his notion of a trinity , his luck is better than his choice . let us proceed to his next enquiry , what is sufficient for christians to believe concerning the trinity ; or , which is all one in this case , what is necessary to be believed ? what the meaning of this question is , i can't well tell ; nor why he makes sufficient and necessary all one ; for , at least , they are not always so . that is sufficient which is enough for any man to believe ; that is strictly necessary which every man must believe : but let him take his own way ; he quits the term sufficient , and enquires what is necessary to be believed ; whereas in many cases , that which is absolutely necessary for all , may not be sufficient for some : i should much rather have enquired how much may be known concerning this glorious mystery , than how little will serve the turn ; which argues no great zeal for it . well : what is necessary to be believed concerning the trinity ? he answers , nothing but . what 's possible to be believed . and . what 's plainly revealed . here we begin to see what the effect is , of consulting nothing but scripture and natural sentiments . i hope he meant honestly in this ; but if he did , he expressed himself very incautiously ; for these two conditions are very ill put together , when applied to matters of revelation . plainly revealed , had been enough in all reason , unless he would insinuate , that what is plainly revealed may be impossible to be believed ; and that how plain soever the revelation be , men must judge of the possibility of the thing by their own natural sentiments , before they are bound to believe it ; which makes natural reason , not scripture , the final judge of controversies . but we must follow him where he leads us ; and thus he divides his whole work. . to consider how far it is possible to believe a trinity . . what the scripture requires us to believe in this matter . as for the first , he tells us , there are two requisites to make it possible for us to believe a thing . . that we know the terms of what we are to assent to . . that it imply no contradiction to our former knowledge : such knowledge i mean , as is accompanied with certainty and evidence . this in some sense may be true ; but as it is thus loosely and generally expressed , it is very like the socinian cant and sophistry . by knowing the terms , he means having distinct natural ideas of what is signified by such terms ; as he himself explains it ; — i can believe it no farther than the terms of which it is made up , are known and understood , and the ideas signified by them consistent . so that all divine mysteries must be examined by our natural ideas ; and what we have no natural ideas of , we cannot , we must not believe : and this once for all condemns all supernatural faith , or the belief of supernatural objects , though never so plainly revealed ; for we have no natural ideas of supernatural objects : and though revelation may furnish us from the resemblances and analogies in nature with some artificial ideas , this will not serve the turn ; for though they know what such terms signify when applied to natural , they know not what they signify when applied to supernatural objects , nor have they any ideas to answer them : as for instance ; we know what father and son signify when applied to men ; but when we say , god is not only eternal himself , but an eternal father , who begot an eternal son ; these terms of father and son , begetting and being begotten , must signify quite otherwise than they do among men , something which we have no idea of ; and therefore say the socinians , all this is unintelligible and impossible to be believed , unless we can believe without understanding the terms : this considerer asserts the premises , he had best consider again how he will avoid the conclusion . another socinian topick is contradiction , and this our considerer makes another requisite to the possibility of believing , that the thing do not imply a contradiction to our former knowledge ; that is , to any natural ideas : and here he learnedly disputes against believing contradictions ; and that it is not consistent with the wisdom , iustice , and goodness of god to require us to believe contradictions . but if instead of all this he had only said , that god cannot reveal such plain and evident contradictions , as he cannot require us to believe ; and consequently , that whatever is plainly revealed , implies no contradiction , how much soever it may be above our comprehension , because god does require us to believe what he plainly reveals ; this had put an end to this dispute , and left the belief of the trinity possible , whatever difficulties we might apprehend in conceiving it : but this great zeal against believing contradictions , when applied to the belief of the trinity , is a very untoward insinuation , as if the doctrine of the trinity , as commonly understood , were clogg'd with contradictions , and that we must cast all such contradictions ( which in the socinian account is the doctrine it self ) out of our faith ; and therefore , that whatever the scripture says , we must put no such sense on it as implies any contradiction to our former knowledge . this is an admirable foundation for considerations concerning the trinity ; and what an admirable superstructure he has rais'd on it , we shall soon see . i may possibly discourse this point of contradictions more at large elsewhere ; at present i shall only tell this author , that as self-evident as he thinks it , this proposition is false , that it is impossible to believe what implies a contradiction to our former knowledge ; and that god cannot require us to believe it . i grant that all logical contradictions which are resolved into is , and is not , are impossible to be believed , because they are impossible to be true ; and such is his contradiction about the whole and its parts ; for to say , that the whole is not bigger than any of its parts , is to say , that a whole is a whole , and is not a whole ; and that a part is a part , and is not a part. but contradictory ideas may both be true , and therefore both be believed , and every man believes great numbers of them : the ideas of heat and cold , white and black , body and spirit , extension and no extension , eternity and time , to have a beginning and to have no beginning , are contradictory ideas , and yet we believe them all ; that is , we believe and know that there really are such things , whose natures are directly opposite and contrary to each other . now when there are such contrarieties and contradictions in created nature , it may justly be thought very strange to true considerers , that our natural ideas should be made the adequate measures of truth or falshood , of the possibilities or impossibilities of things ; that we must not believe what god reveals concerning himself , if it contradicts any natural ideas . and yet i challenge this considerer , and all the socinian , sabellian , arian fraternities , to shew me any appearance of contradictions in the doctrine of the trinity , but what are of this kind ; that is , not logical contradictions , but contradictions to our other natural ideas : and if our natural ideas of created nature contradict each other , it would be wonderful indeed if the divine uncreated nature should not contradict all our natural ideas . every thing we know of god is a direct contradiction to all the ideas we have of creatures ; an uncreated and a created nature , an infinite and a finite nature , are direct contradictions to each other : eternity without succession , omnipresence without extension , parts , or place ; a pure simple act , which is all in one , without composition ; an omnipotent thought , which thinks all things into being , and into a beautiful order ; these and such like ideas of god are direct contradictions to all the ideas we have of creatures ; and can any contradiction then to any ideas of created nature be thought a reasonable objection against believing any thing which god reveals to us concerning himself ? but of this more hereafter . sect . iv. concerning his state of the question , that one and the same god is three different persons . these are his preliminaries , axioms , postulata's , all in the strict demonstrative way ; but now he comes to apply all this more closely to the business in hand ; but then he very unfortunately stumbles at the threshold . the proposition he proposes to examine by these principles , is this , that one and the same god is three different persons . where he met with this proposition in these very terms , i know not ; i 'm sure there is no such proposition in scripture , nor did i ever meet with it in any catholick writer : it is very far from giving us a true and adequate notion of the catholick faith concerning the trinity ; it is of a doubtful signification , and in the most obvious sense of these words ( which i fear will appear to have been intended by this considerer ) is manifest heresy : for if by one and the same god , he means , that there is but one who is god ; and , that this one and same god is three different persons ; it is the heresy of sabellius at least , if he would have owned the term different , which inclines more to the signification of diversity , than of mere distinction , which savours of arianism , and more properly relates to natures than to persons . we meet with different forms of speech in catholick writers concerning the unity and trinity in the godhead , all which must be reconciled , to form a distinct and compleat notion of the trinity . that deus . est vnus & trinus , god is one and three , is very ancient , and very catholick . that the father is the one god , in a peculiar and eminent sense , is both the language of scripture , and of the church . that each person , father , son , and holy ghost , is by himself true and perfect god , is likewise the doctrine both of the holy scriptures , and the catholick fathers . that the trinity is one god ; that father and son are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , vnum , one divinity , christ himself teaches us : that father , son , and spirit , are also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one , st. iohn teaches us . and nothing is more familiar both with the greek and latin fathers , than to call the trinity one god ; and in consequence of this , that one god is the trinity ; though this they rather chose to express by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one divinity in three persons . and whoever would give an account of the catholick faith of the trinity , must have respect to all these notions , and not content himself with any one of them , as , to make the best of it , the considerer here does , when he only proposes to enquire , how one and the same god is three persons : but he ought to have enquired also in what sense each person is by himself true and perfect god ; and the person of the father in a peculiar and eminent sense the one god ; and to have framed his notions of unity and distinction with an equal regard to all these catholick expositions ; which would have secured him from the sabellian heresy , which now his words are very guilty of , whatever he himself be . but let us now proceed to his examination of these terms , god , vnity , identity , distinction , and number , and person . as to the notion of a deity , he confesses he has not a ful● and adequate idea of god ; but yet he knows which of those distinct ideas he has in his mind , are applicable to god , and which are not . but the present question does not conce●n the idea of god , which i hope we are all agreed in , that god is a being infinitely perfect : but whether this name god , in the question of the trinity , signifies only one who is god , or one single divine person ? or , whether this name , and the perfect idea which belongs to it , be applicable distinctly to three , to father , son , and holy ghost ; that each of them is true and perfect god , and neither of them is each other , and all three but one god ? this had been the true explication of the term god , as applied to the doctrine of the trinity , to have told us what is meant by god , when this name is peculiarly attributed to the person of the father , when it is attributed to each person distinctly , and when it is jointly attributed to them all , that father , son , and holy ghost , are one god : ●t is certain all this must be resolved into the same one divinity , which is perfectly in each of them , and insepara●ly and indivisibly in them all : and the true stating of his matter had been very proper , and would have saved all his other labour . and therefore to save me some labour , i will briefly tell him how the catholick fathers understood it ; which is the only possible way i know , of reconciling these different expressions . when they tell us , that the person of the father is in an eminent and peculiar manner the one god ; by this they understand , that the father alone is self-originated , and from himself ; that the whole divinity and godhead is originally his own , which he received from no other : which is the first and most natural notion we have of god , and of one god. when they say , that though the father in this sense be the one god , yet the son also is true and perfect god , and the holy ghost true and perfect god , they ascribe divinity to the son and holy ghost , upon account of the eternal and perfect communication of the divine nature to them : for he who has the true divine nature , is true and perfect god : and therefore the son , who is eternally begotten of his father , of the substance of his father , and is consubstantial with him , is true and perfect god , but god of god ; and the like may be said of the holy spirit , who eternally proceeds from father and son. when they teach , that the trinity is one god , they mean by it , that the same one divinity does subsist whole and entire , indivisibly and inseparably , but yet distinctly in them all , as i have already explained it : so that the unity of the godhead gives an account of all these expressions , why the father is said to be the one god , and yet that the son is god , and the holy ghost god , and father , son , and holy ghost , but one god. all this is taught in scripture , and is the faith of the catholick church ; and i would never desire a better proof of the truth and certainty of any notion , than that it takes in the whole mystery , and answers to every part of it ; which no other account i have ever yet met with , can do . sect . v. an examination of his notions and ideas of unity , distinction , person , &c. and now the sabellian scene opens apace : if the heresy of sabellius was , that there is but one who is god , but one divine intelligent person , as well as one divine nature , this our considerer expresly owns , and does his endeavour to prove it absolutely impossible that it should be otherwise ; that is , that the catholick faith , asserted and defended by the catholick church , against sabellius , is absolutely impossible . to explain the word person , he tells us , it signifies one of these two things ; either a particular intelligent being ; or an office , character , or some such complex notion , applicable to such a being : if you would know in which of these senses we must understand the word person , when we say there are three persons in the trinity ; he tells us plainly , that the simple idea ( of god ) can be applied but to one single person , in the first sense of the word person , as it signifies a particular intelligent being , nature , or principle . — and that all the personal distinction we can conceive in the deity , must be founded on some accessory ideas , extrinsecal to the divine nature ; a certain combination of which ideas , makes up the second notion signified by the word person . and for this he appeals to natural sentiments , mistaking heresy for nature . and if we fairly and impartially examine our own thoughts upon this subject , we shall find , that when we name god the father , we conceive the idea of god , so far as we are capable of conceiving it , as acting so and so , under such respects and relations ; and when we name god the son , we conceive nothing else but the same idea of god over again , under different relations ; and so likewise of the holy ghost . noetus , praxeas , or sabellius , never taught their heresy in more express words than these . and what is to be done now ? must we dispute this point over again with the considerer , and confute a heresy which has been so early , so often , and so constantly condemned by the catholick church ? for my part , i can pretend to say nothing new , which has not long since been much better said by the catholick fathers ; and therefore before we part , i shall acquaint him with their judgment in the case , and leave it to rest on their authority and reasons . but it may not be amiss to mind this considerer , that he has all the schoolmen ( as far as i have heard , or had opportunity to consult them ) as well as the catholick fathers , against him , in his notion of a person ; for they all receive boetius's definition , that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature . or it may be the authority of melancthon may be more considerable with him ; who tells us , that the church in this article of the trinity understands by person , an individual , intelligent , incommunicable substance : and adds , that the ancient ecclesiastical writers distinguish between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that there is but one essence or nature , and three hypostases ; that is , three really subsisting , not commentitious , vanishing , confused , but distinct , particular , intelligent persons . and the censure he passes upon servetus upon this score , is very remarkable . that fanatical fellow servetus plaid with the word person , and contended , that in latin it anciently signified a dress or habit , or the distinction of an office ; as r●scius is sometimes said to act the part of achilles , sometimes of vlysses : or , the person of a consul is one thing , and the person of a slave is another , as cicero speaks ; that it is a great thing to maintain the character of the person of a prince in the commonwealth : and this ancient signification of the word he slily wrested and applied to the article concerning the three persons of the godhead : but let us fly from , and abhor such wicked artifices ; and know , that the church speaks after another manner ; and that person signifies an individual , intelligent , incommunicable substance . and it will be of great use to form and fix this notion in our minds ; to contemplate the baptism of christ , where all three persons were most evidently represented and distinguished : the father spoke in an audible voice , this is my beloved son ; the son is seen standing in the river ; and the holy spirit descends on him in a visible appearance . but since the considerer makes a great flourish with his ideas , and clear and distinct conceptions , and fetches his proofs from the most intimate knowledge of nature , he may take it ill if no notice or regard be had of them : we see very well where he has been trading ; and i doubt the ingenious author of human vnderstanding , will have more disciples of different kinds than he was well aware of , in whom he will have no great reason to glory : for it requires more skill than every man is master of , to form simple and distinct notions and ideas , and to apply them dexterously to their proper subjects . and to refer all men to natural ideas and perceptions , when so very few know how to distinguish between natural notions , and the prejudices and prepossessions of education , the delusions of fancy , and the byass of inclination , is like the quakers appeal to the light within , which is just what every man will have it to be . our considerer reduces all the notions he can find of vnity and distinction , to three heads : the unity or distinction of ideas , of principle , and of position ; and undertakes to prove from them all , that it is impossible , or absolutely unconceivable , that there should be more than one intelligent person , in the proper notion of a person , in the godhead . now in the first place i would be glad to hear a good reason why the considerer takes no notice of that old received definition of one , that vnum est indivisum ; that is one , which is undivided : the most perfect one is that which neither is nor can be divided ; an absolute perfect monad , which is absolutely and perfectly simple , without any parts to be divided into : and this is the unity of the divine nature , as scripture , fathers , schoolmen , and all men of improved and exercised reason teach ; and it is strange he should not find this notion of unity among all his natural ideas , which is the only natural notion of the divine unity , and belongs to no other being . and this would have given him a true catholick notion of the unity of god in a trinity of persons ; for all agree , that the divine nature is indivisibly and inseparably one. and this is another thing i would be glad to know the reason of , why in such an enquiry concerning the unity and distinction of the trinity , he takes no notice of that old catholick distinction , that god is one in nature , and three in persons ; which would have been a good direction to him , what kind of unity , and what distinction to have enquired after : what unity belongs to nature , and what it is which distinguishes persons : but our considerer has no regard to the different notions of nature and person , but applies all his notions of unity to a person , which as far as they are true , belong to nature , and from the unity of nature proves against the catholick faith , that there can be but one proper divine person . and there is one thing i am sorry for , that having mentioned a very good notion , he let it slip between his fingers without making any use of it . he tells us , that identity is nothing else but a repetition of vnity , as number is of difference . this is very catholick , and it is great pity we hear no more of it . upon this principle the fathers justify the unity of the godhead in a trinity of persons : for the divine nature is but one , a perfect monad , and is communicated whole and entire , without the least division or separation , to the son and holy spirit , and therefore is perfectly and identically one and the same in all three ; for the perfect repetition of a monad and unit makes no number : god , and god , and god , are not three gods , but one god , because the same divine nature , without the least difference or diversity , is distinctly in them all ; and the repetition of what is perfectly the same , makes no number ; but father , son , and holy ghost are three , for they are really distinguished from each other , not by any difference of nature , but only by personal differences , or the different manner of having the same nature : that the father has the whole divine nature originally in himself , is god of himself : the son receives the same divine nature by an eternal generation , and is god of god : and the holy ghost in like manner by an eternal procession from father and son : this incommunicably distinguishes persons , that one can never be another ; and this is difference enough to make a number ; not to make three gods of them , because the divine nature is perfectly one and the same in three , but to distinguish them into three persons , each of whom is true and perfect god , and all but one god. why the considerer should wave such a notion as this of unity and distinction , which any one would have thought his own notions of identity and number must unavoidably have led him into , i cannot guess ; but i hope this may satisfy him , that there are other notions of unity and distinction , than what he insists on , and such as may be as easily understood , and which fairly reconcile the belief of three proper divine intelligent persons , with the unity of the godhead : but let us now briefly consider his ideas of unity and d●stinction . . the first is , the vnity of idea : this he discourses of very confusedly , and does not seem well pleased with it himself : the unity of the idea he places in being perceivable at one view , and having one uniform appearance : which makes it one idea indeed , right or wrong , but proves no other kind of unity : this he grew sensible of , that the reality of things may not answer our ideas or appearances ; and i know not how they sh●uld , unless our ideas answer the reality of things ; for things are to be the patterns for our ideas , not our ideas for things . but the considerer , by forsaking his good old rules , for new methods of thinking , has quite mistaken the question . when we enquire into the general notion of unity , the meaning is not , when we conceive of any thing as one , but what it is that makes any thing one. the unity of idea , whether simple or compounded , may be answer enough to the first question , tha● a●l that is comprized in one idea , if our idea be right , belongs to one thing ; but , as he owns , we cannot prove that our idea answers the reality of things , and therefore i know not what this rule is good for at all . but our general notion of unity is of a very different consideration ; and our particular ideas of particular things , contribute nothing to it : for the question is not , how many things are united in one being ? or , how many partial conceptions are united in one idea ? but , what it is that makes it one ; or what the formal conception of its unity is ? but our considerer takes heart at last , from the unity of the idea of god , to prove that there can be but one divine person in a proper sense ; or but one who is true and perfect god. his argument is this ; we cannot conceive that any object should be truly and adequately represented to any mind or vnderstanding under one idea , and truly and adequately represented under three ideas . and what is the cons●quence of this ? that he tells us plainly , that all the perfections ( of the deity ) though considered separately under different apprehensions by our imperfect faculties , being really but one simple idea , can be applied to but one single person , in the first sense of the word person , as it signifies a particular intelligent being , nature , and principle . . now in the first place this argument supposes an idea which truly and adequately represent its object , and yet our considerer is so modest as not to pretend to a full and adequate idea of god : and therefore , according to his own way , he can never conclude from the idea of god , that it can belong but to one single person , because he has not an adequate idea of the divine nature ; and then there may be something in the idea of god , which he does not comprehend , which may make it applicable to more persons than one . certainly it seems very reasonable , when we confess that we have not an adequate idea of the d●vine nature , to refer this whole dispute , not to natural ideas , which can never determine it , but to revelation , which is more certain and more perfect than our natural knowledge . . i grant , that one object cannot be truly and adequately represented to my mind under one idea , and truly and adequately represented under three different ideas : but it is as true , that one and the same idea may be truly and adequately applied to three distinct and different persons : the adequate idea of peter can be applied to none but peter ▪ but the idea of man , or of human nature , may be truly and adequately applied to peter , iames , and iohn , and to every single human person in the world . the idea of god , as abstracted from the consideration of a trinity of persons , is only the idea of the divine nature , which is but one , and can never be three different natures ; for the divine nature always was , and always will be but one and the same ; and this is that one object which is adequately , in his sense , represented by one idea . and this is the account the catholick fathers give of the unity of god , that there is but one divinity , one divine nature in three persons ; and thus the trinity is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the one divinity , that one object represented by the one idea of god. the divine persons are not distinguished by any difference of nature , which is one and the same in all , but by personal differences ; that the father is unbegotten , the son begotten , and the holy ghost proceeds from father and son : these are three different ideas for the three divine persons ; but the idea of the divinity is but one , as the divine nature is one and the same in all . could he indeed prove , that the idea of god is not only one simple idea , but the idea of one single person , that would be somewhat more to the purpose ; it would be such an argument against a trinity of persons , from the idea of god , as necessary existence , as included in the idea of god , is for the being of god : but this he can never prove ; and at best , these arguments from ideas are thought too fine and subtle by most men . . his next kind of unity is a vnity of principle ; that is one thing , which has but one principle of action : and we cannot conceive that one principle or nature should be but one , and yet three different principles and natures . but i suppose he can conceive , that if one and the same undivided principle and nature be and act in three , these three are one by the unity of principle and nature . and this is the catholick faith of the trinity , not three different principles and natures in three persons , but one and the same principle and nature , inseparably and indivisibly subsisting and acting in three : upon account of which identity of principle and operation , the catholick fathers asserted but one life , energy , and power , not confusedly , but distinctly in three ; which asserts the unity of principle , together with the real distinction of true and proper persons . if indeed he can prove from his vnity of principle , that one nature and principle can live , subsist , and act but in one ; such a unity of principle as this , will admit but of one single person , and must overthrow the catholick faith of a real trinity . but though the unity of principle does prove that to be but one , which has but one principle ; it does not prove , that this one nature and principle can be but in one. . his third kind of unity is very surprizing , especially as applied to the unity of god ; it is the unity of position , of place , or of vbi . when we perceive any object in a continued position , bounded and fenced out from other things round about it , all within such terms and limits we call one. bless me ! thought i ; how is this applicable to the unity of god ? who has no body , no parts , no continued position ; can't be bounded and fenced round about , nor confined within terms and limits ; and therefore can never have this vnity of position , which is a very sorry kind of unity at best . his philosophy belonging to this head is very admirable ; but to let that pass , he would not be thought to attribute extension to spirits ; but the idea of a point is more applicable to spiritual beings ; but a physical point is extended still , though it be the least conceivable extension , and has parts , and therefore can't represent simple unity , and is the idea of body , not of spirit . nor does he think local presence or determination any way contained within the idea of a spiritual being , and therefore this can't belong to the unity of a spirit . well : but he is not able to comprehend the vnion or separation of two spiritual beings , without considering them in the same or different localities . i know not how to help this , that he can't conceive of spirits , but only after the manner of bodies . are spirits united by juxta-position of parts , or penetration of dimensions ? if not , one vbi can't unite them , though separate vbi's may prove them separate . but still what is all this to the unity of god ? why , he tells us , it is plain at first sight , that we cannot possibly conceive god under any difference of position : i add further , that we cannot conceive god under any position , and therefore the unity of position can never belong to the vnity of god. but the reason he gives why we can't conceive god under any difference of position , is , because we cannot exclude omnipotence from any imaginable point of space ; nor can we include it in it ; which proves that god has no position , but is present without position , as he is without extension , and without parts . god needs no place to subsist in , but is place to himself , and place to every thing else ; as the hebrews called god mak●m , or place ; according to s. paul's notion of it , that in him we live , move , and have our being ; that as all things receive being by his almighty word , so all things subsist in infinite mind , as the ideas and notions of things do in finite minds . god could not create any thing without himself , because there is nothing extra without him ; and this is the omnipresence of god , not his commensuration to infinite space ; which is a gross corporeal representation of omnipresence by infinite extension , or commensuration to infinite extension , and makes something else as infinite as god , viz. infinite space , which must be commensurate to god , if god be commensurate to space ; but the omnipresence of god is his comprehension of all things in himself . and yet his way of proving the omnipresence of god from his omnipotence , that we cannot exclude omnipotence from any imaginable point of space , if by omnipresence he means an essential omnipresence , as he must do here , is not so self-evident as he seems to think it : the only foundation of it is this , that nothing can act where it is not ; which holds true only where contact is necessary to action , that is , only in bodies , whose power consists in contact , or touching each other ; but any being which acts without contact , as god certainly does , may be omnipotent , without being omnipresent ; that is , may act at an infinite distance , without any local presence with the thing on which it acts . it is the first time , to the best of my remembrance , that ever i met with this notion , that 't is the limited powers and faculties of created beings , which are the foundation of all local distinction . finite creatures indeed have finite and limited powers ; but it is not the limitation of their powers and faculties , but of their presence , which makes a local or vbi distinction : if this were so , power must be proportioned to presence , which we know is false ; for the greatest things , which fill the largest space , are not the most powerful : spirits , which fill no space at all , have the greatest power , and most enlarged faculties . but it is time to see the pinch of this argument from the vnity of position ; and the sum of it is this : whatever is one , must be in some one place or vbi , which distinguishes and separates it from other things : that he cannot conceive the distinction of two or three beings from each other , without considering them in so many different places or localities : that god is omnipresent , and he can no more conceive three omnipresent , than he can conceive three straight lines drawn between the same points . that is , in plain english , there are not three distinct infinite spaces for three distinct omnipresent persons to be in , and therefore there cannot be a trinity of true and proper persons ; but as there is but one omnipresent divine nature , so there can be but one single omnipresent person ; and there is an end of the trinity , till we can find room in the world for three persons , each of whom is omnipresent . i perceive our considerer has not been so fair and equal as he pretended to be . he would not consult the fathers , for fear of prejudices and prepossessions ; but either good wits jump , or he has taken care to consult the ancient hereticks ; for this was the old sabellian argument , which was long since answered and scorned by athanasius ; as he will find in the chapter of sabellianism , to which i refer him and the reader . but in good earnest , does any sober christian want an answer to this argument ? does god then fill a space , as bodies do , that three divine omnipresent persons must have three separate localities , and be commensurate to three infinite spaces ? has god any place ; does he subsist in any thing but himself ? if the considerer can't conceive any beings to be distinct without distinct localities , how does he distinguish god from creatures , when he owns that god is in every imaginable point of space , that is , in the very same vbi's and localities , whereever any creatures are ? but do not all catholick christians own , that there is but one infinite , inseparable , undivided nature , in three persons ? and must this one undivided monad be in three separate localities , because it subsists in three distinct persons ? especially when these distinct persons are whole and entire in each other ; as our saviour assures us , i am in the father , and the father in me . and is not this a wonderful demonstration against three real and proper persons in the trinity , that there cannot be three such infinite omnipresent persons , unless they subsist in three infinite and separate localities ? but enough of this in all reason . these are the premises , from whence with so much open assurance and confidence he draws that sabellian conclusion , that the idea of god being really but one simple idea , can be applied but to one single person , in the first sense of the word person , as it signifies a particular intelligent being , nature , or principle . — from whence , he says , it follows , that according to the notions we are capable of framing of vnity and distinction , — all the personal distinction we can conceive in the deity , must be founded on some accessory ideas , extrinsecal to the divine nature . so that there is not a trinity in the divine nature , as the catholick church has always believed ; but the divine nature , which really is but one single person , is a trinity with respect to something which does not belong to the divine nature , but is extrinsecal to it . whether these be not new terms and new doctrine too , unknown to the catholick church , or known only as condemned heresies , i appeal to all men , who will consult any catholick historian , or any catholick father , without prejudice . and here i might reasonably enough break off ; for i have followed the considerer till we have heard him demonstrate against a trinity of real , proper persons in the unity of the godhead ; which puts an end to the whole dispute about a trinity in vnity , because there is no such thing . he has found out indeed a unity for god , but it is not a unity in trinity , but the unity of one single person ; and he has found a trinity , but it is not a trinity in the unity of the divine nature , but a trinity of extrinsecal accessory ideas . but since he has used some art in palliating this heresy , it will be necessary to take off the disguise . the first step he makes to it , is by seeming to own , that there may be some greater mystery and obscurity in the doctrine of the trinity , than that account which he has given of it : but if this account , says he , of the trinity be too easy , and falls far short of those high expressions of distinction found in scripture ( as i think it does ) , and no other , grounded upon any notions our souls have framed of vnity and distinction , can be true or consistent ( as i have before particularly proved ) , then it necessarily follows , that god must be one and three in some way or manner not conceivable by human vnderstanding . here he thinks he has found a safe retreat : he asserts , and proves ( as he would have us believe ) from all the notions of distinction and unity which our minds can frame , that god is and can be one in no other notion , than of one single person , in the first and proper sense of a person , for an intelligent person ; and that god neither is nor can be three in the sense of three proper distinct persons : if you charge him with sabellianism for this , then he retreats to an obscure , confused knowledge ; to such a way and manner of god's being one and three , as is not conceivable by human understanding . well : but will he allow us with this obscure and confused knowledge , to believe the holy trinity to be three divine , proper , distinct persons , and one god , in a way and manner unconceivable by human vnderstanding ? by no means ! this he has proved by all the notions of unity and distinction cannot be true or consistent ; nor is it possible for us to believe what we do not understand the terms of , or what contradicts our former knowledge ; and we are not bound to believe what is not possible to be believed , nor can god in justice or goodness require such a faith of us , as we have already heard : so that sabellianism we may believe , and must not believe any thing contrary to it ; and then we may believe that there is something more in it than we understand , if we please . and therefore we may observe , that he is not concerned about any difficulties in the notion of the divine unity , which all catholick writers have been most concerned for ; how to reconcile the unity of god with a trinity of divine persons ; but that which troubles him most , is the distinction , which the catholick fathers never disputed about , but positively asserted in the most proper and real sense , against the sabellian hereticks : but he seems sensible , as well he may be , that the sabellian notion of persons falls very short of those high expressions of distinction which are found in scripture : and here it is that he allows of an obscure and confused knowledge . when he has rejected a true personal distinction , all other kinds of distinction he can think of , will not answer those high expressions of distinction found in scripture ; and therefore provided you do not believe them distinct persons , you may believe , if you please , that there is some other unknown and unconceivable distinction between them . this is plainly what he means by his obscure confused knowledge , by his general confused faith , by his general confused notion of the trinity ; and therefore he religiously keeps to that form of words , that one and the same god is three ; which must be understood in his notion of one and the same god , that is , one single person ; for all his notions of vnity and distinction are on purpose designed to prove , that one god can't be three , in a true and proper notion of a person ; and therefore he never so much as names that question , how three divine persons are one god ? which can never be reconciled to a sabellian unity of a single person . sect . vi. what it is the scripture requires us to believe concerning the trinity . the considerer having laid the foundations of sabellianism in his natural sentiments , proceeds to examine what the doctrine of the scripture is concerning this matter ; and to reconcile the scripture to his natural sentiments ; though the more reasonable and safer way had been first to have learnt the faith from scripture , and then to have corrected the mistakes of his natural sentiments by scripture . i do not intend to enter into a long dispute with him here , but shall only let the reader see what it is he would prove , and what he asserts ; for his whole business in short is to prove , that the sabellian notion of the unity of god , or of one single person , and of three names , titles , characters , extrinsecal respects and relations , is the true scriture doctrine of the trinity . this he very freely tells us , that the sum of all that the scriptures plainly and expresly teach concerning a trinity , is this , that there is but one only god ( and what he means by one only god , we have often heard ) , the author and maker of all things : but that one god ought to be acknowledge and adored by us under those three different titles or characters of father , son , and holy ghost : which words are very remarkable . he does not say , that this one god is to be acknowledged and adored in three , who have the same one divinity subsisting whole , and perfect , and distinctly in each of them , which is the catholick faith : but this one god is to be acknowledged and adored by us under these three different titles and characters of father , son , and holy ghost : so that father , son , and holy ghost are not the one god , for neither of them is god , but they are only the different titles and characters of the one god ▪ and though god , when represented by different characters , is god still under each character , yet neither of the characters is god , no more than the titles and characters of a man , is the man. now one might have expected that the considerer should have proved , that the scripture-notion of one god is , that there is but one single divine person ( in the true and proper notion of the word person ) who is god ; and that these names of father , son , and holy ghost , do not in scripture signify three distinct , real persons , but are only three different titles and characters of the same one divine person : this indeed had effectually proved what he pretends to ; but he was too wise to attempt either . the first he says nothing at all of , but takes it for granted , that he has demonstrated that by his natural notions of unity and distinction ; but had he not first demonstrated that nothing could be true and consistent , and that god can require us to believe nothing which contradicts his natural notions , he should have a little enquired what the notion of scripture is about this matter : but taking it for granted that he had already demonstrated this , that one god signifies one single person , he only proves , that the titles and characters of father , son , and holy ghost , belong to god ; and therefore , that these terms must all be so understood , as to include the same god ( the one single divine person ) in their signification . the first , i think , he proves well enough , that these titles and characters of father , son , and holy ghost , belong to god ; and this vindicates him from being a socinian : but when he applies all these titles and characters to one and the same god , that is in his sense , to one and the same single person , this proves him to be a sabellian ; for this was the doctrine of noetus and sabellius , that these different titles and characters did belong but to one single person , who is god. he proves , that these titles and characters , father , son , and holy ghost , do signify god , from the forms of baptism , salutation , and blessing . go teach all nations , baptizing them in the name of the father , of the son , and of the holy ghost . the grace of our lord iesus christ , and the love of god , and the communion of the holy ghost , be with you all . from whence , as he adds , i infer , that all these terms , father , son , and holy ghost , signify god ; because i cannot possibly conceive 't is agreeable to the nature of the christian religion , that the ministers of it should teach , baptize , or bless the people in any other name but god's . i like this argument very well , but if it proves any thing , it proves more than he would have it , that father , son , and holy ghost , are each of them by himself true and perfect god , and not all three one single person ; for it seems altogether as absurd to teach , baptize , or bless in three names and titles , when there is but one single person signified by those three names . and therefore his inference is not very plain , that if any one of these terms signify god , they must all three signify god ; and if all three signify god , they must all three signify one and the same god ; for god is one. this is very artificial , but not plain : the consequence is plain , that if father , son , and holy ghost , are the names of god , they must all signify one god by the unity and sameness of nature , because there is but one god ; but not by the vnity of person , because the scripture mentions three , each of whom is god : which proves , that god is one in nature , but three in persons ; as the catholick church has always believed . as for what he adds , that the one supreme god , the lord and maker of all things , is here meant by the word father , is a thing not questioned ; and therefore s●n and holy ghost are terms expressive of the same divine nature ; may in some sense be allowed , if he will distinguish between nature and person ; but according to the sense of scripture , and the belief of the catholick church , father , son , and h●ly ghost , are the names of three real , distinct , divine persons , not of one divine nature , in the sense of one pers●n . but though we allow this with the catholick church , that the father is the one supreme god ; we have no reason to allow this to the considerer , who will not allow father , son , or holy ghost , to be names of divine persons , or to be names or relations of the divine nature , considered as the divine nature ; for he says they are extrinsecal , that is , ●xtra-essential , ideas , titles , characters , respects , relations ; and therefore father , according to this hypothesis , is not the essential name of the one supreme god , but given to him for some extrinsical and extra-essential reasons ; is his name , not by nature , but by institution , and then must be proved to be his name ; which the mere form of baptism cannot do , for the name god is not expressed in it ; much less does it prove , that father , son , and holy ghost , are one and the same god , or one single person . it is evident indeed from other texts , that father is the name of god , but then it is the name of god the father ; and the son is the son of god , and the holy ghost the spirit of god , the spirit of the father and of the son ; and this does prove , that father , son , and holy ghost , have the same one divinity , the same one divine nature , as the very names and relations of father , and son , and spirit , prove : but surely this does not prove , that god the father , and his son , are the same one single person , as well as one god ; for father and son all the world over signify two distinct persons ; for no one person can be father and son to himself ; nor can the eternal subsisting spirit of god be the same person with that god whose spirit he is . unless he allows that father in the form of baptism is the name of a person , he can prove nothing from it ; and if father be the name of a person , son , and holy gh●st , must be the names of persons also ; and then the names and relations of father , son , and holy ghost , necessarily prove , that they are not one single person , but three persons . thus he proves the son to be god , from that religious worship which is paid to him ; which does indeed prove him to be god , but not the same one person with the father : our considerer is much mistaken , if he thinks it sufficient to prove , that father , son , and holy ghost , are the titles and characters of the same one single person , who is the one god , if he can prove that each of these names signify one who is god. and the truth is , if these names , father , son , and holy ghost , do not signify persons , they cannot signify god ; for then they are not names of nature , but something extrinsecal and accessory to the divine nature ; and therefore they may be the external denominations of him who is god , but not the names of god , considered as god , and therefore cannot signify god ; because they do not signify the divine nature in the persons of father , son , and holy ghost , but something extrinsical and accessory , that is , something which is not essential , and therefore which the divine nature might be without . i hope the considerer did not think of this consequence , that it is possible that god might neither have been father , son , nor holy ghost ; which yet must be allowed possible , if these be mere extrinsecal and accessory titles and characters : nay , this must be allowed , unless we will grant that these names signify three real , subsisting , intelligent , coeternal persons , in the vnity of the same godhead . but these three persons do somewhat puzzle him . that god should be called father , son , and holy ghost , is as easily to be believed , as that he should be called adonai , elohim , and jehovah : that the same thing should be signified and expressed by several names , is no such incredible mystery . which still shews us what it is he believes and would prove in all this , that father , son , and holy ghost , are but three names of that one single person , who is god. but , as he proceeds , if we allow that these terms , father , son , and holy ghost , are all applied to god in scripture , 't is not thought sufficient to say , that these are three several names , which signify god ; but we are further required to believe , that god is one and three ; the same god ( not the same single person ) , but three different hypostases or persons ; and that one of these three hypostases or persons is both god and man. these are the hard sayings which puzzle some mens understandings . this is the faith of the catholick church , and will always be hard sayings to sabellian understandings , which they will never be able to reconcile with their hypothesis of one single person in the godhead . but let us hear how he clears himself of these difficulties . he observes in the first place , that these names , father , son , and holy ghost , are applied to god in scripture in a different way from what any of his other names are . so far he is in the right ; but what is this different way ? in short , it is this ; that the other names of god signify only partial conceptions of the divine nature , such as self-existence , power , &c. and are all contained within the same idea of god , and therefore cannot be the foundation of any distinction in the godhead . let this pass . but each of these names , father , son , and holy ghost , includes the whole idea we have of god , and something more ; as being extrinsecal and accessory to the divine nature , and the whole idea of god full and compleat , before the application of these terms . let us examine this first . he says , each of these names includes the whole idea of god. i beseech you how can that be , when they signify something extrinsecal and accessory to the divine nature , and the whole idea of god may be conceived full and compleat without them ? for if these names are not included in the idea of god , which is full and compleat without them ( which assertion , by the way , overthrows the whole christian faith of the trinity ) , how can they include the idea of god in them , which they are not so much as any part of , much less the whole , and something more ? i grant the names of father , son , and holy ghost , may connote the idea of god , as the name of a king and a father connote the idea of a man who is king and father , which i suppose is all he intends by it ; but then the king must be a man , and the father must be a man , to connote the idea of man : and thus in the blessed trinity ; if these names , father , son , and holy ghost , connote the idea of god , the father must be true and perfect god , and the son must be true and perfect god , and the holy ghost must be true and perfect god ; for neither father , son , or holy ghost , connote the idea of god upon any other account , than as the whole and perfect divine nature subsists in each of them , and that makes the whole idea of god belong to each of them . to proceed : he tells us , that though all these names are separately and together affirmed of god , yet each of them in so peculiar a manner , that there are several occasions , where , when one of these terms is used with relation to god , 't would be improper to use either of the other . that is , when it is proper to call god father , it is improper to call him , son , or holy ghost , and so on the contrary : but the reason of this in his hypothesis , is not that their persons are distinct and incommunicable , but that there are several occasions which make such change of names improper : as a man who is a king , a husband , and a father , all these names do separately and together belong to him , but you must have a care of speaking improperly , by applying these names to improper relations . well : however , from hence , he says , it follows , that these three names of god , father , son , and holy ghost , must denote a threefold difference of distinction belonging to god. i grant , it makes a distinction of names and external offices and relations in god , but no distinction of hypostases and persons , which was the distinction to be shewn ; but this he absolutely rejects ; for it must be no other difference or distinction , but such as is consistent with the vnity and simplicity of the divine nature . this we would all subscribe to , did he mean honestly ; but his vnity and simplicity of the divine nature , is nothing else but the unity and simplicity of one single person ; and all the distinction he will allow these different names to make , is no more than what one single person is capable of . for each of these names includes the whole idea we have of god , and something more . very right ; if we allow these names , father , son , and holy ghost , to be the names of true and proper divine persons ; for then each of them is true and perfect god , and the whole idea of god is included in each of them , because the whole divine nature is in each of them ; otherwise neither of these names include the idea of god , but only connote it , as i have already observed . and what he adds , that as far as these names express the nature of god , they all adequately and exactly signify the same ; is very true also , if by the same , he means the same nature , not the same one single person : and then what he adds , 't is the additional signification which makes all the distinction between them , is very true also ; but he ought to have told us what this additional signification , this something more than the whole idea of god , is , which is included in these names , father , son , and holy ghost , and then we might have known what this distinction is . all the additional signification that i know of , is this ; that father signifies god , includes the whole idea of god ; but besides this , father , when it signifies god , signifies a self-originated , unbegotten god , who is god of himself , and begets a son of his own nature , and coeternal with himself . son signifies god , but begotten god , god of god , the living and perfect image of his father . holy ghost signifies god , but god proceeding eternally from father and son , in the unity and perfection of the same divine nature . and this is all the difference between them , not a difference of nature , but a distinction of true , real , proper persons . the considerer seems to allow this . that person is a proper name for this distinction ; for father , son , and holy ghost — have plainly a personal significati●n ; each of them , without any figure of speech , being determined to signify some intelligent being acting in such a manner as is there related . these words would betray an unwary reader , to believe the considerer as orthodox as the nicene fathers , and that he did acknowledge father , son , and holy ghost , to be three persons , without a figure , as a person signifies an intelligent being ; but he has secured himself against this imputation by an artificial addition , some intelligent being acting in such , or such , a manner : he will not allow person to signify absolutely an intelligent being ▪ but an intelligent being with respect to some peculiar manner of acting ; and thus one single person , in the proper notion of person , for an intelligent being ▪ may sustain three persons , or personal characters , with re●pect to extrinsecal relations , and the different manner of acting . the whole mystery and sophistry of this , is , that god , who is one single person , is upon different accounts sometimes called the father , sometimes the s●n , and sometimes the holy ghost ; and therefore father , son , and holy ghost , have a personal signification , each of these names signify person in a proper sense , that is , the person of god ; but all of them separately and together , signify but one and the same single person ; for they are all of them attributed to god , and god is but one , or one person , though this one proper person may sustain three figurative persons , or personal characters . this is plain dealing : and this is his answer to his first hard saying , that god is one and three ; the same god , but three different hypostases or persons : that god is one and the same single person , under three personal characters , which may be called three persons , because each of them signifies the true and proper person of god. and here we see in what sense these gentlemen allow , that each person is substance , is mind , and spirit , and yet that god is but one substance , one mind , and spirit ; viz. in the very same sense that this author affirms that god is but one single person , and yet that the father is a person , the son a person , and the holy ghost a person ; and for the same reason , that they decry and abhor three substances , three distinct minds and spirits in the godhead , though affirmed to be indivisibly and inseparably one infinite substance , mind , and spirit ; for the same reason they reject three intelligent substantial persons ; though our modern sabellians have been more cautious generally than this considerer , not to own it in express words . now as for these terms of three substances , and three minds , there may be good reason to let them alone , tho when rightly explained no reason to condemn them of heresy ; but we must insist on three distinct , infinite , intelligent , substantial persons , each of which is mind and substance , and one is not the other : if they disown this ( as the considerer does ) they are downright sabellians ; if they own it , we have no farther dispute about this matter . let us now consider his other hard saying , that one of these three hyp●stases or pers●ns should be both god and man. now the hardness of this saying is not , that it is hard to prove from scripture , that so it is ; or that it is hard to conceive how god and man can be united ; which is all that he touches on : but it is and always will be a hard saying to the considerer upon another account ; that is , to reconcile it with a trinity of one proper single person , and three personal characters . the doctrine of the incarnation is this ; that the eternal son of god became true and perfect man , by taking the human nature into a personal union to himself . that the son only became man , not the father , nor the holy ghost : that two perfect distinct natures , the divine and human nature , were without confusion united in the one person of christ ; and that this one person is the eternal word and son of god. now if there be but one single person in the godhead , and father , son , and holy ghost , are but three names , or personal characters of this one single person , how can the son be incarnate , and not the father , nor the holy ghost ? it is only a person that can be incarnate , for a personal character can't be incarnate without the person ; and if there be but one single person , and this same one person is father , son , and holy ghost , it is impossible that that person who is the son , should be incarnate , but the person who is the father and the holy ghost , must be incarnate also ; because the same person who is the son , is the father and the holy ghost . the short question is this ; whether a true , proper , divine person was incarnate , in the incarnation of christ ? if not , then christ was not a divine person , how divine soever he might be upon other accounts ; the divine nature did not pers●nally subsist in him , he was not personally true and perfect god ; and then the person of christ was no more than a man , whatever divine influences he might receive from god : but if the divine nature were truly and properly incarnate in the person of christ , then if there be but one single divine person in the godhead , but one divine nature ▪ in the sense of one single person , then the whole godhead , father , son , and holy ghost , which are but one true and proper person , was incarnate in christ. this is the true difficulty , and he is so wise as to take no notice of it . it does not appear to me , that he believes one word concerning the incarnation of god , or of a true divine person ; he says , he that is in scripture called the son of god , did appear in the likeness of men : he certainly was a true man , but that is not our present dispute ; was he in his own person true and perfect god ? was he a human person ; or the person of the son of god appearing in human nature ? he was , he says , in the form of god , before he took the nature of man upon him . this sounds well ; but why does he not speak out , and tell us what this form of god is ? whether the true divine nature subsisting in him , a true divine person ? well : but god did suffer himself to be worshipped and adored in and by the man christ iesus ; the least that can be inferred from which is , that god was more immediately and peculiarly present in christ , than ever he was said to have been any where else ? as in the heavens , the jewish temple , between the cherubims , in prophets and holy men , who spake as they were moved by the spirit . now all this might have been spared , would he but have said , that the person iesus christ was worshipped with divine honours , as being in his own person true and perfect god , as well as man ; and without saying this , he says nothing to prove that christ is the son of god incarnate . to say , that god did suffer himself to be worshipped in and by the man christ iesus , as he was worshipped in the heavens , in the jewish temple , between the cherubims ( for that must be the force of the comparison ) does no more prove christ to be god , than it proves the heavens , the iewish temple , and the cherubims , to be god : it may prove a more perfect symbolical presence of god in christ , which he calls the fulness of the godhead , but not the incarnation of the son of god. but this is not the doctrine of scripture , merely to say , that god suffers himself to be worshipped in the man christ iesus ; as if god , and the man christ iesus , were not one person ; but that he commands us to worship that person who is called christ jesus , not as a man , in whom the power of god dwells , and is present , as in the heavens , or in the jewish temple , or in the prophets and holy men ( who were never for this reason thought the objects of worship ) but as his own eternal son incarnate . that all men should honour the son , as they honour the father ; which does not only signify to honour the father in the son , but to pay divine honours to the person of the son , which makes them distinct objects of worship , and therefore true and proper persons , not personal characters , which may be distinct reasons of worship , but are not distinct objects . but we shall better understand this , by the account he gives of the union of god and man , in what manner soul and body , or god and man , are united , is not the question ; for we know nothing how this physical union is made ; but the question is concerning the nature and kind of this union : whether , as the soul and body are united in one person , so as to be one man , so god and man are united in one person : that as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man , so god and man is one christ. whether the divine and human natures are united in one person ; or god be united to man only as an assisting principle , by a perpetual and constant influx of divine powers and virtues . these two are vastly different : the first indeed always includes the second in the most perfect manner , but the second does not always infer the first . a personal union is always a union of life , influence , and power ; as he describes the vnion of soul and body ; that there is some intelligent power that makes use of the organs of my body , and acts in conjunction with the motions there produced : this is all true , and necessarily consequent upon a personal union , but a very lame account of the vital union of soul and body ; for thus angels may use the bodies they assume , without a personal union : but a conscious life , sensation , and government , which makes one self , is a great deal more than to act in conjunction with the motions of the body . the union of influence and power may be without personal union , and therefore does not always make one person . it is the first we enquire after , it is the first the scripture teaches , that the word was made flesh ; that god sent forth his son , made of a woman : this is the catholick faith of the incarnation ; but this the considerer takes no notice of ; but all he says , relates only to the union of influence and power . and i may , says he , as well consider god united to man , when he so acts by the ministry and operation of man , that the actions of god seem conveyed to us the same way as the actions of one man are to another . but does this make god true and perfect man ? this falls short of the conjunct operations of soul and body , which are much more close and intimate than the actions of one man are to another ; however , to be sure the actions of one man upon another , do not make two such men one person ; nor therefore can the like influence of god on man , make god and man one person . but he proceeds : had those who upon some occasions spake by the extraordinary assistance of a divine power , been constantly so directed and assisted , how could they have distinguished the motions of their souls from the impressions of god ? just as they did when they were sometimes thus assisted ; for external impressions are always distinguishable from internal motions . but suppose they could not distinguish them , does this prove that god is incarnate in such men ; or would it be a reason to worship such men as god ? he adds , and why then should we not think such an extraordinary power as this , as much united to such men , as that common ordinary power we call the soul , is to those bodies in which it acts and exerts it self . the answer is plain , because it would be an external , not an internal principle of life , and motion , and sensation , how constant soever its influences were . he calls it an extraordinary power , which shews that it is not a natural principle of action ; it is an extraordinary power united to a man , and therefore the man is the person , this extraordinary power only an external assisting principle , of the same kind with that in prophets , though more constant and regular in its actings : but here is nothing of incarnation in all this . is this extraordinary power a divine subsisting person , in the true and proper notion of a person ? is it the son of god , that eternal word , which was in the beginning , was with god , and was god ? is this extraordinary power so united to human nature , as to become man ? is it the person of christ jesus , who was conceived in the womb of the virgin , lived in the world as a man , suffered , and died , and rose again from the dead , and now sits at the right hand of god in the highest heavens ? not one word of all this , which is the true mystery , and the only use of this doctrine of the incarnation , whereon all our hopes of salvation by christ depend . this extraordinary power is not a person , but such a constant regular inspiration , as he says , some are of opinion the soul of man is : but whether that be so or not , as he thinks m●st probably it is not ( which yet argues some kind of inclination to it ) , yet it seems to him plain from scripture , that such a power as we ascribe to god ( he will not say such a power as is god , or a true divine person ) did as constantly and regularly act in and through christ , as the human soul is perceived to do in any other man. that such a power did constantly appear and act in christ , is true ; but whether by nature , or by a constant and regular inspiration , is the question . our saviour proves his divine nature from his works ; our considerer thinks it proves no more than a constant and regular inspiration : the first is necessary to the catholick faith of the incarnation , that the word was made flesh ; the second proves him only to be an extraordinary and perpetual prophet : the first makes him true god-man ; the second makes him only a divine man. and this is all he can mean by this power regularly and constantly acting in and through christ : for if christ be god-man , he is this divine power in his own person ; it is his divine nature , not an external adventitious principle , how regularly and constantly soever it acts ; it is not merely an uninterrupted presence and concurrence of the deity with the man christ jesus , as he represents it , but the personal union of the divine nature of christ to human nature . he was not only as conscious of all the divine perfections in himself , as a man is conscious of his own thoughts , ( which yet , by the way , is absolutely impossible , without being true and perfect god in his own person ) , but he knew himself to be god , the eternal son of god , not the same person with his father , but one with him . were a man thus regularly and constantly inspired , he would know that he was thus inspired , and he would also know , that these divine perfections are not in himself , not seated in his own human person , nor under the conduct of his own will , as his own natural powers are , and therefore must know himself to be a mere man still , not god-man . so that this constant and regular inspiration , this uninterrupted presence and concurrence of the deity , which is all he allows in this matter , cannot make any person god-man . this inspiration is not a subsisting person , is not the person of the son of god , is not incarnate by its union to man , no more than it is incarnate in other prophets : the man is the person , and therefore a mere creature still , tho never so divinely inspired . this is such an incarnation as socinians themselves own , in as high expressions as the considerer can invent . cerinthus owned something more , that christ who descended on iesus at his baptism , was a divine person , not a mere inspiration , and rested on him , and was most intimately united to him , till his crucifixion . that sect of the noetians and sabellians who were called patripassians ( for they do not seem by the accounts we have of them , to have been all of that mind ) did acknowledge the incarnation of god in a true and proper sense , as the catholick church did the incarnation of christ : but then their trinity being but one proper single divine person , distinguished by three names or personal characters ( which is the express doctrine of the considerer ) their whole trinity was incarnate , suffered , and died , in the incarnation and sufferings of christ , the father as well as the son ; as it must of necessity be , if there be but one divine person , who is father , son , and holy ghost , and if this one person is in a true and proper sense incarnate : but this the catholick church abhorred and condemned , under the name of the patripassian heresy . others of them were sabellians in the doctrine of the trinity , but photinians , or samosatenians , that is , socinians , as to the doctrine of the incarnation , as athanasius often intimates : and if i understand him , this is the considerer's way , who believes a trinity in one single person , and an inspired man for a god incarnate . and thus we have lost the trinity and incarnation , and must part with every thing which is peculiar and essential to christianity , with them . and now one would wonder after all this , what he has to say more about the faith of the trinity and incarnation ; and yet this is his next enquiry , what the scriptures necessarily oblige us to believe in this point , that is , concerning the trinity and incarnation ? though he has been careful all along never to use this term incarnation , as being sensible that all he said about god-man , would not reach the catholick notion of incarnation . when i met with this enquiry , i was in hope that there was something behind to unsay all that he had hitherto said ; for if what he has already said be true , it is certain the scripture requires us to believe nothing about them . but upon examination i found , that the question was fallaciously stated ; and the true meaning of it was , what the scriptures oblige us to believe , instead of what has hitherto passed for the true catholick faith of the trinity and incarnation ? i shall not dispute this point with him now ; to shew what he means , will be confutation enough . we must not , he says , look upon the doctrine of the trinity as a nice abstracted speculation , designed for the exercise of our vnderstandings ; but as a plainer revelation of god's love and good will towards men , and a greater motive and incitement to piety than ever we had before this doctrine was delivered . this we grant , that the christian faith is not designed merely for speculation , but for practice ; but yet all the doctrines of faith are matters of speculation , and the doctrine it self must be believed in order to practice , or else the revelation of it is of no use at all . the question then is , whether we must not believe the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation ? or how much we must believe of them ? must we not believe , that god has in a true and proper sense an eternal and only-begotten son , begotten from eternity of his own substance ; his true , perfect , living , subsisting image ? must we not believe , that this eternal son of god did in a true proper notion become man , by uniting human nature to his own person ; and that in human nature he suffered and died for the redemption of mankind ? truly , no ; if i understand him : all this is a nice abstracted speculation , and a very perplexing exercise of our vnderstandings ; and we are bound to understand no more by god's giving his own son to dye for us , but his love and g●od will to mankind , as it is a great motive and excitement to piety . but how can we learn god's love and good will to mankind , from this doctrine , if it be not true ? if god have no eternal son , and therefore did not give his eternal son to become man , and to suffer and dye for us ? the gospel proves the great love of god to sinners , by the incarnation , death , and sufferings of his son ; that if we do not believe this doctrine strictly and literally true , we lose the gospel proof of god's love to sinners , and of the virtue and efficacy of christ's death and sacrifice to expiate our sins , and of the power of his intercession as the eternal , only-begotten , and well-beloved son of god. but our considerer will not allow this : these titles and relations must be chiefly c●nsidered with reference to the great work of man's salvation : but must they not be considered as three distinct proper persons in the unity of the godhead , who have their distinct parts and offices in the redemption of mankind ? no ; but distinct relations and offices of one and the same single divine person , who is the one supreme god , and is all in one , father , son , and holy gh●st , saviour , mediator , comforter . but how then can these titles and relations signify an eternal distinction in the godhead , an eternal f●t●●r , an eternal son , and an e●ernal spirit , when th●se offices relating only to man's salvation were not eternal ? this he resolves into the eternal purpose and decree of god , to redeem mankind by the death and constant mediation of a man chosen and enabled for this work by the fulness of the godhead dwelling in him : and in consideration of his passion and intercession , to impart such gifts , graces , and spiritual assistances , as would be sufficient to render this redemption effectual to the saving of much people . so that god decreed from eternity , upon his foreknowledge of man's fall , that in order to redeem man he would take upon himself the distinctions and offices of father , son , and holy ghost ; saviour , mediator , and comforter , in time ; and this is all the eternal distinction in the godhead . well : but it seems god did not decree from eternity to redeem man by his own son , but by a man chosen and enabled for this work by the fulness of the godhead dwelling in him ; that is , as we have already heard , by an inspired and deified man , not by a god incarnate : it is the man who is the saviour and redeemer , though he be enabled to this work by the fulness of the godhead , or a constant regular inspiration : this is downright socinianism ; the catholick faith is , that it is the son of god who redeems us , though he redeems us in human nature . but if god redeems us by a man , however he be enabled by a divine power , why is he said to give his son for us ? for this divine power is not a person , and therefore no son , nor is the man his own and only begotten son. now this would be a difficulty indeed , were we to understand god's giving his own son for us , in a proper literal sense ; but this is nothing but figure and representation , if we believe the considerer . his words are these ; thus when god is pleased to represent his love to mankind in the highest image of nature , that of a father sacrificing an only-begotten son , the exact transcript and resemblance of himself , perfectly innocent , and obedient to his will in all things , we are to believe ( that god did thus sacrifice his son , as he assures us he did ? no ; but ) that by the sufferings and death of christ , god has given greater proof of his love towards us , than any man is capable of doing to another ; and that such an action of an earthly parent suggests the nearest and likest conception we can possibly frame of what our heavenly father hath done for us ; though at the same time we must acknowledge it comes infinitely short of expressing the riches and fulness of his mercy and loving kindness . it does so indeed . to believe that god has actually given his own eternal and only-begotten son for us , as the scripture assures us he has , is a much nearer and truer conception of what god has done for us , and infinitely exceeds all earthly comparisons . abraham's offering his son isaac at god's command , was an image and figure , but a typical figure of it ; but it was a type without an antitype , if christ was not as truly and properly the son of god , as isaac was the son of abraham . but if we will believe the considerer , the scripture does not oblige us to believe this ; if we do but believe , that god is as good to us as if he had sacrificed his only son for us , we need not believe , that he did sacrifice his son. i have no patience to proceed any further ; if this be true , there is an end of the faith and hope of christians . chap. iii. a brief account of the sabellian heresy , and by what arguments the catholick fathers opposed it . the considerer has given us the most compleat and artificial scheme of sabellianism that i have yet met with , a●d has very fairly and openly confessed his design , to prove , that one god must signify that there is but one who is god , but one single divine person , in the proper notion of a person , as it signifies an intelligent being . i have endeavoured to shew him his mistake , and what it is that has mis-led him ; and how hopeless an attempt it is to reconcile his hypothesis with the catholick faith of the trinity and incarnation . this is so bold an attempt , openly to assert and defend a heresy which has been constantly condemned by the catholick church , since its first appearance , that i am apt to hope he does not believe his hypothesis to be sabellianism , or that heresy which now is best known by that name , though sabellius was not the first author of it . and therefore i will shew him what sabellianism is , and how the fathers opposed it . there were two points in dispute between them and the catholick christians . first , concerning the personality of the son , and of the holy spirit . secondly , concerning the unity of god , whether it were the unity of one person , as they pretended . that we may rightly understand this matter , we must distinguish between the several kinds of sabellianism , because the arguments and answers of the fathers are sometimes adapted to one , and sometimes to another notion of it . that father , son , and holy ghost , were but one person , was asserted by them all , but explained very differently , and that altered the state of the question , and required different answers . . as first , they made father , son , and holy ghost , to be only three names , appearances , or offices of the same person , as i observed before : and then the state of the question was not , whether the son was a person , and the holy ghost a person , in as true and proper a sense as the father was a person ? for this they owned by making father , son , and holy ghost , three names of the same person ; whereas it is impossible they should be the same person , if the son were not a person , nor the holy ghost a person . if the son be the same person with the father , the son must be a person , for no person can't be the same person : which is the same argument to prove that these hereticks owned christ to be a true and real person , that novatianus used ( as i observed before ) to prove that they owned christ to be true and perfect god , because they made him the same with the father , who is true and perfect god , and a true , and real , and substantial person . and if he be the very same with the father , he must be the same we acknowledge the father to be ; viz. a true and real person , and perfect god. the dispute then which the catholick fathers had with these hereticks , with respect to this notion , that father , son ▪ and holy ghost , were the very same person , was not , whether the son was a person , and the holy ghost a person ? but , whether the son and holy ghost were truly and really distinct persons from the father , as the catholick church always believed ? or , whether they were the same person , distinguished only by three names . now when the fathers asserted not only the personality of the son , and of the holy ghost ( which this notion did not oppose ) , but the real distinction of persons , that the son was a person , but not the same person with the father , they must ascribe the same kind of personality to the son , which they do to the father ; that the son is as truly and really a person as the father is , though not the same person ; as truly a person as god would be , were there but one person in the godhead , as these hereticks affirmed . for according to all the rules of disputation , we must take words in the sense of those whom we oppose ; for otherwise it is a mere wrangle about words , without opposing one another . and therefore since the sabellians by person understood such a person as every single person is , ( for they made father , son , and holy ghost , but three different names of the same single individual person ) nothing could oppose or confute them , but to prove , that father , and son , and holy ghost , are three distinct persons , in the same notion of a person which belongs to every single individual person , as far as mere personality is concerned . for to prove them three in any other sense , whether three modes , or three powers , or three parts of the same one single person , is what they would have ; and allow them to be but one person , and they will dispute no further ; nay , will give you leave to call three modes , or three names , or three parts of the same one person , three persons , if you please . but for the clearer understanding of this matter , we must consider by what arguments the ancient writers opposed this heresy . tertullian , in opposition to praxeas , reduces this to a short question , whether god have any son , and who he is , and how he is his son. for if god have a son , the son must be as true and real a person as the father , and father and son must be two distinct persons ; for the same person can't be both father and son to himself ; the very names of father and son signify , that one is of the other , and we must understand things to be what they are called , whether father or son , which can no more be the same than night and day , with respect to these different relations . the father makes the son , and the son makes the father ; and those who receive these relations from each other , can never be these relations to themselves , that the father should make himself a son to himself , or the son make himself a father to himself . this order god has instituted in all other beings , and he observes it himself . a father must of necessity have a son , to be a father ; and a son must have a father , that he may be a son , but to have , and to be , are two things ; as for instance , for a man to be a husband , signifies that he has a wife , not that he is a wife to himself ; and thus to be a father , signifies to have a son , not to be a son to himself ; in such relations we must be one , and have another ; that to be both is to be neither , because we can have neither . if i be father and son to my self , i am no father , because i have no son , who makes a father , but am son my self ; and i am no son , because i have no father , who makes the son , but am son my self ; and thus while they make father and son one and the same person , they destroy the notion both of father and son. now would any man have argued at this rate , who did not believe father and son to be real and substantial persons , and as distinct from each other as a human father and son are ; for if they be not , all this reasoning from the distinct relations of father and son , which require a real distinction of persons , is quite lost : and whether this argument be good , or no , ( which is not the present enquiry ) it is certain that whoever uses it , if he understands himself , must believe , that father and son signify as true and real relations , and as real and distinct persons in the godhead , as they do in human nature . the like may be said of that other argument against the father and the son being one and the same person , that then the same person must , in order of nature , be both before and after himself ; for he who begets must always in order of nature ( though not of time , in an eternal generation ) be before him who is begotten by him : that as father , he is before himself as son ; as son , he is after himself as father ; which had been iudicrous trifling , if they had not believed a real substantial generation of the person , and consequently that the son is a real substantial person : for this argument will not hold in the generation of modes and postures , or in one part of the deity generating another . thus to prove the distinction of persons between father and son , they urge all those texts in which the father speaks to or of the son , and the son speaks to or of the father ; which are so many , and so well known , that i need not transcribe them . and tertullian lays it down as a certain rule , that he who speaks , and he to whom he speaks , and he who is spoken of , cannot be one and the same person ; for this is such perverseness and deceit as does not become god ; that when he himself is the person to whom he speaks , he should speak in such a manner as if he directed his speech to another , and did not speak to himself . and therefore when the father says , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee . this is my beloved son , in whom i am well pleased . when christ tells us , that god is his father ; that he came forth from the father , and came into the world , and again leaves the world , and goes to the father : when he says , i and my father ; and i will pray the father , and he shall send you another comforter : i , and he , and another , must signify three as real and distinct persons , as these words signify in common speech . thus they prove the distinction of persons between father and son , from those texts which tell us , that the father sends the son , and the son is sent ; that the father anoints , and the son is anointed ; that the father gives commands , and the son receives them , and doth the will of his father ; that the father knows the son , and the son the father ; that he sees all that the father doth , and can do all that he sees the father do : for there must be distinct subjects for such different acts ; the same person , with respect to himself , can't with any propriety of speech be said to send , and to be sent ; to anoint , and to be anointed ; to command , and to obey ; to come forth from himself , and to come into the world , and to leave the world , and go to himself : and therefore he who sends , and he who is sent , &c. must be two. nay , it is well observed by these fathers , that christ himself expresly teaches us , that he and his father , with respect to the distinction of persons , are two ; so two , as to make a legal testimony of two witnesses ; . iohn , — . when the pharisees objected against him , that he bore record of himself , and therefore his record was not true : he answers , and yet if i judge , my judgment is true , for i am not alone , but i and my father which sent me . it is also written in your law , that the testimony of two men is true ; i am one that bear witness of my self and my father that sent me beareth witness of me . this is as express as words can make it . if father and son were but o●e single person , christ could not have said , i am not alone , but i and my father which sent me ; for one single person is in this sense alone , how many names soever he has ; and if he and his father are not two distinct persons , they are not two legal witnesses , as two distinct men are . these and such like arguments we may find in all the ancient writers who have engaged in this controversy ; and from hence we learn not only what they thought of the distinction of persons between father and son , but what kind of person they believed the son to be ; such a person as has a personal knowledge , and will , and power , who is capable of being sent , of receiving and executing commands , and has all this as distinctly in himself , as he is a distinct person . the father knows the son , and the son knows the father , but each of them know by their own personal knowledge ; the father wills , and the son wills , and wills all the same with the father , but each of them wills by his own personal will ; the father works , and the son works , and they inseparably do the same things , but each of them work by their own personal power . knowledge , and will , and power of acting , is essential to the notion of a person , and therefore every distinct person must have a distinct personal knowledge , and will , and power ; and those must acknowledge this , who prove the distinction of persons from distinct personal acts , as all these fathers did . this is all we ask , when we assert a distinction of persons in the trinity ; and this we must insist on , or deny a trinity ; for if there are not three who have all the same distinct personal acts , there cannot be three distinct compleat persons ; for personal acts shew a person , and distinct personal acts prove distinct persons ; and in this sense ( as all these arguments prove ) the ancient fathers owned a distinction of three persons in the unity of the godhead . their distinction between deus invisibilis , and deus visibilis , the invisible and visible god , whereby they proved the real distinction between god the father and god the son , is an undeniable proof of their opinion in this matter ; for i urge it no farther . it was the received opinion ( as far as i can find ) of all the ancient fathers , till st. austin , that god the father never appeared in any visible representation of himself ; for he tells moses , no man can see my face , and live : and st. iohn assures us , no man hath seen god at any time , but the only-begotten son , who is in the bosom of the father , he hath declared him : and yet in the old testament we frequently read of god's appearing to men , which they therefore expound of god the son , and that his appearance in a visible form was a preludium to his incarnation . this we may see largely proved by tertullian and st. hilary , and observed by st. athanasius ; and the plain consequence they draw from it , is , that this invisible and visible god cannot be one and the same person ; and the consequence is so sel●-evident , that it needs no proof ; but it evidently proves what a real , substantial , as well as distinct person they thought the son , who could visibly appear , while the father remained invisible ; for as a visible and invisible god can't be the same person , so a visible god must be a real substantial person . and though st. austin was of opinion , that those three men which appeared to abraham , were the three persons of the sacred trinity , and thereby rejected the distinction of the invisible and visible god , by attributing a visible appearance to god the father , which none of the ancients had done before him ; yet by these three distinct appearances he confirmed the real distinction of the divine persons , who were as distinct persons as they appeared to be , and therefore as distinct as three human persons , for they appeared as three distinct men . and therefore he observes , that whereas two of these three went to lot in sodom , lot speaks to them as to one , . gen. . and lot said unto them , oh , not so , my lord : and justifies lot in this , that though they were two , yet they were equal , and he would not divide the father and son ; and urges this against the sabellians , who made father and son one person . i do not justify st. austin in this , because i doubt whether the argument be good ; but by this we may understand st. austin's judgment of the real distinction of persons . and to the same purpose the voice from heaven at our saviour's baptism , this is my beloved son , in whom i am well pleased ; and the descent of the holy spirit like a dove , and lighting upon him , is urged by the ancient fathers to prove a real trinity of divine persons : the voice from the father in heaven , the son on earth , and the holy ghost descending like a dove ; which being three distinct manifestations , and all at a time , must represent the father who spoke from heaven , the son who was on earth , and the holy ghost who descended like a dove , to be three distinct persons , not one single person , which cannot speak of himself in the third person , nor descend on himself in a distinct visible appearance . the sabellians being unable to maintain this point , which is so manifestly absurd , and so irreconcilable with all the forms of speech used in scripture concerning father , son , and holy ghost , found it necessary to allow some distinction between them , but yet were so afraid of tritheism , that they kept religiously to their main point , that one god was but one person , and therefore would admit of no other distinction but what was reconcilable with the unity of a person . . hence , secondly , some of them taught , that the son is distinguished from the father , not as one person is distinguished from another , but as a man's word or wisdom which is in his heart and soul , may be distinguished from himself ; that is , that the son is not a living , substantial , subsisting word , no more than the word of a man , which is only the motion of a living subsisting heart , but does not live and subsist it self , but being spoke it vanishes , and being often repeated , never continues ; and therefore is not another man , nor man of man , nor with man ; as the divine word is true and perfect god , god of god , and god with god ; and therefore they make god and his word but one person , as man and his word is one man. in answer to this , st. athanasius urges all those texts which prove christ and god the father to be two distinct persons ; for if they be two persons , then the son is as true and real a person as the father is . this i have already taken notice of , and need not now repeat it ; only i cannot but observe what athanasius tells us of these hereticks , that when they were convinced by the plain evidence of scripture , that god the father , and christ who called himself the son of god , were two persons , they then took courage , and owned christ to be a person , but not a divine person , as the eternal word of god , but only a human person , as he was man. but athanasius tells them , that this was neither better nor worse than the heresy of paulus samosatenus , or what we now call socinianism , to make christ a mere man ; for he can be no more , if the divine word , which st. iohn tells us was incarnate , be not the person : if the word incarnate be the person , then christ is god-man ; if the man be the person , he can be no more than a man. this athanasius confutes at large , and proves , that what christ says of himself , cannot belong to a mere man. but that which i would observe , is this , that both these hereticks , who denied the divine word to be a person , and athanasius and the other catholick fathers who affirmed him to be a person , agreed very well in the notion of a person , viz. that a person is a distinct , intelligent being , who does really and actually subsist , and subsists distinctly from all other intelligent beings . that the divine word in the godhead is such a person as a man is in human nature : such a person these hereticks would allow christ to be , considered as a man ; and such a person athanasius affirms christ to be , considered as god , or the divine word ; for otherwise they wrangle about words , and do not oppose each other . the fathers proved , that christ was a person , and a distinct person from the father , by those texts which represent him as speaking to and of his father , and which attribute many personal acts to him : the sabellians could not deny but that these were personal acts , and did prove christ to be a real subsisting person ; but then would not allow the word to be the person , but only the man christ jesus to be the person : the fathers , on the other hand , allow their notion of a person , which is the only true intelligible notion , but prove , that the divine word which was incarnate , not merely the man christ jesus , was this person ; and therefore that this divine word is a real , substantial , subsisting word , not like the word of a man , which is a transient act , but has no subsistence of its own . the sabellians would have allowed a trinity of persons in any other notion of a person , than as a person signifies a real , subsisting , intelligent being ; but the catholick fathers would own no other notion of person but this ; and taught that there were three persons in the trinity , in the same sense in which the sabellians denied there were three persons ; three such persons as they affirmed there was but one ; that the son and holy ghost were divine persons , in the same sense that the sabellians owned the father to be a person ; that is , three such persons as they called three gods. the reason of this i 'm sure is not to be answered , that if the catholick fathers understood what they did , when they opposed the sabellians , who made the divine word only to be the word of a divine person , but not a divine person himself , they must assert the divine word in a strict and proper sense to be a divine person , and not merely the transient word of a person , which has no subsistence ; which is a more sensible argument than all the criticisms about persona and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and yet they express themselves so fully and clearly in this matter , that there is no need of gu●ssing at their meaning . tertullian reduces this dispute to this one single question , which is the true state of it ; whether the son and word of god , considered as distinct from god the father , be a substance , and has a subsistence of his own : which he expresly affirms , and offers his reasons for the proof of it . this he tells us is necessary to make the word a real being and person , res & persona , that he have a real substance , and a substance of his own , proper to himself , per substantioe proprietatem , without which he cannot be second to god ; nor the father and the son , god and his word , be two. now for the son and the word to be a substantial being per proprietatem substantioe , by a substance proper to himself , as distinguished from god the father , must signify , that the personal substance of the son is not the same , but a distinct substance from the personal substance of god the father ; so distinct , that the father and son are two persons , in the same sense and notion that the father is one person . in answer to their objection , that the word of god was but like the word of a man , which was nothing else but a voice and sound , a vibration of the air , which conveyed some notions to the mind , but was it self emptiness and nothing , without any substance of its own ; he answers , that god himself is the most real and perfect substance , and therefore whatever proceeds from ( or is begotten of ) his substance , must be a real substantial being ; much less can the son and word , who gave being to all other substances , be an insubstantial nothing himself : for tho there may be equivocal causes , which may produce things of a different nature from themselves , yet nothing can produce nothing . he argues farther , that this word is called the son of god , and god ; the word was with god , and the word was god : and that word which is the son of god , and himself god , can't be an insubstantial nothing , unless god himself be nothing . if god begets a son , he must be a substantial person , as all creature-sons are , much more the son of god : and such a son who is himself god , must have all the reality and perfections which belong to the notion of god. but he argues farther , from what st. paul tells us , that he was in the form of god , and thought it not robbery to be equal with god. in effigie , in the image of god. now , says he , in what image of god , was he ? certainly in another , but not in none : the meaning of which is , that every person , as a person , has his own personal image ; but thus he was not the personal image of the father , because he was not the same person with the father ; but yet if he was the image of god , he must be his true , substantial , though not his personal image ; the true living image of his father's person , but not his person . he seems indeed in what follows , to have entertained too gross and corporeal imaginations of the substance and image of god ; but this was his own mistake , and a mistake only in philosophy , not in the traditionary faith of the church ; for which only we alledge his authority . and the conclusion of this argument most fully acquaints us what he understood by a person : whatever , says he , the substance of the word is , that i call a person ; and to that i give the name of son ; and by acknowledging him the son , i own him to be second to the father . whoever reads this , must confess , that tertullian did believe father and son to be two distinct substantial persons ; that though the son be of the same substance with the father , as begotten of his father's substance , yet the personal substance of the father was no more the personal substance of the son , than father and son were one person . novatianus , who was cotemporary with st. cyprian , though a schismatick , was charged with no heresy in this article ; and he opposes the sabellians with the same arguments , and almost in the same words that tertullian and done before him : and tells us particularly , that this divine word , which is the son of god , begotten and born of him , is not a mere sound or voice , like the word of a man , but that substantial virtue and power which proceeds from god : a divine substance , whose name is the word : such a word as is both the son of god , and god : god proceeding from god , and making a second person in the godhead . epiphanius , in opposition to the heresies of noetus and sabellius , who made father , son , and holy ghost , but one substantial person , affirms over and over , that the father is substance , the son substance , and the holy ghost substance , that is , each of them substance by himself , and as distinct in substance as they are in person : three substantial persons , which are not one another , nor all the same . these hereticks allowed the father to be substance , the son substance , the holy ghost substance , but denied them to be three in substance , but taught that they were but one substance , as they were but one and the same person , three names , or three distinct virtues and powers of the same one substance or person . and therefore when in opposition to these men epiphanius asserts , that the father is substance , the son substance , and the holy ghost substance , he can mean no less but that each of them is as distinctly substance as he is a person ; for to oppose one substance , and one substantial person , you must assert , not three diverse or different substances , but three as distinct in substance as they are in person , or three distinct substantial persons . epiphanius asserts against these hereticks , that the son is not the father , but truly and properly a son , begotten of god the father , as to substance . now a son which is substantially begotten of the father , and is not the father , must in substance be distinct from god the father , that is , a distinct , tho not separate substance from god the father . athanasius also is very positive in this , that this divine word is a perfect son of a perfect father , being of being , the image or character of his father's substance , not an insubstantial word , but a living power , and the author of life to all things ; not like the power of a man , which denominates a man powerful ; for the power of man is not his offspring or son , whereas this power of god is his son ; that the father is perfect power , as the father of power , and the son perfect power , as born of him . it were endless to transcribe such sayings as these out of the fathers ; but i cannot miss athanasius his argument from those words of our saviour , i am in the father , and the father in me . now , says he , the father is not the word in the heart of the son , and therefore neither is the son the word in the heart of the father , but the living word , begotten eternally of the living god the father , and being without beginning with the father ; insomuch that we cannot conceive the father ever to have been alone : which attributes as compleat and distinct personal subsistence to the son as to the father : that if the father , who has the son in himself , be a real , subsisting infinite person ; the son , who has the whole father in himself , must be as real , subsisting , infinite a person ; for there is the same reason of both . the answer athanasius gives to a sabellian objection against the substantial generation and subsistence of the word and son of god , is an unanswerable proof what he thought of this matter . the objection is this , that if the word and son be truly and substantially begotten , this substantial word must go out of the father , and subsist separately from him : whereas the word which is in god must be inseparable from him , and not appear out of him ; for how should he appear out of god , when god fills all places , even heaven and earth , and therefore there is no place for the word to subsist in , where god is not ? in answer to this , athanasius first observes what this objection is levelled against , viz. to disprove the true and proper generation of the son , his eternal procession from the father , and subsistence with the father ; that the father does not compleatly and perfectly subsist by himself , nor the son compleatly and perfectly subsist by himself . this is the faith the sabellians opposed , and which athanasius defended , as the argument it self will assure us ; which contradicts no other notion of generation or subsistence , but a substantial generation , and a compleat personal subsistence of the word ; but they could not imagine how the word should be substantially begotten , and compleatly and perfectly subsist by himself in his own person and substance , distinct from his father's subsistence and person , without going out of the father , and subsisting in a separate place from the father , as all created births do , which opposes nothing but a real substantial birth , and a compleat distinct subsistence of the word ; and therefore this is what the sabellians took for the catholick faith , and this is what athanasius defends : who tells them that this is a very ignorant mistake , to think that god is circumscribed by place , and to conceive the son in another place , and to imagine that the father and son must be divided and separated , one in this place , and another in that , if we acknowledge that the son is begotten of the father , and does appear and subsist by himself , distinct from the father : this he proves from scripture ; that there is no place that can contain god , and therefore we must have no imagination of place , when we think of god , the son , and the holy spirit ; that these are false and atheistical reasonings ; that the omnipresence of god is not a co-extension with all creatures , which is a bodily or kind of corporeal omnipresence ; but his power holds and contains all things , for power is unbodied and invisible , which neither encompasses other things , nor is encompassed by them ; and therefore it is impious to ask for , or to conceive what is the place of god , of the word , or of the holy spirit . and if a man will deny that the son is or was begotten , because he cannot conceive nor find out the place of his essence or substance , for the same reason he may deny that there is a father , or that there is a god. so that athanasius acknowledges the son to be as true and substantial a son , as the father is a substantial father ; and that he does as perfectly and compleatly subsist by himself , as the father does ; but denies that it hence follows , as the sabellians objected , that the son , if he be a distinct substantial person himself , must be divided and parted from the substance of his father , and that if he subsist distinctly by himself , he must subsist in a separate place from his father ; that this distinction of persons and subsistence cannot be conceived without a local separation . for he tells them , all these mistakes are owing to corporeal imaginations ; that they conceive of god after the manner of bodies ; that because body cannot generate another , without parting and dividing of substance , nor subsist without being in some place , nor subsist distinctly without being in distinct and separate places , therefore if god beget a son , and this son subsist distinctly by himself , this son must go out of the divine substance , and be locally separated from god the father , as a human son is from his father ; whereas the divine nature and substance cannot be divided , nor does god subsist in a place ; and therefore the son may be substantially begotten of the father , and subsist distinctly by himself , without any division of the divine substance , or separation of place . let us now proceed to a third sort of these hereticks , who did allow a real and substantial difference between father , son , and holy ghost , but made god a compound being , but one person , as well as one god , and that father , son , and holy ghost , were the three parts of this one god. this st. austin calls triformis deus ; and tells us , that these hereticks did not allow the father to be perfect in himself , nor the son perfect in himself , nor the holy ghost perfect in himself ; that neither of these considered by themselves were perfect god , but that all three together made one compleat and perfect god. this all the catholick fathers unanimously reject , and for the same reasons ; because there can be no composition in the pure and simple nature of god ; and it was the received doctrine of the catholick church , that each person is by himself true and perfect god , not an incompleat part of the deity . thus athanasius warns us against this heresy , which conceives the trinity like three bodily parts , inseparably united to each other ; which , he says , is an ungodly reasoning , contrary to the nature of perfect unbodied beings ; and therefore attributes the perfection of the godhead to each person , who are a real trinity , inseparably united in the same form and nature . that the father is perfect essence and being , without any defect , the root and fountain of the son and spirit : that the son in the fulness of the deity is the living word , and perfect offspring of the father : that the spirit is the fulness of the son , not part of another being , but whole and entire in himself : that we must conceive them inseparably united to each other , but yet three real subsisting persons in the same form and species , which is originally in the father , shines in the son , and is manifested by the holy spirit . and therefore he adds , that he did not compound the trinity , nor force it into a monad or unit ( that is , one single person ) to preserve the unity of the godhead ; nor conceive of god as of a man , who is compounded of three parts , spirit , soul , and body ; for such a composition cannot belong to a simple nature . this is the constant language of the ancient writers , that the divine nature is not compounded of parts , nor is god a compound being ; that each person in the trinity is a complete and perfect person , and three complete and perfect persons cannot be one by composition , as three incomplete parts are : that each person by himself is perfect god and perfect essence , though when we unite them and number three , we acknowledge but one perfect god : for the deity is not compounded but in three , each of which is complete and perfect , there is one perfect being , without composition , and without parts ; that is , the same one divine nature subsisting distinctly , not by parts or composition , but whole and entire in three . let us now then consider the true state of the question between these sabellians , and the catholick fathers : these hereticks owned at last , father , son , and holy ghost , to be three distinct substances , but not three substantial wholes , but three substantial parts , which by their union and composition made up one whole intire god. the catholick fathers join with them so far , as to own these divine persons to be three substantial subsisting persons , but reject their notion of a compounded god , or three parts of the deity , with the utmost abhorrence , and affirm , that each person is by himself entire and perfect god , perfect and complete divine essence or substance , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as damascen speaks ; and that they are not one god by composition , or as one person is one god , but as three complete and perfect persons , each of which is perfect god , can be one god. now i think after this we need not dispute , what the metaphysical notions of person and personality are : for a person in this sacred mystery , signifies one who is true and perfect god , and therefore is whatever god is ; for the true and perfect definition of god , must belong to every person who is true and perfect god. if then we acknowledge god to be infinite substance , mind , life , knowledge , power , every person who is god must be all this ; and if each person be true and perfect god , and yet no one person is the other , nor the motion , affection , or personal power , nor part of the other , then each person is distinctly and by himself complete and perfect god , and therefore has distinctly in himself all those attributes and perfections which belong to the perfect notion and idea of god ; and to make any person less than what god is , is to make him no god. but athanasius has another argument against the sabellian compounded deity , which must put all compositions of the deity for ever out of countenance . the scripture assures us , that god sends his son , and that the son sends the holy ghost ; whereas were the father , son , and holy ghost , three inseparable parts of one compounded deity , how could this one god , father , son , and holy ghost , send part of himself , and one part of the same one god send another ? to send , and to be sent , necessarily supposes persons really and substantially distinct , such as can give and receive , and execute commands , who have distinct understandings , wills , and powers of action , for no other beings are capable of sending or being sent ; and three such distinct persons , each of which is complete and perfect god , is the trinity asserted by the catholick fathers , in contradiction to the heresy of sabellius . but there is one very good rule of athanasius , which is worth observing in this controversy , that we must not imagine to find the unity of the godhead by denying three , but we must find this unity , or monade , in three . the sabellians took the first way to secure the catholick faith of one god , they denied three real , distinct , substantial persons in the godhead ; but the catholick faith owns three real , distinct , substantial , divine persons , and teaches that these three are one god ; not with such an unity as belongs to one person , but as three persons are one god : which should be a warning to some late writers , who think they cannot sufficiently defend the unity of god , without opposing a real and substantial trinity , which is to oppose the ancient catholick faith. to conclude this chapter , the result of the whole in short is this , that in opposition to the noetians , who made father , son , and holy ghost , to be only three names of the same one divine person , whom we call god , the catholick fathers asserted that they were three distinct persons , not the same person under three names , or three appearances ; in opposition to those sabellians , who denied the substantiality of the son , and of the holy ghost , but made the son like the word in the mind or heart of man , which had no substantial , permanent subsistence of its own , and the holy ghost in like manner to be a transient efflux of power from god ; so that god the father was the only subsisting person , and the one god , but the son , and the holy ghost , the insubstantial , transient word and power of god. these ancient fathers in like manner asserted the substantiality of the son , and of the holy ghost , that they were real , distinct , subsisting persons , as true and perfect persons as the father himself is : in opposition to those sabellians who asserted a compound deity , and made a trinity of parts , instead of a trinity of persons in the unity of the godhead ; they unanimously rejected all composition in the deity , and asserted each person distinctly by himself , not to be a part of god , but true and perfect god. now had these fathers asserted nothing positively concerning the three divine persons , but only rejected these noetian and sabellian heresies , it had been evidence enough what their faith was concerning the ever-blessed trinity ; for remove these heresies , and all such as are manifestly the same , however they may differ in words , and there is nothing left for any man to believe concerning a divine trinity , but the true catholick faith of three real , distinct , substantial , divine persons , each of which is distinctly , and by himself complete , entire , perfect god ▪ for if father , son , and holy ghost , are not one and the same person , distinguisht only by three names , according to their different appearances and operations ; nor one single person with two personal vertues and powers , called the son , and the spirit , like the word and emotion in a man's heart , which is no person , and has no subsistence of its own ; nor three parts of one compounded deity , as a man is compounded of body , soul , and spirit , then of necessity father , son , and holy ghost , must be three complete , substantial , subsisting persons , thr●● such persons as the sabellians would allow but one : f●●●f they ●e not the same , nor affections and motions of the ●ame , nor parts of the same , there is nothing left but to own them three completely and perfectly subsisting person . if god be one , not in the sabellian ●otion of singularity , as one god signifies one single person ; but o●e in three , without parts or composition , as the father asserted against sabellius , then each person must be by himself complete and perfect god ; for god cannot be one in three persons , unless each person be perfect god ; for unless this one god be perfect god in each person , he cannot be perfectly one in three . if the unity of god be not the unity of a person , it must be the unity and sameness of nature , and the inseparable union of persons ; and this is the unity in trinity , and trinity in unity , which the catholick fathers taught , and which is the only thing they could reasonably teach , when they had rejected the sabellian unity . there is no medium that i know of in this controversy concerning the unity of god , between the unity of one single person , and that oneness which results from the unity , and the consubstantiality of nature , and inseparable union of persons ; and therefore if the first be heresy , the second must be the catholick faith ; and whatever notions men advance against this , is sabellianism in its principle , and last result : for if the unity of god be not the union of three complete divine persons , each of which is distinctly by himself perfect god , it must be the unity of one divine person , which is the sabellian unity . chap. iv. concerning the homoousion , or one substance of father , son , and holy ghost . in the last chapter i have plainly shewn what sabellianism is , and by what arguments the catholick fathers opposed and confuted it , which is proof enough what they meant by person , when in opposition to sabellius , they taught that there were three persons in the unity of the godhead ; not three personal characters and relations , which sabellius owned , but three true and proper persons , each of whom is by himself true and perfect god. but yet the nicene faith of the homocusion , or one substance of father and son , is so expounded by some , as to countenance the sabellian heresy , which all the nicene fathers condemned , though one would think that should be an unanswerable objection against it ; this has made it so absolutely necessary to the vindication of the catholick faith , and to compose some warm disputes , rightly to understand this matter , that i shall carefully inquire what the nicene fathers meant by these terms of the homoousion , and one substance , which they have put into their creed , as the most express opposition to the arian heresy . and we cannot long doubt of this , if we consider the true state of the arian controversy : there was no dispute between the arians and catholicks concerning the personality of the son ; they both condemned sabellius , and therefore one substance , when opposed to the arians , can't signify a sabellian unity . the arians and sabellians both agreed in this , that one god is but one divine person , who is truly and properly god ; and that to assert three persons , each of which is true and perfect god , is to make three gods. the sabellians , to avoid this tritheism , make father , son , and holy ghost , but one divine person , and in that sense but one god. the arians on the other hand , allow father and son to be two real distinct persons , but attribute true and perfect divinity only to the father , and make the son a creature , though the most excellent creature , made before the world , and as like to god as any creature can be , and the minister of god in making the world. this heresy was condemned by the first general council assembled at nice ; and if we would understand the nicene creed , we must expound it in opposition to the arian heresy , without running into the other extreme of sabellianism . and therefore when we are taught to believe in one lord iesus christ , the only begotten son of god , begotten of his father before all worlds , god of god , light of light , very god of very god , begotten , not made , being of one substance with the father , by whom all things were made ; wemust understand a son , who is a distinct person from his father , as the arians allowed him to be , but not a made or created son , as they taught , but a son by nature , begotten of his father's substance , and that not in time , but from all eternity ; and therefore not a creature , but god by nature , true and perfect god , as god of god , begotten of god , and therefore of one substance with the father ; not in the sabellian sense , as one substance is one person , but as one substance signifies the same nature , in opposition to the arians , who made him not only a distinct person , but of a different nature , like his father , but not the same ; not of the substance of his father , but a new created substance , made out of nothing , as all other creatures are . the opposition of this creed to the arian heresy is certainly the best way of expounding it , and then we find nothing in it , but the true ancient catholick faith , of the real distinction of persons in the unity of the divine essence . but the present inquiry is , what is the true notion of the homousion , or one substance of father and son ; and besides that positive account the fathers give us of it , we may learn this from those false glosses and interpretations which they reject , and those rules they give for the expounding these words . sect . i. the true sense of the homoousion , from those misrepresentations which were made of it , and the answers which were given by the nicene fathers to such objections . . first then , let us consider what misrepresentations were made of this disputed word consubstantial , by the enemies of the catholick faith , and what answers the fathers gave to such objections . st. hilary mentions three in the beginning of his th book of the trinity ; and i shall consider them in the order in which he sets them down . . the first is , that this word homoousion , or consubstantial , is no better than sabellianism ; that it makes the father and the son to be but one , by one singular substance , which being infinite , extended it self into the virgin 's womb , and taking a body of her , in that body took the name of son ; and thus they say some former bishops understood it , and is therefore to be rejected as heretical ; which , as he adds , is the first misrepresentation of the homoousion . thus he observes in his book de synodis , that the fathers in the council of antioch , which condemned paulus samosatenus , did also reject the homoousion , because paulus thereby understood the singularity of the divine nature and substance , which destroys the real personal distinction between father and son ; and adds , that the church , though it retained the word homoousion , still rejects that sense of it as profane . the learned dr. bull , notwithstanding st. hilary's authority , can't believe that either paulus or sabellius did upon choice own the homoousion , but only put a forced and unnatural sense of it , to favour their heresies ; and seems to have very good reason on his side ; but that is not the present question , how perversly soever hereticks understood this word , the nicene fathers rejected this sense as profane and heretical . now if one substance does not signify one singular substance in the sabellian notion of it , which leaves only a trinity of names or modes , instead of a trinity of persons , then three consubstantial persons must signisy three substantial persons , who have the same nature and essence , but not the same singular substance . and st. basil tells us , that this is the proper acceptation of the word homoousion , which is directly opposed to the sabellian as well as to the arian heresy , as it destroys the identity of hypostasis , and gives us a complete and perfect notion of distinct persons ; for the same thing is not consubstantial to it self , but to another ; that there must be another , and another , to make two that are consubstantial . another objection against the homoousion was this , that to be consubstantial , or of one substance , signifies the communion of two in some other thing , which is in order of nature before them both ; as if there were some prior substance or matter , of which they both did partake so as to have the whole substance between them ; which makes them consubstantial , or of one substance both partaking of the same being , nature , or substance , which was before them both ; and therefore they rejected the homoousion , because it did not preserve the relation between the son and the father , and made the father later than that substance or matter , which is common to him with the son. this also st. hilary tells us the church rejects and abominates ; for nothing can so much as in thought be before the substance of the father ; and the relation between father and son signifies to beget , and to be begotten , not to be both made of the same substance . a third reason they assigned against this word homoousion was this , that to be consubstantial , or of one substance , in the strict and proper acceptation of these words , signifies , that the generation of the son , is by the division of the father's substance , as if he were cut out of him , and one substance divided into two persons , and so father and son are of one substance , as a part cut out of the whole , is of the same nature with that from whence it is taken . this was objected against the homoousion in the time of the nicene council , while this word was under debate , which socrates gives a more particular account of . the reason those bishops , who refused to subscribe to the nicene faith , gave against the homoousion , was this , that that only can be said to be consubstantial , which is of another , either by division , or by efflux and emanation , or by prolation or eruption : by eruption , as the branches sprout out of the root ; by efflux , according to the manner of human generations ; by division , as the same mass of gold may be divided into two or three golden cups ; but the son is of the father neither of these ways , and therefore they rejected this faith , and ridiculed the homoousion . for this very reason eusebius of caesarea was for some time in suspense about the homoousion , which he afterwards readily received , when the council had declared in what sense they understood it , and rejected all corporeal passions , all division and partition , change and diminution of the divine essence ; which pure , simple , unbodied , eternal , unchangeable mind is not capable of . now all that i shall observe at present is , that this very objection , which was thought so formidable , necessarily supposes that both they who made it , and they who were so much concerned to answer it , did acknowledge a substantial generation of the son ; for this whole dispute is downright nonsense without it : if god the father in begetting his son , does not so communicate his own nature and substance to him , as to make him a true substantial son , of the same substance indeed , but yet as distinct in substance from the father , as he is in person , how ridiculous is all this dispute , how the father communicates his own nature to his son ? for according to these men , he does not communicate or propagate his own nature and substance at all , there being but one singular solitary divine nature and substance , with a trinity of names , modes , or offices , and therefore no danger of any division or partition of the divine substance . the dispute between the catholicks and the arians about the generation of the son was this : they both owned against the sabellians , that the son is a real , substantial , subsisting person ; but the question was , whence he had his nature ? whether he was created out of nothing , and consequently had a beginning of being , as the arians affirmed ; or was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the substance of his father , and so coeternal with his father , as the nicene council affirmed , that the substance of the son was of the substance of the father , god of god , light of light. against this the arians objected , that the son could not be of the substance of the father , without the division of the father's substance , which is impossible in an infinite uncreated spirit , as god is ; which argument is only against a substantial generation . the nicene fathers allow this objection to be good as to corporeal generations , but deny that it is thus as to the eternal generation of the son of god ; for an eternal , uncreated , immutable mind , if it can communicate its own nature at all , ( and we learn from scripture , that god has a son ) must do it without division of parts ; for the divine nature and substance has no parts , and is capable of no division : and it is very absurd to reason from corporeal passions , to the affections and operations of spirits , much more of an infinite eternal spirit . had not the arians understood the catholick fathers , of the substantial generation of the son , they had more wit than to urge an argument to no purpose ; for where there is no communication of substance , it is certain there can be no division of it : and had not the catholick fathers owned this substantial generation , they would have rejected the argument with scorn , as nothing to the purpose , and not have distinguished between corporeal generations , and the generation of eternal and infinite mind . that though bodies cannot communicate their own nature and substance without division , yet an eternal mind can ; so that from these perverse interpretations of the homoousion , which the catholick fathers rejected , we may learn what they meant by it : for if father and son are not consubstantial in the sense of the sabellians and modalists ; that is , that father and son are not one person with two names , nor one singular solitary substance common to them both , then the father must be a substantial father , and the son a substantial son , and these two substantial persons are consubstantial , as having the same one divine nature and substance intirely , perfectly and distinctly in themselves , without any division , diminution , or separation of substance , by a complete and perfect generation , whereby the father communicates his whole intire nature to the son without any change or alteration in himself . sect . ii. some rules for expounding the homoousion ; and in what sense the fathers understood it . secondly , let us now examine what account the nicene and post-nicene fathers give of the homoousion , and in what sense they understood it . but before i tell you what they expresly say of this matter , i shall observe by the way two or three rules they give us for expounding the homoousion , which are of great use in this enquiry . . the first is , to give the homoousion the right place in our creed , as the nicene fathers have done . they do not tell us abruptly , in the first place , that the son is consubstantial , or of one substance with the father . they first tell us , that jesus christ our lord is the only-begotten son of god , begotten of his father , that is , of the substance of his father , before all worlds , god of god , light of light , very god of very god , begotten , not made ; and then they add , of one substance with the father . this st. hilary lays great stress on , and his reason is very considerable ; because if in the first place we say , father and son are consubstantial , or of one substance , this is capable of an heretical as well as orthodox sense , as we have already heard ; for they may be one substance in the sabellian notion , as that signifies one person ; or one by the division or partition of the same substance , of which each has a part ; for all these perverse senses may be affix'd to it , when this word consubstantial , or one substance , stands singly by it self , or is put in the first place , without any thing to limit or determine its signification . and therefore a true catholick christian must not begin his creed with saying , that father and son are of one substance ; but then he may safely say one substance , when he has first said , the father is unbegotten , the son is born , and subsists of his father , like to his father in all perfections , honour , and nature ; not of nothing , but born ; not unborn , but coaeval ; not the father , but the son of the father ; not a part of the father , but all that the father is ; not the author , but the image , the image of god , begotten of god , and born god ; not a creature , but god ; not another god , of a different kind and substance , but one god , as having the same essence and nature , which differs in nothing from the substance of the father ; that god is one , not in person , but nature , father and son having nothing unlike , or of a different kind in them : and after this we may safely add , that father and son are one substance , and cannot deny it without sin. this is as plain as words can make it , and needs no comment , but fixes and determines the catholick sense of the homoousion . for if we must acknowledge the son to be consubstantial , or of one substance with the father , in no other sense than as a true and real son is consubstantial , a son , not created out of nothing , but begotten of his fathers substance ; the son of god , who in his own proper person is true and perfect god ; not a part of god , but all that god is ; not one god , as one person with the father , but as having the true divine nature distinctly in his own person . this is a demonstration that the nicene consubstantiality , is the consubstantiality of two real substantial persons , who have the same nature distinctly subsisting in each of them . another rule for expounding the homoousion is , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , are equipollent terms ; that to be of one substance , and to be in all things alike to each other , signify the same thing . i know the fathers condemned the arian homoiousion ; for they asserted , that the son was like the father , in opposition to his being of the same nature with the father , and therefore this was an imperfect likeness and resemblance , or indeed no likeness at all ; for a created and uncreated nature are at such an infinite distance , as to have no true and real likeness to each other ; to be sure not such a likeness as there must be between a son and a father : nay sometimes they would not allow , that likeness can be properly applied to two individual natures of the same species , as to two individual human natures , which are not like to each other , but are the same . but yet whether it was proper or improper , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to be upon all accounts , and every way perfectly alike , was allowed to be very orthodox ; and therefore st. hilary in his book de synodis , approves several oriental creeds as very orthodox , though they left out the homoousion , because they in the most express terms confessed the perfect likeness and similitude of nature between father and son ; which they guarded with the utmost caution , against the perverse interpretations both of the sabellian and arian hereticks . and he disputes at large , that perfect similitude is a sameness and equality of nature ; and calls god to witness , that before he ever heard of those words homoousion , and homoiousion , he always thought that what is signified by both these words , is the same : that perfect likeness of nature is the sameness of nature ; for nothing can be perfectly alike , which has not the same nature . and this he says he learnt from the evangelists and apostles , before ever he heard of the nicene faith , which he had not heard of till a little before he was banished for that faith. this observation is of great use , as st. hilary notes , to confute sabellianism , and to fix the true sense of the homoousion : for if to be consubstantial , or of one nature , signifies a perfect likeness , similitude , and equality of nature , consubstantiality must at least signify two , who are thus consubstantial , as likeness , similitude and equality does ; and these two must have one and the same nature , not in the sense of singularity , and sabellian unity , but of likeness and similitude : that father and son are one substance , not as one person is one with himself , but as two persons are one by a perfect likeness and similitude of nature , which must be the true meaning of consubstantial , if consubstantiality and likeness of nature be the same . . i observe farther , that the catholick fathers did not make the homoousion the rule of faith , that whatever sense some critical wits can put on it , must therefore be owned for the catholick faith ; but they chose it as the most comprehensive word , to comprize the true catholick faith , and to detect the frauds of hereticks . they taught no new faith by this word , but what the catholick church had always taught , but secured the faith by it against the shifts and evasions of h●reticks . this is the defence they made to the arian objection , that it was an unscriptural word ; they confessed the word homoousios was not to be found in scripture , but the faith expressed by that word was : thus st. austin answers pascentius , and tells us , that christ himself has taught us the homoousion , where he says , i am in the father , and the father in me ; and i and my father are one ; and expounds this of the unity , dignity , and equality of nature : and adds , that it is not the word , but the thing signified by that word , which is so terrible to hereticks ; and if they would dispute to purpose , they must not reject the word , but the doctrine it contains . and thus laurentius , who presided in that dispute , gives judgment in this controversy , that the homoousion was not the name of the christian faith , but signified the equality of the trinity ; and that though this word be not in scripture , yet the thing signified by it is true ; and we must believe honourably of the unity , lest we injure the trinity . we may find enough to this purpose in athanasius , de decret . syn. nic. and elsewhere , of which more presently . and therefore st. hilary , in his book de synodis , which he wrote to some catholick bishops , who were very orthodox in the faith , and yet doubted of this word homoousion , tells them , that they are to consider what the synod intended by that word , and not reject the word , unless they rejected the faith taught by it , and would profess those arian doctrines , which the council condemned in it . this is the constant language of the nicene and post nicene fathers , when the dispute is concerning the use of this word , which gives us this certain rule for expounding the homoousion , that we must understand it in no other sense than what the nicene fathers intended by it ; for if we do , we may acknowledge the homoousion , and yet deny the nicene faith. what they taught by this word , that we must own ; and what they rejected by it , we must reject . and though we may fancy that this word signifies more than what the nicene fathers understood by it , ( as we have heard what perverse senses the hereticks fixt on it ) yet it being not a scriptural , but an ecclesiastical word , it must be expounded to that sense , and no other , which placed it in the creed . sect . iii what the nicene fathers meant by the homoousion . and this brings me to a more particular account of the homoousion , and what the nicene fathers understood by it . eusebius pamphili , who at first doubted about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that christ was of the substance of the father , and consubstantial , or of one substance with him ; gives an account to his coesareans of the reasons which moved him afterwards to subscribe to that form of faith ; as appears by his letter to them , recorded in socrates his ecclesiastical history . he tells them , that he did not admit these words without due examination ; but when he found there was nothing meant by them , but what was truly catholick and orthodox , he complied for peace sake . for by the son 's being of his father's substance , they meant no more than that he was of the father , not as a part of the father , or of his substance ; and when the son is said to be consubstantial with the father , they did not understand this after the manner of bodies by division , abscission , or any change of the father's substance ; but the only meaning is , that the son has nothing like a created nature , but is in every respect perfectly like his father , as not being of any other substance or nature , but of the father . athanasius gives us a very particular account what it was that forced the nicene fathers to add those two words to their creed , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the son is of the substance of the father , and consubstantial , or of one substance with the father ; which was to cut off all evasions and subterfuges from the arian hereticks , and to force them to confess the truth , or to confess their heresy , which they endeavoured to palliate and conceal under ambiguous words . when the nicene fathers taught , that the son is of the father , the arians were contented to allow this , but meant no more by it , but that the son is of the father , as all other creatures are of god ; and therefore they added , that the son is of the substance of god , to distinguish him from all creatures ; and this is the true interpretation of that phrase , that the son is of the substance of the father , that he is no creature . thus when the fathers taught , that the word was the true power and image of the father in all things , and invariably like the father , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the arians owned this also in a qualified sense , because creatures are said to be the power , the image , the likeness of god , and therefore they were forced to express the sense of scripture , and what sense they understood the scripture in , concerning the son's being the likeness and image of god , by adding , that the son is consubstantial , or of one substance with the father , to declare that the son is not so of the father as meerly to be like him , but to be the very same in likeness and similitude to the father ; and to be inseparably united to his father's substance , and that he and the father are one , as he himself hath said . the word is always in the father , and the father in the word , like the light and its splendor ; and this the word homocusios signifies , and was used by the council to this very end , to distinguish and separate the word from all created nature , as appears from the anathema they immediately denounce against those who said , that the son of god was produced out of nothing , was a creature , of a mutable nature , the workmanship of god , or of any other substance but the substance of the father : and therefore he adds , that those that dislike these words , ought to consider the sense in which the synod uses them , and to anathematize what the synod anathematizes ; and then if they can , let them quarrel with the words ; though he is very confident that no man who owns the sense of the council , and understands the words in their sense , can dislike the words . from whence it appears , that athanasius would have allowed those for orthodox christians ( as i observed before st. hilary did ) who should confess the eternal generation of the son , that there was no time before he was , and that he had no beginning of being ; that he is no creature , nor of any other substance , but only of the father , and that he always was inseparably united to him , and one with him , though they should have boggled at those words , that the son is of the substance of the father , and consubstantial with him . but the true reason why the nicene fathers did so earnestly contend for these words , of the substance of the father , and consubstantial , was because they found by experience , that no other words would hold the arian hereticks , who concealed their poyson under any other form of words , though in appearance very orthodox ; as the catholick bishops found to their cost in the council of ariminum , and upon several other occasions ; which is the account the synod of paris gives the eastern bishops of this matter : but though they desired that all would agree in the use of this word , as most expressive of the true catholick faith , yet they never rejected the communion of any bishops merely upon this account , while they prosessed the true catholick faith , which the nicene council intended to signify by this word , and condemned those arian blasphemies which they intended to condemn by it . before this council had taken the homoousion into their creed , and made it the test of the catholick faith , dionysius bishop of alexandria , in his book against the sabellians , had let drop some expressions , for which he was charged with denying the homoousion , and accused for it to his name-sake dionysius , then b●shop of rome , which occasioned his apology to the roman bishop , which athanasius gives us an account of . he owns , that he did say that the word homoousion was not to be found in scripture , yet what he taught of christ did plainly signify what is meant by the homoousion , that he is no creature , but homogeneous , or of the same nature with his father , which he explained by human births , which are manifestly of the same kind ; there being no difference of nature between parents and children , who differ only in this , that parents are not their own children ; whereby he signified that god the father and god the son had but one and the same nature , though the father is not the son , nor the son the father . the same , he says , he represented by other similitudes of homogeneous productions ; as a root and its branches , the fountain and rivers , which are not the same with each other , but have the same nature . these are true catholick representations of the homoousion , and this dionysius thought a sufficient justification of his faith , and athanasius thought so too , without using that term ; especially if we add what he discourses more at large , de sent. dionysii contra arianos . i shall only observe farther , that the learned dr. bull takes this very way to prove that the ante nicene fathers did own the faith of the homoousion , or that the son is consubstantial to the father , though we seldom meet with the word it self in their writings ; because they teach the same things which the nicene fathers intended by that word : as . when they affirm the son of god is not only of the father , but that he proceeds from , and is begotten of the father . . that the son is the true , genuine , proper , natural son of god. . when they explain the generation of the son , by the root and its branches , the sun and its rays , the fountain and river , which are of the same nature , and therefore represent the father and son to be of the same substance . . when they except the son of god out of the number of creatures , and deny him to be a creature . . when they ascribe such things to the son , as are proper and peculiar only to the true god. . when they affirm the son of god not only to be god , but expresly own him to be true god , god by nature , and one god with the father . this is the true notion of the homoousion ; and now let any man judge , whether a consubstantial trinity be a trinity of personal characters , relations , or names , or of real , substantial , subsisting persons . if we will allow either the nicene fathers , or the arian bishops to be well in their wits , can we think that there would have been any such disputes between them , as whether the son be coeternal with the father , or had a beginning ? whether there were any time , the least conceivable moment before the son was ? whether he was made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , created out of nothing , as all other creatures are , or begotten of the substance of the father , and is the true , genuine , natural son of god , or a son only by adoption ? whether he be true perfect god , in opposition to the most perfect created nature , or be only a made and creature-god ? whether he be consubstantial with the father , or have only a nature like the fathers , but not the same ? and whether he be like his father in all things , in substance and essence , or only in will and affection . i say , could any men in their wits dispute such matters as these , unless both sides were agreed , that the son is a real , substantial son , as human sons are , who are begotten of the substance of their parents ; that he has a subsistence of his own , distinct from his father's subsistence ; that he has a substance of his own , eternally begotten of his father's substance , and therefore the same , but proper and peculiar to his own person , which makes him the son , and not the father . for till these things are agreed , there is no foundation for the other disputes ; for if the son have no real subsistence of his own , who would dispute whether he began to subsist in time , or did subsist from all eternity ? if he have no substance of his own , is it not ludicrous to dispute whether he be of the father , that is , have his substance of his father's substance , or be a new created substance , as like his father's substance as a created substance can be , but not the same ? for if he have no distinct substance of his own , neither of these can be true . to what purpose is it to dispute , whether he be a begotten or created god , if he be not as true and perfect a person , and as true and perfect god ( upon the catholick hypothesis ) in his own person , as the father himself is ? in short , to conclude this argument , if the homoousion signifies , that the son of god , who is consubstantial to his father , is no creature , was not made out of nothing , had no beginning of being , is of his father's substance , begotten of his substance from all eternity , a true and perfect son of a true and perfect father , and upon all accounts the very same that the father is , excepting that he is the son and not the father , it is impossible the nicene fathers should have been either sabellians or modalists . sect . iv. a more particular inquiry into the full signification of the homoousion , with respect to the specifick unity of the divine nature . that the nicene fathers did by the homoousion , or one substance of the godhead , understand something like what we call a specifick sameness and vnity of nature , might be proved by numerous quotations , had it not been sufficiently done already by petavius , curcelloeus , dr. cudworth , and others ; whoever will be pleased to read the testimonies they produce in this cause , will never be able to make any other tolerable sense of them . they apply this word homoousion to things , which are specifically one , or which have the same specifick nature , as a tree and its branches , a fountain and river , as they call god the father the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the root and fountain of the son , and holy spirit ; the sun and its rays and splendor ; as christ is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the brightness and refulgency of his father's glory . they prove that christ has the same nature with his father , because all true , natural , genuine sons have so ; and therefore if he be as truly and properly the son of god , as isaac was the son of abraham , he must be consubstantial to god the father , as isaac was to abraham , which we know is a specifick vnity of nature . and the council of chalcedon expresly affirms , that christ is consubstantial to his father , as to his godhead , or divine nature ; and consubstantial to us as to his manhood , or human nature ; and if the homoousion signifies the same , or something analogous in both , we know what this sameness of nature means ; for it is impossible to reconcile this to one singular nature and unity . christ is not consubstantial to us upon account of the same singular human nature in him , and in all mankind ; for every man has a particular human nature of his own , and so had christ ; but the nature is specifically the same in christ , and in us that is , it is a true human nature , and this makes christ and us consubstantial . and if there be any thing like this , though in a more perfect degree , in the consubstantiality of father and son , it must signify not one singular nature ; which cannot be said to be consubstantial to it self , but the consubstantiality of two persons really and substantially distinct , but united in the same common nature , or the same divinity : and therefore nothing is more common , than to render the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , unius generis , and by such like words , as every one knows signify a specifick vnity . that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the one divinity , and one divine essence , is a common nature , the same in all three persons communicated by the father to the son , and by father and son to the holy spirit , is so universally acknowledged , that it needs no proof ; the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , frequently occur in the writings of the nicene fathers , which signify the one divinity to be a common nature to the three divine persons . this is the very account st. basil gives of the difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , essence and person ; that essence signifies a common nature , which is in more than one , and may be spoken of more than one , as a species is predicated of its individuals . man is a common name for all men , because humanity is a common nature , which is alike in peter , and iohn , and iames , and all the men in the world : but hypostasis or person , though it signifies the nature also , yet not in that general notion , as common to all of the same kind , but as actually subsisting in particulars , which are distinguished from each other by their distinct subsistence , or by such other properties and characteristical marks as are peculiar to each of them , and not common to the whole kind , as the persons of peter , and iames , and iohn , though they have the same common nature , are yet distinguished from each other . now if the one divine nature be in this sense a common nature , that it is really and actually communicated by the father to the son , and holy spirit , and does distinctly subsist whole and entire , and perfect , in all three divine persons , it cannot be one singular solitary nature , which cannot subsist distinctly in three ; for in perfect singularity there can be no distinction : nor can one singular nature be three subsistences , when there is but one which subsists . athanasius , or whoever was the author of that treatise of the common essence of father , son , and holy ghost , proves that all three persons have the same common nature from the same names , and attributes , and works , dominion , and power , ascribed distinctly to them all ; and gives this account , why , though the father be god , and the son god , and the holy ghost god , yet we must not say that there are three gods , but one god in three persons ▪ because a common nature has a common name , as he shews , that all mankind in scripture are called one man , upon account of their common nature ; and if this be allowable among men , to unite all mankind in one name , and to speak of them as one man , notwithstanding all that diversity which is between them in external form , strength , will , affections , opinions , &c. how much more reasonable is it to call the three divine persons one god , who are distinguished and separated from the whole creation by one undivided dignity , one kingdom , one power , one will and energy . and that we may not suspect that by one common nature they meant one singular substance and nature , common to father and son ( which it is impossible to form any notion of ) st. basil tells us what he meant by a common nature , such a nature as has the same notion and definition , that is , which is common , as a genus or species is common : as for example ; if the father , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as to his suppositum , or substance , be light , we must acknowledge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the essence and substance of the son to be light also ; and whatever other notion we form of the being and essence of the father , the same we must apply to the son. and herein he places the unity of the godhead , or the one divinity ; that though the divine persons differ in number , and in their peculiar characters , yet that divine nature which subsists distinctly in each of them , has but one and the same notion and definition , and therefore is but one and the same in all . if this be not a specifick sameness and unity , all our logicks deceive us : i 'm sure the unity of an individuum or singular nature was never thought to consist in a common notion or definition of its nature ; and yet this is the account which the fathers unanimously give of the one common divinity of father , son , and holy ghost . no man who understands any thing of this controversy , can be ignorant of that famous dispute de ingenito & genito , concerning the vnbegotten and the begotten nature . by this sophism the arians endeavoured to prove , that the son could not be homoousios , consubstantial , or of the same nature with the father , because an unbegotten nature cannot be the same with a begotten nature . now had the catholick fathers believed the singularity of the divine nature in the modern notion of it , this objection had been unanswerable ; for it is absolutely impossible that the same singular nature should be both begotten and unbegotten , as much as it is that the same single person should be both begotten and unbegotten . i desire to know , how any sabellianist , who acknowledges but one singular solitary substance of the deity , would answer this objection ; i know no possible way they have , but to deny that the divine nature of the son is begotten ; that though the son be begotten , his divine nature is not begotten , but only his personality , or mode of subsistence , without a begotten subsisting nature : and this , indeed , would effectually answer the objection ; for if there be not a begotten and unbegotten nature , the foundation of the objection is lost . and this is so obvious an answer upon the hypothesis of singularity , that it is sufficient to satisfy any thinking man , that the c●tholick fathers did not believe this singularity of the divine essence , since none of them ever gave this answer to the objection . but we need not guess at their meaning ; for they themselves expresly reject this answer , which is the only proper and pertinent answer upon this hypothesis ; and give such other answers as contradict the notion of the singularity of the divine essence . as strange as some think it , the catholick fathers , from the very beginning of christianity , owned the divine nature and substance of the son to be begotten ; nothing is more familiar in all their writings , than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , natura genita , deus genitus , unigenitus deus . st. gregory nyssen agrees this matter with eunomius , that the divine nature of the son is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a begotten substance ; so does st. basil , so do the other fathers . when eunomius objected , that god being unbegotten , cannot admit of generation , st. basil allows this to be true in one sense , viz. that he who is unbegotten cannot in his own proper nature be begotten , because it is impossible that an unbegotten nature should it self be begotten : but the other sense of the words , that he who is unbegotten himself can't beget , so as to communicate by a substantial generation his own nature to the son , he rejects as blasphemy both against father and son ; which is a plain demonstration what st. basil's judgment was about an unbegotten and begotten nature . eunomius urged , that unbegotten , and begotten , are both names of nature , and therefore must signify two natures as different from each other , as unbegotten and begotten are . now to prove that begotten is not the name of nature and substance , st. basil uses this argument , that if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be the same , if begotten and substance signify the same thing , then as he who is begotten is the begotten of him who begets , so we may in like manner say , that he who is begotten is the substance of him who begets , and then the name begotten will not signify the substance of the only begotten son , but the substance of the god of all : that as the son is the begotten of god , so he is the substance of god ; and thus the begotten is the substance of the unbegotten , which , he says , is ridiculous . and yet as ridiculous as st. basil thought this , those must of necessity own it , who assert but one singular substance of the deity ; for if there be but one substance in the sense of singularity , the son ( if he have any substance ) must be the substance of the father ; he who is begotten , must be the substance of him who is unbegotten . thus much i think is certain , that if st. basil was in his wits , he would never have used this argument , had he believed that father and son are but one singular substance ; and yet elsewhere he expresly tells us , that the nicene fathers distinguished the hypostates of father and son , when they called the son light of light ; for the light which begets , is not the light which is begotten , though their nature is the same , they being light and light. once more , to prevent if it be possible all manner of evasions , since some moderns distinguish between the generation of the son , and of his substance , and will allow that the son is begotten , but not his substance . i observe that st. basil rejects this distinction between the son and his substance . eunomius durst not say that the son was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , made or created out of nothing , this being so expresly condemned by the nicene council , which the generality of christians received as the rule of their faith , and therefore he endeavoured to cheat them into it before they were aware , by a new form of speech : he says , that the substance of the son was begotten , having no being before its own proper subsistence , and was begotten before all things by the will of god. this was very craftily expressed , to insinuate that there was a time when the substance of the son did not exist ; for it could not be before it was begotten , and had a proper subsistence of its own . st. basil exposes this sophistry at large , and shews , that by the same argument they might prove , that there was a time when the father's substance was not ; for that could not be older than its own subsistence : but if the father be eternal , though his substance could not be before its subsistence , so may the son be also , by an eternal generation and subsistence . but that which i would take notice of is , that st. basil observes the vain sophistry of this way of speaking , that when he durst not say that the son was of nothing , or that there was a time when he was not , he insinuates the same thing concerning the substance of the son , as if the son and the substance of the son were two things . now if the son and the substance of the son be the same , then if the son is begotten , the substance of the son is begotten ; if the son be not the father , the substance of the son is not the substance of the father . and yet all the philosophy of the ancient fathers , not excepting st. austin himself , would not allow of any difference between the person of the father , and his being , essence , substance , subsistence , nature , nor between the person of the son , and his being , subsistence , nature , &c. and therefore the son is as distinct from the father in nature , being , life , substance , as in person and subsistence . but to proceed : there was no dispute between the catholicks and the arians about the singularity of the divine substance , they both rejected that as sabellianism , and asserted father and son to be as distinct in nature and substance , as they are in person ; and therefore this objection de ingenito & genito , concerning the unbegotten and the begotten nature , was intended not to prove a numerical distinction , ( which it effectually does ) but a specifick difference and diversity of nature between father and son ; that the son is no more consubstantial to the father , than to be unbegotten and to be begotten are the same . the whole controversy turned upon this one point , whether unbegotten and begotten , were names of nature ; and consequently , whether to be unbegotten , and to be begotten , made a specifick difference of natures . this the catholick fathers unanimously denied ; and not to take notice of all they say on this argument , there is one answer which they all give , very observable to my present purpose , and that is this : that to be unbegotten or begotten , makes no specifick difference in created natures , and therefore there is no reason to say that it makes any such diversity in the divine nature ; and they all give the example of adam , seth , and eve , who all had the same human nature ; and yet adam was unbegotten , as being immediately formed by god. seth was begotten , as being adam's son ; eve was not begotten , but made of one of adam's ribs : but this makes no diversity of nature , but only distinguishes them by their manner of existence , or coming into being , and there is no imaginable reason why the same specifick nature considered in its individuals , may not have very different beginnings , without any alteration of nature . nay , as damascen observes , thus it is in all the several species of creatures ; for the first in every kind is unbegotten : and though the divine nature in all three divine persons is eternal , without any beginning ; yet if to be unbegotten , or to be begotten , make no diversity of nature in creatures , there is no reason to say that it makes any such difference in the divine nature . this is so plain and express , that i need add nothing to shew how this overthrows the opinion of singularity , and owns a specifick unity and sameness of the divine nature : that though the father be unbegotten , and the son begotten , yet they are consubstantial , or of the same nature ; not with the sameness of singularity , which is impossible , but with such a sameness of nature as is between two of the same kind and species , as the example of adam and seth proves . and i need not prove , that a specifick sameness of nature , supposes a real distinction of persons , who agree in this one same nature . sect . v. that by the homoousion , or one substance , the nicene fathers did not meerly understand a specifick , but a natural unity and sameness of substance between father and son. but yet after all this , the catholick fathers did not allow the divine nature in a strict and proper notion to be a species , which is only a notional and logical unity and sameness of nature ; for the divine nature , which is perfect essence , is not logically , but essentially one , though it subsists distinctly in three persons , and this was the faith of the catholick fathers . on this one point the whole controversy turns , concerning the singularity of the divine nature , or the plurality of divine natures multiplied with the persons , and consequently that great controversy of all , whether a trinity of true , real , substantial persons , be essentially one , or three gods. to represent this as plainly as possibly i can , we must consider the difference between a specifick and a natural unity , between being one in notion , and one in nature . the first is , when from that agreement which we observe in the natures of several individuals , we form a notion of one common nature which belongs to them all ; as the notion of humanity , or human nature , which belongs to all men , and affords a common name , and a common definition to them : but this is only the work of the mind , for there is no such one common human nature actually existing in all mankind ; but every man is a man by himself , and has a particular human nature , as he has a soul and body of his own , which is not the soul and body of any other man in the world . and thus damascen owns , it is with all creatures of the same kind , who in truth and reality are distinct separate beings , who subsist apart by themselves , as peter and paul , and all other men do , and are united only in a common notion , not in a common subsisting nature , which is one and the same in all . but then he tells us , that it is quite otherwise in the divine nature , which is a common nature , and yet but one ; not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; not meerly in our notion and conception , but in truth and reality ; the same one divine nature , without the least diversity or separation , actually and distinctly subsisting in father , son , and holy ghost , which being perfectly the same is but one , and really and substantially subsisting in three is a common nature , which is equally and perfectly in them all . thus damascen has declared his opinion fully against the notional and specifick unity of the divine nature , that the divine nature is one , only as human nature is one , because it has one common name and definition , which belongs to all of the same kind ; whereas there is no one common human nature in subsistence , but only in notion : but the same one divine nature actually subsists in three , and is the same one divinity in three . and that this was the true sense of all the catholick fathers will appear , from considering some notions which were common to them all . . they all agree , that there is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but one divinity , and one god ; and one god , because but one divinity ; and for this very reason nothing is more familiar with them , than to call the holy trinity one god. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one divinity in three perfect hypostates . now will any man say , that the one divinity , or one divine nature , and one god , is a meer notion ? is not the unity of god the fundamental article of natural religion ? and if this one divinity does really , immutably , inseparably subsist in three divine persons , as it must do , if these three divine persons with respect to this one divinity , are naturally and inseparably one god , can this one common subsisting divinity be a meer notion , which has no hypostatical subsistence , but only subsists in thought ? can the specifick notional unity of human nature , make three men one man , as the one common divine nature makes three persons one god ? if the unity of the divine nature be but a notion , the unity of god , the unity of the trinity , which is this one god , must be a meer notion also ? and so , in truth and reality , there is no more one god , than there is but one man. i readily grant , that the father may be , and often is , in a peculiar manner called god , and the one god , as distinguished from the person of the son , and of the holy spirit ; but i deny , that he is called the one god , as considered without them , or so much as in thought separated from them : if we do not include the son and the holy ghost in the unity of the godhead , we must deny their godhead also ; unless we will say , that there is one god , and besides him two divine persons , each of which is god , but not the one god : which must introduce a plurality of separate gods : for if they be not one , they are more than one ; and if one person be the one god without the other , they cannot be one god. this shews , what necessity there is of owning the holy and ever-blessed trinity to be the one god , and one divinity , naturally and essentially one ; and then the necessary consequence is , that this one divine nature , which actually and substantially subsists in three distinct divine persons , who for that reason are naturally and essentially one god , cannot be a mere common specifick nature , but one common subsisting nature . but what possible sense can we make of this ? one common subsisting nature , which is really , actually , indivisibly , one , and yet is common , that is , does really and distinctly subsist in more than one . to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to be common , and to be one , not in notion , as a species is common to all the individuals , but in the truth and reality of nature sounds very like a contradiction . when we say the divine nature is common to three persons , and subsists distinctly in three , we deny it to be one singular solitary nature , which can subsist but in one , and constitute but one person , which was the sabellian notion of the divine unity , which the catholick church condemned , as destroying a real trinity , as i have shewn at large : but how then can this common nature , which is not singular , but subsists perfectly and distinctly in three , be actually and essentially one ; for a natural unity is a numerical unity , is one in number , which , one would think , should signify a singular nature , for so it does in all creatures : and when we speak of the unity of the divine nature , it cannot be one by composition , which the absolute simplicity of the divine nature cannot admit . this is the great difficulty , which we must not expect perfectly to understand , because a finite mind can never comprehend , that is , can never have an adequate notion of what is infinite : but i shall give some account , what the catholick fathers have said of this matter , which will satisfy us , that it is a natural , not a mere specifick unity , which they intended ; and will give us such a notion of this venerable mystery , as will deliver it from all inconsistency , and contradiction . . i observe therefore , that the catholick fathers lay the foundation of this sameness and homoousiotes of nature in the eternal generation of the son , of the substance of the father . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the nicene creed is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the son is not of nothing , as all creatures are , but receives his whole substance of the substance of his father : st. basil in express words makes generation essential to the notion of the homoousion : for such beings as upon account of likeness of nature may be call'd brothers to each other , are not therefore homoousious ; but when the cause , and that which actually subsists from , or out of that cause , have the same nature , then they are homoousious to each other : and in opposition to that perverse and heretical sense , which some affixed to the word homoousion , that it signified two made of the same substance by the division and partition of it , as two shillings cut out of the same piece of silver ; besides all other blasphemies , the same father tells us , that this destroys the faith both of father and son ; for in this sense , to be of one substance , can make them no more than brothers : and i need not observe , that all the fathers prove the son to be consubstantial to the father , because he was not made , nor created , but begotten of his father's substance ; which does not refer merely to a specifick sameness of nature , but to the substantial communication of the same nature from father to son ; which is therefore not in meer notion and idea , but substantially the same in both : for they would not allow that a mere specifick sameness of nature made two persons consubstantial unless one of them received his nature and substance from the other . and this seems no improbable account why the nicene fathers in their anathema's , added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : when they teach that the son is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the substance of his father , in opposition to his being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of nothing , they must , by the substance of the father , mean that divine nature and substance which is the person of the father ; for there is no other notion of begetting a son of his father's substance : nor is any other sense of the words directly and immediately opposed to his being made of nothing . but then since ousia does often signify a specifick nature , which the philosophers call a second substance , to prevent this mistake , they added hypostasis , which signifies a first substance , or a subsisting nature ; and condemn those who say the son is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of another nature , specifically different from the nature of the father , as the arians taught ; or that he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of any other substance than that which is the substance of the father , and consequently not begotten of the father : for both these are essential to the notion of the homoousion , to have the same nature for kind , or the true perfect divine nature , and to receive this nature from the father by a substantial generation ; and the council condemns those who deny both or either of these . i must add one thing more to make this notion complete ; that as the son is begotten of the substance of the father , so he receives his whole substance from the whole substance of the father . this is the constant doctrine of the fathers , that the son is totus ex toto , whole of whole ; that the divine generation is not like human generations , by corporeal passions , by a division of the father's substance , by a partial efflux or emanation ; but the father , without any division , diminution , or alteration of his own substance , communicates his whole divine nature to the son ; that the son is perfectly and entirely all and the same that the father is . thus they expound those sayings of our saviour , all that the father hath , is mine . all things are delivered unto me of my father . as the father hath life in himself , so hath he given to the son also to have life in himself . not to signify an external arbitrary gift and donation , but the eternal communication of his whole divine nature to the son ; that he is life of l●fe , light of light , god of god , very god of very god. for this reason the arians rejected the homoousion , because they thought it absolutely impossible that the father should beget a son of his own substance , without a division of his substance ; that he should communicate the whole d●vine nature to his son , and have the same whole divine nature himself . and the fathers allow , that this is above human comprehension , as the divine nature it self is ; but think those men little consider the true measure of human understanding , who will not believe that god has a son , because they cannot comprehend the inessable mystery of the eternal generation . the scripture assures us that god has a son , that eternal word , which was in the beginning , was with god , and was god. the very notion of a son , signifies that he has the same nature with his father , and receives his being and nature from his father , is substance of his father's substance ; for thus all other sons receive their nature and substance from their parents . the absolute simplicity of the divine nature , whi●h has no corporeity , no composition , no parts , and therefore can be divided into none , proves that the divine generation can have nothing like to human generations , no more than god is like a man ; and therefore must be as much above human comprehension , as the divine nature is . we certainly know what it is not , that it is not by any separation or division of substance ; for the divine nature is a pure , simple , indivisible monade ; but how this monade can communicate it self , we cannot tell : but this we know , that if a monade does generate , it must generate a perfect whole ; for when the whole is a simple , indivisible , uncompounded monade , it must generate its whole , or nothing . thus much is evident , that to communicate a whole , perfect , undivided nature and substance , is the most perfect generation . he is the most perfect father , who communicates his whole substance to his son , without division or separation ; who without ceasing to be what he was himself , begets a son wholly and perfectly the same with himself : for the more perfectly one father and son are , the more perfect is the generation ; and they cannot be more one , than to be one and the same substance , communicated whole and entire from father to son. there is nothing like this in human births ; for the imperfection of created nature will not admit it ; the father communicates the first seeds and principles of life with part of his substance , but the child is nourished , grows and encreases to its just proportion by adventitious matter , which never was the substance of the father , and therefore father and son are not one substance , though the father communicates the same specifick nature with part of his substance to his son. now though we cannot conceive how a whole begets a whole , yet we must grant that this is the most perfect generation ; for to generate , is to communicate nature and substance , to beget 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , another self , as the ancients speak of the divine generation ; and then the more perfectly the son is the father's self , the more perfect the generation is ; and therefore thus god must beget a son , if he begets at all ; for he must beget in the most perfect manner . and thus the son must be begotten , if he be begotten at all ; for if he be a son , he must be of his father's substance , and that not a part , but the whole ; for the divine substance must be a perfect indivisible inseparable monade . this eternal generation of the son is a great and unconceivable mystery , and has always been owned to be so by the catholick church ; we have no notion or idea of it , but no more have we of the eternal existence of the divine nature it self , without any cause or beginning , or of the creation of all things out of nothing , or of the natural production and propagation of created beings ; our present inquiry is not concerning the mystery of the eternal generation , but concerning the unity of the divine nature in father and son , in what sense they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the same substance , and that the eternal generation gives an account of : for if the father communicate his whole nature and substance to the son , without division and separation ( which is the catholick faith ) the son must of necessity have the same one substance with the father ; for a whole same of a whole same , cannot be another , and therefore must be the same one substance , whole of whole . st. athanasius reasons very subtilly against the arians upon this point : they taught that the son was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , made of nothing , as other creatures are . then , says he , he must be the son of god by participation ; what is it then he partakes of ? other creatures are the sons of god by the participation of the holy spirit ; but the holy spirit is given by the son , not the son , as the eternal son of god , sanctified by the spirit ; for the spirit receives all from father and son , not the son from the spirit . he must then partake of the father : but what is that , and whence is it ? if that he partakes of be something extra-essential to the father , which is not the father's nature and essence , then he does not partake of the father , but of that extra-essential being , whatever it is ; and then he is not second to the father , that whereof he partakes being before him ; nor is he the son of the father , but of that extra-essential being or nature , by the participation of which he obtains the title and character of son , and god. but this is very absurd , since the father calls him his beloved son , and the son calls god his own father ; and therefore is not a son by extra-essential participations , but son is the name of him who participates in the nature and substance of the father . but then again , if that which is participated of the father , be not the nature and essence of the son , the same absurdity returns , there being some middle term between these two , to be of the father , and the nature of the son , whatever that nature be ; which proves that the nature of the son is not of the father , and therefore he is not the son of the father , for nature makes a son. all this being so absurd , it is necessary to own , that the true genuine son of god is all that he is , of the essence and substance of the father : for when god is thus wholly and perfectly participated , it is the same thing as to say , that god begets ; and to beget , signifies , that he begets a son. and therefore , though all things by the grace of god partake of the son , he will not allow us to say , that the son partakes of any thing , which implies , that the son is one thing , and that which he partakes of , is another ; but that which is the participation of the father , that is the son. this is the most natural and essential unity that is possible to be conceived , that the whole son is nothing else , but the whole , entire , immediate participation of the father's substance , and therefore must be as perfectly one with the father , as the father is one ; for there is but one and the same substance , which is the substance of the father , and by an eternal and ineffable generation , the substance also of the son. though father , son , and holy ghost are three real distinct persons , and each of them have the whole entire divine nature in himself , yet there is but one divine nature , one divinity in them all , and therefore they are but one god. this is the account st. hilary gives , why we may say god is one , and one , and one , but not three gods : because the divine nature is not multiplied with the persons . thus speaking of the father and son , he tells us , that the son is one of one , and therefore they are both one : for between one and one , that is one of one ; there is no s●cond nature of the eternal divinity . for as he adds elsewhere , the nature of the father is born in the nativity of the son , and for this reason , the father and son are one god , because the son is god of the nature of god : but their being thus one , does not destroy the subsisting nature of the son , but in god , and god preserves the nature of one god. and therefore the true , absolute , and perfect profession of our faith is , to confess god of god , and god in god , not after the manner of bodies , but by divine powers ; not by transfusion of nature into nature , but by the mystery and power of the divine nature : for god is of god , not by dissection , protension , or derivation , but by the power of the divine nature subsists by his birth in the same nature . — not so the same nature , that he who is born , is he himself who begets ; ( for how is that possible , since he is begotten ) but he who is begotten subsists in the same whole entire nature , which is his whole entire nature who begets . and this perfect unity sameness , identity of nature , he resolves into the mystery of the divine generation , virtute naturoe , & mysterio & potestate naturoe , for since he is not begotten of any other substance or nature , but of his father's substance , and that not after the manner of bodies , by dissection , protension , or derivation , but by the mysterious power of the divinity , which communicates it self whole and perfect , there must be the same one divinity in both . and he appeals to every man's understanding , what the natural interpretation of these words are , that the son is of the father ; for can of the father signify , that he is of any other than the father , or that he is of nothing , or that he is the father himself ? he is not of another , because he is of the father ; for a son cannot be god , if he have any other father but god , and therefore is god of god. he cannot be of nothing , because he is of the father ; and whoever is begotten , must be begotten of the nature of him who begets . he is not the father himself , because he is of the father , and the birth of the son speaks a necessary relation to the father . now a son , who is so of the substance of the father , as to be nothing but what he is from the father , and to be all that the father is , whole of whole , must have the same one nature , substance and divinity with the father ; for whole of whole must be the same whole . and yet if he be so of the father , as not to be the father , but the son , he must be distinct in substance from the father . he is true and perfect god , but he receives his divinity by his birth ; he is god of god , not god who begets , but god , who is begotten , not of nothing , but of his father's substance , who is unbegotten . and therefore though st. hilary , and all the catholick fathers with him , reject all corporeal passions in the divine generation , all corporeal desection , division , efflux , or emanation of the divine substance , which is incorporeal and indivisible , yet they all assert a true and proper generation of the son , and an impassible production and prolation of him , whole of whole . and st. hilary tells us , that for this reason the arians , under a specious pretence of condemning valentinus his emanations and aeons , denied the prolation of the son from the father , only to deny his generation ; whereas some kind of prolation is essential to the very notion of a birth , which cannot be conceived without it ; and therefore we must not wholly reject all prolation and production of the son from the father , but only reject all corporeal emanations , which are very imperfect images of divine mysteries , and have nothing like the eternal generation of the son , but only that the son is truly begotten of his father's substance . this is that adorable and unsearchable mystery of the divine generation : the son is truly and properly begotten , receives his whole being and nature from his father , is substance of his father's substance , whole of whole , and therefore one and the same substance with the father ; not that substance , which is the person of the father , nor a new or another separate substance , as it is in human generations , but the nature and substance of the father , born and repeated in the nativity of the son , as st. hilary speaks : the father , son , and holy ghost , are but one divinity , one infinite , eternal nature and substance ; but they are thrice this one substance , and as perfectly and distinctly three in this one substance , as any other three are three substances . st. austin was certainly in the right , when he asserted , that the divine nature and essence must not be considered either as a genus or species , nor the divine persons as individuals , and shews particularly the impropriety of each ; though he knows not under what notion to conceive them , but inclines most to some common matter or substance , which is the same in all , as carrying the nearest resemblance and analogy in it : though this he does not very well like neither , of which more presently . it will be of great use briefly to consider this matter ; for the difficulty consists more in want of words to express this unity and distinction by , than in the notion it self . the singularity of the divine essence and substance in the sabellian notion of one substance , the nicene fathers universally rejected , as irreconcilable with a real distinction of persons , which destroys the faith of a real trinity . a mere specifick unity of nature and substance , which is a meer logical notion , falls short of the natural and essential unity of the godhead ; and yet we have no word to serve as a middle term between the unity of singularity , and a specifick unity of nature . for there is no such unity as this in created nature , and therefore no name for it ; and yet the unity of the divine nature in a trinity of persons , is neither of these , but bears some resemblance and analogy to both . as to shew this briefly . the unity of the divine nature is not a meer specifick unity . a species is only an idea , or pattern of nature , according to which particular creatures are formed ; and such creatures as are made according to the same pattern , are specifically the same ; and as far as we can observe this correspondence and ideal sameness of nature , so we rank them under the same species . so that there can be no species but among created beings ; for they must be all made , and made according to the same original pattern . but an eternal and necessary nature was not made , and therefore not made according to any pattern , nor can any other be made according to its pattern ; for what is made cannot be necessary and eternal . so that the divine nature can be but one , and one numerical nature is no species ; it can communicate its own substance by an eternal generation and procession , but it can't be a pattern and idea for any other beings of the same kind , which are not its own substance . for this reason st. austin rejects this specifick unity ; he distinguishes between saying , that the divine persons are vna essentia , & vnius essentiae , one essence or substance ; and that they are ex vna essentia , of one essence . the first may signify a natural unity , and must do so when applied to the trinity . the second signifies only a common specifick nature and unity . when we speak of men we may use either expression , that they are one essence , or that they are of one essence , because in both cases , when applied to creatures , one essence signifies specifically as a common pattern of nature , according to which not only three , but many threes may be made : but the whole divine essence is in the trinity , and cannot subsist in any other person , and therefore is not a common specifick nature . but then there is something in the divine nature , as substantially communicated to the son , and to the holy spirit , which bears some analogy to a species , and to a specifick unity ; and for this reason the catholick fathers in their disputes both with the sabellians and arians , frequently express the unity of the nature , as subsisting in three distinct persons , by a specifick unity . the notion and idea of a common nature , which subsists in many individuals , is called a species ; the same common notion and definition belonging to all the individuals of the same kind : now if we believe the doctrine of a real trinity , we must acknowledge , that the same one divine nature , which is originally in the father , is communicated to the son and holy spirit , and does subsist distinctly and substantially in all three ; and therefore has this resemblance to a species , that it is a common nature , which has the same notion and definition , and is the same in three , but not meerly by a notional identity and sameness , but by the real identity of substance ; there being but one divine substance , unmade , uncreated , unbegotten , but communicated whole and entire to the son by an eternal generation , and to the holy spirit by an eternal procession : so that the divine nature is so far a species , as by its actual communication to the son and holy spirit , and its distinct subsistence in father , son , and holy ghost , it is in truth and reality a common nature and substance , which a species is only in notion and idea . the notion and definition of human nature in peter , iames , and iohn , is the very same , and therefore there is a specifick sameness and unity of nature between them . the divine nature in father , son , and holy ghost , is the same , not merely in notion and idea , but substantially the same ; and therefore all the names of a specifick sameness and unity , do in a more perfect and excellent manner belong to the sameness and unity of the divine nature , as subsisting perfectly , indivisibly , and yet distinctly , in father , son , and holy ghost : and when we speak of the sameness of the divine nature , as subsisting distinctly in three divine persons , we have no other words to express it by , but such as signify a specifick unity ; and we must use such words as we have , and qualifie their sense as well as we can . as for instance : those words , whereby we signify a common specifick nature , which is one and the same in all the individuals of the same species , are the best we have to express the unity of the divine nature , as common to three persons , and thus the catholick fathers use them without scruple , and speak of the unity of the divine nature , and of its being common to all the three divine persons , in the same words and phrases , as they use conc●rning a common specifick nature : which leads some into a great mistake , as if they meant no more by it but a specifick sameness , and unity of the divine nature ; that father , son , and holy ghost have one substance no otherwise , than as peter , iames , and iohn , have one and the same humane nature : for the divine nature is not one merely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not in mere notion and idea , but actually , indivisibly , inseparably , one ; nor is it a common nature , merely as it has a common name and definition , but by an actual inexistence in three . for the same reason it is very difficult what three to call father , son , and holy ghost , so as to avoid the heresies of both extreams ; for there is no example of such three in nature : they are certainly three , for the father is not the son , nor the holy ghost , nor the son the father , or the holy ghost , and each of the three is perfect god , and therefore an infinite mind , an infinite spirit , and the most perfect essence and substance : and that substance which is the person of the son , is not that substance which is the person of the father , no more than the person of the son is the person of the father , or an unbegotten is a begotten nature and substance ; and therefore in opposition to sabellius , they asserted three substantial persons , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three hypostases , or personal substances , as hypostasis signifies ; tria in substantia , tres substantias , tres res , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet at the same time did assert , that there is but one divine nature and substance , which indivisibly and inseparably , though distinctly , subsists in all three . for the understanding of which we must observe , that as the divine nature , which is common to three , is not a mere species , but is really and actually one and the same in all ; so these three divine persons , which have one and the same common nature , are not in a strict and proper notion individuals of the same common nature : though we have no names for these three , but such as signify individuals , as persons , hypostases , subsistences , &c. and there being no created person , hypostasis , or subsistence , but what is an individual . to shew you the difference , with respect to the notion of an individual , between the three divine persons , and three individual humane persons , i observe , that every humane person is such an individual as has a particular humane nature of his own , which is not the particular nature of any other person ; the notion and definition of humane nature is the same in all men ; but the same numerical humane nature does not subsist in all , but every particular individual man has one particular individual humane nature appropriated to himself , that is , which is his particular person ; and as many particular persons as there are , so many particular humane natures , and particular men there are . but now the divine persons are not three such individuals as these ; because they have not three individual divine natures , but the same one divine nature common to them all , originally in the father , and communicated whole and entire to the son by an eternal generation , and from father and son to the holy spirit by an eternal procession . how impossible soever it is , for our finite understandings , to comprehend these mysteries of the eternal generation and procession , it is not so hard to conceive the difference between three persons who have one individual nature common to them all , but subsisting so distinctly in each of them , as to make them three distinct persons ; and three persons who have three individual natures of the same kind and species . as for instance ; three human persons , which have three individual human natures , are by the confession of all mankind three men : but could we conceive one individual human nature , which originally constitutes but one person , to communicate it self whole and entire , without division or separation to two other persons , we must acknowledge three human persons , each of which persons is distinctly and by himself , true and perfect man , but not three men ; for man is a name of nature , and if persons can be multiplied without multiplying the nature , ( as we at present suppose ) there must be three human persons in one individual human nature , that is , three persons and one man ; but not three men , no more than three human natures . thus it is with respect to the divine nature : were there three individual divine natures self-originated and independent on each other , though perfectly the same in their notion and definition ; three such persons would be as perfectly three gods , as three human persons , that have three individual human natures , are three men. but whereas the scripture teaches , and the catholick church has always believed , there is but one infinite , self-originated , divine nature , originally in the father , and by communication in the son , and holy spirit ; these three divine persons are each of them true and perfect god , but not three gods ; because they have not three individual divine natures , but one divine nature subsisting distinctly , but whole and perfect in them all . this , i think , may give us some notion of one numerical common nature , which is no species , and of persons , which are no individuals . st. austin shews particularly , how improper it is to call the one divine essence a genus , and the three divine persons species ; or to call the divine essence a species , and the divine persons individuals ; for in both these cases we must multiply the name of essence with the species and individuals , as we not only say three horses , but three animals ; and as abraham , isaac and iacob , are three individuals , so they are three men ; in consequence of which , we must not only say three divine persons , but three divine essences , not one essence . but besides this , one essence can't be a genus , because what is but one can have no species : nor can it for the same reason be a species , because what is one can't be subdivided into individuals , as though man , considered as a species , is divided into abraham , isaac , and iacob , yet one man can't be subdivided into three men ; for one man is one single man. why then do we say , one essence , and three substances or persons ; ( which are st. austin's words , who always renders the greek hypostases by substances , and makes substances and persons equivalent ) for if essence be a species , as man is , there can be but one essence in the sense and notion of one man : which , by the way , he objects as a great absurdity , for it is the sabellian heresy . thus far st. austin was certainly in the right ; but here i think , with all submission , this great man missed the true notion which he had so happily started . one essence can't be a species , because what is but one , can have no proper individuals under it , as one man can't be subdivided into three men : but then he might have applied individual to essence , which one essence naturally led to ; and have found three persons in one individual essence , which would not indeed be three individuals of one species , but three singulars of one individual nature . and though one man , who is but one individual of human nature , can't be subdivided into three proper individuals , yet to conceive one individual human nature to be communicated whole and entire , without division or separation to two others , is the truest image of three distinct persons in one individual essence , and the only possible explication of totus ex toto , whole of whole , which is the true catholick faith. such an one essence is no species , but yet is a common nature ; and such persons are not what we call individuals , as not having each of them a particular individual nature to himself , but yet they have a particular singular subsistence as other individuals have , and are each of them by himself as true and perfect god , though all but one god , as every individual man is true and perfect man. it seems plain to me , that this is the very notion st. austin intended , in what he immediately adds , the communis eademque materia , that one common matter which he prefers before either a generical or specifick unity . that the same one divine essence is common to father , son , and holy ghost ; not as if father , son , and holy ghost , had their subsistence out of the same common essence , as three golden statues are made of the same gold ; this perverse exposition of the homoousion was rejected with abhorrence by the catholick fathers , as i shewed before ; and st. austin expresly rejects it here , and therefore though these three persons are one essence , una essentia & unius essentiae , he will not allow us to say , that they are ex una essentia , out of one essence , as golden statues are of , or cut out of the same gold ; nay , nor as three men are of the same nature , that is , which is specifically , not identically the same , as i observed a little above . now remove these two notions of one common essence , and there remains only a third , which is that very notion i now insist on , one and the same essence common to three , by a perfect communication of the same one whole undivided essence . and this answers exactly to that notion of st. austin , which he could find no image of in nature ; that the essence of father , son , and holy ghost , is not more or greater all together , than the father alone , or the son alone : but these three substances or persons , if they may be so called , all together are equal to each single person , which a carnal man cannot apprehend . but now if we believe a whole of a whole , we must confess that it is impossible it should be otherwise ; for if the son have the same whole essence with the father , if the father be the whole divine essence , if the son be the same whole divine essence , and so the holy ghost ; the same whole , though subsisting distinctly in three , can never be greater nor less than it self : three persons are more in number than one , but one and the same whole undivided essence can be but one whole . this is the true notion ( and there can be no other catholick sense made of it ) of what the fathers so universally teach , that there is in the trinity vna substantia , but not unus subsistens , one substance , but not one only who subsists ; when yet at the same time they as universally acknowledge , that the father is substance , the son substance , the holy ghost substance ; and neither of them each other : that the person of the father is the essence and substance of the father , the person of the son the substance of the son ; that the person is not one thing , and the essence and substance another , as st. austin upon all occasions teaches : now that there should be but one substance , and three substantial subsisting persons , can never be reconciled any other way , than by the perfect communication of the same whole undivided essence and substance of the father to the son and holy spirit . for the same reason they tells us , that the father is wisdom , the son wisdom of wisdom , and yet but one wisdom ; the father is spirit , the son spirit , and the holy ghost spirit , and yet not three spirits , but one spirit ; and the father is god , the son god , the holy ghost god , yet there are not three gods , but one god : for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one god is the one divine essence ; and one divine essence , though distinctly subsisting in three , is but one god , though every divine person having the whole divine essence in himself , is true and perfect god. three divine natures , though specifically the same , and perfectly alike , would unavoidably be three gods , as three particular humane natures are three men ; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a thrice subsisting monade , as dyonisius the areopagite , calls the divine essence , is but one in three , and therefore but one god in three , because but one divine essence . in this sense we are so often told , that in the trinity there is alius & alius , another and another , that is , distinct subsisting persons , who are not each other , but not aliud in the neuter gender ; not another essence or nature , not only not specifically another , as the arians asserted , but not another nature , though of the same species , but the same one individual nature communicated whole and undivided to more than one. upon the same account , the father is acknowledged by all catholick writers to be the one only god , and they answer the objection of tritheism , by this very principle , that they own but one eternal , self-originated , unbegotten father , and therefore but one god ; they grant , that three fathers would be three gods ; but when there is but one eternal father , though he have an eternal son , and an eternal spirit , there can be but one god. now what is the meaning of this ? is it because none is , or can be god , true and perfect god , but he , who is god of himself , self-originated and unbegotten ? this would destroy the perfect godhead of the son , and of the holy spirit , and answer the objection of tritheism by denying the trinity . and it is certain this could not be their meaning , because they owned the sameness and equality of nature , of majesty and glory , of wisdom and power in father , son and holy ghost , only allowed the prerogative of the father 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the name and relation of father : and when the arians woul● prove the diversity of nature between father and son , by this argument , that the father is unbegotten , and the son begotten , they denied that this inferred the least difference or inequality of nature . now if the divine essence be god , and there be a perfect equality of nature between father , son , and holy ghost , though the father be unbegotten , the son begotten , and the holy ghost proceeds from both ; i desire to know , why three persons , each of which is true and perfect god , though one be unbegotten , another begotten , and a third proceeds , be not as much three gods , as three that are unbegotten , are three gods. the natural notion of god is an eternal , unmade , uncreated essence , which gives being to all creatures ; but neither begotten , nor unbegotten , belongs to the natural notion of god , but is matter of pure revelation ; and therefore three that are eternal , as to the natural notion of god , are as much three gods , as three that are unbegotten . the true account of it then is this , that one father , who is unbegotten himself , but begets a son , is but one eternal divine essence , which he eternally communicates whole and undivided to the son , and therefore is but one divine essence still , and therefore but one god : whereas three unbegottens , who do not communicate in each other , and neither give to , nor receive from any other , must be three absolute independent divine essences , and therefore three gods. and therefore they do not call the father the one god , merely because he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , unbegotten , but as he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the fountain of the deity , who communicates his own whole divine nature and essence to the son and holy spirit : for this reason athanasius condemns sabellius , for saying that there is but one only god in the iewish notion of one god ; not meaning thereby , that there is but one only who is unbegotten , and who only is the fountain of the deity ; but that there is but one god , as having no son , nor living word or true wisdom . it were easy to enlarge here , and to improve this observation for the explication of several difficult passages in the fathers ; but this may satisfy us , that the catholick fathers by one substance did not mean a meer specifick , but a natural and essential unity . sect . vi. a more particular inquiry what the catholick fathers meant by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the sameness and identity of substance in the holy trinity . what i have discoursed in the last section concerning the homoousion , and one substance of the godhead , will receive a new light , if we consider what the catholick fathers meant by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the sameness , identity , and inseparability of essence and substance , whereby they explain the unity of the divine substance , and the unity of the godhead . the learned jesuit petavius has two large chapters , to prove that both the greek and latin fathers did assert the singularity and numerical unity of the divine nature and substance . and i freely grant , that as singularity is opposed to a mere specifick unity , he has unanswerably proved it ; but why he or the schools should chuse a word to represent the sense of the catholick fathers by , concerning the unity of the divine substance , which they themselves rejected as sabellianism , i can't account for ; for singularis & solitarius , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , the singularity of nature and substance , were rejected as suspected terms at least , though they allowed the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the sameness and identity of nature ; the vnitas , but not vnio ; the unity , but not union ; which st. hilary so often calls impia vnio , a wicked union , as destroying the real distinction of persons , and consequently the true faith of father , son , and holy ghost . and to do petavius right , he rejects such a notion of singularity , as denies the divinity to be a common nature ; as if it could subsist only in one person or hypostasis , which he owns to be sabellianism ; and that for this reason some of the fathers ( he might have said , most , if not all the ancient fathers ) did reject the use of such words , and taught , that the divine nature is one , as any other nature is , which is common to more than one : and acknowledges , that st. hilary , st. ambrose , st. austin , and others , do expresly deny that god is a singular being , and reject the notion of singularity from the divine essence . now such a singularity as this , as admits of a real and substantial communication of the divine nature , whole of whole , to the son and holy spirit , is certainly the doctrine of the catholick fathers , and what they meant by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sameness or identity of nature in father , son , and holy ghost , in which they placed the unity of the godhead . that there must be this sameness and identy of nature in all three divine persons , is evident from the last section ; for a whole of a whole , must be identically the same whole ; not so the same , as one singular whole is the same with it self , but as the same whole , which thrice subsists , without the least conceivable difference , is the same with it self in three . and that this is what the fathers meant by that sameness of nature , wherein they placed the unity of the godhead , it were easy to prove by numerous authorities ; but some few may serve in so plain a case . one st. hilary will furnish us with testimonies enow of this nature : he places the sameness of nature between father and son in this , that the son has by his eternal nativity the nature of the father , without the least dissimilitude or diversity ; indifferens , indissimilis , indiscreta natura ; and this makes the father and son one god : but then at the same time he carefully and expresly rejects the notion of singularity , solitude , and union . petavius quotes several passages out of st. hilary , to prove this singularity of the divine essence ; but all that they amount to , and all that he pretends to prove by them , is , that the unity between father and son is greater than a specifick unity , or a communion in the same specifick nature ; and this i readily grant ; and he might , if he had pleased , have transcribed half st. hilary de trinitate & de synodis , to the same purpose : and this is so universally the doctrine of all the greek and latin fathers , that there was no difficulty in multiplying authorities to this purpose . and i dare appeal to any man who is competently skill'd in these matters , and will impartially examine the testimonies petavius has produced for the singularity of the divine essence , whether the most pertinent of them all prove any more than this , that the nature of the father , without the least alteration or diversity , is communicated whole and perfect , without any division or separation of substance , to the son , ( of which more presently ) ; not that the same singular nature and substance which is the person of the father , is also the person of the son ; which makes the father and son to be but one person , as well as one nature and substance ; but so one , that the one nature , substance , and divinity , which is the father , is wholly and perfectly the same in the son , excepting this , that one is the father , and the other the son : which is not the unity of singularity , which is properly the unity of a person ; but the unity of identity and sameness , which is the unity of one individual nature , which is common to more than one . i don't intend to transcribe all the quotations of petavius , which he has alledged to this purpose ; but yet i will give such a general view of them , as may satisfy any impartial reader as to this point ; not to confute petavius , who , as i have already observed , rejects the sabellian singularity ; but to undeceive those who mistake petavius and the schools too , as will appear more hereafter . i shall only premise , that it had become the learning and acuteness of petavius to have reconciled the fathers with themselves ; for they were wise men , and true reasoners , and knew very well what a contradiction meant ; and therefore we ought not easily to believe that they perpetually contradicted themselves . he acknowledges and proves , that the catholick fathers did teach a specifick unity of the divine nature ; that father , son , and holy ghost have one divinity , as peter , iames , and iohn have one human nature ; and he alledges the authorities of the same fathers , to prove the singularity of the divine nature , that it is an exact , perfect , indivisible monad : and this also they do plainly teach : but then he should have considered how to have reconciled these two ; for it is certain , that if the divine nature be an indivisible monad , it can't be a species in the common notion of a species ; and if it have any thing anolagous to a species , it can't be a singular monad , because it must be a common nature , which subsists in more than one ; and singularity is properly the unity of a person , not of a common nature . petavius was very sensible how inconsistent these two kinds of unity are ; and yet that the fathers did most commonly explain the unity of the divine nature by a specifick unity , and did more cautiously mention the unity of singularity ; he might have said , did absolutely reject it , as st. hilary does in a hundred places . and was not this a much better reason , so to qualify the notions of a specifick unity and singularity of nature , as to reconcile them to each other , than to make the fathers contradict themselves ; which destroys three parts of their reasoning about the unity of the godhead , and very much weakens the authoity of all the rest ? the apology which petavius makes for the fathers will by no means salve this matter . he tells us , that if we speak of god according to the exact rules of philosophy ; the three divine persons are not so of one substance or homoousion , as peter , paul , and iohn ; and so far he is in the right , as i have already shewn : but then what he adds is a very heavy charge upon the catholick fathers ; that they taught this almost in every dispute they had with the arians . now if this be true , what apology can be made for them ? for , it seems , they confuted the arians upon false and dangerous principles , and were either ignorant themselves of the true catholick faith , or did prevaricate in it . but let us hear what excuse he makes for them : he says , they are not to be blamed for this , nor accused of ignorance , as if they understood nothing of the numerical unity of the divine essence , and owned no other unity but what is like the unity of human nature ; for they did know the first , but very prudently used the specifick unity , as an example whereby to represent the divine unity : but if there be nothing in the divine nature , which is analogous to this specifick unity , and may be truly and properly represented by it , as the best image we have in nature , i cannot understand either the prudence or honesty of this . yes , he says , they were to take care so to oppose arianism as to avoid sabellianism , which otherwise they might easily slip into : and therefore so tempered their style as to speak more sparingly of that highest unity and conjunction , which gregory nyssen calls a perfect monad , lest they should seem to favour a sabellian solitude and singularity , but did more freely use the examples of a specifick unity , which was sufficient to confute the arians ; who asserted the diversity and dissimilitude of nature between father and son , which cannot be between those of the same kind and species ; and yet at the same time shewed how far they were from sabellianism . that this is a very false account of the matter appears from the former sections of this chapter , and will appear more fully from what is to follow ; but if it were true , it would be a very scandalous account ; for the sum of it is this , that to oppose sabellianism and arianism , the ancient fathers advanced a false notion of the divine unity , and dissembled the true one : which is no great commendation of the catholick faith , that it needs such arts , nor of the catholick fathers to use them ; when both these sorts of hereticks , as i have often observed , charged the catholick faith with tritheism , and made that the very reason of their heresies . can any man think it prudent in these fathers to conceal or very cautiously mention the true notion of the divine unity , and to insist on a specifick unity , which , if we believe petavius , is no better than tritheism ; which would rather have confirmed them in their heresies than have confuted them ? these two heresies being in two extreams , the catholick faith must be in the middle , and the only true medium between them , is a real distinction of persons , without the least diversity of nature ; and this is what they meant both by their monad , and specifick unity , the perfect sameness and identity of essence , actually , indivisibly , inseparably subsisting in three , a thrice subsisting monad , or individual essence or substance , but not one singular and solitary substance . and if this be all that petavius means , as he seems to own , we are agreed in this point : but because some think that he means more , and sometimes he says what seems to imply more , i shall shew that he has proved no more . he begins with athanasius ; who tells us , that the father gives all to the son ; and yet that the father hath the same all himself ; for the godhead of the son is the godhead of the father . which only proves , that the father communicates his own whole nature to the son ; that he gives the whole to the son , and has the whole himself ; which is the same , but not one singular solitary godhead , for it is the whole in two : but yet it is the godhead of the son , and the godhead of the father . and the father and son are two , but yet the godhead an inseparable , indivisible monad . and therefore this wonderful divine monad must not be divided into three godheads . and having quoted some other passages of that father to the same purpose , he concludes with a very remarkable one out of his exposition of faith. that we must not conceive three divided and separate hypostates in the godhead , after the manner of bodies , as it is among men ; which , like the pagans , would introduce a plurality of gods : but as the river , which proceeds from the fountain , is not divided from it , though they have two forms and two names ; for the father is not the son , nor the son the father ; but the father is the father of the son , and the son the son of the father . for as the fountain is not the river , nor the river the fountain , but both are one ; and the self-same water ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) flows out of the fountain into the river ( and so is the very same in both ) so is that divinity , which is communicated from the father to the son , without any efflux , emanation or division . this petavius lays great stress on , and it is a most express testimony against such a meer specifick unity in the godhead , as there is between three individuals of the same species , as between three men. but then it is as express and positive a testimony against a singular and solitary divinity , and confirms the notion of the perfect communication of the same individual nature and godhead from the father to the son , which is as perfectly one and the same in both as the water is , which flows out of the fountain into the river : but with this difference , that the manner of communication is not the same , not by efflux and emanation after the manner of bodies ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which i wonder petavius should transl●te perenniter ) not as waters flow out of the fountain , which the catholick fathers always disowned ; but by the ineffable mystery of the eternal generation , as i have shewn above . the next father he appeals to is gregory nazianzen , whom at other times he has much ado to excuse from tritheism . and he tells us , that there is but one god , because there is but one divinity , and those who are of him ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of this one god , that is , the son and holy spirit ) are reduced to one , tho' we believe them to be three : viz. by that one d●vinity , which perfectly subsists in each of them : and adds , if we may express this in short , it is one vndivided divinity in three distinct persons ( for so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must here signifie , not divided or separate , but distinct ) like the vnion of three s●ns , which would give but one vndistinguished light. one would wonder how this should prove one singular divinity , which it expresly rejects , unless three suns are one single solitary sun , and give but one single solitary light. such expressions as these prove no more than one undivided divinity in three , not one singular divinity . but the same father starts an objection ; that since the wisest philosophers owned but one divinity in all their gods , as we acknowledge but one humanity in all mankind , and yet they believed many gods , as we acknowledge , there are many men , though but one common humanity : why must not we confess , that father , son and holy ghost are three gods also , though they have but one common divinity ? this petavius says , causoe jugulum petit ; and it is indeed an unanswerable objection against a meer specifick unity of nature , which is multiplied in individuals , and therefore must multiply gods as well as men ; but the perfect communication of the same whole individual nature does not multiply natures or divinities , though it multiplies persons . and this is the very answer greg. naz. gives , which i had observed before from damascen , the distinction between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that there is not one common subsisting human nature in all men , and therefore human nature is one , only in notion , not in reality , every particular man's having a particular human nature of his own ; and therefore there are as many men , as there are subsisting human natures ; but the divine nature is one and common , not in meer notion and idea , but by an actual communication without division or separation : this proves it to be one individual , but not a singular nature ; for it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and one undivided divinity , though in a wonderful and ineffable manner it actually subsists in three , can be but one god. his other quotations out of the greek fathers are all to the same purpose , and are resolved into the force of such words as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and their rejecting not only three gods , but three natures , three essences , three divinities ; and that not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which specifically differ from each other , but even 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , those which are specifically the same , as sophronius speaks ; which are unanswerable testimonies against a mere specifick unity of the divine nature ; but confirms what i have all along asserted , that the same one undivided divinity subsists actually and inseparably , but distinctly in three , and therefore is one common individual , but not a singular nature : and the latin fathers , to whom he appeals in chap. ▪ speak all to the same purpose , and one answer serves them all . to give an account of the meaning and reason of these expressions , which petavius insists on to prove the singularity of the divine essence , will be much more instructing and satisfactory , than to comment upon every particular quotation : and therefore i shall , . enquire what the fathers meant by this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sameness and identity of nature . . how they proved the unity of the godhead from this sameness of nature . . how they distinguish'd the divine persons in this sameness of nature . . as for the first , that the fathers by this sameness and identity of nature did not mean one singular , solitary , personal nature , is abundantly evident from what i have already discours'd : the fathers , in opposition to sabellius , universally rejected one singular , solitary nature and substance , as destroying a trinity of real persons ; for in their philosophy , one singular substance is but one person ; and therefore three persons , each of which is by himself true and perfect substance , can't be one singular substance ; which is proof enough , that when they explain the unity of the divine substance by its sameness and identity , they could not by this sameness and identity mean singularity ; but such a sameness as is between real , distinct , subsisting , substantial persons , who are every way alike , without the least change or variation : which the greek fathers commonly call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the latin fathers , as st. hilary especially , indifferens & indissimilis natura . that this is the true notion of this sameness and identity of nature appears from those representations which the catholick fathers make of it , viz. that it is such a sameness and identity , as there is between a perfect , living , subsisting word , and that perfect mind , whose word it is ; such a sameness as is between father and son , between the prototype and the image , between the seal and the impression ; between life of life , wisdom of wisdom , power of power , &c. neither of which is the other , and yet both are the same . that god hath an eternal word , which was in the beginning , was with god , and was god ; that this eternal word was the son of god , and this son the perfect likeness and image of his father , the brightness of his glory , and the express character of his substance , is the known doctrine of the scripture and fathers . that this word is not like the word of a man , but the substantial , essential , living , subsisting , omnipotent word ; and this son a true , natural , genuine son , and this image a substantial , living image , and a living , substantial character of the father ; that this word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a distinct person from him , whose word he is ; that the son is not the father , nor the father the son , but that they are alius & alius ; that the image is not the prototype , nor the prototype the image , nor the chararacter and impression , that whose character it is ; i have already proved to be the received doctrine of the catholick fathers against the sabellians , and were there any occasion for it , i could confirm it with innumerable testimonies : the only question then is , what this sameness and identity of nature is . and if we will allow for that difference there is between god and creatures , we may learn , as the fathers teach us , what this sameness of nature between the divine persons is , from the sameness and identity between a mind and its word , between father and son , between the prototype and the image , the seal and its character and impression . now what this sameness and identity is , is so visible , that a few words will explain it . it is not the sameness of singularity ; for the mind and its word , a father and son , the prototype and its image , the seal and its impression , are visibly two : nor is it the sameness of meer likeness and similitude , how exact and perfect soever we conceive that likeness to be ; for every one must confess , that there is a vast difference between the perfect likeness of two minds , two men , two originals , and two seals , and that sameness , which is between a mind and its own word , a father and his own son , a prototype and its own natural image , and the seal and the impression which is made by it ; just as much difference as there is between similitude and nature , or between a perfect likeness of nature and identity . and therefore the complete and adequate notion of s●meness and identity between two , who are really distinct in subsistence and personality , and are not each other , must be this , that an eternal unproduced person produces another in his own nature , whole , perfect , entire , without the least conceivable or possible difference or diversity ; excepting this , that one produces , and the other is produced : for two such , who distinctly subsist , are really two persons in one and the same individual nature . thus it is with a perfect mind and its perfect living , subsisting word , which is perfectly it self , as its own perfect , natural image ; two in number , but one in re , in nature . thus it is with a father and such a son , as is whole of whole , they are two and the same , the son the natural living image of the father , in whom the father sees himself , and is seen in him , as christ tells us , he that hath seen me hath seen the father : which is agreeable to the common forms of speech , to call the king's picture or image , the king , as the catholick writers frequently observe ; which would be exactly and philosophically true , were it a perfect , natural , living , inseparable image : and this is what the catholick fathers call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the sameness or identity of nature ; as might easily be proved by numerous citations : but i will content my self with a few . the nicene fathers taught , that the father and the son were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the same nature and substance : this , as i observed before , they explain by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a perfect invariable likeness and similitude , without the least difference and diversity ; and this is what they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the sameness and identity of nature , which cannot be the sameness of singularity , but the sameness of indifference and indiversity ; such a sameness as is between two , which are perfectly alike , and differ in nothing from each other . athanasius gives this account , why the nicene fathers taught , that the son was homoousios , of the same substance with the father , that they might signifie that the son was not only like the father , but so of the father , as to be the same in likeness : now the sameness and identity of likeness cannot be the sameness of singularity ; and yet this he calls the sameness and identity with his father ; that the son is the natural genuine son of the father , and the word god's own proper word ; and the invariable likeness between the light and it's splendor ; the unity of nature and the identity of light : with several expressions , noted in the margin , which signifie the most perfect sameness in nature . thus the son is the image of god , the character of his substance , nature and essence ; which is the language of scripture , and the constant doctrine of the fathers : and from hence they conclude the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the perfect sameness and identity of nature between father and son , or a perfect likeness and similitude . by which argument they prove , that he is no creature , but that he is eternal and omnipotent , and all that his father is ; because this is the nature of a perfect living image , to be perfectly all and the same that the prototype is . thus st. basil tells us , that the seal is seen in the impression , and the prototype is known by its image , from that sameness and identity which is in both : which he calls also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . this sufficiently proves what the catholick fathers meant by this sameness and identity of nature ; not the sameness of singularity , which they always rejected as sabellianism , but such a sameness as is between two , who have the same individual nature , subsisting so distinctly in each of them , as to make them two , but without the least conceivable or possible change or alteration ; such a sameness as is a perfect likeness and similitude , which cannot be in singularity . but because petavius lays great stress upon these expressions , it will not be amiss to give two or three direct and positive proofs of this matter . athanasius expresly cautions us against this , that when we hear that the son hath all that the father has , this invariable likeness and sameness of what the son has , may not mislead us into sabellianism , to say , that the son is the father himself : and tells us , that the father gave all to the son , and that the father hath all again in the son ; and the son having all , the father again has the same all ; for the godhead of the son is the godhead of the father . gregory nyssen , or st. basil , for the same treatise is ascribed to them both , proves both the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , from the nature of an image ; that the son is both the same with the father , and another ; for so an image is both the same with its prototype , and yet another ; not the prototype it self . and adds , that we may see the father in the son , not considered as unbegotten , for then he would be upon all accounts the same , and not another , which destroys the nature and character of an image . the same account st. hilary gives of an image , that it signifies a perfect likeness and similitude of nature between two ; for no man is his own image , but the image represents the prototype : and therefore there is a father , and there is a son , if the son be the image of the father ; and being an image , the son must necessarily have in himself the nature and essence of his father . which he urges as a direct confutation of the sabellian singularity . but there is no need of multiplying authorities in this case , since it is so very obvious to every one , who ever look'd into the fathers , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the sameness and identity , and the community of nature , though they differ in their formal notions , yet both equally belong to the same divine nature ; and the same identical nature , which is also a common nature , can't be one in the notion of singularity . dly . having thus shewn what the catholick fathers meant by the sameness and identity of nature in father and son , i proceed to shew , that herein they placed the unity of the godhead , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the one divinity , and what account they give of this matter . the defence they generally make for the unity of god in a trinity of divine persons , is reducible to two heads ; this sameness and identity of nature , and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or inseparable unity ; which two make up the compleat notion of the divine unity ; but i must now consider them apart . that the catholick fathers did resolve the unity of god into this sameness and identity of nature , that the father , son , and holy ghost , though they are three real , proper , distinct persons , yet have the same one divine nature , which subsists whole , and perfect , and distinct , without any change or variation in all three ; and that therefore they are not three gods , but one god , is so very plain , that there is no need of multiplying words about it . the one god in the catholick language is one divine nature in three persons ; and this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this one essence , and one divinity , is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which are often used as equivalent terms , the unity , identity , propriety , and sameness of nature ; as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one and the same . all those passages quoted by petavius , though they do not prove the singularity of the divine nature , yet prove the unity of the godhead , by the perfect and invariable sameness of nature , in the sense now explained . but the testimony of st. basil against the sabellians is so full and express to this purpose , that i shall represent this matter in his words , wherein he agrees with all the other catholick fathers . though ( father and son ) are two in number , yet are they not divided in nature ; nor does he who says two persons , alienate them from each other . there is one god , because a father ; but the son also is one god , not two gods , because of the sameness and identity of the son with the father ; for there is not one divinity in the father , and another in the son ; nor one nature of the father , and another of the son. when therefore you would distinguish the persons , number them distinctly , the father by himself , and the son by himself ; but if you would avoid polytheism , confess but one nature in them both , which rejects both the sabellian and anomoean heresy . but when i say one nature , you must not imagine that two persons are made of one nature , as it were by a division of it into two parts ; but only conceive the son subsisting of the father , as his principle and original : nor must you conceive that father and son are so of one nature , as partaking of some one same nature and substance antecedent to them both ; for we do not call them brethren , but father and son , which signifies the sameness and identity of nature . for the son is of the father , not made by his command , but begotten of his nature ; not by division of the father's substance ; but the son shines forth whole and perfect from a perfect father , without any diminution of him . and therefore , as he proceeds , do not charge us with preaching two gods , or polytheism ; for we preach not two fathers , or two principles , and therefore not two gods , which was the impiety of marcion : nor do we make the father and son of a different nature , unlike to each other , as the anomoeans do . — but where there is but one principle , and one begotten of it , one prototype , and one image , the unity is preserved : because the son who is begotten of the father , and imprints his father's nature and essence on himself , as an image , he has an invariable likeness , as a son he retains the same nature and substance . now as a man who calls the king's image or picture the king , does not make two kings , nor deny him whose image it is , to be the king , much less reason is there for such an imputation in this case . for here , when we hear of the image of god , we must conceive nothing less than the brightness of his glory . but what is this brightness , and what is this glory ? that the apostle adds , the perfect impression or character of his substance . and therefore substance is the same with glory , and character with brightness : so that the divine glory remaining perfect and undiminished , emits a perfect splendor and brightness : and thus the very nature of an image expounded as it becomes god , confirms the faith of one divinity . for the father is in the son , and the son in the father ; because such as the father is , such is the son , and such as the son is , such is the father : and thus two are one , because the son in nothing differs , as receiving no other form or character , but that of his father . and therefore i say again , one and one , but an undivided nature , and never-failing perfection . and therefore there is one god , because by both the same perfect divine form and nature is seen wholly and perfectly subsisting in both . this i think is as plain as words can make it , both what st. basil meant by the sameness and identity of nature , and that herein he placed the unity of the godhead ; and were there any occasion for it , it were easy to confirm this by the concurrent suffrages of athanasius , gregory nyssen , and gregory nazianzen , st. cyril , and other greek fathers , almost in the same words . st. hilary and st. ambrose , to name no more of the latin fathers , are so express in placing the unity of the godhead in this perfect sameness , indifference , indiversity of nature between father , son , and holy ghost , that there is no need of any other art , but barely to represent their words ; and therefore i shall only refer my readers to some few quotations in the margin . it cannot be denied , but that all the fathers unanimously agree in this account of the unity of the divine nature in three distinct persons : which should make modest men very cautious of charging it with a direct contradiction to all reason and philosophy : but modesty and reverence to the catholick fathers , are none of the prevailing virtues of this age. but is it indeed such a contradiction to say , that the same nature , which is perfectly and in every thing the same in three , is but one nature in three , and that such three have not three natures , but one nature ? is it such a direct contradiction to sense and reason , to say , that there is alius , & alius , & alius , in the trinity , but not aliud ? that there is another , and another , and another person in the holy trinity ; but that there is nothing in any one of these persons , which can be called another thing from what is in the other two ? this is so far from a contradiction , that it seems plain sense , nay , plain demonstration to me , that three persons who have nothing in themselves but what each of them have , without the least conceivable variation , are in nature but one and the same ; and though each of them be another person , yet not another thing , or another nature . there are several examples in nature which justify this distinction between alius & aliud , and must make all thinking men confess that they cannot speak properly without it . i would not be mistaken in this matter , and therefore desire the reader carefully to observe , that i do not alledge these instances which follow , as resemblances of the trinity , but only as examples of a perfect sameness and unity in nature ; where we must confess , that the thing is but one and the same , and yet that there is another and another : and if there be any images of this in nature , there is no reason to call this a contradiction in the faith of the trinity . let me then ask this plain question : when five hundred men hear the same man speak , do they all hear one and the same voice , or five hundred voices ? it will , i think , be granted , that it is but one and the same voice which they all hear , and yet it is heard five hundred times , and is distinctly in five hundred ears : the voice is essentially one and the same in all , and yet no man dares deny that the voice in peter's ear is another from that voice which is in iohn's ear ; and therefore is another and another , but not another thing : and were a voice essence and substance , there would be one nature , essence , and substance , in a plurality of hypostases . thus sight furnishes us with as many examples of this as hearing : when five hundred men see the same thing , the object is one and the same , and yet is another and another , according to the number of the persons who see it : is one and the same in nature , and subsists the same , and yet distinctly in each eye . sight and hearing approach nearest to an incorporeal nature , and therefore give us the nearest resemblances of a spiritual sameness , unity , and distinction : but we have still more perfect images of this , in what is more perfectly spiritual . the same notion and idea , though it subsist in ten thousand minds , is perfectly the same in all . a perfect true idea of any thing , is and can be but one ; and therefore how many minds soever it subsist in , it must be one and the same in all ; but yet the idea in the mind of peter is not the same in subsistence with the idea in the mind of paul : it is another and another , and yet the same idea in nature and essence : as suppose the perfect idea of humanity , or human nature , and the perfect idea of the divine nature ; if they be true and perfect , they are perfectly the same in all the minds in the world ; and nothing but the different notions men have of things , can multiply such ideas . now if we advance but one step higher , we shall plainly see what this unity of sameness is ; what the true notion of it is , and how far it reaches : for though this be absolutely essential to the divine unity , yet as i have already noted , and will appear more hereafter , this is not the compleat and adequate notion of it . let us suppose then that human nature , for instance , did subsist as perfectly the same in peter , iames , and i●hn , as the true and perfect idea of human nature is one and the same in all ; that a man were nothing else but the living subsisting idea of human nature , without the least change or variation in nature to distinguish one from another : i say , in such a case as this , would not three such persons be perfectly one and the same , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the sameness and identity of nature , which would be as perfectly and invariably the same , as the common notion and idea of nature ? would not human nature be as perfectly the same in three persons or subsistences , as the idea of human nature is one and the same in three minds ? or could we in proper speaking , with reference to this sameness of nature , any more say that there are three men , than that there are three humanities , when a man is nothing else but the subsisting idea of humanity ? would not , as far as this sameness and identity reaches , human nature be a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; not merely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , both one and a common nature , not merely by a logical and notional unity and community , but by an actual subsistence in all , without the least difference or diversity ? as the idea of human nature is both one , and common to the whole kind . this indeed is but an imaginary case , as to finite creatures , who never were , and never can be so perfectly one and the same , as their idea is ; but yet it is the properest and most sensible representation we can make of the sameness and identity of the divine nature , which has really and actually all that sameness and identity which we only suppose in creatures to help our conceptions of the divine unity ; how different hypostases may be one in nature by this sameness and identy of nature . the divine nature and essence is more perfectly simple and uncompounded than any notion and idea which we can frame of it ; and therefore must subsist as simply as the simplest idea , and consequently must be as perfectly one and the same in all three persons of the trinity , as the same idea is one and the same with it self : and though this be not the whole notion of the sameness and identity of nature , which requires not only two perfect same 's , but that one be of the other without division or separation ; yet this is essential to this notion , and there can be no identity of nature without it : this is what the catholick fathers intended in many passages , which some modern writers have so miserably mistaken and misrepresented , as to charge those wise men , and learned philosophers , with the most wild and absurd conceits , and those great advocates of the catholick faith with the worst of heresies , even tritheism it self . i can't do right to my cause , without doing right to these great lights of the church , in giving a plain account of this matter . and to explain what they meant by this sameness and identity of nature , and to shew how groundless this imputation of tritheism is , i shall begin with their natural proof and demonstration of the unity of god against the pagan polytheism , which they unanimously resolve into this sameness and identity of nature . they prove , that there can be but one god , and one divinity , because the divine nature is not capable of the least conceivable change and diversity , which is necessary to make a number : for what is , and always must be the same with it self , cannot be another , or a second nature ; and one divinity is but one god. this they prove from all the notions which we have of god , especially that comprehensive one of an absolute and perfect being ; for absolute perfection is , and can be but one , without any possibility of change ; for all change and diversity must be either for the better or for the worse , and absolute perfection can admit of neither ; and without diversity and alterity there can be but one. an infinite nature , which nothing can distinguish from it self , can be but one ; and could we imagine any thing to be added to , or taken from it , to make this distinction , it would destroy , not only its unity , but it s infinity too ; it would indeed make a number , but not of absolute perfect beings . if we consider the divine perfections by themselves , it is impossible to conceive any difference or diversity , and consequently any number in them : is not eternal truth , and infinite wisdom , and omnipotent power , always one and the same ? can eternal truth , and infinite wisdom in any thing vary from it self , to make two eternal truths , and infinite wisdoms ? now remove all possible diversity , and you necessarily destroy a plurality of gods ; for a perfect sameness and identity must reduce us to the belief of one god : for what is perfectly the same , is not many , but one . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . well! but can't there be more than one of these eternal , infinitely wise , infinitely good , and omnipotent natures ? no : for if this nature must of necessity be always the same , and is unmade and self-originated , it can be but one : for though in created natures several of the same kind may be made according to the same pattern , there being nothing in the idea of any created nature which hinders the multiplication of its individuals , yet a nature which subsists of it self ; and is absolutely uncapable of any diversity , and consequently of number , can be but one ; for a self-subsisting nature must subsist according to its own essential idea , that is , according to its own nature , and that is but one ; for as far as we can judge of these matters , what we cannot possibly conceive should ever be two , we must conclude to be one. but besides this , these fathers observed , that if there were more than one self-originated divinity , or more divine natures than one , they must be divided and separated from each other ; for if to the sameness and identity of nature you add an inseparable and indivisible union too , it is impossible they should be more than one. and yet two or more such divided and separated natures are inconsistent with the notion of a divine nature and essence , which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , uncircumscribed , and omnipresent ; whereas two divided and separated natures , which are not where each other is , must be circumscribed , and not omnipresent , and this destroys the absolute perfection of both ; for a confined and limited presence , as it is an imperfection it self , so confines and limits all other perfections , as it confines wisdom , power and goodness within a certain limited sphere of action . and now it may be , some may think that these arguments conclude as strongly against a trinity of divine persons , each of which is by himself true and perfect god , as against a plurality of divided and separate divinities ; and upon second thoughts , i suspect this may be what our considerer intended in those surprizing arguments , of the unity of idea , and the unity of position and place , to prove , that there can be but one single person , in the true and proper notion of a person , for an intelligent person , in the trinity ; this to be sure is the argument which a socinian writer alledges with so much triumph out of athenagoras to disprove the trinity , though that very ancient and learned writer understood very well the difference between polytheism and the trinity , and at the same time confutes the one , and professes the other ; which might have made that author suspect , that he did not understand the true force of this argument , since not only athenagoras , but all the other fathers , thought it a good argument against polytheism , and at the same time a confutation of the charge of polytheism against the faith of the trinity . gregory nyssen , and damascen , and many others , having confuted the pagan polytheism , or plurality of gods from the sameness and identity of the divine nature , which can admit of no change or diversity , and therefore not of number ; they immediately proceed to consider the distinction of persons and hypostases in the perfect unity and simplicity of the divine nature , in opposition to the iewish notion of one god , for one single and solitary divine person . and here they undertake to prove by natural arguments ( of which possibly more hereafter ) that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or divinity , must have an eternal subsisting word , which is life , wisdom , power , all the same in his own person that god is , but yet another person : for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the divinity is not without its coeternal word , and coessential reason and wisdom ; and the same they teach and prove concerning the eternal spirit ; so that they make father , son , and spirit , to be essential to one divinity , not as parts , but as perfectly whole , and the same in three distinct hypostases , which they think necessarily included in the perfection of one divinity , as reason and word is essential to a created mind . this is what they mean by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one divinity in three perfect hypostases ; not that three hypostases are united , as it were ex post facto , into one divinity ; but that one divinity does subsist eternally , essentially , and inseparably , in three hypostases , which are necessary to compleat the notion and definition of one divinity . thus it is certain melanchton understood it , and therefore rejects the definition which plato gives of god , that he is an eternal mind , the cause of all good in the world ; for though he owns it to be true and learned , when rightly explained , yet he says it is defective , and must be supplied by the gospel revelation . that god is a spiritual intelligent essence , eternal , true , good , iust , merciful , most free , of infinite power and wisdom , the eternal father , who from eternity begat a son , his own image , and the son , the coeternal image of the father , and the holy spirit , proceeding from father and son. so that the holy and ever blessed trinity is but one eternal coessential divinity ; that were there more divinities than one , there must of necessity be more trinities also , according to the doctrine of these fathers ; which is evidence enough , that this argument against a plurality of divinities from the perfect sameness and identity of the divine nature , which can't be multiplied , can't concern a trinity of real subsisting persons in the same one eternal undivided divinity : for the same one divinity is not multiplied by a trinity of persons coeternal and coessential ; if this be the nature and unity of the deity , to subsist whole and perfectly in three , which was the constant doctrine of the fathers , and which this argument don't oppose ; nay so far from it , that it as evidently proves the unity of the godhead in a trinity of persons , as it confutes a plurality of godheads and divinities ; for if the sameness and identity of nature will not admit of a plurality of divinities , then if three are perfectly one and the same in nature , they are but one divinity , one god. thus the incircumscriptibility or omnipresence of the divine nature is a good argument against a plurality of god's , or divinities , which must be separated , if they be more than one , and therefore circumscribed , or of a limited and confined presence ; but it is no argument against a trinity of persons in the unity of essence , which are all mutually in each other , and therefore equally unconfined and omnipresent , and perfectly one by an essential and inseparable union . and are not these fathers now like to prove very notable tritheites , who prove the impossibility , that there should be more divinities than one , and the perfect unity of the godhead in a trinity of divine persons , from that perfect sameness and identity of nature which is between them ? but yet for all this tritheites they are and must be , if they acknowledge father , son , and holy ghost , to be one god , in no other sense than peter , iames , and iohn , are one man ; that is , because they agree in the same common nature , which has the same notion and definition , and is upon that account one and the same in all . this is what they are charged with , and i should not have wondred at it , had only some careless and unskilful readers charged them with it , for they do say something which at first view may look like it ; but then such sayings as manifestly contradict their avowed doctrine , not only in other places of their writings , but in those very places where these sayings are found , ought in all reason and justice to be expounded only by way of analogy and accommodation , as containing some imperfect image and resemblance of that , which nature has no proper and adequate example of . this must be allowed in all the natural representations which are made by the catholick fathers of the unity and distinction of the ever-blessed trinity ; or there is not one of them , but what literally and philosophically applied , would furnish out some new heresy : this i have already shewn in the specifick unity of the divine nature , which the nicene fathers did teach in a qualified sense ; though it appears from all i have said in the last , and this present section , how far they were from thinking the divine nature to be a meer species , or logical notion , though it has this resemblance to a species , that it is one and common , but not merely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not in meer notion and idea , but by an actual subsistence and inexistence in all three , being as perfectly , wholly , indivisibly the same in all , and in each of the divine persons , as a specifick nature is notionally and ideally one and the same in every individual of the same kind , which , as i have made appear , is that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sameness and identity of nature , wherein they place the unity of the godhead . and yet this is the only foundation of the present charge , that they make father , son , and holy ghost , to be one god only by a specifick unity , as three individuals of the same kind and species , suppose peter , iames , and iohn are one man. that all this is a mistake , is evident , because these fathers do not resolve the unity of the godhead into a meer specifick unity of nature ; and the occasion of this mistake is great inadvertency , as will appear in a very few words . gregory nyssen is principally charged with this paradox , and in vindicating him , i shall vindicate all the rest . the question which ablabius desired him to resolve , was this , that since peter , iames , and iohn , though they have but one common humanity , are yet called three men ; and no man denies , but that the name of nature may be multiplied , when there are more who are united in the same nature , how comes it to pass that we contradict this in the mystery of the trinity ? that we acknowledge three hypostases , who have the very same nature , without the least difference or diversity , and yet teach , that the divinity of father , son , and holy ghost , is but one , and forbid saying , that there are three gods ? now the better to understand the father's answer , we mu●t observe that this was an arian objection against the homoousion , or the perfect sameness , indifference , and equality of nature between father and son : for the design of it was , as st. gregory himself observes , to reduce them to this dangerous dilemma , either to assert three gods , which is unlawful ; or to deny the divinity of the son and holy ghost , which is impious and absurd . if they denied the sameness and equality of nature , then the son and holy ghost are not true and perfect god , consubstantial with the father ; or if father , son , and holy ghost have the same one common nature , and are perfectly consubstantial , then they are three gods ; as peter , iames , and iohn , who have the same one common humanity , are three men ; and there is the very same reason for calling father , son , and holy ghost , three gods , that there is for calling peter , iames , and iohn , three men ; that is , the same nature common to them all . this was the objection st. gregory was to answer ; and therefore his business was to prove , that father , son , and holy ghost are not , and ought not to be called three gods , as peter , iames , and iohn , are and may be called three men ; and therefore he must prove , that they are neither three nor one , in the same sense that three men are three and one ; for if they were , they would be as truly and properly three gods , as peter , iames , and iohn , are three men ; and no more one god , than they are one man ; which had been to give up the cause to the arians , instead of answering their objection . this may satisfy any man , that those learned persons are very much mistaken , who charge such a sense upon this father , as is directly contrary to his design ; for he understood the laws of reasoning better . neither he , nor any other father i ever yet met with , asserted that peter , iames , and iohn , were but one man ; or that father , son , and holy ghost , are one god no otherwise than peter , iames , and iohn , are one man ; which yet is what has been charged upon them . but does not greg. nyssen say , that it is a catachrestical way of speaking , tho become common and familiar , to multiply the name of nature with the individuals of the same nature ? as to say , that there are many men , because there are many who have the same human nature . — but if we would speak accurately and properly , we should say that there is but one man , how many soever have the same nature : and does not he apply this to the unity of god ? and can this have any other sense , than that the same divine nature makes father , son , and holy ghost , but one god , as the same human nature makes all the men in the world but one man ? the interpretation of which seems to be , that father , son , and holy ghost , are as much three gods , as peter , iames , and iohn , are three men ; but that it is very improper to call either the one or the other three , for they are but one , by one common nature . now this father does indeed say , and so many others of them say , that the name of nature ought not to be multiplied with the individuals ; but he was far enough either from saying or thinking what he is charged with , that peter , iames , and iohn , are not three men , but one man ; or that father , son , and holy ghost , are one god in no other sense , but as three men are one : and a due attendance to the series of the argument , would have discovered the falseness and absurdity of this imputation ; which therefore i shall briefly explain . the arian objection which st. gregory undertook to answer , as i observed before , was this ; that since the catholick church owned the father , son , and holy ghost , to be consubstantial , and to have the same undiversified nature , they must for that reason be three gods ; as peter , iames , and iohn , upon account of the same common humanity , are acknowledged to be three men : that is , that whether in god or man , the same nature in three must make three individuals of the same kind and species ; and therefore as the same human nature in three makes three men , so the same divine nature three gods. in answer to this , st. gregory first observes , that it is not the same common nature which distinguishes and multiplies individuals , no , not in men : peter , iames , and iohn , are not three individuals in the species of humanity , merely by having the same nature ( which is the force of the arian objection ) ; for what is perfectly the same in all , can't distinguish or multiply them . and this is plainly all that he means , when he says , that the name of nature ought not to be used plurally ; and therefore man being the name of nature , and signifying the same with humanity , we ought no more , if we speak properly and philosophically , to say three men , than three humanities , or three human natures ; for he proves , that the name man does not distinguish one man from another , nor can we single any particular man out of a crowd by that compellation ; for there is but one man , or one humamanity in them all ; that name not belonging primarily and immediately to the individuals as such , but to the common nature . well ; but are there not individual men then , as well as a common nature ? yes , without doubt ; but they are distinguished and multiplied , not by the common nature , which is the same in all , but by such peculiar properties as diversify and distinguish common nature , as it subsists separately in particular persons , and that makes the number , though nature be one and the same , a perfect indivisible monad . this is not merely to criticize upon words , or to dispute against the common forms of speech , but to give a true philosophical reason of their different use , when applied to god and creatures . we commonly call peter , iames , and iohn , three men , and right enough ; but then they are not three men merely upon account of the same common humanity in them all , ( which was the arian objection ) ; for humanity is but one in all , and what is perfectly one can't be numbred . to say there are three humanities , all men grant to be absurd ; and yet it is to the full as absurd , to say that peter , iames , and iohn , are three men , merely upon account of the same humanity , strictly and precisely taken , as to say that there are three humanities : so that though peter , iames , and iohn , could not be , nor be called three men , without the same common nature , yet some peculiar , distinguishing , diversifying properties make them three men. could human nature subsist as perfectly and indivisibly the same in three , as the perfect idea of humanity , their persons might be distinguished , but their nature would be as perfectly one , as the idea of humanity is one and the same in distinct minds ; and in this case ( as far as this perfect sameness of nature can make them one , which , as i have observed , is not the compleat notion of the divine unity , though it be essential to it ) they might be called three human persons , but not three men : but such peculiar properties as diversify and thereby distinguish the same common nature into particulars , make the number : which is one reason why we must not say three gods , as we do three men , though the same divinity be common to father , son , and holy ghost ; because this same one divinity subsists whole and perfect , without the least change , diversity , or alteration in three : that though their persons are distinct , the divinity is perfectly one and the same in all , and therefore they are but one god. so that these fathers do not insist on a mere specifick unity , but on the sameness and identity of the divine nature in three , as the reason why we must not say that there are three gods ; for the same one undiversified divinity can be but one god. and therefore having answered that popular objection , that peter , iames , and iohn , are allowed to be called three men , upon account of the same common nature , by shewing that it is a great popular mistake , that merely the same one common nature makes them three men , or will justify their being called so ; this father proceeds to shew , that there is such an unity between father , son , and holy ghost , as is not , and cannot be between any three creatures , though they partake of the same common nature : such an unity as makes father , son , and holy ghost , essentially one god , though peter , iames , and iohn , are three men. nay , such an unity , as even a perfect sameness and identity of nature cannot make between creatures who have an absolute and separate subsistence . this gives a reasonable account of this whole argument , and vindicates it from those absurdities which are charged on it . it was necessary to lay the foundation of the divine unity in the perfect and invariable sameness and identity of nature : for if the divine nature in three is not perfectly the same , it cannot be one ; for diversity and alterity makes a number : but if it subsist as perfectly the same in three , as its idea is the same , it must be as perfectly one as its idea is one . no , say these arians , the same nature subsisting in three , becomes three individual natures of the same species ; and the name of nature must be multiplied with the individuals , as all allow it must be as to men , who partake of the same common nature : for peter , iames , and iohn , are acknowledged to be three men , though they have but one common humanity ; and by the same reason , father , son , and holy ghost , must be three gods , if they have the same common divinity . to which st. gregory nyssen answers , that it is not the common humanity which makes them three men ; for that which is but one and the same in all , can't distinguish or multiply them ; and therefore in strict and accurate speaking , as man signifies pure and abstracted humanity , we cannot properly say three men , because there are not three humanities ; and accordingly , the name man does not and cannot distinguish one man from another , nor is ever used to that purpose ; but that which multiplies nature , and the name of nature , are those peculiar properties which distinguish and diversify nature , as well as persons ; and thus the common nature , with diversifying properties , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is distinguish'd and multiplied by a kind of composition ; for the same nature with one peculiar diversifying property , is distinguish'd from the same nature with other properties ; and thus the same nature divided and distinguish'd with these properties , makes a number , and gives the name of nature to each individual person , and thus it is in all creatures : but where the same nature subsists in three , without any thing to distinguish or diversify nature , as it is in the blessed trinity , though the persons may be distinguish'd , the nature and the name of nature can be but one : which is the reason why father , son , and holy ghost , are but one god , because they have but one undistinguish'd , undiversified nature , though their persons are distinct . this is the true account of this matter ; which is so far from such a mere specifick unity of nature as is between three men , that it is that very sameness and identity of nature , which the catholick fathers make essential to the unity of the godhead . and the better to understand this , we must consider their philosophy about numbers ; for according to them , nothing properly but alterity and diversity makes a number : what is perfectly the same , is but one , as boetius tells us ; not by a singularity , but by a perfect sameness and identity of nature . in this sense it is , that greg. nazianzen , st. basil , and others , teach , that god is one , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not in number , but nature ; whereby they do not mean that there are more gods in number than one ; but that the unity of the godhead does not consist in the unity of number , but of nature ; and that the unity of nature consists in the invariable sameness and identity of it ; and therefore where the divinity is perfectly the same , there is but one god. thus greg. nyssen tells us , that the same divinity may be numbred , and yet rejects all number ; that is , the divinity may be numbred with the persons , as when we say the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god ; but the divine nature being perfectly the same in all , that can't be numbred ; that we must not say there are three gods , or three divinities . boetius has given the best account of this , according to the philosophy of the ancients , by distinguishing between numbers ; for he says , number is twofold , that by which we number , and that which is in the things numbred : as to the first , the repetition of units makes a number , for one , and one , and one , are three ; and both the catholick fathers and schools reject this kind of number , which is a species of quantity , from the divinity ; for god is under no predicament , and therefore the unity of god not reducible to the predicament of quantity ; for god is before and above all unity , as he is above substance , above essence , above every thing which we have any notion or conception of ; as dionysius the areopagite speaks . but as to the things numbred , the repetition of units does not multiply , or make a number in things , where the nature is perfectly the same ; for it is not a repetition of units , but alterity and diversity , which multiplies natures : to say god , and god , and god , does not make three gods , because there is but one and the same divinity in three : and this is what they mean by the numerical unity of the divine nature ; not that unity or unit which is the beginning of number , but the unity of sameness and identity ; which tho. aquinas calls unum non numero , sed re numerata ; one , not in the numbring number , but in the thing mumbred ; or as the fathers speak , not in number , but nature . the better to understand this matter , we must consider what st. basil discourses about the unity of god , in answer to those who charged the doctrine of the trinity with tritheism ; viz. that they acknowledged one god , but not in number ( the numbring number ) but in nature : for that which is one in number , is not truly one , nor perfectly simple in nature ; but all men acknowledge god to be the most simple uncompounded being , and therefore he is not one in the notion of this numbring number . this he proves by an induction of particulars ; we say , the world is one in number , but not one in nature ; for it is compounded of great variety of creatures ; and we say , one man , but man is compounded of body and soul ; and even any angel is not perfectly pure and simple , but is compounded of essence and qualities , such as holiness , which is not pure and simple nature , for it may be separated . he adds , that number is a species of quantity , and answers to the question , how many , which properly belongs to a corporeal nature : — and indeed all number denotes such things as have a material , or at least a circumscribed and limited nature , but monad and vnity denote the simple , uncompounded , uncircumscribed infinite essence : and when he says , that number must belong to things of a circumscribed nature , thereby he tells us , he means , not merely such things as are circumscribed by place , which properly belongs to bodies ; but all such natures as have a limited and confined idea , as all created natures , whether body or spirit , have , whose natures are limited , circumscribed , fixt and determined by that infinite mind , which gives being to them . the meaning of all which is this , that to make a number , there must be alterity and diversity in nature , or a separate existence : but a perfect , simple , uncompounded nature , can admit of no possible alteration and diversity ; for the same nature can never differ from it self , without some kind of composition ; and where there is no difference and diversity , there can be no number , and an infinite uncircumscribed nature can never be divided and separated , or subsist a-part , and therefore can't be numbred : so that number can belong only to created natures , which are compounded and finite , and therefore by some diversifying qualities or affections , and a separate ex●istence may be distinguished into individuals , which may be numbred ; but the unity of the divine nature , which is a perfect indivisible , uncompounded , infinite monad , is not the unity of number , but a perfect invariable sameness and identity , and an indivisible , inseparable union . now some men , who do not duly attend to the nature and design of these reasonings , apply all this to prove the perfect singularity of the divine essence , in the most strict and proper notion of singularity , as that signifies one in number ; which contradicts the whole intention of this hypothesis , which is to prove , that the unity of god does not consist in the unity of number , but of nature ; and that the unity of the divine nature is not a unity of number , but a unity of sameness , identity , and inseparability . this is a matter of great consequence , and therefore let us consider it over again . this distinction between the unity of number , and the unity of nature , was alledged by the catholick fathers to avoid the charge of tritheism : the sabellians and arians asserted the unity of god to be a unity of number ; that one divinity is not one , unless it be one in number , one single solitary divine nature : and this , say they , is inconsistent with the trinity of divine persons , each of which is in his own person true and perfect god : for three such divine persons must be three gods , three divinities , if each divine person have the true perfect divine nature in himself ; and it is impossible to understand what a divine person is , without the divine nature : so that if the father be god , the son god , the holy ghost god , if father , son , and holy ghost , be three , they must be three gods. this was the great difficulty , and it is the only material difficulty to this day . to have asserted but one singular divine nature , which is but one in number , had given up the cause to the sabellians or arians : for then either father , son , and holy ghost , are but three names or offices of the same one divine person , who is the one god , as the sabellians taught : or father , son , and holy ghost , are not a consubstantial trinity , but the father alone is god , and the son and holy ghost but mere creatures , how excellent creatures soever they are . on the other hand , should they have denied that three ones make three , this had been false counting , as the socinians tell us now ; and therefore to avoid both these extremes , they distinguish between the number by which we reckon , and the thing which is numbred ; and thus they find a real trinity in perfect unity : as greg. nyssen tells us , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the very same thing , the same divinity , is both numbred , and not subject to number . it may so far be numbred with the persons , as each divine person has the whole and perfect divinity in himself , but yet the divinity can't be numbred ; not because it is one single solitary divinity , for it really subsists in three ; but by reason of that perfect sameness and identity , which admits of no number ; for that which is perfectly one and the same in three , can't be numbred . had they thought of such a singularity of the divine nature , as is but one in number , they must have disputed at another rate against sabellians and arians . would they have taught , that the divinity may be numbred , and yet is without number ? which is impossible to be true of the same singular divinity , which is but one in number , and therefore can never be more than one in number ; that is , in that father's sense , cannot be numbred , much less can the same singular nature be numbred , and incapable of number , that is , be one , and more than one. would they have taken so much pains to prove , that sameness and identity of nature excludes all number ; if by this they had meant the sameness and identity of singularity , as the same thing is one and the same thing with it self , which is no great mystery ? and is it not evident , that this whole dispute is concerning the unity of the divine nature in three distinct persons , and consequently , concerning that sameness and identity of nature which is between three who have the same nature , and therefore not one in the notion of singularity , which is one in number , not in the sameness and identity of nature ? would they have insisted on that distinction of units in number , and units in nature ; that the first multiplies , the second does not , had they believed that there are no units in the divinity ; not one , and one , and one , but only one singular divinity ? at least , could boetius , who so particularly explains and urges this distinction , intend to prove by it the singularity of the divine essence , when at the same time he defines a person to be the individual substance of a rational nature ; and assigns this distinction as the reason why though we number three in the same divinity , yet there are not three divinities , or three divine natures or essences ; because the repetition of units in the thing to be numbred , where there is a perfect sameness and identity of nature , makes no number ? in this sense it was , that the schools asserted the singularity of the divine substance ; because the divine substance , by reason of its perfect sameness and identity can't be numbred , and what can't be numbred , they call a singular substance : but they expresly reject ( as the catholick fathers did ) singularity in the sense of solitude , as it signifies one alone by himself , without any communion or fellowship ( consortium ) with any other in the same divine essence . and therefore the master of the sentences expresly distinguishes between diversity , singularity or solitude , and unity and trinity , distinction and identity . now let any man judge , what that unity is , which is not singularity or solitude , but a unity in trinity ; and what that distinction is , which is perfect identity without any diversity : for my part i can make nothing of it , but this perfect sameness and identity of nature in three , which numbers persons , but not natures . estius takes notice of that objection against the trinity , that the father is god , and the son is god , therefore the father is the son ; which consequence is resolved into that maxim , quaecunque eadem sunt uni tertio , eadem sunt inter se , whatever things are the same with the same third , are the same with each other : to which he answers , that this rule holds true only where the third is a perfect singular : deus autem non prorsus singulare nomen est , but god is not upon all accounts a name of singularity , that is , does not signify one only who is god ; but signifies such a singular nature as is communicable to three , significat enim naturam singularem , sed quae communicari possit tribus suppositis : that is , it is not a singular nature , with the singularity of solitude , because it is communicable , and can subsist distinctly in three , but only with the singularity of identity , as he explains it from st. hilary , dist. . sect. . to which he refers his reader . so that though the schools did use this phrase of a singular nature and substance , which the catholick fathers rejected as sabellianism , yet they did not use it in that sense , which the father 's rejected , for one solitary nature , which can be but one person ; and therefore estius observes , that aquinas uses this name of singularity , when applied to the divinity , non simpliciter , sed cum cautela , not simply and absolutely , but with caution , and qualifies it with ut sic liceat loqui , if i may have leave so to speak : and he imitates this caution himself , dist. . sect. . when he tells us , that the divine essence may quodam sensu in a certain sense be said to be individual , as it neither is a genus nor species , but res una numero , & ut it a dicamus singularis , numerically one , and if we may say so , singular ; though it be not individual , in the sense that boetius defines a person to be an individual substance , because it is not incommunicable . this shews , that though the schools have in this question changed the ancient catholick language , by teaching , that the divine essence is vna numero , & singularis , one in number , and singular ; whereas the catholick fathers denied that god was one in number , but only in nature , and denied the singularity of the divine nature ( which confusion , and appearing contradiction of terms occasions great mistakes ) yet they meant the very same thing , and their philosophy about singularity and number was the same : for they taught a communicable singularity of nature , which is opposed to a sabellian solitude , and rejected the numbring number from the divinity . they universally deny , that god is one in that sense of unity , which is the beginning of number : for number is a species of quantity , & nascitur ex divisione continui , is made by division ; and to assert god to be one in this sense , is to ascribe quantity to him ; for nothing can be thus one , but what has magnitude and figure , that is , nothing but body ; for number , as it is a species of quantity , can belong to nothing , but body , which has divisible parts , and extensions , and magnitude , which may be one or more . this is certainly true , as to that kind of number , which is a species of quantity ; for that can measure only such things as have quantity : but then they were sensible , that other beings are numbred besides bodies , even incorporeal spirits , who have no quantity , parts , or divisibility , and yet these we number , when we say , a hundred , or thousands , or millions of angels . this they own , and call it a transcendental number , that is , such a number as is not reduced to the predicament of quantity : but that is little to the purpose ; if spirits , which have no quantity may be numbred , what is it that makes a number in them ? and why may not number then belong to the divinity , though it be not quantum , have no predicamental , that is , corporeal quantity ? to this they answer , that this transcendental vnity adds no form to the thing , but only signifies the thing it self , as undivided from it self : well! but if this be all , then god , who is thus indivisible from himself , may as properly be called one , as one angel is said to be one : no , say they , for to entitle any thing even to this transcendental numerical unity , ratione rei subjectoe naturam ejus designat ut limitatam , atque extra res alias positam , it must be considered to have a finite and limited nature , and to subsist separately from all other beings , and to be diversified from each other in nature or qualities . res una ab alia , natura vel qualitatibus discreta intelligitur . but now unity in god , though it resemble this transcendental unity , as adding no form to god ; that is , not supposing him to be corporeal , as the predicamental unity does , yet it does not signify any thing limited and finite in god ; but only his undivided inseparable being : as number in god ( that is , the trinity ) does signify the real distinction of three , non ita tamen , ut ea plura natura vel qualitatibus discreta intelligantur , & singula suis velut limitibus circumsepta . but not so , as if these three were distinguished and separated by nature and qualities , or as if each of them had their own separate and circumscribed bounds and limits . this is the account estius gives us of unity and number in god , dist . . sect . . which perfectly agrees with that account i have already given of this matter from st. basil : that an infinite , undiversified , indivisible nature ( as the eternal divinity is ) is neither one nor three , in the same sense , and for the same reasons , which give these denominations to any created beings . and therefore there are no arguments in nature to confute the unity of the godhead from a trinity of proper subsisting persons , nor a trinity of persons from the unity of the godhead , because three and one in god do not signify what they do in creatures . this appeared a great difficulty to the master of the sentences , that since we neither allow of diversity nor singularity , multiplicity nor solitude in the trinity , what should be the meaning of one , and two , and three , of trinity and plurality , and distinction , as when we say , one god , two persons , three persons , more persons , distinct persons ; or a distinction of persons , plurality of persons , a trinity of persons , which seems to ascribe a numerical quantity , a multitude and multiplicity to god. to this the master answers , that these words , when applied to god , are rather intended to remove every thing from god , which is inconsistent with the perfect simplicity of the divine nature , than positively to affirm any thing of him : this answer does not please estius , because it seems to imply , that god is not in a true and proper sense one and three ; but this is his own mistake : for peter lombard meant no more but this , that though god be in the most perfect sense one and three , yet those positive ideas , which we have of one , or two , or three , of distinction , and trinity , when applied to creatures , do not belong to the divine nature ; and therefore we must conceive of them in god , rather by way of negation , than by any positive ideas , by denying such things of god , as are inconsistent with the perfect simplicity of his nature ; which is true of most other divine perfections , that we have rather a negative than positive conception of them , as attributed to god ; for wisdom , and power , and goodness in god , are no more reducible under the predicament of quality , as they are in creatures , than the unity of god is reducible to the predicament of quantity . thus he tells us , when we say one god , we thereby exclude more gods , but do not attribute the quantity of number to god ; that is , we do not mean that there is one god , in that notion of one as it is the beginning of number , which is a species of quantity , for so nothing can be one , but what has quantity , which god has not : thus when we say , one father , and one son , the meaning is , that there are not many fathers , nor many sons . when we say there are more persons , we exclude singularity and solitude , but do not introduce diversity or multiplicity into the divine nature . thus three persons does not signify the quantity of number , or any diversity ( as it is in creatures ) but only determines our thoughts to father , son , and holy ghost , that each of these persons is in the godhead , and none else . distinct persons , or distinction of persons , excludes confusion and mixture ; signifies that they are another and another , without any diversity , or sabellian confusion . the meaning of which is , that we must not form such a notion of one god , as we have of one man , nor of three persons , as of three men ; but must acknowledge one god , in opposition to more gods , or more divinities ; and three persons , in opposition to singularity and solitude in the divinity : all which resolves it self into the unity of identity , which excludes both all manner of diversity , and singularity and solitude . sect . vii . concerning the distinction of persons in the unity and identity of the divine essence . this fairly brings me to the third enquiry i proposed , concerning the real distinction of the divine persons , in the perfect sameness and identity of nature ; how we can distinguish father , son , and holy ghost , when their nature is perfectly one , by the unity of identity and sameness . this is the seat of most of those nice distinctions which we meet with both in the fathers and schools , and therefore it deserves to be carefully examined ; for a sensible account of this matter would answer many great difficulties in the doctrine of the trinity : and to this purpose i shall first give a general account of it , according to those principles which i have now laid down ; and then more particularly explain what the fathers and schools say of it ; which will appear to be no such mysterious nonsense , as the adversaries of our holy faith would represent it to be . . the general account of this is very short : the catholick fathers universally teach , that father , son , and holy ghost , are each of them by himself in his own proper person , true and perfect god : that the same one whole undivided divinity subsists distinctly in each of them : that the person of the father , as he is true and perfect god , is the whole divinity ; that the person of the son , as true and perfect god , is also the same one whole divinity ; and so of the holy ghost : that this divinity is one and the same , not by an unity of singularity and solitude , which is irreconcilable with the notion of a real trinity ; for one singular divinity can be but one single divine person ; but by the unity of sameness and identity , which admits of a trinity of subsisting persons in the same undiversified nature : that whatever the father is , that the son is , and that the holy ghost is . that a divine person is nothing but the divine nature and essence ; for the perfect absolute simplicity of god admits of no imaginable composition , not so much as of nature and suppositum , or that which is the subject of all natural powers , as it is in created beings . this makes it very evident that these divine persons are not distinguished by nature ; for there is nothing in nature to distinguish them , it being perfectly and invariably the same in all ; and where there is no distinction , there can be no number ; for which reason they will not allow that the divine essence is multiplied with the persons , there being but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one and the same divinity in them all . they agree farther , that the divine persons are incommunicable : that the person of the father is not , and can never be the person of the son ; nor the person of the son , the person of the father ; nor the person of the holy ghost , the person either of father or son. but then this seems to make the difficulty insuperable ; that if a divine person be nothing else but the divine nature , how there should be three such distinct incommunicable persons in the same undivided , undistinguished divinity ? why we may not call three divine persons , who have each of them the whole divine nature distinctly and incommunicably , three divinities , as well as three divine persons , when a divine person is nothing else but the divinity ? and then three distinct persons must be three distinct divinities . this unity and distinction in the godhead has always been acknowledged by the catholick fathers to be a great and inexplicable mystery , a wonderful union , and wonderful distinction . damascen , as i observed above , tells us , that the divine nature , though subsisting in three persons , is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , really and actually one , not merely notionally one , as human nature is , which subsists only in individuals , and has a particular , distinct , separate subsistence in every particular man , and therefore can be one in its individuals in no other sense , but only as the same common notion and definition of humanity belongs to them all ; that is , human nature is one in all the men in the world , not by a real subsisting , but by a specifick notional unity : but the divine nature is one with a real subsisting unity , being perfectly the same in three , without any division or separation : and an indivisible , inseparable , undiversified same , is really and actually one , according to the most simple notions we can form of unity . but what room then does this leave for a real trinity of persons , in this one , simple , uncompounded , indivisible , inseparable nature ? to this he answers , that this real distinction of persons in the perfect unity and simplicity of nature , may be known and understood by reason , though there be nothing in nature to distinguish them . father , son , and holy ghost , are upon all accounts perfectly one , excepting this , that one is unbegotten , the other begotten , and the third proceeds . we acknowledge one god , distinguished only by these personal properties of paternity , filiation , and procession , as a cause , and that which is caused ; and as each of them has a compleat perfect hypostasis , distinguish'd only by these different modes of subsistence . this proves a real distinction , without any diversity , division , or separation , and therefore a real distinction in perfect unity . the divine nature is infinite and uncircumscribed , and therefore the divine persons cannot be divided and separated from each other , but are perfectly in each other , without confusion . the divine nature is perfectly one in three , by the unity of sameness and identity , and therefore there can be no diversity or division of will , or counsel , or operation , or power : now a nature which is perfectly the same , and undivided , must be perfectly one. but then father , son , and holy ghost , are certainly three ; for he who begets , is not he who is begotten , for nothing begets it self : to beget , and to be begotten , and to proceed , are the characters of persons , and can belong only to true , real , substantial persons : he who begets , must be a person , and so must he who is begotten , and he who proceeds ; they have each of them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , whatever makes a compleat and perfect person ; but then these three can never meet in the same person , and consequently must distinguish persons ; for the same person can't be unbegotten , begotten , and proceed ; can 't be the cause , and that which is caused . this is demonstratively certain , that a begotten and unbegotten person , and consequently a begotten and unbegotten nature ( a divine person being nothing else but the divine nature ) are and must be two , and never can be each other ; and therefore this distinguishes persons , though it makes no distinction or diversity in the divine essence ; as the catholick fathers proved against the arians , that to be unbegotten , and to be begotten , does not . but to be unbegotten , to be begotten , and to proceed , whatever you will call them , whether personal properties , or modes of subsistence , though they do not make the persons , that is , are not the formal notion of a person , yet they certainly distinguish them , or prove them to be as distinct and incommunicable , as unbegotten , begotten , and proceeding ; for if these terms or characters can never signify each other , then the persons characterized by them can never be each other : and this is all the distinction that can be in an undistinguished , undiversified , undivided essence . well ; but still the difficulty remains , how to distinguish between essence and person in god ; for if person be nature and essence , and each person distinctly in himself be the whole divine essence , or the whole divinity , how can we avoid acknowledging three essences , and three divinities , as well as three persons in the trinity ? now the account of this must be taken from the nature of that distinction and unity which is in god ; for such a distinction as does not destroy the unity , can't multiply natures , though it distinguishes persons . each person is the divine nature , but without any diversity , division , or separation of the divinity ; and what is identically and indivisibly the same , is but one. the divine nature , as self-originated and unbegotten , is the person of the father ; as communicated by generation , is the person of the son ; as proceeding is the person of the holy ghost , and these are three ; but the son is begotten of the substance of his father , and the holy ghost proceeds from father and son , without any diversity , division , or separation of substance , and therefore the divinity is but one. the divine nature subsists distinctly and incommunicably in three , according to their distinct characters of unbegotten , begotten , and proceeding ; and these we call persons , because they bear some analogy to individuals in created beings , which in an intelligent nature are called persons ; but they are not three divinities , because the divine nature , though it be distinct , yet is undiversified , and undivided in three , and therefore is but one in three . this seems to me a very intelligible account of a trinity in unity , and the difference between person and essence , though a divine person is the divine essence . when we distinguish between person and essence , and say there are three persons and one essence , by essence we mean an undistinguished , undivided divinity , which is but one ; by three persons we mean the divine essence , unbegotten , and communicated by generation , and procession , which are really distinct persons , and subsist distinctly , but i● the unity of an undistinguished and undivided divinity ; which makes them really and actually three and one ; the same without diversity , and distinct without division . and this seems to be the reason why the catholick fathers , tho they called the divine persons tres res , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and tres subsistentes , three things , and three that subsist , yet were more cautious in calling them three natures , or essences , or substances ( though there are some examples of this kind ) , because though the divine essence subsists distinctly in father , son , and holy ghost , which makes them three distinct , real , subsisting persons , yet the divine nature is not distinguished nor separated , but is perfectly one , same , undivided essence ; and therefore vna substantia , though not vnus subsistens ; one substance , though not one , but three , that subsist . what i have thus briefly represented , i hope i have proved in the first chapter , from the authority of scripture , and reason founded on scripture : and from what i have already discoursed of the doctrine of the fathers , it may appear to careful and intelligent readers , who use such application as this argument deserves and requires , that this is their unanimous sense also . but yet as far as it is possible , to clear this matter more fully , and vindicate the fathers and schools from those obscurities , inconsistences , and contradictions which are generally charged on them in so concerning an article , i shall reassume this matter , and particularly shew , . that what they call a divine person , is the divine essence and substance , and nothing else . . that this divine essence and substance , as constituting these divine persons , is proper and peculiar to each , and incommunicable to one another ; and therefore that this divine essence and substance , as subsisting distinctly in three , is no more numerically one , than their persons are one. . what difference they made between nature and essence , and hypostasis and person . . whether the catholick faith of a real and substantial trinity , can be as reasonably and intelligibly explained by the notion of one singular substance in the divinity , as by asserting three personal substances or suppositums : and whether the singularity of the divine essence in this notion , deliver the asserters of it from any inconveniences and objections which the contrary opinion is thought liable to . . as for the first , that a divine person is the divine essence , it is and must be in some sense acknowledged by all who profess the faith of a real trinity ; for there cannot be a real trinity of divine persons , if each person be not true and perfect god , that is , the whole divinity , or divine nature and essence . and therefore those who assert in the strictest sense the singularity of the divine essence , yet assert , that this one singular essence subsists distinctly in each divine person ; which , whether it be to be understood or not , yet is an acknowledgment that there is no conceiving a divine person without the divine essence : but we need not be beholden to any man for this concession , for the thing is plain and evident in all catholick writers . petavius has very critically observed the different use of words in catholick writers , relating to this venerable mystery ; such as essence , nature , substance , hypostasis , subsistence , person , &c. which sometimes occasioned great misunderstandings between them , and is to this day made a pretence of charging the fathers with great uncertainty and obscurity , and with contradicting each other , and themselves . this of late has been much insisted on , in order to disparage the authority of ● , as zealous , contentious bigots , who neither understood one another , nor themselves , nor the catholick faith , but so confounded terms , that we can never certainly know what they meant ; or used such dangerous terms , that if we rely too much upon them , we m●y easily m●stake h●resy for the catholick faith. were this true , our case would be very bad ; but two or three observations will set this matter in a clear light . . that very ambiguity which the fathers are charged with in the use of words , does certainly prove , that by a divine person , they meant the divine essence , nature , and substance . the plain case is this . the catholick fathers did universally own and profess a trinity in unity , three persons , and one god ; so that there was no difference in their faith , how different soever their words were : the most common terms , whereby they exprest the unity of the godhead , were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , vna esse●●●● , vna natura , vna substantia ; one ess●nce , one n●ture , one substance ; and a trinity they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three hypostates ; and the latins three persons ; but sometimes we meet in undoubted catholick writers wi●● the direct contrary expressions , such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , tres substantiae , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three essences , three natures , three substances , and one hypostasis : the usual way of reconciling this seeming contradiction is by saying , that when these fathers use such expressions , as three essences , three natures , three substances , they do not understand this of three divers , or specifically different , essences , natures , substances , which is arianism , but of three persons ; and when they affirm , that there is but one hypostasis , they do not by one hypostasis mean one person , which is sabellianism , but one nature , essence , or substance : as we know this very controversy about one or three hypostases , was thus composed in the alexandrian synod , where athanasius presided : and no doubt but this is the true solution , since those , who were neither arians , nor sabellians , could not understand such expressions in any other sense . but then the question still remains , how this ambiguity should happen , or how it comes to pass , that such contradictory terms , as one essence , and three essences , one substance , and three substances , one hypostasis , and three hypostases , should both be orthodox and catholick . now the only account i can give of this matter , is this ; that these terms , essence , nature , substance , hypostasis ( which originally signifies substance , of which more presently ) may signify , as the philosopher speaks , either the first or second substance ; either the common nature , which has the same notion and definition , common to the whole kind , as humanity , which is the same in all men ; or a singular subsisting nature , and substance , which in creatures we call individuals , and in reasonable creatures , persons : now in analogy to this common specifick nature , which is one and the same in all its individuals , the catholick fathers taught but one essence , nature , substance , and in this sense but one hypostasis in the godhead , that is , a consubstantial trinity , in analogy to the several individuals of the same species , in whom only this common nature did really and actually subsist ; they ordinarily asserted three hypostases , sometimes , as we see , three natures , and essences , and substances , in the trinity , that is , three real , substantial , subsisting persons ; and in this sense , three essences , three natures , three substances , was accounted catholick doctrine . st. hilary allows tria in substantia , or tres subs●antias , three in substance , or three substances , for tres subsistentium personas , three subsisting persons . and st. greg. nyssen , in answer to eunomius , who asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three essences , or substances , says , that if he understood this distinction of substances only in opposition to sabellius , who gave three names to one suppositum , or substance , that not only he , but all catholick christians , assented to it : his only fault being in this case , that he uses improper words , three essences , for three hypostases . now that which i observe from hence is this , that had they not believed each divine person to be distinctly by himself the divine nature , essence , and substance , there could never have been any occasion for this dispute about one essence , nature , substance , hypostasis , and three essences , natures , substances , hypostases ; nor for that known distinction , by which they reconciled this difference between essence and hypostasis , that the first signifies something analogous to a common specifick nature , the second to individuals . if the divine nature subsisted in singularity , or were but one singular subsisting nature , essence and hypostasis must signify the same thing ; for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , essence is substance , and so is hypostasis , and in this sense , they must both signify a first substance , and then one singular subsisting nature or substance ; and three singular subsisting natures and substances , is an irreconcilable contradiction . had the singularity of the divine nature been the catholick faith , we should never have heard of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the common nature and essence of the divinity ; for singular and common are express contradictions , and a singular subsisting nature can have nothing thing analogous in it to a common specifick nature : if each divine person be not the divine nature ▪ essence , substance , there can be no pretence , that essence and substance should ever signify a person , nor can any interpretation make three essences and substances catholick doctrine , if there be no sense , wherein three persons may orthodoxly be called three essences and substances ; as there can't be , if a person , as a person , be not essence and substance : and on the other hand , if hypostasis , which is the peculiar and appropriate name whereby the greek fathers denote a person , do not signify essence and substance , it could never be orthodox to say , that there is but one hypostasis , no more than it is to say , that there is but one person in the trinity . . but to set aside this dispute concerning three essences , three natures , three substances , and one hypostasis in the trinity , which though allowed to be catholick , yet were sparingly and cautiously used , because they were liable to heretical senses ; i observe farther , that these words , essence , nature , substance , are distinctly applied to each person of the holy trinity , which could not be orthodox , were not each person distinctly in himself , essence , nature , substance . what i have already discoursed with relation to sabellianism , and upon several other occasions , sufficiently proves this , and i shall not trouble my readers with a needless repetition : petavius owns it , and has given several instances of it , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , essentia , natura , substantia , do not always signify the common essence of the divinity , but the divine persons ; that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is the person of the father , and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the person of the son , which is undoubtedly true ; but still essence signifies essence , and nature nature , and substance substance ; and the only reason he has to say , that in this construction the words signify a person , is because they are used singularly , and construed with the name of a person , as the essence and substance of the father , or of the son : but this is no reason , if the essence be not the person ; if the essence of the f●ther do not signify that essence which is the person of the father ; and the essence of the son , that essence which is the person of the son : for if a divine person be not the divine essence , essence can never signify person : and yet if they do believe that each divine person is by himself in his own person essence and substance , the whole undivided divinity , i cannot imagine the reason of this criticism , why they should be more afraid to say the essence and substance of the father , than the person of the father , unless it be , that this does not so well agree with their notion of the singularity of the divine essence , as i doubt indeed it will not , especially if we add , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the unbegotten and begotten substance , the one the person of the father , the other of the son ; of which more hereafter ; but this is not to learn our faith from the fathers , but to expound them by our preconceived opinions . dly , i observe farther , that all those words , which are more peculiarly appropriated to signify the divine persons , were always used by catholick writers in the notion of substance , and were never thought catholick in any other sense . hypostasis is the most received word among the greek fathers , to signify a person ; and one essence and three hypostases was the catholick language . now it is agreed on all hands , that hypostasis literally signifies substance ; and as i have already observed , the only dispute about it was , that some by hypostasis understood the common nature and substance in the notion of essence , and for that reason asserted , that there is but one hypostasis , as there is but one essence in the trinity ; others understood a singular subsisting nature and substance , and in this sense asserted three hypostases ; but none of them ever understood hypostasis in any other notion , but that of substance , either a common , or individual substance : and to prevent this ambiguity , as far as they could , which might conceal very different heresies , sabellianism on one hand , and arianism on the other , and many times occasioned the orthodox to suspect each other of these opposite heresies , though essence and hypostasis signified much the same thing , yet they appropriated the name essence to signify a common nature and substance , and hypostasis to signify individuals : as we learn from st. basil , greg. nyssen , damascen , and many other catholick writers , who assign this difference between essence and hypostasis . but yet this did not wholly silence this dispute among the greeks , much less did it satisfy the latin fathers , who knew no difference between essentia & substantia , but translated the homoousion by vnius substantiae ; and therefore it was as great heresy to them to say three substances ( as they translated the greek hypostases ) as to say three essences in the trinity : st. austin professes , that he knew not what the greeks meant by one essence , and three substances ; and for the same reason , it is well known , st. ierom rejected three substances , for both by essence and substance they understood a common nature , which made it heresy indeed to assert three substances , which in this acceptation of the word must signify three divers substances , which specifically differ : and therefore tho they did not reject the greek faith , but did believe as heartily as they , that each person by himself was perfect hypostasis and substance , and rejected the sabellian one hypostasis , and one substance ; yet they did not like the phrase of three hypostases , and three substances ; for they knew no difference between three substances and three essences , and by both understood three different kinds and species of beings . and for this reason , both to secure the catholick faith from such a diversity and dissimilitude of nature , as three essences and substances may signify , and from a sabellian unity and singularity , they chose such words , as signified a real perfect subsisting being , but did not immediatly and formally signify essence and substance , tho they did necessarily suppose and connote it . such among the greeks are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , among the latins , subsistentia , suppositum , res , ens : existence , subsistence , subject , suppositum , thing , being , which every one sees , must signify something as real , as essence , and substance , and must necessarily include essence and substance in their very notion ; and that thus they were used by the catholick fathers , petavius proves by numerous quotations , which the reader may consult at his leisure . and though some of these words are sometimes used singularly of all three divine persons in the notion of a common essence and substance , as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , res , in which sense st. austin called the trinity unam summam rem , yet both fathers and schoolmen did without any scruple use them in the plural number , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , tres subsistentiae , tres res , tria supposita , tria entia realia , that the divine persons were three existences , three subsistencies , three suppositums , three things , three real beings ; and why not then three essences , and three substances , since every suppositum , every thing , every real being , is essence and substance ; the reason of which is plainly this , that essence and substance , unless qualified with some limiting adjuncts , signify the formal reasons of things , and can't be multiplied without diversity ; whereas the other terms signify nothing but real and actual existence , which does not diversify , and therefore not multiply , the essence ; for three suppositums , three subjects , three things , three real beings , may have one essence , nature , and substance , formally , identically , and invariably the same . but there is some dispute about the use of those words , existence and subsistence . petavius observes a great difference between the ancient and modern use of them : that the ancients used them in a concrete sense for person and substance , that which does really exist and subsist , as he proves by several quotations ; but that the schoolmen use them in an abstract sense , for the modifications of substance , which they call modes , which together with the substance constitute what we call persons ( of which more hereafter ) and this may be true as to some later schoolmen ; but the more ancient , and many modern schoolmen , retained the old catholick use of the words ; and suarez could trace the doctrine of modes no higher than durandus . peter lombard is express in it , that three persons are tres subsistentioe , tres entes , three subsistencies , three beings , and tres subsistentioe vel entes , & subsistentioe vel subsistentes , subsistencies or beings , subsistencies or those that subsist . thus tho. aquinas tells us , that persons are res subsistentes , subsisting things : and in answer to that objection against a plurality of persons in the godhead , that a person , according to boetius , being rationalis naturoe individua substantia , the individual substance of a rational nature ; if there be a plurality of persons in the godhead , there must consequently be a plurality of substances ; he tells us , that substance either signifies the essence , or the suppositum ; that in this last sense it is used in the definition of a person , as appears by the addition of individual , which is what the greeks call hypostasis , and therefore assert three hypostases ( individual substances ) as we do three persons ; but we don't use to say three substances , by reason of the equivocal use of the word , lest we should be thought to assert three essences in the godhead . from whence it is plain , that by three subsistencies , tho. aquinas understood three that subsist ; three individual substances , in the notion of three distinct supp●situms , though not of three different essences ; for this is the true distinction he makes between suppositum and essence , that they both signify substance , but the one signifies as matter , and the other as form ; and therefore the plurality of suppositums of subsistencies does not multipl●●●e essence or form , for three may be perfectly one in nature and essence ; but to multiply essences , to say there are three n●tures , or three essences , is to diversify them , and to make three gods specifically and essentially different . after this , i need not add much concerning the notion of person . the ciceronian sense of this word ( too much in use of late ) , wherein the same man may be said to sustain several persons , according to his different relations , offices , and quality , has ( as i have observed before ) been rejected by all catholick writers , as sabellianism . st. austin , generally speaking , is the text to the master of the sentences , and he to the schoolmen ; and that father is express in it , that person is essence and substance ; that the person of the father is the essence and substance of the father : from whose authority p. lombard concludes , that person is used in the notion of substance ; that when we say the father is a person , the sense is ▪ the father is the divine essence . he observes from the same father , that the latins used person in the same sense that the greeks used hypostasis , which in latin literally signifies substance ; but yet they were very cautious of saying three substances , as the greeks did three hypostases ; because though the greeks distinguished between essence and substance , that essence expressed the formal nature of things , substance what in creatures we call the matter or suppositum , yet the latins knew no such distinction ; and therefore three substances to them was the same with three essences , which would assert a diversity in the divine nature : and this he shews was the only objection st. hierom had against three substances , or three hypostases , which he allowed in the notion of tres personas subsistentes , three subsisting persons , but not of three natures or essences ; and this solution he acquiesces in , that tres personoe sunt tres substantioe , scilicet , tres entes , pro quo groeci dicunt tres hypostases ; that three persons are three substances , that is , three real beings , which the greeks call three hypostases . and though he observes that person may sometimes signify that personal property whereby one divine person is distinguished from another , yet he will not allow us to call three persons three properties , but three subsistencies , or three hypostases ; for the property is not the person , but only distinguishes persons ; of which more hereafter . and he reduces the several acceptations of person , as used in the doctrine of the trinity , to these three . . that it sometimes signifies the divine essence , as it does when we speak singularly of any one person ; for the person of the father is the divine essence , and so of the son , and of the holy ghost . . subsistencies and hypostases , as when we speak in the plural number , three persons are three subsistencies , three hypostases , but unius essentioe , of one and the same essence . . a property , as when we distinguish the persons by their personal properties . thomas aquinas , and generally the schools , receive and vindicate that definition which boetius gives of a person , that it is the individual substance of a rational nature , as i have already observed , whereby they expresly tell us , that they understand aristotle's substantia prima , or a subsisting individual . st. austin thought that the greeks might as well have used prosopon as hypostasis , for what the latins called person ; and why they rather said hypostasis , he could not tell , unless perhaps the propriety of their language required it ; and this was the truth of the case ; for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was a very ambiguous word , taken originally from the stage , as persona also was , and signified that vizor which was put over the face , to represent the person whom they intended to act , and so was used to signify a mere appearance and representation , not a real subsisting person ; and therefore st. basil tells us , that the sabellians who owned but one essence and hypostasis in god , yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the scripture represented god under different personal appearances , sometimes as the father , sometimes as the son , or holy spirit ; and adds , that therefore those who affirm that father , son and holy ghost are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one in subject , hypostasis , or suppositum , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three perfect persons , or prosopa , or appearances , justify the charge of sabellianism imputed by the arians to the catholicks . and in another place he tells us , that those who say that essence and hypostasis are the same , are forced to acknowledge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , only different prosopa , o● appearances ; and while they are afraid to own 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three hypostases , they relapse into the sabellian heresy . and therefore petavius truly observes , that though the catholick fathers did not scruple the use of this term prosopon , yet they used it in the sense of hypostasis ; and the notion of hypostasis joined with prosopon , makes up the true catholick notion of a person , as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which , as he says , proves that these persons have not one simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or suppositum , nor are merely different functions and energies of the same individual being , but that the diversity and multiplicity is in the subject it self , and that there are three truly and really distinct , and that subsist distinctly . this i hope is a sufficient proof of the first thing proposed , that a divine person is the divine essence and substance ; but i added also , that it is nothing else ; and i must speak something briefly to this . the absolute simplicity of the divine nature , which admits of no kind of composition , neither of parts , nor of substance and accident , nor of nature and suppositum , that which has , and that which is had , is the universal doctrine both of the catholick fathers and schools , as i need not prove ; and the necessary consequence of this is , that a divine person can be nothing else but the divine nature , essence , and substance ; for were a divine person the divine nature and something else , there must be a composition in the divine nature , something superadded to it , to make it a person . the unity of the divine nature in a trinity of persons , as i have shewn at large , is resolved into the perfect invariable s●meness and identity of nature ( the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) in three ; and therefore each divine person must be the whole divine nature and essence , and nothing else ; for otherwise the divine essence could not be perfectly one and the same in three , but would be distinguished and multiplied by some new accidents and modifications , as human nature is in distinct human persons . a trinity of persons is a known objection against the absolute simplicity of the divine nature ; and the answer to it is as well known , that those relations which distinguish persons , make no composition in the divine nature ; and then a person can be nothing else but the divine nature , if there be no composition to make a person : but of this more presently . dly . the next thing i proposed was this , that according to the doctrine both of fathers and schools , the divine essence and substance , as subsisting distinctly in three , is proper and peculiar to each , and incommunicable to one another . this is so universally acknowledged by all who own real and substantial persons , that i need say little of it . i have produced several express testimonies already out of the fathers to this purpose ; and indeed to say , that the substance of each person is proper and incommunicable , is no more than to say that their persons are incommunicable ; that the father is not , and never can be the son , nor the son the father , nor the holy spirit either father or son ; which is what they meant by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , properly and appropriately father and son ; that the father never was nor can be a son , nor the son a father . thus their different characters prove an incommunicable distinction between them : the son is the image of god , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a living substantial image ; but the image , tho by an identity of nature it is the same with the prototype , yet it is not and never can be the prototype ; not imaginale , but imaginalis imago , as victorinus afer speaks ; not the person , nor personal substance of the father , but the express image of his person and substance . in boetius's definition of a person by individua substantia , the schools , as far as i have observed , universally understand incommunicabilis substantia , an incommunicable substance ; and therefore , as i observed before , though they assert the divine essence to be singularis , yet it is singularis communicabilis , a communicable singular ; but a person is substantia individua , or singularis incommunicabilis , a singular incommunicable substance . now this started a great difficulty ; how the essence and substance of the father , which is but one , can be both communicable and incommunicable . the person of the father , which is his divine essence , is incommunicable , and yet the father communicates his own divine nature and essence to the son and holy spirit , without communicating his person . of the same nature is what the schools teach concerning the divine generation and procession . they allow that the father does truly and properly , not metaphorically , beget the son , and that the son is truly and properly begotten ; and that the father by divine generation communicates the divine essence to the son ; and that the son has all that he has from the father , and is all that the father is , excepting that he is not the father , but the son : and yet they will not allow that the divine essence either begets , or is begotten , or proceeds . they have a great authority against them in this , as they all own ; for the fathers made no scruple to say , that god begat god , essence essence , wisdom wisdom , life life ; and that the son is begotten , and only begotten god , god of god , light of light , wisdom of wisdom , and begotten wisdom . upon these authorities richardus victorinus contends earnestly , that we ought in plain terms to own , that substance begets substance , and that those who deny it , reject the doctrine of all the catholick fathers : but peter lombard , and most other schoolmen , especially since the council of lateran , justify themselves in this matter , by saying , that the fathers intended no more in such expressions , than what they themselves own , though they reject that way of speaking . when the fathers taught , that god begat god , essence essence , substance substance , wisdom wisdom , life life , they meant no more , than that the father , who is god , essence , substance , wisdom , life , begat his son , who is also truly and really god , essence , substance , wisdom , life ; and the reason why they rather chose to say , that the father , who is god , and essence , and wisdom , begets the son , who is god , and essence , and wisdom , &c. than to say , that god begets god , essence essence , wisdom wisdom , is this , because god , and essence , and wisdom , &c. signify absolutely , and so may multiply gods , essences , wisdoms ; as when we say man begets a man , the begotten man is as absolutely a man , as he who begets ; and he who begets , and he who is begotten , notwithstanding their relation , are two absolute men : and therefore , to prevent all such mistakes , and to secure the catholick faith of the real distinction of persons and suppositums in perfect unity , without the least diversity or multiplication of essence , they attributed active generation to the person of the father , and passive generation to the person of the son ; which proves a real distinction of persons and suppositums ( for he who begets cannot be he who is begotten ) , and yet preserves the unity and identity of the divine nature . but how can this be , if person and essence , suppositum and nature be the same , as it is in god ? for then if the person be begotten , the essence , which is that person , must be begotten also ; and if the person begets , the essence must beget . now this is in some sense true ; and therefore the catholick fathers promiscuously used these terms ; that the father begets a son , or god begets god , or essence begets essence ; and the schools themselves own , that the father , who is god , begets the son deitatem habentem , who has the divinity , the divine nature and essence , and has it by his generation and birth ; which in reality is the same , though they thought the expression less liable to mistake . for the truth of the case is this ; the schools , that asserted the perfect singularity of the divine essence , fenced against all expressions of an absolute signification , which multiplied natures ; for two absolute natures cannot be singularly one ; and therefore would not say , that nature and essence begets , or is begotten ; for in these propositions , the terms nature and essence , unless qualified and restrained , signify absolutely , and so infer two absolute natures and essences , that which begets , and that which is begotten ; and therefore they rather call this a communication than a generation of nature , because this last signifies relatively : that which is communicated , may be a singular nature , which subsists distinctly in more than one , but with a necessary relation to its original , and such a communication does not multiply natures , but only essential relations . and this is the difference they made between deus & deitatem habens , god , and one who has the divinity ; that god signifies absolutely , an absolute independent divinity , which has no relation or communication with any other ; but one who has the divinity , may signify one , who has it , not originally and absolutely , but by communication from another , and in an essential relation to him , as the son and the holy spirit have , which is the same divinity in three , and but one in three . and therefore i think the schools were very much in the right , for rejecting tres dii , three gods , when at the same time they owned tres deitatem habentes , three who have the divinity , for these do not signify the same thing : the first , unless qualified , is polytheism ; the second , the christian trinity in unity ; though i confess , i should not chuse to call the father , one who has the divinity , but simply god , because he is absolutely and originally so , and not by communication ; and for that reason is both in scripture , and in the fathers , eminently call●d god , and the one god , whereas the other divine per●●●s are the son of god , and the spirit of god ; and as te●●●●●ian observes , never called god , when joined with the father , though they are , when spoken of distinctly by themselves . for the same reason the schools forbid the use of abstract or sub●tantive terms in the plural number , when we speak of the d●vine persons , but allow of plural adjectives , because substantives signify absolutely , and multiply natures , as well as persons or suppositums , but adjectives may signify relatively , and multiply persons without multiplying natures ; as three eternals , three omnipotents , three infinites , in a substantive sense , signify three eternal , omnipotent , infinite , natures , as well as persons ; but three , who are eternal , omnipotent , infinite , signify a trinity of eternal , omnipotent , infinite , persons , but do not necessarily signify a trinity of natures , since these three may subsist in the same eternal , omnipotent , infinite nature , and each of them have this eternal infinite nature , and all the same . but still the difficulty remains , if person or suppositum and nature be perfectly the same , how the father can communicate his nature , and not his person ? how there can be three incommunicable persons , and suppositums , and but one nature , and that communicable to more than one ? that thus it is , and how it may be , is better explained by an example , than by any words without it : and i shall instance in a living substantial image : this is the true character of the second person of the trinity , that he is so the son , as to be the living perfect image of god , as has been explained at large elsewhere , as you may find in the margin . now every man must confess , that the prototype and the image are two distinct incommunicable suppositums , the prototype is not the image , nor the image the prototype ; and yet we must confess , that there is , and must be , but one and the same nature in both , not specifically , but identically the same , for a perfect image is , and can be nothing but the same that the prototype is , the same eternity , the same life , the same wisdom , power , and goodness , but all this not personally the same , for their persons are not , and cannot be the same ; but identically and invariably the same , or else it can't be a true and perfect image . and this makes it evident , that though person and nature be perfectly the same in god , yet when he begets a son , he neither begets his own person , nor nature , which would be to beget himself , which st. austin , and the schools after him , reject as absurd ; for an image of god is neither the person , nor the personal nature of god , but of the same nature with him , and perfectly the same , there being no other difference between them , but that one is the prototype , the other the image ; one the father , the other the son. so that when god of his own whole perfect substance begets a whole , perfect , living , substantial image , he does not beget himself , but another ; he does not beget his own nature , nor another nature like his own , but his own image , of the same nature with himself : he begets another person , who is as truly and perfectly god , as the true , perfect , living , image of god must be perfect god , but he does not in an absolute sense beget god , neither se deum , nor alium deum , as the schools rightly determine , neither himself god , nor another god ; for he neither begets his own essence and divinity , nor another divinity , but another , who is the perfect image of his own divine essence : and what is here said of the generation of the son , as the living subsisting image of god , must be applied to the procession of the holy spirit , who is the eternal spirit of god , as the son is his image . this is what the catholick fathers call the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that one divinity , in which they place the unity of god : that there is but one absolute divinity , or divine nature , which is the person of the father , who is therefore eminently acknowledged to be the one god , as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the fountain of the divinity , that is , of the divinity of the son , and of the holy spirit , which are not two other absolute divinities , for then they would be two more gods , besides the father ; but the divinity of the son and holy spirit is the same one divinity of the father , as an eternal , perfect , begotten , living image , and an eternal proceeding spirit , each of which is in himself true and perfect god , and all three but one god , or one divinity , not merely because they receive their divinity from god by an eternal generation and procession , nor as they have a divinity , or divine nature specifically the same with the father , which alone can no more render them one god , than father and son are one man ; but as the singular individual divinity of the father is in the son and holy spirit ; as it is manifest the singular individual nature of the prototype is , and must be in its living substantial image , without which it is not a natural image , though it may have a perfect likeness of nature , if it have an absolute nature of its own : this is what tertullian tells us , that there is unus deus cum oeconomia , one god with his economy ; and what st. hilary and others so often tell us , that the father does not cease to be the one god by having a son , since the son is god by nativity and birth , and authoritate paternoe naturoe , by having his father's nature , who is the one god. and this is all that the schools mean by the singularity of the divine nature and essence ; and it is impossible they should mean any thing else , when they teach , that this singular nature is communicable . they allow , as i have already shewn , that nature and person is the same , that each person is suppositum and substance , a singular incommunicable substance , and therefore that there were three suppositums , and in that sense three substances in the trinity ; but not three natures and essences , though each person be distinctly by himself , the divine nature and essence . now since what is strictly singular , is numerically one ; and what is numerically one , and never can be more , can't be multiplied , as that seems to be , which is communicated , what sense can there possibly be in a singular communicable , which seem to be contradictory terms ? but this is very good sense , and very catholick doctrine , if we understand this singular communicable , as the schools did , of one absolute divinity , or divine nature , which is so singular , that it can be but one , as is demonstrable by reason : but yet may beget its own essential image , which is not another divinity , or another nature , but it s own singular nature in its image , which is another suppositum and person , but not another nature . that this is the sense of the schools , and all that they meant by the singularity of the divine essence , is evident from the whole doctrine of relations . a trinity of proper , real persons , each of which is nature , essence , and substance , was made an argument against the perfect unity , as well as against the perfect simplicity of the divine nature , for plurality and unity are opposed to each other . to this the schools answer , that a plurality and unity of the same kind , are indeed opposite to each other , and cannot be reconciled ; as a plurality of natures cannot be reconciled with the unity of nature , nor a plurality of persons with the unity of a person ; but a plurality of persons and unity of nature may be reconciled , and thus it is with the trinity in unity ; for though each divine person be the divine nature and essence , yet three divine persons are not three absolute natures and essences , but three relations in one singular absolute nature . sect . viii . concerning the divine relations . but it will be of great use more particularly to consider this doctrine of relations , without which it is impossible rightly to understand what the schools teach , about a trinity in unity : and to reduce it into as narrow a compass as i can , i shall . shew , what the schools mean by relations in the divine nature . . why they insist so much upon relations . . what they mean by divine relations . now they tells us , that they are real relations , not made by the mind from some external respects and habitudes which it observes between things , but antecedent to all the acts of reason in the things themselves : that they are not inherent accidents , but substance , and subsisting relations ; not relative names and appellations , but the relatives themselves ; the persons related being the relations , and the relation the person ; which are therefore by some called substantiae relativae , and entia realia relativa , relative substances , and real beings , but relative ; that is , not absolute substances , and absolute beings , with a relation , as it is in creatures , where the son is as absolute a man , and as absolute a person as the father is , though they are related to each other as father and son ; but the very substance and person is the relation . before i shew , that this is the doctrine of the schools , the better to understand what they say , and the reasons of it , it will be necessary to give as plain and intelligible an idea of this as i can ; especially since i find some learned men boggle very much at the notion of relative substances , which are not merely the subjects of relations , but the relations themselves . what their objection is against this , i can't tell , unless they think that a relative substance is not true and perfect substance ; which is very far from the notion of the schools , who attribute compleat and perfect subsistence to these divine relations or persons , not as accidents in their subjects , nor as parts in a whole , which is their notion of substance and compleat subsistence ; but a relative substance only signifies such a substance as is not the original , but is all that it is from another , which they call the relatio originis , not merely such a relation as is between the cause and the effect , which is seldom a substantial subsisting relation , but the relation between substance and substance , when one substance , in the notion of suppositum , is wholly and perfectly derived and expressed from the other . the easiest representation of this , is the relation between the prototype or original , and its image ; which is not a mere relation of likeness and similitude , but of origination , that the image is taken from the original , which is the foundation of the relation . though two eggs were never so perfectly alike , yet one is not the image of the other , because it is not of the other , nor its natural representation , though perfectly like it ; but the image is that which results from the object , like a face in the glass , or the impression of a seal ; and the whole essence of such an image , as an image is relative . and it is the same case as to a living substantial image of that life and substance from whence it proceeds ; it is as perfect life and substance it self , as its original , or else it could not be a natural image of life and substance ; but yet it is relative life and substance , life of life , the prototype begetting its own image in a perfect identity and sameness of nature , whole of whole . and this is the notion of the schools concerning relative substances , which is intelligible enough . and that this is what they mean by relations in the godhead or divine nature , is as plain . the master of the sentences tells us , that these names , father , son , and holy ghost , signify the properties of paternity , filiation , and procession ; for they are relatives , which speak a mutual respect , and denote relations , which are not accidents in god , but immutably in the persons themselves ; so that they are not mere relative appellations , but are relations or notions in the things themselves , that is , in the persons . and by this argument tho. aquinas proves , that these are real relations , and are really in god , because the father is so called from the relation of paternity , and the son from filiation ; that were not paternity and filiation realiter in deo , real subsisting relations in the divinity , it would follow , that god is not really father or son , but only according to different conceptions , which is the sabellian heresy . and proves , that these relations in god are real , because they are divine processions in the identity of nature ; that is the son , who proceeds from the father in the identity of the same nature ; and the holy spirit , who proceeds from father and son in the identity of the same nature : for they called both the generation of the son , and the spiration of the holy ghost , processions , as the greeks did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the one processio intellectus , the other amoris . now these real processions are respects in the nature of things , and such respects are real relations ; for when any thing proceeds from a principle of the same nature , both that which proceeds , and that from which it proceeds , must necessarily be of the same order , and therefore have a real respect to each other . divine processions in the identity of nature must be related to each other in the unity of the same nature , and must be substantial subsisting relations ; for they are no other than the persons themselves , who thus proceed . it is a received conclusion in the schools , that a relation in god is the same with the divine essence : that personal relations are not reipsa distinguished either from the persons or the essence . and gilbertus porretanus , who taught the contrary , was forced to recant in the council of rhemes . the real distinction of these relations in the unity of the divine nature , is another avowed doctrine of the schools ; and by a real distinction they mean a distinction in re , in the subject and suppositum : and this they prove from the real distinction of persons , which are distinguished only by relations : from a real trinity , which is one in substance , but multiplied by relations , ( relatio multiplicat trinitatem ; ) and therefore unless these relations be really distinguished from each other , there can't be a real , but only a notional trinity , which is sabellianism . that these relations which constitute the trinity , are opposite relations , which require distinct subjects , as paternity and filiation , for no man can be father and son to himself : that these divine relations are real relations , and therefore must be really distinct or else they are not all real , unless they be really opposed to each other , which makes a real distinction ; and therefore there must be a real distinction in god , not as to any thing absolute ( secundum rem absolutam ) , which is the divine essence , which has the most perfect and simple unity , but secundum rem relativam , with respect to a relative being and subsistence : so that these relations are relative beings ▪ relative subsistences , and , as they are sometimes called . relative substances , which are really distinct , though not in nature , yet in their suppositums ; not as t●ree absolute beings , which makes a distinction in nature , but as three real subsisting relations , in the unity of the same nature . but not ●o multiply words in so plain a case , i shall observe bu● one thing more to this purpose , and that concerns the dispute conc●●ning the number of the divine persons . the catholick faith owns a trinity , or only three divine persons in the unity of the godhead , father , son , and holy 〈◊〉 ; and it is the known doctrine of the schools , that the relation is the person ; how comes it to pass then , that when there are four relations in the godhead , paternity , filiation , active spiration , and procession , there should be but three persons ? now the answer , which aquinas and others give to this difficulty , is this . that it is not every relation , but only opposite relations , which constitute and distinguish persons ; for more pers●ns are more subsisting relations really distinct from each other ; but there can be no real distinction between the divine relations , but upon account of their relative opposition : and therefore two opposite relations must belong to two persons , but such relations as are not opposite to each other , must belong to the same person ; and therefore paternity and filiation must belong to two persons , as being relatively opposed ; and therefore a subsisting paternity is the person of the father , and a subsisting filiation the person of the son : which can never be one person , as requiring distinct suppositums for such opposite relations : but now the other two relations , spiration and procession are not opposed to either of these , but only to each other : and therefore spiration does not constitute another person , as not being opposed either to paternity or filiation , and therefore may and does belong both to father and son ; but procession must constitute a third person , as opposed to spiration , and so necessarily distinguished from father and son. and therefore , though there are four relations , yet one of them , spiration , is not separated from the person of the father , and the son , but belongs to them both ; nor is it a property , as not being proper and peculiar to any one person ; nor is it a personal relation , or that which constitutes a person , and therefore there are but three relations , paternity , filiation , and procession , which are personal properties , which constitute persons , and therefore but three persons . now this answer evidently proves , that by relations they did not mean meer habitudes , respects , and external denominations ; for then every relation must of necessity be a person , and there must be as many persons , as there are relations ; but they mean relative beings , and subsistencies , and therefore allow no relations to constitute distinct persons , but such as necessarily require distinct subjects ; that is , such opposite relations , as can never meet in the same subject ; and therefore their suppositums must be really distinct , as paternity and filiation , for no one can be father and son to himself . there is no imaginable account , why only opposite relations constitute persons , but because they distinguish their subjects ; for when opposite relations meet in the same subject , but not in opposition , they do not distinguish and multiply persons , as the same man may be father and son , and but one person ; but when opposite relations distinguish their subjects , as the divine relations necessarily do , they multiply persons too : and no relations , properties , notions , according to the doctrine of the schools , constitute a person , but such as distinguish their subjects , that three persons , and three relations , are not three respects and denominations of the same singular subject , but three real distinct relative beings , and subsistencies . . let us now consider , why they insist so much upon the notion of relations , that when they allow every divine relation to be the divine essence , substance , an incommunicable subsistence and substance , yet they will not allow us absolutely to say three substances , but three relations , or three relative beings , subsistencies , or substances . and the plain and short account of it is this ; that this is essential to the unity of god , and gives us the truest and most perfect conception of a trinity in unity . as to shew this particularly ; . these divine relations ( though each of them be incommunicably in his own person , essence , and substance ) secure the perfect unity of the divine essence . for three relative substances are essentially but one substance , which three absolute substances can never be , though they never so perfectly agree in the same specifick notion and idea . by an absolute substance , i mean one intire , perfect , individual , whole , which is compleat in it self , and subsists compleatly by it self , without any internal , essential union to , or necessary dependence on , any being of the same kind : by relative substances , i mean , such substances as are internal subsisting relations in the same one whole individual nature : of absolute substances we have as many instances , as there are particular creatures in the world ; of relative substances we have no instance in created nature , but some such images and resemblances , as may help us to form an intelligible notion of them . now it is evident , without any need to prove it , that every compleat absolute substance , how many soever they are , multiplies the individuals of the same kind ; three absolute human substances are three men , and three absolute d●vine substances would for the same reason be three gods ; but it is ●therwise as to relative substances , which are ●ubsisting personal relations in the same one individu●l nature ; and it is demonstrable , that the relations of the same one individual nature and substance , can't multiply natures and substances , for then they would not be relations in the same individual substance , but would be ab●olute , not relative substances . as to explain this by a familiar example . the fathers , and after them the schoolmen , find some images of the trinity in human souls , as memory , vnderstanding . will ; or which they think a nearer resemblance , mind , knowledge , love : and a late s●cinian is very fond of such a trinity , as original mind , reflex wisdom , and love. peter lombard explains this particularly from the doctrine of st. austin , and it is evident that all these are very distinct , and never can be each other ; but all have a mutual and necessary relation to each other ; are in each other , and equal to each other , but are but one , one mind , one life , one essence , and one substance ; because they substantially exist in the same soul and mind , not as accidents in their subjects , which may be parted , but as essential properties and powers . this our socinian adversaries like well enough ; for these distinct properties and powers do not multiply persons , and therefore though they grant something like such distinct powers in the divine nature , yet still there is but one divine person , and therefore according to their own notion , but one god. but this is not the question , whether such distinct faculties , properties , and powers , multiply persons , which we grant they do not , because they do not multiply natures , and one individual human natu●e is but one man , or one human person ; but the q●estion is , whether , if instead of these distinct powers and faculties , there were real subsisting persons , as essentially related to each other in the same individual nature , they would any more divide or multiply nature , than such distinct powers and faculties do ? and i am pretty confident , no man can give me any good reason , why relative subsistencies , or personal relations should any more divide or multiply the divine nature , than relative powers and properties divide or multiply human nature : for if these divine persons are as essentially related to each other in the divine nature , as such distinct powers and faculties are in human nature , a trinity of persons must be as essentially one in the same one individual divinity , as a trinity of powers and faculties are in the same single human nature . it is certain , three such divine persons , though each of them be by himself true and perfect god , are not three absolute divinities , and therefore not three gods , but three divine relative subsistencies in the same one individual godhead , and therefore but one god ; as memory , understanding and will , are all that a mind is , and each of them all that the other is , and yet not three minds , but one mind . this shews the diff●rence between absolute and relative substances ; three absolute substances are always distinctly and separately three , and can never be any otherwise than specifically one ; but relative substances may be essentially one in the same one individual nature ; and this is the account both the fathers and schools give of a trinity in unity , three relations , or three relative substances , or subsistencies , essentially related to each other in the unity of the same one individual essence . st. gregory nyssen has given the most particular account of this matter in his catechetical oration . to convince the heathens of the eternal subsistence of the divine word in the unity of the same godhead , he lays the foundation of all in that universally received principle , that the divinity is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which i translate ( not , irrational , without reason , or understanding , but ) not without its word ; which is not the personal wisdom of the father , whereby the father is wise , as i have already shewn ( chap. . ) but a personal , living , subsisting , word : which answers to that word which we feel in our own minds , and which is essential to all minds , that no mind can be without its word ; but is not a vanishing notion and idea , or a transient sound , as human words , but answers to the perfection of the divine nature . and therefore as our mortal nature has a vanishing , perishing word , so the incorruptible , and eternally permanent , immutable nature , has an eternal subsisting word . and ( as he proceeds ) if this divine word subsists , it lives ; for it does not subsist like stupid inanimate stones , but as mind , and spirit , which must live , if it subsists ; and if it lives , the absolute simplicity of the divine nature , which admits of no composition , proves that he lives , not by a participation of life , but as life it self . and if the word lives , as being life it self , it must have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a power to do , what it freely wills and chuses . for that which cannot will and chuse ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) does not live ; and an impotent will is a contradiction to the nature of god ; and therefore its power must be equal to its will : but this divine word can will nothing but what is good , and wills whatever is good ; and being able to effect whatever it wills , is not unactive ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) without doing any thing , but does the good it wills : and since we must acknowledge the world , and all things in it , which are wisely and artificially made , to be good ; all things are the works of this living subsisting word . this is his proof , that god has a subsisting , living , almighty , creating word , which is another distinct person from him , whose word he is . for the word is a relative term , and signifies a relative subsistence , and necessarily supposes the father ; for he is not the word , but with relation to him , whose word he is . and by this means he tells us , we may escape both the polytheism of the gentiles , and the singularity of the iews , by acknowledging the living , energetical , operative word , which the iews deny , and the unity and identity of nature , between the word , and him , whose word he is . for as our word proceeds out of our mind , and is neither every way the same with the mind , nor yet upon all accounts another . for that it is of the mind , proves that is is another , and not the mind it self ; but as it perfectly expresses and represents the mind , it cannot be another nature , but one and the same nature , though a kind of different subsistence . so the word of god , by a distinct subsistence of its own , is distinguished from him , from whom he receives his subsistence and hypostasis ; but inasmuch as he is all , and the same that god is , he is perfectly one and the same in nature . this is the doctrine of all the other catholick fathers , as well as of gregory nyssen , who resolve the unity of the godhead in a trinity of persons , into relative subsistencies in the same individual nature , which no more multiplies natures and divinities , to make two or three gods , than the mind , its word , and love , make three minds . this is the true and compleat notion of the homoousion , which ( as i have already shewn ) does not signify a meer specifick unity , but the unity of one individual , not singular , nature in three ; that three real , distinct , subsisting persons are as intimately and essentially related to each other in the same individual nature , as a human mind and its word are ; which are not , and never can be two minds , but one mind . two compleat and perfect minds can never in a proper notion be consubstantial , or one substance , though they have the same specifick nature ; for their substance is not one and the same , but naturally two , and naturally separable , how closely soever they may be united ; but three divine persons , who are essentially related to each other in the same divinity , as the mind and its word are , are in the strictest notion consubstantial , or one substance , being essentially related to each other in the same one individual nature and essence . and here i must take notice of a great mistake , which some learned men run into , concerning the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , singular and particular natures , substances , and essences , by which they understand , what some others call personal substances ; and conclude , that since philoponus , and others , who asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three particular natures and essences , or substances in the godhead , were charged with tritheism ( as they deserved , if their opinions be truly represented ) those who assert three substantial persons , or three distinct personal subsistencies or substances , are liable also to the same charge . this is a material objection , and a fair answer to it will set this whole matter in a clear light . now the answer in short is this , that those who rejected the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and charged it with tritheism , did not thereby understand particular , personal , relative , subsistencies or substances , but compleat , absolute , particular natures and substances ; not three real , substantial , subsisting relations in one individual nature , as a mind , its internal , essential , word , and spirit , as father , son , and holy ghost , are three ; but three absolute particular natures , as three men , each of whom has a compleat , absolute , personal nature of his own , are three . now if this be the true account , every one sees the difference between three personal , relative , substances or subsistencies of the same nature , and three absolute particular natures ; the first is a real substantial trinity , three subsisting infinite persons in the unity of the same godhead . three persons , and one god ; the other is down-right tritheism . and that this is all they meant by particular individual natures , i have many arguments to prove . for st . had they herein condemned distinct , personal , relative substances , they had condemned the faith of the catholick church , and relapsed into sabellianism , as abundantly appears from what i have already proved at large . those very persons , who charge philoponus with tritheism for asserting three individual natures and essences , do themselves own a personal substance . leontius , as nic●ph rus tells us , wrote a large book against philoponus , and yet he tells us , that the fathers by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , essence or substance , and nature , understood the same thing , and so they did by hypostasis and person . that by essence and substance , they meant what the philosophers call a species ; by hypostasis and person , what they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an individual substance : and in this sense he tells us , they acknowledged one divinity in three hypostases , or three personal subsistencies . that there is one hypostasis ( that is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) of the father , one hypostasis of the son , and one hypostasis of the holy ghost ; that these three ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) in nothing differ from each other , but only in their personal properties , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) that one is the father , the other the son , the other the holy ghost : so that leontius owns three true proper persons , each of which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an individual substance , which he asserts to be the true catholick ecclesiastical notion of a person , and each person as distinct from each other , as he that begets is from him who is begotten ; and therefore when he condemned philoponus for his individual natures and essences , he could not by that mean relative , personal subsistencies or substances . theodorus abucara ( if he be the author of that tract against the severians , explanatio vocum , quibus philosophi utuntur , which i have sometimes suspected to belong to theodorus presbyter raithensis , who promises such an explication of philosophical terms at the end of his treatise de incarnatione , i say , this theodorus , whoever he is ) expresly charges these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , individual natures and essences with tritheism ; and yet throughout that treatise teaches , that hypostasis is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a singular individual nature ; and so does anastasius sinaita in his hodegos ; and indeed all the writers of that age , who asserted against the severians the union of two natures in one person in christ. dly , but we shall soon be satisfied in this matter , if we consider the occasion of this dispute . the severians , as they had learnt from their master severus , and he from eutyches , taught , that there was but one nature , as well as one person in christ , and that for this reason , that to assert two natures , is consequently to assert two persons in christ , which is nestorianism ; for every nature is a person , that it is impossible there should be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a nature without a personality of its own , for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nature and person , or hypostasis , are the same . in opposition to this the catholicks urged , that if nature and hypostasis were so the same , that one hypostasis is one nature , and one nature but one hypostasi● ; then as we assert three hypostasis in the trinity , we must also allow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three individual natures and essences in the trinity . philoponus saw that this was an unavoidable consequence , and therefore rather than own two natures in one person in christ , he chose to assert three individual natures in the trinity : and for this , he and his followers were very justly charged with tritheism . and this shews us , what these individual natures were , not three relative personal subsistencies and substances in the same one individual nature , which is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one divinity ; but three compleat absolute divinities , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three such divine natures , as there are three individual human natures in three men : each of which is by himself , and alone , without communication with any other in the same individual nature , one compleat intire humane nature , and one human person : for this was the rise of the dispute , concerning the humanity of christ. the catholicks owned the personality of the word , but taught that christ's humane nature was so united to his divinity , as not to be a distinct human person , but to subsist in the person of the word , which is the true faith of the word 's being incarnate , or made flesh , which could not be true , if the person of the word were not incarnate , and that could not be true , if the human nature in christ , were a distinct human person , as other men are . on the other hand , the severians denied the union of two natures in the one person of christ , because an individual human nature must be a person , and then christ must be two persons , as well as two natures : so that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a compleat absolute individual nature , such as an individual human nature is , and three such individual natures make three men , or three gods , and to assert three such absolute divinities , is tritheism ; but this concerns not personal , relative , subsistencies or substances in the same individual nature and essence ; and therefore the condemnation of philoponus , or valentinus gentilis , and such kind of hereticks ( if they did really teach what they are charged with ) cannot aff●ct those , who assert three real , distinct , substantial , persons , each of whom is by himself , in his own person , the whole divine nature , essence , substance , but are essentially and inseparably related to each other in the unity of the same individual essence . the very asserting three relative , personal subsistencies , or substances , in one individual nature , is a direct opposition to the doctrine of philoponus , and the severians , that nature and person is the same , so the same , that one nature can be but one person , and one person but one nature , which necessarily overthrows a trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence , and the union of the divine and humane nature in the one person of christ ; but three relative persons and subsistencies in one nature , and one nature and one person are direct contradictions , as one individual substance , and three individual substances are . indeed those who deny three relative personal subsistencies , that is , three real , proper , substantial persons , in the unity of the divine nature , go upon the same principle with philoponus and the severians , that one nature is but one true and proper person , or hypostasis , and therefore there cannot be three proper subsisting persons in the unity of one individual substance ; which , as anastatius sinaita , and the other catholick writers of that age frequently observe , is that fundamental error , which gave birth to sabellianism , arianism , nestorianism , and eutychanism ; for as different as these heresies are , the fundamental principle is the same , that one individual nature is , and can be but one person , and one person but one nature : for this reason sabellius , who acknowledged the unity of the divine nature , rejected a trinity of proper subsisting persons ; arius , who owned a trinity of persons , denied their consubstantiality , or sameness and identity of nature ; nestorius , who owned two natures in christ , asserted also two persons ; and eutyches made christ but one nature , as well as one person ; and in consequence of this philoponus ( if he was not mistaken ) taught three individual natures , as well as three persons in the godhead . so that to make nature and person in the true and proper notion of person commensurate and convertible terms ; that a nature is a person , and a person an individual nature ; that one nature is but one person , and one person but one nature ; and that individual natures and persons must always be multiplied with each other , is the fundamental principle of all the heresies relating to the trinity and incarnation , and then one would think , that those doctrines which expresly contradict this principle , and all these heresies which result from it , should be the true catholick faith : and then three real , substantial , subsisting persons , or three relative personal subsistencies , or substances , in the unity of the same individual essence , or one godhead , is the true catholick faith ; and to reject it upon pretence , that this must multiply natures with persons , and so make three divinities , and three gods , is to return to that condemned heretical principle , that one nature can be but one true and proper person ; which , if men understand the true consequences of what they say , must inevitably betray them to sabellianism , arianism , or tritheism . and thus much for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which , i hope , we shall hear no more of . the doctrine of relations demonstrates the individual unity of the divine essence ; for if father , son , and holy ghost , though each of them in his own person be true and perfect god , yet are not three absolute divinities , but three eternal subsisting relations , in the same one divinity , they must be one individual essence and substance , for else they cannot be the relations of the same one essence and substance . . as these divine relations prove the individual unity of nature and essence , so they prove the sameness and identity of nature , wherein , as i have shewn at large , the catholick fathers place the unity of the godhead . that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . one divinity is one god. a few words will serve to explain this , after what i have already discoursed on this argument . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as i have already shewn , does not signify the singularity , but the perfect invariable sameness and identity of nature ; not such a sameness , as every single person is the same with himself , but such a sameness as is between distinct persons of the same nature . now the doctrine of relations necessarily infers this perfect sameness and identity , and this relative sameness and identy proves a perfect unity . as for the first , there needs no other proof , but barely to represent it , for it is self-evident : for is it possible , that a perfect , living , subsisting word should not be perfectly the same with that infinite mind , whose word it is , and from whom it proceeds ? that a perfect , living , subsisting image , should not be perfectly the same with its prototype , from whom it receives its being and nature ? for if the word be not perfectly the same with the mind , nor the image with its prototype , it is not a true and perfect word , not a perfect image : by these relations of father and son , of a mind and its word , a prototype and its image , the catholick fathers , as i have already shewn , prove the perfect , invariable sameness and identity of nature ; for the thing proves it self . the relation indeed of father and son , considered in general , proves no more than a specifick sameness of nature , which may admit of great changes and variety within the same species ; but when god is the father , and begets a son of his own substance , his nature being absolutely and immutably perfect , he must communicate the same perfect invariable nature to his son ; especially when this son is his own perfect living word , and his perfect image . but this is not all : a perfect sameness between two absolute natures , without the least conceivable difference or variation , would not be a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a sameness of identity ; for though they could subsist as perfectly the same , as their idea is , yet they would be two absolute natures , not one nature : but a perfect sameness in essential relations , or relative subsistencies , proves a perfect identity of nature , that they are perfectly the same in the same one individual nature : as a living substantial word must receive its substance and being , whole of whole , from that mind , whose word it is ; for if it be not the same substance , it can't be the substantial word of that mind , whose substance it is not ; nor can a living substantial image be any other substance , than that of the prototype ; for if it were , it might be its likeness , but not its natural image . and thus this sameness and identity of nature proves each person by himself to be true and perfect god , and all three but one god ; for each person , according to this doctrine , has , and must have , the whole perfect divinity in himself , and all three but one and the same divinity . . these subsisting relations in the unity of nature , give us an intelligible notion of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the inseparable union of the divine persons , and their mutual 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , inexistence , inbeing , in each other . that all the catholick fathers asserted the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or inseparable union of the divine persons , as essential to the unity of the godhead , is so well known , that i need not multiply quotations to prove it , after what i have already observed to that purpose . but the question is , what they mean by this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , wherein the essential unity of the godhead consists . now it is certain this relates to the inseparable union of the persons ; for it is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , divided and separate hypostases and persons , which the fathers charge with tritheism . the son is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , inseparable from the essence and substance of the father , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is inseparably in the father ; that he is begotten of the father without any division of substance , within the father , and inseparable from him ; so that this does not relate immediately to the unity of nature , but the union of persons , and therefore cannot signify the singularity of the divine nature , but the inseparable union of real distinct persons in the unity of nature . that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this inseparable union and inbeing of persons , does as necessarily prove the real distinction of persons as the unity of nature , as st. hilary , and athanasius , and the other fathers , frequently observe , and that proves that the unity of the divine nature , which is the inseparable union of three proper subsisting persons , is not the unity of singularity : which shews by the way , how improperly the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is made use of to prove the singularity of the divine essence , for it proves quite the contrary ; it is the unity of three which is a trinity in unity ; not the unity of one , which is singularity and solitude . in the next place i observe , that by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all the catholick fathers understand in this mystery the inseparable union of relatives in the same individual nature , not the union of compleat , absolute natures , how close and inseparable soever it may be . there is by nature no inseparable union , but in the same individual nature . three compleat individuals , though of the same kind and species , how closely and intimately soever they be united , are not by nature inseparable nor essentially one , for they may be parted by that power which united them , and when they are parted , can subsist apart ; as three compleat minds , how intimately soever they should be united by god , yet can never be essentially and inseparably one , for they are not essential to each other ; they might have subsisted apart , and may be parted again , and an external union cannot so make them one , as to be naturally inseparable . which i think is a demonstration that a natural inseparability , which is an essential unity , can be only in one individual nature between such relatives as are essential to each other , and can neither be , nor be conceived , divided , or separated : and therefore the catholick fathers represented the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by examples of natural unions between things essentially related to each other in one individual nature , which either cannot be conceived , or at least cannot subsist apart . of this last kind are a fountain and its streams , a tree and its branches , whereby they not only represent the homoousion , but the inseparable union of the divine persons , as every one knows ; for there cannot be a fountain but its waters must flow out , nor streams without a fountain from whence they flow ; and though branches may be separated from the tree , yet they live no longer than they are united , and are branches of that tree no longer : but these are very imperfect images , and without great caution will corrupt our ideas of the divine unity . of all corporeal unions the nearest resemblance we have of this , and which the fathers most insist on , is the sun , and its natural splendor , for we cannot conceive the sun without its splendor , nor the splendor without the sun ; they never were , never can be parted , and therefore , though two , are essentially one . this representation the scripture makes of it , which calls the son , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the brightness of his father's glory , and in this sense they teach that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , light of light , as it is in the nicene creed , whereby they do not mean two distinct independent lights , which either are or may be parted , though one be lighted at the other ( this was the heresy of hierachas , as st. hilary tells us , who represented this mystery by two candles , one of which is lighted at the other , or by one and the same lamp , which is divided and burns in two sockets ) ; but that light and splendor which is essential to the same sun , and can never be divided from it , as athanasius teaches . but the truest images we have of this in nature , is the inseparable union which is between a mind and its own internal word , which are so essentially related to each other in the same individual nature , that they can never be parted , nor conceived apart ; the mind can never be without its word , nor the word subsist but in the mind : it is evident , that two compleat , absolute minds can never be thus united ; for they are not essential to each other ; not naturally one , and therefore not naturally inseparable ; but a mind and its word , though two , are essentially one , and therefore can never be parted but must subsist together ; and these are the characters the scripture gives us of god the father and his son ; the father infinite , eternal , self-originated mind ; the son his eternal infinite , living , subsisting word . and if father and son , this eternal mind and eternal word , be as essentially one , as a mans mind and his word are one , this is a demonstration of their inseparable union , and gives us a sensible notion and idea of it . this is the account athanasius every where gives of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the father and son are inseparably one ; the father being in the son , and the son in the father , as the word is in the mind , and the light in the sun. to separate the divine persons , so as not to be in each other , whatever other union we own between them , dionysius of alexandria charges with tritheism ; for the divine word must of necessity be one with god , and the holy spirit be and subsist in him . and this athanasius resolves into such a sameness and unity of nature , as must be between two relative subsistencies in the same individual nature . that the son is in the father , as the word is in the mind , and the splendor in the sun ; that he is a genuine proper natural son in the father's essence and substance , not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not subsisting out of his father's substance , as other creature sons do . that the true notion of the sons being in the father , is that the whole being of a son , is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the genuine natural birth of the father's substance , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as the splendor is of the sun : that the very being of the son is the form of species , and divinity of the father . that as the sun and its splendor are two , but not two lights , but one light from the sun enlightening all things with its splendor and brightness ; so the divinity of the son is the divinity of the father , and therefore inseparable ; and thus there is but one god , and none else besides him . all this plainly refers to the inseparable union and inbeing of relatives of the same individual substance , which are really distinct , but essentially in each other , as the word is in the mind , and the mind in the word , that thought it self cannot part them ; which is such an union as can never be between compleat absolute substances , which are not naturally inseparable , nor essentially one. herein athanasius places the adequate notion of the homoousion , the sameness , identity , and unity of nature . he tells us , that for this reason the nicene fathers taught the homoousion , or that the son is consubstantial , or of one substance with the father , to signify that the son is not only like the father , but to be so of the father , as to be the same in likeness ; not after the manner of bodies , which are like each other , but subsist apart by themselves , as human sons subsist separately from their parents ; but the generation of the son of the substance of the father is of a different kind and nature from human generations , for he is not only like , but inseparable from his father's substance . he and the father are one , as he himself says : the word is always in the father , and the father in the word , as it is with light and its splendor , and this is what the homoousion signifies ; and in like manner he resolves the sameness , identity , and unity of nature , into this internal , inseparable union and inbeing of three , essentially related to each other in one individual divinity . thly , that mutual inbeing of the divine persons , which is their inseparable and essential union , that the father is in the son , and the son in the father , which the greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the latins circumincessio , can be understood only between the relatives of the same individual essence and substance . the true compleat notion of this inbeing or perichoresis , is not merely a mutual presence , or the same vbi , that where-ever one is , there the other is ; or a kind of immeation and penetration of each other , which is a corporeal notion , and rejected as such by the catholick fathers , when they speak of this divine inbeing , as st. hilary expressly does , inesse autem non aliud in alio , ut corpus in corpore ; that they are not in each other , as one body is in another body . and when the arians objected against our saviour's saying , i am in the father , and the father in me ; how can this be in that , and that in this ? or how can the father , who is greater , be at all in the son , who is less ? or what wonder is it , that the son should be in the father , when it is written of us all , that in him we live , and move , and have our being ? athanasius answers , that this is all owing to corporeal conceits , as if they apprehended god to be a body , not considering the nature of the true father , and true son , the invisible and eternal light , and its invisible splendor ; an invisible substance , and its unbodied character and image . but the true notion of this inbeing and pericharesis is the perfect unity of the same individual nature in three . that the nature and essence of the father is in the son , that the son is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the character , image , mind , divinity of the father . here , as athanasius observes , our saviour himself lays the reason and foundation of this mutual inbeing : he first tells us , i and my father are one ; and then adds , i am in the father , and the father in me , that he might shew the sameness and identity of the godhead , and the unity of essence . for they are one , not one divided into two parts , and nothing more than one ; for they are two ▪ the father is the father , and not the son ; and the son is the son , and not the father , but there is but one nature ; for he that is begotten , is not unlike in nature to him that begets , but is his image , and all that the father hath is the sons . there is no need to multiply quotations to this purpose , which may be met with every where . the father is in the son , and the son in the father , as the nature of the father is , lives and subsists in the son ▪ not a nature like the fathers , but the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the father 's own proper nature and essence ; they are in each other , as being essentially one , not one merely as being in each other , as it is possible three may be , and yet not be essentially one , but three ; as three compleat absolute minds would be three still , though they should perfectly penetrate each other : or as three candles in the same room , are three lights though they are perfectly united in one. but original mind , its word and spirit are and must be in each other , as being three in one individual essence ; for the same undivided essence can't be whole and entire in three , but those three must be in each other . if the divinity of the father is in the son , the father is in the son , and the son in the father ; the mind is in its word , and the word in the mind : the son is in the father , as eternally begotten in the substance of the father , whole of whole , and essentially one and the same , as the word is in the mind , not by such an union and penetration as we may suppose between two minds , but as conceived in the mind , and essentially one and the same with it . now according to this representation , which all the catholick fathers make of this mystery , we must of necessity acknowledge number without multiplication , distinction without division or separation , a perfect trinity in perfect unity ; three persons , each of which is by himself true and perfect god , but not three gods , but one god : a mind and its word are two , and a living , subsisting word is true and perfect mind , mind of mind , and yet not two minds , but one mind ; for the mind and its word are essentially one , as all men must confess ; the word is in the mind , and the mind in the word , and therefore identically one and the same : for which reason the fathers acknowledge that the father is spirit , the son spirit , and the holy ghost spirit , and these are three , but not three spirits , as essentially related to each other in the same individual essence , essentially the same , and essentially in each other : and thus will of will , wisdom of wisdom , life of life , power of power , though they multiply and distinguish persons , do not multiply wills , wisdoms , lives , powers , which are essentially one , as the mind , its word , and spirit , are one : they are not one life , one will , one understanding , one power , in the sense of but one who lives , who wills , who understands , and has power ; but as the same , identically the same life , and will , &c. is in each of them , and indivisibly and inseparably in them all . and this gives an account of the unity of operation , wherein the catholick fathers unanimously place the unity of god , for one almighty agent is but one god , and one essential will , wisdom , and power , can be but one agent ; and infinite , original mind , and its eternal subsisting word can have but one will , and wisdom , and power , for the will and wisdom of the mind is in its word ; the same , not merely specifically the same , or the same by consent , as it may be between two minds , which will perfectly the same thing , but the same one individual will ; the father wills , and the son wills , and they both will distinctly , but with one individual will ; as it is impossible that the word should will with any other will , but the will of that mind , whose word it is . and therefore father , son , and holy ghost , though three eternal , infinite , living , intelligent , willing , persons , which subsist and act distinctly , yet being that to each other in a more perfect and excellent manner , that mind , its word , and spirit , are in men , they must be as perfectly one almighty agent as a created mind is , which wills and acts in its word and spirit . the distinction and unity of operation necessarily proves the distinction and unity of essence ; it being in our way of conceiving things a necessary effect of it ; there must be some real distinction in the same nature and essence , in which there are three who act distinctly ; and there must be an individual unity of essence , when in three there is but one individual operation ; and though these things may be distinguished in creatures , where we distinguish the suppositum and the powers , and give a priority of nature to the suppositum , yet essence and energy being the same in god , who is a pure simple act , there can be no priority nor posteriority between them , but the demonstration proceeds equally upon nature or operation ; but that is the best , which is the most intelligible representation of this distinction and unity . for this reason the fathers chose to explain the distinction and unity of the godhead by the distinction and unity of operation , which i need not prove at large , as being universally owned , and therefore i shall only observe , how st. gregory nyssen represents this matter . in his answer to ablabius , that there are not three gods , he tells us , that the best way to form the clearest and most perspicuous notion of this , is to examine what this name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or godhead , signifies . now whereas some think this a proper name to signify the divine nature and essence , he asserts with the scriptures ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) that the divine nature and essence is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , without a name , and can't be signified by words ; and that every name which is given to god , signifies something essential to him , but not his nature and essence it self . this he shews particularly in some names given to god , and affirms , that thus it is in all other divine names , that either they remove all imperfections , or attribute all divine perfections to him , but do not declare his nature : and thus he adds it is in the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , god is a s●er , an inspector , who beholds all things : now if god signifies him , who sees and knows all things , we must inquire , whether this all-seeing power belongs only to one of the divine persons of the trinity , or to all three : for if this be the true interpretation of the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that it is an all-seeing power , and that he that sees all , is god , we cannot reasonably deny this to any person in the holy trinity , since the scripture does equally attribute this omniscience to father , son , and holy ghost . well! suppose this , as he adds , it does not remove but encrease the difficulty ; for though god be not a name of nature , but of energy and power , if the name god signifies a seer and inspector , and there be three , who thus see all things , three must be three gods , as we number persons of the same profession , who all do the very same things , as well as those who have the same nature ; as we say many orators , mathematicians , and the l●ke , as well as many m●n . now this he answers by the unity of energy and power , which is in each of them , but is but one indivisible inseparable power ; not as it is in men , who each of them acts separately by himself ; and though they do the same thing for kind , yet what each of them does , is properly his own doing , and not anothers : they act separately , and produce distinct and separate effects , and therefore are many agents . but it is quite otherwise as to the divine nature : the father does nothing by himself without the son , nor the son without the holy ghost ; but each divine operation proceeds originally from the father , is continued by the son , and perfected in the holy spirit ; and therefore the name of energy is not divided into a number of agents , because neither of them acts separately by himself . and this he proves from the unity of the effect ; that whatever good thing we receive from god , as suppose life , is attributed to father , son , and holy ghost ; but though it be given by three , that which is given , or done for us , is not three ; we do not receive three lives , one from each person of the trinity , but we have but one life , which we receive from them all . now where there is but one undivided effect , there can be but one natural agent ; for separate agents will produce separate effects ; and therefore there can be but one motion of the divine will from the father by the son to the holy spirit , and that without distance and succession . now it is plain , that all this does not signify a mere unity of consent , as may be between three distinct and separate minds , but the unity of principle , which acts distinctly , but uniformly and inseparably in three ; the same divine will , which is originally in the father , acting in the same manner , and with one indivisible motion ( as they speak ) in the son , and holy spirit ; which unity of operation , though it admits of distinct acts , and consequently a real distinction of persons , yet proves the individual unity of essence ; for there can be no unity of principle or operation , but in the same individual essence ; where three persons are united in the same individual essence , as the mind , its word , and spirit , are in man. and here ( had there not been enough already said about it ) is a proper place to vindicate that late representation which has been made of the distinction and unity of the godhead by the self-consciousness , and mutual consciousness of the divine persons . i have met with no body yet so hardy as to deny , that self-consciousness is essential to the natural unity of a person , and that three persons cannot be naturally and essentially one without mutual consciousness . but the great objection against this notion ( and which i am amazed to find some learned men insist on ) is the order of nature , which requires , that a person should be one by an unity of nature , before it can be self-conscious ; and that three persons must be one by the unity of nature , before they can be mutually conscious : for the unity of nature , and the union of persons in the same nature , must be before all acts of self-consciousness , and mutual consciousness : and that which in the order of nature comes after such a distinction and union cannot be the cause of it . but who ever thought of causes of distinction and unity in an eternal nature , which has no cause ? did the fathers philosophize thus concerning priority and posteriority in the divine nature , when they placed the unity of the godhead in the unity of energy and operation ? for does not the same objection lie against the unity of energy and operation , that does ●gainst mutual consciousness , ( which is essential to this unity of energy ) that the divine persons must first be one , before they can be one energy and power ? and therefore that one energy does not cause their unity , because they must be one , before they are one agent . and indeed such men gregory nyssen intimates he had to deal with , who would not allow the deity to be energy and power , but he thought it not worth the while to dispute that point with them ; for the divine nature being infinite and incomprehensible , the pure and simple nature of god is not the immediate object of our knowledge , can have no name and definition given it ; and therefore we can know nothing of it immediately and directly , but by such essential attributes and properties , as we c●n form some notion of . the not considering this , how perfectly unknown and incomprehensible the divine nature it self is , occasioned a late author to tell us , that an hypothesis in this affair , which leaves out the very nexus , the natural and eternal vnion , and insists upon mutual consciousness , which at most is but the consequence thereof , wants the principal thing requisite to the salving the vnity of the godhead . but this is to philosophize about the abstracted natures and essences of things , even the divine substance and essence , which i dare not presume to do . no doubt but god is the most real substantial being in the world , even father , son , and holy ghost ; and there is as little doubt , but there is as real and substantial an union between them : but i know nothing of the substance of god , as distinguished from his essential attributes and perfections , nor of such a distinction and unity of substance in the deity , as can help us to form any notion of a trinity in unity , and defend it from the charge of contradiction and impossibility , when we have done . for we must have a care of conceiving any extension , or parts , or composition in god , without which we can have no notion of a distinction and union of substances , considered purely under the notion of substance . and therefore we must be contented to be ignorant of the substance and substantial unions of the deity , as we are of all other substantial unions . we know not what the substance of a spirit is , nor what the substance of matter is , nor what their substantial unity is : and therefore when we inquire into their distinction and unity , we never meddle with the essential reasons and causes of unity , which are concealed from us , but consider as far as sense , or reason , or observation will reach , wherein the unity of any thing consists , and when a thing may be said to be one : as to instance at present only in the unity of a mind , and in the union of soul and body . is there any thing else in the world which can make a mind one with it self , and distinguish it from all other minds , but a self-conscious sensation , that it feels it self , and its whole self , and only it self ? i suppose these men will grant , that such a mind is one , and but one , and distinct from all other minds ; but self-consciousness is not the formal reason of the unity of a mind , or of a person , because in order of nature the unity of a mind or person must go before self-consciousness ; that is , self-consciousness is owing to the unity of essence , not the unity of essence to self-consciousness . well , but what is this essence of a mind , and this unity of essence , which makes a mind one ? truly that no body can tell ; and therefore to say a mind is one by the unity of its essence , is to say , it is one , because it is so ; for we know no more of the matter : but self-consciousness is a sensible unity , which we all feel in our selves , and know our selves from other men by it . this unity of essence we know nothing of , but by self-consciousness ; and i desire to know , whatever the unity of essence be , whether any but a self-conscious unity would make a mind one , and distinguish it from all other minds ? which shews , that we have nothing to do with the naked essences and substances of things , but with their immediate and essential properties ; and when we know them , we know all that is to be known of nature ; and therefore we can know no more of the unity of a mind than self-consciousness . the substances of things are distinguished from each other by their essential properties , and therefore from them we must learn their unity or distinction . a mind is a substance , and matter is substance ; and the essential difference between them , as far as we can understand , is , that a mind is a thinking substance , and matter extended substance ; and therefore we must judge of a mind by the properties of thinking , and of matter by extension : the unity of a thinking substance must consist in the unity of thoughts and sensations , that is , in one consciousness ; and the unity of an extended substance in the continuity of its extension ; and to ask farther , what is the cause or principle of consciousness in a mind , or of one consciousness in one mind , is to ask a reason of the natures of things ; why a mind is a thinking being , and why one thinking being has one center of thoughts : why do they not ask also , how extension comes to be essential to matter , and how matter is extended ? i know no reason to be given of such matters , but the will of god , who formed all things according to the ideas of his own infinite wisdom . this i hope is sufficient to be said concerning the order of nature , and the priority and posteriority of our conceptions ; for if we do not stop in our inquiries at immediate and essential properties , but demand an antecedent reason for them , this is to demand a reason of nature , why things are what god has made them : those who are not contented to contemplate nature in its immediate and essential properties , may philosophize by themselves for me ; for there is nothing more to be known without an intuitive knowledge of nature it self , which none can have but the author of nature . thus should you inquire of me concerning the union of soul and body ; all that i know of it is , that they are united in one conscious life ; that the soul feels all the impressions of the body , and directs and governs it . no , will such philosophers say , here wants the nexus , the natural union between soul and body ; for they must be one by a natural union before there can be this conscious life and sympathy between them , which is not the union , but the effect and consequent of this union . very true ! they must be vitally united to have one life , and to receive impressions from each other ; but can they give any other notion of this vital union , than that the body is animated by the soul , and lives with it ? could these philosophers tell you , how a soul , which is an immaterial being , could be fastened to a body , what union of substances there is between them , ( which is the thing they want to know ) would they understand a vital union ever the better for it ? an union of substances seems to signify some kind of contact , which is hard to conceive between body and spirit ; but however an union of contact , and an union of life , are two very different kinds of union , and do not include or infer each other ; and therefore the true answer to that question , how soul and body are united , is not to say , that their substances are united or fastened together , which gives us no notion of a vital union ; but that the soul lives in the body , and gives life to it ; receives impressions srom it , and governs its motions . but to inquire farther , is to inquire into the reasons of natural and essential unions , which are as great mysteries as nature is : we may as well ask , how a soul lives , as how it animates a body ; and god alone knows both . so that to inquire after the natural nexus , or cement of this union , is nothing at all to the purpose , and is not the object of human knowledge . now , though the vital union between soul and body , and the union of mutual consciousness , be of a very different kind and nature , yet the dispute about the nexus , or the natural union of substances , is much the same . consciousness is the unity of a spirit ; self-consciousness is the unity of a person , and by the same reason mutual consciousness is a natural union of three distinct self-conscious persons in the unity of the same nature . and to reject this for want of a nexus , or the natural union of substances , is as if we should deny the union of soul and body to be an union of life or animation , because this don't explain the natural nexus between soul and body : if a mutual conscious union be an essential union of three distinct persons in the same nature , as a vital union is the essential union of soul and body , we have nothing to do in either case with the union of substances which we can know nothing of , and if we could , should understand these unions never the better for it . for whatever union of substance we may suppose between soul and body , and the three divine persons in the holy trinity , it is the kind and species of union which gives us the notion and idea of it . if you inquire , what spirit , and what matter is ? it would not be thought a good answer to these questions , to say a spirit is a substance , and matter is a substance , without adding their specifick differences , that a spirit is an intelligent thinking substance , and matter is an extended substance ; nor is it a better answer to that question , what union there is between soul and body , or between the three divine persons in the trinity , to say , that their substances are united , which gives us no distinct notion of their union ; but a vital union , and a mutual conscious union , contain distinct ideas ; and if these be natural and essential unions , though we know no more of the union of substances than we do , what substance is , yet we know that the soul and body must be one natural person , and the three divine persons must be naturally and essentially one god ; for a natural union makes one according to the nature of that union . it is visible enough what has occasioned this mistake : men consider mutual consciousness between three compleat , absolute , independent minds , and rightly enough conclude , that how conscious soever they were to each other , this could not make them essentially one ; for every compleat mind is one by it self , and not naturally conscious to any one but it self , and by whatever power they should be so united , as to be mutually conscious , this could not make them essentially one ; they would be three mutually conscious minds , not essentially one mind ; for they are not by nature one , nor mutually conscious , and therefore may be parted again , and cease to be so . but then , in this way of stating it , the objection equally lies against the perichoresis , the inseparable union and in-being of minds , which can never make three compleat absolute minds essentially one. but if we apply this to the union of living , subsisting , intelligent relatives of the same individual essence , to father , son , and holy ghost , eternal , self-originated mind , its eternal , living , subsisting , word , and eternal spirit , this mutual consciousness gives us the most intelligible notion of the essential and inseparable union and in-being of three in one. i dare not say what other men can do ; but i have tried my self , and can form no notion of an unity in trinity , but what either necessarily includes , or ultimately resolves it self into one natural essential consciousness in three . the divine nature is indivisibly and inseparably one in three ; but we must not understand this inseparability after the manner of bodies , whose parts may be divided and separated from each other ; god is not body , and has no parts ; but in the unity of the godhead there is eternal original mind , an eternal word , and eternal spirit , which are inseparable from each other , that is , can never be parted : what then can parting and separating signify in a mind , which has no parts to be torn and divided from each other ? i can understand nothing by it , but that the mind does no longer see , and know , and feel its word in it self , nor the word the mind ; for this would make a perfect separation between the mind and its word ; that mind has no word which does not see and feel it in it self ; and were it possible that a living subsisting word should lose all conscious sensation of the mind , whose word it is , it would cease to be a word , and commence a perfect separate mind it self : so that as far as we can conceive it , the inseparable union between father and son , between original infinite mind , and its eternal word , is an inseparable conscious life and sensation , which is such a natural demonstration of their inseparable union , as no other notion can give us ; for all men feel that a mind and its word can never be parted ; a mind can never be without its word , nor the word subsist but in the mind . thus what other possible notion can we form of the perichoresis , or mutual in-being of father and son , as our saviour tells us , i am in the father , and the father in me , which is their natural and essential unity , i and my father are one ? we all feel how the word is in the mind , and the mind in the word ; the mind knows , and feels , and comprehends its own word ; and a perfect , living , subsisting word knows and feels that whole mind , whose word it is , in it self ; for the word is nothing else but the whole mind , living and subsisting in the word , which is another hypostasis , but perfectly one and the same nature ; and therefore as they know themselves , so they know and feel each other in themselves . as the father knoweth me , saith christ , so know i the father , john . and thus to see and know god by an internal sensation , and to be in him , are ●quivalent expressions in scripture , john . no man hath seen g●d at any time ; the only begotten son , which is in the bosom of the father , he hath declared him : where to see god , and to be in the bosom of the father , must signify the same thing ; for to be in the bosom of the father , is put in the place of seeing god , that is , to see him within , to see him in his bosom , as the word sees the mind , and this is to be in his bosom , and thus the son is in the father . the same account we have of the holy spirits being in god , cor. . . for what man knoweth the things of a man , but the spirit of man , which is in him ? even so the things of g●d knoweth no man , but the spirit of god ; that is , the spirit of god is in god , as the spirit of a man is in man , and therefore by this in-being , the spirit of god knows all the things of god by such an internal conscious sensation , as the spirit of man knows what is in man. thus what is the unity of energy and operation , but the same conscious will and power acting distinctly , but inseparably in three ? for without this internal consciousn●ss , they must be three separate wills and separate powers , and produce distinct and separate effects ; but when god , his word and spirit are in each other , and see , and know , and feel each other in themselves , as a man's mind , his word , and spirit , do , though in a more perfect and excellent manner , there can be but one undivided motion of the divine will , as there is but one conscious life in three ; the son lives , subsists , wills , understands , and acts , in and with the father , and therefore is but one eternal life , one almighty will and power . now as novel as some men think this notion of the vnity of mutual consciousness to be , we meet with it more than once in express words in s● . hilary , whose authority i hope is sufficient to vindicate it from the charge of novelty . thus with reference to what our saviour says , no man knoweth the son but the father ; neither knoweth any man the father save the son , and he to whomsoever the son will reveal him , . matth. . st. hilary observes , ( hilar. de trin. c. ) illis scientia mutua est , illis vicissim c●gnitio perfecta ; that father and son have a mutual perfect knowledge of each other . and this he asserts to be a conscious knowledge , connate with him , a conscious sensation of his father's nature in himself , which our s●viour himself signifies by his unity of nature and operation with the father ; as the reader may see in the margin . thus tertullian long before describ'd this mutual consciousness between god and his eternal word and wisdom by what we feel in our selves when we silently muse alone , our word does as it were talk with us , and return our thoughts to us , is present with us in every turn , and motion , and pulse of thought , and internal sensation , as conscious to all within us . thus he tells us , that the son alone knows the father , and does not his own , but his father's will , which he knows , de proximo , imo de initio ; that is , by an immediate intuitive knowledge , not by external communication , but by internal sensation . thus the son does nothing of himself , but what he sees the father do ; in sensu scilicet facientem , in his own mind and will ; pater enim sensu agit , the father does all things by disposing and ordering all things in his own mind and will ; filius vero , qui in sensu patris est , videns perficit : the son , who is in the mind , and sense , and will of the father , sees the father's will , and does it : now let any man tell me what else can be meant by the sons being in sensu patris , & videns in sensu patris , but this internal conscious sensation . st. cyril of alexandria calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the son wills together with the father , and with the same will. dionysius the areopagite , says , this union does not only exceed all bodily unions , but the unions also of souls and minds , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and fulgentius tells us , the word was with god , sicut in mente verbum , sicut in c●rde consilium , as the word is in the mind , and counsel in the heart . marius victorinus afer tells us to the same purpose , that the son being in the bosom of the father , signifies , that he is god ; that he is in the bosom and womb of his substance , and therefore they are consubstantial , each of them being in each other , and knowing each other . but not to multiply quotations ; all those catholick fathers and doctors , who placed the unity of the godhead in consent , ( and none of them rejected this in a catholick sense ) could understand nothing less by it than this mutual natural consciousness , for any other consent was down right arianism , as st. hilary witnesses ; and y●t thus the famous lucian , whom the arians would have challenged as theirs , but whom the catholick church always owned , expresses it in his creed ; and thus per substantiam tria , per consonantiam verò unum : three in substance , but in consent and agreement one , is justified by st. hilary , ( hilar. de synod . ) as very catholick ; but then he refers this to the holy spirit , who is the substantial bond and cement of this union and consent . but gregory nyssen , who allows of this unity of consent , more intelligibly represents it by the consent and uniformity of all the motions between the prototype and its image , or a man's face in a glass , which moves and acts with it . thus christ is the image of the invisible god ▪ and is immediately and instantly affected together with his father . does the father will any thing ? the son also , who is in the father , knows the fathers will , or rather is the father 's will. but this i think is sufficient to be said about mutual consciousness , which is so manifestly the doctrine of the fathers , of some in express terms , and of all according to the true interpretation of what they taught , that i cannot imagine the meaning of this furious zeal against it , but a sabellian zeal against three conscious persons , for one single self-conscious nature : as st. hilary observes in the dispute between the sabellians and arians . the arians allowed father and son to be two distinct persons , but denied their consubstantiality , or unity and sameness of nature : the sabellians , who denied the distinction of persons , but asserted the sameness , unity and singularity of nature , which they thought sufficiently proved one person , as well as one nature ( as no doubt but it does ) confuted the arian dissimilitude of nature by what our saviour says , i and my father are one ; which they said could be the language of none , but of a nature conscious to it self of its own identity , and sameness , which he allows to be a good argument against the arians , ( which he could not have done , had he not allowed this consciousness in the trinity ) but then observes , that the arians did as eff●ctually consute them , as to the distinction of persons ; and thus between them both the catholick faith , of a real distinction of persons , in the sameness and conscious unity of nature , was vindicated . in short , if the whole divine nature is conscious to it self , as every created mind is conscious to all that is in it self ; and the three divine persons subsist in the individual unity of the same nature , then these divine persons must be intimately and mutually conscious to each other , as a mind , its word , and spirit , are ; and however men please to philosophize about this , as to the prius & posterius , whether they will make the unity of nature the cause of this mutual consciousness , and therefore in order of nature prior to it ; or make mutual consciousness not the cause of this unity , but the essential union of three distinct subsisting persons in the unity of the same individual nature ; i will not contend with any man which of these speak most properly . consciousness is the unity of an intelligent nature , and the mutual consciousness of persons in the same nature , and the conscious unity of nature in three distinct persons is the same thing . we cannot conceive the unity of a mind without consciousness , nor any other kind of unity of a mind , but a conscious unity ; nor can we conceive an internal essential consciousness without an essential unity ; and if the mutual consciousness of persons in the same nature , is the consciousness of nature , i cannot see why we may not say , that it is at least one notion of the unity of nature too . but to return where i left off , ( if this may be called a a digression ) what i have now said , is sufficient to shew , how necessary this doctrine of relations is to give us a sensible notion of a trinity in unity . to assert a real trinity , we must assert three real , distinct , subsisting , substantial , intelligent persons , neither of which is each other , and each of which is by himself , in his own proper person , true and perfect god : but this , say sabellians , arians , and socinians , is to assert three gods ; which the catholick church always abhorred the thoughts of . now how the fathers answered this charge , and vindicated the divine unity in a trinity of real subsisting persons , i have already particularly shown , as by the consubstantiality , the perfect sameness and identity of nature , whole of whole , their inseparability , and unity of operation ; but we can form no distinct idea of all this , but only among personal subsisting relatives of the same individual nature . whatever is not this , is a meer specifick consubstantiality and identity of nature , and an external union , how inseparable soever it be , which must make a number of individuals in the divine , as well as human nature : but now it is plain to a demonstration , that if god hath an eternal subsisting word , and an eternal subsisting spirit , they can be but one individual essence , as a man's mind , and word , and spirit , are one ; and therefore all three but one god , as a man , with his mind , and word , and spirit , i● but one man ; which is an intelligible notion of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one individual essence and godhead : for though the word of god be a person , which a m●n's word is not , yet if his true nature and character is the word , he is the same to the eternal mind , which a man's word is to his created mind , and therefore god , and his living , subsisting word , must be one individual essence , as a man's mind and his word are one ; a word must be conceived and begotten of the mind , and can have no other substance , if it be a living , substantial word , but that of the mind ; and if it be a perfect word , the perfect image of the mind , it must be whole of whole , all that the mind is ; for the whole mind is in its perfect word and image , and lives and subsists in it , and the whole word in the mind . so that the c●eternity , the coequality , the consubstantiality , the identity , the inseparability , the unity of operation between god and his word , is so far from being jargon , contradiction , unintelligible nonsense , that i● god have an eternal word , it is self-evident that thus it must be : when we contemplate the consubstantiality of father and son , under the notion of substance , we can form no idea of a whole , which is of a whole , that the father should communicate his whole essence , and substance , to the son , and be the whole himself ; and this is no great wonder , since we can form no idea at all of the divine substance ; but we can very well understand , that the whole mind must be in its word , that the eternal mind and its word must be consubstantial , coeternal , coequal , two , but perfectly the same , inseparably in each other ; for all this is included in the very relation and notion of a mind , and its word . i 'm sure , a living , subsisting word , which is not consubstantial , coeternal , coequal , with that eternal mind , whose word it is ; that a mind should be without its word ; that an infinite , eternal mind , which is perfect life and being , should have a vanishing , perishing word , as man has ; not a living , subsisting word ; that a mind and its word should ever be parted ; that the word should not be and subsist in the mind , and the mind in the word ; i say , all this contradicts all the notions we have of a mind and its word : we cannot immediately and directly contemplate the divine nature and essence , which is so infinitely above us , and therefore we must contemplate it in such ideas and representations , as god himself makes of it ; and if they are such , as we can form an intelligible notion of , we have no reason to complain of unintelligible mysteries and contradictions , though when we reduce it into terms of art , we find our minds confounded and perplext , and unable to form any distinct and easy ideas . the arians , to avoid the consubstantiality of the son with the father , would not allow the term substance to be used of god ; the catholick fathers proved , that substance is in scripture used concerning god , and that the arians could not reasonably reject it , because they used it themselves ; for though they would not own the son to be of the same substance with the father ; they taught , that he was of another substance , which still is to own substance in god. but though god be in the most true and absolute sense , perfect essence and being , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or according to st. ambrose his derivation of the word ( which shews what he meant by it , whether it shews his skill in greek or not ) that essence and substance is that which always is , and that which always is , is god , and therefore god is essence and substance , and a consubstantial son is a true and real son ; for which reason , as he observes , the arians would not allow the son to be consubstantial , because they would not allow him to be a true genuine son ; and for this very reason the nicene fathers inserted the homoousion in their creed : but yet if we would rightly conceive of god , of father , son , and holy ghost , of the unity and distinction of the ever blessed trinity , we must not form our notions by the ideas of substance and consubstantiality , which we have no distinct conceptions of ; but we must learn their unity , distinction , and consubstantiality from those characters the scripture gives of father , son , and holy ghost . this rule st. ambrose expressly gives us with reference to the son , and the reason is the same , as to the other divine persons . if we would avoid error , says that father , let us attend to those characters the scripture gives us , to help us to understand what , and who the son is : he is called the word , the son , the power of god , the wisdom of god ; all this we can understand ; and not only st. ambrose , but all the other catholick fathers , as i have already shewn , prove the consubstantiality , coeternity , coequality , unity and distinction of father and son , from these names and characters , which they understood in a true and proper sense , for a living , subsisting son , and word , and power , and wisdom ; and there is no difficulty in conceiving all this , if we contemplate it in these characters ; nay it is impossible to conceive otherwise of it . as impossible as it is to form any notion at all of those philosophical terms , whereby this mystery is commonly represented , when we abstract them from those sensible characters and ideas which the scripture has given us , and begin our inquiries with them . it will be of great use to represent this matter plainly , that every man may see what it is that obscures and perplexes the doctrine of the trinity , and confounds mens notions about it , to the great scandal of the christian religion , and the disturbance of the christian church . the great difficulty concerns the unity and distinction of the ever blessed trinity , that they are really and distinctly three , and essentially one : and this is represented by one nature , essence , and substance , and three hypostases ; and yet hypostasis signifies substance , and every divine hypostasis is the whole divine essence and substance . now if we immediately contemplate this mystery under the notion of substance , it is impossible for us to conceive one substance and three hypostases , that is , in some sense three substances , or which is all one as to the difficulty of conceiving it , though the form of expression is more catholick ; three , each of which is the whole essence and substance , and neither of them is each other ; we may turn over our minds as long as we please , and change words and phrases , but we can find no idea to answer these , or any other words of this nature . but now if instead of essence and hypostasis , we put mind and its word , we can form a very intelligible notion of this unity and distinction , and prove that unity of substance , and distinction of hypostases , which we cannot immediately and directly form any notion of . for eternal original mind , and its living subsisting word , are certainly two , and neither are , nor can be each other ; the mind cannot be its own living word , nor the word the mind , whose word it is ; and yet we must all grant , that eternal mind is the most real being , essence , substance , and that a living subsisting word is life , being , substance , and the very same life and substance that the mind is , and all that the mind is ; for a perfect living word can have no other life and substance but that of the mind , and must be all the same that the mind is . the eternal generation of the son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the substance of the father , life of life , substance of substance , whole of whole , is impossible to be conceived , as immediately applied to the notion of substance ; but the generation of the word , whole of whole , is very conceivable , for the mind must beget its own word , as we feel in our selves ; and a mind which is perfect life and substance , if it begets its word , must beget a living , subsisting , substantial word , the perfect image of its own life and substance . and as impossible as it is to conceive , much more to express in words , this mystery of the eternal generation , yet the necessary relation between a mind , and its word , proves that thus it is ; we feel it in our selves , though we are as perfectly ignorant , how our mind begets its dying vanishing word , as how the eternal mind begets an eternal , living , subsisting word : and the generation of the word includes in it all the properties of the divine generation ; that it is eternal ; for an eternal mind can never be without its word ; that it is without any corporeal passions , or esslux , or division , begotten in the mind , and inseparable from it . now if we conceive after the same manner of the eternal procession of the holy spirit , can any man deny this to be an intelligible notion of a trinity in unity , though we can form no distinct idea of one essence and substance , and three hypostases ? for if we can conceive father , son , and holy ghost ; eternal original mind , its eternal word , and eternal spirit , to be essentially one and three , the catholick faith is secured , though we do not so well understand the distinction between those abstract metaphysical terms of nature , essence , substance , hypostasis , especially when applied to the unity and distinction of the eternal godhead , which is above all terms of art. the catholick faith is , that the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god ; but yet there are not three gods , but one god ; and this the doctrine of the divine relations gives us a very intelligible notion of ; for we cannot conceive otherwise of the eternal mind , its eternal word , and eternal spirit , but that each of them are true and perfect god , and yet a mind , its word , and spirit , can be but one , and therefore but one god. but one substance , and three hypostases , is but a secondary notion of a trinity in unity , to secure the catholick faith against the sabellian and arian heresies : against the sabellians the catholick fathers asserted three hypostases , against the arians one substance ; and the essential relations of father , son , and holy ghost , necessarily prove both the one substance , and three hypostases ; but though one substance and three hypostases be the catholick language , yet those men begin at the wrong end , who think to form an intelligible notion of a trinity in unity from these abstract metaphysical terms . this is not the language of the scripture , nor have we any idea to answer these terms , of one substance in three distinct hypostases , when we consider them by themselves , without relation to the divine nature , to which alone these terms can belong , for there is no such thing in created nature , and therefore we can have no idea of it . it is abundantly sufficient in this case , that we have a clear and distinct notion of one substance , and three hypostases in the essential unity and distinction of father , son , and holy ghost , three subsisting relations in one individual essence and substance , though when we abstractedly consider these terms of one substance and three hypostases , we can form no consistent notion or idea of it . and now let our socinian adversaries , who talk so loud of absurdities , contradictions , nonsense , false counting and tritheism , try their skill to make good these charges against the divine subsisting relations in the unity of the same individual essence . sect . ix . a more particular inquiry into the difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or nature and person , with an account of some catholick forms of speech , relating to the ever blessed trinity . but since one nature and essence , and three hypostases or persons , is the catholick language , and necessary to guard the faith from those two extremes of sabellianism and arianism , it will be necessary to consider how to apply these ecclesiastical terms to the three and one in the ever blessed trinity . and here , were i so disposed , i might enter into a very large and perplext dispute ; but my design , as far as possibly i can attain it , is only to explain what the catholick fathers meant by these terms , and to give a plain and sensible notion of them : and after what i have already so largely discoursed concerning nature and hypostasis , i have little more to do , than to compare them together , and to shew in what the catholick fathers placed this distinction . and as nothing is of greater consequence , than rightly to understand this matter , so nothing requires greater caution , nor greater application of mind . whosoever is conversant in the writings of the ancient fathers , must acknowledge it not only reasonable but necessary , to distinguish between their faith , and their philosophy . their faith , which they received srom the scriptures , and the universal tradition of the catholick church , is plain and simple , and the same in all . that there is but one god , who has an eternal son , and an eternal spirit ; that father , son , and holy ghost , are each of them by himself , true and perfect god , and all but one god , which is a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity ; that they are in a true and proper sense , three and one. this is the catholick faith , wherein they all agree ; but then those philosophical terms , which the importunities of hereticks , who corrupted either the faith of the unity or trinity , forced them to use in the explication of this mystery , are of a different consideration : these have not always been the same , nor have all agreed in them ; and the wisest men have owned great improprieties in them all , when applied to this sacred mystery ; and indeed it is impossible to be otherwise ; for that infinite difference and diversity there is between the divine and humane nature , nay all created nature , can never admit of any common terms proper to express both . the most perfect creatures bear only some imperfect analogy and resemblance to what we conceive of god ; and therefore when we apply such words and terms to the divine natur● , as are borrowed from creatures , ( and we have no other ) we must understand them only by way of analogy and accommodation ; and when we expound such terms as are used by the catholick fathers in such an accommodated sense , we must apply them no further , than that particular matter they intended to represent by them . i have already sh●wn this in several particular passages relating to the homoousion , but now i am more particularly to consider the difference between essence and hypostasis ; and i shall only shew how the matter of fact stands , what has occasioned this difficulty , what the true state of the controversy is , and how we may form some sensible notion of this distinction ; and if i should mistake in so nice a point as this , i hope it will be a pardonable mistake , while i make no change in the catholick faith , and intend it only as an essay , if it be possible to silence or qualify the dispute about words . the greek fathers attribute all the heresies relating to the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation , to this one mistake , that essence and hypostasis are the same ; for then if there be but one essence in the blessed trinity , there must consequently be but one hypostasis , which is sabellianism ; or if there be three hypostases , there must be three natures and essences , either in the arian or tritheistick notion : thus with reference to the incarnation , two natures must be two persons , or hypostases , as nestorius taught , or one person must be but one mixt and compounded nature too , which was the heresy of eutyches . this some fathers thought a fundamental error in philosophy , introduced by aristotle , who makes the first substance , which is the only true and proper substance , to be that which is predicated of no subject , nor is in any subject , that is , what we call , a subsisting individual , as this man , or this horse . and therefore theorianus observes , that the catholick fathers understood essence and hypostasis in a very different sense from the greek philosophers ; that is , by essence , and substance , they did not mean one singular individuum , or singular nature and substance , as aristotle did ; but a common nature , not a common notion , as genus or species , which are aristotle's second substances , but a common subsisting nature , which is one and the same , whole and perfect in every individual of the same kind . and what aristotle call'd his first substance , a singular subsisting nature , that they called hypostasis , a common subsisting nature , with its individuating characters and properties . it is evident some ages past , before these words essence and hypostasis were thus nicely distinguished , or at least before this distinction was so unanimously received ; for as i have already observed , these words were used very promiscuously , which occasioned the alexandrian schism ; and it does not appear to me , that this distinction was setled by athanasius , and the bishops with him , in that synod , as some seem to think ; though soon after it generally prevailed , as we may learn from st. basil , gregory nyssen , st. cyril of alexandria , damascen , leontius , theorianus , theodorus abucara , ignatius sinaita , and generally all the catholick writers of the eutychian and severian age , who universally agree in this , that essence and hypostasis differ as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as that which is universal , differs from what is proper and singular . now so far these fathers were certainly in the right , that if they must apply philosophical terms to divine mysteries ( which the cavilling objections of hereticks made necessary ) there was an absolute necessity for them to change their signification ; for as there is nothing common to god and creatures , so there can be no words in the same sense common to them ; but then this only requires an accommodation of words to divine mysteries by way of analogy and resemblance , but not to change the language and philosophy of created nature , which after all our attempts , and all our art of expression , will fall infinitely short of the divine nature , and give us but a very imperfect image of it . and if by such attempts we confound our notions and ideas of nature too , we shall so much the more confound and perplex our ideas of god. it may help to ease mens minds of some notions which lie cross and uneven : briefly to state this matter . i confess , i am not satisfied of that absolute necessity , which some pretend , of stating nicely and philosophically this distinction between nature and person , in order to understand the doctrine of the trinity . this was the catholick faith long before this distinction was universally received ; and men who understand little of this distinction , may believe very orthodoxly in father , son , and holy ghost , without it : nay the best , the safest , and easiest way , to understand these and all other philosophical terms applied to the explication of this faith , is to fit them to those scripture ideas we have of father , son , and holy ghost , each of them true and perfect god , and all three but one god , as i have shewn at large in the first chapter . but since there is a very warm dispute about nature and ●erson , and has been for many ages , and this distinction is become necessary to secure the catholick faith against the attempts of hereticks on both sides , as the church has found by long experience ; it will be necessary to set this matter in as clear a light as possible we can . and the best way i can think of to do this , is . to consider this distinction of nature and person in creatures : as for instance , in a man ; what the distinction between nature and person is in man ; and to shew , which way soever we state this matter , how improper all these notions are to represent this distinction between nature and person in the blessed trinity . and . to shew how the catholick fathers accommodated these names of essence and person to the explication of this mystery , and what unity , and what distinction they intended to represent by them . . as for the first , if the infinite distance between god and creatures will allow us to philosophize freely about created nature , without incurring the suspicion of heresy ; i must confess , i never could form a distinct notion of the difference between a subsisting nature and hypostasis , or person in man ; but do what i can , i can conceive no otherwise of an individual subsisting human nature , but as of an individual subsisting human hypostasis , or person ; nor of an individual human person , than as of an individual subsisting human nature . and i have some reason to think , that this is not peculiarly my case ; for besides that i find other thinking men blundered in this matter , and could never yet meet with a clear and sensible explication of it ; i observe , that there is no word , which in its original institution signifies this difference ; and it is reasonable to think , as to created nature , that mankind have no notion of that , which they have no word for . it is sufficiently known , that hypostasis originally signifies essence and substance , not person as distinguisht from nature , which is a later , and a mere ecclesiastical use of it ; and it is confessed , that persona and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were taken from the stage , and when they were applied to signify a true and real man , they signified only the man himself , not the personality of a man , as distinguished from an individual subsisting nature : and , which is much more considerable , some of the fathers , as i observed before , confess , that aristotle knew no such distinction ; but in his philosophy , essence and hypostasis signified the same thing ; for nature and essence , which is his first substance , is an individuum , which subsists not as part of another , but as whole and compleat , which the fathers call hypostasis ; and therefore aristotle's first substance , and what these fathers call hypostasis , is in creatures one and the same thing ; and yet all confess , that no man ever more nicely distinguisht all the distinguishable notions in nature , than aristotle did , that what escaped his observation , must be very nice indeed . and though st. basil , and st. gregory nyssen , and the other catholick writers of that age , do distinguish between essence and hypostasis , that they differ as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , what is common to all the individuals of the same kind , which is a common nature , and what is proper and peculiar to each individual , and distinguishes one man from another ; yet i do not remember , that they quarrelled with the greek philosophers , or apprehended that they themselves taught any new philosophy in this point , as afterwards theorianus , and others did ; nor can i see any other difference there is between them , if candidly interpreted , but only in words . the short account of the matter is this . aristotle's first substance , which subsists by it self , these fathers , as they themselves own , call hypostasis , not nature , essence , and substance ; that is , every subsisting individuum is aristotle's nature , essence , and substance , the fathers hypostasis ; now when they mean the same thing , and own that they do so , so far they are agreed in the thing , and differ only in words . but then these fathers in every hypostasis distinguished between the common nature , and such personal properties , which distinguished common nature into individuals , or were characteristical marks , whereby to know one person from another . now aristotle indeed never made such a distinction as this ; but yet all that is material in it , is included in his notion and definition of substance . for when these fathers distinguish in every hypostasis , what is common to the whole kind , and what is proper and peculiar to each individuum , they mean no more by it , but that peter , for instance , considered as a man , is perfectly the same that iames and iohn are , considered also as men , though there is something so peculiar to peter , as to make him a particular human person , and to distinguish him from iames and iohn , and all other men in the world. now it is certain , neither aristotle , nor any man of sense , would ever have denied any thing of all this ; for it is evident , that there is something wherein all men agree , and something proper to every particular man. that which is the same in all men , the fathers call a common nature , and so does aristotle , a common specifick nature ; but here is some appearance of difference between them , which i think , if rightly stated , is none at all . aristotle makes nature as actually subsisting by it self ; as suppose human nature in peter or iames , to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , individuum , a particular , singular nature , and that it is common only in notion , as every particular man has a nature of the same kind , or a true human nature . these fathers on the contrary affirm , that human nature , as considered in peter , or any other particular man , is a common nature , distinguished into hypostases , by something proper , peculiar , and particular to each . that all nature is common to all the hypostases of the same kind , and that it is impossible to find a particular and appropriated nature . now as great an appearance as here is of a direct contradiction , a little consideration , i believe , will satisfy all thinking men , that aristotle would have owned all that these fathers say , and then the only dispute will be , which of them speak most properly , which is of no great moment in this cause . for what do these fathers mean by a common nature ? do they mean , that there is but one numerical subsisting nature common to all the individuals ? but one universal human nature in all the particular men in the world ? by no means . damascen expresly teaches , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the common nature in creatures , is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to be known by reason ; but the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the distinction of hypostases , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is seeen in the things themselves , in their separate existence . but what is this common nature , which is seen by reason ? why , every particular man is a reasonable mortal creature ; each of them is flesh animated by a reasonable soul and mind , and this is the common nature which is seen by reason ; common , because it is perfectly and invariably the same in all , though each of these hypostases , in which this common nature is , subsist distincty and separately by themselves , and therefore the common nature too subsists distinctly and separately in these separate hypostases . now would aristotle , or any one for him , deny that his first substance , though it be an individuum , which subsists compleatly and separately by it self , is in this sense a common nature , as being perfectly the same in all the individuals ; or in the language of the fathers , in all the hypostases of the same nature ? there can be no such thing , as what aristotle calls a species , if every individual have not the common nature ; for nature subsists only in individuals ; and if that be not a common nature , it cannot have a common name and definition ; if human nature be not perfectly the same in peter , iames , and iohn , the name and definition of a man cannot equally and universally belong to them all . and therefore damascen was certainly in the right , who from an universal predication infers , that common nature is the species ; and that for this reason , nature is predicated of its hypostases , or individuals , because in every hypostasis of the same kind , there is the same perfect nature . every man has the perfect nature of a man ; and for that reason , and no other , the name and definition of a man belongs to every man. upon this account it is , that they reject 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a particular , singular nature ; because then the same hypostases must have both the same , and a diverse nature , even the persons of the holy trinity . if nature be perfectly the same in all the hypostases , it is a common nature ; but if human nature in peter have any thing peculiar and different from human nature in paul , it is then a particular humanity , and peter and paul are not perfectly of the same kind , which is one notion , wherein they rejected a particular nature ; which added to what i discoursed above , that by a particular nature , they meant a whole , absolute individual nature , it includes , i think , all that they meant , when they rejected as heresy , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , three individual natures in the trinity : by three particular natures , they always understood three absolute , whole , individual natures , and this alone is trith●ism , for three such absolute divinities must be three gods ; but besides this , they thought there could not be three individual natures , without some essential difference to distinguish and number natures , and this added a mixture of arianism to tritheism , and made , at least in part , three different divinities , that they were partly of the same , and partly of a different nature . for , as far as i can understand this matter , the reason why they rejected singular and individual natures , was not , that human nature , for instance , does not subsist singly and individually , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as damascen speaks , in peter and paul , and every individual man in the world ; but because what is common to all without the least alterity or diversity , can be but one in all , for alterity and diversity is necessary ●o make a number ; and therefore nature , which is perfectly the same in all , though it subsists singly in individuals , is not an individual it self , as having no principle of individuation in it self , that is , no diversity : for which reason it may be numbred with the hypostases , with the numbring number ; but the res numerata , that nature which is numbred with the hypostases , is but one in all , as i have shewn above . in this sense also these fathers rejected an individual nature , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in their disputes with the severians , concerning the personality of christ's human nature : these hereticks taught , that every nature is an individuum , hypostasis , or person , and therefore the human nature of christ , if it were true human nature , must be a human hypostasis or person too : in answer to which , these fathers absolutely denied that there is any such thing as an individual nature ; that pure nature is no hypostasis , not that it can't subsist , for the human nature of christ does actually subsist ; but that meer nature has no individuating principle in it self to distinguish it into different hypostases , but is distinguished not by any essential diversity , but by personal properties ; that nature with personal properties is a person , and therefore if there be a subsisting nature , which has no personal properties , but is distinguished some other way from human nature in human persons , it is certain it is human nature , but no human person : and thus it is with the human nature of christ , which is distinguished from human nature in all others by its hypostatical union to the eternal word , which is no personal property , and therefore does not make it a distinct person , though it be a perfect subsisting nature . this is the best and easiest account i can give of the philosophy of these fathers , concerning a common and individual nature , which if it be thought a new way of speaking , yet it is what may be understood , and has a great deal of old truth in it ; and will help us to understand the fathers in these disputes about the trinity and incarnation , a little better than i find many men do . let us then in the next place , inquire what these fathers mean by hypostasis , and how they distinguish it from nature in created beings . now they themselves tell us , that by hypostasis , they mean aristotle's first substance , or that which subsists by it self ; not as a part in a whole , nor as accidents in a subject , but is a perfect whole it self , and has a compleat subsistence of its own . what is it then that subsists by it self ? for that is aristotle's first substance , and the fathers hypostasis : and that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nature , essence , and substance : for nothing else can subsist by it self , as is evident in aristotle's definition of essence and substance ; and though the fathers put something more into their definition of hypostasis , yet it comes all to one . for as damascen tells us , every hypostasis is perfect nature and substance ; and therefore the hypostases do not differ from each other in nature , but only in such peculiar and characteristical accidents , as distinguish hypostases . for the definition of hypostasis is nature with its accidents : that every hypostasis has the common nature with its peculiar distinguishing accidents , subsisting by it self . so that an hypostasis is nothing else but nature with its accidents and distinguishing characters , subsisting by it self : now we know accidents do not subsist by themselves , but if they be inherent accidents , they subsist in nature and substance ; and therefore though they may distinguish hypostases and persons , do not constitute an hypostasis , and therefore are owned to be only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the peculiar distinguishing marks and characters of hypostases or persons , whereby they are known from each other : but the marks and characters which distinguish hypostases , are not the hypostases themselves ; such as the time when they were born , the place where they lived , their parentage , name , features of body , endowments of mind , and a hundred other distingushing marks , for these are very different in different persons , and as changeable in the same persons , as time , age , place , features of body , endowments of mind , trades , offices , &c. and yet all these are persons , and the same persons under all these changes . now setting aside all these characters and accidents , which cannot make a person , but only distinguish one person from another , there is nothing left to be the hypostasis or person , but only the common nature subsisting by it self : common , as it is the same in every individual , but an hypostasis or individuum by a separate existence , or subsisting by it self . for an individuum , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is one undivided whole , subsisting by it self , and therefore a whole , perfect , undivided human nature , subsisting by it self , is an hypostasis , or person , one single , individual man , though there were no other mark and character to distinguish him from other men , but only this separate subsistence . the humanity of our saviour is a plain demonstration of this , that it is only a separate existence , or subsisting by it self ( which in created beings is the same thing ) that makes human nature an hypostasis , or person . all catholick christians own , that christ took human nature on him , but not a human hypostasis or person , and therefore in him we may see the difference between nature and person . what then was christ's human nature ? i know no more of it , but that he had a true body of flesh , animated by a reasonable soul , such a body , and such a soul , as other men have , and this is human nature : but why is not this human body and soul a human person too ? did he want the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , some peculiar marks and characters to distinguish him from all other human persons ? by no means ! he had more of these marks of distinction , and more authentick ones , than any other man ever had . the time and place of his birth , his parentage , his miracles , his doctrine , the minute circumstances of his death , his resurrection , &c. were foretold by ancient prophets , and he distinguished himself from all the rest of mankind by those wonderful things he did , that if peculiar distinguishing characters make a person , he was more a person than ever any man was before or since . what then was wanting to make us human nature a human person ? truly nothing , but only subsisting by it self , which it never did , but in union to the eternal word . this i think looks very like a demonstration , that an hypostasis is nothing but nature subsisting by it self ; for all that the humanity of christ had , without being a human person , cannot make a person , for then the human nature of christ must have been a human person too ; and that which alone was wanting to make the human nature of christ a person , which was subsisting by it self , must be the only thing which makes nature a person . i have the rather chose this instance , because the humanity of christ , which is no person , is often alledged to prove , that there must be some peculiar mode of subsistence , which must coalesce with common nature to make a person . this , i confess , is language which i do not understand , if there be any thing more meant by i● , than that nature subsisting by it self is a person : for nature which does not subsist , is nothing but in idea , and subsistence is a mere notion without something that subsists ; now we may unite these two notions of nature and subsistence , and form the idea of a subsisting nature , which is all the coalescing i know of ; but actual production makes a subsisting nature , which is not nature and subsistence , or a mode of subsistence coalescing , but nature in act. in a subsisting created nature , which does not necessarily exist , we may distinguish between the notions of nature and subsistence , but a subsisting nature is nothing but nature in being , nature which is , that is , nature it self ; for the meer idea of nature is not nature . but subsistence has a mode , and there must be a peculiar manner of subsistence to make a person : must every person then have a peculiar manner of subsistence ? are there then as many peculiar manners and modes of subsistence , as there are , or ever have been , or ever shall be , distinct persons in the world ? this is beyond my philosophy . i have heard of a compleat and incompleat subsistence , to subsist by it self , or to subsist as a part in the whole , or an accident in a subject , &c. but i never could understand , that any other subsistence strictly belongs to the notion of an hypostasis or person , but to subsist by it self . the human nature of christ did upon all other accounts , as truly and properly subsist , as any other man in the world , but was no person , as not subsisting by it self , but in union to the eternal word ; which made it the human nature of the word , which was made flesh , and dwelt amongst us . all this talk about the different modes and manner of subsistence , seems to be a mistake of the fathers doctrine concerning the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which these men translate modes of subsistence , of which more anon ; but at present i only observe , that the fathers do not place the personality of father , son , and holy ghost , in these modes of subsistence , but only distinguish and characterize their persons by them , and from thence prove the real distinction of persons in the individual unity of the divine essence : but then i do not remember , that they so much as distinguish all created persons by their peculiar modes of subsistence . i know very well , that both damascen and others , give an example of this in adam , eve , and seth ; that adam was immediately formed by god of the dust of the earth , eve formed of one of adam's ribs , and seth begotten of adam and eve , which they call their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which in this example can signify nothing else but their different manner of production , not different modes of subsistence ; but then they do not alledge this as the formal reason of personality , nay not as necessary to the distinction of persons , ( though such peculiarities , whenever they are , will always distinguish persons ) but all they designed by it , was to prove , that such different ways of coming into being , made no change or alteration in nature ; for adam , eve , and seth , had all the same human nature , though formed after such a different manner ; in answer to the arian objection against the homoousion , that an unbegotten and begotten nature cannot be the same , and therefore father and son not consubstantial . indeed this would have been a very ill example of the distinction of persons by these different modes of subsistence , because it could only distinguish adam and eve from all the rest of mankind ; for all mankind ever since , excepting our saviour , have come into the world the same way that seth did , and therefore are not distinguished by a peculiar manner of subsistence , for they have all the same ; and consequently either are not distinct persons , or else such peculiar modes of subsistence , coalescing with common nature , do not constitute the person . and yet i can meet with no other account of any modes of subsistence necessary to the constitution of a created person ( excepting their personal properties and characters , which do not make , but only distinguish persons , which are not properly modes of subsistence , but modes , affections , and properties of the subsisting nature ) ; but only a separate subsistence , that every created hypostasis , or person , subsists by it self , and separately from all others . and herein both fathers and philosophers , notwithstanding some difference in words , seem well enough agreed , and this is all that i need say concerning the distinction between nature and person in created beings . but now every one who understands the true catholick faith of the trinity , must needs be sensible , how improper all this is to explain that venerable mystery of one nature , and three persons , in the unity of the godhead , if we apply these terms strictly and properly . the catholick fathers would not allow aristotle's definition of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nature , essence , and substance , that it is that which subsists by it self ; because this leaves no possible distinction between essence and hypostasis , without which we can never defend the faith of one nature in three persons ; for what in his sense thus subsists by it self , is an individual and singular nature , which is the same with hypostasis , and then it is impossible there should be three hypostases in one singular nature , which is but one hypostasis . but after all , do these fathers deny , that the divine nature is one individual nature ? do they not , as i have largely shewn , make this the fundamental reason of the divine unity , that there is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one divinity in three perfect hypstases ; and that this one divinity is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a perfect indivisible vnit , and monad ; and that in a very different sense from what they own in creatures ? so that in some sense these fathers own , that the divine nature is as true an individuum , and infinitely a more perfect vnit and monad , than aristotle's first substance , though his first substance is , and can be but one hypostasis , and the divine nature subsists perfectly in three . and therefore to qualify this , they tell us , that nature signifies the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that which is common to all the hypostases of the same nature ; but the hypostasis is the common nature with some peculiar and distinguishing properties , subsisting separately by it self ; and this seems to give us a better image and resemblance of one nature in three hypostases ; for here is one common nature , not only in three , but in all the distinct hypostases of that nature , that ever were , or ever shall be : but i 'm sure this needs greater qualification , when applied to the mystery of the trinity , than aristotle's ●irst substance , or it will unavoidably introduce , not merely tritheism , but polytheism without end ; for god can limit the numbers of created hypostases , but the number of hypostases in an infinite necessary nature can never be limited , if the divine nature be common to the divine hypostases , only as humane nature is common to human hypostases . they teach , as i have already observed , that human nature , for instance , is a common nature , and that every hypostasis , or every particular man has this same common nature ; but then it is a common nature , not as it is numerically one in all , for it subsists separately in every hypostasis , and therefore in this sense is not one common numerical , individual nature ; but it is common only , as it is perfectly the same in all . which they will not allow to be a meer common notion , but a common specifick nature ; for the nature is the species , which is the foundation of the common predication : for therefore all men have the common name and definition of a man , because they have the same common human nature . and thus , though every hypostasis has not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a particular nature , as that signifies a distinction in the nature it self , yet it has the common specifick individual nature ; that is , that nature which makes the species , and is common , as it is the same in all , but yet subsists individually 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and separately in each hypostasis . but now will any catholick christian say , that thus it is in the ever blessed trinity ? that the one common divinity is one and common , only as one common humanity is , that is , that it is perfectly the same in all ? not one individual , but one specifick nature : or will he say , that each divine person has one whole intire specifick divinity , as every human person has a whole specifick humanity ? as far as i can see , this would as unavoidably make father , son , and holy ghost , three gods , as peter , iames , and iohn , are three men ; and a common nature , and personal properties , and different modes of subsistence , would no more prevent a trinity of gods. than a trinity of men. this , i think , plainly shews , how vain an attempt it is to find out any notions of unity and distinction , of nature and person , or any words to express those notions by , common to god and creatures . these creature-ideas , and creature terms , can be applied to god only by way of analogy and accommodation , and that a very imperfect one too . . let us then consider , how the catholick fathers accommodated these names of essence and person to the explication of this mystery , and what they intended to represent by them . i shall do this in as few words as possibly i can , that what i have to say may be the more easily understood . they tell us , that all nature is common , that human nature is common to all mankind , and the divine nature common to all the three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost ; not that they thought the divinity or godhead a common nature , merely as human nature is common , but there is this analogy between them ; that the divine nature is not singular , or does not subsist in singularity , but in three hypostases , as human nature is common , because it is not confined to one , but is in all human hypostases ; and that the divine nature is perfectly and invariably the same in each hypostasis , as the human nature is , which for this reason is called a common , not a particular nature ; which is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the sameness , identity , not singularity , of nature in the blessed trinity . thus far the analogy holds , ( which is a direct opposition both to sabellianism and arianism ) but it reaches no farther ; for the divine nature is not a common specifick nature , as all created nature is common , for the godhead is no species ; that is , there is , and can be but one god : which i have already at large shewn to be the sense of the fathers . they expresly teach , that the divine nature is an individual nature , but not singular ; it is common , as being whole and perfect in more hypostases than one , which excludes singularity , but it is one whole entire , individual nature ; so one individual , as human nature is one in one man. for though individual and singular is the same in creatures , it is not so in the divine nature ; nor can it be , if the catholick faith be one nature , one divinity in three perfect hypostases : and if we can form any sensible notion of this , it will silence all the pretences of jargon , nonsense , contradiction , tritheism , which are so constantly objected against this venerable mystery . and therefore i shall briefly inquire , . what that one divinity is , which is common to father , son , and holy ghost , and how it is common : . how this common nature is in a strict and proper sense , one individual nature . and i think this is easily accounted for from the doctrine of the fathers . . as for the first ; this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one divinity , is the divinity of the father , the natura patris , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the nature of the father , and the divinity of the father , who is the eternal self-originated mind , which has no second , and therefore there can be no other , no second , or third divinity . now this one divine nature , one divinity of the father , is common to the son , and to the holy spirit : common , i say , not merely as human nature is common to all men , because it is the same in all , perfectly the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , though it be not the same individual nature in all , which is singular and incommunicable in creatures ; but it is common by a perfect communication , whole of whole ; that it is no new divinity , but the divinity of the father , which is in the son , who is therefore so often , as i observed above , called the nature , and divinity , and mind of the father , his image and character , and that which is signified by all this , his eternal , living , omnipotent word . i do not intend to prove all this over again , which i have abundantly proved already , but only to put every thing into its proper place , that we may view the whole in a true light . this divine nature then of the father which is but one , is that one divinity , which is by an eternal ineffable generation communicated whole and perfect to the son , and by a like eternal and ineffable procession to the holy spirit : but still the difficulty is , how this is one nature , which is not singular , nor subsists in singularity , but in three proper , distinct , compleat hypostases , or persons . . and therefore rightly to apprehend this , we must inquire into the notion of one individual nature . now that which is most obvious , and which the fathers perpetually alledge in justification of the divine unity , is , that an individual is an undivided nature , and therefore the one divinity of the father , though actually communicated to the son , and holy spirit , is one individual divinity , because it is communicated whole and perfect , without division or separation ; and that which is undivided is one. but though to be undivided be essential to the notion of an individual nature , yet there must be something else to compleat this notion , or at least to give us a more distinct conception of it . could human nature propagate it self whole and compleat to two or three , without any division or separation of substance , this could not make it one individual nature , though they were undivided ; for one individual nature , is one whole compleat nature , without division ; which is all that is essential to such a being , and is this all but once , and that without division . but how will this agree with the notion of one divinity , or one individual divine nature ? for does not the one divine nature , which is the divinity of the father , subsist compleatly and distinctly , though without division and separation , in the son and holy ghost ; and will you call this one individual nature , which is not singularly in one , but subsists distinctly in three ? yes , i will , because all these three , father , son , and holy ghost , are essential to the notion of one divinity , and therefore are one individual divinity in three ; for an individual nature is that , which without division has all that is essential to such a nature . well , but is not the father then , in his own person , true and perfect god , and the son true and perfect god , and the holy ghost true and perfect god ? that is , have not each of these divine persons all the divine perfections included in the notion and idea of god ? and are they not three who have all the perfections of the divine nature ? and how then is this one individual nature ? i answer : when i say , that one individual nature is that which has all that is essential to such a nature ; by essential i mean , not only essential properties , qualities , powers , and perfections , ( which are commonly called nature , there being no other notion of nature in created beings ) but essential productions too , which ( when there is any such thing ) are as essential to nature , as any other properties or perfections . in the first sense of essential , the divine nature is not singular , but communicated by the eternal father to the eternal son , and by father and son to the eternal spirit , and all three are infinite in wisdom , power , and goodness , and all other divine perfections . this is but one divinity , one godhead ; for there is not a second and third divinity in the son , and in the holy spirit , but the one divinity of the father . but yet we must confess , that here is number ; father , son , and holy ghost are three , and how can that divinity , which is perfectly and distinctly in three , be one individual nature , one numerically ; one as human nature in every particular man is one ? now this must be resolved into the second notion of essential , for essential productions ; for all essential productions in the unity of nature , though they may be distinguished and numbred among themselves , are but one individual nature . it will be in vain to seek for an example of this in created nature , and i believe the reason of it will be evident without it . an eternal self-originated mind is true and perfect god , the first supreme cause of all things , and has all the perfections of the divinity wholly in it self , is the one and only true god : but if it be essential to an eternal mind to have an eternal , living , subsisting word and spirit , by an eternal generation and procession , then this eternal word and spirit are essential to an eternal mind , not as essential perfections , or essential parts , but as essential productions or processions in the unity and identity of nature . thus the scripture represents this mystery , that there is one god , who has an eternal word , and an eternal spirit ; and the catholick fathers , as i have already observed , insist on this as a natural demonstration of a trinity , that the eternal mind must have its eternal word and eternal spirit . now if the eternal word and eternal spirit are essential to the eternal mind , it is certain , that father , son , and holy ghost , the eternal mind , its word , and spirit , are but one individual divinity ; every thing that is essential , is included in the notion of an individual nature ; for that is not a compleat and perfect nature , nor an adequate notion of nature , that wants any thing that is essential . now though we may have a general notion and idea of a god , that he is an absolutely perfect being , which includes all the divine attributes and perfections , without knowing any thing of the son , or holy ghost ; yet if we consider this absolutely perfect being as eternal self-originated mind , with its eternal word and spirit , as essential productions or processions , we can consider them no otherwise , but as one individual divinity ; this eternal word and spirit being essential processions of the eternal mind , which can never be separated from it : for such essential processions are not only coeval and consubstantial with the nature from whence they proceed ; as the sun , its light and heat , ( by which argument the catholick fathers proved the coeternity and consubstantiality of the son and holy spirit with the eternal father ) but whatever distinction there is between them , they are one individual nature , if all that be one individual nature , which is essential to such a being ; and such all essential processions are , as well as essential perfections . these are two very different questions , and of a very different consideration , what god is ? and who this god is ? in an answer to the first , we form the idea and notion of all divine perfections , or of an absolutely perfect being , which is the true notion of the divinity , and whoever has all these divine perfections , is true and perfect god ; and this is our natural notion of god , as that signifies the divinity , which gives no notice of any distinction in the divinity ; for there can be no diversity in absolute perfections and therefore no distinction or number , according to the philosophy of the fathers . but when we consider who god is , or what is the subject of all these divine perfections , we can form no other idea of it , but an eternal , infinite , self originated mind ; this the wisest philosophers , as well as christians , are agreed in , that god is an infinite mind ; and this rightly explained , may teach us some distinction in the divinity ; for all men must grant , what they feel in themselves , that every mind has its word and spirit , and cannot be conceived without them ; and therefore the eternal mind must have its eternal word and spirit too ; and the reason why this did not lead all mankind into the natural belief of a trinity of persons , mind , word , and spirit , in the unity of the godhead , was plainly this , because they found that their own word and spirit were not permanent , subsisting persons , but were the perishing creatures of the mind , which were no sooner produced , but died and vanished as our thoughts do , and thus they conceived it was with the divine mind ; which is one kind of sabellianism , as i observed above : but yet the catholick fathers thought this natural belief , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the divinity , or divine mind , is not without its word , a very proper medium to prove a real subsisting word in the divinity ; for an infinite perfect mind , which is all life , being , substance , if it begets its own word , as every mind does , must beget a living , substantial , subsisting word , the perfect image and character of its own life and infinite being . however , thus much i think we must own , that since every mind must have its word and spirit in the individual unity of its own nature ; and the holy scripture assures us , that god , who is the most perfect mind , has his word and spirit , and that this divine word and spirit is an eternal , living , subsisting word and spirit , this is a very good foundation for the belief of a real trinity both from reason and scripture . the natural notion and idea of a mind , teaches us this distinction in the divinity ; and natural reason strongly infers , from the perfect productions of an infinitely perfect mind ; that the divine word and spirit must be an eternal , living , infinite word and spirit ; and the holy scripture confirms all this : and therefore scripture and reason are so far from contradicting each other in this article , that the belief of the trinity , though it be ultimately resolved into the authority of revelation , yet has reason on its side , as far as it can judge of such matters : which proves a considerable authority , when the obscure and imperfect conjectures of reason , are explained and confirmed by revelation . for though the notion of an absolutely perfect being , which is the natural idea of the divinity , teaches no such distinction , yet the idea of an infinitely perfect and self-originated mind , which is as natural a notion of god , does . thus damascen teaches us to distinguish between the divinity , and in what the divinity is , or to speak more accurately , what is the divinity , and that which proceeds eternally from this first cause , that is , the hypostases of the son and holy spirit ; the first teaches us that there is but one divinity ; the second shews the distinction of persons in the unity of the divine nature . but then ( which is what i intended in all this ) this very distinction proves one individual divinity , because it is in the individual unity of the same numerical , not specifick nature ; for all essential processions , as the eternal word and spirit are , which cannot so much as in thought be separated from original mind , must continue in the unity of the same individual nature . this is what the fathers meant by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the one common divinity , which is individually one in three perfect hypostases , father , son , and holy ghost : the divinity of the father , of eternal , self-originated mind , is the common divinity , communicated to the eternal word and spirit , in the individual unity of nature . . now this will give us some notion of the distinction of nature and persons in the eternal godhead . i say , persons , not person ; which i take to be the fundamental mistake which has obscured and perplex'd this mystery . men have rack'd their inventions , to find out some distinction between nature and person in every single person in the godhead ; which it is certain these fathers never thought of ; though their attempt to distinguish between nature and person in every man , gave some occasion to this mistake : but i have already proved both from fathers and schoolmen , that when they spoke distinctly of each particular person , they made person and nature the same : that the person of the father is the nature of the father , and the person of the son the nature of the son. nor indeed had they any occasion to distinguish between nature and person in each single person , which could do no service in this mystery : for the true reason and occasion for this distinction , was to reconcile the individual unity of the divine nature , with a trinity of real hypostases or persons ; how one nature can subsist in three distinct hypostases , and continue one individual nature : which had been no difficulty at all , were not each divine person by himself the divine nature . but how the divine nature should subsist whole and perfect in three distinct persons , and not be three distinct natures , but one nature , and one divinity ; not specifically , but individually and numerically one ; this was the difficulty they were concerned to answer ; which the distinction between nature and person in each single person could not answer : for let us suppose such a distinction as this , whatever it be ; if the divine nature subsist whole and perfect in each distinct person , the difficulty still remains how the persons are distinct , and the nature individually one : as , to put the case in human nature ; whatever distinction we allow between nature and person in every particular man ; if we allow that every man has human nature as distinctly in himself , as he is a distinct person , the distinction between nature and person can never prove the individual numerical unity of human nature in three men. the question then is , not how nature and person is distinguish'd in each single person , ( much less , how three persons in one singular nature are distinguished from that singular nature , which unavoidably reduces a trinity of persons to an unintelligible trinity of modes ) ; but , how the three persons in the ever-blessed trinity , which are three in number , and each of them the divine nature , are distinguished from that one individual divinity which is in them all , or rather , which they all are . now what i have already said , seems to me to give a very intelligible notion of this , viz. that the divine nature , which is but one , is the eternal , self-originated divinity , with its eternal , essential processions or productions ; which , as i have already shewn , are but one , not singular , but individual nature , and individual divinity : but then this one self-originated divinity is most certainly an infinite , eternal , self-originated person , if infinite , eternal , self-originated mind be a person ; and these eternal essential processions are persons also , if an eternal , living , subsisting word be a person , and an eternal , living , subsisting spirit be a person ; and then it is evident , that there are three eternal , subsisting persons in the individual unity of nature . these divine processions do not multiply nor divide the divine nature , because they are essential to an infinite mind , and are processions ad intra in the perfect identity ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) and individual unity of nature ; but they are distinct persons , as being eternal , subsisting , living , intelligent processions , which is all that we mean by persons in this mystery , with reference to the eternal word and spirit . for these three divine persons have their different characters and order , whereby they are distinguished from each other , which the fathers call the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by which they meant their different manner of subsisting in the individual unity of the divine nature , that though they have all the same divinity , as that signifies all divine perfections , yet they have it after a different manner that is , as they constantly explain it , vnbegotten , begotten , and proceeding , as the athanasian creed teaches us to believe ; the father is made of none , neither created , nor begotten . the son is of the father alone , not made , nor created , but begotten . the holy ghost is of the father , and of the son , neither made , nor created , nor begotten , but proceeding . this is the only distinction which the catholick fathers allow between the three divine persons , and let us consider the nature of it . now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies actual existence , and that which does actually exist ; and therefore the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signify that there are three that do actually exist , but after a different manner : that is , that the father is unbegotten , self-originated divinity , is god of himself , without any other cause of his being , and this self-originated unbegotten divinity is the person of the father , and in the highest and most absolute sense the one god. the son is eternally begotten of his father's substance , and lives and subsists in him ; and so the holy ghost eternally proceeds from father and son : that is , there is one eternal self-originated divinity with its two eternal processions in the perfect unity and identity of the same nature . the father's manner of subsistence is easily understood , and secures to him the prerogative of the one true god ; but we must shew this a little more plainly with reference to the son and holy spirit , each of which is by himself true and perfect god , but not a second and third god : the right understanding of which depends upon the true stating of their different manners of subsistence . and here i need only refer to what i have already discoursed concerning the difference between an absolute nature , and relative subsistencies in the same nature . an absolute nature is a whole compleat nature , with all that essentially belongs to such a nature , as every perfect man has all that belongs essentially to the nature of man , and thus a man begets a man in his own nature and likeness ; and the son , which is begotten , is upon all accounts as much a man , as he who begets , and father and son are two men : and to beget , and to be begotten , tho they prove their persons to be distinct , yet are but external relations not different manners of subsistence in the same nature . and thus god does not beget a son , which would be to beget a second god : for to beget , and to be begotten , when he who begets , begets in an absolute sense all the same that he is himself , makes two of the same kind . and therefore we must observe , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is the personal character and property of the father , does not only signify , that he has no cause of his being and nature , but that what he is , he is absolutely in himself , has an absolute , not a relative nature and subsistence ; and so consequently the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is the personal property of the son , signifies that his being and nature is relative ; not only , that he receives his being and nature from his father , but that he so receives it , as to be a relative subsistence in his father's nature ; and the like may be said of the procession of the holy ghost . as to shew this more particularly . god begets a son , his own perfect image and likeness , but he does not beget his own absolute nature in his son , as man does , though he begets his son of his own nature and substance ; as for instance . god is perfect , absolute , original mind , not only as original is opposed to what has a cause , and a beginning , but as opposed to an image ; but god does not beget an absolute original mind in his son , but only his own eternal , essential word , which is the perfect , living image of eternal , self-originated mind , and is it self eternal , infinite mind , in the eternal word ; but is in its own proper character , the eternal word of the eternal mind , not originally an eternal mind it self . it has all the perfections of an eternal mind , as a perfect word must of necessity have , which is the perfect sameness and identity of nature ; but it has all these perfections , not as original mind , but as a begotten word , which is a different mode of subsistence , and a sensible distinction between the eternal mind and its word in the perfect identity of nature . this i take to be a true and intelligible account of these different manners of subsistence , which distinguish the divine persons in the perfect unity of nature , that they have all the same nature , and same perfections , but after a different manner ; which can never be understood in absolute natures and persons , for three men , though father , son , and grandson , have all of them human nature after the very same manner ; but in an absolute nature , and relative essential processions , this is to be understood , and proves a real distinction , and perfect unity . it is evident to all men , that the mind and its word are two ; and it is as evident , that life , wisdom , knowledge , are in absolute , original mind , after another manner than they are in its word ; and yet the very notion of a mind , and its word , and that essential relation that is between them , makes it a contradiction to say , that any other life , wisdom , knowledge , can be in the word , than what is in the mind ; which would be to say , that the word is not the word of the mind , if it have any thing that is not in the mind : for a natural word can have nothing but what is in the mind , and is no farther a word , than it is the natural image of the mind : and the like may be said concerning the holy spirit , which hath all the same divine perfections , but in a different manner , from original mind , and its word , as eternally proceeding from both . this is the account which the catholick fathers give of the unity of nature , and distinction of persons , in the ever blessed trinity , which answers the objections of our sabellian , arian and socinian adversaries , and vindicates those catholick forms of speech , which they charge with tritheism , contradiction , and nonsense : as to shew this briefly in one view , for each part of it has been sufficiently confirmed already . the catholick faith teaches us , that there is but one god ; and this is demonstrable from the doctrine of these fathers . for in this account i have now given , there is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one absolute divinity , one divine nature , and therefore but one god. but , say our adversaries , one god in natural religion , and according to the general sense of mankind , signifies one person , who is god : and this also in some sense has always been owned by the catholick church ; that as there is but one absolute divinity , so the person of the father , who is this one absolute divinity , is this one god ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , there is but one person , who is god , in this absolute sense , because there is but one father , who , as they often speak , is the fountain of the deity , that is , of the divine processions , of the son and holy spirit : he is the whole absolute divinity himself , and whatever is divine , eternally and essentially proceeds from him , in the unity of his own nature . but at this rate , what divinity do we leave for the son , and the holy spirit ? truly , the very same by eternal generation and procession , which is originally and absolutely in the father : for it is the nature of the father , and the divinity of the father , which is in the son and holy spirit ; as the fathers constantly own , and as of necessity it must be , because there is no other . this eternal generation and procession has always been owned as an ineffable mystery ; which we must believe upon the authority of the scriptures , without pretending to know how god begets an eternal son , or how the eternal spirit proceeds from father and son , which we confess we have no notion of ; but we know likewise , that this is no reason to reject this faith , no more than it is a reason to reject the belief of an eternal , self-originated being ; because though it be demonstrable , that there must be an eternal first cause of all things , which has no cause of its own being , but an eternal necessary nature , yet we can no more conceive this , than we can an eternal generation and procession . supposing therefore ( without disputing that matter at present ) that god has an eternal son ; that eternal , self-originated mind has an eternal , subsisting word , and an eternal spirit , it is evident that this eternal word and eternal spirit , must have all the same perfections of the eternal mind , must be all that the eternal mind is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , excepting its being an absolute , self-originated mind . now if he be god , who has the whole divine nature and perfections , then the son is god , and the holy ghost is god , who by eternal generation and procession have that same divinity which is absolutely and originally in the father . well then : here is one divine person , viz. the eternal father , who is absolutely and originally god ; and two more , the son , and holy ghost , who are each of them in his own person , true and perfect god , by having all the divine perfections : but are not these three then three gods ? the unbegotten god , who is originally and absolutely god , the begotten god , and the proceeding god. no , it is the constant doctrine of the catholick fathers , that the trinity is but one divinity , and one god , una summa res , one supreme being , as st. austin taught , and from him peter lombard , and was confirmed by the council of lateran , in the condemnation of abbot ioachim . for father , son , and holy ghost , though they are three true and proper persons , are but one individual nature ; for it is essential to the eternal mind to have its eternal word and eternal spirit , and the eternal word and spirit live and subsist in the mind ; and though living , subsisting persons , yet are as individually one with the mind , as a created mind , its word and spirit are one. whatever is essential to nature , is in the individual unity of it ; and that is but one individual nature which has nothing but what is essential to it ; and therefore if , as i have already observed , and as the catholick faith teaches , the son and spirit , the eternal word and eternal spirit , are essential processions of eternal original mind , and essentially , indivisibly , and inseparably in it ; father , son , and holy ghost , are as essentially and inseparably one individual divinity , as any one nature is one with it self . but is not this a kind of sabellian composition of a god ? a whole divinity made up of three partial and incomplete divinities ? which st. austin calls a triformis deus : by no means ! what is compounded , is made up of parts , which make a compound nature ; but perfect hypostases , however united , can make no composition : however you unite iames and iohn , you can never make a compound man of them , because each of them have a perfect human nature ; and as damascen observes , we do not say , that the nature or species is made up of the hypostases , but is in the hypostases : so that each divine person , being a complete and perfect hypostasis , having the whole divine nature in himself , as being true and perfect god ; their union in the same individual nature , though it makes them one essential divinity , yet it cannot make a compound god ; for however their persons are united , the divinity or divine nature is not compounded , each of them being true and perfect god , and not one god by composition , but by an individual unity of nature in three . for every divine person is not god , in the same sense , that every human person is a man , as having an absolute individual nature of his own ; for in this sense the father only is god , as being absolute original divinity , an eternal , self-originated mind ; and three such persons must be acknowledged to be three gods ; but as i have been forced often to repeat it , the son and holy spirit are divine persons , as they are eternal , living , subsisting processions in the divine nature , which proves them to have the very same divinity , and to be but one individual divinity , but not one compound god. for one individual nature in three , though distinguisht into distinct subsisting persons , makes such a natural , inseparable unity of will , energy , and power , that they are as perfectly one almighty agent , as every single person is one agent , as i have shewn above . it is thought by some a manifest contradiction to say , as the athanasian creed teaches us , the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , and yet there are not three gods , but one god. but whoever carefully considers what i have now said , must own , that this is the only true and proper way of speaking in this mystery . if there be but one absolute divinity , there can be but one god ; for the divine processions in the unity and identity of the same individual nature , cannot multiply the divinity , nor multiply the name and title of god ; for the name god does not originally , absolutely , and immediately belong to them , but only relatively : the proper immediate character of the second person in the trinity is , not god , but the son of god , and the word of god ; and so the third , is the spirit of god. and though we must necessarily own , that the son of god , and the spirit of god , are each of them true and perfect god , equal in all divine perfections to the father , as being all the same that the father is , excepting his being a father ; yet they are not three gods , for this is not their immediate , original character , but there is one god the father , his eternal son , and eternal spirit . this is what i have above observed from tertullian , that there is one god with his oeconomy , that is , his son and spirit , and that christ is called god , when he is spoken of by himself ; but when he is named together with the father , he must have his own proper title , which is the son of god ; and the reason is the same , as to the holy spirit ; by which rule , we can never say , that father , son , and holy ghost , though each of them be god , are three gods ; but there are three , god the father , his son , and holy spirit : the father god of himself , the son and spirit eternal processions , and divine subsisting relations in the unity and identity of the father's godhead . they have all the same divinity , their glory equal , their majesty coeternal , but their different manner of having it , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , distinguishes their names and characters : the father is god , absolutely god , an unbegotten , self-originated being ; so god , that there is no other god besides him . the son is not absolutely god , but the son of god ; and when he is called god in scripture , it is in no other sense , - but as the son of god ; for the son of god , must be god the son : nor is the holy spirit absolutely god , but the spirit of god , which is all we mean , when we call him god ; for the spirit of god must be god the holy ghost : this is the catholick faith , and let any man try if he can find three gods in it : for when we number father , son , and holy ghost , we must not number them by the common name of nature , which is one undivided divinity in them all ; but by their relative names and characters , which do not only distinguish their persons , but signify their unity , order , and relations in the same nature . we must not call them three gods , because god is not the original name of the son , or spirit , and therefore they are not three gods ; but there are three in the unity of the godhead . the one god the father , the son of god , and the spirit of god ; so that there is but one god in the christian faith , if the son of god be the son of this one god the father ; and the spirit of god , be the spirit of this same one god : and though the son of god be god , and the spirit of god be god , that is the name of their nature , not of their persons , and therefore can no more be multiplied with the persons , than the divine nature is . the son of god is god , but it is authoritate paternae naturae , as st. hilary speaks , not by any absolute godhead of his own , but in right of his father's nature and divinity , which he received by an eternal generation . thus it must be , where there is but one absolute nature , with its internal processions . let us put the case in a human mind , and suppose , that its word and spirit were distinct , living , intelligent hypostases in the mind , essential processions in the unity and identity of nature , perfectly the same with the mind , but distinct hypostases ; but would any one for this reason , call these three , three men , or three minds ? and yet such a living , subsisting word , and a living subsisting spirit , would as perfectly have the nature of the mind as the mind it self , but neither of them would be an absolute mind , but one the word of the mind , and the other the spirit of the mind ; not three minds , but one mind , with its essential word , and spirit . this , though an imaginary case , gives us a sensible representation of the difference between the eternal mind , and its eternal word and spirit ; which i freely acknowledge cannot properly be called three infinite minds and spirits ; for though the eternal , subsisting word is an infinite mind , and so the eternal , subsisting spirit , yet mind , as well as god , is the name of their nature , not of their persons , which is identically one and the same in all . this , as i take it , is what some learned and truly catholick writers mean , in distinguishing the several acceptations of this name god. that sometimes it signifies the divine nature and essence in general ; as when we say , the trinity is one god , that is , one divinity ; that there is but one divine nature and essence in all the three persons of the holy trinity : sometimes it signifies personally , as when we say , the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god ; that is , the person of the father , the person of the son , and the person of the holy ghost is god : but then they are still forced to acknowledge , that the name god is not predicated vnivocally of all three persons ; but that the father is god in a more excellent and eminent sense , than the son is god , or the holy ghost god , as being god of himself , an unbegotten , self-originated god , the fountain of the deity to the son and holy spirit : upon which account he is so often by the catholick fathers called the one god , and the only true god. now all this is very true , and very catholick , but with all submission , it seems to me to be an inconvenient way of speaking , which perplexes the article with different senses , and is liable to great cavils and misconstructions , as the examples of dr. payn , and the author of the propositions , witness ; and when most dexterously managed , will sooner silence than convince an adversary . the divine essence must be considered only as in the divine persons ; when we say , that the trinity is one god , the true meaning is , that three persons are one god ; and the general abstract notion of the unity of essence does not account for this , but the unity of the divine essence in three . thus to say , that the father is god in the highest sense of that name god ; and that he alone ( strictly speaking ) is a being absolutely perfect , because he alone is self-existent , and all other beings , even the son and holy ghost are from him ; may be expounded to a very catholick sense , and was certainly so meant ; but is liable to great cavils , when men take more pains to pick quarrels with words , than to understand an author . an absolutely perfect god ; and a god that wants any perfection , sounds not only like two gods , but like gods of different kinds ; for every diversity of nature alters the species . all that is meant by this is certainly true and catholick , and taught in express words by the primitive fathers ; that the father is not the son , nor the son the father ; that the son is all that the father is , excepting his being the father , and unbegotten , that is , excepting paternity , and self-existence , or self-origination ; and that upon this account the father is eminently called the one god , the son , god of god ; that is , god as the son of god. what i have now discoursed seems to me to give the fairest account of this matter . i take the name god always to signify a person , in whom the divine nature is , not the divinity in the abstract ; and then the name god must belong to any person after the same manner , as the divine nature is his ; that is , he must be called god in no other sense than as he is god. now , as i have already shewn , there is but one absolute divinity , with two internal processions in the unity and identity of nature : and if we make this our rule of speaking , ( as we must do , if this be the catholick faith of the trinity , and we will fit our words to the nature of things ) then it is very plain , that the name god absolutely belongs only to him , who is this absolute divinity , that is , the person of the father , that no other person is god in recto , absolutely and simply god , but only he ; that he is the one god , the only true god , as both the scripture and fathers own . but what becomes then of the son , and holy ghost ? is not the son god ? and the spirit god ? yes ! the name and title of god belongs to them , as the divine nature does ; that is , not absolutely , as to the absolute divinity , but as to divine processions , to divine subsisting relations in the unity of the godhead ; that is , the second person in the trinity is god , but not in recto , as god signifies that person , who is the divinity ; but as the son of god , as habens deitatem , having the divinity , not absolutely and originally , but by communication , by eternal generation : and so the holy spirit is not absolutely god , but the spirit of god ; and god only as the spirit of god , as an internal procession in the divine nature . but in what sense then can we say , that the trinity is one god , or that three persons are one god ? must we not necessarily own , that god in these propositions is taken essentially for the deity in the abstract , and not as considered in any one person ? for will we say , that the trinity , or three persons , are but one person ? no! and yet in this proposition , the trinity is one god ; by one god , i understand , one , who is absolutely god , one absolute divinity , which is the father , who has indeed a son and spirit , in the unity of his own nature and godhead , each of which is true and perfect god , but not a second , and third god , but the son of god , and the spirit of god ; divine subsisting relations in the one absolute godhead of the father , which does not multiply the name nor nature of god. this is the account the catholick fathers give of the unity of god in a trinity of persons , and therefore this must be the catholick sense of this proposition : and here it will be proper to observe , that in the account they give of the unity of god , that is , the unity in trinity , they indifferently assign one divinity , and one father , as the reason of it : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . there is one god , because there is one divinity ; and there is one god , because there is one father , which are not two different reasons , but one and the same ; from whence it necessarily follows , that this one divinity is the divinity of the father , and that this one god in trinity , is the father ; for one god must necessarily signify one person , when the father is the one god. so that the father , who is the one absolute divinity , is the one god , who ceases not to be the one god , ( as st. hilary and others constantly teach ) by having a son , and holy spirit , who receive all from him , live and subsist in him , and are eternally and inseparably one with him : thus we are taught in the athanasian creed , to worship one god in trinity , that is , the eternal father , who is the one god , with his son , and holy spirit ; and the trinity in vnity , that is , father , son , and holy ghost , not three gods , but one in the unity of the father's godhead . for the godhead of the father , of the son , and of the holy ghost , is all one , the glory equal , the majesty coeternal : there is but one godhead , one glory , one majesty , and that is the godhead , glory , and majesty of the father ; and the son and spirit are in the godhead , glory , majesty of the father , as internal processions , living , subsisting relations in the father's godhead . this account , which i confess is the only account of this matter that i can understand , whatever other faults it may have , which i do not yet see , i 'm sure is perfectly orthodox ; is neither tritheism , sabellianism , arianism , nor socinianism , but the true catholick faith , of a trinity in unity . here is but one absolute divinity , but one father with his eternal son and spirit , in the unity of his own nature and godhead , and therefore but one god : for three gods must be three absolute divinities , without any internal relation , or dependence on each other . internal relations , though real , subsisting relations , can't multiply nature , and therefore can't multiply gods. here are three real , proper , living , intelligent , substantial , divine persons , and therefore no sabellianism , not one personal god , with three names , offices , manifestations , modes , powers , parts . here are three truly divine persons , each of which is by himself , or in his own person , true and perfect god. the father god of himself , unbegottan , self-originated god , the fountain of the deity to the son and holy spirit . the son , the son of god , and true and perfect god , as the son of god. the spirit , the spirit of the father , and the son , and true and perfect god , as the spirit of god : so that here is neither arianism , macedonianism , nor socinianism ; no made or created nature , no creature in the ever blessed trinity . no , say our arian and socinian adversaries , neither the son , nor the holy ghost , according to this hypothesis , are true and perfect god , as the father is : neither of them have self-existence , or a fecundity of nature , which are thought great perfections in the father ; but the son is not of himself , but begotten of his father ; nor is the spirit of himself , but proceeds from father and son ; and neither of them have a son , or spirit of their own , as the father has . all this i readily grant ; for it is the catholick faith , that the father is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , so a father , that he never was a son , and the son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , so a son , that he never was , nor can be a father , and so of the holy spirit ; that there is but one father , not three fathers ; one son , not three sons ; one holy ghost , not three holy ghosts , as the athanasian creed teaches . this proves indeed , as we all own , that neither the son , nor spirit , are absolutely god , an absolute divinity , as the father is , but only divine processions ; an absolute divinity has a fecundity of nature ; absolute , original mind , according to this hypothesis must have its word and spirit , in the unity of its nature ; but the word being no absolute nature , can't beget another word , nor the spirit another spirit . so that this objection only delivers us from the charge of tritheism , by proving father , son , and holy ghost to be but one divinity , one god : for if the son were as absolutely god , as the father is , there is no account to be given , why he should not beget a son , as his father did him , as we see it is among men , where the son begets a son , and becomes a father , and thus there could be no possible end of divine generations ; but these are generations ad extra , which give as compleat and absolute a nature , and absolute subsistence to the son , as the father has ; but internal , essential relations are in the individual unity of nature , and therefore cannot multiply , when nature has all that is essential to it . so that self-existence and generation do not belong to the character of a son ; and with the catholick church , we teach , that the son of god is god , only as the son ; and it would be heresy to ascribe the peculiar prerogatives of the father to him : and then it can be no objection against the divinity of the son , that he has not what is peculiar and proper only to the person of the father , as self-existence and generation is . self-existence , self-origination , to have no cause of his being , i grant , is essential to the idea of a god : and eternal and necessary existence to the notion of any person , who is in any sense god ; for he , who ever began to be , and subsists precariously , can in no sense be god. but then though self-existence be essential to the notion of an absolute divinity , yet a person , who is a son , and therefore not self-originated , but eternally begotten of a self-originated father , and subsists eternally and necessarily as an essential procession and relation in a self-originated nature , must be the son of god , and god the son , true and perfect god , as the eternal , necessary , essential procession of a self-originated divinity . for what is internally and essentially related to a self-existent nature , can be no creature , and therefore must be true and perfect god. thus to proceed : the same rule of speaking ( if men be peaceably and charitably disposed to understand one another ) will easily reconcile that late warm dispute , about one substance , and three substances , in the unity of the godhead ; for the dispute is the very same , in other words , with one nature and three persons . the nicene fathers , who asserted the homoousion , the one nature and substance of father , and son , did not by this mean one singular substance , as i have abundantly shewn ; and those who assert three substances in opposition to sabellianism , do not mean three absolute , nor three divided and separated substances , but one individual substance , as there is one individual nature in three substantial , subsisting persons . that is , there is but one absolute substance , with two relative , substantial procefsions in the individual unity of the same one substance : which the schools make no scruple to call three relative substances . all catholick writers , both ancient and modern , own , that the father is substance , the son substance , and the holy ghost substance ; but yet are cautious of saying three substances ; nor will they say , ter vna , thrice one substance , because number does not belong to the nature , but to the persons ; though at the same time they own , that deus trinus signifies tria supposita deitatis . these seem to be great niceties , and arbitrary distinctions , without any reason and foundation in nature ; for what difference is there between three substances , and three relative substances ? for relative substances are substances . what difference between three substances , and tria supposita ? when suppositum is only another name for substance ; and so st. hilary , as i have observed , called them , tres substantias , & tria in substantia , three substances , and three in substance . when there are three , each of which is in his own person substance , and neither of them each other , what difference is there between saying , tres in una substantia , & ter una substantia ? three in one substance , and thrice once substance ? marius victorinus , as i observed before , ventures to say , ter ipsa substantia , ( not ter una , as it is mistaken in a late treatise , by trusting too much to memory ) thrice the very same substance ; now thrice the same one substance , is thrice one substance ; where the number belongs to the essence and substance , which is aquinas's objection against it . but the whole account of this must be resolved into the distinction between absolute and relative . substance , when it stands by it self , signifies absolutely , and so three substances are three absolute substances ; three human substances , three humanities ; and three divine substances , three divinities ; and therefore we must not without great caution , say three substances in the trinity , for fear of asserting three gods ; but yet we must own , that each person is true and perfect substance ; and both the fathers and schools own this ; and three in substance are three substances , but not three absolute but relative substances , three subsisting relations in the unity of the divine essence and substance : though , as i have more than once observed , in proper speaking , we cannot say three relative substances ; for though the father speaks a relation to the son , and holy spirit , it is as he is the fountain of the deity , original , absolute , divinity , essence , substance , in his own person , not a relative subsistence ; and therefore in the blessed trinity , there is one absolute substance , absolute divinity , and two relative substances , as there are two internal substantial relations in the unity of the same substance . and to prevent mistakes , i must here observe , that by absolute we do not mean compleat and perfect , for so the son is absolute substance , and the holy spirit absolute substance , compleat and perfect substance , as each of them in his own person is true and perfect god ; in which sense st. austin tells us , that persona ad se dicitur , that person is predicated absolutely ; that every person , as considered in himself , is a person , and not merely as related to another ; but when we say , that there is but one absolute substance in the godhead , by absolute we mean original , as i have already explained it , as distinguished from relative processions , as the original is distinguished from the image ; though the image , if a living , subsisting image , is as compleat and perfect nature and substance , as the original is . and this is the only difference i know , between substance , nature , essence , and suppositum , subject , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , res , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , thing , being , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , subsistence , and the like : that the first signify absolutely , or as the schools speak , the form ; that is , an original substance , nature , and essence ; and therefore these must not be multiplied in the divinity , by saying three substances , natures , or essences , for fear of a diversity or number of divinities , and gods. the other terms , though they do not in common use signify relatively , as subject , suppositum , thing , being , subsistence , do not , yet they signify any thing that really is , that has a compleat , actual subsistence of its own , and therefore are applicable , to all substantial relative processions , which are compleat subsistencies , things , beings , as well as to original nature and substance : and both the fathers and schools for this reason owned the three divine persons to be three things , three beings , tres entes , tria entia , tres res , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and scruple not the use of any such transcendental terms , as do not necessarily multiply the absolute and original form. thus the one substance of the godhead either signifies the absolute divinity of the father , and this is but one , and can never be ter vna , thrice one ; or it signifies the one individual undivided divinity of father , son , and holy ghost , that is , the absolute divinity of the father , with his internal essential processions in the perfect unity and identity of nature , and this it is but one substance , for there is but one individual nature ; not ter vna , but tres in vna ; not thrice one substance , but three in one undivided nature and substance ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which i have sometimes , not so properly , translated a thrice subsisting monad , but it is a monad with three hypostases ; which , in other words , is one nature and three persons ; not one singular nature thrice subsisting ( which i cannot understand ) , but one individual nature , and three subsisting hypostases ; vna substantia , non vnus subsistens ; one substance , not one that subsists : this individual nature subsists but once ; but in the individual unity of the father's essence and godhead , are those eternal , substantial , subsisting processions , the hypostases of the son , and holy spirit . and in this sense the one individual substance of the divinity may properly enough be stiled ter ipsa , or ter vna substantia ; thrice the same one substance , not thrice one absolute substance , in which sense aquinas rejected it ; but tria supposita vnius substantiae , or deitatis ; which is one substance , by the individual unity , and invariable sameness and identity of nature ; as i have shewn above . thus that warm dispute among the schoolmen , about one absolute subsistence and existence in the trinity , and three relative subsistencies and existences , which is managed with so much perplexing subtilty , as far as i can understand any thing by it , may easily be composed after the same manner . for there is but one absolute being and nature in the divinity , and therefore there can be but one absolute subsistence and existence , as absolute signifies , not compleat and perfect , but , to subsist and exist as an original , which in the godhead signifies a self-originated subsistence and existence : but then to deny all relative subsistencies and existencies , is to deny the compleat subsistence and existence of the son and spirit , who are essential relations in the unity of the father's godhead , and therefore subsist not as originals , but as relatives , which is the meaning of a relative subsistence . there is but one absolute divinity , and two relative processions , and therefore in this sense , but one absolute , and two , not three , relative subsistencies ; which seems fairly to divide the question between them . thus , once more : it is a known rule of speaking in this mystery , that substantives must be predicated in the singular number , adjectives will admit a plural predication ; and the same difference is made between abstract and concrete terms . there are not three gods , but tres deit atem habentes , there are three who have the divinity ; not three omnipotencies , or three omnisciencies , but three who are omnipotent and omniscient . and the approved reason for this is , that substantives and abstract terms , signify the nature , essence , and form , and to multiply them , is to multiply natures ; but adjectives immediately signify the subjects , suppositums , and persons , and only connote the nature and form , which multiplies the persons , but not the nature . now though i understand what is meant by this , when applied to the divinity , yet i never could understand this reason for it ; for there is no such difference between substantive and adjective predications in any other case ; three men , and three , who have human nature , signify the very same thing , and multiply the form , as well as the persons ; three , who have human nature , are truly and properly three men ; and then the meer difference between substantives and adjectives cannot be a good reason , why three , who have the divine nature , are not three gods. but the difference between an absolute and relative predication does give an account of this . substantives and abstract terms always signify the form , as the schools speak , that is , an absolute and original nature , and in this sense number multiplies nature , as well as persons , and three gods are three absolute original divinities , as wellas three divine persons ; and thus it is as to adjective predications in all creatures , as i observed before , because there is no such distinction in creatures between an absolute nature , and internal subsisting processions in the unity and identity of nature ; and when nature always signifies the original form , a substantive or adjective predication can make no difference : but where there is such a distinction , as there is in the divinity , substantives and adjectives do most aptly represent it , because adjectives admit of a relative predication , and may signify a person , who has the divine nature , as an internal , subsisting procession in the divinity , but is not the absolute divinity , nor in an absolute sense god , but the son of god , and the spirit of god. indeed in such forms of speech we must have more regard to the absolute or relative signification , than to the substantive or adjective form of the words . adjectives in an absolute sense must no more be multiplied than substantives , which i take to be an easier account of the tres aeterni , and unus aeternus in the athanasian creed , than to turn it with aquinas into tria aeterna , and unum aeternum . for three eternals , whether substantives or adjectives , in an absolute sense are three gods ; three eternal , three intelligent , three omniscient persons , in an absolute sense , are three eternities , three omnisciences , and in this sense there is but unus aeternus , one eternal self originated person , as there is but one god : and on the other hand , deus or god , though a substantive , may signify relatively , as it does in the nicene creed , god of god ; and in this sense some of the schoolmen , thought it very orthodox to say three gods , if we explained in what sense we meant it , as i observed above , tertullian did , ecce duos deos , though at the same time he rejects the use of such forms , for their ambiguous signification which might betray men into polytheism . and if god may have a relative signification , so may mind and spirit too , and then three minds and spirits is as orthodox , as three that have an intelligent and spiritual nature . in short ; as far as i can hitherto observe , all the catholick rules of speaking relating to this mystery must be resolved into this distinction of absolute and relative : this is the only distinction we know of in the godhead , and this we as certainly know there is , as we know , that there is an eternal father , who has an eternal son , and an eternal spirit ; one absolute , self-originated divinity , with its internal , essential processions in the individual unity and identity of nature : and if this be the unity and distinction of the divinity , this must be our rule of speaking also , to have a due regard to the one absolute nature , and the relative processions of the godhead ; which will secure us both from a sabellian singularity , and a tritheistick trinity of absolute divinities . the conclusion . with a short application to the socinians . i proposed one thing more to be considered in relation to this subject ; viz. whether the catholick faith of a real a●d substantial trinity , can be as reasonably and intelligibly explained by the notion of one singular substance in the divinity , as by asserting three personal substances or suppositums : and whether the singularity of the divine essence in this notion , delivers the asserters of it from any inconveniences and objections , which the contrary opinion is thought liable to . but , i hope , after what i have already said , there is no occasion for this , and i will not needlesly revive old quarrels . let but men sincerely and heartily believe in father , son , and holy ghost , three eternal , infinite , substantial , living , intelligent , omnipotent , all-wise persons , each of which is in his own person true and perfect god , and all three but one divinity , and one god ; and i will dispute with no such orthodox christians concerning the philosophy of the divine nature , which is so infinitely above our comprehension . there may be a necessity for such disputes , when we have to do with hereticks , who ridicule the catholick faith as contradictions and absurd ; but when men agree in the faith , such disputes are of no use to them , and may prove of dangerous consequence ; for there are too many , who will be sooner disputed out of their faith , than out of their philosophy ; which should teach all catholick christians , as much as it is possible , to silence all disputes amongst themselves , which their common adversaries are so apt to improve into scepticism , infidelity , or heresy . and therefore for a conclusion , i shall only take a brief review of the doctrine of the fathers concerning this article of a trinity in unity , and apply it in a few words to our socinian adversaries . the faith of the catholick church taught by christ and his apostles is , that there is but one god ; but this one god is a father , who has an eternal son , and an eternal spirit , in the essential unity of the same undivided and undiversified godhead : and this is the faith which all the catholick fathers have owned and taught in their several ages . the whole christian church baptizes , as our saviour commanded , in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost ; and this is the rule of their faith , to believe in father , son , and holy ghost : a plain , simple faith , could men have been contented to believe god concerning himself . let our socinian adversaries tell us , what there is absurd , impossible , or contradictious in this faith ? will they venture to say , that it is absurd or contradictious , that god should have a son ? no! in some sense they will allow this true ; they themselves believe in father , son , and holy ghost ; they acknowledge jesus christ to be the son of god , as he is frequently called in scripture , and that in a higher sense , than any other man is the son of god ; but that he is but a man after all , though advanced by god to divine honours , above all principalities and powers , and made the judge both of the quick and of the dead ; and this they affirm to be all that the scripture means , in calling christ the son of god. but this is not the present dispute : they know that the catholick church believed otherwise , that christ is the eternal son of god , begotten of his father before all worlds , god of god , very god of very god ; and they know also , that thus the catholick fathers expounded those texts which concern the sonship and divinity of our saviour ; and they cannot but confess , that they are very capable of such an exposition ; nay , that it is very difficult to put any other sense upon many texts ; and the only reason why they reject these catholick expositions , is the pretended absurdity and contradiction of the catholick faith. here then we join issue with them , and desire them to shew us , what is impossible or contradictious in this faith ? that there is something incomprehensible in this mystery , that is , something which we have no natural adequate ideas of , we readily acknowledge with the whole catholick church ; and some of our adversaries grant , that it is possible for a thing to be , whereof we have no idea ; and then it seems to me very unreasonable to add , but we are no ways concerned , nor can we reason or discourse about those things whereof we have no ideas : for the direct contrary seems to be the more natural consequence , that if god thinks fit to reveal such things to us , of which we have no ideas , we are concerned and obliged to believe them ; for if they may be true , they are the proper objects of faith , though they want the evidence of natural ideas but i do not intend to dispute this now , but refer them to the bishop of worcester ' s answer to mr. lock ' s second letter ; and to a late sermon , and its vindication , concerning the danger of corrupting the faith by philosophy . what i have now to say , is of another nature , viz. that we have an idea of a trinity in unity , and such an idea , as contains nothing absurd , impossible , or contradictious in it : that very idea , which i have so largely explained , one absolute divinity , with two eternal , essential processions , in the unity and identity of nature . the eternal father , eternal self-originated mind , with his eternal word , his eternal son , and the eternal spirit of father and son. this is that idea which the scripture gives us of it , and which the catholick church hath always taught : every man may understand what is meant by it , and therefore it is not jargon and nonsense ; and i think i have sufficiently vindicated it from tritheism and contradiction , and have no more to say of that nature , till i hear what they have to object against what is already said ; and when they come to consider this matter again , as men that shall certainly be called to an account for it in this world , as well as in the next , i hope they will see reason to grow out of conceit with their own philosophy , about emanations and processions , a priority of time , and priority of nature , self-existence and necessary existence , and such like arian objections , which were made and answered many ages since , and which they may find sufficiently answered in this treatise . this brings back the dispute to scripture , where the last appeal must lie in all such matters , without appealing for the sense of scripture to natural ideas and philosophy : and if the interpretations of the catholick fathers were of any authority with these men , i have already shewn how they expounded scripture , which will always be a venerable authority to modest men and sober christians , how much soever it be despised by hereticks . but it is time to put an end to this treatise ; we may consider their expositions of scripture some other time . the end . dr . sherloc● , dean of st. paul's vindication of the doctrine of the trinity . third edition . quarto — apology for writing against socinians . quarto . — the danger of corrupting the faith by philosophy . a sermon . quarto . — a vindication of the sermon , in answer to some socinian remarks . an answer to the animad versions on the dean of st. paul's vindication of the trinity . by i. b. a. m. quarto . a defence of the dean of st. paul's apology for writing against socinians . quarto . a defence of dr. sherlock's notion of a trinity in unity . quarto . the distinction between real and nominal trinitarians examined ; in answer to a socinian pamphlet . quarto . all printed for william rogers . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e quâ nec dicuntur ut cogitantur , nec cogitantur ut sunt . aug. de trinit . l. . c. . cùm ergo quaeritur quid tria , vel quid tres , conferimus nos ad inventendum aliquod speciale vel generale nomen , quo complectamur haec tria , neque occurrit animo , quia excedit supereminentia divinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem . aug. de trin. l. . c. . ad se quippe ( pater ) dicitur persona , non ad filium , aut spiritum sanctum . aug. de trin. l. . c. . cur ergo non haec tria simul unam personam dicimus , sicut unam essentiam , & deum , sed tres dicimus personas , cùm tres deos , aut tres essentias non dicamus , nisi quia volumus vel unum aliquod vocabulum servire huic significationi quâ intelligitur trinitas , ne emnino taceremus interrogati , quid tres , cùm tres esse fateremur . ibid. quidigitur restat , nisi ut fatcamur , loquendi necessitate partita haec vocabula , &c. l. . c. . no● h●c definitione eam quam graeci 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicunt terminavimus . boet. de una persona christi . prima & summa vita , cui non aliud est vivere , & aliud esse , sed idem est esse & vivere . primus & summus intellectus , cui non est aliud vivere , & aliud intelligere , sed id quod est intelligere , hoc vivere , hoc esse est , unum omnia . aug. de tr. l. . c. . si tamen dignum est , ut de●● dicatur subsistere . — deus autem si subsisti● at substantia propriè dici possit , inest in co aliquod tanquam in subjecto , & non est s●●plex . — n●fas est autem dicere ut subsist●t , & subsit deus bonitati suae . — unde manifestum est , deum abusiv● substantiam vocari , ut nomine usitatiore intelligatur essentia , qu●d verè & proprie dicitur , ita ut fortasse solum deum dici oporteat esse essenti●m . — ego sum qui sum , & qui est misit me ad vos . id. l. . c. , . personam in accidentibus non posse constitui , relinquitur ergò , u● personam in substantiis dici conveniat . boet. de una christi persona . non enim aliud est deo esse , ali●d personam esse , sed omnino idem . neque in hàc trinitate , cùm dicimus personam patris , aliud dicimus , quàm substantiam patris . aug. tr. l. . c. . personam in substantiis dici conve●●at — non autem in non viventibus corporibus , vel s●nsu carentibus , vel intellec●●s & ratione . boet. ibid. in universalibus persona dici non potest , sed in singularibus atque individuis . boet. ibid. cùm ipsae substantiae in universalibus quidem sint , in particularibus verò capiant substantiam , jure substantias particulariter subsistentes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( graeci ) appellaverunt . id. omnis essentia , quae relativè dicitur , est etiam aliquid excepto relativo , ut homo dominus , homo servus — ad se dicuntur , & substantiae sunt vel essentiae : dominus vero & servus — ad aliquid relative dicuntur : sed si non esset homo , id est , aliqua substantia , non esset qui relative dominus diceretur . — quapropter si & pater non est aliquid ad se ipsum , non est omnino qui relativè dicatur ad aliquid . aug. de trinit . l. . c. . nos verò unicum , quidem deum credimus , sub hác tamen dispensatione , quam aeconomiam dicimus , ut umci dei sit & filius , & sermo ipsius , qui ex ipso processerit , per quem omnia facta sunt , & sine quo factum est nihil . tert. cont . prax. c. . p. oxon. dum unicum , deum non aliàs putat credendum , quàm si ipsum eundemque & patrem , & filium , & spiritum sanctum dicat , quasi non sit quoque unus sit omnia , dum ex uno omnia , per substantiae scilicet unitatem , & nihilominus custodiatur aeconomiae sacramentum , quae unitatem in trinitatem disponit , tres dirigens patrem , & filium , & spiritum sanctum . ibid. iudaicae fidci ista res est , sic unum deum credere , ut filium adnumerare ei nolis , & post filium spiritum . tert. c. prax. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. cont . sabell . tom. . p. . paris . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. quidam ita evangelicae fidei corrumpunt sacramentum , ut sub unius dei pià tantùm professione , nativitatem unigeniti dei abnegent — qui sub unius dei solâ sanè utili ac religiosâ praedicatione , aut deum natum christum negant , aut verum deum non esse contendunt , ut creatio potentis creaturae intra unum deum fidei sacramentum relinquat , quia nativitas dei extra unius dei fidem religionem protrahat confitentium . sed nos edocti divinitus , neque duos deos praedicare , neque solum , hanc evangelici ac prophetici praeconit rationem in confessione dei patris & dei filii afferemus , ut unum in fide nosira sit uterque , non unus ; neque cundem utrumque , neque inter verum & falsum aliud confitentes : quia deo ex deo nato , neque eundem nativitas p●rmittit esse , neque aliud . hilar. de trin. lib. . cùm enim unum deum prophanae assertio infidelitatis ingereret , & rursum unum deum negare fides sana non posset , tractari de eo non sine ancipitis periculi conscientiâ potuit , quod non minus impiè confirmaretur , quàm negar●tur . hil. de trinit . lib. . non ignorans , quantum in eo sit , vel responsionis periculum vel silentii , & e● utraque opportunitatem impietatis expectans . atque ita sapientia mundi , quae stultitia apud deum est , specie blandae & pestiferae simplicitatis illuderet , cum hoc fidei suae constitu●ret exordium , in quo sibi impiè assentiremur aut adversaremur . et per hoc utriusque rei periculum , dei filium deum non esse obtineret , quia deus unus est ; aut extorqueret alterius haeres●os necessitatem , si & patrem deum & filium deum confitentes , unum deum praedicare secundum sabellii opinionem impiam existimaremur . ibid. non n●gantes deum , unum , sed — deum & deum — praedicantes , & deum unum non per unionem docentes , neque rursum ad diversitatis numerum des●cantes ; neque contra in nominibus tantùm confi●entes , sed deum & deum . ibid. nemini dubium esse oportet ad divinarum rerum cognitionem divinis utendum esse doctrinis — non subeunt ingenia nostra in coelestem scientiam , neque incomprehensibilem virtutem sensu aliquo infirmitas nostra concipiet . hilar. l. . de trin. ipsi de se deo credendum est , & iis , quae cognitioni nostrae de se tribuit , obsequendum ; aut enim more gentilium denegandus est , si testimonia ejus improbantur ; aut si , ut est , deus creditur , non potest aliter de deo , quàm ut ipse est de se testatus , intel●igi . ibid. non negantes deum unum , sed eo ipso autore deum & deum , per quem deus unus praedicatus est , praedicantes . — atque ita non autoritati contrarium est , sed ex autoritate responsum est , ne per id filium liceret deum negare , quia ad israel deus unus est : cùm confitendi dei filium deum idem autor est , qui autor est dei unius praedicandi . hilar. de trin. l. . prope initium . habes ergo deum ex quo , habes deum per quem ; aut si id negabis , necesse est , id quod factum est , per quem factum sit , doceas . quod ergo dictum est , fiat firmamentum , in eò quod pater sit locutus , ostenditur ; & quod fecisse deus dicitur , in eo persona efficientis est intelligenda , qui faciat . hilar. de trin. lib. . sensus communis intelligentiae non recipiet , ut in eo quod dictum est , jussit & facta sun● ▪ solitarius atque id●m significatus credatur . ibid. caeterùm , etsi ubique teneo unam substantiam in tribus cohaerentibus , tam●n ahum dicam oportet ex necessitate sensus , eum qui jubet , & eum qui facit : nam nec j●ber●t , si i●se faceret , dum juberet fieri per eum : tamen jubebat , haud sibi jussurus si unus esset ; aut sine ●●ssit facturus , quia non expectasset , ut sibi juberet . tert. adv . prax. c. . haec aut nega scripta , aut quis es , ut non putes accipienda qu●madmodim scripta sunt ; maxime quae non in allegoriis & parabolis , sed in d●finitionibus , & certis & simplicibus habent sensum . tert. adv . prax. c. . deus enim per legistatorem secundum intelligentiam nostram locutus est : verbis videlicet quibus uti ipse nos voluit , cognitionem corum nobis , quae gessit , imperticus . hilar. ibid. sustulit singularis intelligentiam prof●ssione consortu : consorti●m autem esse aliquod solitario ipsi sibi non potest . quid enim tam alienum ab eo qui solus ●sset , ut sibi faciendum diceret , cùm voluntate tantum opus est , ut fieret . n●one rursum recipit solitarii solitudo , f●ciamus , r●que quisq● un alieno à se nostram loqui●●● uterque sermo , & faciamus , & nosi 〈…〉 silitarium ●●ndemque non patitur , ita neque divers●●● à se alienumque significat . cognita per id , quòd nost●am imagin●m dicit , non etiam imagines nosiras , ●mus in utroque prepietate naturae . hil. ibid. non ergo in fabricatione mundi solitarius pater sibi loquitur , sapientiâ suâ secum & co operante , & consummata co operatione gaudente . ibid. te●t . a●v . pra●●a●● . salvo enim filio recte unicum deum potest determinasse , cujus est filius . non enim definit esse qui habet filium ipse unicus , suo scilicet nomine , quotiens sine filio n●minatur . sine filio autem nominatur , quum principaliter determinatur ut prima p●rsona , quae ante si●i● nomen erat proponenda ; quia pater ante ●●gn●●citur , & post patrem fi●ius nominatur . igitur unus deus pater , & ali●s absque ●o non est . quod ipse infer●us non ●●lium n●gat , sed alium deum . cae●●rum alius à patre filius non est . d●nique , inspice sequentia hujusmodi pronuntiationum , & invenies fere ad id●lorum factitatores atque cultores definitionem carum pertinere ; ut multitudinem falsorum deorum unio divinitatis expellat , habens tamen filium quanto individuum & inseparatum a patre tanto in patre reputandum , etsi non nominatum , atquin si nominasset eum , separasset , ita dicens , alius praeter me non est , nisi filius mēus ; alium enim etiam filium fecisset , quem de aliis excepisset . puta solem dixisse , ego sol , & praeter me ●on est , nisi radius meus , nonne denotasses vanitatem , quasi non & ra●ius in sole deputetur . tert. adv . prax. c. . qui etsi de●●●●catur , quando nominatur sing●●● 〈◊〉 non igitur du●s deos faciat , se● 〈◊〉 , hoc ipso quod & deus ex unitate patri● vocari habeat . ibid. c. . non alter ad eum deus deputatur ( filius ) non enim ex alia substantia , sed ex deo deus est . nihil itaque in eo novum , nihil extraneum , nihil recens est . hilar. de trin. l. . in fine . reliquus autem nunc omnis s●rmo ad id proficiet , ut qui deus verus esse intelligitur , non in deum alterum deputetur : et quod in alterum non proficit , id unum intelligatur . non enim aliud quàm deus subsistit , quod non aliunde quàm ex deo deus subsistit : nam cùm ipse deus sit , tamen etiam per naturae virtutem in eo deus est : et per id quod ipse deus , & in eo deus est , non est deus praeter eum : cùm non extet aliunde quod deus est , & in eo deus sit , habens in se & quod ipse est , & ex quo ipse subsistit . id. l. . quoniam ego sum dominus , & non est deus praeter me : est enim unigenitus deus , neque consortem unigeniti nomen admittit , sicut non recipit innascibilis , in eo tantum quòd est innascibilis , participem . est ergò unus ab uno , neque praeter deum innascibilem deus innascibilis alius est ; neque praeter unigenitum deum deus unigenitus quisquam est . uterque itaque unus & solus est , proprictate videlicet in unoquoque & innascibilitatis & originis . ac sic uterque deus unus est : cùm inter unum & unum , id est , ex uno unum , divinitatis aeternae non sit secunda natura . hil. l. . in his ergo si unum magis quam solitarium deum intelligis , ecclesiae religionem profiteberis , quae patrem in filio confitetur . sin verò unum deum ad solitarii significationem , sacram●nti coelestis ignarus oltendis , extra cognitionem dei es , deum i● deo esse non confitens . l. . considerations , p. . consid. p. . consid. p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . alii qu●que haeretici ●sque adeò christi manifestam amplexati sunt divinitatem , ut dixerint illum fuisse sine carne , & totum illi susceptum detraxerint hominem , ne decoquerent in illo divini nominis potestatem , si humanam illi sociassent , ut arbitrab●ntur , nativitatem . novat . de t●init . c. . epiph. l. . tom. . haer. . five . tertul de praescript . haeret. hoc si qui putaverit me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliquam in● roducere , id est , prolation●m rei alterius ex altera , quod facit valentinus , alium atque ali●m aeonem de aeone producens ; primo quid●m dicam tibi , non ideo non utitur & veritas vocabulo isto , & re & censu ejus , quia & haeresis potius ex veritate accepit , quod ad mendacium suum strueret . prolatus est sermo dei an non ? hic mecum gradum fige . si prolatus est , cognosce probolam veritatis , & viderit haeresis si quid de veritate imitata est . iam nunc quaeritur , quis quomodo utatur aliqua re & vocabulo ejus ? valentinus probolas suas discernit & separat ab auctore : et ita longe ab eo ponit , ut aeon patrem nesciat . denique desiderat nosse , nec po●est ; immo & pene devoratur , & dissolvitur in reliquam substantiam . apud nos autem solus filius patrem novit & sinum patris ipse exposuit , & omnia apud patrem audivit & vidit . — sermo ergo & in patre semper , sicut dicit , ego in patre . et apud deum semper , sicut scriptum est , & sermo erat apud deum , & nunquam separatus à patre , aut alius à patre ; quia , ego & pater unum sumus . haec erit probola veritatis , cuflos unitatis , quâ prolatum dicimus filium à patre , s●d non separatum . tert. adv . praxeam . c. . firmum est genus probationis , quod etiam ab adversario sumitur , ut veritas etiam ab ipsis inimicis veritatis probetur . nam usque adeò manifestum est in scripturis esse deum tradi , ut plerique haereticorum divinitatis ipsius magnitudine & veritate commoti , ultra modum extendentes honores ejus , ausissent non filium , sed ipsum deum patrem promere vel putare . quod etsi contra veritatem scripturarum est , tamen divinitatis christi argumentum grande atque praecipuum est : qui usque adeo deus , sed quâ filius dei natus ex deo ; ut plerique illum ( ut diximus ) haeretici , ita deum acceperint , ut non filium , sed patrem pronunciandum putarent , &c. novat . de trin. c. . in eo quod credit ( arius ) alium esse patrem , alium filium , mecum est contra sabellianos . aug. de . haeres . c. . p. , . p. . p. . ● . . p. . p. . p. . persona , ut ecclesia in hoc articulo loquitur , est substantia individua , intelligens , & incommunicabilis . satis constat veteres scriptores ecclesiae solitos haec duo vocabula discernere , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & dicere unam esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , id est , essentiam aeterni patris , filii & spiritus sancti , sed tres 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , id est , tres verè subsistentes , non commentitios , non caducos , non confusos , sed distinctos , singulares intel●●gentes . lusit homo fanaticus servetus de vecabulo personae , & disputat olim latinis significasse habitum aut officti distinctionem , ut dicimus roscium alias sustin●re personam achillis , alias sustinere personam ulyssis ; seu alia est persona consulis , alia servi : ut cicero inquit , magnum est in republica tueri personam principis . et hanc veterem significationem vecabuli sycophantice detorquet ad articulum de tribus personis divinitatis . sed has impias pras●igias fugiamus & execremur , & sciamus in hoc articulo aliter loqui ecclesiam , & personam dici substantiam individuam , intelligentem , & incommunicabilem . ac prodest in hac cogitatione saepe mente intueri baptismum christi , ubi tres personae illustri discrimine monstrantur . pater sonat hanc vocem : hic est filius meus dilectus . filius stans in flumine conspicitur : & spiritus sanctus specie visibili demittitur . melanct. loci theolog. de tribus personis divinitatis . p. . p. ▪ p. . p. . p. , , . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. , . p. ● . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . sin autem ideo dictum putant deum , quod inspirationem divinitatis habuit , sicut & multi sancti viri — ergo non ultra homines eum praeferunt — ambr. de fide , l. . cap. . p. . sed quia duos unum volunt esse , ut idem pater & filius habeatur , oportet & totum de filio examinari , ut sit , & qui sit , & quomodo sit . tert. ad prax. c. . ipsum qu●d pater & filius dicuntur , nonne aliud ab alio est . utique ●nim omnia quod vocantur , h●c crunt ; & quod crunt , hoc vccaluntur — ita aut pater aut filius est , & neque dies cadem & nox , neque pater idem & filius , ut sint ambo unus , & utrumque alter . ibid. c , . ipsi se , inquiunt , filium sibi faci● , atquin pater filium facit , & patrem filius . et qui ex alterutro fiunt , à semetipsis sibi fieri nullo modo possiunt , ut pater se sibi filium faciat , & filius se sibi patrem praestet . qu●e institut deus , ipse custodit . ibid. habeat , necesse est , pater filium , 〈◊〉 pater sit , & filius patrem , ut filius sit . aliud est autem habere , aliud ●sse . verbi gratia , ut maritus sim , h●b●a● oportet uxorem , non ut ipse mihi ero ●xor ; sic etiam , ut pater s●●n , filium habco , non ipse mihi ero filius . ibid. qu●e enim me faciunt , si ha●●●ero , tun`e ero pater , si filium habeam , filiu● ero , si patrem , parro , si ipse ero qui● coruum , jam non habeo , quod ipse ero ; n●c patrem , quia ipse ero pat●● , 〈◊〉 filium , quia ipse ero filius : in q●antum vero alterum ex his hab●re m● oportet ; alterum esse , in tantum si ●trumque sucro , alterum non ero , dum alterum non habeo ▪ si enim ups● ero filius ut , q●a & pster , sum non habeo filium , sed ipse sun filius . non haben●o autem filium cum ipse sum flius , quem●do pater ero ? habere enim filium d● b●n , ut pater sini ; non sum ergo silius , quia patr●n● non habeo , qui 〈◊〉 filium ; 〈…〉 si ipse sum pater , qu● & filius , &c. h●c ●rit titum ingenium diab●li , alterum ex aliero ●xelua●re , dum utrumque in 〈◊〉 s●b monar●●●ae ●avore conclu●●●ns , ●entrum hale●● 〈◊〉 , &c. ibid. non posse unum & eundem videri , qui loquitur , & de quo loquitur , & ad quem loquitur : quia neque perversit as , neque fallacia deo congruat , ut ci●n ipse esset ad quem loquebatur , ad alium potius , & non ad semetipsum loquatur . ibid. c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. cont . gregales sabellii . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. ibid. ipse enim ad humana semper colloquia descendit ab adam usque ad patriarchas & prophetas , in visione , in somnio , in speculo , in aenigmate , ordinem suum praestruens ab initio semper , quem erat persecuturus in finem ; it a semper ediscebat & deus in terris cum hominibus conversari , non alius potuit quàm sermo , qui caro erat futurus . tert. adv . prax. c. . quid agis lot sancte ? angelos vides , non unum , sed duos , & dicis domine mi. duos video , aequales video , unum rogo , nulli injuriam facio , quia patrem & filium non divido ; sabellianus legat duos venisse , &c. aug. de . haeres . epiph. c. noes . haer. . audi tu sabelliane , audi de coelo patrem , vide in terra filium , & noli dicere , idem pater qui silius . aug. de quinque haeres . cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. cont . gregal . sabellij . ergo inquis , das aliquam substantiam esse sermonem ? plane . non vis enim eum substantivum habere in re per substantae proprietatem , ut res & persona quaedam videri possit , & it a capiat secundus a deo constitutus duos officere , patrem & filium , deum & sermonem . quid est enim , dices , sermo , nisi vox & sonus oris , & sicut grammatici tradunt , aer offensus , intelligibilis auditu , caeterum vacuum nescio quid , & inane & incorporale . tert. adv . prax. c. . at ego nihil di●o de deo mane & vacuum prodire potuisse , ut non de inani & vacuo prolatum , neo carere substantiâ , quod de tanta substantia processit , & tantas substantias fecit , feciz enim & ipse , quae facta sunt per ipsum : quale est ut nihil sit ipse , sine quo nihil factum est ? ut inanis solida , & vacuus plena , & incorporalis corporalia operatus sit ? nam etsi potest aliquando quid fieri diversum cjus per quod fit ; nihil tameu potest fieri per id , quod vacuum & iname est . ibid. vacua & inanis res est sermo de● , qui filius dictus est , qui ipse deus cogneminatus est ? & sermo erat apud deum , & deus erat sermo . hic certè est , qui in effigie dei constitutus , non rapinam exiitimavie esse se aqualem deo. in qua ●ffigie dei ? utique in alia , non tamen in nullâ . quaecunque ergo substantia sermonis fuit , illam dico personam , & illi nomen filii vindico ; & dum filium agnosco , secundum a patre defendo . ibid. in substantia fuit christus ante mundi institutionem . nov. de trin. c. . sermo filius natus est , qui non in ●ono percussi aeris , aut tono coactae de visceribus vocis accipitur , sed in substantia prolatae à deo virtutis cognoscitur . — substantia scilicet illa divina , cujus nomen est verbum . ibid. c. . deus utique procedens ex deo secundam personam efficiens . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. cont . sabellii gregal . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . est alia , quae triformem sic asserit deum , ut quaedam pars ejus sit pater , quaedam filius , quaedam spiritus sanctus , hoc est , quod dei unius partes sint , quae istam faciunt trinitatem , velut ex his tribus partibus compleatur deus , nec sit perfectus in seipso , vel pater , vel filius , vel spiritus sanctus . aug. de haeres . ad quod vult . deum . haeres . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . athan. con . greg. sab. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damasc. orth. fidei . l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . id. ib. c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; ath. contr . gregal . sabell . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — ibid. . quin etiam id adjiciunt , cum unius substantiae patrem & filium esse audiunt , ab anterioribus episcopis esse praedicatum , ut id subtiliter per speciem haereticae opinionis infirment ; dicentes eos verbi hujus significationem , id est , unius substantiae , quod gracè dicitur homoousion , hoc sensu usurpare atque eloqui , tanquam ipse sit pater qui & filius , ex infinitate videlicet suà protenlus in virginem , ex quâ corpus assumens sibi , in to corpore quod assumpsit filii nomen addiderit ; & haec quidem de hil. de trin. l. . secundo id quodque addidistis , quod patres nostri , cum paulus samosatenus hareticus pronunciatus est , etiam homoousion repudiaverint , quia per hanc untus essentiae nuncupationem , solitarium atque unicum sibi esse patrcem & filium praedicabat , & hoc same nunc quoque prophanissimum ecclesia recognoscit , patrem & filium in his nominum professionibus ad unionis & singularis solitudinem negat● personarum proprietate revocare . hilar . de synod . propè finem . bull. defens . fidei nicaenae . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . basil. ep . . sequens illa est , quod affirment id enuntiationem homoousii significare , quod rei anterioris & alterius communio sit duobus , & tanquam prior substantia vel usia materiae alicujus exciterit , quae participata duobus , & in utroque consumpta , utrumque illam & nature anterioris , & rei esse testetur unius . atque ideirco improbare se homoousii aiunt confessionem , quod enuntiatio ejus neque filium à patre distinguat , & posteriorem patrem materia , quae sibi cum filio sit communis , oftendat . hil. de trin lib. . initio . de homoousio verò , quod est unius essentiae tractantes , primùm idcirco respuendum pronuntiastis , quia per verbi hujus enunciationem substantia prior intelligeretur , quam duo inter se partiti essent — prophanus hic sensus est , & communi judicio ab ecclesiae respuendus . hil. de synod quis enim sanae mentis tertiam substantiam , que & patri & filio communis sit , praedicabit . non hic sanctissima religiosorum virorum synodus , nescio quam priorem , quae in duos divisa sit , substantiam introducat , sed filium natum de substantia patris . ibid. tertio quoque hanc improbandi homoousti causam commimscuntur , quod secundum verbi hujus significationem , ex divisione paternae substantiae esse filius existimetur , tanquam desectus ex co fuerit , ita ut in duos sit res una divisa : & ideo substantiae dicantur unius , quia portio desecta de toto , in natura ca sit unde desecta est . hil. de trin. lib . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — socrates h. e. lib. . c. . eusebii epist. ad caesariensis apud socrat . ibid in his igitur tot tamque gravibus fidei periculis , verborum brevitas temperanda est , ne impie dici existimetur , quod pic intelligitur : ne secura atque innocente conscientia , per occasionem haereticorum reus sermo sit , dicturus unam substantiam catholicus patris & filii , non inde incipiat ; neque hoc quasi maximum teneat , tanquam sine hoc vera fides nulla sit . hilar. de synodis . unam substantiam dicet , cùm ante dixerit , pater ingenitus est , filius natus est , subsistit ex patre , patri similis est , virtute , honore , natura , &c. et post haec unam substantiam patris & filii decendo , non errat , at unam substantiam negando , jam peccat . nemo unam substantiam brevi & nudo sermone putet praedicandam : ut possit religiose deci , una esse substantia . nihil solitarium ex divinis sacramentis ad suspicionem audientium , & ad occasionem blasphemantium proferamus . ante nativitas filii , ante subjectio , ante similitudo naturae praedicanda est , ut non impie unius & pater & filius substantiae praedicetur . ibid. si ergo naturam neque aliam , neque dissimilem ci , quem impassibiliter generabat , dedit , uon potest aliam dedisse , nisi propriam ; ita similitudo proprietas est , proprietas aequalitas est , & aequalitas nihil differt ; qui autem nihil differunt , unum sunt ; non unione personae , sed aequalicate a●●urae . hil. de synod . testor dominum coeli atque terra me cùm neutrum audissem , semper tamen utrumque sensisse , quòd per homaeusion homousion eperteret intelligi ; id est , nihil simile sibi secundum naturam esse posse , nisi quod esset ex cadem naturâ . fidem nicaenam nunquam nisi exulaturus audivi , sed mihi homousii & homaeusii intelligentiam evangelia & apostoli intimaverunt . ib. in fine . religiosè unam substantiam praedicamus , dummodò unam substantiam proprietatis similitudinem intelligamus , ut quod unum sunt , non singularem significet , sed aequales . aequalitatem dico , id est , indifferentiam similitudinis , ut similitudo habeatur aequalitas . aequalitas verò unum idcirco dicitur esse , quod par sit , unum verò in quo par significatur , non ad unicum vindicetur . — credamus & dicamus esse unam substantiam , sed per naturae proprietatem , non ad significationem impiae unionis . una sit ex similitudine non ex solitudine . hilar. de synod . ita similitudinis aequalitas nec solitudinem habet , nec diversitatem , quia omnis aequalitas nec diversa nec sola sit . idem l. . de trin. deus qued est genuit , ejusdem substantiae , ejusdem essentiae , sine tempore , sibi coaeternum genuit — hanc dei trinitatis substantiam unam homusion verbo graeci complecti breviter maluerunt . non enim nomen est , sed res terribilis est in verbo hujusmodi sonaus . quod verbum apertè ipse fili●s declarat , cùm dicit , ego & pater unum sumus . in isto uno consistit substantia una . — contra hoc pugnetur , quod possidet , quod habet , quod docet verbum graecum , non contra ipsum verbum , quod auribus retinuit syllabis articulatum . contra divitio●s , contra aequalitatem naturae , quod possidet verbum , &c. altercatio inter aug. & pascentium . to. . nec esse nomen fidei homusion , sed aequalitatem magis ipsius trinitatis — laurentius vir clarissimus dixit , sic ergo & homusion quod in dubium veniebat te proponente , & si scriptum non est , res ipsa tamen , quae latet in verbo , vera est . credatur honorificè unitati , ne fiat injuria tranitati . ibid. displicet cuiquam in synodo nicaena homousion esse susceptum ? hoc si cui displicet , necesse est placeat quod ab arianis est negatum . negatum enim idcirco est homousion , ne ex substantia dei patris deus filius natus , sed secundum creaturas ex nihilo conditus praedicaretur — hilar. de synod . prope finem . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . socr. h. e. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. de decr. syn. nicaenae . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. conc. t. . col. . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. syn. nic. decret . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. ibid. defens . fidei nicenae . p. . basil. hom. . c. sabell . basil. ep. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . athan. de communi essentia . vol. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 basil adv . eunom . t. . l. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . basil adv . eunom . t. . l. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — ibid. lib. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . basil. ep. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damasc. orth . nd . l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — damasc. de orth . fide . l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyssenus cont . eunomium . orat. . p. . parisiis . . tres enim deos dicit , qui divinitatem separat trinitatis , cùm dominus dicendo ; ite , baptizate gentes in nomine patris , & filii , & spiritus sancti , unius esse trinitatem potestatis ostenderit . ambr. de fide. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 basil ep. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. cont . arianos . orat. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . gr. nyss. c eun. or . . p. . quasi aliud sit homoousion quâm quod dicit , ego de patre exivi , ego & pater unum sumus ; — haec est autem nominis ratio , ut in patre & filio unitatem substantiae credas , licet rem ipsam ( quae est inenarrabilis ) definire ●on posses . ambr . de fide cont . arian . c. . cùm autem ego patrem & filium statuo , unitatem generis assigno ; & si illam in personis divido , discretiones tamen personarum rursus cadem nomina in unitatem sui naturali legis foedere consignant , unde & tantus est filius , quantus videbitur pater , totus de toto , integer de integro , perfectus de perfecta consummataque virtute . ibid. c. . habet utique in natura , habet in substantia , & habet non per gratiam temporalem , sed per sempiternam divinitatem ; habet non ex dono quasi servus , sed ex generationis proprietate , quasi filius coaeternus . et habet sicut pater . sicut enim pater habet vitam in semetipso , ita & filio dedit vitam habere in semetipso . sic habet , inquit , sic dedit . didicisti supra quemadmodum dederit , ne putares esse gratiae largitatem , ubi generationis arcanum est . ambr. de fide. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ath. cont . arian . or . . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . verbi enim appellatio in dei filio de sacramento nativitatis est , sicut sapientiae & virtutis est nomen , quae cùm in dei f●lium cum substantia ver●e nativitatis extiterint , deo tamen ut sua propria , quamvis ex deo in deum sint nata , non desunt . — earum rerum unigenito deo aptata cognomina sunt , quae cum eum subsistentem ex nativitate consumment , tamen patri non desint exinde mutabilis virtute naturae . hilar. de trin. l. . non enim sicut frequenter dictum a n●bis est , divisionis in filio , sed nativitatis sacramentum praedicamus ; nec separatio fuit imperfecta sed progenies perfecta , quia nativitas non habet detrimentum generandi , cum profectum teneat nascendi . ibid. quid est enim filius de eo quod pater est ? alius idem . et hoc est quod graeci homoousion appellant , cum uno aliud ipsum . ambr. de fide cont . arianos . c. , . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . gr. nyss. cont . eunom . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. contr . arian . orat . . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. unus ab uno — ac sic uterque deus unus , cùm inter unum & unum . id est , ex uno unum divinitatis aeternae non est secunda natura . hil. de trin. l. . nemo ambigat naturam autoris in filit nativitate connasci . id. l . et per id unus est deus , quia ex natura dei deus sit . — unum autem illud non subsistentem naturam perimat in filio , sed in deo & deo naturam dei conservet unius . verum & absolutum & perfectum fidet nosirae sacramentum est , deum ex deo , & deum in deo confiteri : non corporalibus modis , sed divinis virtutibus , nec naturae in naturam transfusione , sed mysterio & potestate naturae : n●n enim per desectionem , vel protensionem , vel derivationem , ex deo deus est , sed ex virtute naturae in candem naturam nativitate subsistit ▪ eandem autem naturam inde ita , non ut natus sit ipse qui genuit , ( nam quomodo erit ipse , cùm genitus sit ) sed in his ipsis subsistat ille qui genitus est , in quibus totus est ipse , qui genuit : quia non ex alia genitus , neque aliud quam deus est , quia non est aliunde quod genitus est . hil. ibid. unius cujusque intelligentiam consulo , quid existimet in eo quod dictum sit , ex ipso . utrumne ex altero intelligendum sit , anne ex nullo , an ipse ille censendus sit . ex altero non est , quia ex ipso est ; id est , ne aliunde praeterquam ex deo deus sit . ex nihilo non est , quia ex ipso est ; demonstratur enim natura unde nativitas est . ipse non est , quia ubi ex ipso est , nativitas filii resertur ex patre . hilar de trin. l. . nescit enim in deo portionem , se● scit deum totum ex deo toto ; seit ex uno unum , non desectum , sed natum : seit nativitatem dei , nec d●minutienem esse gignentis , nec infirmitatem esse nascentis . ibid. quod deus est , deus totum est — deus ut est deus , quod est permanet , & permanens deum genuit . ibid. deus qui ex deo natus est , non utique natus ex nihilo est , neque de non extantibus natus est , sed nativitatis suae viventem habuit naturam , nec idem deus , qui erat , sed deus ex dec qui erat natus est . ibid. sed quia ex deo deus , neque per nativitatem suam deo ademit , quoa deus est , neque ipse in nativitate non deus est , & quod deus est non caepit esse , sed natus ex deo deus est , & quod nascitur , id ipsum secundum humanae naturae sensum videtur esse prolatum , & ita ut prelatio ipsa nativitas esse existimetur ; idcirco tentatum est per valentini haeresim prolationis nomen excludi , ne nativitatis veritas permaneret , quia prolationis intelligentia opinione terrena non multum esset à natura terrenae nativitatis aliena . ibid. de quâ pater substantia , & ipse substantia filius , spiritusque substantia , sed ter ipsa substantia . marius victorinus afer . hym . . bl. patr. vol. . p. . filium non similem , sed eundem diximus , quippe ex cadem substantia . id. adv . arium . l. . p. . non itaque secundum genus & speciem ista dicimus , sed quasi secundum communem eandemque materiam . aug. de trin ▪ l. . nec sic ergo trinitatem dicimus tres personas vel substantias , unam essentiam & unum deum , tanquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant , quanqam quicquid illud est , in his tribus explicatum sit ; non enim aliquid aliud ejus essentiae est praeter istam trinitatem ; tamen tres personas ejusdem essentioe , vel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus , tres personas ex eadem essentia non d●cimus — cùm dicuntur tres honanes una natura , vel tres homines ejusdem naturae , possunt ctiam dici ●res homines ex eadem naturâ , quia ●n cadem naturâ & alti tres homines possunt existere . in illa verò essentia trinitatis , nullo modo alia quaelibet persona ex eadem essentia potest existere . aug. de trin. l. . c. . nam si genus est essentia , species autem substantia sive persona , ut nonnulli sentiunt ; omitto illud quod iam dixi , oportere appellare tres essentias , ut appellantur tres substantiae vel personae , sicut appellantur tres equi , eademque animalia tria , cùm sit species equus , animal genus ; neque enim species ibi pluraliter dicta est , & genus singulariter , tanquam diceretur tres equi unum animal , sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine , ita tria animalia generali nomine . quod si dicunt substantiae vel personae nomine non speciem significari , sed aliquid singulare atque individuum , ut substantia & persona non ita dicatur , sicut dicatur homo , quod commune est omnibus hominibus , sed quomodo dicitur hic homo , velut abraham , velut isaac , velut iacob , vel si quis alius qui etiam digito praesens demonstrar : possit ; sic quoque illos eadem rati● consequetur ; sicut enim dicuntur abraham , isaac , & iacob , tria ina●vidua , ita tres homines . & tres animae ; cur ergo & pater & filius & spiritus sanctus , si secundum genus & speciem & individuum etiam ista disserimus , non ita dicuntur tres essentiae , vel tres substantiae & personae . sed haec , ut dixi , omitto , si essentia genus est , una essentia jam non habet species . non sunt ergo tres species unius essentiae pater & filius & spiritus sanctus . si aut●m species est essentia ▪ sicut species est homo , tres vero illae quaes appellamus substantias sive personas , sic candem speciem communiter habent , quemadmodum abraham , isaac , & iacob , speciem quae homo dicitur communiter habent , non autem sicut homo sub●ividitur in abraham , isaac , & iacob . ita unus homo & in aliquos si●gulos homines subdi vidi potest , om●●no enim non potest , quia unus homo jam singulus homo est : cur ergo una essentia in tres substantias vel personas subdividiutr : nam si essentia species est . sicut homo , sic est una essencia sicut unus homo . aug de tr. l. . c. ● non enim major essentia est pater & filius & spiritus sanctus simul , quam solus pater out solus filius ; sed tres simul illae substantiae sive personae , si ita dicendae sunt , aequales sunt singules , quod animalis homo non percipit . ibid. teuenda est haec regula , quâ non minor est filius , sed de patre esse int●matur , quibus verbis non inaequalitas , sed nativitas ejus ostendatur . aug. de trin. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. contr . gregal . sabell . vol. . p. . quanquam in ejusmodi nominum usu , cùm singularem & individuam dei esse naturam dicimus , proprietas est observanda significationis : ne sic singularis credatur esse natura , ut communis esse nequeat : & sic individua , ut in unâ tantùm existat persona , vel hypostasi , qui fuit sabellianorum ac similium haereticorum error , ob quem nonnulli patres istis repudiatis vocibus , it a divinitatem unam esse docuerunt , quomodo natura quaelibet communis pluribus una dicitur . petav. de trin. l. . c. . sect . . p. . nec sit dissimilis in genere , quia diversitatem substantiae geniti ex substantiâ patris filii similitudo non recipit , & omnem in se divinitatis paternae , qualis & quanta est , formam invisibilis dei filius & imago complectitur . et hoc verè est esse filium , paternae scilicet formae veritatem , coimaginatae in se naturae perfecta similitudine retulisse . hilar. de syn. retinetur it aque in patre & filio naturae indifferentis similitudo per essentiae nativitatem , non tamen damnum personae affert , ut unus sit missus & mittens , similitudo naturae — quia cùm gignens & genitus unus esse non possit , non tamen diversae naturae sint natus & generans . ibid. in naturâ dei deus unus est , it a tamen ut & filius deus sit , quia in so natura non differens sit ; & cùm deus ex deo sit , non potest non uterque deus esse , quorum per generis indifferentiam — non discernatur essentia . ibid. petav. de trin. l. . c. . si ad exact am philosophiae regulam qui de deo habetur sermo dirigatur , non sic ejusdem substantiae , id est , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sunt tres personae , uti petrus , pauleus , & ioannes ; quod tamen antiqui in omni f●rè sua disputatione ponunt , quam contra arianos instituunt . petav. de trin. l. . s. . p. . neque verò culpandi ob id illi erunt ▪ aut inscitiae daumandi , tanquam numeralem unitatem divinae essentiae funditùs ignorarint ac solam ejus , quae in natura inest humana , similem agnoverint . nam & priorem illam intellexerunt , ut mox ostendam ; & prudenter nihi lominus hâc sunt it . exemplam usi posteriore , speci●ique propriâ etenim sic illi adversus arianos obnitendum sibi esse meminerant , ut scirent sabellianam quoque pesiem esse vitandam ; in quam ab illa fugienti praeceps lapsus erat , ac lubricus . itaque modum hunc adhibendum or ationi suae putarunt ; ut summam illam conjunctionem , & , ut gregorius nyssenus loquitur , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , parcius inducerent , ne sabellianae solitudini & singularitati locus dari videretur ; alteram verò quae speciei convenit , libentiùs usurparent : quae cùm ad arianorum retundendam insaniam satis illis erat , tum ab sabelliani suspicione dogmatis , & calumnia longè cos abesse monstrabat . ibid. petav. de trin. l. . c. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. or. . p. . ath. or . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ ath. in expos . fidei . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. naz. orat. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . at h decr. syn. n p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . c●nt . arian . or. . p. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . v. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. decr. syn. nic. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . bas. ad eunom . c. . p. . tom. . par. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — ath. c. ar. o. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . basil. ep. . gr. nyss. d ediffer . essent . & hypost . exclusa est assertio volentium nominibus tantum patrem & filium praedicare , cùm imago omnis ejus ad quem coimaginetur , species indifferens sit . neque enim ipse sibi quisquam imago est , sed eum cujus imago est , necesse est ut imago demonstret . imago est itaque rei ad rem coaequandae imagiuata & indiscreta similitudo . est ergo pater , est & filius , quia imago patris est filius . et qui imago est ut vere imago sit , speciem necesse est & naturam & essentiam , secundum quod imago est , in se habeat autoris . hilar . de synod . pet. de tri. l. . c. , & . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . basil cont . sabellianos . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. haec est verae nativitatis intelligentia , & fidei nostrae , quae ex natura divinae unitate , unius indifferentisque divinitatis veritatem in patre & filio confitetur , absolutissimum sacramentum . hil. de trin. l. . p. . bas. . exaequata virtus est per naturae indissimilis unitatem . p. . omnia habere sola natura possit indifferens , neque nativitas aliquid possit habere , nisi datum sit . — neque aliter potuit aut debuit filius à patre distingui , quàm quod natus sit , nec tamen differens doceretur . ibid. non confunditur itaque aut aboletur natura , ne filius sit , nec tamen rursum adimitur natura , ne deus sit , nec discernuntur diversitate , ne unum sint , neque quod unum sunt id potest praestare , ne uterque sit . p. . ego & pater unum sumus : ut quod unum sunt , nec diversum nec solitarium crederetur , non alia in utroque per nativitatis & generationis proprietatem existente natura . — confessionem unius in utroque & consimilis naturae . . quia non differt , nec degenerat nativitas , — dum dei filius , non aliud quàm deus est . vnum dixit , ne fiat discretio potestatis ; sumus addidit , ut patrem filiumque cognoscas , quo perfectus pater perfectum filium genuisse credatur . et pater & filius unum sint , non confusione , sed unitate naturae . ambr. de fide , l. . initio . non enim pater ipse qui filius , sed inter patrem & filium generationis expressa distinctio est ; ut ex deo deus , ex manente manens , ex pleno plenus sit . — est enim plenitudo divinitatis in patre , est plenitudo divinitatis in filio , sed non discrepans , sed una divinitas . nec confusum quod unum est , nec multiplex quod indifferens . — quanto magis pater & filius unum sunt , ubi nec substantiae nec voluntatis ulla est differentia . — in te igitur est deus per unitatem naturae , & non est deus praeter te per proprietatem substantiae , repulsam differentiae . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( fortà 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyss. catech. or. praef. gr. nyss. cat . or . c. . deus est essentia spiritualis , intelligens , verax , bona , pura , justa , misericors , liberima , immensae potentiae & sapientiae , pater aeternus , qui filium imaginem suam ab aterno genuit , & filius imago patris coaeterna , & spiritus sanctus procedens à patre & filio , &c. melanct. loci theol. de deo. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyss. ad ablabium , vol. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . gr. nyss. ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. diversitas plures facit , unitas potestatis excludit numeri quantitatem , quia unitas numerus non est , sed haec omnium ipsa principium est . ambr. de fide , c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyss. catech. or. cap. . n●merus enim duplex est , unus quidem , quo numeramus , alter verò , qui in rebus numerabilibus constat ; ergo in numero quo numeramus , repetitio unitatum facit pluralitatem ; in rerum vero numero non facit pluralitatem unitatum repetitio . boet. de duabus in christo naturis . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . basil. apolog . ad caesar. ep. . p. . t. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ibid. peter lomb. lib. . dist . . estius , lib. . dist . . sect . . lib. . dist . . damascen . de orthod . fide l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damasc. de orth. fide. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — ibid. contra eunom . l. . pet. de tr. l. c. , , . petav. de tr. l. . c. . s. . l. . dist . . parte prima . q. . art. . sicut nos d●●in●us in divinis pluraliter tres personas , & tres subsistentias , ita graeci dicunt tres hypostases . sed quia nomen substantiae , quod secund●m preprietatem significationis respond●● hypostasi , aequ●●●ocatur ●pud nos , cùm ●uandoque significet essentiam , quandoque hypostasin , ne pess● esse erroris occasio , maburunt pro hyp●stasi tran ferre s●bsistentiam , quam sabscantiam . ibid. q. . art . . ad secundum . ecce expresse dicitur , quòd persona secundum substantiam decitur , ut cum decitur , pater est persona , hic sit sensut , pater est divina essentia ; similiter cùm dicitur , filius est persona . spiritus sanctus est persona , id est divina essentia . lomb. dist . . idem , dist. . dist. . hoc etiam modo sanè potest accipi persona in praemissis locutionibus , cùm dicitur alia est persona patris , alia filii , id est , alia est proprietas , quâ pater est pater , alia , quâ filius est filius , alia , quâ spiritus sanctus est spiritus sanctus . ita etiam nomine personae quidam proprietates intelligere volunt , cùm dicuntur tres personae ; sed melius est ut subsistentias vel hypostases intelligamus , cum dicimus tres personas . ex praedictis colligitur , quòd nomen personae in trinitate triplicem tenet intelligentiam ; est enim ubi facit intelligentiam essentiae , & est ubi facit intelligentiam hypostasis , & est ubi facit intelligentiam proprietatis ▪ dist. . de tr. l. . c. . basil. ep. . ep. . quae liguendi rati●nes indicent , personat illas , — non unum & simpl●x hahere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , neque diversas solum c●●idem individui functiones & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quibus appel ationes variae comp●●ant — s●d diversitatem illam & mul●iplicitatem in subjecto esse revera , ac tria emnino ex se distincta , & su●sistentibus proprietatibus separata consistere . petav. l. . c. . p. . de trin. l. . c. , . see dr. payn ' s letter to the bishop of rochester . see the defence of dr. sherlock ' s notion of a trinity in unity , p. . &c. adeo propter summam unitatem & simplicitatem excluditur omnis pluralitas absolutè dictorum , non autem pluralitas relationum quae relationes praedicantur de aliquo ut ad alterum , & sic compositionem in ipso de quo dicuntur non important . aquin. . q. . art . , ad . imago enim est similitudo non quaecunique , sed ex eo , cujus imago dicitur expressa ; respondent enim sibi invicem imago & exemplar . proinde non quaecunque sibi mutuò sunt multum similia , ut ovum ovo , sunt ejusmodi , ut alterum sit imago alterius ; non enim in his omnibus , verbi gratia in ovis , alterum de altero expressam gerit figuram , sed quod ex re objecta resultat in speculo , & similitudo sigilli cerae impressa , & alia hujusmodi propriè imagines dicuntur . estius dist . s. . & aquin . q . in corpore . has proprietates designant nomina personarum , scilicet pater , filius , & spiritus sanctus ; quae relativa sunt , & ad se invicem dicuntur . quia notant relationes , quae non sunt deo accidentales , sed in ipsis personis ab aeterno sunt immutabiliter , ut non modo appellationes sunt relativae , sed etiam relationes , sive notiones in rebus ipsis , scilicet in personis sint . lomb. l. . dist . . pater non dicitur nisi à paternitate , & filius à filiatione ; si igitur paternitas & filiatio non sunt in deo realiter , sequitur , quòd deus non sit realiter pater aut filius , sed secundum rationem intelligentiae tantum , quae est haeresis sabelliana . aqu. . q. . art . . relationes in divinis , cùm sint secundum processiones in identitate naturae , reales quasdam in divinis esse relationes necessarium est . ibid. respectus in natura rerum sunt relationes reales , cùm aliquid procedit à principio ejusdem naturae , necesse est quod ambo , scilicet procedens , & id à quo procedit in eodem ordine conveniant , & sic oportet quod habeant reales respectus ad invicem . ib. relatio realiter in deo existens , idem est essentiae secundum rem . aq . q. . art . . relationes personales nec à personis , nec ab essentia reip●â distingui . estius dist . . s. . l. . aquinas & estius , ibid. aqui. . q. . ar. . lomb. l . d. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . nyss. orat. cat. cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. leontius de sectis act. . b.p. gr. l. t. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . theod. abuc . op. . b. p. gr. l. p. . athan. decr. syn. nic. t. i. p. . sed nec sicut hierachas lucernam dixit de lucerna , vel lampadem in duas partes . hilar. de tr. c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. syn. nic. decr . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . dionys. alex. ap . athan. syn. nicen. decr . t. i. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. cont . arian . or. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. syn. nic. decret p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. or. . c. ar. p. . hil. c . de tr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ath. or. . c ar. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nyss. ad abl. vol. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . see the defence of dr. sherlock 's notion of a trinity in unity . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . theophyl . in locum . sed c●m na●ura dei in natura dei substi●●ss●● , id est , ex patre filius natus esser , per virtutis ac naturae in se paternae conscientiam , nihil ab se , ni●i quod patrem faci●ntem vidisset , fi●●●m fac●re poss● testatus est . et cum unigenitus deus pa●ern●e virtutis operationibus operaretur , tantum si●i a● fa●iendum praesumcret , quantum in conscientia sua esfet , inseparabil●m à se dei patris , quam per l●gitimam nativitatem ob●in ▪ bat , posse naturam ; non enim corporalibus modis via●● , sed visus ei omnis in virtute naturae est . hil. de trin. c. . et demonstratio operum non ignorationis instructio , sed nostrae fidei , quae non silio scientiam ignoratorum , sed nobis confess●onem nativitatis invexit — ut demonstratio ipsa nativitatis esse substantia d●ceretur , cui per dile●●●●ne● patris op●rum paterno●●● — esset cognata cognitio . ibid. quod a●tem videt , conscia in se na●●●ae s●●nificatur aguitio , & in eo nunc . 〈◊〉 dei cognosce naturam . ibid. u●●genitus igitur deus naturae in●e 〈◊〉 ●●nscius , &c. di●eun● 〈◊〉 se per loquentem loqui , & per operantum operari , & per judicantem judica●e , & per visum vi●●r● , & per r●con●●●●tem reconci●●●ri , & manere se in ●o , qui in se ma●●ret , qu●ero quo alio a● intellig●nt●● nostrae sensum expositionis sit●e 〈…〉 ap●rtio●i s●rmone , ut unum ●sse intellige●entur quam isio , quo p●r ●●●ivitatis verita●em , & naturae u●●tatem , qui●q●id filius ageret , & diceret , id in filio , pater & loqueretur & ageret ? non est hoc itaque naturae à se alienae . — sed perfecta nativitate in deum perfectum genitae divinitatis , cujus haec naturalis conscientiae fi●ucia est , ut dicat , ego in patre , & pa●er in me , & omnia , quae patres sant , mea sunt . id. l. . vide ci●m tacitus recum ipse congrederis , ratione hec ipsam agi intra te , e●cu●rente e●i tibi cum s●rmone , ad omnem cogitatûs tui motum , & omnem sensus tui pulsum . tert. cont. prax. p . paris . tert. contr. prax. c. . p. . cyr. l. . in joan. dion . de divin . nom . fulg. . ad mon. c. . unigenitus qui est in gremio patris , quod est esse deum , in gremio enim & in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 substantiae ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , uterque , & substantia & divinitate consistens , uterque in utroque , & cognoscit uterque utrumque . vict. afer . bl. patr. vol. . p. . id enim quod ait , ego & pater unum s●mus , tentant ad unanimitatis referre consensum , ut voluntatis in his unitas sit , non naturae ; id est , ut non per id quod idem sunt , sed per id quod id●●m volunt , un●m sent . hil. de tr. l . et quia dixit unum , intel●igant haeretici quod non dixit unus . unum enim neutral●ter positum , societatis concordiam , non unitat●m personae sonat . novat . de trin. c. . quod autem dictum est , ut sint quidem per substantiam tria , per consonantiam vero unum , non habet calummam , quia cognominato spiritu , id est , paracleto , consonantiae potius quam essentiae per similitudinem substantiae praedicare convenit unitatem . hil. de synod . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. gr. n●ss . cont eun. o● . . p . nou alta natura , quàm quae sui conscia est , diceret , ego & pater unum sumus . hil. de trin. c. . uterque hostis ecclesiae res ecclesiae agit ; dum sabellius deum ex natura in operibus praedicat ; hi verò ex sacramento fidei filium confitentur . ibid. quod si de nomine substantiae aut naturae divinae voluerint dicere , facile revincuntur , quia usiam gracè & latinè substantiam frequenter scriptura memoravit — quod si ex aliâ substantiâ filium dicunt , ipsi se revincunt , & verbum substantiae quod metuunt confitendo , & filium creaturis , quibus praeferre se simulant , conferendo . ambr. de fide , c. . tom. . bas. . p. . aut quid est ousia , aut unde dicta , nisi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quod semper maneat ; cui enim esse est semper , deus est , & ideo maneus semper ousia dicitur divina . ambr. ibid. c. . non igitur verbum , sed vim verbi fugiunt , quia nolunt , verum esse dei filium . — sicut autor ipsorum eusebius nicomediensis epistola sua prodidit , dicens , siverum , inquit , dei filium & increatum dicimus , homousion cum patre incipimus confiteri . haec cùm lecta esset epistola in concilio nicaeno , hoc verbum in tractatu fidei posuerunt patres , quod id viderunt adversariis esse formidini , ut tanquam evaginato ab ipsis gladio ipsorum nefandae caput haeresis amputarent . ibid. p. . certè ne quis posset errare , sequatur ea quibus scriptura sancta ut intelligere possimus filium significat . verbum dicitur , filius dicitur , dei virtus dicitur , dicitur dei sapientia . ib. c. . p. . de substantia autem , imperator auguste , quid loquar unius filium cum patre esse substantiae , cùm imaginem paternae substantiae filium legerimus , ut in nullo secundum divinitatem à patre intelligas discrepare ? iuxta h●nc imaginem dixit , omnia quae pater habet , mea sunt ; ergo nec substantiam in deo possumus denegare . ambr. de fide. c. . p. . mihi enim impossibile est generationis scire secretum . mens deficit , vox silet , non mea tantum , sed & angelorum . id. c. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damasc. orth. fid. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . arist. categ . cap. . t. . p. . theor. leg. ad armen . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damasc. orth. fid. l . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damas. orth. fid. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damasc. o●th . fid. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . d●m . orth. fid. l. . c. . damasc. orth. fid. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damasc. ibid. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. damasc. fid. orth. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damasc . orth. fid. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 damas● . orth. fid. l. . c. . & cap. . see doctor payn 's letter to the b of r. aqu. p. . quaest. . art. . the distinction between real and nominal trinitarians exam. p. . notes for div a -e reply to thesecond defence of the twenty eight propositions , p. . a treatise concerning the trinitie of persons in vnitie of the deitie written to thomas mannering an anabaptist, who denyed that iesus is very god of very god: but man onely, yet endued with the infinite power of god. gill, alexander, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a stc estc s this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a treatise concerning the trinitie of persons in vnitie of the deitie written to thomas mannering an anabaptist, who denyed that iesus is very god of very god: but man onely, yet endued with the infinite power of god. gill, alexander, - . [ ], p. by simon stafford, dwelling on adling hill neere carter-lane, imprinted at london : . signed at end: alecsander gil. the bodleian copy has date in imprint changed by pen to read . reproduction of the original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng jesus christ -- divinity -- early works to . trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - elspeth healey sampled and proofread - elspeth healey text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a treatise concerning the trinitie of persons in vnitie of the deitie . written to thomas mannering an anabaptist , who denyed that iesus is very god of very god : but man onely , yet endued with the infinite power of god. ( ⸪ ) imprinted at london by simon stafford , dwelling on adling hill neere carter-lane . ● . to my very louing and deare friend master thomas white , a citizen of bristow . while i was at norwich , in the yeere . i writ this treatise vpon such occasiō as appears therein , and deliuered it vnto that heretike , that by himselfe , if god would , he might consider and be perswaded since which time i haue kept it by me : and though some of my priuate friends desired copies ; yet allowing that wisdome of solon , who would make no law against patricide , least the mention of the fact might giue occasion to commit it : and withall considering that it is too s●mple and poore for the publike view ; i haue hitherto refused to make it common . yet now perceiuing a present necessitie , because that s ●me of late haue wandered in this labyrinth : & withall remembring , that of any weakling shall hereafter entertaine this opinion , he may , before he be wholy possessed therewith , find the absurditie of it and be reformed ▪ that many a nouice in christianitie , who therefore doubts of the truenesse of his religion , because he findes no familiar reason to perswade , but onely the racke of authorities to 〈◊〉 him to acknowledge it ; may perhaps be hereby satisfied and find comfort : and that they who are already strong , may by this ouerplus , triumph in the goodnesse of god , who requires them to beleeue no more , then they may by that vnderstanding , which he hath giuen them , be perswaded of : i haue for their sakes , who may reape benefite thereby , set at nought all other censurers , not guilty vnto my selfe of any offence which i can commit in making it publike . such as it is , accept ( good master white ) as a parcell of that assertion , which may hereafter follow , of euery article of our christian faith ; if god shall vouchsafe me vnderstanding , leasure , and maintenance thereto . i therefore offer it vnto you , both because i know you are diligent in reading bookes of good argument ; and because i haue none other meanes , whereby to shew my selfe thankefull for your manifold kindnesses and your loue . at london , this . of april . . your louing and assured friend , a. g. the treatise . though many things discouraged mee to write vnto you of this argument in such sort as i intend ; considering that neither your daily reading of the scripture , neither the perswasion of learned diuines can moue you to accord vnto the trueth ; though by manifest testimonie of scripture they conuince your heresie : and most of all , that god hath left you to beleeue that lying spirit of antichrist , who denyeth that iesus is that christ : yet neuerthelesse , hauing some hope that god of his goodnes will at last pull you as a brand out of the fire , and quench you with the dew of his grace , that you may grow in the knowledge of his sonne ; i wil as briefly as i can , lay down some few reasons of that faith , which euery one that will be saued must hold . whereby if i perswade you nothing , yet shall i obtayne thus much ; that you , who neither beleeued his word , nor yet opened your eyes to see the light of reasonable vnderstanding , shall at last confesse , that his word and iudgements are holy and true . but before i come to the point , let mee first perswade you , that although the knowledge of the holy trinity be one of the most high mysteries which can be knowne or beleeued , and that it is the onely work of the holy ghost to work this faith and knowledge in the heart of man , yet neuertheles , god hath not left vs destitute of meanes , whereby to come to this faith and knowledge ; but hath also with his word , giuē vs a reasonable soule & vnderstanding , whereby to grow in the knowledge of himself & his will. for whē adam was created , he had giuen vnto him all perfite knowledge meete for him . now god , who created the world for no other purpose , thē the manifestation of his owne glory , might not leaue that creature without vnderstanding of the godhead , who being by nature & creatiō the most excellent in this world , was made for that purpose especially aboue al other , to set forth his prayse and to call on him . now how could he do this , if he knew him not ? but ( i think that ) seeing it is said , that mā was created in the image of god , you wil not deny that man before his fal , had much more perfit vnderstanding of the godhead , thē it is possible for him to haue , till he come to know euen as he is knowen , but that by him ( you may say ) this knowledge was lost : not lost , but corrupted onely , euen as mans will. for then it should follow that wee were inferiour to bruit beasts , who haue in thē a sensible knowledge meete for that ende whereto they were created . furthermore , it is not possible that mans sin should frustrate the ende which god intended in his creation , but it is manifest , that man was created to know and honour the creator . againe , seeing in christ al things consist , hee being ordained of the father before all worldes , in whom the world should be both created and restored ; it is plaine that this light of our vnderstanding both proceedeth from him , and is restored in him , as it is said , ioh. . he is that light which lightneth euery man that commeth into the world , not onely his chosen with knowledge of his sauing trueth , but euen generally euery man with reasonable vnderstanding , whereby wee may know whatsoeuer is to be known of god : & how ? euen by the works of god , as it is plainely concluded , rom. . , . therefore are they not to bee heard , who hold any thing without the compasse of faith , which is without the compasse of knowledge . for faith ought so to be grounded on knowledge , as hope is grounded vpon faith. so that as faith , heb. . . is sayd to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an euiction or proofe of things hoped for , though they bee not seene ▪ so may i say that knowledge is the proofe of things which are beleeued . for faith is nothing els but the conclusion of a particular syllogisme , drawen from the conclusion of an vniuersall , which the knowledge of god had cōcluded , as it is manifest , iam. . . & heb. . . by conference of which two places it appeareth , that this knowledge , of which i speake , this historicall faith , as to beleeue that there is one god which made all things of nought , is onely such a knowledge , as the deuils & wicked men haue : but to beleeue , and haue confidence in this god , is that particular conclusion , & that faith which causeth vs to haue hope in his promises . therefore said christ , haue fayth in god : that is , striue to know god , that knowing , you may haue faith , and beleeue in him . and wee see that in these things , where a bare faith without knowledge might seeme to be most required , because as a man would thinke , there were no reason to be giuen of them , namely , concerning the maintenance of this life , and the resurrection to the life to come ; both christ and his apostles vse no other reasons , but such as euery reasonable man may easily be perswaded by , though authorities of scripture were not wanting to both purposes , as it is manifest , mat. . and . cor . yea paul at athens , or wheresoeuer he perswaded the worship of the true god among the gentiles , hee perswaded not by authority of scripture , which amongst thē had bene very weake ; but by such argumēts as they knew to be sufficient euē in thēselues . if these things were not so ; how thē could the gentiles which knew not the scriptures , he without excuse for their ignorance of god ? therefore i conclude , that there is nothing which is beleeued , but it may also be knowen . now knowledge ( we know ) is ingendred by such principles as haue truth in thē , the which is euident of it selfe . so that by plaine and reasonable vnderstanding , a man may knowe whatsoeuer he beleeueth . you wil say , to what purpose then serue the scriptures ? i answere : that god , infinite in goodnesse , hath together with this vnderstanding & light of nature , giuen vs withall his word , as a greater light whereby our lesser lights might become more shining : that he hath giuen vnto vs not only an inward word , to wit , our natural vnderstanding ; but also an outward worde , as a most illustrious commētary , both of declaration and amplification of that text ; whereby we may the better vnderstand , whatsoeuer wee ought to vnderstand without it . but how thē commeth it to passe , that all men haue not faith ? and how is faith sayd to bee the gift of god ? the first is answered , rom. . and ephe. . for hardnes of their heart , who when they knew god , did not glorifie him as they ought : therefore their imaginations ▪ became vaine , & their foolish heart was ful of darkenes . and for this cause is faith also sayd to bee the gift of god. first , in respect of that knowledge whence it doeth proceede , which knowledge is his gift . secondly , because it is the onely worke of god , to make that knowledge to become fruitful , by laying it so vnto mans heart , that the hardnesse thereof may bee remoued , that when wee know god to bee good and iust , we also beleeue and worship him as we ought . thirdly and most especially , because that god oftentimes pardoning the ignorance which men haue of himselfe and the creature , doth so illumine the heart with 〈◊〉 holy spirit , that it is suddenly 〈◊〉 without any previant knowledge , to faith and obedience . the trueth whereof neuertheles doth not any whit impugne that which i say , that god hath giuen vnto euery man so much vnderstanding as to know what he ought to beleeue , and to bee satisfied for the reasons of his fayth , if he could open his eyes to see in the middest of what wonderous light hee were placed . this point is manifest both by many scripture-authorities , and by many reasons which i omit . but taking this as either granted , or sufficiently prooued , that god hath giuen vs light of vnderstanding , whereby to yeeld a reason of the hope that is in vs ; a reason i say euen of euery article of our faith : let vs with holy reuerence come vnto the thing in question , and see what reason wee haue for our defence . i will therefore a while forbeare to vse the authoritie of holy scripture ; not that i esteeme the waight or euidence of any reason comparable thereto : but onely perceiuing by that talke i had with you , that you had read the scripture , as one of those whom peter noteth , . epist . . . not intending to wrangle about your wrested interpretations ; i wil first propone the euidence of reasonable proofe : and afterwards bring in the assent of holy scripture , that you may perceiue in what wondrous cleare light you striue to be blinde . and because i know not what your opinion is concerning god , ( for he that denieth the godhead of christ , may as well denie the godhead absolutely : ) that beeing one steppe toward the question , i will proceed orderly , and giue you also a reason of our faith , concerning that matter : taking this onely as granted , which is rife in euery mans knowledge , that both the termes of contradiction , cannot bee affirmed of the same subiect : that is , that one and the same thing cannot be both affirmed and denied , of the same subiect , at one time , and in the same respect . but first , by the name of god , know that i meane an eternall being , infinite in goodnesse , in power , in wisedome , in glory , in vertue , and onely worthie of endlesse loue and honour . my reason is thus . if there be not a being which had no beginning , then of necessitie , that which was first existent or begunne , must be a beginning vnto it selfe , by causing of it selfe to be , when it was not . but this is impossible , that any thing should bee a cause , and not bee : for so should it both bee and not be ; therefore there is an eternall being , which is the beginning , middle and ende of all things , and himselfe without beginning , and this eternall beeing wee call god. my reason is plaine to bee vnderstood ; and remember what i haue said , that i may goe on . whatsoeuer is without beginning , is also without ending ; because it hath no superiour which might bring it to nothing : therefore god is eternall . againe , whatsoeuer comes to nothing , is corrupted by his contrary ; but nothing can be opposite to god , therefore hee is eternall . or else i might thus reason . being and not being are such contraries , as one of them cannot spring out of another : for euery thing , for the preseruations sake of it selfe , doth represse and corrupt the contrary . seing then that there is beeing , which could not possibly raise it selfe out of not being , it followes that being had a primacy or prioritie before not beeing : and therefore of necessitie must be eternall ; for otherwise there was a time , wherein it might be said , that being is not being , & so not being should haue been first , and contradictories might haue stood together : but both these are impossible , therefore there is an eternall being ; and this eternall being , wee call god. furthermore wee know , that the greatest excellencie or perfection of euery thing , is in the proximitie or approch thereof vnto the first cause . but euery thing is more excellent in the being thereof , then in the not being : therefore beeing was before not being ; and for that cause eternall . now eternitie is an infinite continuance : therefore whatsoeuer is eternall , must of necessitie be infinite : and this infinite being , we call god. moreouer , whatsoeuer hath infinite continuance , hath infinite power to continue infinitely ; and this omnipotent or endlesse power we call god. i might reason likewise of his goodnes , of his wisedome , trueth , glory , &c. but one shall serue in stead of the rest , and i will take his wisedome for my example , and proue vnto you , that likewise to be infinite , and that not onely in existence , but in action also . and first that hee is wise ; god is most worthy to be such as he is : but if he were not wise , he were not worthy to bee god : ergo hee is wise . now marke how these depende one on another . in god is wisedome , which by reason of his infinitie , is also infinite : and by his eternitie , is also eternal : so that there is no time , wherein it may be said , that this infinite wisdom is not infinitely exercised , for then were it not eternally infinite . therefore his wisedome is infinite , not in existence onely , but also in action . againe , the wisedome of god is such , as hath no defect or imbecillitie therein . but if it were not infinite both in action and in existence , a man might find defect therein , and imagine a more infinite wisedome then that is , but this is impossible . so might i conclude of all the other dignities of god , but i haste to the purpose , and i thinke that you will not vnwillingly graunt what i haue said , but vnderstand the rest . all the dignities of god beeing actuated or brought into working , require of necessitie an infinite obiect , whereon they worke , because they thēselues are infinite : but nothing can be infinite , but god alone , therfore it followeth that these dignities are obiected or exercised in god alone . and this is that eternal sonne , begottē before the worlds , in whome the father resteth : or as the prophet speaketh , his beloued , in whome his soule delighteth ; which cannot be applyed to any creature , without which , god is happy in him selfe : therefore saith the apostle , that in him dwelleth the godhead bodily . how is that ? not in his manly body eternally ; for his humane body tooke beginning of the flesh of the virgin , when the fulnes of time came , but yet bodily , that is , as essentially , or substantially , as the body of a man is substantiall to the man. for euery dignity of god being infinite in action ( as was proued ) must of necessitie produce such as it selfe is . as for example ; the wisdome of god or his infinite vnderstanding , must haue an infinite intelligible or vnderstandable obiect , which is produced thereby , by an infinite vnderstanding . so that ye must know of necessitie , and marke three termes , as i will a while call them : the terme from whence : the terme whereto , or wherein : and the middle terme betweene them . i will for your capacitie , which i know not to bee much exercised in these matters , make a comparison meet for your vnderstanding . when the minde or vnderstanding of a man conceiueth any vnderstandable obiect , then is ( you know ) first the vnderstanding in the minde it selfe , secondly the obiect vnderstood , and thirdly , the discourse or vnderstanding , whereby that obiect is apprehended . now giue me leaue to tell you , what differences you must make , betweene the vnderstanding of god , and the vnderstanding of man in this comparison . first , the minde of man beeing finite , the vnderstanding is not able to view al that which can be vnderstood thereby at one time , or with one action of vnderstanding , but must conceiue of one thing after another : whereas the vnderstanding and wisedome of god is such , as at one sight seeth himselfe , and euery thing els , past , present , and to come ; and this not once onely , but euen continually , because it is eternally infinite . secondly , the intendement of man worketh nothing in the thing conceiued , to make it either to be , if it be a meere conceit , or to be other then it is , if it be existent : but the vnderstanding of god , is by reason of his power so actiue , as that it causeth that wherein it is exercised , both to be , and that according to his maner of apprehension or vnderstanding of it : which vnderstanding is by his infinitie so infinite , and by his eternitie so continuall , as that of necessitie there must bee a subsistence or a person , wherein it must be exercised , which must also be infinite and eternall . and this is that glorious sonne of god , who is thus begotten or produced eternally , both before the world was , euen as hee is now , and shall not cease to be produced after the world shall cease eternally . thus you see two of the termes spoken of : from whence , & wherein : now you must know the middle terme betweene them . the terme whence , is the wisedome intelligent , god the father . the terme wherein , is the wisedome intelligible , god the sonne . the middle terme is , ipsum intelligere , which in my comparison i called , the discomse it selfe , which also in this must needs bee infinite . for an infinite intelligible , cannot bee conceiued of an infinite intelligent , but by an infinite intelligere ; and this is that holy ghost , which as you may easily vnderstand , must of necessitie proceede from both the father and the sonne , and be also infinite and eternall , and therefore god. now because they are all infinite , and of infinite , essentially there can bee but one : therefore are these three in essence or being , one , but in subsistence or cleare distinction of persons , three . vnderstande my comparison which i made : i will yet cleare the matter further for your conceyuing . if you take in a myrrour , the light of the sunne , and reflect it directly thereon againe , in the sunne it is one , in the glasse another , and yet the reflection of the beames , is also a third , but for all this , there is but one nature and worde of light , which comprehends al three : so is it in this tri-vnitie of which i speake . my leisure serues me not to dilate these things , but i hope you are able to vnderstand what i say , therefore i will proceed . it is said , that powers are knowne by their actions , and actions are limitted by their obiects . i know the meaning of it , and it is not vnfitte in this place . but to my reason : the power of god is infinite , and by his infinite wisedome hee knoweth it to be infinite : but god could not know that his power were infinite , vnlesse he were able thereby to bring forth an infinite action ; and euery infinite action must of necessitie be exercised in an infinite subiect . ( for whatsoeuer is receiued , is receiued according to the capacitie of the receiuer : ) therefore there is an infinite subiect , wherein the power of god is exercised : that is the sonne of whom i speake . and here againe behold the tri-vnitie ; an infinite power the father ; an infinite action the holy ghost ; an infinite subiect the glorious sonne ; all three one infinite being . returne to your comparison . as the vnderstanding of man could no way know his owne power , but by his actions , neither can there be any actions of vnderstanding , where there is nothing to be vnderstood , no more is it possible to bee in the deitie . now vnderstand that , as i haue reasoned from the wisedome and power of god : so might i reason from all his other dignities : so that for one reason which i haue brought . i might haue brought you fiftie . but i shew you the way , if you be guided by the spirit of trueth , how you may strengthen your selfe in the way of trueth : therefore i wil goe on , and shew you yet more plainely by more familiar reasons . an infinite power is not more weake then a finite : but euery finite creature which we can cast our eies vnto , doth by nature produce his like , as much as in it is ; as a man begetteth a man ; trees bring forth seed , whereof their like in nature may spring , and in likewise euery other thing . therefore the infinite power of god begetteth his like also , which is the sonne , the image of the inuisible god , the first begotten of euery creature , col. . . but none can bee like vnto god in his being , who is not very god : therefore christ the onely begotten of the father is also very god. maruel not , that i make this argument from the creature to the creator ; for in this very point of the power & godhead , the holy ghost himselfe teacheth me to reason of the inuisible things of god ▪ by the things visible , rom. . . and hereby also learne to helpe your ignorance , and put away your wonder , how god should bee one , and yet three . see you not how the vnderstanding ? the sun-light also , is one in nature , and yet three in euident and cleare distinction ? though in so base and imperfect order , as that which is aboue all perfection , is possible to be aboue it . and further , see you not in euerie thing a bodie , a spirite and a life , which is the knot betweene them ? or rather , see you not how the very bodily composition is both one , and three ? one body which is vnited of three bodies ? that is , earth , water , and ayre , or oyle , which yet again in the root of their nature are but one . for oyle is but a due mixture of water and earth , meanely fixt , and meanely volatil ; and earth is but fixed water ; so that water which is but one , is the root of the three : as it is manifest , genesis . and . pet. . . they which vnderstand the rules of pyronomy , know what i say ; and if you vnderstand me wel , you would confesse , that not onely this instance which i haue brought , of earth , water and ayre ; but euen the whole frame of nature did proclaime the trinitie in the vnitie . you would , i say , confesse , that whatsoeuer may be knowne of god , is manifested in the creature . if i should here tell you , how the heauen , the earth , & the deepe , gen. . might be vnderstood mystically , and the analogie betweene the creator and the creature therein : and then tell you , what let the earth bring forth liuing soule , might meane , and compare it with that place , that which was made in him was life ; and then particularly for man , the lord god also made the man of the dust of the earth , and tell you , that it was so necessary , because that christ is terra ●●●enti●●… : and inforce an argument to proue the tri-vnitie , by that treble repetition of the man made in the image of god ; comparing it with that place , . cor. . . and . if i should then tell you , that it was necessarie that the sonne of god must become flesh , as well that the infinite iustice of god might be actuated in him , which could not bee actuated in him beeing onely god : as for many other reasons , both from the iustice , and mercie , and wisedome of god , though to a well sighted vnderstanding i might seeme to haue layd a precious foundation of philosophie diuine and natural : yet to you i might rather seeme perhaps to haue proponed cabalisticall dreames , then any sound argument to the thing in question . yet this will i tell you , and holde it for good diuinitie : that the mayne drift and scope of the whole scripture , is to shew the creation of all things in christ , through him and for him : and the restoring of the whole creature in man by him : that in al things he might haue the preeminence , col. . neyther doth this any whit derogate from the honour of the father . for first , it hath pleased the father , that in him should all fulnesse dwell : and besides , it is an honour aboue all honours vnto the father , to be the father of so glorious a sonne . therefore is this world and all the things therein , created to the image of christ , to expresse his glory , euen as he is the expressed image and glory of the father . and here is the worlds eternitie , which had in christ an eternall being ; according to that his name , esay . . . the father of eternitie . here are those separate ideas , about which plato and aristotle could neuer agree , and which neyther both of them , nor many of their followers did perfectly vnderstand : not that they might not by the frame of nature , and the wisedome which god had giuen to man , be vnderstood . for is not this world as a booke wherein wee may reade and vnderstand by the created trueths , what is the trueth which is increated ? but all true knowledge is the gift of god. therefore wrest not that place , coloss . . . against the christian search after the knowledge of nature , whereby aboue all other humane knowledges a man is brought to know god , and to honour him as he ought : but rather be sory , that your knowledge of nature is no more . for that will i tell you , to teach you to know your selfe , that there is nothing in the creature , which may be knowne , ( and all may bee knowne that is in the creature ) but man ought to know it , and to glorifie the creator thereby . and this great labour hath god giuen to men , that knowing how short they are of that they ought to be , they might bee humbled thereby , psal . . . eccles. . . and why ought this to seeme strange ? doth not god require that perfectiō at mans hand wherein he did create him ? and was he not created with perfect discourse to know the creature , that hee might therein behold the creator , and so glorifie his wondrous power and goodnesse ? but this question would draw mee from the question in hand : & therefore i wil briefly adde one reason more : and because my leisure is little , i will be as short as i can : but i pray you lend mee your eare ; for it is hard in english , an inartificiall language , to expresse my mind : but because you told me , you could a little latine , i will be bold here and there , to vse a word : my reason is thus . the whole and perfect nature of a principle or beginning is in god , who is alone the beginner of all things . now a principle is of three sortes , whereof euery one is so clearely distinct from another , as that one cannot possibly be that other : therefore in the vnitie of the deitie there is also such cleare distinction into a trinitie , as that one distinct cannot possibly be that other , from which hee is distinguished , yet in the vnitie of essence they are all one . the differences of a beginning stand thus ; it is either principium principians , non principiatum ; that is , a beginning , which is a beginner vnto another ; yet hath not his beginning from another , lest there should be a processe into infinitie a parte ante : this is god the father , to whom it is peculiar to beget the sonne , yet is himselfe neyther made ▪ nor created , nor begotten of any other . secondly , there is principium principiatum principians ; to witte , a beginning which hath his beginning of another , and is also a beginning to another , lest there should be any defect or imbecillitie in the beginning : and this is the euerlasting sonne , very god of very god , begotten of the substance of his father alone before thē worlds , neither made nor created . thirdly , there is principium principiatum non principians ; that is , a beginning , which is also begun , but is not a beginner vnto another : lest there should be a processe into infinitie a parte post : and this is the holy ghost , who proceedeth from the very substance and being of the father and the sonne , and is with them one god coeternall and coequall . but you will say , is not the holy ghost a beginner vnto any other ? how is he then the authour of our consolation ? and how is hee said to leade vs into all trueth , & c ? vnderstand what i meane : hee is not a beginner vnto any other of the same infinite essence or being with himselfe . for the beginnings which i spake of before , are in the essence of god alone now our spiritual consolation , whereof the holy ghost is said to be the beginner , is but an or effluence from that being , which he himselfe is ; as the light of the sunne doth illuminate euery bright body exposed to his light , and yet imparteth not his being thereto . you will againe obiect , that eternitie hath no beginning nor ending : how then can christ be both eternall and begun ? and how againe can he be equall to the father , whereas hee beeing begotten of the father , the father hath a prioritie before him ? i answere , that this beginning is none other , then that production or begetting , which i before declared , to haue been heretofore none other , then it is now and shall be eternally : as the sunne hath brought forth light since his creation , and shall still bring forth light till the worlds dissolution . for this action of god , whereby hee begetteth his sonne , is not a transeant action , to cause a passion in the subiect , and a repassion in the agent , for in such the subiect of necessitie should haue been existent before the action ; but this action is immanent , and therefore of necessitie of the same nature with the agent ; which agent because it is eternall , therefore the production is also eternal , and consequently the product , and so of necessitie very god. but you must euer remember what difference i made betweene the action of god , infinite in power , & therefore able to actuate the obiect ; and the immanent actions of our minde . now for the prioritie or posterioritie , you may obiect . i graunt there is prioritie among the persons of the godhead ; but of what kinde ? not of being ; for their essence is one , and therein is none afore or after another , neither is any one of the trinitie more or lesse god then another : not of time ; for they are all one eternitie : not of dignitie , for they are all one infinitie : and the sonne himselfe being very god , thinketh it no robberie to bee equall with god. but yet there is prioritie , and that of order onely ; for the father is in order before the sonne , because the sonne is begotten of the father : and the sonne likewise is before the holy ghost , because the holy ghost is the mutuall loue betweene the father and the sonne : and so proceeding from them both . i will make a comparison vnmeet for the matter of which i speake ; for to whom shall wee assimulate the highest ? but yet meete to helpe your vnderstanding . when a man doth dreame and imagine things which are not , there is , you know , the phantasie , the phantasme or thing imagined or dreamed , and the phansying or working of the phantasie about that obiect . now these three are all of one nature , and are one after another onely in order , and not in time . for the particular phantasie of such an obiect , is before the obiect , and makes it to haue an intentionall being ; then the obiect being , the discourse of the phantasie followeth in order , which neuerthelesse was in time as soone as it , obseruing euer the cautions that are to bee obserued . thus haue i very briefly showne not many reasons , but rather how that many reasons may bee showen for this christian assertion : yet haue i showen ynough to perswade any reasonable man , to yeelde meekely vnto the trueth of that doctrine , which is so euident both in the booke of god , and in euerie faithfull and true christian mans confession , and according to that discourse which is euident to euery mans vnderstanding . now giue me leaue to speake a little to those arguments which haue throwen the most learned of the iewes head-long to the feet of christ , to make thē acknowledge that the messiab must be both god and man. i will not herein doe any thing contrary to that , which in the beginning i protested , that is , not to compel you by authoritie of scripture , but to intreate you by reasonable perswasion , to encline your eare to the trueth . but because i may not without iniurie to the cause , leaue altogether out such manifest proofe , and without iniurie also to your selfe , who might thinke that i went about to sophisticate a true seeming vntrueth , which would not abide the touch : i will onely intend my finger to some very few , of many thousandes of axiomes of the scripture for this purpose , & leaue you to make the conclusion by your selfe , hoping that the iewes example may prouoke you to follow them , so farre forth as they haue followed the trueth . exod. . , it is said , the lord went before thē , &c. chap. . . the angel of god , which went before them , remoued : where christ the angell of the couenant , is called the lord iehouah . againe , exod. . . the lorde is a man of warre , his name is iehouah : therefore christ is god and man : who by his conflict vpon the crosse , triumphed ouer death and hell , as it is written in the gospell , the booke of the warres of the lord. againe , esay . . . vnto vs a childe is borne , there is his manhood : and vnto vs a sonne is given , and they shall call his name , the mightie god. and esay . vers . . your god will come and saue you . ierem. . . &c. i will rayse vp vnto dauid a righteous branch and a king shal raigne ▪ and this is the name whereby they shall call him , the lord our righteousnesse . and ierem. . vers . . iudah shall be saued , and be that shall saue her , is the lorde our righteousnesse . where the name vsed , is that great name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 iehouah , which is neuer giuen to any creature . zach. . . proues him god and man. what shall i cyte vnto you that of the second pslam ? thou art my sonne , this day haue i begotten thee : which place with many more , is brought in the epistle to the hebrewes , to this purpose , which is your question . these authorities the thalmadists , who sticke onely to the killing letter and apparant sense of the law , hold sufficient to put this matter out of doubt . now , if leauing this outward sense of the scripture , we should desire to know what is the quickning spirit thereof , and should ransacke the treasuries of the cabalists , remembring that place of our sauiour , matth. . . one iod , or tittle of the law shall not passe , till all bee fulfilled ; and should examine the question by the letters and pricks of the scripture , wee should more easily find an entrance , then an end thereto . yet for a taste take only the first . words of the law , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 breshith , bará , elohim : which may not vnfitly be thus turned : in the beginning , they the mighty god created . and of that againe , take the first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bresbith , and see what it may signifie by that part of the cabala which they call notariacon , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 b. the first letter of ben , signifieth the sonne : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. the first of ruach , signifies the holy ghost : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 n a. the beginning of av . is the father : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 s. the first of sabbath importeth rest : ●●… the beginning of the ineffable name of god 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and not there onely , but euen of it selfe it imports the deitie . for we consider of things not obuious to our senses and vnderstanding , as if they were not : and therefore this least of all the letters , neerest vnto nothing , doth signifie god. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . th . the first of ta. or thom. is construed a closet or a depth . which construction if you put together , according to the rules of that excellent grammar of diuinitie , with reference to that which followes , may import thus much . the word , the spirit , and the father , resting eternally in the closet , or vnconceiueable abysse , or as paul calls it , the inaccessible light of the infinite deitie , manifested their almighty power in creating the heauē and the earth . neither is it without a great mysterie that the son is here put in the first place : for in the beginning was the word : because the chiefe honour both of the creation , and restauration of the world is giuen vnto christ , as the apostle doth comment vpon this text , coloss . . and in another place , in him is all the treasure both of the wisedome and knowledge of god. as psal . . vers . . in wisedome hast thou made them all . for in christ were al things together one infinite wisedome , till in the creation he made them seuerall , according to their distinct ideas . therefore saith the apostle , he sustayneth euery thing by his powerfull word : that is , the sonne : and elsewhere , in him ( christ ) wee liue and moue ( after the creation ) and haue our being ( before the creation . ) and for this cause doth iohn begin the law of mercie and grace , in the very same words wherewith moses began the law of iustice and condemnation : in the beginning . for we know nothing of god , neyther of iustice , nor of mercie , &c. but onely by christ ; as he saith , no man knoweth the father , but the son , and he to whom the sonne wil reueile him . and in another place , no man commeth to the father , but by me . now , the holy ghost is put in the second place , because hee is the mutuall loue of the father and the sonne , and as i may say , the instrument of their actions , both in manent , and transeunt . go forward now , if you will , to the next word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bará ; you see , it affords the same argument for the tri-vnitie , by the three letters before explained , and the number which is the singular . thinke not this a fancie , neither reproch the diuine cabala , as the ignorant sophisters vse to doe , not knowing how aboue all other knowledges , it doth aduance a mans meditation on high . and to the present purpose , they which know any thing in the holy language , know that this sentence can no way agree in grammatical construction , vnlesse the singular verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bará , be thus made plurall , that it may haue concordance with the plurall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 elohim . you will aske , why these letters , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . b. r. a. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a. are twice put , seeing in this precisenesse , no such superfluitie should haue needed . i tell you , that it is not done , but to intimate vnto vs a most high mysterie . for in the first place it imports that eternall and infinite being of the father , the sonne , and the holy ghost , which they had before the worlds in their endlesse glorie & felicitie , in that silence of the deitie , in that super-supreme entity which is vnto the godhead , perfect aboue perfection , without any respect vnto the creature , it imports that infinitie , that eternitie , that power , that wisedome , which is aboue all things , and giues vnto it selfe , to be such as it is : that nothing , as the diuine areopagite seemes to speake , which is before and aboue al things , that may be spoken or thought , without any respect of any emanation , or effluence whatsoeuer . and therefore followes that letter of rest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that of vnitie , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and that of perfection . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . now in the second place , it signifies the deitie , as exercised in the creature : and therefore followes that epithyte elohim , which shewes that emanation of power or strength ; and is sometimes giuen vnto the creatures , angels , and men . it were an endlesse thing , to speake that of these mysteries , which may be spoken , neither can i ; for the law of the lord is perfect , and man is full of weakenesse . i haue said so much as i thinke meete concerning the tri-vnitie . now a word to that point , that christ is god : which although it appeare sufficiently in the tri-vnity before proued , by this anagogicall doctrine : yet to that second person in particular , is that which followeth . esay . , it is said of christ , that his name should bee called immanuel ; but in the historie of the gospell , in matthew and luke , both before his conception , and at his circumcision , he is called iesus . it is therefore meete that you know , how iesus is immanuel or god with vs. the writing of the name of iesvs is thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ihsuh , though according to the rules of the pronunciation of that tongue , iesu , and according to the ancient abbreuiation following the hebrue orthography ihts . in which name you see , are al the letters of the greatest ineffable name of god , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 iehouah ; with the interposition of that letter of rest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 s. for then was god reconciled to the world ; then was euerlasting righteousnesse brought in , when the word became flesh . this is that glorious name , of which god spake by the prophet , behold , i will make my name new in the earth . for you see how of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is made , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is , iesvs . this is that name , which is meet for the sonne of god alone , and cannot bee giuen to any creature , because it is a name of the deitie , as it is hebr. . it is that name , which is aboue all names : in which the angels and the righteous soules triumph ; at which the powers of hell are agast and tremble ; to which the whole creature yeeldeth meek obedience . this is that name , of which our lord spake , father , i haue manifested thy name vnto men , the father 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sonne 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for so long as the mysterie of the incarnation of god was hidde , so long that name remained vnsoundable : but when the word became flesh , and dwelt amongst men , so that the mysterie was reueiled ; then the name , which was before not to be pronounced , was lawfully pronounceable . that as the word of life was to bee seene with eyes , and handled with handes ; so that glorious name might also be beaten betweene our lippes and teeth ; and this by the interposition of that letter of rest . the iewes knowing this reason of this great mysterie , & moued with the reuerence thereof , durst neuer pronounce that name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but in stead thereof , adonai or elohim . let it not trouble you , that iudah the sonne of iacob was called by such a name , as had these foure letters therein , with the addition of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 d , thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 iehudah : but rather wonder and learne , how by these sacramentes the children of god before the incarnation , exercised their faith , saluted the promises afarre off , and saw that our lord should enter into our earthly tabernacle , by the doore of iudahs flesh ; for so much the letter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 daleth importeth . to which mysterie the heauenly poet alluding , triumphed with that double ioy , psal . . lift vp your heads yee gates , and be ye lift vp yee euerlasting doores , &c. foreseeing the descension of god the sonne , by the gate of our flesh , and the ascension of our flesh by christ , into the heauenly places : both which he celebrated by that repetition . compare with this place , gen. . . and . . . . . . and reuelat . . . and other places as you shal reade , and vnderstand them : and with all consider , how the ancient fathers haue prided themselues with the seuerall letters of this name , to keepe in remembrance by their owne names , a thing neuer to bee forgotten , the incarnation of our lord. as abram assumed h. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and was called abraham . oshea tooke i. and was called ioshua , as you know . neyther againe let it trouble you , that some do write this name thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . isv , because ( say they ) the letter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 s. turned vpward 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is as much as the double he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 omitted . i know no reason for this , but many authorities against it , as you may know by that which is and shall be said , though i let passe a very great number . now consider the name in euery letter , and see what cloudes of witnesses there are , that christ is god and man : and learne by the name it selfe , how christ is the character or ingraued image of the person or subsistence of the father , hebrewes . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. is the crowne or diademe of the ineffable name of god , and signifies the godhead . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . u. pretends the tree of life : for it is a thing much noted among the learned of the hebrue tongue , that this letter is neuer put radically in any naturall hebrue word , either in the beginning or end thereof , but is as the tree of life , in the middest of the paradise of god. the double letter h. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . signifieth , that christ , concerning his deitie , is essentially vnited to the humanitie ; and concerning his humanitie , vnited also essentially to the deitie ; and that by the holy ghost . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . h. is a spirit or breath : therefore is christ in himselfe , or in respect of his deitie , the superiour wisedome of the father , and the sonne of god , not made , but begotten . prou. . . in the creature , or with respect of his humanitie , the inferiour wisedome of god ; not begotten , but made , and created , ecclus. . . . now the letter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . s. hath many things therein to bee considered . for you may not thinke , that it was taken by chaunce into this name ; but for the notory , and for the geometrie . for the notory , i haue obserued that the theologians , both of the old and new testament , haue celebrated thereby ; first , the rest or dwelling of the godhead in him , as esay . . vers . . and ●o . . vers . . then the rest , or ●ie all beeing of the world in christ before the creation : and the restoring of the world by his suffering : wherein the iustice of god rested , or came to a period , as esay . . . he shall see the trauell of his soule , and be satisfied . lastly , that great iubile or sabbath of sabbaths in the world to come , when all the creature shall rest from corruption . secondly , they learned thereby , the euerlasting anointing of christ to bee our king , our priest and our prophet . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the head of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is to anoint . hitherto belongs that of the . psal . thou art anointed with the oyle of gladnesse aboue thy fellowes . and in particular ; i have found dauid ( or my beloued ) seruant , with my holy oyle haue i anointed him : that for his kingdome . dan. . , speakes of his priesthood : to finish the wickednesse , to seale vp the sinnes , &c. and to ancint the most holy. esay . . of his prophecie ; therefore hath the lord anointed mee , hee hath sent mee to preach , &c. for this cause was there no anointing in the old testament , but typicall , as a shadow of the good things that were to come ; so that when he came , all these anoyntings ceased ; both of the leuiticall priesthood , for thou art a priest for euer . heb. : and of the kingdome ; for hee shall raigne ouer the house of iacob for euer : luk. . . and for his prophecie he saith , whatsoeuer i haue heard of my father , i haue made knowen vnto you . the whole scope of the new testament is to this effect . now the geometrie hath also many mysteries : first , it is one semicircle with three branches ; the mysterie of the trinitie in the vnitie : all whose dignities of vertue and power , &c. are coequall in all , and in euery person , intirely , and indiuisibly ; and therefore in our lord also : according to that saying of the angell , the holy ghost shall come vpon thee , and the power of the most high shall euershadow thee ; therefore also that holy thing which shall be borne of thee , shall be called the sonne of god. shall i tell you what lectures the diuines haue made vpon the text of this letter : z●ch . . , did reade herein that goodly price , at which the wicked iewes did value him . for ● . i. in the hebrue arithmeticke is tenne ; so the three tennes in the triple crowne of this letter , are the thirtie pieces of siluer , which the traytour tooke to betray that precious blood , which was too deare a raunsome for the whole world . and one in another place said ; they haue sold the iust for siluer . consider the letter and euerie part thereof . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this inferiour semicircle is the creature , the earthly paradise , in the middest of which is the tree of life . and that thus the letter vau● is one part , and signifies in that tongue , a nayle , if you will , that nayle , that pierced his tender handes and his beauteous feete , to which if you adde the iod reuersed , you may well perceiue the figure of the whole crosse , that tree of life , which bare that heauenly fruite ; that spirituall food , whereof adam and his faithfull children , which ouercome , may cate and liue for euer . reuel . . . thus you may see , how the word became flesh , and dwelt among vs. you may see that riddle of the angel to esdras , . booke , chap. . vers . . expounded : the image of that word , from which , and whereto , the bookes of both the testaments do found . you may see what confidence wee may haue in that promise of christ , who in the dayes of his flesh said , whatsoeuer you shall aske the father in my name , hee will giue is you , ioh. . but after his ascension , the myracles that are to bee done in that name , are more stupēdious , mark. . . and againe , he that beleeueth in me , greater workes then these shal he do , for i goe to the father . beholde the mysterie of it , cause it to ascend , and describe that circle , whose center is euery where , whose circumference is no where . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . now are the superior and inferior conduit-pipes soudered together , ( as the hebrues speake ) now the higher influences , the spirit and graces of god are not giuen by measure : and the refluences so great , as that whosoeuer beleeueth , out of his bellie shall arise fountaine : of liuing water , springing vp vnto eternall life . o glorious name ! o sacred mysterie ! by which you may wel perceiue , that there is greater vnitie betweene the deitie and the humanitie , then by any wordes of contiguitie , or continuitie , may bee expressed . you may well perceiue , how according to that place of the . psalme , he the first borne ; or as iohn saith , chap. . the onely begotten of the father , is made higher then the kings of the earth . here is our righteousnesse , our sanctification , and redemption complete : here is our adoption and reward : our consolation , our life , and religion : our reuerence , and our feare : yet our ioy and boldnesse : all in all : the presence of god. i may not say what experience hath taught mee , by this magnificent and admirable name ; neyther am i able to giue due honour thereunto . my thoughts are swallowed vp , when i consider the other great mysteries which this one letter doth import : the mysterie of the triple world ; the mysterie of mercy and of iustice ; of election , and reprobation ; of that great iubile , or sabbath of sabbaths , when that which is aboue , shal again descend , to restore the creature from corruption and change , into that nimietie or excesse of goodnes , wherein it was created . but these things are therefore here to bee omitted , because the discourse thereof were long , and because they are rather consequents , then premises to the question . to tell you at once , & to make an end of this argument : the whole nation of the learned iewes confesse , that the messiha should bee called by this great name : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . to which purpose , there are , besides these which haue been brought , many places of scripture , which in the hebrue veritie are most direct , though by our translations they might seeme somewhat harsh . they hold , i say , that hee must be both god and man : and in a word , there is nothing which wee christians doe affirme concerning our lord , but the euidence of scripture doth compell them to confesse it . onely they differ in this , from vs ; whether this iesus be that christ that should come into the worlde ; though this also be a thing not questionable , as you may learne of daniel . vers . . . . & . esd . . vers . . . although the common errour and expectation of the iewes , was of a terrestriall monarchy ; yet the best learned of them agree , that the kingdome of christ is not of this world . for they remember that place in the testament of iacob : the scepter shal not depart from iuda , till shiloh come . by which it followes , that whē messiha shal come , there should bee no more shew of an earthly kingdome . that of zach. . . is as direct , ierusalem , behold , thy king commeth vnto thee poore . they remember also that in the . psalme , i am a worme and no man , a shame of men and the contempt of the people . and that also of esay . . hee hath neyther forme nor beautie : when we see him , there shall be no forme that we should desire him . he is despised & reiected of men , &c. reade the whole chapter and the psalme , compare them with the histories of his passion , and behold him on the crosse , in the horror of his anguish , & extreme perplexitie . 's' superimposed on 't' were it to any purpose to make you know , what the ancient philosophers , who knew not the scriptures , haue thought of this matter ? all speaking this one thing , which the light that god hath giuen to mankind , did make them know , although they concealed their intendiment by diuers names . yet hermes called him plainely the sonne of god. zoroaster , the vnderstanding of his father . pythagoras , wisedome ; as paul and salomon , euery where , and particularly , prouerb . . and in the booke of that title . parmenides named him the sphere of vnderstanding . orpheus termed him pallas , to the same effect as the other , if you know the fable : and yet hee speakes more plainely to the trinitie , in his hymnes of the night , of the heauen , and of the ayre . platoes separate ideas meane nothing else : and in fumme , as many of the philosophers , as were worth any thing , were not ignorant of this thing . but i feare , these authorities are with you of little worth : yet haue i brought them , that you may see how wee are furnished with all kinde of proofes , and how you doe contemne all maner of testimony . if this which i haue said , perswade you to looke better to the foundation of your faith , it is sufficient : if it perswade you nothing , then haue i done contrary to the commandement , which forbiddeth to cast pearles before swine . but yet i hope , that god will not suffer you to bee ledde any longer by that spirit of antichrist , against which s. iohn doth so often warne vs. for i doe you to witte , that this your heresie is no new thing , but euen as ancient as the apostles time . for , the reason of iohns writing of his gospell , was , to proue the godhead of christ , against the heretikes that denied it in his owne time . and truely , i maruell that you , who haue receyued this heresie from the rotten bones of arrius , should not prouide for your safetie as he did . he denied the authoritie of s. iohns writings to be authenticall . and why ? because this earth-bred gyant , which would pul christ , out of the throne of his deitie , should with his lightening be suddenly burnt . beleeue you the scripture ? is iohns authoritie sufficient ? then the case is plaine . we are in him that is true , in his sonne iesus christ , who is very god , and eternall life . . ioh. . . can you now confer this scripture with that place , i haue said ye are gods , and not be ashamed ? i and the father are one . the iewes vnderstood , that hee herein professed himselfe to be very god : and are you his enemie more then they ? read ioh. . vers . . and . and . and you may vnderstand the meaning of both places . the diuels acknowledged him to be god of infinite power : i know thee who thou art , euen that holy one of god : and wil not you cōfesse as much as the diuels ? but this is more then i thought to say , only you may see hereby , that we speake no other thing then christ himselfe , euen in his enemies vnderstanding , said . now if you could see a little the folly of your owne opinion ; that were inough to cause you to put on a better mind . i wil touch it as lightning doth touch the ground : for if you be willing to be reformed , there is no doubt , but you may propound it to the learned diuines , and be fully satisfied . you say christ is onely man , but yet indued with the infinite power of god. here first you doe iniurie to the highest , to make the power of god to bee accidentall vnto him : whereas hee is purus actus , absolute perfection , and without shadow of change : his beeing is most simple and pure , not capable of accidents . then his being is such , as no addition can be made thereto , to make it more thē it is : therfore it is necessary , that he be euer actually whatsoeuer he may be . besides , his being is infinitely distant from not being ; therfore his power is inseparable . again , if there come any thing to god as an accident , it must come vnto him frō himselfe , or els frō another : not frō another , for he is impassible , or such as cānot suffer violence : not frō himselfe ; for all such accidents do proceed a potentia , that is , frō the imbecillity , or imperfection of the subiect : but his being is most simple , & infinitely perfect . again , all accidents do rise frō the matter , forme or composition of the subiect . in him is neither matter , forme , nor composition . now all things we see in this world , do consist , ex actu & potentiâ , of perfection from god , & imperfection frō thēselues : for of thēselues they are non entia , absolutely nothing . yea , euen the very angels , and the soule it selfe , are partakers of this compositiō : ( for nothing is purus actus , but god alone ) therefore are they subiect to accidents ; yet they which come neerest to perfection , are most free from accidents ; as that which is meere perfection , hath no accidents at al. know then , that all the dignities of god are in him essentially one god. for the goodnes of god , his power , his wisedome , his glory , &c. beeing all infinite , do of necessity concur in the nature of infinity . whence it followeth , that whatsoeuer is in him , is essentially himselfe : therefore the power of god is not accidentall , or such as may be imparted to a man. the learned hebrues according to this do hold , that eusoph or infinitie , is not to bee numbred among the other attributes of god : because it is that abstract vnity , wherinto they all essentially concurre , & from which they al essentially proceed . and hēce by the way take another strong argument to the former question : for if god bee essentially a father , then the terme correlatiue a sonne , must bee in the godhead also , and that essentially . but now againe see another folly in your supposition . the worke of our redemption is a worke of infinite goodnesse , mercie , power , wisedome and glory ; therefore it followeth , that christ the worker , had infinite mercie , power , wisedome , &c. now i demaund ; had christ this infinite goodnesse and power , so giuen to him of god , that the father himselfe had in the meane time none ? this you dare not say , for that were to say , that god did cease to bee god ; which cannot stand with his eternitie . now if god the father had , notwithstanding this absolute infinite power of christ , of which he spake , all power is giuen vnto me , both in heauen and in earth : then it followeth that either there were two infinities of power ; or else that these two which had this infinite power , were all one infinite . the first is against the nature of infinitie : or that is absolutely infinite , which so comprehendeth all things , as that it leaueth nothing without it selfe , and yet is not comprehended of any other . besides , if you would say , that the father and the sonne had each of them seuerall indiuisible infinite powers ; it must follow , that neither of their powers were absolutely infinite : because each of them had not the infinite power of the other : and besides , that both these infinite powers must bee conioyned with infinite weakenesse , because they must be mutually subiected to the infinite power one of the other . but both these things are impossible . so you see , that two infinities can by no meanes stand together : therefore it followeth , that these two , to wit , the father and the sonne , are in being one , and that of infinite power ; and this is that which i striue for : which , as you see , i haue concluded by your owne assertion . the time would faile mee , to lay before your eyes the manifold vntrueths , which would insue of your position which sauoureth neyther of witte , iudgement , nor learning : and therefore i see , how they which haue once departed from the trueth , must of necessitie runne into infinite absurdities . therefore looke backe , and be ashamed of such new-fangled toyes , as you do dayly imagine , which in trueth doe argue the great inconstancie and vanitie of your minde , and withall , such palpable blindnesse of vnderstanding , as the darknesse of egypt . for tell mee without selfe-liking , what sound iudgement doth this argue , to be driuen about with euery wind of doctrine ? a protestant , a brownist , an anabaptist , an antichrist . what bringing vp ? what gift of learning and knowledge haue you , that you should presume to oppose your sentence , against the faith and doctrine of all the christian churches in the world ? blush , and learne with meekenesse the trueth of that word , which is able to saue your soule . you may see by your owne miserable experience , what it is to forsake the vnitie of faith , and the communion of the saints , who imbrace the trueth of gods word , and haue manifest tokens that they are the true church , to wit , the word of god truely taught , and the sacraments duely administered . what if there want perfection ? the church militant must euer confesse ; i am louely , yet blacke ▪ for it is impossible that any church should be without imperfectiō , so long as the world standeth : but at the end it shall bee presented without spotte or wrinkle . therfore remēber from whence you are fallen , & repēt , & do the works of righteousnes , lest christ , whō you so despite , come against you shortly . the worke of christianitie is not in foolish questions , and disputing about needlesse subtilties , but in doing the workes of trueth and righteousnesse . pray and endeuour your selfe thereto . and till such time as god for his christs sake , vouchsafe to haue mercie on you , the enemie of his sonne , and giue you grace to repent of this great wickednesse , i am neither your friend , nor yet your foe . alecsander gil. finis . a table of the additions and alterations made in the second edition of the animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book of the trinity south, robert, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s a estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a table of the additions and alterations made in the second edition of the animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book of the trinity south, robert, - . [ ] p. s.n., [london : ] with a caption title. attributed robert south. cf. wing. place and date of publication from wing. intended to accompany: south, robert. animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book entituled a vindication of the holy and ever-blessed trinity &c. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng sherlock, william, ?- . -- vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity, and the incarnation of the son of god. trinity -- early works to . theology, doctrinal -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - jonathan blaney sampled and proofread - jonathan blaney text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a table of the additions and alterations made in the second edition of the animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book of the trinity . preface , page . over against line . this passage is added in the margin , [ dr. owen in his vindication of himself against this author , gives him the character of a scoffer , and a censurer of other mens labours , judgments , and expressions . which witness of his is true ; and since it is so , whether he , of whom it is true , deserves a rebuke , or no , is left to the world to judge . owen ' s vindic. against sh. p. . ] preface , p. . line . this passage in the first edition , which shews , that tender consciences are such things as may some time or other put the church not only to part with its liturgy , rites and ceremonies , but its very faith also for their sake , is thus altered in the second edition ; [ which shews , that there are some such tender consciences in the world , as ( when opportunity serves ) may put the church not only to part with its liturgy , rites and ceremonies , but its very creed also for their sake . ] preface , p. . l. . after the words paying the scores of both , this discourse follows in the second edition . [ but now if either he himself , or any for him shall plead , that it was not fairly done to charge him with those blasphemies , which he may ( and perhaps does ) pretend to have been uttered by him in the person of his adversary , and as the genuine consequences of the doctrine maintained by him . to this i answer . first , that he , who pretends to speak in the person of another , ought , according to all justice and decorum , to speak only such things as that other , whom he personates , uses to speak , and consonant to his known , avowed sence . but did his adversary , dr. owen , ever speak so ? or use the expressions here uttered by this author ? whereas he declares himself concerning the said expressions thus , viz. that he cannot mention them without begging pardon for repeating such horrid and desperate blasphemies . owen ' s vindication against sherlock , p. . that they were fitter for a iew , or a mahometan , for servetus , or socinus , than a son of this church , p. . that he abhorred the rehearsal of such horrid profaneness , p. . that they were odious satanical exprobrations of the truth of christ's satisfaction , ibid. and now can this man pretend to speak these things in the person of one who thus abhors , abominates , and detests them ? the truth is , his whole book is such a lewd misrepresentation both of the words and sence of his adversary , that if he has any bloud in his body , it must needs fly in his face , and bid him blush for such unconscionable falsifications . but secondly , if he charges these assertions as consequences of the doctrine maintained by his adversary , i must put him in mind of these two things . . that to the just charging of any man with the consequences of his doctrine , or opinion , the things so charged , ought to be not only the real , but also the plain , direct , and immediate consequences of that opinion . forasmuch as no man ought in reason to be charged with the remote far-fetched consequences of any proposition held by him ; since he may in all equity ( if he disclaims them ) be supposed ignorant of them , and that inculpably too . . this author is to know , that to the just charging of even any doctrine , or opinion , with such and such consequences , though they follow never so really and truly from it , yet if they also lie any thing remote , and at some distance from the same , they ought first by clear undeniable arguments to be proved to follow from thence , before they can justly and fairly be charged to do so . which two observations thus premised ; that i may lay the whole matter before the reader more particularly ; he is to take notice , that the doctrine , which this author loads with these blasphemous consequences ; is , that of the necessity of a satisfaction to be paid to god's justice in order to the pardon of sin , and the justification of sinners . and this i affirm to have been the received doctrine of the church , and the general opinion of divines in the case ; all asserting the necessity of such a satisfaction ; though not all , i confess , upon the same ground . for first , some found this necessity upon the necessary egress of god's vindictive justice , naturally acting and exerting it self where it meets with a proper object . but secondly , others state this necessity upon the decree or purpose of god , resolving to take this course for the pardon of sin , and no other . which decree and purpose , though made freely , yet being actually passed and declared , it was not free for god to baulk the execution of it . his veracity , wisdom and honour , as supreme governour of the world , not suffering him to let the violation of his laws pass without a due satisfaction made to his iustice. and this has been the opinion of most divines in this matter . nevertheless , ( whether upon either of these grounds , or some other ) it is certain , that the necessity of a satisfaction was still held , and owned by the church : and yet upon supposal of this necessity alone it is , ( whatsoever ground it be stated upon ) that this author sets god forth in a most profane manner , as an impotent man venting his rage and passion without any sufficient ground or reason for it . for , i am sure , no other consideration can answer , or come up to the impiety of the forecited expressions . and i freely appeal to the learned , and unbyassed reader , whether the said passages can be placed to any other account whatsoever . and if they cannot , i ask with what conscience could this man , of his own head , invent such hideous , abominable words , and then thrust them into his adversary's mouth , whether he would , or no ? or charge them as the necessary consequences of his doctrine , without proving , or by any formed argument so much as offering to prove them so ? for surely he ought to have done this in the first place , and ( since he knew that the learned assertors of this doctrine , did and would deny these to be the consequences of it to the very death ) he should by clear and solid ratiocination have proved against them , ( in spight of their denial ) that these were indeed the true and natural consequences of the said doctrine , before he reproached them as such . but , it seems he was for doing execution first , and for proceeding to tryal afterwards ; though , as hasty as he was in the former , he has not yet done the latter , nor , i believe , ever will. upon the whole matter it is manifest , that it was not so much any thing personal in dr. owen ( how bitter soever he was against him ) as the doctrine of christ's satisfaction asserted by the said doctor , in common with the whole christian church , which this author so vilely reflected upon ; and discharged all those blasphemous scoffs at , in that book of his ; and consequently so far as he was the author both of the book and the scoffs in it , he was as fit a person to have joyned in the address to the morocco ambassador , as any man in england besides . i do , i confess , charge this author with asserting three gods ( though he does not in terminis express it ) because of his asserting three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ; but then the case here on my part is quite different from what it was on his . for in this , the consequence of three gods from three distinct infinite spirits , is direct , manifest , and immediate ; or rather , in truth , is not so properly a consequence , or one assertion following from another , as one and the very same thing expressed in other words , which is the true account of this matter : for the words [ infinite mind , or spirit ] are but a periphrasis of the thing signified by the term [ god : ] and their perfect equivalence shall be fully demonstrated in my fifth chapter . from all which i conclude , that since there are ( beyond all pretence of denial ) several horrid blasphemous expressions in this author ' s forementioned book , which must and ought to be charged somewhere ; and since his adversary utterly disowns them all , both as to words and sence ; and since the doctrine it self , maintained by him , infers no such thing , nor has this author proved that it does so ; but that the said representations of it are peculiarly his own , and occur no where but in his book ( except possibly in the writings of some of his old friends the socinians , and those such as the transilvanian ministers ) it follows , that according to the strictest laws of fair and just quotation , all the black dirt of those impious and foul passages which i have cited from him , and charged upon him , ought to lie wholly at his door , and let him ( and his porter ) shovel it away thence as they are able . as to what concerns the licensing this book , so severely and so justly reflected upon by dr. owen , it did ( it must be confessed ) meet with a person ( as it were ) framed for the very purpose , &c. ] in the book , p. . between l. . and . of the first edition , this addition and alteration is made in the second . [ i must here remind him of two things . first , that he would be pleased to tell us how men can write plainer and plainer of the trinity every day after his new notion of it has solved all the difficulties about it , as in the forecited p. . l. . he positively tells us , it does . for ( as i take it ) where there remains no difficulty , there must be the utmost degree of plainness ; and withal , when men are come to the utmost of any thing , they can then go no further . secondly , i must remind him also , that the word plainer in the comparative degree , does not couch under it the positive signification of plain , &c. and much less very plain and easie : [ nay , so very plain as to have all the difficulties of it solved , as this author has expresly affirmed ] . so that if this be a scandalous imputation , it is easie to see to whom the scandal of it must belong , &c. p. . l. . after the word contradicted , this parenthesis is inserted in the second edition ( as nothing ought to be , which cannot be comprehended . ) p. . l. . after the word whatsoever , three lines from the bottom in the first edition , this following parenthesis is inserted in the second . ( for an hypostatick union and an hypostatick composition , viz. such an one as makes a compound hypostasis , are quite different things : and this author shall in due time be taught so much , if he has any thing to object against it . ) or , &c. page . over against line . of the first edition , the following latine quotation is added in the margin of the second . qui personas in deo modos tantúmmodo existendi , sive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse dicunt , ipsam deitatem nequaquam exc●●dum , in quâ conveniunt ; sed nihil aliud esse volunt , quàm existendi modum , in quo differunt . quáre pater non est modus tantùm existendi , sed deus est , quemadmodum & caeter ae personae , verùm deus est cum certo modo existendi , qui neque filio convenit , neque spiritui sancto . sic & filius deus est , non modus tantùm existendi , sed deus est cum certo modo existendi , qualis neque patri convenit , neque spiritui sancto . ad eundem modum discriminis , & spiritus sanctus deus est , non modus existendi tantùm ; sed deus est cum certo modo existendi , qualis nec patri convenit neque filio . summa est , personas in deo non differre essentiâ , quia sunt unus deus , sed proprietate & modo subsistendi . twissus in responsione ad arminii praefationem in extremâ pag. lin. . editionis amstelodamensis apud ianssonium anno . page . after these words [ joyned true greek and english together ] in the th line , this following discourse is to be inserted . [ but there is an extraordinary passage in his book of judgment , chap. . sect. . p. . of the last edition , ( which should be the most correct ) and i was doubting , whether i should charge it upon his ignorance , or his insolence ; but both of them play their parts very remarkably in it . for first he makes a most false , illiterate , and absurd translation of a verse , or rather part of a verse in the new testament , and then reproaches the received translation as wrong , and very faulty , for rendring it otherwise . the place is in pet. c. . v. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . in which he considers only the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , dividing them from the rest of the sentence , viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and by that means from the verb in this latter part of it , which should govern the noun in the former ; thereby making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be governed not by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( as it ought to be ) but most falsely and ungrammatically by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and so he renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , casting them , viz. the apostate angels , down into chains of darkness . and this interpretation he builds partly upon the pretended reason of the thing here discoursed of , and partly upon the signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but upon both of them very absurdly . from the reason of the thing he argues , that if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should signifie the apostate angels being cast down into hell , how could they be said upon sentence passed upon them at the last judgment , to be then cast into hell , if they were there before ? to which the answer is very easie and obvious , that immediately upon their sin they were cast down into , and kept in those lower regions called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or hell locally , but not cast into hell-torments , till the last judgment has passed upon them ; so that with full accord both to scripture and reason we are to distinguish the place of hell , where they now are , from the iudicial penal torments of hell , which they shall be adjudged to , and endure in that place hereafter ; as we distinguish the prison wherein malefactors are kept , from the execution which they are there kept for ; as indeed this text with great significance alludes to both : so that his argument from hence falls to nothing . his other reason is from the signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he affirms to signifie only to cast down . but on the contrary , i must here tell him first , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does not only import the act of casting down , but ( being derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) signifies also the term ad quem , or the place , into which this casting down is . and i refer him to all the greek lexicographers ( not one of them excepted ) whether they do not render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by in tartarum detrudo , dejicio , or praecipito ; and if so , how can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 possibly here agree with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; for if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be the term ad quem of the act , how can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be so too ; since one single act can have but one ultimate term ad quem ? and even this man himself does not allow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be one and the same thing . and besides this , i must tell him further , that if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imported the term , thing , or place , into which god cast down the apostate angels , it ought not to have been 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , forasmuch as the motion of casting down , importing a local descent to something , the dative case cannot in true grammar answer it . and therefore the old latine version makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to import , not the term to which , but the instruments or means by which these angels were thus brought down , rendring the text thus , rudentibus inferni detractos in tartarum tradidit , &c. which , as it is not strictly a translation , but an arbitrary paraphrase , so it is a very forced and unnatural one too ; as importing not a casting but a drawing down these angels into hell. in which case , who must be the person drawing them ? for since god ( to whom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does and must here agree ) ought to be considered by us as in the highest heaven , how can this drawing down be applied to him , which , in the nature of it , supposes the person drawing to be in that lower place , to which he is drawing others ? for all traction is a motion of the agent forcibly bringing something to himself , but trusion a motion by which he removes or forces something from himself . it is clear therefore , that according to all the rules of grammatical construction , and proper speaking , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be governed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that , therefore something else must be sought for to govern it , which can be nothing besides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and then the whole sentence will be properly and plainly translated thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ god ] having cast or thrust them [ viz. the apostate angels ] down into hell [ or the lower regions ] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , delivered , or put them into chains of darkness , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , kept , or reserved to [ or for ] iudgment . and this is sence and propriety of speech , agreeable both to the natural signification , and the grammatical syntax of the words . but the translation so imperiously and ignorantly given by this man ( in correction of that of the church ) is agreeable to neither . for it both divides one part of the sentence from the other , from which it must not be divided , and then makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be governed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which cannot govern it , and quite cutts it off from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which alone can . and now , ought it not to be matter of amazement to all men of sense and sobriety , to see a puny , who is not able to master three words of greek , presume to controul such great masters of that language , as the translators of the new testament into english undoubtedly were ? nay , and thereby to reflect upon the church her self , which has received and owned this translation , and to whose judgment and authority ( if he be so nearly related to her , as he pretends ) he ows so great and filial a deference ? let him rather instead of correcting the english translation ( a work which he was never born for ) thank god , and the translators for it ; there being few men living more beholden to it than himself . and therefore leaving his forlorn criticisme ( as new every whit as his divinity ) to shift for it self ; i , for my part , like my english bible , for his dislike of any part of it , better than before . for i can by no means see any force or consequence in this argument , viz. that because this author is much better at quoting a greek sentence than at construing it ; therefore the english translation of this text in st. peter is a very bad translation : i say , i cannot admit , or yield to this consequence . ] page . of the first edition after this sentence [ in such a case some are of opinion , that where the words escape it , the author himself ought to have it ] the following discourse comes in p. . lin. . of the second edition beginning with these words . [ but because some perhaps will hardly be satisfied with so general a charge without an allegation of more particulars , i shall here give the reader a catalogue of this author's greek errata in the second edition of his vindication of the trinity ( which should in reason be thought the most correct ) together with their correction confronting them . greek errata . correction . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 punctum interrogationis post 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro semicol . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 punctum interrogationis post 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro semicol . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 punctum interrogationis post 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro semicol . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 now all these errata , one would think , make up a jolly company to rendezvous together in the compass of less than half a dozen pages of an english book ; a company fit for our author to march triumphantly in the head of . page . after [ william giles some time of mark-lane ] in the first edition in the margin , is added in the margin of the second [ who wrote ( forsooth ) in defence of our author against the papists . ] page . lines , , . that passage [ it is much fitter to be censured by a convocation , though even he himself should be prolocutor of it ] is altered in page . line . thus — [ [ though even he himself ( since john goodwin and hugh peters are gone off ) should be prolocutor of it . ] and now , upon the issue of the whole matter , i hope all ingenuous , and impartial readers , all true friends of our english , church and old divinity will allow , that i have treated an insolent , imposing innovator , no otherwise than he has deserved ; or rather indeed much short of it ; and that none will tax , or censure me for what i have wrote , but such as can think it reasonable for one man to trample upon , and insult over his whole profession , and to be applauded , or at least endured in such a presumption . for my own part , i can by no means judge so ; and as i abhor such pride in others ; so , i hope , i shall never be guilty of the least degree of it my self . i thank god , i account not the meanest of my own profession my inferiour ; and if i should be tempted to think any one below me , it should be only such an one as thinks himself above all the world besides . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e see a most virulent and blasphemous book wrote by these men , and entituled , praemonitiones christi & apostolorum de abolendo vero christo per antichristum . pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . pag. . l. . pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . d quot . ibid. pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . pag. . l. . pag. . l. . l. . pag. . l. , . pag. . l. . ibid. pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . pag. . l. . quotat . 〈◊〉 . . 〈◊〉 . . 〈◊〉 . . the reflections on the xxviii propositions touching the doctrine of the trinity, in a letter to the clergy, &c. maintain'd, against the third defence of the said propositions by the same hand. tindal, matthew, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing t estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the reflections on the xxviii propositions touching the doctrine of the trinity, in a letter to the clergy, &c. maintain'd, against the third defence of the said propositions by the same hand. tindal, matthew, ?- . p. s.n.], [london : . the "twenty eight propositions" were written by edward fowler. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng fowler, edward, - . -- reflections on the xxviii propositions. trinity. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the reflections on the xxviii propositions touching the doctrine of the trinity , in a letter to the clergy , &c. maintain'd , against the third defence of the said propositions . by the same hand . tim. . . for there is one god , and one mediator between god and men , the man christ jesus . printed in the year mdcxcv . the reflections upon the xxviii propositions , &c. maintain'd . though there is nothing in the third defence of the propositions , &c. that can ( as far as i can perceive ) enervate the least objection that is urged in my letter ; yet because the doctrine therein maintained tends to subvert the foundation of the christian religion , by introducing a plurality of gods , i cannot but think my self in conscience oblig'd to shew the vanity of those pretences that are urg'd in its behalf , especially since the defender's writing with so great an assurance of his own performance , and so much contempt of the reflections , may have some influence upon some weak and prejudiced readers . had the author design'd a just defence of the doctrine of the trinity , he should have taken notice of what is said against it in general , but more especially of what is urged against the real trinitarians , wherein he is equally concerned with them , and not only of those additional absurdities of his own hypothesis . therefore i shall now set down his opinion , both as i find it in his propositions , and in the defences of them , and then shew the weakness of his notions , either with new arguments , or at least with enforcing those that were mentioned in my reflections . the defender in his propositions asserts , that there are three eternal and necessary divine beings or substances , each of which has unlimited power , wisdom and goodness ; and that so many men or angels are not more expresly distinguished in scripture , as different persons or substances , prop. , . and pag. . of the second defence ; i do affirm the son and spirit to be absolutely perfect beings , in reference to the perfections of their nature , they are all boundless and infinite ; so pag. . the father's existence being without a cause , does not make him to have another sort of nature from that of the son and spirit , which may be a necessary nature and uncreated , and constituted of all the boundless perfections of which the nature of the father consists , abstracted from the consideration of the manner of his existence : and in the same page , the divine nature ( speaking of the nature of each ) doth comprehend all perfections . so pag. . an essence of the same kind , though not the same numerical one. so that here are three divine eternal necessary natures or essences , as different as three human or angelical natures ; which at first sight appear as much to be three gods as three human natures to be three men ; which is a revolting to polytheism or plurality of gods , except he can shew that either two of these divine natures are not gods , or that these three divine natures are but one god. we will therefore see what he saith to these two points . . he says , that the name of god is used in more senses than one in scripture . in the highest sense the father alone is god ; he is the only independent , the only true , the only good and great , and self-existent god. the son and spirit have a right to the name of god , next to that which is appropriated to the father ; they depend on him with an entire dependance , both for their being and continuance in being . but is not this inconsistent with what is said before , because it is first to assert , that the different ways or manners of having their natures does not make any difference in their natures , the second and third are as truly divine as the first ; and then in effect to suppose it does , because the father has several perfections the others are uncapable of ? to this he replies , the perfections the father has above them belong immediately to his existence , not to his nature : but what is existence abstracted from the nature that exists , but a chimera ? if the nature did not exist , it would not be a nature . to say such a nature exists , is to say , it is not only in our imagination , but really or in act : to make the existence of a nature a distinct thing from the nature that exists , and to suppose it to be the subject in which the attributes or perfections of independance , and being the first original of all things , do exist , is to suppose it a substance , because we have no other idea of a substance , but that it is a subject in which properties exist , which would be to make two distinct substances in god ; his nature that exists , and the existence of his nature abstracted from the nature . what is the existence of god the father , but the existence of the nature of god the father , except he exists distinct from his nature ? and consequently , if self-existence be so great a perfection , it sheweth that the self-existent nature of the father is more perfect than the not self-existent nature of the son. but suppose self-existence , which is existence of the father , belongs to the existence of the father , ( which by the way is only supposing existence to belong to existence ) ; yet self-existence , as i observed in my letter , is only a perfection as it supposeth necessary or independant existence , and all those perfections that belong to a necessary or self-existent nature : so that self-existence barely considered in it self , abstractedly from those perfections , notwithstanding his denial , is no more a perfection than any other way of having existence , if that way supposeth the same perfections . as suppose there was some matter self-existent , and some other matter not self-existent , and the nature of the one were not any way different from the nature of the other , would they not be both equally perfect ? and a parcel of guinea's made of the one , be as good as a parcel of guinea's made of the other ? or how could it be possible ( they being alike for weight , colour , duration , &c. ) to distinguish them ? and if it be so in lower natures , the reason is the same in the highest natures . but however , to carry the simily as high as we can : suppose a human self-existent father had two sons , who had all the perfections of human nature , and did as necessarily and independently exist as he ; there can be no reason assigned , but that they would be men in the highest sense , and as absolutely perfect as the father . he saith , in pag. . of the first defence , that if a human father could be suppos'd to be self-existent , and that his sons had the now mentioned kind of dependance upon him , ( viz. as the light on the sun ) the consequence must be , that their nature is short of the perfection of their father's nature , notwithstanding the many properties they agree in : which is owning , that self-existence and independence belong to the nature , and that therefore the nature of the father is different from the nature of the son and spirit , whose natures are short of the perfections of the father's nature , and consequently their natures are not divine , because the divine nature contains all perfections ; but theirs want those that not only in themselves are the greatest and most excellent , but the want of which is ( as he saith pag. . ) an abatement of all other perfections : and if the father's nature is independent , and the son 's and spirit 's dependent , it shews they have different kinds of nature , as different , nay as opposite as dependent and independent . but what can be a more staring contradiction , than that beings that do eternally and necessarily exist , and are almighty , yet notwithstanding this have not a power to keep themselves in life and being , no not a moment , and yet at the same time have a power inherent in themselves from all eternity , to give life and being to all things whatever ; which also do entirely depend on them for the continuation of the same ? it is a contradiction to say a necessary nature is dependent , because a necessary nature is that nature which contains in it self the formal reason why it cannot but be : but a dependent nature is so far from having any thing in it self that makes it necessarily exist , that it not only owes to another its existence , but hourly depends upon another ( having no power in its self ) to continue it in existence ; which is the dependence of a creature , not of a creator : is not a dependent creator as great a contradiction as an independent creature ? and did ever any but our author join necessary existence and dependence together ? how can they , as i intimated sect. . having necessary existence , be said more to depend on the father for their continuance in being , than the father on them ? since they as necessarily and as eternally exist as he , who can no more hinder theirs , than his own existence ; nor could he more forbear emaning them from all eternity , than existing himself . and if his existence was without a cause , his emaning must be so too , since the one was as necessary and eternal as the other : in created beings all necessary emanations have the same cause as the beings from whence they emane ; but god having no cause of his being , his necessary emanations must have no cause also . and consequently eternal and necessary existence , as i observ'd in the same sect. . is as great a perfection as self-existence , since one is without a cause as much as the other ; nay , there can be no difference between them ; for if the father is self-existent , the emanations that issue forth from him must be so too , since they are emanatory substances , which were not produced by the will and power of the father from nothing , but they emaned from something ; which since there was nothing else to emane from , must be the father's self-existent substance , to which it was essential to have emanations , and consequently they have the same existence as the substance in which they existed when they emaned ; nor could their emaning make them lose their self-existence . but more of this hereafter . but he says they depend on the father for the continuation of their being , as the streams on the fountain , or the rays on the sun ; but there 's no material substance that depends upon another for its existence or continuance in existence ; all matter is equally old , and has subsisted ever since the creation ; and generation and corruption is nothing but matter according to the laws of motion changing its shapes and figures : and therefore such similies are not to the purpose , because we are not speaking of any supposed form or figure of the son and spirit , but of the existence of their substances , viz. whether they have them by any third way different from both creation and self-existence . as to the streams depending on the fountain , it is no more than this , that if the water did not issue out of the ground , it could not run along the ground ; if it did not bubble up in the fountain , it could no more flow to the next place , than if it stop'd there it could flow to a third : but this does not make one part of the water give being to another part , or continue it in being ; it is the same body of water which was in the fountain that is now in the streams . and as to the rays , they no way depend on the sun for their being or continuance in being , except the sun by a creating power makes them to exist , and by the same power continues them in existence : if the rays are ( as some imagin ) parts of the aether set in motion by the sun , they no more depend on the sun for their being or continuance in being , than the sun does on them ; but if they emane from the body of the sun , they have the same cause of their being and continuance in being as the sun it self , because they like unto all other necessary emanations , were parts of the body whence they emaned , and consequently have the same origin as the sun it self . and if the sun had been self-existent , they , because parts of it , would have been so too : nor would their emaning destroy their self-existing , or any ways cause them then to depend on the sun for their continuance in being ; since the least substance is as much a substance as the greatest , and consequently equally able to subsist by it self ; so that notwithstanding his altogether unlike similies it 's evident , if the son and h. spirit are eternal and necessary , they are as self-existent and independent as the father ; and consequently gods in as high a sense as he , who if he were not a necessary being would not be independent nor self-existent , and consequently those three must go together : but if their natures are dependent and not self-existent , they are so far from containing all perfections , and being as truly divine as the father's , that they are truly created natures , or from no-beings made to be , and like all such beings ( as i observ'd sect. . ) in god they live , and move , and have their being . i said sect. . if the persons have the same unlimited perfections , tho the manner of their getting them was different , this would not cause any inequality between them : to which he answers it would ; that is , in reference to their manner of existence , though not in reference to their meer essence . but if there is not only a different manner of their getting their essences , but their essences when gotten exist after a different manner , ( which he must mean , or else contradict himself and agree with me ) it 's impossible they should have the same kind of nature , because to exist is common to all natures : it 's the different manner of existence that makes the difference between natures ; and consequently a nature that has a more excellent manner of existing , will be a more excellent kind of nature . and therefore if the natures of the son and spirit had not only a different way of having their existence , but do exist after a different manner ; their natures or essences must be of different kinds or sorts : but if they exist after the same manner , though they have different ways of coming by their existence , there can be no inequality or difference between them . i asked sect. . how the father could be greater than the son and holy spirit , and be the only good when they have the same , that is , unlimited power and goodness : he answers , they have unlimited power , but not the same , which is , since the father's power exceeds theirs , to suppose that there is some bounds and limits of their power , and consequently theirs is an unlimited limited power and goodness . he further adds , that the son's power is not as great as the father's ad intra , because he could not beget the father , as the father begat him : but it being a contradiction to suppose the son could beget the father , and contradictions being ( as he observes , pag. . ) objects of no power , cannot be objects of divine power ; therefore it could be no diminution to the son's greatness , that he could not beget the father who always was in being : though upon supposition that the son always was in being , it is equally a contradiction to say , that the father gave him a being . but if it were an essential and necessary perfection of the father's nature , to beget or emane two sons , and the son and holy spirit are not capable to emane sons ; it shows there is a mighty difference in their natures , or that they want some perfections that is necessary and essential to the nature of the father , nay , which belongs ( as he observes , pag. . ) to every creature , where he makes this remark , that if there is not a creature but can communicate his nature ; what a boldness is it to affirm , that the infinite creator cannot do the like ? he that hath planted the ear , shall he not hear ? and he that hath form'd the eye , shall he not see ? he that has given a generative power to the meanest of creatures , shall he not have the same power himself ? &c. so that by his argument , to deny to the son and spirit a power to multiply their species as the father does , is to deny to the infinite creator ( since each is the infinite creator ) a perfection the meanest of creatures have . as to the father's being called the only good by our saviour , there is none good but god ; that phrase ( says he ) signifies the father's being the original and fountain of goodness , which he may be , though not the only perfect good : he refers to grotius , but grotius speaks of the goodness of god , as the fountain of goodness in creatures . but if the streams be as perfectly good as the fountain , it would be very false to say , the fountain is the only good. i shall only apply to himself , which he justly ( prop. . ) says concerning the other trinitarians , if such a liberty as this in interpreting scripture be allowable , what work may be made with scripture ? besides , if the son and spirit are , as he saith , necessary and eternal , they must be as much the original and fountain of goodness , as the father himself who is so , because he is the eternal and necessary being . the notion of three necessary eternal beings is in it self sufficiently absurd ; for the meaning of a necessary eternal being , is a being which in the nature of things , and our conceptions concerning them , could not but be or exist : it was impossible it should be otherwise , because it implies a contradiction that any being or person should now be , if either it had not been from all eternity , or were not produced from that which was from eternity ; for of nothing comes nothing : but it was not necessary there should be more than one such being , because one such being , since he is all-sufficient , is in all reason sufficient for it self and all other beings whatever ; and if one is sufficient , two or more cannot be necessary ; for that implies this contradiction , that one is sufficient and not sufficient , another is necessary where one is all-sufficient . as the supposition of three necessary perfect beings is in it self absurd , so it is more absurd to say , that two of these necessary perfect beings want some perfections ; because necessary perfect beings cannot want any perfections . there was , 't is true , an eternal necessity that some being should exist of it self , or without a cause , and have all perfections ; yet there could not be any necessity of another being which should want any of those perfections the first had ; for it is as much as to say , that it was eternally necessary there should exist a being in some respects imperfect , that is , an imperfect god ; nay , not only imperfect , but useless and superfluous . and therefore it must be absurd to suppose it should be necessary and essential to the divine nature of the father , to have two natures to emane from him , which though they are supposed to be each almighty and all-sufficient , yet must be as needless to himself or to any creation , as he is all-sufficient for both ; and who can serve for no other end , than to rob him of that honour , power , dominion , glory , praise , adoration , love , &c. which without those emanations he would wholly enjoy to himself , and which he can now only share with two others ; so that nothing can be a wilder notion , than of one god emaning two gods. if it be not contrary to reason there should be more than one necessary divine nature ; i demand a reason why the heathens were blam'd for believing a plurality of such , since there can be no reason assign'd for above one , which will not equally hold for as many or more than they worshipped ; all which but one they supposed were not self-existent , but emaned gods. and if they were without excuse for worshipping more than one god , it must be plain by the light of nature what that one god is ; otherwise the generality of mankind could not distinguish between theism and polytheism . and does not the light of nature demonstrate , that one god is but one eternal necessary being ? and can it be suppos'd that the scripture should so severely condemn the heathens as sinning against the clearest light of nature , in adoring more than one ; and at the same time require the christians upon pain of eternal damnation , to worship three eternal necessary natures ? which is to make the holy scripture to contradict not only the light of nature , but it self ; and let him if he can produce any one argument against a plurality of gods , which will not equally hold against a plurality of divine natures . there are none that have wrote against heathenism , but have thought the impossibility of more than one necessary nature , a demonstration against the plurality of gods ; and consequently they suppos'd it most evident , that there can be no more but one such nature , because they use it as a medium ( which ought always to be clearer than that which is prov'd by it ) to prove the existence of but one god. i shall only instance one authority which may be instar omnium , and that is grotius de verit . relig . christ. the first attribute of god ( saith he in the beginning of that excellent book ) is , that he is one god and no more . this is thence collected , that he is that being which is necessarily and by himself ; for whatsoever is necessarily or by it self , is not considered in kind , but as it is in act : but if you suppose more gods , then you will find nothing in each of them , why any of them should necessarily be , and no reason why there should be rather two than three , or ten than five : add hereunto , that the multiplicity of singular things of the same kind , proceeds from the fecundity of causes , by reason of which fewer or more things are brought forth ; but god has no origin nor cause . so that this great man is contrary to our author in every thing . . in supposing it impossible there should be more than one necessary being . . that more than one such necessary being would infer more than one god ; and that god could not out of the fecundity of causes multiply his kind . . whatever had a cause or origin , could not be god. . that there is no difference between necessary being , or being by it self , or without a cause ; they are really one and the same with him , and so they are with all that have writ on this subject : they suppose god self-existent or without a cause , because he is necessary and eternal . they never make use of our author 's admirable distinction , pag. . of having necessary existence from another , and necessary existence from one's self . he asks me pag. . whether i think that god can be the necessary cause of nothing ; or whether the perfection of his nature does not determin him to do what is best , or to do what he in his infinite wisdom knows fit to be done ? to which i answer , that the question between us is not what the perfection of his nature doth determin him to ; but what the perfection of his nature is ? whether three perfect necessary natures or one only ? which is questioning whether the unity of god be a perfection or not . whatsoever is necessarily in god must contain the highest perfection , otherwise it would not be essential to his nature : but god being in his own numerically one nature , absolutely and infinitely happy and perfect , two other divine natures cannot be in him , or ( which is all one with our author ) emane from him necessarily , because they can add no perfection great or little to him , who in his one nature contains all perfections whatever . he and they together can be no more good , powerful , wise , than he is alone : he alone is all-sufficient , and two other such natures can make him no more . therefore it must be directly contrary to the nature of god and highly injurious to his honour , to suppose his nature necessarily to emane two persons , who must be needless ad intra to god himself , and as useless ad extra as god himself is all-sufficient . but if god gave a being freely to the son and holy spirit , because he in his infinite wisdom knew it fit to be done , they are no more necessary beings than all other beings which god also produced , because he in his infinite wisdom knew it fit to be done , or that the perfection of his nature did determin him to what was best ; and consequently they as all others continue in being , because god's wisdom thinks it best . but to say that god acted otherways than so , that is necessarily , in producing or causing the son and holy spirit to exist , who are as distinct and different from him as two men are from all other men , is either to make him act without understanding , or else to act contrary to his mind : for necessity only takes place where thoughts are wholly wanting , or else the power to act or forbear acting according to the direction of thought . but if god did not give them then beings , neither as necessitated , nor because he in his wisdom thought fit , ( which our author calls necessarily ) he could not ( there being no middle way ) give them their beings at all , or be the original or cause of them ; and consequently they having no origin or cause , must be as much without a cause , or self-existent , as the father and the same necessity ( if i may so say ) that made the father to exist , must make them exist . and the father , upon supposition that they necessarily eman'd , can be no more the original of them than of his own nature , because the same necessity that made his nature exist , made it emane : it was as essential to it to emane , as to exist ; and consequently the emaning natures must be as self-existent , and independent as his own nature , since they no more depend on him for existence , or continuance in existence , than his own nature does . which very thing would the defender seriously consider , it would make him abate of his confidence in his hypothesis . but more of this hereafter . . now i shall remind him , that tho the design of his propositions is to prove the doctrine of the trinity is not contradictory to natural reason , yet they ( as i observ'd , sect. . ) directly destroy the unity of god , which is the second point i am to examine : and that we may be assured there are not three persons or divine natures in the godhead , he affirms , prop. . that the godhead , or god in the highest sense , can be but one numerically , and therefore the oneness so frequently affirmed of him in scripture , is a numerical oneness : and in his answer to the consid. ( to which he refers me ) he says pag. . that the name of god in scripture is ever to be understood in the absolutely highest sense . how could an unitarian in more direct terms deny a trinity ? what he urges in behalf of the trinity is pag. . where he says , the holy scripture doth abundantly declare the unity of god , but no where distinguisheth of unity , nor says of what nature that unity is which it ascribes to god. but is not this directly contradicting prop. . where he declares of what nature or sort the unity of god is , to wit , a numerical unity ; and pag. . that the name of god in scripture is ever to be understood in that highest sense ? and indeed it had been very absurd to suppose the scripture did frequently inculcate that god is one , and yet not let us know in what sense he is one , except it be obvious to common reason what that oneness is , to wit , one eternal absolutely perfect necessary being . it 's most certain that when we ascribe any thing to god as a perfection , we ascribe it in the highest sense , and consequently the oneness of god must be taken in that sense . i desire to know what will destroy the unity of god , if every thing treble in him will not do it , as three natures with three unlimited powers , wisdoms , goodnesses . but he pleads , they are not three gods , because there is an immediate union in their spiritual substances : but i say , no union whatever can make three , each of which is one god , to be but one god ; because it is first saying , each is one god , and then denying it by saying , all three are but one god ; so that it cannot without a manifest contradiction be said , that while each remains one god , they can any way be united into one god : for three of the same kind will be thrice what one of the same kind is . if union make them one god , it must either identify them by making them one and the same god ; and consequently there can be no real distinction between them , or it must make none of them god by making them parts of god , which by union compose one god. for we have no other idea of composition , but of one thing being made up of several , which by being united constitute that one ; and which whether material or immaterial we cannot conceive , but as parts of the thing they constitute . for since each is not the whole , it must be only a part of the whole , whatever our author pag. . says to the contrary . i would willingly know why they are not as much three gods , though suppos'd substantially united , as if they were not united , since each has in himself distinctly from the others all the perfections of the divine nature , and they could have no more if they were separate . it is as much idolatry to adore three united as three ununited gods , since in both cases you equally rob god of his honour , by paying it to two numerically diverse and different gods : and being substances , they are in their natures capable of subsisting apart from one another . he pag. . misrepresents what i say concerning union , as though i argued against the bare possibility of their being united , and not of their becoming one god by union , while each remain'd god distinct from the others : and then makes a long harangue about mystery , in which he says , if he do not seriously cry mystery , i know what i know of him . but however to do him the fuller justice , i will mention what he further says concerning this union . in his first defence , pag. . he saith , they are as much one with one another , as they without the most apparent contradiction are capable of being one . a heathen would not have scrupled to have said as much of his gods. but he goes on and says , they are much more than specifically one : but then it is evident they cannot be so much distinguished as so many men or angels which are but specifically one . but he will not allow that they are identified or numerically one , ( p. . ) but if we cannot apprehend any medium between numerical and specifical oneness , then in professing to believe it , we profess we know not what . but i suppose he will say at this turn , as he does in his second defence , pag. . well , suppose this ! is it impossible for a thing to be of which we sorry mortals have no idea ? i say no , by no means ; but with humble submission he 's a very sorry mortal that requires us to believe words without any idea's annex'd to them . but let our author say what he will , he has still a simily to help him out . this medium between specifick and numerical unity , is as great a unity as that between the sun , its splendour , and the light of both : but those must be either different or the same thing ; if different , though of the same kind , there can be but a specifick unity , or if the same , a numerical unity . if by the light he means a thin collection of minute particles , as he , pag. . defines it , then he supposes the splendor to be a second sun , emitting a small sort of active , subtile and piercing particles : but if by light and splendor he means those idea's those particles cause in us , he cannot distinguish between splendour and the light of the splendor , because splendour is but a greater degree of light caused by those minute particles in a greater quantity , or more directly striking our eyes ; so that his simily is every way faulty . but because in his often repeated similies about the sun , its light and heat , he supposes somewhat in the sun , or which does exist by emaning from it , analogous to our idea's of light and heat ; i told him , sect. . that though there is in the sun a power to produce in us heat and light , as well as pain and pleasure , yet there are no such sensations or qualities in the sun , which though ( pag. . ) he argues against , yet he says the very same thing ; but lest his reader should perceive it , he calls the effects ( which when one pretends to talk philosophically , is very improper ) by the names of the causes , and will not say that heat is caused by , but that heat is a close collection of minute , subtile , active , piercing particles , and light a thinner collection of them . but do clothes and exercise by causing heat , produce a collection of such particles ? why do they not sometimes produce light , which is but a less close collection ? but in arguing thus , he grants all i would have , viz. that there are no such qualities in the sun , or emaning from it : but the sun being a body in perpetual agitation , there are minute particles flowing from it , which by their figure , texture and motion , alter the figure , texture and motion of some of the smallest parts of our hands and eyes , and thereby produce in us light and heat , which are as much meer perceptions as pain and pleasure . and i say again , there has not been any book writ these late years on this subject , but what proves there 's nothing in matter , besides bulk , external figure , and internal configuration of its minute parts , which by their motion produce in us heat , light , colour , sound , taste , &c. but enough of this . our author says in his first defence , pag. . that outwardly and in reference to the creation , they [ the three divine natures ] are perfectly one and the same god , as concurring in all the same external actions , though in relation to one another there is a real distinction between them . but if there is no distinction between them in respect of the creatures to whom they are one and the same god ; why do the trinitarians worship them as numerically different gods ? for if they adored them as the same god , it would be as impossible to worship the one and not the other , as to worship and not to worship the same god. but can there be a real and not a real distinction between them ? the reason he gives why the three divine natures are but one god , is as surprizing as the thing it self ; it is because they concur in all the same external actions : but if each is god , does it not suppose three concurring gods ? can one and the same god be said to concur with himself ? is it not directly agaisnt the honour of the father , who is god in the highest sense , to suppose him but a concurring god ? it is in a manner ungodding him , since we cannot say then that we owe more than the third part of our being , preservation and happiness to him . for to attribute them wholly to him , would be robbing the other two who equally concur with him , of what is their due : and no action can be wholly attributed to one , which jointly belongs to three . but if it be injurious to each divine nature to ascribe to it but a third of those benefits we receive ; it must be injurious to say they concur'd in conferring them . but if he says each wholly does all external actions , then he contradicts himself in supposing each concurs ; for he that wholly does an action , can never be said to concur in doing it . and if the father be the original of mankind , there cannot be a second and third original , except men can have as many origins . a second original is as great nonsense as a second first , and a first original is no more sense than a first first : but i refer the desender to my letter , from sect. , to . where i have handled this point more fully . by this time i believe it is evident to an impartial reader , that nothing our author has affirmed of the son and holy spirit does abate of their being gods in the highest sense , or make them one and the same god with the father ; and consequently there cannot be a more open and grosser polytheism than his hypothesis of three eternal and necessary divine natures . but , the defender is not content with asserting three such natures , ( which one would think sufficiently absurd ) but he also runs into a number of inconsistences concerning the manner of the existence of two of these natures in making them such , and yet not self-existent , or from none ; but that they had their eternal beings from another . now as it is evident that whatsoever is self-existent is eternal , because there is no author or cause of its being ; so it is as evident , that whatsoever is not self-existent , but has receiv'd its being from another , or has been caused to be , cannot be from eternity ; because to receive a being , or to be caused to be , supposeth the non-being to precede being . they must once not be , otherwise they were not capable of being caused to be ; and consequently they could not always have been in being or from eternity . what can be a more manifest contradiction , than that that which had ever been , should once be caused to be ? or that that which had been from all eternity , should from not-being be produced , caused or emaned into being ? or must not that which is emaned into being , sometime or other begin to be ? or can that which has a beginning be from eternity , which necessarily supposeth no beginning ? for we have no idea of any thing being from eternity , but that it had no origin . but our author , pag. . says , that the son and spirit had an origin . and prop. . the father is the original of all other beings , in which the son and holy spirit are comprehended . so that we must ( if we can ) believe that two necessary natures had an eternal origin or beginning ; and that they have been caused to be , tho they have always been . it 's as great a contradiction to say , that that which has had an origin has been from eternity , as that that which will have an end shall last to eternity : and if what has had an origin , can be from eternity , creation , which is but giving an origin to things , may be from eternity . and why might not god cause a thing to be voluntarily as well as necessarily from eternity , since in both cases being is equally bestow'd ? and every being that is not without a cause , ( as god the father alone is ) must have a beginning ; for there is no medium between having being from none , and from some one : and what has being from some one , must once be without being , and so have a beginning . and if god be eternal because he is self-existent , by parity of reason , what is not self-existent cannot be from eternity : eadem est ratio contrariorum , is as undoubted a maxim as any whatever ; so that nothing can be more evident than that , to have an origin or cause , or not to be self-existent , and to be from eternity , are inconsistent . and if they are inconsistent in themselves , whatever terms you express them in , they will be still inconsistent . whence it favours ( to say no worse ) of great prejudice , and fondness of an hypothesis , that when a thing is a contradiction in some terms , to seek out others to hide the contradiction . but our author is so unhappy in his attempt , that the very terms he makes use of , ( viz. to have existence from god by way of necessary emanation ) contain in themselves a direct contradiction : for whatsoever substantial being or nature emaneth from another , must before its emanation exist some way or other in the nature it emaneth from , otherwise it is impossible to emane from it , but it must emane from nothing , which is the very same as creation : for every nature must either emane from nothing , or from the nature in which it pre-existed . but to suppose a nature to exist by emaning , is to suppose it did not exist before its emanation , and consequently could not emane from another nature , but from nothing : except it first emaned from the nature and afterward existed ; which puts me in mind of a certain poet , who introduces adam in great haste going to be created . so that if the son and h. spirit did not exist before their emanation , it is impossible they should emane from god , otherwise than that god by the voluntary exercise of his divine power emaned them from nothing ; and consequently they could not emane or issue forth ( as he prop. . terms it ) from the divine nature . but if the son and holy spirit did exist before they emaned , they did not exist by emanation , but were self-existent as the nature of the father . upon my asserting of which , sect. . he answers pag. . but i say with as great assurance , that whatsoever substance emanes from another , must owe its existence to that other ; and the contrary is a manifest contradiction , but to whom i know not except to himself . but i must beg leave to dissent and tell him , that all substances whatsoever owe their existence to god , and not to the substance they emane from ; and that all generation , emanation , or procession in created beings , is only the different forms and figures which the various coalitions of matter , according to the laws of motion , do produce : and consequently whatever substance emanes from another , however it may be modified by it , does not owe its existence to it , but is as old as the creation it self . and by parity of reason , whatsoever emanes from a self-existent substance , does not owe its existence to the substance it emanes from , but is as self-existent as that substance . though to exist by emaning except from nothing , be , as hath been shown , nothing less than a contradiction ; yet our author tells us , pag. . it is a very presumptuous conceit , and in the second defence , pag. . an intolerable presumption not to conclude it possible . though he further says , we have a clearer idea of it than voluntary creation ; yet all the idea he gives us of it is , that it 's a more excellent way of existing than that of creation . but before i proceed in the examination of his hypothesis , it will be necessary to obviate an exception he takes at my using words taken from material substances , in discoursing of spiritual ones ; which is a most frivolous exception , because it is impossible to be avoided , since we have no ideas , and consequently no words to express them in , but what we have from sensible or material objects , and the operations of our minds about them , as is fully demonstrated in mr. lock 's essay of human understanding : and it is sufficiently evident from holy scripture it self , which that we may understand it , represents god with face , eyes , hands , bowels , back parts , motion from place to place , &c. and so spirits are describ'd as standing , falling down , &c. and in a word , so are all other things relating to spiritual beings . but this exception is very strange from one whose hypothesis is built chiefly upon emanations , which is a word borrow'd from matter , and signifies those minute parts or effluvia's of matter which flow from bodies : and his hypothesis makes the whole , or the one divine essence , either to emane from it self , or to be divisible , and have parts emane from it ; or else what he says is wholly unintelligible . the first argument i made use of , sect. . to shew it impossible the son and spirit could emane from the father , was , that they being both infinite substances , and as such being equal ; to suppose two infinites to emane from one , is to suppose twice as much to emane from a being or substance , as the being is . to which he answers , i change his phrase , beings whose perfections are unlimited , and who have all they can have without a manifest contradiction ; which phrase by the way , is not to be found in his propositions . but why might not i call them infinite substances , since twice in his propositions by way of explication , he calls them substances , and every where talks of the union of their substances : and pag. . of his third defence , defines person by substance ? and it is evident , that if the substances do not emane , the perfections that subsist in them cannot emane ; and if the perfections are infinite or unlimited , the substances cannot be finite or limited : and pag. . he expresly says , the son and holy ghost are all boundless and infinite . but where is the difference between infinite and his own term unlimited ? does not the one signify without bounds , as the other without end ? and the argument will equally hold with the one term or the other . therefore i have no reason to change those terms , nor did i injure him in using them . but that all infinites are equal , is as evident as that there is an inequality between finite and infinite : for if one infinite were less than another , there must be some bound or end of that infinite , which would be to make it finite ; wherefore for two infinites to emane from one , is to say , twice as much emanes from a being as the being is . nay , if the son and holy spirit were both but one infinite , to suppose them to emane from but one other infinite , is to suppose the whole infinite to emane from it self ; but if their nature each of them is as truly divine and infinite as that of the father , they must each of them be equal to him , and consequently cannot emane from him . can two suns ( which is a more proper simily for equal natures , than the sun and the rays ) emane from one sun ? would it not be to suppose twice as much to emane from the sun as was in it ? the defender upon better thoughts , though i did not make use of his phrases , thus replies , be he pleased to take notice , that there is nothing in this acute arguing , except he means by infinite substances , substances of an infinite bigness . he might as well have said , to be and not to be was a contradiction only in substances of infinite bigness ; for the reason is the same , of what nature or sort soever the substances be , provided they were capable of emaning : because the argument does not depend upon a being having bigness or quantity , but upon the equality of beings that emane from one another : for let an equal number which has neither matter nor bulk emane from an equal ; does not the whole number emane from it self ? so substract an hour from an hour , and see what becomes of the first hour . so that if the nature of the father emanes from it self an infinite and boundless nature , it must wholly exhaust the nature of the father , which is but boundless and infinite . but to suppose two such natures to emane from him , is to suppose twice as much to emane as the father's nature is . it is ( as i observed sect. . ) dividing one infinite substance into three infinite parts . to which he replies , how does our author already run taplash ? but i will not therefore forbear replying , and i answer , no doubt it is a horrid contradiction so to affirm : but how rank doth this smell of the gross thing called body ? his mind runs altogether upon material substances , which alone , i say , have parts to be divided into . then he goes on to demonstrate , that an infinite spiritual substance cannot be divided into infinite spiritual parts ; which is the absurdity , or if he pleases , the taplash i am condemning as the immediate consequence of his hypothesis . for what difference can we perceive between one infinite nature emaning out of it self two infinite natures , by which it so far parts with them , as they become two distinct and diverse natures from it , as distinct and different as so many men or angels , and one infinite nature divided into three infinite parts ? and by our author's leave we not only attribute parts to matter , but we are forc'd to do so to every thing ( whether finite or infinite ) we can in our minds add to and abstract from , which we cannot but conceive as parts . so we say that numbers and duration , and space though infinite , have parts . and the sober enquirer , in his view of the considerations , pag. . owns that conceptible parts in the deity no man can avoid : and if neither the whole divine nature nor a part of it emaned from it self , it is a contradiction to our idea's , that any thing should emane from it : what is a contradiction in those terms , will be so in any other . but to gratify our author as much as possible , we will express his doctrine in the softest terms we can , viz. one self-existent , eternal and necessary nature , which alone is first in nature , not in time , whilst it remains such , being not subject to any alteration whatever , becomes necessarily and eternally , three eternal and necessary natures , two of which are not self existent . or in other words , one immutable god necessarily and eternally becomes three gods of the same nature , but not three self-existent gods : which though they are monstrous contradictions in themselves , and to our conception of but one god ; yet our author is so happy as to be able to tell us how this is done , namely , by emanation , whereby two of these natures issued forth ( as he terms it ) from the self-existent nature . and though each of these natures is equal to the nature from whence they emaned ; yet the emaning nature is not capable of the least diminution : though one would think to have two natures to emane from one single nature , so as to be distinct and different in number from it , must be a diminution to that nature , since it has two natures by emaning them from it self less than it had . but if the nature of god is indivisible , and consequently no part nor any thing of it can emane ; nothing can be more evident but that all other natures , because not self-existent , must be produc'd from nothing . but he says , pag. . there is not a creature that generates another of the same kind , but may be properly said to communicate its own nature , and yet notwithstanding forgoes not its own individual nature , nor any part of it . but by his leave every generating creature does part with some of its substance , ( which he may call nature ) whereof the foetus is form'd , and which by accession of nourishment grows at length to be a nature or substance equal to its parent . but in the divine generation the son and spirit have their whole beings and natures from the father's nature , and not by accession from without , but all at once , and from all eternity . so that for the father to communicate his nature to each of them , whose natures are equal to his , would be doubly to annihilate himself . for a nature to multiply its kind , is a sign of defect and weakness in that kind of nature : for the same reason that makes it capable of propagating , makes it subject to corruption and dissolution , because it supposes it divisible and subject to augmentation and diminution , which beings in their nature immortal are not ; and therefore what can be more absurd than to argue from beings that are divisible , and for that reason alone capable of generation or emanation , to beings that are indivisible , and consequently not capable of having emanations flow from their substances ? i know none in his senses ever supposed so gross a thing of finite spirits as propagating their kind : however some men take the liberty not only to suppose it of god himself , but that he acts therein necessarily as inanimate beings do ; nay , they suppose it to be one of the highest and most essential perfections of his nature , which i conceive to be most absurd , as well as a most high affront to the sole infinite majesty of god ; and it carries this in it , that it necessarily inferreth not only a plurality , but an infinity of gods : for if god does not constantly and necessarily multiply divine natures , he has lost a perfection which they say is essential and necessary to his nature ; which change cannot happen in the nature of god , but if ( as the sun successively emits an innumerable company of new rays ) he does from eternity to eternity produce new natures , they must needs be infinite in number . but if he says god is eternally emaning into existence the son and holy spirit , it is so far from being true , that they were eternally begotten or emaned into actual being , that they never will be , so , though the father is in doing it from eternity to eternity , by a continued successive generating . but how can they that were , as he says , boundless and infinite from eternity , be capable of any farther production ? and every new or farther production must be as infinite and boundless as each of them . having thus fully ( as i suppose ) shown the impossibility of the father's issuing forth emanations from his own nature , i shall be the shorter in my remarks upon his answers . i said , sect. . upon supposition that the son and spirit are necessary emanations , i cannot see how they owe their origin more to the father , than the father to them , since they are all three of a substance , which is self-existent ; which is ( he says ) very surprizing , and as much as to say , that the root no less owes its origin to the tree , or the rays to the sun , than vice versâ . as to his simily from the sun , i have sufficiently spoken to it already . as to that about the root and the tree , it is evident ( not to mention that the tree cannot owe its origin to the root , because it is part of the tree ) that the trunk and branches do not owe their origin to the root , but are all visibly in the seed , which by nourishment received from without , do equally increase to their designed bulk . but to make it any ways parallel , suppose a self-existent root to emane necessarily from it self ( without any new matter added to it ) two trunks , each of which is as big as the emaning root ; would not the substances of all three be self-existent , since they are all three of the self-same self-existent substance ; and consequently one can no more owe its origin to another , than the self-same substance can owe its origin to it self ? in the same section i said , whatsoever [ substance ] proceeds from another , must first be in it , except it can be in it and proceed from it at the same time . upon which he asks , whether the rays are not as old as the sun ? or whether all thoughts must be younger than minds , because they have their original from them ? as to the first , i grant the rays are as old as the sun , and the reason is , because they have the same origin as the sun ; yet they cannot be in the sun , and emane from it at the same time . as to the second , whether thoughts are younger than minds , it is not to the purpose , because we are discoursing of substances , and of substantial emanations ; which if he supposes thoughts to be , how many substances would be created and annihilated in a minute ? but however , to answer his question , all thoughts must be younger than minds , because thoughts are operations of the mind , in conceiving and comparing idea's together , consequently minds must be before thoughts . but though all thoughts must be younger than minds , because they owe their origin to the mind , as being meer operations of the mind ; yet the powers or abilities that are essential to the mind , must be as old as the mind , because they do not owe their origin to the mind . here he blames me for calling emanation a separation , and says , that distinction , separation and difference , are several things . i suppose most of the trinitarians think distinction and difference to be so , because their books are full of distinctions without difference . he further says , that tho the son and spirit proceed from the father , yet they are still in him , and ever have been in him . but to emane from , to issue forth and proceed from , and yet still to be in , are contradictions in our conceptions . and our author , pag. . makes emaning from , and kindling , the same . but what is kindling , but separating the parts of any thing one from another , by a violent rapid motion ? and what is the emanation of the rays , which he so much insists on , but their separation from the body of the sun ? in the next , sect. . he wholly mistakes the argument , and then wanders to god's decrees ; which is nothing to the purpose , in a discourse of substantial emanations . upon my saying , sect. . what greater absurdity can there be , than that beings which have infinite perfections , should want some ? besides a long harangue about infinite , he answers , it is no monstrous business to imagine , that a being which has not every perfection , may have those it is possest of , in the highest degree . to which i reply , that it is monstrous that a divine nature which he owns contains all perfections , should want some perfections , and those the chiefest : or that natures , that are , as he says , boundless and infinite , should not have infinite perfections ; which is to make them ( to use his word ) unlimited in essence , but limited in the perfections of essence , as wanting the greatest ; the want of which abates , ( as he says , pag. . ) and consequently bounds their boundless perfections . nor can they have in the highest degree those perfections they are possest of , as unlimited power , wisdom and goodness : for if the father be the only wise , the only good , and greater than the son and spirit , they have not those perfections in the highest degree , nor are they ( as i have already proved ) unlimited . god cannot communicate any of his attributes , without communicating all ; because he cannot communicate any , without communicating his divine essence , in which ( as all properties do in a substance ) they inseparably exist . and if god communicate his essence , he must communicate with it his self-existence and independency , which are also inseparable from his essence . i must now beg leave to transcribe my sect. . that the reader may the better see whether it contains so gross a conceit , and such beastly stupidity , as our author , pag. . charges it with . — if they , the three supposed infinite substances , are more than one , they cannot be infinite , because being substances of the same sort , they must be bounded and limited one by another . if the substance of the father be every where , how can the substance of the son be every where too , at the same time , and after the same manner ? for if beings can be in the same place at the same time , in the same manner as they must be if they are of the same sort , it is impossible to distinguish them ; because we have no other mark of distinction between beings , but that they cannot be in the same place , at the same time , in the same manner . i hope our author will grant that two numbers will determine one the other , because if they did not , they would be one and the same : and consequently whatever things we predicate two or more of , they must bound one another , otherwise they could not be two : what makes them two , must necessarily limit them ; so that two infinites are a plain contradiction , because nothing can be infinite which is determined : but if they are two , they must be determined , otherwise they would not be two but one and the same . one infinite cannot contain or comprehend another infinite ; if it did , it would be the same and not another ; therefore that other must determine it : what is not all of the same kind , and so is singular , must have bounds or limits , otherwise it would be all ; and this is so very plain , that should a man in any other case affirm more than one infinite of the same kind , he would scarce be thought to be in his senses . who was ever so ridiculous as to assert more than one infinite space , more than one infinite duration ? yet neither space nor duration are corporeal substances . to suppose two infinite spaces or durations , must we not necessarily suppose an end or limit to one , before the other can commence ? to suppose two infinites of the same sort , is to suppose an infinite addition to that which is already infinite ; therefore it 's very evident that whatever nature or sort a being is of , if we conceive more than one , we cannot conceive any of them as infinite ; nor can we believe that the three persons are ( as he supposes ) as different as so many men or angels , and yet believe that each of them can be after the same manner every where , because holding both , is to believe them distinct and not distinct , different yet the same . and this must necessarily be , as long as we have no other marks of identity and diversity , but that beings cannot be after the same manner , in the same place , at the same time : if our author had any other marks of identity and diversity , he ought to have discovered them before he was so free of his obliging expressions . if there can be more than one infinite of a sort , there can no reason be assign'd why there may not be an infinite number as well as two or three ; so that it would not be absurd : to suppose an infinite number of spaces , durations , &c. and if more than one infinite being can be every where , an infinite number may as well be every where ; and by parity of reason a vast number of finite spirits may be in the very same space as contains one , which our author very roundly supposes , and says , they that do not suppose it have no manner of notion of what they believe . but mr. lock ( whom i never heard charg'd with beastly stupidity , or of having no notion of what he says ) in his essay of human understanding , ch. identity , speaks thus : we have idea's but of three sorts of substances ; first god , second finite intelligences , third bodies . though these three sorts of substances do not exclude one another out of the same place , yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them , exclude any of the same kind out of the same place , or else the notions of identity and diversity would be in vain . there could be no such distinction of substances or any thing else from one another . and if other authorities after this great man were not needless , i might add the learned cusanus , who lib. . de mente , says , impossibile est plura esse infinita , quoniam alterum esset in altero finitum . there cannot be more than one infinite , because the one would make the other finite . and another learned author says , quicquid actu est infinitum , ei nequit dari mensura . deus est actu infinitus , nequit ergo ei dari mensura qua mensuretur . at si plures essent dei , unus esset mensura aliorum , & sic nullus eorum esset infinitus . there can be no measure of that which is actually infinite : god is actually infinite , therefore there can be no measure of him . but if there were more gods than one , none of them would be infinite , because they would be a measure one to another . therefore his three divine natures being ( as he supposes ) every way united to one another , cannot but be a measure to one another . and the greater part even of the trinitarians the modalists , look upon our author's doctrine of three infinite natures , as a notorious contradiction . but the defender to prove his assertion asks , how can god be in those spaces fill'd with body ? or how can body and soul be in the same space ? which questions i thought i had prevented , by adding — beings of the same sort after the same manner : but that he says , can be only for a blind . to which i shall no otherwise reply , than by putting him in mind of the proverb , there are none so blind as those that will not see . however by the by , it 's a pretty-way of answering arguments , to tell his reader , that that wherein the strength of his argument lies , can be only for a blind , pag. . but this argument holds not only in substances of all sorts , but in modes and properties ; as for instance , more than one with infinite power is a contradiction ; because infinite power necessarily supposes supream power , which because all delegated power is contain'd in it , comprehends all power . and since our author , pag. . has a distinct notion of a being absolutely perfect , and beings of unlimited perfections ; i desire to know what idea's he has of three having each of them supream or unlimited power over the universe ? is it not first asserting that one has it , then denying it by saying another has it ? the christians of the first ages thought it an unanswerable argument against the heathens , that there could not be more than one god , because there could not be ( supream power being indivisible ) more than one that could enjoy it . how easily could the heathens have retorted this argument upon the christians , had they held with our author more natures than one , each with supream or unlimited power : so that if the father has all or supream power , it 's evident the power of the son can be no other than a delegated subordinate power , and consequently not unlimited and infinite ; and the reason will equally hold for all other divine perfections : so that by what has been said it appears , that to suppose more than one divine nature , is to make god a finite and limited nature with finite and limited perfections , which is in a manner as dishonourable to god , as to deny he has any being at all . but our author is not content with what he says here , but pag. . after a long dialogue of his own framing , ( where he makes a man of my head-piece ( as he phrases it ) not hesitate at replying that space is a real nothing , and a great many silly things besides ) he charges me with prodigious , monstrous presumption , in drawing most confident conclusions from premises that are unspeakab●y above the reach of human understanding — and with folly and madness in the liberty i take with the most profoundly adorable deity ( he should have said deities . ) in answer to which , and all his harangue concerning mystery , and the difficulties pag. + ) about eternity , &c. which a polytheist might as well make use of for a million of gods , or a papist for transubstantiation , or any other contradiction though never so palpable ; i shall only ask our author , are infinity and eternity mere empty sounds without idea's annext to them ? if they are , why does he use such words ? if they are not , is it not possible to join other idea's to them , which are manifestly inconsistent with them ? which if he has done , then all his common-place-harangue will not make them consistent . to what end is such an harangue ? except he will say , there 's no knowing a contradiction from a difficulty . or must a man be oblig'd to solve all the difficulties in nature and metaphysicks , before he can have a right to tell him , that he is chargeable with as gross contradictions , as to be , and not to be . for though our idea's of infinity and eternity are not compleat and adequate , ( as perhaps our idea's of few other things are ) yet as far as they reach , they are as distinct and clear as any other ; otherwise we could not demonstrate that there is an infinite eternal being , of which we have as great a certainty as of any mathematical demonstration . our idea of infinity consists in a supposed endless progression of the mind , which is still adding on to those large steps it first takes : whatever besides the inexhaustibility of the subject , puts a stop to the mind 's adding on , is directly contrary to our idea of infinity . as for instance , suppose you join a beginning to infinite duration , you thereby necessarily put a stop to the mind 's adding : and therefore our author's assertion of an eternal beginning or origin , is as plain a contradiction as to be , and not to be eternal . so in adding one infinite to another , you put a stop to the progression of the mind concerning the first infinite ; because instead of adding on , the mind has actually past over one infinite , and is viewing another . to add two infinites together , is ( as mr. lock says , ch. infinity , § . . ) too gross an absurdity to be confuted . what is it then to suppose three infinites , and those two every way closely united to one another ? in this case , which way soever the mind turns it self , its idea of infinity is destroy'd ; their continuity or union every way terminating one another . so that at last all the monstrous prodigious presumption i am guilty of , is , in owning the weakness of my understanding , the shortness of my idea's , and consequently the narrowness of my belief , in not giving assent to what appears to be a contradiction to the unity and infinity of the divine nature . i hope by this time the reader is satisfied , that the th section in my letter , did not deserve those hard words the defender was pleas'd to bestow upon it . had i asserted ( as he does , pag. . ) the infinity of quantity , i had deserv'd some such compliments . but i must excuse him since i find what he there says is too true , that he understands nothing of infinite , and that it is an amusing confounding word for his brains ; which , all unitarians must think , is some excuse for his asserting the son and holy spirit to be all boundless and infinite , as pag. . i said , sect. . as there can be no inequality , such as he supposes between infinite beings ; so we cannot pay a lower degree of honour to the son and spirit than to the father , without supposing an infinite distance between them . for as long as we pray to each as having necessarily inherent in himself infinite power , wisdom , &c. our devotion terminates in each , we give each the same divine honour . to which he says , p. . this is a very false charge , for we heartily acknowledg that all the honour we pay to the son and h. spirit , ought to be ultimately terminated in the father ; and i am sure he cannot think otherwise of those he calls the real trinitarians , because their hypothesis necessarily obliges them so to believe , whatever the hypothesis of the others does . but the holy scripture is so express upon this point , that i should think no christian should find it hard to believe it , no , tho there were no oother text but this for it , viz. — that at the name of jesus every knee should bow — to the glory of god the father , phil. . , , . we will now first set when it can be said , that the honour we give a person is not for his own , but for the sake of another on whom it ultimately terminates ; and then examine whether it be such an honour which the trinitarians give to the son and holy spirit . the honour we give a person , does not ultimately terminate on him when it is not for any inherent quality in himself , but for the sake of some power , trust or office that is receiv'd from another , and which he holds during the will of that other . thus we pay honour to a vice-roy , a judg , a magistrate , because they are the image , or some way represent that person who endued them with power . whatever honour or deference we pay such persons , it still terminates in the supreme ; it is for his sake and to his honour : and the reason is , because such persons , how much soever they may be advanced above their fellow-subjects ; yet in respect of the person that advanced them , they have no power at all , but are meer ministers and servants . so our lord christ , tho he is highly advanced as a reward of his perfect obedience above all his fellow-creatures ; yet in respect of god he is a meer minister and servant , wholly impotent , can ( as he saith ) do nothing of himself : and the reason why the honour given him in scripture is not for his own sake , but for the glory of god the father , is , because it is a delegated honour , god has made him a prince and saviour , giving him all power after his resurrection : or because ( as this text says ) god has highly exalted him , and given him a name above every name . and there is no instance in scripture where any honour , glory , power and dignity is ascribed to christ , either by himself or any man or angel , but is expresly given to him either as a man , or as the free gift of god to a man. and it 's more than probable , that this is so done , lest it should administer occasion to people to terminate their worship on him , as a divine nature , with all perfections necessarily and eternally inhering in him . it would be absurd , if he had such a nature , not to worship him for himself ultimately ; except an eternal and necessary divine nature is not to be worship'd for its own sake , which would be to say , that the father is not to be worship'd ultimately for the sake of his divine nature . the honour that does not terminate on the person , is never given to the creator but to the creature : and of this nature is that honour or worship we give to those gods or supreme powers which are the deputies or representatives of the most high god : which worship does not ultimately terminate on them , because what they have they have from god , and hold it only during his pleasure : what then can be a stronger argument that the son is not god than this , that the honour we are oblig'd to pay him , does not ultimately terminate in him but in another ? if any thing were strange from our author , this would be , that he that is god is not to be worship'd for his own sake , or that a supream being must not have supream honour . but let us now see what sort of worship it is which the trinitarians pay to the son. they , of whatsoever denomination , are so far from honouring the son for the sake , and to the glory of god the father , that in their publick prayers and liturgies , they give him equal honour with god the father ; and both papist and protestant trinitarians in their damning creed make them equal , and declare that none is before nor after another , none greater or less than another , the glory equal , the majesty coeternal . which equality is as much to the glory of god the father , as it would be to the glory of a king to have his subjects set up two others with equal power and majesty . therefore i wonder with what assurance our author can deny , that the trinitarians have objects of supream worship : and he himself in this treatise is for giving divine worship to the son and holy spirit ; and divine worship can be no other than supream , and consequently must terminate in the person to whom it is given . nay , he cannot terminate his worship more in one than in another , since all three are ( as he says ) one and the same god with respect to the creatures . all that our author can say is , that it is to the honour of god the father , because they depend on him ; but the more dependent he supposes them , the more absurd it is to pay the same honour to a dependent , as he does to the independent being . but their dependence , since he makes them necessary beings , is independence : and because our author is much taken with similies , i shall oblige him with one that is more parallel than that of the sun and rays . suppose ( for there has been such a thing in nature ) one man born with , and growing out of the side of another , who was a distinct man , though necessarily united to him , which was manifest by their discoursing one with another . now in this instance , we have one intelligent substance emaning from another ; yet this did not make him owe his being or continuance in being to the other , since they had the same cause of being and continuance in being , on which cause both were equally dependent , and not one upon the other : nor did the honour and respect men paid the side-man terminate in the other ; for in honouring the one , they no way honour the other . the parallel is very easy and natural : for as the two men depended on the same cause , and therefore the emaned man was no way obliged to the other ; so god's nature having no cause , his supposed emanations must be as much without a cause ; for what is necessary to the nature , is as much without a cause as the nature it self : therefore they could no more be obliged to god for their divine natures or their being gods , than god is beholden to himself for his own nature ; since there was the same necessity of his emaning them as of existing himself , and consequently they are as independent as he and therefore have a right to be worshipped ultimately without reference to him , who can be no more said to give them that right than to give it himself . so that if our author's hypothesis be true , there are two divine natures or gods , who enjoy all the rights of their godheads by as good a title as the most high god himself ; which if they are not three gods in the highest sense , it is impossible to imagine what are three gods , and as such it is too notorious that all trinitarians worship them . and tho they may with the help of distinctions , without any difference , deny and wrangle about the plainest contradictions ; yet it would be in vain to deny matters of fact , since it is evident they have three objects of supream worship , each of which they adore apart one from the other ; which is either owning three gods , or else owning themselves guilty of wilful idolatry , in paying supream worship to what they do not believe to be god. the reason why it is so necessary a duty to believe the unity of god , is , because we ought to have but one object of supream worship ; whoever has more , destroys that unity , and is guilty of idolatry : for it is most evident that if the having one object of supream worship , be the adoring of one god or supream being ; the having three such objects and the adoring each singly and by himself , is the worship of three gods. and in this point , whether it be lawful to have more than one object of supream worship , turns at present the whole controversy between the trinitarians and antitrinitarians . this was the point i chiefly insisted on in my letter ; and this is what i still desire a serious answer to : for our author's answer is a plain denial of matter of fact in their worship , and a condemnation of those that so worship . but to return , let the relation between the divine persons be what it will , that is wholly ad intra , without any respect or reference to creatures , who being equally oblig'd to each for their beings and all the blessings they do here or shall hereafter enjoy , ( which are the things they ought to pay the highest adoration for ) ought to pay to each the highest ; and consequently not worship one for the sake of the other , but each for his own sake . and this is evident from this farther reason : for suppose ( as we very well may , if there are three divine natures ) that two of them no way concern'd themselves with human affairs , and that our happiness or misery no way depended upon them , there would be no reason why we should give them divine worship ; but we ought to give it to him wholly from whom we have our being , and expect our happiness : and for the same reason , if we are equally indebted to each , justice and gratitude will oblige us to pay to each equal acknowledgment , and to terminate our devotions no more on one than on the others . and i challenge him to produce any text of scripture where there is any ground laid for the worship of god , but it will agree to him that has unlimited wisdom , power and goodness , &c. necessarily and eternally ; and who bestows upon us our life and happiness : and what worship we exhibit to god is certainly for his own sake , and ultimately terminates in him . thus if there be the same reason for terminating our worship on the son as on the father , it 's absurd to do otherwise . nay , were the trinitarians consistent with themselves , they ought to pay a thousand times more acknowledgments to the son than to the father , since the benefits they receive from the one , so much exceed the benefits they receive from the other . for suppose one should owe to two persons , to whom he was otherwise equally oblig'd , an immense sum , without payment of which he must for ever suffer the miseries of an intolerable imprisonment : would he not owe almost infinitely more to that person who not only freely and generously forgave him himself , but even voluntarily paid to the other , though with loss of his life by an ignominious and painful death , whatsoever their common debter owed him ; to whom he was no further oblig'd than for accepting the full satisfaction of him that became his surety . the application to the father and the son is very easy . as to the father's sending his son , if the son were not his subject , and so he could command him , it could amount to no more than the father's being willing to receive and accept of the satisfaction the son was as willing to pay in the stead of the debter . but let us suppose the father , son and h. spirit as equal in nature , so also equally obliging to us , and therefore each of them deserving from us our whole hearts and souls , which it is impossible for us to give to more than one : we must wittingly and willingly by bestowing them on one , either commit sacrilege against the other two , or else by dividing them , give each but a third of that which is wholly due to each of them , which would be sacrilege against all three . these are the mischiefs of our author's scheme of religion , which it is impossible for him to avoid , but by owning with the unitarians , that there is but one eternal necessary nature , which is to be lov'd and honoured infinitely above all , and all others as his creatures , but for his sake and for his glory . and now let the reader judg what great reason our author has to triumph and insult over his antagonist , as he does all along , but more especially p. , , . where amongst other things he says , he cannot but suspect , it is the encreasing or upholding of a party , &c. which has very much the ascendent of the love of truth . how may the learned socrates shame the self-conceited dogmatizers ? how much rather would i be modest socrates , than a christian who so leans to his own or his party's understanding ? our author is a little unlucky in so much mentioning socrates , who chose rather to embrace death than our author 's beloved hypothesis of more than one divine nature , though that was the religion of his country and of the world : but i cannot blame him that sets up for more than one such nature , ( which appears to be contrary to the clearest reason , as well as the most express scripture ) for condemning others for leaning upon that guide , which the one god has obliged them to follow , their own and not others understanding . as to his suggestion of our having other motives , not the love of truth , in opposing him , it is as groundless as uncharitable . for what design but the love of truth is it almost possible for a man to have in defending a doctrine , the doing of which exposes him to be ruin'd by penal laws , and which is worse , makes him an object of the aversion and detestation of all sects ? but since our author has given me the occasion , i shall presume to ask him , how he can , not only own the churches faith , the athanasian creed , but ( if he is of the clergy ) solemnly subscribe to it , and devoutly read it with all its damnatory clauses , when it asserts but one substance , one uncreate , one eternal , &c. and affirms the holy spirit to proceed from both the father and the son ? the contrary of all which he asserts in his propositions , and makes god the father to have two sons , both issuing from him by way of emanation : and consequently the son is not ( as contrary to all creeds as well as the scripture ) god's only son. but i shall conclude , only adding , that as it is contrary to the genius of religion , and is the way to eternize errors , so it betrays a mean and low spirit , to embrace an opinion for the sake of a party though never so venerable . and for my part , as i have been taught to call no man master but christ , so i will own no other name but that of christian , and not of any distinguishing party or sect ; and therefore will be chargeable with no controverted doctrine further than what i expresly own ; and that i do the unity of the nature of god , which is certainly of all doctrines the most fundamental ; and which i have abundantly shown from the consideration of his essence , his attributes , his works , and from the duty and worship we owe him . postscript . and now i am at leisure to bestow a word or two upon my pert adversary the enquirer , who in an advertisement to his view of the considerations , charges me presently with a double deplorable impotency ; and that for no other reason , but saying the enquiry being so fully examined by an abler hand , i shall only observe , &c. but instead of answering and shewing the weakness of those few observations i added , he only vents his spleen in studied raillery , and contemptuous expressions . but it 's usual for men highly conceited , when their weaknesses are expos'd , to grow angry . and i find the calm and sober enquirer not exempt from the same infirmity . he says , i rave in my dream in supposing he makes parts in god , or three inadequate gods. and for reply says , i appeal to that little sense he has left himself , whether power alone be god exclusively of wisdom and goodness ? then , adds he , 't is an inadequate or a notcompleat notion of god , and then by his profound reasoning not eternal . but is not this disowning and owning three inadequate gods ? for where is the difference between three inadequate gods , and three each of which is god , and yet none of them is god in a compleat and adequate sense ? and if the father alone be no more god , than power alone exclusive of wisdom and goodness , he must certainly be god in a very inadequate sense : for neither power , exclusive nor inclusive of wisdom and goodness , is god , but all three properties of the father , who could not be said to be eternal , except he had not only power but all the divine attributes . i wonder with what assurance he can deny , that his hypothesis makes three inadequate gods ; since he says , pag. . when you predicate the name of god of any one of them [ the persons ] , you herein express a true but inadequate conception of god ? now if you predicate the name of god of every one of them singly , and then add them together in one number , i appeal to the enquirer's great sense , how far short that comes of three inadequate gods and he further adds in the same place , as the body is the man not excluding the soul , and the soul the man not excluding the body , so each is god not excluding the others ; which at best is but making each to be god but in part , as the body or the soul is but man in part ; though with this difference , that each of the three persons is but the third of god , when the body or the soul is the moiety of the man. for each of these conceived by it self , are ( as he words it , pag. . ) individual essences ; but conceived together , they are the entire individual essence of god. which i aver is destroying the godhead of each , since each can be no more god , than the third of an essence can be the entire essence it self . and whether this is not making parts and composition in god , i refer the reader to what i have said , pag. . and this notion was by the antients counted a kind of sabellianism , vid. petav. adden . ad tom. . de trin. pag. . and it was by some of the fathers called atheism , id. l. . de tr. c. . § . . as observ'd by an answer to the animadversions on the dean of p. &c. pag. . and it is , by the acknowledgment of his own party , blasphemy against god the father , whom they all own to be god in the most perfect sense ; and who , if he were not so , the addition of the other two would not make one god in the most perfect sense ; because he could not communicate to his son and his holy spirit , those perfections he had not in himself . but to do him justice , he seems , pag. . to be asham'd of this notion , and says , that the father is the only true god , but withal adds , that neither excludes the son nor spirit from being the true god. [ not to take notice of the contradiction , that the father is the only true god , and yet others are the true god as well as he . ] this is directly to destroy his hypothesis , and is asserting what , pag. . of his enquiry , he says , no man that considers with ever so little intention and sincerity will offer at , namely , that they are three and one in the same respect : for if the father be the one only true god , and all three but the same one only true god , the three and the one are the same in all respects whatever ; and there can be no more difference between them than between the self-same god and himself . so that if each single person be god but in an inadequate sense , the trinity must be so too , because that is no more than what each person is , the true god. and , p. . of the view , he is forc'd to own that the father is god in the most adequate and perfect sense of the word , and consequently all three can be no more . thus the three and the one are the same in the same respect : and if there is more in the three in any respect whatever , than in the father , it must either be a perfection or an imperfection ; if a perfection , the father is not god in the most perfect sense of the word ; if an imperfection , then the father is god in a more perfect sense than all three together . but i will say no more on this point , since i have in my letter fully proved that neither son nor holy spirit can be the same god with the father , and consequently if there is but one god , the father is that one god exclusively both of son and spirit . i cannot but remark , that this calm enquirer has no fixt or certain faith of what the three are , which he says , are in the godhead . sometimes he is no more a trinitarian than those he writes against , supposing the three in the godhead are wisdom , power and goodness : sometimes he 's a modalist , as , page . where he says , father , son and holy ghost are each the true god , because each of them communicates in the godhead , which is the cant of the modalists ; and is as much as to say , the father , son and h. ghost communicate in the godhead , or in father , son and holy ghost . sometimes he talks like a realist , in supposing it possible , though not certain , that the three are three individual essences ; and this last seems to be his more settled opinion , because he talks so much of the mutual complacency and delicious society that is between them . which is to make god a collective name of several intelligent beings conversing together . which notion as to one part of it well agrees with that of the old pagans ; who as well as our author could not think a divine being absolutely happy in it self ; or ( to use his expressions ) had no gustful idea of a happy state in meer eternal solitude , therefore did suppose a delicious society of gods , solacing one another with everlasting harmony , and mutual complacency into highest delectation : but as to the other , they could never suppose this delicious society , each of which was one god , to be still but one and the same god. he says , his ( meaning me ) confidently taking it for granted on all hands , that all infinites are equal , shews his little compass of thought , and how unacquainted he is with the difficulties of a controversy , wherein yet he will be so overmeddlesom , qui pauca respicit ▪ &c. but who so bold as — ? i challenge him to produce any one that ever suppos'd somewhat more than infinite , which must be , if infinites are unequal : and if one infinite be less than another , the less would cease to be infinite , by having a bound or end put to it . and there would be no difficulty ( which he there hints at ) in supposing unequal parcels of matter to be divided each into infinite parts , if they could be divided into unequal parts . but i would willingly know , whether it is a finite or an infinite inequality that is between infinites . but i have spoken sufficiently of this matter already , and so i have of necessary emanations . he says of me , he did not need when he writ , to have abandon'd all logick and common sense , that would have told him , relata sunt simul natura . but why that reflection on me , except it be that , § . . ( which is the only place he can mean ) i expresly say , relatives cannot exist but at the same time ? if i had asserted a first in nature in contradiction to time , i should have had as little honesty as he supposes i have sense , in making use of a distinction of which i had no idea ; nor can they who use it , explain to others what they mean by it . and now having taken notice of all his flurts and misrepresentations , i take leave of him as civilly as he of me . good night mr. enquirer . but now having ( as i suppose ) sufficiently maintain'd my reflections , i shall address my self to the reader , and mind him , that not only the real and nominal trinitarians differ one from another , but the real among themselves , as these two authors i have been considering , and the nominal among themselves ; and every one is dissatisfied with all other explications besides his own , as contradictory , absurd , or unintelligible , and inconsistent with either the unity or the trinity : and they attack one another with arguments borrow'd from their common adversary the unitarian , which every one counts valid against the rest . whence i cannot but remark , how wonderful the power of prejudice and education is , whereby it comes to pafs , that though they cannot reconcile their father-god , and son-god , and holy-ghost-god , with the unity of god ; and though both scripture and reason do most expresly and clearly assert , that there is but one only god the father of all ; yet they cannot quit their inveterable doctrine . and though the nominals plainly perceive the realists guilty of polytheism , yet they join with them in the same form of worship , wherein they adore equally with them three divine persons under distinct and different characters , each by himself as one entire perfect god. and though the ignoramus-trinitarians cannot satisfy themselves with any explication , yet they think themselves still oblig'd to profess in words a doctrine they cannot in their own minds make consistent with it self . but i shall ask these gentlemen , whether god requires impossibilities of them , or whether it is possible for them to believe what they cannot apprehend but inconsistent with , and contradictory to it self ; or whether the christian religion , which all grant is plain and easy in its fundamentals , as suted to the simplicity of the bulk of mankind , can chiefly be built upon a doctrine so unintelligible , that the most learned men of that perswasion for above thirteen hundred years , have in vain laboured to make it intelligible and consistent with it self ; and sober men esteem it as vain an attempt as squaring the circle , or finding out the philosophers-stone , & c ? but since my present business has been with the real trinitarians , i shall conclude with an argument of athenagoras a most learned writer of the second century , in his apology for the christians to marcus antoninus . which being urged against a plurality of gods , is as strong against a plurality of divine natures , essences , &c. and it seems to be but an abstract of what i have more at large said against my adversaries ; which i quote not for his authority , but for the reason of it . translated into english it runs thus : pray consider ( saith he ) the reasons why we affirm , that from eternity there was but one god the creator of the universe . if from eternity there have been two or more gods , either they are united in one and the same essence , or each of them has a distinct essence to himself . but for them to exist in one and the same essence , is impossible ; for though they should be one in their denomination of gods , yet as begotten and unbegotten they must be different : seeing what is begotten resembles its parent , whereas the unbegotten is like nothing , being neither made of , nor for any thing . but if it should be said that many gods are one , as the hand , foot , and eye are but parts of the same body , socrates will tell you , that what is compounded of and divisible into parts , is both made and corruptible : but god is uncreated , impassible , and undivisible , therefore not consisting of parts . but if every one has a distinct existence , where shall the other or the rest be , whilst he that made this world surrounds and governs the creatures which he form'd ? if the architect of this earth ( which is of a spherical figure , inclos'd within the celestial orbs ) be over his works , and rule them by his providence ; what place shall we assign to another god ? not in this world , for it belongs to another ; nor over the world , for he that made it , is above it : and if he be not in the world nor over the world , where can he be above the world or god ? is it in another world ? if so , then he is nothing to us that governs not our world ; nor can his power be great , being confin'd to a certain place . if therefore he is neither in nor over this world , nor any other , ( for there is no other , seeing all parts of the universe make but one world , whereof the entire extent is fill'd by its maker ) therefore he is no where , for there is no place for him . but supposing him somewhere , pray to what purpose ? plainly to none at all , &c. it will be said , perhaps to provide for us ; but certainly he cannot provide for those he has not made . it follows therefore that if he created nothing , nor provides , nor can be confin'd to a place ; there is no other god at all , but one from eternity , the only creator of the universe . finis . a reply to the second defence of the xxviii propositions , said to be wrote in answer to a socinian manuscript . by the author of that ms. no socinian , but a christian and unitarian . nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri . london , printed in the year mdc xcv . a reply to the second defence of the xxviii propositions , said to be wrote in answer to a socinian manuscript . sir , i now find by notice in the gazette , that your learned and worthy friend , whose name you concealed from me , is the lord bishop of glocester . he has published an answer ( which he calls , a second defence of his propositions ) to a private manuscript , which he calls socinian . which ms. to excuse his not publishing it , he tells his reader he had returned to you , and had it not by him , nor a copy of it . he saith he collected the substance of it : i believe what he thought the substance ; but how shall the reader judg of that ? since as a great master tells us , the context , the stile , and the phraseology of an author must be well considered by one that means to understand him perfectly . but it seems he was not willing to lose an opportunity to expose a heretick , tho' he strain'd civility in so doing . in the mean time , my ms. gave occasion to encrease the number of his explanatory propositions . but after this farther explanation of his explanation , he is as obscure as ever , tho' that ( to deal ingenuously ) is rather his misfortune than his fault ; for there are some things which will never be explain'd while the world stands : such as necessary and eternal emanation , divine fecundity , the difference between order of time and order of nature . one thing , before i begin my reply , let me acquaint you with : i am advised to pass by whatever does not concern the cause , to bear the imputation of affected poedantry , ignorance and arrogance . contemptuous charges enough to exercise the patience of a well-compos'd man , and urge one of my make to take out letters of reprisal ; at least by way of self-defence , to say something like that of tully , non video in hâc meâ mediocritate ingenii quid despicere possit antonius . but i will submit my resentment to my adviser , as obedient sons are wont their faith to their mother ; and that not only for the reason aim'd at by my friend , but also out of respect to my adversary , ( and therein i shall please you ) whom i believe to be as you character him , one of the most deserving of his order . but yet i beg leave to tell you , that i do not hold my self oblig'd by this promise , to forbear exposing the weakness of an unconcluding argument , or setting two contrary sayings to stare one another in the face : but from all revilings , from foolish words , designed to lessen his lordship's just esteem , i shall religiously forbear . if i sprinkle salt , it shall not grieve his person . p. . of the defence , &c. ] whereas i had affirmed that the trinitarians had in vain tried their strength against the unitarians ; his lordship answers , there 's no doubt of it , if their adversaries may be judges . i now affirm it , if the trinitarians themselves be judges ; for the modalists will not allow the hypothesis of the realists , and the realists despise theirs : and then again , the ignoramus , or mystery-trinitarians , esteem the methods taken by both these parties , not only vain and fruitless , as to the refuting the unitarians ; but also dangerous , and likely to overthrow their own great article ; while both these parties join , and with full consent condemn the ignoramus-trinitarians , who press the belief of a trinity in the godhead , but cannot say what is meant by it . what the modern unitarians have taught in their late tracts concerning this controverted article , some or other of their adversaries teach as well as they . for example , the unitarians have taught , that if by persons are meant relations , capacities , or respects of god to his creatutes , then there may be more persons than in the godhead ; because god hath the capacities , respects or relations of a judg , of an oeconomus , or provider , &c. they have taught , that a mode or a posture cannot be a person ; that a mode cannot be in god , because modes are changeable , and god is not . they look upon it as an inconceivable extravagancy , to fancy that god in one mode or posture , begat himself in another ; and breath'd forth his self , by the help of his begotten self , in a proceeding third-self : and as to all these things , dean sh — k , mr. h — w , and the bp. of gl. have the same sense as the unitarians . the unitarians have taught , that there are not persons in the proper sense of that word , not distinct essences , natures , spirits , minds , or intelligent beings , in the unity of the godhead ; but that it 's down-right tritheism to say it , and equally idolatrous with the polytheism of the heathens . dr. s — th teaches so likewise ; dr. wallis is of the same opinion ; and the famous bps. of worcester and sarum , who will not declare plainly their own sense , both declare against this . the unitarians have taught , that that article , which is propos'd ro be believ'd as necessary to salvation , is capable of being explained ; and that it 's very unjust , not to say ridiculous , to require men to believe words , whereof no certain signification can be given : now if dean sherlock , with all the realists , and his friend dr. south , with all the modalists , were not of the mind of the unitarians in this point ; would they , think you , take such pains to explain the article , each after his own particular manner ? whatsoever single affirmation you arraign the unitarians upon , upon the same you arraign a majority of trinitarians . for i think i may reckon , that no one of the three chief divisions , is equal to the other two . in short , the majority of the church must be guilty of heresy with the unitarians , or the unitarians must be orthodox with them . thus , i think , i have justified that censure , the trinitarians have in vain tried their strength against their adversaries ; and that not those adversaries , but even the trinitarians themselves being judges . his lordship seems angry that i should be amaz'd at his distinguishing between intelligible and comprehensible : but that i have since consider'd the necessities which a good man may be put to , in the defence of a bad cause , i should be more amaz'd at his lordship's defence of that idle distinction . i have many things to say in answer , but because i hear you are not pleas'd with this fruitless contention , i will wave it ; and only tell you , that since his lordship sent me to the dictionary to learn that comprehendere signifies something that intelligere doth not , i put that labour on one of my children , and i 'll take his word , that the metaphorical signification of comprehendo , is just the same with intelligo . p. . l. . his lordship has an obscure period ; in which , if there be any meaning , it must be this , that he holds it possible to understand the manner how three are one ; else he would not have offer'd at an explication of the doctrine of the trinity agreeable to natural reason . and what account has he given of the manner ? why , in pr. . of . but . of . he declares , that there is an unconceivably close , and inseparable union in will and nature between them , [ the numerically distinct persons . ] and is this all he knows of the manner how they are one ? i. e. after such a manner as cannot be known nor told ? well! those sophists ( in rebuke of whom socrates professed , all that he knew was , that he knew nothing ) were not so unreasonable as to make the inconceivableness of the manner , wherein a doctrine might be true , a proof that they knew the manner in which it was true . i said , that three are one is not true in a sense disagreeable to reason : the explication which he gives how are , is disagreeable to reason , and therefore not intelligible , not comprehensible , not true . the latter part he answers with his usual distinction , tho' intelligible , yet not therefore comprehensible : but i pray him to tell me , why a prop. not disagreeble to reason , should not be capable of being compleatly understood , when it is compleatly revealed . i said , . he that understands the truth of a prop. understands the manner in which it is true , &c. i now apply it thus : he that understands the truth of this prop. there are three persons in one god , understands the manner how that can be , or the sense in which it is true ; and if he does not understand the manner or sense , then , let him pretend what he will , he does not understand the truth of the prop. and if not understanding the manner or sense how the prop. is true , he professes to believe it ; then it 's manifest he takes it on authority , believes it in deference to others . prop. . that being which wants any one perfection , cannot be absolutely or infinitely perfect . upon this i observed this consequence , that christ was god only in a metaphorical sense . nor shall he ever be able to avoid the consequence ; for the strict sense of a word or phrase is the proper sense of it ; and every sense besides the strict and proper , is metaphorical . prop. . god the father alone [ strictly speaking ] is a being absolutely perfect , because he alone is self-existent ; and all other beings , even the son and h. ghost , are from him . he seems to allow my former censure : i now observe , that his hypothesis is unluckily built on vain distinctions . indeed he could tell me , that intelligible and comprehensible was an old distinction , and very common ; but now he brings forth one , which is wholly new , which no man ever us'd before him . it is this : absolutely perfect in the stristest sense , and absolutely perfect with reference to the nature of a being . of which ( to be as free with him as he with me ) i can make no better sense than this ; that a being which hath all the perfections of its nature , may in some sort be said to have all perfections without restriction , all whatsoever . that a magistrate may be said to exercise all power without limitation , when he exercises all that was delegated to him . but if one being can be more absolutely perfect than another , i would fain know why one cannot be more omniscient , more omnipotent than another ; more infinite , more eternal , both à parte post , and à parte ante . if a man would study to restrain a word of some latitude , he could not do it more effectually than his lordship has restrain'd the predicate perfect , by the adjunct absolutely . supposing the word perfect may be taken in a stricter and a looser sense , yet the phrase absolutely perfect , cannot possibly admit of any other sense — having all perfections . every man understands this term absolutely so as to imply , that nothing more than what thereby is , can be predicated of the subject . but if this distinction must pass in this controversy against the common sense of mankind ; then let the equivocating jesuits , who were formerly content with very childish salvo's , to take off the infamy of a lie , learn the way of distinguishing , worth a volume of their old mental reservations , when the treason they solemnly disavow , is unluckily discovered . prop. . a being which hath all the divine perfections that are capable of being communicated , may be properly said to be essentially god upon the account of those perfections , or to be indued with the divine nature . it seems i was so rude as to call this a gross prop. contrary to sense and reason , and to all that the proposer had rationally advanc'd before ; nay , i was so perverse as to prove it by induction of particulars . i refer to my animadversions . his lordship here complains , . that i us'd too many words : but the nature of the argument required them . . he tells me , he had no such expression as , derives it self from god : but he has a bad memory ; for in his d prop. he says , 't is an abatement of a boundless perfection , not to be originally in him who hath it , but derivatively . . he affirms that i am a little injurious , in representing him saying , that the son and h. ghost have only some perfections ; whereas i ought to have represented him as saying , that they have all that are capable of being communicated . but i 'll justify it , that i ought to have represented him as i have done ; for 't is my business to expose , not to cover the weakness of his arguments , and i have not misrepresented him ; for if the son and h. spirit have not absolutely all perfections , then they have but some : but how comes it to pass that they have no more than they have ? that 's nothing to my purpose , let him look to that . incapacity to be greater , cannot surely make a rational being as great as the greatest . i come next to consider how his lordship has answered questions which i put . . does the divine nature comprehend all perfections , or can it want one or two of the chiefest , and be still the same divine nature ? to this , thus he ; self-existence is a perfection relating immediately to the father's existence , not to his nature or essence . i reply , that this is not answering the question , but a very sorry shuffling it off ; for let the perfection of self-existence belong to what he pleases , yet i hope it is a perfection ; and if the divine nature comprehends all perfections , that nature which does not comprehend all , must not be the divine nature . . if self-existence ( as he teaches ) relates immediately to the father's existence , and ( as he seems to mean ) be but as good as no perfection ; yet to be first original of all things , and independent , must relate to his nature , or none of all the rest relate to his nature . the nature of a being is that by which he is , that which he is : and if you abstract from the divine nature , independence , and being the first original of all things , you do not conceive god to be that which he is . . even the manner of god's existence ( as his lordship once phras'd it ) belongs to his essence ; nay , it is the very fundamental notion of a god. whatever excellencies you ascribe to a rational being without self-existence , you raise him not above the character of a most excellent creature ; nay more , you cannot ascribe infinite perfections to any but the self-existent god : for his lordship grants , that the perfections of all other creatures are in them but derivatively , and by being so , receive abatement . but if he can make these two things consist , i will give him this gift , he shall never be able to contradict himself while he breathes . . tho' he will not allow self-existence to belong to the essence of god ; yet he says , that it speaks a more excellent manner of existence , peculiar to the father . i argue then , if the father does exist after a more excellent manner than the son ; then he is a more excellent person than the son , and has a more excellent nature : even as created adam ( it is his lordship's simily ) is more excellent than any of the sons of men. and if the more excellent nature of the father be not another sort of nature than the less excellent nature of the son , who can help it ? but then i 'll tell him , that one absolutely perfect god with all perfections ; all and every , self-existence , being the first original , and independence not excluded ; and his gods not absolutely perfect , but as perfect as gods can be , that are not absolutely perfect ; is a dream , which would make sport for any man , that has not more reverence for his vertue than his reasoning . but his lordship is positive that the nature of the son may be a necessary nature , and uncreated , for all that i can object , or he has said : well! i will try that ; i object that the nature of the son is not said to be necessary or uncreated in scripture . he offers no reasons why it should be thought so ; i will produce some why it should not . . because there can be but one numerically necessary existent : dr. cudworth , tho'a trinitarian , could not but own this , p. . the true and proper idea of god , is a being absolutely perfect : absolute perfection includes in it all that belongs to the deity , and is that alone to which necessary existence is essential , and of which it is demonstrable . the nature of the son cannot be uncreated , because there can be but one numerical uncreated nature . indeed the athanasian creed pronounceth , the father uncreate , the son uncreate , the h. ghost uncreate : but the compiler did not believe it ; for he determines , not three uncreate , but one uncreate . his lordship hints sometimes , that the nature of the father , son , and h. ghost is specifically the same ; sometimes that it is closely , inseparably , unconceivably the same : but he constantly teaches , that their natures are numerically distinct : and now if every one of them is uncreate , it undeniably follows , that there are numerical , distinct , uncreated natures : but this methinks he should scarcely venture to assert , if it be but out of reverence to the athanasian creed , how much soever he may be tempted to trespass upon evident principles of reason . . neither the son , nor the h. ghost , is a necessary nature ; because a necessary nature must be also self-existent , and independent . that being which exists necessarily , could exist from no other : but the son exists from the father , therefore does not exist necessarily . he will say , the son exists from the father by eternal necessary emanation ; what that is , i shall presently enquire : i argue on , if a being could exist necessarily , then it would not depend on god for its existence ; but the son ( according to his lordship ) does depend on the father for his existence , therefore he does not exist necessarily . if the nature of the son were necessary , as is the nature of the father , no reason could be assigned why the father should not as much depend on the son , as the son on the father . in short , two necessary natures there cannot be : but if there were , they would both be independent . to my d question , he bids you , sir , read again what he said to the former ; i have done so , and find i have not censur'd these words : god the father's existence being without a cause , doth not make him to have another sort of nature , from the son and h. ghost . ] here it is implied , that the nature of the son , and of the h. ghost , had a cause ; whereas the nature of god had none : will not this pass for a sufficient character , to distinguish them as different natures ? i 'm sure , no two different natures which he can name , do differ half so much as a nature that had a cause , and a nature that had not . and then again , to have a cause , and to be uncreated : if that be not a contradiction , i am satisfied he may talk backward and forward securely . my d question , can a being that depends on god , be properly said to be essentially that god on whom it depends ? he answers , such a being can be properly said to be essentially that god in one sense , but cannot in another ; i. e. can have an essence of the same kind , tho' not the same numerical one. but by his favour , an essence of the same kind , can at most but make a being to be a god , not make him to be that god , on whom himself depends . if a being can be that god which depends on another ; and that very god also , on whom himself depends , then such being may at once be two gods ; and so the second person in the trinity is the father that caus'd the son to be , and the son that was caus'd by the father . thus by his lordship's answer to my d question , it appears he holds the three persons to be one god , as having an essence of the same kind ; but to be three numerical gods. and to make his polytheism look as heathenishly as possible , he saith , p. . that the individual nature of the father , is not a divine nature more truly than that of the two other persons . and then self-existence , being the first original , and independence , signify much . his lordship makes the same answer to my th prop. as he did to my d ; i. e. he has answered it already . what can be more extravagant than this fancy , on which the weight of more hypotheses than one depends ; viz. that angels exist by voluntary creation , but the son and h. ghost by necessary emanation ? it 's common with the trinitarians , to use these terms , generation , emanation , procession : it 's common also with the most eminent of them to acknowledg , that it 's a difficult thing to understand , a dangerous curiosity to enquire , a bold presumption to determine , wherein these terms differ : and the reason is , ( tho' they are asham'd to own it ) because they know not what they would have their terms signify . in common speaking we know what is meant by to generate or beget , to emanate or flow from , to proceed , to go or come forth : but those terms cannot be applied to the father , son , and h. ghost , in that natural obvious sense ; why then should they be applied to them at all , when no man can distinctly say what they are to signify ? 't is granted we have not an adequate conception of god ; there may be something in his nature , whereof we have no just idea : but that which we cannot understand , how can we talk of ? how can we form propositions of things out of the reach of our knowledg ? but by this one particular term emanation , his lordship will venture to say , this is what is meant , a more excellent way of existence than by creation ; and to his term emanation , he adds this epithet necessary : so then , the more excellent way of existence than by creation , is necessary existence ; and so it is : but then the son does not necessarily exist . that being which could not but be , ever was ; and that being which ever was , could be from no other . but because his lordship is wont sarcastically to deride my arguing , ( who am indeed an obscure and unlearned little fellow ) tho' for ought he knows , i may equal the very great abilities of that dying martyr ( yet a trinitarian to my knowledg ) who starves , to the reproach of this nation ; to whom the envious jovian allow'd the praise of mediocrity : i shall therefore seek a little shelter from authority ; that his lordship may not renounce his senses , if any man of sense be of his mind . the author i am going to quote is dr. cudworth , a good man , and very near of his lordship's make too ; who in his intellectual system , contradicts his own and his lordship's hypothesis , as plainly and liberally as heart can wish ; p. . self-existence and necessary existence , are essential to a perfect being , and to none else . but his lordship teaches , that the latter , and not the former , is essential to a perfect being ; and that the son is absolutely perfect ( tho' not in his strictest sense ) without self-existence , and that the self-existence which belongs to the father does not belong to his essence : tho' he who can separate self-existence from the father's essence , may with as much reason deny the existence of his essence ; for the father is as certainly self-existent , as he is existent . cudworth again , p. . nothing could exist of it self from eternity , naturally and necessarily , but that which contains necessary and eternal self-existence in its nature . i am apt to believe , this author put in that phrase of it self to save an emanation or two : but it will not do it ; for he constantly makes self-existence and necessary existence inseparable perfections . and p. . he speaks full and home against his own and the bp. of gloucester's tritheism , in these words : tho' it be certain that something did exist of it self necessarily , from all eternity ; yet it is certain likewise , that there can be but one such thing , necessity of existence being essential to no more . now if necessity of existence be essential but to one , i pray , sir , what will become of his lordship's necessary emanations ? cudw . p. . because something did certainly exist of it self from eternity unmade , therefore also is there actually a necessary existent being . the doctor proves the necessary existence of a being , from its existing of it self from eternity ; i. e. from its necessary existence , as i had done before . let the reader judg if it be not a good argument . p. . his lordship says , a creature communicating its nature , does not forgo its own individual nature , [ but neither does he communicate his own individual nature ] nor any part thereof . here i beg his pardon ; for the creature does forgo a part , a seminal part thereof ; the bodily substance of the foetus is by the wonderful providence of god , made from the bodily substance of the parents ; and as far as the bodily substance of men may be call'd their nature , they waste their nature , to produce their like . how souls are produced , he says not , neither i. but hitherto he has not offer'd any thing to make me retract my assertion ; that we have no other notion of the word communicate , but to impart or give ; and what one person doth impart or give , of any essential and singular thing , that himself hath not , but he hath it to whom it is given . who questions the power of god to generate his like ? he made man in his own likeness , endued him with rational faculties , with noble excellencies of mind : but the unitarians do not see , how god can communicate all his infinite perfections ; for that is to communicate himself , to beget himself , to multiply himself ; which deserves a harder name than i can give it . prop. . there seems to be no contradiction , nor the least absurdity in asserting , that god is able to communicate every one of his perfections , except those of self-existence , and being the first original of all things . ] against this , i did affirm , ( and see no cause i have to retract ) that for the same reason , as self-existence , and being the first original of all things , are incommunicable ; for the very same , infinite power , wisdom , and goodness were incommunicable also : and to make good this affirmation , 't was proper for me to declare why the former were incommunicable , that the reader might judg wherein the latter were not so likewise , for the reason alledg'd . all that his lordship has to offer , is , that i attempt to prove a self-evident principle : but that 's not so great a fault i hope , as to attempt to prove an evident contradiction ; such as , that two persons have all perfections necessary to essentiate a perfect god , tho' they have not absolutely all perfections ; that god the father has more perfections than are necessary to essentiate a perfect god ; that the father who has more , and the son and h. spirit , who have just so many perfections , as are necessary to essentiate a perfect god , are still all three of them but one god. but supposing i have us'd in re non dubiâ argumentis non necessariis , in a plain case needless arguments ; yet he cannot charge me to have obscur'd the self-evident principle : but i defy his lordship , to illustrate his obscurities . i proceed in my defence , whereas it 's very absurd and contradictious to suppose more than one self-existent ; so it is equally absurd and contradictious to suppose more than one infinitely powerful , wise , and good being . and by equally i mean , as evidently so . nor am i the only man that will say this , as i shall prove presently ; tho'he pretends to be sure of the contrary , and civilly tells me , i cannot think so , let me say what i will. i make him but this temperate return ; i will suspect his understanding sooner than his veracity . i said farther , that infinite power , infinite wisdom , infinite goodness go together , and may all of them as well as either of them , be in all beings whatsoever , as well as in more beings than one . he replies , that this as much needs to be prov'd , as that which it is brought to prove ; and that my only answer is like to be , it must be taken on the authority of my lord of canterbury . but then by my lord of gloucester's favour , i am not the only man that will say , more than one infinitely powerful , is as absurd as more than one self-existent . and if the judgment of that lord of cant. ( which he passes with unbecoming contempt ) is of no value , i will laugh at the man who thinks to credit his discourse with the authority of athanasius , or the nicene fathers ; men moderately skill'd perhaps in brangling philosophy , amus'd with mysterious platonism , and full of themselves : whereas the name of tillotson shall be ever bless'd , if sound learning and wondrous modesty , true piety and just moderation do not grow out of fashion and esteem . to that passage i cited out of his sermon on tim. . . my lord of gloucester thinks it enough to answer , that he had not the sermon by him , and i had not distinguish'd his words . a fair answer ! i will now cite them in a distinguishing character . p. . absolute perfection is the most essential notion which mankind hath always had of god , and necessarily supposes unity ; 't is essential to the notion of an absolutely perfect being , that all perfections be united in him : to imagine some perfections in one , and some in another , [ i. e. in god the father , which are not in god the son ] is a contradiction to the most natural and easy notion men have of a god ; i. e. that he is a being , in whom all perfections do meet and are united . now had his grace been a prophet , he could not more directly have pointed his words against the hypothesis of the propositions . and if his grace was so honest as to believe the truth of what he affirmed , why may not i who have said the same things in other words , believe what i have said ? that odious insinuation to the contrary , must needs reflect hardly upon his lordship , rather than on me ; for i will be his proselyte , if the major part of the trinitarians do not believe with me , that it is equally absurd and contradictious , to assert more than one infinitely powerful being , as to assert more than one self-existent being : nay , amongst the trinitarians , there is one , a late eminent and worthy writer ; who in his intellectual system , p. . l. . teaches thus : the genuine attributes of the deity , namely , such as are demonstrable of an absolutely perfect being , are not only not contradictious , but also necessarily connected together , and inseparable from one another . for there could not possibly be one thing infinite in wisdom only , another thing infinite only in power , and another thing only infinite in duration , or eternal ; but the very same thing which is infinite in wisdom , must needs be also infinite in power , and infinite in duration . that which is infinite in any one perfection , must needs have all perfections in it . thus are all the perfections of the deity , not only not contradictious , but also inseparably concatenate . in the very next page dr. cudworth farther asserts , that there is nothing in the genuine idea of god , and his attributes , but what is demonstrable of a perfect being , and that there cannot be the least either aded to that idea , or detracted from it , any more than there can be any thing added to , or detracted from the idea of a triangle , or of a square . ] whence it follows unavoidably , that the son and h. spirit can no more be omnipotent than self-existent , independent , and first originals ; if they have one infinite perfection , they have all ; if they want one , they want all : and if three distinct beings have each of them all infinite perfections , they are three gods in the highest sense . prop. . it seems evident from h. scripture , that the son and h. spirit have all divine perfections but those two , such as unlimited power , wisdom and goodness , and unspotted purity . here his lordship notes , that in my animadversions i said , unspotted purity was but the perfection of a man or angel , not an infinite perfection of a god. and here i say again , notwithstanding what he has said to the contrary , that even saints made perfect , and angels that never fell from their blessed estate , are unspottedly pure ; he will not deny it , and yet they are not gods : he will not assert that they are , and therefore unspotted purity is the perfection of saints and angels , not the infinite perfection of a god. as to his reproach , so frequently cast upon me , that i have a large stock of confidence ; i reply , if my discourse is reasonable , my confidence is just . i excepted , as i justly might , against his lordship's expression , it seems evident from scripture that the son and h. spirit have all perfections but two . my reflection , on which he descants , but thought not good to set down , was this : that which does but seem evident , is not really so ; and that which is evident , does more than seem so . what he excepts , and my reply thereto , i 'm not willing to trouble the reader with , and therefore i omit it , and proceed . in my animadversions , i wish'd he had cited some of the plainest texts , from which he thinks the son and h. spirit have all perfections but two . he now has cited ; what! plain texts ? no such matter , but naked texts , without taking notice of the account already given of them by the unitarians : and then with a faint stroke of rhetorick , says , this text doth at least seem to speak christ infinitely powerful , and that seems to speak him infinitely wise , &c. but i tell him , no , not one of the texts alledg'd doth so much as seem to speak his sense to an impartial reader : for sometimes what he supposes said of jesus christ , is not said of him , but of god his father ; and what is really said of the lord christ , does only prove him to be more honourable than his brethren , but still leaves him inferiour to his father . i will give one instance of each remark : his lordship affirms , that the author to the hebrews , chap. . ver . , , . expresly applies ( he means in the strict literal sense ) some verses of the d psalm to the son of god : i affirm he doth not ; to prove my negative , i premise , . that those verses , if then extant in that epistle , did not seem to clemens romanus , ( the most antient father we have ) who lived in the first century , to be so applied ; neither to aquina in the th , nor to deodati in the last age. the two last were trinitarians . . allowing those verses genuine as we have them , the account given by the unitarians is most agreeable . . setting aside those two considerations , yet it 's most manifest that the th verse , as applied to the son of god , was not so intended by the divine author : for ver . . the author says , god the father made the worlds ; and if he should , v. . ascribe laying the foundation of the heavens and the earth to the son , then he contradicts himself in the same chapter . if his lordship should say the text tells us , god made the worlds by his son ; i reply , that 's not enough for his hypothesis ; it will not therefore follow that the son has unlimited perfections , infinite power , &c. but rather the contrary . he cites rom. . . to prove the knowledg and wisdom of christ to be infinite , without taking notice of the different pointings , and consequently readings , mentioned by erasmus and curcelleus ; and other observations given in the answer to mr. milbourn : and besides , does not fairly read the text as it is even in our english translation . to prove the power of christ to be limited , and not infinite , i cited mat. . . where he says to peter , thinkest thou that i cannot now pray to my father , and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels ? his lordship answers , there 's no necessity it should be implied in these words , that christ had not power to deliver himself without praying to his father . if so , would it not then be a mockery to pray to his father for that which he had in his own power before he pray'd for 't ? he pursues his answer thus : greater works are recorded of christ , without any mention of his praying for ability to do them . if i studied to nick him with his own raillery on me , here i might ask , who told him so ? and what were those greater works ? it 's certain christ had not before he pray'd for it , that power for which he pray'd . well! but ( says his ldp. ) christ's power being originally from the father , he took all opportunities of giving the father the glory of what he did . if he designs this to prove christ's power infinite , he has very ill luck at argument ; for this is a fair and full yielding up the cause . to give glory to the father for the works which he did , signifies no less than to acknowledg he did them , not by a power of his own , but by a power communicated from the father , and for which he praises the father ; which are the characters of a dependent finite being . his next remark is still more against himself , viz. when christ thus said , that he could have obtain'd legions of angels by prayer , he thought fit to declare in the ears of his enemies , how dear he was to god , tho' they hated him . the dearer one is to god , the greater must be his power ; but he that is dearest , acts by a borrowed power ; and that may perhaps be greater than we can imagine , but cannot be infinite . to rivet his pleadings against himself , he is pleas'd to add , that christ did industriously conceal the highest sense in which he was the son of god. this is a most weak conceit ; and if chrysostom was the author of it , his ldp. is as much beholden to him as ajax was to hector for the sword wherewith he stabb'd himself . if christ conceal'd the highest sense wherein he was the son of god , then it is very disingenuously done of the trinitarians to pretend to prove that highest sense from any words of christ ; and if the words of christ do not deliver that sense , i am afraid it will be found , that the apostles did as industriously conceal it as their master ; for the words of christ are indeed strain'd when interpreted this way , but not more than the words of the apostles for the same purpose . and if christ conceal'd that highest sense from his enemies , he also conceal'd it from all others ; for those discourses which were industriously fram'd to conceal it from men not dispos'd to believe it , could not sufficiently reveal it to men dispos'd to believe it . prop. . it 's intolerable presumption to conclude , &c. here his ldp. is pleas'd to disown the grammatical and natural signification of his censure , in that angry phrase intolerable presumption : he does not mean by it a presumption that should not be tolerated . but if i let him take sanctuary in his meaning , it shall be upon condition , that he will excuse my having display'd the odious consequences of his words taken in their proper signification . by intolerable presumption , he meant a most high presumption ; and he will still say , that to conclude , there is no way of being immediately from god but by creation , is a wonderful boldness . i will leave it with the reader , whether it be not a greater boldness for any man to determine , there is a way of being immediately from god , besides by creation , when neither do the scriptures speak of , nor can the reason of man apprehend any such ; which tho' he does not positively determine , yet he builds upon it . i admire and honour him , that he would not persecute when it was in his power . i had affirmed , that necessary emanation was a thing whereof we have no idea ; which not being able to deny , he asks , is it impossible for a thing to be whereof we have no idea ? is god bound to give us idea's , of what he can or has produc'd ? i answer to the first , it is possible . to the second , god is not bound to give us idea's of what he can or has produc'd ; but then we are no ways concern'd , nor can we reason or discourse about those things whereof we have no idea's : therefore it 's high presumption to affirm this or that concerning them ; but to impose such affirmations on the faith of others , is the raging madness of a persecuting spirit , which it is the honour of his ldp. to detest . but what he seem'd but just now afraid to assert , here he makes no scruple to assert : we have ( says he ) a clearer idea of necessary emanation than of voluntary creation . of voluntary creation we have this idea : god of his own free-will , and by his almighty power , did out of nothing bring into being all things that now are . his ldp. understands the terms , and believes the thing : let him , if he can , tell me as distinctly what idea he has of necessary emanation . will he explain it by eternal procession ? i reply , that which was from all eternity cannot be imagined to proceed from another , without reversing the certain fixt sense of words . he says , that necessary emanation is the word of the fathers , and a better cannot be found out , to express what is intended by it : and i tell him , no man could ever yet intelligibly declare , what is intended by it . his ldp. bids as fair as any man for it , when he calls it a more excellent way of existence than by creation ; which , till it be explained , how shall we judg whether it be so or no ? if there be , which i know not ; there may be for ought he knows , a more proper phrase for it . p. . his ldp. quotes lines from my ms. papers ; he quotes right , but i omitted two words , i would have that period read thus : that some thing should necess arily and eternally come from god , which wants some perfection that god has , is a. t 's prodigious supposition , under the name of necessary emanation . now whereas i endeavoured to display the absurdity and impossibility of this in some few questions , his ldp. seems to agree with much of what i would infer ; only merrily taxes me for giving reasons for things so plain they need none : which is a mortifying stroke to me ; for he takes such care of giving no reasons for what he says , that i shall never have an opportunity to be reveng'd on him . but in the conclusion of the page he tells me it is nonsense to talk of god's begetting infinite power , wisdom and goodness : i grant it , just such non-sense as it is to talk of begetting an infinitely powerful , wise , and good being . as for his lordship 's metaphysical distinction of priority of time , and priority of nature whereby he would defend his th prop. 't is a dark riddle , and a tempting subject for sarcasm : but out of reverence to his ldp. all i shall say is , that it is a distinction that can explain nothing , nor can any one explain that . we know what 's meant by priority of time , and priority of excellence ; if priority of nature be neither of these , 't is an empty word , devis'd , i believe , with a bad design ; but us'd now by those that are themselves deceiv'd by it . p. . his ldp. is pleas'd to undertake the defence of an instance : which , he says , he gave in this mention'd prop. of an effect every whit as old as the cause of it ; namely , of the sun the cause of light : in which , if there be any possibility of truth , then we must add new significations to words , and acutely distinguish between causes , by the force of which other things are effected , and causes which have no causality in them ; between effects which are effected by their causes , and effects that are self-existent . for that and make , is not more evident , than that causes , by the force of which other things are effected , are older than their effects ; and that effects that are effected by their causes , are later than their causes . he may as well make one and the same body , to exist in more places than one , at one and the same time . thus miracles are confined to no particular church nor age ; only there is this difference , christ and the apostles wrought miracles to confirm their doctrines , but with the modern teachers the doctrines themselves are the minacles . to what i objected against this his coexisting cause and effect , the sun and its light , he gives me an answer he meant for sacetious : he could find in his heart to grant me , that the sun was not the cause of that light , which was created before the sun. i thank him : but upon second thoughts he will not grant me that , l. . no , not for all the book of genesis : he might have spar'd the book of genesis ; he may use me as pleases . he knows the sun is the cause of light by his eye-sight : he might as well say , his head is the cause of his heel by his feeling . i say , the sun and light , which together began to be , could not one be the cause of the other ; but god the cause of both , at the same time , and in the same manner of causality . his lordship quotes a scrap from my papers , and makes me , by mangling my words , talk contradictions : but my reasoning was , what i have said , that if the sun and light did begin to exist in the same point of time , then the one cannot be the cause of the other ; for that thing which is the cause of another , must be in respect of time before that other whereof it is the cause . that i may not omit any thing his lordship thinks material , i am oblig'd to take notice , that in his first defence of his propositions , p. . he tells the reader , his explication speaks as great an unity between them [ the persons , ] as is between the sun and its splendor , and the light of both . which in very plain english , sounds thus ; between the sun and its light , the light of the sun , and the light of the sun's light. but that he may not pretend i misrepresent him , let the reader take his discovery in his own terms ; . here 's the sun , . the splendour of the sun , . the light of the sun , . the light of the sun's splendour . after the reader has mus'd a while on the distinct parts of his lordship's similitude , let me recal to his mind his lordship's notion of one god absolutely perfect in the highest sense ; and of two , each of which is god , but not absolutely perfect in the highest sense , yet as absolutely perfect in a lower sense as two , each of which is god , can be ; who are not absolutely god in the highest sense : and then let me ask , whether there is any thing in any other hypothesis more apt to make sport for hereticks ? in truth , had i not a greater reverence for his lordship's vertue than his reasoning , i should not slip the occasion of diverting my friend . whereas i have told him , that the two propositions he boasts of , for contradicting arianism and socinianism , do also contradict some of their fellow-propositions ; i now prove it by induction : if the son and h. spirit do necessarily and eternally exist , then they are as self-existent , as independent , as pure originals as god the father ; if they necessarily and eternally exist , then the father as much emanates from , and depends upon them , as they emanate from , and depend upon him ; so that his hypothesis does not more contradict arianism and socinianism , than it contradicts it self . heathenish doctrines by their inconsistency , meet the fate of rome heathen ; suis & ipsa roma viribus ruit . i may now tell his ldp. he has no way to expose me but by exposing my argument : but it 's much easier to play with expressions by chance ambiguous , than to answer arguments . upon my remark to his prop. he asks , who are they that determine any notion to be true , while they cannot conceive it to be so ? why , sir , in general they are the trinitarians , but in particular and more especially his ldp. he is the man ; for does he not expresly determine in this very prop. that there is an unconceivably close union between them [ the supposed persons ? ] therefore unless he can conceive an unconceivable notion , or doubt of that which he determines to be true , he is notoriously guilty of determining that notion to be true which he cannot conceive to be so . i grant him , there may be a stricter union between god and christ than we know of ; but here i am bold and fixt , there can be no such union between them , as contradicts the notions he has implanted in us . according to him , the persons are distinct beings , and there can be no distinct being without its distinct nature ; so distinct beings are distinct natures , and distinct natures continuing so , can never become one single nature : what union soever there is between them , i wonder the trinitarians should so constantly amuse their readers with that unsutable comparison of soul and body in union ; for 't is plain , that in their union , they are that one thing which neither of them can be in a state of separation . prop. . such an union as this between them being acknowledg'd by us , together with the fore-mentioned intire dependence of the son and h. spirit upon the father , the unity of the deity is as fully to all intents and purposes asserted by us as it is necessary or desirable it should be . ] the end for which the unity of the deity was ever asserted : what does he mean by this very odd phrase ? my sense is , that it 's asserted because it is true ; and that the consequence of its being true , is this ; the service of our whole hearts is therefore due to him alone , and our lower respects to other objects , according as his word , and our own reason directs us : but we cannot both to god and christ pay the service of our whole hearts , notwithstanding their union in will and like natures : for if we love one master with our whole hearts , we have no affections left for any other , but as he shall direct us ; and he cannot direct us to love another equally with himself . unity of nature , or beings united in nature , is no better nor worse than beings in being , natures in nature , and not in the same respect , which is a contradiction if any thing be so . upon his prop. i had told him he was an ismaelite trinitarian , whose hand is against all the heads of trinitarian expositors . to this he replies , 't is false . but since he deals so bluntly with me , i will , . set down some of his contradictions , not consequential , but broad contradictions . . not to be wanting in the least to the vindication of my censure , i will plainly show , that i said no worse of his lordship upon the account of his hypothesis , than he himself had said before of himself . the first of his prop. is this , the name of god is used in more senses than one in h. scripture : but in his first def. p. . speaking of perfections necessary to essentiate a god in the absolutely highest sense , he has these words ; which the name of god is ever to be understood in in the h. scripture . in the same def. p. . he affirms , that h. script . saith not of what nature that unity is , which it ascribes to god. but prop. . of the . he says , the oneness so frequently affirmed of him in script . is a numerical oneness . in his second def. p. . he says , the individual nature of the father is not a divine nature more truly than that of the two other persons . but prop. he says , each of them has a right to the name of god , in a sense next to that , in which it is appropriated to the father . this contradiction he is in love with , it often occurs . p. . of d def. distinguishing between perfections which he makes to belong to the father's existence , and perfections which belong to his divine nature or essence , he contends that the son and h. spirit have all the perfections of the divine nature , as well as the father : but p. . of first def. he observes , that athanasius , s. basil , greg. nazianzen , and s. chrysostom , with several of the latin fathers , interpret those words of christ , my father is greater than i , to have been spoken not of his humanity , but his divinity ; and himself gives his judgment to their sentence . prop. . of the . he affirms it to be evident from h. script . that the son and h. spirit have unlimited power , &c. which also he allows , d def. p. . to be an essential perfection : but d def. p. . he acknowledges that the power of judging the world , was a power committed to christ , not as man , and not essentially in him . prop. . he determines , that they [ the persons ] are always spoken of in script . as distinct beings or persons , according to the proper signification of this word , both from the father and from each other ; nor are so many men or angels more expresly distinguished as different persons or substances , by our saviour or his apostles , than the father , son , and h. ghost are . but st def. p. . he says , they are outwardly , and in reference to the creation , perfectly one and the same god , as concurring in all the fame external actions . i hope the reader will allow me at least , that these instances do sufficiently prove , that his lordship's hand is against one of the heads of the trinitarians , i mean himself . that it is also against all the other , he will excuse me the labour of proving by a tedious induction of particulars ; for prop. . of the . he affirms , that his explication is the best and easiest way of reconciling those texts ; which according to the other hypothesis , are not reconcilable , but by offering extream violence to them . here he prefers his hypothesis indefinitely to all other hypotheses . here 's no restriction , no exception . nay , in the conclusion he doubts not to pronounce , that the many explications of the adorable mystery , have had little better success than to make sport for the socinians . my animadversion on his prop. i have a better opinion of , since i saw his answer , than when i first pen'd them . however , i shall examine a few lines : p. . l. . how can he say ( saith his ldp. ) that jesus christ desir'd not divine honours to be paid to him ? except he mean it when he was on earth . i mean as a plain reader would imagin , that christ desired not any divine honours to be paid him , either in one state or other ; meaning by divine honours such as are due to him that is by nature omniscient , omnipotent , and omnipresent : but if we mean by divine honours , such as agree to him that could do nothing of himself , that judgeth as he hears , and hath all judgment committed to him by the father that sent him , that all men should honour the son even as they honour the father that sent him ; i agree that such divine honour is due to the son. divine honour in the former sense , the son himself forbad to be paid him , even after he should leave the world and go to the father , joh. . . at that day ye shall ask me nothing ; verily , ver●●y , i say unto you , whatsoever ye shaell ask the father in my name he will give it you : and ver . . at that day ye shall ask in my name . i think he does not well to take no notice of the account which the unitarians give ●● that text. will he build so great a duty as is the worshipping of another besides one , with the worship due only to the one god , upon the interpretation of the particle as ; which , he cannot deny , does in several places of scripture import , not an equality in the things spoken of , not the just measure and nature of the duty enjoin'd , but the necessity of it , and some similitude , which it bears to what was before-mentioned ? to love our neighbour as our self , is not to be understood equally with our self ; for that is impossible , and contrary to the very principles of humane nature ; for omnes sibi melius esse malle quam alteri : but we should do the one as certainly as we do the other . it is but just and equal , that the great and only god be honoured with all the powers and faculties of our reasonable natures ; and that jesus christ be honoured with an honour next to that . he saith , christ is not god in the highest sense ; therefore say i , the highest honour is not to be paid him . i said upon his th prop. that the socinians are not willing to confess , that the honour of the father is as muoh taken care of in his explication , as they do wish it were . he answers , sure they will not say , that their own hypothesis doth give more honour to the father , than that which speaks him the author of all that the other persons either have or are . i reply , yes , they will ; because it 's more honour to be the voluntary author of what the son and h. spirit have and are , ( as the unitarians hold ) than to be the necessary author [ or indeed no author ] as his ldp. holds . upon my saying , that it is not our duty to think as honourably as we can of any person , but god the father almighty ; his lordship answers , he meant by as honourably as possibly we can , as honourably as lawfully we can . dr. s — th made dean sherlock pay dear for this evasion ; but i will not write after that furious example , preserving my respects to his lordship : all i say is , his ldp. is a well-meaning man ; and in other places , where his words sound tritheistically , and contradictorily , i believe he meant honestly . p. . from that text , i will not give my glory to another , his lordship argues , that the son of god is not a creature ; as if god had said , i will give my glory to no other but my son : but it 's a plain and good consequence , this , [ taking the words in an universal sense ] because god will not give his glory to another ; therefore no other , no not the son , is to be worshipped with that honour which is due to the father . as to my animadversion on his th prop. he appeals to you , my friend , to judg . every man that reads will judg , and some will be biass'd by one prejudice , and some by another ; and some may chance to examine diligently , to consider freely , and to judg impartially : among this latter sort of readers , i fancy i may have the most friends ; but the other i fear are all his . prop. . he says , his explication agrees well with that of the nicene fathers and athanasius . ] i grant it of what some of them have said in divers places of their works , concerning the trinity : but it 's nevertheless true , that in other places it disagrees with what that council and saint have taught . for you must know , sir , that even they are not all of a piece ; but sometimes orthodox , sometimes heterodox ; and often need the assistance of a candid reader , to interpret them according to a pretended sound meaning , quite contrary to the grammatical sense of their words . as for his agreeing with them , i wonder which of the antients ever taught , that beings which depend on god , are as almighty as the god on whom they and all things depend : i wonder which of the antients found out the two senses ; in one of which , the son and h. ghost were each of them essentially god , and in the other not . i question whether there be any such stuff among the school-men ; but if he can produce me the father who has fallen into this particular weakness ; that , tho' the name of god is us'd in more senses than one in h. script . yet the name of god in h. script . is always to be understood in the highest sense ; i will never question but he has antiquity on his side , whether any truth and sense or no. as for his compliment , that he knows not whether there be more of arrogance than ignorance , or ignorance than arrogance in the remark , about credit from the judgment of the antient fathers ; it looks as if it was borrowed from dr. s — th , it has the air of his impatient opiniativeness , but does not at all become the better nature of the bp. of glocester . but he finds i am a sort of an adversary , that would not permit him to treat me otherwise . and how did i compel him to treat me ( as he suspects he has done ) with too much freedom ? why ! i took a liberty with him : but , sir , you can assure him , that when i compos'd my ms. i knew not who was the author of the propositions , and could not dream they should have been printed : my aim was only to let you ( then my very new acquaintance ) privately know my private judgment . i am none of your proselyte , nor no man's else . i profess sincerely , i fell into what i hold touching the trinity , by freely thinking and seriously considering , what i occasionally met with , here and there , now and then . to conclude , i thank his lordship for his good wishes ; and i do really believe , now he has vented his anger , that he is sincere in them : for which i make him this return : i heartily wish all good to him , as i ought upon many accounts ; . in general , because he is a very worthy and good man. . in particular , because he hates persecution . . because he has not only sworn to the government , but looks upon king william , who gave him his preferment , as our deliverer , not conqueror ; our just and lawful king , and no usurper . but i cannot thank him for his advice : he would have me think it possible , that those opinions , which i take for most evident , and most necessary truths , may be gross and dangerous errors . why ! my opinion is , that the being of god , and the reasonableness of h. religion , are most evident and necessary truths ; and no man living shall perswade me to that modesty , as to think it possible for these to be gross and dangerous errors . again ; he would have me believe that i may be mightily mistaken , when i am most confident : indeed this piece of advice has not so ill a face as the other , but his lordship might have spar'd it ; for i will not be most confident , but when the truth is most plain and evident . i am , sir , yours . finis . a fifth letter, concerning the sacred trinity in answer to what is entituled, the arians vindication of himself against dr. wallis's fourth letter on the trinity / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a fifth letter, concerning the sacred trinity in answer to what is entituled, the arians vindication of himself against dr. wallis's fourth letter on the trinity / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. advertisement: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng freke, william, - . -- arians vindication of himself against dr. wallis's fourth letter on the trinity. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - olivia bottum text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a fifth letter , concerning the sacred trinity ; in answer to what is entituled , the arians vindication of himself against d r wallis's fourth letter on the trinity . by iohn wallis , d. d. london : printed for tho. parkhurst , at the bible and three crowns , in cheapside , . a fifth letter concerning the sacred trinity . sir , i have met with an answer to my fourth letter . it is not long , and my reply shall be but short . there is very little in it concerning the merits of the cause , ( save that he resolves to hold the conclusion : ) and as to personal reflections , or disdainful expressions , i do not think fit to trouble the reader with a long reply . for those , i think , do not hurt me so much , as him that useth them . he is not pleased , pag. . that i said , i had argued calmly , without scurrillous language , or reproachful terms . and i appeal to the reader , whether it be not so . nor doth he deny it . and if his language were so too , he needed not to have made the reader an apology , to excuse his expressions , that he might avoid the character of a common railer , p. . but , he says , abating the little subtilties and artifices , incomparably witty , there is not the least grain of weight in my letter . of this the reader is to be judge , both as to the weight , and as to the wit. he says , it seems , a socinian wrote against me . ( true. and it seems he knew it : for he cites him . ) and that himself wrote as an arian . i think he should rather have said , he wrote , first as a socinian ( in his first ten pages , ) and then as an arian , ( in the other ten. ) for i do not find any thing , till toward the end of his tenth page , whereby i could judge him other than a direct socinian . and i think it will so appear to any other reader . he takes to himself the name of unitarian ; by which i do not find the arians were wont to be called . but it is a new name which the socinians have taken up , to distinguish themselves both from us , and from the arians . for the arians are rather pluritarians , as holding more gods than one. and the book to which himself refers us , p. . is intituled , the history of the unitarians , otherwise called socinians . and , in p. . where he first mentions the arians , he doth introduce it with a preface , minding me , that i write against arians as well as socinians : as having , till then , spoke for the socinians only , not for the arians . and even in his tenth page , ( toward the beginning of it ) what had been said of the socinians by name , and of socinus in particular , he takes to himself , as if one of that party . he seems ( saith he of me ) to insinuate an aspersion on us , that we believe not angels . he tells us now , p. . he doth believe them ; and i will suppose also , that he doth believe the soul's immortality . but , when he there says , that i bring a world of arguments to prove the immortality of the soul ; he mistakes again . for those arguments were brought against socinus , not to prove the soul's immortality ; but , that the soul , in its separate condition , was capable of pain or pleasure : which socinus denied . for requital to this , he tells me , he had a good mind to prove the existence of a deity , for that he had heard of some men of the profession of the church of england , that have almost been atheists at the heart . and truly if he should do so , i should not think it much amiss : for i have heard , the same suspected of some socinians . he now tells me , p. . he never was a socinian in his life . of what he had been in the former part of his life , i had said nothing . ( for i knew no more what it was , than who he is . ) but ( p. . ) of what he was in the beginning of his discourse . and 't is plain he there writes like a direct socinian ( as was shewed but now , ) though as an arian some time after . he tells me ( p. . ) that he is neither the socinian , nor his friend , who assisted in his first book . neither did i say , that he is : but , that he might be for ought i knew . but whether he be or not , 't is the same thing to me ; for i am yet to fight in the dark with i know not whom . he says , he is not concerned to defend socinus , or any man who hath dropt imprudent words . nor did i require it of him . and , whether he were , or were not the same man who wrote before ; yet , since here he acts another person , i left it free for him ( p. , . ) to decline , if he pleased , what was said before ; to grant what was there denied , or deny what was there granted . but then , he thinks , p. . i should not charge him with writing contradictions , because such things may possibly be found in the others answer . nor do i. ( this is only a piece of his wonted artifice of mis-reciting me . ) i tell him indeed , it is hard to please them both , when they do not agree amongst themselves ? and i did observe , ( and argue from it ) what he grants , though the other had denied it . but i never charge him with what the other had said . and ( if he look it over again ) he will find , that i did not confront him ( to shew thence a contradiction ) with what the other had said : but did confront what himself had said in his ten first pages , with what he says in the other ten . and 't is manifest , that in the first ten , he acts the socinian ; and in the latter ten , the arian . but , in whether of the twain he acts his own part , it was not easie to determine ; till he now tells us , he is an arian . he had argued , p. , . that the trinity are persons , as really , and as properly , and fully personally distinct , as three angels . and each person ( both son and holy-ghost by name ) compleat and intire in himself , with as compleat personal distinction as that in men and angels . from whence when i inferred his owning the personality of the holy-ghost : he fearing , it seems , he had over-shot himself , now tells us , p. . just as much as becomes on arian . but if he own him to be as much a person , as a man , or angel is a person : it is as much , or perhaps more , than we need contend for in this point . i had charged him also with mis-reciting me in many other things . as when i am introduced ( very often ) as talking of two gods , three gods , personal gods , of adding several persons to our one god , and the like ; ( according as here also , he says , p. . that i say , you your self own two gods , and why may not i then three ? ) when he knows very well , this is not my language ; nor is any thing of all this said by me . to this he now says , p. . 't is true enough he doth so ; but that he doth it by inference . but he should then speak it as his inference , not cite it as my words . i might have taken notice ( amongst a great many gross mistakes , ) that where i had mentioned , the lords and commons of england , declaring the prince of orange , to be king of england , france and ireland ; he mis-recites it , p. . king of england , scotland , and france ; as if the parliament of england , had taken upon them to dispose of the kingdom of scotland , and not that of ireland . but of this , and a many more , i passed over , without reflecting on it . because , in his language , he is so very negligent and careless , ( and otherwise obnotions ) that it were endless to reflect on all . but i was obliged to take notice ( because it quite alters my argument ) of what he says , p. . that i say , three sides make one cube , &c. which is neither true , nor are they my words . i argued not from three sides , but from the three dimensions of a cube . this he calls trifling ; and would perswade us that side and dimension , differ no more than muting and — his other word , which is fitter for his mouth than mine . but though he perhaps know-no difference between them ; yet he should not have cited it as my words ( and say , that i say so , when i did not . ) for i ought to know better ; and that a cube hath six sides , though but three dimensions . nor did i argue from the six sides , but from the three dimensions . yet i can forgive him this ( rather than when he doth it willfully ) though it mis-recite my argument : because i believe it to be out of pure ignorance , not of malice . he doth not like , p. . either this , or any other simile's ; and would have me no more to insist upon them . ( but he must excuse me from taking his advice herein , unless he understood it better , than , by what was now said , he seems to do . ) because , if he be not mistaken ( as i think he is ) they are very far from my purpose . that is , he thinks , they do not prove the trinity . true : these , alone , do not prove it ( nor was it intended they should . ) but they prove ( what they were brought to prove ) that it is not a contradiction , or inconsistent with reason , that there may be three somewhats ( which we call persons ) that are but one god. and thus much he had before granted , and doth now again confirm it , p. , . 't is true indeed ( he says ) i cannot say that there is a contradiction in holding that there may be three persons in god. for , saith he , there be two sorts of contradictions ; the one express , the other implyed . i cannot say , there is a contradiction in holding it : because i have not the definition of the word god so exact , as to raise an implied contradiction : and , for an express contradiction , i do not pretend to it . if therefore there be no contradiction , either express , or implied : it is what i was to prove . but , saith he , the dispute shall not end here . he will be allowed the privilege ( and no body doth deny it him , ) to fetch in the first commandment , to define the word god. with all my heart . i was never against it . ( for what he says , more than once , p. , . that i meanly cry , he flies to scripture , is but another piece of his wonted art of mis-reciting . there is nothing to that purpose in any thing of mine . ) i do sometime blame him for changing the state of the question : as , when he would have me prove by reason , that it is so : i tell him , that is not the question , ( nor is that to be proved by reason : ) the question is , whether there is any thing in reason , why it cannot be so . now , let him keep to the question ; and then , if he think he can prove , from scripture , that it is inconsistent with reason , for three somewhats to be one god ; or , that it is a contradiction , for god the creator , and god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier , to be the same god ; or , that it is impossible for the god of abraham , and the god of isaac , and the god of iacob , to be one and the same god : let him try his skill . and , let him make what use he can of the first commandment , to define the word god , so as to prove this a contradiction . but , when he had claimed this privilege , ( and no body doth deny it ) he makes no use of it for any such definition . the truth is , i had already granted him , from that commandment , ( p. , , , , . ) more than he was willing i should grant : that we are to have no other god ( great or little , equal or unequal , ) but the lord god of israel . yes , says he ; there is one supreme god , another creature-god ; but that this is not to have two personal gods. how so ? if these be two gods , and each of them a person , ( compleat and entire of himself ; as really , and properly , and fully , and personally distinct , as a man or angel , as he had before told us at p. . . ) they must needs be two personal gods. but we , according to the first commandment , acknowledge but one god ; and those three somewhats ( whom in a metaphorical sense we call persons ) not so to be distinct as to become three gods. he hopes however to avoid the first commandment , by saying that , though they be two gods , they are not two gods co-equal , p. . and that they worship the son , not : with supreme worship ; with mediation , not adoration , p. . what he means by his two worships ; of mediation , and adoration ; i do not well understand : unless they be new names for doulia and latria . nor do i remember , that i have before heard of a worship of mediation . that christ is our mediator , i know ; but did not know that he is our worshipper . and what doth he think of the israelites , when they worshipped the golden calf ? surely they did not think this calf to be co-equal with the supreme god. nor did they think it to be ( deus natus ) a god by nature ; but ( deus factus ) a made god : ( for themselves had made it , just before : ) yet i never knew , that this did excuse them from idolatry . he doth not own christ to be the true god , ( for such there is but one , the only true god , ) nor yet a false god ; but a mean between both , p. . now 't is true , the heathen had ( their deos medioxumos ) their middling gods : but i never knew that we could worship such , without idolatry . thou shalt worship the lord thy god ( the supreme god ) and him only shalt thou serve , was our saviour's doctrine , mat. . . and st. iohn expresly calls him the true god , joh. . . ( not a middling god , between true and false ) and therefore the same god with the father , the only true god. to that character of christ , rev. . , . i am alpha and omega , the beginning and the end , ( the first and the last ) saith the lord , which is and was and is to come , the almighty . he says , this stile is given him in opposition to gods simpler one , i am. but he should have observed , that the same title is , at ver . . given to god , in contradistinction to christ , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. and if it were there a character of the supreme god , it is so here . and if he think the simpler term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i am , to be more expressive of the supreme god ; we have that also emphatically given to christ , rom. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he which is , or the being , over all ; the supreme being . to what further i had brought , p. , , , . to prove him to be the supreme god , the same god with the father , ( not a middling , or titular god , ) he makes no reply : which therefore stands as it was ; nor need i repeat it , because it may be read there . and it is so full and clear , that i need add no more to it . to what i had said of ioh. . . to know thee ( not thee only , or only thee , ) the only true god. he saith , he hath answered already . and i have already replied ; nor need i repeat it . their argument from thence is just in this form : the god of abraham is the only true god ; therefore , not the god of isaac , or the god of iacob . yes , say i , the god of isaac , and the god of israel , is the same god , but under another consideration . so here ; god the creator ( or god the father ) is the only true god ; therefore not god the redeemer , nor god the sanctifier . yes ; god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier , is the same god , the only true god. in like manner , ier. . , . it shall no more be said , the lord liveth that brought up the children of israel out of the land of egypt ; but , the lord liveth , that brought up the children of israel out of the north country . now , saith the first commandment , i am the lord thy god , which brought thee out of the land of egypt ; thou shalt have no other god but me : therefore not the god which brought them out of the north country . yes , say i , even this god also . which is not another god ; but the same god ; though considered as the author of another benefit . there be many other things , both in his first and second paper ( his answer and his vindication ) which lie very open to be reflected on , if it were worth the while : but i think , i have said enough already ; and , he thinks , too much , ( that i have been too stiff , too hard with him , p. . ) which things i shall therefore omit , to save my self , and the reader , the labour . but three things he calls me to account for omitting ; his reproof of my false idea of the personality of god , the impossibility and blasphemy of his incarnation , and of the death of god , p. . now when i had proved the things to be true ; i thought that had been a sufficient answer , to his calling them false , impossible , and blasphemous . for they are never the more so , for his calling them so . and i know not what further answer he should expect , unless he would have me say , 't is foul-mouthed blasphemy in him , to call it blasphemy . but if i should answer him all along at this rate , according as his language deserves ; we should , instead of disputing fall to right down railing ; which is the character he was afraid of , pag. . however ( to gratify him once more , ) that by the word , joh. . is meant , christ , himself owns : and , that this word was god from the beginning ; that he made the world , and all things ; and that without him was not any thing made which was made ; ( and therefore , say i , himself was not made ; unless our arian would have us think , he made himself ) that this god , is the supreme god , we have proved at large , ( if he deny it to be proved , we must leave it to the reader to judge of the arguments : ) and this word was made flesh. ( i hope i need not tell him , that to be made flesh , and to be incarnate , is all one ; for every one understands this who know that caro carnis is latin for flesh. ) therefore this is no blasphemy . again ; that god in christ suffered and died ; and that we are redeemed by the blood of god , he had before told us , p. , . that this is the true god , we have proved at large ( as was but now said ; ) therefore the death of god ( that is , of him that was god as well as man , ) is no blasphemy . yet again ; i do not take his reproof ( as he calls it ) to be a proof , that my idea of personality is false . and therefore i did not think it deserved an answer ; having proved the thing before . yet i thought i had answered it ( as much as it need to be answered ) when ( at my pag. . ) i told him ( nor doth he deny it ) that he seemed well pleased at his p. . that i owned the word person to be but metaphorical ; though at his p. . ( which is the reproof he means ) he did not like it . for tid after pag. . he acted the socinian , and did not come to act the arian , till afterward ; and then he seemed , at p. . to like it well enough . i shall yet add somewhat more upon that point , which if it may not satisfy him , ( who seems to intimate p. . that he will not be satisfied , ) may give some further satisfaction to the reader . the word person ( persona ) is originally a latin word ; and doth not properly signify a man ( so as that another person must needs imply another man , ) for then the word homo would have served , and they needed not have taken in the word persona : but rather , one so circumstantiated . and the same man , if considered in other circumstances ( considerably different , ) is reputed another person . and that this is the true notion of the word person , appears by those noted phrases , personam induere , personam deponere , personam agere , personam sustinere , sustineo unus tres personas , and many the like in approved latin authors . thus the same man may at once sustain the person of a king and of a father ; if he be invested both with regal and paternal authority . now because the king , and the father , are for the most part not only different persons but different men also ( and the like in other cases ) hence it comes to pass , that another person is sometimes supposed to imply another man : but not always , nor is that the proper sense of the word . it is englished in our dictionaries , by the state , quality , or condition , whereby one man differs from another : and so , as the condition alters , the person alters , though the man be the same . our school-men of later ages , do sometimes apply the word persona to angels as well as men ; but even that is but metaphorical ; nor do i find that it ever was so used , in approved latin authors , either for angels , genii , or their heathen gods ; but for the different state or condition of men only . now when the same man doth thus sustain two persons , as that of a king , and that of a father ; he may as to one thing act as a king , by his regal authority ; as to another thing as a father , by his paternal authority . and these authorities , may be in subordination one to the other , though the man be the same . and what is done in either capacity , may indifferently be said to be done by the man , or by the king : ( as that david , or the king , pardoned absolom ; ) and in like manner , by the man , or by the father . this being the true and proper notion of the word person , we are next to consider what it is to signify in the present case . where we are to consider , that the word person is not applied in scripture to these three so called : it is not there said , these three persons are one , but only these three are one . 't is but the church's usage that gives to these three somewhats , the name of persons . and therefore our arian was much mistaken , when he tells us , p. . that the word person is the hinge of the controversy . the hinge of the controversy , is that notion concerning these three somewhats , which the fathers ( who first used it ) did intend to design by the name person . so that we are not from the word person to determine what was that notion ; but , from that notion which they would express , to determine in what sense the word person is here used . and if the word person do not well fit that sense ; all that can be thence inferred , is no more , but that they have made use of an unfit name to express their notion . it is no more but as if a cruel pope take the name of clement ; or a wicked one the name of pius ; or if a man be named willson , whose father's name was thomas . and in all such cases , certitudo rei tollit errorem nominis . and if we know who is the man designed by such a name , 't is a ridiculous exception , to say , this is not the man , because that name doth well agree with his nature . now two of these three being represented in scripture , as father and son ; and this father said to beget the son , and all these in a sense metaphorical ; ( not in such sense as those words do properly signifie amongst men ; ) they thought it not unfit ( in continuation of the same metaphor ) to call them persons . because as the word person doth properly agree to the relations of father and son in a proper sense ; so doth the word person in a metaphorical sense , to the father and son so taken metaphorically ; and the word beget , by a like metaphor . when therefore it is certain , that the notion which the ancient fathers had concerning these three , which in a metaphorical sense they called person , was this , that there is a distinction between them , greater than that of the divine attributes , but not so great as to make them three gods : it is manifest that they took the metaphor , not from that abusive sense of the word person , when ( amongst us ) it is put for man ; but from that proper sense of the word persona , wherein it signifies the state , condition , office , or relation of a man , as variously circumstantiated with reference to others ; whereof the same man may sustain more than one. as when david , was the son of iesse , the father of solomon , and the king of israel . so if we say of any , that he is a person of honour , a person of worth , and a person of interest : that same man may be all this , without becoming three men. now this our arian may call this ( if he please ) a quirk , a criticism , an undermining the very idea of the word person , as he did in his , p. , , . ( or may neglect it , if he pleases : ) but the sober reader ( who understands it better ) will have better thoughts of it . and therefore i shall not take his advice , p. , . to say that god is the name of an office , that so he might know how to attack me , ( as he says , ) which while i talk so warily , he knows not how to do . i say , god is the name of the nature ; but if he will have christ to be the name of an office ( the mediatory office , ) and the comforter , or even the creator , the redeemer , the sanctifier , to be names of work or office , it will not be much amiss . now , when i had said this doctrine of ours is as old at least as the new testament , ( because i can prove it from thence ; ) he will have it ( p. . ) no older than the disputes of alexander and athanasius ; which the primitive church knew nothing of . but he barrs quotations all along . and therefore i must not prove it ( to be known to the church before that time , ) but leave it to the judgment of readers versed in church-history , whose word must pass in this case ; his or mine . to his question , p. . did the iews ever hear of it before christianity ? i think they had some intimations of it , as they had of the resurrection : but not so clearly ( either of them ) as to be generally understood of all ; nor so fully as in the new testament . and i think it was from those notices of it amongst the jews , that not only plato derived much of his philosophy , but other heathens also much of their mythology ; though they did much disguise , and sometimes ridicule the notices they had thence , as our arian now doth that of the trinity . but this is not the business now before us . toward the close , he is so kind as not to desire arianism to be imposed on others , any more than trinitarianism on him , p. . but neither is this business before us ; who are but disputants , not law-makers . but so constant he means to be to his cause , that he will be content to be perswaded out of his name with his opinion . ( i think there is reason why he should change his opinion , but as to the changing of his name , he may use his discretion . ) but having said much ( that he might not be thought to desert it ) he thinks it advisable to drop the cause . which he may , if he please , and leave it to the reader to judge of what is said . i conclude as he doth ; it is impossible but offences will come ; but wo unto him through whom they come . it were better for him that a mill-stone , &c. febr. . / . yours , &c. i. wallis . advertisement . the life of faith , in two sermons to the university of oxford , at st. mary's christ-church , oxford ; on ianuary . frac ; , and iune . following : by the same author , dr. iohn wallis . sold by tho. parkhurst at the bible and three crowns in cheapside . certain propositions by which the doctrin of the h. trinity is so explain'd, according to the ancient fathers, as to speak it not contradictory to natural reason together with a defence of them, in answer to the objections of a socianian writer, in his newly printed considerations on the explications of the doctrin of the trinity : occasioned by these propositions among other discourses : in a letter to that author. twenty-eight propositions by which the doctrine of the trinity is endeavoured to be explained fowler, edward, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing f estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) certain propositions by which the doctrin of the h. trinity is so explain'd, according to the ancient fathers, as to speak it not contradictory to natural reason together with a defence of them, in answer to the objections of a socianian writer, in his newly printed considerations on the explications of the doctrin of the trinity : occasioned by these propositions among other discourses : in a letter to that author. twenty-eight propositions by which the doctrine of the trinity is endeavoured to be explained fowler, edward, - . , [ ] p. printed for brabazon aylmer ..., london : . attributed to edward fowler. cf. halkett & laing ( nd ed.). a reissue of: twenty-eight propositions by which the doctrine of the trinity is endeavoured to be explained. . cf. dnb. advertisements: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng nye, stephen, ?- . -- considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion certain propositions , by which the doctrin of the h. trinity is so explain'd , according to the ancient fathers , as to speak it not contradictory to natural reason . together with a defence of them , in answer to the objections of a socinian writer , in his newly printed considerations on the explications of the doctrin of the trinity : occasioned by these propositions , among other discourses . in a letter to that author . london , printed for brabazon aylmer at the three pidgeons in cornhil , . certain propositions , &c. . the name of god is used in more sences than one in holy scripture . . the most absolutely perfect being , is god in the highest sence . . self-existence is a perfection , and seems to be the highest of all perfections . . god the father alone , is in reference to his manner of existence an absolutely perfect being ; because he alone is self-existent . . he alone , consequently , is absolutely perfect , in reference to those perfections , which do praesuppose self-existence . . those perfections are absolute independence , and being the first original of all other beings : in which the son and the holy ghost are comprehended . . all trinitarians do acknowledge , that these two persons are from god the father . this is affirmed in that creed which is called the nicene , and in that which falsely bears the name of athanasius : tho' with this difference , that the holy ghost is asserted in them , to be from the son as well as from the father . wherein the greek church differs from the latin. . it is therefore a flat contradiction , to say that the second and third persons are self-existent . . and therefore it is alike contradictious , to affirm them to be beings absolutely perfect in reference to their manner of existence ; and to say that they have the perfections of absolute independence , and of being the first originals of all things . . since the father alone is a being of the most absolute perfection , he having those perfections which the other two persons are uncapable of having . he alone is god in the absolutely highest sence . . and therefore our blessed saviour calls him , the onely true god , joh. . . this is life eternal to know thee the onely true god , and iesus christ whom thou hast sent . and it is most absurd to think , that in these words , and the following prayer , he did address himself to the three persons of the trinity conjunctly , since throughout the prayer he calls this onely truly god his father ; and calls himself twice his son , before these words . not to mention the absurdity of making our lord to pray to himself , or of distinguishing himself from those three , of which himself was one . if such a liberty as this , in interpreting scripture , be allowable , what work may be made with scripture ! . our lord calls the father , the onely true god , because he only is originally , and of himself god , and the first original of all beings whatsoever . as he calls him the onely good , saying , there is none good but god , because he alone is originally so , and the spring of all that good which is in other beings . . the god head , or god in this highest sence , can be but one numerically . of which the best philosophers were satisfied by their reason ; and therefore the oneness so frequently affirmed of him in scripture is a numerical oneness . . there seems to be neither contradiction , nor absurdity , in supposing the first original of all things , to be productive of other beings so perfect , as to have all perfections , but that of self-existence , and those which are necessarily therein implyed . . supposing any such beings to have immediately issued forth from that infinite fullness , and foecundity of being , which is in the deity , each of them must have a right to the name of god , in a sence next to that in which it is appropriated to the father ; since they have all the perfections of the godhead , but those that must of necessity be peculiar to him. . it is evident from the holy scripture , that the son and holy spirit are such beings , viz. that they have all divine perfections but the forementioned : such as unlimited power , wisdom , goodness , &c. . and they are always spoken of in scripture , as distinst beings or persons , according to the proper signification of this word , both from the father and from each other . nor are so many men or angels more expresly distinguished as different persons or substances , by our saviour or his apostles , than the father , son and holy ghost still are . . it is a very presumptuous conceit , that there can be no way but that of creation , whereby any thing can be immediately and onely from god , which hath a distinct existence of its own . or , that no beings can have existence from him , by way of necessary emanation : of which we have a clearer idaea than of voluntary creation . it is the word of the ancients , both fathers and philosophers ; nor can a better be found to express what is intended by it , viz. a more excellent way of existing , than that of creation . . it is no less presumptuous to affirm , that it is a contradiction to suppose , that a being can be from eternity from god the father , if 't is possible it may be from him , in a more excellent way than that of creation . and we have an illustration of both these propositions , by something in nature . for , according to our vulgar philosophy , light doth exist by necessary emanation from the sun , and therefore the sun was not before the light which proceeds from thence , in order of time , tho' it be in order of nature before it . and the distinction between these two priorities , is much elder than thomas aquinas , or peter lombard , or any school-man of them all , or christian-man either . . and if any thing can be from another thing by way of necessary emanation , it is so far from a contradiction to suppose , that it must only be in order of nature before it ; that 't is most apparently a contradiction to suppose the contrary . . our th . and th . propositions do speak our explication of the h. trinity , to be as contrary to arianism as to socinianism ; since the arians assert that there was at least a moment of time , when the son was not ; and that he is a creature . . altho' we cannot understand , how it should be no contradiction to affirm , that the three persons are but one numerical being , or substance ; yet hath it not the least shadow of a contradiction to suppose , that there is an unconceivably close and inseparable union both in will and nature between them . and such a union may be much more easily conceived between them , than can that union which is between our souls and bodies ; since these are substances which are of the most unlike and even contrary natures . . since we cannot conceive the first original of all things , to be more than one numerically ; and that we acknowledg the now mentioned union between the three persons , according to the scriptures , together with the intire dependence of the two latter upon the first person , the unity of the deity is , to all intents and purposes , as fully asserted by us , as it is necessary or reasonable it should be . . and no part of this explication , do we think repugnant to any text of scripture ; but it seems much the easiest way of reconciling those texts , which according to the other hypotheses are not reconcilable , but by offering manifest violence to them . . the socinians must needs confess , that the honour of the father , for which they express a very zealous concern , is as much as they can desire taken care of by this explication . nor can the honour of the son and holy spirit be more consulted , than by ascribing to them all perfections , but what they cannot have , without the most apparent contradiction , ascribed to them . . and we would think it impossible , that any christian should not be easily perswaded , to think as honourably of his redeemer and sanctifier as he can , while he robs not god the father for their sake ; and offers no violence to the sence and meaning of divine revelations , nor to the reason of his mind . . there are many things in the notion of one god , which all hearty theists will acknowledg necessary to be conceived of him , that are as much above the reach and comprehension of humane understandings , as is any part of this explication of the h. trinity . nay this may be affirmed , even of the notion of self existence ; but yet there cannot be an atheist so silly as to question it : since it is not more evident , that one and two do make three , than that there could never have been any thing , if there were not something which was always , and never began to be . . left novelty should be objected against this explication , and therefore such should be prejudiced against it , as have a veneration for antiquity , we add , that it well agrees with the account which several of the nicene fathers , even athanasius himself , and others of the ancients who treat of this subject , do in divers places of their works give of the trinity : as is largely shewed by two very learned divines of our church . and had it not been for the schoolmen , to whom christianity is little beholden , as much as some admire them , we have reason to believe that the world would not have been troubled since the fall of arianism , with such controversies about this great point , as it hath been , and continues to be . this explication of the b. trinity perfectly agrees with the nicene creed , as it stands in our liturgy , without offering the least violence to any one word in it . which makes our lord jesus christ to be from god the father by way of emanation ; affirming him to be god of god , very god of very god , and metaphorically expressing it by light of light ; answerably to what the author to the hebrews saith of him , chap. . . viz. that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the effulgency of his glory , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the character of his substance : and so is as much of one substance with the father , as the beams of the sun are with the body of it . and since there have been of late , so many explications or accounts published of this most adorable mystery , which have had little better success than making sport for the socinians , i thought it very seasonable now to revive that , which i affirm with great assurance to be the most ancient one of all ; much elder than the council of nice ; and to have much the fewest difficulties in it , and to be incomparably most agreeable to h. scripture . a defence of the foregoing propositions . sir , the author of the twenty eight propositions thanks you for the very charitable opinion you have expressed concerning him , in the entrance into your reflexions upon them ; and hopes he shall always endeavour to deserve the character of a man so honest , as never to speak otherwise than he thinks ; and so true to his understanding , as always to make reason one of his guides in the choyce of his opinions : he professing to believe , that the use of reason is so far from being to be condemned in matters of religion , as no where else to be so well employed : and that it is infinitely unworthy of almighty god , to conceive it possible for him to contradict his internal by his external revelations . but so he must have done , should such writings be of his inspiring , as are manifestly contradictory to the plain dictates of natural reason , which the wise man faith , is the candle of the lord. and sir , our author takes no less notice of your candour , in the character you give , in the words following , of his explication of the doctrin of the h. trinity in those propositions . but after your acknowledgment , that he hath avoided a great many contradictions , which those of your party do charge on this doctrin , as it is held by others ; and that his explication is a possible scheme ; and that it is clear from any contradictions to natural reason ; you object that , besides some insuperable difficulties , the author hath not been able to avoid some numerical contradictions . now , as to the insuperable difficulties with which you charge his explication , since you acquit them from being contradictions to natural reason , you mean , i suppose , that it is fraught with several contradictions to h. scripture : and i confess such contradictions to be as insuperable difficulties to us , as we are christians , as those to reason are , as we are men. if this be your meaning , the author may well expect to have it shewn , what texts of scripture are contradicted by this explication ; but if you mean otherwise , my reply is , that you are not so shallow a thinker as not to be aware , that there are also insuperable difficulties in the notion of one god , both as his nature is described by all christians , according to the account given of him in h. scripture ; and as all theists are compelled by natural light to conceive of him. nay you will frankly own , that there is not any one thing in the whole universe , which doth not suggest insuperable difficulties to an inquisitive mind . and whereas , sir , you charge our author with not being able to avoid some numerical contradictions , i confess i never before met with this distinction , but i think i understand it by your description of it . you say that a numerical contradiction is an error committed in the summing up of things . but how is he guilty of such contradictions ? if you mean that he hath made contradictory conclusions ( or such a conclusion ) to several of his premisses , i cannot ( though you do ) excuse him from contradicting natural reason , any more than from contradicting himself : and it appears from what follows , that that is your meaning ; for , after you had given the sum and substance of the first thirteen propositions , your reflexion thereon is this : one would think that such a foundation being laid , the conclusion must be wholly in savour of the unitarians . for if the father is absolutely perfect ; if the son and spirit are not absolutely perfect , how shall we ever prevent this consequence , therefore onely the father is god ? what is the definition of god among all divines and philosophers ? is it not this , a being absolutely perfect ; or , a being that hath all perfections ? but if so , than onely the father having all perfections , or being absolutely perfect , he must be the onely god , to the certain exclusion of the other two persons ; to the exclusion of the son and spirit by name , because 't is affirmed here of them by name , that neither of them is absolutely perfect , or hath all perfections . but this author will shew us in his following propositions , that , for all this , the son is god , and so also is the holy ghost : that is , he will pu● out the light of the sun. and , sir , as you have now represented our author , you cannot but be sensible , upon second thoughts , of over great modestly in your not having charged him with natural contradictions ; nay and of too great partiality towards him in acquitting him , as you have done , of such contradictions . he will instruct us , say you next , in his premisses , that there is but one who is god , and in the progress and conclusion , or , in the summing up the whole reckoning , he will make it appear , that there are three beings , each of which is ( singly and by himself ) god : which is the numerical contradiction that i charged at first on his hypothesis . and i say , sir , if you have not too incautilously represented him in these words , he is as justly to be here charged with a natural , as with a numerical contradiction ; except you will affirm , that 't is no natural contradiction to say , that the number one is as many as three , or the number three is no more than one. but , sir , i must crave leave to say , that you have committed a great oversight in representing our author as you have now done . for his first proposition is , the name of god is used in more sences than one in h. scripture . the second , the most absolutely perfect being is god in the highest sence . the third , self-existence is a perfection , &c. the fourth , god the father alone is , in reference to his manner of existence , an absolutely perfect being , because he alone is self-existent . and from these , with the five following propositions , he infers in the tenth , that the father alone is god in the absolutely highest sence : and in the thirteenth , that the god-head , or god in this highest sence , can be but one numerically . and therefore , sir , you should not have made our author say , ( as you do ) that there is but one who is god , without any restriction , when you now see he saith , that there is but one who is god in the absolutely highest sence : and that god in the absolutely highest sence , can be but one numerically . and whereas you say , that he will make it appear that there are three beings , each of which is singly and by himself god , you should have said , he will make it appear that there are three beings , each of which is god , but not in all the self-same respects . and therefore i cannot as yet accuse him , either of any one natural or numerical contradiction ; if this be a proper distinction , which i will not dispute . what remaineth of your reflexions is chiefly a charge of tritheism against this explication of the trinity . . you say , i acknowledge in these propositions the genuine doctrin , and very language of the fathers , who wrote shortly after the council of nice , till the times of the school-men . and the author is assured , that this explication for substance , is a great deal elder than that council . but he gives you his hearty thanks for this free concession of yours , because you have saved him the pains of proving his last proposition : and i will therefore requite you , for him , in imitating your brevity , as you say , you do his : but methinks you should also acknowledge , that the authors explication hath no inconsiderable advantage on its side , in that you allow it to be of so great antiquity . if the socinians will not acknowledge this an advantagious circumstance , in all disputable points , they are certainly the onely learned men who have no regard for antiquity . . you add , but the school-divines , or the divines of the middle ages , saw , and almost all the moderns , that are well versed in these questions , confess it , that this explication is an inexcusable indefensible tritheism . and quickly after you say , that the school-divines , and , generally speaking , the most learned of the moderns , with the greatest reason in the world , abhor making the three divine persons , to be persons in the proper sence of that word : which is to say , they are distinct intellectual beings , and have different substances in number , tho' not in species or kind . and you affirm , that the forementioned divines do with the greatest reason in the world abhor this , because they perceive it destroys the true and real unity of god ; it taketh away his proper , and natural , and numerical unity ; and leaveth onely a certain political and oeconomical unity ; which is indeed onely an imaginary unity . hereto i answer , . that a wise man will think never the worse of any thing , merely for its having an ugly name given it : as you would account it no real dishonour to the socinian hypothesis , should it be called ditheism , which sounds every whit as ill as tritheism . and you cannot deny it to be ditheism in a certain sence , because it asserts two gods ; one by nature , and the other by office ; and that this god by office , is to be honoured by all men , even as they honour the father , ( according to his own declaration ) though but a mere man by nature . and this grates every whit as much upon my understanding , as any thing in this explication can on yours : and is as contradictory to natural reason in the opinion of all trinitarians , as any of their explications are in the opinion of socinians ; who cannot but acknowledge , that honouring the son even as the father is honoured , is giving him that honour which is truly and properly divine , let them restrain it as much as they can . . whereas you say , that this explication destroyeth the true and real unity of god , and therefore to be abhorred ; i must grant , if it does so , it can not be too much abhorred ; but i would know from whence we are to learn , wherein consists his true and real unity . it must either be learned from scripture or reason , or both . but as to the h. scripture , this indeed abundantly declareth the unity of god , but it no where distinguisheth of unity , nor saith of what nature that unity is which it ascribes to god. were you never so well satisfied that that text in st. iohn's epistles is genuine — these three are one ; you would say it proves nothing against the socinians , because it saith not in what sence the father , son , and holy ghost are one. but i am sure our author never spake a truer word , than what he saith in his seventeenth proposition , concerning the real distinction of the three persons in scripture . and surely those whose notions are most agreeable to the letter , and most proper sence of scripture , when there is no apparent necessity of departing from them ( as i think there is the greatest necessity of keeping thereto in this case ) if they happen to be in an error , their error is on the safer side . and since those of your opinion do so zealously contend for making the h. scriptures the sole rule of faith , and profess that you will take nothing for a point of religion but what is found in the bible , ( wherein you do like protestants , at least if you will acknowledge that to be there which is there by evident consequence , as well as in express words ) ; since , i say , you do so , you of all men should not be over dogmatical in determining a point , which the h. scripture is silent in . and then for reason , such an unity as our author ( after the fathers ) asserts , is not contradictory , or contrary , to any plain and evident dictate thereof . this i adventure to affirm with very great assurance : and , sir , your self must needs be of the same mind , if you were in good earnest ( as i can't think otherwise ) in calling the explication a possible scheme , and owning that it is not contradictory in any of its parts to natural reason . but , sir , ( to speak my mind freely ) i will not , of all men , go to school to the school divines to learn what reason saith on an argument of this nature ; and therefore neither to those modern divines , who pin their faith upon their sleeves . if i could satisfie my self to be an implicit believer , i would a thousand times rather take the ancient fathers ( and , it may be , philosophers too ) for the guides of my reason , than those gentlemen who spent their time in the weaving of fine cobwebs ; and particularly are so superfine upon the simplicity of the divine essence , as to render god almighty ( at least , to such a dull understanding as mine ) a no less unconceivable than incomprehensible being ; and to simplifie him rather into nothing , than into simple vnity . . that this explication leaveth onely a certain political , or oeconomical unity is only said by you ; but the twenty second proposition tells you the contrary , of which more anon . . this explication doth not take away the numerical unity of the god-head , or of god in the absolutely highest sence , and the first original of all things : for it expresly affirms the necessity thereof , prop. th . . it maketh the other two persons as much one with the first , and with one another , as they are , without the most apparent contradiction , capable of being . one in so high a sence , as that we want a word , by which to express their unity : and therefore that they are much more than specifically one , as three humane or angelical persons are . were i a schoolman it should scape me hard , but i would add another distinction of unity , between specifical and numerical , to express this unity by ; which i am sure would have more of a fundamentum in re , than many of their distinctions have . this explication speaks as great a unity between them , as is between the sun and its splendor , and the light of both : and a greater than is between the vine and its branches ; or than is between the fountain and the streams which flow from it : which are similitudes of the ancients . i say , this explication speaks the unity of the divine persons greater than the unity of each of these ; because , tho' they are most closely and intimately united , yet are not inseparable . and for the same reason , it speaks a greater unity between them , than is between our souls and bodies ; as appears by the twenty second proposition . and where is he who will pretend to know how many degrees , or kinds of unity are possible , or actually are ? . the inseparable unity in will and nature between the three persons , which that proposition affirmeth not to have the least shadow of a contradiction in it , and therefore is taken into this explication , doth answer all the ends for which the unity of the deity was ever asserted . and therefore the distinction asserted between the three persons , hath not the least appearance of any one of the pernicious consequents , which follow upon a plurality of gods ; and consequently there is no reason in the world , ( tho' you say there is the greatest ) why it should be abhorred by the school-divines , or the most learned among the moderns ; or by any mortal , learned or unlearned . for they are outwardly , and in reference to the creation , perfectly one and the same god , as concurring in all the same external actions ; tho' in relation to one another , there is a real distinction between them . and it seems very wonderful , that this should be denyed by any one who professeth himself a trinitarian ; since there is no understanding what a contradiction means , if a being that begets , and that which is begotten thereby , and a third which proceeds from both , should not be really distinct from each other . . a plurality of gods hath generally been so understood , as to imply more than one independent , and ( therefore likewise ) self-existent deity , as the common arguments against a plurality of gods do suppose ; but it was never otherwise understood , than so as to import separate deities . and never were there more zealous asserters of the unity of the deity against the pagans , than were divers of the ancients to whom our author is beholden for the substance of this explication . one of these was lactantius ( to pass by several others of the three first centuries ) and i find him thus discoursing in the th . chap. of his fourth book , de vera sapientia . fortasse quaerat aliquis , &c. some one perhaps will ask , how when we say we worship one god , we can assert two , viz. god the father , and god the son , &c. and to this question the father thus answers , quum dicimas deum patrem , &c. when we say god the father and god the son , we don't separate and part them asunder , &c. they have one mind , one spirit , one substance . and , in the next words , he saith in what sence they are one : sed ille quasi exuberans fons , &c. but the father , is as it were the overflowing fountain , the son as a stream flowing from him : he like to the sun , this like to a sun-beam . and this is the same description of their unity with one another , that the explication gives . and i think there needs no more to be said in defence thereof , against the odious charge of tritheism to any ingenuous and free-minded person . nor doth there need to be given any farther answer to what remains in your paper , that designs to prove this a to be abhorred tritheistical explication . but i must clear it from another great mistake in the account you next give of it . you say that the hypothesis expresly acknowledgeth in each of the two persons , not onely whatsoever properties can make them to be distinct intellectual beings , and substances ; but also all the attributes that are necessary to essentiate a god , that is , to make him a perfect god ; onely it saith the father hath this peculiar 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or priviledge , that he is first in order of nature . he hath no essential or real perfection more than the other two persons ; onely he hath this honour , that their original is from him. and hence you conclude , that it is not possible to say what are three gods , if this be not an account and description of three gods. but , sir , doth our author's hypothesis give the father no other priviledge above the son and h. spirit , than his being first in order of nature , and their original ? doth not the fourth proposition expresly say that he is self-existent too ? and his being their original , is so far from being the same thing with self-existence , that simply in it self considered , it doth not so much as necessarily suppose his self-existence . doth he who faith , that the sun is the original of the illustrious splendour in the heavens , and of the light which pervades the world , in so saying affirm that it is self-existent ? and i shall wonder , if self-existence be but an imaginary perfection , i should rather conclude it the very greatest of all real perfections . how then can you say , that this hypothesis gives the father no other priviledge above the other persons , but onely that he is first in order of nature ? again , is not absolute independence a real perfection , and being the first original of all things another ? but doth not the sixth proposition considered with the fifth , ascribe both these too to the father onely ? and whereas you say farther , that this hypothesis gives the second and third persons all the attributes that are necessary to assentiate a god , what earnings will you make of this ? since it saith not that those which are ascribed to them ( viz. infinite goodness , wisdom and power , ) are all that are necessary to essentiate a god in the absolutely highest sence , which the name of god is ever to be understood in in holy scripture . and now you can need no answer to what you say in the last words of this paragraph , viz. the perfections of the deity that are real , are gods infinite wisdom , power , goodness , duration , and such like : therefore the son and spirit are gods in the highest sence of that word , if they have all those aforesaid real and positive perfections of the divine nature ; tho' it be granted at the same time , that they are originated from the father . you need , i say , no answer hereto , since you were now minded , that self-existence , absolute independence , and being the first original of all things , are perfections peculiar to god the father ; and that this is part of the explication . and upon this account athanasius , s. basil , gregory nazianzen , and st. chrysostom , with several of the latin fathers , interpret those words of our b. saviour , my father is greater than i , to have been spoken , not of his humanity , but his divinity ; as dr. cudworth hath shewed in his th . page of his intellectual system of the universe . nor certainly did our lord ever say so little a thing , as that the infinite maiesty of heaven and earth is greater than any mortal man. and having this occasion to mention dr. cudworth , the honour i have for the memory of that excellent person , constraineth me to say , that the account he gives of the fathers judgment of the trinity , is not represented as it ought to have been , in the former socinian treatise of considerations on the explications thereof . and i so word that most learned performance of the doctor , because he was therein an historian , rather than an explicator . your next paragraph begins with this question , a father begets two sons that have all the properties of the humane nature , in as great perfection as their father ; shall we deny that they are men in the highest sence of that word , because they are originated from their father ? and this , say you , is the very case before us . but , sir , this is not ( with your leave ) the very case before us : 't is nothing like it , because 't is the perfection of no man , to be self-existent ; nor are a humane fathers sons immediately dependent on him for the continuation of their being , as the two persons are upon god the father , as light is upon the sun , and as streams on the fountain . but if a humane father could be supposed to be self-existent , and that his sons had the now mentioned kind of dependence upon him , the consequence must be , that their nature is short of the perfection of their fathers nature , notwithstanding the many properties they agree in ; and therefore that they are not men in so high a sence , as he is a man ; seeing the humane nature would be supposed capable of perfections which they have not , but their father hath . what follows of this paragraph , is only applying the point in controversie to this case ; but i have said enough to shew that there is not the least affinity between these two cases . the substance of what you farther object against this explication , is a remark upon the twenty second proposition : and you say , in these few words consist the strength and hopes of this explication . the unconceivably close union in will and nature between the three gods , makes them to be one god. i see , sir , you as odiously word it as you can , but you would have lost nothing by it , had you kept to our author's words , and said three persons ; or , if you had pleased , three distinct proper persons , instead of three gods. well , sir , the unconceivably close union in will and nature between the divine persons is that ( as you say ) in which the strength and hopes of this explication do consist . but you object , that this is as much as to say , that they are one god by that very thing , which most incontestably declares them to be three gods. and this you make out by this question , what is the union of will and nature between distinct intellectual beings , and different substances ; is it any other but this , in plain english , that they always will the same things , and their natures and substances are united in the same properties , attributes , or perfections ? that is to say , as you proceed , these three intellectual substances or beings , are each of them almighty , omniscient , most good , and the rest ; why this is the very thing that makes them to be three gods. next , you give us a proof of this , but you might have saved your self that labour ; for 't is readily granted , if this be all the union that is between them . but in answer to your question , it must never be granted you that the inseparably close union between the three divine persons , both in will and nature , is no more than their union in the same will and properties ; for it is also their immediate union in their substances , ( their spiritual substances ) as the union between our souls and bodies is in their substances . and if they were acknowledged to be separate substances , and united onely as you say , you would have made our author ashamed of his explication . but if , sir , you think you may do it however , by saying that the substance and properties of the divine nature are the self-same thing ; i will now content my self to say onely this , then you might have used the word substances , as well as properties and attributes ; and then it would have appeared at first sight , that there is no force in your objection . but your self doth also expresly here distinguish them , in saying , that their substances are united in the same properties , attributes or perfections . if you ask me what account can be given to the satisfaction of any rational person , of such an union between the substances of the three persons , i will reply that when you give me an intelligible account of the union betwixt our souls and bodies , i do promise to give you a no less intelligible account of the union betwixt the substances of the three divine persons . nay ( as the twenty second proposition tells you ) the union between our souls and bodies is more unaccountable to reason , than is this union ; because that is an union between substances of perfectly unlike , and even contrary natures . in reciting that proposition , you say contradictory instead of contrary ; but i suppose this was the fault , not of your pen , but of the press . but if you will say , that the substances of our souls and bodies are onely united in their properties ; i say they are not at all united in these , because their properties are of as different and contrary a nature , as their substances . but if they could be united in these , yet the union of their substances must be more than their being united in their properties , except my soul is as much united with your body as with mine own ; for the essential properties of all souls and bodies are the same . and now , sir , i hope you are sensible , that you might have spared your last paragraph , viz. how is it possible that this author should overlook such an obvious reasoning , or not be satisfied with it ? and say i , how is it possible that so acute a person as your writings speak you to be , should be guilty of so plain a flaw in that reasoning , and take it to be so obvious ? i shall give you no farther trouble , than while i desire you to take notice , that i have not troubled you with more words than needs must ; and much less with finesses , to use your own word ; nor with any subtle distinctions , as much enamoured , as you perceive i am , with the school-men ; nor with any thing you may be tempted to call scholastical cant , or metaphysical gibberish ; nor so much as with the father's great word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but my answer is as plain as a pyke staff , yet as full as plain , to all the reflections you have made upon the explication . but whether it be to the purpose too , i must leave it to the judgment of the fair and impartial reader . but i can sincerely avow , that i have said nothing to any of your objections , merely because for my credits sake , ( seeing i undertook to reply to them ) i must say something : nor hath a line come from me which is not agreeable to the sense of my mind ; nor which i think not to be pertinent . as i also solemnly profess , that since such perfections and operations , as are unquestionably proper to the deity , are attributed in h. scripture to the son and h. spirit ; and that i cannot be satisfied by the extremely laboured glosses and criticisms of the socinians , to depart from the most obvious and natural sence of the multitude of texts wherein they are so ; as doubting whether many texts are to be found , which might not have more than one sence put upon them , by the same labour and art : and since divine honour is most expresly declared to be due to the son , iohn . . and he hath the honour of such a doxology , apocal. . . as according to the original , as well as our translation , i remember not an higher given to god the father in all the new-testament . and since too the son and spirit are all along most plainly described , as distinct persons both from the father , and from one another , even as plainly as words can do it ; and yet all this while the unity of the deity is fully asserted ; i can not , for my life , reconcile these things but by this ancient explication of the trinity , which your self ingenuously acknowledges to be a possible scheme ; and hereby , i thank god , i can do it to my great satisfaction . that god almighty would give us a right understanding in all the points of our christian faith , and particularly in the great and weighty one , wherein you differ from the generality of christians in all ages ; and that we may be sincere and unbyassed , and also humble , in our searches after truth ; not leaning over confidently to our own understandings , since those that most improve them are most sensible of their being infinitely too shallow to comprehend truths of this nature especially , is the humble and most hearty prayer of , sir ; notwithstanding our being ( as i suppose ) perfect strangers , and our wide difference in opinion , your sincere friend to serve you in all christian offices , &c. some books printed for b. aylmer . forty two sermons and discourses upon several occasions , most at court ; in four volumes , vo . the rule of faith : or , an answer to the treatise of mr. i. sergeant , &c. vo . six sermons concerning the divinity and incarnation of our blessed saviour ; of the sacrifice and satisfaction of christ ; and of the unity of the divine nature , and the b. trinity , &c. against the socinians , vo . six sermons , ( newly printed ) one concerning resolution and stedfastness in religion ; one of family religion ; three of education of children ; and one of the advantages of an early piety , vo . a perswasive to frequent communion in the sacrament of the lords supper , vo . alone stitch't , price d. or in o bound , price d. a discourse against transubstantiation , vo . alone price d. stitch't . all published by his grace iohn lord arch-bishop of canterbury . the exact effigies of his grace iohn lord arch-bishop of canterbury ; on a large sheet of paper curiously engraven by r. white , price d. the great wickedness , and mischievous effects of slandering : a sermon preach'd at st. giles cripplegate , on psalm . . a sermon preached before the lord mayor of london , and court of aldermen , in easter-week , . on luk. . . a sermon preached at the meeting of the sons of the clergy , in st. mary-le-bow church , the th . of dec. . on iohn . . these three by edward lord bishop of gloucester . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e dr. cudworth , and dr. bull. notes for div a -e octob. th . . remarks upon a book lately published by dr. will. sherlock ... entituled, a modest examination of the oxford decree, &c. edwards, jonathan, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) remarks upon a book lately published by dr. will. sherlock ... entituled, a modest examination of the oxford decree, &c. edwards, jonathan, - . [ ], p. printed at the theater, and are to be sold by h. clements, oxford : . concerns the debate over the nature of the trinity. attributed to jonathan edwards. cf. halkett & laing ( nd ed.). reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng sherlock, william, ?- . -- modest examination of the authority and reasons of the late decree. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - robyn anspach sampled and proofread - robyn anspach text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion remarks upon a book lately published by dr. will. sherlock dean of st. pauls , &c. entituled a modest examination of the oxford decree , &c. oxford , printed at the theater , mdcxcv . and are to be sold by h. clements . remarks upon the examination of the oxford decree . reflections on the late examination of the oxford decree . a modest examination of the oxford decree ; so the dean begins his book : but the whole book , and almost every page in it , is a very plain and effectual confutation of the title ; in which you will find as little modesty in this censure of the decree , as there is soundness and truth in the propositions which are condemned by it . the former is just as decent as the latter are orthodox , and they may each of them be thus called by the same figure , which is commonly known by the name of antiphrasis ; as some say parcae are so called à non parcendo . but the dean is to be excused , if any excuse may be framed from long use and custome , which have rendred such a way of contradicting himself habitual , and that habit is turned almost into a second nature . i shall readily therefore acknowledge , ( and let him take what advantage he pleases of that concession ) that there is as great an harmony between this title and the book , as there is between the several parts of this , and and some others of his late discourses . upon which account i have sometime bin induced to think , that a man could not reasonably desire to encounter a fairer antagonist than the dean , who will save his adversary the pains and trouble of confuting him ; he will do it so often and so effectually himself . it hath long since bin made an observation , that when men have once cast away the faith , they at the same time make shipwrack of a sound and discerning judgment ; being oftentimes , as a just punishment of their pride and vanity , delivered up 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to a mind which cannot rightly judge of , and distinguish the natures of things . one would almost be temted to imagine , that some such thing hath overtaken this dean , who as he doth not make a right difference , in some points of great importance , between truth and falshood : so in these papers he seems to have lost all distinction between reason and sophistry ; between arrogance and modesty . for if this be a modest vindication of his opinions , then we have lost the true signification of words . but perhaps he will come off , and relieve himself , as he doth upon some other occasions , by his meaning . it is true indeed , if you will judge of things by the letter and words of his book , he hath treated the governors of the university with great insolence and contempt : but yet still he meant nothing but fairness and respect towards them ; and therefore in spight of what can be said to the contrary , his discourse shall still be called a modest examination . i am loath to part with this word , because if i do , i must bid a final adieu to it , and never expect to find any thing again like it , at least in this book . if any man therefore who at present hath a good opinion of this dean's modesty , hath a mind likewise to continue in it , then i must tell him , if he meets with this examination , he must be content to read but a few pages ; nay that is too much ; titulo debet , aut si placet , titulis contentus esse . he must be satisfied to read only the title of the book , or at most the titles of the author ; which are enough in all reason . and indeed before this trifling paper , he hath prefixt so many of them , as if he had a mind to oppress those by his puissance , whom he despaired to subdue by his reasons . it is true indeed , they are all of them ( not now to enquire into his merits ) such as he hath reason to be proud of : but however it will not become him to swell and look too big : for i must tell him , tho these titles , may give him a place above some of the heads of houses ; yet neither will they , nor twice as many more put together , render him equal to all , or the major part of them when met together . he cannot be offended then if i put him in mind of the frog in the fable : he knows the story , it will become him to make the application ; or if he will not , some body else would do well to whisper him in the ear , and advise him , ne te infles , ne intumescas , decane , non si te ruperis par eris . and now from the preface , i proceed to the book . but before i come to consider his examination of the decree , there are certain passages and expressions , here and there dispersed in these papers , which must not slightly and disrespectfully be passed over , but call for our notice and observation . and the first thing i am to take notice of is , the manner how he treats the oxford decree , and the persons who made and published it . the decree he styles rash and injudicious , the rash and hasty judgment of some heads , p. . which heads he all a long by way of contempt calls these heads , decreeing , heresy-making heads , p. . who in their determinations , have not only opposed the common faith of christians , but acted likewise in opposition to the common sense of mankind . of them he farther saith , that they talk of the fathers and councils , but are wholly ignorant of those matters , of which they have no knowledge , except it be by inspiration or prophesy . and in short , this ignorance and inconsideration hath betrayed them into a belief , and declaration of what is at the same time both heresy and nonsense ; and for which , not only all learned men , but even the most illiterate plowmen , whom he makes competent judges of these matters , will condemn them . i shall consider first what he saith of the decreeing heads , and then of the decree its self . now as to what concerns the heads of the university , i believe there is no indifferent stander-by , that is , no man who is not perfectly of this dean's complexion and interest , but will acknowledge that he hath treated them in a very rude , and unbecoming manner . he ought to have considered who were present at this meeting , and to have made some distinction at least . among them he ought in the first place to have thought upon the vicechancellor , who presided in this meeting , and not over-hastily to have passed his censure , without a salva reverentia , a preface of respect , which is due to his place and character . for he should be put in mind of , what now perhaps by reason of his long absence from the university he may have almost forgotten , that the vicechancellor of this , as also of our sister university , upon the account of the greatness of his trust , and the condition and quality of the persons under his government , hath bin always thought to deserve a place , and hath accordingly bin ranked , with the chiefest magistrates , and officers of corporations in the kingdom . upon which account he hath bin wont to be treated with honor and respect by all persons of good manners , and civil behaviour . besides him , among the persons who composed that meeting , ( as his friends who gave him an account of what passed there , might , and i suppose did inform him ) there were two more , one whereof upon the account of his noble birth , and the other of his character and station in the church , deserved to have bin distinguished . but he without any restriction or qualification , jumbles and shakes all these heads together , and represents them to the world , as a company of indiscreet , ignorant , rash men . some of the wiser heads indeed he saith were absent ; by which he would have it believed , that those who were present were a company of illiterate and injudicious blockheads . and so infallibly they must be , if in the affairs of religion , and the judgment and doctrines of the ancient church , they understand nothing but by prophesy or inspiration , as he saith , p. . that is , nothing at all . neither can he relieve himself , by suggesting as if some who were present dissented . for his friends might have informed him , that after some previous discourse , as usually happens at such meetings ; when the censure and decree was setled and agreed upon , there was not one person who opened his mouth , or said one word in opposition to it , either as to matter or form . so that all who were present are equally involved in those decent epithets before mentioned . from the decreeing heads let us pass to the decree it self ; this is styled the rash and hasty judgment of some of the heads of colleges and halls ; and immediately afterwards , he sets himself to shew the rashness and injudiciousness of this decree , p. . sure our author when he made this reflexion had his own writings before him , in which there are so many marks of hast and precipitation . but let us consider these epithets apart . first he says it was a hasty judgment ; but that is more than he knows ; and if it were as hasty as he imagines , yet i must tell him , that is no disparagement to it in this case . for there are some things so grossly and palpably false and absurd , that their falshood and absurdity appear at first view , and therefore require no long time , or previous deliberation to detect them , and when they are so detected , i hope it is no argument of rashness to condemn them . and such were the propositions censured in the decree , which are directly repugnant to the common faith , and universally received doctrines of all sound christians ; tending plainly to overthrow the unity of the godhead , which is the first and fundamental principle of all religion , whether natural or revealed . but if these propositions were not so grossly and palpably absurd , yet the condemnation of them could not be accounted injudicious ; because the heads , who were concerned in that censure , herein followed and were governed by the judgment and determinations of fathers and councils . to make this more plain . suppose any one now should assert , that there are two persons , or but one nature in christ , and thereby revive the heresy of nestorius , or eutyches ; would it require any long time and previous consultations to censure those positions ? or could such a censure so passed be accused of rashness ? i say no , because we have the example and authority of two general councils , to justify such a condemnation , which cannot be impeached of imprudence , without reflecting upon the wisdom and integrity , not only of the fathers who composed those august assemblies , but likewise of the catholick church , which hath confirmed their sentence , by rejecting those errors which they condemned . he on the other hand , is justly to be accounted rash and arrogant who presumes to oppose his own single opinion , to the judgment and determinations of fathers and councils ; and upon that account endeavors fixa refigere , to shake and unsetle those doctrines , and those words in which they have bin conveyed down to us , and which are now universally established in the christian church . in short therefore , to censure any positions which have already bin condemned by any general councils , doth not require any slow or tedious consultations ; it is sufficient to declare them impious and scandalous , because they have bin so adjudged formerly , by assemblies composed of persons who have bin celebrated for their wisdom and learning , and renowned for their soundness in the faith and their zeal for it . and so it was in the case before us . the propositions censured by the decree , were such as had formerly bin condemned by the famous council of nice , whose determinations have bin received with respect and reverence by all good christians , and make up at this day part of the established doctrine of all the churches in the christian world : who , amidst that variety of judgments and opinions in other matters , are at perfect agreement among themselves in this , that the father and son are consubstantial , or of one and the same substance , to which assertions the propositions condemned , are plainly and diametrically opposite ; it being absolutely impossible that two or three individual substances , should be one and the same substance . the second thing which ought not to be passed over without observation , is that undecent reflection , which in more places than one of this examination , he passes upon zeal . one would think , he accounteth it unlawful and unwarrantable in the affairs of religion ; or else sure he would never brand any man with the name of zealot , as if it were a mark of infamy and reproach . he ought therefore to be told , that there never was a just sense , and a firm belief of religion found in any person , where it was not likewise accompanyed with a zeal & concern for it ; which for that reason was never condemed by any wise or honest man. neither indeed can it be censured , without a bold and dangerous reflection upon our blessed savior himself ; and together with him , upon those wise and good men who in all ages of the world , as occasion hath served , have shewen a zeal for the glory of god , and a just concern for the preservation , and maintenance of the true religion . it is true indeed it may be , as oftentimes it hath bin , joined with ignorance , or excess ; in which cases it hath bin found to be so far from being serviceable to the interest of truth , that it hath rather bin the occasion of a great deal of mischief in the world . but on the other hand , to disparage and expose it without any just restriction and limitation , is to introduce a coldness and indifference among men in the great affairs of religion , which in time may end in the ruin and extinction of it . perhaps it will be said , that he doth not design to condemn zeal absolutely and for it self , but as it is to be found in conjunction with some other ill qualifications , which are apt to corrupt and spoil it : the best things being liable to abuse , and when they are so abused , they often prove very hurtful and mischievous . i find it therefore joined with two other qualities , for the sake of which possily , he may speak disrespectfully of it . the first whereof is warmth , p. . where he represents a certain member of the university under the character of a warm zealot ; which to be sure he did not design to be a commendation , but rather a title of contempt and disgrace . the other is orthodoxie or soundness in the faith , p. . where in the same slight and contemptuous manner , he styles some persons , our modern orthodox zealots ; to which he joyns an other ornamental epithete of heresy makers . it may not possibly then be bare naked zeal , but zeal thus qualified , which he thinks fit to condemn . as to the first epithete of warm ; if zeal found in conjunction with warmth , be blame-worthy , than i would fain know of him where he can direct us to find out any kind of zeal , which will not come under the same condemnation . in all his great reading did he ever meet with any author who furnished him with the notion of a cold zeal ; or in this case did he ever meet with any medium between hot and cold , i. e. a luke-warm zeal . doth this great critick in languages know whence this word is derived ? perhaps he will say , that it was not the bare warmth , but the excess of it , which he disliked in this zealot . but i do not hear that he did promote any petition , or use any endeavors that the sermon should be burned , but that the propositions delivered in it which gave great occasion of offence , should be condemned . however let the warmth of this zealot be what it will , the reflexion made upon it by this examiner can never be excused in him , who in many of his writings discovers such an intemperate heat , as hath bin disapproved by his friends as well as enemies . nay there is one peculiar circumstance of his warmth , for which i think no tolerable excuse can possibly be made by any person , tho never so much byassed in his favor ; and that is , the fervor which he hath discovered on both sides of the question ; having discoursed pro and con , and with equal violence appeared in defence of quite contrary opinions . it is true indeed , it is no disparagement to any man to alter his opinion ; provided that that change be attended with modesty , and supported by reason . but whoever shall maintain both parts of a contradiction , and then with equal fury shall think to bear down all opposition ; it is plain such an one can have no sincere concern for truth , but only for his own opinion , and thereby gives too great occasion , to call in question either his judgment , or sincerity , which are hereby brought under a just suspicion . but dly , supposing that a warm zeal may be excused , yet i find a zeal for the faith is not like to meet with the same fair quarter ; for an orthodox zealot , is a pernicious creature , and never to be endured ; who will be sure either to find or make heresies ; and thereby disturb the quiet and peace of the world . but where , i beseech you , can a man employ his zeal more commendably , than in the defence and maintenance of the truth ; especially when it is of great importance ? as it certainly must be , when the opposite error is such , as plainly overturns the foundations of our religion ; and this is plainly the case before us . but it seems , a zeal for errors , for false and impious opinions may be warranted , tho attended with all the warmth , nay with all the rudeness and scurrility imaginable ; but we must not lift up a finger to support the faith , nor open our mouths in defence of it , but presently they must be stopped again , with such dirty & foul language as this examiner thinks fit to fling in our faces . this is not just and equal dealing . dly , the next thing that calls for our observation is , that strange vein of pride and haughtyness which runs through this paper . to give an account of all particulars of this nature , would be in a manner to transcribe his book , which ought not to be honoured with too many editions . i shall therefore confine my self to two particulars , in which a vanity and arrogance which are insupportable are too plainly discovered . the first is , the charge of heresy , which almost in every page , he lays at the doors of all them who differ from him in his notion of three distinct minds and substances in the blessed trinity ; the denyal of which he over and over calls sabellianism , and in the conclusion of these papers , he dubbs with the honourable titles of heresy and nonsense . but i would fain know how this dean comes to be thus invested with this large authority and prerogative of adjudging and declaring heresy , which he saith , and saith rightly , ought not to be entrusted with any single person , nor any body of men less than a national synod . i do not know that he is his majestie 's high commissioner for ecclesiastical affairs . perhaps it will be said , that he did this by way of retaliation : the heads of houses declared his notion of three minds and substances to be heretical ; and he adjudges their opinion of three persons and one substance to be so too . here he doth but recriminate , and therefore is on the same level with these decreeing heresy-making heads . if this be a fault , it is a fault on both sides , and they are alike equally criminal . to which i answer , st , that the heads of houses by the judgment and declaration which they made , were very far from designing to assume to themselves an illegal and extravagant power of adjudging or declaring any matter or cause to be heresy , which was not , as they thought , adjudged and declared to be so before by a competent authority , and allowed for such by the laws of this land. the doctrine of one substance was decreed in the council of nice , confirmed afterwards by all the other general councils ; to which the contrary opinion of three substances , as was said before , is diametrically opposite ; and therefore by the whole church hath bin in former ages accounted and adjudged heretical . on the other hand , the examiner declares the belief of one substance in the trinity to be heresy , not only which had never bin declared so before by any council either general or particular : but quite contrary to the plain meaning of the canonical scriptures , to the express determinations of general councils , to the established faith and doctrine of the catholick church ; to all which , he hath with unparallel'd pride and presumtion bid defyance , and thereby brings himself within the compass and condemnation of the law. but dly , the judgment and declaration of the heads of houses , was made with a particular regard to the members of their own body , over whom they are entrusted with a just and legal authority . they have reason to look upon themselves to be under a strict and sacred obligation , to prevent as far as in them lies , the growth of any pernicious doctrines in religion . some such had bin preached among them , which they had reason to fear , might in time gain ground , if not timely obviated . to prevent therefore the infection and growth of such false and impious opinions , they thought fit to publish their decree , which , as i said before , had a particular regard to those persons who were committed to their care , eorum fidei & curae commissis . but this dean like an universal pastor and bishop , sets himself as it were in cathedra , and from thence he dictates to the whole church . he lifts up his voice , as if he would say , audiat orbis christianus , i do declare , and let all persons take notice of it at their peril , that the doctrine of three persons , and one god , or one substance in the god-head ( which is all one , as shall be shewn by and by ) is sabellianism , is heresy and nonsence . would not this dean , think you , have done well to have advised with some men of skill and learning , how far the reputation of his wisdom and modesty , ( not now to mention the integrity of his faith , which thereby may be justly called in question , ) might be affected by such a bold and presumtuous declaration ? the next instance of his great modesty may be found in the th and th pages of this examination , where he makes an apology for the use of new forms of words , unusual , unscriptural forms of speech , in order to explain and declare , as he calls it the catholick faith : several of which , as it is very well known , this examiner had invented and made use of to this purpose , in his vindication of the blessed trinity , and for which he was justly called to an account by the learned animadverter . now among other things , which he offers in vindication of this bold and dangerous practice , p. . he tells us , that the church tho it never had authority to make a new faith , yet it always had , and always will have authority to declare and explain the true catholick faith , in such words as are most aptly expressive of it , and necessary to countermine the arts and evasions of hereticks . and this he saith will justify the use of such expressions as these , three distinct infinite minds , and spirits , or three substances , how novel soever they may be thought . to this suggestion of his i have several things to answer . first he saith the church hath authority to use new , and unusual forms of words in articles of faith. but i am apt to think she would be very unwilling to exercise her power , and would never do it , except when pressed with a great and an unavoidable necessity . we have reason to think it would be one of her last remedies , when all other methods of preserving the faith had proved ineffectual . it is true indeed , in the ancient church , the meaning of certain words which sometime were of doubtful and ambiguous signification , were afterwards settled and determined , such as was substantia , persona , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and some new unscriptural words , such as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , were made choice of by the fathers , and put into their creeds , in order to detect the hypocrisy and heresy of the arians . but this was not done till after many disputations , and great deliberation : and afterwards they thought themselves obliged to declare the necessity they were under , of settling the sense of one word upon this important subject , which was not a new word neither , but such as had bin formerly used ; before they would impose it on the church . so weighty a thing was the faith and peace of the church , in the opinion of those great men in those days . but tho they introduced some new words , and settled the signification of others , they never did attempt to alter , and lay aside the use of any which had formerly bin of general usage , and universally received among christians , in order to introduce new ones in the room of them . on the other hand the church hath condemned all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , all new invented terms ; and hath forbid the introducing any such , under the pain of deprivation or anathematization . and for this decree of the th general council , the third of constantinople , the church in succeeding ages hath preserved so great a veneration , that none , either greek or latin , roman or reformed , have ever since complained of the hardship of that synodical sentence , or have endeavored to reverse it . but on the other hand , they have declared a high displeasure against all such who have at any time attempted any such innovations . as is evident from the fate that attended abbot joachim , and valentinus gentilis , the one in his book , the other in his person . all this the dean had formerly bin put in mind of by the learned animadverter ; and yet notwithstanding this monition , he still persists in that presumtuous humor , of using and defending these new , unusual , inconvenient forms of speech ; and which he himself allows may be liable to an heretical meaning . but dly , let it be granted , that the church may alter old phrases ; but hath she actually made use of that her authority in the case before us ? hath she published any declaration , whereby she hath discovered her pleasure in this affair , viz. that the old words , such as those of persons , hypostasis , subsistence , should be laid aside to make room for self-consciousness , and mutual consciousness ? or that one nature , one essence , one substance , must be discarded , and in their place , the phrases of three distinct minds , spirits , and substances should be introduced . that maxime in law , is true here in divinity ; eodem modo res solvitur quo ligatur . the church hath tyed us to the use of these words , i pray who hath set us at liberty ? why he saith , or at least intimates , that the church hath . but what church i beseech you ? why none that i know of , except it be that which is included , and which he carries about with him in his own person . how comes he to be styled the church ? that you must know is by a synecdoche , whereby the dean of a church may be called the church it self . tho others may account it rather a catachresis , or vocis abusio ; when a word is abused , being transferred from a proper to a very improper and absurd signification . but sure the dean cannot so far forget himself , as to arrogate to himself the name of the church . he doth not that i know of indeed assume the name , but he plainly doth the authority of the church . and under her name and power he shelters himself . for as was said before , p. . he justifies his own innovations , by saying that the church always had , and always will have authority to use such words as she thinks most expressive of the faith . how can this apology vindicate him , except either he be the church , or at least be commissioned by her , and invested with her authority ? i presume he will not pretend to be formally the church either oecumenical or national . he must therefore only be so , either virtually , or by way of representation . and sure some such thing he fancies of himself , viz. that the christian faith , or at least the words wherein it is to be expressed , are committed to his care , or rather are to be disposed of at his pleasure . otherwise sure he would never talk as he doth in this book . for instance , p. . he hath these remarkable words . now since person is the catholick word , which long ecclesiastical use hath rendered familiar , i should by no means allow of any other word in this mystery , could we retain the catholick faith , together with the word . what must words be used , or laid aside at his discretion ? he acknowledges the word to be ecclesiastical : the church hath made it her own ; she hath adopted it into her creeds , and confessions of her faith : by long use it is now rendered familiar , and is become the common language of all christians . what authority i pray hath he to order the laying of it aside ? i should by no means allow , &c. it is fit he should be told upon this occasion , that this word was anciently used without his leave , and will still continue to be so without his allowance . for neither the faith nor language of the church have any such dependance upon him , as that they must stand or fall at his pleasure . but lastly , whatever authority the church may have to alter the usual and received forms of speech , yet to be sure she would never exercise it , except forced , as was intimated before , by some very great , and some very apparent reason . to this he answers that there is as great reason and necessity for such an alteration of words now , as ever there was in any age of the church , p. . and the reason that he assigns is this , viz. that we are in great danger of losing the catholick faith , by the revival of the heresy of sabellius , p. . which walks publickly abroad , tho under the disguise of a new name . and if we believe him it is one of those doctrines too publickly received in the church of england , which are not the true doctrines of our church , p. . now this , i cannot but say , is not only extremely false , but likewise a very scandalous suggestion . because it must not only affect our own times and nation ; but likewise bring all other churches ancient and modern , eastern and western , roman and reformed under the same suspicion . for all these are at perfect agreement both in the belief of the doctrine of the trinity , and in the manner of expressing their faith ; which is by the profession of three persons , and one nature or substance . so that if by retaining the old words there is danger of losing the catholick faith , it must be lost out of the catholick church : and this revolt to sabellianism , must be both the most lasting , and the most general apostasy , that ever was foretold , or feared should happen to the christian church . but as to what may concern this church , i believe , if all wise and good men in it , have reason to fear any danger , 't is from another quarter ; i mean from the revival of the heresies of arius , pelagius , and socinus , which some evil men with great industry , and with no small art , endeavor to propagate among us . but dly , tho the charge of sabellianism be a very great and heavy one , yet we ought not to look upon it to be such a bug-bear , as thereby to be affrighted out of our religion . we may comfort our selves with this , that this imputation is no other , nor better , than what hath formerly bin made by hereticks against the orthodox . for the arian against whom zanchy wrote , in his antithesis doctrinae christianae & antichristi de uno vero deo ; and valentinus gentilis in order to establish his doctrine of three distinct infinite spirits , made the very same objection against the catholick faith , with relation to the error of sabellius . cantilenam sabellii nobis obgannit , saith aretius of gentilis ; & eandem nobis cantilenam occinit decanus , may we say . but as they who believe three persons and but one nature or substance , are as far from being sabellians , as any the greatest tritheist ; so they no doubt will be as ready to oppose the attempts of such , who at any time hereafter may endeavor to revive the heresy of sabellius . but in order to combate that heresy , they will not think themselves obliged to use any other weapons , than those with which in former times it hath bin so succesfully vanquished . the faith hath bin transmitted down to us for these thirteen centuries , in that form of sound words , viz. three persons and one nature , and hath conquered all opposition made against it ; and in all times since , they who have refused the language of the church , have bin justly suspected to be no true friends to the faith of it ; which now by long use , and the prescription of so many ages , have contracted such a friendship , that they are like to live or die together . and therefore we find none , as i now intimated , who in any times heretofore , either quarrelled with , or rejected the words established in the church , but either open hereticks , or such who were justly suspected to favor their errors . thus of old , the arians and semi-arians were displeased with the words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because these words troubled and gave offence to many forsooth ; and were such as rather perplexed than explained this doctrine , being above the reach of mens understanding and conceptions . so the polish and transylvanian unitarians in their times made the same complaints . that the church by using those words , homoousion , person , essence , unity , trinity , had perfectly confounded all right notions of god , and in a manner overturned the christian religion . valentinus gentilis echoed back the same calumnies , from bern and geneva , and called the former words monstrosae & profanae voces , quibus omnia divina mysteria pervertuntur . and to bring up the rear , we find the dean in his vindication , declaring his displeasure against them in the like expressions , p. . where he tells us , that that which hath confounded this mystery , hath bin the vain endeavor of reducing it to terms of art , such as nature , essence , substance , existence , hypostasis , person and the like . i am sorry to find him in such ill company . tho i charitably hope he is not engaged in the same evil designs with them . however it will become all men of wisdom and integrity , to avoid giving any the least countenance to such tho but suspicious practices , which we have reason to think , were first set on foot on purpose to undermine our holy faith and religion . there is one thing more to be observed , before i come to consider the propositions , which i had almost forgotten ; but it must not by any means be omitted , and that is , his very curious and critical remark upon the latin decree , p. . where he tells us that he who drew it up need not brag much of his skill in latin , having transgressed the plain rules of grammar , in using eorum fidei et curae for suae fidei et curae . and for this , that you may not rely only on his word and single judgment , he vouches the authority of some criticks , some criticks say , &c. who those criticks are we are not able to divine : perhaps they may be found in the number of those wise and learned men whom he mentions in the th page , and of whom he undertakes to procure a meeting any day in the year , to censure the oxford decree . but whosoever those criticks were , i am sure neither he nor they have any great reason to boast of their skill in criticism . for i would fain know what those rules of grammer are which he saith are transgressed , by using eorum for suae fidei . some waggs sure pretending to be criticks imposed on him . i will endeavor to set him right . and therefore for his better information , i would direct him to the oxford grammar , and to the observations which are there made , p. . upon the pronouns sui and suus , which are called reciproca , quia reflectuntur ad id quod praecessit in eadem oratione . but perhaps he may think that book beneath his perusal ; he may therefore , if he pleases , consult gerhard vossius , in his book de sermonis constructione , where in the th chap. he will find three canons or rules laid down de reciprocis ; the last of which , being to our present purpose , is this : si ob neglectum reciproci nulla oriatur ambiguitas , potest aliquando reciproci loco aliud relativum poni . this is the rule , and there he may likewise find several examples among the most approved authors . cic. philipp . . omnes boniquantum in ipsis fuit , caesarem occiderunt . idem . de off. perfuga fabritio pollicitus est , si praemium ei proposuisset , &c. id . de off. si non poterit causas defensitare , illa praestare debebit , quae erunt in ipsius potestate . quinctil . declam . . neque ignoravit , quae eum manerent pericula . more instances he may there find to this purpose , out of curtius , pliny , &c. now the dean i hope will not be so hardy , as to say , that tully , and pliny , and quinctilian were ignorant of the rules , nay the plain rules of grammar . the dean i verily believe , knew nothing of this matter . he hath no better way then that i can think of to come off , but to tell the world that some persons under the disguise of criticks imposed upon him ; the confession of his ignorance being in this case his best excuse , tho at best it is but a very sorry one . having thus finished these previous remarks , i come now to consider more particularly the propositions which occasioned the oxford decree , and which were condemned by it . the propositions are these : there are three infinite distinct minds and substances in the trinity . item , that the three persons in the trinity , are three infinite distinct minds or spirits , and three individual substances . these are adjudged and declared to be false , impious , &c. he desires to know the reasons upon which this decree was grounded , which he saith , in the conclusion of his examination , p. . had much better have bin thought on at first , and then we should have escaped this decree : intimating thereby , what he had in broad words expressed before , that it was a rash injudicious censure , neither managed with consideration , nor supported by any good reason . i must confess for my own part , i do not see any just ground why we should comply with this examiner's expectation . for reasons have already bin offered by the learned animadverter , and those penned with such a strength and clearness , as are peculiar to his writings . but he saith , he cannot perswade himself to read what the animadverter hath written on this occasion . to what purpose therefore is it to offer any new arguments , which must all be lost , upon one , who superciliously disdains to peruse and consider , what either hath , or what may hereafter be charitably proposed for his conviction ? but because he , who resolved never to read whatever should be written by the animadverter , may perhaps cast a scornful glance on these papers , i shall therefore so far gratify him in his demand , as to offer him one reason against his three substances in the blessed trinity , but it shall be a substantial one , and such as most men i am sure , will look upon to be as considerable , and as effectual to shew the falshood and impiety of his opinion , as if twenty were proposed . and that is this , viz. that if there be three distinct substances , ( and the same is to be said of three distinct minds and spirits ) in the trinity , then there must unavoidably be three gods. this hath bin so plainly and irrefragably already made out by the learned animadverter , that if the dean would have vouchsafed to have spent that time in reading and examining the animadversions , which he hath mispent in examining the oxford decree , it would have spared any farther trouble or pains in this affair . now for a farther proof and confirmation of this reason , i shall lay down some observations , which carry such a plainness and evidence along with them , as cannot i think be gainsaid or resisted , but by such who are before-hand resolved to persist in their errors , and are hardned against all conviction . such as st . that the existence and unity of the godhead , is the first and fundamental principle of all religion , both revealed and natural . and consequently that there cannot be more gods than one , in any sense whatsoever ; if the word god be taken in its proper , and not in a metaphorical and figurative signification . that therefore which i affirm is , that there are not more gods than one , either superior or inferior ; coordinate or subordinate ; numerical or specifical ; ancient or modern . hear , o israel , the lord our god is one lord , deut. . . the lord he is god , and there is none else besides him , deut . . but this is the dictate of nature as well as the language of the scripture ; reason ( i mean where it is not corrupted and depraved ) and revelation both conspiring to teach us this lesson . dly , that , there being but one god , from thence it must follow , that in god there must be but one nature , one essence . because essence is that by which every thing is constituted that which it is : it is the ratio formalis of that thing be it what it will , & primo de re concipitur , being the first thing that offers it self to our thoughts , when we form an idea of it . one essence , one nature , constitutes one thing ; two natures , two or more essences , constitute two or more things . where there is one human or angelical nature ▪ there is but one man , one angel . where there are two or more , there are two or more men or angels : peter , and john , michael , and gabriel . and so for the same reason , there being but one god , there can be but one divine essence ; and if more essences , more gods. dly , that when we speak of god , the words essence , nature , substance , divinity , are synonymous terms , and signify one and the same thing . thus in the fathers , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , are promiscuously used to denote the divine nature , or godhead . the divine nature , essence , substance , being nothing else but the deity or divinity : and the divinity , vice versa , is nothing , but the divine nature , substance , essence . thly , therefore , if in the trinity there are three distinct substances , there must be three distinct essences , and divinities , and consequently , there must be three gods. for that there is one god , or more gods than one , must depend upon the unity or multiplication of the divine nature and essence . if there be but one divine nature , substance , divinity , there is , and for that reason it is impossible there should be any more than one god ; and if more distinct substances and divinities , there must be more gods. as the former are numbred and multiplied , so are the latter ; in the same proportion , both as to number and kind . if there be but three distinct substances and divinities , there are but three gods ; and if those substances be only numerically distinguished , then they constitute only three numerical gods ; but if specifically distinguished , then there must be three gods of a different kind , that is specifically distinguished from each other . thly , that the unity of the godhead is the most perfect and complete sort of unity that can be imagined . no nature , essence , substance , can in any sense be more one , than the divine nature or essence is ; which hath such so perfect , and so peculiar a simplicity and identity , as to exclude all manner of division , and all sorts of multiplication . it is true indeed , there is one peculiar prerogative of the divine nature and substance , founded in its infinite , and therefore transcendent perfection , whereby it is capable of residing in more persons than one ; and is accordingly communicated from the father , to the son , and holy ghost . but this is done without any division , or multiplication ; so that the same divine nature is a singular , but not a solitary nature , being whole and entire in the three blessed persons ; in each of which it doth completely subsist , tho with a different manner of subsistence ; yet so , as to retain its most complete identity , excluding all plurality of essences , whether equal or unequal , like or unlike ; the divine nature being but one and the same , as was said before , in the three divine persons , without diversity and without distinction . the persons indeed are distinguished from each other by a true , real , proper distinction . but this is not founded in the diversity or distinction of their natures , but is taken from the different ways of subsistence , which one and the same nature hath in the three persons ; whereby they have different properties , characters , and relations , which are absolutely incommunicable to each other , and whereby some things may be affirmed of one , which cannot possibly be affirmed of either of the others . such as are the generation of the son ; the procession and mission of the holy ghost . and in this different manner of subsistence is founded , as the distinction , so likewise the subordination between the divine persons : the father being the first , and therefore styled by the fathers , the origine and fountain of the divinity with respect to the son and holy ghost . not by the production of a new divine nature , but by a communication of his own , which , as the fathers always speak , is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one and the very same , in all three , without separation , difference , or distinction . this is indeed a great mystery , but we speak of the blessed trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , which hath bin always looked upon by the greatest and wisest men in the church , to be above all expressions and description . if any man therefore will not be satisfied with this general account , but will be putting new and nice questions , and desire to be informed with nicodemus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; how can these things be ? then i must acquaint him once for all , that neither man , nor angel can give a satisfactory answer to such enquiries , which are not only impertinent but dangerous ; proceeding from a wanton , and impious curiosity , which ought severely to be condemned . as for us of this place , i hope we shall always endeavor to regulate our apprehensions in the affairs of religion , by the discoveries which god hath made in the holy writings ; accounting that the truest wisdom , when men are wise according to what is written . and therefore in spight of all the objections and flouts of arians , socinians , tritheists , atheists , we will resolve to believe what is revealed , and to adore what we cannot comprehend . lastly , since the unity of the divine nature is such , and so perfect as is before described , therefore we may conclude , that all those , who attempt to explain it by a specifical sameness and identity , are so far from confirming that they plainly undermine this great and fundamental truth . for st , hereby they destroy a true real unity , and in the room of it , introduce only a notional unity , which may be consistent with , nay indeed , as the dean hath bin told , implys a multiplication of the divine nature . so that when we say the three persons are one god , they are no otherwise one according to this explication , than as ten thousand individual men , are one man , or a myriad of angels , are one angel. neither is it enough to say , that the three divine natures and substances are united in the trinity ; but are separated or divided in the persons of angels and men . for this will not alter the case ; for the three substances so united , retain their true and real distinction from each other , notwithstanding that union , and are still as much three as if they were not united . and therefore this union of natures will no more constitute one nature , than the union of the three persons in the trinity , who are most intimately , and inseparably united to each other , will make one person ; or than the union of both natures divine and humane , in our blessed savior , will constitute and make one nature . eutyches of old maintained such a senseless opinion ; but the fathers told him , that those natures were united , it is true , but yet , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , without confusion , alteration , or conversion of either into the other . so that each nature retained its own powers , faculties and properties , entire and distinct from those of the other , without any mixture or change . the like is to be said , of the union of several essences and natures in the trinity . for should such an union be allowed , yet still the natures must remain entire and distinct ; and so must their attributes likewise . they must have distinct understandings , and wills , and distinct operations , as flowing from powers and faculties , essentially distinguished ; and consequently they must be three gods to all intents and purposes , when united , as much as if they were separated . but dly , a specifical sameness of the godhead , is by no means to be allowed , because it destroys the true and fundamental reason of that unity , viz. the infinite perfection of the divine nature , which renders it absolutely incapable of any multiplication ; and places it upon another weak and unstable foundation ; viz. the operation of the mind and understanding . so that the unity of the godhead according to ths hypothesis , doth not result from the nature of god , but is owing to , and dependent upon the operation of some intellect , drawing one common notion from the agreement which it observes in several individuals . which to affirm would certainly be both a monstrous and a blasphemous assertion ; ss the animadverter hath very judiciously observed , p. . from all these observations , i think it is as evident as any truth in nature , that to assert three substances in the blessed trinity , is plainly to imply , and in other words to affirm , that there are three gods ; which assertion therefore in the judgment not only of all true christians , but even of jews and mahometans , and some sober pagans , would be accounted and adjudged false and impious , as it is declared to be by the oxford censure . but against this the dean will urge in behalf of his three distinct substances ; the plurality and distinction of persons in the trinity . are there not three persons in the godhead ? yes . are not these three persons three substantial persons ? yes , we acknowledge they are . tho by the by , this epithet of substantial when added to person , is superfluous , and is no better than a plain tautology ; because the very notion of person imports the perfection and complement of substance , so that it receives no addition to its signification by the word substantial . but to pass this by , and proceed to his questions : are not three substantial persons , three distinct substances ? i answer , no. for these three persons have but one and the same substance , or nature that is common to them all ; which nature hath three different ways of subsisting in the three persons . from which different ways of subsisting , as i said before , do result distinct properties , and relations , belonging to each of those divine persons , and which are incommunicable to the others . all these questions so often and so impertinently proposed by the dean , are easily resolved by proposing the like questions , in other words , but such as are , perfectly equipollent . are not the persons in the trinity three distinct divine persons ? yes . is not every divine person , truly and properly god ? yes . is it not then as plain , that if there be three distinct divine persons , there must consequenty be three gods ? i answer , no. because , tho each of them distinctly is a divine person , and therefore god ; yet they have but one and the same divinity or godhead in common to them all : so that they are distinguished only by their personalities , but are united in one divine nature or godhead . and therefore , as the athanasian creed tells us , tho we are compelled by the christian verity to acknowledge every person by himself to be god and lord ; yet we are forbidden by the catholick religion , to say there are three gods , or three lords . now of all this i would defire no greater or plainer acknowledgment , than what i find in the writings of this examiner , and particularly in the papers before us . p. . he hath these words : that there are three persons and one god , is the catholick language , and therefore three belongs to the persons , and one to the godhead . this is right : but in the words immediately succeeding , he quite overturns the catholick faith and language , by saying : that therefore whatever is essential to the notion of each person , may be numbred and distinguished with the persons . from hence he would have it follow , as indeed it will , if this be allowed , that spirit and substance being included in the notion of a person , it must be multiplied with it , so that as there are three persons , so there must be three spirits , three substances , in the trinity . now this is extremely false ; for by the same way , and for the same reason that there are three substances or three spirits , there must be three godheads . he saith no : adding that this will not affect the unity of the godhead ; for three , he saith , belongs to the persons , which are three , not to the godhead , which is but one : very right . and must it not be said for the same reason , that when we affirm that there are three substantial persons , three is to be applied to persons , and not to substance ; because substance when we speak of god , being equipollent to godhead , as was said before , is but one , and therefore cannot be multiplied ? but cannot what is essential to the notion of a person , be numbred and distinguished with the person ? no , by no means ; for tho it may and must be so in finite persons , it is not so when we speak of the divine infinite persons in the trinity . because there is something in each of those persons , which in common belongs to them all ; such is the divine nature , substance , godhead , which is so in each as to be whole and entire in all three ; and therefore tho residing in , and applied to each person , yet it may not , it cannot be numbred or distinguished with the persons ; who are distinguished by their properties and relations , which arise from three different ways & manners of their subsistence , but not by their substance and godhead , which is but one and the same in all three , without division , distinction , or multiplication . the same orthodox acknowledgment we have , p. . tho tacked by him , according to his usual method , to an egregious contradiction . there he saith : that the divine nature is whole and entire in each divine person ; and that infinite , and infinite , and infinite , when applied to the persons , are but one and the same infinite nature . very right : but then with the same breath in a manner he puffs all this away ; by telling us , that each of the divine persons is a distinct infinite mind ; and yet that these three infinite distinct minds can have but one and the same divine nature . which is a plain contradiction , making one to be three , and three one , in one and the same respect . and is no better than if he should say , in three gods , there is but one and the same godhead ; for infinite mind and spirit is but the same thing in other words with god , as he himself elsewhere acknowledges . lastly to mention no more , p. , . he repeats the same orthodox expressions : the scripture-notion of the unity of god is not such an unity as is only in one person , for then it could not enjoyn the faith and worship of father , son , and holy ghost . but such an unity as can be between three : when the one same divine nature , is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal father , to the eternal son , and by the father and the son , to the eternal spirit , without any division or separation . and that which is communicated whole and entire , without division or separation , makes no number , for it is but one still . here he is as sound and orthodox as athanasius ; but when he comes to explain himself , and therein to give us his true sentiments , ( for all the former expressions , are but an artificial disguise of his errors ) then he uses such a shuffing , ambiguous , deceitful way of speaking , that you would think , that ursacius , or valens , or eusebius of nicomedia , were risen from the dead . i confess i have bin beyond measure astonished , when i have perused his writings on this subject , to find such plain and gross contradictions , so often and so boldly uttered by him . sometimes he will make a good and laudable confession of the faith ; and by and by he spoils all , by a very fraudulent and treacherous explication . and indeed hereby he hath laid the foundations of such a sophistical and deceitful way of writing ; that if it should be countenanced in him , and thereupon imitated by others , it would render it almost impossible , either to vindicate the truth , or to confute any heresy . this charge will be made good by considering these following particulars . such as are st , his manifest , and manifold contradictions , with which his books written upon the subject , which is now before us , do every where abound . whereby he affirms and denys the same thing , almost in a breath ; and what he erects in one place , he presently kicks down in another . to make out this , i shall confine my self to one instance of it , relating to the unity of the divine nature , p. . he saith the divine nature is whole and entire in each divine person , and the three divine persons , whom he very falsly and very dangerously there calls three divine minds , have the same one divine nature , and are but one and the same infinite nature . p. . there is but one and the same divinity or godhead in them all , speaking of the three persons . the same one divinity or godhead is entirely and indivisibly in three distinct persons . p. . the same one divine nature is wholly and entirely communicated from the father to the son , &c. see p. . where you have the like expressions , by which he affirms that there is but one and the same nature , one divinity , one godhead in the three persons . and yet in other places , he is as confident , that there is not only one singular nature , and substance in god ; p. . to say that there is one singular substance in the deity is the fundamental article of the sabellian creed . p. . if there be but one singular divine nature and substance in the deity , tho men could find a trinity of persons in this one divine nature ( which yet p. . he represents as a ridiculous imagination ) yet from thence he saith it must follow , that the whole trinity must be incarnate , p. . now to affirm that there is but one godhead , one and the same divine nature in the three persons ; and yet to deny , that there is one singular divine nature and substance in those persons , i think , amounts to a very plain contradiction . i know it will be said , that he affirms and denies the unity of the divine nature , but it is not in the same respect : when he saith it is one , he means that the same specifical nature is whole and entire in the three persons ; but when he denies it to be one , he means , that there is not one only singular , or numerical divine nature , for this were , by so saying , to revive the heresy of sabellius . i answer , this will not save him from a contradiction . for let him make choice of which of these terms he pleases to express the unity and sameness of the divine nature by , it is certain , that what he affirms in one place he denies in another . when he saith it is one , one and the same , doth he mean one singular , numerical nature ? if he means so , then this he doth at other times in plain downright terms deny , not only as a thing that is false , but as heretical , impossible , contradictory , as was seen before . well ? when he asserts the unity of the godhead , and saith , that one and the same divine nature is in the three persons , wholly and entirely communicated from the father to the son , as he expressed himself , p. . doth he mean a specifical identity ? i suppose he doth , for p. . he tells us that to assert three substances in the arian notion , that is three distinct minds and species of substance , or three natures and essences specifically different , this is false , impious , and heretical . therefore to affirm three natures of the same kind , must be a true , religious , orthodox acknowledgment . this he must mean if he means any thing . otherwise if he shall say , that when he affirms there are three natures , or substances , he means , that there are three , but yet which are neither of the same kind nor of a different kind ; that is , neither numerically , nor specifically different : then i say that he advances an absurd and an inexplicable position , which neither he nor any man else can possibly understand . but on the other hand , if he affirms or means a specifical unity in the godhead , then i am sure he doth as plainly as words can make it , in other places contradict his meaning . for p. . he hath these words , tho the ancient fathers frequenty make mention of a specifick unity of nature in the godhead , yet they did not confine the unity of the divine nature to this . and p. . this specifick sameness doth not answer the complete notion of the divine unity . nay , he doth not only say this , but gives a very good reason for it . p. . the divine nature is no species , for it is but one . if there be any force in this consequence , it must be this viz. that the divine nature is but one singular individual nature , which is incapable of plurality or multiplication , and therefore it cannot be a species , because a species , can be multiplied , and therefore is capable of being affirmed and predicated de pluribus , of more things of the same kind . he proceeds : the unity of the godhead is the most real , essential , indivisible unity . very right . therefore say i , it is not a specifical unity , the former assertion being a clear & an unanswerable proof that it is not so : for st , the unity of the godhead is a real unity ; but a specifick unity , is only a logical and notional one . dly , the unity of the godhead , is an essential unity , the unity of one nature and essence ; the specifick is only an unity of several natures , which are really and essentially , à parte rei , distinct from each other , and are only united in the understanding . lastly , the unity of the godhead is the most real , and therefore the most perfect unity ; but a specifick unity is not the most real , but of a lesser sort , and much inferior to a singular and numerical identity . it is this latter then that is to be found in the godhead , which being uncapable of division , or multiplication , is for the same reason , as he himself acknowledges , uncapable of numeration . for when we say three persons , three belongs to the persons who are three , but not to the godhead , which is but one , p. . and now is it not plain to any man , that the dean , by thus going forward and backward , saying and unsaying , very evidently contradicts himself ? i think he doth . but if this wants any farther confirmation , let the reader look into his vindication , and there he will find these contradictions yet in more plain and express terms , if it be possible , which the reader may find exemplified in the animadversions , p. . &c. and thither i refer him , to save the trouble of transcribing . but the dean for all this , will not allow that he is guilty of a contradiction ; and therefore to save himself from that imputation he hath contrived two answers , but they are the most bold and arbitrary , that ever were invented . but when men are hard pressed , it is no wonder that they should make use of any the most desperate shift to make their escape . st then , doth not he who asserts the unity of the godhead , and yet tells the world , that this is neither a specifick nor a numerical unity ( for of a generical one , there is no question in this case ) i say doth not such an one contradict himself ? surely he doth . for if god be one , he must be so in either of these two senses . and therefore if the godhead be one , and yet is neither numerically nor specifically such , it must be one , and not one , which is a contradiction . he answers no , because there is an unity that is a medium between both . the unity of the godhead , is not such as is to be found in a singular nature : that is , saith he , sabellianism , neither is it a specifick unity , for that is only a logical and notional unity , and therefore the unity of the divine nature is not to be confined to this , p. . in opposition to the arians the father 's taught , not one singular substance in god , which is sabellianism . but such an oneness of substance as we know not how otherwise to express , than by a specifick sameness and unity , tho that doth not answer the complete notion of the divine unity , p. . in short , the divine nature is one , but by what kind of unity no man can divine . it is neither a specifical , nor a numerical oneness , but an unity either made up of both , or made up of neither ; however it is a medium between them . i fancy such another medium , as he found who desired the people to join with him in singing the psalm , that was between the three and twentieth , and the twenty fourth psalms . but if this answer will not bring him off , he hath contrived a second , viz. that these three numerical substances are united into one , by a mutual self-consciousness . but for this notion of his the animadverter hath sufficiently-accounted with him : and therefore there remains nothing more by me to be said upon that head. thus it is plain that the dean in his writings is guilty of many gross and palpable contradictions , which way of writing is very scandalous , and ought therefore by every one to be condemned . but this is not all ; there are several other things in his way & manner of writing , which ought to be discountenanced : i can but just name them . any man that peruses his late writings , will besides his contradictions , find in the d place , that he frequently , but very fraudulently , endeavors to impose upon his readers , by makeing two words to be equipollent , which yet have a different signification . thus in order to amuse unwary readers , when he speaks of the divine nature , he joins the words singular and solitary together , as if they were synonymous terms ; and then insidiously asks , p. . is it not sabellianism to affirm that there is but one singular and solitary nature in the trinity ? answer , to affirm that there is but one solitary nature , is to revive the heresy of sabellius ; because it were as much as to say , that the divine nature or substance is to be found only in , and therefore confined to one person . but to say there is but one singular nature imports no such thing . for the same singular numerical nature is to be found in each of the divine persons , being common to them all , but yet without multiplication , as he hath often bin told by his adversary , and which thing he hath often affirmed himself ; how sincerely let others judge . so again , in order to establish a plurality of substances , he makes three substantial persons , to be the same with three personal substances . but he hath bin often told , that tho the persons are different , each of which is a substance ; yet that the substance or nature is not distinct , but common to all three . and therefore three substantial persons , are no more three substances , than three divine almighty persons , have three distinct divinities or almightinesses ; which he himself sometimes will not allow . dly , when hard pressed by his adversary , to defend himself , he invents several arbitrary and incomprehensible distinctions , for which he hath neither reason nor example . thus when told that three substances , must infer a multiplication of the divine nature in the trinity , & that again must infer three gods : to avoid the force of this argument , he tells us , that the same individual nature subsists thrice , not by multiplying but by repeating its self , and that the divine nature is repeated in its image , but without multiplication . and this senseless distinction he often repeats in his defence ; by which it is certain that he multiplies words , tho perhaps he may think that he doth not multiply distinctions . again , having denied a numerical unity of the godhead , and yet being aware , that a specifical unity would lay him open to many unanswerable difficulties ; he hath in a most presumtuous , unprecedented manner , formed a distinction as to identity and sameness of nature , by which he makes a middle sort of unity between the two former , partly specifick , and partly numerical . which distinction is perfectly an original , and for which he hath neither copy , nor precedent , from any writer either living or dead . lastly , in the same insidious manner , to avoid the force of those arguments which are brought against him ; when he cannot maintain his words , he flies to his meaning , where he entrenches himself , and then he is as safe as if he were in an enchanted castle . and there let him continue for me , unmolested and undisturb'd , provided that he will no longer disturb the world , with so unjustifiable a practice ; for if men may be allowed by a mental reservation to harbor a meaning different from the plain , obvious and natural signification of words , then there is an end of all truth and sincerity , and consequently of all mutual confidence between man and man , which by this means , or such meaning , if you please , is entirely destroyed . by all that hath bin said upon this head , i think it will appear plain to every unprejudiced person , that there was great reason to condemn the propositions mentioned in the decree , which plainly overthrow the unity of the godhead ; and therefore are justly styled false , and impious . of them it is farther affirmed in the decree , that they are contrary to the doctrine of the catholick church ; and particularly to that received here in the church of england . and so they are , as opposite to it , as truth is to falshood , and faith to infidelity . it hath bin the belief and profession of all good christians , since the first planting of christianity in the world , that as there is but one god , so there is but one nature and essence in the three persons of the trinity , of which they are all partakers . this was upon a particular occasion decreed in the council of nice , confirmed afterwards by all the other general councils ; and they who have opposed this determination have in all times heretofore bin adjudged and declared hereticks . for some time indeed , the words substance , person , and hypostasis , were of ambiguous signification , but that was afterwards settled ; and the language of the church , ever since hath bin three persons , and but one substance , nature , essence , divinity . in this all the fathers agree , both greek and latin , even st. hilary , who styles the father , son , and holy ghost , three substances , yet in the very same place where he is cited by the examiner , he explains himself , and vindicates the synod of antioch , and tells us p. . tres substantias esse dixerunt , subsistentium personas per substantias edocentes ; by three substances they meant three persons . but as to the substance it self when placed in opposition to person , he acknowledges that to be but one ; and that the father and son , unius recte ambo creduntur esse essentiae . again : credamus & dicamus esse unum substantiam . p. . and p. . deus unus , ob indiscretae in utroque naturae indissimilem substantiam praedicetur . which the examiner thus renders into english : the father who begets , and the son who is born , are to be acknowledged one god , upon the account of the same nature in both , without the least difference or variation ; and therefore , say i , without the least distinction : except the dean can find out a distinction without a difference , which i confess he hath done in some other cases before mentioned . but this is his peculiar talent , to find out that which no body before him ever dreamed of . the like observation is to be made with relation to the alexandrian synod under athanasius ; which one would think he would never have mentioned , if he had not in a manner bin forsaken by his reason , at the same time that he abandoned his religion . for nothing could have bin produced , which is more apposite and pertinent , to overthrow his new notion of three minds and substances . for there happened a dispute between the catholicks , concerning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which was meerly a contention about words , when they all agreed in the same thing ; those who asserted three hypostases , thereby meaning three persons , but yet but one godhead , and one substance in the trinity ; those who denied there were three hypostases , thought that by hypostasis was meant substance , and they dreaded nothing more , than to affirm there were three substances in the godhead . take it in the words of the examiner , p. . they owned but one hypostasis or substance , for they believed but one ' divinity or divine nature , by reason of the identity of nature , between father and son. and they having given their several explications , were all found to agree in the catholick faith ; and then afterwards three hypostases and one nature was the catholick language . can any thing be more directly opposite to his notion , than this determination of the synod . one cannot but think he was infatuated when he produced it . but still he hath a shift in reserve to save himself and his three substances . for in that same place , he renders hypostasis by substance , and saith , that when they said three hypostases , they meant it still in the notion of three substances . a very false and perfidious suggestion ; making the catholick language , as he himself acknowledges it , wherein catholicks expressed their consent in the same faith , to consist in a ridiculous contradiction . for according to him , when they said , three hypostases and one nature , they meant three substances , and one nature ; that is , three substances , and one substance ; three natures , and one nature ; these being two words that signify but one and the same thing . but the true language of the church was , that there are three persons , truly and really distinct , and yet but one nature , essence , substance . and this doctrine hath bin constantly , uniformly , and without any alteration conveyed thro all the ages of the church to our days ; this being the faith , and these the words , of all christian churches , greek and latin , eastern and western , that are at this day in the world. and particularly of our own church , who in the first article of our religion teaches us to profess , that there is but one god ; and that in the unity of this godhead , there are three persons , of one power , substance , and eternity . and in our most solemn addresses to heaven , she directs us to make the same acknowledgment , viz. upon trinity sunday ; and to give glory to god in these words : who art one god , one lord , not one only person , but three persons in one substance . for that which we believe of the glory of the father , the same we believe of the son , and holy ghost , without any difference or inequality . and if there be not any difference in the substance , there can be no distinction , as was said before . and now at length being quite tired with following this examiner , thro that maze and labyrinth , into which he commonly leads his readers : it is high time i should take leave of him , after i have committed him to the mercy of god , and his writings to the censure of the church . the former i hope he will partake of ; the latter perhaps he and they may escape , tho he stands in great need of it , especially since he so obstinately and pertinaciously persists in his errors , after so plain a discovery , and so clear a confutation of them . but i cannot fairly part with him , without enquiring into the reasons , which induced him to publish this paper , wherein he treats the governors of the university , in so rude and insolent a manner ; falling foul upon persons , whose character , profession , and station he ought to have considered ; and from whom he never received the least personal injury or provocation , that ever i could yet hear of . among other reasons , he hath suggested one in the last page of this book , which i shall only take notice of , viz. that it was impossible for him to do otherwise than he hath done , unless he wonld be content to be trampled upon by every scribler . now this is a reason , i think , that is wholly owing to his guilt , and some unreasonable fears which are consequent thereupon . sure he is conscious to himself that his credit runs low , and that he is much fallen in the esteem of many who formerly had a good opinion of him . he is sensible that his adversary hath foiled him , which some perhaps may call running him down ; and now he is afraid that the by-standers should trample upon him . what persons who are abroad may do , i cannot tell ; but as for the members whether scriblers or no scriblers of the university , notwithstanding this humiliation , i am apt to think that they never intended to insult over him , especially if he had not published this insolent paper . but this phrase of treading and trampling , brings to my mind the story that socrates tells of that famous rhetorician ecebolius ; a man much talked of in the days in which he lived , and who by his levity and inconstancy in the profession of religion , hath given occasion to be much talked of ever since . this man , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , accommodating himself , as the historian tells us , socr. hist. eccl. lib. . cap. . to the manners and inclinations of the emperors under whom he lived , in constantius's time was a zealous christian , but an arian , as baronius thinks , under julian's reign he turned apostate , and proved a violent pagan . but after his death , he was desirous to embrace once again the christian religion , and to be admitted into the society and communion of the faithful . but being sensible that his prevarications had rendered him unworthy of that favor , he made use of this notable stratagem , to move the compassion of christians : he laies himself prostrate before the doors of the church , and bespeaks those who were entering into it , in those emphatical words , conculcate me , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , salem insipidum infatuatum , good christian people , tread me under your feet , trample upon me , a lump , a heap of salt , which hath lost its savor . now that which i have to add farther upon occasion of this story , is only this , in relation to the members of the university ; for whom , i think , i durst undertake , that if any of them should happen to find , i will not say the dean , but any tho a much inferior person to mr. dean , in the same humble penitent posture , begging pardon for any the like publick offence and scandal , that he might either by word or deed have given the church : i dare be confident , i say , there is no member of the university would insult over the misfortunes of such a penitent . they would rather on the other side lend him a helping hand , and would lift him up : they would comfort him , and give him good words , and bid him hope for gods mercy , and the church's pardon upon the condition of a sincere repentance . but i am apt to think likewise , they would add counsel to their consolations , and would give him good advice into the bargain . they would advise him to be steady for the future in the practice of his duty ; and by no means to play fast and loose with the faith , or to be guilty of any the least prevarication in the affairs of religion . and in short , i presume they would dismiss him with those words of our savior , jo. . . go and sin no more lest a worse thing come unto thee . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e orthodoxi universo orbi christiano testatum faciunt , se patrem , filium , & s iritum sanctum in unum individuum conflare , ita ut pater non sit alius revera quam filius ; nec filius alius quam pater ; sed ejusdem substantiae uterque , idque hoc ipsum est quod haeresis sabelliana . arian . apud zanch. quum ad supplicium educeretur ( scil . val. gentilis ) non desiit homo pertinacissimus , & ex sola indomita pervicacia gloriam quaerens , ( sicut satanae martyres solent ) ingeminare , se pro gloria altissimi dei pati . nos omnes esse sabellianos , & deum habere trinomium , benedicti aretii . hist . valent. gent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . vid. athan. de synod . arim. & seleu. epist . p. . edit . colon. & alibi passim . p. . . a fourth letter concerning the sacred trinity in reply to what is entituled an answer to dr. wallis's three letters / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a fourth letter concerning the sacred trinity in reply to what is entituled an answer to dr. wallis's three letters / by john wallis ... wallis, john, - . [ ], p. printed for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . reply to stephen nye--nuc pre- imprints. imperfect: pages stained and with print show-through. reproduction of original in the huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng nye, stephen, ?- . -- answer to dr. wallis's three letters. trinity. theology, doctrinal. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a fourth letter , concerning the sacred trinity ; in reply to what is entituled , an answer , to d r wallis's three letters . by john wallis , d. d. london : printed for tho. parkhurst , at the bible and three crowns , in cheapside , . a fourth letter , concerning the sacred trinity . sir , in a former answer ( from i know not whom ) to my first and second letter ; we had two persons ( a friend and his neighbour ) in one man. of which i have given account in my third letter . we have now an answer to that also . but whether from the friend , or the neighbour , or from a third person , he doth not tell me . yet all the three persons , may ( for ought i know ) be the same man. however , whether it be , or be not , the same man , it is not amiss for him to act a third person ( as of an adversary ) , as being thereby not obliged to insist upon , and maintain what was before said ; but may fairly decline it if he please . the one may grant what the other denies , and deny what the other grants : and still , as the scene changes , the man may act another person . and so i find it is . as for instance : the former answerer , takes it unkindly , and would have it thought a calumny , that i charged it on some of the socinians , that how clear soever the expressions of scripture be for our purpose , they will not believe it , as being inconsistent with natural reason : and though they do not think fit to give us a bare-faced rejection of scripture , yet they do ( and must , they tell us ) put such a forced sense on the words , as to make them signify somewhat else . therefore , to shew that this is not a calumny , but a clear truth , i cited their own words , and quoted the places where they are to be found , wherein themselves say the same things , in as full expressions as any that i had charged them with ; that every one is to interpret the scripture according to his own sense ; and what so seems grateful to him , he is to imbrace and maintain , though the whole world be against it : that he is not to heed what men teach or think , or have at any time taught or thought , whoever they be , or have been , or how many soever : that though , even in the sacred monuments , it be found written , not once only , but many times ; he should not yet for all that believe it so to be : that what plainly appears cannot be ( or , as was before explained , what he thinks so , though all the world beside think otherwise , ) is not to be admitted ; even though in the sacred oracles it appear to be expresly affirmed : but those sacred words are to be interpreted , ( though it be by unusual ways or tropes , ) to some other sense than what they speak : that ( because it seems to him absurd ) he must ( with augustine's good leave , and of the rest who think as he doth ) put a force ( how great soever ) upon paul's words , rather than to admit such sense . that , if our reason dictate to us ought otherwise than the scripture doth ; it is an errour to say , that in such case we are rather to believe the scripture . now our new answerer ( though he would still have it to be a calumny ) shuffles it off with this , he is not concerned , that socinus , or any other author , has dropt imprudent words , and leaves it to the socinian to answer , pag. . ( for he is now to act the arian , pag. , , , , . ) this point therefore i look upon as yielded ; concerning the slight opinion which ( some of ) the socinians have of scripture , in competition with humane reason . again ; when i had spoken of our immortal soul , in its separate existence after death , as of an intellectual being ; ( but , with an if at lest those who deny the blessed trinity will allow that there are such beings : ) to shew the suspicion intimated , was not groundless ; i cited socinus's own words , where he expresly tells us , that the soul after death doth not subsist ; nor doth so live as to be then in a capacity of being rewarded or punished , ( that is , in effect , it is no more alive , than is the dead body , not sensible of pain or pleasure . ) which i think is ground enough for such a suspicion , without being uncharitable . nor doth this new answerer clear socinus , or himself , from this suspicion . onely tells us ( pag. . ) it is an insinuation , as if they believe not angels . which is nothing to the purpose of the soul 's separate existence , ( which is that i insisted on ) nor doth he so much as tell us , that he doth believe angels ( much less that he doth believe the souls separate existence , ) so that the ground of suspicion still remains . i had shewed him how different socinus's opinion is , from that of st. paul ; when he desired to be dissolved , or to depart hence , and to be with christ , as much better for him , than to abide in the flesh , phil. . , . and , to be absent from the body ( which must be after death , and before the resurrection ) and to be present with the lord , cor. . . and this new answerer , though he takes notice of the charge , doth not so much as tell us , that he is not of socinus's opinion herein . which ( if it be so ) he might reasonably have told us upon this occasion . i might have added that of christ , mat. . . fear not those who kill the body , but are not able to kill the soul : whereas , if the soul after death be as insensible as the body , that is as much killed as this. and that of christ to the converted thief on the cross , luk. . . this day shalt thou be with me in paradise . for surely by paradise he did not mean purgatory ; nor yet , that he should be with him in hell , amongst the devils and the damned ; nor that his soul should be in a condition as senseless as his body : for paradise doth not sound like any of these . i might have added also that of lazarus and the rich glutton , luk. . , , , . for though parables are not strongly argumentative , as to all the punctilio's of them ; yet , as to the main scope of them , they are : ( else , to what purpose are they used . ) now here we have that glutton represented as tormented in hell , and lazarus at rest in abraham's bosom ; and there comforted , while the other is tormented : and all this , while yet he had brethren upon earth , to whom he desires lazarus might be sent . all which is not agreeable to a condition not capable of reward or punishment . and upon the whole , we have reason to suspect , that socinians may have some other odd tenents , which they think fit rather to conceal , than to deny . so that i look upon this point as gained also ; that socinus ( uncontrouled by this answerer ) doth deny the subsistence of the soul after death , as then capable of reward or punishment . another point which i look upon as granted , is concerning that place , joh. . in the beginning was the word ; and the word was with god ; and the word was god ; and the word was made flesh , and dwelt amongst us . concerning this place , we were come to this issue with our former answerer , ( at his p. . ) if by word be meant a person , ( pre-existent to christs incarnation by the virgin mary ; ) and , by god , be meant the true god , or god almighty ; then this place is to our purpose ; for else ( he tells us ) st. john writes nonsense . now , that st. john writes non-sense , i suppose he will not say ( whatever he thinks ) because he pretends a great reverence for scriptures ( and doth not take it kindly that i should suspect the contrary . ) whether of the other two points he would stick to , he did not think fit to tell us ; for indeed his business was not to tell us what he would have , but what he would not have ; and concludes nothing thereupon , but that the place is obscure ( he knows not how to make it serve his turn ; ) and ( that it may so seem ) he indeavours to cast what dust he can into the spring , and then to say , the water is not clear . i have given him my reasons ( and i think they be cogent ) why i judge the place clear enough , as to both points . and should i admit ( as i think i may ) that , by word , is meant somewhat else ( as he tells us ) in forty other places : this is nothing to the purpose . for we are not here enquiring , what by the word logos is meant in aristotle , or what in plato , or what in forty other places ; but what is meant , by the word , in this place : nor what , by gods , is meant in psal. . , . i have said ye are gods , but ye shall die like men ; but what by god is here meant , where it is said , the word was with god , and the word was god. nor is here any need of a rhetorick lecture , to inquire , by what trope , or figure , or with what allusion , christ is here called the word ; it is enough that 't is christ who is here so called . and , after all his toil , i do not find , that himself hath the confidence to deny ( though he doth not think fit to grant it ) but that here , by the word , is meant christ ; and that god here mentioned , is god almighty ; and consequently , if st. john do not write non-sense ( as he is pleased to phrase it ) the place is to our purpose . now our new answerer , seems to me , to quit the first of these points ; and chooseth rather to act the arian , than the socinian , as taking that to be more defensible , pag. , , . and doth admit that , by the word here , is meant the person of christ ; and pre-existent to his incarnation ; as by whom the world was made , at least as by an instrument ; and doth allow him to be god , though not the same god ; but that the father and the word are two gods ; ( p. . ) and can allow him the character of being over all , god blessed for ever ; and can so be as liberal of the title of god , to christ , as any trinitarian whatever ; p. . so that now the dispute is reduced to this ; when it is said , the word ( meaning christ ) was with god , and the word was god ; whether by god , be meant the true god , god almighty . of which we are to say more anon . another grant we have , pag. . where he doth admit , that a thing may be unum and tres ( one and three ) in several respects : and that 't is true indeed , he cannot say , that there is a contradiction in holding , that there may be three persons in god. and , in granting this , he grants what i undertook to prove . for he knows very well , that the business which i undertook , was not , to discourse the whole controversy at large ; but so stated the question , as to confine it to this single point , whether it be an impossibility , or inconsistence with reason , that there may be three somewhats ( which we call persons ) which are but one god ? and when he grants me , that there is in it no contradiction , or inconsistence with reason ; all the rest is beside the question . i know very well , that both this and the former answerer have made it their business to change the state of the question : and if what i bring to prove what i undertake , do not prove the task they set me ; they glory as if they had the better . but the lawyers tell us , that , when issue is once joined ; if we prove the thing in issue , we carry the cause ; and what is more than so , is over and above , or to spare . and a mathematician , if he prove what he proposeth , concludes with quod erat demonstrandum , ( he hath proved what he undertook to prove ; ) if he prove more than so ; 't is more than he was obliged to do . and if a logician prove ( propositionem negatam ) the proposition which is incumbent on him to prove , he hath done his work ; and if he prove more than so , it is more than he need to do . and accordingly , when this answerer doth acknowledge that i have proved what i undertake to prove , ( that there is no impossibility , there is no contradiction , nor inconsistence with reason , that three somewhats may be one god ) he ought to acquiesce therein , and acknowledge that i have done my work. for when the controversy was divided into two branches , whether the thing be true , and whether it be possible ; and it was the latter of the two that i undertook : if i have shewed , it is not impossible , ( which this answerer doth grant that i have done , ) i have done the work that i undertook . and if this be once agreed , it goes a great way as to the other branch , that the thing is true. for i find the last result of our adversaries , ( when they are close pressed , ) is commonly this , it is impossible , it is absurd , it is non-sense , it is inconsistent with reason , and therefore it cannot be true. and that therefore a force , no matter how great , must be put upon the words which do , how expresly soever , affirm it ( to make them signify somewhat else than what they plainly do signify ) then to admit it . and if i have ( as is now confessed ) destroyed this last reserve , let them press this point no more . or , if they will retract this grant , let the next answerer keep to this point , to prove it impossible , or inconsistent with reason , and not ramble out into other discourses , which are nothing to the purpose of what i proposed to prove . amongst his other concessions , i shall reckon that in pag. . where he argues from joh. . . that there is between the father , son , and holy ghost , a distinction so great , as that they may not unfitly be called three persons ( where i observe also , that he owns the personality of the holy-ghost , as of the father , and of the son. 't is true indeed , he seems to make the distinction between them , greater than i do . but i thus far agree with him , that there is , in truth , a distinction ; and that more than imaginary , or what depends only upon our imagination ; and greater than that of what we call the divine attributes . and therefore we reckon the persons to be but three ; but the attributes to be more . and we do admit , amongst the persons , a certain order or oeconomy ; such as in the scripture we find assigned to them . but do not own the distinction so great as to make them three gods. and that also of p. , . where he argues , that christ is indeed god , ( not only a dignified man : ) that god in christ was tempted , suffered , and died ; not man only . that the merits thereof are founded on the godhead . in plain terms , ( saith he ) if christ were only a man , extraordinarily assisted by god , and thereupon merited by his sufferings and death : 't was the man redeemed us by his blood , and not god. and p. . the like from rom. . . of whom , as concerning the flesh , christ came ; who is over all ; god blessed for ever . and asks , if i ever knew an unitarian , especially an arian , deny him that character ? and from heb. . . to the son he saith , thy throne , o god , endureth for ever ; a scepter of righteousness is the scepter of thy kingdom , &c. he argues , that it is not the humanity of christ that is here spoken of . for what ! is the humanity of christ called god ? is the humanity preferred before angels ? or did the humanity frame the world ? indeed ( he says ) they are apt to clog it with a limitation , ( as not acknowledging him co-equal with the father . ) but under that restriction , they can be as liberal of the title of god to christ as any trinitarian whatever . where i take what he grants : and , as to the co-equality , shall discourse it afterwards . more of this kind i shall have occasion to mention afterward . yet do not blame him for taking this advantage ( of shifting the person ) where he sees cause to grant what was before denied . but our new answerer hath yet another art. when he seems to cite what i say ; he takes the liberty very often to vary therein ( according as he thinks fit ) both from my words , and from my sense . and therefore i desire the reader not to take all as mine , which seems to be cited as such ; but so much only as he finds to be truly cited . it would be too long to mention all the places where i am so used . i shall only give instance in some of them . he tells us , pag. . that i indeavour to illustrate the trinity by an example in a cube , or die : and so far he says true . but not so in what follows , where three sides , he says , make one cube ; and which cube , he says , is not to be made without all the three sides . but certainly he can no where find these to be my words . i confess i am no great gamester at that sport : but i always thought ( till now ) that a die had six sides , and not only three . i have said indeed , that in a cube , or die , there be three dimensions , ( length , breadth , and thickness ; ) but i never called these , the three sides of a cube ; nor have i any where said , that a cube hath but three sides . i am represented , pag. , , , . as maintaining three personal gods. but he knows very well this is not my language ; but , that the three persons are one god ; not three gods , nor a council of gods , as he calls it . so , where he would ask the doctor , p. . whether these two gods , to wit , the father and the word , be one . he knows my answer must be , that these two , ( not , these two gods , ) are one god. and that i do no where call them two gods , but one and the same god ; according to that of christ himself ; i and the father are one. so , where he talks of adding several persons to our one god , pag. , . for he knows , that is not my language , but these three are god ; not that they are added to god : much less that bacchus and venus &c. may be thrust into the number . and p. . one of your gods : we have but one god. 't is he and his arian , that own two gods , p. . not we . another there is which runs through most part of his whole discourse ; wherein he willfully mistakes the state of the question : and then , what is brought to prove one thing , he mis-applies as brought to prove another ; and then makes a great out-cry , that it doth not prove , what it was never brought to prove . and this he calls cross purposes . he knows very well , that the question was by me clearly stated ( not as to the whole doctrine of the trinity at large , but ) as to the possibility . that ( whatever the socinians pretend ) there is no impossibility , non-sense , or inconsistence with reason , that three somewhats ( which we call persons ) may be one god. and this he owns to be the state of the question , p. . to prove the same agreeable to the common notions of humane reason . and it is done by shewing that , according to the common notions of humane reason , nothing is more common than that what in one consideration are three , or many , is yet in another consideration but one. thus in one cube there be three dimensions ; length , breadth , and thickness . so the understanding , will , and memory , in one soul. so the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a power to know , to will , and to doe , in the same intelligent agent ; and the like . 't is therefore not inconsistent with reason ( and this answerer doth allow it ) for one to be three ; nor is it non-sense to say , these three are one ; or i and the father are one ; or that three somewhats may be one god. the former answerer complains of these resemblances , as impossible to be apprehended by the common people ; and desires some more familiar parallel ( than that of a cube , or die ) that the tankard-bearer may apprehend ( in his p. , . ) yet i believe his tankard-bearer is not so dull of apprehension , as he would have us think . for if he have ever seen a die ( as most of them have , ) or shall now be shewed one , he may be able to apprehend , ( without a metaphysick , or mathematick lecture ) that in a die , there is length , breadth , and thickness , ( and that it is as broad as it is long , and as thick as either ; ) and yet it is not three dies , but one die. however , to gratify his request , i have given him some other ; as that the same man , may have three dignities , or three kingdoms , and sustain three persons , or three relations , without thereby becoming three men ; with other like . with this , our new answerer is not pleased . he is ashamed , he doth blush for me , &c. ( how much am i obliged for this his great compassion ! ) but all this is but banter , ( it is not argument , ) and no sober man will be more of his opinion for this language : and much less for that of st. john's writing non-sense , of a lying revelation , of a three-headed monster , p. , . and other such indecent language of god and the scripture . but , why so displeased with these simile's ? these are too mean , too familiar ; he expected somewhat higher , somewhat more distinct , p. . ( i see it is as hard a matter to please my two answerers , as to serve two masters . the one complains my simile's are not familiar enough ; the other that they are too familiar ; he expected somewhat more sublime ▪ ) these do not prove , that a trinity in unity is necessary to the perfection of the godhead , p. . true : these alone do not prove that there is a trinity in unity in the godhead ; much less do they prove , that a trinity in unity is necessary to the perfection of the godhead . nor were they brought to prove it . they were brought to prove , there is no inconsistence , but that there may be a trinity in the unity of the godhead . and if they prove thus much , ( he perhaps may have cause to be ashamed , but ) i see no reason why i should be ashamed , ( or any one for me . ) now , that they prove thus much ; he hath already granted , that a thing may be one and three , in divers respects : and that 't is no contradiction , to hold , that there may be three persons in god. they have proved therefore , what they were brought to prove . but , says he , p. . our debate is not , whether there may be three persons in god. yes ; our debate is , whether there may be . not , whether there be. and he knows the question was so stated by me ; and so acknowledg'd by himself ; upon this single point , whether there be any impossibility in it . ( and so owned by himself , p. . ) not whether it be so ( for this , i had before said , was not to be argued upon the topick of reason alone ; ) but whether it be agreeable to the common notions of humane reason , that it may be so . and if this were the question , ( as he owns ; ) and this be proved ( as he owns also ; ) then i have proved , what i undertook to prove . and have no reason to be ashamed , either of the undertaking , or of the proof . 't is our new answerer ( who doth wittingly and willingly mis-state the question ) that is at cross purposes ; while he applies those arguments to one point , which he knows were brought to prove another , ( which point himself grants to be proved ; he cannot say , there is a contradiction in it , pag. . ) and then complains , that they ( alone ) do not prove what they were never brought to prove . of like nature is that other point ; where he tells us , that we do now venture , to prove it to be agreeable to the common notions of humane reason ; that is , not inconsistent with it . and we do so . but he would have it thought , that it is but now of late that any have presumed to this confidence , pag. , . and would have us content , modestly to acknowledge it a meer mystery ; and to rely upon the authority of the church , and tradition ; without pretending , that it is agreeable to reason . now , that there is in it a mystery , we readily grant , ( and so there is in the whole doctrine of our redemption ; god manifested in the flesh , &c. tim. . . ) as that which , without revelation , we could not have found out by meer reason ; and , that it is above reason , ( that is , more than what reason alone could have taught us : ) but not that it is against reason , or inconsistent with it . this is not the doctrine of the trinitarians ; nor ever was that i know of . nor is it tradition only , or the church's authority ; but the authority of scripture that we rely upon ▪ which is a true , not a lying revelation . nor is it ( as he pretends ) a new doctrine ▪ not raised till several hundred years after christ , ( as if the doctrine were to be dated from the time of penning the athanasian creed ; ) but ( as old at least as the new testament ; ) and never contested ( that i know of ) till several hundred years after christ , when the arians arose . but here again my answerers are not agreed : ( so hard it is to please them both ; ) while one complains , 't is but of late ; the other tells me , 't is old-fashioned , ( in his p. ▪ thus dr. wallis may see , that his notions concerning the trinity are old-fashioned ; not of a new mode . ) and truly i take him to be more in the right ; that 't is not a new quirk , but old-fashioned doctrine ▪ and i like it never the worse for being so . as to what i have said of joh. . . it is more than forty years , ( and well towards fifty , ) since i first preached it in london , on that text , ( as i have since done , there and elsewhere , more than once ; ) and i did not then take it to be new , but what i had been always taught . and as to that of the three dimensions in a cube , it is forty years or more , since i first discoursed it at oxford , with dr. ward , then astronomy-professor there , and since bishop of salisbury ; and as to the doctrine in general , ( of three persons in one god , ) it is no newer , than the new testament . but here again our answerer forsakes the question : for the question is not , whether it be a new , or old , adventure : but whether it be inconsistent with reason , that three may be one : or ( as he words it , p. . ) that a trinity in unity is absurd . another piece of the same art it is , where my word of personality is by him changed for personation , p. , . for which i would not have quarrelled with him , if by changing the word , he had not meant to change the sense also . for to personate a man , ( he tells us , p. . ) is but to compose ones actions in likeness of him ; and that one cannot personate three together , but one after another . but my personality ( he knows ) is more than this personation . it is not only acting a person , but being a person . a man may successively personate , or act the person of , a king , and a father ; without being either this or that : but when the same man is both a king and a father ( which he may be at the same time , as well as successively , ) this is more than only to act them . and if by personation he mean no more than acting a person , i wonder how he can tell us , p. . that personation is the greatest perfection of being ; and that he never could apprehend any other real unity but personation . what ? no real unity but acting a person by imitation ? sure there is . the bottom , and top , and middle of a mountain , are one mountain : yet i do not take mount atlas to be a person , or to act a person ; much less to become one mountain by personation , or acting a person ▪ of like nature is it , where ( to do me a kindness ) he will state my cube more to my purpose ; p. . ( meaning the contrary . ) but how ? in a marble cube may be two accidents , hardness , and coldness . there may be so . but what then ? then , ( he says , ) here are three cubes more for me . he would have it thought , i suppose , that i had before discoursed of three cubes ( whereas i spoke but of one cube , under three dimensions ; ) and he will now help me to another three . but he is out again . for the cold cube , the hard cube , and the marble cube , are but one cube , not three cubes . 't is the same cube that is cold , and hard , and marble . it would have been much the same , if , instead of a cube , he had taken a marble bowl , or ball ; and then told me , 't is cold , and hard , and round . true. and yet it is but one bowl , not three bowls : one ball , not three balls . and what is there in all this of inconsistent absurdity ? it seems to me very consistent ; not absurd : and it suits my notion very well . but , says he , p. . not to suppose the simile altogether impertinent , ( very well ! ) yet it is in our case . why in our case ? for our debate ( he says ) is not , whether there may not be three persons in god. yes : that is our debate : and the true state of the question . all his other excursions are beside the question . but the simile , though not impertinent , is yet ( he says ) most absurd , because not adequate ; and it is a general rule with him ( p. . ) where he brings a simile , to have it adequate , that it may really prove the matter designed . now that my simile's are not adequate ( so as to prove all that is to be said of god , or the blessed trinity ) i had told him at first , and more than once ; and that they were not intended so to be ; ( and i tell him now , that i did purposely make choice of such as were a great way off , that it might not seem as if i would have them thought to be adequate , as to all that is to be said of the trinity . ) and as to the rule he goes by ; perhaps it may be his method , where much is to be proved , to prove it all at once , ( and take all arguments to be absurd , which do not at once prove all. ) but we who are conversant in cubes and demonstrations ( as he phraseth it ) think fit sometimes to use another method : and , where much is to be proved , to proceed by steps . we first propose one thing , and prove that : then another , and prove that : and so on . and if what be brought to prove the first step , do prove what it is brought to prove ; we do not say , the argument is absurd , because it doth not prove all at once : but , that it is a good argument so far . and , i think , ( if he will here give me leave to use a simile which is not adequate , ) it is a method used by other men , as well as mathematicians . for , if a man be to mount a pair of stairs ; we do not say , the first step is absurd , because that alone doth not bring him to the top : or , if to go a journey , that the first step is absurd , because it doth not bring him to his journeys end : but the first step brings him so far ; and the second , somewhat farther ; and so on , till ( step by step ) he comes to the top , or to his journeys end. now , there being divers points concerned in the doctrine of the trinity ; i stated my question , not so as to prove all at once ; but singled out this one point , that it is not inconsistent with reason ( or , to use his own words ; it is agreeable to the common notions of humane reasoning , ) that what in one consideration are three , may in another consideration be one ; and , that there may be three somewhat 's , which are one god. but , whether indeed there be so , is another step ; and whether these somewhat 's may fitly be called persons , is yet another . now , if i have made good my first step ; my argument or simile , is not only not altogether impertinent , but neither is it most absurd , yea not absurd at all ; because it proves what it was brought to prove . and , that so it doth , himself allows ; and tells us plainly , p. . he cannot say , there is a contradiction , in holding , that there may be three persons in god. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but i find , he would fain be upon another point , p. . and draw me to it . a point not to be argued upon the topick of reason only , ( for , reason alone , can go no further than to prove it possible , or not inconsistent ; ) but to be argued from scripture , and divine revelations , whether indeed there are three somewhats ( which we call persons ) that are but one god. but this , i have told him already , is beside the question which i undertook . and , in this , it is he that is the aggressor , not i : and i only upon the defence . yet , because he is so desirous of it , i am content to go somewhat out of my way , to wait on him ; and to hear what he hath to say , why we should think that is not , which he confesseth may be without any contradiction to natural reason . and i shall take notice as i go along , what it is wherein we agree , as well as wherein we differ : that so we may not quarrel about what is agreed between us . he begins with the first commandment , p. , , , . and seems mightily to dread the guilt of idolatry , in admitting more gods than one : ( our case is , we are afraid of idolatry , p. . ) contrary to this commandment , of having no other god. ( and so i would have him be . but we shall find this fear will be over with him by and by . ) what ( says he ) was that commandment made for ? what! to prevent polytheism . why , how is that to be done ? by denying many gods. if it be not made to deny personal gods , 't is made to no purpose . and soon after ( with some indignation . ) what! is the divinity of christ implied in the new testament ? 't is denied in the first commandment . and , p. . pray , what scripture shall we regard , in competition with this commandment , written by the finger of god , and one of the only precepts he himself immediately delivered ? now i am so far from disliking his zeal for the first commandment ; that i do perfectly agree with what i find in that commandment ; i am the lord thy god ( the lord god of israel ) thou shalt have no other god but me. ( and this i shall desire him to remember by and by . ) he may add that of deut. , . ( for in this i agree also ) hear , o israel , the lord our god ( the lord god of israel ) is one lord. and that of mat. . . thou shalt worship the lord thy god ( the lord god of israel , ) and him only shalt thou serve . and that of cor. . . to us there is but one god. ( and as many more places , as he pleases , to that purpose . ) and from all these i do agree , that we are to have but one god and no more ; ( not two gods. ) no other god than the lord god of israel : that we are to worship him alone , and none else ; ( not sathan , not the god of ekron , not any god , or man , or angel , who is not the lord god of israel . ) for all this i grant to be there fully taught . and i am willing to put as great weight upon this solemn set precept of the first commandment , as he doth , ( and perhaps more . ) he would have us shew ( if we can ) p. . where this commandment is abrogated . i say , no where . it was never abrogated : never repealed : it remains ( i grant ) still in its full force . and therefore we own no other god , but the lord god of israel . and this lord god of israel , we say is one lord , one god , and no more gods than one. we say indeed , there is a wise god , a powerful god , an almighty god , an eternal god , a just god , a merciful god , god the creator , god the redeemer , god the sanctifier ; a god who in the beginning created the heaven and the earth , a god who in the beginning laid the foundation of the earth , and the heavens are the work of his hands , a god of abraham , a god of isaac , a god of jacob , a god who brought the children of israel out of egypt , a god who brought them out of the north country , a god who is our mighty redeemer , a god who is a saviour of all that trust in him , a god who doth create in us a clean heart , and doth renew a right spirit within us , a god who gives us a heart of flesh , a god who gives us a new heart , who putteth his fear in our hearts , who writes his law in our inward parts , a god who searcheth the heart and trieth the reins , a god who hath visited and redeemed his people , and hath raised up a mighty salvation for us . but we say , the lord god of israel is all this ; and , in being all this , he is but one god ; and , that there is no other god but one. and we grant , that whoever owns any other god as a true god , or worships a false god , breaks this commandment . i do not know what he would have us grant more upon this commandment . i wish he do not think we have granted too much . he says , p. . we vitiate this commandment , by bringing in new persons , by adding several persons to our one god. no : we add no persons to our god ; we say , that god the creator , god the redeemer , god the sanctifier , ( or , in other words , the father , son , and holy-ghost , ) are this one god ; not added to him . nor are they new persons added to god ; but , are god ; and ever were so . he would have us think , p. . that the father only , ( and not the son , or holy-ghost ) is the only true god ; because of joh. . . the words are these , this is life eternal , to know thee ( not only thee ) the only true god ( to be that god , beside which there is no other true god , ) and jesus christ whom thou hast sent . and we say the same that is here said . the father is the only true god ( the lord god of israel , beside whom there is no other true god ; ) the son is also , not another god , ( as the arians say , and this answerer , p. . ) but the same only true god ( the lord god of israel ; and he is expresly so called , luk. . , . ) and the holy-ghost likewise , ( for these three are one , ▪ joh. . . ) and the words ( without any force put upon them ) may be thus read , to know thee ( and whom thou hast sent , jesus christ ) to be the only true god. for the word only is not a restrictive to thee , but to the true god. and this is not only a new querk or criticism ( which is the only answer he gives to this defence , ) but is the true sense of the place . for the same writer doth ▪ in another place , say the very same thing of god the son , joh. . . we are in him that is true , even in his son jesus christ ; this is the true god , and eternal life . now if scripture must interpret scripture , ( as he tells us , p. . ) certainly s. john in his epistle ( ▪ joh. . . ) understood what himself said in his gospel ( joh. . . ) and that , what he said of the father's being the only true god , was not exclusive of the son ; to whom himself gives the same title , this is the true god , and this is eternal life . and this i think is a full answer to what he would urge from this place ; or from ( what he joins with it ) cor. . , , . to us there is but one god. which is no more express to his purpose , than this is : nor doth he pretend that it is ; but puts them both together , p. . there is one place more , which comes under consideration , which ( because he finds it pinch ) he would fain shake off , p. . it is that of joh. . , , , . in the beginning was the word ; and the word was with god , and the word was god ; the world was made by him ; all things were made by him ; and without him was not any thing made which was made ; and the word was made flesh , and dwelt amongst us . the former answerer would fain shuffle off this place ( in his p. . ) upon one of these three points ; ( for , otherwise , he grants , it is for our purpose ; ) either that by the word is not meant christ ; or , by god , not the true god ; or else that s. john writes non-sense . now the last of the three , i suppose our new answerer will not say ; because he pretends a great reverence for scriptures . the first he quits ; and doth admit ( according to the arian sense , which he looks upon as more defensible than that of the socinians ) that , by the word , is here meant the person of christ ( who was afterward incarnate of the virgin mary ; ) and that he was pre-existent to his incarnation ; as by whom the world was made , at lest as by an instrument . and that he was with god ( the true god ) at least in the beginning of the world ( if not sooner ; ) and that he was god. all the doubt is , whether these two gods ( for so he calls them ) to wit the father and the word , be one , p. . now , if he be god ; he must be either a true god , or a false god. that he is a false god , methinks they should not say . and , if he be a true god , he must be the same god with the father ; who is the only true god , joh. . . that he is to be worshipped with religious worship ; both the arians and the socinians do allow . and if he be god ( as the arians and this answerer do affirm , ) this worship , must be divine worship . and he must be then the lord god of israel ; or else they break that precept , thou shalt worship the lord thy god ( the lord god of israel and him only shalt thou serve , mat. . . if he be the lord god of israel , but not the same lord god of israel : how doth this agree with that , deut. . . hear , o israel ) the lord our god is one lord ? and if he be another god ( whether true or false ) then do they break the great and first commandment , thou shalt have no other god but me ; ( no other god , true or false , great or little , equal or unequal ; but the lord god of israel . ) on which commandment this answerer doth ( deservedly ) lay so great a stress ; as we heard before . what was it made for , if not to prevent polytheism ? how shall it be done , but by denying many gods ? if not to deny personal gods ; it is made to no purpose . how is it consistent with that first commandment , ( that solemn and set precept of the first commandment , that was delivered by god himself ; written by the finger of god ; and never abrogated ; ) to bring in new persons ; to add persons ( one or more ) to this only god , though particularly prohibited , and not break it ? what! is the divinity of christ implied in the new testament ? it is denied in the first commandment ( if he be not the same god who is there meant : ) and pray , what scripture shall we regard in competition with this commandment ? with more to the same purpose . whether he will make use of the popish distinction of latria and doulia , ( for his two gods , not co-equal ) i cannot tell . but the commandment says expresly , thou shalt have no other god , but me , equal or unequal . nor doth this error end here ( as he proceeds : ) for our adversaries are not always so lucky as to see consequences . for should some revelation ( such as , he says , is not impossible ) deify more men than ever the heathen did ; here 's no fence left . ( here 's room enough to thrust in his jupiter , bacchus , venus , &c. of which he tells us , p. . ) and 't is in vain ( he tells us ) in such a case , to pretend that the number would be of offence to us : for if we consider aright , there is no more reason for one number than another . and he thinks , that if there be more than one , it is more honourable they should be infinites ; because all between one and infinite , is imperfect . with much more of like nature . of all which i know not what better to think , than that he had forgot all this , when afterwards ( at p. . ) he will have these two gods ( as he calls them ) to wit , the father and the word , not to be one , but two and separate . nor will it excuse the matter to say , that this other god , is not co-equal with the father . for , at this rate , the polytheism , or many gods of the heathen , would be excused , as out of the reach of this commandment . for they did not make all their gods co-equal to their great jupiter ( nor perhaps any of them equal to our god. ) but jupiter was their god paramount , and the rest were either middling gods , or lesser gods. but yet this did not excuse them from polytheism and idolatry , within the reach of the first commandment . for that commandment ( that unrepealed law ) forbids all other gods , whether equal or unequal : the leeks and onions in egypt ( which are said to have been there worshipped ) as well as the calves at dan and bethel . nor is it less idolatry , nor less within the reach of this commandment , to worship the god of ekron , because not co-equal to the god of israel . we therefore chuse to say , that christ is indeed god ( as he is expresly called , joh. . . the word was with god , and the word was god ; and hebr. . . thy throne , o god , endureth for ever : and in many other places : ) and not only a man , extraordinarily assisted by god , ( as this answerer grants also , at p. . ) that he was in the beginning , and in the beginning was with god ; joh. . , . ( and therefore was pre-existent before his incarnation ; and did not then begin to be. ) that he was in the beginning , and all things were made by him , and without him was not any thing made that was made ; that the world was made by him ; joh. . . . ( and is therefore the same god , who in the beginning created the heaven and the earth , gen. . . ) that of him it is said , thou , lord , in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth , and the heavens are the works of thy hands , heb. . , . cited out of psal. . . ( and is therefore the same god , to whom that long prayer , psal. . was made ; and of whom so many great things are there said ▪ and which cannot belong to any but the supreme god : ) and no doubt but , when this was there said by the psalmist , he meant it of that god , who in the beginning created the heaven and the earth , gen. . . that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the being above all things ( or the supreme being , ) god blessed for ever ( or , the ever-blessed god ) rom. . . ( which are titles too high for any lower than the supreme god. ) that what is said of god indefinitely ( as contra-distinguished from christ in particular ) rev. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , from him which is , and which was , and which is to come ( or which shall be ) and from jesus christ , &c. ; is particularly applied to jesus christ as his character , ver. . i am alpha and omega , the beginning and the ending , saith the lord , ( he that liveth , and was dead , and liveth for evermore , ver. . ) which is , and was , and is to come ; the almighty . that he is the true god , joh. . . ( and therefore the same god with the father ; who is the only true god , joh. . . and no other true god but what he is . ) that he and the father are one , joh. . . that the father , and the word , and the spirit , these three are one , joh. . . and christ , not another god , but the same god , manifested in the flesh , justified in the spirit , seen of angels , preached unto the gentiles , believed on in the world , received up into glory , . tim. . . now i know not well , what could be said more ( at least , what more need be said ) to make the point clear : or , what character he can reasonably desire more , by which to describe the almighty supreme god ; and the same god with the father . he is god ; the true god ; the only true god , ( for there can be but one god , that is the only true god ; ) one with the father ; one with the father and holy-ghost ; the eternal god , ( who is , and was , and shall be ; who , when the heavens and the earth shall wax-●old as a garment , he is the same and his years shall not fail ; ) the almighty ; the mighty god ; the eternal father ; the god who in the beginning made the world ; who made all things ; and without whom not any thing was made that was made ; who in the beginning laid the foundation of the earth , and the heavens are the works of his hands ; who is the son of god , the begotten of the father ; the only-begotten of the father , ( and therefore of the same nature with the father , however not the same person , or not under that consideration . ) nor can he say , this is impossible , a contradiction , or inconsistent with reason , and that therefore , though the words be clear and plain , yet we must seek out some other sence to be forced upon them : for this point is already gained ; and he doth confess it , p. . that there is no contradiction , in holding that there may be three persons in god. and , if there be no contradiction in it , why should we be afraid to say , what in scripture is said so plainly ? or , why should we set up two gods where one will serve , and when the scripture says , there is but one ? he 'll say perhaps , god made the world by christ. and we say so too . but not as by a tool or instrument , ( as he would have it , p. . ) but rather as by his power or wisdom . but the power and wisdom of god , are not things diverse from god himself ; but are himself . ( much less are they different gods from god himself . ) and , even amongst us , the power and wisdom of a man , are not things distinct from the man ; ( in that sense wherein the words thing and mode are contra-distinguished ; ) much less are they distinct men from the man whose power and wisdom they are . the man and his wisdom ; the man and his power ; are not distinguished ut res & res , ( as the schools speak ) but ut res & modus . and power and wisdom ( in the same man ) ut modus & modus . for though a man may subsist without wisdom ( but god cannot ; ) yet wisdom cannot subsist without somewhat that is wise ; nor this man's wisdom without the man ; and therefore this wisdom ( according to the school-distinction ) must be modus ▪ and not res. ( and the like of power . ) so that if we say , that christ is the power of god ; or the wisdom of god ( as he is called cor. . . ) and that god , by his power and wisdom , made the world ; it doth not follow , that this power , or wisdom of god , is another god from god himself : but god and his wisdom , or god and his power , are god himself . consonant to this it is , where it is said , col. . . in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge . and perhaps it is this divine wisdom , who tells us , prov. . , ▪ . the lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways ; i was from everlasting , from the beginning ; when he prepared the heavens , i was there ; and much more to the same purpose . so the holy ghost is called the power of god , luk. . . the holy-ghost shall come upon thee , and the power of the highest shall over-shadow thee . now shall we say , ▪ because god is wise in heart , and mighty in strength , job . . or because by his wisdom and power he made the world ; therefore his wisdom and his power are distinct gods from himself ? or if we should say , that god as the fountain of being , may be called the father ; and the same god , as the fountain of wisdom , be called the son ; and , as the fountain of power , be called the holy-ghost : there is nothing of this that is inconsistent with reason , but very agreeable with the common notions of humane reasoning ; and yet all these ( however under divers considerations ) are but one god. but here i must caution again ( for i find people are willing to mistake , or mis-apply what i say . ) that i do not set down this as the adequate distinction between the three persons ( for this i do not pretend throughly to understand ; ) but only that it is not inconsistent with reason , that it may be so : and that there is no necessity , upon this account , to set up another god ▪ or we may say ( much to the same purpose ) that god by his word , and spirit , made the world ; and yet that his word , and his spirit , are not therefore distinct gods from himself . and we have them all mentioned in the story of the creation . god created the heaven and the earth , gen. . . the spirit of god moved upon the face of the waters , ver . . and god said , ( or spake the word ) let there be light , &c. ver. , , , , , , . and ver. . let us make man. and psal. . , . by the word of the lord were the heavens made ; and all the host of them by the spirit , or breath of his mouth : he spake and it was done , he commanded and it stood fast . ( and to the like purpose , psal. . . job . . ) yet are they not three gods ; but rather three somewhats which are but one god. i have insisted the longer on this ; because i do not know , but that ( through the grace of god ) such a discourse as this , may have a like effect on him ( or some of his party ) as that of wittichius had on his friend sandius . and i have argued it calmly . i have used no scurrillous language ; nor given any reproachful terms . i do not oppress him with the authority of fathers , or councils ; but with scripture only ▪ and plain reason . and it seems to me so clear , that if they cannot see it ; it is from some other reason than from want of clearness . as to what i have said for explication of the athanasian creed ( though i cannot expect he should approve of that creed , while he retains his opinion , ) i do not find that he takes any great exceptions to what i say of it . he doth not like the words trinity in unity , as foreign and unscriptural , p. . he may ▪ ( if that will please him better ) put it into plainer english , and call it three in one : and then the words are scriptural ▪ these three are one. the possibility of gods being incarnate , he doth not deny . only he likes the arian incarnation better than ours . he seems well pleased , p. , . that i do not possitively affirm , this creed to be written by athanasius : that i do not anathematize the greek church : that i do not damn all children , fools , madmen , and all before christ ; ( as , he tells us , some rigid irinitarians , i know not who , have done too often : ) that i own the word person to be but metaphorical , ( which at p. . he did not like : ) which , i will not disoblige him , by unsaying . where it is that i have blamed the fathers , i do not remember . for i think the fathers do concur in this ; that there is a distinction between the three ( which we call ) persons ; greater than that between the divine attributes ; but not such as to make them three gods : and , that by calling them persons , they mean no more . and i say the same . i shall conclude with this observation upon the whole . he was at the beginning of his discourse , a direct socinian ; dreading the guilt of idolatry in having more gods than one ; as contrary to the first commandment : ( and therein i agree with him : ) but denied the divinity of christ ; as the socinians do . and thus he continues till toward the end of p. . but then begins ( silently ) to tack about ; and , after a while ▪ doth with as much earnestness affirm the divinity of christ , as he had before denied it ; that christ was god from the beginning , before the world was ; that he was afterward incarnate and became man ; and , as god and man , redeemed us , &c. ) and here he is orthodox again . but then tells us , that this god is not the same god , or co-equal with the father , but another god. and at length tells us plainly , that there are , at least , two gods , to wit the father and the word : ( for now the fear of having more gods than one , is over with him : ) and is by this time a perfect arian . and he who , from a socinian , is thus turn'd arian , may at the next turn ( for ought i know ) turn orthodox . in order to which , i would advise him to keep to the sound part of his first opinion , while he was a socinian , namely , that we ought to acknowledge and worship but one god : and the sound part of his second opinion when he was turned arian ; namely , that christ ( the word ) was god , from the beginning , ( before the world was ; ) that he was afterward incarnate , and so became god and man ; that , as such , he suffered , died ▪ and wrought out our redemption ▪ ; that the merits of his sufferings are founded on his godhead ; which otherwise would not have been meritorious , if he were only a man ▪ however extraordinarily assisted by god. and when he hath so joined these two together , as to make them consistent : he will be therein orthodox . and if , to these two , he add a third ( which he owns also ) namely , that there is no contradiction , in holding , there may be three persons in god : he will then be able to answer all the cavils which either the arian or the socinian shall bring against it . finis . a discourse in vindication of the doctrine of the trinity with an answer to the late socinian objections against it from scripture, antiquity and reason, and a preface concerning the different explications of the trinity, and the tendency of the present socinian controversie / by the right reverend father in god edward, lord bishop of worcester. stillingfleet, edward, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a discourse in vindication of the doctrine of the trinity with an answer to the late socinian objections against it from scripture, antiquity and reason, and a preface concerning the different explications of the trinity, and the tendency of the present socinian controversie / by the right reverend father in god edward, lord bishop of worcester. stillingfleet, edward, - . [ ], lxii, [ ], p. printed by j.h. for henry mortlock ..., london : . reproduction of original in cambridge university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity -- early works to . socinianism -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - olivia bottum text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a discourse in vindication of the doctrine of the trinity : with an answer to the late socinian objections against it from scripture , antiquity and reason . and a preface concerning the different explications of the trinity , and the tendency of the present socinian controversie . by the right reverend father in god , edward , lord bishop of worcester . london , printed by i. h. for henry mortlock at the phoenix in s. paul's church-yard , . the preface . when i was desir'd , not long since , to reprint the discourse lately published , concerning the doctrine of christ's satisfaction , i thought it necessary to look into the socinian pamphlets , ( which have swarmed so much among us within a few years ) to see how far an answer had been given in them to any of the arguments contained in it ; but i found the writers of them thought it not for their purpose to take any notice at all of it ; but rather endeavour'd to turn the controversie quite another way , and to cover their true sense under more plausible expressions . of which i have given a full account in the preface to the late edition of it . but among those treatises which ●or the general good of the nation are gather●d into volumes and dispers'd abroad to make either proselytes or infidels ) i found one , wherein there is p●etended to be an answer to my sermon about the mysteries of the christian faith , ( reprinted with the former discourse ▪ ) and therein i meet with a passage , which hath given occasion to this vindication . for there are these words , that i had utterly mistaken , in thinking that they deny the articl●s of the new creed , or athanasian religion , because they are mysteries , or because , say they , we do not comprehend them ; we deny them , because we do comprehend them , we have a clear and distinct perception , that they are not mysteries , but contradictions , impossibilities and pure nonsense . which words contain in them so spitefull , so unjust , and so unreasonable a charge upon the christian church in general , and our own in particular ▪ that i could not but think my self concerned , especially since they are addressed to me , to do what in me lay ( as soon as my uncertain state of health would permit ) towards the clearing the fundamental mystery of the athanasian religion , as they call it , viz. the doctrine of the trinity , ( which is chiefly struck at by them ) without running into any new explications , or laying aside any old terms , for which i could not see any just occasion . for however thoughtfull men may think to escape some particular difficulties better , by going out of the common roads ; yet they may meet with others , which they did not foresee , which may make them as well as others judge it , at last , a wiser and safer course to keep in the same way , which the christian church hath used , ever since it hath agreed to express her sense in such terms , which were thought most proper for that purpose . for in such cases , the original and critical signification of words is not so much to be attended , as the use they are applied to , and since no other can be found more significant or proper for that end ; it looks like yielding too great advantage to our adversaries , to give up the boundaries of our faith. for although there be a difference between the necessary article of faith it self , and the manner of expressing it , so that those may truely believe the substance of it , who differ in the explication ; yet since the sense of the article hath been generally received under those terms , there seems to be no sufficient reason to substitute new ones instead of the old , which can hardly be done , without reflecting on the honour of the christian church , and giving occasion for very unreasonable heats and disputes , among those , who , if we may believe their own words , agree in the same fundamental doctrine ; viz. a trinity in unity , or three persons in the same undivided divine essence . i am so little a friend to any such heats and differences among our selves especially when we are so violently attacked by our common adversaries , that were there no other reason , i should for the sake of that alone forbear making use of new explications ; but there is another too obvious , which is , the mighty advantage they have taken from hence to represent our doctrine as uncertain , as well as unintelligi●le . for as soon as our unitarians began to appear with that briskness and boldness they have done now for several years , some of our divines thought themselves obliged to write in defence of the doctrine of the trinity . thence came several answers to them , and in several methods , as the persons thought most subservient to the same end ; but whatever their intentions were , our adversaries were too much pleased to conceal the satisfaction which they took in it . for soon after , we had the several explications set forth and compared with each other ; and all managed so , as to make the cause to suffer by the disagreement of the advocates for it . and from hence they have formed a fivefold trinity . . the ciceronian trinity , because tully had used the word personae for different respects ; sustineo ego tres personas ; and according to this acceptation , three persons in the godhead are no more than three relations , capacities or respects of god to his creatures , which say they , is downright sabellianism : and is no manner of mystery , but the most intelligible and obvious thing in the world. . the cartesian trinity , which maketh three divine persons , and three infinite minds , spirits and beings to be but one god. . the platonick trinity , of three divine co-eternal persons , whereof the second and third are subordinate or inferiour to the first in dignity , power , and all other qualities , except only duration . . the aristotelian trinity , which saith the divine persons are one god , because they have one and the same numerical substance . . the trinity of the mobile , or that which is held by the common people , or by such lazy divines , who only say in short , that it is an unconceivable mystery ; and that those are as much in fault who go about to explain it , as those who oppose it . but that which hath made the most noise , and caused the greatest heat and ferment among us , hath been a difference first begun between two learned divines of our church , about the second and fourth ; and the account which our unitarians give of both is this , that the one is a rational and intelligible explication , but not true nor orthodox ; the other is true and orthodox , but neither rational , intelligible nor possible . i do not mention this , as though their words were to be taken as to either ; but only to shew what advantage they take from both , to represent that which is set up for the churches doctrine , either not to be truly so , or to be neither rational nor intelligible . the design of the following discourse , is to make it appear , ( . ) that the churches doctrine , as to the trinity , as it is expressed in the athanasian creed , is not liable to their charges of contradiction , impossibilities and pure nonsense . ( . ) that we own no other doctrine than what hath been received by the christian church in the several ages from the apostles times : ( . ) and that there are no objections in point of reason , which ought to hinder our assent to this great point of the christian faith. but the chief design of this preface , is to remove this prejudice which lies in our way from the different manners of explication , and the warm disputes which have been occasion'd by them . it cannot be denied , that our adversaries have taken all possible advantage against us from these unhappy differences ; and in one of their latest discourses they glory in it , and think they have therein out-done the foreign unitarians : for , say they , we have shewed , that their faiths concerning this pretended mystery are so many and so contrary , that they are less one party among themselves , than the far more learned and greater number of them are one party with us : this is spoken of those they call nominal trinitarians ; and for the other whom they call real , they prove them guilty of manifest heresie ; the one they call sabellians , which they say is the same with unitarians , and the other polytheists or disguised pagans , and they borrow arguments from one side to prove the charge upon the other ; and they confidently affirm that all that speak out in this matter , must be driven either to sabellianism , or tritheism . if they are nominal trinitarians , they fall into the former , if real , into the latter . this is the whole design of this late discourse , which i shall here examine , that i may remove this stumbling block , before i enter upon the main business . . as to those who are called nominal trinitarians . who are they ? and from whence comes such a denomination ? they tell us , that they are such who believe three persons , who are persons in name only ; indeed and in truth they are but one subsisting person . but where are these to be found ▪ among all such , say they , as agree that there is but one only and self-same divine essence and substance . but do these assert , that there is but one subsisting person , and three only in name ? let any one be produced who hath written in defence of the trinity ; for those who have been most charged , have utterly deny'd it that learned person , who is more particularly reflected upon in this charge , is by them said to affirm , that god is one divine intellectual substance , or really subsisting person , and distinguished and diversified by three relative modes , or relative subsistences . and mr. hooker is produc'd to the same purpose , that there is but one substance in god , and three distinct rela●ive properties , which substance being taken with its peculiar property , makes the distinction of persons in the godhead . but say they , these modes and properties do not make any real subsisting persons ; but only in a grammatical and critical sense , and at most , this is no more than one man may be said to be three persons on the account of different relations , as solomon was son of david , father of rehoboam , and proceeding from david and bathsheba , and yet was but one subsisting p●rson . this is the force of what they say . but then in a triumphing manner they add , that the realists have so manifest an advantage against them , that they have no way to de●end themselves but by recrimination , i. e. by shewing the like absurdity in their doctrine . and thus they hope either side will baffle the other , and in the mean time , the cause be lost between them . but in so nice a matter as this , we must not rely too much on an adversaries representation ; for the leaving out some expressions , may make an opinion look with another appearance , than if all were taken together , it would have . we must therefore take notice of other passages which may help to give the true sense of the learned author , who is chiefly aimed at . . in the very same page he asserts , that each of the divine persons has an absolute nature distinctly belonging to him , though not a distinct absolute nature ; and to the same purpose in another place . . that the eternal father is and subsists as a father , by having a son , and communicating his essence to another . and elsewhere , that the relation between father and son is founded on that eternal act , by which the father communicates his divine nature to the son. . that the foundation of the doctrine of the trinity is this , . that there can be but one god. . that there is nothing in god but what is god. . that there can be no composition in the deity with any such positive real being , distinct from the deity it self . but the church finding in scripture mention of three , to whom distinctly the godhead does belong , expressed these three by the name of persons , and stated their personalities upon three distinct modes of subsistence , allotted to one and the same godhead , and these also distinguished from one another by three distinct relations . what do these men mean , to charge one who goes upon these grounds with sabellianism ? doth he make the three persons to be mere names , as s. basil in few words expresses the true nature of sabellianism , that it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one thing with different denominations ? can the communicating the divine essence by the father to the son , be called a name , or a mode , or a respect only ? and these men of wonderfull subtilty , have not learnt to distinguish between persons and personalities . where is the least intimation given , that he look'd on the divine persons as modes and respects only ? that is impossible , since he owns a communication of the divine essence , and that each of the divine persons hath the divine nature belonging to him ; could it ever enter into any man's head to think , that he that owns this should own the other also ? but the personality is a thing of another consideration . for it is the reason of the distinction of persons in the same undivided nature . that there is a distinction , the scripture assures us ; and withall , that there is but one divine essence . how can this distinction be ? not by essential attributes , for those must be in the divine essence , and in every person alike , otherwise he hath not the entire divine nature ; not by accidents , as men are distinguished from each other , for the divine nature is not capable of these ; not by separate or divided substances , for that would be inconsistent with the perfect vnity of the godhead ; since therefore there can be no other way of distinction , we must consider how the scripture directs us i● this case ; and that acquaints us with the father , son and holy ghost , as having mutual relation to each other ; and there is no repugnancy therein to the divine nature , and therefore the distinction of the persons hath been fixed on that , as the most proper foundation for it . and these are called different modes of subsistence , on which the distinct personalities are founded , which can be no other than relative . but a person is that which results from the divine nature and subsistence together ; and although a person cannot be said to be a relative , consider'd as such , yet being joyned with the manner of subsistence , it doth imply a relation , and so a person may be said to be a relative being . but say they , if the three persons have all the same individual substance , then they are truly and properly only three modes ; and therefore a●though among men , personalities are distinct from the persons , because the persons are distinct intelligent substances , yet this cannot hold where there is but one individual substance . the question is , whether those they call nominal trinitarians , are liable to the charge of sabellianism ; the answer is , that they cannot , because they assert far more than three names , viz. that each person hath the divine nature distinctly belonging to him . but say they , these persons are but mere modes . no , say the other ; we do not say that the person is only a modus , but that it is the divine nature , or godhead subsisting under such a modus , so that the godhead is still included in it , joyned to it , and distinguished by it . grant all this , the vnitarians reply , yet where there is the same individual substance , the person can be only a modus . to which it is answer'd , that this individual substance hath three distinct ways of subsisting , according to which it subsists distinctly and differently in each of the three divine persons . so that here lies the main point , whether it be sabelliani●m , to assert the same individual substance under three such different modes of subsistence . if it be , the most learned and judicious of the fathers did not know what sabellianism meant ( as i have shewd at large in the following discourse ) for they utterly disowned sabellianism , and yet asserted , that the several hypostases consisted of peculiar properties in one and the same divine substance . but it is not the authority of fathers which they regard , for they serve them only as stones in the boys way when they quarrel , viz. to throw them at our heads . let us then examine this matter by reason without them . persons among men , say they , are distinguished from personalities , because they have distinct substances , therefore where there is but one substance , the person can be only a mode , and therefore the same with the personality . i answer , that the true original notion of personality is no more than a different mode of subsistence in the same common nature . for every such nature is in it self one and indivisible ; and the more perfect it is , the greater must its vnity be . for the first being is the most one ; and all division comes from distance and imperfection . the first foundation of distinction is diversity ; for if there were no diversity , there would be nothing but entire and perfect vnity . all diversity comes from two things , dissimilitud● and dependence . those philosophers ( called megarici ) did not think much amiss , who said , that if all things were alike , there would be but one substance or being in the world ; and what we now call different substances , would be only different modes of subsistence in the same individual nature . the difference of substances in created beings , arises from those two things . . a dissimilitude of accidents , both internal and external . . the will and power of god , whereby he gives them distinct and separate beings in the same common nature . as for instance , the nature or essence of a man consider'd in it self , is but one and indivisible ; but god gives a separate existence to every individual , whereby that common nature subsists in so many distinct substances , as there are individuals of that kind ; and every one of these substances is distinguished from all others ▪ not only by a separate internal vital principle and peculiar properties , but by such external accidents , as do very easily discriminate them from each other . and the subject of all these accidents is that peculiar substance , which god hath given to every individual , which in rational beings is called a person ; and so we grant that in all such created beings the personality doth suppose a distinct substance ; not from the nature of personality , but from the condition of the subject wherein it is . the personality in it self is but a different mode of subsistence in the same common nature , which is but one : but this personality being in such a subject as man is , it from thence follows ▪ that each person hath a peculiar substance of his own ; and not from the nature of personality . but when we come to consider a divine essence , which is most perfectly one , and is wholly uncapable of any separate existence or accidents , there can be no other way of distinction conceived in it , but by different modes of subsistence , or relative properties in the same divine essence . and herein we proceed , as we do in our other conceptions of the divine nature , i. e. we take away all imperfection from god , and attribute only that to him , which is agreeable to his divine perfections , although the manner of it may be above our comprehension . and if this be owning the trinity of the mob , i am not ashamed to own my self to be one of them ; but it is not out of lazyness or affected ignorance , but upon the greatest and most serious consideration . they may call this a trinity of cyphers , if they please , but i think more modest and decent language about these matters would become them as well as the things themselves much better . and they must prove a little better than they have done , that different modes of subsistence in the divine nature , or the relations of father and son are mere cyphers , which is so often mentioned in scripture , as a matter of very great consequence ; and that when we are baptized in the name of the father , son and holy ghost , we are baptized into a trinity of cyphers . but our unitarians proceed , and say that the same author affirms not only the personalities , but the persons to be merely relative . for he saith , that every person , as well as every personality in the trinity , is wholly relative . but it is plain he speaks there , not of the person in himself , but with respect to the manner of subsistence , or the relative properties belonging to them . but if the notion of a person doth besides the relative property , necessarily suppose the divine nature together with it ; how can a person then be imagined to be wholly relative ? but they urge , that which makes the first person in the trinity to be a person , makes him to be a father , and what makes him to be a father , makes him to be a person . and what follows from hence , but that the relative property is the foundation of the personality ? but by no means , that the person of the father is nothing but the relative property ? the instance of solomon is not at all to the purpose , unless we asserted three persons founded upon those different relations in his individual nature . who denies , that one person may have different respects , and yet be but one person subsisting ? where doth the scripture say , that the son of david , the father of rehoboam , and he that proceeded from david and bathsheba were three persons distinguished by those relative properties ? but here lies the foundation of what we believe as to the trinity ; we are assured from scripture , that there are three to whom the divine nature and attributes are given , and we are assured both from scripture and reason , that there can be but one divine essence ; and therefore every one of these must have the divine nature , and yet that can be but one. but it is a most unreasonable thing to charge those with sabellianism , who assert , that every person hath the divine nature distinctly belonging to him , and that the divine essence is communicated from the father to the son. did ever n●etus or sabellius , or any of their followers speak after this manner ? is the divine essence but a mere name , or a different respect only to mankind ? for the asserting such relative persons as have no essence at all , was the true sabellian doctrine , as will be made appear in the following discourse . and so much is confess'd by our unitarians themselves , for they say , that the sabellians held , that father , son and spirit are but only three names o● god given to him in scripture , by occasion of so many several dispensations towards the creature , and so he is but one subsisting person and three relative persons ; as he sustains the three names of father , son and spirit , which being the relations of god towards things without him , he is so many relative persons , or persons in a classical critical sense , i. e. persons without any essence belonging to them as such . but those who assert a communication of the divine essence to each person can never be guilty of sabellianism , if this be it , which themselves affirm . and so those called nominal trinitarians , are very unjustly so called , because they do really hold a trinity of persons in the unity of the godhead . . let us now see what charge they lay upon those whom they call real trinitarians : and they tell us , that the nominals will seem to be profound philosophers , deep sages in comparison with them . these are very obliging expressions to them in the beginning . but how do they make out this gross stupidity of theirs ? in short it is , that they stand condemned and anathematized as hereticks by a general council , and by all the moderns , and are every day challenged and impeached of tritheism , and cannot agree among themselves , but charge one another with great absurdities ; and in plain terms they charge them with nonsense in the thing , whereas the other lay only in words . because these assert three divine subsisting persons , three infinite spirits , minds or substances , as distinct as so many angels or men , each of them perfectly god , and yet all of them are but one god. to understand this matter rightly , we must consider that when the socinian pamphlets first came abroad , some years since , a learned and worthy person of our church , who had appear'd with great vigour and reason against our adversaries of the church of rome in the late reign ( which ought not to be forgotten ) undertook to defend the doctrine of the trinity against the history of the unitarians , and the notes on the athanasian creed ; but in the warmth of disputing , and out of a desire to make this matter more intelligible , he suffer'd himself to be carried beyond the ancient methods which the church hath used to express her sense by , still retaining the same fundamental article of three persons in one undivided essence , but explaining it in such a manner , as to make each person to have a peculiar and proper substance of his own . this gave so great an advantage to the author of those treatises , that in a little time , he set forth his notes with an appendix in answer to this new explication . wherein he charges him with heresie , tritheism and contradiction . the very same charges which have been since improved and carried on by others ; i wish i could say , without any unbecoming heat or reflections . but i shall now examine how far these charges have any ground , so as to affect the doctrine of the trinity , which is the chief end our adversaries aimed at , in heaping these reproaches upon one who appear'd so early , and with so much zeal to defend it . we are therefore to consider these things : . that a man may be very right in the belief of the article it self ; and yet may be mistaken in his explication of it . and this one of his keenest adversaries freely acknowledges . for he plainly distinguishes between the fundamental article and the manner of explaining it , and affirms , that a man may quit his explication without parting with the article it self . and so he may retain the article with his explication . but suppose a man to assent to the fundamental article it self , and be mistaken in his explication of it , can he be charged with heresie about this article ? for heresie must relate to the fundamental article to which he declares his hearty and unfeigned assent ; but here we suppose the mistake to lie only in the explication . as for instance , sabellianism is a condemned and exploded heresie , for it is contrary to the very doctrine of the trinity ; but suppose one who asserts the doctrine of three persons , should make them to be three modes , must such a one presently be charged with heresie , before we see whether his explication be consistent with the fundamental article or not ? for this is liable to very obvious objections , that the father begets a mode instead of a son , that we pray to three modes instead of three real persons , that modes are mutable things in their own nature , &c. but must we from hence conclude such a one guilty of heresie , when he declares , that he withall supposed them not to be mere modes , but that the divine essence is to be taken together with the mode to make a person ? yea , suppose some spitefull adversary should say , that it is a contradiction to say , that the same common nature can make a person with a mode superadded to it ▪ unless that be individuated , for a ●erson doth imply an individual nature , and not a mere relative mode . is this sufficient to charge such a person with the sabellian heresy , which he utterly disowns ? is not the like equity to be shew●d in another though different explication ? suppose then a person solemnly professes to own the fundamental doctrine of the trinity as much as any others ; but he thinks , that three persons must have distinct substances to make them persons , but so as to make no division or separation in the godhead , and that he cannot conceive a communication of the divine essence without this ; must this presently be run down as heresie , when he asserts at the same time three persons in the same undivided essence ? but this is said to be a contradiction ; so it was in the other case and not allow'd then and why should it be otherwise in this ? i speak not this to justifie such explications , but to shew that there is a difference between the heresie of denying an article , and a mistake in the explication of it . even the greatest heresie-makers in the world , distinguish between heresies and erroneous explications of articles of faith , as any one may find that looks into them . and even the inquisitors of heresie themselves allow the distinction between heresie and an erroneous proposition in faith , which amounts to the same with a mistaken explication of it ; and they all grant that there may be propositions that tend to heresie or savour of it , which cannot be condemned for heretical . and even pegna condemns melchior canus for being too cruel in asserting it to be heresie to contradict the general sense of divines , because the schools cannot make heresies . . it is frequently and solemnly affirmed by him , that the unity of the godhead is the most real , essential , indivisible , inseparable unity ; that there is but one divine nature , which is originally in the father , and is substantially communicated by the father to the son , as a distinct subsisting person , by an eternal ineffable generation , and to the holy ghost by an eternal and substantial procession from father and son. do the others who maintain a trinity deny this ? by no means . for we have already seen that they assert the same thing . so that they are fully agreed as to the main fundamental article . and even the unitarians yield , that from the beginning he asserted , that the three divine persons are in one undivided substance . wherein then lies the foundation of this mighty quarrel , and those unreasonable heats that men have fallen into about it ; to the great scandal of our church and religion ? in short it is this ; that the same author asserts , ( . ) that it is gross sabellianism to say , that there are not three personal minds , or spirits , or substances . ( . ) that a distinct substantial person must have a distinct substance of his own proper and peculiar to his own person . but he owns , that although there are three distinct persons , or minds , each of whom is distinctly and by himself god , yet there are not three gods , but one god , or one divinity ; which he saith , is intirely , and indivisibly , and inseparably in three distinct persons or minds . that the same one divine nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal father to the eternal son and by the father and son to the eternal spirit without any division or separation ; and so it remains one still . this is the substance of this new explication , which hath raised such flames , that injunctions from authority were thought necessary to suppress them . but those can reach no farther than the restraint of mens tongues and pens about these matters , and unless something be found out to satisfie their minds and to remove misapprehensions , the present heat may be only cover'd over and kept in ; which when there is a vent given ▪ may break out into a more dangerous flame . therefore i shall endeavour to state and clear this matter so as to prevent any future eruption thereof , which will be done by considering how far they are agreed , and how far the remaining difference ought to be pursued . . they are agreed , that there are three distinct persons and but one godhead . . that there are no separate and divided substances in the trinity ; but the divine nature is wholly and entirely one and undivided . . that the divine essence is communicated from the father to the son , and from both to the holy spirit . so that the charge of sabellianism on those who reject this new explication is without ground . for no sabellian did or could assert a communication of the divine essence . which being agreed on both sides , the dispute turns upon this single point , whether a communicated essence , doth imply a distinct substance or not . on the one side it is said , that there being but one god , there can be but one divine essence , and if more essences more gods. on the other side , that since they own a communicated essence necessary to make a distinction of persons in the son and holy ghost , if the essence be not distinct , the foundation of distinct personalities is taken away . but how is this clear'd by the other party ? they say , that it is one peculiar prerogative of the divine nature and substance , founded in its infinite and therefore transcendent perfection , whereby it is capable of residing in more persons than one , and is accordingly communicated from the father to the son and holy ghost . so that the communication of the divine nature is owned to the persons of the son and holy ghost . but how then comes it not to make a distinct essence , as it makes distinct persons , by being communicated ? the answer we see is , that it is a peculiar prerogative founded on the infinite and therefore transcendent perfection of the divine nature . but they further add , that when the son and holy ghost are said to have the same divine nature from the father , as the origin and fountain of the divinity ; not by the production of a new divine nature but by a communication of his own ; which is one and the same in all three without separation , difference , or distinction ; that this is indeed a great mystery , which hath been always look'd upon by the greatest and wisest men in the church , to be above all expressions and description . so that the greatest difficulty is at last resolved into the incomprehensible perfection of the divine nature ; and that neither man nor angels can give a satisfactory answer to enquiries about the manner of them . and the author of the animadversions saith , that in the divine persons of the trinity , the divine nature and the personal subsistence coalesce into one , by an incomprehensible , ineffable kind of union and conjunction . but do those on the other side think , that the asserting three distinct substances in one and the same individual substance tends to clear and explain the notion of the trinity and make it more easie and intelligible ? the divinity , they say , is whole , intire , indivisible , and inseparable in all three . but can one whole entire indivisible substance be actually divided into three substances ? for if every person must have a peculiar substance of his own ; and there be three persons , there must be three peculiar substances , and how can there be three peculiar substances , and yet but one entire and indivisible substance ? i do not say , there must be three divided substances in place , or separate substances , but they must be divided as three individuals of the same kind , which must introduce a specifick divine nature , which i think very inconsistent with the divine perfections ; but of this at large in the following discourse . i do not lay any force upon this argument , that there can be no ground of the distinction between the three substances , if there be but one substance in the godhead , ( as some have done ) because the same substance cannot both unite and distinguish them ; for the ground of the distinction is not the substance but the communication of it , and where that is so freely asserted , there is a reason distinct from the substance it self , which makes the distinction of persons . but the difficulty still remains , how each person should have a substance of his own ; and yet there be but one entire and indivisible substance , for every person must have a proper substance of his own ; or else according to this hypothesis , he can be no person ; and this peculiar substance must be really distinct from that substance which is in the other two : so that here must be three distinct substances in the three persons . but how then can there be but one individual essence in all three ? we may conceive one common essence to be individuated in three persons , as it is in men ; but it is impossible to conceive the same individual essence to be in three persons , which have peculiar substances of their own . for the substances belonging to the persons , are the same essence individuated in those persons : and so there is no avoiding making three individual essences and one specifick or common divine nature . and maimonides his argument is considerable against more gods than one ; if , saith he , there be two gods , there mu●t be something wherein they agree , and something wherein they differ ; that wherein they agree must be that which makes each of them god ; and that wherein they differ must make them two gods. now wherein doth this differ from the present hypothesis ? there is something wherein they differ , and that is their proper substance ; but maimonides thought that wherein they differ'd sufficient to make them two gods. so that i fear it will be impossible to clear this hypothesis as to the reconciling three individual essences with one individual divine essence , which looks too like asserting that there are three gods and yet but one . and the author of this explica●ion doth at last confess , that three distinct whole inseparable same 's , are hard to conceive as to the manner of it . now to what purpose are new explications started and disputes raised and carried on so warmly about them , if after all , the main difficulty be confess'd to be above our comprehension ? we had much better satisfie our selves with that language which the church hath receiv●d and is express'd in the creeds , than go about by new terms , to raise new ferments , especially at a time , when our united forces are most necessary against our common adversaries . no wise and good men can be fond of any new inventions , when the peace of the church is hazarded by them . and on the other side , it is as dangerous to make new heresies as new explications . if any one denies the doctrine contained in the nicene creed , that is no new heresie ; but how can such deny the son to be consubstantial to the father , who assert one and the same indivisible substance in the father and the son ? but they may contradict themselves . that is not impossible on either side . but doth it follow that they are guilty of heresie ? are not three substances and but one a contradiction ? no more , say they , than that a communicated substance is not distinct from that which did communicate . but this whole dispute we find is at last resolved into the infinite and unconceivable perfections of the godhead , where it is most safely lodged ; and that there is no real contradiction in the doctrine it self , is part of the design of the discourse afterwards . but here it will be necessary to take notice of what the unitarians have objected against this new explication , viz. that it was condemned by the ancients in the person of philoponus ; in the middle ages , in the person and writings of abhor ioachim ; but more severely since the reformation , in the person of valentinus gentilis , who was condemned at geneva , and beheaded at bern for this very doctrine . to these i shall give a distinct answer : . as to joh philoponus , i do freely own , that in the greek church , when in the sixth century he broached his opinion , that every hypostasis must have the common nature individuated in it , this was look'd upon as a doctrine of dangerous consequence , both with respect to the trinity and incarnation . the latter was the first occasion of it ; for as leontius observes , the dispute did not begin about the trinity , but about the incarnation ; and philoponus took part with those who asserted but one nature in christ after the vnion , and he went upon this ground , that if there were two natures there must be two hypostases , because nature and hypostasis were the same . then those on the churches side , saith leontius , objected , that if they were the same , there must be three distinct natures in the trinity , as there were three hypostases ; which philoponus yielded , and grounded himself on aristotle's doctrine , that there was but one common substance and several individual substances , and so held it was in the trinity , whence he was called the leader of the heresie of the tritheius . this is the account given by leontius who lived very ●ear his time , a. d. . the same is affirmed of him by nicephorus , and that he wrote a book on purpose about the vnion of two natures in christ , out of which he produces his own words concerning a common and individual nature , ( which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which can agree to none else . and the main argument he went upon was this , that unless we assert a singular nature in the hypostases , we must say , that the whole trinity was incarnate ; as unless there be a singular humane nature distinct from the common , christ must assume the whole nature of mankind . and this argument from the incarnation , was that which made roscelin , in the beginning of the disputing age , a. d. , to assert , that the three persons were three things distinct from each other , as three angels or three men , because otherwise the incarnation of the second person could not be understood , as appears by anselm's epistles , and his book of the incarnation written upon that occasion . but as a●selm shews at large , if this argument hold , it must prove the three persons not only to be distinct , but separate and divided sub●●ances , ( which is directly contrary to this new explication ) and then there is no avoiding tritheism . but to return to joh. philoponus , who , saith nicephorus , divided the indivisible nature of god into three individuals as among men : which , saith he , is repugnant to the sense of the christian church ; and he produces the testimony of gregory nazianzen against it , and adds , that leontius and georgius pisides confuted philoponus . but in that divided time . there were some called theodosiani , who made but one nature and one hypostasis ; and so fell in with the sabellians ; but others held , that there was one immutable divine essence , but each person had a distinct individual nature : which the rest charged with tritheism . which consequence they utterly rejected , because although they held three distinct natures , yet they said , they were but one god , because there was but one invariable divinity in them . nicephorus saith , that conon's followers rejected philoponus ; but photius mentions a conference between conon and others , a●out philoponus , wherein he defends him against other severians . photius grants , that conon and his followers held a consubstantial trinity and the unity of the godhead , and so far they were orthodox : but saith , they were far from it , when they asserted proper and peculiar substances to each person . the difference between conon and philoponus about this point , ( for conon wrote against philoponus about the resurrection ) seems to have been partly in the doctrine , but chiefly in the consequence of it ; for these rejected all kind of tritheism , which philoponus saw well enough must follow from his doctrine , but he denied any real division or separation in those substances as to the deity . isidore saith , that the tritheists owned three gods , as well as three persons ; and that if god be said to be triple , there must follow a plurality of gods. but there were others called triformiani , of whom s. augustin speaks . who held the three persons to be three distinct parts , which being united made one god ; which , saith he , is repugnant to the divine perfection . but among these severians , there were three several opinions : . of philoponus , who held one common nature and three individual . . of those who said there was but one nature and one hypostasis . . of those who affirm'd there were three distinct natures , but withal , that there was but one indivisible godhead ; and these differ'd from philoponus in the main ground of tritheism , which was , that he held the common nature in the trinity , to be only a specifick nature , and such as it is among men. for philoponus himself in the words which nicephorus produces , doth assert plainly , that the common nature is separated from the individuals , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by a mere act of the mind ; so that he allow'd no individual vnity in the divine nature , but what was in the several persons ; as the common nature of man is a notion of the mind , as it is abstracted from the several individuals , wherein alone it really subsists ; so that here is an apparent difference between the doctrine of joh. philoponus and the new explication , for herein the most real , essential and indivisible unity of the divine nature is asserted ; and it is said to be no species , because it is but one , and so it could not be condemned in joh. philoponus . we now come to abbat joachim , whose doctrine seems to be as much mistaken , as it is represented in the decretal , where the condemnation of it by the lateran council is extant . but here i cannot but observe what great authority these unitarians give to this lateran council , as if they had a mind to set up transubstantiation by it , which they so often parallel with the trinity . thence in their late discourse they speak of it as the most general council that was ever called , and that what was there defined , it was made heresie to oppose it . but by their favour , we neither own this to have been a general council , nor that it had authority to make that heresie which was not so before . but that council might assert the doctrine of the trinity truly , as it had been receiv'd , and condemn the opinion of joachim justly but what it was , they do not or would not seem to understand . joachim was a great enthusiast , but no deep divine ( as men of that heat seldom are ) and he had many disputes with peter lombard in his life , as the vindicator of joachim confesses . after his death , a book of his was found , taxing peter lombard with some strange doctrine about the trinity , wherein he called him heretick and madman ; this book was complained of in the lateran council , and upon examination it was sound , that instead of charging peter lombard justly , he was fallen into heresie himself , which was denying the essential vnity of the three persons , and making it to be vnity of consent . he granted that they were one essence , one nature , one substance : but how ? not by any true proper unity , but similitudinary and collective , as they called it , as many men are one people , and many believers make one church . whence thomas aquinas saith , that joachim fell into the arian heresie . it is sufficient to my purpose , that he denied the individual vnity of the divine essence , which cannot be charged on the author of the new explication , and so this comes not home to the purpose . . but the last charge is the most terrible , for it not only sets down the heresie , but the capital punishment which follow'd it . yet i shall make it appear , ( notwithstanding the very warm prosecution of it by another hand ) that there is a great difference between the doctrine of valentinus gentilis , and that which is asserted in this explication . . in the sentence of his condemnation it is expressed , that he had been guilty of the vilest scurrility and most horrid blasphemies against the son of god and the glorious mystery of the trinity . but can any thing of this nature be charged upon one , who hath not only written in defence of it , but speaks of it with the highest veneration ? . in the same sentence it is said , that he acknowledged the father only to be that infinite god which we ought to worship , which is plain blasphemy against the son. but can any men ever think to make this the same case with one , who makes use of that as one of his chief arguments , that the three persons are to be worshipped with a distinct divine worship ? . it is charged upon him , that he called the trinity a mere human invention , not so much as known to any catholick creed , and directly contrary to the word of god. but the author here charged , hath made it his business to prove the doctrine of the trinity to be grounded on scripture and to vindicate it from the objections drawn from thence against it . . one of the main articles of his charge was , that he made three spirits of different order and degree , that the father is the one only god , by which the son and holy ghost are excluded manifestly from the unity of the godhead ; but the person charged with his heresie saith , the reason why we must not say three gods , is , because there is but one and the same divinity in them all ; and that entirely , indivisibly , inseparably . but it is said , that although there may be some differences , yet they agree in asserting , that there are three distinct eternal spirits or minds in the trinity ; and genebrard is brought into the same heresie with them but genebrard with great indignation rejects the doctrine of valentinus gentilis , because he held an inequality in the persons , and denied the individual vnity of the godhead in them ; but he saith , he follow'd damascen in asserting three real hypostases ; and he utterly denies tritheism , and he brings a multitude of reasons , why the charge of tritheism doth not lie against his opinion , although he owns the hypostases to be three distinct individuals , but then he adds , that there is an indivisible and insep●rable union of the divine nature in all three persons . now to deal as impartially in this matter as may be , i do not think our understandings one jot helped in the notion of the trinity by this hypothesis ; but that it is liable to as great difficulties as any other , and therefore none ought to be fond of it , or to set it against the general sense of others , and the current expressions of divines about these mysteries ; nor to call the different opinions of others heresie or nonsense , which are provoking words , and tend very much to inflame mens passions , because their faith and vnderstanding are both call'd in question , which are very tender things . but on the other side , a difference ought to be made between the heresie and blasphemy of valentinus gentilis , and the opinion of such who maintain the individual and indivisible unity of the godhead ; but withal , believe that every person hath an individual substance as a person , and that sabellianism cannot be avoided otherwise . wherein i think they are mistaken , and that the fathers were of another opinion ; and that our church owns but one substance in the godhead , as the western church always did , ( which made such difficulty about receiving three hypostases , because they took hypostasis for a substance ) but yet i see no reason why those who assert three hypostases , and mean three individual substances should be charged with the heresie of valentinus gentilis , or so much as with that of abba● joachim or philoponus , because they all rejected the individual unity of the divine nature , which is constantly maintained by the defenders of the other hypothesis . but it is said and urged with vehemency , that these two things are inconsistent with each other ; that it is going forward and backward , being orthodox in one breath and otherwise in the next ; that all this looks like shuffling and concealing the true meaning , and acting the old artifices under a different form. for the samosatenians and arians , when they were pinched , seem'd very orthodox in their expressions , but retained their heresies still in their minds ; and there is reason to suspect the same game is playing over again , and we cannot be too cautious in a matter of such consequence . i grant very great caution is needfull , but the mixture of some charity with it will do no hurt . why should we suspect those to be inwardly false , and to think otherwise than they speak , who have shew'd no want of courage and zeal , at a time when some thought it prudence to say nothing , and never call'd upon their superiours then to own the cause of god , and to do their duties as they have now done , and that in no very obliging manner ? and if the same men can be cool and unconcerned at some times , ( when there was so great reason to be otherwise ) and of a sudden grow very warm , and even to boil over with zeal ; the world is so ill natur'd , as to be too apt to conclude there is some other cause of such an alteration than what openly appears . but there is a kind of bitter zeal , which is so fierce and violent , that it rather inflames than heals any wounds that are made ; and is of so malignant a nature , that it spreads and eats like a cancer , and if a stop were not given to it , it might endanger the whole body . i am very sensible how little a man consults his own ease , who offers to interpose in a dispute between men of heat and animosity ; but this moves me very little , when the interest of our church and religion is concerned , which ought to prevail more than the fear of displeasing one or other party , or it may be both . i do heartily wish , that all who are equally concerned in the common cause , would lay aside heats , and prejudices , and hard words , and consider this matter impartially ; and i do not question , but they will see cause to judge , as i do , that the difference is not so great as our adversaries for their own advantage make it to be . and since both sides yield , that the matter they dispute about is above their reach , the wisest course they can take is to assert and defend what is revealed , and not to be too peremptory and quarrelsom about that which is acknowledged to be above our comprehension , i mean as to the manner how the three persons partake of the divine nature . it would be of the most fatal consequence to us , if those weapons , which might be so usefully imploy'd against our common adversaries , should still be turned upon one another . i know no manner of advantage they have against us , but from thence , and this is it which makes them write with such insolence and scorn towards those who are far their superiours in learning and wit , as well as in the goodness of their cause . and is it possible that some of our most skilfull fencers should play prizes before them , who plainly animate them against each other for their own diversion and interest ? sometimes one hath the better , sometimes the other , and one is cried up in opposition to the other , but taken alone is used with the greatest contempt . one man's work is said to be learned and accurate , and the more , because it follows , that he concerns not himself with the socinians . the wiser man no doubt , for that reason . at another time it is called the birth of the mountains , and the author parallel'd with no less a man than don quixot , and his elaborate writings with his adventures , and they ridicule his notion of modes as if they were only so many gambols and postures . and then for his adversary , they hearten and incourage him all they can ; they tell him , he must not allow to the other the least title of all he contends for , least their sport should be spoiled ; and to comfort him , they tell him , that his adversary is a socinian at bottom , and doth not know it ; that all his thingums , modes , properties are only an addition of words and names , and not of persons properly so called , and that his whole scheme is nothing but socinianism drest up in the absurd cant of the schools . that his book hath much more scurrility than argument , that his usage of him was barbarous , and a greater soloecism in manners , than any he accuses him of in grammar or speech ; and in short , that his explication of the trinity is a great piece of nonsense , ( though it comes so near to socinianism . ) but how doth the other antagonist escape ? what , nothing but good words to him ? in this place they had a mind to keep him in heart , and only charge him with a heresie which they laugh at ; but in another place , they set him out with such colours , as shew they intended only to play one upon the other . they charge him not only with heresie but polytheism , which , they say , is next to atheism ; that his vindication is a supercilious , disdainfull and peevish answer : that he had neither humanity nor good manners left : that there is nothing considerable in his books but what he borrow'd from them. these are some of the flowers which they bestow on these persons of reputation in polemick squabble as they call it , which plainly shew , that their aim is , as much as may be , to divide and then to expose us . and shall we still go on to gratifie this insulting humour of theirs , by contending with one another , and afford them still new matter for books against both ? as we may see in their late discourse about nominal and real trinitarians , which was intended for a rare shew , wherein the two parties are represented as combating with one another , and they stand by and triumph over these cadmean brethren , as they call them . neither are they the socinians only , but those who despise all religion ( who i doubt are the far greater number ) are very much entertained with such encounters between men of wit and parts , because they think , and they do not think amiss , that religion it self will be the greatest sufferer by them at last : and this is the most dangerous , but i hope not the most prevailing party of men among us . the socinians profess themselves christians , and i hope are so , ( especially if but one article of faith be required to make men so ) but i cannot but observe that in the late socinian pamphlets , there is too strong a biass towards deism , ( which consideration alone should make us unite and look more narrowly to their steps . ) i do not charge their writers with a professed design to advance deism among us ; but their way of managing their disputes , is as if they had a mind to serve them . and such men who are enemies to all revealed religion , could not find out better tools for their purpose than they are . for they know very well , that in such a nation as ours , which is really concerned for the profession of religion one way or other , there is no opening professed schools of atheism ; but the design must be carried on under some shew of religion . and nothing serves their turn so well , as setting up natural religion in opposition to revealed . for this is the way by degrees to loosen and unhinge the faith of most men , which with great reason is built on the scripture as the surest foundation . but here it is fit to observe the several steps they take in order to this advancing deism , and how our unitarians have complied with all of them . i. the first point they are to gain is , the lessening the authority of scripture , and if this be once done , they know mens minds will be left so roving and uncertain , that they will soon fall into scepticism and infidelity . ii. the next is , to represent church-men as persons of interest and design , who maintain religion only because it supports them ; and this they call priest-cra●t , and if they can by this means take away their authority too , the way lies still more open for them ; for it is more easie to make a prey of the flock , when the shepherds are suspected only to look after their fleeces . since such a suspicion takes away all trust and confidence in their guides ; and they know very well , how little others will be able to defend themselves . iii. another step is , to magnifie the deists as men of probity and good sense ; that assert the just liberties of mankind , against that terrible thing called priest-craft ; and that would rescue religion from false glosses and absurd notions taken up from the schools and taught in the universities , on purpose to keep under those principles of universal liberty as to opinions , which those of freer minds endeavour to promote . but especially they are great enemies to all mysteries of faith , as unreasonable impositions on those of more refined vnderstandings , and of clear and distinct perceptions , as they have learnt to express themselves . these they account intolerable vsurpations on men of such elevations as themselves ; for mysteries are only for the mob , and not for persons of such noble capacities . iv. the last thing is , to represent all religions as indifferent , since they agree in the common principles of natural religion , especially the vnity of god , and all the rest is but according to the different inventions of men , the skill of the contrivers , and the several humors and inclinations of mankind . these are the chief mysteries of deism in our age ; for even deism hath its mysteries , and it is it self a mystery of iniquity , which i am afraid is too much working already among us , and will be more if no effectual stop be put to it . i call it deism , because that name obtains now , as more plausible and modish ; for atheism is a rude unmannerly word , and exposes men to the rabble , and makes persons shun the company and avoid the conversation and dealing with such who are noted for it . and this would be a mighty prejudice to them , as to their interests in this world , which they have reason to value . but to be a deist , seems to be only a setting up for having more wit , than to be cheated by the priests , and imposed upon by the common forms of religion , which serve well enough for ordinary people that want sense , and are not skill●d in demonstrations ; but the deists are so wise as to see through all these things . and therefore this name gains a reputation among all such as hate religion , but know not how otherwise to distinguish themselves from prosessed atheists , which they would by no means be taken for ; although if they be pressed home , very few among them will sincerely own any more than a series of causes , without any intellectual perfections , which they call god. a strange god without wisdom , goodness , iustice or providence ! but i am now to shew , how in all these points the present unitarians have been very serviceable to them , in the books which they have lately published and dispersed both in city and country . . as to the authority of scripture : they have been already justly exposed for undermining the authority of s. john's gospel , by mustering up all the arguments of the old hereticks against it , and giving no answers to them . and what defence have they since made for themselves ? no other but this very trifling one , that they repeat their reasons but do not affirm them . what is the meaning of this ? if they are true , why do they not affirm them ? if they are false , why do they not answer them ? is this done like those who believe the gospel of s. john to be divine , to produce all the arguments they could meet with against it ; and never offer to shew the weakness : and vnreasonableness of them ? doth not this look like a design to furnish the deists with such arguments as they could meet with against it ? especially , when they say , that s. iohn doth not oppose them why then are these arguments produced against his gospel ? men do not use to dispute against their friends , nor to tell the world what all people have said against them , and give not a word of answer in vindication of them . but they say , the modern vnitarians allow of the gospel and other pieces of s. iohn . a very great favour indeed , to allow of them . but how far ? as of divine authority ? not a word of that . but as ancient books which they think it not fit for them to dispute against . but if the ancient ebionites were their predecessors , as they affirm , they can allow none but the gospel according to the hebrews ; and must reject the rest and all s. paul's epistles ; and in truth , they make him argue so little to the purpose , that they must have a very mean opinion of his writings . but of these things in the discourse it self . as to church-men , no professed deists could express themselves more spitefully than they have done , and that against those to whom they profess the greatest respect . what then would they say of the rest ? they say in general , that it is natural to worldlings , to mercenary spirits , to the timorous and ambitious ; in a word , to all such as preferr not god before all other , whether persons or considerations , to believe as they would have it . but although the words be general , yet any one that looks into them may s●e● find that they were intended for such church-men who had written against their opinions . and the insinuation is , that if it were not for worldly interests , they would own them to be in the right . whereas i am fully perswaded , that they have no way to defend their opinions , but to reject the scriptures and declare themselves deists ; and as long as we retain a just veneration for the scripture , we can be of no other opinion , because we look on their interpretations as unreasonable , new , forced , and inconsistent with the circumstances of places and the main scope and tenor of the new testament . but their introduction to the answer to the late archbishop's sermons about the trinity and incarnation , shew their temper sufficiently as to all church-men . he was the person they professed to esteem and reverence above all others , and confess that he instructs them in the air and language of a father , ( which at least deserved a little more dutifull language from them . ) but some mens fondness for their opinions breaks all bounds of civility and decency ; for presently after , mentioning the archbishop and other bishops who had written against them , they say it signifies nothing to the case , that they are great pensioners of the world. for it is certain we have a mighty propensity to believe as is for our turn and interest . and soon after , that their opposers are under the power of such fatal biasses , that their doctrine is the more to be suspected because it is theirs . for the reason why they maintain the doctrine of the trinity is , because they must . the plain meaning of all this is , that the late archbishop ( as well as the rest ) was a mere self-interested man , ( which none who knew either the outside or inside of lambeth could ever imagine ) that if he were really against them ( as none could think otherwise , who knew him so well and so long as i did ) it only shew'd what a strange power , interest hath in the minds of all church-men . but what bias was it , which made him write with that strength and iudgment against their opinions ? let us set aside all titles of respect and honour as they desire , let reason be compared with reason ; and his arguments with their answers ; and it will be soon found that the advantage which he had , was not from any other dignity than that of a clearer iudgment , and a much stronger way of reasoning whereas their answers are such , as may well be supposed to come from those , who had some such bias , that they must at least seem to answer what in truth they could not . as hath been fully made appear in the vindication of him , to which no reply hath been given , although other treatises of theirs have come out since . in the conclusion of that answer they say , that they did not expect that their answer should satisfie us , and in truth they had a great deal of reason to think so . but what reason do they give for it ? a very kind one no doubt ; because prepossession and interest have taken hold of us . as though we were men of such mean and mercenary spirits , as to believe according to prepossession without reason , and to act only as serves our present interest . but we never made mean addresses to infidels to shew how near our principles came to theirs , nor made parallels between the trinity and transubstantiation , as some did , and defended them , as well as they could , when popery was uppermost . but enough of this . . we have seen how much they have gratified the deists by representing church-men in such a manner , let us now see in what manner they treat the deists . it is with another sort of language ; and which argues a more than ordinary kindness to them . in one place they say , that the deists are mostly well-natured men , and men , of probity and understanding ; in effect that they are sincere honest-hearted men , who do good by the impulse of their natural religion , honesty and good conscience , which have great influence upon them . what another sort of character is this from that of the greatest , and in their opinion the best of our clergy ? this must proceed from some intimacy and familiarity with them ; and it is easie to imagine from hence , that they are upon very good terms with one another , because they must be unitarians , if they believe a god at all . but where else are these honest , conscientious deists to be found ? it is rare indeed for others to find any one that rejects christianity out of pure conscience , and that acts by principles of sincere virtue . i never yet could meet with such , nor hear of those that have . and i would fain know the reasons on which such conscientious men proceeded ; for truly the principles of natural religion are those which recommend christianity to me ; for without them the mysteries of faith would be far more unaccountable than now they are ; and supposing them , i see no incongruity in them , i. e. that there is a just and holy god , and a wise providence , and a future state of rewards and punishments ; and that god designs to bring mankind to happiness out of a state of misery ; let these be supposed , and the scheme of christianity will appear very reasonable and fitted to the condition and capacity of mankind . and the sublimest mysteries of it are not intended to puzzle or amuse mankind , as weak men imagine ; but they are discover'd for the greatest and best purposes in the world , to bring men to the hatred of sin and love of god , and a patient continuance in well-doing , in order to a blessed immortality . so that this is truly a mystery of godliness , being intended for the advancement of real piety and goodness among mankind in order to make them happy . but as to these unitarians , who have such happy acquaintance with these conscientious deists ; i would fain learn from them , if they think them mistaken , why they take no more pains to satisfie and convince them ; for i find they decline saying a word against them . in one place they compare the atheist and deist together ; and very honestly and like any conscientious deists , they impute all the deism and most part of the atheism of our age to the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation . is it possible for men that live in our age to give such an account as this of the growth of deism and atheism among us ? what number of atheists is there , upon any other account than from a looseness of thinking and living ? where are those who believe god to be an incomprehensible being , and yet reject the mysteries which relate to his being , because they are incomprehensible ? suppose any reject spiritual substance as nonsense and a contradiction , as they do the trinity on the same pretences . is this a sufficient reason or not ? they may tell them , as they do us that they can have no ideas , no clear and distinct perceptions of immaterial substances ? what answer do they give in this case ? not a syllable ; although they take notice of it . but i hope they give some better satisfaction to the deist ; no , for they say , this is not a place to argue against either atheist or deist . by no means : some would say , they were not such fools to fall out with their friends . and it cannot be denied , that they have been the greatest incouragers of such kind of writings , which serve their turn so well ; and in pure gratitude they forbear to argue against them . iv. to shew how near they come to an indifferency in religion , they speak favourably of mahometans , and jews , and even tartars , because they agree with them in the vnity of the godhead . what an honest-hearted deist do they make that impostor mahomet ? one would hardly think such a character could have come out of the mouth of christians . but these are their words , mahomet is affirmed by divers historians to have had no other design in pretending himself to be a prophet , but to restore the belief of the unity of god , which at that time was extirpated among the eastern christians by the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation . who are those historians who give this character of him ? why are they not named , that their authority might be examin'd ? was the morocco ambassador one of them ? or paulus alciatus , who from a unitarian turned mahometan ? but by the best accounts we can meet with , we find that he was a very cunning impostor , and took in from the jews and ishmaelites his countrymen , circumcision ; from the christians , an honourable mention of christ , as a prophet , and as the the word and spirit of god , and owned his miracles ; from the ancient hereticks he denied his suffering , but owned his being taken up into heaven . yea , he owned , that he had his gospel from heaven ; but that his disciples changed it after his death , and attributed more to christ than he assumed to himself . which shews that he had so much sence , as to discern , that if the books of the new testament were genuine , more must be given to christ , than either mahomet or the unitarians do allow . let any indifferent reader compare their character of mahomet with that of athanasius , which these men give , and they will easily find that they take as much care to blacken one , as they do to vindicate the other . what christian ingenuity is here ? but mahomet was a deist , and athanasius a trinitarian . but they go on . whatsoever the design of mahomet was , its certain , that mahometism hath prevailed over greater numbers and more nations , than at this day profess christianity . but how ? was it not by force of arms and the prevalency of the saracen and turkish empire ? no , say these learned historians , it was not by the force of the sword , but by that one truth in the alcoran the unity of god. it were endless to quote the historians , who say , that it was mahomet's principle , to subdue all by force of arms who opposed his religion ; but the authority of elmacinus alone is sufficient ; for in the beginning of his history he owns that it was his principle , to make war upon those that would not submit to his law. and others say , that in remembrance of this , their law is expounded by their doctors , with a sword drawn by them , and that it is the law of the alcoran to kill and slay those that oppose it . what liberty the turkish empire allows to christians in the conquer'd provinces is not to this purpose , but by what means mahometism prevailed in the world. but say they , the jews as well as mahometans are alienated from us , because they suppose the trinity to be the doctrine of all christians . and what then ? must we renounce the christian doctrine to please the jews and mahometans ? must we quit christ's being the messias , because the jews deny it ? or the suffering of christ , because the mahometans think it inconsistent with his honour ? but if this be the truth of the case , as to jews and mahometans ; no persons are so well qualified to endeavour their conversion , as our unitarians ; which would be a much better imployment for them , than to expose the christian doctrine by such writings among us . i am ashamed to mention what they say of the tartars , when they call them , the shield and sword of that way of acknowledging and worshipping god. so that mahometans , jews and tartars are fairly represented because they agree in the grand fundamental of the vnity of the godhead ; but the christian church is charged with believing impossibilities , contradictions , and pure nonsense . and thus we find our unitarians serving the deists in all their methods of overthrowing revealed religion and advancing deism among us . and if this will not awaken us to look more after them , and unite us in the defence of our common cause against them , i do not think that other methods will do it . for it is become a restless and active , although as yet , but a small body of men , and they tell the world plainly enough that they are free from the biasses of hopes and fears ; and sit loose from the awes and bribes of the world. so that there is no way of dealing with them , but by shewing the falsness & weakness of the grounds they go upon ; and that they have no advantage of us as to scripture , antiquity or reason : which is the design of this vndertaking . worcester , sept. . . e. w. the contents . chap. i. the occasion and design of the discourse . pag. . chap. ii. the doctrine of the trinity not receiv'd in the christian church by force or interest . p. . chap. iii. the socinian plea , for the antiquity of their doctrine , examined . p. . chap. iv. of the considerable men they pretend to have been of their opinion in the primitive church . p. . chap. v. of their charge of contradiction in the doctrine of the trinity . p. . chap. vi. no contradiction for three persons to be in one common nature . p. . chap. vii . the athanasian creed clear'd from contradictions . p. . chap. viii . the socinian sense of scripture examined . p. . chap. ix . the general sense of the christian church , proved from the form of baptism , as it was understood in the first ages . p. . chap. x. the objections against the trinity , in point of reason , answer'd . p. . errata . pag. . l. . for our r. one . p. . l. . r. heb. . . for unto which . p. . l. . add n. . p. . l. . for damascenus r. damascius . p. . l. . for appointed r. appropriated . p. . l. . after them put in not . p. . l. for we r. were . p. . l. . dele that . p. . l. . for hypostasis r. hypothesis . p. . l. . for intermission r. intromission . p. . l. . r. as well as . a discourse in vindication of the doctrine of the trinity : with an answer to the late socinian objections . chap. i. the occasion and design of this discourse . it is now above twenty years since i first published a discourse about the reasons of the sufferings of christ , ( lately reprinted ) in answer to some socinian objections at that time . but i know not how it came to pass , that the socinian controversy seemed to be laid asleep among us for many years after ; and so it had continued to this day , if some mens busie and indiscreet zeal for their own particular opinions ( or rather heresies ) had not been more prevalent over them , than their care and concernment for the common interest of christianity among us . for it is that which really suffers by these unhappy and very unseasonable disputes about the mysteries of the christian faith , which could never have been started and carried on with more fatal consequence to all revealed religion , than in an age too much inclined to scepticism and infidelity . for all who are but well-wishers to that , do greedily catch at any thing which tends to unsettle mens minds as to matters of faith , and to expose them to the scorn and contempt of infidels . and this is all the advantage which they have above others in their writings . for upon my carefull perusal of them ( which was occasion'd by re●rinting that discourse ) i found nothing extraordinary , as to depth of judgment , or closeness of reasoning , or strength of argument , or skill in scripture or antiquity , but the old stuff set out with a new dress , and too much suited to the genius of the age we live in , viz. brisk and airy , but withal too light and superficial . but although such a sort of raillery be very much unbecoming the weight and dignity of the subject ▪ yet that is not the worst part of the character of them ; for they seem to be written , not with a design to convince others , or to justifie themselves , but to ridicule the great mysteries of our faith , calling them iargon , cant , nonsense , impossibilities , contradictions , samaritanism , and what not ? any thing but mahometism and deism . and at the same time they know , that we have not framed these doctrines our selves ; but have received them by as universal a tradition and consent of the christian church , as that whereby we receive the books of the new testament , and as founded upon their authority . so that , as far as i can see , the truth of these doctrines and authority of those books must stand and fall together : for from the time of the writing and publishing of them all persons who were admitted into the christian church by the form of baptism , prescribed by our saviour , were understood to ●e received members upon profession of ●●e faith of the holy trinity ; the hymns and doxologies of the primitive church were to father , son and holy ghost ; and those who openly opposed that doctrine were cast out of the communion of it : which to me seem plain and demonstrative arg●ments , that this was the doctrine of the christian church from the beginning , as will appear in the progress of this discourse . the chief design whereof is to vindicate the doctrine of the trinity , as it hath been generally received in the christian church , and is expressed in the athanasian creed , from those horrible imputations of nonsense , contradiction and impossibility ; with which it is charged by our vnitarians ( as they call themselves ; ) and that in the answer to the sermon lately reprinted , about the mysteries of the christian faith : which i first preached and published some years since , upon the breaking out of this controversie among us , by the notes on athanasius his creed , and other mischievous pamphlets one upon another . i was in hopes to have given some check to their insolent way of writing about matters so much above our reach , by shewing how reasonable it was for us to submit to divine revelation in such things , since we must acknowledge our selves so much to seek , as to the nature of substances , which are continually before our eyes ; and therefore , if there were such difficulties about a mystery which depended upon revelation , we had no cause to wonder at it ; but our business was chiefly to be satisfied , whether this doctrine were any part of that revelation . as to which i proposed several things , which i thought very reasonable , to the finding out the true sense of the scripture about these matters . after a considerable time , they thought fit to publish something , which was to pass for an answer to it ; but in it , they wholly pass over that part which relates to the sense of scripture , and run into their common place about mysteries of faith ; in which they were sure to have as many friends , as our faith had enemies : and yet they managed it in so trifling a manner , that i did not then think it deserved an answer . but a worthy and judicious friend was willing to take that task upon himself , which he hath very well discharged : so that i am not concerned to meddle with all those particulars , which are fully answer'd already , but the general charge as to the christian church about the doctrine of the trinity , i think my self oblig'd to give an answer to upon this occasion . but before i come to that , since they so confidently charge the christian church for so many ages , with embracing errors , and nonsense , and contradictions for mysteries of faith , i desire to know ( supposing it possible for the christian church to be so early , so generally and so miserably deceived in a matter of such moment ) by what light they have discovered this great error . have they any new books of scripture to judge by ? truly they had need , for they seem to be very weary of the old ones ; because they find they will not serve their turn . therefore they muster up the old objections against them , and give no answer to them ; they find fault with copies , and say , they are corrupted and falsified to speak the language of the church : they let fall suspicious words , as to the form of baptism , as though it were inserted from the churches practice ; they charge us with following corrupt copies and making false translations without any manner of ground for it . and doth not all this discover no good will to the scriptures , at least , as they are received among us ? and i despair of meeting with better copies , or seeing a more faithfull translation than ours is . so that it is plain , that they have no mind to be tried by the scriptures . for these exceptions are such , as a malefactor would make to a jury , he is afraid to be condemned by . but what then is the peculiar light which these happy men have found in a corner , the want whereof hath made the christian church to fall into such monstrous errors and contradictions ? nothing ( they pretend ) but the mere light of common sense and reason ; which they call after a more refined way of speaking , clear ideas and distinct perceptions of things . but least i should be thought to misrepresent them ; i will produce some of their own expressions . in one place they say , we deny the articles of the new christianity , or the athanasian religion , not because they are mysteries , or because we do not comprehend them ; we deny them , because we do comprehend them ; we have a clear and distinct perception , that they are not mysteries , but contradictions , impossibilities , and pure nonsense . we have our reason in vain , and all science and certainty would be destroy'd ▪ if we could not distinguish between mysteries and contradictions . and soon after , we are not to give the venerable name of mystery to doctrines that are contrary to nature's and reason's light , or which destroy or contradict our natural ideas . these things i have particular reason to take notice of here , because they are published as an answer to the foregoing sermon about the mysteries of the christian faith : and this shews the general grounds they go upon , and therefore more fit to be consider'd here . to which i shall add one passage more , wherein they insinuate , that the doctrine of the trinity hath been supported only by interest and force . their words are ( after they have called the doctrine of the trinity , a monstrous paradox and contradiction ) this is that , say they , which because all other arguments failed them in their disputations with the photinians and arians , they at last effectually proved , by the imperial edicts , by confiscations and banishments , by seizing and burning all books written against it or them , by capital punishments , and when the papacy ( of which this is the chief article ) prevailed , by fire and faggot . this is a new discovery indeed , that the doctrine of the trinity , as it is generally receiv'd in the christian church , is the chief article of popery ; although it were embraced and defended long before popery was known ; and i hope would be so , if there were no such thing as popery left in the world . but if every thing which displeases some men must pass for popery , i am afraid christianity it self will not escape at last : for there are some who are building apace on such foundations as these ; and are endeavouring what they can , to remove out of their way all revealed religion , by the help of those two powerfull machines , viz. priest-craft and mysteries . but because i intend a clear and distinct discourse concerning the doctrine of the trinity , as it hath been generally received among us ; i shall proceed in these four enquiries . ( . ) whether it was accounted a monstrous paradox and contradiction , where persons were not sway'd by force and interest ? ( . ) whether there be any ground of common reason , on which it can be justly charged with nonsense , impossibilities and contradiction ? ( . ) whether their doctrine about the trinity or ours , be more agreeable to the sense of scripture and antiquity ? ( . ) whether our doctrine being admitted , it doth overthrow all certainty of reason , and makes way for believing the greatest absurdities under the pretence of being mysteries of faith ? chap. ii. the doctrine of the trinity not received in the christian church by force or interest . as to the first , it will lead me into an enquiry into the sense of the christian church , as to this doctrine , long before popery was hatched , and at a time when the main force of imperial edicts was against christianity it self ; at which time this doctrine was owned by the christian church , but disowned and disputed against by some particular parties and sects . and the question then will be , whether these had engrossed sense , and reason , and knowledge among themselves ; and all the body of the christian church , with their heads and governors , were bereft of common sense , and given up to believe nonsense and contradictions for mysteries of faith. but in order to the clearing this matter , i take it for granted , that sense and reason are no late inventions , only to be found among our vnitarians ; but that all mankind have such a competent share of them , as to be able to judge , what is agreeable to them , and what not , if they apply themselves to it ; that no men have so little sense as to be fond of nonsense , when sense will do them equal service ; that if there be no biass of interest to sway them , men will generally judge according to the evidence of reason ; that if they be very much concerned for a doctrine opposed by others , and against their interest , they are perswaded of the truth of it , by other means than by force and fear ; that it is possible for men of sense and reason to believe a doctrine to be true on the account of divine revelation , although they cannot comprehend the manner of it ; that we have reason to believe those to be men of sense above others , who have shew'd their abilities above them in other matters of knowledge and speculation ; that there can be no reason to suspect the integrity of such men in delivering their own sense , who at the same time might far better secure their interest by renouncing their faith ; lastly , that the more persons are concerned to establish and defend a doctrine which is opposed and contemned , the greater evidence they give , that they are perswaded of the truth of it . these are postulata so agreeable to sense and common reason , that i think if an affront to human nature to go about to prove them . but to shew what use we are to make of them ; we must consider that it cannot be denied , that the doctrine of the trinity did meet with opposition very early in the christian church , especially among the iewish christians ; i mean those who strictly adhered to the law of moses , after the apostles had declared the freedom of christians from the obligation of it . these ( as i shall shew by and by ) soon after the dispersion of the church of ierusalem , gathered into a body by themselves , distinct from that which consisted of iews and gentiles , and was therefore called the catholick christian church . and this separate body , whether called ebionites , nazarens , or mineans , did not only differ from the catholick christian church , as to the necessity of observing the law of moses , but likewise as to the divinity of our saviour , which they denied , although they professed to believe him as the christ or promised messias . theodoret hath with very good judgment placed the heresies of the first ages of the ch●istian church , under two distinct heads , ( which others reckon up confusedly ) and those are such as relate to the humanity of christ , as simon magus , and all the sets of those who are called gnosticks , which are recited in his first book . in his second he begins with those which relate to the divinity of christ ; and these are of two kinds : . the iewish christians who denied it . of these , he reckons up the ebionites , cerinthians , the nazarens , and elcesaitae , whom he distinguished from the other ebionites , because of a book of revelation , which one elxai brought among them ; but epiphanius saith , he joyned with the ebionites and nazarens . . those of the gentile christians , who were look'd on as broaching a new doctri●e among them : of these he reckons artemon as the first , then theodotus ; whom others make the first publisher of it , as tertullian , and the old writer in eusebius , supposed to be caius , who lived near the time , and of whom a considerable fragment is preserved in eusebius , which gives light to these matters . the next is another theodotus , who framed a new sect of such as set up mel●hisedeck above christ. then follow paulus samosatenus , and sabellius , who made but one person as well as one god , and so overthrew the trinity ; with whom marcellus agreed in substance , and last of all photinus . but theodoret concludes that book with this passage , viz. that all these heresies against our saviour's divinity were then wholly extinct ; so that there were not so much as any small remainders of them . what would he have said , if he had lived in our age , wherein they are not only revived , but are pretended to have been the true doctrine of the apostolical churches ? had all men lost their senses in theodoret's time ? and yet there were as many learned and able men in the christian church then , as ever were in any time . chap. iii. the socinian plea for the antiquity of their doctrine examined . but this is not the age our vnitarians will stand or fall by . they are for going backward ; and they speak with great comfort about the old ebionites and nazarens as entirely theirs ; and that they had considerable men among them , as theodotion and symmachus , two translators of the hebrew bible . and among the gentile christians , they value themselves upon three men , paulus samosatenus , lucianus , the most learned person , they say , of his age , and photinus bishop of sirmium . as to the vnitarians at rome , ( whom they improperly call nazarens ) they pretended that their doctrine was apostolical , and the general doctrine of the church till the times of victor and zepherin . this is the substance of their plea , which must now be examin'd . i begin with those primitive vnitarians , the ebionites , concerning whom , i observe these things : . that they were a distinct , separate body of men from the christian church . for all the ancient writers who speak of them , do mention them as hereticks , and wholly divided from it , as appears by irenaeus , tertullian , epiphanius , theodoret , s. augustin , and others . eusebius saith of them , that although the devil could not make them renounce christianity , yet finding their weakness , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he made them his own . he would never have said this of any whom he look'd on as members of the christian church . but wherein is it that eusebius blames them ? he tells it in the very next words ; that it was for the mean opinion they entertained of christ ; for they look'd on him as a meer man , but very just . and although there were two sorts of them ; some owning the miraculous conception , and others not ; yet saith he , they at last agreed in the same impiety , which was , that they would not own christ to have had any pre-existence before his birth ; nor that he was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , god the word . it 's true , he finds fault with them afterwards for keeping to the law of moses ; but the first impiety he charges them with , is the other . that which i inferr from hence is , that eusebius himself ( to whom they profess to shew greater respect than to most of the ancient writers , for his exactness and diligence in church-history ) doth affirm the doctrine which overthrows the pre-existence and divinity of christ to be an impiety . and therefore when he affirms the first fifteen bishops of the church of ierusalem who were of the circumcision , viz. to the siege of it by hadrian , did hold the genuine doctrine of christ , it must be understood of his pre-existence and divinity ; for the other we see he accounted an impiety . and he tells us the church of ierusalem then consisted of believing iews , and so it had done from the apostles times to that of hadrian 's banishment of the iews . which is a considerable testimony to two purposes : . to shew that the primitive church of ierusalem did hold the doctrine of christ's pre-existence and divinity . but say our vnitarians , this doth not follow . for what reason ? when it is plain that eusebius accounted that the only genuine doctrine . no , say they , he meant only the miraculous conception , and that they held that , in opposition to those ebionites who said that he was born as other men are . this is very strange ; when eusebius had distinguished the two sorts of ebionites about this matter , and had blamed both of them , even those that held him born of a virgin , for falling into the same impiety . what can satisfie such men , who are content with such an answer ? but say they , eusebius only spake his own sense . not so neither : for he saith in that place , that he had searched the most ancient records of the church of ierusalem . yes , say they , for the succession of the first bishops ; but as to their doctrine he had it from hegesippus , and he was an ebionite himself . then eusebius must not be the man they take him for . for if hegesippus were himself an ebionite , and told eusebius in his commentaries , that the primitive church of ierusalem consisted of all such , then eusebius must suppose that church guilty of the same impiety with which he charges the ebionites ; and would he then have said , that they had the true knowledge of christ among them ? no , say they , eusebius spake his own opinion , but hegesippus being an ebionite himself , meant otherwise . but eusebius doth not use hegesippus his words , but his own in that place ; and withal , how doth it appear that hegesippus himself was an ebionite ? this , one of their latest writers hath undertaken , but in such a manner , as is not like to convince me . it is thus , hegesippus was himself a iewish christian , and made use of the hebrew gospel , and among the hereticks which crept into the church of jerusalem , he never numbers the ebionites or cerinthians , but only the gnosticks . i will not dispute , whether hegesippus was a jewish christian or not . grant he was so , yet how doth it appear that all the iewish christians were at that time ebionites or cerinthians ? it seems they were neither of them hereticks , although they were opposite to each other ; the one held the world created by inferiour powers , the other , by god himself : the one , we see , made christ a mere man ; but the cerinthians held an illapse of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon him , and so made him a kind of a god by his presence , as nestorius did afterwards . but honest hegesippus took neither one nor the other for hereticks , if our vnitarians say true . but yet it doth not appear , that hegesippus was either one or the other . for he speaks of the church of ierusalem , as is plain by eusebius , and the cerinthians and ebionites , were in other parts ; the former in egypt and the lesser or proconsular asia ; and the latter about decapolis and coelesyria , from whence they spread into arabia and armenia , as appears by epiphanius . but origen saith , that all the iewish christians were ebionites . what! no cerinthians among them ? were not those iewish christians ? or were they all turned ebionites then ? no such thing appears by origen's saying . but we are not enquiring now , what they were in his time , but in the church of ierusalem . doth origen say all the iewish christians there were such ? and as to his own time , it is not improbable that those who then made up the separate body of jewish christians were ebionites . but what is this to the first christians of the church of ierusalem ? very much , say they , because the first christians were called nazarens , and the nazarens held the same doctrine with the ebionites . but the title of nazarens did not always signifie the same thing . it was at first used for all christians , as appears by the sect of the nazarens in tertullus his accusation of s. paul ; then it was taken for the christians who stay'd at pella and setled at decapolis and thereabouts , as epiphanius affirms ; for although all the christians withdrew thither before the destruction of ierusalem , as eusebius saith , yet they did not all continue there , but a great number returned to ierusalem , and were there setled under their bishops ; but those who remained about pella kept the name of nazarens , and never were united with the gentile christians , but kept up their old jewish customs , as to their synagogues , even in s. ierom and s. augustine's time . now these nazarens might be all ebionites , and yet those of the church of ierusalem not so at all . . the next thing observable from this place of eusebius is , that while the nazarens and ebionites were setled in coelesyria , and the parts thereabouts , there was a regular christian church at ierusalem , under the bishops of the circumcision , to the siege of hadrian . eusebius observes , that before the destruction of ierusalem , all the christians forsook not only ierusalem , but the coasts of iudea . but that they did not all continue there , is most evident from what eusebius here saith of the church and bishops of ierusalem ; between the two sieges of titus vespasian and hadrian , which was in the year of his empire , saith eusebius . who produces another testimony out of iustin martyr , which shews that the christians were returned to ierusalem . for therein he saith , that barchochebas in that war used the christians with very great severity to make them renounce christianity . how could this be , if all the christians were out of his reach , then being setled about pella ? and although eusebius saith , that when the iews were banished their country by hadrian 's edict , that then the church of ierusalem was made up of gentiles ; yet we are not so strictly to understand him , as though the christians who suffer'd under barchochebas , were wholly excluded . orosius saith , that they were permitted by the emperor's edict . it is sufficient for me , if they were connived at , which is very probable , although they did not think fit to have any such publick persons as their bishops to be any other than gentiles . and hegesippus is allow'd after this time , to have been a iewish christian of the church of ierusalem : so that the church there must consist both of iews and gentiles ; but they can never shew that any of the ebionites did admit any gentile christians among them , which shews that they were then distinct bodies . . they were not only distinct in communion , but had a different rule of faith. this is a point of great consequence , and ought to be well consider'd . for , since our vnitarians own the ebionites as their predecessors , we ought to have a particular eye to the rule of faith received by them , which must be very different from ours , if they follow the ebionites , as i doubt not to make it appear . they say , the ebionites used only s. matthew 's gospel . but the christian church then , and ever since , have receiv'd the four gospels , as of divine authority . eusebius , one of the most approved authors in antiquity by our vnitarians , reckons up the four evangelists and s. paul 's epistles , as writings universally received by the christian church ; then he mentions some generally rejected as spurious ; and after those which were doubted , among which he mentions the gospel according to the hebrews , which the iewish christians follow'd . now here is an apparent difference put between the gospel according to the hebrews , and s. matthew 's gospel ; as much as between a book receiv'd without controversie , and one that was not . but if the gospel according to the hebrews were then acknowledged to be the true gospel of s. matthew ; it was impossible a man of so much sense as eusebius , should make this difference between them . but it is worth our observing , what our vnitarians say about this matter . and by that we may judge very much of their opinion about the gospels . i shall set down their words , for fear i should be thought to do them wrong . symmachus and the ebionites , say they , as they held our saviour to be the son of ioseph and mary ; so they contended that the first chapter of s. matthew's gospel was added by the greek translators . s. matthew wrote his gospel in hebrew , when it was translated into greek , the translator prefaced it with a genealogy and narration that our saviour was conceived by the holy spirit of god , and was not the son of ioseph , but this genealogy and narration , said symmachus and the ebionites , is not in the hebrew gospel of s. matthew , nay is the mere invention of the translator . as for the other gospels , the ebionites and symmachians did not receive the gospel of s. luke : and for that of s. iohn , they said it was indeed written by cerinthus , to confirm his platonick conceits about the logos or word , which he supposed to be the christ or spirit of god , which rested on and inhabited the person of jesus . let us now but join to this another passage , which is this , those whom we now call socinians , were by the fathers and the first ages of christianity called nazarens ; and afterwards they were called ebionites , mineans , symmachians , &c. if this be true , they must have the same opinions as to the books of the new testament ; and hereby we see what sort of men we have to deal with , who under the pretence of the old ebionites , undermine the authority of the new testament . as to s. matthew's gospel , i see no reason to question its being first written in the language then used among the jews , which was mixt of hebrew , syriack , and chaldee : since this is affirmed , not merely by papias , whose authority never went far ; but by origen , irenaeus , eusebius , s. ierom , and others . but i must distinguish between s. matthew's authentick gospel , which pantaenus saw in the indies , and that which was called the gospel according to the hebrews , and the nazaren gospel . s. ierom in one place seems to insinuate , that s. matthew's gospel was preserved in the library of pamphilus at caesarea , and that the nazarens at berrhaea in syria had given him leave to transcribe it . but if we compare this with other places in him , we shall find , that he question'd whether this were the authentick gospel of s. matthew or not ; he saith , it is so called by many ; but he confesses it was the same which the ebionites and nazarens used . in which were many interpolations , as appears by the collections out of it in s. ierom's works and other ancient writers ; which some learned men have put together . and s. ierom often calls it the gospel according to the hebrews . and so do other ancient writers . from the laying several passages together , erasmus suspects , that s. ierom never saw any other than the common nazaren gospel , and offers a good reason for it , viz. that he never made use of its authority to correct the greek of s. matthew , which he would not have failed to have done in his commentaries ; and he produces the nazaren gospel upon sleight occasions . but how came the preface to be curtail'd in the ebionite gospel ? of which epiphanius gives an account , and shews what was inserted instead of it : no , say the ebionites , the preface was added by the translator into greek . from what evidence ? and to what end ? to prove that christ was born of the holy spirit . this then must be look'd on as a mere forgery ; and those ebionites were in the right , who held him to be the son of ioseph and mary . what do these men mean by such suggestions as these ? are they resolved to set up deism among us , and in order thereto , to undermine the authority of the new testament ? for it is not only s. matthew's gospel , but s. luke's and s. iohn's which they strike at , under the pretence of representing the arguments of these wretched ebionites . if their arguments are mean and trifling and merely precarious , why are they not slighted and answered by such as pretend to be christians ? if they think them good , we see what we have to do with these men ; it is not the doctrine of the trinity , so much as the authority of the gospels , which we are to maintain against them : and not those only , for the ebionites rejected all s. paul 's epistles ; and called him an apostate and a transgressor of the law. what say our vnitarians to this ? why truly , this comes from epiphanius , and because he quotes no author , it seems to be one of his malicious tales . this is a very short way of answering , if it would satisfie any men of sense . but they ought to have remembred that within a few pages , they alledge epiphanius as a very competent witness about the ebionites , because he was born in palestine , and lived very near it . but we do not rely wholly upon epiphanius in this matter . for those whom they allow to be the best witnesses as to the doctrine of the nazarens , say the same thing concerning them . as the most learned origen , as they call him , who lived a long time in syria and palestine it self ; and he affirms , that both sorts of ebionites rejected s. paul 's epistles : and theodoret , who they say , lived in coelesyria , where the nazarens most abound , affirms of them , that they allowed only the gospel according to the hebrews , and called the apostle an apostate : by whom they meant s. paul. and the same is said by s. ierom who conversed among them ; that they look on s. paul as a transgressor of the law , and receive none of his writings . have we not now a very comfortable account of the canon of the new testament from these ancient vnitarians ? and if our modern ones account them their predecessors , we may judge what a mean opinion they must have of the writings of the new testament . for if they had any concernment for them , they would never suffer such scandalous insinuations to pass without a severe censure , and a sufficient answer . but their work seems to be rather to pull down , than to establish the authority of revealed religion ; and we know what sort of men are gratified by it . chap. iv. of the considerable men they pretend to have been of their opinion in the primitive church . i now come to consider the men of sense they pretend to among these ancient vnitarians . the first is theodotion , whom they make to be an vnitarian . but he was , saith eusebius from irenaeus , a iewish proselyte , and so they may very much increase the number of vnitarians , by taking in all the iews as well as proselytes . but must these pass for men of sense too , because they are against the doctrine of the trinity , and much upon the same grounds with our modern vnitarians ? for they cry out of contradictions and impossibilities just as they do ; i. e. with as much confidence and as little reason . symmachus is another of their ancient heroes ; he was , if epiphanius may be believed , first a samaritan , and then a iew , and eusebius saith indeed , that he was an ebionite , and therefore for observing the law of moses . s. augustin saith , that in his time the symmachiani were both for circumcision and baptism . s. ierom observes , that theodotion and symmachus , both ebionites , translated the old testament in what concerned our saviour , like iews , and aquila who was a iew , like a christian ; but in another place he blames all three for the same fault . eusebius goes somewhat farther : for he saith , symmachus wrote against s. matthew 's gospel to establish his own heresie , which shew'd he was a true ebionite . the next they mention as one of their great lights , was paulus samosatenus , bishop and patriarch of antioch . but in another place , they have a spiteful insinuation , that men in such places are the great pensioners of the world ; as though they were sway'd only by interest ; and that it keeps them from embracing of the truth . now paulus samosatenus gave greater occasion for such a suspicion than any of the persons so unworthily reflected upon . for he was a man noted for his affectation of excessive vanity and pomp , and very unjust methods of growing rich . it is well we have eusebius his testimony for this ; for they sleight epiphanius for his malicious tales , and s. ierom for his legends ; but they commend eusebius for his exactness and diligence . and i hope theodoret may escape their censure , who affirms , that paulus samofatenus suited his doctrine to his interest with zenobia who then governed in those parts of syria and phoenicia , who professed her self to be of the iewish perswasion . athanasius saith , she was a iew and a favourer of paulus samosatenus . what his opinions were , our vnitarians do not take the pains to inform us , taking it for granted that he was of their mind . eusebius saith , he had a very mean and low opinion of christ , as having nothing in him above the common nature of mankind . theodoret saith , he fell into the doctrine of artemon to oblige zenobia , and artemon , he saith , held that christ was a mere man born of a virgin , but exceeding the prophets in excellency . where the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are used to express the opinion of artemon , which ought to be taken notice of , because our modern vnitarians say , that those words among the ancient writers were taken in opposition to the miraculous conception of our saviour . but paulus samosatenus was universally disowned by the christian church of that time ; although as long as zenobia held her power , he kept his see ; which was for some time after he was first called in question for his heresie . but at first he made use of many arts and devices to deceive the christian bishops of the best reputation , who assembled at antioch in order to the suppressing this dangerous doctrine , as they all accounted it . for hearing of his opinions about our saviour , they ran together , saith eusebius , as against a wolf which designed to destroy the flock . now from hence it is very reasonable to argue , that the samosatenian doctrine was then look'd on as a very dangerous novelty in the christian church . for , although the ebionites had asserted the same thing , as to the divinity of our saviour , yet they were not look'd on as true members of the christian church ; but as s. ierom saith , while they affected to be both iews and christians , they were neither iews nor christians . artemon whoever he was , was but an obscure person ; and theodotus had learning , they say , but was of no place in the church ; but for such a considerable person as the bishop of antioch to own such a doctrine must unavoidably discover the general sence of the christian church concerning it . paulus samosatenus wanted neither parts , nor interest , nor experience ; and he was supported by a princess of great spirit and courage , enough to have daunted all the bishops , at least in those parts , from appearing against him . but such was the zeal and concernment of the bishops of the christian church in this great affair , that they not only assembled themselves , but they communicated it to dionysius bishop of alexandria , and to another of the same name , bishop of rome , and others ; and desired their advice and concurrence , who did all agree in the condemnation of his doctrine . the former said , he would have gone himself to antioch , but for his extreme old age ; and he died soon after the first council , which met at antioch on this occasion ; but he sent his judgment and reasons thither , which we find in an epistle of his still extant , whereof mention is made in the epistle of the second synod of antioch to dionysius bishop of rome , and maximus bishop of alexandria , and all other bishops , priests and deacons of the catholick church , wherein they give an account of their proceedings against paulus samosatenus , and they say , they had invited the bishops of the remoter parts to come to antioch for the suppression of this damnable doctrine ; and among the rest dionysius of alexandria , and firmilian of cappadocia , as persons of greatest reputation then in the church . firmilian was there at the former synod , ( of whom theodoret saith , that he was famous both for divine and humane learning ) and so were gregorius thaumaturgus and athenodorus bishops of pontus , and helenus bishop of tarsus in cilicia , and nicomas of iconium , and hymenaeus of ierusalem , and theotecnus of caesarea ; who all condemned his doctrine , but they spared his person upon his solemn promises to retract it ; but he persisting in it when they were gone home , and fresh complaints being made of him , firmilian was coming a third time to antioch , but died by the way : but those bishops who wrote the synodical epistle do all affirm , that they were witnesses and many others , when he condemned his doctrine , but was willing to forbear his person upon his promise of amendment , which they found afterwards was merely delusory . dionysius alexandrinus , they say , would not write to him , but sent his mind about him to the church of antioch . which epistle is mention'd by s. ierom , ( as written by him a little before his death ) as well as by eusebius and theodoret ; and i do not see sufficient reason to question the authority of that , which fronto ducaeus published from turrian's copy , although it be denied by h. valesius and others . it 's said , indeed , that he did not write to him , i. e. he did not direct it to him , but he might send it to the council in answer to his letters , which he mentions . how far it differs from his style in other epistles , i will not take upon me to judge ; but the design is very agreeable to an epistle from him on that occasion . it 's true , that it seems to represent the opinion of paulus samosatenus after a different manner from what it is commonly thought to have been . but we are to consider , that ●e made use of all the arts to d●sguise himself that he could ; and when he found the making christ to be a mere man would not be born , he went from the ebionite to the cerinthian hypothesis , viz. that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did dwell in him , and that there were two persons in christ , one divine and the other humane ; and two sons , the one by nature the son of god , who had a pre existence , and the other the son of david , who had no subsistence before . this is the opinion which dionysius sets himself against in that epistle ; and which therefore ●ome may imagine was written after nestorius his heresie . but that was no new heresie , as appears by the cerinthians ; and it was that which paulus samosatenus fled to , as more plausible ; which not only appears by this epistle , but by what athanasius and epiphanius have delivered concerning it . athanasius ▪ wrote a book of the incarnation against the followers of paulus samosatenus , who held , as he saith , two persons in christ , viz. one born of the virgin , and a divine person , which descended upon him and dwelt in him . against which opinion he disputes from two places of scripture ; viz. god was manifest in the flesh ; and the word was made flesh : and from the ancient doctrine of the christian church , and the synod of antioch against paulus samosatenus . and in another place he saith , that he held , that the divine word dwelt in christ. and the words of epiphanius are express to the same purpose ; that the logos came and dwelt in the man iesus . and the clergy of constantinople charged nestorius with following the heresie of paulus samosatenus . and photius in his epistles saith , that nestorius tasted too much of the intoxicated cups of paulus samosatenus ; and in the foregoing epistle , he saith , that paulus his followers asserted two hypostases in christ. but some think , that paulus samosatenus did not hold any subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before , but that the word was in god before without any subsistence of its own , and that god gave it a distinct subsistence when it inhabited in the person of christ ; and so marius mercator and leontius understand him ; who say that he differ'd from nestorius therein ; who asserted a divine word with its proper subsistence . but according to them paulus by the word unders●ood that divine energy whereby christ acted , and which dwelt in him ; but dionysius saith he made two christs , and two sons of god. but the doctrine of the christian church , he saith was that there was but one christ , and one son , who w●s the eternal word , and was made flesh. and it is observable , that he brings the very same places we do now to prove this doctrine , as in the beginning was the word , &c. and before abraham was i am . it seems that some of the bishops who had been upon the examination of his opinions before the second synod , which deposed him , sent him an account of their faith and required his answer ; wherein they declare the son not to be god , according to god's decree , ( which he did not stick at ) but that he was so really and substantially ; and whosoever denied this , they said , was out of the communion of the church , and all the catholick churches agreed with them in it . and they declare , that they received this doctrine from the scriptures of the old and new testament , and bring the same places we do now , as , thy throne o god was for ever , &c. who is over all , god blessed for ever . all things were made by him , &c. and we do not find that paulus samosatenus , as subtle as he was , ever imagin'd that these places belong'd to any other than christ , or that the making of all things was to be understood of the making of nothing ; but putting it into mens power to make themselves new creatures . these were discoveries only reserved for the men of sense and clear ideas in these brighter ages of the world. but at last , after all the arts and subterfuges which paulus samosatenus used , there was a man of sense , as it happen'd , among the clergy of antioch , called malchion , who was so well acquainted with his sophistry , that he drove him out of all , and laid his sense so open before the second synod , that he was solemnly deposed for denying the divinity of the son of god , and his descent from heaven , as appears by their synodical epistle . it is pity we have it not entire ; but by the fragments of it , which are preserved by some ancient writers , we find that his doctrine of the divinity in him by inhabitation was then condemned , and the substantial union of both natures asserted . i have only one thing more to observe concerning him , which is , that the arian party in their decree at sardica , ( or rather philippopolis ) do confess that paulus samosatenus his doctrine was condemned by the whole christian world. for they say , that which passed in the eastern synod , was signed and approved by all . and alexander bishop of alexandria , in his epistle to alexander of constantinople affirms the same . and now i hope , i may desire our men of sense to reflect upon these matters . here was no fire nor faggot threatned , no imperial edicts to inforce this doctrine , nay the queen of those parts , under whose jurisdiction they lived at that time , openly espoused the cause of paulus samosatenus , so that here could be nothing of interest to sway them to act in opposition to her . and they found his interest so strong , that he retained the possession of his see , till aurelian had conquer'd zenobia , and by his authority he was ejected . this synod which deposed him , did not sit in the time of aurelian , as is commonly thought , but before his time , while zenobia had all the power in her hands in those eastern parts , which she enjoy'd five years ; till she was dispossess'd by aurelian , from whence ant. pagi concludes , that paulus kept his see three years after the sentence against him ; but upon application to aurelian ; he who afterwards began a persecution against all christians , gave this rule , that he with whom the italian bishops , and those of rome communicated , should enjoy the see , upon which paulus was at last turned out . by this we see a concurrence of all the christian bishops of that time against him , that denied the divinity of our saviour ; and this without any force , and against their interest , and with a general consent of the christian world. for there were no mighty awes and draconic sanctions to compell , of which they sometimes speak , as if they were the only powerfull methods to make this doctrine go down . and what greater argument can there be , that it was then the general sense of the christian church ? and it would be very hard to condemn all his opposers for men that wanted sense and reason , because they so unanimously opposed him . not so unanimously neither , say our vnitarians , because lucian , a presbyter of the church of antioch , and a very learned man , joyned with him . it would have been strange indeed , if so great a man as paulus samosatenus , could prevail with none of his own church to joyn with him , especially one that came from the same place of samosata , as lucian did ; and probably was by him brought thither . he hath an extraordinary character given him by eusebius , both for his life and learning ; and so by s. ierom , without the least reflection upon him as to matter of faith. but on the other side , alexander bishop of alexandria in his epistle concerning arius to alexander of constantinople , doth say , that he follow'd paulus samosatenus , and held separate communion for many years , under the three following bishops . he doth not say that he died so , when he suffer'd martyrdom under maximinus at nicomedia ; neither doth he say the contrary . upon which learned men are divided , whether he persisted in that opinion or not . petavius and valesius give him up ; on the other side baronius vindicates him , and saith , the mis-report of him came from his zeal against sabellianism ; and that alexander wrote that of him before his books were throughly examin'd ; that athanasius never joyns him with paulus samosatenus ; that the arians never produced his authority in their debates , as they would have done , since the emperor's mother had built a city in the place where he suffer'd martyrdom . it cannot be doubted that the arian party would have it believed that they came out of lucian's school , as appears by arius his epistle to eusebius of nicomedia ; but on the other side , the great argument to me is , that this very party at the council of antioch , produced a creed , which they said , was there found written with lucian's own hand , which is directly contrary to the samosatenian doctrine . now , either this was true or false : if it were true , then it was false that he was a samosatenian ; if it were false , how came the arian party to give it out for true ? especially those who valued themselves for coming out of his school . they were far enough from being such weak men to produce the authority of lucian at antioch , where he was so much esteemed , for a doctrine utterly inconsistent with that of paulus samosatenus , if it were there known , that he was his disciple , and separated from three bishops on that account . for therein the son is owned to be god of god , begotten of the father before all ages , perfect god of perfect god , &c. suppose they had a mind to subvert the nicene faith by this creed under the name of lucian , ( only because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was left out ) yet what an improbable way did they take , when they supported the main points by his authority , and that at antioch , where it was greatest ? if philostorgius may be credited , the great men of the arian party had been his scholars , as besides eusebius of nicomedia , maris of chalcedon , theognis of nice , leontius of antioch , and several other leading bishops , and even arius himself pretended to it . which makes me apt to think , that alexander knowing this , and at first not being able so well to judge of lucian's opinion , charged him with following paulus samosatenus , from whence the odium would fall upon his scholars . for his design is to draw the succession down from ebion , and artemon , and paulus samosatenus , and lucian to arius and his associates ; and charges them with holding the same doctrine , wherein he was certainly mistaken ; and so he might be about lucian's separation from the following bishops on that account . the last our vnitarians mention among their great men , is photinus bishop of sirmium . they take it for granted that he was of their opinion . this is certain , that whatever it was , it was generally condemned , as well by the arians as others ; and after several councils called , he was deposed for his heresie . the first time we find him condemned , was by the arian party in a second council at antioch , as appears by the profession of faith drawn up by them , extant in athanasius and socrates . there they anathematize expressly the disciples of marcellus and photinus , for denying the pre-existence and deity of christ. but by christ , they understood , the person born of the virgin , who was the son of god ; but they did not deny the pre-existence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and never dream'd that any could think that christ was to be called the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , from his office of preaching , as our modern vnitarians assert . but photinus his opinion was , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was before all ages , but not christ , or the son of god , which divine word was partly internal , and so it was ever with god , and partly external , when it was communicated to the person of christ , whereby he became the son of god. but the arians there declare their belief , that christ was the living word , and son of god before all worlds , and by whom he made all things . the next time he is said to be condemned , was in that which is called the council at sardica , but was the council of the eastern bishops after their parting from the western . this is mention'd by epiphanius and sulpitius severus , the latter saith he differ'd from sabellius only in the point of vnion , i. e. because sabellius made the persons to be merely denominations which was then called the heresie of the vnionitae ; and therefore photinus must assert an hypostasis to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or else he did not at all differ from sabellius . and it appears by epiphanius , that photinus did distinguish between christ and the word . in the beginning was the word , said he , but not the son , which title was promised and foretold , but did not belong to christ till he was born of the holy ghost and mary , so he expresses it . herein , saith epiphanius , he follow'd paulus samosatenus , but exceeded him in his inventions . in answer to him , he saith , that s. iohn's words are not , in the beginning was the word , and the word was in god , but the word was with god , and the word was god. little did either side imagine that this was to be understood of the beginning of the gospel , as our modern photinians would make us believe they think ; but photinus himself was a person of too much sagacity to take up with such an absurd and insipid sence . i pass over the fresh condemnations of photinus in the councils at milan and rome , because his opinion is not to be learnt from them ; and come to that at sirmium , where it is more particularly set ●orth , as well as condemned . but here we must distinguish the two councils at sirmium ; in the former , he was condemned , but the people would not part with him ; but in the second , he was not only condemned , but effectually deposed , the emperor constantius a professed arian , forcing him to withdraw : but it was upon his own appeal to the emperor against the judgment of the council , who appointed judges delegates to hear this cause : and basilius ancyranus was the manager of the debate with him , wherein he is said to have been so much too hard for photinus , that the emperor himself order'd his banishment . and i can find nothing of his return ; but our vnitarians have found out ( but they do not tell us where ) that the people recalled him , and so he planted his doctrine among them , that it overspread and was the religion of the illyrican provinces , till the papacy on one hand , and the turk on the other , swallow'd up those provi●ces . this looks too like making history to serve a turn , unless some good proof were brought for it . but instead of photinus his returning , and his doctrine prevailing and continuing there , we find valentinian calling a council in illyricum , and establishing the nicene faith there : and a council at aquileia against the arians , where the bishop of sirmium was present , and declared against arianism , and joyned with s. ambrose , who condemns photinus for making christ the son of david , and not the son of god ▪ paulinus saith in his life , that he went on purpose to sirmium to consecrate an orthodox bishop there ; which he did , notwithstanding the power of iustina the empress , who favoured the arians . s. ierom in his chronicon saith , that photinus died in galatia which was his own country ; so that there is no probability in what they affirm of photinus his settling his doctrine in those parts , till the papacy and the turk swallow'd those provinces ; for any one that looks into the history of those parts may be soon satisfied , that not the pope nor the turk , but the huns under attila , made the horrible devastations not only at sirmium , but in all the considerable places of that country : so that if these mens reason be no better than their history , there is very little cause for any to be fond of their writings . but as though it were not enough to mention such things once ; in their answer to the late archbishop's sermons , they inlarge upon it . for he having justly rebuked them for the novelty of their interpretations , they , to avoid this , boast of the concurrence of the ancient vnitarians , the followers of paulus and photinus , who , they say , abounded every-where , and even possessed some whole provinces . this passage i was not a little surprized at . since theodoret , who , i think , was somewhat more to be credited than sandius , doth so expresly say , that the samosatenians and photinians were extinct in his time , in a place already mentioned . but upon search i could find no other ground for it , but a passage or two in sandius , who is none of the exactest historians . in one place he saith from an obscure polish chronicle ( extant in no other language but of that country ) that the bulgarians when they first received christianity embraced photinianism . and is not this very good authority among us ? from hence he takes it for granted , that they all continued photinians to the time of pope nicolas , who converted them . but all this is grounded on a ridiculous mistake in platina , who in the life of nicolas saith , that the pope confirmed them in the faith , pulso photino ; whereas it should be pulso photio ; for photius at that time was patriarch of constantinople , and as appears by his first epistle , assumed their conversion to himself ; and insisted upon the right of jurisdiction over that country . sandius referrs to blondus ; who saith no such thing , but only that the bulgarians were converted before ; which is true ; and the greek historians , as ioh. curopalates , zonaras , and others , gives a particular account of it ; but not a word of photinianism in it . so that the archbishop had very great reason to charge their interpretation with novelty ; and that not only because the photinians had no such provinces , as they boast of ; but that neither paulus samosatenus , nor photinus , nor any of their followers , that we can find , did ever interpret the beginning of s. john , as they do ; i.e. of the new creation , and not of the old ; and so , as the word had no pre-existence before he was born of the virgin. i do not confine them to the nicenists , as they call them ; but let them produce any one among the samosatenians , or photinians , who so understood s. iohn . and therein sandius was in the right ( which ought to be allow'd him , for he is not often so ) when he saith , that no christian interpreter before socinus ever held such a sense of the word , as he did ; and therefore his followers he saith , ought to be called socinians only , and not ebionites , samosatenians , or photinians . but to return to photinus his opinion . it is observable , what socrates saith , concerning his being deposed at sirmium , viz. that what was done in that matter was universally approved , not only then , but afterwards . so that here we have the general consent of the christian world , in that divided time , against the photinian doctrine . and yet it was not near so unreasonable as our vnitarians ; for photinus asserted the pre-existence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and its inhabiting in christ from his conception ; wherein he differ'd from paulus samosatenus who asserted it to have been upon the merit of his virtue . in the anathema's of the council of sirmium against photinus , one is against any one that asserts that there is one god , but denies christ to have been the son of god before all worlds , and that the world was made by him in obedience to the will of the father . others , against him that asserts that there was a dilatation of the divine substance to make him the son of god , who was a man born of the virgin mary ; this appears from anath . , , . put together . which is best explained by hilary himself in another place , where he mentions this as the photinian doctrine , that god the word did extend himself so far , as to inhabit the person born of the virgin. this he calls a subtle and dangerous doctrine . and therein he saith photinus differ'd from sabellius ; that the latter denied any difference between father and son , but only in names ; but photinus held a real difference , but not before the nativity of christ ; then he said , the divine word inhabiting in christ made him to be the real son of god. the only doubt is , whether photinus held , the word to have had a distinct hypostasis before or not . marius mercator an author of good credit , who lived in s. augustin's time ( and to whom an epistle of his is extant in the new edition of his works ) gives a very particular account of the opinion of photinus with relation to the nestorian controversie , in which he was very well versed . in an epistle written by him on purpose , he shews that nestorius agreed with photinus in asserting , that the word had a pre-existence ; and that the name of son of god did not belong to the word , but to christ after the inhabitation of the word . but he there seems to think , that photinus did not hold the word to have had a real hypostasis before the birth of christ : but when he comes after to compare their opinions more exactly , he then affirms , that photinus and nestorius were agreed , and that he did not deny the word to be con●substantial with god ; but that he was not the son of god till christ was born in whom he dwelt . by which we see how little reason our vnitarians have to boast of photinus as their predecessor . as to the boast of the first unitarians at rome , that theirs was the general doctrine , before the time of victor ; it is so fully confuted by the ancient writer in eusebius , who mentions it , from the scriptures and the first christian writers , named by him , that it doth not deserve to be taken notice of ; especially since he makes it appear , that it was not heard of among them at rome , till it was first broached there by theodotus , as not only he , but tertullian affirms ; as i have already observed . thus i have clearly proved , that the doctrine of the trinity , was so far from being embraced only on the account of force and fear , that i have shewed there was in the first ages of the christian church , a free and general consent in it , even when they were under persecution ; and after the arian controversie broke out , yet those who denied the pre-existence , and co-eternity of the son of god were universally condemned ; even the arian party concurring in the synods mention'd by hilary . but our vnitarians are such great pretenders to reason , that this argument from the authority of the whole christian church , signifies little or nothing to them . therefore they would conclude still that they have the better of us in point of reason , because they tell us , that they have clear and distinct perceptions , that what we call mysteries of faith , are contradictions , impossibilities , and pure nonsense ; and that they do not reject them , because they do not comprehend them , but because they do comprehend them to be so . this is a very bold charge , and not very becoming the modesty and decency of such , who know at the same time that they oppose the religion publickly established , and in such things which we look on as some of the principal articles of the christian faith. chap. v. of their charge of contradiction in the doctrine of the trinity . but i shall not take any advantages from thence , but immediately proceed to the next thing i undertook in this discourse , viz. to consider what grounds they have for such a charge as this , of contradiction and impossibility . in my sermon which gave occasion to these expressions ( as is before intimated ) i had undertaken to prove , that considering the infinite perfections of the divine nature , which are so far above our reach , god may justly oblige us to believe those things concerning himself which we are not able to comprehend ; and i instanced in some essential attributes of god , as his eternity , omniscience , spirituality , &c. and therefore , if there be such divine perfections , which we have all the reason to believe , but no faculties sufficient to comprehend , there can be no ground from reason to reject such a doctrine which god hath revealed , because the manner of it may be incomprehensible by us . and what answer do they give to this ? they do not deny it in general , that god may oblige us to believe things above our comprehension ; but he never obliges us to believe contradictions , and that they charge the doctrine of the trinity with ; and for this they only referr me to their books , where they say it is made out . but i must say , that i have read and consider'd those tracts , and am very far from being convinced that there is any such contradiction in this doctrine , as it is generally received in the christian church ; or as it is explained in the athanasian creed . and , i shall shew the unreasonableness of this charge from these things . . that there is a difference between a contradiction in numbers , and in the nature of things . . that it is no contradiction to assert three persons in one common nature . . that it is no contradiction to say that there are three distinct persons in the trinity and not three gods. if i can make out these things , i hope i may abate something of that strange and unreasonable confidence , wherewith these men charge the doctrine of the trinity with contradictions . . i begin with the first of them . and i shall draw up the charge in their own words . in one of their late books they have these words . theirs , they say , is an accountable and reasonable faith , but that of the trinitarians is absurd and contrary both to reason and to it self ; and therefore not only false but impossible . but wherein lies this impossibility ? that they soon tell us . because we affirm that there are three persons , who are severally and each of them true god , and yet there is but one true god. now , say they , this is an error in counting or numbring , which when stood in is of all others the most brutal and inexcusable ; and not to discern it is not to be a man. what must these men think the christian church hath been made up of all this while ? what ? were there no men among them but the vnitarians ? none that had common sense , and could tell the difference between one and three ? but this is too choice a notion to be deliver'd but once ; we have it over and over from them . in another place , they say , we cannot be mistaken in the notion of one and three ; we are most certain that one is not three , and three are not one. this it is to be men ! but the whole christian world besides are in brutal and inexcusable errors about one and three . this is not enough , for they love to charge home ; for one of their terrible objections against the athanasian creed is , that here is an arithmetical , as well as grammatical contradiction . for , in saying god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost , yet not three gods but one god , a man first distinctly numbers three gods , and then in summing them up brutishly says , not three gods but one god. brutishly still ! have the brutes and trinitarians learnt arithmetick together ? methinks such expressions do not become such whom the christian church hath so long since condemned for heresies . but it may be with the same civility they will say , it was brutishly done of them . but can these men of sense and reason think , that the point in controversie ever was , whether in numbers , one could be three , or three one ? if they think so , i wonder they do not think of another thing ; which is the begging all trinitarians for fools ; because they cannot count one , two and three ; and an vnitarian jury would certainly cast them . one would think such writers had never gone beyond shop-books ; for they take it for granted , that all depends upon counting . but these terrible charges were some of the most common and trite objections of infidels . st. augustin mentions it as such , when he saith , the infidels sometimes ask us , what do you call the father ? we answer , god. what the son ? we answer , god. what the holy ghost ? we answer , god. so that here the infidels make the same objection , and draw the very same inference . then , say they , the father , son and h. ghost are three gods. but what saith s. augustin to this ? had he no more skill in arithmetick than to say there are three and yet but one ? he saith plainly that there are not three gods. the infidels are troubled , because they are not inlightend ; their heart is shut up , because they are without faith. by which it is plain , he look'd on these as the proper objections of infidels and not of christians . but may not christians have such doubts in their minds ? he doth not deny it ; but then he saith , where the true foundation of faith is laid in the heart , which helps the vnderstanding ; we are to embrace with it , all that it can reach to ; and where we can go no farther , we must believe without doubting : which is a wise resolution of this matter . for there are some things revealed , which we can entertain the notion of in our minds , as we do of any other matters , and yet there may be some things belonging to them which we cannot distinctly conceive . we believe god to have been from all eternity ; and that because god hath revealed it ; but here is something we can conceive , viz. that he was so ; and here is something we cannot conceive , viz. how he was so . this instance i had produced in my sermon , to shew that we might be obliged to believe such things concerning god , of which we cannot have a clear and distinct notion ; as that god was from all eternity , although we cannot conceive in our minds , how he could be from himself . now , what saith the vnitarian to this , who pretended to answer me ? he saith , if god must be from himself , then an eternal god is a contradiction ; for that implies , that he was before he was ; and so charges me with espousing the cause of atheists . i wish our vnitarians were as free from this charge as i am . but this is malicious cavilling . for my design was only to shew , that we could have no distinct conception of something which we are bound to believe . for upon all accounts we are bound to believe an eternal god , and yet we cannot form a distinct and clear idea of the manner of it . whether being from himself be taken positively , or negatively , the matter is not cleared ; the one is absurd , and the other unconceivable by us . but still i say , it is a thing that we are bound to believe stedfastly , although it is above our comprehension . but instead of answering to this , he runs out into an examination of one notion of eternity : and as he thinks , shews some absurdities in that , which are already answer'd . but that was not my meaning , but to shew that we could have no clear and distinct notion of eternity ; and if his arguments were good they prove what i aimed at , at least as to that part ; and himself produces my own words to shew , that there were such difficulties every way , which we could not master ; and yet are bound to believe , that necessary existence is an inseparable attribute of god. so that here we have a clear instance of what s. augustin saith , that we may believe something upon full conviction , as that god is eternal ; and yet there may remain something which we cannot reach to by our understanding , viz. the manner how eternity is to be conceived by us : which goes a great way towards clearing the point of the trinity , notwithstanding the difficulty in our conceiving the manner how three should be one , and one three . but s. augustin doth not give it over so ; let us keep stedfast , saith he , to the foundation of our faith , that we may arrive to the top of perfection ; the father is god , the son is god , the holy ghost is god ; the father is not the son , nor the son the father , nor the holy ghost either father or son. and he goes on . the trinity is one god , one eternity , one power , one majesty , three persons one god. so it is in erasmus his edition ; but the late editors say , that the word personae was not in their manuscript . and it is not material in this place , since elsewhere he approves the use of the word persons , as the fittest to express our meaning in this case . for since some word must be agreed upon , to declare our sense by , he saith , those who understood the propriety of the latin tongue , could not pitch upon any more proper than that , to signifie that they did not mean three distinct essences , but the same essence with a different hypostasis , founded in the relation of one to the other ; as father and son have the same divine essence , but the relations being so different that one cannot be confounded with the other , that which results from the relation being joyned with the essence , was it which was called a person . but saith s. augustin , the caviller will ask , if there be three , what three are they ? he answers , father , son and holy ghost . but then he distinguishes between what they are in themselves , and what they are to each other . the father as to himself is god , but as to the son he is father : the son as to himself is god , but as to the father he is the son. but how is it possible to understand this ? why , saith he , take two men , father and son ; the one as to himself is a man , but as to the son a father ; the son , as to himself is a man , but as to the father , he is a son : but these two have the same common nature . but saith he , will it not hence follow , that as these are two men , so the father and son in the divine essence must be two gods ? no , there lies the difference between the humane and divine nature . that one cannot be multiplied and divided as the other is . and therein lies the true solution of the difficulty , as will appear afterwards . when you begin to count , saith he , you go on , one , two and three . but when you have reckon'd them what is it you have been counting ? the father is the father , the son the son , and the holy ghost , the holy ghost . what are these three ? are they not three gods ? no , are they not three almighties ? no , they are capable of number as to their relation to each other ; but not as to their essence which is but one. the substance of the answer lies here , the divine essence is that alone which makes god , that can be but one , and therefore there can be no more gods than one . but because the same scripture , which assures us of the unity of the divine essence , doth likewise joyn the son and holy ghost in the same attributes , operations and worship , therefore as to the mutual relations , we may reckon three , but as to the divine essence , that can be no more than one. boëthius was a great man in all respects , for his quality , as well as for his skill in philosophy and christianity ; and he wrote a short but learned discourse to clear this matter . the catholick doctrine of the trinity , saith he , is this ; the father is god , the son god and the holy ghost ; but they are not three gods but one god. and yet ( which our vnitarians may wonder at ) this very man hath written a learned book of arithmetick . but how doth he make this out ? how is it possible for three to be but one ? first he shews , that there can be but one divine essence ; for to make more than one must suppose a diversity . principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est . if you make a real difference in nature as the arians did , then there must be as many gods , as there are different natures . among men , there are different individuals of the same kind ; but , saith he , it is the diversity of accidents which makes it ; and if you can abstract from all other accidents , yet they must have a different place , for two bodies cannot be in the same place . the divine essence is simple and immaterial , and is what it is of it self ; but other things are what they are made , and consist of parts , and therefore may be divided . now that which is of it self can be but one ; and therefore cannot be numbred . and one god cannot differ from another , either by accidents or substantial differences . but saith he , there is a twofold number ; one by which we reckon ; and another in the things reckoned . and the repeating of units in the former makes a plurality , but not in the latter . it may be said , that this holds where there are only different names for the same thing ; but here is a real distinction of father , son and holy ghost . but then he shews , " that the difference of relation , can make no alteration in the essence ; and where there is no diversity , there can be but one essence , although the different relation may make three persons . this is the substance of what he saith concerning this difficulty , which , as he suggests , arises from our imaginations , which are so filled with the division and multiplicity of compound and material things , that it is a hard matter for them so to recollect themselves as to consider the first principles and grounds of vnity and diversity . but if our vnitarians have not throughly consider'd those foundations , they must , as they say to one of their adversaries , argue like novices in these questions . for these are some of the most necessary speculations for understanding these matters ; as what that vnity is which belongs to a perfect being ; what diversity is required to multiply an infinite essence , which hath vnity in its own nature : whether it be therefore possible , that there should be more divine essences than one , since the same essential attributes must be , where ever there is the divine essence ? whether there can be more individuals , where there is no dissimilitude , and can be no division or separation ? whether a specifick divine nature be not inconsistent with the absolute perfection , and necessary existence which belongs to it ? whether the divine nature can be individually the same , and yet there be several individual essences : these and a great many other questions it will be necessary for them to resolve , before they can so peremptorily pronounce , that the doctrine of the trinity doth imply a contradiction on the account of the numbers of three and one. and so i come to the second particular . chap. vi. no contradiction for three persons to be in one common nature . ii. that it is no contradiction to assert three persons in one common nature . i shall endeavour to make these matters as clear as i can ; for the greatest difficulties in most mens minds have risen from the want of clear and distinct apprehensi●ns of those fundamental notions , which are necessary in order to the right understanding of them . . we are to distinguish between the being of a thing , and a thing in being ; or between essence and existence . . between the vnity of nature or essence , and of existence or individuals of the same nature . . between the notion of persons in a finite and limited nature , and in a being uncapable of division and separation . . between the being of a thing , and a thing in being . by the former we mean the nature and essential properties of a thing ; whereby it is distinguished from all other kinds of beings . so god and his creatures are essentially distinguished from each other by such attributes which are incommunicable ; and the creatures of several kinds are distinguished by their natures or essences ; for the essence of a man and of a brute are not barely distinguished by individuals , but by their kinds . and that which doth constitute a distinct kind is one and indivisible in it self : for the essence of man is but one and can be no more ; for if there were more , the kind would be alter'd ; so that there can be but one common nature or essence to all the individuals of that kind . but because these individuals may be or may not be , therefore we must distinguish them as they are in actual being , from what they are in their common nature ; for that continues the same , under all the variety and succession of individuals . . we must now distinguish the vnity which belongs to the common nature , from that which belongs to the individuals in actual being . and the vnity of essence is twofold : . where the essence and existence are the same , i. e. where necessary existence doth belong to the essence , as it is in god , and in him alone ; it being an essential and incommunicable perfection . . where the existence is contingent , and belongs to the will of another ; and so it is in all creatures , intellectual and material , whose actual being is dependent on the will of god. the vnity of existence may be consider'd two ways . . as to it self , and so it is called identity ; or a thing continuing the same with it self : the foundation whereof in man is that vital principle which results from the union of soul and body . for as long as that continues , notwithstanding the great variety of changes in the material parts , the man continues entirely the same . . the vnity of existence as to individuals may be consider'd as to others , i. e. as every one stands divided from every other individual of the same kind ; although they do all partake of the same common essence . and the clearing of this , is the main point , on which the right notion of these matters depends . in order to that , we must consider two things . . what that is , whereby we perceive the difference of individuals ? . what that is , which really makes two beings of the same kind to be different from each other ? . as to the reason of our perception of the difference between individuals of the same kind , it depends on these things . . difference of outward accidents , as features , age , bulk , meen , speech , habit and place . . difference of inward qualities and dispositions ; which we perceive by observation , and arise either from constitution , or education , or company , or acquired habits . . as to the true ground of the real difference between the existence of one individual from the rest , it depends upon the separate existence which it hath from all others . for that which gives it a being distinct from all others and divided by individual properties , is the true ground of the difference between them , and that can be no other but the will of god. and no consequent faculties or acts of the mind by self-reflection , &c. can be the reason of this difference ; because the difference must be supposed antecedent to them . and nothing can be said to make that , which must be supposed to be before it self ; for there must be a distinct mind in being from all other minds , before it can reflect upon it self . but we are not yet come to the bottom of this matter . for as to individual persons , there are these things still to be consider'd . . actual existence in it self , which hath a mode belonging to it , or else the humane nature of christ could not have been united with the divine , but it must have had the personal subsistence , and consequently there must have been two persons in christ. . a separate and divided existence from all others , which arises from the actual existence , but may be distinguished from it ; and so the humane nature of christ , although it had the subsistence proper to being , yet had not a separate existence , after the hypostatical vnion . . the peculiar manner of subsistence , which lies in such properties as are incommunicable to any other ; and herein lies the proper reason of personality . which doth not consist in a meer intelligent being , but in that peculiar manner of subsistence in that being which can be in no other . for when the common nature doth subsist in individuals , there is not only a separate existence , but something so peculiar to it self , that it can be communicated to no other . and this is that which makes the distinction of persons . . there is a common nature which must be joyned with this manner of subsistence to make a person ; otherwise it would be a meer mode ; but we never conceive a person without the essence in conjunction with it . but here appears no manner of contradiction in asserting several persons in one and the same common nature . . the individuals of the same kind are said to differ in number from each other , because of their different accidents and separate existence . for so they are capable of being numbred . whatever is compounded is capable of number as to its parts , and may be said to be one by the union of them ; whatever is separated from another is capable of number by distinction . but where there can be no accidents nor division , there must be perfect unity . . there must be a separation in nature , where-ever there is a difference of individuals under the same kind . i do not say there must be an actual separation and division as to place , but that there is and must be so in nature , where one common nature subsists in several individuals . for all individuals must divide the species , and the common nature u●ites them . and this philoponus understood very well , and therefore he never denied such a division and separation in the divine persons , as is implied in distinct individuals : which is the last thing to be consider'd here . . we are now to enquire how far these things will hold as to the persons in the trinity , and whether it be a contradiction to assert three persons in the godhead and but one god. we are very far from disputing the vnity of the divine essence , which we assert to be so perfect and indivisible , as not to be capable of such a difference of persons as is among men. because there can be no difference of accidents , or place , or qualities in the divine nature ; and there can be no separate existence , because the essence and existence are the same in god ; and if necessary existence be an inseparable attribute of the divine essence , it is impossible there should be any separate existence ; for what always was and must be , can have no other existence than what is implied in the very essence . but will not this overthrow the distinction of persons and run us into sabellianism ? by no means . for our vnitarians grant , that the noetians and sabellians held , that there is but one divine substance , essence or nature , and but one person . and how can those who hold three persons be sabellians ? yes , say they , the sabellians held three relative persons . but did they mean three distinct subsistences , or only one subsistence sustaining the names , or appearances , or manifestations of three persons ? the latter they cannot deny to have been the true sense of the sabellians . but say they , these are three persons in a classical critical sense . we meddle not at present with the dispute which valla hath against boethius about the proper latin sense of a person ( and petavius saith valla's objections are mere iests and trifles ) but our sense of a person is plain , that it signifies the essence with a particular manner of subsistence , which the greek fathers called an hypostasis , taking it for that incommunicable property which makes a person . but say our vnitarians , a person is an intelligent being , and therefore three persons must be three intelligent beings . i answer , that this may be taken two ways . . that there is no person where there is no intelligent nature to make it a person , and so we grant it . . that a person implies an intelligent being , separate and divided from other individuals of the same kind , as it is among men : and so we deny it as to the persons of the trinity , because the divine essence is not capable of such division and separation as the humane nature is . but say they again , the fathers did hold a specifical divine nature , and the persons to be as so many individuals . this they repeat very often in their late books ; and after all , refer us to curcellaeus for undeniable proofs of it . let us for the present suppose it , then i hope the fathers are freed from holding contradictions in the doctrine of the trinity ; for what contradiction can it be , to hold three individual persons in the godhead , and one common nature , more than it is to hold that there are three humane persons in one and the same common nature of man ? will they make this a contradiction too ? but some have so used themselves to the language of iargon , nonsense , contradiction , impossibility , that it comes from them , as some men swear , when they do not know it . but i am not willing to go off with this answer ; for i do take the fathers to have been men of too great sense and capacity to have maintained such an absurd opinion , as that of a specifick nature in god. for either it is a mere logical notion , and act of the mind without any real existence belonging to it as such , which is contrary to the very notion of god , which implies a necessary existence ; or it must imply a divine nature , which is neither father , son , nor holy ghost . which is so repugnant to the doctrine of the fathers , that no one that is any ways conversant in their writings on this argument , can imagine they should hold such an opinion . and i am so far from being convinced by curcellaeus his undeniable proofs , that i think it no hard matter to bring undeniable proofs that he hath mistaken their meaning . of which i shall give an account in this place , because i fear his authority hath had too much sway with some , as to this matter . i shall not insist upon his gross mistake in the very entrance of that discourse , where he saith , that the bishops of gaul and germany disliked the homoousion , and gave three reasons against it ; whereas hilary speaks of the eastern bishops whom he goes about to vindicate to the western bishops , who were offended with them for that reason ; as any one that reads hilary de synodis may see . but i come to the main point . his great argument is from the use of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which may extend to individuals of the same kind . who denies it ? but the question is whether the fathers used it in that sense , so as to imply a difference of individuals in the same common essence ? there were two things aimed at by them in their dispute with the arians . ( . ) to shew , that the son was of the same substance with the father , which they denied , and made him of an inferior created substance , of another kind . now the fathers thought this term very proper to express their sense against them . but then this word being capable of a larger sense than they intended , they took care , ( . ) to assert a perfect unity and indivisibility of the divine essence . for the arians were very ready to charge them with one of these two things . ( . ) that they must fall into sabellianism , if they held a perfect unity of essence : or ( . ) when they clear'd themselves of this , that they must hold three gods ; and both these they constantly denied . to make this clear , i shall produce the testimonies of some of the chief both of the greek and latin fathers , and answer curcellaeus his objections . athanasius takes notice of both these charges upon their doctrine of the trinity : as to sabellianism he declared , that he abhorred it equally with arianism ; and he saith , it lay in making father and son to be only different names of the same person ; and so they asserted but one person in the godhead . as to the other charge of polytheism , he observes , that in the scripture language , all mankind was reckon'd as one , because they have the same essence ; and if it be so , as to men , who have such a difference of features , of strength , of vnderstanding , of language , how much more may god be said to be one , in whom is an undivided dignity , power , counsel and operation . doth this prove such a difference , as is among individuals of the same kind among men ? no man doth more frequently assert the indivisible vnity of the divine nature than he . he expresly denies such divided hypostases , as are among men ; and saith , that in the trinity there is a conjunction without confusion , and a distinction without division ; that in the trinity there is so perfect an vnion , and that it is so undivided and united in it self ; that where-ever the father is , there is the son and the holy ghost , and so the rest , because there is but one godhead , and one god who is over all , and through all , and in all . but saith curcellaeus , the contrary rather follows from this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or mutual inexistence , for that could not be without distinct substance , as in water and wine . but this is a very gross mistake of the fathers notion , who did not understand by it a local in-existence as of bodies , but such an indivisible vnity that one cannot be without the other , as even petavius hath made it appear from athanasius and others . athanasius upon all occasions asserts the unity of the divine nature to be perfect and indivisible . god , saith he , is the father of his son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , without any division of the substance . and in other places , that the substance of the father and son admit of no division , and he affirms this to have been the sense of the council of nice ; so that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of the same indivisible substance . curcellaeus answers , that athanasius by this indivisible vnity meant only a close and indissoluble vnion . but he excluded any kind of division , and that of a specifick nature into several individuals as a real division in nature ; for no man whoever treated of those matters denied , that a specifick nature was divided , when there were several individuals under it . but what is it which makes the vnion indissoluble ? is it the vnity of the essence or not ? if it be , is it the same individual essence , or not ? if the same individual essence makes the inseparable union , what is it , which makes the difference of individuals ? if it be said , the incommunicable properties of the persons ; i must still ask how such properties in the same individual essence , can make different individuals ? if it be said to be the same specifick nature ; then how comes that which is in it self capable of division to make an indissoluble vnion ? but saith curcellaeus , athanasius makes christ to be of the same substance as adam , and seth , and abraham , and isaac are said to be con-substantial with each other . and what follows ? that the father and son are divided from each other , as they were ? this is not possible to be his sense ; considering what he saith of the indivisibility of the divine nature . and athanasius himself hath given sufficient warning against such a mis-construction of his words ; and still urges that our conceptions ought to be suitable to the divine nature , not taken from what we see among men . and it is observable , that when paulus samosatenus had urged this as the best argument against the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that it made such a difference of substances as is among men ; for that reason saith athanasius , his iudges were content to let it alone , for the son of god is not in such a sense con-substantial ; but afterwards , the nicene fathers finding out the art of paulus , and the significancy of the word to discriminate the arians , made use of it , and only thought it necessary to declare , that when it is applied to god , it is not to be understood , as among individual men. as to the dialogues under athanasius his name , on which curcellaeus insists so much ; it is now very well known that they belong not to him , but to maximus ; and by comparing them with other places in him , it may appear , that he intended no specifick nature in god. but saith curcellaeus , if the fathers intended any more than a specifick nature , why did they not use words which would express it more fully , as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ? for that very reason , which he mentions from epiphanius , because they would seem to approach too near to sabellianism . s. basil was a great man , ( notwithstanding the flout of our vnitarians , ) and apply'd his thoughts to this matter , to clear the doctrine of the church from the charge of sabellianism and tritheism . as to the former , he saith , in many places , that the heresie lay in making but one person as well as one god , or one substance with three several names . as to the latter , no man asserts the individual unity of the divine essence in more significant words than he doth . for he uses the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , . as s. cyril of alexandria doth likewise , and yet both these are produced by curcellaeus for a specifick nature . but saith curcellaeus , s. basil in his epistle to gregory nyssen doth assert the difrence between substance and hypostasis to consist in this , that the one is taken for common nature , and the other for individual , and so making three hypostases , he must make three individuals , and one common or specifick nature . i answer , that it is plain by the design of that epistle , that by three hypostases he could not mean three individual essences . for he saith , the design of his writing it , was to clear the difference between substance and hypostasis . for saith he , from the want of this , some assert but one hypostasis , as well as one essence ; and others , because there are three hypostases , suppose there are three distinct essences . for both went upon the same ground , that hypostasis and essence were the same . therefore saith he , those who held three hypostases , did make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a division of substances . from whence it follows , that s. basil did look upon the notion of three distinct substances as a mistake : i say distinct substances , as individuals are distinct ; for so the first principles of philosophy do own that individuals make a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or division of the species into several and distinct individuals . but doth not s. basil go about to explain his notion by the common nature of man , and the several individuals under it ; and what can this signifie to his purpose , unless he allows the same in the godhead ? i grant he doth so , but he saith the substance , is that which is common to the whole kind ; the hypostasis is that which properly distinguisheth one individual from another ; which he calls the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the peculiar incommunicable property . which he describes by a concourse of distinguishing characters in every individual . but how doth he apply these things to the divine nature ? for therein lies the whole difficulty . doth he own such a community of nature , and distinction of individuals there ? he first confesses the divine nature to be incomprehensible by us ; but yet we may have some distinct notions about these things . as for instance , in the father we conceive something common to him and to the son ; and that is the divine essence : and the same as to the holy ghost . but there must be some proper characters to distinguish these , one from another ; or else there will be nothing but confusion : which is sabellianism . now the essential attributes and divine operations are common to them ; and therefore these cannot distinguish them from each other . and those are the peculiar properties of each person , as he shews at large . but may not each person have a distinct essence belonging to him , as we see it is among men ? for this s. basil answers : ( . ) he utterly denies any possible division in the divine nature . and he never question'd , but the distinction of individuals under the same species was a sort of division , although there were no separation . and the followers of ioh. philoponus did hold an indissoluble vnion between the three individual essences in the divine nature ; but they held a distinction of peculiar essences , besides the common nature , which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; as appears by photius , who was very able to judge . and it appears by one of themselves in photius , that the controversie was , whether an hyposiasis could be without an individual essence belonging to it self ; or whether the peculiar properties and characters did make the hypostasis . but as to s. basil's notion , we are to observe ; ( . ) that he makes the divine essence to be uncapable of number , by reason of its perfect unity . here our vnitarians tell us , that when s. basil saith , that god is not one in number , but in nature , he means : as the nature of man is one , but there are many particular men , as peter , james and john , &c. so the nature of god , or the common divinity is one , but there are as truely more gods in number , or more particular gods , as there are more particular men. but that this is a gross mistake or abuse of s. basil's meaning , i shall make it plain from h●mself . for , they say , that he held , that as to this question , how many gods ? it must be answered , three gods in number , or three personal gods , and one in nature , or divine properties ; whereas he is so far from giving such an answer , that he absolutely denies that there can be more gods than one in that very place . he mentions it as an objection , that since he said , that the father is god , the son god , the holy ghost god ; he must hold three gods ; to which he answers , we own but one god , not in number , but in nature : then say they , he held but one god in nature and more in number . that is so far from his meaning , that i hardly think any that read the passage in s. basil , could so wilfully pervert his meaning . for his intention was so far from asserting more gods in number , that it was to prove so perfect a unity in god , that he was not capable of number , or of being more than one . for , saith he , that which is said to be one in number , is not really and simply one , but is made up of many , which by composition become one ; as we say , the world is one , which is made up of many things . but god is a simple uncompounded being ; and therefore cannot be said to be one in number . but the world is not one by nature , because it is made up of so many things , but it is one by number , as those several parts make but one world. is not this fair dealing with such a man as s. basil , to represent his sense quite otherwise than it is ? as though he allow'd more gods than one in number ? number , saith he again , belongs to quantity , and quantity to bodies , but what relation have these to god , but as he is the maker of them ? number belongs to material and circumscribed beings ; but , saith he , the most perfect vnity is to be conceived in the most simple and incomprehensible essence . where it is observable , that he uses those words which are allow'd to express the most perfect and singular unity . which petavius himself confesseth , that they can never be understood of a specifick nature : and curcellaeus cannot deny , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being added to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , doth restrain the sense more to a numerical vnity , as he calls it . how then is it possible to understand s. basil of more gods than one in number ? and in the very same page he mentions the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the sameness of the divine nature , by which the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is better understood . but curcellaeus will have no more than a specifick vnity understood . before he said , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 would have signified more , but now he finds it used , the case is alter'd : so that the fathers could not mean any other than a specifick vnity , let them use what expressions they pleas'd . but these , i think are plain enough to any one that will not shut his eyes . in an other place , s. basil makes the same objection and gives the same answer . one god the father , and one god the son ; how can this be , and yet not two gods ? because , saith he , the son hath the very same essence with the father . not two essences divided out of one , as two brothers ; but as father and son , the son subsisting as from the father , but in the same individual essence : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but curcellaeus hath one fetch yet , viz. that s. basil denied god to be one in number , and made him to be one in nature , because he look'd on a specifick vnity or vnity of nature as more exact than numerical . s. basil look'd on the divine nature as such to have the most perfect vnity , because of its simplicity , and not in the least speaking of it as a specifick vnity ; but curcellaeus himself calls this , an vnity by a mere fiction of the mind ; and can he imagine this to have been more accurate than a real unity ? these are hard shifts in a desperate cause . after all , our vnitarians tell us , that s. basil doth against eunomius allow a distinction in number with respect to the deity . but how ? as to the essence ? by no means . for he asserts the perfect vnity thereof in the same place , even the vnity of the substance . but as to the characteristical properties of the persons , he allows of number , and no farther . but say they , this is to make one god as to essential properties , and three as to personal . how can that be ? when he saith , so often there can be but one god , because there can be but one divine essence ; and therefore those properties can only make distinct hypostases , but not distinct essences . and is this indeed the great secret which this bold man , as they call him , hath discover'd ? i think those are much more bold , ( i will not say impudent ) who upon such slight grounds , charge him with asserting more gods than one in number . but gregory nyssen , saith curcellaeus ▪ speaks more plainly in his epistle to ablabius ; for saith he , to avoid the difficulty of making three gods , as three individuals among men are three men ; he answers , that truly they are not three men , because they have but one common essence , which is exactly one , and indivisible in it self , however it be dispersed in individuals ▪ the same , he saith , is to be understood of god. and this petavius had charged him with before , as appears by curcellaeus his appendix . this seems the hardest passage in antiquity for this purpose , to which i hope to give a satisfactory answer from gregory nyssen himself . . it cannot be denied , that he asserts the vnity of essence to be indivisible in it self , and to be the true ground of the denomination of individuals ; as peter hath the name of a man , not from his individual properties , whereby he is distinguished from iames and iohn ; but from that one indivisible essence , which is common to them all , but yet receives no addition or diminution in any of them . . he grants a division of hypostases among men , notwithstanding this indivisibility of one common essence : for saith he ; among men , although the essence remain one and the same in all , without any division ; yet the several hypostases are divided from each other , according to the individual properties belonging to them . so that here is a double consideration of the essence : as in it self , so it is one and indivisible ; as it subsists in individuals , and so it is actually divided according to the subjects . for although the essence of a man be the same in it self , in peter , iames and iohn ; yet taking it as in the individuals , so the particular essence in each of them is divided from the rest . and so philoponus took hypostasis for an essence individuated by peculiar properties ; and therefore asserted , that where-ever there was an hypostasis , there must be a distinct essence ; and from hence he held the three persons to have three distinct essences . . we are now to consider , how far gregory nyssen carried this , whether he thought it held equally as to the divine hypostasis ; and that he did not , appears to me from these arguments : . he utterly denies any kind of division in the divine nature ; for in the conclusion of that discourse , he saith , it is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( a word often used by the greek fathers on this occasion , from whence athanasius against macedonius inferr'd an identity , and caesarius joyns 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and so s. basil uses it ) but he adds another word , which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , indivisible . yes , as all essences are indivisible in themselves ; but they may be divided in their subjects , as gregory nyssen allows it to be in men. i grant it , but then he owns a division of some kind , which he here absolutely denies as to the divine nature ; for his words are , that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in any consideration whatsoever . then he must destroy the hypostases . not so neither , for he allows that there is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the hypostases however . for he proposes the objection himself , that by allowing no difference in the divine nature , the hypostases would be confounded . to which he answers , that he did not deny their difference , which was founded in the relation they had to one another ; which he there explains ; and that therein only consists the difference of the persons . which is a very considerable testimony , to shew that both petavius and curcellaeus mistook gregory nyssen's meaning . but there are other arguments to prove it . . he asserts such a difference between the divine and human persons , as is unanswerable , viz. the vnity of operation . for , saith he , among men , if several go about the same work , yet every particular person works by himself , and therefore they may well be called many ; because every one is circumscribed : but in the divine persons he proves that it is quite otherwise , for they all concurr in the action towards us ; as he there shews at large . petavius was aware of this , and therefore he saith , he quitted it and returned to the other ; whereas he only saith , if his adversaries be displeased with it , he thinks the other sufficient . which in short is , that essence in it self is one and indivisible ; but among men it is divided according to the subjects ; that the divine nature is capable of no division at all , and therefore the difference of hypostases must be from the different relations and manner of subsistence . . he expresses his meaning fully in another place . for in his catechetical oration , he saith , he looks on the doctrine of the trinity as a profound mystery ( which three individual persons in one specifick nature is far from . ) but wherein lies it ? chiefly in this , that there should be number and no number ; different view and yet but one ; a distinction of hypostases , and yet no division in the subjects . for so his words are , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; which is contrary to what he said of human hypostases . now , what is the subject in this case ? according to curcellaeus his notion , it must be an individual . but since he asserts there can be no division in the subjects , then he must overthrow any such individuals , as are among men. these are the chief testimonies out of the greek fathers , whose authority curcellaeus and others rely most upon , as to this matter , which i have therefore more particularly examin'd . but s. ierom , saith curcellaeus , in his epistle to damasus , thought three hypostases implied three distinct substances ; and therefore when the campenses would have him own them , he refused it and asked his advice . then it is plain , s. ierom would not own three distinct substances , and so could not be of curcellaeus his mind . but saith he , s. ierom meant by three substances , three gods different in kind , as the arians did . but how doth that appear ? doth he not say , the arian bishop , and the campenses put him upon it ? but who was this arian bishop , and these campenses ? no other than the meletian party ; for meletius was brought in by the arians , but he joyned against them with s. basil and others , who asserted three hypostases ; and the campenses were his people who met without the gates , as the historians tell us . but it is evident by s. ierom , that the latin church understood hypostasis to be the same then with substance ; and the reason why they would not allow three hypostases , was , because they would not assert three substances . so that curcellaeus his hypothesis hath very little colour for it among the latin fathers ; since s. ierom there saith , it would be sacrilege to hold three substances , and he freely bestows an anathema upon any one that asserted more than one . but hilary , saith curcellaeus , owns a specifick vnity , for in his book de synodis , he shews , that by one substance , they did not mean one individual substance , but such as was in adam and seth , that is of the same kind . no man asserts the vnity and indiscrimination of the divine substance more fully and frequently than he doth ; and that without any difference or variation , as to the father and the son. and although against the arians he may use that for an illustration , of adam and seth ; yet when he comes to explain himself , he declares it must be understood in a way agreeable to the divine nature . and he denies any division of the substance between father and son , but he asserts one and the same substance to be in both ; and although the person of the son remains distinct from the person of the father , yet he subsists in that substance of which he was begotten , and nothing is taken off from the substance of the father , by his being begotten of it . but doth he not say , that he hath a legitimate and proper substance of his own begotten nature from god , the father ? and what is this , but to own two distinct substances ? how can the substance be distinct , if it be the very same ; and the son subsist in that substance of which he was begotten ? and that hilary ( besides a multitude of passages to the same purpose in him ) cannot be understood of two distinct substances will appear by this evidence . the arians in their confession of faith before the council of nice set down among the several heresies which they condemned ; that of hieracas , who said the father and son were like two lamps shining out of one common vessel of oil. hilary was sensible that under this that expression was struck at , god of god , light of light , which the church owned . his answer is , luminis naturae vnitas est , non ex connexione porrectio . i e. they are not two divided lights , from one common stock ; but the same light remaining after it was kindled that it was before . as appears by his words , light of light , saith he , implies , that it gives to another that which it continues to have it self . and petavius saith , that the opinion of hieracas was , that the substance of the father and son differ'd numerically as one lamp from another . and hilary calls it an error of humane understanding which would judge of god , by what they find in one another . doth not s. ambrose say , as curcellaeus quotes him , that the father and son are not two gods , because all men are said to be of one substance ? but s ambrose is directly against him . for , he saith , the arians objected , that if they made the son true god , and con-substantial with the father , they must make two gods ; as there are two men , or two sheep of the same essence ; but a man and a sheep are not said to be men , or two sheep . which they said to excuse themselves , because they made the son of a different kind and substance from the father . and what answer doth s. ambrose give to this ? . he saith , plurality according to the scriptures rather falls on those of different kinds ; and therefore when they make them of several kinds , they must make several gods. . that we who hold but one substance , cannot make more gods than one. . to his instance of men , he answers , that although they are of the same nature by birth , yet the● differ in age , and thought , and work , and place from one another ; and where there is such diversity , there cannot be vnity : but in god , there is no difference of nature , will , or operation ; and therefore there can be but one god. the last i shall mention is s. augustin , whom curcellaeus produces to as little purpose ; for although he doth mention the same instance of several men being of the same kind ; yet he speaks so expresly against a specifick vnity in god ; that he saith , the consequence must be , that the three persons must be three gods ; as three humane persons are three men. and in another place , that the father , son and holy ghost , are one in the same individual nature . and what saith curcellaeus to these places , for he was aware of them . to the latter he saith , that by individual , he means specifick . this is an extraordinary answer indeed . but what reason doth he give for it ? because they are not divided in place or time , but they may have their proper essences however . but where doth s. augustin give any such account of it ? he often speaks upon this subject ; but always gives another reason . viz. because they are but one and the same substance . the three persons are but one god , because they are of one substance ; and they have a perfect vnity , because there is no diversity of nature , or of will. but it may be said , that here he speaks of a diversity of nature . in the next words he explains himself , that the three persons are one god , propter ineffabilem conjunctionem deitatis ; but the union of three persons in one specifick nature , is no ineffable conjunction , it being one of the commonest things in the world ; and in the same chapter , propter individuam deitatem unus deus est ; & propter uniuscujusque proprietatem tres personae sunt . here we find one individual nature ; and no difference but in the peculiar properties of the persons . in the other place he is so express against a specifick vnity , that curcellaeus his best answer is , that in that chapter he is too intricate and obscure . i. e. he doth not to speak his mind . thus much i thought fit to say in answer to those undeniable proofs of curcellaeus , which our vnitarians boast so much of , and whether they be so or not , let the reader examine and judge . chap. vii . the athanasian creed clear'd from contradictions . iii. i now come to the last thing i proposed , viz. to shew , that it is no contradiction to assert three persons in the trinity and but one god ; and for that purpose , i shall examine the charge of contradictions on the athanasian creed . the summ of the first articles , say they , is this , the one true god is three distinct persons , and three distinct persons , father , son and holy ghost are the one true god. which is plainly , as if a man should say , peter , james and john , being three persons are one man ; and one man is these three distinct persons , peter , james and john. is it not now a ridiculous attempt as well as a barbarous indignity , to go about thus to make asses of all mankind , under pretence of teaching them a creed . this is very freely spoken , with respect , not merely to our church , but the christian world , which owns this creed to be a just and true explication of the doctrine of the trinity . but there are some creatures as remarkable for their untoward kicking , as for their stupidity . and is not this great skill in these matters , to make such a parallel between three persons in the godhead , and peter , iames and iohn ? do they think there is no difference between an infinitely perfect being , and such finite limited creatures as individuals among men are ? do they suppose the divine nature capable of such division and separation by individuals , as human nature is ? no , they may say , but ye who hold three persons must think so : for what reason ? we do assert three persons , but it is on the account of divine revelation , and in such a manner , as the divine nature is capable of it . for it is a good rule of boethius , talia sunt praedicata , qualia subjecta permiserint . we must not say that there are persons in the trinity , but in such a manner as is agreeable to the divine nature ; and if that be not capable of division and separation , then the persons must be in the same undivided essence . the next article is , neither confounding the persons , nor dividing the substance ; but how can we , say they , not confound the persons that have , as ye say , but one numerical substance ? and how can we but divide the substance , which we find in three distinct divided persons ? i think the terms numerical substance , not very proper in this case ; and i had rather use the language of the fathers , than of the schools ; and some of the most judicious and learned fathers would not allow the terms of one numerical substance to be applied to the divine essence . for their notion was , that number was only proper for compound b●ings , but god being a pure and simple being was one by nature and not by number , as s. basil speaks ( as is before observed ) because he is not compounded , nor hath any besides himself to be reckon'd with him . but because there are different hypostases , therefore they allow'd the use of number about them , and so we may say the hypostases or persons are numerically different ; but we cannot say that the essence is one numerically . but why must they confound the persons , if there be but one essence ? the relative properties cannot be confounded ; for the father cannot be the son ▪ nor the son the father ; and on these the difference of persons is founded . for , there can be no difference , as to essential properties , and therefore all the difference , or rather distinction must be from those that are relative . a person of it self imports no relation , but the person of the father or of the son must ; and these relations cannot be confounded with one another . and if the father cannot be the son , nor the son the father , then they must be distinct from each other . but how ? by dividing the substance ? that is impossible in a substance that is indivisible . it may be said , that the essence of created beings is indivisible , and yet there are divided persons . i grant it , but then a created essence is capable of different accidents and qualities to divide one person from another , which cannot be supposed in the divine nature ; and withall the same power which gives a being to a created essence , gives it a separate and divided existence from all others . as when peter , iames and iohn received their several distinct personalities from god ; at the same time he gave them their separate beings from each other , although the same essence be in them all . but how can we but divide the substance which we see in three distinct divided persons ? the question is , whether the distinct properties of the persons do imply a division of the substance ? we deny that the persons are divided as to the substance , because that is impossible to be divided ; but we say , they are and must be distinguished as to those incommunicable properties which make the persons distinct . the essential properties are uncapable of being divided , and the relations cannot be confounded ; so that there must be one undivided substance and yet three distinct persons . but every person must have his own proper substance ; and so the substance must be divided if there be three persons . that every person must have a substance to support his subsistence is not denied , but the question is , whether that substance must be divided or not . we say , where the substance will bear it , as in created beings , a person hath a separate substance , i. e. the same nature diversified by accidents , qualities and a separate existence , but where these things cannot be , there the same essence must remain undivided , but with such relative properties as cannot be confounded . but may not the same undivided substance be communicated to three divided persons ; so as that each person may have his own proper substance , and yet the divine essence be in it self undivided ? this is not the case before us . for the question upon the creed is , whether the substance can be divided ? and here it is allow'd to remain undivided . yes in it self , but it may be divided in the persons . the substance , we say , is uncapable of being divided any way ; and to say , that a substance wholly undivided in it self , is yet divided into as many proper and peculiar substances , as there are persons , doth not at all help our understanding in this matter ; but if no more be meant , as is expresly declared , than that the same one divine nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal father to the eternal son ▪ and by father and son to the eternal spirit , without any division or separation ; it is the same which all trinitarians assert . and it is a great pity , that any new phrases or ways of expression should cause unreasonable heats among those who are really of the same mind . for those who oppose the expressions of three distinct substances as new and dangerous ; yet grant , that it is one peculiar prerogative of the divine nature and substance , founded in its infinite , and therefore transcendent perfection , whereby it is capable of residing in more persons than one ; and is accordingly communicated from the father to the son and holy ghost ; but this is done without any division or multiplication . now if both parties mean what they say , where lies the difference ? it is sufficient for my purpose that they are agrred , that there can be no division as to the divine essence by the distinction of persons . and so this passage of the athanasian creed holds good , neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance . the next article , as it is set down in the notes on athanasius his creed , is a contradiction to this . for there it runs , there is one substance of the father , another of the son , another of the holy ghost . they might well charge it with contradictions at this rate . but that is a plain mistake for person ; for there is no other variety in the copies but this , that baysius his greek copy hath 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and that of constantinople 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but all the latin copies persona . but what consequence do they draw from hence ? then , say they , the son is not the father , nor is the father the son , nor the holy ghost either of them . if they had put in person , as they ought to have done , it is what we do own . and what follows ? if the father be not the son , and yet is the one true god , then the son is not the one true god , because he is not the father . the one true god may be taken two ways : . the one true god , as having the true divine nature in him , and so the father is the one true god ; but not exclusive of the son , if he have the same divine nature . . the one true god , as having the divine nature so wholly in himself , as to make it incommunicable to the son ; so we do not say , that the father is the one true god , because this must exclude the son from being god ; which the scripture assures us that he is ; and therefore though the son be not the father , nor the father the son , yet the son may be the one true god as well as the father , because they both partake of the same divine nature , so that there is no contradiction in this , that there is but one true god , and one of the persons is not the other . for that supposes it impossible , that there should be three persons in the same nature ; but if the distinction of nature and persons be allow'd , as it must be by all that understand any thing of these matters , then it must be granted , that although one person cannot be another , yet they may have the same common essence . as for instance , let us take their own , peter , iames and iohn . what pleasant arguing would this be , peter is not iames nor iohn , nor iames nor iohn are peter , but peter hath the true essence of a man in him ; and the true essence is but one and indivisible ; and therefore iames and iohn cannot be true men , because peter hath the one and indivisible essence of a man in him ? but they will say , we cannot say that peter is the one true man , as we say , that the father is the one true god. yes ; we say the same in other words , for he can be said to be the one true god in no other respect , but as he hath the one true divine essence . all the difference lies , that a finite nature is capapable of division , but an infinite is not . it follows , the godhead of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost is all one , the glory equal , the majesty co-eternal . to this they say , that this article doth impugn and destroy it self . how so ? for , if the glory and majesty be the same in number , then it can be neither equal , nor co-eternal . not equal for it is the same , which equals never are , nor co-eternal for that intimates that they are distinct . for , nothing is co eternal , nor co temporary with it self . there is no appearance of difficulty or contradiction in this , if the distinction of persons is allowed ; for the three persons may be well said to be co-equal and co-eternal ; and if we honour the son , as we honour the father , we must give equal glory to him . but one great point of contradiction remains , viz. so that the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god , and yet there are not three gods ; but one god. first , they say , this is as if a man should say , the father is a person , the son a person , and the holy ghost a person , yet there are not three persons ; but one person . how is this possible , if a person doth suppose some peculiar property , which must distinguish him from all others ? and how can three persons be one person , unless three incommunicable properties may become one communicated property to three persons ? but they are aware of a distinction in this case , viz. that the term god is used personally , when it is said god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost ; but when it is said , there are not three gods , but one god , the term god is used essentially , and therefore comprehends the whole three persons , so that there is neither a grammatical , nor arithmetical contradiction . and what say our vnitarians to this ? truly , no less , than that the remedy is worse , ( if possible ) than the disease . nay then , we are in a very ill case . but how i pray doth this appear ? . say they , three personal gods , and one essential god make four gods ; if the essential god be not the same with the personal gods : and tho' he is the same , yet since they are not the same with one another , but distinct , it follows , that there are three gods , i. e. three personal gods. . it introduces two sorts of gods , three personal and one essential . but the christian religion knows and owns but one , true and most high god of any sort . so far then , we are agreed , that there is but one , true and most high god ; and that because of the perfect vnity of the divine essence , which can be no more than one , and where there is but one divine essence , there can be but one true god , unless we can suppose a god without an essence , and that would be a strange sort of god. he would be a personal god indeed in their critical sense of a person for a shape or appearance . but may not the fame essence be divided ? that i have already shew'd to be impossible . therefore we cannot make so many personal gods , because we assert one and the same essence in the three persons of father , son and holy ghost . but they are distinct , and therefore must be distinct gods , since every one is distinct from the other . they are distinct as to personal properties , but not as to essential attributes ; which are and must be the same in all : so that here is but one essential god , and three persons . but after all , why do we assert three persons in the godhead ? not because we find them in the athanasian creed ; but because the scripture hath revealed that there are three , father , son and holy ghost ; to whom the divine nature and attributes are given . this we verily believe , that the scripture hath revealed ; and that there are a great many places , of which , we think no tolerable sense can be given without it , and therefore we assert this doctrine on the same grounds , on which we believe the scriptures . and if there are three persons which have the divine nature attributed to them ; what must we do in this case ? must we cast off the vnity of the divine essence ? no , that is too frequently and plainly asserted for us to call it into question . must we reject those scriptures which attribute divinity to the son and holy ghost , as well as to the father ? that we cannot do , unless we cast off those books of scripture , wherein those things are contained . but why do we call them persons , when that term is not found in scripture , and is of a doubtful sense ? the true account whereof i take to be this . it is observed by facundus hermianensis , that the christian church received the doctrine of the trinity before the terms of three persons were used . but sabellianism was the occasion of making use of the name of persons . it 's true , that the sabellians did not dislike our sense of the word person , ( which they knew was not the churches sense ) as it was taken for an appearance , or an external quality ; which was consistent enough with their hypothesis , who allow'd but one real person with different manifestations . that this was their true opinion , appears from the best account we have of their doctrine , from the first rise of sabellianism . the foundations of it were laid in the earliest and most dangerous heresies in the christian church , viz. that which is commonly called by the name of the gnosticks , and that of the cerinthians and ebionites . for how much soever they differ'd from each other in other things ; yet they both agreed in this , that there was no such thing as a trinity , consisting of father , son and holy ghost ; but that all was but different appearances and manifestations of god to mank●nd . in consequence whereof , the gnosticks denied the very humanity of christ , and the cerinthians and ebionites his divinity . but both these sorts , were utterly rejected the communion of the christian church ; and no such thing as sabellianism was found within it . afterwards , there arose some persons who started the same opinion within the church : the first we meet with of this sort , are those mention'd by theodoret , epigonus , cleomenes , and noëtus , from whom they were called noe●ians ; not long after , sabellius broached the same doctrine in pentapolis , and the parts thereabouts ; which made dionysius of alexandria appear so early and so warmly against it . but he happening to let fall some expressions , as though he asserted an inequality of hypostases in the godhead , complaint was made of it to dionysius then bishop of rome ; who thereupon explained that , which he took to be the true sense of the christian church in this matter . which is still preserved in athanasius : therein he disowns the sabellian doctrine , which confounded the father , son and holy ghost , and made them to be the same ; and withal , he rejected those who held three distinct and separate hypostases ; as the platonists , and after them the marcionists did . dionysius of alexandria , when he came to explain himself , agreed with the others and asserted the son to be of the same substance with the father ; as athanasius hath proved at large : but yet he said , that if a distinction of hypostases were not kept up , the doctrine of the trinity would be lost ; as appears by an epistle of his in s. basil. athanasius saith , that the heresie of sabellius lay in making the father and son to be only different names of the same person ; so that in one respect he is the father , and in another the son. gregory nazianzen in opposition to sabellianism , saith , we must believe one god , and three hypostases ; and commends athanasius for preserving the true mean , in asserting the vnity of nature , and the distinction of properties . s. basil saith , that the sabellians made but one person of the father and son : that in name they confessed the son ; but in reality they denied him . in another place , that the sabellians asserted but one hypostasis in the divine nature ; but that god took several persons upon him , as occasion required : sometimes that of a father , at other times of a son ; and so of the holy ghost . and to the same purpose , in other places he saith , that there are distinct hypostases with their peculiar properties ; which being joyned with the vnity of nature make up the true confession of faith. there were some who would have but one hypostasis ; whom he opposes with great vehemency ; and the reason he gives , is , that then they must make the persons to be meer names ; which is , sabellianisn . and , he saith , that if our notions of distinct persons have no certain foundation they are meer names , such as sabellius called persons . but by this foundation he doth not mean any distinct essences , but the incommunicable properties belonging to them , as father , son and holy ghost . it is plain from hence , that the necessity of asserting three hypostases , came from thence , that otherwise they could not so well distinguish themselves from the sabellians whose doctrine they utterly disowned ; as well as arianism and iudaism ; and it appears by the testimonies of athanasius , gregory nazianzen and s. basil , that they look'd on one as bad as the other ; and they commonly joyn iudaism , and sabellianism together . but yet there arose difficulties , whether they were to hold one hypostasis or three . the former insisted on the generally received sense of hypostasis for substance or essence ; and therefore they could not hold three hypostases without three distinct essences , as the platonists and marcionists held . upon this a synod was called at alexandria to adjust this matter , where both parties were desired to explain themselves . those who held three hypostases were asked , whether they maintained three hypostases as the arians did , of different substances and separate subsistences , as mankind and other creatures are ? or as other hereticks , three principles or three gods ? all which they stedfastly denied . then they were asked , why they used those terms ? they answered , because they believed the holy trinity to be more than mere names ; and that the father , and son , and holy ghost had a real subsistence belonging to them ; but still they held but one godhead , one principle , and the son of the same substance with the father ; and the holy ghost not to be a creature , but to bear the same proper and inseparable essence with the father and the son. then the other side were asked , when they asserted but one hypostasis , whether they held with sabellius or not ; and that the son and holy ghost had no essence or subsistence ? which they utterly denied ; but said , that their meaning was , that hypostasis was the same with substance ; and by one hypostasis , they intended no more , but that the father , son and holy ghost were of the same individual substance ; ( for the words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so they held but one godhead and one divine nature : and upon these terms they agreed . from whence it follows , that the notion of three hypostases , as it was received in the christian church , was to be under●●ood so as to be consistent with the individual vnity of the divine essence . and the great rule of the christian church was to keep in the middle , between the doctrines of sabellius and arius ; and so by degrees , the notion of three hypostases and one essence was look'd on in the eastern church , as the most proper discrimination of the orthodox from the sabellians and arians . but the latin church was not so easily brought to the use of three hypostases , because they knew no other sense of it , but for substance or essence ; and they all denied that there was any more than one divine substance , and therefore they rather embraced the word persona ; and did agree in the name of persons , as most proper to signifie their meaning , which was , that there were three which had distinct subsistences , and incommunicable properties , and one and the same divine essence . and since the notion of it is so well understood , to signifie such a peculiar sense , i see no reason why any should scruple the use of it . as to it s not being used in scripture , socinus himself despises it , and allows it to be no good reason . for when franciscus davides objected , that the terms of essence and person were not in scripture ; socinus tells him , that they exposed their cause who went upon such grounds ; and that if the sense of them were in scripture , it was no matter whether the terms were or not . h●ving thus clear'd the notion of three persons , i return to the sense of scripture about these matters . and our vnitarians tell us , that we ought to interpret scripture otherwise . how doth that appear ? they give us very little encouragement to follow their interpretations , which are so new , so forced , so different from the general sense of the christian world , and which i may say , reflect so highly on the honour of christ and his apostles , i. e. by making use of such expressions , which if they do not mean , what to honest and sincere minds they appear to do , must be intended ( according to them ) to set up christ a meer man to be a god. and if such a thought as this could enter into the mind of a thinking man , it would tempt him to suspect much more as to those writings than there is the least colour or reason for . therefore these bold inconsiderate writers ought to reflect on the consequence of such sort of arguments , and if they have any regard to christianity , not to trifle with scripture as they do . but say they , the question only is , whether we ought to interpret scripture when it speaks of god , according to reason or not , that is like fools or like wise men ? like wise men no doubt , if they can hit upon it , but they go about it as untowardly as ever men did . for is this to interpret scripture like wise men , to take up some novel interpretations , against the general sense of the christian church from the apostles times ? is this to act like wise men , to raise objections against the authority of the books , they cannot answer : and to cry out of false copies and translations without reason , and to render all places suspicious , which make against them ? is this to interpret scripture like wise men , to make our saviour affect to be thought a god , when he knew himself to be a mere man , and by their own confession had not his divine authority and power conferr'd upon him ? and to make his apostles set up the worship of a creature , when their design was to take away the worship of all such , who by nature are not gods ? is this like wise men , to tell the world , that these were only such gods , whom they had set up , and god had not appointed ; as though there were no real idolatry but in giving divine worship without god's command . chap. viii . the socinian sense of scripture examined . but they must not think to escape so easily for such a groundless and presumptuous saying ; that they interpret the scripture not like fools , but like wise men : because the true sense of scripture is really the main point between us ; and therefore i shall more carefully examine the wise sense they give of the chief places which relate to the matter in hand . . is this to interpret scripture like wise men , to make the author to the hebrews in one chapter , and that but a short one , to bring no less than four places out of the old testament , and according to their sense , not one of them proves that which he aimed at ? viz. that christ was superiour to angels , heb. . . as will appear by the sense they give of them . for unto which of the angels said he at any time , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee ? these words , say they , in their original and primary sense are spoken of david , but in their mystical sense are a prophecy concerning christ. was this mystical sense primarily intended or not ? if not , they are only an accommodation and no proof . but they say , even in that mystical sense , they were intended not of the lord christ's supposed eternal generation from the essence of the father , but of his resurrection from the dead . but if that be not taken as an evidence of his being the eternal son of god , how doth this prove him above angels ? heb. . . and again , when he bringeth his first begotten into the world , he saith , and let all the angels of god worship him . this , one would think home to the business . but our wise interpreters tell us plainly , that the words were used by the psalmist on another occasion , i. e. they are nothing to the purpose . but being told of this , instead of mending the matter , they have made it far worse ; for upon second thoughts , ( but not wiser ) they say , the words are not taken out of the psalm , but out of deut. . . where the words are not spoken of god , but of god's people ; and if this be said of god's people , they hope it may be said of christ too , without concluding from thence , that christ is the supreme god. but we must conclude from hence , that these are far from being wise interpreters ; for what consequence is this , the angels worship god's people , therefore christ is superiour to angels ? heb. . . thy throne o god is for ever and ever , i. e. say they , god is thy throne for ever . and so they relate not to christ but to god. and to what purpose then are they brought ? heb. . . thou lord in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth , and the heavens are the work of thy hands . these words , say they , are to be understood not of christ , but of god. which is to charge the apostle with arguing out of the old testament very impertinently . is this interpreting the scriptures like wise men ? is it not rather exposing and ridiculing them ? is this to interpret scripture like wise men , to give such a forced sense of the beginning of s. john's gospel , as was never thought of from the writing of it , till some in the last age thought it necessary to avoid the proof of christ's divinity from it . for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was never taken , in the sense they put upon it , for him that was to preach the word , in s. iohn's time ; but the signification of it was then well understood from the alexandrian school ( as appears by philo ) whence it was brought by cerinthus into those parts of asia , where s. iohn lived when he wrote his gospel : and one of themselves confesses , that cerinthus did by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mean something divine , which rested upon , and inhabited the person of iesus , and was that power by which god created original matter and made the world , but as the christ or the word descended on iesus at his baptism , so it left him at his crucifixion . that which i observe from hence is , that there was a known and current sense of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the time of s. iohn's writing his gospel , very different from that of a preacher of the word of god ; and therefore i cannot but think it the wisest way of interpreting s. john , to understand him in a sense then commonly known ; and so he affirms the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to have been in the beginning , i. e. before the creation ( for he saith afterwards , all things were made by him ) and that he was with god , and was god ; and this word did not inhabit iesus , as cerinthus held , but was made flesh and dwelt among us . and so s. iohn clearly asserted the divinity and incarnation of the son of god. and in all the disputes afterwards with paulus samosatenus , and photinus , it appears , that they understood the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not for any meer man , but for some divine power , which rested upon the person of iesus . so that this was a very late , and i think no very wise interpretation of s. iohn . and even sandius confesses , that socinus his sense was wholly new and unheard of in the ancient church ; not only among the fathers , but the hereticks , as i have before observed . for they agreed ( except their good friends the alogi who went the surest way to work ) that by the word no meer man was understood . let them produce one if they can , saith sandius ( even the learned and judicious sandius . ) did they all interpret the scriptures like fools , and not like wise men ? but if the christian interpreters were such fools ; what think they of the deists , whom they seem to have a better opinion of , as to their wisdom ? what , if men without biass of interest , or education think ours the more proper and agreeable sense ? the late archbishop to this purpose had mentioned amelius the platonist , as an indifferent iudge . but what say our wise interpreters to this ? truly they say , that the credit of the trinitarian cause runs very low , when an uncertain tale of an obscure platonist of no reputation for learning or wit , is made to be a good part of the proof , which is alledged for these doctrines . if a man happen to stand in their way , he must be content with such a character , as they will be pleased to give him . if he had despised s. iohn's gospel , and manner of expression , he had been as wise as the alogi ; but notwithstanding the extraordinary character given of friend amelius ( as they call him ) by eusebius , by porphyrius , by proclus , and by damascenus , this very saying of his sinks his reputation for ever with them . what would iulian have given for such a wise interpretation of s. iohn ? when he cannot deny , but that he did set up the divinity of christ by these expressions ; and upbraids the christians of alexandria , for giving worship to iesus as the word and god ? with what satisfaction would he have received such a sense of his words ; when he complemented photinus for denying the divinity of christ ; while other chrians asserted it ? but they do not by any means deal fairly with the late archbishop as to the story of amelius ; for they bring it in , as if he had laid the weight of the cause upon it ; whereas he only mentions it , as a confirmation , of a probable conjecture , that plato had the notion of the word of god from the jews ; because that was a title which the jews did commonly give to the messias , as he proves from philo , and the chaldee paraphrast . to which they give no manner of answer . but they affirm in answer to my sermon , p. . that socinus his sense was , that christ was called the word , because he was the bringer or messenger of gods word . but were not the iews to understand it in the sense it was known among them ? and if the chaldee paraphrast had used it in that sense , he would never have applied it to a divine subsistance , as upon examination it will appear that he doth . of which rittangel gives a very good account , who had been a iew , and was very well skilled in their ancient learning . he tells us , that he had a discourse with a learned vnitarian upon this subject , who was particularly acquainted with the eastern languages ; and he endeavoured to prove , that there was nothing in the chaldee paraphrasts use of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because it was promiscuously used by him for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where it was applied to god. this rittangel denied ; and offer'd to prove , that the chaldee paraphrast did never use that word in a common manner , but as it was appropriated to a divine subsistance . he produces several places where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is put , and nothing answering to word in the hebrew , as gen. . . the chaldee hath it , the word of iehovah shall be my god. exod. . . and iehovah said , he would redeem them by his word , exod. . . your murmurings are not against us , but against the word of iehovah , exod. . . and moses brought the people out to meet the word of iehovah , levit. . . these are the statutes and iudgments , and laws , which iehovah gave between his word and the children of israel by the hand of moses , numb . . . ye have despised the word of iehovah whose divinity dwelt among you , numb . . . the word of iehovah is with him , and the divinity of their king is among them , deut . . the word of iehovah shall fight for you , deut. . . these forty years the word of iehovah hath been with thee , deut. . . ye did not believe in the word of iehovah your god , deut . . iehovah thy god , his word is a consuming fire , deut. . . i stood between the word of iehovah and you , to shew you the word of the lord , deut. . . . iehovah thy god , his word shall go with thee , with many other places , which he brings out of moses his writings ; and there are multitudes to the same purpose in the other books of scripture ; which shews , saith he , that this term the word of god , was so appointed for many ages ; as appears by all the chaldee paraphrasts and the ancient doctors of the iews . and he shews by several places , that the chaldee paraphrast did not once render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when there was occasion for it ; no , not when the word of god is spoken of with respect to a prophet ; as he proves by many testimonies ; which are particularly enumerated by him . the result of the conference was , that the vnitarian had so much ingenuity to confess , that unless those words had another sense , their cause was lost ; and our faith had a sure foundation . but it may be objected that morinus hath since taken a great deal of pains to prove the chaldee paraphrasts , not to have been of that antiquity , which they have been supposed by the iews to be of . in answer to this , we may say in general , that morinus his great proofs are against another chaldee paraphrast of very small reputation , viz. of ionathan upon the law ; and not that of onkelos , which rittangel relied upon in this matter . and none can deny this to have been very ancient ; but the iews have so little knowledge of their own history , but what is in scripture , that very little certainty can be had from them . but we must compare the circumstances of things , if we would come to any resolution in this matter . now it is certain , that philo the alexandrian iew , who lived so very near our saviours time , had the same notion of the word of god , which is in the chaldee paraphrast : whose testimonies have been produced by so many already , that i need not to repeat them . and eusebius saith , the jews and christians had the same opinion as to christ , till the former fell off from it in opposition to the christians ; and he particula●ly instances in his divinity . but if morinus his opinion be embraced , as to the lateness of these chaldee paraphrases , this inconvenience will necessarily follow , viz. that the iews when they had changed so much their opinions , should insert those passages themselves which assert the divinity of the word . and it can hardly enter into any mans head that considers the humour of the jewish nation , to think , that after they knew what s. iohn had written concerning the word ; and what use the christians made of it to prove the divinity of christ , they should purposely insert such passages in that paraphrase of the law which was in such esteem among them , that elias levita saith , they were under obligation to read two parascha●s out of it every week , together with the hebrew text. now , who can imagine that the iews would do this upon any other account , than that it was deliver'd down to them , by so ancient a tradition , that they durst not discontinue it . and it is observed in the place of scripture which our saviour read in the synagogue , that he follow'd neither the hebrew nor the greek , but in probability the chaldee paraphrase ; and the words he used upon the cross , were in the chaldee dialect . the later iews have argued against the trinity , and the divinity of christ like any vnitarians , as appears by the collection out of ioseph albo , david kimchi , &c. published by genebrard , with his answers to them . and is it any ways likely , that those who were so much set against these doctrines , should themselves put in such expressions , which justifie what the evangelist saith about the vvord , being in the beginning , being with god , and being god ? the substance of what i have said , as to s. iohn's notion of the word is this ; that there is no colour for the sense which socinus hath put upon it ; either from the use of it among other authors , or any interpretation among the jews . but that there was in his time a current sense of it , which from the jews of alexandria , was dispersed by cerinthus in those parts where he lived . that for such a notion there was a very ancient tradition among the jews , which appears in the most ancient paraphrase of the law , which is read in their synagogues . and therefore according to all reasonable ways of interpreting scripture , the word cannot be understood in s. iohn , for one whose office it was to preach the word , but for that word which was with god before any thing was made , and by whom all things were made . . is this to interpret scripture like wise men , to give a new sense of several places of scripture from a matter of fact of which there is no proof , the better to avoid the proof of the divinity of the son of god ? this relates to the same beginning of s. iohn's gospel , the word was with god ; and several other places , making mention of his descent from heaven . the sense which these wise interpreters put upon them is , that christ was rapt up into heaven , before he entred upon his preaching . but where is this said ? what proof , what evidence , what credible witnesses of it , as there were of his transfiguration , resurrection and ascension ? nothing like any proof is offer'd for it ; but it is a wise way they think of avoiding a pressing difficulty . but they have a farther reach in it , viz. to shew how christ , being a mere man , should be qualified for so great an undertaking as the founding the christian church ; and therefore they say , that before our lord entred upon his office of the messias ▪ he was taken up to heaven to be instructed in the mind and will of god ( as moses was into the mount , exod. . , , . ) and from thence descended to execute his office , and declare the said will of god. in another place , that when it is said , the word was with god ; that is , the lord christ was taken up into heaven to be instructed in all points relating to his ambassage or ministry . in a third , they say , that our saviour before he entred upon his ministry , ascended into heaven , as moses did into the mount , to be instructed in all things belonging to the gospel doctrine and polity which he was to establish and administer . now considering what sort of person they make christ to have been , viz. a mere man ; this was not ill thought of by them ; to suppose him taken up into heaven and there instructed in what he was to teach and to do , as moses was into the mount before he gave the law. but here lies a mighty difference ; when moses was called up into the mount , the people had publick notice given of it ; and he took aaron and his sons , and seventy elders of israel with him ; who saw the glory of god , v. . and all israel beheld the glory of the lord as a devouring fire on the top of the mount , v. . and after the days were over , it is said , that moses came down from the mount , and the children of israel saw him with his face shining , exod. . . now if christ were taken up into heaven , as moses was into the mount , why was it not made publick at that time ? why no witnesses ? why no appearance of the glory to satisfie mankind of the truth of it ? and yet we find , that when he was transfigured on the holy mount , he took peter , and james , and john with him ; which circumstance is carefully mention'd by the evangelists . and peter , who was one of the witnesses then present , lays great weight upon this being done in the presence of witnesses . for we have not follow'd cunningly devised fables , when we made known unto you the power and coming of our lord iesus christ , but were eye-witnesses of his majesty . for he received from god the father , honour and glory , when there came such a voice to him from the excellent glory — . and this voice which came from heaven we heard , when we were with him in the holy mount. now let any one compare this with the account which they give of christ's ascension into heaven . the transfiguration was intended only for a particular testimony of god's favour , before his suffering ; but even in that , he took care there should be very credible witnesses of it . and is it then possible to believe , there should be such an ascension of christ into heaven , for no less a purpose , than to be instructed in his ambassage , and to understand the mind and will of god as to his office ; and yet not one of the evangelists give any account of the circumstances of it ? they are very particular , as to his birth , fasting , baptism , preaching , miracles , sufferings , resurrection and ascension ; but not one word among them all as to the circumstances of this being taken up into heaven for so great a purpose ? if it were necessary to be believed , why is it not more plainly revealed ? why not the time and place mention'd in scripture , as well as of his fasting and temptation ? who can imagine it consistent with that sincerity and faithfulness of the writers of the new testament , to conceal so material a part of christ's instructions and qualifications ; and to wrap it up in such doubtfull expressions , that none ever found out this meaning till the days of socinus ? enjedinus mentions it only as a possible sense ; b●t he confesses , that the new testament saith nothing at all of it ; but , saith he , neither doth it mention other things before he entred upon his office. but this is a very weak evasion , for this was of greatest importance with respect to his office , more than his baptism , fasting and temptation ; yet these are very fully set down . and after all , our vnitarians themselves seem to mistrust their own interpretations ; for in their answer to my sermon , they say , it is not the doctrine of all the unitarians , and refer me to another account given of these texts in the history of the unitarians . there indeed i find grotius his interpretation ( as they call it ) prefer●d before that of socinus . but they say , grotius was socinian all over , and that his annotations are a compleat system of socinianism ; and his notes on the first of s. john are written artificially , but the sense at the bottom is theirs . in short , that the word , according to grotius , is not an eternal son of god , but the power a●d wisdom of god ; which abiding without measure on the lord christ , is therefore spoken of as a person and as one with christ , and he with that . and this notion of the word leads a man through all the difficulties of this chapter , with far more ease than any hitherto offer'd . but these wise interpreters have as much misinterpreted grotius , as they have done the scriptures , as i shall make it appear . ( . ) grotius on iohn . . interprets christ's ascension into heaven , of his corporal ascent thither after his resurrection , where the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or word was before , of whom it is said , that the word was with god. but how comes christ to assume that to himself which belong'd to the word ? he answers , why not , since we call body and soul by the name of the man ? but if no more were meant by the word , but a divine attribute of wisdom and power , what colour could there be for the son of man taking that to himself , which belonged to an attribute of god ? what strange way of arguing would this have been ? what , and if ye shall see the son of man ascending where he was before ? for according to this sense , how comes a divine attribute to be called the son of man ? how could the son of man be said to ascend thither , where a divine attribute was before ? the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , must relate to him spoken of before ; and how could the power and wisdom of god be ever said to be the son of man ? but if we suppose a personal union of the word with the human nature in christ , then we have a very reasonable sense of the words ; for then no more is imply'd , but that christ , as consisting of both natures , should ascend thither , where the word was before ; when it is said , that the word was with god ; and so grotius understands it . ( . ) grotius doth not make the word in the beginning of s. john 's gospel to be a mere attribute of wisdom and power , but the eternal son of god. this i shall prove from his own words . . he asserts in his preface to s. iohn's gospel , that the chief cause of his writing was universally agreed to have been to prevent the spreading of that venom which had been then dispersed in the church ; which he understands of the heresies about christ and the word . now among these , the heresie of cerinthus was this very opinion which they fasten upon grotius ; viz. that the word was the divine wisdom and power inhabiting in the person of iesus , as i have shew'd before from themselves . and besides , grotius saith , that the other evangelists had only intimated the divine nature of christ from his miraculous conception , miracles , knowing mens hearts , perpetual presence , promise of the spirit , remission of sins , &c. but s. john , as the time required , attributed the name and power of god to him from the beginning . so that by the name and power of god , he means the same which he called the divine nature before . . he saith , that when it is said , the word was with god ; it ought to be understood as ignatius explains it , with the father ; what can this mean , unless he understood the word to be the eternal son of god ? and he quotes tertullian , saying , that he is the son of god , and god ex unitate substantiae ; and that there was a prolation of the word without separation . now what prolation can there be of a meer attribute ? how can that be said to be the son of god begotten of the father , without division , before all worlds , as he quotes it from iustin martyr ? and that he is the word , and god of god , from theophilus antiochenus ? and in the next verse , when it is said , the same was in the beginning with god ; it is repeated on purpose , saith he , that we might consider , that god is so to be understood , that a distinction is to be made between god , with whom he was , and the word who was with god ; so that the word doth not comprehend all that is god. but our wise interpreters put a ridiculous sense upon it ; as though all that grotius meant was , that gods attributes are the same with himself ( which although true in it self , is very impertinent to grotius his purpose ) and that the reason why he saith , that the word is not all that god is , was , because there were other attributes of god besides . but where doth grotius say any thing like this ? is this wise interpreting ? or honest and fair dealing ? for grotius immediately takes notice from thence of the difference of hypostases ; which he saith was taken from the platonists , but with a change of the sense . . when it is said , v. . that all things were made by him ; grotius understands it of the old creation , and of the son of god. for , he quotes a passage of barnabas , where he saith , the sun is the work of his hands ; and several passages of the fathers to prove , that the world and all things in it were created by him ; and he adds , that nothing but god himself is excepted . what say our wise interpreters to all this ? nothing at all to the purpose ; but they cite the english geneva translation ( when they pretend to give grotius his sense ) and add , that the word now begins to be spoken of as a person by the same figure of speech , that solomon saith , wisdom hath builded her house , &c. doth grotius say any thing like this ? and yet they say , let us hear grotius interpreting this sublime proeme of s. john 's gospel . but they leave out what he saith , and put in what he doth not say ; is not this interpreting like wise men ? . the vvord was made flesh , v. . i. e. say the vnitarians as from grotius ; it did abode on , and inhabit a humane person , the person of iesus christ ; and so was in appearance made flesh or man. but what saith grotius himself ? the word that he might bring us to god , shew'd himself in the weakness of humane nature ; and he quotes the words of s. paul for it , tim. . . god was manifest in the flesh : and then produces several passages of the fathers to the same purpose . is not this a rare specimen of wise interpreting , and fair dealing with so considerable a person , and so well known , as grotius ? who , after all , in a letter to his intimate friend ger. i. vossius , declares that he owned the doctrine of the trinity ; both in his poems and his catechism ; after his reviewing them ; which epistle is printed before the last edition of his book about christ's satisfaction ; as an account to the world of his faith as to the trinity . and in the last edition of his poems , but little before his death , he gives a very different account of the son of god from what these vnitarians fasten upon him . and now let the world judge , how wisely they have interpreted both s. iohn , and his commentator grotius ? iv. is this to interpret scripture like wise men , to make our saviour's meaning to be expressly contrary to his words ? for when he said : before abraham was , i am ; they make the sense to be that really he was not , but only in gods decree , as any other man may be said to be . this place the late archbishop ( who was very far from being a socinian , however his memory hath been very unworthily reproached in that , as well as other respects , since his death ) urged against the socinians , saying , that the obvious sense of the words is , that he had a real existence , before abraham was actually in being , and that their interpretation about the decree is so very flat , that he can hardly abstain from saying it is ridiculous and the wise answer they give is , that the words cannot be true in any other sense , being spoken of one who was a son , and descendant of abraham . which is as ridiculous as the interpretation ; for it is to take it for granted , he was no more than a son of abraham . v. is this to interpret scripture like wise men , to say , that when our saviour said in his conference with the iews , i am the son of god , his chief meaning was , that he was the son of god in such a sense , as all the faithful are called gods children ? is not this doing great honour to our saviour ? especially when they say , that he never said of himself any higher thing than this , which is true of every good man , i am the son of god. and yet the iews accused him of blasphemy , for making himself the son of god ; and the high priest adjured him to tell , whether he were the christ the son of god. did they mean no more , but as any good man is ? but mr. selden saith , that by the son of god the jews meant , the word of god ( as he is called in the chaldee para●hrast ) which was all one , as to profess himself god : and our learned dr. pocock saith , that according to the sense of the ancient iews , the son of god spoken of , psal. . was the eternal son of god , of the same substance with the father . and by this we may understand s. peter's confession , thou art the christ , the son of the living god ; and nathanael's , thou art the son of god. but it is plain the iews in the conference thought he made himself god , by saying , i and my father are one. not one god , say our wise interpreters , but as friends are said to be one. and what must they think of our saviour the mean time , who knew the iews understood him quite otherwise , and would not undeceive them ? but they say , the jews put a malicious construction upon his words . how doth that appear ? do they think the iews had not heard what passed before in some former conferences , when they thought he had made himself equal with god ; and that he said , that all men should honour the son , even as they honoured the father ? these sayings no doubt stuck with them ; and therefore from them , they had reason to think that he meant something extraordinary , by his saying , i and my father are one. and if they were so wise in interpreting scripture , as they pretend , they would have considered , that if these things did not imply his being really the son of god , according to the old jewish notion , he would have severely checked any such mis-constructions of his meaning , and have plainly told them , he was but the son of man but s. paul's character of him doth plainly shew , that he was far from any thing like vanity or ostentation , although he was in the form of god , and thought it no robbery to be equal with god ; which must imply that he was very far from assuming any thing to himself ; which he must do in a very high measure , if he were not really the son of god , so as to be equal with god. the meaning whereof , say our wise interpreters , is , he did not rob god of his honour by arrogating to himself to be god , or equal with god. but what then do they think of these passages in his conferences with the iews ? was he not bound to undeceive them , when he knew they did so grossly mis-understand him , if he knew himself to be a meer man at the same time ? this can never go down with me , for they must either charge him with affecting divine honour , which is the highest degree of pride and vanity , or they must own him to be , as he was , the eternal son of god. vi. is this interpreting scripture like wise men , to deny divine worship to be given to our saviour when the scripture so plainly requires it ? when i had urged them in my sermon with the argument from divine worship being given to christ ; they do utterly deny it , and say , i may as well charge them with the blackest crimes . this i was not a little surprized at , knowing how warmly socinus had disputed for it . but that i might not misunderstand them , i look'd into other places in their late books , and from them i gather these things . . they make no question but some worship is due to the lord christ , but the question is concerning the kind or sort of worship . . they distinguish three sorts of worship . . civil worship from men to one another . . religious worship given on the account of a persons holiness , or relation to god ; which is more or less , according to their sanctity or nearer relation to god . divine worship which belongs only to god ; which consists in a resignation of our vnderstandings , wills and affections , and some peculiar acts of reverence and love towards him . the two former may be given to christ , they say , but not the last . from whence it follows , that they cannot according to their own principles , resign their vnderstandings , wills , and affections to christ ; because this is proper divine worship . are not these very good christians the mean while ? how can they believe sincerely , and heartily what he hath revealed , unless they resign their vnderstandings to him ; how can they love and esteem him , and place their happiness in him , if they cannot resign their wills and affections to him ? i think never any who pretended to be christians , durst venture to say such things before and all for fear they should be thought to give divine worship to christ. but they confess , that they are divided among themselves about the invocation of christ. those who are for it , say , that he may be the object of prayer , without making him god , or a person of god , and without ascribing to him the properties of the divine nature , omnipresence , omniscience , or omnipotence . those who deny it , they say , do only refuse it , because they suppose he hath forbidden it , which makes it a meer error . and in the new testament , they say , the charge is frequently renewed , that they are to worship god only . and as great writers as they have been these last seven years , they affirm that , they have wrote no book in that time in which they have not been careful to profess to all the world , that a like honour or vvorship ( much less the same ) is not to be given to christ as to god. and now i hope we understand their opinion right as to this matter . the question is , whether this be interpreting those scriptures which speak of the honour and worship due to christ , like wise men ? and for that i shall consider , . that herein they are gone off from the opinion of socinus and his followers , as to the sense of scripture in those places . . that they have done it in such a way , as will justifie the pagan and popish idolatry ; and therefore have not interpreted scripture like wise men. . that they are gone off from the opinion of socinus and his followers , who did allow divine worship to christ. this appears by the disputes he had with franciscus davidis and christianus francken about it . the former was about the sense of scripture . socinus produced all those places which mention the invocation of christ , and all those wherein s. paul saith , the grace of our lord iesus christ be with you all ; and the lord iesus christ direct our way , &c. and all those wherein a divine power and authority is given to christ as head of the church , for the support of the faith and hope of all those who believe in him in order to salvation . and this socinus truly judged to be proper divine worship . georg. blandrata was unsatisfied , that socinus did not say enough to prove the necessity of the invocation of christ , which he said he could do from his priesthood and his power , from the examples of the apostles , and the very nature of adoration . and blandrata was a man of great authority among the vnitarians ; and he thought socinus ought to assert the necessity of it ; or else he would do injury both to christ and to his cause . in the dispute with francken , socinus went upon this ground , that divine authority was a sufficient ground for divine worship , although there were not those essential attributes of omnisciency and omnipotency . but i observe , that socinus did not look on this as a matter of liberty , as our vnitarians now seem to do ; for in the preface to the former dispute , he calls the error of denying the invocation of christ , not , as they now do , a simple error or a mere mistake ; but a most filthy and pernicious error , an error that leads to iudaism , and is in effect the denying of christ ; and in the latter dispute he saith , that it tends to epicurism and atheism . and smalcius saith , that they are no christians who refuse giving divine worship to christ. . is it like wise men , to go upon such grounds as will justifie both pagan and popish idolatry ? this they have been charged with , and we shall see what wise men they are , by the defences they make for themselves . . as to pagan idolatry , they say , . they had no divine command for such a worship . this was well thought of , when they confess , that some among themselves deny that there is any command for invocating christ , and therefore they must charge all those who do it with idolatry . but this is no very wise notion of idolatry , which depends upon the nature of the worship , and not the meer positive will of god. . they set up the creatures more than the creator , as s. paul saith . s. paul doth not think them such fools , that they took the creatures to be above the creator , which was impossible , while they owned one to be the creator and the other the creatures ; but that they g●ve such acts of worship to them , as belonged only to the creator , and exceeded in the worship of them those bounds which ought to be between them . . they set up an infinite number of gods who had been mere men. this is , as if the question were only , whether one , or a great many were to have such worship given them : as if it were a dispute about a monarchy or a common-wealth of gods. but if it be lawfull to give divine worship to one creature , it is to a hundred . . their worship was terminated on them , and so they made true gods of men. suppose they asserted one supreme god , and made the rest subordinate to him , and appointed by him to be the immediate directors of humane affairs . i desire to know , whether the adoration of such were idolatry or not ? if it were , they cannot be excused who give adoration to christ , while they esteem him a mere creature ; if not , all the wiser pagans must be excused . . as to the papists , the difference they make , is not like wise interpreters of scripture ; for they say , . they have no text of scripture , which commands them to worship s. peter , s. paul and s. francis. so some among them say , there is none for the invocation of christ , and with them the case is parallel . but if socinus his principle be true , that communicated excellency is a sufficient foundation for worship , because it is relative to the giver , then the papists must be justified in all their relative acts of worship without any text to command it . . they exceed the bounds of honour and respect due to glorified saints . but who is to set these bounds but themselves in all acts of relative worship , because they depend upon the intention of the persons ? and they hold the very same things concerning communicated knowledge and power from god , which our vnitarians make use of to justifie their notion of the invocation of christ. vii . is this interpreting scripture like wise men , to turn s. paul's words , of whom as concerning the flesh christ came , who is over all , god blessed for ever , into a thanksgiving to god for the exaltation of christ , i. e. god who is over all be blessed for ever . but what reason do they give for such a forced and unusual sense , besides the avoiding the difficulty of having the name of god given here to christ ? a very substantial one . if the words had been intended of christ , it would have been in the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which they have taken up from erasmus and curcellaeus . but beza , who understood greek as well as either , ( and curcellaeus owned him for his master in that tongue ) saith , he could not sufficiently wonder at this criticism of erasmus , and thinks it a violent and far-fetched interpretation , and not agreeable to the greek idiom , and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same there with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and which may signifie more to our vnitarians , one of the learnedst men they have had among them , utterly disowns this interpretation , and saith , that the whole verse belongs to christ. but if that will not do , they have another fetch in the case , viz. that it is very probable that the word god was not originally in the text. how doth this appear to be very probable ? of that , we have this account : grotius observes , that the greek copies , used by the author of the syriac , had not the word god , and that erasmus had noted , that the copies of s. cyprian , s. hilary and s. chrysostom had only blessed over all , or above all , without the word god ; upon which he charges his adversary with no less than impiety in concealing this ; and calls it , cheating his reader . but how if all this prove a gross mistake in him ; unless it be only , that grotius and erasmus come in for their shares . it 's true , that grotius saith , that the word god was left out in the syriac version . but f. simon , whose authority they sometimes magnifie as to critical learning , saith plainly , that grotius was mistaken , and that the word god is in all the old copies , and in all the old versions . and upon his bringing erasmus to prove that it was not in s. cyprian , s. hilary , and s. chrysostome , he cries out , where is sincerity ? erasmus had met with one faulty edition which had it not , but he saith , all the rest of the mss. have it . and the learned oxford annotators , both on s. cyprian , and the greek testament compar'd with mss. ( which excellent work we hope will shortly appear more publickly ) declare , that they found it in all the mss. they could meet with ; and even erasmus himself saith , that the omission in s. hilary might be only by the negligence of the transcribers ; and so it appears by the late edition out of the best mss. where the words are , ex quibus christus qui est super omnia deus . and for s. chrysostom , all that is said , is , that it doth not appear that he read it , but he thinks it might be added afterwards . but what a sort of proof is this against the general consent of mss. for s. chrysostom doth not say he thought so . erasmus very plainly saith , that it is clearer than the sun , that christ is called god in other places of scripture ; but grotius can by no means be excused , nor those that rely upon him as to this place . viii . is this interpreting scripture like wise men , to take advantage of all omissions in copies , when those which are entire ought to be preferr'd ? this i mention for the sake of another noted place , tim. . . god was manifest in the flesh. here our wise interpreters triumph unreasonably ; viz for , they say , it appears by the syriac , latin , aethiopick , armenian , arabick , and most ancient greek bibles , that the word god was not originally in this text but added to it . but the arabick in all the polyglotts hath god in ; the syriac and aethiopick , if we believe their versions , read it in the masculine gender , and therefore in the king of spain's bible , guido fabricius boderianus puts in deus . as to the armenian , i have nothing to say , but what f. simon tells us from vscan an armenian bishop ; that there was great variety in their copies , and that their first translation was out of syriac and not out of greek . and the main point is , as to the old greek copies ; and we are assured , that there is but one , viz. the clermont copy which leaves out god , but that it is in the alexandrian , the vatican and all others ; and curcellaeus mentions no more than the clermont copy . it is therefore necessary to examine in this place , the authority of this clermont copy , ( as it is called ) whose reading is set up against all other ancient greek copies . beza affirms it with great confidence , that all the greek copies have god with one consent . but how comes he to take no notice of this difference of the clermont copy ? for that he had a sight of that part of it , which hath the epistles of s. paul , appears by his notes in which he refers to it . for he mentions it three times in his notes on rom. . v. . . . and in one he calls it a very ancient manuscript written in large letters . what should make beza pass it over here ? it seems by morinus that in the clermont copy , there was a correction made by another hand ; which is put into the various lections of the polyglott in morinus his words . but how doth it appear , that beza's clermont copy was the very same which morinus had ? morinus saith , he had it from the f. f. puteani ; ( and is the same i suppose with that in the king of france's library ; of which they were then the keepers ) but morinus intimates that it was an old copy , which fell into their hands ; and so might come into the french king's library , when they gave their own manuscripts to it . this seems to have been the same which p. pithaeus speaks of ; for the description exactly agrees with it ; but pithaeus , who was a person of great integrity and learning , affirms , that this volume of the epistles in great letters came out of the monastery of corbey ; and so it could not be the clermont copy which beza had . and i shall make it appear from the very places mention'd by morinus , that beza's copy did differ from that which morinus perused , as rom. . . morinus his copy had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; beza takes notice of it only in the vulgar latin ; which he would never have done , if it had been in the clermont copy , rom . . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 morinus reads in that copy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and saith it is the true reading : but beza condemns it , and never intimates that his copy had it , rom. . . morinus saith , the reading of his copy is the true , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : beza saith , it is against all the greek copies but one , and that hath 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; whether beza were mistaken as to other copies is not our business to enquire ; but if the reading had been in his copy as morinus found it ; he could never have said , that but one copy had that different reading . rom. . , morinus his copy had it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; beza takes no notice of any difference . rom. . , morinus reads 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . beza saith , it is not in the greek copies ; and he had then the clermont by him : but it is both in that of the french king's library , and of s. germain's ; which agree with each other , where beza's copy differs ; and beza upon rom. . . and . observes , that his clermont copy differs from the rest ; by which we see how careful he was to observe the variuos readings in it ; and so upon rom. . , , , . rom. . . beza observes , that the vulgar latine leaves out part of the verse , but that it is found in all the greek copies ; here morinus charges beza with negligence , or dis-ingenuity ; because it was left out in the clermont copy ; but how doth he prove he had the same copy ? he saith indeed , that the ancient copy , which he had was lent to beza ; but he tells not by whom , nor in whose possession it was afterwards . but if beza were a man of any ordinary care or honesty , he would never have concealed those things , which morinus found in it . cor. . , beza saith , that those words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , are in all the greek copies ; morinus saith , that they were wanting in that which he made use of . it 's true , they are wanting in the alexandrian , and some others ; but in none that beza had the sight of ▪ if he may be believed . these are sufficient to shew , that there is no good proof , that the ●opy which beza had was the same which morinus borrow'd ; and therefore his authority is not to be slighted in this matter , when he affirms , that all the greek copies agreed in reading god manifest in the flesh ; and i cannot imagine beza so intolerably careless as he must have been , if morinus his copy and beza's were the same . but whether it were in beza's copy or not , it 's certain , they say , that it is not in that ancient manuscript , which is called the clermont copy ; which is affirmed by morinus , and taken for granted by others , therefore we must enquire a little farther into the authority of this ancient copy . it appears by those who have view'd and considered them , that there are two very ancient copies of s. paul's epistles , so exactly agreeing , that one is supposed to be the transcript of the other ; one is in the king's library , the other in the monastery of s. germains . which mabillon saith is a thousand years old . these two copies are in effect but one , agreeing so much where they differ from others ; and having the old latin version opposite to the greek . monsieur arnauld had so bad an opinion of both parts of this clermont copy , ( as it is called ) that he charges it with manifest forgery , and imposture ; inserting things into the text without ground . f. simon who defends them cannot deny several things to be inserted , but he saith , it was through carelessness and not design . but he confesses , that those who transcribed both those ancient copies of s. paul 's epistles did not understand greek , and hardly latin . and now let us consider , of what just authority this different reading of the clermont copy ought to be against the consent of all other ancient copies . we find some good rules laid down by the roman criticks , when they had a design under vrban th . to compare the greek text of the new testament , with their ancient manuscripts in the vatican , and elewhere , and to publish an exact edition of it ( which collation was preserved in the barberin library , and from thence published by pet. possinus . ) and the main rules as to the various lections of manuscripts were these , . that the text was not to be alter'd but a concurrence of all , or the greatest part of the manuscripts . . that if one manuscript agreed with the vulgar latin , the text was not to be alter'd , but the difference to be set down at the end of the chapter . but it is observable in that collation of twenty two manuscripts , there is no one copy produced , wherein there is any variety as to this place . i know they had not twenty two manuscripts of s. paul's epistles , ( they mention but eight ancient manuscripts ) but they found no difference in those they had . and now i leave any reasonable man to judge , whether this clermont copy ought to be relied upon in this matter . but i have something more to say about the greek copies . . that god is in the complutensian polyglott , which was the first of the kind , and carried on by the wonderful care and expence of that truly grea● man cardinal ximenes , who spared for no cost or pains in procuring the best ancient copies both hebrew and greek ; and the fittest men to judge of both languages . and in pursuit of this noble design , he had the best vatican manuscripts sent to him ( as is expressed in the epistle before his greek testament , ) and what others he could get out of other places , among which he had the codex britannicus mention'd by erasmus . but after all these copies made use of by the editors , there is no intimation of any variety as to this place ; although the vulgar latin be there as it was . but erasmus mentions the great consent of the old copies as to the vulgar latin , and whence should that come , but from a variety in the old greek copies . to that i answer , . that the greek copies , where they were best understood had no variety in them ; i. e. among the greeks themselves . as appears by gregory nyssen , s. chrysostom , theodoret , oecumenius and theophylact. but doth not monsieur amelote say , that the marquiss of velez had sixteen old manuscripts , out of which he gathered various readings , and he reads it o! i cannot but observe , how he commends fabricius and walton , for rendring the syriac version according to the vulgar latin ; but that will appear to be false , to any one that looks into them ; the former is mentioned already ; and the latter translates it , quod manifestatus sit in carne . but as to the marquiss of velez his copies , there is a secret in it , which ought to be understood , and is discover'd by mariana . he confesses , he had so may manuscripts , eight of them out of the escurial , but that he never set down whence he had his readings . and in another place , he ingenuously confesses , that his design was to justifie the vulgar latin ; and therefore collected readings on purpose , and he suspects some , out of such greek copies , as after the council of florence were made comfortable to the latin . which readings were published by la cerda , whose authority amelote follows . and now what reason can there be , that any such late copies should be prefer'd before those which were used by the greek fathers ? . that the latin fathers did not concern themselves about changing their version , because they understood it still to relate to the person of christ. so do s. ierom , leo , hilary , fulgentius , and others . as to the objections about liberatus , macedonius and hincmarus , i refer them to the learned oxford annotations . ix . it is not wisely done of these interpreters , to charge our church so much for retaining a verse in s. iohn's first epistle , when they had so good authority to do it ? the verse is , there are three that bear record in heaven , the father , son , and holy ghost , &c. from hence they charge us with corrupted copies and false translations ; as an instance of the former , they produce this text , which they say , was not originally in the bible , but is added to it , and is not found in the most ancient copies of the greek , nor in the syriac , arabick , ethiopick , or armenian bibles , nor in the most ancient latin bibles . notwithstanding all which , i hope to be able to shew , that our church had reason to retain it . for which end we are to consider these things ; . that erasmus first began to raise any scruple about it . for , however it might not be in some mss. which were not look'd into , this verse was constantly and solemnly read as a part of scripture both in the greek and latin churches , as mr. selden confesses , and that it was in wickliff's bible . so that here was a general consent of the eastern and western churches for the receiving it ; and although there might be a variety in the copies , yet there was none in the publick service , and no objections against it that we find . but erasmus his authority sway'd so much here , that in the bibles in the time of h. . and e. . it was retained in a different letter . as in tyndell's bible printed by the king's printer , a. d. . and in the church bible of king e. . in both which they are read , but not in the same character . yet erasmus his authority was not great enough to cast it out , if he had a mind to have done it . which doth not appear , for he saith himself , that finding it in the codex britannicus , as he calls it , he restored it in his translation as well as the greek testament , out of which he had expunged it befo●e in two editions . and the complutensian bible coming out with it , added greater authority to the keeping of it in , and so it was preserved in the greek testaments of hervagius , plautin and r. stephens and others , after the mss. had been more diligently searched . morinus saith , it was in seven of rob. stephens his mss. but f. simon will not allow that it was in any but the complutensian , which is a strange piece of boldness in him . for beza saith , he had the use of them all from him ; and h. stephens let him have his father's copy compared with mss. and he affirms , that he found it in several of r. stephens his old mss. besides the codex britannicus and the complutensian copy , and therefore he concludes , that it ought to be retained . ( and so it was , after these copies were come abroad in the bishop's bible , under queen elizabeth , without any distinction of character , as likewise in our last translation . ) and it is observable , that amelote affirms , that he found it in the most ancient greek copy in the vatican library ; but the roman criticks confess , it was not in their mss. yet they thought it fit to be retained from the common greek copies , and the testimonies of the fathers agreeing with the vulgar latin. . this verse was in the copies of the african churches from s. cyprian's time , as appears by the testimonies of s. cyprian , fulgentius , facundus , victor vitensis , and vigilius tapsensis , which are produced by others . f. simon hath a bold conjecture , of which he is not sparing , that victor vitensis is the first who produced it as s. john 's saying ; and that it was s. cyprian 's own assertion and not made use of by him as a testimony of scripture . but they who can say such things as these , are not much to be trusted . for s. cyprian's words are , speaking of s. iohn before , et iterum de patre & filio scriptum est , & hi tres unum sunt . and it was not victor vitensis , but the african bishops and eugenius in the head of them , who made that address to huneric , wherein they say , that it is clearer than light , that father , son and holy ghost are one god , and prove it by the testimony of s. john. tres sunt qui testimonium perhibent in caelo , pater , verbum & spiritus sanctus , & hi tres unum sunt . . in the former testimony , the authority of the vulgar latin was made use of : and why , is it rejected here ? when morinus confesses there is no variety in the copies of it . vulgata versio hunc versum constanter habet . and he observes , that those of the fathers , who seem to omit it ( as s. augustin against maximinus ) did not follow the old latin version . lucas brugensis , saith only , that in old copies , they found it wanting but in five . as to s. ierom's prologue , i am not concerned to defend it ; but erasmus thought it had too much of s. jerom in it , and others think it hath too little . f. simon confesses , that p. pithaeus and mabillon think it was s. ierom's , and that it was in the mss. but i conclude with saying , that whoever was the author , at the time when it was written , the greek copies had this verse , or else he was a notorious impostor . x. the next thing i shall ask these wise interpreters of scripture , is , whether , when the scripture so often affirms , that the world was made by the son , and that all things were created by him in heaven and in earth , it be reasonable to understand them of creating nothing ? for after all their shifts and evasions it comes to nothing at last . but that we may see , how much they are confounded with these places , we may observe , . they sometimes say , that where the creation of all things is spoken of , it is not meant of christ but of god. for in the answer they give to the place of the epistle to the colossians , they have these words : for by him all things were created , are not spoken of christ , but of god : the sense of the whole context is this , the lord christ is the most perfect image of the invisible god , the first born from the dead of every creature ; for , o colossians , by him , even by the invisible god were all things created ; they were not from all eternity , nor rose from the concourse of atoms , but all of them , whether things in heaven , or things in earth ; whether thrones , or dominions , or principalities , or powers , are creatures , and were by god created , who is before them all , and by him they all consist . this is a very fair concession , that of whomsoever these words are spoken he must be god. . but in the defence of this very book they go about to prove , that the creation of the world is not meant by these words . is not this interpreting like wise men indeed ? and they tell us , they cannot but wonder , that men should attribute the old or first creation to christ. wise men do not use to wonder at plain things . for what is the old or first creation , but the making the world , and creating all things in heaven and earth ? and these things are attribu●ed to the word , to the son to christ. but say they , the scripture does never say in express words ▪ that christ hath created the heaven and the earth . what would these wise interpreters have ? doth not by whom all things were created in heaven and earth imply , that heaven and earth were created by him ? but they have a notable observation from the language of the new testament , viz that christ is never said to have created the heaven , the earth , and the sea , and all that therein is ; but we are apt to think , that creating all things takes in ●he sea too , and that in the scripture language heaven and earth are the same with the world , and i hope the world takes in the sea ; and the world is said to be made by him , and do not all things take in all ? no , say they , all things are limited to all thrones , principalities and powers , visible and invisible . then , however the making of these is attributed to christ. and if he made all powers , visible and invisible , he must be god. not so neither . what then is the meaning of the words , by him were all things created that are in heaven and in earth , visible and invisible ; whether they be thrones , or dominions , or principalities , or powers , all things were created by him and for him ? surely then , these dominions and powers were created by him . no , say they , that which we render created , ought to be rendred , modelled , disposed , or reformed into a new order . were ever wise men driven to such miserable shifts ? one while these words are very strong and good proof of the creation of the world against atheists and epicureans , and by and by they prove nothing of all this , but only a new modelling of some things called dominions and powers . do they hope ever to convince men at this rate of wise interpreting ? well , but what is this creating or disposing things into a new order ? and who are these dominions and powers ? they answer , men and angels . how are the angels created by him and for him ? did he die to reform them , as well as mankind ? no , but they are put under him . and so they were created by him , that is , they were not created by him , but only made subject to him . but who made them subject to him ? the man christ iesus ? no , god appointed him to be the lord of every creature . then they were not created by christ , but by god ; but the apostle saith , they were created by christ. but god made him head of the church , and as head of the body he rules over all . this we do not at all question ; but how this comes to be creating dominions and powers , visible and invisible . did god make the earth and all the living creatures in it , when he made man lord over them ? or rather was man said to create them , because he was made their head ? if this be their interpreting scripture like wise men , i shall be content with a less measure of understanding , and thank god for it . xi . lastly , is this to interpret scripture like wise men , to leave the form of baptism doubtful , whether it were not inserted into s. matthew's gospel ; or to understand it in another sense than the christian church hath done from the apostles times ? i say first , leave it doubtful , because they say , that learned criticks have given very strong reasons why they believe these words . in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost , were not spoke by our saviour , but have been added to the gospel of s. matthew , from the common form and practise of the church . why are these strong reasons of learned criticks mentioned , but to raise doubts in peoples minds about them ? but they declare afterwards against them . not too much of that . for they say , only , that they are not without their weight , but they have observed several things that make them think , that this text is a genuine part of scripture . very wisely and discreetly spoken ! the reasons are strong and weighty ; but they think otherwise . i wish they had told the world , who these learned criticks were ; lest it should be suspected that they were their own inventions . but i find a certain nameless socinian was the author of them ; and his words are produced by sandius ( a person highly commended by them for his industry and learning , but as much condemned by others , for want of skill or ingenuity . ) the reason of writing these reasons sandius freely confesses was , because this place clearly proved a trinity of persons against the socinians . but what are these very strong and weighty reasons ? for it is great pity , but they should be known . in the first place he observes , that s. matthew's gospel was written in hebrew , and the original he saith is lost ; and he suspects that either s. jerom was himself the translator into greek and latin ( who was a corrupter of scripture , and origen ) or some unknow person : from whence it follows , that our gospel of s. matthew is not of such authority , that an article of such moment should depend upon it . is not this a very strong and weighty reason ? must not this be a very learned critick who could mention s. ierom , as translator of s. matthews gospel into greek ? but then one would think this interpreter might have been wise enough to have added this of himself . no ; he dares not say that , but that it was added by transcribers . but whence or how ? to that he saith , that they seem to be taken out of the gospel according to the egyptians . this is great news indeed . but comes it from a good hand ? yes , from epiphanius . and what saith he to this purpose ? he saith , that the sabellians made use of the counterfeit egyptian gospel , and there it was declared that father , son and holy ghost were the same . and what then ? doth he say they borrowed the form of baptism from thence ? nothing like it . but on the contrary , epiphanius urges this very form in that place against the sabellians : and quotes s. matthew's authority for it . but this worthy author produces other reasons , which sandius himself laughs at , and despises ? and therefore i pass them over . the most material seems to be if it hold , that the most ancient writers on s. matthew take no notice of them , and he mentions origen , hilary , and s. chrysostom , but these negative arguments sandius thinks of no force . origen and s. chrysostom , he saith , reach not that chapter ; the opus imperfectum , which was none of his , doth not ; but his own commentaries do , and there he not only mentions the form , but takes notice of the compendious doctrine delivered by it , which can be nothing else but that of the trinity . in the greek catena on s. matthew there is more mentioned , viz. that christ had not then first his power given him ; for he was with god before , and was himself by nature god. and there gregory nazianzen saith , the form of baptism was in the name of the holy trinity ; and he there speaks more fully . remember , saith he , the faith into which thou wert baptized . into the father ? that is well , but that is no farther than the jews go ( for they own one god , and one person . ) into the son ? that is beyound them , but not yet perfect . into the holy ghost ? yes , saith he , this is perfect baptism . but what is the common name of these three , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . plainly , that of god. but this learned critick observes , that hilary in some copies takes no notice of this form. that is truly observed , for the very conclusion is not hilary's , but taken out of s. ierom ; but if he had look'd into hilary's works , he would have found the form of baptism owned , and asserted by him . for he not only sets it down as the form of faith , as well as our baptism appointed by christ ; but argues from it , against the sabellians and ebionites , as well as others . thus we see how very strong and weighty the arguments of this learned critick were . chap. ix . the general sense of the christian church , proved from the form of baptism , as it was understood in the first ages . but our vnitarians pretend , that they are satisfied , that the form of baptism is found in all copies , and all the ancient translations ; and that it was used before the council of nice , as appears by several places of tertullian . but how then ? there are two things stick with them . ( . ) that the ante-nicene fathers do not alledge it to prove the divinity of the son , or holy ghost . ( . ) that the form of words here used , doth not prove the doctrine of the trinity . both which must be strictly examined . . as to the former . it cannot but seem strange to any one conversant in the writings of those fathers ; when s. cyprian saith expressly , that the form of baptism is prescribed by christ , that it should be in plenâ & aduna●â trinitate : i. e. in the full confession of the holy trinity ; and therefore , he denied the baptism of the marcionites , because the faith of the trinity was not sincere among them , as appears at large in that epistle . and this , as far as i can find , was the general sense of the ante-nicene fathers , as well as others . and it is no improbable opinion of erasmus , and vossius , two learned criticks indeed , that the most ancient creed went no further than the form of baptism , viz. to believe in the father , son and holy ghost ; and the other articles were added as heresies gave occasion . s. ierom saith , that in the traditional creed , which they received from the apostles , the main article was , the confession of the trinity ; to which he joyns the vnity of the church , and resurrection of the flesh ; and then adds , that herein is contained , omne christiani dogmatis sacramentum , the whole faith into which christians were baptized . and he saith , it was the custom among them to instruct those who were to be baptized for forty days in the doctrine of the holy trinity . so that there was then no question but the form of baptism had a particular respect to ●t ; and therefore , so much weight is laid upon the use of it , as well by the ante-nicene fathers , as others . for , tertullian saith , that the form of baptism was prescribed by our saviour himself as a law to his church . s. cyprian to the same purpose , that he commanded it to be used s. augustin calls them , the words of the gospel , without which there is no baptism . the reason given by s. ambrose is , because the faith of the trinity is in this form. but how if any one person were left out ? he thinks , that if the rest be not denied , the baptism is good ; but otherwise , vacuum est omne mysterium , the whole baptism is void . so that the faith of the trinity was that which was required in order to true baptism , more than the bare form of words . if there were no reason to question the former , s. ambrose seems of opinion that the baptism was good , although every person were not named , and therein he was followed by beda , hugo de sancto victore , peter lombard and others . and s basil in the greek church , asserted that baptism in the name of the holy ghost was sufficient , because he is hereby owned to be of equal dignity with the father and son ; but it is still supposing that the whole and undivided trinity be not denied . and he elsewhere saith , that baptizing in the name of the father , son and holy ghost is a most solemn profession of the trinity in vnity , because they are all joyned together in this publick act of devotion . but others thought that the baptism was not good , unless every person were named ; which opinion generally obtained both in the greek and latin church . and the late editors of s. ambrose observe , that in other places he makes the whole form of words necessary as well as the faith in the holy trinity . the baptism of the eunomians was rejected , because they alter'd the form and the faith too , saying , that the father was uncreate , the son created by the father , and the holy ghost created by the son. the baptism of the samosatenians was rejected by the council of nice . s. augustin thinks it was because they had not the right form , but the true reason was , they rejected the doctrine of the trinity . and so the council of arles i. doth in express words refuse their baptism who refused to own that doctrine . that council was held a. d. . and therefore bellarmin , and others after him , are very much mistaken , when they interpret this canon of the arians , concerning whose baptism there could be no dispute till many years after . but this canon is de afris ; among whom the custom of baptizing prevailed ; but this council propounds an expedient as most agreeable to the general sense of the christian church , viz. that if any relinquished their heresie and came back to the church , they should ask them the creed , and if they found that they were baptized in the name of the father , son and holy ghost , they should have only imposition of hands , but if they did not confess the trinity , their baptism was declared void . now this i look on as an impregnable testimony of the sense of the ante-nicene fathers , viz. that they did not allow that baptism which was not in the name of the father , son and holy ghost ; or ( which they understood to be the same ) in the confession of the faith of the trinity . how then can our vnitarians pretend , that the ante-nicene fathers did not alledge the form of baptism to prove the trinity ? for the words are , if they do n●t answer to this trinity let them be baptized , saith this plenary cou●cil , as s. augustin often calls it . what trinity do they mean ? of mere names or cyphers , or of one god and two creatures joyned in the same form of words , as our vnitarians understand it ? but they affirm , that the ancients of years do not insist on this text of s. matthew to prove the divinity or personality of the son or spirit . therefore to give a clear account of this matter , i shall prove , that the ante-nicene fathers did understand these words , so as not to be taken , either for mere names , or for creatures joyned with god ; but that they did maintain the divinity of the son and holy ghost , from the general sense , in which these words were taken among them . and this i shall do from these arguments ; . that those who took them in another sense , were opposed and condemned by the christian church . . that the christian church did own this sense in publick acts of divine worship as well as private . . that it was owned and defended by those who appeared for the christian faith against infidels . and i do not know any better means than these , to prove such a matter of fact as this . . the sense of the christian church may be known by its behaviour towards those , who took these words only for different names or appearances of one person . and of this we have full evidence , as to praxeas , noëtus and sabellius , all long before the council of nice . praxeas was the first , at least in the western church , who made father , son and holy ghost , to be only several names of the same person , and he was with great warmth and vigor opposed by tertullian , who charges him with introducing a new opinion into the church , as will presently appear . and his testimony is the more considerable , because our vnitarians confess , that he lived years before the nicene council , and that he particularly insists upon the form of baptism against praxeas . but to what purpose ? was not his whole design in that book to prove three distinct persons of father , son and holy ghost , and yet but one god ? doth he not say expresly , that christ commanded that his disciples should baptize into the father , son and holy ghost , not into one of them ; ad singula nomina in personas singulas tingimur . in baptism we are dipped once at every name , to shew that we are baptized into three persons . it is certain then , that tertullian could not mistake the sense of the church so grosly , as to take three persons to be only three several names . he grants to praxeas , that father , son and holy ghost are one , but how ? per unitatem substantiae , because there is but one divine essence : but yet he saith , there are three , not with respect to essential attributes , for so they are unius substantiae , & unius status , & unius potestatis , quia unus deus . and therefore the difference can be only as to personal properties and distinct capacities , which he calls gradus , forma , species , not merely as to internal relations , but as to external dispensations , which he calls their oeconomy . for his great business is to prove against praxeas , that the son and holy ghost had those things attributed to them in scripture , which could not be attributed to the father . for praxeas asserted , that the father suffer'd ; and thence his followers were called patripassians and monarchici , i. e. vnitarians . the main ground which praxeas went upon , was the vnity of the godhead , so often mention'd in scripture , from hence tertullian saith , that he took advantage of the weakness of the common sort of christians , and represented to them , that whereas the doctrine of christ made but one god , those who held the trinity according to the form of baptism , must make more gods than one . tertullian answers , that they held a monarchy , i. e. unicum imperium , one supreme godhead , and a supreme power may be lodged in distinct persons and administred in several manners ; that nothing overthrew the divine monarchy , but a different power and authority , which they did by no means assert . they held a son , but of the substance of the father , and a holy ghost from the father by the son : he still keeps to the distinction of persons , and the vnity of substance . and he utterly denies any division of essences or separate substances ; for therein , he saith , lay the heresie of valentinus , in making a prolation of a separate being . but although he saith , the gospel hath declared to us , that the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , yet we are taught that there is still but one god : redactum est jam nomen dei & domini in unione , c. . whereby the christians are distinguished from the heathens who had many gods this is the force of what tertullian saith upon this matter . and what say our vnitarians to it ? they cannot deny that he was an ante-nicene father ; and it is plain that he did understand the form of baptism so as to imply a trinity of persons in an vnity of essence : to which they give no answer . but i find three things objected against tertullian by their friends : . that tertullian brought this doctrine into the church from montanus , whose disciple he then was . so schlichtingius in his preface against meisner , grants , that he was very near the apostolical times , and by his wit and learning promoted this new doctrine about the trinity , especially in his book against praxeas . but how doth it appear , that he brought in any new doctrine ? yes , saith schlichtingius , he confesses , that he was more instructed by the paraclete . but if he had dealt ingenuously , he would have owned that in that very place , he confesses , he was always of that opinion , although more fully instructed by the paraclete ? this only shews that montanus himself innovated nothing in this matter , but endeavoured to improve it . and it is possible , that tertullian might borrow his similitudes and illustrations from him , which have added no ●●rength to it . but as to the main of the doctrine he saith , it came from the rule of faith delivered by the apostles , before praxeas , or any hereticks his predecessors . which shews , that those who rejected this doctrine were always esteemed hereticks in the christian church . and this is a very early testimony of the antiquity and general reception of it , because as one was received the other was rejected , so that the assertors of it were accounted hereticks . and the sense of the church is much better known by such publick acts , than by mere particular testimonies of the learned men of those times . for when they deliver the sense of the church in such publick acts , all persons are judges of the truth and falshood of them at the time when they are deliver●d ; and the nearer they came to the apostolical times , the greater is the strength of their evidence ; this i ground on tertullian's appealing to the ancient rule of faith , which was universally known and received in the christian church , and that such persons were look'd on as hereticks who differ'd from it . which being so very near the apostles times , it 's hardly possible to suppose , that the whole christian church should be mistaken as to what they received as the rule of faith , which was deliver'd and explained at baptism , and therefore the general sense of the form of baptism must be understood by all who were admitted to it . so that the members of the christian church cannot be supposed better acquainted with any thing than the doctrine they were baptized into . here then we have a concurrence of several publick acts of the church . . the form of baptism . . the rule of faith relating to that form , and explained at baptism . . the churches rejecting those as hereticks who differ'd from it : which tertullian applies to those who rejected the trinity . and praxeas his doctrine was then condemned , not by a particular sentence , but by the general sense of the church at that time . for optatus milevitanus reckons him among the condemned hereticks , and joyns him with marcian and valentinus , as well as sabellius , who follow'd him in the same heresie . how was this possible , if praxeas deliver'd the true doctrine , and tertullian brought in a new opinion as schlichtingius fansies . tertullian was at that time a declared montanist ; and if he had introduc'd a new doctrine about the trinity , can we imagine those would have been silent about it , who were sharp enough upon tertullian for the sake of his paraclete ? some of the followers of montanus afterwards fell into the same opinions with praxeas , as theodoret tells us , and tertullian saith as much of those cataphrygians who follow'd aeschines : but these montanists are distinguished from the rest . and rigaltius observes , that tertullian follow'd montanus chiefly in what related to discipline , and that himself was not so corrupted in point of doctrine as some of his followers were . . it 's objected , that tertullian's doctrine is inconsistent with the doctrine of the trinity ; for he denies the eternal generation of the son ; and only asserts an emission of him before the creation . but my business is not to justifie all tertullian's expressions or similitudes ; for men of wit and fancy love to go out of the road , and sometimes involve things more by attempts to explain them ; but i keep only to that which he saith , was the faith of the church from the beginning ; and i see no reason to call in question his fidelity in reporting , however he might be unhappy in his explications . . tertullian himself saith , schlichtingius , in other places , where he speaks of the rule of faith , doth not mention the holy ghost ; and therefore this seems added by him for the sake of the paraclete . but this can be of no force to any one that considers , that tertullian grounds his doctrine not on any new revelation by the paraclete , but on the rule of faith received in the church long before ; and upon the form of baptism prescribed by our saviour . will they say , the holy ghost was there added for the sake of montanus his paraclete ? and in another of his books , he owns the father , son and holy ghost to make up the trinity in vnity . wherein petavius himself confesses , that he asserted the doctrine of the church in a catholick manner ; although he otherwise speaks hardly enough of him . the next i shall mention , is novatian , whom schlichtingius allows , to have been before the nicene-council ; and our modern vnitarians call him a great man , whoever he was , and very ancient . and there are two things i observe in him . . that he opposes sabellianism ; for , before his time praxeas and noetus were little talked of , especially in the western church ; but sabellius his name and doctrine were very well known by the opposition to him , by the bishops of alexandria and rome . he sticks not , at the calling it heresie several times ; and disputes against it , and answers the objection about the vnity of the godhead . . that he owns , that the rule of faith requires our believing in father , son and holy ghost ; and asserts the divine eternity of it , and therefore must hold the doctrine of the trinity to be the faith of the church contained in the form of baptism . for he saith , the authority of faith , and the holy scriptures admonish us to believe not only in the father and son , but in the holy ghost . therefore the holy ghost must be considered , as an object of faith joyned in the scripture with the other two , which is no where more express , than in the form of baptism , which as s. cyprian saith , was to be administred in the full confession of the trinity , in the place already mention●d . and it is observable that s. cyprian rejects the baptism of those who denied the trinity at that time , among whom he instances in the patripassians , who it seems were then spread into africa . the dispute about the marcionites baptism was upon another ground , for they held a real trinity , as appears by dionysius romanus in athanasius , and epiphanius , &c. but the question was , whether they held the same trinity or not . s. cyprian saith , that our saviour appointed his apostles to baptize in the name of father , son and holy ghost , and in the sacrament of this trinity they were to baptize . doth marcion hold this trinity ? so that s. cyprian supposed the validity of baptism to depend on the faith of the trinity . and if he had gone no farther , i do not see how he had transgressed the rules of the church ; but his error was , that he made void baptism upon difference of communion , and therein he was justly opposed . but the marcionites baptism was rejected in the eastern church , because of their doctrine about the trinity . in the parts of asia about ephesus , noetus had broached the same doctrine , which praxeas had done elsewhere . for which he was called to an account , and himself with his followers we cast out of the churches communion , as epiphanius reports , which is another considerable testimony of the sense of the church at that time . epiphanius saith , he was the first who broached that blasphemy ; but theodoret mentions epigonus and cleomenes before him ; it seems , that he was the first who was publickly taken notice of for it ; and therefore underwent the censure of the church with his disciples . when he was first summon'd to answer , he denied that he asserted any such doctrine ; because no man before him saith epiphanius , had vented such poison . and in the beginning he saith , that noetus out of a spirit of contradiction had utter'd such things , as neither the prophets , nor the apostles , nor the church of god ever thought or declared . now what was this unheard of doctrine of noetus ? that appears best by noetus his answer upon his second appearance which was , that he worshipped one god , and knew of no other , who was born and suffer'd , and died for us ; and for this he produced the several places which assert the vnity of the godhead , and among the rest one very observable , rom. . . of whom as concerning the flesh christ came , who is over all god blessed for ever . from whence he inferr'd that the son and the father were the same , and the same he affirmed of the holy ghost . but from hence we have an evident proof that the most ancient greek copies in noetus his time , which was long before the council of nice , had god in the text. epiphanius brings many places of scripture to prove the distinction of persons in the unity of the godhead ; but that is not my present business , but to shew the general sense of the church at that time . i do not say that noetus was condemned by a general council ; but it is sufficient , to shew that he was cast out of the church , where he broached his doctrine , and no other church received him , or condemned that church which cast him out , which shews an after consent to it . now what was this doctrine of noetus ? the very same with that of praxeas at rome . theodoret saith , this his opinon was , that there was but one god the father , who was himself impassible , but as he took our nature , so he was passible and called the son. epiphanius more fully , that the same person was father , son and holy ghost ; wherein he saith , he plainly contradicts the scriptures , which attribute distinct personalities to them ; and yet assert but one godhead . the father hath an hypostasis of his own , and so have the son and holy ghost ; but yet there is but one divinity , one power , and one dominion ; for these distinct persons are , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; of the same individual essence and power . but epiphanius was no ante-nicene father : however in matters of antiquity , where there is no incongruity in the thing , we may make use of his authority ; and i think no one will question , that noetus was condemned ; which was the thing i produced him to prove . but although noetus was condemned , yet this doctrine did spread in the eastern parts ; for origen mentions those who confounded the notion of father and son , and made them but one hypostasis , and distinguished only by thought , and denomination . this doctrine was opposed not only by origen , but he had the sense of the church concurring with him , as appears in the case of beryllus bishop of bostra , who fell into this opinion , and was reclaimed by origen ; and eusebius gives this account of it , that there was a concurrence of others with him in it , and that this doctrine was look'd on as an innovation in the faith. for his opinion was that our saviour had no proper subsistence of his own before the incarnation ; and that the deity of the father alone was in him . he did not mean that the son had no separate divinity from the father , but that the deity of the father only appeared in the son ; so that he was not really god , but only one in whom the deity of the father was made manifest . which was one of the oldest heresies in the church , and the most early condemned and opposed by it . but those heresies , which before had differenced persons from the church , were now spread by some at first within the communion of it ; as it was not only in the case of noetus and beryllus , but of sabellius himself , who made the greatest noise about this doctrine ; and his disciples , epiphanius tells us , spread very much both in the eastern and western parts ; in mesopotamia and at rome . their doctrine , he saith , was , that father , son and holy ghost were but one hypostasis , with three different denominations . they compared god to the sun , the father to the substance , the son to the light , and the holy ghost to the heat which comes from it ; and these two latter were only distinct operations of the same substance . epiphanius thinks that sabellius therein differ'd from noetus , because he denied that the father suffer'd ; but s. augustin can find no difference between them . all that can be conceived is , that a different denomination did arise from the different appearance and operation ; which our vnitarians call three relative persons , and one subsisting person . sabellius did spread his heresie most in his own country ; which was in pentapolis of the cyrenaick province , being born in ptolemais one of the five cities there . of this dionysius bishop of alexandria gives an account in his epistle to xystus then bishop of rome , wherein he takes notice of the wicked and blasphemous heresie , lately broached there against the persons of the father , son and holy ghost . letters on both sides were brought to him , on which occasion he wrote several epistles , among which there was one to ammonius bishop of bernice , another of the cities of pentapolis . in this , he disputed with great warmth against this doctrine of sabellius , insomuch , that he was afterwards accused to dionysius of rome , that he had gone too far the other way ; and lessen'd the divinity of the son by his similitudes ; of which he clear'd himself , as appears by what remains of his defence in athanasius . but as to his zeal against sabellianism it was never question'd . dionysius of rome declares his sense at large in this matter against both extremes , viz. of those who asserted three separate and independent principles , and of those who confounded the divine persons ; and he charges the doctrine of sabellius too with blasphemy , as well as those who set up three different principles , and so made three gods. but he declares the christian doctrine to be , that there were father , son and holy ghost ; but that there is an indivisible vnion in one and the same godhead . it seems dionysius of alexandria was accused for dividing and separating the persons , to which he answers , that it was impossible he should do it , because they are indivisible from each other ; and the name of each person did imply the inseparable relation to the other , as the father to the son , and the son to the father , and the holy ghost to both . and this judgment of these two great men in the church concerning sabellianism , was universally receiv'd in the christian church . and this happen'd long before the nicene council . . another argument of the general sense of the christian church is from the hymns and doxologies publickly received ; which were in the most solemn acts of religious worship made to father , son and holy ghost . the force of this argument appears hereby , that divine worship cannot be given to mere names , and an equality of worship doth imply an equality of dignity in the object of worship , and therefore , if the same acts of adoration be performed to father , son and holy ghost , it is plain , that the christian church did esteem them to have the same divine nature , although they were distinct persons . and if they were not so , there could not be distinct acts of divine worship performed to them . s. basil mentions this doxology of africanus , ( that ancient writer of the christian church ) in the fifth book of his chronicon , we render thanks to him who gave our lord iesus christ to be a saviour , to whom with the holy ghost be glory and majesty for ever . and another of dionysius alexandrinus in his d . epistle to dionysius of rome . to god the father and his son our lord iesus christ with the holy ghost , be glory and power for ever and ever , amen . and this is the more considerable , because he saith he did herein follow the ancient custom and rule of the church ; and he joyned with it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , praising god in the same voice with those who have gone before us , which shews how early these doxologies to father , son and holy ghost , had been used in the christian church . but to let us the better understand the true sense of them , s. basil hath preserved some passages of dionysius alexandrinus which do explain it , viz. that either the sabellians must allow three distinct hypostases , or they must wholly take away the trinity . by which it is evident , that by father , son and holy ghost he did understand three distinct hypostases , but not divided ; for that appears to have been the sabellians argument , that if there were three , they must be divided : no saith dionysius , they are three whether the sabellians will or not ; or else there is no trinity : which he look'd on as a great absurdity to take away , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the divine trinity . of what ? of mere names or energies ? that is no trinity ; for there is but one subsisting person of separate and divided substances : that the sabellians thought must follow but both the dionysius's denied it . and in another passage there mention'd , dionysius of alexandria asserts the trinity in vnity . but before dionysius , he quotes a passage of clemens romanus concerning father , son and holy ghost , which attributes life distinctly to them . now life cannot belong to a name or energy , and therefore must imply a person . but that which is most material to our purpose , is the publick doxology in the church of neo-caesarea , brought in by gregory thaumaturgus . s. basil gives a very high character of him , as of a person of extraordinary piety and exactness of life , and a great promoter of christianity in those parts , and by him the form of doxology was introduced into that church , being chiefly formed by him ( there being but seventeen christians when he was first made bishop there ) which was , glory to god the father , and son with the holy ghost , which ought to be understood according to the sense of the maker of it . and gregory hath deliver'd his sense plainly enough in this matter : for in that confession of faith , which was preserved in the church of neo-caesarea , he owns a perfect trinity in glory , eternity and power , without separation or diversity of nature , on which doctrine his form of doxology was grounded . which s. basil following , exceptions were taken against it , by some as varying from the form used in some other places . for the followers of aetius took advantage from the expression used in those doxologies , glory be to the father , by the son , and in the holy ghost , to infer a dissimilitude in the son and holy ghost to the father , and to make the son the instrument of the father , and the holy ghost only to relate to time and place . but s. basil takes a great deal of pains to shew the impertinency of these exceptions . they would fain have charged this doxology as an innovation on s. basil , because it attributed equal honour to father , son and holy ghost , which the aetians would not endure ; but they said , that the son was to be honoured only in subordination to the father , and the holy ghost as inferiour to both . but s. basil proves from scripture an equality of honour to be due to them : and particularly from the form of baptism , c. . wherein the son and holy ghost are joyned with the father , without any note of distinction . and what more proper token of a conjunction in the same dignity , than being put together in such a manner . especially considering these two things . . the extream jealousie of the jewish nation , as to joyning the creatures with god in any thing that related to divine honour . but as s. basil argues , if the son were a creature , then we must believe in the creator , and the creature together ; and by the same reason that one creature is joyned , the whole creation may be joyned with him ; but saith he , we are not to imagine the least disunion or separation between father , son and holy ghost ; nor that they are three distinct parts of one inseparable being , but that there is an indivisible conjunction of three in the same essence ; so that where one is , there is the other also . for where the holy ghost is , there is the son , and where the son is , there is the father . and so athanasius urges the argument from these words , that a creature could not be joyned with the creator in such a manner , as in the form of baptism ; and it might have been as well said , baptize in the name of the father , and any other creature . and for all that i see , our vnitarians would have liked such a form very well ; for they parallel it with those in scripture ; and they worshipped the lord , and the king ; and they feared the lord and samuel . but the iews understood the different occasion of such expressions too well , to have born such a conjunction of creatures with the creator in the most solemn act of initiation into a profession of religion . . the iews had a notion among them of three distinct subsistences in the deity sutable to these of father , son and holy ghost . this hath been shew'd by many as to the son , or the divine word ; and rittangel makes out the same as to the holy ghost . among the three subsistences in the mercavah ( which rittangel had proved from their most ancient writings ) those which are added to the first are wisdom and intelligence , and this last is by the old chaldee paraphrast rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and he proves it to be applied to god in many places of the pentateuch , where such things are attributed to him , as belong to the holy ghost . and he particularly shews by many places , that the schecinah is not taken for the divine glory , but that is rendred by other words ( however the interpreters of the chaldee paraphrast have rendred it so ) but he produces ten places where the chaldee paraphrast uses it in another sense ; and he leaves , he saith , many more to the readers observation . if the iews did of old own three subsistences in the same divine essence , there was then great reason to joyn father , son and holy ghost in the solemn act of initiation : but if it be denied , that they did own any such thing ; they must deny their most ancient books , and the chaldee paraphrast , which they esteem next to the text , and rittangel saith , they believe it written by inspiration . that which i chiefly urge , is this , that if these things be not very ancient , they must be put in by the later iews , to gratifie the christians in the doctrine of the trinity ; which i do not believe any iew will assent to . and no one else can imagine this , when our vnitarians say , that the doctrine of the trinity is the chief offence which the iews take at the christian religion . how then can we suppose the iews should forge these books on purpose to put in such notions , as were most grateful to their enemies , and hateful to themselves ? morinus hath endeavoured to run down the credit of the most ancient books of the iews ; and among the rest the book iezirah , the most ancient cabbalistical book among the iews , which he learnedly proves was not written by abraham , ( as the iews think . ) i will not stand with morinus about this ; however the book cosri saith , it was made by abraham before god spake to him , and magnifies it to the king of cosar , as containing an admirable account of the first principles above the philosophers . buxtorf saith , that the book cosri hath been extant nine hundred years , and in the beginning of it , it is said , that the conference was four hundred years before , and therein the book iezirah is alledged as a book of antiquity : and there the three subsistences of the deity are represented by mind , word , and hand . so that this can be no late invention of cabbalistical iews . but our vnitarians utterly deny that the jews had any cabbala concerning the trinity . and they prove it , because the jews in origen , and justin martyr deny the messias to be god. they might as well have brought their testimony to prove jesus not to be the messias ; for the iews of those times , being hard pressed by the christians , found they could not otherwise avoid several places of the old testament . but this doth not hinder , but that they might have notions of three subsistences in their ancient books : which contained neither late invention , nor divine revelations ; but a traditional notion about the divine being , and the subsistences in it : and i can find no arguments against it , that deserve mentioning . for when they say the iewish cabbala was a pharisaical figment , &c. it needs no answer . but what do they say to the old paraphrases , whereon the main weight as to this matter lies ? all that i can find is , that they do not speak of distinct persons ; but they confess that philo speaks home , and therefore they make him a christian . but philo had the same notion with the paraphrasts ; and their best way will be to declare , that they look upon them all as christians ; and they might as well affirm it of onkelos , as they do of philo ; but i doubt the world will not take their word for either . but to proceed with the christian doxologies . n●●hing , saith s. basil , shall make me forsake the doctrine i received in my baptism , when i was first entred into the christian church ; and i advise all others to keep firm to that profession of the holy trinity , which they made in their baptism ; that is , of the indivisible vnion of father , son and holy ghost . and , as he saith afterwards , by the order of the words in baptism , it appears that as the son is to the father , so the holy ghost is to the son. for they are all put without any distinction or number , wh●ch he observes agrees only to a multitude . for by their properties they are one and one ; yet by the community of essence the two are but one : and he makes it his business to prove the holy ghost to be a proper object of adoration , as well as the father and son , and therefore there was no reason to find fault with the doxology used in that church : and that , firmilian , meletius and the eastern christians agreed with them in the use of it , and so did all the western churches from illyricum to the worlds end : and this , he saith , was by an immemorial custom of all churches , and of the greatest men in them . nay , more he saith , it had been continued in the churches , from the time the gospel had been receive'd among them . and nothing can be fuller than the authority of his testimony , if s. basil may be believed . to these i shall add the doxology of polycarp at this martyrdom , mentioned by eusebius , which is very full to our purpose ; i glorifie thee by our eternal high-priest iesus christ thy beloved son , by whom be glory to thee , with him in the holy ghost . what can we imagine polycarp meant by this , but to render the same glory to father , son and holy ghost ; but with such a difference as to the particles , which s. basil at large proves come to the same thing ? and to the same purpose , not only the church of smyrna , but pionius the martyr , who transcribed the acts , speaking of iesus christ , with whom be glory to god the father , and the holy ghost . these suffer'd martyrdom for christianity , and owned the same divine honour to the father , son and holy ghost . what could they mean , if they did not believe them to have the same divine nature ? can we suppose them guilty of such stupidity to lose their lives , for not giving divine honour to creatures , and at the same time to do it themselves ? so that , if the father , son and holy ghost were not then believed to be three persons and one god , the christian church was mightily deceived ; and the martyrs acted inconsistently with their own principles . which no good christian will dare to affirm . but some have adventured to say , that polycarp did not mean the same divine honour to father , son and holy ghost . but if he had so meant it , how could he have expressed it otherwise ? it was certainly a worship distinct from what he gave to creatures ; as appears by the church of smyrna's disowning any worship but of love and repect to their fellow creatures ; and own the giving adoration to the son of god ; with whom they joyn both father and holy ghost . which it is impossible to conceive , that in their circumstances , they should have done , unless they had believed the same divine honour to belong to them . s. basil's testimony makes it out of dispute , that the doxology to father , son and holy ghost , was universally receiv'd in the publick offices of the church , and that from the time of greatest antiquity : so that we have no need of the te●timonies from the apostolical constitutions ( as they are called ) to prove it . but i avoid all disputable authorities . and i shall only add that it appears from s. basil , that this doxology had been long used not only in publick offices , but in occasional ejaculations , as at the bringing in of light in the evening , the people , he saith , were wont to say , glory be to the father , and to the son , and to the holy ghost , &c. this , he saith , had been an ancient custom among the people , and none can tell who brought it in . but prudentius shews , that it was continued to his time ; as appea●s by his hymn on that occasion , which concludes with this doxology , and s. hilary ends his hymn written to his daughter , in the same manner . . i come therefore to the last proof , which i shall produce of the sense of the christian church , which is , from the testimony of those who wrote in defence of our religion against infidels . in which i shall be the shorter , since the particular testimonies of the fathers , have been so fully produced , and defended by others , especially by dr. bull. iustin martyr in his apology for the christians , gives an account of the form of baptism , as it was administred among christians , which he saith , was in the name of god the father of all , and of our saviour iesus christ , and of the holy ghost . and that he spake of them as of distinct persons , as appears by his words afterwards . they who take the son to be the father , neither know the father nor the son , who being the word and first begotten is god. and when he speaks of the eucharist , he saith , that it is offer'd to the father of all , by the name of the son , and the holy ghost : and of other solemn acts of devotion , he saith , that in all of them they praise god the father of all , by his son iesus christ , and the holy ghost . and in other places , he mentions the worship they give to father , son and holy ghost . indeed he mentions a difference of order between them ; but makes no difference as to the worship given to them . and all this in no long apology for the christian faith. what can be the meaning of this if he did not take it for granted , that the christian church embraced the doctrine of the trinity in baptism ? iustin martyr was no such weak man to go about to expose the christian religion instead of defending it ; and he must have done so , if he did not believe this not only to be a true , but a necessary part of the christian faith for , why did he at all mention such a mysterious and dark point ? why did he not conceal it , ( as some would have done ) and only represent to the emperours , the fair and plausible part of christianity ? no , he was a man of great sincerity , and a through christian himself ; and therefore thought he could not honestly conceal so fundamental a point of the christian faith , and which related to their being entred into the christian church . for if the profession of this faith had not been look'd on as a necessary condition of being a member of the church of christ ; it is hard to imagine , that iustin martyr should so much insist upon it , not only here , but in his other treatises : of which an account hath been given by others . athenagoras had been a philosopher , as well as iustin martyr , before he professed himself a christian ; and therefore , must be supposed to understand his religion before he embraced it . and in his defence he asserts , that the christians do believe in father , son and holy ghost ; in god the father , god the son , and the holy ghost . and he mentions both the vnity and order which is among them . which can signifie nothing unless they be owned to be distinct persons in the same divine nature . and in the next page , he looks on it , as thing which all christians aspire after in another life , that they shall then know the vnion of the father , and the communication of the father to the son , what the holy ghost is , and what the vnion and distinction there is between the holy ghost , the son and the father . no man who had ever had the name of a philosopher would have said such things , unless he had believed the doctrine of the trinity a● we do , i. e. that there are three distinct persons in the same divine nature , but that the manner of the union , and distinction between them , is above our reach and comprehension . but our vnitarians have an answer ready for these men , viz. that they came out of plato 's school , with the tincture of his three principles ; and they sadly complain , that platonism had very early corrupted the christian faith as to these matters . in answer to which exception , i have only one postulatum to make ; which is , that these were honest men , and knew their own minds be●t , and i shall make it appear , that none can more positively declare , than they do , that they did not take up these notions from plato , but from the holy scriptures ; iustin martyr saith he took the foundation of his faith from thence , and that he could find no certainty as to god and religion any where else : that he thinks , plato took his three principles from moses ; and in his dialogue with trypho , he at large proves the eternity of the son of god from the scriptures ; and said , he would use no other arguments , for he pretended to no skill but in the scriptures , which god had enabled him to understand . athenagoras declares , that where the philosophers agreed with them , their faith did not depend on them , but on the testimony of the prophets , who were inspired by the holy ghost . to the same purpose speaks theophilus bishop of antioch , who asserts the coeternity of the son with the father , from the beginning of s. john's gospel ; and saith , their faith is built on the scriptures . clemens alexandrinus owns not only , the essential attributes of god to belong to the son ; but that there is one father of all , and one word over all , and one holy ghost who is every where . and he thinks , plato borrowed his three principles from moses ; that his second was the son , and his third the holy spirit . even origen hims●l● highly commends moses above plato , in his most undoubted writings , and saith , that numen●us went beyond plato , and that he borrowed out of the scriptures ; and so he saith , plato did in other places ; but he adds , that the doctrines were better deliver'd in scripture , than in his artificial dialogues . can any one that hath the least reverence for writers of such authority and z●al for the christian doctrine , imagine that they wilfully corrupted it in one of the chief articles of it ; and brought in new speculations against the sense of those books , which at the same time , they professed to be the only rule of their faith ? even where they speak most favourably of the platonick trinity , they suppose it to be borrowed from moses . and therefore numenius said , that moses and plato did not differ about the first principles ; and theodoret mentions numenius as one of those , who said , plato understood the hebrew doctrine in egypt ; and during his thirteen years ●ay there , it is hardly possible to suppose , he should be ignorant of the hebrew doctrine , about the first principles , which he was so inquisitive after , especially among nations , who pretended to antiquity . and the platonick notion of the divine essence inlarging it self to three hypostases , is considerable on these accounts : . that it is deliver'd with so much assurance by the opposers of christianity ; such as plotinus , porphyrius , proclus and others were known to be , and they speak with no manner of doubt concerning it ; as may be seen in the passage of porphyrie preserved by s. cyril and others . . that they took it up from no revelation ; but as a notion in it self agreeable enough ; as appears by the passages in plato and others concerning it . they never suspected it to be liable to the charge of non-sense , and contradictions , as our modern vnitarians charge the trinity with ; although their notion as represented by porphyrie be as liable to it . how came these men of wit and sense , to hit upon , and be so fond of such absurd principles which lead to the belief of mysterious non-sense , and impossibilities ; if these men may be trusted ? . that the nations most renowned for antiquity and deep speculations , did light upon the same doctrine , about a trinity of hypostases in the divine essence . to prove this i shall not refer to the trismegistick books , or the chaldee oracles , or any doubtful authorities ; but plutarch asserts the three hypostases to have been receiv●d among the persians , and porphyry , and iamblicus , say the same of the egyptians . . that this hypostasis did maintain its reputation so long in the world. for we find it continued to the time of macrobius ; who ment●ons it as a reasonable notion , viz. of one supreme being , father of all , and a mind proceeding from it , and soul from mind . some have thought that the platonists made two created beings , to be two of the divine hypostases ; but this is contrary to what plotinus and porphyry affirm concerning it , and it is hard to give an account , how they should then be essentially different from creatures , and be hypostases in the divine essence . but this is no part of my business , being concerned no farther , than to clear the sense of the christian church , as to the form of baptism in the name of the father , son and holy ghost ; which according to the sense of the ante-nicene fathers , i have proved , doth manifest the doctrine of the trinity , to have been generally receiv'd in the christian church . . let us now see what our vnitarians object again●t the proof of the trinity from these words . . they say , that there is a note of distinction and superiority . for christ owns ▪ that his power was given to him by the father . there is no question , but that the person who suffer'd on the cross , had power given to him , after his resurrection ; but the true question is , whether his sonship were then given to him . he was then declared to be the son of god with power , and had a name or authority given him above every name ; being exalted to be a prince and a saviour , to give repentance , and remission of sins : in order to which he now appointed his apostles to teach all nations ; baptizing them in the name of the father , the son and the holy ghost . he doth not say in the name of iesus , who suffer'd on the cross ; nor in the name of iesus the christ now exalted ; but in the name of father , son and holy ghost : and although there were a double gift with respect to the son and holy ghost ; the one , as to his royal authority over the church ; the other , as to his extraordinary effusion on the apostles , yet neither of these are so much as intimated ; but the office of baptism is required to be performed in the name of these three as distinct and yet equal ; without any relation to any gift , either as to the son or holy ghost . but if the ancient iews were in the right , as we think they were , then we have a plain account , how these came to be thus mention'd in the form of baptism , viz. that these three distinct subsistences in the divine essence , were not now to be kept up as a secret mystery from the world ; but that the christian church was to be formed upon the belief of it . . they bring several places of scripture , where god and his creatures are joyned , without any note of distinction or superiority ; as , the people feared the lord , and samuel , sam. . . they worshipped the lord , and the king , chron. . . i charge thee before god the lord iesus christ , and his elect angels , tim. . . the spirit and the bride say come , revel . . . but can any man of sense imagine , these places contain a parallel with a form of words , wherein men are entred into the profession of a new religion , and by which they were to be distinguished from all other religions ? in the former places , the circumstances were so notorious as to god , and the civil magistrate , that it shews no more than that the same external acts may be used to both , but with such a different intention as all men understood it . what if s. paul name the elect angels in a solemn obtestation to timothy , together with god , and the lord iesus christ ? what can this prove , but that we may call god and his creatures to be witnesses together of the same thing ? and so heaven and earth are called to bear witness against obstinate sinners : may men therefore be baptized in the name of god and his creatures ? the spirit and bride may say come without any incongruity ; but it would have been strange indeed , if they had said , come be baptized in the name of the spirit and the bride . so that these instances are very remote from the purpose . but they say farther , that the ancients of the first four hundred years do not insist on this place , to prove the divinity or personality of the son or spirit . as to the first three hundred years , i have given an account already ; and as to the fourth century , i could not have thought , that they would have mention'd it : since there is scarce a father of the church in that time , who had occasion to do it , but makes use of the argument from this place to prove the divinity and personality of the son and spirit . athanasius saith , that christ founded his church on the doctrine of the trinity contained in these words ; and if the holy ghost had been of a different nature , from the father and son , he would never have been joyned with them in a form of baptism , no more than an angel , or any other creature . for the trinity must be eternal and indivisible , which it could not be , if any created being were in it , and therefore he disputes against the arian baptism , although performed with the same words , because they joyned god and a creature together in baptism . to the same purpose argue didymus , gregory nazianzen , s. basil and others , within the compass of four hundred years , whose testimonies are produced by petavius ; to whom i refer the reader , if he hath a mind to be satisfied in so clear a point , that i cannot but think our vnitarians never intended to take in the fathers after the council of nice , who are so expressly against them ; and therefore i pass it over as a slip . . they object , that the form of baptism implies no more , than being admitted into that religion which proceeds from god the father , and deliver'd by his son , and confirmed by the testimony of the holy ghost . so much we grant is implied , but the question still remains , whether the son and holy ghost are here to be consider'd only in order to their operations , or whether the persons of the son and holy ghost , from whom those effects came , are not here chiefly intended ? for if no more had been meant , but these effects , then the right form of admission had not been , into the name of father , son and holy ghost ; but in the name of the father alone , as revealing himself by his son , and confirming it by the miraculous works of the holy ghost . for these are only subservient acts to the design of god the father , as the only subsisting person . . they tell us , that it is in vain , not to say ridiculously pretended , that a person or thing is god , because we are baptized into it ; for some were baptized into moses , and others into john's baptism , and so moses and john baptist would be gods ; and to be baptized into a person or persons , and in the name of such a person is the same thing . grant this ; yet there is a great difference between being baptized in the name of a minister of baptism , and of the author of a religion , into which they are baptized . the israelites were baptized unto moses ; but how ? the syriac and arabic versions render it per mosen ; and so s. augustin reads it . and this seems to be the most natural sense of the word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , being put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is , act. . . compared with gal. . . and the force of the apostle's argument , doth not lie in the parallel between being baptized into moses , and into christ ; but in the privileges they had under the ministery of moses with those which christians enjoyed . the other place implies no more , than being enter'd into that profession , which john baptized his disciples into . but doth any one imagine , that because iohn baptist did enter his disciples by baptism , therefore they must believe him to be god ? i know none that lay the force of the argument upon any thing parallel to those places . but it depends upon laying the circumstances together . here was a new religion to be taught mankind , and they were to be entred into it , not by a bare verbal profession , but by a solemn rite of baptism ; and this baptism is declar'd to be in the name of the father , son and holy ghost : which cannot be understood of their ministery , and therefore must relate to that faith , which they were baptized into , which was concerning the father , son and holy ghost . and so the christian church understood it , from the beginning , as i have proved in the foregoing discourse . and from hence came the instruction of catechumens , who were to be baptized about the trinity ; and the first creeds which related only to them , as i have already observed . and so much our vnitarians grant in one of their latest pamphlets , that a creed was an institution , or instruction what we are to believe in the main , and fundamental articles , especially concerning the persons of father , son and holy ghost . but they contend , that the creed which bears the name of the apostles , was the original creed framed by the apostles themselves , because they suppose this creed doth not assert the son and holy ghost , to be eternal and divine persons , and therefore they conclude , that the makers of this creed , either did not know , that any other person but the father is god , or almighty , or maker of heaven and earth , or they have negligently , or wickedly concealed it . this is a matter so necessary to be clear'd , that i shall examine these two things before i put an end to this discourse . . what proofs they bring that this creed was framed by the apostles . . what evidence they produce , that this creed excludes the divinity of the son and holy ghost . . as to the proofs they bring , that this creed was framed by the apostles . we believe the creed to be apostolical in the true sense of it ; but that it was so in that frame of words , and enumeration of articles , as it is now receiv'd , hath been called in question by some criticks of great judgment and learning , whom i have already mentioned . erasmus saith , he doth not question the articles being apostolical ; but whether the apostles put it thus into writing . and his chief argument is from the variety of the ancient creeds ; of which no account can be given so probable , as that they were added occasionally in opposition to a growing heresie . as for instance , the word impassible was inserted with respect to the father in the ancient eastern creed , against the doctrine of sabellius ; but it was not in the old western creed . and he argues , that the apostolical creed ended with the holy ghost ; because the nicene creed did so . and vossius thinks the other articles which are in cyril , were added after the nicene council ; which would not have omitted them , if they had been in the former creed . and when there were so many creeds made afterwards , it is observable , that they do all end with the article of the holy ghost ; which they would never have done , in so jealous a time about creeds , if they had left out any articles of what was then receiv'd for the apostolical creed . the first creed after the nicene , which made great noise in the world , was that framed at antioch ; and that creed not only ends with the article of the holy ghost ; but mentions the form of baptism ; and our saviours commanding his apostles to baptize in the name of the father , son and holy ghost ; as the foundation of the creed . for it hereby appears , that the father is true father , and the son true son , and the holy ghost true holy ghost ; not bare names , but such as import three distinct subsistences . for hilary observes , that this council chiefly intended to overthrow sabellianism , and therefore asserted tres subsistentium personas , as hilary interprets their meaning , and so doth epiphanius ; which was to remove the suspition , that they asserted only triplicis vocabuli vnionem ; as hilary speaks . the next creed is of the eastern bishops at sardica , and that ends wi●h the holy ghost , and so do both the creeds at sirmium ▪ and the latter calls the article of the trinity , the close of our faith ; which is always to be kept according to our saviour's command , go teach all nations , baptizing them in the name of the father , son and holy ghost . so that in all these creeds , about which there was so much heat in the christian church , there was not the least objection , that any articles of the apostolical creed were omitted . it is no argument , that there was then no contest about these articles ; for they were bound to give in an entire creed ; and so the council of antioch declares , that they would publish the confession of the faith of the church : and how could this be , if they left out such articles which had been always receiv●d from the apostles times ? but certainly our vnitarians would not attack such men , as erasmus , and vossius in a matter relating to antiquity , if they had not some good arguments on their side . their first business , is to shew , that some of vossius his arguments are not conclusive ; such as they are , i leave them to any one that will compare them with the answers . but there are two things they lay weight upon . . that the whole christian church east and west , could not have agreed in the same creed , as to number and order of articles , and manner of expression , if this creed had not come from the same persons , from whom they receiv'd the gospel and the scriptures ; namely , from the apostles and preachers of christianity . . that it was receiv'd by a constant tradition to have been the apostles ; not a bare oral tradition , but the tradition of the ancient commentators upon it . now these i confess to be as good arguments , as the matters will bear ; and i will no longer contest this point with them , provided , that we be allowed to make use of the same arguments ; as to the second point ; wherein they undertake to prove , that the apostles creed doth exclude the divinity of the son and holy ghost . what is now become of the general consent of the christian church , east and west ? and of the commentators upon this creed ? if the argument hold good in one case , i hope it will be allowed to do so in the other also . and what greater testimony can be given of such a consent of the christian church ; than that those who opposed it , have been condemned by it , and that the church hath expressed her sense of it in publick , and private acts of devotion , and divine worship , and have defended it as a necessary part of the christian faith , against the assaults of infidels and hereticks ? so that although the apostles creed do not in express words declare , the divinity of the three persons in the vnity of the divine essence ; yet taking the sense of those articles , as the christian church understood them from the apostles times , then we have as full , and clear evidence of this doctrine , as we have that we receiv'd the scriptures from them . chap. x. the objections against the trinity in point of reason answer'd . having in the foregoing chapters endeavour'd to clear the doctrine of the trinity from the charge of contradictions , and to prove it agreeable to the sense of scripture , and the primitive church ; i now come in the last place to examine the remaining objections , in point of reason ; and those are , . that this doctrine is said to be a mystery , and therefore above reason , and we cannot in reason be obliged to believe any such thing . . that if we allow any such mysteries of faith as are above reason , there can be no stop put to any absurd doctrines , but they may be receiv'd on the same grounds . as to this doctrine being said to be above reason , and therefore not to be believ'd ; we must consider two things ; . what we understand by reason ; . what ground in reason there is , to reject any doctrine above it , when it is proposed as a matter of faith. . what we understand by reason . i do not find that our vnitarians have explained the nature and bounds of reason in such manner , as those ought to have done , who make it the rule and standard of what they are to believe . but sometimes they speak of clear and distinct perceptions , sometimes of natural ideas , sometimes of congenit notions , &c. but a late author hath endeavour'd to make amends for this , and takes upon him to make this matter clear ; and to be sure to do so , he begins with telling us , that reason is not the soul abstractedly consider'd ; ( no doubt of it ) but the soul acting in a peculiar manner is reason . ( and this is a ver● peculiar way of explaining it ) but farther we are told , it is not the order or report ( respect i suppose ) which is naturally between all things . ( but that implies a reason in things . ) but the thoughts which the soul forms of things according to it , may properly claim that title , i. e. such thoughts which are agreeable to the reason of things are reasonable thoughts . this is clear and distinct . and i perfectly agree with him , that our own inclinations , or the bare authority of others is not reason . but what is it ? every one experiences in himself a power , or faculty of form●ng various ideas , or perceptions of things ; of affirming , or denying according as he sees them to agree or disagree , and this is reason in general it is not the bare receiving ideas into the mind , that is strictly reason , ( who ever thought it was ? ) but the perception of the agreement , or disagreement of our ideas in a greater of lesser number ; wherein soever this agreement or disagreement may consist . if the perception be immediate without the assistance of any other idea , this is not call'd reason , but self-evidence : but when the mind makes use of intermediate ideas to discover that agreement or disagreement , this method of knowledge is properly call'd reason or demonstration . and so reason is defined to be that faculty of the soul , which discovers the certainty of any thing dubious , or obscure by comparing it with something evidently known . this is offer'd to the world , as an account of reason ; but to shew how very loose , and unsatisfactory it is , i desire it may be consider'd , that this doctrine supposes , that we must have clear and distinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of in our minds , and that the only way to attain this certainty , is by comparing these ideas together . which excludes all certainty of faith or reason , where we cannot have such clear and distinct ideas . but if there are many things of which we may be certain , and yet can have no clear and distinct ideas of them ; if those ideas we have , are too imperfect and obscure to form our judgments by ; if we cannot find out sufficient intermediate ideas ; then this cannot be the means of certainty , or the foundation of reason . but i shall keep to our present subject ; and our certainty of it in point of reason , depends upon our knowledge of the the nature of substance , and person and the distinction between them : but if we can have no such clear ideas in our minds concerning these things , as are required from sensation , or reflection ; then , either we have no use of reason about them , or it is in sufficient to pass any judgment concerning them . . i begin with the notion of substance . and i have great reason to begin with it ; for , according to this man's principles there can be no certainty of reason at all about it . and so our new way of reason is advanced to very good purpose . for we may talk and dispute about substance , as long as we please , but , if his principles of reason be true , we can come to no certainty ; since we can have no clear idea in our minds concerning it , as will appear from his own words ; and the method he proceeds in . ( . ) he saith , that the mind receives in ideas two ways . . by intermission of the senses , as colours , figures , sounds , smells , &c. . by the souls considering its own operations about what it thus gets from without , as knowing , doubting , affirming , denying , &c. ( . ) that these simple and distinct ideas , thus laid up in the great repository of the vnderstanding , are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning . then it follows , that we can have no foundation of reasoning , where there can can be no such ideas from sensation , or reflection . now this is the case of substance ; it is not intromitted by the senses , nor depends upon the operations of the mind ; and so it cannot be within the compass of our reason . and therefore i do not wonder , that the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning , have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world. for they not only tell us . that we can have no idea of it by sensation or reflection ; but that nothing is signified by it , only an uncertain supposition of we know not what . and therefore it is parallel'd , more than once , with the indian philosophers , he knew not what ; which supported the torto●se , that supported the elephant , that supported the earth ; so substance was found out only to support accidents . and , that when we talk of substances we talk like children , who being ask'd a question , about somewhat which they know not , readily give this satisfactory answer , that it is something . if this be the truth of the case , we must still talk like children , and i know not how it can be remedied . for , if we cannot come at a rational idea of substance , we can have no principle of certainty to go upon in this debate . i do not say , that we can have a clear idea of substance , either by sensation or reflection ; but from hence i argue , that this is a very insufficient distribution of the ideas necessary to reason . for besides these , there must be some general ideas , which the mind doth form , not by meer comparing those ideas it has got from sense or reflection ; but by forming distinct general notions , of things from particular ideas . and among these general notions , or rational ideas , substance is one of the first ; because we find that we can have no true conceptions of any modes or accidents ( no matter which ) but we must conceive a substratum , or subject wherein they are . since it is a repugnancy to our first conceptions of things , that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves , and therefore the rational idea of substance is one of the first , and most natural ideas in our minds . but we are still told , that our vnderstanding can have no other ideas , but either from sensation or reflection . and that , herein chiefly lies the excellency of mankind , above brutes , that these cannot abstract , and inlarge their ideas as men do . but how comes the general idea of substance , to be framed in our minds ? is this by abstracting and inlarging simple ideas ? no , but it is by a complication of many simple ideas together : because not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves , we accustom our selves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist , and from which they do result , which therefore we call substance . and is this all indeed , that is to be said for the being of substance , that we accustom our selves to suppose a substratum ? is that custom grounded upon true reason or not ? if not , then accidents or modes , must subsist of themselves , and these simple ideas need no tortoise to support them : for figures and colours , &c. would do well enough of themselves , but for some fancies men have accustomed themselves to . if it be grounded on plain and evident reason , then we must allow an idea of substance , which comes not in by sensation or reflection ; and so we may be certain of some things which we have not by those ideas . the idea of substance , we are told again , is nothing but the supposed , but unknown support of those qualities we find existing , which we imagine cannot subsist , sine re substante , which according to the true import of the word , is in plain english , standing under , or upholding . but very little weight is to be laid upon a bare grammatical etymology , when the word is used in another sense by the best authors , such as cicero and quintilian , who take substance for the same with essence ; as valla hath proved ; and so the greek word imports ; but boethius in translating aristotle's predicaments , rather chose the word substance as more proper , to ●xpress a compound being , and reserved essence , for what was more simple and immaterial . and in this sense , substance was not applied to god but only essence , as s. augustine observes , but afterwards , the names of substance , and essence were promiscuously used , with respect to god and his creatures . and do imply , that which makes the real being , as distinguished from modes and properties . and so the substance , and essence of a man are the same ; not being taken for the individual substance , which cannot be understood without particular modes and properties ; but the general substance , or nature of man abstractly from all the circum●●ances of persons . and i desire to know , whether according to true reason , that be not a clear idea of a man ; not of peter , iames or iohn , but of a man as such . this is not a meer universal name , or mark , or sign ; but there is as clear and distinct a conception of this in our minds , as we can have from any such simple ideas , as are convey'd by our senses . i do not deny that the distinction of particular substances , is by the several modes and properties of them , ( which they may call a complication of simple ideas if they please ) but i do assert , that the general idea , which relates to the essence without these is so just , and true an idea , that without it the complication of simple ideas , will never give us a right notion of it . i must do that right to the ingenious author of the essay of humane vnderstanding ( from whence these notions are borrowed to serve other purposes than he intended them ) that he makes the case of spiritual , and corporeal substances to be alike , as to their idea's , and that we have as clear a notion of a spirit , as we have of a body , the one being supposed to be the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without , and the other of those operations we find within our selves . and that it is as rational to affirm , there is no body , because we cannot know its essence , as 't is called , or have no idea of the substance of matter ; as to say , there is no spirit , because we know not its essence , or have no idea of a spiritual substance . from hence it follows , that we may be certain , that there are both spiritual and bodily substances , although we can have no clear and distinct ideas of them . but , if our reason depend upon our clear and distinct idea's ; how is this possible ? we cannot reason without clear ideas , and yet we may be certain without them : can we be certain without reason ? or doth our reason give us true notions of things , without these idea's ? if it be so , this new hypothesis about reason must appear to be very unreasonable . let us suppose this principle to be true , that the simple ideas by sensation or reflection , are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning : i ask then , how we come to be certain , that there are spiritual substances in the world , since we can have no clear and distinct ideas concerning them ? can we be certain without any foundation of reason ? this is a new sort of certainty , for which we do not envy these pretenders to reason . but methinks , they should not at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these ideas to our knowledge , and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them . if there be any other method , they overthrow their own principle ; if there be none , how come they to any certainty , that there are both bodily and spiritual substances ? as to these latter ( which is my business ) i must enquire farther , how they come to know that there are such . the answer is by self-reflection , on those powers we find in our selves , which cannot come from a mere bodily substance . i allow he reason to be very good , but the question i ask is , whether this argument be from the clear and distinct idea or not ? we have ideas in our selves of the several operations of our minds of knowing , willing , considering , &c. which cannot come from a bodily substance . very true ; but is all this contained in the simple idea of these operations ? how can that be , when the same persons say , that notwithstanding their ideas it is possible for matter to think . for it is said , that we have the ideas of matter and thinking , but possibly shall never be able to know , whether any mere material being thinks or not ; it being impossible for us by the contemplation of our own ideas , without revelation to discover whether omnipotency hath not given to some systems of matter , fitly disposed , a power to perceive or think . if this be true , then for all that we can know by our ideas of matter and thinking ; matter may have a power of thinking : and if this hold , then it is impossible to prove a spiritual substance in us , from the idea of thinking : for how can we be assured by our ideas , that god hath not given such a power of thinking , to matter so disposed as our bodies are ? especially since it is said , that in respect of our notions , it is not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that god can , if he pleases , super-add to our idea of matter a faculty of thinking , than that he should super-add to it another substance , with a faculty of thinking . whoever asserts this , can never prove a spiritual substance in us , from a faculty of thinking ; because he cannot know from the idea of matter and thinking , that matter so disposed cannot think . and he cannot be certain that god hath not framed the matter of our bodies , so as to be capable of it . it is said indeed elsewhere , that it is repugnant to the idea of sensless matter , that it should put into it self sense , perception and knowledge : but this doth not reach the present case ; which is not what matter can do of it self , but what matter prepared by an omnipotent hand can do . and what certainty can we have that he hath not done it ? we can have none from the ideas ; for those are given up in this case ; and consequently , we can have no certainty upon these principles , whether we have any spiritual substance within us or not . but we are told , that from the operations of our minds , we are able to frame the complex idea of a spirit . how can that be , when we cannot from those ideas be assured , but that those operations may come from a material substance . if we frame an idea on such grounds , it is at most but a possible idea ; for it may be otherwise ; and we can have no assurance from our ideas , that it is not : so that the most men may come to in this way of idea's is , that it is possible it may be so , and it is possible it may not ; but that it is impossible for us from our ideas , to determine either way . and is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reason ? i am very glad to find the idea of a spiritual substance made as consistent , and intelligible , as that of a corporeal ; for as the one consists of a cohesion of solid parts , and the power of communicating motion by impulse , so the other consists in a power of thinking , and willing , and moving the body ; and that the cohesion of solid parts , is as hard to be conceived as thinking ; and we are as much in the dark about the power of communicating motion by impulse , as in the power of exciting motion by thought . we have by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced , both by impulse and by thought ; but the manner how , hardly comes within our comprehension ; we are equally at a loss in both . from whence if follows , that we may be certain of the being of a spiritual substance , although we have no clear and distinct idea of it , nor are able to comprehend the manner of its operations : and therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend , that all our reason and certainty is founded on clear and distinct ideas ; and that they have reason to reject any doctrine which relates to spiritual substances , because they cannot comprehend the manner of it . for the same thing is confessed by the most inquisitive men , about the manner of operation , both in material , and immaterial substances . it is affirmed , that the very notion of body , implies , something very hard , if not impossible to be explained , or understood by us ; and that the natural consequence of it , viz. divisibility ; involves us in difficulties impossible to be explicated , or made consistent . that we have but some few superficial ideas of things ; that we are destitute of faculties , to attain to the true nature of them ; and that when we do that , we fall presently into darkness and obscurity ; and can discover nothing farther , but our own blindness and ignorance . these are very fair and ingenuous confessions of the shortness of humane understanding , with respect to the nature and manner of such things , which we are most certain of the being of , by constant and undoubted experience . i appeal now to the reason of mankind , whether it can be any reasonable foundation for rejecting a doctrine proposed to us , as of divine revelation , because we cannot comprehend the manner of it ; especially , when it relates to the divine essence . for as the same author observes , our idea of god is framed from the complex ideas of those perfections we find in our selves , but inlarging them so , as to make them suitable to an infinite being , as knowledge , power , duration , &c. and the degrees or extent of these which we ascribe to the soveraign being , are all boundless and infinite . for it is infinity , which joyned to our ideas of existence , power , knowledge , &c. makes that complex idea , whereby we represent to our selves the best we can , the supreme being . now , when our knowledge of gross material substances is so dark ; when the notion of spiritual substances is above all ideas of sensation ; when the higher any substance is , the more remote from our knowledge ; but especially when the very idea of a supreme being implies its being infinite , and incomprehensible , i know not whether it argues more stupidity , or arrogance to expose a doctrine relating to the divine essence , because they cannot comprehend the manner of it . but of this more afterwards . i am yet upon the certainty of our reason , from clear and distinct ideas : and if we can attain to certainty without them , and where it is confessed we cannot have them ; as about substances : then these cannot be the sole matter and foundation of our reasoning , which is so peremptorily asserted by this late author . but i go yet farther : and as i have already shew'd , we can have no certainty of an immaterial substance within us , from these simple ideas ; so i shall now shew , that there can be no sufficient evidence , brought from them by their own confession , concerning the existence of the most spiritual and infinite substance , even god himself . we are told , that the evidence of it is equal to mathematical certainty ; and very good arguments are brought to prove it , in a chapter on purpose : but that which i take notice of is , that the argument from the clear and distinct idea of god is passed over . how can this be consistent with deducing our certainty of knowledge from clear and simple ideas ? i do not go about to justifie those , who lay the whole stress upon that foundation ; which i grant to be too weak to support so important a truth ; and that those are very much to blame , who go about to invalidate other arguments for the sake of that ; but i doubt all this talk about clear and distinct ideas , being made the foundation of certainty , came originally from those discourses , or meditations , which are aimed at . the author of them was an ingenious , thinking man , and he endeavour'd to lay the foundations of certainty , as well as he could . the first thing he found any certainty in , was his own existence ; which he founded upon the perception of the acts of his mind , which some call an internal , infallible perception that we are . from hence he proceeded , to enquire , how he came by this certainty , and he resolved it into this , that he had a clear and distinct perception of it ; and from hence he formed his general rule , that what he had a clear and distinct perception of was true . which in reason ought to go no farther , than where there is the like degree of evidence : for the certainty here , was not grounded on the clearness of the perception , but on the plainness of the evidence which is of that nature , that the very doubting of it proves it ; since it is impossible , that any thing should doubt or question its own being , that had it not . so that here it is not the clearness of the idea , but an immediate act of perception , which is the true ground of certainty . and this cannot extend to things without our selves ; of which we can have no other perception , than what is caused by the impressions of outward objects . but whether we are to judge according to those impressions , doth not depend on the ideas themselves , but upon the exercise of our judgment and reason about them , which put the difference between true and false , and adequate , and inadequate ideas . so that our certainty is not from the ideas themselves , but from the evidence of reason , that those ideas are true , and just , and consequently that we may build our certainty upon them . but the idea of an infinite being hath this peculiar to it , that necessary existence is implied in it . this is a clear and distinct idea , and yet it is denied , that this doth prove the existence of god. how then can the grounds of our certainty arise from clear and distinct ideas ; when in one of the clearest ideas of our minds we can come to no certainty by it ? i do not say , that it is denied to prove it ; but this is said , that it is a doubtful thing from the different make of mens tempers and application of their thoughts . what can this mean , unless it be to let us know , that even clear and distinct ideas , may lose their effect by the difference of mens tempers and studies ; so that besides ideas , in order to a right judgment , a due temper and application of the mind is required . and wherein is this different , from what all men of understanding have said ? why then should these clear and simple ideas be made the sole foundation of reason ? one would think by this , that these ideas would presently satisfie mens minds , if they attended to them . but even this will not do , as to the idea of an infinite being . it is not enough to say , they will not examine how far it will hold : for they ought either to say , that it doth hold , or give up this ground of certainty from clear and distinct ideas . but instead of the proper argument from ideas , we are told , that from the consideration of our selves , and what we find in our own constitutions , our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth ; that there is an eternal , most powerful , and most knowing being . all which i readily yield ; but we see plainly , the certainty is not placed in the idea , but in good and sound reason from the consideration of our selves and our constitutions . what! in the idea of our selves ? no certainly ; for let our idea be taken which way we please , by sensation or reflection , yet it is not the idea that makes us certain , but the argument from that which we perceive in , and about our selves . but we find in our selves perception and knowledge . it 's very true ; but how doth this prove that there is a god ? it is from the clear and distinct idea of it . no , but from this argument : that either there must have been a knowing being from eternity , or an unknowing ; for something must have been from eternity : but if an unknowing , then it was impossible there ever should have been any knowledge ; it being as impossible , that a thing without knowledge should produce it , as that a triangle should make it self three angles bigger than two right ones . allowing the argument to be good , yet it is not taken from the idea , but from principles of true reason ; as that no man can doubt his own perception ; that every thing must have a cause ; that this cause must either have knowledge or not : if it have , the point is gained ; if it hath not , nothing can produce nothing ; and consequently , a not knowing being cannot produce a knowing . again , if we suppose nothing to be first , matter can never begin to be ; if bare matter without motion eternal , motion can never begin to be ; if matter and motion be supposed eternal , thought can never begin to be . for , if matter could produce thought , then thought must be in the power of matter ; and if it be in matter as such , it must be the inseparable property of all matter ; which is contrary to the sense and experience of mankind . if only some parts of matter have a power of thinking , how comes so great a difference in the properties of the same matter ? what disposition of matter is required to thinking ? and from whence comes it ? of which no account can be given in reason . this is the substance of the argument used , to prove an infinite spiritual being , which i am far from weakning the force of ; but that which i design , is to shew ▪ that the certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and distinct ideas , but upon the force of reason distinct from it , which was the thing i intended to prove . . the next thing necessary to be clear'd in this dispute is , the distinction between nature and person , and of this we can have no clear and distinct idea from sensation or reflection . and yet all our notions of the doctrine of the trinity , depend upon the right understanding of it . for we must talk unintelligibly about this point , unless we have clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature and person , and the grounds of identity and distinction . but that these come not into our minds by these simple ideas of sensation and reflection , i shall now make it appear ; . as to nature , that is sometimes taken for the essential property of a thing , as when we say , that such a thing is of a different nature from another , we mean no more than that it is differenced by such properties as come to our knowledge . sometimes nature is taken for the thing it self in which those properties are ; and so aristotle took nature for a corporeal substance , which had the principles of motion in it self : but nature and substance are of an equal extent ; and so that which is the subject of powers , and properties is the nature , whether it be meant of bodily or spiritual substances . i grant , that by sensation and reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things ; but our reason is satisfied , that there must be something beyond these ; because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves . so that the nature of things propery belongs to our reason , and not to meer ideas . but we must yet proceed farther . for , nature may be consider'd two ways . . as it is in distinct individuals , as the nature of a man is equally in peter , iames , and iohn ; and this is the common nature with a particular subsistence proper to each of them . for the nature of man , as in peter , is distinct from that same nature , as it is in iames and iohn ; otherwise , they would be but one person , as well as have the same nature . and this distinction of persons in them is discerned both by our senses , as to their different accidents ; and by our reason , because they have a separate existence ; not coming into it at once and in the same manner . . nature may be consider'd abstractly , without respect to individual persons , and then it makes an entire notion of it self . for however , the same nature may be in different individuals , yet the nature in it self remains one and the same : which appears from this evident reason ; that otherwise every individual must make a different kind . let us now see , how far these things can come from our simple ideas , by reflection and sensation . and i shall lay down the hypothesis of those , who resolve our certainty into ideas , as plainly , and intelligibly , as i can . . we are told , that all simple ideas are true and adequate . not , that they are the true representation of things without us ; by that they are the true effects of such powers in them , as produce such sensations within us . so that really we can understand nothing certainly by them , but the effects they have upon us . . all our ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate ; because they refer to the real essences of things , of which we are ignorant , and no man knows what substance is in it self : and they are all false , when look'd on as the representations of the unknown essences of things . . abstract ideas are only general names , made by separating circumstances of time and place , &c. from them , which are only the inventions , and creatures of the vnderstanding . . essence may be taken two ways . . for the real , internal , unknown constitutions of things , and in this sense it is understood as to particular things . . for the abstract idea , and one is said to be the nominal , the other the real essence . and the nominal essences only are immutable ; and are helps to enable men to consider things , and to discourse of them . but two things are granted , which tend to clear this matter . . that there is a real essence , which is the foundation of powers and properties . . that we may know these powers and properties , although we are ignorant of of the real essence . from whence i inferr . . that from those true and adequate ideas , which we have of the modes and properties of things , we have sufficient certainty of the real essence of them : for these ideas are allow'd to be true ; and either by them we may judge of the truth of things ; or we can make no judgment at all of any thing without our selves . if our ideas be only the effects we feel of the powers of things without us ; yet our reason must be satisfied , that there could be no such powers , unless there were some real beings which had them . so that either we may be certain by those effects of the real being of things ; or it is not possible , as we are framed , to have any certainty at all of any thing without our selves . . that from the powers and properties of things which are knowable by us , we may know as much of the internal essence of things , as those powers and properties discover . i do not say , that we can know all essences of things alike ; nor that we can attain to a perfect understanding of all that belong to them : but if we can know so much , as that there are certain beings in the world , endued with such distinct powers and properties , what is it we complain of the want of , in order to our certainty of things ? but we do not see the bare essence of things . what is that bare essence without the powers and properties belonging to it ? it is that internal constitution of things from whence those powers and properties flow . suppose we be ignorant of this ( as we are like to be , for any discoveries that have been yet made , that is a good argument to prove the uncertainty of philosophical speculations about the real essences of things ; but it is no prejudice to us , who enquire after the certainty of such essences . for although we cannot comprehend the internal frame , or constitution of things , nor in what manner they do flow from the substance ; yet by them we certainly know that there are such essences , and that they are distinguished from each other by their powers and properties . . the essences of things as they are knowable by us , have a reality in them : for they are founded on the natural constitution of things . and however the abstract ideas are the work of the mind ; yet they are not meer creatures of the mind ; as appears by an instance produced of the essence of the sun , being in one single individual ; in which case it is granted , that the idea may be so abstracted , that more suns might agree in it , and it is as much a sort as if there were as many suns as there are stars . so that here we have a real essence subsisting in one individual , but capable of being multiplied into more , and the same essence remaining . but in this one sun there is a real essence , and not a meer nominal or abstracted essence : but suppose there were more suns ; would not each of them have the real essence of the sun ? for what is it makes the second sun to be a true sun , but having the same real essence with the first ? if it were but a nominal essence , then the second would have nothing but the name . therefore there must be a real essence in every individual of the same kind ; for that alone is it , which makes it to be what it is . peter , and iames , and iohn , are all true and real men ; but what is it which makes them so ? is it the attributing a general name to them ? no certainly , but that the true and real essence of a man is in every one of them . and we must be as certain of this , as we are that they are men ; they take their denomination of being men from that common nature , or essence which is in them . . that the general idea is not made from the simple ideas by the meer act of the mind abstracting from circumstances , but from reason and consideration of the true nature of things . for , when we see so many individuals , that have the same powers and properties , we thence infer , that there must be something common to all , which makes them of one kind : and if the difference of kinds be real , that which makes them of one kind and not of another , must not be a nominal , but real essence . and this difference doth not depend upon the complex ideas of substance , whereby men arbitrarily joyn modes together in their minds ; for let them mistake in the complication of their ideas , either in leaving out , or putting in what doth not belong to them , and let their ideas be what they please ; the real essence of a man , and a horse , and a tree , are just what they were : and let their nominal essences differ never so much , the real common essence , or nature of the several kinds are not at all alter'd by them . and these real essences are unchangeable : for , however there may happen some variety in individuals , by particular accidents , yet the essences of men , and horses , and trees remain always the same ; because they do not depend on the ideas of men , but on the will of the creator , who hath made several sorts of beings . . let us now come to the idea of a person . for , although the common nature in mankind be the same , yet we see a difference in the several individuals from one another : so that peter and iames , and iohn are all of the same kind ; yet peter is not iames , and iames is not iohn . but what is this distinction founded upon ? they may be distinguished from each other by our senses , as to difference of features , distance of place , &c. but that is not all ; for supposing there were no such external difference ; yet there is a difference between them , as several individuals in the same common nature . and here lies the true idea of a person , which arises from that manner of subsistence which is in one individual , and is not communicable to another . an individual , intelligent substance , is rather supposed to the making of a person , than the proper definition of it ; for a person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another intelligent substance in the same nature ; and therefore the foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of subsistence , which agrees to one , and to none else of the kind ; and this is it which is called personality . but how do our simple ideas help us out in this matter ? can we learn from them , the difference of nature and person ? we may understand the difference between abstracted ideas , and particular beings , by the impressions of outward objects ; and we may find an intelligent substance in our selves by inward perception ; ●ut whether that make a person or not , must be understood some other way ; for , if the meer intelligent substance makes a person , then there cannot be the union of two natures , but there must be two persons . therefore a person is a compleat intelligent substance , with a peculiar manner of subsistence ; so that if it be a part of another substance , it is no person ; and on this account the soul is no person , because it makes up an entire being by its union with the body . but when we speak of finite substances and persons , we are certain that distinct persons do imply distinct substances , because they have a distinct and separate existence ; but this will not hold in an infinite substance , where necessary existence doth belong to the idea of it . and although the argument from the idea of god , may not be sufficient of it self to prove his being ; yet it will hold as to the excluding any thing from him , which is inconsistent with necessary existence ; therefore , if we suppose a distinction of persons in the same divine nature , it must be in a way agreeable to the infinite perfections of it . and no objection can be taken from the idea of god , to overthrow a trinity of co-existing persons in the same divine essence . for necessary existence doth imply a co-existence of the divine persons ; and the unity of the divine essence , that there cannot be such a difference of individual substances , as there is among mankind . but these things are said to be above our reason , if not contrary to it , and even such are said to be repugnant to our religion . . that therefore is the next thing to be carefully examin'd , whether mysteries of faith , or matters of revelation above our reason , are to be rejected by us . and a thing is said to be above our reason , when we can have no clear and distinct idea of it in our minds : and , that if we have no ideas of a thing , it is certainly but lost labour for us to trouble our selves about it ; and that , if such doctrines be proposed which we cannot understand , we must have new powers , and organs for the perception of them . we are far from defending contradictions to our natural notions ( of which i have spoken already ) but that which we are now upon is , whether any doctrine may be rejected , when it is offer'd as a matter of faith upon this account , that it is above our comprehension , or that we can have no clear idea of it in our minds . and this late author hath undertaken to prove , that there is nothing so mysterious , or above reason in the gospel . to be above reason , he saith , may be understood two ways . . for a thing intelligible in it self , but cover'd with figurative and mystical words . . for a thing in its own nature unconceivable , and not to be judged of by our faculties , tho' it be never so clearly revealed . this in either sense is the same with mystery . and from thence he takes occasion to shew his learning about the gentile mysteries , and ecclesiastical mysteries , which might have been spared in this debate , but only for the parallel aimed at between them , as to priest-craft and mysteries ; without which a work of this nature would want its due relish with his good christian readers . others we see have their mysteries too ; but the comfort is , that they are so easily understood , and seen through ; as when the heathen mysteries , are said , to have been instituted at first in commemoration of some remarkable accidents , or to the honour of some great persons that obliged the world by their vertues and useful inventions to pay them such acknowledgments . he must be very dull that doth not understand the meaning of this ; and yet this man pretends to vindicate christianity from being mysterious . but there are some , he saith , that being strongly inclined out of ignorance , or passion to maintain what was first introduced by the craft or superstition of their forefathers , will have some christian doctrines to be still mysteries in the second sense of the word ; that is , unconceiveable in themselves , however clearly revealed . i hope there are still some , who are so throughly perswaded of the christian doctrine , that they dare own and defend it , notwithstanding all the flouts and taunts of a sort of men , whose learning and reason lies most in exposing priest-craft , and mysteries . suppose there are such still in the world , who own their assent to some doctrines of faith , which they confess to be above their comprehension , what mighty reason , and invincible demonstration is brought against them ? he pretends to demonstrate ; but what i pray ? the point in hand ? no. but he will demonstrate something instead of it ? what is that ? why truly , that in the new testament mystery is always used in the first sense of the word . and what then ? doth it therefore follow , that there are no doctrines in the gospel above the reach and comprehension of our reason ? but how doth it appear , that the word mystery is always used in that sense ? when s. paul saith in his first epistle to timothy , chap. . v. . that the deacons must hold the mystery of faith in a pure conscience ; doth he not mean thereby the same with the form of sound words , which timothy had heard of him , tim. . . and are not all the main articles of the christian faith comprehended under it ? especially that whereinto they were baptized , in the name of the father , son and holy ghost : and if the doctrine of the trinity were understood by this form , as i have already proved , then this must be a part of the mystery of faith. and in the same chapter , v. . he makes god manifest in the flesh ; the first part of the mystery of godliness . if it extends to all the other things , doth it exclude this , which is the first mention'd ? ( and that our copies are true , is already made to appear . ) there is no reason therefore to quarrel with our use of the word mystery in this sense ; but the debate doth not depend upon the word , but upon the sense of it . and therefore i pass over all that relates to the bare use of the word , as not coming up to the main point ; which is , whether any point of doctrine , which contains in it something above our comprehension can be made a matter of faith ? for our author concludes from his observations , that faith is so far from being an implicit assent to any thing above reason , that this notion directly contradicts the end of religion , the nature of man , and the goodness and wisdom of god. but we must not be frighted with this bold conclusion , till we have examin'd his premises ; and then we shall find , that some who are not great readers , are no deep reasoners . the first thing he premises is , that nothing can be said to be a mystery , because we have not an adequate idea of it , or a distinct view of all its properties at once , for then every thing would be a mystery . what is the meaning of this , but that we cannot have an adequate idea of any thing ? and yet all our reason depends upon our ideas according to him , and our clear and distinct ideas are by him made the sole foundation of reason . all our simple ideas are said to be adequate , because they are said to be only the effects of powers in things which produce sensations in us . but this doth not prove them adequate as to the things , but only as to our perceptions . but as to substances we are told , that all our ideas of them are inadequate . so that the short of this is , that we have no true knowledge or comprehension of any thing ; but we may understand matters of faith , as well as we understand any thing else , for in truth we understand nothing . is not this a method of true reasoning to make us reject doctrines of faith , because we do not comprehend them , and at the same time to say we comprehend nothing ? for i appeal to the common sense of mankind , whether we can be said to comprehend that , which we can have no adequate idea of ? but he appeals to the learned ; for he saith , that to comprehend in all correct authors is nothing else but to know . but what is to know ? is it not to have adequate ideas of the things we know ? how then can we know , that of which we can have no adequate idea ? for if our knowledge be limited to our ideas , our knowledge must be imperfect and inadequate where our ideas are so . but let us lay these things together . whatever we can have no adequate idea of is above our knowledge , and consequently above our reason ; and so all substances are above our reason ; and yet he saith , with great confidence , that to assent to any thing , above reason , destroys religion , and the nature of man , and the wisdom and goodness of god. how is it possible for the same man to say this , and to say w●thal , that it is very consistent with that nature of man , and the goodness and wisdom of god , to leave us without adequate ideas of any substance ? how come the mysteries of faith to require more knowledge than the nature of man is capable of ? in natural things we can have no adequate ideas ; but the things are confessed to be above our reason ; but in divine and spiritual things , to assent to things above our reason is against the nature of man. how can these things consist ? but these are not mysteries . yes , whatever is of that nature that we can have no idea of it , is certainly a mystery to us . for what is more unknown than it is known is a mystery . the true notion of a mystery being something that is hidden from our knowledge . of which there may be several kinds . for a mystery may be taken for , . something kept secret , but fully understood as soon as it is discover'd ; thus tully in his epistles speaks of mysteries which he had to tell his friend , but he would not let his amanuensis know ; no doubt such things might be very well understood as soon as discover'd . . something kept from common knowledge , although there might be great difficulties about them when discover'd . thus tully speaks of mysteries among the philosophers , particularly among the academicks , who kept up their doctrine of the criterion as a secret , which , when it was known , had many difficulties about it . . something that persons were not admitted to know , but with great preparation for it . such were the athenian mysteries which tully mentions with respect , although they deserved it not : but because they were not communicated to any but with difficulty , they were called mysteries . and this is so obvious a piece of learning , that no great reading , or deep reasoning is required about it . only it may be observed , that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and so the mysteries related to those who were initiated and not made epoptoe ; i. e. to those who did not throughly understand them , although they had more knowledge of them than such as were not initiated . olympiodorus , in reckoning up the degrees of admissions , mentions the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . so that they were properly mysteries to such , who knew something ; though there were other things farther to be discover'd , but they did not yet know what they were , as the epoptoe did . from hence the ancient christian writers did not only call the sacraments , but more abstruse points of faith by the name of mysteries ; so s. chrysostom calls the resurrection , a great and ineffable mystery . and isidore pelusiota in his epistle to lampetius saith , that s. paul , when he speaks of the great mystery of godliness , doth not mean that it is wholly unknown to us , but that it is impossible to comprehend it . theophylact saith , it is therefore called the great mystery of godliness ; because although it be now revealed to all , yet the manner of it is hidden from us , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for this reason it is called a mystery . but this is in the way of reading ; let us now come to deep reasoning ; and see how strongly he argues against this sense of the word mysteries : his words are these ; they trifle then exceedingly , and discover a mighty scarcity of better arguments , who defend their mysteries , by this pitiful shift of drawing inferences from what is unknown to what is known , or of insisting upon adequate ideas ; except they will agree as some do , to call every spire of grass , sitting and standing , fish and flesh to be mysteries . and if out of a pertinacious or worse humour , they will be still fooling , and call these things mysteries , i 'm willing to admit as many as they please in religion , if they will allow me likewise to make mine as intelligible to others , as these are to me . it is easie to guess whom these kind words were intended for : and are not these very modest and civil expressions ? trifling , fooling ; out of a pertinacious , or worse humour ; but why , fooling about mysteries , to call such things by that name , which are in some measure known , but in a greater measure unknown to us ? and if these are real mysteries in nature , why may not the same term be used for matters of faith ? and i think in so plain a case , no great store of arguments need to be used . but in these natural things , he saith , we have distinct ideas of the properties which make the nominal essence , but we are absolutely ignorant of the real essence , or intrinsick constitution of a thing , which is the ground or support of all its properties . are not then ( without trifling and fooling ) these real essences mysteries to them ? they know there are such by the ideas of their properties , but know nothing of their real essence ; and yet they will not allow them to be mysteries ? if they do understand them , why do they say , they do not , nor cannot ? and if this be true , let them call them what they please , they must be inexplicable mysteries to them . so that all this is mere quarrelling about a word , which they would fain be rid of , if they knew how ; but they involve and perplex themselves more by their own deep reasonings against the trifling and fooling of others . but he saith , that some would have the most palpable absurdities and gross contradictions to go down , or words that signifie nothing , because men cannot comprehend the essence of their own souls , nor the essence of god , and other spiritual substances . we utterly deny , that any article of our faith contains in it any palpable absurdities , or gross contradictions ( as i hope hath been proved already as to the doctrine of the trinity which is chiefly struck at ) but surely your deep reasoners may find a difference between gross contradictions to our reason , and barely being above it , or not having any distinct conception of the nature of it . and that is all that we assert , and which they grant as to all substances . if this be their way of arguing , they may even return to transubstantiation again , without any great lessening of their understandings . but none are so bold in attacking the mysteries of the christian faith ; as the smatterers in ideas , and new terms of philosophy , without any true understanding of them . for these ideas are become but another sort of canting with such men ; and they would reason as well upon genus and species , or upon occult qualities , and substantial forms , but only that they are terms out of fashion . but we find that the change of terms doth neither improve nor alter mens understandings ; but only their ways of speaking ; and ill gamesters will not manage their game one jot the better , for having new cards in their hands . however , we must see what work they make of it . although we do not know the nature of the soul , yet we know as much of it , as we do of any thing else , if not more , i. e. we really know nothing by any adequate idea of it , but we must believe nothing , but what we have a clear distinct idea of . is not this a rare way of fixing the boundaries of faith and reason ? as to god and his attributes , it is said , that they are not mysteries to us for want of an adequate idea ; no not eternity . and in another place , as to god , we comprehend nothing better than his attributes . let us try this , by the attribute pitched on by himself ; viz. eternity . we see he pretends to comprehend nothing better than the divine attributes ; and eternity as well as any ; ( which i am very apt to believe ) but how doth he comprehend eternity ? even by finding , that it cannot be comprehended . is not this subtle and deep reasoning ? but reason he saith , performs its part in finding out the true nature of things ; and if such be the nature of the thing , that it cannot be comprehended , then reason can do no more , and so it is not above reason . was there ever such trifling that pretended to reason ; and that about the highest matters , and twith scorn and contempt of others whom he calls mysterious wits ? the question is , whether any thing ought to be rejected as an article of faith , because we cannot comprehend it , or have a clear and distinct perception of it ? he concludes it must be so , or else we overthrow religion , and the nature of man , and the wisdom and goodness of god. here is an essential attribute of god , viz. his eternity . am i bound to believe it or not ? yes , doubtless . but how can i comprehend this attribute of eternity ? very easily . how so ? do not you comprehend that it is incomprehensible ? what then ? doth this reach the nature of the thing , or only the manner of our conception ? if the nature of the thing be , that it cannot be comprehended , then you rightly understand the nature of the thing , and so it is not above your reason . let the case be now put as to the trinity ; do you believe the doctrine of it , as of divine revelation ? no , god hath given me the nature , and faculties of a man ; and i can believe nothing , which i cannot have a distinct and clear idea of ; otherwise i must have new faculties . will you hold to this principle ? then you must believe nothing , which you cannot have a clear and distinct idea of . very true : but can you have a clear and distinct idea of what you cannot comprehend ? a clear idea , is that whereof the mind hath a full and evident perception . a distinct idea , is that whereby the mind perceives the difference of it from all others . is this right ? yes . but can you have a full and evident perception of a thing , so as to difference it from all others , when you grant it to be incomprehensible ? if you have a full perception of it , you comprehend its nature , and especially if you can difference it from all other things ; but when you say , its nature is incomprehensible , and yet believe it , you must deny it to be necessary to faith , to have a clear and distinct idea of the thing proposed . and if it be repugnant to your faculties to reject the trinity , because you cannot have a clear and distinct idea of it , for the same reason , you must unavoidably reject his eternity , and all other attributes which have infinity joyned with them . but we must stop here , because this admirable undertaker hath said , that he despairs not of rendring eternity , and infinity as little mysterious , as that three and two make five . and till then i take my leave of him . and so i return to our professed vnitarians , who in answer to my sermon fell upon the same subject , and it is necessary that i consider so much , as tends to the clearing of it . in my sermon i had urged this argument to prove , that we may be bound to believe some things that are incomprehensible to us , because the divine nature , and attributes are acknowledged to be so ; and i had said , ( . ) that there is no greater difficulty in the conception of the trinity , and incarnation , than there is of eternity . not but that there is great reason to believe it , but from hence it appears , that our reason may oblige us to believe some things , which it is not possible for us to comprehend . and what say our vnitarians to this ? they charge my notion of eternity ( as they call it ) with a contradiction . the best way of proceeding will be to set down my own words which are these . we know that either god must have been for ever , or it is impossible he ever should be , for if he should come into being when he was not , he must have some cause of his being , and that which was the first cause would be god. but if he was for ever , he must be from himself , and what notion , or conception can we have in our minds concerning it ? to this say they , to say a person , or thing is from it self is a contradiction ; it implies this contradiction , it was before it was . and they are sorry an eternal god must be a contradiction . what a false and spiteful inference is this ? but it had look'd like very deep reasoning , if i had said , that god was the cause of himself . for , that would have implied the contradiction he had charged it with : but i had expressly excluded his being from any cause ; and the thing i urged was only the impossibility , of our having a clear and distinct conception of eternity . for , if he could have no cause , what could we think of his being eternal ? if to be from himself as a cause , be unconceivable , ( as i grant it is ) then it proves what i designed , that we cannot have any distinct idea of eternity . but to be from himself in the sense generally understood , is a meer negative expression ; for no men were such fools to imagine any thing could be before it self , and in this sense only , learned men have told us , that it is to be understood by those ancient and modern writers , who have used that expression . as when s. ierom saith , that god is self originated ; and s. augustin , that god is the cause of his own wisdom ; and lactantius , that god made himself ; all these and such like expressions are only to be negatively understood . but i confess i aimed at shewing , that it was impossible for us to have any clear and distinct idea of eternity , and therefore i took in all possible ways of conceiing it , either by gods being from himself , or his co-existing with all differences of time , without any succession in his own being ; or his having a successive duration . from all which i argued the impossibility of a clear notion of eternity . and now what do these men do ? they dispute against one of these notions , and very triumphantly expose , as they think , the absurdities of it . and what then ? why then this notion will not do . but i say none will do . i prove there can be no successive duration in a being of necessary existence ; and that it is not to be conceived , how without succession god should be present with the being , and not being , the promise and performance of the same thing ; and yet one of these ways we must make use of . from whence i concluded , that all we can attain to is , a full satisfaction of our reason concerning god's eternity , although we can form no distinct conception of it in our minds . but when these men instead of answering the argument from all the notions of eternity , only dispute against one notion of it , they apparently shew the weakness of their cause , if it will bear no other defences , but such as this . for i take it , that the main debate in point of reason depends upon this , whether we can be certain of the being of a thing , of which we can have no clear and distinct idea ? if we may , then it can be no objection in point of revelation , that we can have no clear and distinct idea of the matter revealed ; since there can be no reason to tie us up stricter in point of revelation , than we are without it . if we can be certain in reason of many things , we can have no such ideas of , what imaginable reason can there be , that a point of faith should be rejected on that account . . i urged another attribute of god , viz. his spirituality for the same reason ; viz. that we are satisfied in point of reason that god must be a spirit ; and yet we cannot have a clear distinct positive notion of a spirit . and what answer do they give to this ? as wise as the former . why truly , i had no cause to object this against them , because they own the spirituality of god's nature , and none since biddle have denied it . very well ! but doth my argument proceed upon that , or upon the not having a distinct and clear idea of a spirit ? it was hardly possible for men so to mistake my meaning , unless they did it , because they had no other answer to give . . i argued from god's prescience , which i do expresly assert , and prove that they cannot have a distinct notion of it , nay that socinus denied it , because he could not understand it . 〈…〉 they tell me , i cannot defend our 〈…〉 against theirs without finding contra●●●tions in god●s eternity and foreknowledge . if this be the ingenuity and justice and charity of the vnitarians ; commend me to the honest-hearted deists , if there be any such , as they assure us there are . one had better be charged with trifling and fooling with mysteries , than with undermining the main foundations of religion , by charging them with contradictions . but nothing could be farther from my thoughts , than any thing tending that way . and such a base calumny is too much honoured with a confutation . but do they offer to clear the difficulty and give us a clear and distinct idea of god●s fore-knowing future events without a certain cause to make them future . nothing like it . for the question is not , whether a thing be necessary because god foresees it as certain , ( as they suppose . ) but how of a thing merely possible it comes to be certain without a certain cause ; and how a thing which hath no certain cause can be certainly foreknown , and what clear and distinct notion we can have of this in our minds . if they had answer'd this , they had said something to the purpose . to resolve all into god's infinite wisdom is a good answer from us , but not from them . for we think it our duty to satisfie our selves with what god hath revealed , without prying into the manner of things above our comprehension ; but these men who will receive nothing but what they have clear and distinct ideas of , ought to shew the manner of this , or else we must be excused on the same reason , if we allow the manner of the divine subsistences in the same essence to be above our comprehension . . i shew'd how unreasonable their demands were , when the nature of god is owned to be incomprehensible , and his perfections infinite . and now of a sudden they are quite turned about ; for before they were only for fencing and warding off blows , but at last they come to the point , and own the being of god to be comprehensible by them ; and that they have clear and distinct ideas of god's infinite attributes . this is indeed to the purpose , if they can make these things out . but fencers have many tricks , and i wish we find none here . i had said , that in consequence to the assertion , that nothing is to be believ'd , but what may be comprehended , the very being of god must be rejected too , because his being is incomprehensible , and so they must reject one god as well three persons . to this they reply , that to comprehend the being or existence of god , is only this , to comprehend that god is , and if we cannot comprehend that , all religion ceases . is not this a fine turn ? what i said of god as to the perfections of his nature , they will have it understood of his bare existence , which i do not mention . when god is said to be an incomprehensible being ; who before them did understand the meaning to be , that we cannot comprehend that there is a god ? this is not mere trifling , for it looks like something worse ; and yet they presently after say , that to comprehend a thing is to have a clear adequate conception of it . and will they pretend to have such a one of the divine essence , when they confess but a little before , that we converse every day with very many things , none of which we comprehend , and that i might have spared my pains in proving it ? but what can be the meaning of these sayings , they cannot comprehend the common natures of things , nor have a clear and distinct idea of them , but they can comprehend an infinite being , whom all mankind own to be incomprehensible . but as to divine attributes , they say , they have clear distinct and adequate conceptions of them ; and instance in eternity , power , wisdom and iustice. we do not deny that in such attributes which we apply to god , because we find them to be perfections in us , we have a distinct and clear perception of them , as they are consider'd in themselves , for that is the reason why we attribute them to god. but for such as peculiarly belong to god as eternity doth ; and for the degrees of other attributes as they belong to him , as they are infinite , so they are above our comprehension . ( . ) as to eternity , say they , it is a clear and distinct notion of eternity , to say , it is a duration without beginning and without end . but we can have no clear and distinct notion of duration , when applied to a being that hath necessary existence . for duration , they say , consists in a succession . and what succession can there be in a being which always is the same , if there were no difference of times , i. e. god was the same being before time was , and is the very same being under all the differences of times ; he hath not any other duration now than he had before , and what succession could there be where there was no time ? but we make use of duration with respect to things done in time , and for the help of our und●●standings apply the measure of time to divine acts. but in a necessary existence , there can be no past , present , or to come ; and in a successive duration , there must be conceived a longer continuance from time to time ; which is repugnant to the notion of a being , which always is . so that , if we cannot conceive eternity wi●hout duration , nor duration without succession ; nor can apply succession to a being which hath necessary existence , then we can have no clear and distinct notion of god's eternity . ( . ) as to the infiniteness of god's perfections , they say , that although the mind be in it self finite , yet it hath an infinite comprehension , for what is finite with respect to its extension of parts may be infinite in other respects , and with respect to some of its powers . but how doth it appear that we have any power to comprehend what is infinite ? all the power we have extends only to adding and enlarging our ideas without bounds , i. e. we can put no stop to our apprehensions , but still they may go farther than we can possibly think , but is this an infinite comprehension ? so far from it , that this shews our capacities to be finite , because our ideas cannot go so far as our reason . for our reason tells us , we can never go so far , but we may still go farther : but it is impossible for our understanding to have distinct ideas of the infinite moments in an eternal succession of the utmost bounds of immensity , or of the extent of infinite power and knowledge , since the very notion of infinite implies , that we can set no bounds to our thoughts ; and therefore although the infinity of the divine attributes be evident to our reason , yet it is likewise evident to our reason , that what is infinite must be above our comprehension . ii. i come now to the last enquiry which is that if we allow things above our reason , what stop can be put to any absurd doctrine , which we may be required to believe ? and this is that which our vnitarians object in all their late pamphlets . in answer to my sermon they say , that on our principles , our reason would be in vain , and all science and certainty would be destroy'd , which they repeat several times . and from hence they do so frequently insist on the parallel between the doctrine of the trinity and transubstantiation : they say , that all the defence we have made for one will serve for the other , or any other absurd and impossible doctrine . that what we say , will equally serve all the nonsense , and impossible doctrines that are to be found among men ; and they particularly instance in transubstantiation . i need mention no more . but i did not expect to have found this parallel so often insisted upon , without an answer to two dialogues purposely written on that subject , at a time when the doctrine of the trinity was used as an argument to bring in transubstantiation , as that is now alledged for casting off the other . but i must do them that right to tell the world , that at that time a socinian answer was written to those dialogues , which i saw , and wish'd might be printed , that the world might be satisfied about it and them . but they thought fit to forbear ; and in all their late pamphlets where this parallel is so often repeated , there is but once , that i can find , any notice taken of those dialogues , and that in a very superficial manner . for the main design and scope of them is past over , and only one particular mention'd , which shall be answer'd in its due order . but in answer to the general enquiry , i shall endeavour to state the due bounds between faith and reason , and thereby to shew , that by those grounds on which we receive the doctrine of the trinity , we do not give way to the entertainment of any absurd opinion , nor overthrow the certainty of reason . . we have no difference with them about the vse of our reason as to the certainty of a revelation . for in this case , we are as much as they , for searching into the grounds of our faith ; for we look on it as a reasonable act of our minds , and if we did not allow this , we must declare our selves to believe without grounds . and if we have grounds for our faith , we can express them in words that are intelligible ; and if we can give an account of our faith in an intelligible manner , and with a design to give others satisfaction about it , i think this is making use of our reason in matters of faith. . we have no difference with them about the use of our reason , as to the true sense of revelation . we never say , that men are bound to believe upon the bare sound of words without examining the sense of them . we allow all the best and most reasonable ways of attaining to it , by copies , languages , versions , comparing of places , and especially the sense of the christian church in the best and purest ages , nearest the apostolical times and express'd in solemn and publick acts. by these rules of reason we are willing to proceed , and not by any late and uncertain methods of interpreting scripture . . we differ not with them about the right use of the faculties which god hath given us , of right vnderstanding such matters as are offer'd to our assent . for it is to no purpose to require them to believe , who cannot use the faculties which are necessary in order to it . which would be like giving the benefit of the clergy to a man with a cataract in both his eyes . and it would be very unreasonable to put his life upon that issue , whether he could read or not , because he had the same organs of seeing that other men had ; for in this case the whole matter depended not on the organ but the vse of it : this needs no application . . we differ not with them about rejecting some matters proposed to our belief which are contradictory to the principles of sense and reason . it is no great argument of some mens reason , whatever they pretend to talk against admitting seeming contradictions in religion ; for who can hinder seeming contradictions ? which arise from the shallowness of mens capacities , and not from the repugnancy of things : and who can help mens understandings ? but where there is evident proof of a contradiction to the principles of sense and reason ; we are very far from owning any such thing to be an article of faith , as in the case of transubstantiation . which we reject , not only , as having no foundation in scripture , but as repugnant to the common principles of sense and reason ; as is made to appear in the two dialogues before-mention'd . but our vnitarians find fault with the author of them , for laying the force of his argument upon this , that there are a great many more texts for the trinity than are pretended for transubstantiation ; whereas many other arguments are insisted on , and particularly the great absurdity of it in point of reason , dial. . from p. . to the end . and it is not the bare number of texts , which he relies upon , but upon the greater evidence and clearness of the tex●s on one side than on the other , which depends upon figurative words , not capable of a literal sense without overthrowing the doctrine designed to be proved by it . see with what ingenuity these men treat the defenders of the trinity , and the enemies to transubstantiation , which they call only a philosophical error or folly ; but the doctrine of the trinity is charged with nonsense , contradiction , and impossibilities . but wherein then lies the difference in point of reason ? for thus far i have shew'd , that we are far from overthrowing reason , or giving way to any absurd doctrines . it comes at last to the point already treated of in this chapter , how far we may be obliged to believe a doctrine which carries in it something above our reason ; or of which we cannot have any clear and distinct ideas . and of this i hope i have given a sufficient account in the foregoing discourse . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e consideraton the ezplications of the doctrine of the trinity , by dr. w. &c. p. . p. . p. . discourse concerning the real and nominal trinitarians , a. d. , p. . letter to the universities , p. . discourse of nominal and real trinit . p. . p. . p. . p. . tritheism charged , &c. p. . animadvers p. . animadv . &c. p. . ibid p. . basil ep. . considerat . on the explication , p. . animadv . p. . tritheism charged , p. . chap. vii . letter to the university , p. . discourse of nominal and real trinitarians , p. . tritheism charged , &c. p. . discourse of nominal and real unitarians , p. . discourse of nom. &c. p. . p. . consideraton the explication of the trinity , p. . tritheism charged , &c. p. . direct . inquisit . part ii. quaest . . p. . modest examin p. . p. , . notes on athanasius his creed , edit . . p. . modest examin p . p. . p. . p. . remarks upon the examinat . p. . remarks p. . p. . ibid. animadv . p. . modest examin p. . tritheism charged , p. . p. . more nevoch , par . ii. c. . modest examin . p. . considerat . on the explication of the trinity , &c. p. . leont . de sectis act. . niceph. callist l. . c. , . anselm . epist. l. . ep . . de fide trinit . &c. c. . c. . c . phot. biblioth . cod. . phot cod. . isid. orig. l. . de haeret de trinit . aug. de haeres●● . modest examin . p. . discourse of real and nominal trinit p greg de laur apol . joachim abb●t , c. . decret . greg. l. . c. . comment . in decret . opusc . . bri●f account of valentin . gentilis , p. . ibid. modest examin . p. . brief account , &c. p. . brief account , &c. p. , , , . modest examin . p. . genebrard de trinit l. . p. . l p . p. . od●●at rixas & jurgia , p●aesertimque inter eruditos ; ac turpe esse diceb●t viros indubitatè doctos canina rabie famam vicissim suam rodere ac lacerare scriptis trucibus , tanquam vilissimos de plebe cerdones in angiportis sese luto ac stercore conspurcan●●● . nic rigalt . vit . p. 〈◊〉 , p. . considerat . on the explication by dr. w. &c. p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . defence of the notes on athanasius his creed . p. . p. . vindication of the archbishop's sermons . p. . answer to dr. bull , p. . history of the unitarians , p. . considerat . on the explication by the archbishop , &c. p. . answ●r to the archbish . serm. p. . p. . answer to the archbishop p. . some thoughts upon dr. sh. vindication , p. . letter of resol . concerning the trinity and incarn . p. . letter of resol . p. . letter of resol . concerning the trinity and incarn . p. . elmacin hist. sarac . p. . levin . warner . de alcoran . acts of athanasius , p. . ricard . confut . legis saracen . c. . letter of resol . p. . answer to the archbishop p. . p. . notes for div a -e considerat . on the explications of the trinity , by dr. w. &c. p. , . defence of the history of the unit . p. . answer to the archbishop's sermon , p. . answer to the archb. serm. p . explic●● of the t●●nity , p. . answer to milbourn , p. , . history of the unit. p. . answer to the archb. p. , . answer to my sermon p. . ans. to dr. wallis 's four letters , p. . theodoret haeret . l. . & . epiphan . haeres . . n. . . n. . tertull de praescript . haeret c . euseb. hist. eccl. l. . c. . hist. of the unit. p. . edit . ii. euseb. l. . c. . ante-nicenism . p. . answer to milb . p. . euseb. l. . c. . resp. ad judic . eccles . p. . answer to dr. bull , part i. p. . euseb. l. , c. . act. . . epiphan . haer . n. . euseb. l. . c. . l. . c. . l. c. . oros. l. . c. . answer to dr. bull , p. . answer to dr. bull , p. . euseb. l. . c. , . l . c. . . l. . c. . hieron . c. pelag. l. . hieron . de script . in matth. comment . in matth. c. . in isa. c. . in ezek. c. . erasm. advers . stunic . c. . answer to dr. bull , p. . p. . p. . origen c. cels. l. . p. . theodor haeret . l. . c. . hieron in matth. c. . euseb. l. . c. . epiph. de ponder . & mens . n. . euseb. l. . c. . august . c. crescon . l. . c. . hier. in heb. c. . advers . ruffin . answer to the archb. sermon p. , . euseb. l. . c. . reflect . on dr. bull , p . answer to milbourn , p. . athan. ad solit . vit . agent p. . euseb. l. . c. . respons . ad judicium ecclesiae p●r i● . bull , p. restaurans pauli samosatensis artes & dolos . decret . conc. sardin . apud hilar. fragment . p. . ed. par. . euseb l. . c. . theodor. haer . fab . l. . c. . athanas. desentent . dionysii , p. . euseb. l. . c. . athan. de incarn . to i. p. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . epiph. haer . . n. . concil . ephesin . part i. supplicatio basilii , &c. phot. epist . . marius mercat . de anath . nestorii , n. . leontius de sectis p. . edit . basil. euseb. l. . c. . leont . c. nestor . l. . hilar. fragment . p. . theod. l. . c. . pagi critica in bar. a. . n. . answer to the archbishop , p. . euseb l. , , . c. . theod. l. . c. . petav. de trinit . l. . c. . n. . h. valesius in theod . l. . c. . baron . a. . n. , &c. soz. l. c. . philost . l. . c. , . athanas. tom. . p. . socr. l. . c. . athan. de synodis arim. &c. p. . epiph haeret . . sulpit . sever. l. . p. . prudent . apoth . epiph. n. . n. , . n. . epiph. haeret . . socr. l. . ● . . soz. l. c. . hist. tripart . l. . c. . hist. of the unit. p. . concil general . to. ii. p. . ib. p. . ambros. apol. david . c. . ans. to the archbish. serm p. . theodor. haer●t . fab. l. . in photino . sand. hist. enucl . l. . p. . p. . blond . dec. . l. . sand. hist. eccles. l. . p. . . socr. l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . hilar. de synod . p. . ed. paris . hilar. de trinit . l. . n. . hilar. de trin. l. . n. . august . ep. . ma●ii mercat . oper . par. . p. . 〈◊〉 . a●●th . n●s●orii p. . euseb. l. . c. . answer to the serm. about the trinity , p. , , . history of the unitar . p. . n. . d●fence of the history of the unitarians , p. . a●t o● athanasiu● , p. . interrogant enim nos aliquando infideles , & dicunt , patrem quem dicitis , deum dicitis ? respondemus deum . filium quem dicitis , deum dicitis ? respondemus deum spiritum sanctum quem dicitis , deum dicitis ? respondemus deum . ergo inquiunt , pater & filius & spiritus sanctus tres sunt dei. respondemus , non. turbantur , quia non illuminantur , cor clausum habent quia clavem fidei non habent aug. in ioh. tr. . nos ergo fratres , fide praecedente , quae sanat oculum cordis nostri , quod intelligimus sine obscuritate capiamus , quod non intelligimus sine dubitatione credamus . ibid. answ. to serm. p. . a fundamento fidei non recedamus , ut ad culmen perfectionis veniamus . deus est pater . deus est filius , deus est spiritus sanctus , & ramen pater non est qui filius : nec filius est qui pater , nec spiritu● sanctus . patris & filii spiritus , pater est aut filius . ibid. trinitas unus deus , trinitas una aeternitas , una potestas , una majestas , tres personae sed non tres dii . non audemus dicere unam essentiam tres substantias , sed unam essentiam vel substantiam , tres autem personas , quemadmodum multi latini ista tractantes & digni auctoritate dixerunt , cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent , quo enunciarent verbis , quod sine verbis intelligebant . aug. de trinit . l. . c. . nunc mihi calumniator respondeat , quid ergo tres ? ecce inquit tres dixisti , sed quid tres exprime ? immo tu numera . nam ego compleo tres , cum dico , pater & filius & spiritus sanctus . id. ubi supra . id enim quod pater ad se est , deus est , quod ad filium est , pater est : quod filius ad seipsum est , deus est ; quod ad patrem est , filius est . sed non quomodo illi duo homines sunt sic isti duo dii . quare hoc non est ita ibi ? quia illud aliud , hoc autem aliud est , quia illa divini●● est , haec humanitas . ubi cogitare coeperis , incipis numerare ; ubi numeraveris , quid numeraveris , non potes respondere . pater , pater est ; filius , filius ; spiritus sanctus , spiritus sanctus est . quid sunt isti tres ? non tres dii ? non. non tres omnipotentes ? non , sed unus omnipotens . hoc solo numerum insinuant , quod ad invicem sunt , non quod ad se sunt . boëth . oper . p. ● . numerus enim duplex est , unus quidem , quo numeramus , alter verò qui in rebus numerabilibus constat ; ergo in numero quo numeramus , repetitio unitatum facit pluritatem ; in rerum vero numero non facit pluralitatem unitatum repetitio . ita igitur substantia continet unitatem , relatio verò multiplicat trinitatem . nam idem pater qui filius non est ; nec idem uterque qui spiritus sanctus . idem tamen deus est , pater filius & spiritus sanctus . answer to milb . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . porphyr . isag. c. . ● . niceph. callist . l. . c. . discourse concerning the nominal and real trinitarian , p. . petav. de trinit . l. . c. . defence of the history of the unit . p. . ib. ib. answer to la moth. p. . explic. p. . letter to the university , p. . curcell . devocibus trinit . sect. . athanas. de sentent . dionys . p. , . orat. . de arian . p. . de communi essent . &c. p. . expos. fidei , p. ● . in illud omnia mihi trad p. . ep. ad serap . p. . orat. . c. arian . p. , , . &c. curcell . sect. iii. petav. de trinit . l. . c. . de decret . synod . nic. p. . , , . orat. . c. arian . p. . de decret . synod p. . curcell . dissert . n. . curcell . n. . athanas. de synod . arim & seluc . p. , , . p. . curcell . n. . maxim. oper. t. ii. p. . t. i. p . curcell . sect. . a discourse conc●rn●●g no●●●●l and real unitar . p . basil hom. ● . p. ● , . epist. , , . t. i. p. . t. ii. p. ● . cyril alex . dialog . de trinit . . p. , . curcell . n. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. . b. phot. cod. . cod. . discourse conce●ning the nominal and real unitar . p. , . basil. ep. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . basil. t. ii. p. . petav. de trinit . l. c. . n. . cur. n . basil. t. i. p. . cur n. . n. . t. ii. p. . cur. n. . greg. nyssen . t. iii. p. . petav. de trin. l. . ● n. , . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 niceph. calist. hist. l. . c. . athan. t. ii. p. . caesar. quaest. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyssen , tom. iii. p. cur. n. . n. . cur. n. . hilar. de synod . n. . hilar. de trinit . l. . n. . hilar. de synod . n. . hilar. de trinit . l. . n. . lumen ex lumine , quod sine detrimento suo naturam suam praestat ex sese , & quod dat habet , & quod dederit habeat , nascaturque quod sit . petav. de trinit . l. . c. . n. , . curcell . n. . ambros. de fide l. . c. . ed. nov. curcell . n. . aug. de trinit . l. . c. . c maxim l. . curcell . n. . august . de trinit . l. . c. . l. . c. , , . l. . c. . de ago●e christ. c. . c. maxim. l . c. . curcell . n. . notes on athanasius his creed , p. . basil. ep. . notes on athanas . his creed , p. . facund . l . p. . ed. serm. theod. haeret . fab. l. . c. . athan. de sent. dionys . p. . athanas. de decret . fidei nicen . p. . athanas. de sent. dionys. basil de sp. sancto c. . athan. orat . . c. arian . p. . greg. nazian . or. i. p. , . or. xxi p. . basil. hom. . p. , . basil. epist . ●pist . . . athanas. ● . . greg. naz. p. . basil. hom. . ruffin . p. . hist. l. . athan. ep. ad antioch , p. . socin . vol. l. p. . notes on athanas . his creed , p. . answer to my sermon , p. . hist. of the unit. p. . edit . . hist of the unit. p. . defence of of the hist. of unitar . p. . hist. of the unit. p. . ibid p. . answer to dr. wallis his letter , p. . answer to my sermon , p. . reflections no dr. bull , p. , . sand. p. . answ. to the archbishop , p. . eus●b . pra●p . evang . l. . c. . cyril . c. julian , l. . p. . . julian ep . . facund . l. . p. . rittangel in jezirah p. . morinus exerc. biblic . l. . exerc. . c. . eusebius dem. evang . l. . c. . bichin . happerasch p. . paris , a. d. . joh. . . . . . , . . . answer to the archbishop's serm. p. . answer to my sermon , p. . hist. of the unit. p. . answer to my sermon , p. . ans. to the archbishop , p. . matth. . . mar. . luk. . . pet. . . . enjed. in joh. . . answer to my sermon , p. . history of the unit. p. . p. p. ● . h. grot. opusc p. t. . christe caput rerum vitae melioris origo , immensi mensura patris , quem mente supremâ miratus sese genitor , de lumine lumen fundit , & aequali se spectat imagine totum . h grot. syl. p. . ed. ▪ joh. . . answer to the archbishop . p. . joh. . . answer to milb . p. . ib. p. . joh. . . matt. . . selden de jure nat. & gent. l. . c. . pocock not. miscel . ad maim . p. . &c. matt. . s. joh. . . . . . . . hist. of unitar . p. . answer to milb . p. . joh. . . . phil. . , . hist. of unitar . p. . answer to serm. p. . answer to milb . p. . ib. col. . answer to archbish. serm p. . p. . de divin . christi , c. ● . defence of the hist. of the unit. p. . rom. . . hist. of the unit. p . answer to milb p . ante-nicen . p. , . answer to milb p . ans. to the archbishop , p. . answer to milb p. . histoir critique du nov. test. to. iii. c. . p. . annot. in cypr. advers . judaeos . hilar. in psal. . hist. of the unit. p. . hist. critique du nov. to. ii. c. . verum repugnant perpetuo consensu omnes graeci codices . bez. motinus exercit. bibl. l. . ex. . c. . simon . dissert . sur le ms. du nov , test p. rigalt . vit . p. puteani , p. . p. pithae de latino interpret . p. ii. mabil . de re deplomat . l. . p. . dissert . surless ms. du nov. test. p. . alavarez gomez de rebus gestis fr. ximenii , l. . & . amelote in loc. marian. edit . vulg . c. . praef. ad schol. hier. in loc. leo epist. . ad fl. hilar de trinit . l. . fulg. ad thra. c. . joh. . . consider on the explic. p. . history of unit. p. . ans. to the archbishop , p. . selden de syned . l. . c. . morin exercit bibl. l. , , ex. . simon dissert . de mss p. . bez epist. ad nov . testam . critique in nov . test. c. . morin . exercit . bibl. l . ex. . c. . n. . critique to. i. c. . joh. . . heb. . , . col. . . hist. of the unit. p. . defence of the history of unitar . p. , . p. . answer to milb . p. . p. . sand. interp . et paradox . p. . epiph. haer . . n. . n. . hilar. l. . de trinit . p. . cypri●n . ad jul. ep. . erasm. ad cens. paris . tit. ii. vossi . de symb. diss . i. n. . hierom. ep. . tertul. de bap●ism . ● . de praescript . haeret . c. . cyprian . ep. . . ed. ox. aug. de baptism . c. donat. l. . c. . ambros. de sp. sanct. l. . c . bed. in act. . hugo de s vict. de sacr. l. . c. . lomb. . sent. dist. ● . c. sed qd . basil c eunom . l. . c. . c. . epiph. haer. . ad fin . concil . nicaen . c. . aug. de haeres c. . concil . arel . i. c. . bellarm. de bap. l. . c. . answer to mi●b p. . p. . advers . prax. c. . c . tertul. de praescr . haeret . c. ult . con. prax. ● . . c. . alium autem quomodo accipere debes jam professus sum , personae non substantiae nomine , ad distinctionem , non ad divisionem , caeterum ubique teneo unam substantiam in tribus cohaerentibus . advers . prax. c. . et sermo erat apud deum & nunquam separatus à patre aut alius à patre , quia ego & pater unum sumus . haec erat probola veritatis , custos unitatis qua prolatum dicimus filium à patre , sed non separatum . c. . schlicht . ad m●isn . de trinit . p. , . . advers . prax. . nos vero ut semper nunc magi● ut instructiores per paracletum , &c. hanc regulam ab initio evangelii decueurrisse etiam ante priores haereticos , n●dum praxean hesternum . optat. mil. l. . theodor. haer l. c. . tertul. de praefer . c. . rigalt . in tertul. ad praxean . ante-nicen . p. . p. . in quo est trinitas unius divinitatis , pater , filius & spiritus sanctus . de pudicit . c. . petav. t. . l. . c. . sect. . schlichting . praef p. . ante-nicen . p. . novatian . de trinit . c. . , . c. . et cum spiritus sancti divina aeternitate sociari . cypr. ep. . basil epist. canon , . epiph haeres . . n. . n. . theod. haer . l. . c. . epiph. . n. . comment . in matth. p. . euseb. l. . c. . epiph. haer . . aug. in joh. tract . . discourse of nominal . and real unit. p. ● euseb. l. . c. . . athan. de decret . synodi nicaenae , p. . athanas. de sentent . dionysii , p. . basil de sp. sancto c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. thaumat . p. . athanas. c. serap . p. . answer to milb . p. . rittang . p. . p. . p. . answer to dr. bull , p. . morin . exercit. l. . l. . c. . cosri part. . p. . p. . p. . de sp. sancto , c. . c. . c. . c. . euseb. l. . c. . vales. ad euseb. p. . coteler vii . p. ● . c. . prudent . cath. hymn . . hilar. op. n. e. p. . apol. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . athenag . p. . defence of the hist. of the unit. p. . resp. ad judic . eccles p. . . just. apol. . paraei . ad graec. p. , , . dial. cum trypho , p. , &c. athenag . p. , . theophil . ad autolyc . p. . clemens paed. l. . c. . str. l. . p. . prof. p. . paed l. . c . str. l p. . orig. c. celf l . p. . l . p. l. . p. , ● , &c. . l . p. , . clem alex . str. . euseb. praep. l. . theod. serm. . cyril . c. jul. l. . & l. . plutarch de isid. & osirld . p. . ed. fr. eusebius praep. e. l. . c. . jamb . de myst. sect. . c. . macrob. in som. scipion . l. . c. . answer to milb p. . athan. ep. ad serapion , p. . tom. . ad serap . tom. . p. , . or. . c. arian p. . petavius t. ii. l. . c. . sect . . hist. of the unitar . p. . aug. in psal. . answ. to dr. bull , p. . eras. ad cens. paris . tit. ii. voss de tribus symb. dissert . . sect. . hilar. de synod . p. . epiphaninius haer . . n. . clausula fidei in edit . nuperâ paris . ex mss. p. . p. . answer to my sermon p. . letter of resolution , p. . christianity not mysterious , p. , . chap. i. human understanding , l. . chap. . sect . . l. . c. . sect . . chap. . sect . . l. . ch . . sect . . l . ch . . sect . . valla disput . dial. l. . c. . chap. . sect . . humane underst . i. . ch . . sect. . d . ed. p. book . iv. chap. . sect . . book . ii. chap. . sect . . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. , , . sect. . book iv. chap. . sect . . sect. . sect. . sect. . sect. . humane underst . l. . ch . , . chap. . sect . . book . chap. . sect . . ib. sect . . sect. , . book chap. sect. . christianity not myst. p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . ad. attic. . . ed. r s. acad. . . de leg. l. . c. . chrys. hom. de resurrect . isidor . pelus . l. . ep. . christianity not myst. p. , . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. ● . answer ● serm. p. . possevin . appar . in genebrard . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . answer to the archbishop , &c. p. . p. . p. . letter of resolut p. . considerat . on the explication , &c. by dr. w. p. . considerat . on the explication by dr. w. p. . answer to the archbishop , p. . the two great mysteries of christian religion the ineffable trinity, [the] vvonderful incarnation, explicated to the satisfaction of mans own naturall reason, and according to the grounds of philosophy / by g. g. g. goodman, godfrey, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; :e , no ) the two great mysteries of christian religion the ineffable trinity, [the] vvonderful incarnation, explicated to the satisfaction of mans own naturall reason, and according to the grounds of philosophy / by g. g. g. goodman, godfrey, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by j. flesher, london : . 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should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng incarnation -- early works to . trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - rina kor sampled and proofread - rina kor text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the two great mysteries of christian religion , the ineffable trinity , the wonderfull incarnation , explicated , to the satisfaction of mans own naturall reason , and according to the grounds of philosophy . by g : g : g sancta trinitas unus deus miserere nobis . o bone jesu esto nobis jesus . london , printed by j. flesher . . to his excellency , my lord oliv : cromwel , lord general . my lord , fifty years since , or thereabouts , the name of socinus and socinians in italy first began to be known : they are a sect so carried away with their own fancies , under pretence and colour of adhering to their own natural reason , that they deny the mysteries of our christian faith and religion ; which are indeed above reason , beyond the reach of reason , but no way contrary to reason . this sect of all others i have ever most hated and detested ; the rather , because they pretend philosophy and humane learning to back and to second them : which i know to be otherwise , and so i hope i have made it appear , and by gods grace i will yet make it more manifest : for about years since i had a publick disputation against them , and not resting there , i did resolve to examine every mystery of faith , and every miracle wrought in confirmation of those mysteries ( for so it pleaseth god that works above natural power should witness the truth of words above natural knowledge ) according to the rules of philosophy ; and i began with the first , proving the fall of adam from paradise by natural reason . not that i was able to prove the manner of the fall , as that it should be by tasting the forbidden fruit , by the tempting of a serpent ; but i shewed the truth and certainty of his fall , by those many punishments of sin , which are yet extant , and may be seen in nature . and about years since i set forth a book to that purpose ; and although i say it , i had then the approbation and encouragement of those whom we did esteem to be the most learned men , as bishop andrews , bishop overall , bishop mountaine , and others . then i proceeded to examine the rest of the mysteries and miracles , but especially the wonders which moses wrought in egypt , whether they were sufficient assurances to the natural man , for admitting and introducing the mosaical law. i did likewise examine the resurrection of the dead , and the general judgement ; and truly with these king james of blessed memory was acquainted , and did not dislike them . i did then proceed to other mysteries , and i did examine the several visions of scripture in daniel , ezekiel , the apocalypse , how far they did agree together , and how necessary it was that there should be such visions , to withdraw the jews from their carnal conceits , and their expectation of temporals . and after scripture , i did then further proceed what had continually hapned in the church , and in succession of times did serve for the proof of christianity . this i could not conveniently do , unless together i should write an history of the church , how god had planted and preserved it . and here i reduced it as much as possibly i could , to this island , wherein we live : but when once i came to the year . being the eighth year of hen. . then i made annals , and set down every year constantly and particularly , what was done in the church of england : first , i set down the then present state thereof , what liberties they had in respect of our common laws , what ecclesiastical jurisdiction , and what great revenues ; then what alteration did yearly befal the church , and so i had composed a great volume , which i did forbear to print in this regard ; i thank god for it , i did never flatter any man , and i made a conscience to relate the truth ; and doing it , i should have cast very foul aspersions upon some great families , which would have drawn much envy and hatred upon me whereupon i did resolve , that it should not be published , till after my death , and then it should serve as a memorial of my studies and labors , and as a testimonial of my faith and religion ▪ thus far i proceeded before the late wars began . i hac then five several houses in my hand , and a little houshold-stuff in each house , ( and now i have not one in all england ▪ i thank god for it : ) but in every house , what with fire and plundring together with other losses , my notes and writings miscarried ( a just punishment of god upon me for my sins : ) and in regard of my great age , i had thought never to have stirred any further , but to have prepared my self for my grave , and to desire god to be so merciful unto me , that i might die in quietness and peace , for my wants and troubles were great . and while i was thus resolved , it did plainly appear unto me , that the socinians did increase ; for i take no notice of any particular persons , but of publick acts : some have been questioned before the parliament for denying the trinity , and blaspheming christ , yet i never heard that any were put to death , or greatly punished . i finde that the fonts where we are baptized , and make profession of the trinity , and the incarnation , they are generally pulled down . i finde that the solemnity and joy at christs nativity , was forbidden ; that fasting in lent , and sorrow at christs passion , were by publick order neglected ; i found that all the memorials of christs passion , the harmless crosses ▪ were demolished ; i found no honor was given to the name of jesus , no setled form of prayer , but every one left to his own inventions ; nor was there any time appointed for prayers , but onely a little preparation for preaching ; i found that in very many parishes the church-doors were locked up , and there was not so much as any publick meeting , the churches generally decaying , and never repaired ; that many men would not have their children baptized , and that many were dipped , it should seem into some other church ; for if they were christians , it is impossible they should deny the virtue and efficacy of their first baptism , no more then they can deny the original sin , derived unto them from their first parents . and i will insist in one particular , the white-thorn at glastenbury , which did usually blossom on christmas day , was cut down , yet i did not hear that the party was punished ; certainly the thorn was very extraordinary , for at my being there , i did consider the place , how it was sheltred , i did consider the soyle , and all other circumstances , yet i could finde no naturall cause ; this i know , that god first appeared to moses in a bramble bush ; and that aarons rod being dried and withered did budde ; and these were gods actions , and his first actions ; and truly glastenbury was a place noted for holinesse , and the first religious foundation in england , and in effect it was the first dissolved , and therein was such a barbarous inhumanity , as aegypt never heard of the like ; it may well be that this white thorn did then spring , and began to blossom upon christmas day , to give a testimony to religion , that it might flourish in persecution , as the thorn did blossom in the coldest time of winter ( though the sun in so great a distance might seem to want heat to bring forth the sap ) so religion should stand , or rather rise up , though religious houses were pull'd down . i never heard nor read , that any ancient author did mention this thorn , which certainly they had not omitted , if there had been any such thing ; and by the growth of the thorn , truly i did judge the age thereof to be much about the time of the dissolution of that abbey . i do accuse no man , but if i may judge of the inward faith , by the outward tokens and signes ; then i must needs say , that it is high time ( the church being now undermined , ) to set up props , and to raise up buttresses , for the support of christian religion ; and i bethought my self to whose office this did properly belong , christ being the head-corner-stone , laid the foundation of his church , the apostles did finish the building ; they were very carefull in the choyce of their successors , the first thing they did after the ascension of christ , was the election and choyce of saint matthias ; and generally they had the authority , posuit vos regere ecclesiam dei. so then i did conceive , that the generall care of the church did belong unto them ; and where things were not setled , and that there was no superiour amongst them , that then it did belong to every one of them in particular , but especially to the eldest ; for so in the state of nature , the primogenitus had ever the care of gods service ; and in the law aaron was the eldest brother to moses , and the high-priest hood was setled on him , and his sons ; and here i bethought my self , that having been these ten yeers , the ancientest bishop in the province , i was bound in conscience to do my uttermost indeavour , to strengthen and support religion ; or at least to enter a protestation , and to make a publick confession of mine own faith , that such as would might follow my example ; this i took as part of my duty , and office , to which i was bound , and obliged in conscience , and to have neglected this , i thought i should have greatly sinned ; then i did think my self bound , to do the uttermost of my endeavours ; and when i considered , that the custom of the church in such like cases , hath ever been to implore brachium seculare , to whom should i address my self , but to your lordship , and humbly crave your assistance , and furtherance herein ; and whereas formerly there was a course of law , for the punishment of open and scandalous blasphemers , and that there were severall writs , de excommunicato capiendi de haretico comburendo , &c. there being now no ecclesiasticall jurisdiction , that your lordship would be pleased to be a means to the honourable , and reverend judges , to supply those wants ; and to settle a course , whereby there may be a legall proceeding against these publick and scandalous blasphemers , according to the true intent of the law. thus both in composing this treatise , and for the dedication thereof to your lordship , i have done no more , then what i thought my self bound in conscience to perform , and the rather to express my joy in some things , which have lately hapned ; for living here in the church-yard of saint margarets in westminster , which was the church proper to the parliament , for here they kept their thanksgivings , their humiliations , and all other their solemnities ; when as in their time the font was pulled down , and so continued demolished and in ruines , it is now set up again in a most decent and comely manner ▪ and i hope it will be an example for other churches to follow : so likewise they had a very solemn perambulation in rogation week , according to the old manner ; which had been omitted during the sitting of parliament : and holydayes begin to be kept ; thus with joy and alacrity , not without hopes of good times to suceed , i thought fit to publish this treatise , as containing the grounds of christian religion ; for these are the two great and principall mysteries , which all others presuppose ; and herein if we should waver , in the least kinde , then christian religion would faile and come to nothing ; and by the publishing of these , it will appear what satisfaction i gave in all the rest of the mysteries ; for these are the hardest and most difficult , and as i have performed in these , so let men judge of the rest ; and if god shall inable me , and that i may have any competency of meanes to subsist , together with the use of a library ; i shall then proceed in the rest god willing . thus much in generall , though i am a stranger , utterly unknown , and never deserving the least favour from your lordship , yet i make bold to become a petitioner . when i undertook to write the history of the church of england , especially in the time of henry the eight , wherein there was the greatest alteration and change ; knowing that the lord cromwell ( your lordships great unckle ) was then in great favour ; for i have seen the archbishops , and the lord chancellor audley , their letters unto him , to desire his help in furthering their suits to the king ; and that he was then the only man imployed , especially in spirituall causes ; for he did exercise the whole ecclesiasticall jurisdiction under the king ; and by virtue thereof , he took place of the arch bishop of canterbury , which never any subject did , and sat on the bishops side in parliament ; i thought it very necessary and fit to hearken after his writings ; and by the meanes of sir robert cotton the great antiquary ( now with god ) i had the perusall of his study , where i read all his letters , notes , and papers ; and where i found that it was the lord cromwell , who made that order in the church , that every one should learn in the english tongue the apostles creed : which may be some example and encouragement to your lordship , to defend these mysteries of our faith and religion ; which hath hitherto been my whole suit . amongst other letters to the then lord cromwell , i found one from john fisher bishop of rochester , a man famous for his devotion , learning and courage , when he was in far greater distress then ever i was ( i thank god for it ; ) the effect of the letter was , to desire his help for his relief : the letter is yet extant , and may be produced . what effect it took , i cannot say ; but i do not finde that it was ever seconded with any other letter , which is usual in cases of distress , nor did the bishop complain at the time of his execution , when he was beheaded ; and therefore i conceive he found some relief . this hath encouraged me to become a suitor to your lordship . i shall not here acquaint you with any particulars , ( for this were to be over-troublesome ) but i call god to witness , that i know no man , nor have i heard of any man , that hath suffered so much , in such several kindes , so unjustly , in proportion , as my self have done ( though things are onely known to god and my self ) and i have as fair testimonials for my innocency , as any man hath , or can have in this world . i have been now five years petitioning for a hearing , if at length by your lordships good favour , i might prevail , you should for ever oblige me , that either i might know my offence , or otherwise that i might have some means ( out of mine own ) to subsist : the hearing cannot possibly take up half an hour , and i hope to dispatch it in less then half a quarter : for i will demand nothing for what is past , but do as heartily forgive all men , as i desire god to forgive me . and i will likewise make this motion , in behalf of my brethren the clergy , that what hath been violently taken from them , their cause never heard , or what a committee hath done , being no court of record , being not upon oath , and their power lasting onely during the parliament , that men upon slight pretences might not lose their freeholds , to the great prejudice of the liberties and laws of this nation ; and sequestrations , which are but for a time , might not be continued for ever , contrary to their own nature , but that men , upon submission and satisfaction , might be restored to their own possession , until some just cause be shewed to the contrary in a legal way . hereby your lordship shall do god good service , discharge your own conscience , you shall for ever engage them , and give an earnest of your justice and compassion . so humbly craving pardon for my boldness , with my prayers to god for your health and happiness , my lord , i am your most humble servant , godfree goodman bishop late of gloucester . june the . . being the eve of trinity sunday . to the reverend master , the fellowes , scholars , students ; and all the members of trinity college in cambridge . my good brethren , i do give god most humble thanks , that i had the happiness to have my education and breeding in your college , where i found the seeds of religion , and learning , the good example of others , and truly many favours in mine own particular ; i did ever resolve ( in token of my thankfulness ) to give you some memoriall , not of any great value or price , but onely out of a desire that i had , ( wherewith i did acquaint some of your fellowes ) that you would conform your studies to the present occasion and necessity of these times ; for whereas before your studying of philosophy , did only serve for your disputations , and your keeping of acts for your degrees ; now i could wish , that they might tend to some practise , whereby they might be more usefull , and serviceable unto you in the course of your lives ; and therefore i had thought to have given you all the mathematicall instruments , and some things which belong to chymistrie , together with optick glasses , and herballs , and whatsoever else did tend to the practise of philosophy ; for seeing man is not wholly spirituall ; therefore i would not have him to content himself onely with the theorie : the charge i confess had not been great , but whatsoever it was , i am now so utterly plundered , that as yet i am able to perform nothing . in stead of giving , i am now become a suitor unto you , while i was in your college i began a quarrell , and it was against the socinians , and the antitrinitarians ; and truly the rather for namesake , because our college is dedicated to the honour of the blessed trinity , and therefore we are bound both to the adoration , and to the defence of that high mysterie ; now in my old age upon some occasion , this quarrell is again renewed ; and as it is usuall in all duels , to have a second , so i do desire your college to second me ; and being very old , i cannot live long ; for i have now been these nine and twenty yeers together the ancientest bishop of your college i do therefore leave you this legacy , to be the heires and successors in this my quarrell , and to continue a deadly fewd with the socinians and antitrinitariants ; and not only to spend your inke , but to adventure your blood in the cause . thus i have done my uttermost endeavour , i have desired the secular power to asssist me by way of punishment ; and your selves in point of learning , and religion , to stand in defence of our faith , and cause ▪ for it concerns , as your souls health , so in effect no less then the foundation of your college . this is all my business , and here i should take my leave of you ; but in truth out of my love and affection , i cannot so soon and so easily part with you ; but i must claim the privilege of old men , to speak of things which are past ; and by calling them to minde to renew them , and so to continue them , [ ad perpetuam rei memoriam , ] it is now much about yeers since i came to your university : and even then both the church and learning had many enemies , and they raised up many malitions and false reports , yet during all my time , i may truly say , ( for though i was a young scholar , yet i might fee and know the actions and carriages of my governors ) there was not an university in christendom , nor any city or corporation better governed ; neither can i conceive , how it could be better governed , without religious vowes : and for our college in particular , i may truly say , that as the members were not inferiour to any others , for their learning , and studies ; so for their discreet carriage , and behaviour , for their wisdom , and prudence , in worldly and temporall affairs , i did verily believe , that no society in england , whether of churchmen , lawyers , or citizens , did exceed them : i was then in the hardest times , when the college in effect was new built ; when we could not get chambers or lodgings , and the debts were great in regard of the building , yet then did they flourish exceedingly , and had much credit and reputation . and because i was a member of several cathedral and collegiate churches ( which are now dissolved ) lest posterity may hereafter blame them , and think their offence to be great , i shall therefore give them this testimony , that i take god to witness , i did never see any thing amongst them , but what did proceed from piety , charity ▪ and goodness . i was a very diligent observer , and truly in their chapters things past with as much wisdome and discretion , as ever i did see business pass in the lords house of parliament . what charity did we shew to our tenants , in accepting such small fines ? by our counsel we sometimes made them good husbands ; very often we prevented the sale , and preserved the lease for the true heirs , especially if orphans : and in a word , they lived better under us , as tenants , then ever they will do as they are land-lords ; and i do verily believe , that if the parliament had been pleased to imploy the members of the church , in stead of their committees , surveyors , and other officers , ( who were the very worst of men ) that with renewing leases , and putting years into lives ; they would have raised as great sums of money , ( yet reserving the rents and inheritance to the state ) as now they have done by selling the inheritance ; and truly we were very provident , in improving the church revenews ; i am at this time in wants , i would desire of god no more to live upon then what i have raised , and improved in church rents ; and what i have done together with others , that i might have but according to my proportion ; so that in a maner pro tanto , we were in effect founders of the church ; for we might have converted our improvement to our own private uses . and that posterity might judge of the clergy , at this time , that we were not so faulty , or wanted courage , which might occasion our ruine , there are two common lawyers who have done very ill offices to the church , mr. selden and mr. pryn ; and truly i did once think to have answered them both : but when i considered that we did differ in the course of our studies , in our method , in our style , so that we should not have the same or the like weapons to encounter each other , i did therefore forbear ; yet some of my intimate friends did it . for mr. pryn , he is pleased to write as bitterly as he could against bishops , yet could he not charge any one of them with corruption or bribery , or any great sin ; no man is accused for ignorance , or unworthiness : yet it cannot be denied , but the gentlemen who were imployed for the buying of impropriations ( whereof i conceive mr. pryn was a principal man ) did tempt bishops with bribes , with no other intent , but to accuse them ; and to me in particular they sent twenty angels , in the business of cicester , but i thank god for it , i had the grace to refuse it . if a man were to write against other professions , suppose the lawyers ( as god forbid any man should ) he might have found a hundred times more , and worse faults , then mr. pryn hath done against bishops . and on the contrary i dare boldly say , that many bishops in their own particular persons , have done so many acts of piety , of charity , of goodness , as all the enemies of the church , taken together , have not done the like . they that did impeach us of high treason , onely for entring a protestation , they would never have spared us , if they could have ●…ound any just cause of complaint against us . yet i confess that god would never have permitted us to have suffered in such a manner , as we have done , had we not provoked him with our sins ; and that i may be our own accuser , i think our greatest offence did consist in these two things : first , that many of us did not spend our church-means in a church-like manner , but converted them to our own private uses , or otherwise misimployed them , therefore god justly takes them away , and permits sacriledge ; we our selves having first offended in the same kinde : for certainly church-means should have relation as well to the uses , as to the persons ; and a church-man in mis-spending them , commits sacriledge . and whereas many excuse it in regard of their wives and children ; god forbid , but regard should be had of them , ye●… still with moderation : i cannot excuse the excess of apparel , and some other courses of expence . yet this i must testisie ●…or a truth , that speaking privately with some bishops , they told me ( and i beleeved them ) that they laid not up one farthing of their bishopricks : and this may appear , ●…or many of them died very poor , as worcester , hereford , peterborough , bristol , and not unlike but others will do ●…o . another great fault in the church was , the intolerable abuse of ecclesiastical jurisdiction ; therefore god hath made us now uncapable of any jurisdiction , so just and wonderful is god in all his judgements . i confess in mine own particular , i did as much desire and labour to reform it , as any man could do , yet i could never prevail . herein a little to excuse the church , i have it , and can produce it at this time , under the kings own hand and seal , wherein he forbids that any church-man or priest in holy orders , should be a chancellor ; and this was the occasion of all the corruption of the spiritual court : for the judges at the common law have their pensions and allowances , but chancellors have none at all , they live onely upon the fees of the court , and fo●… them to dismiss a cause , it was to lose so much blood : now if they be naugh●… in themselves , then they must for their own advantage and prosit ▪ have instruments and agents accordingly ; so the registers , proctors , apparators , they were pessimum genus hominum . whil●… the spiritual court was onely governed by church men and priests , as it ought to be , ( and hath ever been so heretofore ) they ha●… their spiritual benefices and dignities to live upon , and did scorn the fees of the court : besides , the holiness of the profession kept them from bribing and corruption . little do men think how much they suffer by this one position , that church-men should not interpose in civil and moral affairs : whereas formerly bishops and church-men were onely trusted with last wills and testa ments , and granting out administrations : and certainly , if ther●… be any honesty amongst men , it must be supposed to be rather in them then in others ; but there having been such an abuse , it must be acknowledged that god is most just in all his wayes , and what hat●… befaln us , it is according to the deserts of our sin . and now at length , my good brethren , i will be no further troublesome unto you , but onely make this small motion , which proceeds out of my love : your statutes do allow the fellows to travel beyond seas , to see the state of the christian world , to better their experience , whereby they may be fitter to do the church and the state service at home . now i would fain adde some encouragement i●… this kinde , and perswade you to be forward , thereby to learn languages , and to enable your selves to do the state service ; and while you are in your travel , though you are not publickly imployed , yet to do your countrey what good office you can , by way of information . this is my suit to the fellows in general : but i do earnestly intreat the master and the seniors , that they would be so far from abating any part of their allowance , as that they would rather give them some addition towards their charge , besides all brotherly assistance and furtherance . this is the onely motion which i make : but if any of your members should offer me his help in my study , now that mine own sight and memory do fail me ( for i would very fain finish my intended course , to give satisfaction to natural reason , in all the mysteries of christian religion ) truly , if ever god should enable me , i would reward him . so god blesse you all. i rest , your loving friend and brother , godfree goodman , bishop late of gloucester . june . . being the eve of trinity sunday , which we were wont to keep very solemnly , and i hope you do so continue still . the introduction . st joh : . . and the word was made flesh . i should be much afraid to speak of this word , and to multiply my words in the exposition of this one word , were it not that my text doth inform me , that thi●… word was made flesh , and therefore i may well presume on gods mercy , that as it was his humility , to descend down from heaven , to take up our flesh ; so without disparagement to his honour , ●…lesh and blood may presume to speak of this word , to clothe him with our mortall words , as some time ▪ he was clothed with our mortall nature ; again to imbase him , and ( as i●… were ) to give him a new birth , conceived in the womb of the heart , brought forth by the tongue , that so future ages and succeeding generations might testifie of this word , for this word was made flesh . the written word of god proceeding from the wisdom of god , may seem to have been a stream derived from the fountain of this eternal word , as large commentaries and expositions serve to unfold a little text , wherein there is much more matter implyed , then can be expressed ▪ now this written word , though otherwise gods own word ( in whom there is no blemish or imperfection ) yet certainly it was imperfect , before such time as this eternall word was made flesh . i speak not only that it consisted of types , shadowes and figures , without the spirit of grace and o●… truth , not only that it did ●…arre surmount the state and condition of man , untill this word was made flesh , sanctifying our corrupted nature , and descending to our capacity : but whereas the written word was a precept , a law , and a rule to square out our actions , necessary it was that after the rule given , there should be some pattern to exemplifie the rule . praecepta docent , exempla excitant ; the rule is imperfect without an example . but before the time , the fulnesse of time , wherein god appeared in our flesh , there could be no example of true holinesse and obedience to gods law , and therefore for the upshot and conclusion of the law , in the eclipse of the prophets , cum silentium contineret omnia , & nox in suo cursu mediū iter haberet , omnipotens sermo tuus , domine , exiliens de coelo à regalibus sedibus durus debellator in mediam exterminii terram prosiluit : sap : . here is the example annexed to the rule , an example in whom dwels the fulnesse of the deity , all the treasures of gods wisdom , from whom as from a fountain the written law is derived , to whom as to an ocean , the whole scope of the law is directed , thus is the rule perfected by the example ; the written word serves for a precept , the begotten word serves for a president ; the yoak is made easie , the burden is light : for wherein the law might seem obscure and difficult , that shall now easily appear by the practise , example and imitation of this word , for this word was made flesh . saint austin hath well observed , that before such time as the word was made flesh , man in the pride and presumption of his own heart , might have used some excuse unto god ; lord , why hast thou commanded such strict lawes , such as are opposite to the inclination of nature , the forgiving of wrongs , the chastising of the flesh , the mortifying of passions , continuall repentance and sorrow ; whatsoever thou didst unto man , thou didst it with the greatest facility and ease , verbo virtutis tuae , thou spakest the word , and all things were created ; but whatsoever thou requirest of man , it is done with the greatest difficulty and labour : thus ( in effect ) especially considering the manner , thou seemest to require more of man , then thou hast done unto man ; here then there is no proportion . but behold , to stop the mouthes of blasphemers , that sin might be inexcusable , behold the word is made flesh , god hath entred the lists of our misery , and hath run thorough the whole course of our pilgrimage , in sudore vultus , in the sweat of his browes , with watchings , and fastings , with labour , and passions , he hath fulfilled the law , and having performed it in his own person , it is no wrong or injustice to impose the same law upon his vassals and creatures , for the word was made flesh . man as he totally proceeds from god , so is he totally directed to god , but before such time as the word was made flesh , it should seem only the better part of man , the soul and the understanding , were capable of gods word ; alas what becomes of the sensible part ? shall the body and the flesh be excluded ? if it lookes for a portion in glory , needs it must have some earnest in grace ; body and soul ▪ they are both creatures alike , they are both parts of man alike . see then the wonderfull work of gods mercy , the word is made flesh , a word speaking to the understanding , and possessing the soul , flesh subject to the sense , visible to the outward appearance , that so the whole man might be sanctified , for the word was mad ▪ flesh . but leaving all preambles , i will tie my self more strictly to the words of my text , wherein i will consider these three parts : the word in it self ; the word in our flesh ; the manner , and circumstances , answerable to the three termes of of my text : et verbum caro factum est , and the word was made flesh : wherein are implyed the ineffable mysteries of the trinity , and the incarnation ; and both these great mysteries . i will first set them down as the church receives them ; then i will illustrate them by naturall reason , and the grounds of philosophie ; and lastly i will give sufficient assurance for the truth of them : for i will produce miracles above natural power , for confirmation of mysteries above naturall knowledge , which is an abundant satisfaction . this first chapter of saint john , in my poore judgement , hath some relation to the first chapter of genesis ; and though saint john be the last evangelist , prophet , and penman of scripture , yet he seems to inclose and incompass on every side , moses , the first law-giver , prophet , and pen-man of scripture ; whereby it may appear that christ was agnus occisus ab origine , a lamb slain from the beginning , and by the eternall decree of god , long before the foundations of the world were laid . you shall then observe , that both saint john and moses , they use the same first word in both their writings , in principio , in the beginning ; only with this difference , that moses intended the beginning of time , where first god began the creation , and set the first wheel on going ; but our apostle and evangelist , like an eagle , makes a higher flight , and looking upon the sun , and fastning his eyes thereon , is no way daunted ( though the sun be the master piece of the creation , which other creatures cannot behold ) but aymes at a higher beginning , in aeterno principio aeternitatis , in the eternall beginning of eternity ; ( you must give me leave , is sometimes i speak in unusuall termes , when neither the words , nor apprehension of man , can otherwise serve to express , or conceive the mysterie . ) and to what can the regeneration or new birth of man , be better resembled or compared , then to the creation ? see then how they agree , and concur together ; after the creation of the heaven and the earth , and the confused masse of the waters , the first thing created for ornament and beauty , was light , gen : . light , is but an accident , and must presuppose a substance , and though it be light , yet in respect of the substance , it is in effect but a shadow ; saint john therefore doth better express this light together with the fountain of this light , in the fourth verse of this chapter , speaking of the word , in him was life , and the life was the light of men ; and as in the creation , before this light was created , the state of the world is described by moses gen. . . and darkness was upon the face of the deep , which is most truly explicated by saint john in the th verse of this chapter , the light shineth in darkness , and the darkness comprehendeth it not , this darkness betokeneth the state of sin , the death of sin , as adam soon after his creation committed sin , whereupon followed the sentence of death . and out of this death of sin , it was the great mercy of god , that man should be awakened , and that by degrees , first , with the sound and noyse of the law , which came with thunder and lightning , to strike terror into man , as the bellowing of beasts , designed for slaughter and sacrifice , might shew them their own condition , for death is the wages of sin ; and thus far moses proceeds . man being now rowsed & a little awakened with this great sound of the law , trembling and fearing he listens , and finds that this sound becomes a voice , vox hominē sonat , the voice betokens a man ; and here after the great terror and threatnings of the law , he begins to conceive hope , that he may find bowels of compassion , and then expects mercy and pity : this was the office of saint john baptist , whose time was an interregnum between the law and the gospel ; and who was vox clamantis in deserto , the voyce of a cryer in the wilderness described by s. john in the th verse of this chapter . hitherto we have heard the sound of the law , and the voice of a cryer ; but all this will not suffice to discover the secrets and mysteries of god ; we must then listen , and we shall find that this voyce doth tend and end in a word ; and that this word may be fitted to mans capacity , it is necessary that this word be made flesh , verbum caro , and in him should dwell all the treasures of gods wisdom ; and as this word was of an extraordinary condition , so it is necessary that there should be tongues of an extraordinary nature and form , fit to express this word , linguas attulit qui pro verbo venit , and this was the holy ghost , who came down in the form of fiery cloven tongues to testifie of this word ; and here you have the full hight and perfection of the state of grace ; and this is the scope , and the object of saint john , which is implyed in his name , for it signifies the grace of god ; so that moses comes as far short of saint john , as time doth of eternity , and in other respects , especially for the object , saint john as far exceeds moses as the fruit doth the blossom , or the substance the type , or the body the shadow ; moses by a propheticall spirit , and speciall illumination describes the creation of the world , and the making of man ; and so descends downwards , and writes only the history of his own time ; but our apostle transcends , and as he begins with the eternity of christ , so in the revelations , he prophesies of the church , even to the worlds ends , and after the dissolution of this world , then to remain glorious for all eternity . and as they had several ends , so they proceeded severall ways ; moses according to the office of a law-giver sets down many judgements of god upon the committing of the first sin , as the sentence of death , the expulsion out of paradise , the murder of abel , the vengeance upon cain , the deluge , the confusion of tongues , the burning of sodom , the captivity of egypt , besides the heavy yoak of gods own law , that they should begin with circumcision , the shedding of bloud , that they should be so many in number , commanded with such strict observances , with such severe punishment , and notwithstanding all this , yet could he not so much prevaile , as to bring the israelites into the land of promise . but our apostle saint john , according to the nature of an evangelist , in every page brings many tokens , signes , and assurances of gods mercy , and goodness ; they are so many , that i will not reckon them : and as upon the creation , man committed sinne , so in our regeneration , he that knew no sin , became a sacrifice for sin . mans nakednesse did then appear , but now he is clothed with christs righteousness ; paradise was then lost , but now he recovers a better inheritance ; and that it might appear , how in every point and parcell a full restitution should be made , as in paradise there was the tree of life , and pleasant fountains , and waters ; so the like are described in the heavenly jerusalem ; as paradise was kept shut by an angell , with a fiery sword , so on the contrary the heavenly jerusalem hath many doores , all standing wide open , there is free entrance , none are excluded , as you may read in the latter end of the apocalypse , besides those frequent and daily works of mercy practised by christ , whose custome was deambulare benefaciendo , he had no other imployment , but onely to doe works of mercy curing all manner of diseases , feeding many thousands raising the dead , blessing sanctifying , and teaching men in the wayes of salvation ; and to reckon them up in particular were endless , onely i conclude with our apostle , in the last words of his gospell , where he confesseth that the world would not contain the bookes , that might be written of christs acts. thus our apostle doth every way inclose and incompass moses , and so far doth the last evangelist exceed the first law-giver , both in the object whereof they treat , ( for the world was created of nothing , but the word was begotten in the understanding of god , ) not six thousand years are yet past , since the world was created ; but the word was begotten from all eternity : so moses ends with his own time but our apostle proceeds to the eternity of the church , & by comparing the first pen-man of scripture with the last , it is memorable to consider the difference between the beginning of scripture , and the end of scripture , between genesis , and the apocalipse ; for it points out the whole course & progress of christianity , that man was first created in happiness , then he commits sin , and is therefore expelled paradise , untill justly for his sin passing through a vale of misery , god takes mercy on him , becomes his shepherd ▪ guides him with his grace , dies for his sin , and in the right and virtue of his own passion conducts him to the heavenly jerusalem , where you may see the tree of life , the water of life , and no longer darkness , or the state of sin ; and so man attaines a far better condition , then what was lost in paradise , as you may read in the last of the apocalypse ; which i confess was figured out in the mosaicall law , for upon the death of the high priest , the banished men returned , and were restored to their own inheritance ; so by the death and passion of christ our high priest , there was purchased a full restitution of paradise , implyed in that heavenly jerusalem . having thus compared the first pen-man of scripture with the last , let us now take our apostle saint john more particularly ; and first for the very name of john , which signifies the grace of god , it was given by a miracle to john baptist ; & he that imposed the name , old zacharie , immediately received the benefit , for he was instantly restored to his speech , as an argument of the cessation of the law , and an inchoation of the state of grace to be suddenly put in execution , as it was already in part begun ; for an earnest thereof was given , when as john baptist in the wombe did express joy , as it were in reverence saluting christ in the virgins womb ; & then he became the immediate forerunner of christ ; and what the prophets spake a far off , and somewhat obscurely , he pointed out christ with his finger , ecce agnus dei , and had the honour to be christs ghostly father , in baptizing him , preparing the way for christ , by preaching repentance ; and by his strict and austere life gave a good example of mortification , sending his disciples to christ , and himself suffering martyrdom in the execution of his office , for reprehending herod ; and then did christ express sorrow , and mourn for his death , giving him an honourable testimony . — thus did the grace of god appear in john baptist , according to his name , but much more in our saint john the evangelist ; for though iohn baptist was greater then the old prophets , yet he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater then he , much more the beloved disciple , who leaned on the bosom , and pointed out the eternall generation of christ , which is a work of much more excellency , and difficulty , then to point him out in the wombe . our saint iohn had the honour to be the onely prophet of the new testament , the forerunner of christs second coming in glory , which is described in the apocalypse ; and which is much more admirable , then to be a forerunner of christs first coming in our flesh . our saint iohn was present at the transfiguration of christ , where he did see the glory of god ; and as moses and elias were there transfigured , no doubt but our apostle might likewise be transfigured , and have an earnest of his reall and actuall enjoying of gods glory , besides those many visions which he had in the apocalypse , as a farther and successive confirmation , for the assurance of his possession ; and these are the great favours and graces of god , which are ●…tly implyed in the name of iohn . thus far for our saint iohn the evangelist in comparison with moses , and saint iohn baptist , and such as went before him ; now for such as did accompany him in respect of the rest of the apostles . he was the youngest brother of saint iames the apostle , both sons of zebedee , their mother mary salome recommended them to christ desiring him that one might sit on the right hand , & the other on the left hand in his kingdom : which requests did savour of much weakness , that she should presume so far to make such a suit , considering their unworthiness , and how unfit it was that they should encompass and monopolize christ on every side ; yet proceeding out of the great love and affection of a mother , christ gave but a slight reprehension , and in a sort yeelded to her request ; for these two brethren were ever in speciall favour with christ , and ever imployed in the greatest actions , suppose in christs transfiguration , which did betoken the kingdom of christ , or the triumphant church in heaven , and therefore it was in the mount , but below was s. peter , or the rock upon whom the church should be built ; and there being none other then present but saint iames , and saint iohn , surely they might be said to be sup-porters or butresses on either side , both on the right hand , and on the left hand , to uphold the building , while christ doth alwayes reside in his church . but because the transfiguration was not a kingdom , having but a short time of continuance therfore it may be the more fitly understood in regard saint iames was the first of al the apostles who suffered martyrdom , some very few years after the ascension of christ , and so being first admitted into heaven , in regard of precedencie he might be said to have the first place , or to sit on the right hand of christ ; and saint iohn as being the last apostle that dyed , for he lived almost years after the ascension of christs , even to the beginning of the second century , because the reward of his glory was so long deferred , therefore christ admitted him as the beloved apostle to lean on his bosome , and no doubt nearest the heart , on the left side , and so was the mothers desire accomplished . of all the apostles our saint iohn had the prerogative to be called the beloved apostle , in so much that the great apostle saint peter made him a mediator and intercessor for him , what he himself durst not presume to ask , he beckoned to him to know of christ ; and further above all the apostles , he had the happiness and courage to be present at the sacrifice of christ , together with the blessed virgin mother , whilest saint peter denyed christ , and all the rest of the apostles fled for fear of the jewes , saint iohn alone was the onely apostle , there to assist , as a deacon , or a priest , or a servant to the high priest , in offering up himself a sacrifice upon the holy altar of his crosse ; and as a token of the great love of christ to him , and as a reward for his observance and attendance , at the crosse , as the mother of saint iohn recommended him unto christ , so christ recommends him to his own blessed mother the virgin , he adopts him , and makes him her son , and commits her to his custody , which as it was a high honour unto him , so it argues a greater trust reposed in him then in others . his love and observance still continued after the death of christ , for when it was known that christ was risen , then did both saint peter , and saint iohn run together to the sepulcher , but saint iohn came thither first s. ioh. . . and when they were in the ship together , saint iohn was the first man that knew christ , s. joh. . . after the ascension of christ , he did ever most entirely adhere to saint peter , and did accompany him to the temple , where the lame man was cured act. . . then they were joyn'd in commission to goe together to samaria act. and that i may yet further adde to stir up our thankfulness ; he was an evangelist of the gentiles , as may appear by the manner of his speech , for he never names the passeover , but he expresseth it that it was a feast of the jewes , which if he had written expressely to the jewes there needed no such explication , as being sufficiently known unto them , thus in s. joh. . . . . . therefore by all likelyhood he wrote to them that might be ignorant of that feast ; it appears likewise by the translation of some words , whereof we have three examples in this very first chapter of saint john ; as verse the . rabbi is interpreted master , verse . messias is interpreted christ , v. . cephas is interpreted peter , which interpretation had been needless , if s. john had written to the jewes , for they spake syriack , and understood hebrew , and therefore needed not any such interpretation , but the gentiles who were strangers , and knew not the language , they needed the interpretation . next the manner of speech used by our apostle , as the word was with god , and god was the word , they seeme to savour of platonicall philosophy , which hath much of ideas , and certainly the platonicks had it by tradition from the jewes , faciamus ad imaginem nostram : as saint paul was the apostle of the gentiles , and therefore did use quotations out of heathenish poets , so saint john being the evangelist of the gentiles , in the apocalypse , he describes the heavenly jerusalem , with some rites and solemnities used by the heathens in their triumphs , as the wearing of lawrel , &c. whereby may appear what use is made of human learning in theologie ; so much are we beholding to this evangelist above others , who living very long , and in his time there beginning some heresies to arise , as cerinthus and the ebionites , who denyed the trinity , ( though the church had ever beleeved the trinity , as may appear by the profession of our faith made in our baptisme , ) the bishops of asia , where saint john lived , and was their superiour , became earnest suitors unto him , to write his gospell , both for the confutation of the hereticks then being , and for the prevention of the future ; this saint john did at their request , and being done upon that occasion , therefore he was more exact , and more elaborate in that one mysterie , then the rest of the evangelists were . if you aske how saint iohn above others should have such an exact knowledge of their mysteries ; surely in regard of the heresies then rising , and the necessity of those times , god did more enlighten him , as no doubt he doth his holy catholick church to this day . some may conceive , that because our apostle was present at christs transfiguration , where moses and elias , the law and the prophets were transfigured , that such apostles as were then present , were a little transfigured and might see the glory of god , though christ for the present did forbid them to reveale those mysteries : yet our apostle living some years after , might make them known , especially being the beloved apostle , and leaning on the bosom , he might suck out these mysteries , and might know more secrets , then were opened to others . and it is not unlike , but he might have a greater knowledge from the blessed virgin mother , being appointed by christ to be her son ; to whom the angell gabriel , was sent in a message of the annunciation . and certainly other mysteries were then imparted & revealed to her ; especially the blessed trinity ; as conducing much to the incarnation : for persons being supposed in the deity , you may the more easily beleive , that one of those persons , ( that is ) the son of god , might become the son of man ; and persons thus supposed , it seems the lesse strange , that one person should satisfie , while the godhead receives satisfaction for sin ; so that god himself in regard of persons , might both offer sacrifice , and receive the oblation . and it is further observed in the blessed virgin , that of all others , she did most observe christ , and laid up his sayings in her heart , as she did conceive him in her heart , before she conceived him in her womb ; and she never forsook him , no not at the crosse ; now it is the office , and duty of a mother , to instruct her son : especially such a son , as was so recommended unto her , as our evangelist was , and to catechise him in private , though not in publick ; for women must be no teachers in the church , ( in regard of their sex ) and therefore as soon as the blessed virgin , had received the holy ghost , for her own private sanctification , there is no further mention made of her in the acts , nor in the epistles ; but there the apostles wholly intend the conversion of nations . but for this great mysterie of the trinity , in my poor judgement , it is intimated at the annunciation ; for mark the message of the angel , that she had found favour with god , that she should bring forth a son ; and why may not this son imply as well the son of god , as the son of the woman ? god is every way truth , and nothing but truth ; and if in the same word , there is involved a double truth , this is most agreeable to gods wisdom ; and how far the son of god is here signified , that which followes may make it manifest , that his name shall be jesus or emanuel , that he shall be great , and shal be called the son of the highest , luke . v. , . and then followes in the . verse , the holy ghost , and the power of the highest shal over shadow thee ; and here is the third person in the trinity ; for is it credible , that the angel coming upon such a message , that he should be so sparing in his relation , as that he should discover no other mystery , which might tend to strengthen and illuminate her faith , to raise up her hope , to increase the measure of her love , and thereby to make her a fitter temple , wherein the godhead might dwell bodily . thus having compared our saint iohn with moses , with saint iohn baptist , and the rest of the apostles ; and from whence , and upon what occasion he might know this mysterie above others ; that so being revealed to him , they might be received with greater reverence , and work the deeper impression : now let us a little consider him in himself . he is figured unto us in the form of an eagle . an eagle hath these properties , both to behold , and to fasten her eyes on the sun , thereby to betoken the high mysteries discovered by our saint iohn ; and secondly , the eagle renewes her age to betoken the long life of saint iohn , or rather the eternity of such things as he prophesied , in so much , that it gave occasion to a false report ; for whereas christ made only a supposition , they conceived it as really true , that saint iohn should not die ; and thus far indeed it proved true , that he died not of a violent death , as all the rest of the apostles suffered martyrdom , but his matyrdom it should seem was then , when he did assist at the passion of christ , and none other apostle attended there but himself ; and no doubt , but his then sorrow and grief might equall , or rather exceed in virtue and power , the martyrdom of others . and secondly , that common fame and report of his not dying , might thus far prove true , that he died not in that age , but lived to the beginning of the second century , being now very old , as s. hierome relates in his commentaries upon the epistle to the galatians ; when he could not goe of himself , but was carryed by others , to the church , or place of meetings ; he made no other sermon but this , [ filioli diligite alterutrum , quia praeoeptum domini est , & si solim fiat , sufficit ] it should seem being the beloved disciple , the love of christ was so fastened , and fixed in him , that it made a repercussion , and became an echo , and brake out into these termes of love ; filioli my sons , whom i so dearly love , let not my love rest in you as singulars , but impart it to each other , that so you may be united and linked together in the bonds , and chaines of love , that as this love proceeds from christ to me , and from me to you , so from you to each other among your selves ; that we may all lay hold on the anchor of our hope , christ the son of god , who hath reconciled us to god , notwithstanding our sins and transgressions . i will now come directly to the text , which is the very ke●…nell , the marrow , the elixi●… of all christian religion , and hath ever been received with the greatest admiration , and astonishment , and at the very naming of the words , christians were 〈◊〉 to bow , and to express all possible honour and reverence . the ineffable trinity . and the word was made flesh . the first word of my text , standing in the forefront ( & and ) being a conjunction copulative , gives me occasion to look back , and mark the dependence ; wherein i dare boldly say , that neither the large volumes of the fathers , nor the subtill and curious invention of the schooles , nor the deep and profoundest divines , can better unfold the mystery of this word , then may be well gathered by the precedent and express words of this evangelist : onely here stands our weakness ; that as moses having talked with god , his countenance received that light , that the israelites could not behold the face of moses : so this our apostle having leaned on the bosom , and sucked out these mysteries , he is now become boanerges , the son of thunder , rather astonishing the eare with wonder and amazement , then distinctly informing the heart in things which are too high for the weak state , and condition of man ; but i pray mark the first verse of this chapter . in principio erat verbum , in the beginning was the word ; ●…ere is the eternall generation of this word , not proceeding from gods free will and election , not supposing his determinate decree and purpose , but a natural and a necessary generation equally existing with god in the moment of his eternity , as the sun and the light were together created , the soul and the understanding together infusect ; so is the generation of ●…his word equall in time and continuance with the deity . et verbum erat apud deum , and the word was with god ; here is the distinction and relation of the persons , apud deum with god , not as a property or quality , not as an attribute or faculty , but as a person distinctly existing ; and that by a different manner of generation from the father . et de●… erat verbum , and god was the word ; here is the mutuall communication and participation of the deity ; for it is a property of the greatest good , that it should be most fruitfull in his own kind ; and communicate it self in the largest , and greatest manner ; now in the creatures , we find some foot-steps of the deity , as appears by their being , moving , order , perfection , but necessary it is , that god should impart his own nature , which nature though infinitely imparted , yet still continuing infinite , it can be but one and the same nature equally communicated to the three persons , three persons and one god. if a man communicate his nature to his son , this nature though still continuing the same in kind and condition , yet must it differ in number , in regard of the finitenesse of our nature , the circumscription both of time and of place : but it is otherwise with god ; for out of the infinite extent of his own nature , one and the same deity , the same in number , the same in virtue and power , is equally and totally imparted to the three persons in one blessed , and undivided trinity . thus much ( ad intra ) concerning the relation of persons within themselves , now ad extra in respect of the creatures , it followes in the third verse of this chapter , et verbo facta sunt omnia , and without him nothing was made : so that both inwardly and outwardly , the deity of this word appears ; inwardly , in the coeternall existency , and infinite participation of the godhead ; and outwardly , as together concurring in the creation , framing and making of this world . and having thus discovered the second person , because we acknowledge another person in the deity , take therefore the testimony of this second person concerning the third , when the holy ghost whom i shall send unto you from the father , the spirit of truth which proceeds from the father , he shall give testimony of me , john the . . . these are the mutuall testimonies of persons in behalf of each other ; and hereunto i shall adde , what the holy catholick church out of other texts of scripture doth undoubtedly , demonstratively , and most necessarily conclude . verbum a word , must necessarily imply intellectum an understanding to conceive this word ; this understanding being alwayes active , the word must be of like continuance and eternity ; and being active , as there was an eternall , so is there a daily and continuall generation of this word , hodie genui te . this word being naturall to the understanding , it proceeds not from any voluntary , or free election of god , but from the necessity of his nature ; and according to his nature , so is it begotten in a spirituall , and most unspeakable manner , being in the understanding , answerable to the understanding , and of like extent . it can be no creature , seeing by it all things were made and created ; and being in the understanding , it must subsist of the same nature , which nature being infinite , though infinitely imparted , yet still it remaines one and the fame infinite nature , and cannot admit a plurality ; and though the nature be the same both in kind and number , yet must there be a difference of persons , in regard of the different act of generation , deus intelligendo seipsum , genuit verbum . here we have an understanding and a word , but can this understanding subsist without a will ? or what shall unite and knit together the understanding and the word , as they are in themselvs most inseparable , but only amor the love of god ; or that conformity of the understanding to the word & of the word to the understanding , which proceeding from both , serves to unite both ? here then we have a third person , the holy ghost ; and seeing the will of god , is no lesse active then the understanding , this third person must therefore be necessary and eternall , with the word , and with the understanding ; proceeding from both , it must be of like extent , and nature with both , the understanding infinite , the word infinite , the love must likewise be infinite ; this nature being infinite it can be but one , and the same nature infinitely imparted to the three persons ; and though the same nature , yet this love proceeding , it must be a person ; and in regard of the different manner of procession from both , needs it must be a different person from both , god comprehending and understanding himself to be infinite , begets verbum infinitum , which is the action of the understanding ; and by this word knowing himself to be infinitum bonum , from the understanding , and from the word proceeds amor infini●…us , which is the action of the will. thus the understanding , and the will , as they are the most inward , active , and eminent qualities in every spirit , so are they most wonderfull in god , for they are fruitfull in their own kind ; neither power , providence , justice , mercy , nor any other divine attribute can produce the like unto themselves ; these look only ad extra , as if from the castle of the deity the windowes were opened , and they should look only upon the creatures , but the wisdom , and the will of god look ad intra , re●…lect upon the deity it selfe , god comprehending and understanding himself to be infinite , begets verbum infinitum , which is the action of the understanding ; and by this word knowing himself to be infinitum bonum , from the understanding , and from the word proceeds amor infinitus , which is the action of the will. these three persons though admitting a difference between themselves , in regard of generation and procession , yet they agree in their nature , and the whole nature is in every person , and there can be no more then the whole , in the three persons , according to the nature of an infinite , which being infinitely imparted , yet still it remains infinite ; hence it is that all the actions of god , are alike ascribed to every one of the persons , and though the different persons revealed , may appear unto us by different actions , as the father by creation , the son by redemption , the holy ghost by ●…anctification , yet this difference , as the mystery it self , is likewise unsearchable . as all the actions , so all the attributes of god are likewise ascribed to every one of the persons , yet in the persons they are tyed to the nature : thus we say not three incorruptibles , but one incorruptible ; not three incomprehensibles , but one incomprehensible ; three persons in unity , and one god in trinity ; the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is other gods , according to the very letter , & not the persons in one godhead , for they are but one god : and if you would know what gods are excluded , surely the verse following will direct you , thou shalt worship no idols . but why this mystery should not be revealed to the jews , this is a question of such a nature , as being answered , yet still the like question remains ; as , why should not all other mysteries , and why should not the incarnation be long before it was ? and therefore i will make bold to propose the same question to the jews . why should god reveal himself to the later prophets , more then he did to moses ? or why should moses institute sacrifices , and such a number of ceremonies , which were never discovered to abraham ? or why should god by abraham institute circumcision , which was unknown unto noah ? or why were not all the mysteries together revealed unto adam , the father of mankinde , created in paradise , in a state of innocency , sanctified with original grace , and himself being the immediate workmanship of god ? now to all these questions i will return this answer , god is not to be tyed to mans captious curiosity , he may do as he please , and reveal himself according to such manner , as his own wisdom shall appoint . it is certain , that in all natural things god observes degrees , and nothing comes all at once to his ripeness and perfection : thus there is a blossom and a bud , before you come to the fruit ; thus a childe begins first to learn his letters , then to reade , before he comes to any exact knowledge : so god did make himself known by several names , and each name did import more mysteries then other , as god speaks , by my name of sadai , quod sufficit , i did reveal my self unto them , but not by my name of four letters , which of all other gods names , did involve the greatest mysteries : and god requires no more of man , then god hath given unto man , and that shall abundantly suffice , until it shall please god further to reveal himself . think you that god would not reserve some mystery for his son to reveal , more then ever was known to the prophets ? and what greater then the trinity , which neither men nor angels can comprehend , and both men and angels must adore ? neither do i think that all is yet revealed , but that we shall have a further knowledge of things in the state of glory , when we our selves shall be made more and more capable of his knowledge , and in the interim god doth herein deal with men but after the manner of men , as he doth in all other things . thus we get knowledge by degrees , and first we begin with the easiest lessons , and then come to that which is more difficult : and this stands well with the honor , majesty , and magnificence of god , that we should come to him by degrees ; thus was there a court , a porch , a temple , before we come to the holiest of holies . thus far i have answered their objection , and requited them in the same kinde , by proposing another question of like nature , but i may not so far wrong moses and the patriarchs , as to think they were utterly ignorant of this mystery , though it may be they had not such an express knowledge , as god revealed in succeeding times : and likewise for the manner , that it was not in such express terms . we reade then that moses and elias , the law and the prophets , did attend christ , when he was transfigured in the mount ; whereby is intimated , that they had christ in figures and types . so then , if i shall make it appear , that either the three persons , or any one of the persons , are named or appeared in scripture , we may thence very well gather , that they had some knowledge of the mystery . first , let us view the creation , verbo domini coeli formati sunt , and god said , let there be light : said , that is , spake the word : to whom should god speak , when as yet there was nothing but himself ? so then , a word is begotten in his understanding , which reflects upon the understanding ▪ and proves a distinct person , and the word was god : then follows , and the spirit of the lord moved on the waters : this spirit could be no creature , for now began the creation , the spirit of the lord. surely there is nothing in god but god ; god can admit of no mixture or composition , he is actus purus & simplicissimus , nothing but pure form , therefore this spirit must be god the holy ghost . do we not here see how all the three persons did concur as in one nature , so in the same outward act of creation ? from the creation of the world , where it is said ▪ dii creavit , let us come to the creation of man , for whom the world was created : and therefore being a work of so great moment , god seems to deliberate , and to enter into consultation : certainly when we enter into counsel , it argues a diversity of persons , or at least it must imply a greater caution , that neither in words or acts there might be any mistake ; the rather , because it is the first time that ever god spake of himself , wherein frail man is usually more cautionate and wary then in any other discourse : and therefore this may much more be supposed in the most wise god ; let us then hear god with the greatest reverence , faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram , let us make man according to our own image , the plural number , which argues persons , is here twice implied , both in the act faciamus , let us make , and in the type or sampler , ad imaginem nostram , according to our own image . if here you shall tell me , that it is an hebrew phrase , and an ordinary and usual form of speech , i confess it , and acknowledge it : but therein i do more magnifie the providence of god , who did so ordain the speech and language of men , as that it should be fit to express such a mystery : yet withall consider , that it is otherwise with god then with men , for god is truth it is self , and therefore i believe that there is not a metaphor or figure spoken of god , wherein there is not a stamp of truth involved . and whereas it is now frequent , that great princes do speak of themselves in the plural number , i conceive that it is therefore more justifiable , because they are politick bodies , and in a sort corporations , and so represent others ; and that it might imply , that whatsoever they do , it was with the grave advice of their councel , and therefore for the greater honor and majesty they use the plural number . come we then after the fal of adam , to that which the fathers call semen evangelii , the beginning of our redemption ; semen mulieris conteret serpentis caput : is it possible that when as adam being the immediate workmanship of god , and therefore of the greatest perfection , created in paradise , in a state of innocency , sanctified with original grace , that he should not be able to resist the temptation , and yet the seed of the woman , of the weaker sex , should be able to bruise the head of the serpent , ( that is ) utterly to destroy the kingdom of sin and satan ? surely it must needs argue , that the son of the woman , could be no less then the son of god , seeing such a conquest farre exceeds the power of all angels and creatures . after the sin , consider the punishment , and therein gods mercy and compassion , how he clothes the nakedness of adam with the skins of beasts . some divines do ask , what became of the carkases of those beasts ; and they conceive it very credible , that god did offer them up in sacrifice , to himself , to shew adam the manner of sacrificing ; and withall to prefigure , that god alone should offer up the only great , sufficient , propitiatory sacrifice , that is , that he should offer up himself to himself ; which must needs argue severall persons in the deity . hence followed as an earnest or type thereof , the sacrifice of abel ; and because his sacrifice was acceptable ▪ he himself was more acceptable then his sacrifice , therefore he must be offered up in sacrifice , to prefigure him , whose blood speaks better things , then the blood of abel . hitherto gods promises for the coming down of his son were only tyed to mankinde ▪ but after the confusion of tongues , when men were dispersed , then it pleased god to make choice of his nation , & to promise abraham , that in his seed all generations should be blessed ; in token & memory hereof , god instituted circumcision , as it were for the honor of his issue , and for the assurance of his faith , that christ should succeed ; and as a pledge thereof , abraham being to administer an oath to his servant , takes his hand , and layes it upon his loynes , and then makes him swear . now in a corporall oath ▪ we ever lay our hands upon the most holy thing , suppose the bible , or the altar ; and therefore the servant layes his hands upon the loynes , gen. . . seeing that christ was then in the loynes of abraham . another memorable thing in abraham , that he saw three angels , and he worshipped one , gen. . . which may a little set forth three persons and one god. in isaacs sacrifice it is more manifestly implyed , for god would never require that of man , which he did not intend to perform unto man ; and therefore god requiring of abraham to sacrifice his son , what was then only proposed , god would hereafter really perform on his part , in sacrificing his only son , for abraham and his sons . isaac gives the blessing to jacob ; of whom that i may say nothing of his life , the blessing which he gives unto his sons upon his death-bed , was very memorable , gen. . giving his blessing to judah , from whom christ was to descend , he there prophesieth of the time of his coming , and expresseth much joy and comfort therein ; but after speaking of dan , that he was a serpent , certainly he had some relation to that cursed serpent , which seduced our first parents ; for judas iscariot who betrayed christ , was of the tribe of dan : and it is not unlike but the great antichrist shall be of the same tribe , which jacob foreseeing suddenly breaks out into these words , expectabo salutare tuum domine , lord i will expect thy salvation ; though some of my posterity shall betray thee , yet lay not the sin to my charge , hold me as innocent ; and therefore in the assured hope of gods mercy he takes order , that his body should be carried out of egypt , as it were going to jerusalem in pilgrimage ; there to meet christ at his coming . and not to trouble my self with so many testimonies , all which do sufficiently prove the truth of christs coming ; and that christ must needs be the son of god , which presupposeth the great mysterie of the trinity : take one instance for all . when god did deliver his people out of egypt , with so many wonders , and miracles ; and that he gave the law , and used the ministry of angels : yet notwithstanding at that time , moses out of the certainty of his hope , should use these words , mitte quem missurus es , lord , use no such preparation , but send him whom thou art about to send , ( that is ) send thine own son immediately : for he must needs be the son of god ; for he must be greater then moses , greater then the angels , who were then imployed , greater then all the commands of god , which were then to be delivered to his people ; and his work and imployment must be greater then their deliverance from egypt ; and therefore it must be a freedom , and liberty from the captivity of sin , hell , and damnation , and the conducting of us to that heavenly jerusalem , the true land of promise , which is a work and imployment only fit for the deity . many other types might be produced ; suppose the three children in the fire , all praising god with one voyce , see how three do concurre in one , and that the fire did not hurt them ( as the fire did not burn the bramble bush , wherein god appeared to moses ) they saw one among them like the son of god : so here is not only an acknowledgement of the son , but as if they had known him by his face and countenance , that he was the son of god. what shall we bring further instances , when it is most certain , that the whole scope and intent of the law tends only to christ , and therefore must undoubtedly assure us , that he could be no less then god ? for if we should think that god would rest satisfied with the slaughter of unreasonable creatures , we must thinke it to be a very unreasonable service ; and we cannot imagine , that gods service should be directed to any other end , but himself , which must inforce the deity of christ. but further you shall observe , that whereas the form of our baptisme is , that we are baptized in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost ; and that the matter of our baptisme is water , and therein we make a profession of the trinity ; certainly the jews had a tradition , that the messias should institute baptisme in this manner : for whereas there is no such thing written in scripture , yet the priests and the levites did send to saint john baptist , to know whether he were the m●…ssias or not ; and if he were not , then why he did baptize ? in token and memory hereof , some there were , who kept watering pots after the manner of the jews , s. john . and this was done likewise by tradition , for they had no warrant in scripture , joh. . to the message of the priests , and to the common custom of jews , give me leave to adde that miraculous pool of bethesda , john the th where the angell came down at a certain season ▪ and moved the waters ; and such as took the first opportunity to be let into the water , were cured , of all their diseases ; this first letting down , did only betoken their watchfulness , their zeale , their strength of faith ; and how the endeavours of men must concurre , cooperate , and correspond with gods goodness , and providence . here then we have the matter of baptisme , the element of water , severall times intimated : shall we then think , that the jews were utterly ignorant of the form , which is no lesse then the profession , or acknowledgement of the blessed trinity ? certainly as they had types and figures of the one , so they might have an obscure knowledge of the other ; and this i do rather beleive , because at the baptism of christ , when the three persons did so manifestly discover themselves , for there was vox patris , this is my well beloved son , there was the person of the son and there was the holy ghost , in the form of a dove ; yet we do not read , that this seemed any way new or strange to saint john baptist , who certainly if he had been utterly ignorant , would have been strangely strucken with astonishment and admiration of this so great a mysterie then revealed : but saint john not contenting himself with that present mysterie , taking it as granted ; he points out a further mysterie , when this son of god should become the lamb of god , and be made a sacrifice to satisfie for the sins of the whole world , ecce agnus dei , qui tollit peccata mundi . now it is not credible , that the jews should have so many tokens , and such use of the element of waters , as the matter of baptisme ; and should be utterly ignorant without any the least intimation , or notice of the form of baptisme , which is the profession of the trinity : and to conclude , how often do we read in scripture , verbum domini venit ad prophetas , spiritus domini replevit orbem terrarum , which very phrases seem to imply pers●…ns in the deity ? i will yet further proceed ; certainly at the time of their sacrifice , they did use prayers onely to that effect , that god would send down his son for the redemption of the world : for in scripture there is no mention made , what prayers they used in the time of sacrifice , but it is hence gathered , luk. . when zachary was sacrificing , the angel said unto him , thy prayers are heard , but what these prayers were , did not yet appear ; m●…rk then by the successe , and so you shall know the effect of his and their prayers , which was , that the angel gabriel told him , that he should have a son , who should be the forerunner to the messias , who was the expectation of nations ; and the same angel , a little after , carried another message to the blessed virgin for her conception of christ : so then here was the effect of their prayers , at the time of their sacrifice , that god would has●…en his own coming , and no longer feed them with types . but it doth most especially appear in the cessation of the law , which falling out at the coming of christ , it must needs argue that christ could be no less then the end of the law , and therefore god ; for you shall understand , that about a full age before the birth of christ , there was a cessation of prophets ; and god sent no message to his people . as when the sun ariseth , the stars are obscured . so lest the jews might take any of gods messengers for the messias , the time now approaching for his coming , therefore god sent no messengers , untill at length zachary at the time of his sacrifice was strucken dumb , and so continued untill the birth of his son , to whom he gave the name of john , which signifies the grace of god , and points out the proper time of the gospel . but if you look to the totall abrogation of the law , as it was intimated in the dumbness of zacharias , when he was sacrificing ▪ so not the priest alone , but the temple it self did suffer , in the passion of christ ; for the vayle of the temple was rent , as if god were then dissolving , and pulling down his own temple , with an intent no longer to inhabite there ; and so the temple was afterward destroyed by titus . as he forsook his leviticall priests by degrees , though formerly he had committed his laws , and his doctrin to their custody ; for upon the birth of christ , they were able to direct herod to the place of his birth , but they had not the grace to go to adore him ; so herein they were only defective , mat ▪ . then in the next place ▪ know you not that it is expedi●…nt , that one should die for the people ? s. john the ● here god gave them power to speak truth ; but god suffered them through their own malice to erre , not understanding their own truth ; but in the last place , they sought false witnesse against christ , mat. . here was malice , ignorance , and perjury ; and as there was renouncing of god in words , so in deeds : because christ made himself what indeed he was , the son of god ; therefore they cryed crucifie him , crucifie him ; and here was deicid●…m , the greatest of all the sins of the world ; so far forth as it lay in their power , they did murther god. thus they fell by degrees , together with their law , and their temple ; yet no doubt but god had many servants , who then were in the state of salvation ; for here is the difference between the synagogue , and the church , many were saved out of the synagogue , as the ninevites , but the church is the mother of all the faithfull ; and without the church , there is no hope of salvation : the reason hereof i conceive to be , because the synagogue was hedged in within the bounds of palestina , but the church is catholick over the face of the whole world : so they are in excusable , who do not adhere to the church . all this i write to the jews , that seeing the whole law was referred to christ ; all their sacrifices directed to christ ; all their prophets prophesiing of christ ; many types and figures of christ , and all due preparations for his entertainment : surely this must needs argue the godhead of christ ; for here was a worship onely proper to god. or if we look not to the service of god , then take gods judgements upon the jews , they are become slaves and vass●…ls to all nations ; i never heard that any of them had so much as a seigniory , though certain it is , that they are the most expert , and skilful merchants in the world , and the richest : a wonder it is but some of them should intend a plantation , and erect a government . i do likewise conceive them to be the best physicians in the world , not onely because their ancestors lived in the east ▪ countreys , where the best drugges and simples are ; and so they were better acquainted with their virtues and operations , by the daily experience of them : and certainly they did leave the knowledge of them by tradition to their successors ; which they keep secret among themselves , while throughout the whole world , they are become slaves and vagabonds , ever since the passion of christ , even as cain was upon the murder of abel : that now in the whole world , they have not one place for sacrifice ; their tribes are confounded , their temple destroyed ; and this hath continued longer , then their own mosaicall law continued in his vigor : which could never stand with the goodness and providence of god to permit , had it not been that the law was accomplished ; and therefore abrogated by god himself , that the gospell might succeed . thus i think now at length , i have satisfied the jews , and made it appear , that their an●…estors had some certain knowledge of the trinity ; and that the messias was to be the son of god ▪ more then ordinary man , one of the persons of the diety ▪ and if this will not servo to give them satisfaction , then i have paid them home at last , ( that is ) i have come to their own homes , i have dispersed them , i have scattered them , and in effect dissolved them ; so that as a nation , they shall no longer oppose , or continue obstinate ; it must be now held self-will , perverseness , and every mans particular contumacy . so from the jews i come to gentilisme : which as it was accompanyed with infidelity and atheisme , so you shall give me leave to strike at the root , that i may eradicate both root and branch ; and because the gentiles had no other pretence , but human reason ; i will now give satisfaction to human reason , in this high mysterie of the trinity ; not that reason can comprehend the mysterie ; for neither scraphins , nor cherubins , nor all the angels in heaven , can fully understand god : for to understand god , it is indeed to be god , and to make his understanding equall to that eternall word , in the understanding of god. but i do undertake , to satisfie human reason in this mysterie , notwithstanding our own ignorance . first , i will make it appear that there is a god , and but one god ; then that this god is every way incompr●…hensible , whereby it must follow , that the blessed trinity , exceeds mans reason no further , then all the rest of his attributes do . then i will bring some proofes for the blessed trinity ; and lastly , i will seal and conclude all with miracles , works above naturall power , to confirm words above naturall knowledge . this world being the workmanship of god , serves as a book or a volume , whereby every letter or punctilio points out the maker : i shall not need to insist in the motion of the heavens , the influence of starres , the strange and wonderfull meteors ; but take the least flie or worm , and it shall afford infinite arguments , for the proof of the deity ; and i do here call heaven and earth to witness ; and i desire god , that my tongue may cleave to the roof of my mouth , and that my right hand may forget her cunning , if ever i shall faile in any the least creature , to produce infinite invincible demonstrative arguments , for the proof of the deity . and therefore of all others , the cursed atheist is the greatest impostor , denying , a god , he makes himself god ; for denying his maker , he must needs make himself , and consequently makes himself god , who cannot adde one haire to his own growth , nor a minute to his age . yet some such there are , who continue thus in their mad blasphemy ; and here i call all the creatures to witness against them , and all arts , and sciences shall concurre in the same testimony , and utterly condemne them . whatsoever is seen or unseen , whether it belongs to the visible , or invisible world , every thing points out a deity ; and from the severall perfection of creatures , we thence infer severall attributes in god , which although they may seem severall to us ; yet being every way , and every one infinite , ( for what should limit or bound god , when as indeed there is no thing but god ) it must therefore necessarily follow , that there can be but one infinite ; and the attributes , though they appear severall to us , yet are they all but one infinite god : more particularly , because we receive our first information from sense , we thence conclude , whatsoever is , is either god , or the work of god , deus est quod vides totum , & quod non vides totum , whatsoever thou seest , or seest not , serves as an argument , and proof of the deity ; as for example , in the creatures in generall , consider their proper and bounden nature , together with so great variety and perfection in their own kind , in this nature such excellent properties , affections , and accidences , which do so well agree with the nature ; from this nature such strange and wonderfull operations and effects ; by this nature , such an excellent order and proportion , both in themselves , and to the whole universe ; through this nature , such a constancy and perseverance in keeping their due course , in performing their duty , service , and ministery to man ; and as all the creatures look to one end , so they must needs have but one efficient cause , which made and directed all to the glory of himself , the perfection of the universe , and the good of particulars , in their preservation , that they might be more usefull , and serviceable to man ; who might therefore return his praises , and thankfulness to god ; that all may tend and end in gods glory , this was the end which was first in intention , and now is the last in execution : that as the world is circular , where it begins , there it ends ; so beginning with god , it endeth with god , thus every thing doth testifie a god , and therefore you may fill up a book greater then the whole world , with arguments , and proofs of the deity . and now i come to the severall arts , and sciences : the metaphysicks have this prerogative , to treat of generals and universals , to prescribe every art her own proper bounds ; and to confirm the first grounds and principles of every art , wherein the art it self is defective , and in particular to take the heavenly bodies , seperated soules ; and what belongs to the spirituall world , as their own proper objects ; and they do not only conclude one omnipotent maker ; but they proceed further , and considering the motion of the heavens , which are bodies ; how they move in their own proper places , which no other bodies do the like , but alwayes rest when they are at home ; and their motion serves them abroad , only to recover their own homes : considering that the heavens do not move for their own private ends , that they receive no benefit , or advantage by their own motion ; but that it is wholly directed for the good of others , for the preservation of the universe ( when as no other naturall , or sensless bodies do the like ) considering that simple bodies can have but one simple motion ; yet are there great varieties , and divers●…ies of motions in the heavens ; the metaphysicks do hence infer , that needs the motions of ●…he heavens , must proceed from intelligences , who are indeed angels ; and thereby proceed influences , the operation whereof we find in our sublunary bodies , which cannot be prevented by application of any elementary qualities . thus in the bowels of the earth , where neither sunshine , nor motio●… could penetrate , yet by vertue of these influences , we find metals , and minerals , which are of that excellent nature , as that for their composition , their long continuance , and speciall virtues , they are not inferior to the best of bodies ; and therefore they serve for coyn , to carry the price of all our other commodities ; thus do the metaphysicks , by the speculation of the heavens , not only conclude a first maker , but likewise a necessity of angels , to continue that motion which the creator began , by setting the first wheel on going . thus farre by the heavens alone , now by a view of the creatures , the metaphysicks finde that there are certain transcendentia , generall and universall qualities which are incident , and must necessarily be fastned on all creatures ; whereupon they infer , that they are but the rayes and foo●…steps of one unversall maker ; as when they see that every thing is , ens ●…num , verum , bonum , they instantly conceive that these are immediately borrowed , and proceed from the first maker ; and therefore do necessarily conclude , that he must be ens entium , prima veritas , simplicissima ●…nitas , infinita bonitas , who is causa eausarum , the author of his own beeing ; the efficient cause from whom all the rest do proceed ; the finall cau●…e to whom all the rest are directed ; thus every thing must have as inward causes matter and form , whereof it subsists ; so outward causes efficient and finall , from whom , and to whom it is directed , for of nothing comes nothing ; adde nothing to nothing , and there remains nothing . in the metaphysicks this is a rule , that in things which exceed the ordinary rank and condition , such as least exceed , must ever be admitted , for that they are most facile and easie ; whereby mans understanding may be better guided in knowledge , sooner satisfied , and finde lesse opposition . e : g : if i should aske , whether every thing should be eternall , or that there should be but only one eternall●… ? which should give a beeing to all inferior creatures , which as they are bounded in all their dimensions and qualities , so likewise in their continuance , whereas that only one eternall must be infinite , and unlimited in all other attributes as well as eternity ; surely right reason would instantly conclude rather for one , then for all ; and thence infer a necessity of the godhead ; and seeing the whole universe is so well compacted , and that every part hath such a mutuall co●…respondencie , and relation each to other , that it makes one body , one corporation , right reason concludes there can be but one maker , one efficient cause , from whom all do proceed ; and one finall end to which all do tend , the glory and service of that maker . thus having found out that unum principium , that only one efficient cause of the universe , i must then recommend unto you another axiom of the metaphysicks , semper excipiendum est primum in unoquoque genere , by virtue hereof , infinite are the prerogatives , which are to be ascribed to the deity , while all blemishes and imperfections do vanish and come to nothing ; thus the knowledge which we have of god by a naturall light , it is either by way of eminency , transcending and surpassing the sphear of all creatures , for that god is not to be ranked within the compass of their limited measure ; or otherwise by way of negation , in scattering and dispersing those cloudy mists , which may any way obscure , or cast the least aspersion upon the deity ; so zealous are the philosophers of gods honour , and to preserve the truth , unity , and majesty of the godhead . the metaphysicks do further use arguments taken from analogies , as that one spirituall god should appoint one vicegerent under himself , as it were one corporeall god , to govern this materiall world , viz. one sun in the firmament , from ▪ whom all the stars borrow their light ; and from whom the corporeall world receives all her perfection ; and as god is only known by the revealing of himself , so this sun is discerned only by his own light , yet the eye must not presume to penetrate , or fasten on the sun , lest wasting the spirits , it fall into blindness and darkness ; yea , when the sun is eclipsed , when by the interposition of the moon , the brightness thereof is obscured ; yet then it is not safe to behold it ; nothing is so hurtfull to the sight : which serves by way of comparison or analog●…e , to deterre us from prying into the secrets of the deity . from the metaphysicks , i come to the mathematicks , which have the commendations that of all other sciences , they are the most demonstrative : i will therefore borrow some examples from them ; and i will only instance in astrology ; and when it plainly sheweth so many great , and such strange wonders in the heavens , such as a man of ordinary capacity cannot easily conceive , it must needs argue that god himself must be much more admirable , and incomprehensible : suppose that the sun which appears unto the eye , to be but of a little compass and quantity , yet should be so much greater then the whole earth , which certainly it must be , or else it could not enlighten so great a part of the world ; secondly , the motion of a bullet may seem very swift , for the eye cannot follow it , nor avoyd it ; yet certain it is , that the stars near the equinoctiall , do move a hundred times swifter then a bullet , which must needs be , considering the great circuit which they make within the compass of a naturall day ; and yet notwithstanding they seem unto us , as if they stood still ; thirdly , the spacious earth , together with all her huge mountains and rocks ; alas , they carry no proportion of any sensible quantity in respect of the heavens , when we are at sea , we see the whole medietie of the heavens , as if there were no earth at all to hinder our sight ; fourthly , one mother earth affording the same nourishment , a little durty pap to the severall plants , yet by virtue of the heavens , it should prove sweetness in one , bitterness in another ; and so of all severall tasts and savours fitted and proportioned to all particular natures ; this i write to assure man , both in his sense and in his understanding , that there is such a difference , and disproportion between the two worlds , that man might see his own infirmity , acknowledge his weakness ; and himself to be so much inferior , as to be ignorant in the particulars of the spirituall world ; and therefore not rashly to oppose , but humbly to submit his own judgement . but fearing lest these metaphysicall mathematicall contemplations might be obscure ; i will therefore descend lower , and instance in such particulars , which may be more perspicuous ; and whereof we may take morenotice as being more sensible , and therefore better known unto us ; and seeing the logicians have reduced all things into predicaments , i will insist in them , as they are in order . first for , substance , which consists of matter and form , who fashioned these each to other , that the matter should afford organs and instruments , and a fit habitation for the form , that the form should adde perfection , beauty , and ornament to the matter ? surely they could not thus severally dispose themselves , therefore there must be some efficient cause to order them accordingly . from the matter proceeds quantity , which hath severall dimensions , longitude , latitude , and profundity ; but who squared out these with his rule and his compass , according to measure and proportion , but some omnipotent power , for nothing will bound and limit it self ? from the form proceeds qualitie , which admits degrees of comparison , good , better , best , but needs there must be some infinite power to prescribe and appoint the degrees . thus far how things are constituted in themselves , now in relation to others , to see how the heavens are sitted for the earth ; how the e●…ements are proportioned each to other , and agree in their symbolizing qualities ; how the male and the female are fitted to each other ; how every thing is fitted with food , with harbour , with rayment : surely some infinite omnipotent wisedom made our provision ; for if we were left to our selves , we should starve in our own wants . for action , if unreasonable creatures do work according to the rules of reason , as the dumb creatures do in every thing naturally , which concerns them , and their condition : surely this must proceed from some infinite intellective power , which infuseth such a knowledg into them , with this limitation , that it should only extend to such things as are necessary to their beei●…g , and no further . for passion , it is a wonderfull thing to consider what birds and beasts will do for their own defence ; the hares which are near the sea side , do watch their time , that when the hounds are in pursuit , they may goe close by the sea side , that the tyde coming in , might take away the sent , they shall observe where the sharpest stones are , that themselves being light may pass over , while the dogges being heavy , may cut themselves , and cannot follow the pursuit : if gunpowder be a late invention of ours , surely the wilde foule in discovering it , it is a late invention of theirs ; there is not a fencer so cuning as they are in defending themselves . the serpent will so winde her body , that she will make it a buckler for defence of her head , where she knows the least blow proves deadly ; neither are they wanting in stratagems . quando , in respect of time it is wonderfull to consider how the poor silkworm , and the mulbery bud come together . the swallow , the cuckow , and other summer birds , if they come not at their just time ; it is an argument that some storms and winter cold are behind . where these birds should hide themselves ; how they should continue without food , and where they should provide food at their coming ; for it is certain the martins bring into their nest such worms , as no reasonable man scarce knowes where to finde the like . for the building of their nests , that they should be able on the highest trees , to lay as sure a foundation , as if they did build upon a rock , that no man let him be never so skilful in architecture , and use the best means and instruments he hath , his rule , his square , his levell , his compass , yet he shall not be able to make the like nest. and to conclude , whatsoever doth habitually concern the creatures ; you shall finde it so grounded in wisdom , and so supported with all severall circumstances , that we can do no lesse then admire the goodness and power of their maker ; that such unreasonable creatures in themselves , should notwithstanding order themselves , according to the rules of best reason . thus every thing doth testifie a god ; and therefore you might fill up a book greater then the whole world with arguments and proofes of the deity . not to confound my self with generals , i will descend to particulars . when we look upon the heavens , and see the suns continuall motion for our service , when we our selves are not the authors thereof , nor yet those heavenly bodies , as wanting understanding , cannot direct their course , and know not the use of their own motions , doubtless we must conceive some higher agent , some intellective power , who both giving and knowing the influence and operation of the heavens ; as likewise the use and necessities of this inferior world , did accordingly dispose and order these actions , and that is god himself . and seeing that all things are carried , certa lege , pulcherrimo ordine , by the rule and square of his providence , seeing all things were created verbo virtutis suae , by the word of his mouth , for otherwise a world of ages would not have sufficed for the framing of this world : doubtless we must conceive , that in god there is an infinite wisdom , ●…joyned with infinite power ; and this the best approved heathen philosophers did acknowledge nothing can be hid from his wisdom ; for there is nothing which his wisdom hath not contrived ; nothing can resist his power , for there is nothing but only the effects of his power . but here if , i shall further demand what is an infinite ? then we begin to discover our own weakness , natura abhorret infinitum , we cannot possibly conceive that any thing should be infinite , and the reason is , because mans understanding is a kinde of comprehension ; and to comprehend that which is infinite without limits and bounds ; and therefore is in it self incomprehensible , this implies a contradiction . and thus by the light of reason , we are brought to acknowledge god ; this god to be infinite , and by the same light of reason we are taught , that we cannot possibly conceive an infinite . now every thing in god being of like extent , that is , infinite ; reason in the knowledge of god , must be taught in hurnility to prostrate her self , and not with blear eyes to behold the sunshine ; with waxen wings , to draw near a consuming fire , as it were again p●…esumptuously to taste of the tree of knowledge . for your further satisfaction , let us consider other attributes of god , every one of them hath this property , to be infinite ; and even naturall reason shall testifie so much ; for to be infinite , is to be without bounds , or limitations ; and what should bound or limit gods nature , when as there is nothing but god , and the creatures the effects of gods power ? thus god hath a most absolute freedom , & liberty of wil ; neither violence can inforce him , nor any necessity can be imposed upon him , only he is tyed to the laws of his own nature , which makes for his infinite excellency and perfection , for thereby he is made uncapable of any blemish or defect ; thus being infinitely good , or goodness itself , he cannot commit sin ; being justice it self , he can do no injury or wrong ; being truth it self , he cannot speak falshood , there can be no contradiction in his words ; he is a light without shadow , he neither hath , nor can any imperfection befall him . since god is the author of his own beeing , he must therefore have the best and most incomparable beeing , to which there can be no addition made ; for his duration or continuance , both à parte ante , and à parte post , it is alike infinite , for it is from all eternity , and to all eternity , for the extent of his being , it is infinite , he is every where , and hath an unlimited ubiquity , the whole world , and the heavens cannot contain him , and the least ▪ punctilio cannot exclude him : for his wisdom , he is omniscient , he knows all things , past , future , present , what is , or what can possibly be , without any discourse or reasoning , he sees them all in an instant , they are all present unto him . when his wisdom hath once laid the ground and platform ( give me leave to speak of god after the manner of men , having the weakness of infirmity of man in my self , and speaking to men , who cannot otherwise conceive me ) then the power of god puts all in execution , and this is infinite , and therefore omnipotent , for he creates all things of nothing , à non-ente ad ens , there is an infinite distance , which requires an infinite power , and what can resist this power , when as there is nothing , but onely the effects of his power ? things being once constituted , then succeeds gods infinite providence , which implies his wisdom and power , together with the constancy of his will , for the preservation of that , which being founded with such excellent wisdom and power , cannot possibly be permitted to perish . and as there is such a constancy in his actions , so is there an immutability in his nature , for having the best condition , if he should any way alter or change , it should be for the worse , and so to his detriment and loss , which his infinite wisdom and power could not permit : and upon all several occasions god is most abundantly provided , for having given unto men a liberty and freedom of will , making man according to his own image , and like unto himself , hereby man is enabled and made capable either to conform himself to gods law , or to transgress : and answerable thereunto , there is in god an infinite justice , to punish the offence of infinite malignity , being committed against an infinite majesty ; or otherwise there is in god an infinite mercy , to accept and reward the poor weak endevours of man , which are of no value in themselves : for alas , what can man do to deserve gods favor ? when as he is nothing in himself , surely his works must needs be less then nothing , for if the substance or body be wanting , there cannot be so much as a shadow : gods infinite mercy , and christs passion , as the means must make them acceptable , and crown them with an infinite bliss , both in respect of the object , which is god himself , as likewise in respect of continuance , which is for eternity . neither can god make any thing which shall be wholly independent from himself , for this were to devest himself of his own power , and to resign it to the creatures , and so to deprive himself , which god cannot do : for as man was created of nothing , so without a constant and continual support , he would in every moment fall unto nothing . as god is the first and sole cause , so he is the continual and sole preserver of all ; and though making man according to his own image , he hath given him a liberty of will , yet still god hath reserved to himself , not onely the foresight and prescience , but when occasion serves , he hath a curb to bridle and order this liberty of will , as he shall see cause , and gods prescience imposeth no necessity upon the action , for as the omnipotency of god creates all things out of nothing , so the omnisciency of god may foresee and foreknow all things out of nothing , gods power and gods knowledge are of like extent and efficacy , and when no cause is determinated and ordered , yet god who seeth all things which are not , as if they were , so he may foresee things which shall be , though the causes be free , and not determinated , for he sees things not onely in their causes , but in the infinite light of his own intellectuals ; so that in respect of the causes ( whereof alone we are to judge ) the effects may be free & voluntary , though in respect of gods prescience ( whereof we are not to judge ) they may be necessary , and infallibly succeed . this i will illustrate by an example ; he that stands on a high mountain , and on either side sees passengers riding in the same rode-way , some forward , some backward , some towards each other , the passengers ride of themselves , and it lies in their power to go or not to go , but he that stands on the hill may know where and when they shall meet , and yet notwithstanding his foreknowledge , they meet very casually and voluntary : and thus may gods prescience stand with the freedom and liberty of mans actions . hitherto i have made a high flight , and now me thinks i am like a man that is weary in holding up his head to look upon the sun , and the heavens , and finding that his spirits are a little wasted with too much light , he retires home , and coming to his inner rooms , he findes them so dark , that he can see nothing , yet rests himself there for a time to recover his strength , whereby he might be the better enabled again to discern the sun and the heavens : so give me leave , in stead of making further search into the attributes of god , wherein i finde my eyes dazled , now to turn mine eyes inward , and to make a diligent search , what knowledge man hath of his own , in such things as meerly concern himself , and how far his natural knowledge may transport him in the knowledge of god , and religion , and how far we may presume upon our natural light , to discern a supernatural object , and things of another world , & of a higher condition . our own reason informs us , that there is nothing in man that hath not bounds of circumscription : thus in our stature , datur maximum & minimum , we cannot adde to our own growth ; thus in our senses , excellens sensibile ●…orrumpit sensum , we cannot fasten our eyes on the sun ; thus in the strength of our limbs , we finde in our selves a definite and determinate power , that we cannot work beyond our ability ; so is there a measure and stint of knowledge , that we cannot conceive beyond our limited capacity . this will better appear , if we consider the several degrees of understanding in man himself , how one man doth far exceed another in wit , capacity and apprehension . thus we finde that all wits are not fit for all studies , and all sciences ; he must have the light of great natural intellectuals , who is fit to wade through the midnight of the metaphysicks , or to spy out the curious subtilties of school-learning ; he must have engines in his brain who is fit for mathematical studies , or architecture ; he must have a quick and nimble fancy , who aims to excel in poetry or rhetorick ; he must have an exact memory , to compute the concordancy of times , to be a perfect historian : so then it pleaseth god so to order the states of men , and the several gifts of nature , that some should become teachers , others prove scholars , and proficients , as god shall give a blessing , and prosper their endevours : and while they are learning , necessary it is that they should believe their teachers . and is there such a difference of men between themselves , comparing one with another ? then much more is there a far greater difference between god and man. suppose i should compare god with man in other attributes , and see the infinite difference , what is the strength of man but weakness , in respect of gods omnipotency ? what is the length of mans age , but less then a minute , in respect of gods eternity ? what is the wealth of man , but beggery , in respect of gods treasures ? then what is the wit and understanding of man , but meer foolishness , in respect of gods wisdome ? but that we may lay a deeper foundation , lest natural reason might presume too far , she must first be taught to humble her self ; i would then first ask , what is the object of natural reason ? surely i will extend the object as far as possibly i can , i will give her the uttermost due , and therefore i do acknowledge the object of natural reason to be the natural world ; for upon the same grounds and principles whereof the world doth subsist , reason doth likewise guide her self by way of direction : but man sees the bounds of the natural world , the material heavens , which incompass and hedge in the world , as a circumference to the centre or circle : then surely he must see the bounds of his natural reason , beyond which he cannot extend his natural knowledge , which is very fitly set forth by the form and fashion of mans head or scull , which is somewhat circular , and not unlike the globe of the world , all his brains are within the scull , and what is without , is no part of man : so what is within the cavity of the globe of the world , may be partly involved and laid up in mans brain , as it were written in characters ; but what is without the convexity of this globe , it cannot enter into mans brain . thus every faculty hath his object , and this must be adaequatum every way answerable and proportionable to the faculty , and what exceeds this object , comes not within the sphere of that faculty , as the eye cannot hear , the ear cannot smell , the hand cannot taste ; for every faculty hath as her own proper organs and instruments , so her own proper bounds . and lest reason should be presumptuous , and being onely natural , should rashly adventure to leap into the supernatural world , or out of infidelity should utterly deny , what is above her reach and apprehension ; i must lay open her weakness , and see how far she is wounded even in her own naturals , that she may be well asham'd of her self , if being so ignorant at home , and in things which concern her , yet she must presume to comprehend mysteries of another world , which so far exceed her reach and apprehension . see then our defects in natural knowledge , not onely in the motion of the heavens , the insensible influences , the miraculous meteors , but come we to the meanest creatures , and to speak of them in general : the philosophers will tell you , that the forms of things are utterly unknown ; whence the logicians conclude , that we cannot assign the proper differences , and consequently both of them fail in their definitions , and content themselves onely with bare descriptions , and outward properties : and therein we are so far from attaining any perfection , that every day new qualities are discovered . and thus far i tax the greatest philosophers in the world ; hippocrates who knew as much as any man did living in his time , begins his book with excusing his ignorance , ars longa est , & vita brevis . alas , what shall we say of the ordinary sort of men , when great clerks after much study , night-watchings , and labours , think it a great perfection , if they can but discern their own ignorance . i remember when i was a young scholar in cambridge , sometimes for our own health and recreation , taking the fresh air in the fields , we would look for herbs and simples , but for the virtues and operations of them , alas , alas , ou●… her alists were wonderfully defective : at the same time , to try conclusions , we would finde out a birds nest , and when the hen had laid her full number of eggs , and began to sit , every third day we would open an egge , to see the manner and degrees of conception ; it was the white of the egge which made the skin , the bones , the feathers , the beak , while the yolk was reserved for the more inward and vital parts ; and truly , we could but admire gods workmanship and wonders in the course of nature , and thence we did conclude , that if there were such ignorance in natural things , it could not seem strange if we proved stark blinde in supernaturals . thus far we have taught the natural man his ignorance in natural things , and until he can acquit himself therein , it were a strange presumption to trust to his own skill in supernaturals . now god observes the same method and rule for our learning and instruction , both in things natural and supernatural ; and that is , that first we must begin with belief : thus it is necessary that the scholar should first believe his schoolmaster , and he that is simplest and weakest in apprehension , out of a trust reposed in others , doth naturally submit his own opinion to the better judgement of others . thus the poor silly childe , who understands not the reason of his fathers counsel , yet he believes him , and follows his counsel . thus the poor countrey husbandman or plowman , though he knows not the reasons of state , nor the secret counsels of his governors , yet he believes them , and yields his obedience accordingly : and if this course be taken in temporal things , why not much more in spiritual ? wherein first god requires faith , which by degrees is more and more inlightned , until at length it comes to the beatifical vision , and then no longer faith of things unseen , but an actual vision , and a real possession . and herein see the goodness of god , that man finding the miseries of this world , should at length by experience dislike his own estate , and loathing the fond carnal pleasures , should be ambitious to attain a better condition , and to this end god hath added to his natural reason , some spark or thirst of knowledge , more then natural : for seeing the heavens , which are the bounds of nature , he conceives that above these heavens there must needs be some more excellent and supernatural world , regio superior incognita , a place not yet discovered , wherein notwithstanding he desires to make a plantation , for he concludes in reason , and by the rule of architecture , that the roof is the fairest and beautifullest thing in building , as being most in sight , the pavement and groundsel is the meanest and basest , as being to be troden on , therefore the material heavens which are the roof of this inferior world , they are the fairest thing in nature , beset and imbroydered with most rich and costly jewels , the sun , the moon , and the stars , yet are these heavens nothing but the pavement and groundsel of the superior world , where the inhabitants do tread and trample them under their feet , and over our heads , and therefore are the meanest things in that superior world . and as in dignity and worth , so likewise in quantity , for the whole earth is in effect an indivisible point , and carries no sensible quantity in respect of the heavens , which plainly appears by many astronomical demonstrations : then what inconvenience is it , that there should be such a disproportion in the knowledge of these two worlds ? for the supernatural world must needs have a supernatural light , for nothing can be known or acted without means , and the means must be of like condition and nature with the end ; as here below we see the sun and the stars onely by their own light , so is it much more necessary that we should know nothing above the heavens , but by a revealed light , answerable and agreeable , and of the same nature and condition with that superior world . thus natural reason , by the force and strength of natural reason , is brought to acknowledge the use and necessity of grace to sanctisie and inlighten our natural blindness and ignorance . and if the difference be such for the beauty and quantity between the two worlds , natural and supernatural , then surely there must be as great a disproportion in the knowledge of these two several worlds : for to understand the supernatural world , needs there must be some supernatural light , for nothing can be known without means , and the means must ever be of like condition and nature with the end ; as here below we see the sun and the stars , not by candle-light or torch light , but by their own light ; and the natural eye is not capable of that supernatural light , neither yet can reason , for want of means to discourse , come to any supernatural knowledge ; yet god , for the satisfaction of reason , hath ingraffed in man wonder , astonishment , admiration , whereby man may see his own blindness , and not oppose the truth of things , which are above his reach and apprehension . thus for the knowledge and attaining of the supernatural world , there must be a supernatural light , and in man there are some aspiring thoughts , some ambitious desires , that naturally he aims at things higher then nature , wherein appears the great mercy of god , that as the tasting of the t●…ee of knowledge , was the first sin which proceeded from curiosity ; so god in his mercy is pleased to sanctisie mans curiosity , that being kept within due bounds and limits , it proves to be the first step or degree to bring man unto god ; for now he is curious to know things of a better world , and takes this world but for a transitory passage , tending and ending in death and destruction . thus far we have brought the natural man to believe , that seeing the bounds of the natural world , he is apt to confess , that above the heavens there is a supernatural world , for knowledge whereof there must be a supernatural light ; for procuring whereof , he findes naturally in himself wonder , astonishment , and admiration , and needs there must be some proper object answerable thereunto . and here god , like an excellent workman or planter , doth ingraff and inoculate a sciens , giving man grace and faith to believe , and together revealing a knowledge , which could not be collected by any natural inquisition ; & then god for his greater honor that it might appear he had made an absolute conquest of man , according to the military fashion , he sets up his standard in the principal part of man , even in the understanding of man , that as in his law he requires obedience contrary to the natural lusts of flesh and blood , and mans own violent passions : so he requires submission of his understanding , to believe what is above the reach and comprehension of reason ; and therein together he gives him this assurance , that as for the instant he gives him an earnest or taste of things , so in due time , he shall impart the full and real possession . and thus whereas i did compare the circumference of the heavens to bounds and limits , to hedge in this natural world , 〈◊〉 thinks i have opened a gap , to let down the mysteries of the superior world : and whereas i compared mans head or skull to the globe of the world , me thinks i have opened the futures or seams , to let in the gracious influence of gods spirit , to sanctifie and illuminate mans natural reason , to cleanse and defecate all his carnal corruptions . and now give me leave to return to my former subject , wherein i did use one argument to prove the deity , and that was the whole universe : and the argument is yet of a larger extent , then the whole universe , for that things seen and unseen , do point out the deity , things past , present , future , all joyn in the same testimony . i did likewise prove , that this god can be but one , because he is infinite , and there cannot be two infinites , for then they would bound and limit each other , and then neither of them should be infinite . i shewed likewise , that what is infinite must be incomprehensible , because having no limits or bounds , it is therefore incomprehensible as in it self , so to mans knowledge . i did then make a digression , to view mans natural knowledge , how mean it was in natural things , and wholly defective in supernaturals , and what degrees were observed in his preparation to grace , and by a dislike of his present state , what hopes and ambition he had to aspire to a better condition . i did likewise insist in many attributes of god , and i proved that they were all incomprehensible . now seeing those attr●…butes are somewhat better known unto us , then the persons in the deity , i will therefore use those attributes as arguments and proofs to introduce the blessed trinity . i have formerly proved , that reason doth acknowledge in god many attributes , as providence , power , justice , mercy , &c. for these do all demonstratively appear in their several effects , and from these attributes i will draw some arguments to prove the persons in the deity . though there are attributes which to us may seem accidences , for so they are in man , as power , justice , mercy &c. yet reason assureth us , that there is no accident in god , there is nothing in god , but god ; to admit a composition in god , were to detract from his integrity , and from his eternity , for every thing must first subsist in it self , before it can come to composition . thus then the attributes of god are substances , and what is more , they are god himself : and thus god is not so properly good and just , as goodness , and justice it self ; goodness in abstract , for god is the fountain of his own beeing , and therefore must have the best beeing , and cannot admit accidences , which are inferior to substances : so that what is in god , must be a substance ; yet reason cannot possibly conceive , how that which is a quality in man , should be a substance in god , and i pray is there so great a difficulty in acknowledging persons in the deity ? seems it not a far greater inconveniency , that accidences contrary to their own nature should be made substances , then that a substance agreeable to nature should become persons ? in the first there is an opposition and difference of nature , in the second there is onely a difference of number . now as is the opposition and difference less , so is the inconvenience less , in beeing , and in our understanding , give me leave to speak according to the weakness and capacity of man. secondly , how the attributes do agree in the godhead , though many and several attributes , which i have already proved , yet being all infinite , and there being but one infinite , ( for if we should admit two infinites , they would bound and limit each other , and so neither of them should be infinite ) therefore all these several attributes of god , can be and are indeed but one and the same infinite attribute . thus the wisdom of god is his power , the power of god is his eternity , the eternity of god is his ubiquity . these and all other his attributes , are indeed but one and the same attribute , deus est actus purus , he consists of no heterogeneal parts : this reason acknowledgeth , and the same reason acknowledgeth this to be incomprehensible ; and i pray is there any greater difficulty in believing the three persons in one deity , and the deity to be equally competent to the three persons ? thirdly , there are some attributes in god , which seem to detract from each other , as the justice and mercy of god , for justice implies rigour and severity , mercy abates the rigour of justice , and addes compassion and pity : so they seem to stand in opposition to each other , and not to be reconciled without a contradiction , and surely the truth of gods nature cannot admit a contradiction ; yet notwithstanding we must say and believe , there is in god an infinite justice , and an infinite mercy , yea more , that they are but one and the same faculty , for his mercy is his justice , and his justice is his mercy ; and i pray is there any greater d●…fficulty in believing the three persons in one deity , between whom there is no seeming contrariety ( as there is between justice and mercy ) then to believe so many attributes , and those to have several objects , and to appear in their various and several forms , yet all these attributes to be but one and the same , this we must yield by necessary demonstrations in philosophy ; and if those very attributes of god , whereof the light of reason informs us , we cannot apprehend : can it seem strange if in those mysteries which we onely receive by revelation , such as are of like condition with the attributes of the deity , and do equally , or rather more inwardly , touch the nature and essence of the deity , we be found alike purblinde , and cannot discern them . in a word , i do here challenge the whole world , all the philosophers , and all the socinians , let any man undertake to discover any one attribute of god , and i will with as great ease and facility discover the trinity . give me leave sometimes to recall my self , lest i might lose my self in these dark mists of divine mysteries : i have proved a god , and but one god , and that this one god is every way infinite , and therefore incomprehensible : i have proved all the several attributes of god , as wisdom , power , &c. that they are all substances , which notwithstanding in the creatures are but accidences : i have proved that all the several attributes they are but one and the same , for there cannot be several infinites , for then they would bound and limit each other : i have proved that some attributes , according to mans apprehension , seem to oppose each other , as mercy detracts from justice , yet that they are but one and the same attribute in god : and now i conclude , that all these being duly considered , they do as farre exceed mans natural reason , as doth the great and ineffable mystery of the most holy , blessed , and undivided trinity . i never name gods mercy , but my heart danceth for joy , and then i begin to lay hold on it , and to fasten on it , and i cannot so cursorily pass over it . i would here by way of objection ask , how can all the attributes of god be infinite , when as scripture seems to enlarge gods mercy for every thing must do , and consequently hath knowledge , according to his own nature , whether spirituall , or corporeall : and certainly the inhabitants of one world , cannot conceive the state and condition of another world , the angels would be as ignorant of this corporeall world , as we are of their spirituall , unless it be revealed alike to both . suppose then that i should elevate my reason above the course of this our present nature ; and that i had conference with an angell upon my relation , certainly the angell not having any other knowledge of the inferiour world infused from god , but judging of things according to his own spirituall condition , he would say it were more impossible , that one individuum or person should subsist of different natures , matter and form , then that one nature should subsist of different persons . the angell would think it a far greater inconvenience , that one nature not able to preserve it self , yet should be able to communicate her nature to another : that is , to be generative in her own kind ( for so the angels are not ) as that one eternall nature should be alike , and equally communicated to three persons ; or if i should inform the angels , that one grain of corn , when it is dissolved , and seems to be rotted in the earth , yet then it should send down a root , send up a blade , and so come with an increase ; and happily bring twenty graines for one , this would seem more strange to an angel , then that one infinite nature should be alike , and equally imparted to three persons . this i write only by way of supposition , for i doubt not , but the angels by their spirituall condition , and by their daily assistance , and beatificall vision , have a far greater knowledge revealed unto them ▪ both of the state of the naturall world , as likewise of the most blessed trinity , then we have , being only in statu viae , having now but an earnest of what we shall hereafter receive in greater measure . from conferring with an angel ( which many others have done ) i will now descend to a conference , which may seem much stranger then that of the angel ; for it is with an infant in the wombe , who hath a reasonable soul , and wants only ●…it organs , and a right disposition for the practise and exercise thereof , as saint john baptist did spring in the wombe upon the approach of our saviour , wherein he did express both reason and religion ; yet this is not ordinary ; but suppose an infant had the right use of understanding , i would tell him , that he should no longer lye crouching , and sleeping in the wombe ; but he should come abroad , and prove a day-labourer , and get his living in the sweat of his browes ; that there should be no further use of the navill , but his mouth should be his taster , and his teeth should be grinders , that he should be no longer silent , but should go to school , and learn a language , these things would seem as strange , and as incredible to the infant , ( for want of experience and due information ) as now they seem frequent , usuall and ordinary to us ; for every thing hath knowledge according to his present condition ; and therefore no marvell , if the naturall man cannot understand the things of the spirit of god. thus it plainly appears by the angels , by the infant , that there is a great difficulty in conceiving things of an other nature , but to instance in our own nature . suppose i should ask of the greatest doctors , and philosophers the reason and cause , why the adamant should draw up iron , and turn it self to the north ; or how should the moon , which is not able to turn a little stick , yet should be able to turn the whole ocean ; o●… take the late invention , the unguentum armarium , by ano●…nting the weapon to cure the wound , who can imagine the cause thereof ? thus how many things are we bound to believe , whereof we cannot understand the manner and means ? and therefore if in very naturall things it is very necessary ▪ there should be a faith and belief , some reposing trust in others , in regard that all are not of a like apprehension , much mo●…e in things , which are not within the compass of this naturall world , and therefore fall not within the compass of mans naturall reason . but there is as great a distance between them , as is between heaven and earth . and all creatures , even angels themselves in respect of god , there is as great a difference between them in knowledge as is in beeing ; or if you will have me to express it further , there is as much difference between them , as is between finite and infinite , between the most excellent being , and no being ; between something and nothing ; for so all creatures are both in themselves , for what they have of themselves , and in comparison with god. here then at length , i come to the greatest difficulty , why should there not be the like operations upon the godhead from his other attributes , as there is from the understanding , and from the will ? for the understanding begets verbum a word ; and from both proceeds amor , which is the action of the will ; and here are three distinct persons , which cannot be said of the rest of gods attributes . surely the answer is very plain ▪ because the understanding , and the will of god , they look ad intra , they reflect upon the deity it self ; for thus god is the object of his own understanding , he understanding himself , doth thereby enjoy most infinite happiness ; he is likewise the object of his own will , or his love , for knowing himself to be infinitely good , he must therefore love himself infinitely , and is therefore necessarily , the finall end of all . so that all are refer'd unto god ; but for the other attributes of god , they look [ ad extra ] upon the creatures ; and therefore it is only proper to the understanding , and the will of god that only from them there should be a generation of the son , and a procession of the spirit ; and so a difference of pe●…sons . some do here object against some termes , which as they say , are not to be found in scripture , but are only imposed by the church ; and that is the word trinity ; and the word persons ; and that in a mysterie of this infinite high nature , there should be no addition of mans wit and invention , but we should tye our selves most strictly to the terms of scripture , seeing this mysterie so infinitly exceeds mans understanding . to whom i return this answer . do ye think that what the church shall determin in this and other mysteries , that it proceeds from the wit and invention of man ? do you ascribe no more to the cloven tongues , that fell upon the apostles , whereby they were replenished with gods spirit ? and which spirit they did conferre upon others , by imposition of hands , by election , or succession ; and do you stile all this , by the wit and invention of man ? when i consider the determinations of the church , their form of divine service , their canons , their discipline , their religious orders ; god knows , i do verily believe , that i do see more in them , then the wit and invention of man ; and i think them to be the immediate dictates , and directions of gods spirit . but call them what you will , for these words of persons and trinity , truly i conceive them to be nothing , but the translation of scripture ; and i hope you will think translations very necessary ; for the evangelists , and the apostles use the translations of the septuagints , in their quotations of the old testament ; if then christ shall prescribe the form of our baptism to be , in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost ; and that we know there are no accidences in god , but all are substances [ and distinct substances ] surely i know not by what other term i should call substances , and distinct substances , but by the name of persons ; and if these three persons be one god , and so the scripture stiles them , the word was with god , and god was the word ; surely i know not with what other words to express it , but by the name of trinity or triunity . so likewise those words of schoolmen , deus intelligendo seipsum genuit verbum , are not these words taken out of scripture , hodie genui te , and thence they infer , verbum in intellectu ? thus without the determinations of the church , and unless due respect and reverence be given to the church , no religion can subsist , but will instantly fall to confusion . thus as our understanding begets a word ; and there is a mutuall love , and correspondency between this understanding and this word , so if god be said to beget a son , or a word , in a spirituall manner in his understanding , and that from both proceeds the holy ghost , the church must then necessarily conclude , that they are severall and distinct persons , not that we should conceive them to be like the persons of men , with circumscription of time and of place , in various and different formes ; but to be divine persons , all alike partaking of one infinite nature ; and what god hath revealed , what the church hath explicated , that we believe ; desiring the same god , by the inlightning of his spirit , to engender faith in our hearts , to strengthen and increase it ; and what god hath reserved only for his own knowledge , that not curiously to pry into , but content our selves with such a measure and proportion of knowledge , as he hath been pleased to impart : remembring that the first sin which gave occasion to all the mischieves and miseries which have befallen us , it was the tasting of the tree of knowledge , whereby in stead of that great light , which we aymed at , whereby we should have knowledge like god , indeed we had our eyes opened , but it was to see and feel our own nakedness , to our own confusion . yet to give some little information , i will only make this instance , if i should take out of a river severall cups full of water ; i would ask what difference there were in these waters ? surely none would appear in the nature , but as they are distinct in severall cups or vessels , which give them severall forms , and severall dimensions : and thus it is in all homogeneall bodies ; suppose i should insist in spirituall qualities , as in light , certainly the difference would be less ; what then if i should insist in spiri's themselves ? which are not capable of dimensions , yet still in respect of the finitness of their nature , there would be some difference : but if i should ascend to an infinit nature , then there would be no difference in respect of the nature ▪ ye●… a difference there would be in respect of their different manner of subsisting , as by generation , procession , &c. yet here we must take heed of curiosity , and know the weakness of mans understanding , that we cannot speak of god , but after the manner of men : and it is most probable , that god should commit his secrets to the care and custody of his church , which may put them into such form and fashion of speech , as may best beseem them , rather then that particular spirits , who are so apt to be misled with errors , even in things of least moment , should be left to their own inventions and expressions in the highest mysteries . but how should the whole deity be in every person ? is it not true in all homogeneall bodies ? suppose the elements that where they are , they are totally , they carry their whole nature about them : but this truth more especially appears in spirits ; for there is nothing so common and triviall in schooles , as this known principle , anima ubi est tota est tota in toto & tota in qualibet parte totius . but if this deity be wholly imparted , yet then how should it still remain whole and entire ? is it not proper to all spirituall qualities , as light , knowledge , and the like , that they should be communicated , without any loss , or diminution of themselves ? here then at length consists the whole difficulty , that the nature being imparted , there should be no difference in number , reason seeing the difficulty , sees likewise the reason of the difficulty , for her own further satisfaction ; for this in the creatures proceeds from the bounded , finite , and limited nature of the creatures , which must be circumscribed both with time , and with place , and so make a difference in the number ; but if you will suppose this nature to be infinite , as is the deity , then would it admit no difference , as not in nature , so not in number . what i have hitherto written , hath been according to the opinion of our best , and most ●…earned divines , together with the acknowledgement of the whole catholick church , to which i do believe a man may very safely subscribe ; for whatsoever is there related , as it is grounded in scripture , so it is strengthned , and fortified with the bulwark ; of naturall reason and philosophy ; and against which , the most wicked socinian shall never be able to oppose . hereunto , as an addition give me leave to relate my own private opinion , which i hope may be without offence , either to god or man , for that it proceeds not out of any vain presumption ; neither doth it any way derogate from the truth : but whether it ariseth from a strong apprehension , and from a minde , that is totally possessed with the love of truth , and admiration of this great and ineffable mystery , that i leave to better judgements . the first is , that i do believe , and am confident , that this mystery of the most blessed trinity doth together , and as well as all the rest of gods attributes , appear , and is plainly made manifest in the works of nature ; and in the framing of this created , visible , corporeall world . my reasons , and arguments briefly are these . first , see in the framing of the creatures , what footsteps there are of the trinity ; which may in some measure , point out a triun-efficient cause : take nature in her first ground and foundation , are there not three distinct principles , the matter , the form , the sympathy , and agreement between both ? see how these principles are knit and united together ; the matter , tamquam matrix & commune seminarium ; the form , edu●…itur ex materia ; the sympathy , and agreement , indifferently arising from both . or if you take the elixir of bodies , have not the chymists found out that all bodies consist of sal , sulphur , mercury ? thus far it is in the constitution of things , take then the propagation of the kinde ; do not the male and female agreeing in nature , but differing in sex , number , and person , bring forth an issue ? i will leave curious subtilties in philosophy , and descend to the gross , and terrestriall substances ; wherein you shall likewise observe some obscure shadow of a trinity ; do not all bodies consist of three dimensions , longitude , latitude , and profundity ? and these necessarily , and inseparably knit and united together ? do not all qualities admit of three degrees of comparison ? is not the most perfect number the number of three ? which i think was the occasion , that aristotle could say , in numero ternario perfecto colitur deus . a strange speech for a heathen man ! whether he spake it casually , or blindely of himself , or whether by an elevated understanding , he was carryed in an extasie or trance ; or rather , as i suppose guided by a divine providence , being the king of philosophers , among the heathen ; like caiaphas at the death and passion of christ , god put into his mouth words , which he himself understood not , as it were to give a true testimony to succeeding ages , for the conversion of the heathen . no perfection ought to be denyed to the deity , suppose that all things were good in their own kinde , in the root and foundation of nature , according to gods own approbation , et vidit deus & erant omnia valde bona , yet are there severall and different perfections : as first , in respect of quantity , there is one perfection of an unity , an other of a number ; let the number appear in the persons , the unity in the godhead : so secondly , in qualities they are good in themselves , good in diffusion , bonum est maximè diffusivum sui ipsius , what is finitely good , doth finitely communicate it self , therefore that which is infinitely good , must infinitely communicate it self , within it self , to the persons in the deity . thirdly , in relations there is a paternal , there is a filial relation , both perfections must appear in the deity . fourthly in actions it is the highest perfection of the creature , generare sibi simile , and therefore not to be denyed to the deity ; yet being impossible to produce many severall infinite natures ; therefore different persons do appear in one and the same infinite nature ; for it is as proper for god to be perfect , as it is to the creatures to be imperfect ; let all perfection be elevated to the deity , while the imperfection like dross fals upon the creatures : man himself though fruitfull in his own kinde , yet corruptible in his own kinde ; the angels though beautifull and incorruptible , yet fruitless , and barren like rachel ; but with god in respect of himself there is a generation , without any corruption or diminution ; as in respect of his works , there is a creation without any change in his nature . fifthly , god made man according to his own image , and likeness , and then god spake of adam , non est bonum hominem esse solum , it is not good for man to be alone , let us make him a helper like unto himself . if then man be like unto god , why may not he reflect upon god ? and say unto god , non est bonum deum esse solum , it is not good for god to be alone : we will therefore in all humility prostrate our selves ; and with boldness and confidence adore three persons in one deity ; for the greatest comfort which a man hath in this world , it is in a sweet society , therefore god injoying infinite happiness , he must have consortium aequalium , a sweet society ; there must be severall persons in one deity . i come now to my second position , which god knowes as it proceeds from no ill intention , so i hope through his mercy , i may deliver my poor opinion without offence : i confess that supreme magistrates are very tender of their prerogative , as without which they cannot support their government ; and therefore they seldom name it , but with this addition and parenthesis , quam argui nolumus , so jealous they are of themselves , and of their own power : but surely with god it is otherwise , for he is able , as he made the world of nothing , so with the least word of his mouth , to reduce it again to nothing , and thereby upon every occasion to vindicate his own authority . here then i will first inform you , that it is necessary that every act which god doth , it should partake of god , and what is contrary to gods nature , it is without the compass of gods power ; god can do no injustice , being justice it self ; god cannot speak an untruth , being truth it self ; or commit any sin , being goodness it self . dly , god can do nothing to the prejudice or disparagement of himself , as to make any thing independent from himselfe , but it is necessary , as it was made of nothing , so it must be continually supported from falling to nothing , to which of it self , being left to it self , it would instantly fall . dly , god can do nothing according to the uttermost extent of his power ; the reason is , because his power hath no uttermost extent , but is every way infinite : so when he hath made the most excellent creature , ( in respect of such as are now in being , ) yet still he is able to create a more excellent : and as in every creature god doth imprint a character of himself , whereby it speaks the praise of the maker : so my second position is this , that as there is not any creature , wherein at this time the footstep and impression of the blessed trinity doth not appear , as i have already proved ; so i doubt whether god can make any creature , wherein the stamp or mark of the blessed trinity shall not be imprinted . my reason is , that god alone is actus purus & simplicissimus , nothing but pure form , a light without shadow , or an absolute perfection , without blemish or spot ; but whatsoever is besides god , is was created by god of nothing , and therefore in respect of this nothing from whence it arose , it must have in it self quiddam potentiale , something defective and imperfect , that being made of nothing , it is apt of it self , being left to it self , to return again to nothing : so then it must consist ex actu & potentia , and there must be vinculum or ligamen to knit or unite together this actum and potentiam . so here is some resemblance of the blessed trinity , in effect , those three first principles , whereof every thing doth subsist , and which are so much insisted upon in philosophy . and here you see that the blessed trinity doth necessarily appear in the works of god , as well as the rest of his attributes . more particularly if it be lawfull to make comparison between small things and great , wherein i do the rather presume , because i know my intention to be harmless and innocent , and i serve a merciful god , who is apt to forgive sins , especially such as proceed out of ignorance , i would take notice how farre forth this mystery of the trinity is shadowed forth in the knowledg & affections of man himself . it is the counsel of the wisest philosopher , nosce teipsum , know thy self ; thou mayest make better use of the knowledge of thy self , for the direction of thy self , to thine own happiness , then of any other forain or outward knowledge : so for the love of thy self , it is imprinted in thy heart , that man should love himself above all others , proximus ipse mihi , and all his actions tend , and are directed accordingly : which may a little , if not point out , yet resemble the operations , which the knowledge , and love of god do cause in the blessed deity ; and therefore if we were to prefer some of gods attributes above others , natural reason would say , that his understanding and his will did excel all the rest of his attributes ( as they the most active and eminent qualities in every spirit ) for first , our understanding must direct us , and then our will must execute ; so in god they are the most eminent of all his attributes , for god himself is the object of his own understanding , and his own will , and so he is not of the rest of his attributes , for he is not the object of his own power , nor of his justice , nor of his mercy , but onely of his understanding , and of his will , and these being operative , and producing some fruits ( as all the rest of gods attributes have their proper effects ) needs they must produce wonders in the godhead , to the astonishment and admiration of reason . consider how the strong apprehension and longing of a woman in the time of her childe-bearing , makes an impression sometimes in the mother , but most commonly in the infant , to the astonishment of philosophy , when the physicians with their dissections and anatomies , can neither shew the means ▪ nor the manner , but profess their own ignorance . and as the understanding works such effects , so in the next place consider the nature of our humane love , which of all other passions is the strongest , and doth most firmly and inseparably unite , and therefore makes two persons , man and wife , in the eye of the law , to be reputed but as one person : and this is much more strange , that two persons having two natures , and differing in sex , should be but one person ▪ then that one nature should be in several persons ; yet so the wisdom of the law esteems them , and it were high presumption in any man , to question their wisdom . mans understanding and mans love , have such operations in mankinde ( and no other faculties in man have the like . ) thus in the schools it is said , intellectus fit quod intelligit , the understanding doth work upon it self ; and for our love , amor unionem , love hath ever that property and appetite , as to desire an union : how the poor mother hugs the childe in her arms , takes it into her bosom , and with all her might and power would fain incorporate the childe into her self ! and if such be the effects of our understanding and our love , then what may we conceive of the understanding and love of god ? but contraries do sometimes best appear by contraries , and therefore to know the strength and efficacy of the understanding and love in man , consider them in their defects and abuse , and in the heavy judgements which sometimes befall them ; for all fits of madness , when men are distracted and out of their wits , most commonly they arise either from the understanding , when with night-watchings and studies they distemper themselves , and so with strong impressions of melancholy , have not the right use of their wits ; or otherwise when with outragious lusts , in the strength and vehemency of their love-passions they do impart themselves , and then rest in their rage and their fury besides themselves . god grant that i do not offend in making any comparison to that which is incomparable , the mystery of all mysteries , the secret of all secrets , and is ineffable , not to be understood by men or angels ; yet seeing god hath in part revealed it , i thought fit , with all humility and submission , prostrating my self at the footstool of gods throne , to express it , according to the tenents of gods catholick church , for the inlightning , strengthning , and confirmation of our faith . i will now at length give this admonition to the socinian , who professeth to believe no more of god , then his own reason shall teach him ; and reason , we know , depends upon the information of sense ; and he might as well say , that what he hath not seen , he will not believe , so that his infidelity might as well extend it self to the sensible world . thus he should not believe all those delicious and beautiful fruits which the eastern countrey affords , nor should he believe those great whales and monsters of the sea , whereof he hath not been an eye-witness ; nor should he believe the former ages of the world , nor take any thing upon the relation of others , much less should he believe a spiritual world , which is of another nature and condition ; nor should he believe the influences of the heavens , which exceed his reason , for they are not sensible ; nor should he believe the working of gods spirit , and that his prayers should be of any efficacy or power . and thus he utterly overthrows all faith and religion , and so in effect is a profest atheist , onely he would cover it with a cloak and pretence of natural reason , pretending some great skill and knowledge in philosophy , which i know to be very little , very little indeed : and were my age fit for an encounter , i would question their skill in philosophy , as here i will give you a little taste thereof . and first , see and consider the great difference and opposition between us ; the socinian professeth , that he doth not believe the mysteries in religion , because he cannot understand them in reason ; and i profess the contrary , that i do believe the mysteries in religion revealed , and much the rather , because the socinian cannot understand them in reason , nollem ego in deum quem tu comprehenderes , that god whom thou art able to comprehend , shall never be my god ; i will not vouchsafe to serve such a god , i scorn to worship such a god , i renounce such a god , for he is too like thy self to be the true god. this i am taught in philosophy , and even by the strength of reason , that god is infinite , and every way incomprehensible . and this i have learned of the heathen , who did erect an altar ignoto deo , to the unknown god , or to the incomprehensible god. surely there is a greater difference between the true god and man , then that we should make god of like nature and condition with our selves , as that we should think our selves to be able to comprehend him . before i proclaim war , i have ever thought it a necessary point of charity , first to try how far forth the difference may be reconciled , and so to go hand in hand as far as honesty and truth will permit us ; and when as once we become irreconcileable , then to make an utter separation , and every man to stand on his own guard . that i may then deliver my opinion concerning natural reason , how far she is to be admitted in religion ; i do not commend credulity , nor would i have a man apt to believe , but upon good grounds : memento diffidere is the first rule in policy , though i confess , as mysteries are above reason , and that i would have reason to know her distance , and not to incroach too far , yet would i have reason to have full satisfaction , for it is the guide which god hath given to man for his direction , not onely in humane and civil things , but even a little to prepare and direct him in his way to salvation , and to make him capable of religion ( whereof the brute beasts are not : ) and though religion be as far above reason , as the heavens are above the earth , yet is she no way contrary to reason , but serves to inlighten , and to sanctifie reason , and to confirm reason in her own principles and grounds , as the heavens adde beauty and perfection to the earth : for neither jewels nor beautiful flowers , can be discerned , or appear glorious , without the light of the heavens . thus for all the moral law , which is a great part of religion , reason serves as an excellent glosse , or a commentary , for the exposition . thus reason being sanctified , having a tincture of grace , serves to draw excellent conclusions , and theological precepts , out of the premises of scripture : but if we should know no more of god then reason informs us , surely we should be then very unreasonable , for we should know nothing of the state of that other world , since natural reaon can make no discovery of a supernatural world . if then we should know no more of god , but onely so far forth as may be gathered by the works of nature , it would much shorten our knowledge of god ▪ and a little detract from gods glory , besides a preposterous course : for whereas we are to govern and teach the dumb creatures , who are onely made for our use , and therein attain their own ends ; now on the contrary , they should be our onely teachers , to direct us to our last end and perfection , if all our knowledge of god should be onely by their information , and that we should know no more of god , but onely so far forth as they should instruct us , or catechise us : and seeing that every day we learn more and more in the creatures ( for new qualities and secrets of nature are daily discovered ) it must hence follow , that as yet we have not learnt so much of god , as the creatures can teach us , they are our very learned schoolmasters , and we are ill proficients , and thus contrary to all good order and form , our reason must be subject to their sense , even for the knowledge of such things , as do infinitely exceed all sense and all reason . nor is it possible that god should be so forgetful of man , as to supply him with all the provisions of this world , for his back and belly , for his kitchin , his wardrobe , and yet should neglect his breeding and education , to teach him at school , and there to instruct him in his necessary ways and means to attain his last end and salvation . surely god is more merciful to the dumb creatures , for they have a natural instinct in themselves , sufficient and necessary for their preservation , to conduct them to their own last natural end ; and what is wanting in them , god hath commanded man to take the care and charge over them : yea further , god hath given them some priviledges , as that they should take the benefit of a rest on the sabbath , that they should have some refreshing in their labours , thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn , that they should be priviledged from slaughter when they are breeding ; and god hath given them an ingenuity , to be taught what is fit for their condition . thus the horse learns his pace , remembers his way , as knowing that his last end is to be a traveller : thus is there a natural inclination in every thing , to conduct and direct it self in attaining its own last natural end . and surely god will be no less merciful to man in supplying him with such means as shall be necessary for his last supernatural end : the world was created for man ; the sun , the moon , and the stars , have their continual motion , for the fruitfulness of the earth , and the preservation of this sublunary world ; and all nature tends to the use , service and ministery of man : man is the end of nature , and therefore man cannot end in nature , or have a natural end , by the course of this world , and the continual succession , he knows it can be but a passage , he sees the bounds of this natural world , the material heavens ; and then he concludes , that needs above this natural world , there must be a supernatural world ; thus over and above his natural knowledge , which consists in a rational discourse , he findes in himself wonder and admiration , which may serve him for his knowledge of that supernatural world : thus he still looks up to heaven , and by his aspiring thoughts , his hopes , and expectation , he seems to cast up an anchor to heaven , and wants onely wings to fly up , or a ladder to climb , and that blessed spirit which came down in the form of a dove , supplies him with wings of grace and the cross of christ serves for his ladder , or for mathematical jacobs staff , to take ●…he height , or to fathom the depth and breadth of gods most hidden secrets , while his own reason doth a little direct or prepare him for hi●… christian faith ; for it serves as a ground or foundation upon which the beautiful building of grace may be erected , and therefore there was first a state of nature , which continued until moses , then succeeded the law , and the gospel . i will further adde by the actions and carriage of man , it appears , that god hath placed in him some majesty and magnificence , that he justly claimes more then a naturall descent ; for if you take the elements , they are moved by their own naturall qualities , and their highest ayme and intent , is only to preserve their naturall beeing ; so the dumb creatures ( consisting only of elements ) they run the same course , and have no higher ambition , for they have no choyce , freedom , or liberty , in their actions , but are carried according to the strength of their own naturall inclinations ; only man by a prerogative of his condition hath a freedom of will , and is no way ty●…d to the temper or inclination of elements , but bids defiance to nature in her own denne , professing sanctity and holiness , renouncing lusts , luxury , pride , sloath , and other carnall corruptions , and uncleanness , to which nature wholly inclines ; and being lord of the creatures , he will not be ranked with them ; he scorns to die like a beast , and seems to claim and challenge a more excellent condition , then to lie in the grave , or to be dissolved into dust ; though his body may for a time pay the wages of sin , yet his soul which is the better part of man , neither sees nor feels corruption : and in gods due time , both body and soul shall be again reunited together , in a glorious resurrection . man having once made choyce of his actions , and performed them , he then reflects upon them , reviews , and begins to examin them ; when the check of his own conscience upon the committing of sin ( be it ever so secret ) gives him assurance , that he must be accomptable for his actions , the joy and comfort that he receives in doing good , makes him confident that he shall not lose his reward ; the rare and admirable operations of the soul , which exceed all naturall perfections , do plainly demonstrate , that they cannot proceed from nature , for then they should not ascend higher then nature ; as the water will not rise higher then the springhead : and finding these effects in ourselves , we are confident that god who ordained man to a supernaturall end , the same god , in his own goodness and providence , will not faile to supply man with supernaturall means , to conduct him to that supernaturall end ; for the means must ever be answerable , and of like condition with the end ; otherwise they will not serve to conduct him . as the sun is discerned by his own light ; so god must only be known by the revelation of himself . thus in nature , there may be some preparatives to a true christian faith , or we may be some way predisposed , and thereby made more capable to receive the infusion of grace ; and this i have proved both by our naturall knowledge , and by our morall actions : yet this will not suffice ; but it is necessary that god himself should reveale himself , and adde his by the act and exercise of the understanding , from the will proceeds amor , as the heart is the fountain of all affection ; and thus is there some resemblance of the blessed trinity , in the manner and form of mans apprehension . come we then to look into gods attributes , which some distinguish in this manner , that most of the attributes are operative , some are not operative , yet make for the perfection of the deity , but there are none passive : such as they conceive are not operative , are the eternity of god , in respect of his continuance , the ubiquity of god in respect of extention , the immutabillity of god in respect of duration , the constancy of his will , as ever making choice of the best , and so makes for the certainty of his resolution , &c. and these men are thus misled , because they conceive the greatest perfection to consist in variety ; and because amongst the creatures , such accidences as proceed from the matter , suppose all quantities , they are not operative ; but truly i am otherwise perswaded ; for i think that there is but one best , and that one best must be gods nature , for better it is to be operative , then not to be operative ; god is actus purus , nothing but pure form , and it best befits and resembles the nature of spirits , which are alwayes in action ; for to be not operative , it comes neerer the condition of stocks and blocks ; which in doing nothing , seem to incline to idleness and sloth ; and if once it be acknowledged , that ▪ all gods attributes are operative , then better it is to be fruitfull then barren , rather to produce some fruits , then none at all ; and these fruits to be rather permanent then transient ; and these attributes concern the godhead it self ; for as god is the first efficient cause , so is he the last finall , to whom all is directed . now of all the attributes of god , to speak according to the manner of men , the understanding and the will are the most excellent , and have the most wonderfull operations ; they are likewise the most inward , and intimate such as cannot be discerned , but by gods own relation of himself ; and thus it fals out with man , who was created according to gods image , we can easily judge of mans strength , of his age , and other ab●…lities ; but for his understanding and his will , they are most private and secret to himself ; and i pray here note , that philosophers do seldom reckon the understanding , and the will of god amongst his other attributes , but they do usually supersede them , as if they were eminencies , and excellencies in god above the ordinary attributes , for though they were all eternall , and equally perfect in god ; yet did they not alwayes appear in their effects ▪ and therein god did moderate them , and qualifie them , as seemed best to his wisdom ; for before the creation , gods power did not appear in the effects ; gods providence in governing the world did not appear , when as yet there was no world to be governed ; the justice of god could not appear in any outward act , when as yet no sin was commited ; the mercies of god could not appear in relieving miseries , when as yet there was nothing but god himself ; all these attributes of god , though they were eternally in god , and every way alike perfect in regard of virtue and efficacy ; yet in the outward act , in respect of the effects , god appointed his time , when first to manifest them , and that according to measure and proportion ; for god did not work according to the uttermost of his power , he could have created many infinite worlds , with the same ease and facility ; so then these attributes , which concern the creatures , there was a space when they had not their act , and exercise . but above all others , there are two principall the understanding and the will ; from the understanding proceeds knowledge , from the will proceeds love ; god knowing himself to be infinitly good , the love of himself must likewise be infinite ; and these have this peculiar property , to reflect upon god himself ; so that god is the object of his own knowledge , and the object of his own love . here then we may expect admirable operations , more then of his other attributes , for they look outwardly upon the creatures , but these look inwardly , and reflect upon god himself , and are operative , and produce wonders ; his other attributes doe not so nearly and inwardly concern him , as his understanding and his will do , ( as for example ) god cannot be the object of his own justice to punish himself , god cannot be the object of his own mercy ; for to be in case and condition of relief , it implies imperfection ; god is not the object of his own omnipotency , for he cannot work upon himself , to adde any new perfection to himself , or to make any change , or al●…eration in his own nature ; so for gods providence , though he governs the world yet he doth not thereby regulate himself . thus the attributes which concern the creatures , though they were eternall , and equally perfect in god , yet they did not appear in their objects , before god began his creation . but it is necessary that god should ever know himself , and his own perfection ; and thus knowing himself by the act , and exercise of his own understanding , which is alwayes operative , and not barren but fruitfull ; needs he must beget in a spirituall , and most excellent manner , verbum in intellectu , a word in his understanding , every way answerable to his understanding , for here god imparts himself quoad ultimum posse , and so he doth not in the creatures ; and by this word , knowing himself to be infinitely good , needs there must proceed from the word , and from the understanding , amor infinitus , an infinite love , answerable to the measure and proportion of the goodness ; and these are the proper fruits of gods understanding , and his will from all eternity , and what is from all eternity , is every way infinite ; and can be no less then god himself ? that is a person in the deity , which persons have no difference between themselves , but onely in respect of the act of generation and procession ; so that god without the act of knowing himself , and loving himself , he could not subsist one minute , but he subsisted many infinite ages , and was alike perfect in himself , before the creatures were made . so then here is the difference , other attributes of god , produce the creatures of god ; but his understanding ▪ and his will , being inward and reflecting upon himself , they produce persons in the godhead ; which notwithstanding we must imagin not in a carnall , and in an humane , or sensuall manner ; as if persons should be circumscribed with time , place , circumstances , and other differences , but in a most spirituall , and a most excellent manner , as all things in god , are incomprehensible , so is the generation of this word , and the procession of this spirit , and the personality in the deity ; thus as god is his own beginning , subsists of himself , preserves and continues himself ; so he must be his own end , and his attributes must tend to himself . these are those inward and secret jewels , which are lockt up , and inclosed within the cabinet of the deity , such as are not alwayes visible ; for they are not kept , or to be seen in the outward shop , or magazin of the creatures , as other attributes of god are ; but the understanding and the will of god , they are most inward and secret , such as god himself must reveale , as amongst our selves , the thoughts and intentions of man , must onely be discovered by man himself . yet we are confident in this , that the fruit of gods understanding , and his will being in god himself , they can be no less , then god himself , ( i. e. ) severall persons in the deity , which god himself hath been pleased to reveale . so then there is a difference between the attributes of god , and the act and exercise of those attributes ; for gods omnipotency is not alwayes creating , gods justice is not alwayes punishing ; and many infinite ages past , before there was a creation ; and this was necessary , that the creatures might know their distance , and how inconsiderable they were in respect of god , who was alike perfect and absolute without them ; and god himself making choyce of his own instant for their creation , did thereby manifest , that he was a most free agent ; and the creatures wholly depended upon him , both for their beginning and all other circumstances accompanying ; while before their creation , god wanted not a greater and a more excellent imployment , in the eternall and spirituall generation of his son , and the procession of his spirit , for these were from all eternity . god in his own understanding must ever know himself ; and knowing himself to be infinitely good , he must therefore infinitely love himself ; and these must ever work ad ultimum posse , and because they look inwardly ; therefore they produce persons , and not creatures , which creatures are the works of his free-will ; and may subsist or not subsist at his pleasure ; and are qualified as he shall dispose ; and have their beginning , as he shall appoint : so then here is the difference betwixt his understanding and his will , from his other attributes , for these look ad intra , and therefore produce persons in the deity ; whereas his other attributes look ad extra , and therefore produce only creatures of the deity . i will yet give an other instance , whatsoever man receives in this world , whether in respect of soul and body , whether for food or rayment , as there is nothing in man , which he hath not by the free gift of god ; all these are the fruits of gods attributes ; but when i come to the last end , and perfection of man , which consists in a beatificall vision , or in a large measure and extent of gods knowledge , together with a most perfect union , love , and conformity with god , these seem to have reference to the persons in the deity ; for the vision hath reference to the word in gods understanding and mans conformity to god , hath reference to that love of god , which proceeds from the understanding ; therefore these last perfections of man , coming neerer the persons in the deity , and more representing them , are therefore of a more excellent condition , then the fruits of his other attributes ; so that which makes mans supreme and eternall happiness , it is a compliance , as with the attributes of god in generall ; so more immediately with the severall persons in particular , by a beatificall vision , and a wonderfull love and union with the deity . and thus it is in all spiritual substances , the understanding and the will are the chief and principal faculties ▪ and have the most powerful operations : which truly may a little signifie and intimate how eminent and wonderful they are in god. and wherein natural reason shall object any thing against this mystery , still i will appeal from natural reason in particular , to natural reason in general ; which , acknowledging god to be infinite , doth together acknowledge him to be incomprehensible : for nature in general hath naturally placed in man wonder and admiration , that so nature in particular might be assured , that there is something which exceeds her power , and is above the reach and apprehension of man , yet no way contrary to reason , but far transcending and exceeding reason , and not to be hedged and bounded within the compass of mans brain , or the circumference of a natural world , for hitherto mans natural reason extends , and no further . this is not mine own private opinion , though from the creation ▪ whole mankinde hath ever had the same light of naturall reason , together with the socinians ; yet was there never any nation or religion in the world , which did content themselves only with naturall reason ; but some things they had in religion , as the objects of wonder and admiration and therefore not the philosophers ( who were the curious inspectors of nature , and did in effect distill nature , as in a limbeck , & reduce her to her first principles ) these men were not the divines or priests to intend matters of religion , and the service of god , but poets who had their fictions , and their strange historicall narrations ; these were imployed in their sacrifices ; wherein you shall observe , that their fictions and falshoods , many of them , did arise from a mistake , and a misreport of the jewes ; for the offering beasts in sacrifice , according to gods command ; and finding happy success therein , this gave occasion to the heathen , to worship beasts , and so commit idolatry ; whereunto the father of lyes the divell ( who was not then tyed , nor bound in chaines , as since he hath been by the conquest of christ ) being then permitted by god , gave h●…s best ( or rather worst ) help and furtherance , with lying oracles , and strong del●…sions ▪ seduce the hea●…hen . thus we shall finde that many miraculous historie ; in scripture , are a little resembled in the fictions of poets , enoch in the state of nature ; elias in the state of the law being translated , m●…ght give occasion , that the heathen did make their gods to ●…e planets and stars in the heavens , as jupiter , mars , venus , 〈◊〉 c so for those miraculous actions , which befell the jewes in their passage out of egypt ▪ in the time of their judges , and their law ; the gentiles hearing a confused fame thereof , being strangers , they might mistake in circumstances ; yet thereby take occasion to fasten the like upon their own fictious gods. and whereas some use this as an argument , that naturall reason is a sufficient guide to direct us in our morall actions ; and therefore might serve the like for the whole knowledge of religion ; this is an utter mistake , and overthrowes it self , because naturall reason might suffice to direct our actions between man and man , and is only fitted thereunto , therefore it cannot reach to the mysteries between god and man , which are of a higher condition ; neither yet to conduct us to a supernatural end , which is of a higher degree ; then the spring or fountain of nature , can reach unto ; so that if morall actions must have the tincture of grace , they must be ( as i may so say ) christened before they come within compass of a religious worship , and service of god ; for the morall actions of the heathen , they were but splendida peccata . and thus farre , through the great mercy of god , i have waded into the secret of this great mysterie ; and i hope without any offence , either to god , or gods people ; wherein , if i have sinned , god knowes it is out of ignorance ; and i do humbly begge pardon : and i may here truly profess , that unless my memory , and the whole course of my studies do utterly faile me , i have not written a word , which is not comformable , and agreeable to the true grounds , and rules of philosophy , and most consonant to naturall reason ; whereas on the other side , if i should examin the socinians infidelity , i would make it plainly appear , that they denying our mysterie ; they stand like men amazed ; and cannot pitch upon any certain truth , but run headlong to their own confusion ; so that they may oppose , contradict ▪ and pull down what others have built , but they shall never be able to lay any sure ground , for their own new foundation ; and i am very confident that more absurdities , incongruities , impossibilities in philosophy , must be admitted in their new frame of opinions , and phansies , then ever they shall be able to alleage against the old foundation of catholick doctrin , and religion . thus having spoken of the mystery in it self , i will now come to outward testimonies , and produce sufficient warrants for our faith , as in the course of justice , the security that a man gives for the payment of a debt , or the performance of an action , should alwayes be of greater worth , then the thing it self ; thus if i were to borrow money , i would bring a pledge of a greater value then the money , that so it might serve as an abundant assurance for my repayment ; or if i had not a pledge , then i would enter into a double bond , to be bound in forty pounds , for the payment of twenty : yet sometimes it fals out so , that we have not a pledge , or being bound in a double bond ; yet our wants may be such , as we may faile in the payment of a single ; and therefore i conclude , that it is easier to enter into a double bond , then to pay the single : but now in respect of god , all things are of like ease , in regard of his omnipotency ; yet if we speak of god according to the weakness of mans apprehension ; we may say without offence , that it is easier for god to speak , then to doe , for actions are of greater difficulty then words ; if then god shall bring actions for the confirmation of words , this is abundans cautela , there can be no exceptions against it ; or that ever we should require any greater assurance . speaking of the warrant of our faith , i will not here alleage the proof of scripture , or the inward testimony of the spirit ; for my intention is to deal with the carnall and naturall man ▪ if we discern in him who first taught , and revealed these mysteries , such extraordinary wisdom , in discerning mens thoughts , in fortelling future , voluntary and contingent events , it must argue a supernaturall knowledge in things naturall ; if we discern in him such extraordinary power in working miracles ; miracles of all sorts , upon all severall subjects , the heavens , the elements , the dumbe creatures , the blinde , the lame , the dead , the devils themselves ; and these at all severall times , before his birth , in his birth , in his infancy , in his youth , at the time of his passion , and after his last resurrection ; and these not done in secret , but in the sight of multitudes and thousands , all testifying the truth of things done , the jewes acknowledge , the gentiles confess , the apostles proclaim , the evangelists record , many millions of martyrs seal with their bloud ; and all the world with joynt consent and harmony beares witness , seen by our fore-fathers , and left unto us together with their memory , for the salvation of our own soules ; then these undoubted miracles , must argue a supernaturall power in things naturall ; which if reason confess ( as herein she is convinced ) that the wisdom and power of the teacher , was supernaturall ; then must there be some supernaturall object , though not appearing in nature , yet answerable and ag●…eeable to this supernaturall knowledge and power ; here then at length , we have opened a gap , to let in all the mysteries of our christian faith and religion ; yet l●…st we should be left to our own conjectures , and presumptions , lest the hardness of our heart should not easily condescend to things above our reach and capacity ; therefore truth beares evidence to truth , the wonders of nature to the mysteries of grace ; as his deeds and actions were much above nature , so it cannot seem strange , if his doctrine and precepts far exceed our naturall understanding , for his words , as well as his actions , were much above nature ; and therefore did a●…gue a pow●…r above nature , which is god himself ; christ jesus god and man , the second person in trinity , who came down and took our nature upon him , to satis●…ie for our sins ; he it is , that hath revealed these mysteries ; that so by faith and belief , as our first fathers fell from god by unbelief and presumption , we might come unto him , and through his mercy obtain our everlasting salvation . here i did examine all the miracles , and the most remarkable things in the old testament ; and first i did reduce all the ages of the world to the deluge , where i did infer by many probabilities , what past before the deluge ; for that it could not stand with the mercies of god who created all things to begin with such an heavy judgement , as an universall deluge ; and because we have no other records of those times , but the testimony of scripture ▪ i did therefore produce necessary and demonstrative arguments for the proof of the deluge , and of scripture , together with some remarkable tokens , i did insist upon , which must needs point out some former times before the deluge : here i made good proof , that the eastern parts of the world , must needs be the first parts inhabited ; i shewed the greatness of their monarchies , their continuance and dissolution ; i shewed how all other nations issued from them ; and how they borrowed their customes and manners : i shewed how the hebrew was the originall tongue of all the eastern languages , by the roots , and by the proprieties of that tongue . i did instance in all the ancient monuments ; and made it appear , that the world could not be elder then the time related by moses for the creation . for the histories before christ , i did use torniellus , pererius , salianus , and all the rest ; for the time since christ , i had such authors , as were extant : but especially , i did rely most upon baronius , and bibliotheca patrum ; and i do heartily wish , that some younger man would undertake that task , for i am aged , and my short time which remains , cannot suffice for such a work ; besides i have the infirmities of old age , my memory failes me ; and i am past all imployments , neither can i so put off all naturall passions , but i confess it doth grieve me ▪ to thinke that heretofore having alwayes liv'd in great plenty ( god reward my founders for it ) that now i should be reduc'd to such poverty , and wants , but i hope god will raise up some other to compose such a history ; and leaving that task for them , i will now only instance in the miracles of scripture , for confirmation of mysteries ; and first for the truth of scripture , it is a demonstrative proof to me , that it should be the most ancient of all writings ; and many ages exceeding the heathen authors , or poets ; and this is an undoubted argument of truth , for truth is the most ancient , and that which doth accompany truth , that others should give testimony to truth , and none to oppose it ; for in these ancient poets , we find somethings borrowed from the jewes , which makes for the confirmation thereof , and none ( in effect ) did ever oppose them ; for had they so done , surely we should have heard of their writings , as we do of their warres , and their histories ; and no doubt there were many enemies , which would not have omitted such an opportunity ; at this day the jewes , the christians , the mahumetans , all do acknowledge scriptures , without any manner of contradiction ; for in effect the heathen are utterly vanished , and not to be seen , or to stand in opposition . it is true , that at this day heathen there are , but they no way partake with the ancient heathen , neither in the same gods , nor in the number of their gods , nor in the manner of their worship ; only like upstarts , because they must have a religion , ( for they cannot ●…ook upon heaven , without some kinde of adoration ) therefore every one frames a religion to himself , and according to his own phansie , either agrees or differs from others . but because the blessed trinity hath been only expresly revealed in the new testament , i will therefore insist only in the miracles of the new testament ; and reserve other proofes and evidences for confirmation of other mysteries , that we may take all by degrees , and not spend our whole stock and store at once ; so then to instance only in the miracles of the new testament ; if these had fallen out only in the person of christ , there might have been cause of suspicion ; but the whole law was only a preparation to his coming such types , figures , and prophesies ; and in a word , the scope and intent of the law had no other relation ; and this will appear , for that it seems scarce reasona●…le , that god should be served with the slaughter and offering up of unreasonable beasts , had they not relation to the sacrifice of his only son ; and such infinite variety of strange ceremonies , would never have been admitted , had they not pointed out some extraordinary holiness to succeed ; this did likewise appear in the cessation of the law ; for about a full age before the coming of christ , there was a cessation of prophets ; and neither did god appear , either by speciall messengers , or by miraculous victories : that the minds of men not being withdrawn , nor having any other solace or comfort , might wholly intend the expectation of the messias whose immediate forerunner was saint john baptist ; and therefore whatsoever is ascribed unto him tends unto christ , as being his forerunner , for he gives testimony to christ , and that three severall times in this one first chapter of saint john verse the . when the priests and levits sent unto him , to know whether he were the messias ? he answered no , but pointed out christ , the latchet of whose shooe he was not worthy to unloose . secondly , when he saw christ verse . presently he confesseth , behold the lambe of god , behold him , who taketh away the sins of the world . thirdly , he gives the like testimony to his disciples concerning christ verse . that so they might take occasion to leave him and to follow christ : now these are the prerogatives of saint john baptist. that his birth was foretold by an angell , in a miraculous manner , by a vision at the time of sacrifice ; at whose conception a heavy judgement be●…ell his father zachary the priest , then offering the sacrifice ; for he was strucken with dumbness , untill the imposition of his name john , signifying the grace of god , which was a most remarkable signe and token of the cessation of the law , and the inchoation of the gospell ; he was conceived in a barren wombe ; and in that wombe did honour and salute christ in a virgin wombe ; so in the wombe being a forerunner of christ , he began to do his office and duty , as after in the course of his life , he did truly perform it : for his baptisme was a preparation to the baptisme of christ ; and though he was most innocent , strict , austere , mortified , and devout , yet god made him the preacher of repentance , thereby to shew the necessity of repentance , even to the most righteous ; and though he wrought no miracles , lest he should be taken for christ , yet his sanctity and holiness was such , that no less then the levites doubted whether he were the messias or not ; and therefore sent messengers unto him from jerusalem to be rightly informed ; he had the honour to baptize christ , and in that baptisme the three persons in the deity , did openly and manifestly discover themselves ; after this baptisme , he sent his own disciples to christ ; that by him they might be cathechised , and instructed in the wayes of salvation , while he himself had the honour to suffer martyrdom : and as in his life time , the priests and levites took him for the messias ; so after his death , his cursed murtherer herod , took the messias for saint john baptist , saying upon the fame of christs miracles , this is john baptist whom i beheaded , and works such wonders amongst the people . though the annunciation might seem strange , and only known to the blessed virgin ; and strange it did seem unto her , which occasioned that demand , quomodo fiet istud ? and therefore the angel addes as a motive , that the barren wombe of elizabeth had already conceived ; and then it must seem the less strange , if the virgin wombe should likewise conceive , and further to strengthen the faith of the parents , it was expedient and so ordered by gods providence , that the childe in the barren wombe , should express some joy at the approach of the childe in the virgin wombe , and there exhibit the first fruits of honour , and reverence to christ , now god in our flesh , that as he was prophesied to be a forerunner of christ ; so in the wombe he should begin to exercise his office , as hereafter he should point him out with his finger , ecce agnus dei , yet be the anunciation never so strange ; when in the birth of christ , the shepards shall be taught by angels , the wise men allured by a star , st. matth. and the cursed enemy manifesting his malice and fury , by the murther of innocents ; these give sufficient testimony to his admirable birth and nativity . though the infancy and childhood of christ might pass according to the usuall course of nature , thereby to shew the truth of his manhood , and the infirmity of our flesh ; yet at the age of yeers disputing with the doctors s. lu. . herein the power & wisdom of his godhead appears ; though we have only his own word for his dayes fast in the wilderness , mat. . mar. . luk. . yet when we find that he feeds with five loaves , and with seven loaves , mat. . mar. . luk. . joh. . mat. . mar. . and that it was not a fancy , or thing imaginary ; so many baskets of broken meat to be taken up : we conclude that his fasting was not for want , nor could he want delicates ; for ●…e turned water into wine , joh. . and as he had thus the command of the creatures ; so by his fasting and abstinence , it appears he had the command of himself , and of his own appetite . if any shall doubt of his dispossessing of devils , yet when it shall appear that the devils entred into the swine , and the swi●…e run into the sea , mat. . mar. . luk. . this makes it a truth undenyable ; so likewise that he cured one possessed of a devill , in the synagogue , mark. . and luk. . this was in the sight of all , who undoubtedly did examine the miracle ; so likewise that he cured all diseases ; and the rulers daughter among others , mat. . mar. . luk. . whose father was , vir fide dignus ; and therefore his testimony not to be refused . that he appeased a tempest on the sea , matt. . mark ▪ . luk ▪ . this might be ascribed to some naturall causes , but that joh. . he should walk upon the seas , and cause saint peter to do the like , by their trampling on the seas , it appears that the seas were under his command ; and in token thereof , the fish brought him a piece of silver in his mouth , to pay tribute , in acknowledgement of his soveraignty . luke . so likewise joh. . he giveth sight to him that was born blinde , as an undoubted token , that he was a second adam , and did work in us a regeneration , so mat. . mark. . luk. . he cured the withered hand on the ●…abbath , to signifie that charitable workes for the observation of that day , are as necessary as preaching ; thus lepers palsies , agues , fluxes of bloud ▪ blinde , lame , and all manner of diseases are cured ; and how the people were generally perswaded of him , appears by their pressing upon him to touch the hem of his garment ; how they let down the sick of the ●…alsie through the tiles , mat. . mar. . luk. . how they spread their garments by the way , singing hosanna , mat. . mar. . lu. . jo. . with such like exclamations . but what shall i need to insist in diseases , when it appears , that he raised up the dead , where all remedies and means did faile , and nature could no way concurre in the act ? matt. . mark. . luk. . there he raised the archisynagogues daughter . luk. . there he raiseth the wi●…owes son at naim ; then saint john the he raiseth up lazarus ; for the first of these , his very office gives credit to the testimony ; for the second he was then carrying to his grave ; look how many attended the corps , or did inhabite in the way , so many were witnesses of his raising again ; for the third which was lazarus , he was laid some dayes and some nights in the grave ; surely the sun and the moon , which cause the day and night , must needs testifie the truth of his death ; and himself for many yeers after , might assure us of his rising again . hereunto you may adde the manner of his own death , what speed was made ; how was the course of justice precipitated , that in one morning he should be apprehended , accused , examined , whipped , scourged , condemned , exposed to all contempts , with his crown of thorns , carry his own cross , and at noone be crucified , that there he should be nayled for the space of three houres ; and though his enemies had no power to break his bones , according to the prophesie , as they did the malefactors , yet what was more ( for that life did not consist in the breaking of bones ) they gave him a wound through the side into the heart ; as may appear ▪ because there issued forth bloud and water , which are not so usually found in the body , but only in the parts nearest the heart ; for that the excessive heat there dissolves the bloud into the first elements ; and thence you have water , and this water makes recompence , by cooling , and refreshing the heat ; so by a providence they mutually help each other ; and this bloud and water , did serve for the institution of our sacraments . being dead he was buryed in a new sepulcher , as he was conceived in a virgins wombe , lest they might say that some other dead body had risen ; a great stone was rowled over the sepulcher , because himself had prophesied , that he would rise again the third day ; watch and ward was kept about the sepulcher , as to prevent his disciples from coming thither to steal away his body ; so if it had been p●…ssible to hinder his resurrection , but being risen again , he did converse with his d●…sciples for forty dayes ; and then by his own power he ascended up in o heaven , in the sight of many thousands ; and because the eyes of men might faile , and that some might 〈◊〉 , that his ascension was onely out of sight and no further ; therefore ●…he a●…gels came down to testifie the truth of his ascension into heaven ; and according to christs command , the apostles continued at jerusalem , there to receive the holy ghost , who at the day and appointed time came down in a miraculous manner , in fiery cloven tongues , and wrought wonderful effects upon the apostles , not onely in their inward sanctifying their gift of tongues , and power of working miracles , all foretold , that as before his birth there were many preparatives for his coming , so af●…er his death the subsequent signs and wonders might give testimony to the forerunning miracles , and the truth of the doctrine confirmed by them . now at length to draw to a period , as s. john begins his gospel with the eternal generation of christ , wherein is implied the great mystery of the trinity ▪ so my self having shewed the doctrine of the church , and having a little expressed the mystery ▪ and thereby giving satisfaction to mans natural reason , though reason could not comprehend it ; and having in the last place produced many miracles above natural power , to confirm mysterie , above natural knowledg , as i began with the begining of s. john , so i will end with the conclusion of s. johns gospel as you shall finde in his last chapter , the last verse ; the words are these , and there are also many other things which jesus did , the which if they should be written every one , i suppose that even the world it self could not contai●… the books that should be written . some may conceive this speech to be a figure or metaphor of an high transcendent quality ; but i suppose it may be exactly and literally understood in this sense , that seeing the narural world is but a book , and that in every creature , or rather in every punctilio of the creature , as in every letter , word and syllable we reade gods wisdom , mercy , power , providence , &c. if hereunto you will adde christs miracles , which were above nature , and did presuppose nature , as being done in natural bodies , and though not offering violence to nature , yet being far above the reach and power of nature , and therefore therein nature did seem to suffer . seeing this supernatural power is much above nature , surely it may be truly said , that the natural world cannot contain those books which might be written of christs supernatural power , for they include nature , they exceed nature , they are over and above nature ; and therefore something must remain , which the natural world cannot contain . and this shall serve to have spoken of the great mystery of the most holy , blessed , and undivided trinity . thus i hope in god i have given satisfaction to mans reason●… in this great mystery of the trinity , that god never did nor could subsist one minute without the knowledge of himself , and love of himself , which being the acts and exercise of his understanding and his will , being inward and in the deity , and from all eternity , they can ●…e no less then god himself , for there is no accident in god , there is nothing in god but god. yet these being produced by the understanding and the will , needs they must have such a difference between themselves , as to make several persons in the deity , which is not so with the rest of gods attributes , for they look outwardly upon his works , and therefore onely produce the creatures : and though the blessed trinity do infinitely exceed mans capacity , yet doth it no more exceed , then all the rest of gods attributes do ; for they are all above reason , beyond reason , and infinitely transcending reason , but no way contrary to reason , and therefore they are the objects of our faith , in respect of gods knowledge revealed , and they are the objects of our admiration , in respect of our own natural ignorance . and so to conclude , persons being supposed in the deity , here is one step and degree towards the incarnation , for now we may with more confidence lay hold on a person in the deity , and cloth him with our nature and our flesh . sanctae & individuae trinitati sit omnis honor & gloria . amen . the wonderful incarnation . after the blessed trinity , i now come to the wonderful incarnation ; where i shall likewise speak some things by way of introduction . and here i must first enter a caveat , or a solemn protestation . though i do examine these mysteries by natural reason . i confess they are far transcending reason , above reason , beyond the reach of reason ; yet are they no way contrary to reason , nor opposite to gods attributes or actions , whereby they might seem improbable , much less impossible : for i confess that reason is so powerful in man , that it serves him for his guide and conductor ▪ as in his natural and civil actions , so partly in his religion ; for all the moral law , which is a great part of religion , is much squared out by natural reason : and it serves as a ground-work or foundation whereupon religion is built , and which makes a man capable of religion : for if he had onely sense , the●… he should be altogether sensless , and without any feeling of religion . it serves likewise as a ladder or stairs to ascend by degrees , from the creatures to the creator ; for whatsoever is good or commendable in them , adde an infinity thereunto , and then you may safely fasten it on their maker . suppose the beauty or power of the creatures , if to their small measure , you will adde an infinity , then you make them the prerogatives of god , who is most beautiful , most powerful &c. and even the small measure in the creatures tends chiefly , and principally redounds to the honour and praise of the maker . thus several waye●… reason plays the handmaid to religion , and though the mysteries of religion far transcend , yet they offer no violence , nor any way contradict the grounds and principles of reason , but both m●…y together consist ; yea they further each other , ●…nd give mutual testimonies to each other : for natural reason seeing the bounds of the natural world , it acknowledgeth a supernatural world to which it can conduce nothing , but wonder , astonishment , and admiration ▪ and in defect of our knowledge , reason gives way unto faith , and thence insers a necessity of grace , to sow the seeds of this supernatural faith in our natural hearts . if mans condition were wholly above reason , suppose angelical , then he should have his religion altogether by infusion , without any rational discourse , but being such as it is , surely both his reason and his senses must concur in his religion , his reason to strengthen his faith ( having first received satisfaction in her self ) then his senses must joyn in the service of religion , as memorials to his reason , to stir up and increase his devotion , and for the honor of gods worship and service , that god might be served like a god , with all decent ceremonies , with all rich and costly ornaments , while our sectaries , out of their sacrilegious ends , though otherwise under the colour of idolatry ) abandoning these , they do indeed rob god of a great part of his honor , though with the jews they do not murther christ , yet they can be content to share in his garments , to make him poor and naked , and both his servants and service contemptible . thus is my intent to give satisfaction to reason in the mysteries , onely i love to distrust my self , and therefore on my bare knees i do humbly desire god in his mercy , to grant , that i may not offend in prying too far into the secrets of god , they are above my reach , capacity and apprehension , onely so far forth as god hath revealed them , for his honor , and for the strengthning of our faith , i hope i may explain them , and therefore here i fall down in humility , prostrate my self , and humbly adore those great blessed mysteries , the ineffable trinity , the wonderful incarnation , which god hath revealed , the church hath received , whereof in our baptism we make our profession ; and god grant that we may all live and die in the true faith of gods holy catholick and apostolick church , without which there neither is , nor can be any salvation . see how credible things are in religion , as god created all things of nothing , and is the first efficient cause ; so undoubtedly he must be the final cause , to whom all things are directed : for being the most excellent good , he cannot so deprive himself , but he must be the end of all . thus all things tend to his glory . and as god hath done so much for the creatures , to make them of nothing , to preserve them from falling to nothing , to give them whatsoever is necessary or convenient for their beeing , no doubt but god will expect something from the creatures , that according to their abilities they should in some sort express their thankfulness . thus the sun , the moon , and the stars , do move as god first appointed them , they do not alter their course , they neither hasten nor slacken their motion : so it is with the elements and dumb creatures , they follow the course of their nature , according to that path wherein they were first put , they still keep their way , and do not offend ; and as from god they have their beeing and protection , so there is due from them unto god , a thankfulness in the acknowledging , and an obedience for their submission . this is the general case of all creatures , such as are here regulated by nature , they cannot offend , nor do otherwise then they do , but it hath pleased god to make some spiritual creatures , and to them he hath given a free-will , a liberty in the choice of their own actions , and so hath left it in their own power , either to stand with the help and assistance of his grace , or otherwise to fall and to transgress , being left to themselves , and god onely permitting them . this liberty of will was an excellent gif●… , for thereby it lay in their power , to confirm and settle what they had in being , and farther to improve their condition , and to enlarge their happyness in a greater measure ; but so it fell out , that it was the occasion of their fall and ruine . and first to insist in the angels , who were gods first creatures , and more spiritual then man , some of them stood , and became angels of light , and were confirmed in their happiness , and had some further and more honorable imployment in gods service , which did adde to the dignity of their condition , but many of them , choosing the worser part , fell of themselves , and their sin was pride and presumption , being made of nothing , yet they disliked their condition , wherein they were created , and began to conceive aspiring thoughts of exalting themselves above their condition , though they were the first created , and had great honor and dignity , according to their birthright . and this they attempted even against god , in despight of god , who made them of nothing , and from whom they held in courtesie what they had , and in whose power it lay , every minute to destroy them ; yet did they oppose god , and fain would subsist of themselves without god ▪ which was in effect to equal themselves to god , and to enter upon gods throne : therefore were they justly cast down , and became the most accursed , and had the most wicked imployment , in tormenting others , to be tormented themselves . all this scripture relates ; and by their punishment , it is made most credible , the work of creation , is a work of mercy , for thereby god imparts himself , and if any punishment do befal the creatures , it argues their sin and transgression in deserving it . for in the creation of the world , there is no mention made of hell , or of torments , these it should seem are of a later edition , and came in with the ill husbandman , who after the sowing of good corn , sows his own cockles and tares : and some conceive hell to be in the centre of the earth , as if god had found out a nook in the farthest distance from himself , to make it a prison , or a house of correction , and a place of torments for such as are damned . whether to supply the number of gods elect , in lieu of those angels that fell , or whether out of the goodness of god , to shew the greatness and excellency of the work of creation , in the variety of his creatures ( which i rather conceive ) it pleased god to create man not altogether so spirituall as angels ; but to consist alike , both of the corporeall , and incorporeall world , as a medium between both , and therefore partakes of both ; thus it is in the contiguous elements ; the water partakes with the aire , partakes with the earth ; with the aire , in respect of moysture , and thinness ; with the earth , in respect of coldness and weight : so the moon which is the lowest star , and neerest the earth , it partakes with the sublunary bodies , as it is alwayes increasing or decreasing , and daily changing her countenance ; but as she doth still return the same , and hath brightness and light , and a wonderfull operation upon these inferiour bodies ; therein she partakes with the rest of the stars , appearing glorious in the firmament ; and such i conceive to be the state of man , who is a middle creature , and partakes with the beasts , in respect of his nourishment and sense ; and partakes with the angels , in respect of his intellectuals and freewill ; there must be then in man , a knowledge answerable to his condition , it must arise from sense , or at least proposed in a sensible way , then doth his understanding elevate it , and put it into a spirituall habite ; and thus is the knowledge of man , neither wholly plunged or drowned in sense , nor yet so resined as that it becomes wholly spirituall ; and this i take to be no little hinderance , and impediment in our knowledge of heavenly things , wherein sense should wholly be abandoned , and our intellectuals carry the sway , and over-rule sense ; we must therefore as farre as we can , lay aside sense , and wholly intend intellectuals : so for the freedom of mans will , which is not to be inticed with the pleasures , surfets , and riots of the flesh , or of sense ; but rather to be moderated by the rule of reason , and by divine precept , to be obedient to the spirit . thus in respect of the liberty of will , it pleased god to take the same course with man , as he did with the angels , to make triall of his obedience ; and man followed the ill example of the angels in transgressing gods lawes ; only with this difference , that the sin of the angels was greater then mans . first , because the angels had greater graces and intellectuals then man ; and therefore they might have better prevented , and consequently their offence was greater in the transgression of gods law●… secondly , their sins were spirituall , as pride and presumption , which stand more in opposition to god ; and are more hatefull unto him , then carnall sins of gluttony . thirdly , the angels were neither outwardly nor inwardly tempted , whereas m●…n was both outwardly tempted by the angels that fell , and inwardly by the concupiscence , and appetite of his own flesh , and that cunningly by degrees ; first the weaker vessell the woman is tempted ; now god did not forbid the woman ; and she mighr be ignorant of gods command ; the woman whom god gave to man for his helper , she tempts her husband ; and , there being between them all the bonds of love , he could not but make a conscience to suspect the wife of his own bosom , flesh of his own flesh , and bone of his own bones ; so he might conceive , that as god had given him all the fruits of the earth ( one tree only excepted ) so now as an addition , his wife procured this t●…ce of knowledge , as part of her portion . that god should put man to a tryall , we must not call him to an account , how shall the vessell say to the potter , why mad'st thou me thus ? this seems very reasonable and just , that as god hath given all unto man , so god should require something from man ; namely , his thankfulness and obedience , and that it should be in such a kinde ; alass , all is as nothing in respect of god ; but the triall in effect , was only an instance , whether man could adhere to the flesh , or the spirit ? especially god forbidding the fruit , and man making choyce of the flesh , he therefore became liable to the miseries of the flesh ; which as it is composed of earth , so in a naturall course it is to be dissolved into earth ; and so man becomes lyable to death . that the forbidden fruit should be the tree of knowledge ; how many fruits and plants are there , which upon an instant intoxicate the brain , and bereave man of understanding ? then why may not other fruits and plants , refresh the understanding , and by generating good spirits inlighten it and quicken the apprehension ? is there not an eye-bright which serves in stead of spectacles to clear the sight ? hereunto you must adde gods speciall appointment , and ordinance ; who as he can do all things without means , so he may do all things with meanes , according to his own good will and pleasure . thus all things are most rationall , and stand with the grounds of wisdom , though they may seem otherwise to the socinian , who may be here convinced by his own reason ; for as a memoriall and a remarkable token , and relique thereof , this sin of our first parents hath wrought upon their posterity , for whole mankinde in succession , runs in the same pathes ; there is not a man in the world , but offends in carnall sins , either by abusing gods creatures to his luxury and riot , not taking them in moderation ; or in generall ▪ that the flesh is not obedient to the spirit ; so together with the sin , and our originall corruption , ( which we derive from our parents ) the flesh holds on the same course in opposing , and usually prevailing against the spirit , notwithstanding ▪ gods law to the contrary . if you think it strange , that the sin had not been some greater sin , consider the infancy of the world ; here were no houses to be blown up with gunpowder ; here could be no publick m●…ssacres , nor private assasines ; here was no place for oppression , or injustice ; here were no infants ; or orphans to be plundered ; no churches to be demolished , or sacriledge to be practised ; here could be no adultery or incest ; here could be no poysoning , no treachery , no perjury ; there could be no atheism , or infidelity ; god had newly created them , and as yet the world was unpeopled ; onely there was the breach of gods command , in taking the pleasure of a delicious fruit ; and thereby the flesh prevailing against the spirit . in this triall of mans obedience the same cursed angel , who was his own destruction , being now forsaken of god he became desperate ; and whether out of his hatred to god ▪ or his envy to man , he begins to tempt and seduce man ; and not appearing in his own shape , for then he might have easily been discovered ; he takes upon him the shape of a serpent ; and inticeth the weaker vessel , the woman to break that only commandement , which god had prescribed ; this was done in the infancy of the creation , when adam and eve might happily be ignorant , whether the rest of the creatures were rationall or irrationall ? whether they were dumbe , or spake a language ? they might see that their works , and all their naturall actions were very agreeable to reason ; and the creatures having all the instruments of speech , why might they not be supposed to have the free use , and exercise of speech , as well as man ? and for other things , they could speak nothing by their own experience ; we have heard of monsters of men , whom by their shape and form , you could hardly know to be men ; yet had they the use of reason . there was a fish taken in the time of hen. . so like a man , that fishermen were mistaken , and did conceive him to be a man indeed ; certainly without triall and experience , which our first parents could not have so immediately upon the creation , it was easie for them to mistake : i should never believe that parots and pyes should speak so distinctly , were it not that i find it by proofe . but not to trouble you with every circumstance , the angels did sin spiritually in their pride and presumption ( sins spirituall answerable to their condition ) as they are wholly spirits ; man subsisting of flesh , sinned carnally in tasting the forbidden fruit ; and therein his flesh prevailed over his reason in breaking gods command : only some of the angels sinned , and they were punished accordingly ; but the first parents of mankinde sinned , and in them according to the course of our own ordinary justice , their whole race and posterity was to suffer ; but the punishment was small , for they had the benefit of repentance , whereby they might not only have remission ; but likewise through the mercies of god , and the merits of christ , they might attain a greater degree of happiness , then was at first allotted unto them : and for that punishment of death , which god enacted by a statute law , statutum est hominibus semel mori , alas it is but the transition to a better world , whereby we take the possession of that , whereof we are not now so capable ; and therefore it should be a great part of our desires , cupio dissolvi & esse cum christo. thus after the fall of angels , god having given the like freedom of will unto man , in pleased god likewise to make tryall of his obedience in giving him the free use of all the rest of his creatures , only forbidding one fruit , the tree of knowledge , which might be seen , but not tasted ; whereby might appear , whether gods command , or mans inordinate appetite , were the more powerfull in man ? or whether man subsisting of flesh , and spirit , which of these should be predominant ? whether man being placed between the blessed angels , and dumbe beasts , should by his abstinency and conformity to god , draw neerer to the angelicall state , and become more spirituall ? or by his carnall uncleanness , giving way to his appetite , and gluttony , he should fall down to the sensuality of beasts ? that whatsoever he lusted after , he should not deny himself , what his own eyes , and his carnall concupiscence should offer unto him , he should greedily imbrace it ; and thus by the tasting of the forbidden fruit , which the socinians conceive to be but a small offence , there is implyed the great opposition between the flesh and the spirit . now for the truth and demonstration , that man did offend , it shall appear by the punishment ; for i have already proved by undenyable arguments , that man is fallen from his first integrity , and perfection ; and that the state of the world is much changed and altered , since the creation ; that many things have , and do daily befall man , which can be no less , then the punishments of sin , and the just effects of gods vengeance ; that man himself by his fearfulness and naturall uncleanness , seemes to acknowledge a guilty conscience , and himself to be justly condemned . this i have already proved ; and i set forth a book to that purpose about years since : the title of the book is , the fall of man , or the fall of adam from paradise , proved by naturall reason , wherein i do not only give satisfaction to reason ; but i do plainly evince it by many naturall proofs ; i consess i cannot do the like for other mysteries , but only for that alone , because it comes nearer our naturall state and condition , while other mysteries are far above our reach , and concern the state of another world ; but the fall and corruption of nature must manifestly , and demonstratively appear in the effects and punishment of sin ; and therein the ground and foundation of socinianism , is utterly dissolved ; and though since that time , many of their books have been vented , and published ; yet i never heard that the scope and intent of that book , was ever so much as questioned ; which i am ready still to make good , and to justifie now in my old age , though my strength , memory , and intellectuals do a little faile me , i thank god for it . man being fallen from his first integrity , as god would not utterly destroy him , so neither would he suffer him to continue in a sinfull state and condition : look what distance there is between heaven and earth , between life and death ; such and so great is the distance and opposition between corrupted nature and grace , therefore needs there must be a regeneration , and a redemption of man ; but whether this should be done without means , only by gods omnipotency , as was the act of creation , therein we doubt ; it is true , that in the creation no means could be used , ( for then there was nothing but god ) yet notwithstanding in the creation it self as soon as god had created the confused mass of the heavens and the earth out of nothing ; then immediately he useth this generall mass , as a means for producing particulars , producat terra herbam virentem , pro ducant aquae reptile , and that light which was created the first day , did serve to make the sun and the stars the fourth day ; and in the constituted course of nature , there is nothing done without meanes , the sap and fatness of the earth , together with the sunshine , and influence of the heavens , ( god appointing , protecting , concurring , and blessing his own means ) serve for our fruitfulness , and to continue nature in her own kind : thus in religion , god hath instituted sacraments and rites ; then certainly the same god , who is ever so constant in the uniformity of his works ( for that he doth ever make choyce of the best ; and therefore is not uncertain , or wavering in the constancy of his own resolutions ) he would use means in the work of mans redemption , as well as in the preservation of the world ; for god out of his infinit love , desiring to impart himself , as he gives a beeing , whereby creatures made of nothing , may together subsist with himself ; so they subsisting to honour them the more , he refuseth not their help , but useth them as means , that they should together cooperate with himself . thus in all naturall works god useth meanes , and why not in supernaturals ? it is most credible , that the same wise god observes the same wise course , for the effecting of his own will ; nor can this disparage god , for the means are none other , but such as god himself doth appoint ; thus is god the beginning , the end , and the meanes , that god may be all in all . thus it appears , that meanes must be used to purchase our redemption ( i. e. ) that a price or ransome must be paid for our sin , but where should we procure this ransom ? if we have it not of our own , where shall we borrow it ? who will be bound for us , or become our surety ? it is true that god hath locked up in the bowels of the earth ( as it were in natures coffers ) great treasures of gold , silver , precious stones , minerals ; and these serve to make our coyn , which carries the price of all things ; whereby these worldly commodities are bought , and sold in the market ; and these will serve to pay for the ransom of princes , or to corrupt magistrates , and to buy their consciences ; or for any other worldly or finister imployment : and answerable hereunto , god hath his coyn in the materiall heavens ; his golden sun , his silver moon ; and as the chimists observe , there is not a planet , which hath not a speciall influence upon some metalls . thus do gods treasures in the heavens cause the generation of ours in the bowels of the earth ; but alas , all these are temporary , the rust doth consume them ; and therefore they are not currant mony to purchase eternity ; neither yet do they serve in the exchange , and remission of sins . after the metals , we will consider the vegetatives , the beauty , and sweetness of fair and delicious flowers ; the odoriferous , and aromaticall fruits , the pretious drugs , and all whatsoever else the earth doth afford ; these may very well be natures incense , or sacrifice to god ; but alass , their odours do vanish , like vapours ; and cannot wash away the spots , and cleanse the uncleanness of sin . after the vegetatives , we come to the beasts , such as have motion and sense ; and in them by their slaughter and sacrifice in the mosaicall law , we finde the just deserts , and rewards of our sin , that death is the wages of sin ; so that god in the law , did institute sacrifices to betoken the truth of things to succeed ; for it appears that the spots and staines of sin have so far defiled , and made such a deep impression in man , that they cannot be washed away , but by the effusion of bloud , it is bloud and bloud only , that must serve to scoure them . from beasts come we to man , for whom the whole world was created , and in whom the whole world did transgress ; and having now found out the principall party , we must lay hold on him , he is our prisoner ; and untill we proceed first against him , we cannot touch upon the accessaries ▪ death being the wages of sin , therefore man must dye : but seeing the sin was of infinite malignity , as being committed against an infinite majesty , it requires either an infinite price and ransom , or an infinite punishment and satisfaction : therefore the death of poor silly man alone cannot suffice , though we must take it in part of payment , yet it cannot discharge the whole debt . we must then ascend higher , and if meanes be used in the redemption of man , as it is a work of the highest nature , so needs it must have the most excellent meanes . this whole world is sublunary , and serves for our inferiour uses , to cloth the back , and to fill the belly ; it cannot reach so high as the heavens , or the work of our redemption ; the angels are only our gardians , they attend and assist us ; and being so meanly ministeriall , it were high presumption to make them our redeemers ; for they cannot be sufficiently thankfull for their own beeing , much less are they able to satisfie for the sin of others ; which sin being infinite , requires an infinite satisfaction ; and therefore none but god alone can suffice , for in justice there must be a proportion between the offence , and the punishment ; but if the punishment should be infinite , either in the torments , or in the continuance , then there were no place for mercy , but it should be wholly excluded , which being one of gods attributes , it must ever subsist ; therefore it was necessary , that some infinite person should suffer ; and seeing that the work of redemption is far greater then the work of creation ; and therefore we call the time , hebdomada major , for in the creation there was no resistance of gods power ( for there was nothing ) but in the work of redemption , our sins stand in opposition , and thereby hinder gods action ; and therefore god is pleased not to use any of those generall attributes , which performed the work of the creation , as the omnipotency in making , the providence in preserving , the justice in punishing ; but a person in the deity must be ingaged , and the more to interest him , in the cause , and the more for the satisfaction of justice ; there must be an hypostaticall union of the godhead and manhood in one person , whereby the weakness , and guiltiness of man supported by the power , and al-sufficiency of the godhead , might make a full satisfaction for sin ; and though it be not agreeable to justice , that an innocent should dye for the nocent , yet by the free oblation of himself it seems very reasonable and just ; and thereby he becomes a true reall propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world ; and as man using means under god , repentance and sorrow for sin , laying hold on gods mercies in christ , shall receive the full benefit , so i doubt not but the cursed angels , the very devils themselves , may finde some mitigation of punishment , even by christ's passion ; for god could infinitely increase their torments , as their sins have justly deserved ; and it is the mercy of god to binde them up in chaines , that they might not be permitted to do more mischief , whereby they might further provoke and incurre gods heavy wrath and vengeance against them ; and that they are capable of some mercy , or at least of some mitigation of punishment ; they are gods creatures , they partake of a spirituall nature ; and are in the compass of gods generall mercy , which may abundantly suffice all ; and i do ascribe all the mercies of god to christ. thus then for our redemption , no less then a person in the deity can suffice ; and as this is necessary in respect of justice , which requires a due recompence ; so in regard of the purchase , which is no less then the kingdom of heaven , and a crown of glory ; and therefore could be of no less undertaking , and performance , then of a person in the deity ; and that it should be the second person , because he is the word , or the wisdom of god ; and the sin was committed against the wisdom of god , by tasting the tree of knowledge ; and though god be life in himself , & imparts life to all others , yet hereby he makes himself lyable to death without which there could be no satisfaction . thus god becoming man , he is interessed in the cause ; and so the justice and mercies of god are fully reconciled in christ. thus the incarnation being presupposed , let us now consider what inconveniency or disparagement it may be , or rather what advantage , or prerogative , may thereby accrue to the deity ; and how all the creatures are thereby exalted and honoured , but man especially is infinitely tyed to his thankfulness . for any dishonor to the deity , certainly there can be none at all ; for the whole universe , in respect of god , is as nothing ; and therefore what aspersion may arise from the creatures , and be cast on the deity , it doth utterly vanish , and come to nothing . thus the mists , and ill vapours of the earth ascend no higher , then the middle region of the aire ; and there they are dissolved into showers , storms , and tempests , and so fall again to the earth : thus blasphemies and sins done in contempt of god , yet no way sasten on god , or any way obscute his honor , but thereby god takes occasion in justice , to powre down his wrath and vengeance upon the transgressors . thus god according to his own ubiquity is every where , and in every creature , yet without the least disparagement to himself : as the sun-beams or light , shining upon the most unclean and sordid places , yet are thereby no way tainted , or infected ; much less can the godhead receive any blemish or stain from his creatures . so there being no inconvenience , let us see what advantage , benefit and honor redounds to the godhead by the incarnation . first , we know , and our fathers have told us , that the love of god towards man is infinite , but how shall this appear really and actually , if all the fruits of gods love towards man , be finite , and so bounded ? therefore it is requisit , that some act of this infinite love might appear ; this is done by an infinite bond , by an hypostaticall union of god with our nature ; and this is such a bond , as that god himself can do no more , he cannot come nearer man , then by uniting the two natures in one person ; and this we must truly confess to be the fruit , and plainly to demonstrate gods infinite love towards man. secondly , we confess gods omnipotency ; but how shall this appear , unless there should be some infinite creature ? it is true , that making must something of nothing , there being an infinite distance , a non ente adens , it needs argue omnipotency ; yet this is only in respect of the manner , but that gods omnipotency might every way appear , it is necessary there should be an infinite creature : and here behold god and man are united , and become one christ , who is truly infinite , and omnipotent ; and therefore doth every way confirm gods omnipotency . thirdly , the incarnation seems to adde some perfection to god , and to improve gods knowledge : it is true , god knowes all the miseries and sorrowes of man , all his imperfections and weakness ; but he knew them not in that manner as now he doth , for he knew them not by way of triall and experience in himself . the sick patient , who feeles the smart , and sorrow of his disease , may seem to have better knowledge then the physitian , who hath it onely by speculation ; god himself had not that experimentall knowledge of mans condition , before he became man , and put on our nature , and in his own person became subject to passion . fourthly , to vindicate the justice of god , for god requires no more of man , then what god performed to man. the creation was done by the word of his mouth , verbo virtutis su●… , with the greatest ease and facility , but what god requires of man , it is accomplished with sorrow , labour and misery , therefore here is no proportion . now to stop the mouthes of blasphemers , god himself hath taken up mans nature , thereby to make himself subject to passion , and so to perform more in his own person to man , then he requires of man , or that man can perform unto god , for that god died for man , but man dies for his own sins . fifthly , as god was the creator of all things , the end and conclusion of all , so it was necessary , he should be the mediator and redeemer of man ; that so god might be all in all , the beginning , the means , and the end . sixthly , it was a great addition and increase of honor to god , which i prove by the title which god assumes to himself : for whereas before he was called the god of heaven and earth , the lord of the universe , the maker and creator of all things , the lord god of hosts : now he assumes another title and style of honor , to be called the god of abraham , the god of isaac , the god of jacob , which is a more honorable style , then to be called the god of heaven and earth , seeing that he was then in their loins , who did infinitely exceed the whole universe . and as this was his title in the old testament , so in the new he is called more particularly the father of our lord jesus christ : and this is gods greatest honor . seventhly , and as these advantages and prerogatives accrue unto the deity by the incarnation of christ ; so there are great priviledges which befal the creatures , in having god to be one of their number and society , for without this priviledge , the creatures might have expostulated with god , that although they were made of nothing , yet still in respect of god they were nothing . now god is verity and truth , and therefore according to verity and truth , they were yet still as nothing : see then how much god is disparaged in the work of his creation , that he should create nothing of nothing : see how man and all the creatures are become contemptible , for that in respect of god , that is in verity and truth , they are nothing , this were to abate their thankfulness to god , and to make them dislike their condition ; and man himself , though he may seem to boast of gods love , that he was created according to gods image , yet still he discerns , that there is an infinite distance between god and man : but when as once god became man , and the creator was made a creature , this did not onely shorten the distance between both , but did indeed incorporate them , and made both natures , god and man , to be one person , as if god should descend from the throne of his majesty , and come nearer the creature , and stretch a hand out of the clouds , while poor man out of the dust , raised by gods grace , lifts up his hand of faith and hope , and while these two hands meet , and are joyned and coupled together , there becomes a perfect marriage , both are united in one person , the deity puts on our weakness , and our manhood is clothed with gods 〈◊〉 : and thus is there a perfect union in the person of christ. eighthly , though the creatures were made by god , yet still it lies in gods power to unmake them , and in every minute to reduce them to nothing , and some wic●…ed men might a little distrust god , but for the assurance of the continuance of gods favors , god is become man , the creator made a creature , both natures now fastned and riveted together by an indissoluble knot of marriage , which can never be broken ; and which serves as a great ingagement and assurance from god , to preserve and continue his graces and blessings upon the works of his own hands , whereof we have a pledge or earnest in christ , perfect god and perfect man , both creator and creature united in one person , never to be separated . so i hope it plainly appears , that as the incarnation can be no dishonor to god , so it tends to the great honor and settlement of the creatures . in speaking of the blessed trinity , i began with the beginning of s. johns gospel . in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and god was the word . then for proof and assurance of this great mystery , i ended with the end of s. johns gospel , wherein he affirms , that the world could not contain the books which might be written of christs acts ; thereby intimating , that the works and miracles that christ wrought above natural power , did most abundantly serve to confirm and justifie the works and mysteries which he taught above natural reason . and now that i come to the incarnation of christ , where the invisible god becomes visible man , it is strange how this our apostle s. john alters his style : for in his first epistle , chap. . ver . . speaking of god in our flesh , he saith , that which was from the beginning , which we have heard , which we have seen , which we have looked upon , and our hands have handled of the word of life : so that he who speaking of the deity of christ , like an eagle soared aloft , as it were out of sight , even beyond all humane reason and understanding , speaking now of the humanity of christ , he descends so low , to make it more manifest and palpable , as he seems to fall beneath sense , for that he calls all the senses of man to witness , which we have heard , which we have seen with our eyes , which we have looked upon , and our hands have handled : and this in effect twice repeated , whereby we may be the more assured of the truth of his manhood . as there was an eternal generation of this word according to the godhead , so was there a temporal birth of this word in the fulness of time , according to his manhood : for these two mysteries , though very different in themselves , yet are they both very wonderful . in the first you shall observe three persons in one nature ; in the second you have three natures in one person ; a trinity of persons in a unity of nature , and a trinity of natures in a unity of person , the father , the son , and the spirit , three distinct , several , and real persons , yet all subsisting in one undivided essence of the deity ; the flesh , the soul , and the godhead , three distinct and several natures , yet all subsisting in one undivided person of christ. how wonderful is the mercy of god , that whereas our saviour the second person in trinity was all-sufficient and happy in himself , yet in commiseration of man , man that had sinned in the root , sinned in the bud ; when to our first-fathers guilt we had heaped up innumerable transgressions against the day of wrath , he took up our nature and infirmities to satisfie for our sins , to offer up himself as a propitiatory sacrifice to reconcile us to god : men , angels , and all other inferior created powers , cannot any way satisfie for the least part of our guilt , as not being able to be sufficiently thankful for their own beeing . sin is an infinite evil , as being committed against an infinite majesty ; and therefore in the exact ballance of gods justice , requires no less then an infinite rans●…m , or an infinite punishment . righteousness and justice pleaded against man , that our sins were such as could not stand with his integrity freely to pardon ; mercy and peace put him in minde of his ancient love , that as he had freely created man , so now likewise in the bowels of compassion he should freely intend the redemption of man. and thus it was concluded in the high court of parliament in the highest heavens , that god himself , christ jesus the second person in trinity , should take our nature upon him , that as every act of his proceeding from his deity , the shedding of the least drop of his blood , the trickling of one tear , the suffering of one stripe , the least temptation , was of infinite value , of infinite estimation : so he alone was able to recompense for sin . and thus it was fulfilled what was said by the prophet . mercy and truth have met together , righteousness and peace have kissed each other : here is the agreement , and thus is god and man reconciled , by the coming and incarnation of our onely dear lord and saviour christ jesus . when i consider the first sin , the sin of the angels , i cannot conceive that such excellent creatures in their own kinde , understanding natures , intelligent spirits , should attempt such a foul offence against god , as to ascend up to his throne , to take upon them gods majesty , were there not some probability , or likelihood to effect it . i cannot say , whether they had it by immediate infusion from god , or to speak after the manner of men , by some common fame or report , that the creator and creature should be united in one person ; or whether by the excellency of their own knowledge , they did fitly gather , that as the creation was a work of gods infinite love , and as god was existent in every creature , according to the infinite extent of his own nature ; so undoubtedly as an effect of that infinite love , god should tie unto himself some creature by an infinite band , namely , by an hypostaticall union : and this their conceit gave some way and occasion to their pride and presumption , as claiming and challenging that high prerogative , above other creatures , by virtue of their birthright . but herein did appear the oversight and ignorance of the angels , for the creature was not to aspire to the height and dignity of the creator , but the creator was to descend to the humility and baseness of the creature ; neither was god to be united to the angelical nature ( though otherwise highest in order and condition ) but to descend lower , to give a more undoubted token of that infinite love , even to the humane nature and manhood , mans nature being the centre in the midst of the circumference , a little microcosin , in whom all the creatures are united : things sensible partake in his body , the intelligent spirits are combined in his soul ; and thus god taking the nature of man , sits in the very midst of his creatures , imparting himself infinitely to all , so far forth as it may well stand with the truth of his godhead , and with the state and condition of the creature . but supposing the three persons in one deity , why should the word be made flesh , the father and the spirit excluded ? certainly , if we were to make choice of the person , reason would inform us , that to be the natural son of man is more agreeable to the natural son of god , then to the unbegotten father , or to the proceeding spirit : the manner of his double birth would testifie the same truth , begotten in the understanding of god from all eternity , conceived in the womb of a virgin in the fulness of time . the nature of that sin which was the first motive of this descent , seems to fasten a necessity upon the second person of the trinity , it was a sin against the wisdom of god , the tasting of the tree of knowledge , eritis sicut dii scientes bonum & malum ; and therefore fit it was , to shew the large treasures of gods mercy , and the strictness of gods justice , that the same wisdom offended , should satisfie for the offence , foelix culpa quae talem habuit redemptorem ; where is the wrong ? where is the injury , when the party offended shall satisfie ? and therefore we will with humility retort gods own words upon himself , who upon the fall of man could say , ecce adam quasi unus ex nobis ; so now upon the fall of god , that is , upon the descent of god , we will say , ecce deus quasi unus ex nobis . if man lose the image of god , as concerning holiness and sanctity , wherein he was first created , nothing can restore this image , but that which gave the first impression . if man cannot conform himself unto god , then for an upshot and agreement between both , necessary it is that god should consorm himself unto man : man lost gods image , god takes up mans image ; and this was most competent to that person in the holy trinity , who as the apostle describes him to the hebrews , was splendor gloriae , & figura substantiae patris . observe , i beseech you , the creation of man , being made of the earth , god breathed into his nostrils the breath of life : breath , if it were agreeable to gods nature , yet certainly proceeding from an intelligent spirit , it could not be bare breath , but necessarily it must be accompanied with some word , especially considering , that in all other creatures you shall finde the power of this word ; for god spake the word , and they were created . but here this word is concealed , and therefore we may well suppose , that there is some mystery concealed . behold then the first earnest of his incarnation , god intending a marriage between the deity and the humane nature , he takes the body of man , as it were taking his wedding gloves , breathes in them , to extend them , to warm them , to sit them for himself , at length puts them on . here now at length the word accompanies the breath , the breath made us living souls , the word shall make us quickning spirits ; breath gave us a natural life , the word shall regenerate , and give a new birth : and thus by virtue of this breath , by virtue of this word , man hath a double root , the first adam , and the second adam , taking sap from both ; he is arbor & arbor inversa , he hath a root downward , and a root upward , he treads upon the earth , and looks up towards heaven . and thus god , if ever intending the renewing of his creatures , sit it was , that god should there begin , where he did end : man was the last work of the creation , and therefore in man there must be the first beginning of renovation , incipiat ubi desitum est , it is a rule in all works , and here you shall finde it true by experience , the last work is first perfected , for the word was made flesh . but i would gladly demand of the jews , who do not acknowledge these mysteries , either the trinity , or the incarnation , why should god be so careful and curious in giving himself a name , a name it is , therefore ordained to make a difference in a multitude , as many men of one kinde are distinguished by their names : but the nature of god is one , as the sun is but one , and therefore wants no name , but the name of his own kinde . gods name then , as it imports no difference in his nature , so it implies a distinction and difference of persons in that one nature of the deity . this will better appear , if you please to consider that great and ineffable name of god , the name of four letters : the first letter was jod , quod significat principium , and doth undoubtedly betoken the person of the father ; the second was he , quod vivere significat , setting out the second person , as being life in himself , though life by participation , imparting life unto the creatures , for in him we live , we move , and have our being , he is the way , the truth , and the life ; the third letter was vau , quae vim apud hebraeos habet copulandi , intimating the love of god proceeding from the father and the son , whereby the father and the son are united ; the last letter it was the same with the second letter , he twice repeated , ut duas in filio fateamur naturas , & dei & hominis . and that you may conceive that this observation of the name , proceeds not from mans fancy , and conjecture , i pray give me leave to bring another example to this purpose . when god had tied himself unto abraham , as touching the promised seed , in token hereof it pleased god to change the name of abraham , from abram to abraham , by the addition of a letter ; so likewise of his wife , from sarai to sarah , by the substraction of a syllable , and the addition of a letter . now you shall observe that this letter , which was added to both their names , it was indeed one and the same letter , and it was a letter of gods own name , the second letter of his name , that as the second person was to be united to the nature of abraham and sarah , so this letter given and received , might serve as a pledge or an earnest to signifie that union . observe the phrase and style of scripture , verbum domini venit ad isaiam , venit ad prophetas , &c. which form of speech , to my understanding , cannot be so well justified , were it not that this word were a person , and that some certain manner of coming were proper and peculiar to this person . why should god speak of himself after the manner and fashion of men ? i cannot disallow the opinion of our divines , that god speaking to mans understanding , fit it was that he should descend to mans capacity ; but desiring that truth in gods words might altogether appear , i had rather apply them to an intended incarnation , then to admit a bare figure in gods words , which happily to us might be some occasion of error . wherefore serve the groanings and cries of the fathers , expectabo salutare tuum domine , mitte quem missurus es , rorate coeli desuper , & nubes , pluan●… iustum , utinam disrumperes coelos & descenderes , elevate portas principes 〈◊〉 introibi●… rex gloriae , &c. were not this son to be born , this expected messias , above the state and condition of man ? for by nature children should rather boast of their parents , shewing their honorable descent , pedegree and linage ; but if the decrepit parents , for many precedent ages , shall comfort themselves in hope of this childe , as it is no natural course , so undoubtedly this childe must claim a higher birth then nature can afford him . let their own prophets witness against them , i will now content my self with two onely quotations , jer. . . in those dayes shall judah be saved , and jerusalem shall dwell safely , and he that shall call her , is the lord our righteousness . isa. . . behold , a virgin shall conceive and bear a son , and she shall call his name emmanuel , which is by interpretation , god with us . for that temporal kingdom which the jews expect , i would gladly know , what contentment can the world yield , whereof their fathers were destitute ; a rich , glorious , and beautiful temple , the land of protnise in possession , a people multiplying above measure , made a terror to all nations , peace and plenty within their walls , a wise and a just law , politick and good governors , valiant and victorious captains ; and yet in those dayes there was a continual expectation of the messias , not to adde to their worldly pomp , but to establish a higher kingdom , the kingdom of grace and of truth , which herein exceeds all earthly monarchs ▪ that it wants no outward thrones nor ceremonies to set forth his own greatness , but it appears glorious in baseness , powerful in weakness , that so gods immediate hand might better discover it self , who pulls down the mighty from their seat , and exalts the humble and meek . far be it that the coming of the messias , the expectation of all nations , should only tend to worldly and transitory honours , which is but vanity of vanities , and cannot quench the moderate thirst of the soul ; neither is so befitting mans present state and condition for this world , which we now inhabit , is but the place of our exile , a vale of misery , a just punishment for our fathers disobedience , and onely serves as an earnest , or a passage to a farther happiness . if paradise were to be replanted on earth , god had never expelled man paradise ; yet let the jews apply those promises of glory to the second coming of christ , his coming to judgement , and there shall they finde them truly verified according to the letter , that not one tittle of the law can miscarry . thus having incountred with the jews , i will now come to the hypostatical union of this word with our flesh : for explication whereof , i do much commend the saying of a father , nec inferiorem consump sit glorificatio , nec superiorem minuit assumptio , two distinct and several natures , the godhead and manhood , and yet the weakness and infirmities of man not swallowed up in the majesty of god , nor yet gods majesty imbased or lessened by the assumption of the manhood , but both continue whole and entire , both make but one person , christ jesus , our dear and blessed messias . i will illustrate this with two similitudes : god first appearing to moses , appeared in the form of fire in a bramble bush , the fire not consuming the bush ▪ nor the bush obscuring the fire , but both continuing whole and entire in their own nature . . our saviour is here styled by the name of a word : and in a word you shall observe these two parts ; sonus , a sound , the elision of the air proceeding from the mouth , and possessing the ear ; and likewise verbum , a significant word , carried by the conduit-pipe of this sound , and informing the understanding . the sound proceeds from motion , and onely beats upon the sensitive part ; the word taking his descent from reason , doth likewise speak to the reasonable soul , neither sound nor word are confounded , neither sound nor word can be separated . i will not onely content my self with bare similitudes , but it shall further appear by a type . benjamin had two names , from his mother he was called henoni , that is , the son of sorrow , the son of affliction ; and from his father he took the name benjamin , that is , the son of strength , the son of portitude and courage . make the application to christ. now , for the possibility of this union of the godhead with our nature , doth not reason inform us , that as creatures have their condition from god , so it cannot stand with the same goodness of god , without great , and just occasion , to alter and change their state and propriety . see you not god in all his works , and yet the works still continuing and subsisting in their own kinde ? canst thou conceive how all the contrary elements should be combined in one compound subject ? canst thou understand how the body and soul are united , two distinct and several substances , of several kindes , the spirit and the flesh , not necessarily depending upon each other , the soul having life , motion , action , existency , without the help of the body , and the body likewise subsisting in his own elements , without the information of the soul ? then why should it seem strange or incredible , that the godhead and manhood should be linked in one person ▪ since nothing is impossible to god , but that which implies a contradiction ? from this union of the word with our flesh , necessary it is that the manhood of christ should receive all possible infusion of grace , all possible perfection , which may be any way competent , or stand with the condition of a creature ; and that in the first moment of this union , christ increased in knowledge , but it was according to mans apparance and judgement ; for in his first conception , the manhood in the right of the deity , contained in it self all the treasures of gods wisdom , the fulness of knowledge ; which notwithstanding by degrees , according to mans state and condition , did manifest and discover themselves . this band between both being indissoluble , which did well appear in the time of christs ( passion hough the soul and the body were separated , yet the soul and the deity were never divorc'd ) and two distinct natures being knit together by this indissoluble bond , making but one person ; hence it is , that there is a mutuall communication of attributes between both , and that without the breach of truth ; mans weakness fastned on the deity , and gods power ascribed to mans infirmity , deus natus est , & passus est , homo fecit miracula , & captivam duxit captivitatem , in this union nothing was wanting to christ , which was necessary to mans nature , no imperfection redounding in christ , whereof the nature of man might be priviledged , he was conceived without sin , and therefore might well subsist without sin , yet the punishment of sin , of that originall sin , morte morieris , being tyed to our nature , by a statute law , statutum est hominibus semel mori , if god takes up mans nature , he cannot be exempted from that penalty ; though free from the sin yet lyable to the punishments as sustaining the person of whole mankinde , and with his undeserved punishment , satisfying for all ; but for our actuall transgressions , as he was likewise free from these sins , so neither could the vengeance of god , due for those particular sins , seise upon christ ; no error in his understanding , no perverseness in his will , no blemish in his body , nothing defective in his members , no sickness could attach him , no leprosie infect him , and therefore the price of his innocent bloud , being of infinite value was made an infinite ransome for sin ; and takes away the guilt , both of originall and of our actuall sins ; for he dyed for our sins , and rose again for our justification , and thus is the word made flesh ; god is manifested in the flesh , justified in the spirit , seen of the angels , preached to the gentiles , believed on in the world , and received up in glory . and now i come to the manner and circumstances of christs birth and nativity ; not intending to speak any more of the mystery it self . i wil only insist in some very few outward circumstances , not unlike our unskilful historians , who sometimes unacquainted with the secresies of state , the close carriage of business , and the inward affaires of kingdomes , are able notwithstanding to discover many severall circumstances , and outward occurrences , whereby the judicious reader better conceives then the author could happily inform : so here for want of due knowledge , i will only acquaint you with the circumstances , reserving the mysterie it self , to your godly and serious meditations ; these circumstances , i will divide according to the schooles division , antecedentia , concomitantia , subsequentia . first in the preparatives to his coming , i might be infinite in relating the severall promises of god , as touching the seed of the woman ; the stock , tribe , and family , to which these promises were tyed and intayled ; the truth of these promises , continued in many prophesies , acted out in types , resembled in figures , shadowed in parables , offered up in bloody sacrifices ; and in a word sealed and confirmed unto us , in the whole scope and intent of the law ; from hence proceedeth such a certain expectation of the fathers , that in their infallible hope and assurance , they went so far , as to make his nuptiall song , the song of songs , the canticles , as if they had been to bo sung , on the day of his marriage ; and in their deaths , that it might appear , that still their hopes did survive them . i will only instance in jacob , expectabo salutare tuum domine , in token hereof , as it were making his last will and testament , bequeathing his soul unto god ; he takes order for his christian buriall , layes a charge on his son , to carry his dead body out of egypt , as it were then going to jerusalem in pilgrimage ; that so , christ at his coming , might tread upon his dead bones ; and that he might for ever rest near the place of his rest , the holy sepulcher . but i will here only make choyce of prophesies , for that it is said that christ before his coming , was assimilatus in manibus prophetarum , framed out in wax , in the hands of the prophets : not unlike a custom of princes , who intending to match with strangers , as it well beseemes their high condition , and stands with the policy of government state ; having no opportunity upon all occasions , or suddenly to meet themselves ; first they send their ambassadors to treat of a marriage ; and together with them , their own pictures , to move love and affection . so christ intending to espouse himself to the church ▪ willing not personally to appear before the fulness of time were accomplished ; first sends out his prophets , who so lively and accurately describe him to the world , as that in his coming , we could not mistake either in his person , or in his condition ; but if i should give way to all severall prophesies ▪ i should prove infinite ; how am i plunged with varieties , and over-laded with plenty , in this argument ! i will only tye my self to some few prophesies , which point out the very instant time of his coming . gen. . . the scepter shall not depart from judah , nor a l. a wgiver from between his feet , untill shiloh come , and the people shall be gathered unto him ; that this is meant by the messias all confess ; and it is manifest by the word shiloh , which signifies the prince of peace ; that the time is now accomplished it is apparent in herod , who first succeeded ▪ and put down their sanedrim or councell house ; consisting especially of the chosen men of the tribe of judah , in so much that many of the jewes , well perceiving that the time was now come ; and knowing gods promises to be certain and infallible , they began to acknowledge herod for their messias , as succeeding the tribe of judah , in the government of that state ; and from thence they are called herodians , as they are mentioned in the acts of the apostles . others seeing that all things were not accomplished in herod , began to acknowledge vespasian the emperor for their messias , as having the government of the roman empire ; and pretending that he was descended by his mothers side from the high priest , and the tribe of judah . a third sort seeing that all things were not accomplished in herod or vespasian , began presently to rebell , and stir up in armes against their prince and the romans ; as then expecting upon this occasion , that their messias should manifest and discover himself ; and at length recover their weak , decayed , and ruinated monarchy . the best of them the high priests , the scribes , and the levites sent to john baptist to know , whether he were that expected messias or not ? as being privy and guilty to themselves that the time was now come for the approach of the messias ; how were these men deluded , when through pride and hardness of heart , they went a whoring after their own inventions , expecting a lord ike , and a temporall messias ; and looking to the glory of this world , their eyes were dazelled ; and they could not discern majesty clothed in humility , power shadowed in weakness ; our expected shiloh , our deer and blessed messias christ jesus ; even at that time born of a virgin , and laid in a manger the second text of scripture to prove the just time of his coming , is taken out of the ninth of daniels prophesie , whereby the number of weeks the time is described ; so that by the exact computation of chronologie , it cannot possibly betoken any other time , then the birth and nativity of our saviour . the third testimony is taken out of the second of aggay , yet a little while , and i will shake the heavens , and the earth , and the sea , and the dry land ; and i will move all nations , and the desire of all nations shall come ; and i will fill this house with glory , saith the lord of hosts , this could not happen at any other time , but in the dayes of our saviour ; and many hundred years are now past , wherein the jewes have continued an ignominious , and desolate people ; a reproach to all nations , their temple destroyed , their priesthood abolished their tribes confounded , their kingdom ruinated , and themselves scattered , and dispersed over the face of the whole earth ; and therefore these things were then accomplished , at the birth of our saviour . for the manner of his coming , see how all other prophesies do concurre with our saviour , that he should be born of a virgin , esay . born at bethelem , mich. . that then he should come into the world , when there should be an universall peace , for the greater propagation of christianity , esay . mich. . zach. . that john baptist should be his forerunner , and prepare the hearts of men by preaching repentance , mal : . esay . that the gospell should be preached to the poor , confirmed by miracles , esay . and the . that poor , and yet as a king , he should enter into jerusalem , zach. . that the gentiles should be called , the jewes rejected , isa. . and the . alas , i should be infinite , if i should run over all severall prophesies . thus much in generall , there is not any one action attributed to the messias by the prophets , which is not most truly competent to christ , all severall types are likewise accomplished ; the brazen serpent lift up in the wilderness , the paschall lambe slain in remembrance of their delivery from the bondage of egypt , all other sacrifices offered by the priests , for the sins of people : these and many other infinite are all fulfilled , in our dear and crucified saviour . i shall not here need to speak of their miracles , for they tending wholly to strengthen , and confirm the truth of their doctrine ; their doctrine being referred to christianity , their miracles do likewise testifie our faith and belief ; and so i come to the gentiles . not any prophesie to my understanding , more evident and effectuall , then was the prophesie of balaam numb . . wherein we may observe the certainty of his hope , videbosed non modo , intuebor sed non prope , the double nature of christ , together with his descent and genealogie , stella orietur ex jacob , the kingdom of christ , virga consurget de israel , the power of this kingdome , together with the large extent , and happiness of this kingdom in the words following , percutiet duces moab &c. that this prophesie must be understood of christ , all consent and agree ; and i pray mark his own preparation , twise repeated in the same chapter , balaam the son of beorhath sayed , & the man whose eyes are open hath said ; he hath said , who heard the words of god , and knew the knowledge of the most high , which saw the vision of the almighty , falling into a trance , but having his eyes open ; you would think this man to be mad , werei●… not a prophesie of such excellency , wherein he seemes to glory , and boast that it was the only joy and comfort of his heart ; and therefore desires to prefix his own name , in great capitall letters , to leave a testimony of his faith , to all succeeding ages . for the truth and confirmation of this prophesie , lest the jewes might seem to distrust him , and wholly to neglect , and condemn all the gentiles ( when as notwithstanding some of them had the knowledge of the true god ) behold a miracle , the asse speaks ; for i should as soon believe , that an asse might see an angel , know an angel , discern the secret intent , and thoughts of an angel , be able to speak , able to reprehend his master , though a prophet , as that a heathen man of himself should be able to prophesie of the comming and kingdom of christ. for the success and event of this prophesie , both figuratively and literally ; see how all things were fulfilled , when as the great magi either descended from balaam , or having certain knowledge of his prophesie , did continually watch ; and attend the appearing of the star in judea , which conducted them to the place of his birth ; where they worshipped god in our flesh ; and were accepted of christ ; and were made the first fruits of the gentiles : o the joy and comfort of all our hearts , who were then the forlorn and desolate people , but now in them , by them , and together with them , we are made the sheep of christs fold , members of his church ; thus balaam in his posterity , saw the accomplishing of his own prophesie . but i will not borrow my evidences from scripture , i will deal with the heathen in their own records ; it was not the simple and rude multitude , or the ignorant and vulgar people , which so much admired , and extolled the sibylls ; but the sibylls were famous among the learned , much esteemed of the wise , such as were the only oracles in all the uncertainties of state ; and here see the wonderfull works of gods providence , whereas their writings had lien moth-eaten for many yeers , wrapp'd ●…p together with other old records of the romans , whereas none might pe●…use them under a certain penalty ; see here a little before the birth of our saviour , by the emperours command , they were reviewed , and set to the open sight of the world , that all people might take just notice of the truth ; and accomplishing of these prophesies , see here a thing which seems casuall to the eyes of man : god hath ordained even by the means of bad instruments , the heathen emperours , the manifesting of his glory . now for the subject matter , contained in their prophesies . i can give no other testimony but only this ; it is impossible for the best grounded divine , or the mo●… constant , and assured christian , to comprize more severall mysteries , or greater variety of actions in so few vers●…s , all verified in our saviour ; then are contained in their prophesies . the blessed saint austin hath well observed , that the first letters of their verses , being joyned together will make up these words , jesus christus filius unigenitus dei , jesus christ the only begotten son of god. it were needless to repeat any of their sayings , seeing all of them tend , and bear witness of the messias ; insomuch as the christians were ever after forbidden the use of their books , by the heathen emperours , the persecutors of christ , lest they should convert , or confound them , by the testimony of their own prophets . now for the religion of the heathen , see how god did naturally ingraff in them some small shadow of his deity ; or otherwise permitted their errors , that so they might the sooner be brought to believe these mysteries of christianity , they acknowledged one god ; and thus they were taught by the light of reason , for there can be but only one infinite ; and yet they worshipped many god , as saturn , jupiter , mars , and such like ; which doubtless , hath some small resemblance , and is an obscure shadow of the trinity ; wherein we acknowledge three persons , and yet but one god. secondly , in their gods , they considered one , as the father of the rest , divum pater , &c. all of them link'd together in the chain of consanguinity and kindred , and this may in some sort , set forth the eternall generation of christ , that god the father , did beget his son ; and from both proceeds the holy ghost . thirdly , their gods were men , which in effect might intimate thus much , that god should prove man , christ jesus god and man , two d●…stinct natures , and yet but one person and substance ; and thus the jews in regard of the divine revelation , the gentiles by the principles of their own religion , cannot suppose the mysteries of christianity , to be strange and incredible ; but all might acknowledge the star of salvation ; which god hath prepared before the face of all people , to be a light to enlighten the gentiles , and to be the glory of his people israel : and so now i come to such things as are concomitantia , such as did accompany his birth . god having decreed to take our nature upon him , he prepared for himself a chosen vessel , the most pure , spotless , immaculate , & undefiled virgin , that ever did subsist of our corrupted flesh , the blessed virgin mary . blessed be the wombe that conceived my saviour ; and happy are the paps , that gave him suck ! mary an espoused virgin ; and that for these five reasons . first , that no unjust imputation should be laid against her , through the infamy of childbirth . second●…y , that she might have the comfort of a spouse , a fellow-helper in such extremities . thirdly , that the birth of christ , might be concealed from the evill spirit , who did undoubtedly foresee , that the messias should be born of a virgin ; and therefore it was the providence of god , that she should be an espoused virgin ; so to prevent his mischievous , and wicked practises and designes . fourthly , for the approbation of all the severall states of men ; virginity which is recommended unto us in the mother of christ , and yet an espoused virgin ; and there is the approbation of marriage . fifthly , and most especially as i conceive ; because the genealogie of males was only enrolled , and publick notice taken only of their tribe ; and they matching in the same tribe , there could be no further question , but both were of judah ; whereof the promise was made for the descent of the messias . i will not here speak of saint john baptist , the forerunner of christ , who was the voyce of a cryer in the wilderness , as was prophesied by esay . i will tye my self more strictly to speak of his birth ; being conceived in galalee , it fell out so , that augustus caesar then emperour , taxing the whole world , every one was to repair to his own city ; and therefore joseph and mary went from nazareth in galilee unto bethlehem a city of david , for they were of the house & linage of david , as it is recorded by saint luke in his second chapter . observe here i beseech you , a most wonderfull and unspeakable providence of god ; it may be this genera●…l meeting and assembly was called against the coming of their true king , notwithstanding the edict came from augustus : it may be that it was gods goodness , that through this generall concourse , and passage of people , there might be a greater manifestation of his birth ; and therefore he was conceived in galilee , born in bethlehem , brought up in egypt , that all the world might take just notice of his coming . these happily may be but mans conjectures ; i will therefore acquaint you with four things , which i thinke were most especially intended by the holy ghost . first , whereas the blessed virgin having no revelation , might happily be ignorant of the place of christs birth , and where she should be del●…vered ; see here there comes forth an edict from an heathen emperour , that so the prophesie might be fulfilled , that the messias should be born at bethlehem , mich : . secondly , whereas there might be made some doubt of his genealogie , joseph and mary by virtue of this edict , were constrained to go to bethlehem a city of david , thereby to make it manifest , that they were descended from the tribe of judah , whereof the messias was expected . thirdly , whereas it was prophesied , that the scepter should not depart from judah , nor a law-giver from between his feet untill shiloh come , by this one act of gathering together the dispersed people , and that for the payment of tribute to the roman empire to a forain prince , it is manifest that the people were now in thraldom and captivity ; and that the time now approached for the coming of the●…r messias . fourthly , to manifest the truth of his nature , no sooner born , but he was instantly circumcised among the jews , which did serve for the triall and touchstone of his manhood : so with the gentiles he is here numbred and accounted amongst men . and as his nature , so his condition did appear , that he was not to be any temporal king , for he travelled in his mothers womb , to pay tribute unto caesar , and therefore herod might be well secured of his own kingdome , non eripit mortalia qui regna dat coelestia . how many and how great mysteries are contained in this one action , time , place , genealogie and descent , the truth of his nature and condition , all manifested by a decree of an heathen prince , little intending the good of gods church , god over-rules the hearts of princes : and this is wholly to be referred to his all-disposing providence . coming to bethlehem , joseph and mary were lodged in a common inne : no marvel , for here was the birth of a stranger and forainer , god of himself , yet now become man , being lord over all , yet for our sins taking upon himself the form of a servant , &c. thus the preparation for his birth and nativity , was answerable to his state and condition : in a common inn , as being to extend equally his universal grace unto all , none are excluded from a common inn , none are rejected from the bosom of the church , the passage lies open to all , and all are admitted through faith and repentance : so was his passion . extra portas civitatis , without the walls of the city , as not redounding to the particular benefit of city or people , but equally extended to all . in a common inn , where commonly the greatest excess , the greatest ryot and disorder is observed ; and therefore it shews the end of his coming , which was to satisfie for the sins of his people . and yet there was no room in the inn ( it should seem it was taken up , with a multitude of guests in this great concourse of people ) and therefore she must be delivered in a stable . see here a homely entertainment of the majesty of god , and mans unthankfulness for his mercy ! and thus it befals the heart of man , which being wholly possessed and swallowed up with our worldly thoughts , the lust of our eyes , the concupiscence of our flesh , cannot afford the least entertainment or harbor for the working of gods spirit . born in a stable ? here it was verified that the ox and the ass acknowledged their lord and master , while sinful man stood wilful and obstinate , neglecting his maker . born in a stable ? true it is , that from the first day of his birth , to the last minute of his passion , the foxes had holes , the birds had their nests , but the son of man had no place of habitation . born in a stable ? here is no preparation , no solemnity , as if we were to expect not a man , but the worm of men , and the outcast of the people . alas dear virgin , comfort thy self , thy babe is thy comforter , thy comforter thy saviour : for behold , from henceforth all generations shall call thee blessed . alas sweet babe , pardon our unkindness and discourtesie in thy entertainment , thou thy self hast taken the nature of man , and what is man but grass and hay , well befitting a stable ? and therefore as thou thy self hast infinitely abased thy self , so pardon our unthankfulness , if in stead of princely palaces , rich pavilions , ivory beds , tho●… wert born in a stable , and laid in a manger . and thus much for the place now i come to the time. it was in the sixth age of the world : as man was created on the sixth day , so in the sixth age god intended the renewing and redemption of man. we are not to demand , why sooner or later he took not our flesh ? for this was in the free choice and election of god ; onely this probable reason may be given , that as wise physicians then labour to purge the disease , when it is grown to his height and ripeness ; so god expected the time when charity was grown cold , the kings office decayed , the priests duty neglected , the synagogue divided into sects and schisms : and this is in some sort resembled by the barrenness of the earth , for he came in the winter season . and it is to be feared , lest our sects and divisions , our sins , our crying sins , will hasten his second coming in judgement . his coming was in solstitio brumali , when the days were at the shortest , and then began to increase . and hence is gathered , though a common , yet a witty observation of s. ambrose , that as john the baptist decreased , so christ should increase ; john baptist born at midsummer , when the dayes shorten , and christ with the lengthning of days increasing in glory . see here an admirable providence in every the least circumstance ; christ was born at midnight , as may appear by the shepherds watch , which argues the worlds universal darkness , and that his coming in the flesh was to cover and conceal sin , that in the day of gods wrath he might take our iniquities upon himself , and impute his righteousness to us : and therefore it was an approved and laudable custome of the fathers , to keep their watchings the same night , and to offer up their prayers and thanksgivings , in memory of the hour of his nativity . and so i come to such things as are consequentia , such as followed his nativity . i will not speak of the angels song to the shepherds , which was the calling of the jews . i will not speak of the stars appearing , which guided the wise-men to the place of his birth , where they worshipped , and were the first-fruits of the gentiles . i will onely name one action , which is the murther of infants , the martyrdome of innocents . it should seem then that the birth of christ was not a matter of small importance , or little moment in the eyes of princes , that herod should slay all the children from two years old and under , for the assurance of his state and kingdom . but here observe the providence of god ; herod in revenge , and to satisfie his own ambition , attempted such an horrible cruelty : god permitted the action , . for the punishment of the jews , who for not affording place for our saviours birth , they justly incurred his wrath and indignation , insomuch that their own eyes beheld the slaughter of their own babes , flesh of their flesh , and bones of their bones , late conceived in the womb , now committed to the grave , from the cradle to the coffin , late pampered in the bosom , novv putrifying in the dust . . that the prophesie might be fulfilled , in rama was a voice heard , mourning , and weeping , and great howling , rachel weeping for her children , and would not be comforted , because they were not , jer. . . . for the manifesting of his own glory , that upon his entrance into the world , so many happy infants should be ordained from all eternity to suffer martyrdome for his cause , the day of their death was much more happy to them , then was the day of their nativity ; and therefore we celebrate and keep solemn a certain feast-day , in memory of those innocents . . since moses was a type of christ ( for both of them were law-givers ) as the children of the hebrews were put to death at the birth of moses ; so the death of these infants might give testimony to a second , to a new law-giver . thus as king pharaoh did persecute moses , so king herod persecuted christ : moses was laid in a basket , christ in a manger . and as they thus agreed in the circumstances of their nativity , so in the manner and course of their lives . moses led the israelites through the red-sea ; christ led his people through baptism , and so through his own blood : both of them fasted forty days : moses appointed seventy elders ; christ seventy disciples : moses sent out twelve spies to discover the promised land ; christ sent out twelve apostles into the world , to publish the kingdom of heaven : moses wrought his miracles by a rod ; christ by his cross : and therefore as moses rod was laid up in the ark ; so the cross of christ hath ever been most precious in the church : moses delivered his people from the bondage of egypt ; and christ delivered his from the thraldome and slavery of sin . thus do the two law-givers agree , whereby it appears , that moses was but a type of christ , and the law only a preparation to the gospel . but i will leave the jews , and descend to the gentiles , whose posterity we are : and i will take a view , what hapned amongst them upon the birth of our saviour . certain it is , that the oracles then spake , that nature had brought forth a king , and immediately the images which were wont to be worshipped in churches , fell down , and were broken , which many referred to the greatness of augustus , though truly it was competent to christ. eusebius reports , that at the same time there sprang out of the earth a river of oyl , which argues that grace was now to be conferred to the gentiles , and that he was now born , who was anointed with the oyle of gladness above his fellows . orosius reports , that augustus caesar then emperor , commanded on the same day , that no man hereafter should call him lord or master ; as ▪ if god had secretly inspired in his heart , that then was born the lord of lords , the king of kings , christ jesus , god and man : and therefore it was impiety and sacriledge for any vassal of his , during his presence , to accept the title of lord or master . suidas reports , that when augustus caesar , having offered his sacrifice , demanded of apollo who should reign after him , at first he stood mute ; and after a second sacrifice , he returned this answer , me puer hebraeus , divos deus ipse gubernans , cedere sede jubet , tristomque redire sub orcum ; aris ergo dehinc tacitis abscedito nostris ; which in effect is thus much , that the hebrew childe , which is god almighty , had commanded him silence , and never after spake the oracles . whereupon augustus returned , and built a stately and beautiful altar , with this inscription , ara primogeniti dei , the altar of the first begotten of god. one of the sibyls at that time living in rome , shewed augustus a circle near the sun , wherein there sate a virgin with a childe in her arms ; and withall she told him , that now was born a greater and mightier prince then he . templum pacis , the temple of peace , whereunto was annexed this prophesie , that it should so long continue , until a virgin should conceive : at the birth of our saviour suddenly it fell down ; whereupon there was another temple erected , virgini pariturae , to the virgin that doth or shall hereafter conceive . and to conclude , some have observed , that at the same time when christ took our nature to honour man , and make him equal with angels , such as had abused our nature , such as were tainted with the most foul , unclean , and carnal sin , all suddenly perished , and the execution of death overtook them unawares . my method hath been to confirm the doctrine by miracles : and as the blessed trinity is the highest and greatest mystery of all others , so for confirmation both of that and of the rest of the mysteries , i did onely produce such miracles as were done by christ in the gospel . now seeing to that mystery i have added the incarnation , i will then here produce such miracles as were done in the church successively , for confirmation of christian religion in general : for i should as soon believe , that christ never instituted a church , as that he should be wanting in the means to preserve that church . you shall then observe , that no church or state can subsist without government ; therefore in the last of s. john , christ appoints a governor in his church : and the first thing that is done by s. peter , was the choice and election of matthias , act. . in stead of judas iscariot , that so the number of the apostles might be made up : and the last thing which he did a little before his death , was to appoint his own successor , as it appears in his second epistle . the first great miracle after christs own ascension , was the coming down of the holy ghost in fiery tongues ; the effect of these tongues , that they spake all languages ; the power and efficacy of these tongues , that in one sermon he converted , act. . but because men are most moved with things that are sensible , therefore s. peter cures one that is born lame , and then believe , acts . . and as it falls out in military affairs , and in all governments , some must be made examples of justice for the terror of others : so ananias and sapphira were strucken to death with his bare word , act. . and that it may appear that the powers of hell could not oppose him , simon magus can testifie , act. . and that it might appear how beneficial his power was to mankinde , he healeth the sick at lydda , and raiseth tabitha from death at joppa , act. . and all this was done the first year after the ascension of christ. and how much he prevailed in rome , may appear by a heathen author , cornelius tacitus , in the life of claudius . i shall not need to prosecute this any further , when it may appear by my annals . it is the practise of the church , that seeing s. peter and s. paul suffered both in one day , and that they were the great and the chief apostles , therefore the church doth never separate them . see then the miraculous conversion of s. paul , that there should be such a light , and a voice to be heard , and himself to be strucken blinde , while he was in his heat of persecuting the christians , and that he should become such a convert , which is a far greater miracle , then that he raised up eutychus from death , act. . or his prediction of the shipwrack , or the casting away of the viper , without any hurt to himself , which the very heathen did acknowledge to be wonderful . thus the acts of the apostles , as they begin with s. peter , so they end with s. paul , and they leave him at rome , that both s. peter and s. paul together might suffer martyrdome on the same day ; and together with them the church was there left , god forsaking the jews , came to the gentiles : and as all the religion of the gentiles had been formerly coyned at rome , so no doubt but the roman empire was a special means to propagate the church . as the jews had their types and figures , their prophesies of christ ; so the romans had their moral virtues , and their humane learning in great measure , onely as a preparation to christianity : and seldome are the romans mentioned in scripture , but with some commendation ; insomuch that christ himself would not come into the world , and descend of the jews , untill the jews first became subject to the romans ; and christ himself travelled in the womb , onely to pay tribute to caesar ; and in his preaching he preached obedience to caesar , and thereby setled that empire , then newly erected . and pontius pilate the roman governor , did what he could to set christ at liberty ; and being inforced by the importunity of jews to crucifie him , yet he washed his hands in his own innocency , being thereunto forewarned by his wife ( that so she might make some recompense fo●… the tempting of eve ) the romans did likewise revenge the death of christ upon the jews , destroying their temple , scattering them , and making them no nation . s. paul likewise thought it an honor to himself to be a roman , and claimed the priviledge , and did appeal unto caesar . and certainly the intercourse which the romans had with other nations , did serve as a great means to propagate christianity : and i doubt not but in the apostles time , it was here planted in this island of britany . tertullian in the second century , makes mention of it , though for any solemn message for our conversion , or for any general profession , no publick notice might be taken thereof , that might be respited according to the occasion of state , and as it might stand with the civil government and peace . and here i made a history of the church , and examined all the several miracles as they fell out ; and if whole scripture in effect be but the history of the church , how god hath preserved it , what wonders he hath wrought in it , either in protecting his own people , or for the punishment of sin ; thus the old testament shews the manner of creation , the first ages of the world , gods judgements , gods mercies , the giving of the law , the instituting of sacrifices , their hopes and expectation of the messias , together with gods frequent messages and admonitions by prophets . thus the four gospels of the new testament describe the life and history of christ ; the acts of the apostles shew how the church was planted and continued ; the epistles were written upon several occasions ; the apocalypse is a prophesie of the church to the end of the world : and if scripture hath such reference to the church , and that the penmen of scripture were but particular members of the church , surely the church cannot be vilified or neglected without great offence to scripture , or rather to god himself . and therefore in my judgement there is yet one great daily continual miracle in the church , which exceeds all , and serves most abundantly for the confirmation of christian catholick religion ; and it is this , to consider all the times and ages of the world , and all the parts of the habitable world , and therein the several religions professed , and compare them with christian catholick religion , and they will all instantly vanish and come to nothing . god hath ever had the guiding , and a special providence in the protection of his church ; it hath ever been accompanied with all moral virtues , with paternal civil government , with fruits and blessings of peace , attended on with all humane learning , with the profession of all arts and sciences ; to consider how this religion hath continued , and been preserved in all ages , visibly , successively , notwithstanding many persecutions , and the cursed attempts of gods adversaries . to consider these things , uno intuitu , not to insist in singulars and particulars , but take all things together in general , and then they shall amount to as much as a miracle , above nature , in so much that a man may plainly say , hic digitus dei est , these things could not fall out in a naturall course , but by gods extraordinary providence . here i did consider what religion was every where professed , through the whole world : i found when those religions began their progress , and what testimony they gave to christianity , and what they borrowed from jewes , or christians ; and this i did for the satisfaction of those which are learned ; but for such as were simple & ignorant , they cannot but hear of the navigations of this age , how we have compassed the whole earth ; and finde that a great part of the world is not yet inhabited ; so the world in effect is but newly created , this morning , for it hath not yet once seen a revolution of the heavens ; nay , it hath not yet seen the sixt part of one revolution , for it hath not yet seen years ; and take all the monuments of the world , we know , and can point out their beginnings ; the most ancient monument in the world , is not above three thousand yeers continuance ; we have our merchants , and factors in all nations , under the sun ; we have the fruits , the spices , the druggs , the silk , and commodities of all nations : it is easie then to hearken out what religion is every where professed ; alas , you shall finde them all barbarous , and not worth the naming , in respect of christian catholick religion . i cannot insist in particulars , onely in generals for the distribution of times , as saint matthew the first evangelist divided the times by generations ; so i do distinguish the time of the gospell by three hundred yeers ; and mark the degrees how religion hath been setled , and since hath declined from the first integrity : after our blessed lord and saviour , christ jesus had laid the first foundation of his own church in his death and passion ; then for the raising of walls , and to finish the building , it was necessary , that there should be some conformity ; that the workmen & labourers , in laying their stones upon that head-corner-stone , should temper their morter with their own bloud , as then in the birth of christ there were miracles , a vision of angels , and a star appearing in the heavens , together with the massacre of innocents , so in the birth of his church , there were miracles , his own resurrection , a vision of angels , the coming down of the holy ghost in a miraculous manner , the gift of tongues , many miracles : so was there great effusion of bloud , for the first yeers past , in ten great persecutions , and martyrdom it self , is a kinde of miracle , to see such courage and resolution accompanied with all morall virtues ; and that man in the flesh , shall renounce the flesh , and scorning the world , and the pompe thereof , shall offer up himself as a sacrifice for the truth of his religion , and the honour of god ; and this to be done deliberately , advisedly ; not out of rashness , or any strong impression of melancholy ; surely this can be no naturall act , for it is to renounce , and deny nature in her own denne ; and therefore being a supernaturall work , it can be no less then a miracle ; and this age lasted to constantine the blessed emperour . after the martyrs , the next yeers was the age of confessors , and excellent writers , men that for their sanctity , holiness , and great learning became lights in the church ; and by their mortified lives , by their preaching , and writtings , though their letters were not written in bloud , yet did they serve to convert the nations , and this age lasted to the six hundred yeer after christ to the time of saint gregory the great . after the confessors , the next yeers was the age of virgins ; here were those brave magnificent foundations of monasteries , the erection of cathedrals , where god might be served like a god , with the greatest magnificence ; and that fond expectation of a temporall messias might in some sort , be verified by the great solemnity of gods service ; and in this age lived many famous founders here in england , king ethelbert , king osricus , ulfrune , with others whom i doubt not but god hath rewarded . in the next yeers , was the flourishing time of laicks , where the kings were generally much given to devotion and piety , where so many great princes took upon them religious habits ; and so many excelled in all virtue and piety , as here amongst us king alfred , edmund , oswald , canutus the dane , edward the confessor , my blessed founder ; and hereunto you may adde the christian valour of princes , in recovering the holy land , where godfrey of bullen was their chief captain ; and this age lasted to the end of the twelve hundred yeer after the birth of christ. in the next yeers , began the school learning to flourish , then began peter lumbart , and saint thomas aquinas to be in request , together with all the rest of the schoolmen : and thus much i will say in the behalf and honor of schoole-learning , that it is the very touchstone of all truth ; and it is impossible for any falshood to endure the tryall thereof ; and hereunto we may adde some military orders , as champians to fight in defence of the church , and though military , yet were they religious orders ; as that of saint george in windsor , where i had the honour to be a chaplain , to that great order , instituted by my blessed founder , king edward ; and i have been a servant to that order near yeers . god having thus laid a sure and strong foundation of his church , that besides the operation of his spirit , and his over-ruling providence , even naturall reason , by demonstrative proofes , might be sufficiently assured , and convinced in the truth of religion . now for a further tryall of our faith ▪ in the beginning of the fifteenth hundred yeer after christ , he exposeth his church to a tryall , by the incounter of enemies , and first the school-learning , which indeed did sharpen the wits of men ; yet for our sins , some out of perversness , and others out of shallowness of brain , not able to fathom the depth and grounds of that learning , they made all the articles of our faith disputable ; and as in humane things there is variety of opinions , so in religion , if man be left to himself , there will be nothing but sects , and divisions . and here the carnall man hath found out two motives to incourage him in his cursed attempts : first , he conceives that all the laws of the church , are like so many yokes imposed upon him to infringe his christian liberty ; thus he would fain be a lawless man , and wholly left to his own carnall will and profaneness . the second motive is , that whereas he sees stately and great cathedrals erected ; which as they were built with great charge , so they must be supported with great meanes ; and here a sacrilegious eye is cast upon them , yet must there be some pretence of religion , as if these had proceeded from superstition ; and that god needed not , nor required any such sumptuous charge in his service , that it was superfluous , and that a spirituall service of the inward man might suffice ; and could we but look and search that inward man , it is not unlike but we should finde as much emptiness there , as outwardly we finde ruines : but this serves for the present , and so much i will say ; let all the ages from the creation of the world be examined , & i am confident it will be found , that god was never so much provoked to right himself , and in his own quarrell to revenge himself , so much upon man , and to vindicate his own honour , as in these times ; and seeing he made the world of nothing , onely with the word of his mouth , and that he daily supporteth this world , and preserves it from falling to nothing , it is he that will govern this world ; and may in an instant , with the blast of his mouth , bring all the endeavours and practises of men unto nothing , and this he may do in his own due time , when we think all is secure . and here i cannot sufficiently blame these times , and our unhappy condition ; it was the observation of josephus the jew , speaking of the worst sort of men , and wondring much that there should be such monsters amongst men , sunt qui ex contemptu religioni●… & sacerdotum famam & opinionem sapientiae & nobilitatis sibi aucupantur ; alass ! this is now grown to be the common condition of these times , a man for his credit sake , and that he might be reputed a wise states-man , doth generally scorn and contemn churchmen ; and therein he dishonours god , and makes his service contemptible ; thus the devill hath long intended and attempted to blot out all religion out of mans heart : but this he could never do , for as long as man can look up to heaven , so long he conceives hopes of gods mercy , and sees the skirts and bounds of an other world , and if man lookes down to the earth , he sees the place of his buriall , and the way of all flesh ; and that he is in his passage , for every day he loseth a day of his age , and a great part of his life is already spent , and is dead unto him , he shall never see it return ; and that which remaines , it is the worst part of his age , the dregges of his age , the longer he lives he shall be sure to have the more sorrow ; and these very thoughts must needs work some religion in man : now the devill seeing that he could not herein prevaile , to root all religion out of mans heart , therefore he hath found out another stratagem , to reduce all religion to some few acts or heads ; and then to make those acts of religion contemptible ; and so to bring religion to nothing : and this i fear he hath effected . for whereas religion is lex christiana , a law to govern our actions , he hath made it dogma christianum , a theame to be disputed on , or a text to be ●…iscoursed on , as if the whole practise of religion , did onely consist in the precept ; and that men should be alwayes learning , which is an argument of their ignorance ; and that they are not come to the knowledge of the truth : sir thomas moore ( that wise lord chancellor ) did foresee this , and therefore called it by the name of pelpeting , wherein men would take occasion to broach all their new and strange opinions , and wherein the state might likewise suffer , for somtimes it might serve for sedition , what a lamentable thing it is to consider , how all the exercises of religion are laid aside , as if preaching alone would suffice , thus we have no fasting , mortification , confession , charity , devotion , sacrifice , or frequent sacraments , no religious orders , or magnificency in gods service , and in a word , whatsoever else may tend to the honour of god , and the furtherance of piety ; we know not the practise thereof . queen elizabeth was wont to say , that she had rather speak to god her self , then to heare an other speaking of god , she seldom heard sermons , but onely in lent , and then as it may be supposed , she heard them with the greater devotion ; there was a sufficient ground laid for the whole year after to practise ; it were to be wished that preaching alone , might not swallow up all publick prayer , and all other acts of religion . you will say likewise , that we have a strict observation of the sabbath ; i fear it is over strict , and not kept in the right way , for it ought to be kept , with hospitality , relief of the poor , and whatsoever doth tend to nourish love and society between man and man ; and certainly after gods service , to express our joyfulness , and to stir up a cheerfulness of minde , with honest recreations ; for a man may be so tired , and dulled in gods service , as that he may be unfit for his service , and sin more against god with his wandring thoughts , and his sleepy heavyness , then if he should be absent from gods service ; but under colour of this strict observation of the sabbath , chirurgians have been hindred from going to dress wounds , physitians from visiting their patients , midwifes from doing their duties , and poor infants cannot have a little new sweet milk on the sundays ; alas , they know not what belongs to the sabbath : mundus vult decipi . i will here make bold to desire my brethren the church-men , that they would intend painful and profitable preaching , rather then frequent and tedious preaching ; which i speak out of the great honour and reverence which i bear to preaching , multiloquium parit contemptum . some there are , i fear , who spend their hours with vain repetitions , while their auditors in stead of taking things to heart , and working upon their affections , they labour and take pains on the sabbath , with their short writing of notes ( while others wonder what they should write ) but this gives them occasion to make their repetitions at home and that breeds them up perfect preachers , so that now you have preachers of all trades and professions ; and ●…am sure some have preache i who can neither write nor reade , and their sermons are plundred of all learning and elegancy , and they think themselve , such preachers , that they are grown to have a very mean esteem of all humane learning , which certainly in the end must bring in ba●…barism . some men there are who take a very preposterous course , for they begin their religion , and in effect their whole course and practise of religion consists , in the last book of scripture the apocalyps for all their devotion is in pointing out antichrist , and in pulling down babylon : thus they are destroyers . but take heed of the apocalyptical doctors i think i should have called them apocalyptians , for they are very like our gyptians , who are alwayes wandering up and down to tell fortunes , and to cousen people : so in truth they are very great impostors , they have raised up so many controversies in religion , that now religion it self is become a controversie ; and therefore i desire every lay-man , especially such as have had good b●…eeding and education , that seeing church-men themselves are parties , therefore they as more indifferent , would be pleased to see with their own eye●… , and to allot one hour in the day to study the controversies of religion : for while men are wavering and doubtful in the doctrine , they take little thought of the practise . but let them consider , that our time is but short , and here we are to lay up for eternity . if we were but rightly perswaded of religion , it were impossible that such actions should proceed from christian men . god grant we may so live in this world , that we may not lose the end of our creation . what a lamentable thing it is , to see all the great cathedral churches , and all the ancient foundations which were erected for gods glory , and the practise of our piety , that they should serve as an occasion to our sacriledge , and that our devotion should be to pull them down , and to convert the revenue to profane uses , as if we did grudge and envy that god should be served , who notwithstanding created the whole world for man , and created the world especially for this end , that man might serve god : but we on the contrary , as if we did desire utterly to abolish gods service , we pull down the monuments and reliques of devotion , erected by the ancients our present reformation consists in demolishing ; and it is to be feared , lest we give such an example to posterity , that none of them hereafter will erect churches , and god grant they do not forget all devotion ; and this not onely for the present , but for all times past , and future , from the beginning of the world to the end of the world , if it lay in our power we should make gods service void , and of none effect . i cannot speak of these times with patience , and therefore i will here end abruptly ; onely this i will say , that when i began to speak of the blessed trinity , i began with the beginning of s. johns gospel , and i ended with the end of s. johns gospel ; and when i spoke of the incarnation , i began with the beginning of s. johns epistles , and now i end with the end of s. johns apocalyps , surely i come quickly , amen , even so come lord jesus : the grace of our lord jesus christ be with you all , amen . how long , how long , o lord , wilt thou suffer thy church to be thus afflicted ? lord , shorten our dayes , hasten thy kingdome , accomplish the number of thine elect even so , lord jesu , even so , lord jesu , come quickly , come quickly , and give us all a joyful deliverance . usquequo domine ? usquequo ? sancte & individuae trinitati crucifixi domini nostri jesu christi humanitati , sit omnis honor , & gloria , amen . finis . to my worthy friend mr. charles harcourt , servant to the l. bishop of gloucester . sir , hearing that the book is now in the press , and ready to be finished , i do intreat you to cause these few verses to be printed in the later end of the book : it must be done without his knowledge , for i know him to be inexorable . i do it onely to shew my special respects unto him , and that it might appear in print . your true friend , jeffery moore . g. g. g. vir trium literarum dominicalium . ecce fidem godfreede ecce fidem goodmanne ecce fidem gloucestre tuam , tres literae & una litera designant , deus est tibi trinus , & unus . anacl . godfree goodman , god is free and good to man. goodness , grace , glory be thy portion , god giving , grant thee full possession . oratio . agnoscimus , ultrò agnoscimus ( o clementissime deus ) ex hoc quod fecisti nos , debemus tibi nos ipsos , & quia nos redemisti , & pro nobis homo factus es , & pas●…us es ; deberemus tibi plusquam nos si habe●…emus , quanto tu m●…jor es nobis , pro quibus dedisti teipsum ? sed ecce nec plus habemus , nec quod habemus da●…e tibi possumus sine te : sancte d●…us nos ipsos nobis eripe , & totos nos tibi dede , aufer & tolle a nobis , quicquid nos avocat vel abstrahit à te , vilescant caecera propter te , & chara sint tua & tu deus plusquam omnia : de nullo gaudeamus vel doleamus , nisi quod promoveat ad te , vel abducat à te , nulli placere appetamus vel displicere timeamus , nisi tibi : sordescat omne gaudium quod est absque te , & suavis sit omnis dolor qui provenit a te ; delectet nos omnis labor qui est pro te , & taediosa sit omnis quies , quae est sine te ; nec aliquid velimus qu●…d est extra te . f●…cisti nos domine propter te , & inquietum est cor nostrum donec veniat ad te : via ergo ad te sis nobis domine , mentes instrue sensus corrige , gressus di●…ige , sid●…m adjuva , spem vivisica , charitatem excita , qui es via , veritas & vita ; consige timore tuo cor nostrum , ut quae minaris metuendo evadamus ; redde nobis laetitiam saluta●…is tui , ut quae spondes , diligendo percipiamus ; suggere quid de te cogitemus , doce quibus te sermonibus invocemus , da quibus operibus tibi placeamus , ut inter prospera & adversa non deficiamus , in illis non extollamur , in istis non deprimamur : quod à nobis requiris tribue ut velimus & possimus , & da exequi sicut oportet & expedit saluti animarum nost●…arum , & quod deerit nobis , suppleat pietas & benignitas tua . da domine quod jubes , & jube quod vis . ecce misericors pater , multa rogavimus qui nec pauca promeruimus , fatemur , heul fatemur non solum quae postulamus , non debentur dona , sed & multa & exquisita supplicia ; habes quidem confitentes reos , peccavimus nimis , peccavimus nimis , in iniquita●…bus concepti , in peccatis consenuimus , malum coram te fecimus , & modis omnibus peccavimus , quibus miseri peccare potuimus ; & quo plus potuimus plus peccavimus , nec hîc desistendum , si data occasione vires suppetiissent , & tu permisisses , & sic quidem justè furorem irae tuae provocavimus , nostra culpa , nostra culpa , nostra maxima culpa , eloi eloi lamma sabacthani . ecce peccatorum merces , virga vindictae tuae , bellum , fames , pestis , egestas , & rerum omnium inopia ; maledicimur , persecutionem patimur , blasphemamur , tanquam purgamenta mundi hujus facti sumus , & omnium peripsema : quas plagas , irrisiones , injurias , improperia , illusiones , dolores , damna , oppressiones , orbitates , iniquè sustinuimus ? quoties ludibria experti cogebamur fugere ante faciem inimici , & in perpetuo pavore versari ? in solltudinibus errantes , in montibus , & speluncis , vix reliquerunt domum , habitaculum , aut vestimentum nobis , inebriatae sunt sagittae eorum sanguine , & gladius eorum devoravit carnes ; eloi eloi lamma sabacthani . nosque pastores gregis , episcopi & sacerdotes tui , omnium miserrimi , namque insurrexerunt in nos viri iniqui , absque misericordia , quaesierunt nos interficere falsis suis accusationibus , linguis suis quasi lanceis vulneraverunt nos , captivos nos duxerunt , & de spoliis nostris sortem mittunt inter se , vene●…unt gentes in haereditatem tuam , polluerunt templum sanctum tuum , posuerunt jerusalem in ruinam , comederunt jacob , & locum ejus desolaverunt , eloi eloi lamma sabacthani . si non nobis domine , si non nobis , at saltem nomini tuo da gloriam , respice templa tua infidelium manibus profanata , & tui dilecti gregis afflictionem , reminiscere haereditatis tuae effusione preciosissimi sanguinis tui unigeniti acquisitae , vineámque tua plantatam dextera , quam ferus aper exterminare conatur , ferventer visita ; & illius cultores adversus devastantium rabiem tua virtute corrobora , victores effice ; impugnatores in te sperantium potentiâ tuae defensionis expugna , auxiliare famulis tuis implotantibus misericordiam tuam , ut omnium in●…micorum nostrorum feritate dep●…essa , incessabili te gratiarum actione laudemus . usquequo domine irasceris ? accendetur velut ignis furor tuus ? tandem aliquando miserere , aufer bella usque ad finem terrae , arcum contere , arma confringe , scuta combure igni , pacem restitue in dicbus nost●…is , tempora sint tua protectione tranquilla , ut 〈◊〉 nostri qui in suo confidunt exercitu , dexterae tuae potentià conterantur : morbos aufer , famem depelle , aperi carceres , vincula dissolve ; exulibus reditum , infirmantibus sanitatem , navigantibus portum salutis indulge , domine deus noster , qui es moestorum consolatio , & laboranti●…m fortitudo . ne memine●…is domine peccata nostra nec parentum nostrorum , nec ultra vindictam sumas de peccatis nostris ; parce nobis domine ; quos delictorum catena constringit , miseratio tuae pietatis clementer absolvat ; & flagella tuae iracundiae quae pro peccatis nostris meremur , averte , ut sciamus & te indignante talia supplicia prodire , & te miserante cessare . kyrie eleison , christe eleison , kyrie eleison : propitius esto nobis domine miserrimis peccatoribus , jesu fili david miserere nostri , agne dei qui tollis peccata mundi miserere nostri , miserere nostri deus secundùm magnam misericordiam tuam , & secundum multitudinem miserationum tuarum dele iniquitates nostras , miserere nostri qui pater es misericordiarum , & deus totius consolationis ; namque major est misericordia tua quam iniquitas nostra , major est pietas tua quàm impietas nostra ; plus potes dimittere , quam nos committere ; plus parcere , quàm nos peccare : etiamsi commisimus unde nos damnare potes , & meritò , tu tamen non amisisti unde salvare potes , & soles pro tuo beneplacito : noli sic attendere malum nostrum , ut obliviscaris bonum tuum , ne perdat nos iniquitas nostra , quos fecit omnipotens bonitas tua : recognosce quod tuum est , absterge quod alienum est . nec respicias multitudinem iniquitatum nostrarum , sed secundùm multitudinem miserationum tuarum miserere nostri : memento nominis , & numinis , & muneris tui , domine ; o bone jesu esto nobis jesus ; quem judicem snstinere non possumns , salvatorem habere desideramus . quod si necessitas cogat , & justitiae ratio postulet ut punlamur , tu domine supplicium sume , at non in furore tuo arguas nos , nec in ira tua corripias nos , sed pro tuo paterno amore corrige , & c●…stiga , virga tua & baculus tuus , ipsa nos consolentur ; & ne ultra disseras , sed hic dum tempus poenitendi est , dum tempus miserendi est , hîc ure , hic seca , ut in aeternum parcas , nec tradas nos tortoribus & potestatibus tenebrarum igne inextinguibili cruciandos . quae utilitas in sanguine nostro dum descendimus in aeternam corruptionem ? non mort●…i laudabunt te domine , neque omnes qui descendunt in infernum , neque tu vis mortem peccatoris , sed magis ut convertatur & vivat . et hoc scimus domine , si poenitentia ducamur , parcis & ignoscis , si revertamur suscipis , dum disserimus sustines & praestolaris , revocas errantes , invitas repugnantes , expectas torpentes , amplexaris redeuntes , doces ignorantes , lugentes consolaris , à ruina suscitas , post lapsum reparas , petentibus largiris , quaerentibus inveniris , & pulsantibus aperis . agè ergo sanctissime deus , da nobis cor pervigil quod nulla abducat à te curiosa cogitatio , da nobile quod nulla deorsum trahat indigna affectio , da invictum quod nulla fatiget tribulatio , da liberum quod nulla sibi vendicet violenta commotio , da rectum quod nulla seorsum obliquet sinistra intentio . largire nobis domine deus noster intellectum te cognoscentem , diligentiam te quaerentem , sapientiam te invenientem , conversationem tibi placentem , perseverantiam te fiducialiter expectantem , & fiduciam te fideliter amplexantem : da tuis nos poenis affligi per poenitentiam , tuis beneficiis in via uti per gratiam , & tuis gaud●…is in patria ●…rui per gloriam , amen . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e mans excuse in trea●…ing of mysteries . the written wo●…d and the begotten word . the word of god is imperfect without christ. man expostulates with god. blasphemers suppressed . whole man is made capable of god. the division of the text. the method . saint john ex ceeds moses . the comparison between both . they both agree in particulars . moses . iohn baptist. christ. saint john transcends moses . the heavy judgements accompanying the law . the gospell accompanyed with works of mercy . the great difference between the beginning and ending of scripture . of the name of john how imposed upon saint john baptist. a comparison of saint john baptist , with saint john the evangelist . the parents of saint john , and how he was recommended to be an apostle . how his mothers desire was accomplished . saint johns prerogatives above other apostles . after christ he did adhere to saint peter . saint john was the evangelist of the gentiles . the occasion of writing his gospell . how he might come to the knowledge of this mysterie . saint john might be instructed by the blessed virgin . at the annuntiation there was implyed the trinity . saint john an eagle . as he was the beloved apostle , for he did ever preach love . notes for div a -e saint john was boanerges . christs eternall generation . a distinct person . the same godhead . the difference between god and man. the three persons outwardly concurre . the manner of the generation of the word . the mauner of the procession of the holy ghost . a prerogative of the understanding and will of god above his other attributes . how the three persons agree in actions and attributes . the jews question answered . god is known by degrees . all mans knowledge is gotten by degrees . moses had some knowledge of this mystery . the trinity appears in the creation of the world . the messias must needs be a person in the deity . god doth sacrifice to himself ; there are persons in the deity . the seed of abraham is more then man. isaac's sacrifice . jacobs expectation the faith of moses . the whole law directed to christ. the jews had a tradition of our baptisme . and severall types of our baptisme . they knew the form of our baptisme , as well as the matter . what prayers were u●…ed at their sacrifices . the c●…ssation of the law. the temple destroyed . how the jews fell by degrees . gods judgement upon the jewes . the jewes no longer a nation . the method how to deal with the heathen . the atheist is the greatest impostor . the infinite proofs of a godhead . the metaphysicks acknowledge god and ang●…ls . influences . the effect of influences . the transcendentia discover god every thing points out both an efficient and a final cause . the lea●… inconveni●…nce must ev●…r be admitted . the first is ever excepted from the ordinary rank . the sun is a kind of corpo●…eall god. the mathematicks shew the wonders of god. the wonders in astrologie . in lo●…ick all the pre●…icaments predicate the deity . substance . 〈◊〉 . qualit●… . relation . action . passion . 〈◊〉 . ubi . situ●… . habitus . the infinite proofes of a godhead . a particular instance , for proof of the deity . : god is iusiuite . we acknowledge an infinite , yet we cannot conceive a●… infinite . god must be infinite . without imperfection . god is of himself eternity . ubiqui y. omnis●…iency . omnipotency . providence , constancy . immutability . gods justice . mercy . as every thing was made , so it must depend upon god. how causes may be free , yet the effects necessary . mans weakness . every thing in man is bounded . the difference of men n their intellectuals . no comparison between god and man. mans natural reason is bounded within the natural world . the object & faculty must be proportionable . our natural ignorance in natural things . the same method in naturals as in supernaturals . mans natural knowledge discerns a supernatural world . a supernatural light must fully discover a supernatural world . man 〈◊〉 naturally an ambition above n●…e . admi●…ation is a kind : of natural faith . the understanding must obey in believing , as the will in performing . a repe●…ition what hath been proved . it is a greater wonder that accidences should become substances in god , then that one substance should become persons . it is a greater wonder that all gods attributes should be but one attribute , then that one substance should be three persons . that gods justice should be his me●…cy , is as strange as the godhead should be three persons . gods attributes as wonderfull as the persons . a brief of what hath been proved . a digression upon the mercy of god. a conference with an angel. the angels wonder at naturall things . a conference with an infant in the wombe . the wonders in nature . the creatures are nothing in comparison with god. gods understanding and will produce persons . the authors private op●…nion . the determinations or traditions of the church , are more then human . the church in effect , doth translate . the personality in the godhead . how the persons are d●…stinct . the godhead being spirituall and infinite , is imparted without loss . proofes of the trinity in nature . the authors private opinion . footsteps ' of the trinity . reasons in nature to prove the trinity . gods prerogative may be examined . a resemblance of the blessed trinity must appear in every creature . the knowledg and love of man , what events it works . the longing of women . two persons become one . the understanding and love are causes as of union so of distraction . how 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 extends . the an●…pathy between the author and the socinians . the excellent use of reason in religion . dumb creatures catechise the socinians . god is mans schoolemaster . man is the end of nature , and therefore cannot end in nature . how man stands naturally affecte●… in religion . faith presupposing , nature . a supernaturall knowledge must conduct us to a supe●…naturall end ▪ gods perfection , consists not in variety , as the creatures doth . the effects of gods power &c. do not alwayes appear . the excellency of gods understanding ●…nd will. what kinde of persons there are in the deity . god only must reveale the trinity . what god did before the creation . mans salva ion hath more reference to the persons , then to his other attributes . the exce●…lency of gods understanding and will. not philosophers , but poets were the priests of the heathen . the 〈◊〉 borrowed from the jewes . reason may ▪ serve to direct morall actions but no●… our faith . this mysterie hath nothing contrary to philosophy . the great assurance or security , which we have for our ●…aith . actions confirm words . the miracles and manner of working them confirm mysteries . works above nature confirm words above nature . in the notes which are plundered and lost . forain authors recommended . no writings extant which contradict scripture . the law ordained to chr●…st . saint john ▪ baptist his testimonies of christ. the prerogatives of saint john baptist. severall miraculous acts of chri●…t . mir●…cles of all sever●…ll kinds . raising the dead , the greatest of mirac●…es . the rashness and haste , used in christ's condemnation . the wonders in christs resurrection . how the text of s john may be understood . notes for div a -e the great use of reason in religion . reason an handmaid to religion . reason and sense must join in gods service . mysteries are to be adored , not curiously to be searched into . what god requires of the creatures . god gave some creatures liberty of wi●…l . the fall of the angels . man is a middle creature , between angels and beasts . the angels sin , was greater then mans. the flesh prevailed in man. god used means . what sins could not be in the infancy of the world the devill tempts man. the punishment of mans sin was small . my book of he fall of man. god doth ever use meanes . the treasures of nature . vegetatives . man alone not sufficient to satisfie for sin . god and man must joyn in satisfying for sin . all gods mercies are by christ. a person in the deity redeems us . no dishonor to god to be incarnate . gods infinite love . gods omnipotency . gods experience . gods pa●…lion . the mediator . a new honor of god in his title . the dignity of the creatures by the incarnation . the incarnation is a settlement to the creatures . s. john's testimony of the incarnation . the incarnation proceeds from gods mercy . gods justice and mercy reconciled in christ. the occasion of the sin of angels . christ was not to take the nature of angels . why the second person , rather then any other , should be incarnate . how gods words are verified . the incarnation intimated in mans creation . the first adam and the second adam . the great mystery in gods name . the name of abraham changed . several presages of christs coming . christs god ▪ head prophesied . a temporal messias how improbable . christs coming to judgment . two several natures . similitudes to set forth the hypostatical union . the possibility of the incarnation . the consequences of the incarnation . how the natures were united . no sickness ▪ could befall christ. the circumstances of christs birth . the preparatives to his coming . the gentiles . jacobs expectation . the prophesies of christ. the coming of of eltah . herodians . christ no temporall messias as he jewes expected . the time of his comming . the manner of christs comming . prophesies and preparatives among the gentiles , for the comming of christ. a miracle to confirm the prophesie . the ful●…lling of the prophesie . the prophesies of the sibylls . the sibylls speak very punctually of christ. the religion of the heathen a preparation to christianity . the mother of christ , an espoused virgin . the generall taxing at the birth of christ. the effects which fo●…lowed the emperors edict . why christ was born in a common inn. christ was born in a stable . christ was born in the sixt age . christ was born at midnight . what followed the birth of christ. the martyrdome of the innocents . the keeping of the feast , an argument of the truth . a comparison between christ and moses . signs amongst the gentiles for the coming of christ. the oracles having first acknowledged christ , after became dumb . the miracles which ha●…e hapned in the church . s. peters miracles . where scripture leaves the church . a commendation of the ancient romans . the dignity of the church . the dignity of christian religion . all other religions vanity . a distribution of times . the first ages after christ. the age of miracles and martyrs . the age of confessors . the age of monasteries . the age of laicks . god will govern the world . the contempt of the church . the devills policie . preaching should not exclude other acts of religion . the keeping of the sabbath . none should preach without much study . take heed of apocalyptical doctors . the pulling down of churches . the author ends abruptly . a letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the defense of dr. sherlock's notion of the trinity in unity, relating to the calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject howe, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing l estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the defense of dr. sherlock's notion of the trinity in unity, relating to the calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject howe, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by j. astwood for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . written by john howe. cf. nuc pre- . advertisement: [ ] p. at end. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng sherlock, william, ?- . -- defence of dr. sherlock's notion of a trinity in unity. howe, john, - . -- calm and sober enquiry. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - jonathan blaney sampled and proofread - jonathan blaney text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a letter to a friend , concerning a postscript to the defence of dr. sherlock's notion of the trinity in unity , relating to the calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject . london , printed by j. astwood for tho. parkhurst at the bible and crowns at the lower end of cheapside , near mercers-chappel , . a letter to a friend , &c. sir , i find a postscript to the newly published defence of dr. sherlock 's notion of the trinity in unity , takes notice of the enquiry concerning the possibility of a trinity in the godhead . he that writes it seems somewhat out of humour , or not in such as it is decent to hope is more usual with him : and i can't guess for what , unless that one , whom he imagines a dissenter , hath adventured to cast his eyes , that way that he did , his . but for that imagination he may have as little ground , as i to think the dean's defender is the dean : and as little as he had to say the enquirer took great care that no man should suspect that he favours the dean in his notions , where he is quite out in his guess ; for the enquirer took no such care at all , but nakedly to represent his own sentiments as they were , whether they agreed with the dean's , or wherein they differ'd : and really cares not who knows that he hath not so little kindness either for the truth or for him , as to abandon or decline what he thinks to be true for his sake , or ( as he express'd himself p. . of that discourse ) because he said it . but the defender represents the dean as much of another temper , and that he will thank him for not favouring him in his notions . but yet he says , that tho' the enquirer doth not in every particular say what the dean says , yet he says what will justifie him against — the charge of tritheism . and is there any hurt to him in that ? what a strange man doth he make the dean ! as if he could not be pleased unless he alone did engross truth ! will he thank a man for not favouring his notions , and yet would blame him for not saying in every particular what he says , tho' he say what will justifie him against the heaviest charge fram'd against him ! may one neither be allow'd to agree with him , nor disagree ? but sir , the defender's discourse hath no design ( nor i believe he himself ) to disprove the possibility of a trinity in the ever blessed god-head . therefore the enquirer is safe from him as to the principal design he is concerned for , it is all one to him if it still appear possible in what way it be so represented , that is intelligible , consistent with it self , and with other truth ; so that it is hardly worth the while to him , further to enquire whether the dean's hypothesis or his be better , if either be found unexceptionably , safe and good . but because the defender hath , to give preference to the one , misrepresented both with some appearing disadvantage to the cause it self , what he says ought to be considered . and the whole matter will be reduced to this twofold enquiry : . whether the enquirer hath said more than the dean , or more than is defensible , of the distinction of the sacred three in the godhead . . whether the dean hath said so much as the enquirer , or so much as was requisite of their union . . for the former , the defender , p. . mentions the dean's notion of three infinite minds or spirits : and makes the enquirer to have been proving three spirits , three distinct essences , three individual natures , in the godhead ; and then adds — for my part , i cannot take where the difference is , unless it be in the term infinite . 't is indeed strange the enquirer shou'd have said more than the dean , if there were no difference , unless in the term infinite , wherein he must have said infinitely less . but he at length , apprehends another difference , tho' he after labours to make it none , viz. that the enquirer disputes , but asserts nothing , and he fancies he doth so to shelter himself from the animadverter , of whom he says he seems to be terribly afraid — here he puts the dean into a fit of kindness and good nature , allowing the enquirer to partake with him in his fears , tho' not in his notions , as more sacred . but he herein understands not the enquirer , who if he had been so terribly afraid , could very easily have said nothing : and who was really afraid of a greater animadverter , thinking it too great boldness , under his eye , to speak confidently of his own peculiarities , and that ly folded up in so venerable darkness . he thought it enough , in opposition to the daring person ( whosoever he was ) with whom he was concern'd that so peremptorily pronounc'd the trinity an absurdity , a contradiction , nonsense , and an impossibility , to represent whar he proposed as possible for ought he knew . and now the defender will have the dean to have done no more . and with all my heart let him have done no more , if he and his animadverter , and the rest of the world will so agree it : but he will have the enquirer to have done more , and to be much more exposed to the charge of tritheism , by asserting three distinct essences , three individual natures , and three spiritual beings in the godhead . this is indeed very marvellous , that the enquirer should expose himself to the charge of tritheism by asserting all this , when but a few lines before upon the same page , he is said to have asserted nothing ! but he may as well make the enquirer in asserting nothing to have asserted all this , as the dean in asserting all this to have asserted nothing . and where the enquirer hath said in express words that the sacred three are three distinct substances i can't find : and we must in great part alter the common notion of substance to make it affirmable of god at all , viz. that it doth substare accidentibus , which i believe the dean will no more than the enquirer suppose the divine being to admit . but 't is true , that there is somewhat more considerable in the notion of substance , according whereto , if the dean can make a shift to avoid the having of any inconvenient thing proved upon him by consequence , i hope the enquirer may find a way to escape as well . but whereas he says the dean allows but one divine essence , and one individual nature in the godhead repeated in three persons , but without multiplication , as he says he had already explained it . this hath occasion'd me to look back to that explanation , and if he thinks the allowing but one divine essence , and one individual nature in the godhead , will agree with what the dean hath said in his vindication , i shall not envy him , nor ( now ) go about to disprove it . but i confess i see not how it can agree with what the defender says in this his explanation it self , when p. . he tells us the son is the living subsisting image of the father , and the image and the prototype can not be the same but must be two . no man is his own image , nor is an image the image of it self . and he adds , this is so self evident , &c. but whereas the distinction all this while might be understood to be but modal , and that appears to be the defenders present ( what ever was the deans former ) meaning , that the three subsistences differ only in their different manner of subsisting , yet with this meaning his other words do little agree , for he plainly asserts a real distinction of three in the same individual numerical nature . and who did ever make a real distinction to be but modal ? more expresly he had said before p. . the divine nature is one individual nature , but not one single nature , for one single nature can be but one person whether in god or man. i shall not here discuss with him the criticism upon which he lays so mighty stress of one individual nature and one single nature , but take the terms he chooses , and if the divine nature be not one single nature , it must be double , it must be triple . and what doth this come to less than three natures ? unless all ordinary forms of speech must be quite abandon'd and forsaken . and wherein doth it come short of what is said by the enquirer ? p. . and . this term individual must ( in the case now supposed , as possible not as certain ) admit of a twofold application either to the distinct essence of the father , or of the son , or of the holy ghost ; or to the entire essence of the godhead , in which these three do concurr . each of these conceived by it self , are ( according to this supposition ) individual essences , but conceived together they are the entire individual essence of god , for there is but one such essence and no more , and it can never be multiplied nor divided into more of the same name and nature . duplicity , triplicity , are admitted ; simplicity rejected , if ( simple and single be of the same signification . ) where is the difference , but that the one thinks absolute omnimodous simplicity is not to be affirmed of the divine nature , as he often speaks . the other says downright , it is not single or simple without limitation . the one denies multiplication of it , so doth the other : the one indeed speaks positively , the other doth but suppose what he says as possible not certain . and there is indeed some difference between supposing a thing as possible for ought one knows ; and affirming it so positively , as to impute heresie , and nonsense to all gainsayers . but both bring for proof , the same thing , the incarnation ; as in the postscript , the defender takes notice the enquirer doth . p. . and so doth he himself in his letter , p. . — the divine nature was incarnate in christ , he was perfect god and perfect man , and if there was but one single divine nature in all three persons , this one single divine nature was incarnate , and therefore the father and the holy ghost who are this single divine nature as well as the son , must be as much incarnate as the son was . he makes the contrary absurd . and brings in ( fitly enough ) victorinus afer teaching , that we ought not to say , nor is it lawful to say , that there is but one substance ( i. e. as he paraphrases it , one single subsisting nature ( therefore there must be three single subsisting natures ) and three persons . for if this same substance did and suffer'd all ( patri-passiani et nos ) we must be patri-passians , which god forbid . and what the defender alledges from the ancients , against the sabellians , allowing only a trinity of names and his taking the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the concrete not in the abstract , fully enough speaks the enquirers sense , his accounting the contrary too fine and metaphysical for him was what was writ to dr. wallis , calm discourse , p. . too fine or too little solid , &c. in short , till it can be effectually prov'd , that mind and spirit do not signifie somewhat as absolute as nature or essence ( or rather more than the former , which signifies the principle of operation as the other of being , ) and till it can be as well prov'd , that asserting a thing as certain , so as to pronounce it heresie and nonsense to think otherwise , is less than only to propose it as possible , or enquire whether it be so or no , the dean must be judg'd by every one that understands common sense , to have heightened the distinction of three persons at least as much as the enquirer . and whether the enquirer have supposed more than is defensible against the defenders objections , will be considered by and by in its proper place . in the mean time let it . be examin'd whether the dean has said as much for salving the unity of the godhead as the enquirer , or as much as is requisite to that purpose . and here our business will be short , for it all turns upon that one single point , whether mutual consciousness be that union which must be acknowledged , or suppose it only . for which we need only appeal to common reason , whether being do not in the natural order precede even the power of working , and consequently whether being united vitally , precede not the possibility of acting agreeably to that united state , whereupon the enquiry is not concerning actual conscience only , but ( as he speaks ) consciousness . is it possible any three persons or intelligent subsistences , should naturally have vital perception of each others internal motions and sensations , without being vitally preunited ? i say naturally , for that god might give to three created spirits a temporary perception of each other without bringing them into a stated union each with other , is little to be doubted ; as a spirit may assume a body and animate it pro tempore without being substantially united with it . and if that body were also a spirit they might pro tempore for ought we know by extraordinary divine disposition ( for within the ordinary course of nature we know of no such intimacy of created spirits to another ) be quasi animae to one another . but if naturally they were so to mingle and transfuse sensations mutually into each other , they must be naturally , first , in vital union with one another . nor therefore did the enquirer mistake the dean's notion as the defender fancies in the passage he quotes p. . as if he took mutual consciousness for meer mutual perspection . for tho' scire abstractly taken doth not signifie more than perspicere , yet the enquirer in that passage speaking of a never so perfect mutual perspection properly enough express'd thereby as great a feeling such spirits were supposed to have of each other , in themselves , as mutual consciousness is apt to signifie , or as the dean can yet be supposed to have meant , that perspection being more perfect which produces gusts and relishes suitable to the object , than that which stays in meer speculation only . and upon the whole , it seems very strange the defender should say , if such an internal , vital sensation , be not an essential union , he believes no man can tell what it is . for how can such actual sensation be imagin'd to be union ? as well might the use of sense its self ( speaking of any thing singly to which it belongs ) be said to be its constituent form , or ( consequently ) the doing any thing that proceeds from reason , be the form of a man. so the writing a book , should be the author . and whereas he says it is certain the dean took it to be so , and therefore he did not leave out a natural external union ; it follows , indeed , that he did not leave it out , in his mind , and design , but he nevertheless left it out of his book , and therefore said not enough there , to salve the unity of the godhead , but ought to have insisted upon somewhat prior to mutual consciousness , as constituent of that unity , and which might make the three one , and not meerly argue them to be so . . but now p. . he comes to find as great fault with the enquirers way of maintaining this unity , and because he is resolv'd to dislike it , if he can't find it faulty , sets himself to make it so . the temper of mind wherewith he writes to this purpose what follows p. . and onwards to the end so soon , and so constantly shews it self , that no man whose mind is not in the same disorder will upon tryal apprehend any thing in it , but such heat as dwells in darkness . and he himself hath given the document which may be a measure to any apprehensive reader . true divine wisdom rests not on an ill natur'd , and perverse spirit , i understand it , while the ill fit lasts . but 't is strange he could write those words without any self-reflection . the thing to be reveng'd is , that the enquirer did freely speak his thoughts , wherein he judg'd the dean's hypothesis defective , his not taking notice of what he reckon'd naturally antecedent and fundamental to mutual consciousness : a most intimate , natural , necessary , eternal union of the sacred three . if the enquirer spake sincerely , as he understood the matter , and him ; and it evidently apppear the defender did not so , i only say the wrong'd person hath much the advantage and wishes him no other harm , than such gentle regrets , as are necessary to set him right with himself , and his higher judge . he says , he ( the enquirer ) represents this ( unity ) by the union of soul and body , and by the union of the divine and humane nature , &c. 't is true , he partly doth so , but more fully by the ( supposed union of ) three created spirits ( to which he that will may see , he only makes that a lower step ) and he says , ( with respect especially to the former of these ) that an union supposeable to be originally , eternally , and by natural necessity in the most perfect being , is to be thought unexpressibly more perfect than any other . but ( he adds ) these are personal unions , and therefore cannot be the unity of the godhead . and he very well knew ( for he had but little before cited the passage ) that the enquirer never intended them so , but only to represent that the union of the three in the godhead , could not be reasonably thought less possible . what he farther adds is much stranger ( and yet herein i am resolv'd to put charity towards him to the utmost stretch , as he professes to have done his understanding ) for he says — as far as he can possibly understand and that he should be glad to be better informed , tho' there is some reason to apprehend that former displeasure darkned his understanding , ( and even dimn'd his eye-sight ) which yet i hope hath it's more lucid intervals , and that his distemper is not a fixed habit with him . ) and what is it now that he cannot possibly understand otherwise ? that no other union will satisfie him ( viz. the enquirer ) but such an union of three spiritual beings and individual natures as by their composition constitute the godhead , as the composition of soul and body do the man , i. e. he cannot understand but he means what he expresly denies . who can help so cross an understanding ? if he had not had his very finger upon the place where the enquirer says in express words [ i peremptorily deny all composition in the being of god ] this had been more excusable , ( besides much said to the same purpose elsewhere ) it had been ingenuous in any man not to impute that to another , as his meaning , which in the plainest terms he disavows , as none of his meaning : and it had been prudent in the dean ( or his defender ) of all mankind not to have done so in the present case , as will further be seen in due time . but he takes it for an affront , when he fancies a man to come too near him . he adds , for this reason he disputes earnestly against the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity of the divine nature , and will not allow that wisdom , power , and goodness , are the same thing in god , and distinguished into different conceptions by us , only through the weakness of our understandings , which cannot comprehend an infinite being in one thought , and therefore must , as well as we can , contemplate him by parts . i know not what he means by earnestly , the matter was weighty , and it is true , he was in writing about it in no disposition to jeast . but it 's said he disputed against the universal , absolute , omnimodous simplicity of the divine nature . i hope the defender in this means honestly , but he speaks very improperly , for it supposes him to think that the universal , absolute , omnimodous simplicity , so earnestly disputed against , did really belong to the divine nature , but i can scarce believe him to think so , and therefore he should have said , his disputation tended to prove it not to belong . if he ( viz. the defender , or the dean ) did really think it did , they , or he , must be very singular in that sentiment . i would have them name me the man that ever laid down and asserted such a position . some i know have said of that sacred being , that it is summè simplex , or more simple than any thing else , but that imports not universal , absolute , omnimodous simplicity , which is impossible to be a perfection , or therefore to belong to the divine nature . no man that ever acknowledged a trinity of persons even modally distinguished , could ever pretend it , for such simplicity excludes all modes . nay , the antitrinitarians themselves can never be for it , as the calm discourse hath shewn . and if the dean be , he is gone into the remotest extream from what he held ( and plainly enough seems still to hold ) that ever man of sense did . but for what is added , that he will not allow that wisdom , power and goodness , are the same thing in god : this is not fairly said , civility allows me not to say , untruly . there is no word in the place he cites , nor any where in that book , that signifies not allowing , 't is intimated we are not instructed by the scripture to conceive of the divine nature , as , in every respect , most absolutely simple , or that power , wisdom , goodness in the abstract , are the same thing , and that our difficulty is great to apprehend them really undistinguishable . and let me seriously ask himself , doth he in good earnest think it is only through the weakness of our understandings that we distinguish the notions of the divine wisdom , power and goodness ? certainly it were great weakness of unstanding to define them alike . i believe he never met with the writer yet that distinguisht them less , than ratione ratiocinatâ , in contradistinction to ratocinante , which implies somewhat corresponding to our distinct notions of them ( eminently and not formally ) in naturâ rei . and whereas he further says , this prepared his way to make goodness , wisdom , power , — a natural trinity n unity , herein the defender is mistaken . this is not the trinity which the enquirers discourse was ever intended to terminate in , as he himself hath expresly said , and the defender takes notice of it , which makes me wonder how he could think it was so intended , citing the very passage p. . where the enquirer professes , not to judge , that we are under the precise notions of power , wisdom and goodness , to conceive of the father , son and holy ghost . but why then were these three so much discourst of before ? they are three most celebrated divine attributes , wherein we have our most immediate and very principal concern . and some have thought the trinity was most fitly to be conceived by them : the enquirer did not think so ; but he thought first , it would be requisite to have our minds disentangled from any apprehended necessity of conceiving them to be in all respects the very same things , nor are they the very same , if they be so distinguish'd as is expressed in the th . of the summary propositions ; where also they are each of them said to be common to father , son , and holy ghost , whence therefore it is impossible they shou'd be thought to distinguish father , son , and holy ghost . but that some distinction being admitted even of them , this might facilitate to us our conception of the greater distinction which must be , of father , son and spirit , as is express'd p. . indeed he did not think fit to interrupt his discourse by staying to shew reasons why he did not rest in that account alone of the trinity , tho' it might seem plausible , or not absurd , but proceeded further to what was more satisfying to himself , and might be so to other men . and ( as the intervening series of his discourse leads thereto ) this is more directly done p. . & . &c. especially where he comes to speak of the necessary coexistence , and the ( as necessary and natural ) order of the father , son and spirit , towards each other . the second being , not by any intervening act of will , but by necessary , eternal promanation , from the first , and the third from them both . and the true reason why power , wisdom and goodness , were not thought expressive of the distinction of father , son and spirit , but common to each of them ( as is said , summary prop. . ) was , thatt the two latter can not but be necessary emanations , most connatural to their original , as is truely suggested by the defender , p. ● . if you object ( as the defender brings in the enquirer , saying ) that this gives us the notion of a compounded deity , &c. this , i. e. the supposition , that absolute omnimodous simplicity , belongs not to it , is the thing which may be thought to give us this notion . and he tells us , he ( the enquirer ) answers this difficulty , by giving us a new notion of a compositum . and what 's that which he calls a new notion ? that a compositm seems to imply a preexisting component , that brings such things together , and supposes such and such more simple things to have preexisted apart , or separate , and to be brought afterwards together into an united state. and indeed is this a new notion ? as new as the creation ? let him shew me an instance through the whole created universe of beings ( and for the uncreated being the defender ( now at this time ) disputes against any composition there , and the enquirer denies any ) first , where there hath been a compositum without a pre-existing component , or next the compounded parts whereof , if substantial did not in order of nature pre-exist separate ; i. e. whether esse simplicitèr do not naturally precede esse tale , or which is all one , to our present purpose , whether they were not capable hereof if the creator pleased : let any man , i say , tell me where was there ever a compositum made by substantial union , that did not consist of once separate or of separable parts . but note his admirable following supposition , that is to say , that if a man , suppose , who consists of body and soul , had been from eternity , without a maker , and his soul , and body had never subsisted a part , he could not have been said to have been a compounded creature ? this is said with design most groundlesly ( as we shall see ) to fasten an absurd consequence upon the enquirer , and see how it lucks : did ever any man undertake to reprove an absurdity with greater absurdity ? a creature without a maker ! what sort of creature must this be ! we have a pretty saying quoted in the defender's letter ; he that writes lies down ; and we are apt enough too , when we write to trip and fall down , and ought in such cases to be merciful to one another , even tho' he that falls should be in no danger of hurting his fore-head , much more if he be . what was another man's turn now , may be mine next . but let the supposition proceed , and put we being instead of creature , which no doubt was the defender's meaning , for creature he must needs know it could not be that had no maker . and what then ? why he should not ( says he ) have been said to be compounded , though he would have had the same parts that he has now : we have here a self-confounding supposition , which having done that first , can't hurt him whom it was designed to confound , being taken in season . grant one , and you grant a thousand . a being made up of a soul and a body , is so imperfect an entity , as could not be of it self . nothing is of it self which is not absolutely perfect . if he mind to disprove this , let him try his faculty when he pleases against it , and ( which i sincerely believe he never intends ) together with it , against all religion . but besides , he hath destroy'd his own supposition himself ( to put us out of that danger ) by saying in plain words , p. . we have no notion of an eternal and necessary existence , but in an absolutely perfect and infinite nature . now say i , what is so perfect , and hath whatever belongs to it necessarily , though distinguishable things belong to it , hath no parts , for what are parts , but such things as can be parted ? such things as never were parted , and never can be , ( as 't is nonsence to talk of those things being parted that are united necessarily , and of themselves ) are no parts , if partiri , whence they are so called , must not ( and herein he cannot so fool the whole christian world as to make it concur with him ) lose its signification to serve a turn . tho' the things be real , there partibility is not real . if any indeed will call them parts , beeause they may be conceived or contemplated apart , as parts meerly conceptible are no prejudice to the perfection of the divine being , so are such conceivable parts acknowledged by this author himself in express words ; we cannot comprehend an infinite being in one thought , and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by parts . god can as little admit to be a part of any thing , as to have any thing a part of him . and yet 't is no prejudice to the dignity and perfection of his being , to conceive of him conjunctly with other things , as when we make him a part ( subject or predicate ) of a proposition . all his disputation therefore against parts and composition in the deity , is against a figment , or no present adversary . for my part i am of his mind , and i should be obliged to thank him that this once he vouchsafes to let me be on his side , when he knows i am , if he did not take so vast pains to make others not know it . how hard a thing is it for an angry man ( especially when he knows not why ) to write with a sincere mind . but hath he in all this fervent bluster a present concern at this time for the honour of the divine being ? ( as god forbid i should think he never hath ) what is that he supposes injurious to it ? is it the words , parts and compounds ? or is it the things supposed to be united in the divine being ? the words he knows to be his own , and let him dispose of them more ineptly if he can tell how : parts that were never put together , never parted , nor ever shall be the one or other ; i. e. that never were or will be parts : and a compound of such parts ! but now for the things upon which he would obtrude these words [ three essences , natures , ( or if you please , infinite minds or spirits ) signified by the names of father , son and holy ghost , in eternal union , but distinct in the being of god. ] let us consider his disputation against them united , or in union , according to its double aspect : first , upon the hypothesis or supposition of them : secondly , upon himself . first , consider his disputation as levell'd against the hypothesis or supposition of such distinct essences , natures , minds , spirits , in necessary , eternal union in the divine being . and one of his arguments against it , is in those words of his one principal argument against it ( here put out parts and composition which are his own , and we have no more to do with them ) is , that god is eternal and unmade , and whatsoever ( hath parts , saies he ) hath such essences in it , must have a maker . and here let him prove his consequence , and his business is done , viz. both ways , as will be seen by and by . but let him shew the inconsistency between a things having such distinct essences naturally and necessarily united in it , ( as the supposition to be argued against is , and before ought to have been justly stated ) and it 's being eternal and unmade . but how that is to be evinced i can not so much as guess ; confident affirmation , against the most obvious tenour of gods own word , is of little account , who shall ascend into the heavens ? or fathom the depths ? or can have that perspection of god's incomprehensible nature , as without ( and visibly against ) his own revelation to be able , without great rashness , to pronounce so concerning him ? but so toyish an argument as here follows , is worse than the position ; i. e. when one shall say , that for ought we know there may be three distinct essences by an eternal unmade union , united into one , in the being of god ; any man should say , and be so vain as to expect to be regarded , that because they are united by an eternal and unmade union , therefore they are not united by an eternal and unmade union ! if there be not a contradiction in the terms to disprove a thing , by it self , is to say nothing , or is all one with proving a thing by it self . he proceeds , to what hath no thing in it like an argument , but against his own conceit of parts , and that very trifling too . there can be but one eternal nature in god : but if there be three — there must be three . this 't is now come to , proving his point by its self . here he makes sure work to have nothing deny'd , but then nothing is prov'd , no advance is made ; if there be three , there must be three . but if there be three what ? eternal parts : there must be three different natures , or else they — would be the same . ( what ? tho' distinct ? ) but this supposes some body said the first : and who ? himself ; therefore he is disproving himself . if i had said so , i would have deny'd his consequence , for there may be similar parts : whereas by different , he seems to mean dissimilar . he says not only distinct , but different natures . now you have that wonderful thing talk'd of some times , but never brought to view before , a distinction without a difference . 't is strange how any things should be distinct , and no way different . what distinguishes them if they differ by nothing . this different , apply'd to this present case , is his own word , coined to introduce a notion that is not new to christians only , but to all man-kind . if by different natures he means ( as he seems ) of a different kind , who thought of such a difference ? but i trow , things that differ in number , do as truly differ ( however essentially cohaering ) tho' not so widely . his next is , that though we have a natural notion of an eternal being , we have no notion of three eternal essences ( which again i put instead of his parts ) which necessarily coexist in an eternal union . doth he mean we are to disbelieve every thing of god whereof we have not a natural notion ? then to what purpose is a divine revelation ? is this notion of god pretended to be natural ? 't is enough , if such a notion be most favoured by his own revelation , who best understands his own nature , and there be no evident natural notion against it . he forgot that he had said , ( defence , p. . ) if every thing which we have no positive idea of must be allow'd to contradict reason , we shall find contradictions enow ; adding , we must confess a great many things to be true , which we have no idea of , &c. he adds , once more we have no notion of an eternal and necessary existence , but in an absolutely perfect and infinite nature , but if there be ( i here again leave out his three parts , because i design to consider if there be any thing of strength brought against what was supposed possible by the enquirer , not against his fiction , which i trouble not my self any further with ) three spiritual beings — neither of them can be absolutely perfect and infinite , ( i would rather have said none , or no one , than neither , since the discourse is of more than two . i thought the meaning of uter and neuter had been agreed long ago , ) tho' we could suppose their union to make such a perfect being , because they are not the same , and ( neither ) no one of them is the whole , — &c. this is the only thing that ever came under my notice among the school-men , that hath any appearing strengh in it , against the hypothesis which i have proposed as possible for ought i knew . they generally dispute against many sorts of compositions in the being of god , which i am not concern'd in . that of matter and form , which is alien from this affair , of quantitative parts , which is as alien . of subject and accident , which touches us not . of act and power , which doth it as little . each subsistent , being eternally in utmost actuality . and by sundry sorts and methods of argument , whereof only this can seem to signify any thing against the present supposition . and it wholly resolves into the notion of infinity , about which i generally spoke my sense in that first letter to dr. wallis . and as i there intimated how much easier it is to puzzle another upon that subject than to satisfy one self , so i here say , that i doubt not to give any man as much trouble about it in respect of quantitative extension , as he can me , in this . i think it demonstrable that one infinite can never be from another by voluntary production , that it cannot by necessary emanation , i think not so . in the mean time when we are told so plainly by the divine oracles , of a sacred three , that are each of them god , and of some one whereof some things are spoken that are not nor can be of the others . i think it easier to count three than to determine of infiniteness : and accordingly to form ones belief . but of this more when we come to compare him with himself . and for what he discourses of the aspect this supposition hath upon the trinity , and the homo-ousion . it all proceeds still upon his own fiction of parts , and upon the invidious straining of that similitude of the union of soul and body , as he himself doth tantum non confess ; except that he lessens it by saying most untruly that he ( the enquirer ) doth expresly own the consequence . therefore if he do not own the consequence , then the defender confesses himself to have invidiously devised it ; and what is it ? that if all three by this composition are but one god , neither of them by himself is true and perfect god. the divinity is like the english. but both his own . the enquirer denies both antecedent ( which he knows ) and consequent too . leave out by this composition , ( his own figment ) and his argument as much disproves any trinity at all as it doth the present hypothesis . but wherein doth the enquirer own it ? because such a similitude is used ( as 't is often in that discourse ) of the union between soul and body ( declared elsewhere to be unexpressibly defective ) that therefore the father , son , and holy ghost , are each of them by himself no more truly lord or god , according to the athanasian creed , or otherwise than in as improper a sense , as the body of a man , excluding the soul , is a man , or an humane person . or as if deity were no more in one of the persons , than humanity in a carkass ! who that looks upon all this with equal eyes , but will rather choose as doubtful a notion , than so apparently ill a spirit ! are similitudes ever wont to be alike throughout , to what they are brought to illustrate ? it might as well be said , because he mentions with approbation such as illustrate the doctrine of the trinity by a tree and its branches , that , therefore , there we are to expect leaves and blossoms . is it strange the created universe should not afford us an exact representation of uncreated being ? how could he but think of that ; to whom do ye liken me ? at least one would have thought he should not have forgot what he had so lately said himself . we must grant we have no perfect example of any such union in nature . what appetite in him is it , that now seeks what nature doth not afford ? a very unnatural one , we may conclude . 't were trifling to repeat what was said , and was so plain , before , that the union between soul and body was never brought to illustrate personal union but essential . the former is here imagin'd without pretence , there being no mention or occasion for the the mentioning of persons in the place he alledges . but to make out his violent consequence he foists in a supposition , that never came into any man's imagination but a socinians and his own . ( which i say , contradistinguishing him to them , that the matter may ( as it ought ) appear the more strange . ) if god be a person , he can be but one . is god the appropriate name of a person ? then indeed there will be but one person ; but who here says so but himself ? the name god is the name of the essence , not the distinguishing name of a person . but if three intelligent natures be united in one deity , each will be persons , and each will be god , and all will be one god ; not by parts , other than conceptible , undivided , and inseperable , as the soul and body of a man are not . which sufficiently conserves the christian trinity from such furious and impotent attaques as these . and the homoousiotes is most entirely conserved too . for what are three spiritual natures no more the same , than ( as he grosly speaks ) the soul and body are ? no more than an intelligent mind , and a piece of clay ? by what consequence is this said , from any thing in the enquirers hypothesis ? whereas also he expresly insists , that the father , as fons trinitatis , is first , the son of the father , the holy ghost from both . is not the water in the streams , the same that was in the fountain ? and are not the several attributes expresly spoken of as common to these three ? essential power , wisdom , goodness , ( which are deny'd to be the precise notions of father , son , and spirit ) said by more than a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as that may be understood to signify , meer presence , ( how intimate soever ) but by real , vital union , as much each one 's as any one 's ? and all other conceivable perfections besides ? why were these words read with eyes refusing their office , to let them into the reader 's mind ? whence also how fabulous is the talk of powers begetting wisdom , &c. against what is so plainly said of the order of priority and posteriority , &c. there had been some prudence seen in all this conduct , if the defender could have taken effectual care , that every thing should have been blotted out of all the copies of that discourse , but what he would have thought fit to be permitted to the view of other eyes than his own . for then , tho' in so gross praevarication he had not preserved his innocency , he might have sav'd in some degree his reputation . yet also he should have taken some heed that anger might not so have discoloured his eye , as to make so injudicious a choice what to confess and what to conceal . for had he not himself blab'd , that it was said , we are not under the precise notions of power , wisdom and goodness , to conceive of the father , son and holy ghost . he might more plausibly have formed his odd births , and father'd them where he doth . but wrath indulg'd will show its governing power . and all this fury and vengeance ( upon the enquirer , and the dean too ) he reckon'd was due , only because it was so presumptuously thought , that somewhat in his hypothesis ( or which he defends ) might have been better , and that he ( probably ) sees it might , so much a greater thing ( in some ill fits ) is the gratifying a humour than the christian cause ! . but let us now see how all this turns upon himself . and how directly his ill-polisht ( not to say envenom'd ) darts , missing their designed mark , strike into that very breast which he undertakes to defend . whereas there are two things , principally to be designed in a discourse of this subject . viz. . the explaining the unity of the father , son and holy ghost , so as that tho' they are some way three , they may yet be concluded to be in godhead but one . . the evincing notwithstanding that unity , the possibility of their sufficient distinction , to admit the distinct predicates that are severally spoken of them in the holy scriptures . the enquirer's discourse chiefly insists upon these two things . . that necessity of existence is the most fundamental attribute of deity . and that therefore the father , as the fountain , being necessarily of himself : the son , necessarily of the father : the holy ghost , necessarily from them both , each cannot but be god , and the same , one god. ( in reference to the former purpose . ) . that absolute omnimodous simplicity , being never asserted , in scripture , of the divine being , nor capable of being , otherwise , demonstrated of it , and it being impossible , either from scripture , or rational evidence , accurately to assign the limits thereof , and determine what simplicity belongs to that ever-blessed being , and what not . if it be necessary to our apprehending how such distinct predicates and attributions may severally belong , to the father , son , and holy ghost , that we conceive three distinct essences necessarily coexisting , in an eternal , vital , inseperable union in the divine being . the thing may be in it self possible for ought we know . ( and this is propounded to serve the latter purpose ) the defender of the dean seems to think otherwise of these two things , viz. of necessity of existence , common to the sacred three , which will prove each of them to be god , and , belonging to them in the mentioned order , as father , son , and spirit , will prove them , necessarily , to be one god. and of what is said of simplicity , which might admit their sufficient distinction ; of both these , i say , he seems to think otherwise by neglecting both , lest that discourse should be thought any way pertinent , or useful to its end . and disputes vehemently against the latter , how strongly and successfully , he does it , in respect of the truth of the thing , we have seen . but whether weakly or strongly , that his disputation tends to wound the dean's cause , all that it can , shall now be made appear . it is notorious the dean hath asserted , so positively , three infinite minds or spirits , that the benign interpretation wherewith this defender would salve the matter , ( a new vocabulary being to be made for him on purpose , and the reason of things quite alter'd ) will to any man of sense seem rather ludicrous , than sufficient , without express retractation . for which the enquirer thinks he is upon somewhat better terms , than he , if there were occasion for it , both by the tenour of his whole discourse , and by what he hath particularly said in the sect. but after the interpretation offer'd , see whether such things are not said over and over in the defence , as make the defender ( and the dean if he speak his sense ) most obnoxious to the whole argumentation in the postscript . so as , if a part was acted , it was carried so untowardly , that it seem'd to be quite forgotten what part it was , and all the blows ( for it was come now to offending instead of defending ) fall directly upon him , whom the actor had undertaken to defend . it hath been noted already , that the defender says expresly , the divide nature is one individual nature , ( and so says the enquirer ) — but not one single nature ; ( then it must be double and triple , not absolutely simple , as also the enquirer says ) to which he ( viz. the defender ) adds , one single nature can be but one person , whether in god or man. now let any man judge whether all his reasonings are not most directly applicable against him , ( if they signify any thing ) which are contained in his postscript , p. , , . &c. how furiously doth he exagitate that saying , when you praedicate godhead , or the name of god , of any one of them , ( viz. father , son , or holy ghost ) you herein express a true but inadequate conception of god , &c. insisting that the whole undivided divine nature ( no doubt it is everlastingly undivided wherever it is ) subsists entirely , in three distinct persons : this the enquirer never deny'd , tho' he charges it upon him , that he makes no one of the persons to be true and perfect god. but how well doth that agree with what he had himself said , ( defence , p. . ) tho' god be the most absolute , compleat , independent being , yet neither the son , nor the holy ghost , can be said to be , an absolute , compleat , independent god. he falsly charges it upon the enquirer that he makes the persons severally not perfect god , and he denies two of them to be compleat god. to say not perfect , is criminal ( as indeed it is ) to say not compleat is innocent ! but his saying the son and holy ghost are not compleat god ; how doth it consist with what is said , postscr . p. . the same whole entire divinity distinctly and inseparably subsists in the person of the son and of the holy ghost . what is wanting to make him compleat god , in whom the whole , entire divinity subsists ? no wonder if he quarrel with all the world who so little agrees with him , whose defence he undertakes , or with himself . in the mean time the enquirer hath the less reason to complain , when he manifestly treats , himself as ill as him . i only add , that for his discourse concerning [ the one divinity , or one divine nature , subsisting wholly and entirely , three times , ( whereas i had thought the three persons had subsisted at all times , and all at once ) defence p. , &c. and the persons of the son and holy spirit , not being emanations , p. . not the son , because he is the father's image : and an image is not an emanation , but a reflection : ( but how should there be a reflected image without an emanation ? ) nor the holy ghost being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not in the sense of emanation , but of the mysterious procession ] i shall make no guesses about it ( for it concerns not the enquirer ) only i think it very secure against the formidable objection which he mentions p. . of it's being too intelligible . upon the whole matter i see not what service it can do him , to put intelligent person instead of mind . for i thought every person had been intelligent . boethius his definition which he alledges plainly implies so much , and one would think he must know that it is the usual notion of person to understand by it suppositum rationale or intelligents . therefore methinks he should not reckon it necessary to distinguish persons ( as he doth by this addition of intelligent ) into such as are persons and such as are no persons . but since he expresly saies ( and i think for the most part truly ) that the three persons or subsistences , in the ever blessed trinity are three real , substantial subsistances , each of which hath entirely , all the perfections of the divine nature , divine wisdom , power , and goodness ; and therefore each of them is eternal , infinite mind , as distinct from each other as any other three persons ; and this he believes , the dean will no more recant , than he will renounce a trinity ; for all the wit of man , can not find a medium , between a substantial trinity , and a trinity of names , or a trinity of meer modes , respects and relations in the same single essence , which is no trinity at all . as also he had said much to the same purpose before , that to talk of three subsistences in the abstract , without three that subsist , or of one single nature which hath three subsistences , when it 's impossible that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence , &c. i believe he will find no small difficulty to name what it is , that with the peculiar distinct manner of subsistence makes a person ; not the very same common nature , for the persons can not be distinguished from each other by that which is common to them all . therefore the divine nature which is common to the three , must according to him comprehend three single natures , and not be absolutely simple . hither must be his resort at last , after all his earnest disputation against it . and these he will have to be parts , which because they are undivided , impartible , inseparable , everlastingly and necessarily united . i do reckon the enquirer did with very sufficient reason , and with just decency ( and doth still continue very peremptorily to ) deny . and whereas he contends that the whole divine nature is entirely in each subsistence , ( as he does again and again ) i think the term whole , improper , where there are no proper parts . and i doubt not , when he gives place to cooler thoughts , he will see cause to qualify that assertion . for if he strictly mean that every thing that belongs to the godhead is in each person ; i see not how he will fetch himself from the socinian consequence , that then each person must have a trinity subsisting in it , and be father , son , and h. ghost . for i doubt not he will acknowledge that the entire divinity includes in it the father , son and holy ghost . and therefore he must be beholden to an inadequate notion in this very case , when all is done , how much soever he hath contended against it . i do however think it safe and free from any other difficulty , than we unavoidably have , in conceiving infinites . to say that all perfection is in each subsistent ( which i like better than subsistence , as more expressive of the concrete ) as far as their natural , necessary , eternal order , towards one another , as the first is the fountain or radix , the second from that , and the third from both , can possibly admit . all must be originally in the father , with whom , the other two have that intimate , vital , eternal union , that what is in him the other communicate therein , in as full perfection as is inconceivable , and more than it is possible for us , or for any finite mind to conceive . therefore since that difference which only proceeds from that natural , eternal order , is conjecturable only , but is really unknown , unrevealed and inscrutable ; it is better , herein , to confess the imperfection of that knowledge which we have , than to boast that which we have not , or aspire to that which we cannot have . finis . these books written by the reverend mr. john howe , are sold by tho. parkhurst at the bible and three crowns in cheapside . . the blessedness of the righteous : the vanity of this mortal life . on psal. . ver . . and psalm . . . of thoughtfulness for the morrow . with an appendix concerning the immoderate desire of fore-knowing things to come . . the redeemer's tears wept over lost souls , in a treatise on luke . , . with an appendix , wherein somewhat is occasionally discoursed concerning the sin against the holy ghost , and how god is said to will the salvation of them that perish . . of charity in reference to other mens sins . . self-dedication discoursed in the anniversary thansgiving of a person of honour for a great deliverance . . a sermon directing what we are to do after a strict enquiry whether or no we truly love god. . a funeral sermon for that faithful and laborious servant of christ , mr. richard fairclough , ( who deceased july . . in the sixty first year of his age. ) . a funeral sermon for mrs. esther sampson , the late wife of henry sampson , dr. of physick , who died nov. . . . the carnality of religious contention . in two sermons preach'd at the merchant's lecture in broadstreet . books lately printed for thomas parkhurst . spira's despair revived . being a narration of the horror and despair of some late sinners under the apprehensions of death and judgment . wherein are such unquestionable examples produc'd , and such matters laid down and proved , as may stop the mouths of the atheistical scoffers and mockers . by thomas james , minister of the gospel at ashford in kent . the confirming work of religion , and its great things made plain by their primary evidences and demonstrations : whereby the meanest in the church may soon be made able to render a rational account of their faith. the present aspect of our times , and of the extraordinary conjunction of things therein ; in a rational view and prospect of the same , as it respects the publick hazard and safety of brittain in this day . these two last by rob. fleming , author of the fulfilling of the scriptures , and minister at rotterdam . england's allarm : being an account of gods most considerable dispensations of judgment and mercy towards these kingdoms , for fourteen years last past ; and also of the several sorts of sins and sinners therein : especially the murmurers against this present government . with an earnest call to speedy humiliation and reformation , and supplication , as the chief means of prospering their majesties councils and preparations . dedicated to the king and queen . a discourse concerning old age , tending to the instruction , caution and comfort of aged persons . by richard steel , a. m. notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e letter , p. , . see his letter , p. . calm discourse p. . calm discourse p. , . p. . calm disc. calm . disc. p. . his letter , p. . see calm disc. p. . p. . , . his letter . p. . calm disc. . his letter p. . calm disc. p. . calm disc. p. . postscr . to his letter p. . calm disc. p. . calm disc. p. . defence p. . p. . calm disc. p. . . postscrip . p. , . postscrip . p. . defence p. . considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity by dr. wallis, dr. sherlock, dr. s-th, dr. cudworth, and mr. hooker as also on the account given by those that say the trinity is an unconceivable and inexplicable mystery / written to a person of quality. nye, stephen, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity by dr. wallis, dr. sherlock, dr. s-th, dr. cudworth, and mr. hooker as also on the account given by those that say the trinity is an unconceivable and inexplicable mystery / written to a person of quality. nye, stephen, ?- . wallis, john, - . sherlock, william, ?- . p. s.n.], [london : mdcxciii [ ] attributed to nye by wing and nuc pre- imprints. place of publication suggested by nuc pre- imprints. incorrectly listed in reel guide as wing n a. reproduction of original in the huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity , by dr. wallis , dr. sherlock , dr. s — th , dr. cudworth , and mr. hooker ; as also on the account given by those that say , the trinity is an unconceivable and inexplicable mystery . written to a person of quality . printed in the year mdcxciii . considerations on the explication of the doctrine of the trinity , &c. sir , 't is the principal design of both testaments , by confession of all parties , to estabish the worship and belief of one only god ; 't was for this that all the books of the old testament were written , and delivered to the jews ; and for this the new was bestowed on the gentiles . of jews and gentiles , as the apostle observes , there were none that understood , none that sought after ( the true ) god : they were all gone out of the way ; they became vain in their imaginations , and their foolish heart was darkened : professing to be wise , they became fools ; and changed the truth of god into a lie , by worshipping the creature , and doing service to them who were not by nature gods. this was the condition of both jews and gentiles , when first the law , and then the light of the glorious gospel of christ , who is the image of god , shone out upon them . in the law , the jews were charged , ye shall have no other gods but me : and again , thou shalt know no other god but me. in the gospel the gentiles are taught , there is one god , and there is none other but he : there is no other god but one ; god is one . exod. . . hosea . . mark . . cor. . . gal. . . these and an hundred more such like , clear and express declarations of holy scripture , have been the occasion , that the unity of god , or that there is but one god , is the first article of faith , both with jews and ( true ) christians . from the christians and jews , it hath been learned and embraced by all the mahometans , and is now the general belief even of the pagan and idolatrous nations : for tho these last own and worship many gods , yet they ( commonly ) own but one who is supream , infinite , almighty and pre-eternal ; they make the other deities to be but the ministers of his providence and will , and their mediators with him. but that there is an almighty and all-wise mind , the maker of heaven and earth , and of all the creatures and kinds in them , we discern plainly by the order , beauty and stability of things ; and more especially , by the admirable designs in the whole , and in all the parts of the creation : but as this divine beauty and order , and those numberless and most useful designs , aims and ends seen in the creation , do evince that there is a thinking , designing and all-powerful mind , whom we call god ; so they no way intimate to us , that there is more than one creating and governing mind , or god. they demonstrate to us ( beyond exception ) that one such mind there is , but not that there is more than one : therefore we may say , that we can own and worship but one such mind , or but one god , because we know of no more . of one we are certain , by the order and design of the parts in the world : of more than one , we have no manner of proof ; therefore we cannot own , or worship , or but talk , or even think of more . but the revelation made to us in holy scripture is categorical , apodictical , express and direct : there we are told plainly , and in terms , there is no other god but one ; there is one god , and there is none other but he ; the lord thy god , the lord is one ; god is one . as this doctrine is so clearly delivered in scripture , so good christians have been always very jealous ; that neither directly nor indirectly , neither in express words nor in consequence , any thing should be said or held contrary thereto . they have considered , that polytheism and atheism are much the same thing : as 't is much one to acknowledg , and contend for more kings of england , others besides king william , and to renounce or deny him to be king of england . both the covenants , the old as well as the new , are between us on the one part , and the one true god on the other part : he covenants to be our god , and our exceeding great reward ; we covenant to be his people , and his only : this covenant is manifestly dissolved , and the premium , or promise of eternal life , annexed to our faithfulness to this covenant , is utterly forfeited ; if we take to our selves any other , besides him with whom we are in covenant , and who alone is true god. the guilt of polytheism , or of affirming more than one god , being so very great ; and the forfeiture thereby made so unspeakable , and the unity of god being so often and so expresly delivered in holy scripture ; 't is an amazing circumstance , that polytheism is not only found among christians , but is also the more general and prevailing belief of christian states and kingdoms . it is true , we all agree in the words , there is one god , and there is none other but he : but when we come to explain our selves on these words , the incomparable majority of modern christians are found to affirm three gods , and not one only . one would have thought that these words , thou shalt have no other gods but me , the lord thy god is one lord , thou shalt know no other god but me , there is none other god but one , god is one : i say , one would have thought these declarations to be so plain , and so uncontestable , that a question could never have arose concerning their meaning . but so it is , that there are a great many senses given of these words , which senses are contrary to , and destructive of one another . the doctrine of the unitarians concerning god. the first of these senses is the unitarian . for the unitarians say , there is none other god but one , god is one ; the plain , obvious and indubitable meaning of these words is this , there is but one , who is god , or a god : one god , say they , is to be understood in the same natural , sincere and unsophisticated sense ; as when we say one sun , one earth , one world. when the scriptures , say they , speak to us of so high an object as god ; when they tell us , there is one god , and there is none other but he ; when they declare this faith to be the very first of all god's charges , or commandments to men ; without doubt they speak without artifice or querk , they have no double or deceitful meaning ; they don't lay snares for us , by intending such a meaning as is contrary to the usual , the grammatical and proper sense of the words . there is but one god , say the holy scriptures ; where can be the ambiguity of such usual and plain words ? the meaning of the terms one and god , is perfectly known to all men ; why do we study subtilties and finenesses , with which to deceive our selves into polytheism , and to destroy the simplicity of the faith ? when god says in the first commandment ; thou shalt have no other god but me , he speaks to all men , to the illiterate , to the sincere , and even to children , as well as to those who are practised in the arts of deceiving and being deceived , by a disguise of words , and by captious forms of speaking . if his meaning therefore was , there is an almighty father , who is god ; he hath an almighty son , who also is a god ; and besides these , there is an almighty spirit distinct from the other two , and a god no less than either of them : if ( i say ) this was his meaning , would he have couched it in such words as these , there is none other god but one ? or in these , there is one god , and there is none other but he ? or would he have said , thou shalt have none other god but me ? could the wisdom of god it self find no other words but these , which are so directly contrary to such a meaning , by which to express himself ; and that too to those who were utterly uncapable of apprehending such a sense in them ? these are the words which god spake upon mount sinai , with thunders that shook the earth and heavens , i am the lord thy god , thou shalt have no other god but me. they tell us his meaning was , there are three almighty , all-knowing , and most good persons , each of them ( singly and by himself ) god , and all of them jointly creators of all things : now who would have thought it , that this should be the meaning of no other god but me ? without doubt , the texts and the meaning are as far from one another , as any the most contradictory propositions can be : and till they can remove this first commandment out of the way , it will be impossible for men of sense to be of the trinitarian perswasion ; i mean , if they be also sincere , if they suffer not themselves to be blinded by the interests , or awed by the ( vain ) terrors of the present false world. our opposers themselves grant , that when the israelites first heard this commandment , they understood it , and could then no otherways understand it , as the unitarians now do , namely thus , thou shalt never own any other person as god , but only me who now speak to thee . god almighty suffered this sense of his words to pass current for upwards of years : but then , say they , he sent our saviour and his apostles to give another sense of them ; nay , a contrary sense . the apostles and our saviour had it in charge to tell us , that no other god but me , was as much as to say , god the father , and god his son , and god the holy ghost , three divine persons , each of them almighty , each of them all-knowing and most good , and each of them god. but i verily think , had the apostles indeed pretended this to be the interpretation of the first commandment , they would not have found a single person who would have believed or received them . for these good men had not ( nor desired ) penal laws , prisons , confiscations , deprivations , exclusions from the common privileges of the society , by which to awe mens minds , to profess , and even to believe that black is white , and white is black . it would have been told them by all their hearers , that the sense of words is unalterable ; and that even the greatest miracles cannot authorize an interpretation evidently contrary to the text. if the speaker had been only a man , yet the sense of his words when actually spoken , can never be changed by any authority whatsoever : if heaven and earth were miraculously destroyed to confirm an interpretation that disagrees with the natural and grammatical sense of the words , it will ( for all that ) ever remain a false interpretation . cardinal bellarmine is extreamly puzled with this difficulty ; he saw plainly , that the first commandment ( and other texts of the law ) is conceived in such words , that the israelites could not think there were three divine persons , but only one divine person . but the reason , saith he , of this was , because the israelites having lived long in a nation where they owned and worshipp'd many gods ; if they had been told of three divine-persons , ( or of god the father , god his son , and god the holy ghost ) they would most certainly have apprehended them to be three gods. this , saith the cardinal , is the reason why the doctrine of the trinity was reserved to the times of the new testament . bellarm. de christo , l. . c. . notandum est , deum in vetteri testamento noluisse proponere mysterium triuitatis expresse , quia judaei incapaces erant , & quia recens exierant de egypto , ubi colebantur multi dii , & intraturi erant in terram chanaan , ubi etiam multi babebantur dii , ne videlicet putarent , sibi tres deos proponi colendos● voluisse tamen deum adumbrare hoc mysterium ; ut cum in novo testamento praedicaretur , non videretur omnino novum . q. d. the doctrine of the trinity was not propounded expresly to the jews in the old testament ; they were uncapable of it , because coming out of egypt where many gods were worshipped , and entering into canaan where also many gods were acknowledged , the jews would have thought that three gods had been propounded to them to be worshipped . nevertheless it was hinted , or shadowed to them , lest when it came to be preached in the new testament , it should seem altogether a new thing . in reading the works of this cardinal , i have often had this thought , that provided his works were but bulky and learned , he never cared what other property they wanted : no one can deny that his five books against the unitarians , intituled by him de christo , are the most learned of any that have been written against us ; but they have no wit , and are ( throughout ) most injudicious . what can be more unthought or silly , for instance , than this vain elusion ? god speaks to the jews , saith he , as if he were but one person , because they ( living among people who acknowledged many gods ) would have mistaken three divine persons to be three gods. how came it to be more safe or seasonable , or less liable to misinterpretation , to instruct christians in the belief of three divine persons ; than it would have been to teach the same belief to the jews ? the jews , saith the cardinal , would have mistaken , they would have thought the trinity ( an almighty father , an almighty son , and an almighty spirit ) to be three almighties , and three gods ; so this mystery was not preached to them . what a narrowness of thought and consideration is implied in this answer ; for , was not the whole christian church taken from among such nations , who all worshipped and owned many gods ? the reason alledged by the cardinal , if it were good for any thing , must also have prevented the revelation of that ( pretended ) mystery to any of the christian nations and churches . i might also ask the cardinal , why he hath so much better thoughts of athanasius , than of moses , and the prophets ? athanasius knew how to compose a trinitarian creed , in the most express and particular manner , that might be delivered out to all the churches , without the least danger of leading them into any mistake about it : but moses and the prophets , tho inspired by god , wanted this dexterity . they , poor men , were forced to speak ( falsly ) of god , as if he were but one person , not a trinity of persons , lest they should commit some dangerous blunder in the wording of their doctrine , and so lay an occasion of polytheism in the way of the jewish church ; but athanasius , and the nicene fathers have happily got over this difficulty , they have blest the christian churches with a pair of creeds , worth an hundred first commandments . but to be short ; the unitarian explication of the texts , which say there is but one god , is , that there is but one who is god , or but one divine person , but one who is almighty , all-knowing , and perfectly good. our very opposers confess that this was the antient and first sense of the words , so the faithful understood them for years together . they confess too , 't is a very natural and a very rational sense ; that it hath no difficulties , no mysteries or monstrosities in it . they are constrained also to own , that the before-mentioned texts alledged by the unitarians , are so read in all copies both of the hebrew and greek , and can no other ways be rendred from the original text ; or more clearly thus , as to these texts there is no variety or difference in the reading , in the copies of the original , nor any uncertainty in the translations of those copies . this is a very great matter , and cannot be said , nor is so much as pretended , for the texts are urged by trinitarians ; they have been often challenged to produce but one text for their doctrine of the trinity : but either 't is otherwise read in the most antient and eminent copies of the greek and hebrew , or 't is easily and naturally render'd and translated to another sense ; or 't is given up by their own ( ablest ) interpreters and criticks , as wholly impertinent , and no proof of the doctrine in question . from these confest and acknowledg'd premises , we have these two necessary and unavoidable consequences . . that the account which the unitarians give of god , and his unity , is the very voice of nature and reason , supported by such texts of holy scripture , as have neither uncertainty nor ambiguity . . that the trinitarian faith is at best but precarious , uncertain and doubtful ; because it is not only disclaimed by reason , but it hath no other scripture-proofs but such , concerning which there is no certainty , either how they are to be read in the originals , or how they are to be translated from the originals into the modern languages . no faith or doctrine whatsoever can be more certain than the proofs are on which 't is grounded : if those proofs are of suspected authority and credit , or of uncertain meaning and sense , the doctrine it self must be altogether uncertain , suspicious and precarious . but because you expect from me a letter , not a volume , i will say no more now of the unitarian hypothesis , but will briefly ( as i can ) compare and consider the hypotheses , or explications advanced by our opposers . of the explication by dr. j. wallis . all men know , that the difference between the unitarians and their opposers the trinitarians , is ( in few words ) this , whether there be more than one divine person , or more than one person , who is true and most high god ? the unitarians say there can be but one divine person ; because , not to mention the scripture-proofs of it , a divine person being as much as to say a divinity , or a god ; if you say , there are more divine persons , you therein and thereby say there are more gods. as three angelical persons are three angels , and three human persons are three men : so three divine persons in grammar and common sense , are three divinities ; which ( all grant ) is as much as to say three gods. so they . but , saith dr. wallis , here 's a reasoning why 't is grounded on this silly mistake , that a divine person is as much as to say a divinity , or a god ; when indeed a divine person is only a mode , a respect , or relation of god to his creatures . he beareth to his creatures these three relations , modes , or respects , that he is their creator , their redeemer , and their sanctifier : this is what we mean , and all we mean , when we say god is three persons ; he hath those three relations to his creature , and is thereby no more three gods , than he was three gods to the jews , because he calleth himself the god of abraham , the god of isaac , and the god of jacob. three human persons , say the socinians , are tres homines , or three men , and three angelical persons are three angels ; therefore three divine persons are , in grammar and common sense , three divinities , or gods : where , i pray , did they learn this stuff ? not from tully ; that learned orator , and great master and director of elegant and proper speaking , would have taught them , that an human person is not as much as to say homo , or a man , but is a qualification , a capacity , a respect , or relation of one man to other men. n●o unus tres personas , saith tully ; i. e. i being but one man do sustain ( or am ) three persons , that of my self , that of my adversary ; and that of a judg. see here , one man sustains ( or is ) three persons , an advocate , an accuser , and a judg , without being three men : why should it be thought incredible , or harsh , to say with the church , three divine persons are but one god , when tully maketh those three other persons to be but one man ? this is the sum of what dr. wallis hath said in eight printed letters , and in three sermons that were preached to the university of oxford . sermons that have been preached to the university , and not censured by them , must be supposed to contain nothing heretical , no nor dangerous , scandalous , or heterodox . but besides that these sermons have passed so great a test , as that of the university of oxford , the doctor assureth us , that he hath been thank'd and complemented , in a great number of private letters , on account of his sermons and letters : some of these letters written to him have been published ; and it doth appear , they were indeed written by able men. we must also take notice of two other considerations in favour of these letters and sermons of dr. wallis : the first is , that dr. s — th ( author of the animadversions on dr. sherlock ) having taken particular notice of the letters written by and to dr. wallis , speaks respectfully of the authors of them , calling them reverend and very learned persons , without making the least reflection on his doctrine , as heretical , or as heterodox . the second is , dr. sherlock himself , tho dr. wallis had expresly said in his answer to w. i. that dr. sherlock's doctrine doth imply tritheism , and that so much had been proved upon him by w. i. yet does dr. sherlock , who is so little wonted to carry coals , pass by this affront and imputation which no clergy-man ought to bear ; nay he even fawns upon the oxford doctor , in his late answer to the stander by . but a very surprizing thing hath happened ; dr. wallis writes in defence of the trinity and the athanasian creed ; his explications are allowed by the university of oxford , and even applauded by great numbers of learned men who profess to be trinitarians : and yet after all , the socinians in their observations on the letters of dr. wallis , profess that they are of his mind ; they even say , that in honour of him they are content to be called wallisians . this is very odd ; for it follows , that either the socinians are the true orthodox , and their opposers tritheists ; or else , that this good doctor is a socinian , and knows it not . those that say , without doubt the socinians understand their own doctrine , are very picquant upon dr. wallis ; they pretend themselves very desirous to be informed , what might be in the doctor 's mind , to apologize for the athanasian creed and the trinity , and yet to asperse at the same time his own patriarch socinus , and his dear and close friends and brethren the unitarians ; especially in such an hainous manner as we see in his third and fourth letters . they say , either the man is wood , or he has written after that fashion , only to give occasion to the socinians , as in effect it also happened , to appear more bright , by a thorow and unanswerable vindication of themselves : for so it is , that wronged innocence and vertue are rendred more conspicuous and lovely , when injurious calumnies are wiped off . they say farther , that 't is not to be much regarded that so many have complemented dr. wallis for his letters ; for what assurance have we that the writers of them are not secret socinians , and that they only banter the good doctor ? as for the university of oxford , to whom these sabellian and unitarian sermons were preached , 't is very usual for the old men that preside in that university , to sleep at sermons , especially at dull ones . but you are not to think , say they , that these sermons or letters were ever licensed to the press by the university ; or that the doctors there understand so little , as to mistake a disguised sabellianism or socinianism , for the trinity of the catholick church . the three persons , says dr. wallis , are but three relations , capacities , or respects of god to his creatures ; he is their creator , redeemer and sanctifier ; and in this sense of the word person , god is three persons . but then because god hath also the capacity or relation of a judg , and of an oeconomus , or provider , and many more ; we must not say that god is only three persons , he is five at the least , besides i know not how many more . furthermore , this new-fangled socinian or sabellian has introduced a trinity of divine persons ; that were but of yesterday . the churches trinity are all of them from all eternity ; co-eternal , saith the athanasian creed ; before all worlds , saith the nicene creed : but dr. wallis his three divine persons , the first of them begins with the creation , and the second is no older than the crucifixion of our saviour ; for god was not a creator before he created any thing ; nor a redeemer , till those words were spoken by our saviour on the cross , it is finished , i. e. the great work of redemption is accomplished . the three divine persons believed by the church , begat one another after a wonderful manner : will dr. wallis , being the oldest divine of england , instruct novices that are desirous to learn , how his persons begat one another ? how did creation beget redemption , and from all eternity , that is , before either of them were ; for creation it self is but coeval with the world : and how was sanctification , we must not say begotten , for that 's heresy when you speak of a third person ; but how did it proceed from creation , and from redemption ? dr. wallis , say they , will find it as hard to account for these difficulties , as to double the cube , or even to square the circle , which the most learned mathematicians think to be impossible . he is not , say they , to think that he is orthodox , because he hath escaped the heavy cudgelling that hath all fallen on dr. sherlock ; 't is not because his doctrine , but because his luck hath been better than that doctor 's . in a word , whereas the church believes three real subsisting persons , dr. wallis hath taught a trinity of external denominations , or accidental predications only . creation , redemption and sanctification are acts of god's free and soveraign will : he was under no necessity to create , to redeem , or to sanctify ; they are all effects of his most voluntary and every way free love : if therefore the mystery of the trinity , so much hitherto contested , be nothing else but almighty god , considered as the maker , redeemer and sanctifier of his creatures ; 't is a trinity only of three denominations or names , and of predications purely accidental ; and besides that , 't is no manner of mystery , but the most intelligible and obvious thing in the word ; nor was it ever denied , either by sabellians or socinians . thus it is , sir , that divers learned persons speak concerning the trinity maintained by dr. wallis : i , for my part , will add nothing to the observations i have formerly made on dr. wallis his letters ; only ( i pray ) take notice here with me , how well the cadmean brethren agree among themselves . three divine persons , saith dr. wallis , are the three relations of god to his creatures ; he made , he redeemed , he sanctifies them ; this is the holy trinity . out upon it , saith dr. sherlock , 't is nonsense and heresy both ; for the divine persons are three beings , three minds , three spirits , all of them living , subsisting , and conscious to one another . no , no , that 's as much too much , saith dr. s — th , 't is neither so nor so , but as i have explained it in my eighth chapter of animadversions on dr. sherlock . the explication of the trinity by dr. sherlock , saith dr. s — th , is a treacherous and a false defence of that mystery ; he hath advanced a notion , that immediately and unavoidably infers three gods : and if he had lived in the times of the sixth general council , he would have incurred the penalty of deprivation . pref. p. , , & . well , i hope dr. s — th hath at length told us the very true doctrine about the trinity . yes , he hath ( without question ) laid down the very explication of the schools , the doctrine or explication generally received in universities ; i doubt not it would be approved by most of the chairs of our european universities , or schools of learning : he hath verily acquitted himself like a man of learning and wit. for all that , dr. cudworth , in his intellectual system , hath largely and clearly proved these two things . . that this trinity of the schools is quite different from the trinity held by the fathers , and that by them it would have been reckoned no other than sabellianism . . that as the first inventors of it were peter lombard and the schoolmen ; so it hath no other publick authority , but that of the fourth lateran council , held in the year . he saith , 't is a gross piece of nonsense ; that it falleth not under human conception ; neither ( saith he ) can it be in nature . this is the judgment , which this great philosopher and divine maketh , of the explication propounded and defended in dr. s — th's animadversions on dr. sherlock . and in very deed , dr. s — th's explication can ( fitly and properly ) be called by no other name , but an absurd socinianism , or socinianism turn'd into ridicule ; as we shall see , when we come to consider it , in particular . mr. hooker , the celebrated author of the ecclesiastical polity , giveth yet another explication of the trinity ; he descibeth it to be the divine essence , distinguished by three internal and relative properties : this explication differs as much from dr. wallis as any of the rest ; for dr. wallis's three persons are all of them external denominations or predications . but these differences , sir , among our opposers , will appear to you most clearly , without my needing to point at them ; in the accounts i am about to give , of their several explications of their trinity , and the observations i shall make on them . therefore i pass on , to the explication given us by dr. sherlock . of the explication by dr. w. sherlock . for memory and method's sake , and because the division is so just ; we may distinguish the accounts , or explications of the trinity contrived by our opposers ; after this manner . there is , first , the trinity according to tully , or the ciceronian trinity ; which maketh the three divine persons , to be nothing else but three conceptions of god ; or god conceived of as the creator , the redeemer , and sanctifier of his creatures . dr. wallis , after many others , hath propounded and asserted this trinity , in his letters , and his sermons to the patris conscripti at oxford . he found in tully , sustineo unus tres personas ; of which he mistaketh the meaning to be , i being but one man , yet am three persons : saith the doctor hereupon ; why may not god be three persons ; as well as one man was three persons ? the next is the cartesian trinity , or the trinity according to des cartes : which maketh three divine persons , and three infinite minds , spirits and beings , to be but one god ; because they are mutually , and internally , and universally conscious to each others thoughts : mr. des cartes had made this inventum to be the first principle and discovery in philosophy , cogito , ergo sum ; i think , therefore i am : and he will have the very nature of a mind or spirit to consist in this , that 't is a thinking being . therefore , says dr. sherlock , three persons can be no otherways one god , but by unity of thought ; or what will amount to as much , as internal and perfect consciousness to one anothers thoughts . any one may see , that dr. sherlock's mutual consciousness , by which he pretends to explain his trinity in unity , was by him borrowed from the meditations and principles of monsieur des cartes : his system was hinted to him , by that unhappy philosopher who hath razed ( as much as in him lay ) the only foundation of religion ; by resolving ( so absurdly , as well as impiously ) the original of the world and of all things , not into the contrivance and power of an almighty and all-wise mind , but into the natural tendencies of bodies , or as he calls them , the laws of motion . the third is the trinity of plato , or the platonick trinity ; maintained by dr. cudworth , in his intellectual system . this trinity is of three divine co-eternal persons , whereof the second and third are subordinate or inferior to the first ; in dignity , power , and all other qualities , except only duration . yet they are but one god , saith he ; because they are not three principles , but only one ; the essence of the father being the root , and fountain of the son and spirit : and because the three persons are gathered together under one head , even the father . this , saith dr. cudworth , is the trinity of plato , and the genuine platonists ; and is the only true trinity : all other trinitarians besides the platonists , are but nominal trinitarians ; and the trinities they hold , are not trinities of subsisting persons , but either of names and denominations only , or of partial and inadequate conceptions . the fourth is the trinity according to aristotle , or the aristotelian or peripatetick trinity ; which saith , the divine persons are one god , because they have the same numerical substance , or one and the self-same substance , in number : and tho each of the three persons is almighty , all-knowing , and most good ; yet 't is by one individual and self-same power , knowledge and goodness , in number . this may be called also the reformed trinity , and the trinity of the schools ; because the divines of the middle ages , reformed the tritheistick and platonick trinity of the fathers , into this sabellian jargonry ; as dr. cudworth , often and deservedly , calleth it . this is the trinity intended by dr. s — th , in his animadversions on dr. sherlock , especially at chap. . the author or first contriver of it , was peter lombard , master of the sentences , and bishop of paris , who died in the year . it never had any other publick authority , saith dr. cudworth , but that of the fourth lateran council ; which is reckoned by the papists among the general councils , and was convened in the year . he might have added , that the doctrine of p. lombard was disliked and opposed by divers learned men , and censured by alexander the third , and other popes ; till pope innocent the third declared it to be orthodox . it may be not unprobably said , that an unitarian was the true parent of it ; for 't is said , that peter lombard took his four books of sentences , for so much as concerneth the trinity , out of a book of p. abelardus concerning the same . to this trinity ( of aristotle and the schools ) we must reckon the trinity of properties ; which ( we shall see hereafter ) is so variously explained , as to make even divers sorts of trinities : yet i refer all the property-trinities to this fourth distinction of trinities , the trinity according to aristotle ; because they are all grounded , on the abstracted or metaphysical and logical notions , of that philosopher ; nor can they be understood , without some knowledge of his philosophy . we must add to all these , the trinity of the mobile ; or the trinity held by the common people , and by those ignorant or lazy doctors , who in compliance with their laziness or their ignorance , tell you in short , that the trinity is an unconceivable , and therefore an inexplicable mystery ; and that those are as much in fault , who presume to explain it , as those who oppose it . i have propounded to my self , to discourse briefly on all these trinities ; i have begun with the trinity of marcus tullius cicero , or , if he pleases , of dr. wallis : i have said of it , as much as is necessary ; the next is the trinity according to the philosopher des cartes , but the discoverer of which is dr. sherlock . when dr. sherlock came out with his vindication , in answer to the brief history of the unitarians , and the brief notes on the creed of athanasius : the more ignorant of the doctors and rectors , and all the young fry of lecturers and readers about town , were his hawkers to cry it about , and cry it up . they questioned not , what such a master in polemicks had delivered ; especially with so much assurance and confidence , and with so much keenness , and contempt of the poor kick'd note-maker , and epistler . but the more learned among them , said from the very first ; that indeed dr. sherlock meant honestly , and he might have propounded this explication to his private friends , to be considered and debated : but it was liable to too many obvious exceptions , to be published to all the world ; without great corrections , in the manner of expression . but the socinians presently saw their advantage ; and resolved to make use of it : accordingly , in about four or five weeks time , out came their observations on the vindication of dr. sherlock ; which in some editions of them are prefaced , with the acts or gests of athanasius . here they tell the doctor , that he hath published a worse heresy , than even ours is held to be , by our bitterest opposers ; in one word , that he hath revived paganism by such an explication of the trinity , as undeniably introduces tritheism , or three gods. they show him , that his error was condemned by the antients in the person of philoponus ; and in the middle ages in the person and writings of abbat joachim : but more severely since the reformation , in the person of valentinus gentilis ; who was condemned at geneva , and beheaded at bern , for this very doctrine . they demonstrate to him , by a great many unexceptionable arguments , that a mutual consciousness of three ( supposed ) divine spirits and minds , having each of them his own peculiar and personal understanding , will and power of action , is so far from making three such spirits to be one god in number ; that 't is the clearest and the certainest demonstration , that they are three gods. mutual-consciousness maketh them to be a consult or council , a cabal or senate of gods , if you will ; but by no means , one numerical god , or one god in number . the observations of the socinians opened all mens eyes , to see and acknowledg , that dr. sherlock had greatly overshot the mark ; and that it was necessary , he should yield his place to some new opponent , who ( in these disputes with the socinians ) would speak more cautiously . all endeavours therefore were used by his friends , to perswade dr. sherlock to be quiet : and because such an example had been made of him , they stopped a while all sermons and other tracts , that were going to the press against the socinians . the politicians among them feared the success of a war , that in its beginnings had been so unsuccessful : they said to one another , we need not trouble our selves with the socinians ; because being masters of all the pulpits , we can sufficiently dispose the people to the orthodox belief , without the help of printed answers and replies . 't is about three years , since these observations on dr. sherlock's vindication were made publick ; and all this time , he hath very peaceably taken the imputations of heresy , and paganism ; tho he had said in the preface to his vindication , that having dipped his pen in the vindication of so glorious a cause , by the grace of god he would never desert it , while be could hold a pen in his hand . the socinians did not design to give him any farther trouble : but dr. s — th not able to endure , that such aspersions should lie at the door of the church ; could not refrain from declaring to all the world ; that the church had suffered nothing , in the defeat of dr. sherlock . he professeth , that the charge drawn up against dr. sherlock , by the socinians , is true ; for he hath in very deed advanced an explication of the trinity , saith dr. s — th , which immediately and unavoidably inferreth three gods. pref. p. . it not being the design of dr. s — th , in his animadversions , to prove the truth of the doctrine of the trinity ; but only to explain or declare it , that is , to notify in what sense and manner 't is held by the church : we must say , that his performance is an accurate , and learned work. he concerneth not himself with the socinians ; but only rescues the received doctrines of the church , from the misrepresentations of them by dr. sherlock , who either understood them not , or ventur'd to depart from them . nor do we concern our selves with dr. s — th : but whereas he is the only writer , since the revival of these controversies , who has indeed understood what the church means by a trinity in unity ; therefore we must take leave to say , and will also prove it ; that this his true explication of the trinity , is ( for all that ) a great untruth , or rather a great piece of nonsense . dr. sherlock's was a rational and intelligible explication , tho not a true one ; 't is not orthodox , as orthodoxy is reckoned since the lateran council : dr. s — th's is a true and orthodox explication , of what the church intends to say ; but 't is neither rational , nor intelligible , nor possible . but of that in its proper place ; for i must next examine the trinity according to plato , defended by dr. cudworth . of the explication by dr. cudworth . it will be necessary , in the first place , to declare dr. cudworth's explication , more largely and clearly , than hath been yet done . in accounting for the doctrine of the trinity , he professeth to follow the platonick philosophers ; with whom , saith he ( not the arians , as some suppose , but ) the orthodox fathers perfectly agree . these held a trinity of divine persons , co-eternal indeed ; but not co-equal : for the son and spirit are inferior to the first person , or the father , in dignity , in authority , and in power . they are so many distinct substances ; not one numerical substance , as hath been taught by the school-doctors , and the lateran council . for tho the fathers said , that the three persons have but one and the same substance , essence or nature ; they did not mean thereby one and the self-same substance or essence in number , but the same essence or substance for kind , or nature . because each person of the three , is spiritual , eternal , infinite , a creator , and necessarily existent , therefore they were said by the fathers and platonists , to have the same nature , essence or substance ; and not because their essences or substances , physically or properly so called , are one and the same physical substance in number . in few words ; saith he , this famous term consubstantial ( or of the same substance ) was never intended by the platonists , or by the fathers , to deny ( as the schools do ) three distinct individual essences , or to denote one numerical substance or essence ; but only to signify , that the trinity believed by the orthodox is not made up of contrary or unlike natures , ( as the arian trinity is ) but of persons all of them homogenial , all of them eternal , spiritual and uncreated . they that shall deny this to be the doctrine of the fathers , will find themselves obliged to answer to two things , which are indeed ( fairly and truly ) unanswerable : the first is , why those fathers who contend for the homo-ousios ( consubstantial , or of the same substance ) do yet expresly reject the tauto-ousios and mono-ousios , or of the self-same substance and essence in number ? the tauto-ousios and mono-ousios ( or of the self-same essence or substance , in number ) is the very doctrine of the schools and moderns ; but is denied by the fathers , as meer sabellianism : which invincibly proves , that by one and the same substance and essence they meant , not one and the self-same , or one in number ; but one for kind , nature or properties . secondly , they must also satisfy the citations of d. petavius , and s. curcellaeus , and these in the intellectual system ; which do all of them severally ( and much more conjunctly ) clearly show what the sense of the fathers was , about homo-ousios , and consubstantial . it appears by this , and abundance more the like ; that dr. cudworth had the same apprehensions , concerning the three divine persons , with dr. sherlock : they both apprehend the three persons to be as distinct and different , and as really three several intelligent beings and substances , as three angels are , or as peter , james and john are . dr. sherlock saith , they are however called one god , because they are internally conscious to all one anothers thoughts and actions : but i do not believe , that dr. cudworth would have allowed so much to the son and spirit , as to be internally conscious to all the thoughts and actions of the first person ; he always speaketh of them , as every way inferior to the father : he will not allow them to be omnipotent in any other respect , but only externally , that is to say , because the father concurreth omnipotently to all their external actions , whether of creation or providence . dr. cudworth desires to distinguish his explication , from all others of the moderns , by this mark ; that it alloweth not the three persons to be , in any respect but duration , co-equal : for ( saith he ) three distinct intelligent natures or essences , each of them pre-eternal , self-existent , and equally omnipotent ad intra , are of necessity three gods , nor can we have any other notion of three gods ; but if only the first person be indeed internally omnipotent , and the other two subordinate in authority and power to him , you leave then but one god , only in three divine persons . this is dr. cudworth's explication . every one will readily make this exception : he thinketh , either that there is one great god , and two lesser ones ; or else only the first is true god , and the other two in name only . the doctor foresaw , without doubt , this objection ; therefore see , how he hath endeavour'd to prevent it . first , he reports some answers of the fathers , to this difficulty ; which answers he expresly rejecteth . for some of them said , that the three persons are one god , by their unity of will and affection : others said , they are one god , as all men or all mankind are called homo , or man ; namely because they all have the same specifick nature , or essence , or substance , even the rational . for as all men have the same specifick essence or nature , which is the rational ; so the divine persons also agree in one nature , namely the eternal , spiritual and self existent . but dr. cudworth confesseth , that an union of will and affection is only a moral union , not a physical or real unity : and as three human persons would be three distinct men , notwithstanding the moral union in affection and will ; so also the three divine persons will be three distinct gods , notwithstanding such an union in will and affection . as to the other , that the three persons are but one god , by their having the same specifick nature or essence ; or as some call it substance , namely because they are all of them spiritual , self-existent , and coeternal ; he calleth it an absurd paradox , contrary to common sense , and our common notions of things : for so all men will be but one man , because they have the same specifick essence or nature , namely the rational ; and all epicurus his ( extramundan ) gods will be but one god. then , he propoundeth divers other explications , which he neither approveth , nor expresly rejecteth , tho 't is plain that he disliked them : for the explication on which he insisteth , and which appears to be his sense of the matter , is this that follows . the three divine persons are one god , because they are not three principles , but only one ; the essence of the father being the root , and fountain of the son and spirit : and because the three persons are gathered together under one head or chief , even the father . he adds here expresly , that if the persons were co-ordinate , ( i. e. equal in authority , dignity , or power ) they should not be one , but three gods. this is at large dr. cudworth's opinion : the short of it is ; that the three persons are as really distinct beings , essences , or substances , as dr. sherlock hath imagined them to be . and as their substances or natures are not one , but three ; so also must their understandings , and other personal powers and properties . the doctors differ only in this ; that dr. sherlock maketh the unity of the three persons in the godhead , to consist in the mutual-consciousness of the persons ; but dr. cudworth in this , that the father is both the principle ( root or fountain or cause ) and also the head of the other two persons . they neither of them believe one numerical , but one collective god : one god , not who is really one god , but is one god in certain respects ; as of mutual consciousness , or of being the cause , principle and head of all other beings , and of the second and third persons . dr. cudworth contends by a great number of very pertinent and home quotations ; that his explication ( i mean , that part of it which makes the three persons , to be so many distinct essences or substances ) is the doctrine of the principal , if not of all the fathers , as well as of the platonists : and i ( for my own part ) do grant it . for i am perswaded , that no man hath read the fathers , with judgment and application , but he must discern ; that tho they do not express themselves , in the incautelous , unwary and obnoxious terms used by dr. sherlock , as neither doth dr. cudworth ; yet the fathers as much believed the three persons are distinct minds and spirits , as dr. sherlock doth ; all the difference ( as i said ) is only this , that they and dr. cudworth do not use his very terms . they do not say in express words , three minds , or three spirits : but the comparisons which they use , and their definitions or descriptions of what they mean by persons , are such ; that it cannot be questioned by any , that they apprehended the three persons , to be three distinct spirits , minds and beings , having each of them his own understanding , and all other personal qualifications . it is indeed apparent tritheism ; and that was the true reason , why the schools advanced a new explication : but because the schools durst not find fault with the fathers , or seem to depart from their doctrine ; therefore what the father 's intended of one specifick essence , or nature , or substance , that the scools interpreted of one numerical substance , nature or essence ; but of that hereafter , when we examine their doctrine in its own place . dr. cudworth being so great a philosopher , as every one knows he was , found himself very hard put to it , what to say ( colourably , and reasonably ) concerning the persons of the trinity . he saw , that either he must say , that they are but one self-same essence or substance , in number ; or that they have distinct and several substances or essences . to say , that they are ( or they subsist in ) one self-same substance or essence in number , is such jargonry in philosophy ; that is to say , in the nature and possibilities of things ; that he never speaks of it , without a just mark of contempt : 't is nonsense , saith he , and 't is impossible ; and besides that , 't is sabellianism , and a trinity not of persons , but of words and names . well , shall we say then , that the three persons are three distinct substances ; is it not plain tritheism ? no , saith the doctor ; for the persons are not equal : the father is both the principle or original , and the head of the other two persons ; and besides that , he only is omnipotent ad intra . but then , will some say ; indeed this explication leaveth us but one god , which is the thing we look'd after : but it is , by utterly abolishing the godhead of the son and spirit ; it maketh only the father to be really god , the other two persons are so only by a certain dependance on him , both in origination and acting . as bad as this consequence is , and as clear ; dr. cudworth is forced to swallow it , and to sit down contented with it : he thought , it should seem , it is better somewhat to strain the use of words , than the natures and possibilities of things . 't is hard indeed , that we must say , one supream and two dependent persons make but one god ; but 't is harder to say , three persons have but one substance or essence in number . words are arbitrary signs , applied to things according as men please , and therefore are capable of alteration in their use : but the nature of things is absolutely unchangeable ; three persons can never be one substance , essence or individual nature . no philosophy , but that of gotham , will allow ; that one intelligent substance can be more than one person : but divers philosophers , especially the platonists , have called three distinct , intelligent , divine substances , one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one di●inity , or god ; therefore nothing hinders , but that so also may christians . to this purpose dr. cudworth , in divers places of his intellectual system . but it is now time to make our observations on this doctor 's explication ; which i shall do the more carefully , because i am perswaded , that all the chief fathers were in his sentiments , that the three divine persons are three distinct individual substances or essences in number ; which by the schools and all the moderns , is granted to be tritheism : and because it is evident by his intellectual system , that this doctor understood all the philosophies , antient and modern , in the most perfect manner ; and was himself one of the ablest philosophers we have known . his explication hath these parts . . that the divine persons are ( one specifick , but ) three distinct , particular individual substances or essences in number , or in the reality of things : and that otherwise , there could not be three divine persons , but only one such person . . that three distinct , individual , intelligent divine essences or substances , commonly called persons , are yet but one god ; because tho they are three in number , yet they are one in original ; for the second and third persons are derived from the father , as their fountain and cause . . tho they are three persons , yet they are but one god , because they concur to all the same actions both of creation and providence , under one head , even the father . the emphasis of this lies in their concurring to all the same actions ; but principally in this , that they concur to the same actions under one head , which is the father . . that the divine persons are three distinct , particular , individual , intelligent substances , essences or natures ; and that otherways , that is , were there but one self-same substance or essence in number , they should not be three persons , but only one person . i have granted , that if there are three divine persons ; those persons are ( of necessity ) three distinct , individual essences or substances : so that , as to this first proposition , the doctor and the socinians are perfectly agreed ; all that we deny , is , that three such essences ( or persons ) are , or can be but one god. but tho the socinians allow , that three persons must be three distinct substances or essences , yet all the modern trinitarians utterly deny it : the reason is , because they saw plainly , that to say there are three distinct essences , or substances , is to grant ( in effect ) to the socinians what they so much contend for ; namely that the doctrine of the trinity doth imply three gods. three distinct divine persons , saith dr. cudworth , are three distinct divine essences or substances ; it is true , say the socinians , and we grant this to the doctor : no , say all the modern trinitarians , three distinct divine essences , are not only three distinct divine persons , but they are also three distinct gods ; if once we grant that the three divine persons are three essences , the socinians will extort it from us ( as an unavoidable consequence ) that we teach three gods. the truth is , since the lateran council , which determined in favour of p. lombard , against abbat joachim and the fathers , that there is but one only divine essence or substance in number ; i do not believe , there hath been any divine of note but dr. cudworth and dr. sherlock and some few who may have borrowed it from them , who durst ever publish it in writing , that there are three distinct divine substances , essences or natures , or that every distinct person is a distinct substance . they all saw , that so to say , is to introduce three gods : for if you say , there are three distinct intelligent , almighty , all-knowing and pre-eternal substances , essences or natures ; you have actually said , there are three gods , because you can possibly give no fuller nor other description of three gods. if one all-knowing , almighty essence or substance , is one perfect god , to whom nothing at all can be added ; 't is no better than fooling , or effrontry , to deny , that three such essences or substances are three gods. this plain and clear reason hath constrained the school-divines to depart from the explication of the fathers ; and has also obliged all the moderns , to follow the schools , and forsake the fathers . yet so , as out of good manners , to deny that the fathers ever held more than one divine essence or substance : but i have shown before , the ground of that gross ( and i doubt not , wilful ) mistake , of the doctrine of the fathers . but dr. cudworth thought , that he had found an expedient , how he might keep sincerely to the fathers , and yet not be guilty of tritheism : for , saith he , tho there are three distinct divine essences or substances , vulgarly called persons ; yet the second and third persons or essences are derived from the first ; and they all concur to the same actions , under the same head or principal , even the father . therefore , . to that , the second and third persons are derived from the father , as their fountain and cause ; therefore they may be reckned as one god with him . here begins the controversy , between the socinians and the doctor . they grant , that every distinct person is a distinct and particular essence or substance ; but they deny , that three distinct divine essences can be understood to be one god : unity of original , or that the second and third persons are derived from the first , will not help the doctor , no not in the least . the three divine essences ( which are called persons ) are one god , saith this doctor ; because the second and third are derived from the first : why doth he not say too , that three human essences ( or persons ) whereof the second and third derive themselves from the first , are one man ? he may as well say this , and as soon perswade it , as the former : the son and grandson derive themselves from a first human essence ( or person ) called the grandfather ; two brothers derive themselves from their common father : doth this unity of original make them all to be but one man ? if not , neither can unity of original make the son and spirit one god , with their fountain and cause , even the father . it is a reasoning , altogether unworthy of dr. cudworth ; the son and spirit are particular substances or essences , derived from the essence of the father , as their principle or cause , therefore they are one god with the father : for then , all angels , all men , nay and all beasts , shall be one god with the father , who is their cause and principle . unity of original is so far from proving , that they are one god with him ; that it even demonstrates the very contrary : for if they are derived from the one true god , they themselves cannot be that one true god ; no more than the effect can be the cause , that very cause whose effect it is . these arguments are so clear , and withal so very obvious ; that i wonder much , that dr. cudworth foresaw them not : but it may be , he foresaw them ; but thought withal that even all these consequences are better , than to admit such a monstrosity in philosophy , as three persons having only one self-same substance in number . all things , how hard soever , would go down with him , but only that ; but that can never be agreed to , by a philosopher . . his last subterfuge was this ; the three divine essences ( called persons ) are but one god , because they concur to all the same actions , of creation and providence , under one head the father , who only is almighty ad intra , or really almighty . how many rarities hath he boxed up , in a very little compass ? . here is one almighty , who together with two other persons , is one god. i would know , how two other persons can contribute to make him a perfect god , who without them is almighty ? the scale is already full , if almightiness be there ; we need no more weight : and least of all , the weight of two impotents . if the son and spirit are not almighty ad intra , or not really almighty , but only as the father omnipotently concurs with them ; they are impotent : for every person and thing , that is not almighty , or cannot do all things , is impotent to some things . dr. cudworth , being so accurate a philosopher , saw evidently , that three almighty persons are ( of necessity ) three gods ; therefore he will admit of but one almighty person , even the father . but then , he should have look'd a little further , or closer ; and he would also have seen , that when he had found one almighty , there was no need to add to him two impotents , to make him a compleat god ; or ( as he speaks ) to make up the intireness of the divinity . . 't is altogether as rare , strange and surprizing ; that the son and spirit are one god with the father , because they are gathered under him , as their head and principal . doth not the doctor prevaricate ? doth he not say these things , only to establish unitarianism , so much the more strongly ? for if you say first , that the father is the head and principal , and the son and spirit are subjected to him ; and then , therefore they are one god with the father their principal and head : this , in a man of so great sense , looks like meer prevarication ; for 't is plain to all , that he should have inferred the contrary , namely , therefore only the father is god. we shall see the weakness of dr. cudworth's reasoning , so soon as ever we apply it to any other instances . the son and spirit are one god with the father , saith he , because he is their head and principal : therefore say i , the servants and their master , the subjects and their prince , the children and their parent , are all one governour ; because the subjects , servants and children , are gathered under their prince , their master and parent , as their principal and head. will the doctor allow of this ( last ) consequence ; if not , he vainly urges , or insists on the other . . but the son and spirit concur with the father , to all the same actions , both of creation and providence ; and therefore may be said to be one god with him . if the doctor could prove , that the son and spirit concur to the same acts , of providence and creation , with the father ; he would thereby prove , that there are three gods , not that the concurring persons are one god. many carpenters , for instance , concur to make a ship , under one head or principal , the master-builder : many colonels and captains concur to the marshaling of an army under one principal and head , their general : are therefore all these carpenters , colonels and captains , one master-builder , and one general ? that there is but one master-builder , and but one general , we grant ; but the captains and carpenters , concurring with their master-builder and general , are not one with the general and master-builder . i do not think it necessary to make any further reflections , on such impotent reasonings : i will leave it with you , sir , to judg , whether dr. cudworth hath given any new strength to the trinitarian cause , by reviving an old forsaken explication ! if we will give a name to dr. cudworth's explication of the trinity , we must call it mollis arianismus , a moderate arianism . the arians were divided into two parties , the high or rigid arians , and the ariani molles , or the moderate arians . the former of these ( being the eunomians and aetians ) strictly followed arius ; they believed that the son was created by the father , or god , but a little before the creation of the world ; and that the spirit was the work or creature of the son : and further , that their substances or essences were altogether unlike ; from whence they were also called heterousians . but the moderate arians were content to say , that there was no conceivable duration or time , between the being of god or the father , and the generation or creation ( for those are with them equivalent terms ) of the son ; the father made or generated the son , so early , that there was no conceivable portion of time before the son was ; no more than was absolutely necessary , for giving to the father the priority of existence , and his title of father : and as to their substances , they are consubstantial ; by which this sort of arians meant ( and the church then meant no more ) that their substances or essences are alike , or the same for kind and properties , tho not in number ; that is , the essences of these three persons are all of them spiritual , eternal and infinite , tho only the father is infinite in power . these moderate arians were received to communion by the moderate trinitarians ; and particularly by pope liberius . dr. cudworth holdeth their very doctrine ; he alloweth only the father to be omnipotent : and tho he saith , that the son and spirit are also eternal ; yet he cannot deny , that there must be some priority of the father , as the fountain , principle and cause , before the son and spirit as effects . in a word , the moderate arians ascribed as much to the son as dr. cudworth doth . were dr. cudworth alive , it would not be expedient to make this judgment of his explication ; but being dead , it cannot hurt him . he is retired to the true mount moriah , or land of vision ; where he no longer guesses , by prudent and wary conjectures , but he knows and even sees how these things are . god and nature , after which he enquired with so much application and freedom , are now known to him : and he now rests from his excellent labours , out of all danger from the malevolence of the present evil generation ; with whom 't is a crime , not to take every thing upon trust , on the meer credit of those who have been before us . as if it were the way to truth ; not to enquire , but to believe ; not to examine , try and judg , but to pre-suppose and take for granted , every thing that has been told us , by men in power and place . this is the spirit that now prevails in the church : and on the contrary , an ingenuous freedom in enquiring and examining , tho it be nothing else indeed but an honest and necessary sincerity , is now called heresy , and schism ; and is , if you 'll believe them , to be punish'd with certain damnation . we have however , in the mean time , this satisfaction ; that it is god , who shall at last judg us : he that hath said to us , try all things , hold fast that which is good . but i pass to the trinity according to aristotle , defended by dr. s — th . of the explication by dr. s — th . i have already done right to dr. s — th , and his book : if he takes it amiss , that i observe also some defects in it ; he ought to show his patent , by which he is constituted the only animadverter on the books of others . if he hath received any personal wrong , or affront from dr. sherlock ; he is the more excusable , that his book hath so much more scurrility , than argument : but the injury must have been very great , to excuse him wholly . he has noted some errors , either of inadvertency and haste , or of the pen ; in some expressions and words used by dr. sherlock : he imputes all these as faults of meer ignorance or dulness to the doctor . this was somewhat barbarous : nay it was more barbarity in point of morality or manners , than ever dr. sherlock was guilty of , in grammar or speech . dr. s — th will not ( at least has not yet been able to ) perswade many , that dr. sherlock wants the qualifications , or the degree of the qualifications , for which dr. s — th hath deserved esteem : the world thinks , there is a great deal more in dr. sherlock to be commended , besides his preferments ; it is only wished , that both these doctors had something more of the tenderness , and catholick charity of genuine christianity , tho it were accompanied with lesser abilities or learning . dr. sherlock hath publish'd an essay , towards vindicating and explaining the difficulties of the trinity , and incarnation ; the method he hath taken , is wholly new , and is a mistake , but it was meant well : and i do not think , that setting aside some authorities or quotations , dr. s — th hath said any thing against it , which dr. sherlock will much value . the arguments used by dr. s — th , are only metaphysical reasonings ; easily advanced , and as easily destroyed . dr. s — th's is the true explication ; that is to say , as orthodoxy is reckoned since peter lombard , and the lateran council : but dr. sherlock knew it to be nonsense , and therefore adventur'd to propose another ; he put forth his hand , to save the tottering and falling ark , and 't is made an inexcusable fault . but i will pass from the too cynical doctor , to his book and explication . 't is not till chap. . that he begins to bless us , with the catholick and orthodox account , of his trinity in unity : but at length , at pag. . out comes the secret ; with this preface to it . the doctrine of the church , and of the schools , concerning the blessed trinity ; so far as i can judg , but still with the humblest submission to the judgment of the church of england in the case , is this . truly , i am heartily sorry to hear it ; that dr. s — th , at these years , has no fixed religion of his own , no not concerning the trinity it self : but is ready to turn with the wind ; is prepared to renounce a doctrine and explication , which he believes to be not only true , but fundamental ; if the church commands him . mr. milbourn makes the same complement to his good mother the church , in his late book against the socinians ; as i have noted in my answer to him : but mr. milbourn is somewhat excusable , because he hath not yet received any of the rewards , due as he thinks to his industry and learning ; but dr. s — th is full , and even overflows with the blessings of the holy mother . it should seem dr. s — th thinketh , he hath not yet enough ; else he would never be so over-mannerly , as to put his faith it self afloat , and that too with the humblest submission , at the command of his reverend mother . we may infer however , from these publick professions of the writers , that could the socinians get mother church of their side ; all her champions would also come over to us : for 't is not ( it seems ) the cause , that they defend ; 't is not the trinity or incarnation , that they value ; but our mother , our mother the church . if dr. s — th makes so light of his own explication , that he is ready to fling it into the kennel ; at the first nod , that the church shall make : he cannot wonder , that the socinians will handle it , will look on both sides of it , will view it in a clear light ; before they bargain for it . well , see , here it is : the personalities , by which the godhead stands diversified into three distinct persons , are called and accounted modes . therefore for understanding the mystery of the trinity ; we must declare , what is properly a mode ( or manner ) of being : it is not a substance , nor an accident ; which two make indeed the adequate division of real beings : but a mode is properly a certain habitude of some being , essence , or thing : whereby the said essence or being is determined to some particular state or condition , which , barely of it self , it would not have been determined to . and according to this account , a mode in things spiritual and immaterial hath the like reference to such beings , as a posture hath to a body ; to which it gives some difference or distinction , without superadding any new entity or being to it . in a word , a mode is not properly a being , whether substance or accident ; but a certain affection cleaving to being , and determining it , from its common general nature and indifference , to something more particular ; as we have just now explained it . as for instance , dependence is a mode , determining the general nature of being to that particular state and condition , by virtue of which it proceeds from , and is supported by another : and the like may be said of mutability , presence , absence , inherence , adherence , and such like , viz. that they are not beings , but modes or affections of being ; and inseparable from it so far , that they have no existence of their own , after a separation or division from the things , or beings to which they belong . animadver . p. , , . behold the birth of the mountains ! we are kept in suspense seven long chapters ; at length in the th , at p. . of his book , he gives forth this oracle . that the three divine persons , so much talk'd of , are neither substances , nor accidents ; and consequently , saith he , no real beings . nay , they have no real existence of their own ; but are modes , habitudes , or affections of the divine substance , or the substance of god : they are in the godhead , or in the substance of god , such as mutability , presence , absence , inherence , adherence , and such like , are in the natures , or substances to which they belong . or if you will have a great deal in one single word , the very iliads in a nut-shell ; they are postures : or what amounts to the same thing , they are such in spiritual and immaterial beings , that a posture is to a body . i must needs here tell you , sir , the story of the princess dulcinea del toboso , mistress to the renowned don quixot , of the mancha in spain . this famous princess had the honour to be mistress of the affections of the so much celebrated don quixot : for her , he traversed mountains , deserts , and other dreadful places ; for her he encountred giants , knights-errant , and other formidable dangers ; and at length for her , to satisfy his amorous passions towards her , he retired to a place called the poor rock ; where he spent much time in lamenting the disdains , the cruelty and hard-heartedness of his mistress towards himself , as is largely related in the history . don quixot was waited on in his long travels and adventures , by his esquire sancho pancha , who greatly pitied his master , that he should serve so rigorous a mistress : but the esquire had one scruple in his mind , who this dulcinea del toboso should be ? but while don quixot was tormenting himself , at the poor rock ; he unluckily happened to drop some words , by which it evidently appeared , that dulcinea del toboso was only an imaginary lady or princess : and that indeed she was no other person , but a certain coarse country wench , daughter of the farmer alonso zanchez , and for her plainness called joan. ta , ta , cries sancho pancha , and is the princess dulcinea , our neighbour joan zanchez ! by my troth , a sturdy quean ; well may my master languish for her , for i am well perswaded , she hath no regard or sense of love-matters : but 't is a good-natur'd wench , &c. methinks , sir , there can be nothing more pat , or proper for this place , than this story . for just such a disappointment do we all meet with , in the explication for which dr. s — th hath made us wait so long ; as sancho pancha had when he found the princess dulcinea , was joan zanchez . dr. s — th had raised the expectation of his readers , in no fewer than seven preliminary chapters ; in the eighth he promises in the title of it , the long-lock'd for , the much-desired , catholick , and orthodox explication of a trinity of divine persons , in the unity of the godhead : but when all comes to all , he tells us , the three divine persons are nothing else but the substance of god , or the godhead , diversified into three postures . never were men so bilk'd before as his readers are , at this news ; 't is the princess dulcinea turned into joan zanchez ! was it worth while , to fall upon dr. sherlock in that outragious manner , only because he would not call the three divine persons , three postures of the godhead , or the substance of god in three postures ? dr. sherlock , poor , sensless , illiterate , cantabrigian ignoramus , thought , that these words father , son and spirit implied something that was real . he imagin'd , that the notion which all men naturally have of a father , his son , and a spirit distinct from both , must be filled up with something that will honestly and satisfactorily answer to such names and natural notions of a father , a son , and a spirit diverse from both : therefore , saith he , seeing these persons are spiritual , and immaterial , and intelligent ; i call them three minds , three spirits , and three beings . but the adepti of oxford will make him know his mistake ; first , dr. wallis tells him , three persons and one god , is as much as to say , three respects of one god to his creatures ; he is their creator , redeemer and sanctifier , and in this sense is called three persons , tho he is indeed but one god , and but one being : but dr. s — th answers , 't is neither so nor so ; three divine persons are the substance of god , in three gambals , or postures ; or in three such i know not what 's , which have the same or like reference to things spiritual and immaterial , that postures have to bodies . the three personalities are that in the one substance of god , which mutability , presence , absence , inherence , adherence , and such like ( changeable ) affections and habitudes , are in the substances to which they belong . he thinks , it should seem , that the faithful must put their trust in three postures ; and worship mutability , presence , absence , or something which in spirituals is like to them ; something which is no more in the deity , than postures are in bodies . i fancy dr. sherlock will object to him , that it is of the nature of a meer habitude or modality , to be changeable : and that the personalities in the divine nature ( or god ) are not alterable or changeable . he will say too , it may be , that there is no meer modality but may be away from the nature , or substance to which it belongs ; without any damage to the essential perfections , of such nature or substance : but you cannot take away the personalities , or the persons , from the substance of god , without lessening the perfections of the godhead . therefore we must not say , that the three divine persons , are only the divine substance with three modes . the three divine persons , he saith , are the one substance of god diversified in three postures . but how shall we conceive , that the substance of god in the first posture , or in posture a , begat the same substance of god ( in number ) in posture b ? and how doth the third posture , or posture c , proceed ( for under pain of damnation we must not say of this third posture , how was it begotten ) from the substance of god considered in the postures a and b ? the divine substance , say they in posture a , or in the first mode , generated the divine substance in the second mode , or , as dr. s — th speaks , in posture b ; and the self-same divine substance in the first and second modes , breathed ( you must well mark that ) the self-same divine substance in the third mode , which is posture c. now how shall we understand such gibberish as this ? may they not as well tell us in plain terms , that to be trinitarians , 't is necessary that we should renounce at once all good sense , and content our selves for ever with a cant without sense ? the persons , as distinguished from the substance of god , are only personalities ; which is to say , three such modes , as posture , mutability and dependence ; saith dr. s — th . they that hear this , will presently say dr. s — th and the socinians are very near to an agreement ; we are like to have this tedious , intricate and dangerous controversy fairly ended , by the rare and particular dexterity of dr. s — th . for he hath taught us , that all the difference is indeed nothing : both parties confess one self-same substance , essense or godhead , only the orthodox contend for three postures in this substance ; and the sullen , conceited socinians hitherto seem unwilling to allow of more than one mode or posture ; but under the institution and instruction of such a teacher as dr. s — th , they will return to the full acknowledgment of the whole truth . dr. sherlock had said , that there are some who make the three divine persons , to be nothing else but three modes ; and he maketh thereupon this note , can any one think that the father begat only a mode , and called it ▪ his son ? let us see now , how dr. s — th rates him for this piece of ignorance . no , good sir , no ; none that i know of , is in danger of thinking or saying so : no more than that socrates begat only the shape and figure of a man , and then called it his son ; or ( to turn your own blunt weapon against your self ) no more than god the father begot another self-consciousness , and called it his son. animadv . p. . and at p. , . and often else-where , he saith , the personalities , by which the deity stands diversified into three distinct persons , are by the generality of divines , both antient and modern , called and accounted modes . so that in short , let all the dunces take notice for the time to come , that dr. s — th , with all the antients and moderns at his heels , saith , pronounceth and declares , in manner and form following ; the personalities in the godhead ( not the persons ) are three modes , affections , or habitudes , of the divine substance , nature , or essence . now were i dr. sherlock , i would not grant to this arrogant adversary , the least tittle of all he contends for . it is certain , there is nothing more common with the metaphysicians , who follow the schools ; than to call the three persons , three modes ; and sometimes more largely , three modes of subsistence of the divine substance , or the substance of god. dr. sherlock may well defend it , that neither hath he mistaken the modalists , nor have they mistaken in what they mean to say . he may say , it is indeed true , that in all other persons , human persons and angelical persons , we may be so nice , as to distinguish between the persons and the personalities : for example , the personalities of peter , james and john , are only modes or properties peculiar to these three persons , by which they are ultimately distinguish'd from one another , and from all other persons of the same specifick nature , namely the human ; but the persons of peter , james and john , besides those modes and properties , take in also three distinct intelligent substances , in which those modes suosist . it is true , i say , that human ( and also angelical ) persons may be thus distinguished from their personalities ; but 't is otherways in the three divine persons : the three divine persons are properly and truly called only three modes ; the reason is , it is supposed by the modalists , that in the godhead the three persons have all the self-same individual substance or essence in number ; and that they have also but one self-same understanding , will and energy ( or power of action ) in number ; contrary to what happens in all other persons , whether human or angelical , who all have distinct substances , distinct understandings , wills and energies , as well as are distinct persons : this being so , 't is evident , that the very modes or personalities in the godhead , cannot be distinguished from the persons ; we must say , that the three divine persons are three modes , because they are distinguished from one another by nothing else , as all other persons are . all other persons are distinguished by their distinct substances their distinct and several understandings , wills and energies ; as well as by their peculiar modes and properties : but in the godhead there is no such distinction ; it has one self-same substance , understanding , will and energy ; 't is only distinguished by its modes , and those modes are distinguished from one another by themselves only . briefly , dr. sherlock may say , that all the modalists acknowledg no other distinction between the three divine persons , than is between modes ; they are not distinguished by their substances , nor by particular understandings , wills , or energies of their own : therefore we , properly enough , call them three modes . dr. s — th may wrangle as long as he pleases ; he may ( if it be for his credit ) write such another book of inadversions , as this upon dr. sherlock ; but when he has done and said all he can say or do , all men but himself will perceive that these two propositions are the same for sense : this of dr. sherlock , which he imputes to the modalists , and which dr. s — th so much abhors , the three divine persons are only three modes , of subsistence , in the substance or essence of god ; and this , which dr. s — th owns , and maketh to be the substance of his whole book , the three divine persons are the substance or essence of god , diversified by three modes of subsistence . but above all ; i would not have dr. s — th please himself overmuch in this ; that he hath cited some passages of the fathers , which describe the personalities of the father , son and spirit , by modes . justin and irenaeus have called them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , modes of subsisting ; others call them properties : but by modes , properties , characters , and such like , the fathers meant quite another thing , than dr. s — th and the moderns do ; they meant what dr. sherlock and dr. cudworth mean. by a mode and property they meant that discriminating character , by which the individuals of any specifick nature are distinguished or differenced , from all the individuals of the same species or nature . for example , the individuals of the specifick nature of humanity , are particular men ; and all these individuals or particular men are discriminated , characterized , differenced or modified , each by his ▪ particular properties : peter from john , peter and john from james , by particular properties , characters or modes , both of body and mind ; one ( for instance ) is bigger ▪ taller , wiser , or some other the like , than the other . this was what they meant , when they described personalities by modes , and when they said there were three properties , modes , or characters in god : they meant not in the least to deny , that each person is a particular substance , essence or nature , different in number from all other substances , essences or natures ; or to deny , that each person is a particular being : they meant only , that each individual , or each person , besides the common specifick nature , ( that is , besides the meer human , angelical or divine nature ) has also some particular properties or characters ; which ultimately distinguish him , from all the individuals or persons of the same species , specifick nature , or kind . it is not true therefore , what dr. s — th pretends , that by modes of subsistence the antients meant no more , than certain such habitudes or affections , as mutability , presence , absence , posture , or such like : they meant real , discretive and characterizing properties or qualifications ; and by person they meant , a particular , individual , intelligent substance or essence , and so modefied or characterized . they were far from dreaming , that the three divine persons , an almighty son , an almighty father ; and an almighty spirit distinct in number from both , were only one individual substance distinguished , or diversified by only three such lank and meagre affections , as absence , posture , adherence ; or any other that are no more in a spiritual substance , than those three are in bodies ; to which they add no perfection , and from which they are ( every moment ) separable . but the socinians are not concerned , what becomes of the dispute about persons and personalities in god ; whether they are adequately the same , yea or no ; and again , whether the moderns who follow the schools , agree with the antients in their notion of them : for i will put to dr. s — th a plain question , to which if he is disposed to give a clear and categorical answer , it will appear to all men , that either he falls in with dr. sherlock , or with the unitarians ; that is to say , he is either a tritheist , or ( what , i doubt , he will as much abhor ) a socinian . he saith , there is one only divine substance , essence or nature ; and thus far we agree with him : but he adds , this one substance is so diversified by three modes , affections or habitudes , or something like to them , that we must say ( under pain of heresy and damnation ) that this one substance is three divine persons , a father , his son , and a spirit distinct from both . therefore i ask , have the three ( pretended ) divine persons , each his own proper , peculiar and personal understanding , will and energy ; so that there are in the divine substance , or in god , three distinct ( all-knowing , almighty ) understandings , wills and energies , as there are three distinct persons ; as dr. sherlock has affirmed ? or have the three persons but one only self-same understanding , will and energy in number , as there is but one self-same substance in number ? if he saith the former , he joins hands with dr. sherlock ; and is guilty of tritheism , no less than he : for three ( omniscient and omnipotent ) understandings , wills and energies , without doubt , are three gods. if there be three omnisciencies and omnipotencies , of necessity there must be three omniscients and omnipotents : but that is tritheism , even in the judgment of athanasius himself ; who expresly denies three almighties , or three all-knowings . and indeed i do not think , dr. s — th will say , that each person hath his own proper and personal understanding , will or energy ; so that there are three distinct understandings , wills and energies in what his party call the godhead : i see his book is written with more judgment and precaution , than dr. sherlock's ; or even than any that i have seen , that have been written in defence of the trinitarian cause . but if he denies , that there are three ( all-knowing , almighty ) understandings , wills and energies ; he is a socinian , he has granted to us the point in controversy , he grants the whole that we contend for . they will allow him to say , there are three persons , or three thousand persons in the godhead ; so long as he grants but one ( omnipotent ) energy and will , and but one ( all-knowing ) understanding or wisdom . if this be granted to us , 't is plain to every one who gives but never so little heed ; that the question about three persons , is a meer strife of words ; and the authors of the brief history , and brief notes , are ( tho not in their words , yet in their senses ) as orthodox as dr. s — th and the schools . i will affirm , we have no need of our brief histories , or brief notes ; we need not make an operose proof of our doctrine of the unity of god , from the holy scriptures or from reason : the whole controversy with the church is ended , in the resolution of this short and plain question ; is there more than one all-knowing , almighty understanding , will and energy ? if you say , there is but one such understanding , will and energy , in one self-same divine substance ; you may talk of as many persons , fathers , sons , spirits , modes , properties , respects , nothings , as you please : we will only peaceably advise you , that these are meer empty words , that have nothing to answer them in the thing under consideration . when you have granted to us , that there is but one divine substance , and but one omniscient , omnipotent understanding and energy ; what you add more of persons , properties , thingams , and call them a trinity , 't is an addition only of words and names ; not of realities , or persons that are properly so called . these things being so , and so very evident ▪ i cannot wonder , that so discerning a philosopher as dr. cudworth , never speaks of the trinity of the schools ( maintained by dr. s — th ) without calling it a nominal trinity , a trinity of names and words only , a disguised sabellianism : which is to say , unitarianism or socinianism drest up in the absurd cant of the schools . but whereas the schools deform the sincere and easy notion of the unity of god , as 't is held by the socinians and sabellians , by transforming it into a fantastick trinity of nominal persons , or of persons who are persons only in name , not in truth and reality : therefore dr. cudworth saith farther , that this trinity is jargonry in philosophy , a trinity that falls not under human conception , and which cannot be in nature . intellect . system , p. . elsewhere he scruples not to name it , the philosophy of gotham . these are the just characters which that great philosopher and divine gives of the scholastick trinity of dr. s — th : he giveth his reasons up and down in the intellectual system ; but 't is not necessary for me to report them , when every one may see them in the author himself ; and besides they are too philosophical , to be put into a discourse which i design for the use of the less learned , as well as of the learned . i have done with dr. s — th's explication , for this time : if he is angry with me for the reflections i have made thereupon , i protest 't is without just cause . i have used no disrespectful language ; i have acknowledged , and do acknowledg the worth of the man , and all other perfections in his book , but only this one , that it maintains an unjustifiable explication . the method or structure of his book is natural , elegant and judicious ; the words , expression , or phrase , is proper , forcible , clean , and well chose : it hath very many agreeable turns of wit , which render it pleasant to an ingenious reader . as this author hath a great deal of wit , so he hath known how to govern it in this respect ; that he is witty , without buffoonry . this is a conduct , not very usual in those that have much wit ; commonly they know not how to manage it ; and among other unjudicious neglects , they forget the where and when , and other such like circumstances ; they are so taken with their talent , as to be always using it , because they know not that everlasting fooling is true and meer fooling . but i wish that dr. s — th in exercising his wit , had remembred the who , which he hath utterly forgotten : and that was utterly an oversight , and a very great one . he cannot excuse himself , by pleading the many contradictions in dr. sherlock's book : a candid man would not impute them to the author , but to the extream obscurity of the subject ; when the subject it self is contradictory , there will be many contradictions committed in defending it . i doubt not that dr. sherlock will find many contradictions in dr. s-th's second chapter . having done to dr. s — th this right , he ought not to be out of humour , that i as a socinian , have attacked his explication ; as i have some other learned men : i mean no disrespect thereby to him , or them ; i acknowledg their personal merit , but cannot give up to them so sacred a truth , as the unity of god , or consent that it be disguised and deformed . of the explication by mr. hooker , author of the ecclesiastical polity . mr. hooker , tho he was none of the fathers of the catholick church , is not of less authority in the particular church of england , than any one of the fathers is : and it must be confest he was not only a very good , but a very learned and discerning man. but it is observed of him , that in speaking of the trinity , he speaks somewhat incorrectly : this was a doctrine which he took for granted , there was no dispute in his time about it ; so he hath delivered himself , not with his usual precaution and judgment . he saith , that the substance of god , with this property , to be of none , doth make the person of the the father . the very self-same substance in number , with this property , to be of the father , maketh the person of the son. the same substance , having added to it the property of proceeding from the other two , maketh the person of the holy ghost . so that in every person there is implied both the substance of god , which is one ; and also that property , which causeth the same person really and truly to differ from the other two . i must observe , in the first place , hereupon , that mr. hooker in this matter hath not spoken over critically and correctly ; nay , hardly orthodoxly : i mean , as orthodoxy goes among the learned of his own parry . he saith that the substance of god , with these properties , to be of none , to be of the father , and to proceed from the other two , make the persons of the father , son and spirit : now to be of none , to be of the father , and to proceed from both , are but other words for this sense , to beget , to be begotten , and to proceed . but that father of modern orthodoxy , peter lombard , whom we have already twice mentioned , denies that these ( before-mentioned ) are properties in the substance of god , or that they can belong to it : he saith , essentia divina non est genera●● , nec genera●● , nec procedens ; i. e. the substance of god neither begets , nor is begotten , nor proceeds . 't is impossible to make this consist with mr. hooker , who expresly ascribeth those properties to the divine substance or essence , and saith , that being in the divine substance , they make it to be three persons . what shall we do here ? shall we say , reverend hooker has mistaken , and missed his sons ( who are all the church of england ) into an error concerning the trinity ? hath he ascribed to the divine essence , properties , which he calleth persons , that are not in it ? to give up hooker , is to dishonour the church of england it self ; to part with father hooker , is to endanger the very surplice , and even the cross in baptism ; nay , that book of books the common-prayer . if mr. hooker could err about the trinity ; what will the fanaticks and trimmers say ? will they not be apt to pretend too , he may have erred in his profound dissertations and discourses for the rites and discipline of the church ? i am afraid , for all that , we must keep close to peter lombard , master of the sentences , and of the modern divinity : he hath been espoused by all the popes since innocent the third , by the lateran council which was general , and by the tacit approbation of the whole church ever since . i doubt , it is not much more passible , that mr. hooker saith , that the properties , to be of none , to be of the father , and to proceed , do ( together with the substance of god ) make the persons of the father , son and spirit . it is not true , that those are the properties which make the persons : he might say , that they make the persons to be father , son and spirit , or to have that threefold relation among themselves ; but they do not make the three persons to be persons ; or thus , they do not make ( as he speaks ) the persons . to be of none maketh the father ; but i deny , that it maketh ( as mr. hooker affirms ) the person of the father : the character , or property which maketh the person of the father , is quite another from the property or character that maketh the father . to beget , to be begotten , and to proceed , are properties which constitute the relations of father , son and spirit : but they are other properties , which make the persons of the father , son and spirit . concerning the properties or characters which make the re●●tions , all learned trinitarians are agreed ; they acknowledg them to be these three , active generation , ( not , as mr. hooker mistakes , this meer negation to be of none ) eternal passive generation , or to be begotten , and eternal procession : but concerning the properties that make the persons , they are not so well accorded . the antient divines said , the property that maketh the person of the father , or the peculiar property and character of the first person , is monarchy ; the property of the second person , is wisdom ; and of the third is love. others said , that the property of the first person , is beatitude and rest ; the property of the second is operation : others had still other conceits , all of them false . but allowing now the way of speaking , used by mr. hooker , what a riddle has he propounded ? here is the self-same substance ( in number ) unbegotten , and yet begotten : the divine substance with the property to be of none , or to be unbegotten , is ( saith he ) the person of the father ; the self same substance ( in number ) with the property to be of the father , or to be begotten , is ( or makes ) the person of the son. can the self-same substance ( in number ) be of none , and yet be of the father ; be unbegotten , and begotten too ? are they not contradictory terms , and therefore not to be applied to the self-same substance in number ? they will say , mr. hooker doth not affirm , that the self-same substance is begotten and unbegotten ; this indeed were a ●●t contradiction : but he saith , that as 't is in the father , 't is unbegotten ; as in the son , 't is begotten . but do they reckon they have to deal only with fools ? what if i should say , my hand as in my pocket , is unskalded ; but at in my glove , 't is skalded : would it not be a contradiction , for all the blinds of in the pocket , and in the glove ? the self-same hand in number , cannot be burnt , and unburnt ; the place in which it is , will not palliate such a contradiction : in like manner , the self-same substance cannot be begotten , and unbegotten ; because you are pleased to pretend , you consider it sometimes in one subject or person , sometimes in another . in whatever person a substance is , it must either be a begotten substance , or an unbegotten ; it cannot possibly be both : if it really remains unbegotten , then it never was begotten ; but if in process of time it has been begotten , then it cannot still be unbegotten . why do our opposers choose to maintain such extravagant paradoxes , rather than acknowledg so easy and natural a truth , as the unity of god ? rather than receive the first commandment , in its natural and obvious sense ; rather than we will sincerely ( and without disguise or juggle ) own that there is but one only god : we will choose to make our selves scorned by all sensible men ; by saying , the self-same substance ( in number ) is begotten , and unbegotten ; 't is of the father , nay 't is of father and of son , and yet 't is of none . let us consider mr. hooker's catch , in three human persons . he will say , the substance of john is begotten , as john is the son of peter ; but john's substance is unbegotten , as john is the father of james : and yet it is the self-same substance in number , that is thus both begotten and unbegotten . is it so ? but if john's substance be really begotten , i will ever stand in it , that his substance is not unbegotten : it was begotten by his father peter , therefore 't is a begotten substance , not an unbegotten . some one may say , but is not john's substance unbegotten , in respect of john ' s son james ; tho it was begotten by peter ? by no means : for if peter begot john's substance , then john's substance is begotten , tho his son james begot it not ; and consequently it cannot be said to be an unbegotten substance , in any respect whatsoever . in short , they would have us to say ; john's substance is unbegotten , because it was begotten by peter , and not by john's son james . i deny , that 't is a proper , or a true way of speaking : for if the substance has been begotten by any whomsoever ; it must never after be called unbegotten , on this absurd account , that it was not begotten by james , but by peter . farther , whereas mr. hooker saith , the substance of god , with this property to be begotten , or to be of the father , maketh the person of the son : i ask , is then the substance of god begotten ; i pray , who begat it ? they must answer , the father ! but did the father beget the substance of god ? do they not say , that the self-same substance that is in the father , is also in the son ? but if so , then if the father begat the substance of the son , or of god , he begat his own substance . can any one beget his own substance ? is it not a contradiction , a manifold contradiction ? is it not as much as to say , he was before he was ? he that begets his own substance , begets himself : but he that begets himself , is thereby supposed to have been before he was . i know , it hath been said by some divines , god is self-originated or self-begotten . but 't is utterly false ; they ought to have said , he is unoriginated or unbegotten . as god is not originated or begotten , by another ; so much less by himself : not by another , for then that other must be before him , at least in order of nature ; not by himself , because then he must be before he was . but to finish with mr. hooker , i will show his followers , that in pursuance of his explication , they will be forced to say ; that as the father begat the son , so the son destroys the father . and i make challenge to them all , to rescue their master's explication from that fatal consequence . begotten doth always destroy unbegotten ; when once a person or thing is begotten , that self-same thing or person can be no longer unbegotten . if therefore the substance of god unbegotten , maketh ( as mr. hooker contends ) the person of the father ; and the self-same substance begotten , maketh the person of the son : it unavoidably follows , that the generation of the son is the destruction of the father ; because the property or characteristick of the father , even unbegotten , is destroyed out of the divine substance , by the characteristick of the son , which is begotten . unbegotten ( that is to say , the father ) remains no longer in the divine substance ; if begotten ( that is , according to hooker , the son ) hath taken place in it . o that our learned opposers would vouchsafe , to consider these things impartially : that they would not reckon 't is their glory , to defend received doctrines , only because they have been long received , and by many ; as if prescription or numbers could alter the nature of truths and untruths . which ( i pray ) is more honourable , to own a clear and necessary truth ; or to set one's self to darken and to obstruct it ? i confess the latter requires more wit , especially against an able and dexterous defendant ; but 't is the other that deserves greater praise , especially before god , because it argues sincerity and justice . but i pass to the last sort of trinity , the mystical trinity . of the mystical trinity , or the trinity of the mobile . the poor common people are first made to believe , by the help of corrupted copies , and false translations of the bible , that 't is a scripture-doctrine ; that there is a trinity of divine persons , an almighty father , an almighty son , and an almighty spirit distinct and different ( in number ) from both father and son. but because this ( at the very first sight ) appears contrary to reason and common sense ; therefore in the next place they are told , that they must consider this doctrine , as a mystery , impossible indeed for us to understand , yet necessary to be believed , because god hath said it . how many things , say these teachers , are there in the works of nature , which we understand not , no more than we can understand the trinity : and yet we believe them to be , as assuredly ; as if there were no difficulty , in conceiving how they should be . as , that there are antipodes , whose feet are opposite to our feet , and who walk with their heads downwards , with respect to our parts of the world. again , that a spirit can move a body from place to place : tho reason first assures us , that there can be no motion without a resistance ; and then , that a pure spirit can meet no resistance , from matter or bodies . also , that the parts of matter or bodies hold together ; tho no cause can be assigned for it , but what appears immediately to be unsufficient , nay ridiculous . all these are great truths , and we believe them , even contrary to the verdict of reason : how much more ought we to believe the trinity , which hath been propounded to us , as an article of faith , in the word of god it self , tho our fallible and frail reason reclaims , and kicks perhaps against it ? when the socinians , say these gentlemen , have accounted for all the mysteries of nature and art ; let them begin to object to the trinity , that 't is a mystery , and that it hath sundry contradictions to reason : but till they do the first , 't is nothing else but a bold impiety to insist on the other . it must be confessed , sir , that this is the most plausible pretence ; the strongest hold , as well as the last resort of our opposers : when we have drove them from all other posts , here they take sanctuary . i will therefore take care to remove this occasion , and cover of error . i say , . i might leave it wholly to dr. s — th , to answer this pretence of some of his party . at p. , and , &c. of his animadversions , he shows at large , what is a mystery ; he saith , that a mistery is a truth revealed by god , above the reach of human reason to find out , or to comprehend . he vindicateth this definition , part by part ; he saith , p. . first , a mystery is a truth ; by which , saith he , i exclude every thing from being a mystery , which is absurd , or contradictions . now we desire nothing else of our oppo●●●● , but that they would abide by this account of mystery ; that 't is not something absurd , or contradictory , but only some secret revealed by god , because it was above human capacity to discover it , and sometimes also even to comprehend how it can be . for there is a vast difference between my not being able to conceive how a thing should be , and a clear apprehension and sight that it cannot be . there are ( it may be ) mysteries , which we cannot comprehend how they should be : but that three divine persons , or three distinct almighty and all-knowing persons , should be but one almighty , but one all-knowing , or but one god , a man ( who considers but with never so little intention and sincerity ) clearly sees , that it cannot be . in short , that 't is not a mystery , but ( as dr. s — th speaks ) an absurdity and a contradiction . in a word , we do not reject the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation , because they are mysteries ; but because they are plain contradictions to reason and common sense , and consequently untruths : for ( without doubt ) reason and truth are but two names , for the same thing ; and clear reason is no other thing , but clear truth . . i consider , that what will equally serve to excuse all the nonsense , and impossible doctrines , that are to be found among men ; we cannot admit of it , as a defence of the ( pretended ) trinity and incarnation : especially in opposition to such powerful proofs , both from scripture and reason ; as may be , and actually are alledged against those doctrines . a papist , for example , does ( with equal colour ) alledg this pretence , for his transubstantiation . he says , 't is a scripture-doctrine , delivered in these express words , this is my body : and how many things are there in the works of nature , which we comprehend not , no more than we can comprehend the miracle of the transubstantiation ; and yet we believe them to be , as assuredly , as if there were no difficulty in conceiving how they should be , or that they can be . such as the antipodes ; and that a pure spirit can ●●●ve a body , in which it findeth no resistance ; and that the parts of matter or bodies are continuos , or hold together : and many the like . thus do the papists argue ; and i deny , that this pretence can be wrested from them , by any trinitarian : for 't is the same defence that the trinitarian makes for his doctrines of the trinity and the incarnation . our opposers will not vouchsafe , so much as to hear catholicks and lutherans , when they plead mystery , for the transubstantiation or the consubstantiation : i desire of them therefore , to give me but one reason , why that plea is not as good in those controversies , as in these of the trinity and incarnation . the author of two dialogues , concerning the trinity and the transubstantiation , finding himself pressed with this difficulty , answers to this effect , that there are a great many more texts of holy scripture for the trinity , than are pretended for the transubstantiation . but this is no solution of the proposed difficulty : for 't is not at all the question , which doctrine hath most texts alledged for it ; but only , whether the pretence of mystery , be not a plea as rational and allowable , against all the exceptions made against the transubstantiation , as an impossible , inconceivable and contradictory doctrine ; as 't is to the same exceptions , when urged by the socinians against the incarnation or trinity ? but whereas that author insists upon an answer , wholly foreign to this difficulty ; and is so careful to bring together , from cardinal bellarmine , all the texts alledged for the trinity : he is desired to name to us so much as one text for either of those doctrines ; that is not given up to the socinians , by some of the most learned interpreters and criticks of his own party , as indeed no proof of the trinity , the incarnation , or the divinity of the son or spirit . what avails it , for a man to talk of the great number of texts , which he can alledg ; when the ablest persons of his own party , do ( in the mean time ) ow● the unsufficiency of every one of them in particular ? if he thinks he has cause to deny , that the socinians have this great advantage on their side ; whenever he shall do it publickly , i will bear the reproach , if i do not justify what i have said , by citation of particular authors of the first note and rank among our opposers . . our opposers urge , that there are ( and the soci●●●●s themselves believe ) a great many mys●●●●●s in nature ; of which no human reason can give an account , nay reason objects against them , and professedly contradicts them : as that a pure spirit can move a body , in which it meets no resistance ; that bodies or matter consist of indiuisible parts ; and such like . well , suppose the socinians should grant these , or other unaccountable mysteries , which not only are not comprehended , but are contradicted by reason : what then ? why , then they are very inconsiderate , to deny ( as they do ) the trinity and incarnation ; on this account , that 't is contrary to reason , or implies contradictions and absurdities . but our opposers should have thought better of this objection , before they laid so great a weight on it ; even the weight of their whole cause . for tho we should grant , that we believe some mysteries of nature or art , against which reason objects , and many ways contradicts them ; yet is this no plea for the trinity , or the incarnation . for if we believe natural or artificial mysteries , 't is because we plainly see that so the thing is : we see or we feel , or have some other undeniable proof of the thing ; some such proof , as no rational man will or can resist . doth any man believe misteries , or wonderful tales , contrary to his reason , and the reason of all other men ; without a most manifest and uncontestable proof of them ; without some such proof or proofs , as undeniably evince the thing so to be ? but will our opposers pretend , they have any such proofs for the incarnation or trinity ; such manifest , such evident , such uncontestable proofs , that no sober man , or no reasonable man can except against them , or refuse to admit of them ? i do not think they will pretend to it , if it be but for this only reason , because the socinians are confest to be a rational and learned party . are those evidence or proofs uncontestable , which are rejected , not without some scorn , by some of the learnedest , and most unsuspected of their own party ? are they uncontestable , that not only may be interpreted to another sense , but also are either otherways read in the best copies of the hebrew and greek , or may be otherways translated from those languages ; and all this , by confession of the more ingenious of our opposers themselves ? briefly , we say , mysteries there are ; and it may be such mysteries , as are even contradicted by reason ; that is , are in some respects contradictions to our present ( short-sighted and frail ) reason : but when we believe there are some such mysteries , it is because they appear to our senses ; or are proved to us by some such either reason or authority , as no reasonable man , much less any number of such men , does or can deny to be uncontestable . and otherways , all the unwarrantable nonsense in the world may be imposed on us , under the pretence and cloak of mystery . but now the doctrine of the trinity , hath not only no uncontestable proofs ; but the pretences for it are so feeble , that none of them can be named , but is not only rejected , but despised by some of the learnedest of our opposers themselves . they would perswade us to acknowledg a mistery , full of contradictions to the clearest reason , and to indisputable texts of holy scripture ; and supported in the mean time , only by some texts that may be interpreted to a rational sense , that is , to a sense that hath nothing contrary either to reason , or to the unquestionable parts or texts of the holy scripture . for peace sake , we would do so , if it were some light matter that they urged on us : but when the question is , about one or more gods , one or more divine persons , we judg it adviseable , not to be too facile in admitting such dangerous mysteries ; mysteries that would destroy the allegiance and homage that we all owe to the one true god. i have done , sir , with the explications of our opposers . you see what they are : dr. s — th's explication is only an absurd socinianism ; or unitarianism disguised in a metaphysical and logical cant. dr. wallis his explication is an ingenious sabellianism ; and in very deed differs from unitarianism , no more than dr. s — th's , that is to say , only in the wording . dr. sherlock's is such a flat tritheism , that all the learned of his own party confess it to be so ; and dr. s — th hath written a very accurate book to prove it so . dr. cudworth's is a moderate arianism ; the ariani molles ascribed as much to the son , as this doctor doth : and he denies as much to the son , as they did ; even an equality of power , and authority with the father . mr. hooker's is a trinity , not of persons , but of contradictions : and he hath advanced such a son , as of necessity destroys his father . what the mystical divines teach , cannot be called an explication ; they deny all explications : we must say therefore 't is samaritanism ; for what our saviour says of the samaritans , by way of reproof and blame , that these gentlemen profess concerning themselves , that they worship they know not what . these , sir , are the doctrines that we oppose ; i shall leave it with you , whether it be without cause . before i conclude , i beg your leave to say two words to mr. basset , who hath answer'd ( or thinks he has answered ) to the brief history of the unitarians : and to dr. fulwood and dr. edwards , men of dignity in the church ; but who have not thought it below them , to use the very vilest language , and the basest and most ungrounded scandals , that their malice to our persons , and their ignorance of the points in question between us and the church , could suggest to them . these two doctors tell their readers , that the unitarians deny the omniscience of god , or that he fore-knoweth contingent events : that they deny his omnipresence , making him to be present in all places , only by his knowledg , and his power ; that they ascribe the same degree of power and knowledg , and pay the self-same worship to the lord christ , whom they affirm to be a meer man , which they ascribe or pay to almighty god ; and hereby , say these doctors , they are guilty of an idolatry that is equally evident and abominable . they pretend to prove this charge out of the writings of socinus , smalcius , and some others of the party . i say now ; . that their quotations out of socinus and the rest , are ( for a great pa●● of them ) as false and disingenious as those ●● dr. wallis were : as any one will see , who shall take the pains to consult the authors themselves . . they make it to be a great heresy in some socinians , that they deny there is a certain fore-knowledg of contingent events : they say 't is a denial of god's omniscience . and yet all men know , that very many of the most learned trinitarians , have been of the same opinion ; antients as well as moderns , protestants as well as catholicks . nor have these doctors so much as offered at an answer to the reasons of socinus and crellius , concerning a conditional knowledg in god. . that god is omnipresent , not in his essence or person , but by his knowledg and power ; is also held by divers learned trinitarians : and it must needs have been the opinion of those fathers , who either were anthropomorphites ; or held that god is a body , not a spirit . . these doctors have written against the socinians , by occasion of the english books , that have been lately published , by those of that perswasion : they should therefore have attacked the doctrine of those books ; they should have described our opinions out of our own writings , not from the books of foreigners . the english socinians sincerely believe , that god is truly omniscient ; that he foreseeth all events , how contingent soever they may be to us . they believe the real omnipresence of god ; or that he is present in his essence or person in all places , and not only by his power , knowledg or ministers . they honour , or if we must use that word , they worship the lord christ ; neither with the same sort , nor with the same degree of worship , which is due to god : they worship or honour him , with their minds , only as one who is highly exalted by god , above all principality and power , and every name that is named ; and to whom god hath given to be head over all things to the church . in a word , they neither pay a higher worship , nor impute a greater power or knowledg to the lord christ , than the most learned , and the far greater number of trinitarians , impute and pay to the human nature ( the meer human nature ) of jesus christ , in his present state of exaltation . we have said these things so often in our late books ; we have defended them so earnestly , that none but persons of little honesty , or great inconsideration , would object to us such opinions as these before-mentioned . but these gentlemen had a longing mind to be authors ; and who should they signalize themselves upon , so popularly , as upon the socinians : if they have got reputation by their books , that is , by weak arguments and strong calumnies ; it is with so very few , that i do not think they will reap an advantage by it . but one of them urgeth , that socinus was in this dangerous heresy , that the soul of man , after the death of his body , is in a state of inactivity and unperception ; in a word , neither perceives nor lives , till the resurrection of the body : at which time , it receiveth immortality , by the meer grace or gift of god ; but is not , of its own nature , immortal . i do acknowledg , that this seems to be the opinion of f. socinus ; but , i believe , of very few unitarians besides . but this error was common to him , with some of the fathers : the learned monsieur du pin has noted , that justin martyr , irenaeus , minutius foelix and arnobius were in this sentiment . there was no reason therefore to object this , to socinus ; as if it were a peculiar opinion of his ; much less to the english unitarians , who never defended it ; nor , that i know of , do any of them hold it . as to mr. basset , there are two things very remarkable , in his answer to the brief history of the unitarians : the meanness and dulness of the book it self , it being written with no vivacity , wit , or elevation of thought ; and the undecent insolence of the author . his book being such as it is , if the brief history cannot shift for it self , against that reply to it ; the historian is resolved it shall take its fortune : he is perswaded , that when a discerning man has read mr. basset's answer ; if he again looks over the brief history , he will ( at least ) as much approve of it , as at first . mr. basset has said nothing , that can in the least shake the reputation of the brief history ; unless his reader will believe him , when he charges the historian with false quotations of authors . to this the historian answers ; that he hath not made one false or mistaken citation : but mr. basset sometimes not understanding the authors that are quoted , for they are greek and latin ; and sometimes mistaking the sense of the historian , which he doth very frequently ; it hath happened hereupon , that he hath charged the historian with his own either ignorances or inadvertences . but i am not at leisure to write a vindication , every time that negligent and ignorant scriblers mistake my meaning ; or the sense or the authors by me alledged . i reckon it to be his insolence , that a person who had nothing to offer on these questions ; but what was very trivial and vulgar ; should yet give disrespectful language , without any the least provocation given by the historian . he saith , for instance , that indeed the foreign socinians have been learned and subtile men ; but he cannot say so concerning the english : but for the epistler , so he calls the writer of the brief history , because 't is written in four letters ; he saith , poor wretch ought to have imploy'd his small talent to honester purposes , and not have sought for reputation only by his nonsense , his follies , and his impieties . this was a mortification indeed , c●ming ( as it does ) from so great and worthy a hand : but the comfort is , we are apt to be more advised , and better'd also by our humiliations . and yet i am still of opinion , that as mr. basset thought it requisite to answer the brief history after the great victory gained over it by dr. sherlock : so there will not want many others , who will judg it no less than necessary ; to give other answers to it , after this triumph of mr. basset . but however that be , i answer to mr. basset , as moses did to pharaoh , glory over me ; i am resolved mr. basset shall have the self-satisfaction , that he hath mauled the epistler for ever . for i will not catch flies , nor spend my artillery upon mud-walls ; when i happen on some such second , as dr. sherlock found up against the jesuits , mr. basset may hear from me , and not before , i will not ask pardon , sir , for the length of this letter ; for you see to how many it was necessary to make some answer : but i ought not to forget , to give you my thanks and respects , for the liberalities and favours , which you have done to your humble servant . a letter to the publisher from another hand . sir , i heartily thank you for the perusal of this most learned and judicious letter , which i return you ; and i congratulate the worthy author , whom the divine wisdom has made an instrument for the vindicating of his glorious and incommunicable attribute of unity , which he has in several tracts even demonstrated , not only by clear and express scriptures and obvious reason , but also now at length from the confessions of the trinitarians themselves , the infringers of it . for whilst each one condemns the several explications of the rest , as either inconsistent with the unity , or the trinity , they do all in their turns bear witness to the unitarians , that their opposition to the trinitarian doctrine is well-grounded and reasonable , and consequently their doctrine of the unity the truth of god. for if each one of their explications does either introduce the worship of three gods , or the heresy of sabellianism , as they call it , the turning the son and holy ghost into names and operations without any real distinction of persons , or things answering those distinct names , as it plainly appears they do ; then it undeniably follows , there is no such trinity as they imagine , but a numerical unity of person and essence in god , as the unitarians hold ; and as some trinitarians contend in their opposition one to another . it remains then that the trinitarian worshippers , especially the common people , do seriously and in the fear of the one most high god , consider , what notions , conceptions , or idea's they have , of an infinite and almighty holy ghost distinct from the almighty father and producer of them : for they cannot possibly escape the condemnation of one of the highest crimes , even the worship of three infinite real gods , or two imaginary ones , or two names without notions ; that is , they know not what , as this author expresses it ; condemnation i say , not only by the unitarians ( who worship the father only as god in the highest and strictest sense of that term ) but also by all the trinitarians , that hold not the same opinion , or have not the same notion . i know the times of ignorance god winketh at , as well now , as before the preaching of the gospel ; but after he has made his unity manifest , and vindicated it from the scholastick subtilties and absurd distinctions , that have been invented to hide the truth , he then commands all men , to whom this evidence comes , to repent . inconsideration or negligence will not now excuse . men must not say or think ( as they commonly do ) this point is too high for me to determine ; for they have already determined it , whilst they profess to believe in , and to worship three equal ones , a father , a son , and a spirit . neither can they alledg the universality of the trinitarian faith : for besides ( as this author observes ) the worshipping of many gods was formerly , and is now far more universal ; we see that this opinion and worship , which soever it be , is condemned by at least four to one of those that go under that common name of trinitarians . the rise of these divers and contrary explications has been this ( as is observed by the author in that which now obtains ) that learned men looking narrowly into former explications , have found them inconsistent with the oneness of god , and therefore have devised somewhat either more obscure , that would hide the contradiction , or somewhat more consistent with the unity , tho it destroyed the trinity ; or more consistent with the trinity , tho it destroys the unity , as dr. sherlock has done . and perhaps others like him may devise other hypotheses , taking it for granted from the prejudices of early education and customary thinking , that the trinity is a fundamental of christianity . but we see here they labour in vain to reconcile manifest contradictions : and in believing the son and holy spirit to be equally god with the father , they offend against express scriptures and clear reason , upon the account of their own reasonings upon obscure texts ; and therein transgress the plain principles , both of natural light and revelation , which require , . that nothing be held for truth contrary to evident and fundamental truth . and , . that obscure passages are to be interpreted by clear passages , and the current of scripture , and not otherwise . the jews walking contrary to these principles , was the cause of rejecting christ and christianity , and it is indeed the ground of all error whatever . in vain do men press a great many texts ( that have , even in the opinion of learned trinitarians , another meaning ) to prove that the son and holy ghost are god ; till they can reconcile that inference to plain scripture and evident reason . in vain does the author of the snare broken ( who could not overcome the prejudices of his education and converse ) perswade men to lay aside their philosophy , and wholly to betake themselves to a scriptural consideration of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; by which i understand , they must take the words of scripture without understanding them , or reconciling them to other scriptures , or even the current of scripture or common reason . do they think that scripture is to be interpreted contrary to it self ? or , that divine wisdom has made the belief of contradictions necessary to salvation ? it seems strange that christians should be very zealous in the punctilio's of the worship of god , ceremonies of posture , gesture or apparel ; forms of addresses to god , the wording of faith to an iota ; and yet go on in the worship of one god the father , and of two distinct from him , god as perfectly as he ; and in which their worship terminates equally with him . they can love god the father with all their hearts and strengths , and two persons distinct from him with the same all : they can give all to one , and all to another , and all to a third , and never question the possibility of it ; as if there were a trinity in unity in every man ; that his own heart were three hearts , to be bestowed all and entirely upon each of three objects , and yet be but one heart still . but whither am i carried ? this author needs none of my notes or illustrations : and indeed both he and all others that have labour'd in this controversy , may surcease their pains henceforth , and leave what they have already said to the judgment and conscience of all considerate and sincere men. i am , sir , yours , &c. animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book, entituled a vindication of the holy and ever-blessed trinity, &c, together with a more necessary vindication of that sacred and prime article of the christian faith from his new notions, and false explications of it / humbly offered to his admirers, and to himself the chief of them, by a divine of the church of england. south, robert, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book, entituled a vindication of the holy and ever-blessed trinity, &c, together with a more necessary vindication of that sacred and prime article of the christian faith from his new notions, and false explications of it / humbly offered to his admirers, and to himself the chief of them, by a divine of the church of england. south, robert, - . the second edition [ ], xix, [ ], p. printed for randal taylor ..., london : . written by robert south. cf. dnb. errata: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng sherlock, william, ?- . -- vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity. trinity -- early works to . socinianism -- early works to . arianism -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion animadversions upon dr. sherlock's book , entituled a vindication of the holy and ever-blessed trinity , &c. together with a more necessary vindication of that sacred , and prime article of the christian faith from his new notions , and false explications of it . humbly offered to his admirers , and to himself the chief of them . by a divine of the church of england . the second edition with some additions . london , printed for randal taylor , near stationers-hall , mdcxciii . a preface , or , introduction to the following animadversions . to be impugned from without , and betrayed from within , is certainly the worst condition that either church or state can fall into ; and the best of churches , the church of england , has had experience of both. it had been to be wished , and ( one would think ) might very reasonably have been expected , that , when providence had took the work of destroying the church of england out of the papists hands , some would have been contented with her preserments , without either attempting to give up her rites and liturgy , or deserting her doctrine . but it has proved much otherwise . and amongst those , who are justly chargeable with the latter , i know none , who has faced the world , and defied the church with so bold a front , as the author of two very heterodox books ; the first entituled , a discourse concerning the knowledge of jesus christ , &c. published in the year , . and the other , a vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever-blessed trinity , &c. published in the year . and ( as one would think ) wrote purposely , to let the world see that the truth cannot be so much shaken by a direct opposition , as by a treacherous , and false defence . i shall in this preliminary address to the reader , pass some brief remarks upon both these books . but first upon this , which i have here undertook to animadvert upon . it is now of about three years standing in the world , and i have wondered , even to astonishment , that a book so full of paradoxes , and those so positively , as well as absurdly delivered , could pass unanswered for so long a time . for the author , having therein advanced a notion immediately and unavoidably inferring three gods , has yet had the confidence not only to assert it , but to declare it heresie and nonsence to think , or hold otherwise ; that is , in other words , to call the whole christian church , in all ages and places , fools and hereticks . for i do here averr , and will undertake to prove it , ( as far as a negative may be proved ) that no church ( known to us by history , or otherwise ) ever held this notion of the trinity before . and must we then be all fools and hereticks , who will not acknowledge the three persons of the blessed trinity to be three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , that is , in other terms , to be three gods ? and can so learned , and every way excellent a clergy bear this ? for if they could not , whence is it that some writers amongst them , while they are declaring their dislike of his opinions , yet do it with so soft an air , and so gentle a touch , as if they were afraid either to condemn the opinion , or to attack the author ? nay , and some i find creeping under his feet with the title of very reverend , while they are charging him with such qualities and humours , as none can be , justly , chargeable with , and deserve reverence too . for my own part , i franckly own , that i neither reverence , nor fear him ; that is , i reverence none , who gives whole communities and churches such words , nor fear any one , who writes such things , and in such a manner . for even those mean spirits , who can both court , and censure him in the same breath , complain , that he gives no quarter , where he supposes he has his adversary upon the least advantage . and if this be his way and temper never to give quarter , i am sure he has no cause to expect any , whatsoever he may find . but still , methinks , i can hardly believe my eyes , while i read such a pettit novellist charging the whole church as fools and hereticks , for not subscribing to a silly , heretical notion solely of his own invention . for does he , or can he think to live and converse in the world upon these terms ? and to throw his scurrility at high , and low , at all about him , above him , and below him ( if there be any such ) at this insufferable rate ? does he , ( i would fain know ) in this speak his judgment , or his breeding ? was it the school , the university , or gravel-lane , that taught him this language ? or does he never reflect upon himself , nor consider , that though he does not , others assuredly will ? one would think by his words and carriage that he had ingrossed all reason and learning to himself : but on the contrary , that this his scornful looking down upon all the world besides , is not from his standing upon any higher ground of learning , and sufficiency , than the rest of the world ; and that he huffs and dictates at a much more commanding rate than he reasons , the perusal of my ninth , tenth , and eleventh chapters will , or ( i am sure ) may sufficiently inform the impartial reader ; and shew him how many things there are in this author's vindication , which too much need another , but admit none . in the mean time , i do , and must declare both to himself , and to all others , that the forementioned charge of heresie and nonsence ( as he has laid it ) is so very rude , scandalous , and provoking , that it is impossible for the tongue , or pen of man to reply any thing so severely upon him , which the foulness of the said expression will not abundantly warrant both the speaking and the writing of . the church of england is certainly very merciful ; merciful ( as a great judge once said of k. charles ii. ) even to a fault . for who , by her silence upon what this bold man has wrote , and the encouragement he has since received , would not be shrewdly induced after some consider able number of years ( if his stuff should live so long ) to believe , that his notions were the current doctrine of our church , or , at least , of our church-men at that time ? none then opposing them , most over-looking them , and some countenancing and advancing the author of them ; and , perhaps , for them too . this is truly the case ; and i hope to do the church of england so much service at least , as to break the universality both of the silence , and the presumed acceptance , by one plain , resolute and full negative put in against it . for upon a due consideration of the things vented by this author , and comparing them with the proceedings and zeal of the primitive church in its councils , i do from my heart believe , that had he lived and published this book in those days , and asserted , that the three divine persons in the trinity were three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . and that their personal distinction consisted only in self-consciousness , and their unity only in mutual-consciousness . and withal , that the terms essence , nature , substance , person , and hypostasis , or subsistence , &c. applyed to the godhead and the divine persons , served only to perplex , obscure , and confound men's apprehensions of them ; and for that cause ought to be laid aside ; i say , i do not in the least question , but that all and every one of these propositions , would have been publickly and solemnly condemned in council , and the author of them ( as high as he now carries his head , like another abbot joachim ) severely dealt with for asserting them ; and that upon great reason . forasmuch , as the two chief of those terms , viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , substance and subsistence , were equally with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it self opposed by those two grand arian hereticks and furious disturbers of the church , ursacius and valens , who with their accomplices vehemently contended to have them all wholly suppressed and disused . so that as for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the father and the son , they would have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , no mention at all to be made of any such thing ; and as for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it ought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not so much as to be named concerning any of the three persons . and , as one reason for this , they alledged the satisfaction of tender consciences . which shews , that there are some such tender consciences in the world , as ( when opportunity serves ) may put the church , not only to part with its liturgy , rites , and ceremonies , but its very creed also for their sake . but right , or wrong , those two arian incendiaries pressed hard for the abolition of these two words ; as this author also does in this his vindication ; treading hereby exactly in the steps of those blessed leaders ; who , no doubt , understood the interest of their base cause well enough , and were both self-conscious , and mutually-conscious , how much they served the design , they drove at , by what they did . and , since things were so in former days , what hinders , but that in these latter days likewise , the same , if not prevented , may happen again ? and , that one , who , ( tho' he carries himself , as if he were able to teach the whole world , yet , for some certain reasons , professes himself a * learner still ) having already exploded the terms substance and subsistence , as not to be used about the trinity , may , upon the winning prospect of some approaching advantage , ( as , where advantage is the teacher , some care not how long they continue learners ) be very easily prevailed upon to send the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 packing after its fellows , and to abandon and cast off that too ? for , though such an one should give the church his oath to the contrary , there is no security from thence , but that a perpetual learner ( by a due waiting upon providence ) may , all in convenient time , learn to forget it too : and a self-contradictor having freely allowed a thing at one time , as freely and fully disown it at another . wherefore it was , no doubt , upon a most serious consideration of the force of words in conjunction with the tempers of men , that the sixth general council ( and third of constantinople ) was so jealously concerned , and so remarkably strict to fence against all heretical mischief from that quarter ; as appears from the concluding article of the synodical sentence pronounced by the said council against the monothelites , as we find it thus set down in the acts thereof . these things therefore , being thus with the utmost care and exactness , on all sides , formed and drawn up by us , we decree and enact , that it shall not be lawful for any one to produce , write , compose , conceive , or teach another faith , or this in any other way , or manner . but as for those who shall presume to compose , or contrive another faith , or publish , teach , or deliver forth another creed , to such as shall be ready to come over to the acknowledgment of the truth from heathenism , or judaisine , or any other sect whatsoever , or shall introduce any unusual way of speaking , or new invented terms , as tending to subvert all that has been defined by us , if they be bishops , or in clerical orders , we decree , that they shall be deprived of their bishopricks , or said orders ; or if they be monks , or laymen , that they shall be anathematized . so that we have here a clear and full declaration of a general council , against all teaching , not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that is , not only against delivering another faith , but against delivering the same in another way , or manner , than the council had settled , and against the use of all new-invented terms , all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness themselves not excepted ) as in the judgment of the council , destructive in their consequence to the faith declared ; and all this upon pain of deprivation , or anathematization , as the quality of the persons concerned should happen to be . according to the rigour of which sentence , and the proceeding of the church in those ●ges sutable to it , deprivation , or suspension , would , no doubt , have attended this author , had he then lived and produced his new terms , in defiance and reproach of the former received ones . and if such a punishment had actually befallen him , he would have found , that in those days , men were not wont either to be suspended , or deprived in order to their promotion . i know indeed , that in the apology lately put out by him for writing against the socinians , he utters some things contrary to what he had asserted in this his vindication of the trinity . but this the reader ought not at all to be surprized at ; it being as natural to some men to write as to breath , and to contradict themselves at to write : and no man of sence , who knows this author , will reckon that he knows his iudgment , or opinion from any book wrote by him , any longer , than till he writes another ; nor from that neither , till he has wrote his last . having given the reader this short prelibation , or taste of the book , which i shall more particularly and fully examine presently , i think fit to remark something also upon that other piece mentioned by me , and entituled , a discourse concerning the knowledge of jesus christ , &c. a book fraught with such vile and scandalous reflexions upon god's justice , with reference to christ's satisfaction , that it may deservedly pass for a blasphemous libel upon both . and i do seriously think , that never was any book licensed , published , and suffered to pass uncontrolled , more to the disgrace of the church of england than this , which the reader will quickly see upon his reading some passages of it ; which , i am sure , if he be but christianly disposed , be cannot do , but with extreme horrour . but before i direct the reader to his blasphemies , i shall lay before him one grand leading absurdity , which utterly evacuates and overthrows the whole doctrine of free grace , and the redemption of mankind thereby ; and indeed , by consequence , the whole oeconomy of the christian religion . and it is that wonderful assertion concerning the goodness of god , in page . of his knowledge of christ , viz. that it is not possible to understand what goodness is , without pardoning grace . now certain it is , that natural reason , by its own light , is able from the common works of god's providence , to collect the knowledge of god's goodness ; as st. paul expresly told those heathens of lycaonia , acts . . and therefore , if the knowledge of god's goodness , necessarily implies in it , the knowledge of pardoning grace , it will follow , that the heathens by understanding one from the works of providence , must needs understand and know the other also ; and consequently , that the knowledge of pardoning grace is not owing to revelation , nor the gospel necessary to make a discovery of it to mankind . a blessed principle , and foundation , no doubt , to establish the new-designed scheme of a natural religion upon ! for it is not unknown , what projects were on foot amongst some , when this book was wrote , though the author had the ill luck to be left in the lurch , and not seconded in the attempt . but in opposition to this paganish assertion , i do here affirm , that if god may be good , and that , both as to the essential attribute of his goodness , and as to the actual exercise of the same , without the pardon of sin , then it is not impossible to understand the goodness of god , without pardoning grace . the consequence is evident . for whatsoever any thing is , it is capable of being understood to be . and as for the antecedent , that is manifest from these considerations . first , that god was good , and exerted acts of goodness , before there was any sin in the world , and therefore might be , and undoubtedly was , understood both as good , and as exercising his goodness , by the angels before the fall of any of them , and for that reason before pardon of sin could come into consideration . in the next place , god had been good , and had exercised his goodness , had men and angels been created impeccable ; and , i am sure , it is no contradiction to hold , that they might have been originally made such , as all glorified spirits now actually are . and lastly , god is , and may be understood to be good , even in respect of those , whose sins shall never be pardoned . and therefore that assertion of this author , that it is not possible to understand what goodness is without pardoning grace , is apparently false and absurd ; as drawing after it one of these two consequences . first , that either we cannot understand the creation and support of angels , and of this visible world , and particularly of mankind , to have been acts and instances of the divine goodness ( which yet , no doubt , were very great ones . ) or , secondly , that we cannot understand them as such , but by understanding them also to imply in them pardoning grace . and if so , then , supposing the creation of man , and his sin after his creation , and the goodness of god remaining still entire , notwithstanding man's sin , ( as it certainly did ) it will follow , that pardoning grace , having ( according to the forementioned principle ) a necessary connexion with , or result from the said goodness , must have fallen in of course , and by necessary consequence from thence . and then , where could be the freedom of this grace ? nay , where could be this grace it self ? for the very nature of grace consists in this , that it be an act perfectly free ; so free , that god might have chosen , after man had sinned , whether he would ever have offered him any conditions of pardon , or no ; and if he had not , men might , notwithstanding that , have abundantly known and understood the goodness of god , by several other acts and instances , in which it had sufficiently declared it self . so that the foregoing assertion is nothing but a gross paradox , and a scurvy blow at all revealed religion besides , if the knowledge of pardoning grace could , or may be had without it . and now after this absurdity presented to the reader 's examination ; i shall point out to him some of the blasphemies also that occurr in the same book . such as are these that follow . the justice of god ( says he ) having glutted it self with revenge on sin in the death of christ , henceforward we may be sure he will be very kind , as a revengeful man is , when his passion is over . knowledge of christ , p. . again , the sum of the matter is , that god is all love and patience , when he has taken his fill of revenge ; as others use to say , that the devil himself is very good when he is pleased , pag. . again , the death of christ ( says he ) discovers the naturalness of justice to god ; that is , that he is so just , that he has not one dram of goodness in him , till his rage and vengeance be satisfied ; which , i confess , is a glorious kind of justice . and presently after . now the justice and vengeance of god having their actings assigned them to the full , being glutted and satiated with the blood of christ , god may pardon as many and great sins as he pleases , p. . and sutable to this , he likewise calls the method of god 's saving sinners upon a previous satisfaction made to his iustice , as necessary for the remission of sin , god's trucking and bartering with sin , and the devil for his glory , p. . concerning which and the like expressions uttered by this great-good man ( as a certain poor wretch calls him ) i cannot but out of a due zeal , and concern for that eternal truth , by which , i hope to be saved , declare , that the tongue that should speak such things , deserves to speak no more ; and the hand that should write them , to write no more . and great pity it is , that at this time , and in this case also , his ascendant had not tyed up his hands from writing . for see , how one of the leading dissenters insults over our church , upon occasion of these horrid passages . is this ( says he ) language becoming a son of the church of england ? ought it not more justly to have been expected from a iew , or a mahometan ? from servetus , or socinus , ( from whom also it was borrowed ) than from a son of the church , in a book published by licence and authority ? and thus he goes on , equally chastising his arrogance , and exposing his ignorance ; the poor church 's reputation all the while paying the scores of both . but now , if either he himself , or any for him shall plead . that it was not fairly done to charge him with those blasphemies , which he may ( and perhaps does ) pretend to have been uttered by him in the person of his adversary , and as the genuine consequences of the doctrine maintained by him . to this i answer . first , that he , who pretends to speak in the person of another , ought , according to all justice and decorum , to speak only such things as that other , whom he personates , uses to speak , and consonant to his known , avowed sence . but did his adversary , dr. owen , ever speak so ? or use the expressions here uttered by this author ? whereas he declares himself concerning the said expressions thus , viz. that he cannot mention them without begging pardon for repeating such horrid and desperate blasphemies . owen 's vindication against sherlock , p. . that they were fitter for a iew , or a mahometan , for servetus , or socinus , than a son of this church , p. . that he abhorred the rehearsal of such horrid profaneness , p. . that they were odious satanical exprobrations of the truth of christ's satisfaction , ibid. and now can this man pretend to speak these things in the person of one who thus abhors , abominates , and detests them ? the truth is , his whole book is such a lewd misrepresentation both of the words and sence of his adversary , that if he has any bloud in his body , it must needs fly in his face , and bid him blush for such unconscionable falsifications . but secondly , if he charges these assertions as consequences of the doctrine maintained by his adversary , i must put him in mind of these two things . . that to the just charging of any man with the consequences of his doctrine , or opinion , the things so charged , ought to be not only the real , but also the plain , direct , and immediate consequences of that opinion . forasmuch as no man ought in reason to be charged with the remote far-fetched consequences of any proposition held by him ; since he may in all equity ( if he disclaims them ) be supposed ignorant of them , and that inculpably too . . this author is to know , that to the just charging of even any doctrine , or opinion , with such and such consequences , though they follow never so really and truly from it , yet if they lie any thing remote , and at some distance from the same , they ought first by clear undeniable arguments to be proved to follow from thence , before they can justly and fairly be charged to do so . which two observations thus premised ; that i may lay the whole matter before the reader more particularly ; he is to take notice , that the doctrine , which this author loads with these blasphemous consequences ; is , that of the necessity of a satisfaction to be paid to god's justice in order to the pardon of sin , and the justification of sinners . and this i affirm to have been the received doctrine of the church , and the general opinion of divines in the case ; all asserting the necessity of such a satisfaction ; though not all , i confess , upon the same ground . for first , some found this necessity upon the necessary egress of god's vindictive justice , naturally acting and exerting it self where it meets with a proper object . but secondly , others state this necessity upon the decree or purpose of god , resolving to take this course for the pardon of sin , and no other . which decree and purpose , though made freely , yet being actually passed and declared , it was not free for god to baulk the execution of it . his veracity , wisdom and honour , as supreme governour of the world ; not suffering him to let the violation of his laws pass without a due satisfaction made to his iustice. and this has been the opinion of most divines in this matter . nevertheless , ( whether upon either of these grounds , or some other ) it is certain , that the necessity of a satisfaction was still held , and owned by the church : and yet upon supposal of this necessity alone it is , ( whatsoever ground it be stated upon ) that this author sets god forth in a most profane manner , as an impotent man venting his rage and passion without any sufficient ground or reason for it . for , i am sure , no other consideration can answer , or come up to the impiety of the forecited expressions . and i freely appeal to the learned , and unbyassed reader , whether the said passages can be placed to any other account whatsoever . and if they cannot , i ask with what conscience could this man , of his own head , invent such hideous , abominable words , and then thrust them into his adversary's mouth , whether he would , or no ? or charge them as the necessary consequences of his doctrine , without proving , or by any formed argument so much as offering to prove them so ? for surely he ought to have done this in the first place , and ( since he knew that the learned assertors of this doctrine , did and would deny these to be the consequences of it to the very death ) he should by clear and solid ratiocination have proved against them , ( in spight of their denial ) that these were indeed the true and natural consequences of the said doctrine , before he reproached them as such . but , it seems he was for doing execution first , and for proceeding to tryal afterwards ; though , as hasty as he was in the former , he has not yet done the latter , nor , i believe , ever will. upon the whole matter it is manifest , that it was not so much any thing personal in dr. owen ( how bitter soever he was against him ) as the doctrine of christ's satisfaction asserted by the said doctor , in common with the whole christian church , which this author so vilely reflected upon ; and discharged all those blasphemous scoffs at , in that book of his ; and consequently so far as he was the author both of the book and the scoffs in it , he was as fit a person to have joyned in the address to the morocco ambassadour , as any man in england besides . i do , i confess , charge this author with asserting three gods ( though he does not in terminis express it ) because of his asserting three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ; but then the case here on my part is quite different from what it was on his . for in this , the consequence of three gods from three distinct infinite spirits , is direct , manifest , and immediate ; or rather , in truth , is not so properly a consequence , or one assertion following from another , as one and the very same thing expressed in other words ; which is the true account of this matter . for the words [ infinite mind or spirit ] are but a periphrasis of the thing signified by the term [ god : ] and their perfect equivalence shall be fully demonstrated in my fifth chapter . from all which i conclude , that since there are ( beyond all pretence of denial ) several horrid blasphemous expressions in this author 's forementioned book , which must and ought to be charged somewhere ; and since his adversary utterly disowns them all , both as to words and sence ; and since the doctrine it self , maintained by him , infers no such thing ; nor has this author proved that it does so ; but that the said representations of it are peculiarly his own , and occur no where but in his book ( except possibly in the writings of some of his old friends the socinians , and those such as the transylvanian ministers ) it follows that according to the strictest laws of fair and just quotation , all the black dirt of those impious and foul passages which i have cited from him , and charged upon him , ought to lie wholly at his door ; and let him ( and his porter ) shovel it away thence as they are able . as to what concerns the licensing this book , so severely , and so justly reflected upon by dr. owen , it did ( it must be confessed ) meet with a person , as it were , framed for the very purpose . for none certainly could be so fit to stamp an imprimatur upon a book wrote against christ 's satisfaction , as one , who while he was eating the bread , and wearing the honours of the church , could stab the doctrine of it to the heart , by writing for transubstantiation . and then in the next place , for it s passing uncontrolled , it had really been to be wished , that the clergy in convocation , in the last especially ( in which so many of them acquitted themselves so exceeding worthily upon other accounts ) would have vouchsafed to wipe off this foul blot from the church by a due censure passed upon the forementioned positions , so reproachful to that , and so contumelious to our common christianity . for what vast advantage the dissenters have taken from hence to scandalize and bespatter the government and governours of our church , is but too well known , and cannot be too much lamented ; and i heartily wish , that it had been a scandal only taken , and not given . and the rather do i represent this as a work fit for the convocation ; since this author has given the world such a notable proof , that nothing but a convocation can convince , or work upon him . and thus i have given the reader a specimen of the doctrines of this author in these two books of his . in the former of which , he affects to be the socinian 's humble servant , by ridiculing and exploding christ 's satisfaction of god 's iustice ; and so in effect , the whole mystery of the gospel : and in the latter he pretends to oppose them by such a vindication of the trinity , and of christ's incarnation , as one would think , were wrote by themselves . but whatsoever it is , that he either pretends , or intends ( as it is hard to know the latter by the former ) this character i shall give of him as a writer , that there is hardly any one subject , which he has wrote upon , ( that of popery only excepted ) but he has wrote both for it and against it too : not that i say , that he has printed all which he has so wrote ; but printing is not the only way of publication ; and this i will say besides , that where he has not printed , he has acted it with a witness . and yet even for printing ; could any thing be wrote and printed more sharp and bitter against the dissenters , than what this man wrote in his answer to the protestant reconciler ? and yet how frankly ( or rather fulsomely ) does he open both his arms to embrace them in his sermon preached before the lord mayor , on novemb. . ? though i dare say , that the dissenters themselves are of that constancy as to own , that they were of the same principles in , that they were of in . but the truth is , old friendships cannot be so easily forgot . and it has been an observation made by some , that hardly can any one be found , who was first tainted with a conventicle , whom a cathedral could ever after cure ; but that still upon every cross turn of affairs against the church , the irresistible magnetism of the good old cause , ( as some still think it ) would quickly draw him out of the good old way . the fable tells us of a cat once turned into a woman , but the next sight of a mouse quickly dissolved the metamorphosis , cashiered the woman , and restored the brute . and some virtuosi ( skilled in the useful philosophy of alterations ) have thought her much a gainer by the latter change ; there being so many unlucky turns in the world , in which it is not half so safe and advantagious to walk upright , as to be able to fall always upon one's legs . but not to hold the reader too long in the entrance of the work , which i am about to present him with , i do here assure him , that , in the following animadversions , i have strictly pursued this author in every part of his new hypothesis , i have answered all his arguments , not omitting so much as one , or any thing that looks like one . and if i have thought fit sometimes in a short remark or two , here and there to refresh the reader and my self , by exposing his bold and blind side together , yet this has still been my method , throughly to dispatch the argument , before i offer to divert upon the author . as for that part of his book , which peculiarly concerns the socinians , i leave him and them to fight it out . my business is to shew , that the doctrine of our church is absolutely a stranger to his novel and beloved notions : it knows them not ; it owns them not ; nor ought we to look upon him , so far as he asserts and maintains them , to be any true and genuine son of it : and consequently , whether he worries the socinians , or ( which is much the more likely ) the socinians worry him , the church of england is not at all concerned . the contents of the chapters . chapter i. representing the sence and signification of the word mystery ; as also a vindication of the use and application of it to some of the most difficult and sublime truths of the gospel ; and lastly , a full proof , that the account given by this author of his explication of the article of the trinity , is wholly inconsistent with the mysteriousness of it ; together with some remarks upon his needless apology for writing against the socinians . chap. ii. containing an account of several terms commonly made use of in discoursing of the divine nature , and persons , and particularly shewing the propriety of applying the words essence , substance , nature , infinity , and the like , to this great subject ; and lastly , proving this author's exceptions against the use of them about the same , false , groundless and impertinent : with some further remarks upon his forementioned apology . chap. iii. in which this author 's new notion of self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness is briefly declared ; self-consciousness made by him the formal constituent reason of personality in all persons , both create and increate ; and on the contrary , proved against him in the first place , that it is not so in persons create . chap. iv. in which is proved against this author , that neither is self-consciousness the formal constituent reason of personality in the three persons of the blessed trinity ; nor mutual-consciousness the reason of their unity in one and the same nature . chap. v. in which is proved against this author , that the three persons of the blessed trinity are not three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . chap. vi. in which is considered , what this author pretends to from the authority of the fathers and the schoolmen , in behalf of his new hypothesis ; and , in the first place , shewn , that neither do the fathers own the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds ; nor self-consciousness to be the formal reason of their distinction . chap. vii . in which is shewn , that the passages alledged by this author out of the fathers , do not prove mutual-consciousness to be that wherein the unity of the divine nature in the three persons of the blessed trinity does consist ; but that the fathers place it in something else . chap. viii . in which is set down the ancient and generally received doctrine of the church concerning the article of the blessed trinity , as it is delivered by councils , fathers , schoolmen , and other later divines ; together with a vindication of the said doctrine so explained from this author's exceptions . chap. ix . in which this author's paradoxes , both philosophical and theological , as they occur in this discourse , are drawn together , examined , and confuted . chap. x. in which this author 's grammatical ( and other such like ) mistakes , as they are found here , and there in his writings , are set down and remarked upon . chap. xi . in which is given some account of this author's temper , and insolent way of writing , as well in extolling himself , as in depressing and scorning his adversaries ; in both which he has not his parallel . chap. xii . containing a brief review , and conclusion of the whole . advertisement . it having been found requisite to make some alterations and additions in this second impression of these animadversions , &c. yet that those who have bought up the former , may suffer thereby as little as may be , the author has thought fit for their use and benefit to cause the said additions and alterations , to be printed in a sheet or two by themselves . some of the most considerable errata of the press are thus to be corrected . preface , page . line . of the quotation , for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . of the quotation , for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for at read as . book , p. . l. . for asserter r. assertor , p. . l. . for analagous r. analogous , p. . for chap. ii. r. chap. iii. p. . l. . for destinct r. distinct , p. . l. . for it r. that , p. . l. . for spirits , r. spirits . p. . l. . for one and another dele and , l. . for infiinite r. infinite , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. , , . r. campósque lucentémque titaniáque totámque p. . l. . for of deity r. of the deity , p. . l. . instead of me read men , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . of the quot . for utrûm r. utrùm , p. . l. . for denaeus r. danaeus , p. . l. . for our read our , l. . in quot . for genetricem r. genitricem , p. . l. . for gratis r. gratis , p. . l. . dele one to , p. . l. penult . for imploying r. implying , p. . l. . of the greek quot . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for separately read separately , p. . at the end of the second greek quot . for quarta read quartâ , p. . l. . for [ of three ] read [ of the three ] p. . l. . for specificully read specifically , p. . l. . for quod sic read quòd sic , l. . for quod non read quod non , p. . l. . for in self r. in it self , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , l. . of the gr. quot . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . in the d gr. quot . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . of the th quot . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . of the second quot . ex-eâ r. ex eâ , p. . l. . for the unity r. that unity , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . for ergò r. ergo , p. . l. . for audiérant r. audierant , p. . l. . for beotius r. boetius , and ibid. l. . for difinition r. definition , p. . l. . for nicaenae r. nicenae , p. . l. . for on r. upon , p. . l. . for bu r. but , p. . l. . for metaphisician r. metaphysician & alibi , p. . l. . quot . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , l. . for concession r. a concession , p. . l. . quot . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , l. . quot . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . in the latin quot . l. . for tantummodo r. tantúmmodo , l. . for quarc r. quáre , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for asserter r. assertor , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for archbishop r. bishop , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . catch word for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. greek errata , p. . correction the th . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . for wreaking r. reeking , p. . l. . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for ita r. itá . if the reader chance to meet with any more faults in accents , he is desired to correct , or excuse them , together with all mispointings , which in books of any length are commonly too many to be particularly and exactly set down : besides that here , through the faintness of the character several letters , points and accents do scarce appear in some copies , though legible in others . animadversions , &c. chap. . representing the sence and signification of the word mystery ; as also a vindication of the use and application of it to some of the most difficult and sublime truths of the gospel ; and lastly , a full proof , that the account given by this author of his explication of the article of the trinity , is wholly inconsistent with the mysteriousness of it ; together with some remarks upon his needless apology for writing against the socinians . in order to the better examination of what this author has wrote about the holy trinity , i think it requisite to premise something concerning the signification , sence , and nature of a mystery . for certainly the unity of one and the same undivided god-head , in a trinity of distinct persons , is one of the greatest mysteries , if not absolutely the greatest in our christian religion . now a mystery , according to the common signification of the word , is derived either from the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies to initiate , or enter one into sacred rites , or doctrines , or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , another greek word ( and that in the judgment of eustathius and stephanus , more regularly and naturally ) signifying to shut or close up , and most commonly apply'd to the shutting of the eyes or mouth , the solemn posture of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or initiati in the rites of the gentile worship . and , lastly , one of no small note for critical as well as other learning , will needs run it up even to a hebrew original , deriving it from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies res abscondita aut secretum . concerning which , it must be confessed , that there is a more than ordinary agreement between the hebrew and greek word , both as to sound and signification . but whether this be not wholly accidental , is lest to the criticks in these languages to determine . in the mean time , most account 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word purely and perfectly greek : and the original of it lies so manifestly in one of the two fore-mentioned greek words , that it seems a needless curiosity , or rather a meer fancy to seek for it elsewhere . but whatsoever the origination of the word is , it always imports something hidden or concealed , especially with reference to sacred or religious matters ; and in this sence it occurs frequently , if not always , in prophane writers ; from whence the holy pen-men of the new testament seem to have borrow'd and apply'd it to some of the great and arduous truths of christianity , such as human reason cannot give a clear and explicit account of . this therefore being the undoubted notation and signification of the word , i shall deliver the nature of the thing it self in this definition , viz. that a mystery is a truth reveal'd by god , above the power of natural reason to find out or comprehend . this , i take , to be a full and proper definition of a mystery . and accordingly i shall consider the several parts of it distinctly . as , first , that it is a truth . by which we exclude every thing from being a mystery that is absurd or contradictious ; since a truth can by no means be so . and consequently hereby stand excluded also the fooleries and falsities of all other religions , how mysterious soever they may be pretended to be , and with how much solemnity and confidence soever delivered . secondly , the next qualification is , that it be revealed by god , viz. as to its existence , that there is such a thing . for otherwise , as to the nature of the thing it self , and several other respects , in which it may be known , the revelation of it is not suppos'd to extend so far . in a word , as a mystery implies some revelation of a thing ; so it follows , that all revelation does not overthrow the mysteriousness of it : but only such a plenary and entire revelation of it , as leaves nothing in the nature of it abstruse or undiscovered . but now , though revelation be a necessary ingredient in this definition , yet it is not sufficient ; something more being still required . since nothing hinders , but that the same thing may be both revealed by god , and known upon other accounts too . as the moral law was revealed by god to his people , and may be drawn and demonstrated from principles of natural reason also . and therefore , the third property of a mystery is , that it surpass all the power of natural reason to discover or find it out . and that not only as to the quid sit , or particular nature , but also as to the quòd sit of it too . for that there are or should be such or such things , ( to consider only the bare existence of them ) no principle of humane reason , by its own natural or improved light , could ever have found out , as might be easily shewn by induction , through the several mysteries of our religion , such as are the trinity , the incarnation , the mystical union of christ with the church , the resurrection of the body , and the like ; of all , and each of which , meer reason could never have made a discovery . fourthly , the fourth and last condition of a mystery , express'd in the foregoing definition of it , is , that it be such a thing , as bare natural reason ( even after it is discovered ) cannot comprehend . i say comprehend , that is , know it perfectly , and as far as it is capable of being known . i do not say , that it is , or ought to be wholly unintelligible . for some knowledge ( no doubt ) may be had of it . as , first , we may know the signification and meaning of the words or terms , in which it is delivered or revealed to us . likewise as to the thing it self , we may have some imperfect , defective knowledge of that too . such as the apostle paul calls a knowing in part , and seeing as through a glass darkly , cor. . . which words manifestly and naturally import , that something is known , though in a very imperfect manner and degree , and that something also remains still unknown , which shall hereafter be clearly and fully discovered , and made known unto us . so that i think nothing could give us a truer , and more satisfactory account of the nature of an evangelical mystery , than this scripture , viz. that it is a truth , of which we know something , at present , though very imperfectly ; but are ignorant of a great deal more belonging to it . and this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this obscure and abstruse part of it , is that which properly constitutes and denominates a sacred truth a mystery ; and consequently we may reckon the account given us of a mystery by st. chrysostome , a true and exact description of it by its principal property , viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , homily . on the corinth . and homily . on the epistle to the romans . where i desire the reader still to observe , that i do not affirm , that this last acception of the word is either the original sence of it , or that the heathen writers used it in this signification ; all that they intended to signifie by the word mysterium , seeming to have been only that it was , quid sacrum & secretum . but this i affirm , that the fathers and writers of the christian church generally used it in the sence specified ; that is , they affix'd a farther sence to it of their own ; but still such an one as carried with it something of analogy and cognation to the first , whereby it signify'd only something obscure or occult in sacred matters . so that now , if any one should argue , that in the writers of the christian church , mysterium signified only , quid sacrum & secretum , because it signified no more in the heathen writers , from whom they borrowed it , this would be very inconsequent and ridiculous ; and all one , as if , because sacramentum in the heathen writers signified only a military oath : therefore in the ancient christian writers it must signifie so too . for the christian writers apply it , to signifie those two great rites of christianity , baptism and the holy eucharist ; though still ( in this instance as well as in the former ) with some analogy , reference , and affinity to the first use of the word , viz. that as by this military oath , soldiers did solemnly devote themselves to their emperor's service ; so in these two religious rites men do much more solemnly devote and bind themselves over to the obedience and service of christ , according to all the rules and precepts of his holy religion . i conclude therefore , by a parity of the case , that mysterium , according to the christian use of the word , imports not only , quid in sacris secretum , by reason of an actual concealment of the same , but moreover something , that is so much a secretum in religion , as to transcend and surpass all human comprehension . and it is the authority of the ancient writers using the word thus , which i state this sence of it upon , as abundantly sufficient to enfranchise and render it authentick in the church . though , i confess , as to the adversary whom i am to deal with , my purpose would be sufficiently serv'd against him , even by the first and narrowest signification of the word , as it imports only something in religion actually secret , hidden , and not open to a common view or perception . i have now given the notation , signification , and definition of the word mystery . but after all , there is a new light sprung lately into the world , which tells us , the use of the word in scripture determines the case quite another way ; for that the scripture knows no such signification of the word , as we have insisted upon ; nor that any thing that is incomprehensible , is , or ought to be accounted , a mystery . the asserter of this ( as we may well perceive ) is a bold man , but being at present engaged with a much bolder , i shall only say thus much of this socinian tract here , viz. that as to the argument which the author would raise against the trinitarians ( as he calls them ) from the sence of the word mystery , as he has there stated it , it has been throughly baffled and overthrown by a learned person , in a short discourse in vindication of the mysteries of the christian faith , &c. and when this anti-trinitarian has answer'd that learned person , if there appears need of any further answer to the foremention'd piece , he may , all in good time , receive one in a distinct discourse by it self . and so i immediately address my self to the author undertook by me , who by pretending to defend the great article of the trinity , has given the adversary those great advantages against it , which the bare article left to defend it self , ( as the faith is generally its own best defender ) could never have given him . the socinians charge it with paradox , and downright contradiction . for the repelling and staving off which charge from this doctrine , our author has thought fit to give us some rules to judge of a contradiction by , and in so doing , has laid down this remarkable assertion , viz. that it is a vain and arrogant presumption , to say , what is , or what is not a contradiction , when we confess we do not understand , or comprehend the thing we speak of , p. . this , i say , is a very remarkable assertion , and the first thing remarkable in it , is , that ( according to a custom , very usual with him ) he promiscuously joyns together words , as if they were of the same import and extent of signification , when really they are very different . for to understand a thing , is to know it in any respect , or degree , in which it is knowable ; and to comprehend a thing , is to know it in every respect in which it is knowable . and as it is certain , that we cannot know god this latter way ; so it is as certain , that we may know him the former : for we do , and may know him by inadequate and imperfect , and uncommensurate conceptions ; as that he is just , wise , good , and the like ; which are several inadequate ways of representing him to our mind . but now , if this author's assertion should take place , viz. that we cannot say what is , or what is not a contradiction , when we confess we do not comprehend the thing we speak of , then we cannot pronounce these propositions , iupiter olympius is the supreme god , the sun is the supreme god , or the world is the supreme god , to be contradictions : forasmuch as it is certain , that speaking here of god , we do not comprehend the thing we speak of . and yet since iupiter olympius , the sun , and the world are all of them finite material beings , and god both infinite and immaterial : i doubt not but that to affirm one of the other , is a real and manifest contradiction . and to shew that it is so , this author should do well to consider , that a contradiction is not properly ( or universally at least ) oppos'd to the compleat and adequate knowledge of a thing , but to the true knowledge of it . and we may have a true knowledge even by such inadequate , imperfect , incomplete conceptions of it , as we have mention'd . for he who knows god to be just , though he cannot comprehend every way and respect in which he is , or may be so , and much less all his other perfections , has thereby a true knowledge of god , though an imperfect one . that is , he knows and understands , though he does not comprehend him . but according to this author's assertion , we cannot say , that any thing is a contradiction , with reference to god , since it is certain and evident , that we neither do nor can comprehend him . and what absurd , and insufferable consequences , this must needs draw after it in our discourses of god , i leave to any one but the author of this assertion to judge . but the consequences of it , as bad as they are , do not stop in god. for in the th page , our author proceeds farther , and affirms , that it is so far from being a wonder to meet with any thing , whose nature ( or rather the nature of which ) we do not perfectly understand , that he knows nothing in the world which we do perfectly understand , or , in his other word , comprehend , ( for to understand a thing perfectly , and to comprehend it , i take to be the same . ) and now let us apply his former rule , viz. that we cannot say what is , or is not a contradiction , when we confess we do not comprehend the thing we speak of . i say , let us apply this rule here also ; and since he positively avers , that there is nothing in the world which we do comprehend , or perfectly understand : it must roundly follow , that there can be no such thing as a contradiction ; since whatsoever is so , is , and must be a contradiction to something or other . now for the truth and reason of his assertion , i cannot undertake , but certainly the prudence and forecast of it is admirable , as being like to do him knight's service ( as i shall shew hereafter ) at many a turn , and , next to a convocation-book , help him out at a dead lift. in the mean time , let us see how our author makes good this strange and loose proposition , viz. that there is nothing in the world , that we perfectly understand . and in order to this , let us bring and lay together what he asserts in several places . and here first in page . line . &c. it is agreed by all men , that the essences of things cannot be known , but only their properties and qualities ; and that the world is divided into matter and spirit ; and that we know no more what the substance of matter , than what the s●bstance of spirit is : and then he enumerates some of the essential properties of each , and owns that we know them ( in confirmation , i suppose , of his fore-going assertion , that we know nothing . ) after which , in pag. . line . he adds , as for the essential properties , operations , and powers of matter , sence , experience , and observation will tell us what they are . and then i hope we may know also what they are , when sence and experience has told us . so that we see here what our author asserts ; but may we rely upon it , and hold him to his word ? alas ; that , i fear , may prove something hard and unkind . for a man , to whom a whole convocation has given a large scope and liberty of thinking , and who has given himself as large an one for speaking , loves not , of all things in the world , to be held too strictly to what he says . for in page . line . reckoning up some of the absurdities , and contradictions attending the doctrine of transubstantiation , he tells us , that we know them to be so ; because we know the nature of a body ( and this also we must suppose said in further confirmation of his other assertion , that we know not the nature of any thing ) and moreover , that we know that such things ( as he there mentions ) are a contradiction to the essential properties of a body , line . all this he says here , and that in very plain terms . but in page . ( in which it is high time for a man to forget what he said in the th . ) he tells us , that the essences of things cannot be known ; and consequently one would think , that the essence of a body could not be known : and yet for one to know the nature of a body , ( which in page . he says we do ) without knowing the essence of it ; ( which in page . he says , we cannot know ) is , i conceive , a way of knowledge peculiar to this author . in the next place , as for the property of things , he tells us very positively in page . line , . that the properties and operations both of bodies and spirits , are great secrets , and mysteries in nature , which we understand nothing of , &c. and yet in page . line . he tells us , that we know the essential properties of a spirit , that it is a thinking substance with the faculties of understanding and will , &c. now to know the essential properties of a spirit ; and yet for these properties to be such secrets and mysteries in nature , that we understand nothing of them , ( both which this author expresly affirms in the compass of two pages ) is another sort of knowledge , which ought in all reason to be reckon'd peculiar to himself . and thus having consider'd some of his assertions in contradiction to one another ( if there be any such thing as a contradiction ) i will consider some of them severally by themselves . and here , as i have already shewn , that he says positively page . line . that we have no clear and comprehensive notion of a spirit : so he adds in the next words , that it is impossible to know what is contrary to the nature of a spirit , if we know not what the nature of a spirit is , i. e. comprehensively , as he must still mean. but this , by his favour , i very much question , and desire him to tell me , whether we may not know , that it is contrary to the nature of a spirit to be material , to be extended , and to be compounded of the elements , &c. these things i take to be such as are contrary to the nature of a spirit , and such as may be certainly known to be so , and consequently such as may safely , rationally , and consonantly to all principles of philosophy , be pronounced to be so : and therefore this author's assertion , viz. that it is impossible to know what is contrary to the nature of a spirit , if we have not a clear , comprehensive notion of the nature of a spirit , is apparently false , absurd , and ridiculous . but to proceed , this author having said , that he knows nothing in the world that we do perfectly understand : and for the proof of it alledged , that the essences of things cannot be known ; and for the farther proof of that , affirm'd , that the whole world is adequately divided into matter and spirit ; the natures of which ( as he says ) are wholly unknown to us : suppose now , i should ( as i do ) deny this whole argument , and affirm , that there is a third sort of beings , which are neither matter , nor spirit ; which yet ( as to some of them , at least ) may be perfectly understood and known by us ; and these are accidents , which , according to the ablest philosophers hitherto , do together with substance , make a much better , and more comprehensive division of the whole world , than matter and spirit . for certain it is , that accidents , as contradistinct to substance , are real beings , and have their respective essences and properties belonging to them , and such as may be matter of demonstration ; which kind of argument is known to be the proving of any property , or proper attribute of its subject , by a third thing , or principle , bearing an essential connexion with both . and amongst accidents , i do particularly affirm this of numbers , figures , and proportions , that they are such things as may be perfectly understood by us in the strength of natural reason . for i think it may be perfectly , and comprehensively known , that two and two make four ; and that a circle is a figure , every part of the circumference whereof is equidistant from the centre ; and a thousand more such things , all which are capable of being scientifically made out to us by demonstration : and this indeed to such an height , that as some will admit of no demonstrations , but in the mathematicks , viz. in numbers , figures , and proportions : so there are few , or none , but readily grant , that the demonstrations about these matters , are the clearest , the most scientifick , and convincing of all other demonstrations whatsoever . from all which i conclude , that what this author has affirm'd , viz. that there is nothing in the world but matter and spirit , and withal , that there is nothing which we do perfectly understand is not only a crude , loose , unwary , but really , and , in strictness of truth , a very false assertion . and therefore ▪ though this author pleaseth himself with a fanciful harangue about our ignorance of the philosophy ; how the fire burns , and the waters are condens'd ( as he calls it ) into ice ? how stones fall to the ground , and vapours ascend and thicken in clouds , and fall down again to the earth in gentle showres , &c. ( for it must be granted , that it is much easier to change like the weather , than to understand it ) and moreover , though he is pleased to say , that he who thinks he understands these matters , would make a man question , whether he has any sense at all ? ( which is his usual complement to most whom he deals with ) yet all this confident talk will neither clear him from the absurdity and paradox of the forementioned general position laid down by him ; nor convince such as are conversant in the experimental part of natural philosophy , but that a very true , rational , and satisfactory account may be given of all the fore-mentioned phaenomena in nature , which this man , with so much confidence , or rather insolence , says , no man of unquestion'd sence will pretend to give the reason , or philosophy of . accordingly i will direct him to some who took the boldness to give a philosophical account of his unresolvable problems . as for instance , that of the congealing of water by cold , into such a solid body as ice , he will find excellently , and rationally accounted for , by the learned mr. boyl , in his treatise of cold , containing new experiments , and observations touching it , and an experimental history of it begun . likewise a reason of the same given by those learned french-men , the authors of the philosophia vetus & nova , commonly called , the colbertine philosophy , in the vol. p. , , , . and then , for the descent of heavy bodies , or stones falling to the ground ; he will find the cause of it assigned by galileo , in his systema cosmicum , collat. . & . and since by gassendus , in his accurate tract de motu impresso à motore translato . as also , an account of the gravitation , or descent of such bodies , judiciously given by claudius berigardus , professor of philosophy first in pisa , and then in padua , in his circulus pisanus d part , and the dial. p. , . in the person of aristaeus . and last of all , in the causes of gravitation briefly , but ingeniously given by isaac vossius , in his observationes variae , p. , &c. in like manner he will find a philosophical , and historical account of winds , by that great man , the lord bacon , in his treatise upon that subject ; which , i am sure , is as difficult an one , as any mentioned by this author . and as for what he here says of the ascent of vapours ( which is easily accounted for , from the sun and other celestial bodies ) and their descent again in showres ; which might easily be stated upon their own gravity , being combined into bigger bodies , as is lively exemplified in an alembick ) this author in this , seems to give us some philosophical account of rain , and consequently for presuming so to do , ought to bear his share in the same reproach , which upon the like account he hath so insolently fastned upon others . but as touching rain and vapours , snow and frost , and innumerable more such subjects ; there is not a natural philosopher , whether peripatetick , gassendian , or cartesian of any note , but professeth to give a philosophical reason of the nature of them , both as to what they are , and how , and by what means they are caused . concerning all which , learned men , who have avowedly travelled , and imployed themselves in such studies , and that with great applause of all the learned world ; i desire his haughtiness to speak out , and declare freely , whether he taketh them to have been such persons , as a man would question , whether they had any sense , or no ? for as these famous men were far from denying their senses , in complement to their understanding ; so they were as far from passing such a complement upon their senses , as to own , that their understanding could look no farther , and that where sense had started the game , reason might not follow it , and by a diligent , and sagacious pursuit , at length overtake it . the things treated of by these mighty searchers into nature , i acknowledge to be very difficult ; but every thing that is difficult , is not therefore impossible , even to him that thinks it so . and therefore , as to the ignorance of such like matters , let our author ( in god's name ) and others like him , pronounce each man for himself , and not undertake for others . for there may be several things , which one man may not know , and yet others may : as for instance , it may sometimes so fall out , that a man may not know himself , and yet others may know him very well : which is an observation , i conceive , not unworthy of this author's remark . but to go on : whereas he is very positive , and decretory , that the essences of things cannot be known : i very much question , ( and allow him , if he pleases , to question my sense also , for so doing ) whether this be absolutely true ? for a thing may be known more ways than one ; and if it be perfectly known , any one way , according to the utmost extent of that way , it cannot be truly said , not to be known . now , if by knowing , he means the knowledge of a thing , by a direct apprehension , and intuition of it , so as to have an exact idea , or resemblance of it thereby imprinted upon the mind : i pretend not that the essences of things are by any human intellect so known . but then , this is still but one way of knowledge ; and what is not known one way , may ( for all that ) be very well known another . but if on the other side , by knowing a thing be meant , the knowing it to be of such , or such a nature , by such peculiar properties , such peculiar effects , and operations , as discriminate it from other things , and that , to know it thus , be truly to know it : then i affirm , that the natures , or essences of things may be truly , and ( one way at least ) perfectly known . and accordingly , i think it a very good account of the essence of any thing , to say , that it is such a thing as always , and necessarily has such properties , such operations , and produces such effects . for this is an answer , not only to that question , that enquires , whether there be such a thing , or essence , or no ? but also , and much more properly to the question , that enquires , what kind of nature , or essence such a thing is of ? for when that is askt , to say , in reply to it , that the essence , or nature of that thing is a certain principle , always attended with such properties , and always , or generally operating in such a manner , and producing such effects , is a full , and satisfactory answer to that question . if now this author replys here , that he grants , that the properties of things may be known ; i answer , that sometimes indeed he grants it , and sometimes again he positively denies it , as i have shewn . but if in the issue he will stand by the concession of it , then he must stand by the consequence of that concession too , and grant , that properties are declaratory of the quality of the essence they flow from , and belong to . for , i hope , he will grant , that the effect declares the nature of the cause : and consequently that the nature of the cause may be known by it ; not by way of simple and immediate apprehension of the cause it self , i confess , but by way of inference and discourse , collecting one thing from another ; which is one sure way of knowing . and therefore i do here affirm , and own to this confident , assuming man , that to assert absolutely ( as he does ) that the essences of things cannot be known , is , by no means , a justifiable proposition ; or , in the latitude it is laid down in , to be admitted : but is really that fallacy , that concludes à dicto secundùm quid ad dictum simpliciter . well , but since this author has concluded the whole world in ignorance ( himself , i suppose , still excepted from so general a doom ) what must we do in so sad a condition ? must we all take up in scepticism , and acknowledge , that nothing is to be known ? what then will that old principle of nature , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , serve for , but to tantalize and torment us ? for must we thus think , and thirst , and desire to know , and , after all , find nothing to be known with any thing of plainness , evidence , and demonstration ? why , yes ; to comfort us under this cimmerian darkness , and to shew , that god has not given us our intellectual faculties wholly in vain : there is one certain thing in the world , viz. the doctrine of the trinity ; that is , to say , of three distinct persons , all united in one and the same numerical divine nature , which is wonderfully plain , easie , and obvious to be known : though still , thanks to our author for it , who by a new-found exposition , and explication of it , has bestowed this piece of charity upon the world as to render it so . for thus , in page . line . of his book , explaining the union of the three persons in the god-head , by self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness , ( which words shall be throughly considered in their due place ) he says , that this is very plain , and intelligible , and makes the three persons to be as much one , as every man is one with himself . and certainly it is hardly possible for any thing to be more plain and clear , more evident and intelligible , than that every man is one with himself . ( except it be only when he contradicts himself . ) again in page . line . he tells us , that his notion of self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness , seems to him to make a trinity in unity as intelligible , as the notion of one god is . and in page . line , . that it gives a plain , and intelligible solution to all the difficulties , and seeming contradictions in the doctrine of the trinity . and surely that thing , about which all difficulties are solved , and all seeming contradictions are cleared , cannot be imagined to have any difficulty remaining in it at all . and again , in page . line . he roundly tells us , that the explication given by him of a trinity in unity , is a very plain and intelligible account of this great and venerable mystery ; as plain and intelligible as the notion of one god , or of one person in the godhead . and in good earnest , the notion of one first cause of all things , and of one supreme being , and consequently of one god , is so easily demonstrated , or rather , with such a broad light , stares all mankind in the face , even without any demonstration , that if the trinity in unity be as plain as this is , it is hardly possible for any thing to the reason of man to be plainer : and the arians , and socinians are ten times more inexcusable , than ever i thought them before . again , in page . line . having affirmed , the trinity to be a most sacred and venerable mystery ; within or lines after , he says , if men would but consider it according to his hypothesis ( which he there sets down ) then a trinity in unity is a very plain , intelligible notion . again , in page . line . there will appear ( says he ) no difficulty , or absurdity in the essential union of three minds by a mutual-consciousness to each other . but will this man conclude , that where there is no absurdity , there is therefore no difficulty neither ? so that , that which removes one , must needs remove the other too ? it is strange to me , that any one who pretends to argue closely , should place two words so vastly different upon the same level . but again , in page . line . he tells us , that this gives an intelligible account of one of the most difficult problems in all school-divinity , viz. that the whole trinity is not greater than any one person in the trinity . and again , in page . line . this notion ( says he ) gives a plain account too of that maxime of the schools , that all the operations of the trinity , ad extra , are common to all the three persons . so that by this time we see here all things relating to the trinity , made plain , easie , and intelligible ; and that since this man has shewed his skill upon it , all knots and difficulties are wholly cleared off ; so that now none are to be found , though a man should beat his brains as much to find them , as divines did heretofore to solve them . and therefore well may he magnifie the exploits of such a triumphant hypothesis , as he does , first in his preface , page . line . ( which though it be always placed first in books , yet is generally written last ) having told us , that his original design was to vindicate the doctrines of the trinity , and incarnation , from those pretended absurdities , and contradictions which were so confidently charged on them : he adds these words , this ( says he ) i am sure i have done ; for i have given a very easie and intelligible notion of a trinity in unity . if he has , 't is well . but ( how great soever the assurance is , which he utters this with , as he had always a very great stock of it ) i dare aver , that he has here said more of himself , than any divine of note , since christianity came into the world , ever durst say , he was sure of , before . but as high as this sounds , in page . line . he raises his voice something higher , or at least is more particular in the encomiums he bestows upon this his performance in these words : thus ( says he ) i have endeavoured to explain this great and venerable mystery of a trinity in unity . and this i may say , that i have given not only a very possible , and a very intelligible notion of it , but such also , as is very agreeable to the phrase , and expressions of scripture , such as preserves the majesty of the article , and solves all the difficulties of it . by which account , as we see that our author is not wanting to the commendation of his own hypothesis ( as it is pity but self-consciousness , and self-commendation should go together ) so we see also , that he does it upon three distinct heads , or topicks , which therefore , by his good leave , we will as distinctly consider . and first , for it 's being so agreeable to the phrase and expressions of scripture , i hope amongst these , some consideration ought to be had of such texts of scripture , as that forementioned one in the corinth . . . where ( no doubt , with reference to the mysteries of the gospel , of which this is one of the chief ) we are said to see but as through a glass darkly , and to know but in part , &c. neither of which , can i perswade my self to think , is only another expression for knowing a thing plainly , easily , and intelligibly , and without any difficulty . the like may be said of that place in pet. . . where the apostle speaking to the saints , he wrote to , of the things reported to them by such as had preached the gospel ( amongst which , this doctrine , doubtless , had it's place , or an equal difficulty at least ) he adds , that they were such things as the angels desire to look into . the greek word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which all interpreters lay a peculiar weight and emphasis upon ; as importing both the earnest intention of the inspector , and the difficulty of the object inspected , from the posture of such as use to stoop down for the better discerning of such things as cannot otherwise be well perceived , or look'd into . and now , is not this ( think we ) a most proper and fit posture for such as view and look into things very plain , obvious , and intelligible ? and yet , i doubt not , but the angels , who are said to use it , could very easily give us the philosophy of rain , snow , and ice , of the fires burning , and the descent of stones , and other heavy bodies , which yet this author will allow no man of sense and reason ( without forfeiting the reputation of both ) to presume to give a philosophical account of : whereas , in the mean time , the trinity is declared to be a very plain , easie , and intelligible notion , even to such persons as can give no such account of the other . and thus much for the agreement of his hypothesis with the phrase and expressions of scripture . the next head of its commendation is , that it preserves the majesty of this great article ( as he words it : ) but in much the same sense , i suppose , as his refusing the oath , preserved the majesty of king william , and his taking it , the majesty of k. iames : but , that it preserves it so , as to have a singular virtue to encrease men's veneration of it , this i very much question , and demur to : forasmuch as that old observation that familiarity breeds contempt , holds too frequently , as well as undeservedly , no less in things than in persons ; which we are more apt to venerate at a distance , than upon a clear , plain , and full knowledge of them . i do not say , that men ought to do thus ; but such is the present state of nature , that thus they use to do . and it is worth our marking ; that where a man is said to know a thing perfectly , he is said to be master of it ; and mastership ( one would think ) is not naturally apt to create in the mind , any great awe for the thing , it is thus master of . but be it , as it may ; this i am sure of , that as the scripture tells us , that things revealed belong to us , so the same scripture tells us also , that there are secret things , which ( by a kind of sacred enclosure ) belong only to god , deut. . . and till god shall think fit to reveal to us the nature of the trinity , i , for my part , shall reckon it amongst those secret things : and , accordingly , with all the pious submission of an humble reason falling down before it , adore and admire it at a distance ; not doubting , but that for this very cause , that men should do so , god in his infinite wisdom thought fit to spread such a cloud and veil over it . and therefore i cannot but think , that that man expressed the due measures of our behaviour to this , and the like mysteries , extreamly well ; who being pressed in the schools with an argument from the trinity , in opposition to the question held by him , gave it no other answer but this : magister , hoc mysterium trinitatis ex quo argumentaris , est potiùs flexis genibus adorandum , quàm curiosâ nimis indagine ventilandum . the respondent who made this reply , had the repute of a learned and eloquent man ; and i think this reply represents him a very pious , and discreet one too . and therefore , as for the third and last topick , upon which our author would recommend his hypothesis about the trinity , viz. that it solves all the difficulties of it . i fear , from what hath been last said , that it will prove as far from being a commendation , as it is from being a truth ; especially when the author himself , after his saying so , in page . immediately adds , and that in the very next words , page . line . that there may be a great deal more in this mystery than we can fathom , &c. but now , if our author will in this manner utter one assertion , and immediately after it subjoyn another which quite overthrows it , who can help this ? for that a great deal more should remain in this mystery than we can fathom , or that there can be any thing unfathomable in that , in which there is nothing difficult ; or that any thing can be difficult , after such an explication given of it , as solves all the difficulties of it ( for that is his very word in page . the last line ) i must freely confess , surpasses my understanding , to conceive ; and god bless his understanding , if it can . it must be confessed indeed ( as i hinted before in my preface ) that in a short treatise lately published by him , and entituled , an apology for writing against the socinians , he seems to deny the notion of a trinity to be comprehensible and easie , page . telling us , that there must be infinite degrees of knowledge , where the object is infinite ; and that every new degree is more perfect than that below it : and yet no creature can attain the highest degree of all , which is a perfect comprehension ; so that the knowledge of god may encrease every day , and men may write plainer and plainer about these matters every day , without pretending to make all that is in god , even a trinity in unity , comprehensible and easie , which he calls , a spightful and scandalous imputation . by which angry words it is manifest , that he would fain rid himself from those inconveniences which his former unwary , and absurd assertions had involved him in . but by his favour , the truth of the charge shall take off the scandal from such as make it , wheresoever else it may fix it . for i have fully shewn , that in this his vindication , &c. he has frequently ( and as clearly as words can express a thing ) affirmed , a trinity in unity to be a plain , easie , intelligible notion : where , by plain must be understood either st . such a plainness , as excludes all doubts and difficulties whatsoever : in which sense alone a thing can be said to be simply and absolutely plain : and in this sense also it can admit of none , and much less of infinite degrees of plainer and plainer ; since that , which excludes all doubts , certainly can exclude no more . or dly , the word may be taken in a lax , popular , and improper sense ; for that which is so plain , as to have no considerable doubt , or difficulty remaining about it . but now , the notion which men have of god , or of the trinity , can never be truly said to be plain , in either of these senses , and therefore not at all . for in the first , to be sure , it cannot : no , nor yet in the second . for let men know never so much of any object , yet if there remains more of that object actually unknown , than either is , or can be known of it , such a knowledge can never render , or denominate the notion of that object ( even in the common sense of the word ) plain . and so , i hope , our author will allow it to be in the knowledge , men have of god , and the blessed trinity . and , whereas he lays no small stress upon this , that men may write plainer and plainer of these matters every day , i must here remind him of two things . . that he would be pleased to tell us , how men can write plainer and plainer of the trinity every day , after his new notion of it has solved all the difficulties about it , as in the forecited page . line . he positively tells us , it does . for ( as i take it ) where there remains no difficulty , there must be the utmost degree of plainness ; and withal , when men are once come to the utmost of any thing , they can then go no further . . i must remind him also , that the word plainer in the comparative degree does not couch under it the positive signification of plain , but denotes only a less degree of difficulty , and signifies no more than , that a thing , or notion , is not quite so difficult , or obscure , as it was before ; which it may very well be , and yet be far from being plain , in either of the two foregoing senses , laid down by us . and therefore , tho' we should admit , that men might write plainer and plainer of the trinity every day ; yet i affirm notwithstanding , that the notion of a trinity in unity , can in no sense be truly said to be plain and easie , and much less , very plain and easie ; nay , so very plain , as to have all the difficulties of it solved , as this author has expresly affirmed . so that if this be a scandalous imputation , it is easie to judge , to whom the scandal of it must belong . but besides all this , i see no cause to grant this author that , which he so freely takes for granted , ( for i think it very questionable ) viz. that men may write plainer and plainer of the trinity every day . for , so far as the writers of the church have informed us about this great mystery , the catholick church for above these years past , has not only had , and held the same notion of a trinity , but has also expressed it in the same way and words , with the church at this very day . and for so much of this mystery , as divines could give no account of then , neither have they given any clearer account of it ever since ; nor has the church hitherto advanced one step further in this subject : which is an evident demonstration , that it has already proceeded as far in it , as the reason of man could , or can go . and as for any further discoveries of it , which this author pretends to from two phantastick words , found out by himself , it will not be long , before they shall be throughly weighed in the balance , and found as inconsiderable as the dust of it . but there is one thing more , which i must not pass over ; and it is this : that in the passage , i transcribed from him , he lays down that for a certain principle , which is indeed an intolerable absurdity , viz. that where the object is infinite , there must be infinite degrees of knowledge . now it is most true , that nothing but insinite knowledge can adequately comprehend an insinite object . for which reason , god alone can comprehend himself , and he does it by one simple , indivisible act , uncapable of parts , or degrees . but as for degrees of any sort , whether of knowledge , or any thing else , nothing but a finite being is capable of them ; and therefore for this man to assert infinite degrees of knowledge , when uncreated knowledge is uncapable of degrees , and created knowledge uncapable of infinite degrees , is a gross thick piece of ignorance , in the first , and commonest rudiments of philosophy . but to return to his absurdities about the plainness and easiness of the notion of a trinity in unity , and therein to be as short with him as i can , i shall only demand of him , whether he does in this apology retract and renounce all , that in his vindication he has asserted quite contrary to what he has since delivered in his apology . if he does , let him declare so much , and i have done ; but till then , no regard at all ought to be had to his apology ; as serving for nothing else , but to shew , that according to his accustomed way , and known character , he has denied some things in one of his books , which he had positively , and expresly affirmed in another ; and consequently proving , that the apology , which denies a trinity in unity to be comprehensible and easie , and the vindication , which forty times over affirms it to be plain and easie ; nay , very plain and easie , ought to pass for the genuine , undoubted works of this author , though they had never born his name . wherefore upon the result of all , what shall we , or what can we say to the fore-cited particulars , which with so much positiveness over and over assert the plainness , and intelligibility of the notion of a trinity ! which yet has hitherto amazed and nonplus'd the whole christian church . for if it be really so plain and intelligible , as this author tells us , it must to my apprehension unavoidably follow , either that a mystery is a very plain intelligible notion , or that the trinity is no mystery . i shall not here presume to take this author 's beloved word out of his mouth , and cry nonsence , and contradiction . but certainly if the trinity be a mystery , and a mystery in the nature of it imports something hidden , abstruse , and by bare reason not to be understood ; then to say , we may have a plain , as well as an intelligible notion of it ; nay , plain even to a demonstration ; this , to say no more , is as like a contradiction , as ever it can look . but really our author has shewn himself very kind and communicative to the world : for as in the beginning of his book he has vouchsafed to instruct us how to judge of contradictions ; so in the progress of his work he has condescended to teach us ( if we will but learn ) how to speak and write contradictions too . there remains therefore only one favour more , viz. that he would vouchsafe to teach us how to reconcile them also . for i , for my own part , think it every whit as hard a task to reconcile contradictions , as to reconcile protestants ; and , i hope , much harder . and yet this latter he has endeavoured to prove in a certain book , wrote by him in the year , a thing not to be done . but whether it can , or no , i am sure , he has hardly published any book since , but what manifestly proves , that there is great need of some reconciler to do the other . but why do i speak of reconciling contradictions ? it would be a very troublesome work , if it could be done ; and a very uncomfortable one , when it could not : and therefore our author ( to give him his due ) has attempted a much surer , and more compendious way of clearing himself of this imputation , than such a long and tedious way of reconciling inconsistent propositions , could possibly have been . for having asserted , that we cannot justly charge a contradiction , where we cannot comprehend the nature of the thing said to be contradicted ; and that , in the next place , there is nothing in the world ( which he knoweth of ) the nature of which we can throughly understand , or comprehend : i hope it follows , that , where nothing can or ought to be contradicted , ( as nothing ought to be , which cannot be comprehended ) none can be guilty of a contradiction . and this , i suppose , none will deny to be an expedient , every way answerable , and equal to our author's occasions : for otherwise i cannot see what can stand between him and the charge of many scurvy , contradictory assertions ; but that which shall effectually prove , and make out to us , that indeed there neither is , nor can be any such thing as a contradiction . chap. ii. containing an account of several terms , commonly made use of in discoursing of the divine nature and persons ; and particularly shewing the propriety of applying the words , essence , substance , nature , infinity , and the like , to this great subject ; and lastly proving this author's exceptions against the use of them about the same , false , groundless , and impertinent : with some further remarks upon his forementioned apology . our author seems so desirous to advance nothing upon this sublime subject , but what shall be perfectly new , that in order to the making way for his particular novelties , he quarrels with almost all the old words , which divines , in their discourses about the divine nature , and persons , were heretofore accustomed to make use of . he can by no means approve of the words essence , substance , nature , subsistence , and such like ; as reckoning them the causes of all the difficulties , and seeming absurdities , that are apt to perplex mens minds in their speculations of the deity , and the trinity , sect. p. , , . and therefore they must be laid aside , and made to give way to other terms , which he judges properer , and more accommodate to those theories . to which purpose , though our author has fixed upon two purely of his own invention , ( which are to do such wonderful feats upon this subject , as in all past ages were never yet seen nor heard of before , and which i therefore reserve in due place to be considered of particularly by themselves ) yet at present the author seems most concerned to remove , and cashier the fore-mentioned useless , cumbersome words , and to substitute some better , and more useful , in their room : such as eternal truth and wisdom , goodness and power , mind and spirit , &c. which being once admitted ; and applyed to all disputes about the divine nature ( and an act of exclusion past upon the other ) the way will become presently smooth and open before us , and all things relating to the mystery of the trinity ( according to our author 's own excellent words ) be made very plain , easie , and intelligible . nevertheless , as i may so speak ( to borrow another of our author's elegancies ) let not him that putteth on his armour , boast as he that putteth it off . a great promissor , with a great hiatus , being much better at raising an expectation , than at answering it . and hitherto i can see nothing but words , and vapour : though after all , it is performance , and the issue of things alone that must shew the strength and reason of the biggest pretences . now for the clearer , and more distinct discussion of the matter in hand , i shall endeavour to do these four things . i. i shall shew , that the ground upon which this author excepts against the use of the terms , nature , essence , substance , subsistence , &c. in this subject , is false and mistaken . ii. i shall shew , that the same difficulties arise from the terms , truth , wisdom , goodness , power , &c. used for the explication of the divine being , that are objected against essence , substance , nature , and the like . iii. i shall shew , that these terms do better , and more naturally explain the deity , or divine being , than those other of truth , wisdom , goodness , &c. and , iv. and lastly , i shall shew , that the difficulty of our conceiving rightly of the deity , and the divine persons , does really proceed from other causes . these four things , i say , i will give some brief account of . but because the subject , i am about to engage in , is of that nature , that most of the metaphysical , and school-terms hitherto made use of by divines upon this occasion , will naturally , and necessarily fall in with it , i think it will contribute not a little to our more perspicuous proceeding in this dispute , to state the import and signification of these terms , essence , substance , existence , subsistence , nature , and personality , with such others , as will , of course , come in our way , while we are treating of , and explaining these . and here , first of all , according to the old peripatetick philosophy , which , for ought i see , ( as to the main body of it at least ) has stood it's ground hitherto against all assaults : i look upon the division of ens , or being ( a summary word for all things ) into substance and accident , as the primary , and most comprehensive ( as we hinted before in our first chapter . ) but that i may fix the sense and signification of these terms , all along as i go , by giving them their respective definitions , or at least descriptions , where the former cannot be had , i look upon ens , or being , to be truly and well defined , that which is ; though , i must confess , it is not so much a perfect definition , as a notation of the word from the original verb est . for to define it by the term essence , by saying , that ens , or being , is that which has an essence , though it be a true proposition , yet i believe it not so exactly proper a definition ; since the terms of a definition ought to be rather more known than the thing defined : which in the fore-mentioned case is otherwise . as for substance , i define that to be a being not inhering in another ; that is to say , so existing by it self , as not to be subjected in it , or supported , this way , by it . accident , i define , a being inherent in another , as in a subject supporting it , and without which it cannot exist , or support it self . which division being made by terms contradictory , viz. inhering in another , and not inhering in another , must needs be adequate , and perfect , and fully comprehensive of the whole that is divided thereby . but now , besides these two terms of substance and accident , there is another assigned by logicians , metaphysicians , and school-men , called , a mode of being , viz. such a thing , as being added to another , does not make any addition of another being , or degree of being to it , but only restrains , and determines it ; and may be defined an affection of a thing , or being , by which the nature of it , otherwise indeterminate and indifferent , is determined to some certain respect , state , or condition . thus , whereas the nature of a thing may be considered either as yet in its causes , or as actually produced , and existing out of them , either of these is a mode of that nature ; the first rendring it only potential , the other actual : nor is this a meer ens rationis , forasmuch as it affects the being of a thing antecedently to any operation of the mind passing upon it . and the reason assigned by some logicians for the allowing and asserting these modes , is this : that some things must necessarily be admitted to belong to being , which are not beings themselves , to prevent an infinite progress in beings . for since every thing is capable of being defined , or described , and yet nothing can be defined merely by it self , ( an identical proposition being no definition ) it must needs be defined by somewhat or other , distinct from it self ; but now if that be also a being , then that likewise must be defined by another being , and that by another , and so on in insinitum ; which would be most absurd : whereas , if this definition , or description of a thing be made by some modus of it , which is not strictly and properly a being it self , the thing presently stops here , without any necessity of proceeding to any more beings . but perhaps it will be here said , if these modes are not so many meer nothings , or entia rationis , what order , or rank shall they be placed in ? since those ten heads of being , which we call predicaments , cannot seem the proper receptacles of things , which we own not to be properly , or formally , beings . i answer , that though they are not beings , properly so called , and so not directly , and upon their own account , placeable under any of the ten fore-mentioned heads of being ; yet since they are appendages of being , as cleaving to it , and depending upon it , they are accounted under , and reduced to those respective heads , or genera of being , to which the beings modified by them , do directly belong . now the nature of these modi being thus accounted for , we are , in the next place , to take notice of the difference resulting from them , which we call modal ; and that is either between two , or more , such modes differing from one another ; as the personalities belonging to several persons , differ amongst themselves ; or when a thing , or being , differs from the mode affecting it ; or lastly , when several things thus modified , or affected , do by vertue of those modes differ from one another ; and thus the persons in the blessed trinity may be said to differ amongst themselves . i proceed now to those other terms of essence , existence , nature , subsistence , and personality . and first for essence : as i shewed , that ens , or being , might be truly defined , that which is ; so essence may be as truly and properly defined , that by which a thing is what it is ; that is to say , by which it is constituted in such a kind , or order of being : and this difference i take to be founded in the different ground , upon which we conceive of the same thing . accordingly the essence of a thing , no less than the thing it self , may be considered , either as yet in the power of its causes , and only producible by them , or as actually existing , and produced by them . by which we see , that an essence , as such , may be indifferent to exist , or not exist ; and that from hence springs the difference between essence and existence . there is indeed a reality ascribed to it , even without existence : but that is not properly a reality in the thing it self , but partly in respect of the power of its causes enabling them to produce it ; and partly , because it is properly the subject of science , and capable of having true propositions formed of it , and demonstrations built upon it : as we may form as true propositions of a rose in winter , and demonstrate all the properties of it , as of their proper subject , by their proper respective principles , as well , as while it is actually flourishing upon the tree . and this is all the reality which i think can be ascribed to essence , in its separation from existence . as for existence it self , it may be defined , that mode , or affection of being , by which a thing stands actually produced out of the power of its causes ; or , at least , not actually included in any cause ; in which sense god himself does exist . from whence it appears , that in created beings , essence bears no such necessary connexion with existence , since it is not necessarily included in the nature of any finite being , that it must needs be produced , or actually exist . but it must be confessed , that existence being a perfection , and , in god especially , a very great one , must of necessity be included in his very essence , as containing in it ( formally , or eminently ) all sorts , or degrees of perfection . the next term is subsistence , which is a mode of being , by which a thing exists by it self , without existing in another , either as a part in the whole , or an adjunct in the subject . i say an adjunct , not an accident , for a substance may be an adjunct . and , i think , if we would assign a way , by which the humane nature of christ exists in the person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , we shall hardly find out a fitter , than to say , that it exists in it , as an adjunct in the subject . for it is certain , that it does not exist in it , as a part in the whole ; since by this means , the second person in the trinity , must , till his incarnation , have wanted one part of his person . but i shall not be positive in the application of this term here . in the mean time it must be observed , that essence and subsistence really differ , ( so far as a modal difference is reduced to a real ) not only in created beings , but also in uncreate . in created it is evident ; forasmuch as a part divided from the whole , loses the subsistence which it had from thence , but still continues its existence , as being still a substance actually subsisting by it self , and not inhering in any subject , as accidents do . nor is it less evident in the deity it self , and the divine persons belonging to it . for one and the same undivided existence , as well as one and the same essence or nature belongs to all the three persons equally ; whereas yet every person has his own proper distinct subsistence by himself ; which must make as great a difference between existence and subsistence , as that which unites several persons into one nature , and that which personally distinguishes them from one another . and then also for christ's person , with reference to his humanity ; though this subsists by the subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , yet it does not properly subsist by the existence of it , ( since every distinct nature must have its own distinct existence ) which shews , that even in the oeconomy of this divine person , existence and subsistence must be considered as formally different ; since something , we see , may relate to , and be affirmed of one , which cannot be affirmed of , or bear the same relation to the other . now , whatsoever being , or nature , this mode of subsistence does belong to , that is properly called a suppositum ; as being a thing , which by no means exists in any other , but as a basis , or foundation , supports such things , or beings , as exist in it ; from which also it receives its name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and the consequence of this is , that as subsistence makes a thing , or being , a suppositum ; so suppositality makes it incommunicable ; since that which makes it uncapable of existing in another , must also hinder it from being communicated to another . and another consequence of the same is , that every suppositum , or being , thus subsisting by it self , is a compleat being ; that is , such an one as is not made for the completion of any other : for whatsoever is so , must naturally exist in it , as a part does in the whole , or at least be originally designed so to do . this account being given of subsistence , and of a suppositum , which is constituted such by it , it will be easie to give an account also what a person is ; which is properly defined suppositum rationale , or intelligens . so that as a suppositum is substantia singularis completa per se subsistens ; so the ratio intellectiva , being added to this , makes it a person , which is a farther perfection of suppositality , and the utmost perfection of subsistence , as subsistence and suppositality is the utmost bound and perfection of existence in all beings not intelligent . if it be here now asked : whether subsistence , or suppositality added to bare nature , does not make a composition ? i answer , that in created finite persons it does , but not in uncreated and infinite : and the reason is , because though all composition implys union ; yet all union , is not therefore a composition , but something higher and transcendental ; so that in the divine persons of the trinity , the divine nature , and the personal subsistence coalesce into one , by an incomprehensible , ineffable kind of union and conjunction . and if this does not satisfie , ( as i think it rationally may ) i must needs profess , that my thoughts and words can neither rise higher , nor reach further . having thus stated and fixed the signification of the fore-mentioned terms , i cannot but remark these two things of the term , or word , essence . as , . that it is sometimes taken not only for the ratio formalis entis , but simply and absolutely for an entire entity , or being it self . and . that those two other terms , nature and form , are for the most part used as terms equipollent , and of the same signification with it : nature being the essence of a thing considered as an active , productive principle ; and form being the essence , or nature of a thing , as it is the chief principle , giving being and perfection to it , in the way of composition . nevertheless it is sometimes also applyed to simple uncompounded natures promiscuously with the other . so that we see here , that essence , form , and nature , generally taken , are only three formally distinct considerations of one and the same thing ; which i thought fit to take notice of , to prevent all cavil , or mistake about the use of these terms . i have now gone over , and severally given an account of the notions of being , substance , accident , modes of being , essence , form , nature , subsistence and personality ; and hereby , i hope , laid some foundation for our clearer , and more intelligible discoursing of the great article we have undertook to rescue from a false vindication : there being hardly any one of all the foregoing terms , of which a clear and distinct notion is not highly requisite to a clear , explicite , and distinct consideration of the subject now before us . concerning which , i think fit to note this , that ( so far as i can judge ) the thing now in dispute is not , what fully and exactly expresses , or represents the nature of god ( for nothing can do that : ) but what is our best and most rational way of conceiving and speaking of him , and subject to fewest inconveniences ; and for this , we shall debate it , whether this author , or we take the best course . these things being thus premised , and laid down , we shall now resume the four heads first proposed to be spoken of by us , and discourse of them severally : and , . i shall shew , that the ground upon which this author excepts against the use of the terms substance , essence , subsistence , &c. in treating of this subject , is false , and mistaken . his exceptions against them we find in page , , and . of his book . the great difficulty ( says he ) of conceiving a trinity of persons in one infinite and undivided essence , or substance , arises from those gross and material ideas , we have of essence and substance , when we speak of the essence , or substance of god , or created spirits . we can form no idea of substance , but what we have from matter ; that is something extended in a triple dimension of length , breadth , and depth , which is the subject of those qualities , which inhere and subsist in it . and therefore , as matter is the subject of all sensible qualities , so we conceive some such substance of a mind , or spirit , which is the subject of will and understanding , thoughts and passions ; and then we find it impossible to conceive how there should be three divine persons , which are all infinite without three distinct infinite substances , each distinct infinite person having a distinct infinite substance of his own : and if we grant this , it seems a plain contradiction to say , that these three distinct infinite substances are but one numerical infinite substance , &c. thus far our author : and i freely grant , that this does not only seem ( as he says ) but really is a contradiction . and , before i have done with him , i will prove to him also , that to say , that three distinct infinite minds are but one numerical infinite mind , ( which shall be effectually laid at his door ) or , that three distinct infinite minds , are not three distinct infinite substances , or essences , are as gross , and palpable contradictions as the other . but he goes on in the same page a little lower , we know nothing ( says he ) of the divine essence , but that god is an infinite mind ; and if we seek for any other essence , or substance in god , but an infinite mind ; that is , infinite wisdom , power , and goodness , the essence of god , though considered but as one numerical person , is as perfectly unintelligible to us , as the one numerical essence , or substance of three divine persons in the ever-blessed trinity . in which words , i think this author guilty of a double absurdity . one , that he supposes a mind not to be an essence , or substance ; and it is manifest , that he does so , since he finds fault with substance , and puts mind in the room of it : whereas a mind is really a substance , or nothing ; not that there is nothing in the world besides substance , but nothing else which a mind can be properly said to be . his other absurdity is , his supposing mind , wisdom , power , and goodness , to be the same ; whereas wisdom and goodness , are not properly a mind , but the affections , or attributes of a mind . and here let not our author tell me , that they are all one and the same thing in god : for that is no news ; yet nevertheless , mind , wisdom , power , goodness , &c. are formally distinct from one another , and so not affirmable of one another : and in speaking of things , the formal differences of them must still be attended to : god's iustice and his mercy are one pure simple act in him ; but he that says , his iustice is his mercy , speaks absurdly for all that : and he who says , that a mind is wisdom , or goodness , or power , &c. speaks just at the same rate . but again in page . it is this gross and material imagination ( says he ) about the essence and substance of the deity , which occasions all the difficulties about the notion of one god , as well as of a trinity in unity . for we cannot imagine how any substance should be without a beginning , how it should be present in all places without parts and without extension , how substance , essence , existence , and all divine attributes and powers ( which are distinct things in created spirits ) should be all the same and one simple act in god , &c. from all which we are ( according to this author ) to conclude , that the terms substance , essence , and existence , ought to be laid aside in all discourses of the deity ; as serving for nothing but to cause in us those false notions of it . nor are those only excepted against , but also all divine attributes and powers ; for in his last words ( newly quoted ) he equally joyns and puts them all together . and what monstrous work this must needs make in our conceptions and discourses of god , shall , i hope , in the process of this dispute , be made to appear . in order to which , i do here first of all , in opposition to what this author has asserted about substance and matter , lay down this proposition , viz. that substance in the proper nature , and notion of it , includes no communication with , or respect to matter at all . and this i prove to him by one plain argument , before i proceed to any thing that is metaphysical , viz. that there was substance in the world before ever there was matter ; and therefore the notion of the former does not essentially include in it the notion of the latter : for , surely , if the being of one might be without the being of the other , the notion of the one may be no less without the notion of the other too . now that there was substance in the world before matter , i prove from this , that there was a being existing by it self , in the world , before matter , and therefore there was substance : for this is the very definition of substance , that it is a being existing by it self , and consequently they must reciprocally infer one another , as the definition and the thing defined by it always do . and then , that there was a being thus existing by it self , before matter , is proved from hence , that there was a being which produced matter , which nothing but a being existing by it self could do . and now i would fain know of our author , whether we may not have a clear and distinct conception of such a being , without so much as thinking of matter . and if we may , ( as i see nothing to hinder us ) then it is false , that the notion of substance does necessarily engage our thoughts in , or confound them with the idea of matter . besides , all the world does , and must allow , that we may have a full and perfect conception of a genus , or generical nature of a thing , without considering any of its species . and withal , that it is impossible , that such a generical nature should include in it any one of the specifick differences of the things , which it is communicable to , and which are contained under it ; for if so , then one species would include in it the specifick difference of the other opposite species ; forasmuch as including in it the generical nature , it must include all that is included in that nature too : which would be infinitely absurd . but now substance is a generical nature , equally communicable both to material and immaterial substances , as to two distinct species ; and consequently in its precise conception , implys nothing of materiality in it ; and for that cause may be conceived and known , and distinctly represented to our minds without it . nay , and to shew further the difference between substance , and matter , in the proper notions of each , this proposition , substance is not matter , is certainly true ; true , i say , particularly though not universally ; that is , with reference to all those substances , the nature of which excludes all matter , as the nature of angels , and of the souls of men , confessedly does . but now , if the general nature of substance essentially implyed in it matter , it could not be truly said of any one particular substance in the world , that it is not matter . mr. hobbs i know , makes substance and matter commensurate , or rather the same . but methinks , though some have lately wrote after him in his lewd politicks , no divine should venture to fall in with him in his natural philosophy too , for fear of some certain consequences , which , it is too well known , must follow from it . in a word , the first thing to be conceived in god , is , that he is a being ; the next , that he is a being existing by it self ; that is , in other words , he is a substance : and therefore , i hope , we may both form an idea of substance , and afterwards apply it to god , without plunging our selves into the gross imaginations of matter . and so far do all other divines , and philosophers differ from this man , that they affirm the word substance much more properly , and really applicable to god , than to any of the creatures ; which certainly it could never be , if it implyed any such essential cognation to matter , either in the nature , or notion of it . it is evident therefore , that there is no necessity from the thing it self to justifie this author's objection . and as for those gross and material imaginations of substance , taken up and borrowed from material corporeal things , nothing can be inferred from thence to his purpose . for is it good arguing to conclude , that because a thing is actually thus or thus , it cannot possibly be otherwise ? do not some form to themselves gross and absurd imaginations of god the father , from that expression of the ancient of days , dan. . . representing him to their thoughts , as an old man sitting in heaven ? but may not others therefore , who are wiser , conceive more worthily of him , without laying aside that scripture-expression ? if it be a good argument ( as it is all our author brings ) that terms , which may occasion gross and material imaginations in the minds of men , ought not to be applyed to god ; then i hope it is as much an argument in one thing as in another . and accordingly i desire to know of him , whether the terms begetting , and being begot , father and son , are not very fitly applyed to , and used about the divine persons ? and if so , whether they are not altogether as hard to be abstracted from material imaginations , as the notions of essence , or substance are , or rather , indeed , much harder ? i believe all thinking men will conclude they are . nay , and i shall venture to tell him further , that these two words , partly through their corporeal signification , and partly through the weakness of men's minds , have occasioned more difficulties about the notion of a deity , and a trinity too , than ever the words essence , or substance did , or perhaps could do : and yet , for all that , the spirit of god has thought sit to make use of them to express so sacred a mystery by . but this man should have remembred , that how gross and material soever the representations of things are , which our senses first make to us , there is a iudicium correctivum in reason , as the superiour faculty , which is to consider and separate what is gross and material in them , from what is otherwise , till at length by rejecting some notions , and retaining others , it finds out something even in the most material things , which may truly , properly , and becomingly be applyed to the purest and most immaterial . but to give a fuller account of this matter , we must observe , that the idea of substance may be said to be taken from matter two ways . . remotely and occasionally ; as the observation of material things may first set reason to work , which in the strength of its own discourse may draw from thence the knowledge of immaterials , as the apostle tells us in rom. . . that the invisible things of god , from the creation , were clearly seen and understood from the things that are made , viz. such visible sensible objects , as men daily converse with : and if so , then surely these do not necessarily dispose the mind of man to gross and material imaginations of the things so apprehended by it . but . the idea of substance may be said to be taken from matter immediately and exemplarily , as when the imagination does , ( as it were ) transcribe and copy one from the other , and take one for the representation of the other ; and this , i confess , must needs imprint a very gross idea of substance upon the imagination : and to this way may be referred all those gross and material ideas of substance , which this author so much exclaims against . but then , all this is from the neglect of the person , in not imploying his reason to correct and refine the first reports of sence , as he might and ought to have done ; and if from hence we conclude an utter incapacity in the thing it self to be improved and heightened into immaterial representations , and thereupon to be conceived and spoken of agreeably to them , we must even expect a teacher to be sent down from heaven to furnish us with a new language , or we must shut up our mouths , and put up our pens , and not speak , or write of divine matters at all . and therefore whereas this author further adds , in page . that we cannot imagine how any substance should be without a beginning , and how it should be present in all places . i tell him , this is not the point in controversie , whether we can imagine it , or no ? but i tell him withal , that it is as easie for the mind of man to conceive all this of substance , as of any thing else whatsoever . for , why not a substance without beginning , as well as truth , or wisdom , or goodness , without a beginning ? i say , let him shew me some solid reason why . in the mean time , i can tell him , that of the two , it should seem less difficult to imagine the eternal existence of substance , than of truth ; since substance is in order of nature before it ; as the subject must needs be before that which affects it . though in very deed , the main difficulty here , is not so much to find out which of those perfections may be the most easily conceived to have been without a beginning , as it is to bring the mind to a full and clear conception , how any thing at all is so ? while it finds it self wholly at a loss in running up its thoughts still higher and higher , without any bound or stint to determine them . and this it is , and not the particular nature of essence , or substance , that nonplusses and confounds our reason in these unlimited speculations . and whereas he goes on in the next words , and tells us , that we cannot imagine , how substance , existence , and all the divine attributes and powers should be all one and the same simple act in god ? i answer , what if we cannot ? must nothing be applyed to god , but what shall let us into the full knowledge of all that is difficult and mysterious in the divine nature ? or will this man say , that the application of the terms essence and substance to god , is the true cause and reason , why we cannot apprehend , how substance and existence , and all the divine attributes and powers , are one and the same simple act in god ? for this is the thing that he has been professedly driving at , and therefore ought to prove . and besides , as what he has here alledged , is nothing to his purpose , without the proof of that , so it is all but a meer fallacy , a fallacy of the accident : for albeit , we cannot apprehend how all these attributes are one and the same simple act in god , yet surely it will not follow hence , that we cannot apprehend them singly and severally by themselves , and as we so apprehend them , apply them properly and fitly to god. and here i cannot but take notice of a way of arguing usual with this author , as , i cannot conceive , and i cannot understand , and i cannot imagine , &c. after which , as if he had laid down irrefragable premises , he concludes , that the thing it self is not to be conceived , understood , or imagined . but for my part , i must be excused , that i cannot allow this man's single judgment ( or prejudice rather ) for the universal standard , or measure of humane reason ; or that such a way of discoursing proves any thing but the assuming humour of him who uses it ; and one strangely full of himself , instead of better things . in conclusion therefore , i do here assert , that the gross and material imaginations which men form to themselves of substance , proceed not from the thing it self , but from the grossness and fault of the persons who take up these imaginations . and accordingly i affirm to this author , that that assertion of his in page . that we can form no idea of substance , but what we have from matter , is false , and manifestly proved to be so . and moreover , that it is not only as possible , but as easie to form in the mind , a conception of a substance , or being existing by it self ( which is all one ) as abstracted from , and strip'd of all conception of matter and corporeity , as it is to frame to our selves a conception of truth , or wisdom , or of a being eternally true and wise , separate from all those gross qualifications : and consequently that the word substance , with others of the like import , may be most fitly and significantly applyed to the divine nature and the persons of the holy trinity , which was the thing to be proved . but because our author avers , in page . that if we consider god as truth and wisdom , which is his true nature and essence , without confounding our mind with some material conceptions of his substance ( as he had already affirmed all conceptions of substance must needs be ) then these things ( viz. the difficulties before-mentioned concerning our apprehensions of god ) are all plain and easie . where , by the way , it is observable , that he calls truth and wisdom the true nature and essence of god ; whereas in this very page , as well as in . he had excepted against the term essence , no less than that of substance , as ( by reason of the gross material ideas raised by it in the mind ) very unfit to be applyed to god. so happy is this author above other men , that he can rectifie the most improper words and expressions barely by his own using them . but because he is so positive in making the terms truth and wisdom an effectual remedy against all the inconveniences alledged from the terms essence and substance , as applyed to the deity , this brings us to our second proposition , viz. that the same objection lies against the terms truth , wisdom , goodness , &c. as applicable to the deity , that are made against essence , substance , existence , and the like . in order to the proving of which , i shall observe , that truth may be taken in a three-fold sense . first , for the truth of propositions , which is called logical . secondly , for an affection of being , which is truth metaphysical . and thirdly and lastly , as it is a qualification of men's words and actions , and consists properly in an agreement of the mind with both . concerning all which i observe , that the truth of propositions is no further eternal , than as it exists in the mind of god. that the metaphysical truth of things is eternal , or not eternal , as the being , or thing it belongs to , is , or is not so . and for the moral truth of men's words and actions , it is no more eternal than the said words and actions , the proper subject of them , can be said to be . this premised , i would here ask our author , whether the first notions we actually entertain of truth and wisdom , are not drawn from the observations we make of these things in men ; that is , in beings sensible and material , and consisting of body as well as soul , and accordingly cloathed with sensible accidents and circumstances ? i cannot imagine that he will deny this , since we do not speak immediately , or converse visibly with god , or angels ; and i suppose also , that he now speaks of truth , wisdom , goodness , &c. not as they are exhibited to us in books , or propositions , but as they actually exist and occur in persons , and consequently as they are first apprehended by us in concretion , or conjunction with men ; that is , with beings so compounded , qualified , and circumstantiated , as above expressed , and as we find , see and observe them , in men's words and actions , in what they speak , and what they do ; and these are certainly very sensible things , and such as incurr into , and affect the sence as much as matter it self can do . and if so , i desire to hear some satisfactory reason , why the observation of substance in material beings , and our first occasional collection of it from thence , should so necessarily pervert , and cause such a grossness in our conceptions of it , as to make it hardly ( if at all ) possible to conceive of substance , without the gross conception of matter ; and yet that the same consideration and cause should not equally take place in truth and wisdom , and equally pervert and thicken our apprehensions of them , when they are equally drawn from sensible , gross , and material objects , viz. the words and actions of men , which they both exist in , and converse about ? for i can see no ground why the same reason should not infer the very same thing , and the same antecedents draw after them the same consequents , whatsoever they are applyed to . for the argument à quatenus ad omne , &c. is certain and infallible . if it be here said , that truth and wisdom in the proper notion and conception of them , imply no communication at all with matter : i answer , that as the notion of them is abstracted , and gathered up by the discourses of reason it does not ; but so neither does that of substance , after such an act of the mind has passed upon it . so that hitherto the case is much the same in both . but to carry the matter a little further . truth and wisdom as observed in and amongst men , are certainly finite things . for whatsoever exists in a finite subject ( whatsoever the object be which it converses about , or is terminated upon ) is certainly it self finite also . and here i would have this author tell me , why a notion drawn off , and borrowed from finite things , should not be as apt to perplex and confound our minds , when applyed to an infinite being ; as a notion abstracted from a material being , can be to distract and confound our thoughts when applyed to an immaterial ? i must confess , i can see nothing alledgeable for one , which may not be as strongly alledged for the other . all that can be said , is what has been mentioned already , viz. that reason may , and does extract some notions from a finite being , that may be properly applicable to an infinite , due allowance made for the disproportion between both ; and in like manner i affirm , that it can and does draw notions from a thing endued with matter , which may as well agree to things spiritual and immaterial . so that i cannot perceive , that truth , wisdom , or goodness , have upon this account any preheminence , or advantage over essence , substance , existence , and the like terms at all , but the one may be applyed to the divine nature as well and properly as the other . but this is not all ; for i affirm in the d place , that essence , substance , nature , existence , and other terms equipollent to being , considered precisely in and by themselves , are naturally fitter to express the deity by , than those other terms , truth , wisdom , and goodness , contended for by our author . this is our third proposition ; and for the proof of it i first appeal to that high and glorious account , which god himself gave of his own nature , when moses desired to be informed of it , viz. i am that i am , exod. . . in which he describes himself only from his being and substance , which indeed rendered him more eminently , and even more substantially , and truly a being or substance , than all other beings or substances whatsoever , which , in comparison of him , can hardly be so much as said to exist or be. and i am perswaded , that god knew his own name and nature , and withal , how to give the best and most proper declaration of both , as well as the author of self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness does or can pretend to do . and indeed this seems to have been the very character by which god would be then known to all the world , viz. all the rational part of the creation ; for it was sent to his people , then living under , and with a heathen prince , to answer them and him even in those notions of a god , which meer nature suggested to all mankind ; and consequently were so known and received by them , that they could not easily question , or deny them . for otherwise we know god addressed himself to the same people afterwards in a character extreamly different , and more peculiar , viz. a god merciful and gracious , long-suffering , abundant in goodness and truth , and pardoning iniquity , transgression , and sin , exod. . , . which , it seems , was the opening a particular attribute to them , which the bare account of his being ( as known as it was ) could not sufficiently inform the world of before . but to proceed to other considerations , vastly indeed inferiour to this , but yet of singular use in their degree , to direct our speculations about these matters , i have some other things to offer in behalf of the proposition laid down by us . as first , that all divines hitherto have looked upon , and professedly treated of the divine nature and attributes , as different and distinct from one another ; still considering the first as the subject , and the other as the adjuncts of it ; or , at least , as analogous to these terms as they stand properly applyed to other things . according to which notion , as the subject , or that which is analagous to it , naturally both precedes and supports the adjuncts ; so all notions importing the divine nature , being , or substance , are to be accounted as the subject , in respect of all god's other attributes , or perfections , whether they be truth , wisdom , goodness , power , eternity , omniscience , or any other whatsoever . which being so , i do here affirm , that the terms essence , substance , existence , and others synonymous to them , ought to have the precedence of the other divine perfections , commonly called attributes , in their application to god , and that upon a three-fold account , viz. . of priority . . of simplicity . . of comprehensiveness . of each of which severally . . for that of priority . as we have already observed , that the first thing in order of nature conceivable of god , is , that he is a being ; and the next to it , that he is a being existing by it self , or ( in another word ) a substance ; so the same is yet further evidenced from this , that the notion of being , or substance , is that , which fully answers and determines the last question and enquiry , which can be made concerning god. for if we describe his nature by any particular attribute , or perfection , and be thereupon asked , what that is ? and having given an answer to that question , be afterwards urged with another , and perhaps another ; and accordingly , after an answer given to those also , the enquiry be still continued , till at length we answer , that god is a being ; a being existing by it self , that is , a substance . then we must of necessity stop , and can go no further ; which makes it evident even to a demonstration , that this is the first and original notion which we have , or can have of god. forasmuch as that which answers the last enquiry , or question , naturally made concerning any thing , is certainly the first thing into which the being , or reason of that thing is resolved . and thus much for priority . pass we now to the second thing , which is the simplicity of these terms , for primum in omni genere simplicissimum . so that when we say , god is a being existing by it self , viz. a substance ; this includes in it no respect to , and much less any conjunction with any other thing or notion whatsoever : but on the contrary , truth , goodness , power , &c. are all affections of being , or substance , and so connote a relation to , and a conjunction with it , as their subject . so that to give you the same thing in words at length , truth and goodness are nothing else but being , or substance , with these qualifications , or being and substance under such certain respects formally determining them to such a condition , viz. either of conformity to the understanding , as truth determines them , or of conformity to the will , as goodness does . so that in these , and all other the like attributes , being or substance do , as it were , pass from their absolute and original simplicity by the accession of the fore-mentioned perfections superadded to them . and then in the third and last place . for the comprehensiveness of being , or substance , above any one , or more of the divine attributes . this also is evident ; forasmuch as it runs through and contains them all , which no other particular attribute does , or can be said to do . and certainly that which signifies being in the whole compass and perfection of it , should be much more properly applicable to god ; than that , which signifies being only under some certain and particular determination of it , as every one of his attributes does , and no more . for we cannot say , that god's justice , mercy , wisdom , holiness and power , are properly contained under , and formally attributable to his truth , but they are all contained under , deducible from , and referible to his being or substance . so that it may properly be said , that god is an infinitely true , wise , good , holy , omnipotent , omnipresent being or substance . but we cannot with any propriety of speech pitch upon any one of the other divine attributes , and in like manner affirm all the rest of that one . as to say that god is an infinitely wise , good , eternal , omnipotent , omnipresent truth . this ( i say ) cannot be equally said : for though the thing be fundamentally true , yet the expression is neither proper nor natural : forasmuch as goodness , justice , omnipotence , omnipresence , and the like , are not the proper affections of truth , but they are properly so of substance , or being . and moreover , whereas this author will needs have the terms substance , essence , and existence discarded , and the terms truth , wisdom and goodness put in their room , when we speak of the divine nature ; i desire him to give me some good reason , why he pitches upon truth , wisdom and goodness , rather than upon eternity , omnipotence and omnipresence . for these , in their proportion , express the divine nature as much as the other ; but neither the one nor the other can grasp in the whole compass of the divine perfections , so as to be properly denominable from all and every one of them , as substance , and essence , and such other terms as barely import being , are found to 〈◊〉 i conclude therefore , that in our discourses of god , essence , substance , nature , and the like , are so far from being necessary to be laid aside , as disposing our minds to gross and unfit apprehensions of the deity ; that they are much fitter to express and guide our thoughts about this great subject , than truth , wisdom or power , or all of them together , as importing in them both a priority , and a greater simplicity , and larger comprehensiveness of notion , than belong to any of them ; and these surely are considerations most peculiarly suted to , and worthy of the perfections of the divine nature . i have now done with my third proposition , and so proceed to the fourth and last , viz , that the difficulty of our conceiving rightly of the deity and the divine persons , does really proceed from other causes , than those alledged by this author . i shall assign three : as , first , the spirituality of the divine nature . for god is a spirit , joh. . . and it is certain that we have no clear , explicit , and distinct idea of a spirit . and if so , must we not needs find a great difficulty in knowing it ? for we know things directly by the idea's , the species intelligibiles , or resemblances of them , imprinted upon the intellect , and these are refined and drawn off from the species sensibiles , and sensible resemblances of the same imprinted upon the imagination . and how can a spirit incur directly into that ? indeed not at all . for we can have no knowledge of a spirit by any direct apprehension , or intuition of it ; but all that we know of such beings , is , what we gather by inference , discourse , and ratiocination : and that is sufficient . but , . the second reason of our short and imperfect notions of the deity , is , the infinity of it . for this we must observe , that we can perfectly know and comprehend nothing , but as it is represented to us under some certain bounds and limitations . and therefore one of the chief instruments of our knowledge of a thing , is the definition of it . and what does that signifie , but the bringing , or representing a thing under certain bounds and limitations , as the geeek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 manifestly imports ? upon which account what a loss must we needs be at , in understanding , or knowing the divine nature , when the very way of our knowing seems to carry in it something opposite to the thing known ? for the way of knowing , is by desining , limiting , and determining : and the thing known is that , of which there neither are nor can be any bounds , limits , definitions , or determinations . and this , i think , is not only a sufficient , but something more than a sufficient reason , why we stumble and fail , when we would either have , or give a distinct account of the deity . . a third reason of the same , especially with reference to the trinity of persons belonging to the divine nature , is , the utter want of all instances and examples of this kind . for when a long and constant course of observation has still took notice that every numerically distinct person , and every suppositum has a numerically distinct nature appropriate to it , and religion comes afterwards , and calls upon us to apprehend the same numerical nature , as subsisting in three numerically distinct persons ; we are extreamly at a loss how to conform our notions to it , and to conceive how that can be in three persons , which we never saw before , or in any thing else , to be but onely in one. for humane nature , which originally proceeds by the observations of sense , does very hardly frame to it self any notions , or conceptions of things , but what it has drawn from thence . nay , i am of opinion , that the mind is so far governed by what it sees and observes , that i verily believe , that had we never actually seen the beginning or end of any thing , the generality of men would hardly so much as have imagined , that the world had ever had any beginning at all : since with the greatest part of mankind what appears , and what does not appear , determines what can , and what cannot be , in their opinion . and thus i have shewn three causes ( which i take to be the true causes ) why we are so much to seek in our apprehensions of , and discourses about the divine nature , and the three glorious persons belonging to it . and the reason of them all is founded upon the essential disparity which the mind of man bears to so disproportionate , and so transcendent an object . so that it is a vain thing to quarrel at words and terms , especially such as the best reason of mankind has pitched upon as the fittest , and properest , and most significant to express these great things by . and i question not , but in the issue of all , wise men will find , that it is not the defect of the terms we use , but the vast incomprehensibility of the thing we apply them to , which is the true cause of all our failures , as to a clear and distinct apprehension and declaration of what relates to the godhead . from all which i conclude , that the terms , essence , substance , nature , &c. have had nothing yet objected against them , but that they may still claim the place , and continue in the use , which the learned'st men the christian church hath hitherto had , have allotted them in all their discourses and disputes about the divine nature , and the divine persons ; which are confessedly the greatest and most sacred mysteries in the christian religion . but as in my time , i have observed it a practice at court , that when any one is turned out of a considerable place there , it is always first resolved ( and that out of merit foreseen , no doubt ) who shall succeed him in it : so all this ado in dismounting the terms essence , substance , nature , &c. from their ancient post , i perceive , is only to make way for these two so highly useful and wonder-working terms , self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness . and therefore let us , with all due and awful reverence ( as becomes us ) expect their august appearance , and for a while suffer the mountain to swell , and heave up its belly , and look big upon us , and all in good time , no doubt , we shall have the happiness to see and admire , and take our measures of the mouse . but before i close this chapter , to shew how like a judge upon life and death , this man sits over all the formerly received terms , by which men were wont to discourse of god , sentencing and condemning them as he pleases ; not content to have cashiered the words essence , substance and nature , from being used about this subject , he has as great , or greater a quarrel at the word infinite , as applyed to god ; and i shall here give his exceptions against it in his own words , being such , as i believe few would dare to utter but himself , and approaching so near , or rather quite coming up to blasphemy , that it may be truly said , that he has not spoke more blasphemously of god's vindictive iustice in his book of the knowledge of christ , than he has spoken of god's infinity in this : for in the , , pages , he expresses his thoughts of it thus . the truth is ( says he ) this very word infinite confounds our notions of god , and makes the most perfect and excellent being the most perfectly unknown to us . for infinite is only a negative term , and signifies that which has no end , no bounds , no measure , and therefore no positive and determined nature , and therefore is nothing , ( mark that ) and withal , that an infinite being , had not use and custom reconciled us to that expression , would be thought nonsence and contradiction . which i am so far from granting him , that i affirm , if there had never been any thing in the world besides god alone , it had yet been most true and rational . but he goes on . for ( says he ) every real being has a certain and determined nature , and therefore is not infinite in this sense , which is so far from being a perfection , that it signifies nothing real . thus he discourses : and yet this word infinite has been universally received and applyed to the divine nature , by learned men in all places and ages ; and i desire this man to tell me , how , if this word infinite were so liable to be thought nonsence and contradiction , this could possibly come to pass . for what he speaks of use and custom reconciling us to this expression , is impertinent , and begs the thing in dispute . for still i would know of him , how a word so utterly unfit to express the thing it was applyed to , could ever pass into use and custom , so as to be took up , approved , and made use of by all mankind . let him prevail with the whole world to speak nonsence , and to use words that signifie nothing , if he can . but this man , before he played the aristarchus at this rate , should have done well to have considered , that every term is not negative , which has a negative particle in the composition of it . of which , innumerable instances may be given . and if he does not know this , for all his flirting at his socinian adversary , as if he knew neither greek nor latin , p. . it is a scurvy sign that he is not so over-stocked with either of them as to have any to spare . and therefore , whereas he goes on in page . and pretends there to explain this word infinite , he might have kept his explication to himself . for no body ever used it otherwise , but so as to signifie a positive perfection by it , but yet withal connoting an illimitation belonging to it . it signifies , i say , a thing real , absolute and positive , but still with a connotation of something , which is to be removed from it , and denied of it ; such as are all bounds and limits in respect of that substantial , all-comprehending perfection of the divine nature . in a word , the thing principally signified by this term , is positive , the thing consignified , or connoted , ( which is but secondary and consequential ) is a negation . and this sufficiently overturns all his odd descants upon it . but if , after all , our minds cannot fully master this notion , persons , as thinking as he can be , know , and acknowledge , that it is not the word infinite , but the thing infinite , that renders them so short and defective in this matter . but it is pleasant to see him take his turns backwards and forwards in speaking of this thing . there is ( says he ) page . a measure of the most absolute and ( in this sense ) infinite perfections ; and if such a measure there be , then i hope there is as much nonsence and contradiction in the word immense , as in the word infinite ; and withal , if there is even in the most absolute and infinite perfections , a no plus ultrà , and an ultimum quod sic ( as the school-men , who were never bred at st. mary overies , are apt to speak ) then i confess , that an infinite , with all these qualifications about it , must needs ( according to his beloved dialect ) be nonsence and contradiction ; and that of the highest rank . and again , p. . we know not ( says he ) how far infinite wisdom , and power , and goodness reaches , ( and thus much is very true ) but then ( says he again ) we certainly know that they have their bounds , and that the divine nature is the utmost bounds of them . by which words if he means , that they have their fixed determinate notions , whereby they are formally distinguished among themselves , as well as from other things , it is right . for the notion of infinite wisdom is so bounded , that it cannot be said to be infinite power , or infinite power to be infinite goodness , or the like ; but still the thing couched under all these is infinite , and neither has nor can have any bounds set to its being . and if he should here reply , that then the notion of infinite wisdom , power , and the like , are false notions , as not answering the things they are applyed to . i answer , that they are indeed imperfect and inadequate , as not fully answering the thing it self , but they cannot be said to be false for all that . but on the contrary , if he will needs have the thing hereby signified to have any real bounds or limits of its being ; then it will and must follow , that in the forecited words he has with accurate and profound speculation presented to us an infinite with bounds , and the divine nature ( which has no bounds ) made the bounds of it . these are the very words he uses ; and withal delivered by him with such a magisterial air and contempt of the whole world besides , who have hitherto approved and made use of these expressions , ( and that in a sense and signification not to be born down by every self opiniator , after so long and universal a prescription ) that so much confidence cannot be sufficiently wondred at , nor too severely rebuked . and therefore to review a little the foregoing particulars , and thereby to take some estimate of the man ; where shall we find such another instance of a private presbyter , who in the communion , or rather in the very bosom of so pure and orthodox a church , as this our church of england , ever before durst , in so great an article of the christian faith , draw his pen against all the writers of the church ancient and modern , fathers and school-men , and with one dash of it explode and strike off all those received terms by which they constantly explained this mystery , as not only useless , but mischievous in all discourses about it ? whereas ( not to anticipate what i intend more particularly and fully upon this head in my eighth chapter , ) i shall only affirm thus much at present ; that the greek writers in expressing the godhead , or divine nature , whensoever they do not use the words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , constantly express it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and sometimes by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , while 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were commonly used in the same sense . and likewise the latins , where they express not the same by deitas , or divinitas , do as constantly express it by natura and substantia ; which words stand now particularly condemned by this presuming man ; and that , not only in defiance of all the ancients , but also of the church of england her self , which has set her authorizing stamp upon those two words , substance and person , by applying them to this subject both in her articles and liturgy . in the first of them teaching us , that in the unity of the godhead there are three persons , of one substance , power and eternity . artic. . and in her liturgy rendring the athanasian creed by the same words , neither confounding the persons , nor dividing the substance . as likewise that passage in the nicene creed , by the son 's being of one substance with the father . and again in the doxology at the communion on trinity sunday , it gives us these full and notable words , one god , one lord , not one onely person , but three persons in one substance . after all which , with what face can this strange , anomalar son of the church ( while he is sucking her breasts , and at the same time poysoning the milk , with which she should feed her children . ) i say , with what face can he aver to the world , that this word substance thus embraced , owned , and used by her , ought to be thrown away , as the direct cause of all the errours men are apt to fall into , about this great mystery ? and that we can have no notion of substance , but what implies in it something gross and material ? which , were it so , can any one imagine , that the church of england would ever have made use of such a word , as could serve for nothing , but a snare and a trap to betray the understandings and consciences of men , into such errours as may cost them their souls ? this is so fouly reflexive upon her , that i would have any man living give me a good reason , why this author should not be call'd upon by publick authority to give the church satisfaction for the scandal given to all the orthodox members of it , by the contumely and reproach which he has passed upon those terms and words which she has thought fit so solemnly to express her faith and her devotions by . but some men , ( such is the regard had to her laws and discipline ) will venture to utter and write any thing , that the bookseller will pay them for , though they throw their conscience and religion into the bargain . but god himself , who resisteth the proud , seems to have took the matter into his own hands , and ( to shew his controlling providence over the minds and hearts of men ) has at length brought this scornful man to eat his own words , ( the hardest diet certainly that a proud person can be put to ) and after all the black dirt thrown by him upon the school-men and their terms , to lick it off again with his own tongue . so that after he had passed such a terrible killing doom upon these words , essence , substance , subsistence , suppositum , person , and the like , here in his vindication , all on a suddain , in a relenting fit , he graciously reaches out his golden scepter of self-contradiction , and restores them to life again , in his apology . and that the reader may behold both sides of the contradiction the more clearly , i think it the best and fairest way to give him the sense of this author , ( if it may be so call'd ) in his own words . vindication . i have not troubled my reader with the different signification of essence , hypostasis , subsistence , persons , existence , nature , &c. which are terms very differently used by the greek and latin fathers , and have very much obscured this doctrine , instead of explaining it , p. . l. . the school-men have no authority where they leave the fathers ; whose sense they sometimes seem to mistake , or to clog it with some peculiar niceties and distinctions of their own , p. . l. . the truth is , that which has confounded this mystery ( viz. of the trinity ) has been the vain endeavour to reduce it to terms of art , such as nature , essence , substance , subsistence , hypostasis , and the like , pag. . l. the last , & p. . l. . and speaking of the ancient fathers in the same page , he tells us : they nicely distinguished between person and hypostasis , and nature , and essence , and substance ; that they were three persons , but one nature , essence and substance : but that when men curiously examined the signification of these words , they found that upon some account or other , they were very unapplicable to this mystery . hereupon he asks the following questions in an upbraiding manner , viz. what is the substance and nature of god ? how can three distinct persons have but one numerical substance ? and , what is the distinction between essence , and personality , and subsistence ? and lastly , at the end of the same page , he confesses , that some tolerable account of the school-terms and distinctions might be given , but that it would be a work of more difficulty than use . apology . he ( viz. ) the melancholy stander-by , is very angry with the school-doctors , as worse enemies to christianity , than either heathen philosophers , or persecuting emperours . pray what hurt have they done ? i suppose he means the corruption of christianity , with those barbarous terms of person , nature , essence , subsistence , consubstantiality , &c. which will not suffer hereticks to lie concealed under scripture-phrases . but why must the school-men bear all the blame of this ? why does he not accuse the ancient fathers and councils , from whom the school-men learn'd these terms . why does he let st. austin escape , from whom the master of the sentences borrowed most of his distinctions and subtleties ? but suppose , these unlucky wits had used some new terms , have they taught any new faith about the trinity in unity , which the church did not teach ? and if they have only guarded the christian faith with an hedge of thorns , which disguised hereticks cannot break through , is this to wound christianity in its very vitals ? no , no : they will only prick the fingers of hereticks , and secure christianity from being wounded ; and this is one great cause , why some men are so angry with the school-doctors ; tho' the more general cause is , because they have notindustry enough to read , or understand them . apology , p. , . i have ( to prevent all exceptions ) given the reader the whole paragraph ; in which the last clause strikes home indeed ; tho' in such cases , some think this author would do well to take heed of striking too home and hard , for fear the blow should rebound back again , and do execution where he least intended it . now here the reader is desired to observe the soveraign usefulness ascribed by our author to those school-terms : person , nature , essence , subsistence , consubstantiality , &c. as , that they will not suffer hereticks to lie concealed under scripture-phrases . that the schools learned all these terms of the ancient fathers . that they have guarded the christian faith with an hedge of thorns , which disguised hereticks cannot break through . that instead of wounding christianity in its vitals , they only prick the fingers of hereticks , and secure christianity from being wounded . all these great and good things he tells us have been done in behalf of christianity by the school-men , and their fore-mentioned terms , here in this apology ; and now if the reader will but look back into the vindication too , our author will there tell him also , how , and by what way and means the said school-men and their terms have atchieved all these worthy feats , viz. by their obscuring instead of explaining the doctrine of the trinity . by their mistaking the meaning of the fathers , or clogging it with peculiar niceties of their own . also by confounding the mystery of the trinity , through a vain endeavour to reduce it to such terms of art , as essence , substance , subsistence , nature , person , and the like . as likewise by the said terms being found very unapplicable to this mystery . and lastly , because though some tolerable account might possibly be given of their meaning , yet that it would be of little or no use to give any such account , or explication of them : so useful ( it seems ) does he account them , to secure christianity against hereticks , that it is of no use at all to explain them . and now , i hope , when the reader has considered , what this author has said on both sides , he will acknowledge , that hand and glove cannot more exactly agree , than the vindication and the apology . and as for that melancholy stander-by , upon whose account this apology is pretended to have been written , if he will but read and compare the apology and vindication together , i dare undertake , that he will not be half so melancholy as he was before . but does this author , in sober sadness , think that this is the way to confute hereticks , thus to play backwards and forwards , to say , and unsay , and only to set two books together by the ears ? let me tell him , that god is not mocked , nor the world neither ; and that he owes an account , of what he has wrote , to both . for my own part , so far as my converse reaches , i meet with no serious and judicious person , who does not reckon , that this author , by his desultorious inconsistent , but withal imposing way of writing , will in all likelihood make twenty hereticks , before he confutes one. it is indeed an amazing thing to consider , that any one man should presume to brow-beat all the world at such a rate ; and we may well wonder at the force of confidence and self-conceit , that it should be able to raise any one to such a pitch . but naturalists have observed , that blindness in some animals , is a very great help and instigation to boldness . and amongst men , as ignorance is commonly said to be the mother of devotion , so in accounting for the birth and descent of confidence too , ( whatsoever other cause some may derive it from ) yet , certainly , he who makes ignorance the mother of this also , reckons its pedigree by the surer side . chap. iii. in which the author 's new notion of self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness , is briefly declared . self-consciousness made by him the formal constituent reason of personality in all persons , both create and uncreate ; and on the contrary , proved against him in the first place , that it is not so in persons create . our author not being satisfied with the account given of the mystery of the blessed trinity by the schools , nor with those notions about it , which have hitherto obtained in the world , till he came into it ( no doubt as a person peculiarly sent and qualified to rectifie all those imperfect , and improper notions , which had been formerly received by divines . ) he , i say , with a lofty undertaking mind , and a reach beyond all before , and indeed beside him , and ( as the issue is like to prove ) as much above him too , undertakes to give the world a much better , and more satisfactory explication of this great mystery , and that by two new terms , or notions , ( purely and solely of his own invention ) called , self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness ; which , though still joyned together by our author in his explication of the blessed trinity , have yet very different effects , as we shall presently see . for by self-consciousness , he means , a mind 's , or spirit 's being conscious to its own thoughts , reasonings , and affections , ( and i suppose all other internal motions too ) which no other finite spirit is , or can be naturally conscious to , but it self . and this ( he says ) makes a finite spirit numerically one , or one with it self , ( for he uses both expressions ) and withal separates and distinguishes it from all other spirits ; so that hereby every spirit feels only its own thoughts , passions , or motions , but is not conscious to the thoughts , passions , or motions of any other . and this ( so far as his own words import ) he means by self-consciousness . as for mutual-consciousness . that takes place , when two or more spirits , or minds know all that of one another , which each mind , or spirit knows of its self , by a particular self-consciousness of its own . and this , i conceive to be a just account of what this man means by mutual-consciousness . now the effects of these two ( as i noted before ) are very different . for self-consciousness , ( according to him ) is the constituent principle , or formal reason of personality . so that self-consciousnss properly constitutes , or makes a person , and so many self-consciousnesses make so many distinct persons . but mutual-consciousness , so far as it extends , makes an unity , not of persons , ( for personality as such imports distinction , and something personally incommunicable ; ) but an unity of nature in persons . so that after self-consciousness has made several distinct persons , in comes mutual-consciousness , and sets them all at one again ; and gives them all but one and the same nature , which they are to take amongst themselves , as well as they can . and this is a true and strict account of this author 's new hypothesis ; and such , as i suppose , he will not except against , because justly , i am sure , he cannot ; howsoever i may have expressed the novel whimsey something for the reader 's diversion . now , by what has been said , it is evident , that the author assigns self-consciousness as the formal reason of personality , in all persons universally , whether finite , or infinite , create , or uncreate , for having first stated it so in finite and created spirits , pag. . lin . , &c. he afterwards applies it to infinite and uncreate , viz. the three persons of the godhead . and therefore , that we may proceed fairly , and without any ground of exception in the case , we will examine : i. whether or no self-consciousness be the reason of personality in finite persons ? and , ii. whether it be so in infinite ? and first , for finite , or created spirits . i deny self-consciousness to be the formal reason of personality in these . and before i give my reasons against it , i shall premise this one consideration , viz. that wheresoever the formal reason of personality is , there is personality . and again , that wheresoever personality is , there is the formal reason of personality , viz. that they exist convertibly , and that one mutually and essentially infers the other . now this premised and laid down , my reasons , why i deny self-consciousness to be the formal reason of personality in finite , or created beings , are these . . argument . according to the natural order of things , self-consciousness in persons , pre-supposes their personality , and therefore is not , cannot be the reason of it . the argument , i conceive , is very plain . for whatsoever pre-supposes a thing , is in order of nature posterior and subsequent to the thing so pre-supposed by it ; and again on the other hand , the formal reason of any thing is in order of nature precedent to that thing , of which it is the reason . we will therefore prove the major proposition . and we do it thus . personality is the ground and principle of all action , wheresoever it is . for where there is a suppositum , whether it be rational , ( which is another word for person ) or not , still it is the whole suppositum , which acts. so that there must be a person before there can be an act , or action proceeding from , or attributable to a person . in a word , there must be a person in being , before any action issues from him ; and therefore the act must essentially and necessarily pre-suppose the person for the agent . but now self-consciousness does not only do this ; but ( which is more ) it also pre-supposes another act antecedent to it self . for it is properly and formally a reflex act upon the acts , passions , or motions of the person whom it belongs to . so that according to the nature of the thing , there is not only a person , but also an action ( which is , and must be subsequent to a person ) that is antecedent to self-consciousness ; which being a reflex act , must needs in order of nature be posterior to the act reflected upon by it . and therefore self-consciousness , which is by two degrees posterior to personality , cannot possibly be the formal reason of it . this i look upon as a demonstration of the point . and i leave it to our author ( who is better a great deal at scorning the schools , than at confuting them ) to answer and overthrow it at his leisure . . our second argument is this . the humanity , or humane nature of christ , is perfectly conscious to it self of all the internal acts , whether of knowledge , volition , passion , or desire , that pass in it , or belong to it ; and yet the humanity , or humane nature of christ is not a person , and consequently self-consciousness is not the proper formal reason of personality ; forasmuch as it may be in that , which is no person . that the humane nature of christ is thus self-conscious , is evident , since it has all the principles and powers of self-reflection upon its own acts , whereby it intimately knows it self to do what it does , and to be what it is , which are in any particular man whatsoever ; so that if any man be conscious to himself of these things , the humane nature of christ , which has the same operative powers in perfection ( and those essentially proper to , and inseparable from it self ) which the rest of mankind are endued with , must needs be so too . and then , as for the assumption , that the humane nature of christ is not a person , is no less evident . since it is taken into , and subsists in and by the personality of the second person of the trinity , and therefore can have no distinct personality of its own ; unless we will with nestorius assert two persons in christ , an humane , and a divine . and the truth is , if self-consciousness were the formal reason of personality , since there are two destinct self-consciousnesses in christ , no less than two distinct wills , an humane , and a divine , viz. one in each nature , i cannot see how , upon this author's hypothesis , to keep off the assertion of nestorius , that there are two distinct persons in him also . . my third argument against the same shall be taken from the soul of man in a state of separation from the body . and it is this : the soul in its separate estate is conscious to it self of all its own internal acts , or motions , whether of knowledge , passion , or desire , and yet the soul in such an estate is not a person ▪ and therefore self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality ; for if it were , it would and must constitute a person , wheresoever it was . now , that the soul , in its separate estate , is thus self-conscious , i suppose no body will pretend to deny , but such as hold a psychopannychisme , viz. such a dormant estate , as renders it void of all vital motion or action , during its separation from the body . but this being an errour which few now a-days think worth owning , neither shall i think worth the disproving . but for the minor proposition , that the soul in its separate estate is not a person . in this i expect to find some adversaries , and particularly our author himself , who expresly affirms , that the soul in such a separate estate is a person , pag. . a soul ( says he ) without a vital union to an humane body , is a person . nor does he bestow the name and nature of a person upon the soul only as separate from , but also ( as shall be afterwards made appear ) as it is joyned with the body ; which assertion of his , together with some others of near affinity with it , shall in due place be examined by themselves . at present in confirmation of my argument , i shall produce my reasons against the personality of the soul , held by this author , and in order to it , shall lay down this conclusion in direct opposition to his , viz. that the soul of man is not a person . and since ( as we have noted ) he holds , that it is so , both in its conjunction with the body , and its separation from it ; i shall bring my arguments against the personality of it in both . and first , i shall prove , that the soul while joyned to , and continuing in the body , is not a person ; and as a ground-work of the proof thereof , i shall only premise this one thing , as a truth acknowledged on all hands , viz. that the soul and body together constitute the person of a man. the same being plainly asserted in the athanasian creed , where it tells us , that the reasonable soul and flesh , is one man , [ or one human person ] for both signifie but the same thing ; which being thus laid down , as a thing certain and confessed , i argue thus : if the soul and body in conjunction constitute the person of a man , then the soul in such a conjunction is not a person . but the former is true , and therefore the latter must be so too . the proposition is proved thus : nothing which , together with the body , constitutes a person , is , or can be it self a person . for if it be , then the body must be joyned to it , either by being assumed into the personal subsistence of the soul , as the human nature of christ is assumed into the personal subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . whereupon the composition and constitution of a man , will be an hypostatick union between soul and body : which i suppose , no body will be either so bold or absurd , as to affirm ; all divines accounting an hypostatical union so peculiar to christ's person , as not to be admitted in any other person or being whatsoever . ( for an hypostatick union , and an hypostatick composition , viz. such an one as makes a compound hypostasis , are quite different things : and this author shall in due time be taught so much , if he has any thing to object against it . ) or , secondly , the body must be joyned with the soul , as one part , joyntly concurring with another , to the composition of the whole person . and if so , then the soul being a part , cannot possibly be a person . forasmuch as a part is an incomplete being , and therefore , in the very nature of it , being designed for the completion of something else , must subsist in and by the subsistence of the whole . but a person imports the most complete degree and mode of being , as subsisting wholly by it self , and not in or by any other , either as a subject of inherence or dependence . so that it is a direct contradiction to the very definition and nature of the thing , for the same being to be a part and a person too . and consequently that which makes the soul the former , does irrefragably prove it not to be the other . besides , if the soul in the composition of a man's person , were an entire person it self , and , as such , concurred with the body towards the constitution of the man ; then a man would be an imperfect , accidental , and not a perfect , natural compound . he would be that which philosophy calls unum per accidens , that is , a thing made up of two such beings , as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into one . for a complete being ( as every person essentially is ) having received the utmost degree of subsistence , which its nature can give it , if it comes afterward to be compounded with another being , whether complete , or incomplete , it must necessarily make such a loose , unnatural union and composition . but to assert , that the person of a man is such a compound , would be exploded by all who understood any thing of natural philosophy . so that it would be a very idle thing to attempt any further confutation of it . let this author overthrow these reasonings , and support his assertion against them if he can . but having thus disproved the personality of the soul while in conjunction with the body , i go on to disprove it also while in a state of separation from it : which i do thus . if the soul in such a state be a person , then it is either the same person , which the man himself was , while he was living and in the body ; or it is another person : but to assert either of them , is extreamly absurd , and therefore equally absurd , that the soul in such a state should be a person . and first , it is absurd to affirm it to be the same person . for a person compounded of soul and body , as a man is and a simple uncompounded person , as the soul ( if a person at all ) must needs be , can never be numerically one and the same . for that , differing from one another as simple and compound , they differ as two things , whereof one implies a contradiction and negation of the other . a compound , as such , including in it several parts compounding it . and a simple being utterly excluding all parts and composition . so that if a man , while alive , be one person , and his soul after his death be a person too , it is impossible for the soul to be one and the same person with the man. and then for the other part of the disjunction . to assert , that they are two distinct persons , is as absurd as the other , as drawing after it this consequence , viz. that it is one person who lives well or ill in this world , to wit , the man himself while he was personally in the body ; and another person , who passes out of the body into heaven or hell , there to be rewarded , or punished , ( at least till the resurrection ) for what that other person had done well or ill here upon earth . and does not this look mightily agreeable to all the principles of reason and divinity ? nevertheless so much is certain , that wheresoever there are two distinct persons , we do , and must by all the rules of grammar and logick , say , that one of them is not the other ; and , where one is not the other , we cannot in truth or justice say , that one ought to account for what was done , or not done by the other . but then , if it be intolerably absurd , ( as no doubt it is , ) that the soul in the other world should not be responsible for what the man himself in person had done in this , then it is altogether as absurd and intolerable , for any one to represent and speak of these things under such terms and notions , as must necessarily throw all discourse and reasoning about them , into paradox and confusion . but 't is needless to insist any longer upon a thing so clear , or to add any other arguments in so plain a case . and indeed to me , the soul 's thus changing its state forwards and backwards , from one manner of subsistence to another , looks very odd and unnatural . as , that from an incomplete state in the body , it should pass to a personal and complete state out of the body , ( which state is yet preternatural to it ) and then fall back into an incomplete state again by its re-union to the body at the resurrection ( which yet , one would think , should rather improve our principal parts , in all respects , not merely relating to the animal life ; as the bare subsistence of them , i am sure , does not . ) these things , i say , seem very uncouth and improbable , and such as ought not , without manifest necessity , to be allowed of ; which here does not appear ; since all this inconvenience may be avoided , by holding , that the soul continues but a part of the whole person , and no more , in all its conditions . and thus having proved our assertion against the personality of the soul , whether in the body , or out of it ; let us now see what may be opposed to it . and here , i suppose , some will object , that the soul in a state of separation , is not properly a part , forasmuch as it exists not in any compound , nor goes to the composition of it . to which i answer , that an actual inexistence in a compound , is not the onely condition which makes a thing a part , but its essential relation to a compound ; which relation is founded partly upon its original designation , and partly upon its natural aptitude to be an ingredient in the constitution of a compound . and this relation to the compound , i affirm the soul to retain , even while it is separated from it ; as is evident from what both philosophers and divines hold concerning the soul , viz. that even in its separation and disjunction from the body , it yet retains a strong appetite and inclination ( as well as an essential aptitude ) to return and be re-united to it : which re-union also we know will be effected at the great and last day . but you will say , does not the scripture , in heb. . . speaking of blessed souls in a state of separation from the body , call them , the spirits of just men made perfect , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and if those just men were made perfect , must it not have been in respect of the perfection of their souls , since their bodies were then rotting , or ( rather ) rotten under ground ? and if they derived this perfection from their souls , must not their souls have been eminently perfect themselves , which rendred them so ? and if perfect , can we deny them the perfection of personality , ( which as we have shewn ) in rational beings , carries in it the greatest natural perfection ? to all which i answer , that the perfection here spoken of , is not natural , but supernatural ; and relates only to the consummation of their graces , and not to the manner of their subsistence . which being the only thing now in dispute , this scripture , which speaks only of the former , can make nothing at all to the present purpose . having thus evinced , that the soul , notwithstanding its self-consciousness is neither during its conjunction with the body , nor its separation from it , properly a person ; and having withal shewn the grounds and reasons upon which i conclude it impossible to be so , i shall however think it worth while something more particularly to examine ( as i promised ) this author's extraordinary and peculiar notions of person and personality , as he applies them to the soul , even while it is joined with the body also . and first in the th page , he discourses of it in this manner . all the sufferings ( says he ) and actions of the body , are attributed to the man , though the soul is the person , because it is the superiour and governing power , and constitutes the person . these are his words , and they contain a very pleasant way of arguing , though wholly contrary to the common , known rules of philosophy . for according to these , one would , and must have concluded , that for this very reason , that all the actions and sufferings of the body ( and he ought to have added of the soul too ) are ascribed to the man , therefore the man himself , to whom these personal acts are ascribed , must indeed be the person , and that for the same reason also , the soul cannot be so . but our author has a way of reasoning by himself . for ( says he ) the soul is the person , because it constitutes the person . but for that very cause , say i , the soul is not the person . for whatsoever constitutes a person , must do it either efficiently or formally . that is , either as a principle producing it , or a principle compounding it . as for the first way , whatsoever constitutes a person efficiently , must do it either by creation , or generation ; but this the soul ( as much a superiour power as it is ) is not able to do . for will any one say , that the soul can either create or generate the person , or ( to speak more plainly ) the man who is the person ? and then , for the other way , by which it may be said to constitute a person , to wit , formally . this it can do no otherwise than as it is a constituent part , and therefore only as a partial , and not a total adequate cause of the constitution . that is , in other words , the soul , as the form , must concur with the body as the matter , to the constitution of the whole person of the man. but then for that very reason again , the soul cannot possibly be a person , since it contributes to the constitution of the person only as a part ; which , by reason of its incomplete being , can upon no principle of philosophy be a person . and i would fain have this profound philosopher give me but one allowed instance , where one person is the constituent principle of another . but to examine the forementioned assertion yet more particularly , since this man so peremptorily says , that the soul is the person , because it is the superiour power , and constitutes the person . i must tell him , that the superiour power is not therefore the sole power , and consequently cannot solely constitute the person , which yet this author pretends it does . if indeed he had said , that the soul as the superiour power bears the chief and principal part in the constitution of a person , this had been sence , but by no means sufficient for his purpose ; for still this would not prove the soul to be a person , ( which he contends for ) but on the contrary , by proving it to concur thereto only as a part , demonstrate it , upon the same account , not to be a person . but this is not all , for in page . he calls the mind of man a person , and thus discourses about it . faculties , ( says he ) vertues and powers have personal acts and offices ascribed to them only upon the account of their unity and sameness with the mind in which they are , which is a person , and acts by them . now this also is very odd and strange ( could any thing in this author , which is odd , be strange too ; ) for the thing asserted by him amounts to neither more nor less than this , that powers , faculties , and vertues have personal acts ascribed to them upon the account of their unity and sameness with that , which it self neither is , nor can be a person ; as we have abundantly proved , that the mind of man , ( taking it in his sense for the soul ) cannot be . and for his further conviction , i could tell him of something which has personal acts very remarkably ascribed to it ; and yet neither for being it self a person , nor for its unity and sameness with the mind , in which it is , and which sometimes acts by it . and that , if he pleases to turn to corinth . . he will find to be that notable grace and virtue , called charity ; which , being but an accident , i believe , that even this author himself will not affirm to be a person ; and , i am sure , as little can be said for any unity or sameness that it has with the mind , which it is lodged in : since , though it should be utterly lost , the mind would nevertheless retain all the essentials of a mind , and continue as truly a mind , as it was before : which , i think , is but an ill argument of any unity or sameness between the mind and that ; and this being indubitably true , all that this author here discourses about personal acts being ascribed to the mind , and about their identity with the mind , as the reason of it , is with equal mistake and impertinence alledged by him in this case . for he might and should have known , that personal acts are often ascribed to faculties , vertues , and graces , not in strict propriety of philosophical speaking , but tropically and figuratively , by a figure ( which he shall hear further of hereafter ) called prosopopoeia ; which represents things , that are not persons , speaking and doing as if they were so . but besides this , there are here two things which this author takes for granted , which yet such dull mortals as my self will be apt a little to demurr to . as first , that he takes the mind and the soul of man for one and the same thing ; whereas very learned men , both grammarians and philosophers hold , that in men there is a great difference between animus and anima ; and that as anima imports the spiritual substance which we call the soul , so animus signifies only a power or faculty , viz. the supreme intellectual , reasoning , governing faculty of the soul , or at least , the soul it self considered , as exerting the forementioned acts. but whether it be one or the other , we have sufficiently proved against this author , that neither of them can be a person . the other thing here supposed by him , is the unity or sameness of the powers or faculties of the soul , with the soul it self ; which yet the peripateticks generally , and most of the school-men with thomas aquinas in the head of them do positively deny , and think they give very good reason for such their denial . for if substances and accidents are beings really distinct , and if qualities be accidents , and the powers and faculties of the soul come under the second species of quality , as aristotle reckons them , then it is manifest , that they are really distinguished , and that there is no identity between them . nor does there want a further reason for the same . for , since the bare substance or essence of the soul , considered nakedly in it self , may rationally be supposed undetermined , and therefore indifferent to all those acts or actions that naturally proceed from it ; and since withal , bare objects can of themselves neither enable nor dispose the agent to exert any action , there seems a necessity of asserting the intervention of some third thing distinct from both , which may thus enable , dispose , and determine the soul to exert it self in such a particular way of acting rather than another , sutably to the several objects which shall come before it ; which thing is properly that quality residing in the soul , which we call a faculty or power . and this to me seems the true philosophy of the matter . but i need not here press the decision of the case one way or other ; as not directly affecting the point in debate between us . only i thought fit to suggest these remarks , to check this author 's bold unwary way of dictating and affirming in things disputable and dubious , and to remind him how much it becomes and concerns one that writes controversies , to be more liberal in his proofs , and less lavish in his assertions . but before i quit this point about the personality of the soul ; since this author has so absolutely and expresly affirmed , that the soul , or mind of man is a person , and given this for the reason of it , that being the superiour governing power in man , it does , as such , constitute the person ; over and above the arguments which have been already brought for the confutation of it , i desire to leave with him two or three questions , which seem naturally to rise from this wonderful position . as , first , whether the soul , or mind of man be one person , and the man himself another ? secondly , whether the asserting of the soul to be a person , because it constitutes the person , does not infer so much , viz. that the soul is the person that constitutes , and the man the person that is constituted ; unless we will say , that the soul constitutes it self a person ? and then , thirdly , whether to say , or assert this , does not infer two distinct personalities in the same soul , one in order of nature before the other , viz. that , by which it is it self formally a person , and that other , which by its constituting it self a person , is constituted and caused by it ? but since it is too hard a task to drain any one absurdity ( especially a very great one ) so , as to draw forth and represent all its naturally descending consequences , i desire the author with the utmost ( if impartial ) strictness to compare the foregoing questions with his own assertion and to see , first , whether they do not directly spring from it : and next , whether the matter couched under the said questions , if drawn out into so many positive propositions , would not afford as many intolerable defiances to common sense , reason and philosophy . but thus it is , when men will be writing at thirty , and scarce thinking till threescore . but to proceed and shew , that it is not only the soul , or mind of man which our author dignifies with the name and nature of a person ; but that he has almost as free an hand in making every thing he meets with a person , as k. charles the second had in making almost every person he met with , a knight ; ( so that it was very dangerous for any one who had an aversion to knighthood , to come in his way , ) our author , out of the like over-flowing communicative goodness and liberality , is graciously pleased , to take even the beasts themselves into the rank and order of persons ; in some imitation , i suppose , of the discreet and humble caligula , so famous in history for making his horse consul . and for this , let us cast our eyes upon page . where he has these words , worthy ( in sempiternam rei memoriam ) to be wrote in letters of gold. a beast ( says he ) which has no rational soul , but only an animal life ( as a man has together with an humane soul ) is a person , or suppositum , or what you will please to call it . but , by your favour , good sir , the matter is not so indifferent ; for person and suppositum , are by no means the same thing ; and i pity you with all my heart , that you should think so . for any single complete nature actually subsisting by it self , is properly a suppositum , but not therefore a person . for as subsistence superadded to nature , constitutes a suppositum , so rationality added to suppositality , constitutes a person ; which is therefore properly defined suppositum rationale , or intelligens , as we have sufficiently shewn already in our second chapter ▪ so that to call a beast a person , is all one as to call it a rational brute : which this author , who can so easily reconcile contradictions , or ( which may serve him as well ) swallow them , may do , if he pleases ; and so stand alone by himself in this , as well as ( he says ) he had done in some other things . but others , who think themselves obliged to use philosophical terms only as philosophers intended them , dare not venture to speak thus , for fear aristotle should bring an action of battery against them ; who certainly has a pate to break as well as priscian , and is as sensible of hard usage , how patiently soever he has took it hitherto at this author's hands . but to give the said author his due , he is not so much a slave to his word , as to speak the same thing in all places of his book . for , to quote his own authority ( though of little value , but when brought against himself ) in page . of this very tract , he has these words . a person ( says he ) and an intelligent substance are reciprocal terms . and , are they so ? why , how then comes a beast , in page . to be a person ? is a beast an intelligent substance ? or , can a beast be a person , and yet not an intelligent substance , when he affirms , that they are terms reciprocal ? if i have not quoted this author fairly and justly , let the advantage be his , and the shame mine . but if i have , then let all the learned and impartial world ( which i appeal to ) judge , whether one who talks thus ignorantly and self-contradictiously about the nature of a person , be fit to prescribe to the whole church new terms and models never heard of before , to explicate the persons of the sacred trinity by . but the truth is , the distance between the . and the . pages , was so great , and the contradictions which passed within that compass so numerous , that how gross and bulky soever this one might be , yet with the help of a little good luck , it might well escape the author's eye in such a crowd . and perhaps , it had been never the worse luck for the author himself , if it could as easily have escaped the reader 's eye too . and now , to sum up in short , the chief heads of what has been treated of in this chapter , i have proved against this author , that self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality in created beings . and that first by an argument drawn from the very nature of the thing ; for that , self-consciousness presupposes personality , and therefore cannot be the formal reason of it . as also from two notable instances , one of the humanity , or humane nature of christ. the other of the soul of man in its state of separation from the body : both of which i have shewn to be perfectly self-conscious of all the internal acts , motions and passions respectively belonging to each of them ; and yet that they were , neither of them , persons . and pursuant to this subject , i have , by clear , and solid reasons overthrown the pretended personality of the soul , both in a state of conjunction with the body , and of disjunction from it ; which in both is asserted by this author . and lastly , i have examined his absurd unphilosophical assertions about these matters ; in one whereof he ascribes a personality even to beasts themselves . by all which , it is but too manifest against this assuming big-talking man , that as loftily as he carries it , yet in very deed and truth he does not understand what those terms suppositum and subsistence , person and personality mean. so fit is he ( as i have said ) to treat of the divine persons of the god-head ; whom yet he has made so bold with . and here i should judge it high time to conclude this chapter ; but that , methinks , it is pity to leave this fine trim notion of self-consciousness so ; without taking a little further view of the curious artifice and admirable contrivance of so rare a production . for if it were not such , could this author vaunt of it at such a rate as he does , pleasing himself , and proclaming his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as upon an invention ( forsooth ) which all antiquity before him could never yet reach to ? nevertheless to deal clearly and plainly amongst friends , such a cheating , lurching thing does this expectation usually prove , that after all these pompous shews , and glorious boasts of self-consciousness , self-consciousness , ushered in with twenty encomium's ( at least ) like so many heralds , or tip-staves , or ( rather ) yeomen of the guard , marching before it ; yet , in truth , after all this noise , it is , ( like an owl stripp'd of its feathers ) but a very mean , meagre , ordinary thing ; being , in down-right terms , neither more nor less than only one property of a rational , or intelligent being ; by vertue whereof , the soul is ( as the schools express it ) supra se reflexiva , that is to say , able by a reflex act of knowledge , intimately to know and consider it self , and its own being , together with its own acts , motions , and operations . this is the sum total of the matter , and all that self-consciousness is , or can truly pretend to be . and , ( which is yet a further diminution to it ) as poor and mean a notion as it is , it is borrowed too . but you will say , from whom ? why ? even from honest des cartes , and his cogito ergo sum . only with this unhappy difference in the application of it , that this proposition , which des cartes lays as the basis and ground-work of his philosophy , our author places with its heels upwards in his divinity . for whereas des cartes insists upon cogitation , only to prove and infer being , as one would prove a cause from its effects , or rather an antecedent from its consequent : our author , on the contrary , makes cogitation the very cause and principle of being and subsistence , by making it the formal constituent reason of personality in the person who thinks , or reflects ; than which nothing can be more false , and ridiculous . and this , according to the truest , and most philosophical account of the thing , is the very utmost which this new , and so much bragg'd of notion amounts to . and i do hereupon challenge this author to prove these two things if he can . first , that the self-consciousness hitherto spoken of by him is any thing more than a bare property of an intelligent being , whereby it reflects upon it self , and its own thoughts and actions . and in the next place , that such a property does , or can constitute the being or nature which it flows from , and belongs to , properly a person . these two things , i say , i call upon him to prove ; and if he does not by dint of argument make them good , he exposes a poor , senceless , infant hypothesis to the wide world , and then very unmercifully leaves it to shift for it self . in fine , i cannot but again and again own my amazement at the confidence of some bold presuming men , who set up for enlightners of the church , and new modellers of divinity in the strength of some odd upstart notions , which yet are not able to acquit , or support themselves upon , and much less against the very first elements and principles of a long tryed and never yet baffled philosophy , chap. iv. in which is proved against this author , that neither is self-consciousness the formal reason of personality in the three persons of the blessed trinity ; nor mutual-consciousness the reason of their unity in one and the same nature . having thus examined , and ( as i think ) overthrown our author's notion of self-consciousness , with reference to created and finite persons , i shall now proceed to the consideration of what he says of it with reference to the three persons in the glorious god-head . and this i shall do under these following heads , which shall be the subjects of five distinct chapters . as first , i shall treat of his two new notions , viz. of self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness , and shew , that self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality in the three divine persons , nor mutual-consciousness , the reason of their unity in one and the same nature . and this we have here allotted for the business and subject of this th chapter . secondly , i shall prove , that the three divine persons of the godhead , are not three distinct , infinite minds , or spirits in the th chapter . thirdly , i shall consider , what this author pretends to from the authority of the fathers and school-men , in behalf of his new invented hypothesis , and shew , that they speak nothing at all for it , or towards it : and this shall make the th and th chapters . fourthly , i shall set down the ancient and generally received doctrine of the church and schools concerning the article of the trinity , and vindicate it from this author's exceptions , in the th chapter . and when i shall have discussed and gone over these particulars , i cannot imagine what can be found considerable in this his book ( so far as i have undertook it ) but what will have received hereby a full and sufficient answer . though , when all is done , i confess i have some further complements to make to this author upon some other accounts ( though still occasioned by this work of his ) which , i should be extremely wanting both to him and the cause now before me , should i not , with all due address , pass upon him . and this will add three or four chapters more to the former , and so conclude this work. and first , to begin with the first of these , i shall endeavour to prove , that self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality in the three divine persons . in order to which , i shall premise and lay down these following considerations . consideration . that although the divine nature be one pure , simple , indivisible act , yet in our conceptions of it ( which are always inadequate to it ) there is a natural order of prius and posterius founded in the universal reason of things ( according to which , the conception of one thing presupposes , and depends upon the conception of another ) which , though it can make no prius or posterius in the divine nature , yet is by no means to be contradicted , or confounded in our discoursing of god ; forasmuch as without our admitting this rule it is impossible for any humane understanding either to conceive , or discourse consistently ; or intelligibly of him at all . consideration . ( which , i think , affords us a rule safely and universally to be relied upon ) is this , that in things having a dependence between them , where we may form to our selves a clear and distinct conception of one thing , without implying , or involving in it the conception of any other thing , there that thing is in order of nature precedent to all those things which are not essentially included in the conception of it . thus , for instance , we may have a clear and distinct conception of entity and being , and of unity too , without entertaining in our mind , at the same time , any notion , or conception of knowledge at all ; and therefore the ratio entitativa , of any thing must needs in nature precede the ratio cognitiva , as well as cognoscibilis of the same . consideration . we must distinguish between the affections ; or modes of being ( as they are strictly so called ) and between the attributes of it . the first sort are reckoned of the same order with being it self , and so precede whatsoever is consequent upon it , as the attributes of it are accounted to be ; which relate to the being or subject they belong to , as things in order of nature posterior to it . accordingly in the first rank are existence , subsistence , personality , &c. and in the second are all acts issuing from a nature , or subject so subsisting ; whether they be of knowledge , volition , power , duration , or the like : the denominations derived from which , are properly called attributes . consideration . though there can be no accidents inhering in god , yet there may be accidental predications belonging to him . and i call those accidental , which are not necessary , or essential . such as are all extrinsecal denominations of him founded on such acts of god , as were perfectly free for him to do , or not to do ; nothing in the divine nature obliging him thereto . of which number are the denominations , or predicates of creatour , redeemer , and the like : since there was nothing in god that made it necessary for him to be so . consideration . when the terms [ cause , formal reason , constituent ; or productive principle , and the like ] are used about the divine nature , and persons , they are not to be understood as applicable to them in the strict and proper signification of the said terms , but only by way of analogy ; as really meaning no more than a causal , or necessary dependence of one notion , or conceptus objectivus upon another ; so that it is impossible for the mind to conceive distinctly of the one , but as depending upon , or proceeding from the other . consideration . that the divine nature may with all fair accord to the rules of divinity and philosophy be considered as prescinding , or abstracting ( though not as divided ) from the divine persons . consideration . that whatsoever is essentially included in the divine nature thus considered , is equally common and communicable to all the divine persons . consideration . that whatsoever is the proper formal reason of personality , is utterly incommunicable to any thing , or person beyond , or beside the person to whom it belongs . consideration . that for any absolute perfection essentially included , or implyed in the divine nature to be multiplyed in the three persons belonging to it , is a manifest multiplication of the divine nature it self in the said persons . by which we are given to understand the difference between the multiplication , and the communication of the divine nature to those persons . these rules , i thought fit to draw up and lay down before-hand , in order to the use which we shall have of them in the ensuing disputation . and so i proceed to my arguments against this author's new notion of self-consciousness , with reference to the persons of the blessed trinity . and the first is this : argument i. no personal act can be the formal reason of personality in the person , whose act it is . but self-consciousness is a personal act , and therefore self-consciousness cannot be the formal reason of personality in the person , whose act it is , and to whom personally it belongs . the minor , i suppose , neither our author himself , nor any one else , can deny . for if self-consciousness be not a personal act , let any one assign what else it is , or what it ought to pass for . it is certainly an act of knowledge , by which each person knows and comprehends himself , and whatsoever belongs to him . the major proposition therefore is to be proved , viz. that no personal act can be the formal reason of personality in the person whose act it is . and i prove it thus : the formal reason of every thing , is in order of nature , before the thing of which it is the formal reason ; but no personal act is , in order of nature , before the personality of the person whose act it is , and therefore it cannot be the formal reason of his personality . the major is self-evident . and as for the minor , that no personal act is before the personality of the person whose act it is ; this also is manifest ; because such an act cannot be before the person himself , and therefore not before his personality : for as much as his personality is that by which he is formally a person ; so that it is impossible to be before the one without being before the other too . and now , that it cannot be before the person himself , is manifest from hence , that as every personal act in general bears a relation of posteriority to the person to whom it belongs , as to the cause or productive principle of all the acts proceeding from him ; so this particular act of self-consciousness , bears a treble relation of posteriority to the person whose act it is , viz. as to the agent or principle producing it . . as to the subject recipient of it , and sustaining it . and thirdly and lastly , as to the object which it is terminated to . all which respects it sustains , not barely as it is an act , but partly as it is an immanent act , and partly also a reflex act. in the first place therefore , every person being the agent , or productive cause of all the personal acts issuing from him , he must upon that account , in order of nature , precede the said acts ; and consequently every divine person must in nature be before that act of self-consciousness , which personally belongs to him . and moreover since it is likewise an immanent act , it relates to him , as the subject in which it is , as well as the cause from which it is , and upon that account also , must bear a natural posteriority to him. and then lastly , as it is also a reflex act , by which the person knows himself to be a person , and is conscious to himself , what he is , and what he does , it terminates upon him as its object also . so that the cause , the subject , and the object of this act being the same person , in this last respect , no less than in the two former , it bears another and third relation of posteriority to him ; since every act , not productive of something besides , and without the agent , is in order of nature posterior to the object it terminates upon . from all which i conclude , that that act of self-consciousness , by which each divine person knows , or is conscious to himself of his own personality , cannot be the formal reason of the said personality , without being , in order of nature , both before it , and after it too , viz. before it , as it is the formal reason of it , and yet posterior to it , as it is an act proceeding from , lodged and received in , and lastly , terminated upon the same person . all which is so very plain , that hardly can any thing be plainer : and indeed , the very word self-consciousness contradicts and overthrows its being the ground , or formal reason of personality . for still self must be before consciousness ; and self imports personality ; as being that , by which a person is said to be , what he is ; and they both stand united in this one word , as the act and the object , and therefore consciousness cannot be the reason of it . or to express the same thing by other terms , self-subsistence must precede self-consciousness , and self-subsistence here implys personality ; and therefore personality , upon the same account , must in nature precede self-consciousness , and consequently cannot be the formal effect , or result of it . for , surely , according to the most essential order of things , a person must be what he is , before he can know what he is . and this argument , i confess , being founded upon the priority of subsistence to all acts , and particularly to those of knowledge in every person self-conscious , does , and must universally run through all instances , in which personality and self-consciousness , with reference to one another , come to be treated of . and as it affects self-consciousness , so it will equally take place in mutual-consciousness too . what allowances are to be here made for the absolute simplicity , eternity , and pure actuality of the divine nature and persons ( when these notions are applyed to them ) we have already observed , in the first of those preliminary considerations mentioned in this chapter . the proper use and design of all which notions , is to lead , guide , and direct our apprehensions about that great object , so much too big for our narrow faculties ; so that whatsoever contradicts the natural order of these apprehensions ought upon no ground of reason to be admitted in our discourses of the divine nature , how much soever it may and does transcend the said apprehensions . and this must be allowed us , or we must sink under the vast disproportion of the thing before us , and not discourse of it at all . for i cannot think , that the word self-consciousness has brought the deity one jot lower to us , or raised our understandings one degree higher and nearer to that . argument ii. my second argument against self-consciousness being the formal reason of personality in the divine persons , is this : nothing in the nature of it absolute and irrelative can be the formal reason of personality in the persons of the blessed trinity ; but self-consciousness is in the nature of it absolute and irrelative ; and therefore it cannot be the reason of personality in any of the said persons . now the major proposition is proved thus . nothing in the nature of it absolute can be the formal reason of any thing in the nature of it purely and perfectly relative . but the personality of every one of the divine persons is purely and perfectly relative ; and therefore nothing absolute can be the formal constituent reason of their personality . the major of which syllogism is also manifest . for things essentially different , and thereby uncapable of being affirmed of one another , cannot possibly be the formal reason of one another . and , that the persons in the blessed trinity are purely relative to one another , and consequently , that their personalities are so many relations , is no less evident from this , that two of them relate to one another , as father and son , and the third to both , as proceeding from both ; and it is impossible for one thing to proceed from another , especially by a continual act of procession , without importing a relation to that from which it so proceeds ; so that the very personal subsistence of these persons implys and carries in it a formal relation . for the father subsists personally as a father , by that eternal communication of his nature to his son ; which act , as proceeding from him , is called generation , and renders him formally a father , and as terminated in the son , is called filiation , and constitutes him formally a son ; and in like manner the holy ghost subsists personally by that act of procession , by which he proceeds from , and relates to both the father and the son. so that , that proper mode of subsistence ( by which in conjunction with the divine essence always included in it , each of them is rendred a person ) is wholly relative , and so belongs to one of them , that it also bears a necessary reference to another . from all which , it undeniably follows , that the three persons in the blessed trinity , are in the formal constitution of them relative to one another ; and consequently , that the three personalities , by which they become formally three persons , and are so denominated , are three eternal relations . but now , for the minor proposition in the first syllogism , viz. that self-consciousness is a thing in the nature of it absolute and irrelative , that , i think , can need but little proof ; it being that act by which each person intimately knows , and is conscious to himself of his own being , acts , motions , and every thing personally belonging to him ; so that , as such , it terminates within , and looks no further than that one person , whom it is an entire survey and comprehension of . and as it is an absolute and irrelative term , so it may be conceived distinctly and fully without conceiving , or implying the conception of any thing , or person besides . and now , what relation does or can such an act of self-consciousness imply in it ? it is indeed on the contrary , a direct contradiction to all that is relative . for it incloses the person wholly within himself ; neither pointing nor looking further , nor referring to any one else . if it be here said , that each person , by an act of self-consciousness , intimately knows the relation which he stands in to the other two persons . to this , i answer two things . . that to know a thing or person to be relative , or to be conscious of the relation belonging to it or him , does not make that act of knowledge to be either a relation , or of a relative nature . . i answer , that this very thing proves self-consciousness not to be the constituent reason of personality . for , if the father knows himself to be a father by an act of self-consciousness , it is evident , that self-consciousness did not make him so : but that he was a father , and had the relation of a father , and thereby a personality belonging to him as such , in order of nature antecedent to this act of self-consciousness ; and therefore that this self-consciousness cannot be the reason of the relation , nor of the personality implyed in it . forasmuch as it is in several respects posterior to the person whom it belongs to , as in the foregoing argument we have abundantly shewn . but to take a particular and distinct account of this notion , in the several persons of the trinity ; does the father become a father by being conscious to himself , that he is so , or rather by that act by which he communicates his nature to , and thereby generates a son ? or does the son's relation to the father consist in his being conscious to himself of this relation ? or lastly , does the holy ghost proceed from the father and the son , and so personally relate to both by that act of self-consciousness , by which he is conscious to himself of this procession ? all this is absurd , unnatural , and impossible . for no person is related to another by that act of self-consciousness , by which he knows and reflects personally upon himself . and yet it is certain , that to be a father , is a relative subsistence , and to be a son depending upon the father by an eternal act of generation perpetually begetting him , is also to have a relative subsistence ; and lastly , to be eternally proceeding from both , as the holy ghost is , must likewise import a way or mode of subsisting altogether as relative as the two former . in which three ways of subsistence consist the personalities of the three persons respectively ; and upon these self-consciousness can have no constituting influence at all ; as being an act quite of another nature ; to wit , absolute and irrelative , and resting wholly within the person , whom it belongs to . from all which , i conclude , that self-consciousness neither is , nor can be the formal reason of personality in the three persons of the blessed trinity . and this argument i take to have the force and clearness of a demonstration . argument iii. the third argument is this . if self-consciousness be the formal reason of personality in the three divine persons , then there is no repugnancy in the nature and reason of the thing it self , but that there might be three thousand persons in the deity as well as three . but this is absurd , and therefore so must that be likewise from which it follows . the consequence appears from this , that there is no repugnancy but that there might be so many self-consciousnesses , or self-conscious minds or spirits , for the deity to communicate it self to : and therefore , if self-consciousness be the formal reason of personality , there is no repugnancy , but that there might be three thousand persons in the god-head , as well as three . the proposition is proved thus . because this repugnancy ( if there be any ) must be either from the nature of self-consciousness , in the several self-conscious minds or spirits it belongs to , or from the nature of the god-head , which is to be communicated to them . but it is from neither of them , for first , there is nothing in the nature of self-consciousness to hinder its multiplication into never so great a number of particulars ; but that there may be three thousand , or three millions of self-conscious minds or spirits , as well as three . nor , in the next place , is there any repugnancy on the part of the god-head , that three thousand self-conscious spirits should subsist in it any more than that three should : for the godhead considered precisely and abstractedly in it self ( and not as actually included in any person ) is as able to communicate it self to the greatest number as to the smallest . if it be here said , that the three persons are not only three self-conscious spirits , but also three distinct infinite self-conscious spirits , ( as our author says they are , and of which , more in the next chapter . ) i answer , that there may be as well three thousand distinct infinite spirits as three . for infinity is as much inconsistent with the least plurality of infinites , as with the greatest ; and therefore if it be no repugnancy , that there should be three distinct infinite minds , neither is there that there should be three thousand . so that if self-consciousness be the formal reason of personality , there appears no repugnancy either from the nature of self-consciousness , or the number of the spirits endued with it , nor from the [ supposed ] infinity of the said spirits , no nor yet from the nature of the god-head it self , but that there might be three thousand persons in it as well as three . but how then comes there to be only three ? why , upon these grounds no other reason can be assigned for it , but only that it was god's free determination that there should be three and no more . and then the trinity of persons must be an effect of god's will , and not a necessary condition of the divine nature ; and the further consequence of this must be , that the three persons are three created beings , as proceeding from the free results of god's will , by vertue whereof they equally might , or might not have been . but on the contrary our author himself holds page . line . that the three persons are essential to the divine nature , and so essential to it , that they necessarily belong to it in this number , and can be neither more nor fewer than three . and if this be so , i am sure it is a contradiction that it should be otherwise : for it is a contradiction , that it should not be , which necessarily is , and cannot but be . but now i have proved , that there is no repugnancy or contradiction to the nature of things considered barely according to their nature , that three thousand self-conscious minds or spirits should subsist in the godhead any more than that three such spirits should so subsist . and therefore if it be absurd , and impossible , ( as undoubtedly it is ) that so many persons should belong to the divine nature , then must the reason of this absurdity be fetched from some other thing , than either from self-consciousness , with reference to the divine nature , or from the divine nature , ( considered in it self abstractedly from all actual personality : ) for these , as we have shewn , afford no sufficient proof of this absurdity . and therefore , i say , some other reason must be found out , and assigned against it . and accordingly , let this author produce such an one ( whatsoever it be ) as shall solidly and conclusively prove , that there cannot be three thousand self-conscious persons belonging to the godhead , and that from the nature of the thing it self ( as several such reasons may be brought ) and i will undertake to him to prove , by the very same reason and argument as conclusively , that self-consciousness is not , cannot be the formal reason of personality in the three divine persons of the trinity . in the mean time , by that kind of arguing , which is called deductio ad absurdum , i have sufficiently disproved it , by shewing what an intolerable absurdity must follow the asserting it . argument iv. the fourth and last argument shall proceed thus . if three distinct self-conciousnesses formally constitute three distinct personalities , then three distinct self-complacencies will constitute three distinct personalities too . but our author , isuppose , will not allow of the latter , and therefore neither ought he to assert the former . the consequence is plain . because there is no reason alleagable ( according to our author's hypothesis ) why self-complacency may not found a personality as well as sels-consciousness . for they are both of them equally distinct internal acts in the person whom they belong to ; and as to the formal effect of each , an act of self-complacency seems to have the preheminence ; since it is a greater perfection to be united to an infinite good , that is , to the deity , by way of love and adhesion , than barely by way of knowledge and intellection . and self-complacency is the former , whereas self-consciousness rises no higher than the latter . and consequently since self-complacency is the more perfective act of the two ( knowledge of good being still in order to the love of it ) and since withall personality is the most perfect way of subsisting , which any nature is capable of , it seems most rational to derive the perfectest way of subsistence , belonging to an intelligent being , from the most perfective act of that being ; if from any act at all . and now if this author should object , that self-complacency , is in order of nature subsequent to self-consciousness ; and so , that there cannot be the same ground to make it the formal reason of personality , that there is , to make self-consciousness so . i answer , that , according to my principle , whereby i deny self-consciousness to be the reason of personality , because it is postnate to self-subsistence , it is , indeed , a good reason ; but according to our author's hypothesis , it is none at all . for if the priority of self-subsistence to self-consciousness ( according to him ) hinders not but that self-consciousness may nevertheless be the principle or reason of personality , why should the precedency of self-consciousness to self-complacency , hinder self-complacency from being as proper a reason or principle to found personality upon , as the other . all this i alledge only as an argument ad hominem ; and desire this author to consider , if any one should borrow some of that boldness of him , by which he dissents from all antiquity , and confidently averr , that self-complacency is the proper formal reason of personality in each and every one of the divine persons , i would have him , i say , consider by what reason or argument , consistent with his new opinion he could confute this other new assertion . for my own part , since i think as much may be said for the one as for the other , i am ready to set up for self-complacency against his self-consciousness , when he pleases ; and will undertake to give as good reasons for my notion , as he can sor his , and perhaps better ; let him begin and enter into the dispute , as soon as he will. and as i shall oppose my self-complacency to his self-consciousness , so i shall find out a mutual-complacency to vye against his mutual-consciousness too . and if any one should here object , that this and the like disputes are of that nature , that the world is not like to be much edified by them ; i , perhaps , think so as much as he : but that is no great matter ; since our author is of so very benign a temper , that he does not always write only for the reader 's edification , but sometimes for his diversion too . having thus given my reasons against this author's new notion of self-consciousness , both with reference to persons create and uncreate , and proved , that it neither is , nor can be the formal reason of personality in either of them : i shall now pass to his other new notion of mutual-consciousness , whereby those persons , who were distinguished from one another by their respective self-consciousnesses , are united and made one in nature by vertue of this mutual-consciousness . concerning which notion also , i must profess my self in the number of those who are by no means satisfied with it , as of any such peculiar efficacy to the use and purpose it is here brought for . and there are sufficient reasons against it . in giving of which , as i must acknowledge , that that one consideration of the priority of being ( whether essentially , or personally considered ) together with the first modes and affections of it , to any act of knowledge attributable to the said being , is the fundamental principle upon which i impugn this author's new hypothesis ; so it does and must ( as i have noted ) run through all , or most of the parts of this disputation , both about self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness too . and accordingly , in the first place i argue against it thus . argument i. no act of knowledge can be the formal reason of an unity of nature in the persons of the blessed trinity : but an act of mutual-consciousness , is an act of knowledge ; and therefore no act of mutual-consciousness can be the formal reason of an unity of nature in the three divine persons . the major i prove thus . every act of knowledge supposes the unity of a thing , or being from which that act flows , as antecedent to it , and therefore cannot be the formal reason of the said being . for still i affirm , that being , and consequently unity of being ( which is the first affection of it ) must in order of nature precede knowledge , and all other the like attributes of being . and if so , no attribute subsequent to a thing , can be the formal reason of that thing , which it is thus , in order of nature , subsequent to . for neither can omniscience it self ( one of the greatest and most acknowledged attributes of the divine nature ) be said to be the reason either of the being , or of the unity of the said nature : and therefore neither can any act of knowledge whatsoever be so . this is my first argument , which i think sufficient fairly to propose , without any farther amplification . argument ii. if unity of nature in the divine persons be the cause , reason , or principle of mutual-consciousness in the said persons , then their mutual-consciousness is not the cause or reason of the unity of their nature : but the former is true , and therefore the latter is so too . as for the consequence of the major proposition , it is as evident , as , that nothing can be the cause and effect of the same thing . and for the minor , that unity of nature , or essence in the divine persons is the cause , reason , or principle of mutual-consciousness , is proved from this , that we can no otherwise conceive of mutual-consciousness , than as of an essential property equally belonging to all the three persons : and all properties , or internal attributes , are accounted to issue and result from the essence or nature of the things which they belong to ; and therefore can have no antecedent causal influx upon the said nature , so as to constitute either the being , or the unity thereof . but the divine nature or essence being one and the same in all the three persons , there is , upon this account , one and the same knowledge in them also . and they are not one in nature , by vertue of their mutual-consciousness ; but they are therefore mutually conscious , because the perfect unity and identity of their nature , makes them so . and to assert the contrary , is of the like import ( still allowing for the disproportion of an infinite and finite nature ) as if we should make risibility in a man , the principle of his individuation , and affirm , that peter's having this property , is that which constitutes him this particular individual man ; which is egregiously absurd in all the philosophy i ever yet met with , whatsoever it may be in this author's . argument iii. to affirm mutual-consciousness to be the cause of the union of the three divine persons , in the same nature , is to confound the union and communion of the said persons together : but such a confusion ought by no means to be allowed of : and therefore neither ought that to be asserted , from whence it follows . now certain it is , that all acts of several persons upon one another ( as all that are mutual must needs be ) are properly acts of communion , by which the said persons have an intercourse amongst themselves , as acting interchangeably one upon the other . but then , no doubt , both their essence and personality , must still go before this mutual-consciousness , since the three persons must needs be really one in nature before they can know themselves to be so . and therefore union of knowledge ( as i think mutual-consciousness may properly be called ) cannot give an union of nature . it may indeed suppose it , it may result from it , and upon the same account may infer and prove it , but it can never give or cause it , nor be that thing or act , wherein an unity of nature does properly consist , whatsoever this author asserts to the contrary . but the truth is , all that he has said both of self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness ( and he has no more than said it , as never offering at the proof of any thing ) is founded in a manifest perversion of that natural order , in which humane reason conceives and discourses of things : which order ( to give an instance of it in our discoursing of any particular person , or complete being ) proceeds by these steps . first we conceive of this person as possessed of a certain essence or nature constituting or rendring him what he is . then we conceive of this nature as one , which is the first affection resulting from being . after this we consider this being , as stepping forth , or exerting it self in some acts , whether of intellection , volition , power , or the like . in which whole process the order of these conceptions is such , that it cannot , with any accord to reason , be transposed , so as to have the second or third put into the place of the first . but now let us see how contrary to this order our author's hypothesis proceeds . for whereas nature or being should be first , unity next , and the acts issuing from thence obtain the third place , and then those acts stand in their due order amongst themselves . this author , on the contrary , makes mutual-consciousness , which is by two degrees , or removes posterior to unity of nature ( in the persons whom it belongs to ) to be the cause or formal reason of the said unity . for first self-consciousness is posterior to this unity , and then mutual-consciousness is posterior to self-consciousness , as being an act supervening upon it . for mutual-consciousness is that act by which each person comprehends , or is conscious of the self-consciousness of the other two ; and therefore must needs presuppose them , as the act must needs do its object . and therefore to make ( as this author does ) mutual-consciousness the constituent reason of the unity of the three persons , when this unity is by two degrees , in order of nature , before it , runs so plainly counter to all the methods of true reasoning , that it would be but time lost to pursue it with any further confutation . argument iv. our th and last argument proceeds equally against mutual-consciousness and self-consciousness too ; and is taken from that known maxime in philosophy , that entities , or beings , are not to be multiplied without manifest necessity : that is , we are not to admit of new things , nor to coin new notions , where such as are known and long received are sufficient to give us a true and full account of the nature of the things we discourse of , and to answer all the ends and purposes of argumentation . accordingly i affirm , that the notions of mutual-consciousness and self-consciousness in the subject now before us ought to be rejected not only as new and suspicious , but as wholly needless . for what can be signified by those , which is not fully , clearly , and abundantly signified by that one plain word , and known attribute , the divine omniscience ? and what are mutual-consciousness and self-consciousness else ( if they are any thing ) but one and the same omniscience exerting it self several ways , and upon several objects ? as to apply it to the matter before us ; does not every one of the divine persons , by vertue of the divine nature , and of this omniscience therewith belonging to him , perfectly , intimately , and intirely know himself as a person , and all the actions , motions , and every thing else belonging to him ? no doubt he does ; for that otherwise he could not be omniscient . and does not the same person again , by the very same omniscience , know all that is known by the other two persons , and the other two persons by the same mutually know all that is known by him ? no doubt they may and do : forasmuch as omniscience knows all things that are knowable , and consequently all that is or can be known of , or in any one or all of the divine persons joyntly or severally considered . but to argue the matter yet more particularly . either self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness are one and the same with the divine omniscience , or they are distinct sorts of knowledge from it . if they are the same , then they are useless and superfluous notions , as we affirm they are ; but if they import distinct sorts of knowledge , then these two things will follow . . that in every one of the divine persons there are three distinct sorts of knowledge , viz. a knowledge of omniscience , a knowledge of self-consciousness , and a knowledge of mutual-consciousness too ; which , i think , is very absurd and ridiculous . . and in the next place : if we affirm them to be distinct sorts of knowledge from that of omniscience , then they must also have objects distinct from , and not included in the object of omniscience ; since all such difference , either of sorts or acts of knowledge is founded upon the difference of their objects . but this is impossible ; since the object of omniscience comprehends in it all that is knowable ; and consequently if mutual-consciousness and self-consciousness have objects distinct from , and not included in the object of omniscience , those objects must be something that is not knowable ; for that omniscience ( as we have shewn ) claims all that is knowable , or possible to be known , for its own object . from all which it follows , that self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness considered as distinct from omniscience are two empty chimerical words , without any distinct sense , or signification . in a word , every person in the trinity , by one and the same act of omniscience , knows all the internal acts , motions , and relations proper both to himself , and to the other two persons besides . and if so , what imployment or use can there be for self-consciousness , or mutual-consciousness , which omniscience ( that takes in the objects of both ) has not fully answered and discharged already ? if it be here said , that omniscience cannot give personality ; forasmuch as the personality of each person distinguishes him from the other two ; which omniscience ( being common to them all ) cannot do . this i grant , and own it impossible for any thing essentially involved in the divine nature , to give a personal distinction to any of the three persons ; but then i add also , that we have equally proved , that neither was self-consciousness , the formal reason of this personal distinction , by several arguments ; and more especially , because that self-consciousness being a thing absolute and irrelative , could not be the formal reason of any thing in the nature of it perfectly relative , as the divine persons certainly are . for this is a received maxime in the schools , with reference to the divine nature and persons , repugnat in divinis dari absolutum incommunicabile , greg. de valen. tom. p. . and it is a sure rule , whereby we may distinguish in every one of the divine persons , what is essential , from what is personal . for every attribute that is absolute , is communicable , and consequently essential , and every one that is purely relative , is incommunicable , and therefore purely personal , and so è converso : upon which account self-consciousness , which is a thing absolute and irrelative , cannot be incommunicable , nor consequently the formal reason of personality in any of the persons of the blessed trinity ; as we have already at large demonstrated . so that still our assertion stands good , that all that can be truly ascribed to self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness with reference to the divine nature and persons , may be fully and fairly accounted for from that one known attribute , the divine omniscience . and therefore , that there is no use at all either of the term self-consciousness or mutual-consciousness , to contribute to the plainer or fuller explication of the blessed trinity ; as this author , with great fluster of ostentation pretends , but has not yet by so much as one solid argument proved . but when i consider how wonderfully pleased the man is with these two new-started terms so high in sound , and so empty of sence , instead of one substantial word , which gives us all that can be pretended useful in them , with vast overplus and advantage , and even swallows them up , as moses's rod did those pitiful tools of the magicians ; this ( i say ) brings to my mind ( whether i will or no ) a certain story of a grave person , who riding in the road with his servant , and finding himself something uneasy in his saddle , bespoke his servant thus . john ( says he ) a-light ; and first take off the saddle that is upon my horse , and then take off the saddle that is upon your horse ; and when you have done this , put the saddle that was upon my horse , upon your horse , and put the saddle that was upon your horse upon my horse : whereupon the man , who had not studied the philosophy of saddles ( whether ambling or trotting ) so exactly , as his master , replys something short upon him ; lord ! master , what needs all these words ? could you not as well have said , let us change saddles ? now i must confess , i think the servant was much in the right ; though the master having a rational head of his own , and being withal willing to make the notion of changing saddles more plain , easie and intelligible , and to give a clearer explication of that word , ( which his fore-fathers , how good horse-men soever they might have been , yet were not equally happy in the explaining of ) was pleased to set it forth by that more full and accurate circumlocution . and here it is not unlikely but that this author , who , with a spight equally malicious and ridiculous , has reflected upon one of his antagonists , and that for no cause , or provocation that appears ( unless for having baffled him ) may tax me also , as one drolling upon things sacred , for representing the vanity of his hypothesis by the forementioned example and comparison . but i hope the world will give me leave to distinguish between things sacred , and his absurd phantastick way of treating of them ; which , i can , by no means look upon as sacred , nor indeed any thing else in his whole book , but the bare subject it treats of , and the scriptures there quoted by him . for to speak my thoughts plainly , i believe this sacred mystery of the trinity , was never so ridiculed and exposed to the contempt of the profane scoffers at it , as it has been by this new-fashioned defence of it . and so i dismiss his two so much admired terms ( by himself i mean ) as in no degree answering the expectation he raised of them . for i cannot find , that they have either heightned or strength'ned men's intellectual faculties , or cast a greater light and clearness upon that object which has so long exercised them ; but that a trinity in unity is as mysterious as ever ; and the mind of man as unable to grasp and comprehend it , as it has been from the beginning of christianity to this day . in a word , self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness have rendred nothing about the divine nature and persons , plainer , easier , and more intelligible ; nor indeed , after such a mighty stress so irrationally laid upon two slight empty words , have they made any thing ( but the author himself ) better understood than it was before . chap. v. in which is proved against this author , that the three persons of the blessed trinity , are not three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , it being certain both from philosophy and religion , that there is but one only god , or god-head , in which christian religion has taught us , that there are three persons ; many eminent professors of it have attempted to shew , how one and the same nature might subsist in three persons , and how the said three persons might meet in one , and make no more than one simple , undivided nature . it had been to be wished , i confess , that divines had rested in the bare expressions delivered in scripture concerning this mystery , and ventured no further by any particular , and bold explications of it . but since the nature , or rather humour of man has been still too strong for his duty , and his curiosity ( especially in things sacred ) been apt to carry him too far ; those , however , have been all along the most pardonable , who have ventured least , and proceeded upon the surest grounds both of scripture it self , and of reason discoursing upon it . and such i affirm the ancient writers and fathers of the church , and after them the school-men to have been ; who with all their faults ( or rather infelicities , caused by the times and circumstances they lived in ) are better divines , and soberer reasoners than any of those pert , confident , raw men , who are much better at despising and carping at them , than at reading and understanding them : though wise men despise nothing , but they will know it first ; and for that cause very rationally despise them . but among those , who leaving the common road of the church have took a by-way to themselves , none ( of late years especially ) have ventured so boldly and so far as this author ; who pretending to be more happy ( forsooth ) in his explication of this mystery than all before him ( as who would not believe a man in his own commendation ? ) and to give a more satisfactory account of this long received , and revered article by terms perfectly new , and peculiarly his own , has advanced quite different notions about this mystery , from any that our church was ever yet acquainted with ; affirming , ( as he does ) that the three persons in the god-head , are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , as will appear from the several places of his book , where he declares his thoughts upon this great subject . as , first in page . he says , the three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost , are three infinite minds really distinct from each other . again , in page . the persons ( says he ) are perfectly distinct ; for they are three distinct and infinite minds , and therefore three distinct persons : for a person is an intelligent being ; and to say , they are three divine persons , and not three distinct infinite minds , is both heresie and nonsense . for which extraordinary complement passed upon the whole body of the church of england , and perhaps all the churches of christendom besides , as i have paid him part of my thanks already , so i will not fail yet further to account with him before i put an end to this chapter . in the mean time , he goes on , in page . i plainly assert ( says he ) that as the father is an eternal and infinite mind , so the son is an eternal and infinite mind distinct from the father , and the holy ghost is an eternal and infinite mind distinct both from father and son : adding withall these words ; which ( says he ) every body can understand without any skill in logick , or metaphysicks . and this , i confess , is most truly and seasonably remarked by him : for the want of this qualification is so far from being any hindrance in the case mentioned , that i dare undertake , that nothing but want of skill in logick and metaphysicks , can bring any man living , who acknowledges the trinity , to own this assertion . i need repeat no more of his expressions to this purpose ; these being sufficient to declare his opinion ; save only that in page . where ( he says ) that three minds , or spirits , which have no other difference , are yet distinguish'd by self-consciousness , and are three distinct spirits . and that other in page . where speaking of the three persons , i grant ( says he ) that they are three holy spirits . by the same token , that he there very learnedly distinguishes between ghost and spirit , allowing the said three persons ( as we have shewn ) to be three holy spirits , but at the same time denying them to be three holy ghosts , and this with great scorn of those who should hold , or speak otherwise . to which at present i shall say no more but this , that he would do well to turn these two propositions into greek , or latin ; and that will presently shew him what difference and distinction there is between a ghost and a spirit , and why the very same things which are affirmed of the one ( notwithstanding the difference of those words in english ) may not , with the same truth , be affirmed of the other also . but the examination of this odd assertion will fall in more naturally towards the latter end of this chapter , where it shall be particularly considered . i have now shewn this author's judgment in the point , and in opposition to what he has so boldly asserted , and laid down , i do here deny , that the three persons in the blessed trinity , are three distinct infinite minds or three distinct infinite spirits . and to overthrow his assertion , and evince the truth of mine , i shall trouble neither my reader nor my self , with many arguments . but of those , which i shall make use of , the first is this . argument i. three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , are three distinct gods. but the three persons of the blessed trinity , are not three distinct gods. and therefore the three persons of the blessed trinity , are not three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . the minor , i suppose , this author will readily concur with me in ; howbeit his hypothesis ( as shall be shewn ) in the certain consequences of it contradicts it , and , if it should stand , would effectually overturn it . for by that he asserts a perfect tritheisme , though i have so much charity for him , as to believe , that he does not know it . the major proposition therefore is that which must be debated between us . this author holds it in the negative , and i in the affirmative : and my reason for what i affirm , viz. that three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , are three distinct gods , is this , that god and infinite mind , or spirit , are terms equipollent , and convertible . god being truly and properly an infinite mind , or spirit , and an infinite mind or spirit being as truly and properly god. and to shew this convertibility and commensuration between them yet further : whatsoever may be affirmed or denied of the one , may with equal truth and propriety be affirmed or denied of the other . and to give an instance of this with reference to the three persons of the blessed trinity ; as it is true , that one and the same god , or god-head is common to , and subsists in all and every one of the three persons ; so is it true , that one and the same infinite mind , or spirit , is common to , and subsists in the said three persons : and consequently , as it is false , that one and the same god , or god-head , by being common to , and subsisting in the three persons , becomes three gods , or three god-heads ; so is it equally false , that one and the same infinite mind , or spirit , by being common to , and subsisting in the said three persons , becomes three infinite minds , or spirits . this is clear argumentation , and craves no mercy at our author's hands . if it be here objected , that we allow of three distinct persons in the god-head , of which every one is infinite , without admitting them to be three distinct gods ; and therefore , why may we not as well allow of three distinct infinite minds or spirits in the same god-head without any necessity of inferring from thence , that they are three distinct gods ? i answer , that the case is very different , and the reason of the difference is this , because three infinite minds , or spirits are three absolute , simple beings , or essences , and so stand distinguished from one another , by their whole beings or natures . but the divine persons are three relatives , ( or one simple being , or essence , under three distinct relations ) and consequently differ from one another , not wholly , and by all that is in them , but only by some certain mode , or respect peculiar to each , and upon that account causing their distinction . and therefore to argue from a person to a spirit here is manifestly sophistical , and that which is called , fallacia accidentis , or ( since several fallacies may concur in the same proposition ) it may be also à dicto secundùm quid ad dictum simpliciter . for so it is to conclude , that three persons are three distinct gods ; since the difference of persons is only from a diverse respect between them ; but three gods import three absolutely distinct natures or substances . and whereas we say , that the three persons are all and every one of them infinite , yet it is but from one and the same numerical nature common to them all that they are so , the ternary number all the while not belonging to their infinity , but only to their personalities . the case therefore between a mind , or spirit , and a person , is by no means the same . forasmuch as [ person ] here imports only a relation , or mode of subsistence in conjunction with the nature it belongs to : and therefore a multiplication of persons ( of it self ) imports only a multiplication of such modes , or relations , without any necessary multiplication of the nature it self to which they adhere . forasmuch as one and the same nature may sustain several distinct relations , or modes of subsistence . but now on the other side , a mind , or spirit , is not a relation , or mode of subsistence , but it is an absolute being , nature , or substance ; and consequently cannot be multiplyed without a multiplication of it into so many numerical absolute beings , natures , or substances ; there being nothing in it to be multiplyed but it self . so that three minds , or spirits , are three absolute beings , natures , or substances , and three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , are accordingly three distinct infinite absolute beings , natures , or substances . that is , in other words , they are three gods ; which was the thing to be proved ; and let this author ward off the proof of it as he is able . argument ii. my second argument against the three persons in the blessed trinity being three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , is this . three distinct minds , or spirits are three distinct substances . but the three persons in the blessed trinity are not three distinct substances . and therefore they are not three distinct minds , or spirits . the major proposition is proved from the definition of a mind , or spirit , that it is substantia incorporea intelligens , an intelligent , incorporeal , [ or immaterial ] substance ; and therefore three distinct minds , or spirits , must be three such distinct substances . and besides , if a mind , or spirit , were not a substance , what could it be else ? if it be any thing , it must be either an accident , or mode of being . but not an accident , since no accident can be in god ; nor yet a mode of being , since a spirit ( not designed to concur as a part towards any compound ) is an absolute , entire , complete being of itself , and has its proper mode of subsistence belonging to it ; and therefore cannot be a mode it self . from whence it follows , that a spirit is , and must be a substance , and can be nothing else . as for the minor , viz. that the three persons in the blessed trinity are not three distinct substances ; this is evident both from authority , and from reason . and first for authority , tertullian against praxeas affirms , semper in deo una substantia . and st. ierom in his epistle to damasus , quis ore sacrilego tres substantias praedicabit ? and st. austin in his th book de trinitate , chap. . and in book . chap. . and ruffinus in the st book of his history , chap. . all affirm one substance in god , and deny three , and yet the same writers unanimously hold three persons , which shews , that they did not account these three persons , three substances . and anselmus in his book de incarnatione , chap. . says , that the father and the son may be said to be two beings , provided that by beings we understand relations , not substances . and bellarmine , a writer orthodox enough in these points , and of unquestionable learning otherwise , in his d tome , page . about the end , says , that to assert , that the father and the son differ in substance , is arianism : and yet if they were two distinct substances , for them not to differ in substance , would be impossible . and as for the greek writers , they never admit of three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the deity , but where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used to signifie the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as sometimes it was used : and by reason of this ambiguity it was , that the latin church was so long fearful of using the word hypostasis , and used only that of persona , answering to the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , lest they should hereby be thought to admit of three substances , as well as three persons in the god-head . nor , in the next place , is the same less evident from reason , than we have shewn it to be from authority . for if the three persons be three distinct substances , then two distinct substances will concur in , and belong to each person ; to wit , that substance which is the divine essence , and so is communicable or common to all the persons , and that substance which constitutes each person , and thereby is so peculiar to him as to distinguish him from the other , and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him to whom it belongs : since for one and the same substance to be common to all three persons , and withal to belong incommunicably to each of the three , and thereby to distinguish them from one another , is contradictious and impossible . and yet on the other side to assert two distinct substances in each person , is altogether as absurd ; and that , as upon many other accounts , so particularly upon this , that it must infer such a composition in the divine persons , as is utterly incompatible with the absolute simplicity , and infinite perfection of the divine nature . and therefore the three persons in the blessed trinity , can by no means be said to be three distinct substances , but only one infinite substance , equally common to , and subsisting in them all , and diversified by their respective relations . and moreover , since three distinct minds , or spirits are essentially three distinct substances , neither can the three persons of the trinity be said to be three distinct minds , or spirits ; which was the point to be made out . argument iii. my third argument against the same shall proceed thus . if it be truly said , that one and the same infinite mind , or spirit is father , son , and holy ghost , ( i mean all three taken together ) and it cannot be truly said , that one and the same infinite mind , or spirit is three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ; then it follows , that father , son , and holy ghost are not three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . but it may be truly said , that one and the same infinite mind , or spirit is father , son , and holy ghost ; and it cannot be truly said , that one and the same infinite mind , or spirit is three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . therefore the three persons in the trinity , viz. father , son , and holy ghost are not three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . this is the argument . now the consequence of the major appears from this , that the same thing , or things , at the same time , and in the same respect , cannot be truly affirmed and denied of the same subject : and therefore since [ father , son , and holy ghost , taken joyntly together ] are truly predicated of one and the same infinite mind ; and [ three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ] cannot be truly affirmed or predicated , and consequently may be truly denied of the same ; it follows , that [ father , son , and holy ghost ] and [ three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ] neither are , nor can be accounted the same , nor be truly affirmable of one another . as for the minor , it consists of two parts , and accordingly must be proved severally in each of them . and first , that it is , and may be truly said , that one and the same infinite mind is father , son , and holy ghost ( viz. joyntly taken ) as i noted before . this , i say , may be proved from hence , that god is truly said to be father , son , and holy ghost ( still so taken . ) and it having been already evinced , that [ one infinite mind , or spirit ] and [ one god ] are terms convertible and equipollent , it follows , that whatsoever is truly affirmed or denied of the one , may be as truly affirmed or denied of the other . and this is too evident to need any further proof . and therefore in the next place , for the proof of the other part of the minor , viz. that one and the same infinite mind , or spirit , cannot be truly said to be three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ; this is no less evident than the former , because in such a proposition both subject and predicate imply a mutual negation of , and contradiction to one and another ; and where it is so , it is impossible for one to be truly affirmed , or predicated of the other . and now , after this plain proof given both of the major and the minor proposition , and this also drawn into so little a compass , i hope this author will not bear himself so much above all the rules which other mortals proceed by , as , after the premises proved , to deny the conclusion , viz. that the three persons in the blessed trinity , father , son , and holy ghost , are not three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . the affirmation of which , is that which i undertook to confute . but before i dismiss this argument , i cannot but take notice , that the same terms , with a bare transposition of them , viz. by shifting place between the predicate and the subject ( which in adequate and commensurate predications , may very well be done ) will as effectually conclude to the same purpose , as they did in the way in which we have already proposed them . and so the argument will proceed thus . if it be truly and properly said , that the three persons in the blessed trinity , are one numerical infinite mind , or spirit ; then they cannot be truly said to be three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . but they are truly and properly said to be one numerical infinite mind , or spirit . and therefore they neither are , nor can be truly said to be three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . the consequence of the first proposition is manifest , because ( as we have shewn before ) one and the same infinite mind cannot be three distinct infinite minds without a contradiction in the terms . and for the minor , viz. that the three persons are truly said to be one infinite mind , or spirit ; that also is proved by this , that all and every one of them , are truly and properly said to be god ; and god is truly and properly one numerical infinite mind , or spirit : and therefore if the three persons are said to be the first , they must be said to be this latter also ; and that ( as i shew before ) because of the reciprocal predication of those terms . but as to the matter before us , that god is truly and properly one numerical infinite mind , or spirit , even this author himself allows , who in page . positively says , that we know nothing of the divine essence , but that god is an infinite mind . very well ; and if he grant him to be an infinite mind , let him prove this infinite mind to be three distinct infinite minds , if he can . the truth is [ infinite mind or spirit ] is an essential attribute of the divine nature , and convertible with it , and whatsoever is so , belongs equally to all the three persons , and consequently cannot be ascribed to them plurally any more than the deity it self ; it being as uncapable , as that , of being multiplied . upon which account , if the three persons are with equal truth said to be [ one infinite mind , or spirit ] and to be [ one god ] they can no more be said to be three distinct infinite minds , than they can be said to be three distinct gods. so that which way soever the argument be proposed , either , that one infinite mind is father , son , and holy ghost ; or , that father , son , and holy ghost , are one infinite mind , it still overthrows this author's hypothesis , that the said three persons are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . argument iv. my fourth and last argument against the same , shall be this . whatsoever attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the divine persons in the athanasian form , so belongs to them all in common , that it can belong to none of them under any term of distinction from the rest . but the attribute [ infinite mind , or spirit ] may be truly predicated of all and each of the divine persons in and according to the athanasian form. and therefore it can belong to none of them under any term of distinction from the rest . the major is as evident ; as that no attribute can be common to several subjects , and yet peculiar and appropriate to each of them . and the minor is proved by instance thus ; the father is an infinite mind , the son is an infinite mind , and the holy ghost is an infinite mind ; and yet they are not three infinite minds , but one infinite mind . and this i affirm to be as good divinity as any part in the athanasian creed , and such as i shall abide by , both against this author , and any other whatsoever . but now let us see how his assertion cast into the athanasian model , shews it self , as thus . the father is a distinct infinite mind , the son is a distinct infinite mind , and the holy ghost is a distinct infinite mind ; and yet they are not three distinct infinite minds , but one distinct infinite mind . and this is so far from being true , that it is indeed neither truth nor sence . for what truth can there be in denying , that three persons , of which every one is said to be a distinct infinite mind , are three distinct infinite minds ? and what sence can there be in affirming , or saying , that they are but one distinct infinite mind ? whereas the term [ distinct ] is never properly used or applyed , but with respect had to several particulars each discriminated from the other ; but by no means where there is mention made only of one thing and no more , as it is here in this proposition . but to make what allowances the case will bear , and for that purpose to remit something of the strictness of the athanasian form , by leaving out the word [ distinct ] in the last and illative clause , we shall then see that our author's hypothesis will proceed thus . the father is a distinct infinite mind , the son is a distinct infinite mind , and the holy ghost is a distinct infinite mind ; and yet they are not three infinite minds , but one infinite mind . thus , i say , it must proceed in the athanasian way with the word [ distinct ] left out of the conclusion . nevertheless even so , the inference is still manifestly and grosly false in both the branches of it . for it is absolutely false [ that three distinct infinite minds , are not three infinite minds ] and altogether as false [ that three infinite minds , are but one infinite mind . ] the author's hypothesis put into the athanasian model , must needs fall in with that fallacy sometimes urged against us by the socinians , viz. the father is a person , the son a person , and the holy ghost a person , and yet they are not three persons , but one person ; which is manifestly sophistical , by arguing ab imparibus tanquam paribus , viz. concluding that of an attribute relative , and multiplicable , which can be concluded only of such as are not so. for the athanasian inference holds only in attributes essential and common to all the three persons joyntly , or severally taken , and not in such as are proper , personal , and peculiar to each . as also in such as are absolute , ( as the attribute of mind , or spirit without the word [ distinct ] is ) and not in such as are relative . for those attributes , which agree to the divine persons , personally , peculiarly , and relatively can never unite , or coincide into one in the inference , or conclusion . in a word [ infinite mind , or spirit ] is a predicate perfectly essential , and so in its numerical unity common to all the three divine persons , and for that cause not to be affirmed of , or ascribed to , either all or any of them with the term [ distinct ] added to it , or joyned with it . for that would multiply an attribute that cannot be multiplyed . and now , what i have here discoursed upon , and drawn from the athanasian creed with respect to this particular subject , i leave to our author's strictest examination . for my own part , i rely upon this creed , as a sure test , or rule to discover the falshood of his hypothesis by . so that as long as it is true , that god is one numerical infinite mind or spirit , and as long as the athanasian form duely applied is a firm and good way of reasoning , this author's assertion , that the three divine persons , are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , is thereby irrefragably overthrown . and therefore i shall not concern my self to produce any more arguments against it . only by way of overplus to , and illustration of those , which have already been alledged , i cannot but observe the concurrent opinion of the philosophers , and most learned men amongst the heathens about god's being one infinite mind , or spirit , as a necessary deduction ( no doubt ) made by natural reason from the principles thereof concerning the divine nature . for most of the philosophers looked upon god as the soul of the world , as one infinite mind , or spirit , that animated and presided over the universe . for so held pythagoras , as cicero in his first book , de naturâ deorum , and lactantius in his book de irâ dei , tells us , pythagoras quoque unum deum confitetur dicens incorpoream esse mentem quae per omnem naturam diffusa & intenta vitalem sensum tribuit . in like manner the great hermes being asked , what god was , answered , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the maker of all things , a most wise and eternal mind . thales called him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , god , the mind of the world. diogenes , cleanthes , and oenipides , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the soul of the world. plato in phoedone , says of god , that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a mind that is the cause and orderer of all things . and plato the son of ariston says , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , god is the mind of the world. and lactantius gives this testimony of aristotle , that , quamvis secum ipse dissideat , ac repugnantia sibi & dicat , & sentiat , ( by which one would think our author better acquainted with him than he is ) in summum tamen unam mentem mundo praeesse testatur . lact. de falsa relig. lib. . cap. . agreeably to all which , seneca in the preface to his natural questions , putting the question , quid est deus ? what is god ? answers , mens universi , the mind of the universe . as the learned emperour antoninus after him , expresses god the same way , and by the same word in greek , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , lib. . p. . oxon. edit . and that passage in virgil's . aeneid is famous ; where speaking of god , as the great soul of the world , running through all the parts of that vast body , he expresses it in those known verses : — coelum , ac terras , camposque liquentes , lucentemque globum lunae , titaniaque astra , spiritus intus alit , totamque infusa per artus mens agitat molem , & magno se corpore miscet . and the same was the opinion of cato before him , a great man , though but a small author , who tells us from the ancient poets ( who were accounted the philosophers of the first ages . ) that deus est animus , god is a mind , or spirit . and the truth is , i reckon that these learned men , all along , by an infinite mind , or spirit , understood as truly and certainly one infinite mind , or spirit , as if the term of unity had been added by them . for besides that the particles a , or the , ( which we use in translating any single word into our own language ) import so much , the very condition also of the subject spoken of , as being infinite , must needs infer the same . so that we see here how the judgment of natural reason in these eminent philosophers amongst the heathens falls in with what god himself revealed by the mouth of our saviour concerning his own nature , in john . . viz. that god is a spirit . for we have them expressing him by these words , aninius , mens , & spiritus . so that had they all lived after st. iohn , ( as one of them did , ) their sentences might have passed for so many paraphrases upon the text , all declaring god to be one infinite soul , mind , or spirit . but perhaps our author will here say , what is all this to the purpose , since we found our knowledge of the three divine persons , wholly upon revelation ? and i grant , we do so ; yet nevertheless i shall , by his good favour , shew , that what i have alledged is very much to the purpose . and to this end , premising here what we have already proved , viz. that to be one infinite mind , and to be three distinct infinite minds , involve in them a mutual negation of , and contradiction to one another : ( forasmuch as to be unum , is to be indivisum in se ; that is to say , indivisible into more things , such as it self . ) this , i say , premised , first , i desire this author to produce that revelation , which declares the three persons of the blessed trinity , to be three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . for i deny that there is any such . secondly , i affirm , that whatsoever is a truth in natural reason , cannot be contradicted by any other truth declared by revelation ; since it is impossible for any one truth to contradict another . upon which grounds , i here ask our author , is it a contradiction for one god to be one infinite mind , or spirit , and to be also three infinite minds , or spirits ? if he grant this ( as i have proved it , whether he does or no ) then i ask him in the next place , whether it be a proposition true in natural reason , [ that god is one infinite mind , or spirit ? ] if he grants this also , then i infer , that it cannot be proved true from revelation , [ that god is three infinite minds , or spirits , ] since the certain truth of the first proposition supposed and admitted must needs disprove the truth of that revelation , which pretends to establish the second . but some again may perhaps ask , suppose it were revealed in express terms , [ that god is three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , ] would you in this case throw aside this revelation in submission to the former proposition declared by natural reason ? i answer , no : but if the revelation were express and undeniable , i would adhere to it ; but at the same time , while i did so , i would quit the former proposition , and conclude , that natural reason had not discoursed right when it concluded , that god was one infinite mind , or spirit : but to hold both propositions to be true , and to assent to them both as such , this the mind of man can never do . so that , in a word , i conclude , that if it be certainly true from reason , that god is one infinite mind , or spirit . no revelation can , or ought to be pleaded , that he is three distinct infinite minds , or spirits : and if revelation cannot , or ought not to be pleaded for it , i am sure , we have no ground to believe it . and yet at the same time i own and assert a revelation of the truth of this proposition , [ that god is three persons ] or , which is all one , [ that god is father , son , and holy ghost , ] since it does not at all contradict the forementioned propositions founded upon natural reason , [ viz. that god is one infinite mind , or spirit , ] nor could it yet ever be proved to do so , either by arians , or socinians . but on the contrary , these two propositions , viz. [ god is one infinite mind , or spirit ] and that other , [ god is three distinct infinite minds or spirits ] ( which he must be , if the three divine persons are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ) are gross , palpable , and irreconcileable contradictions . and because they are so , it is demonstratively certain , that the said three persons are not three distinct infinite minds , or spirits : as this author against all principles of philosophy and divinity has most erroneously affirmed them to be . i have said enough , i hope , upon this subject . but before i quit it , it will not be amiss to observe what work this man makes with the persons of the blessed trinity , ( as indeed he seldom almost turns his pen , but he gives some scurvy stroke at it or other , ) particularly in page . he affirms , that the expression of [ the one true god , and the only true god ] cannot properly be attributed to the son , nor to the holy ghost . from whence i infer , that then neither can the expression of [ god , or the true god ] be properly attributed to the son , or to the holy ghost . forasmuch as the terms [ one god ] and [ one true god , or one only true god ] are equivalent . the term [ one god ] including in it every whit as much as the term [ one true god , or one only true god ] and the term [ one true god , or one only true god ] including in it no more than the term [ one god ; ] and consequently if he asserts , that these terms cannot with equal propriety be attributed to , and predicated of the son and the holy ghost , we have him both arian and macedonian together in this assertion . and i believe his adversary the author of the notes could hardly have desired a greater advantage against him , than his calling it ( as he does ) a corruption of the athanasian creed , to joyn the term [ one true god ] to every person of the trinity ; adding withal , that upon the doing so , it would sound pretty like a contradiction to say in the close [ that there was but one true god. ] these are our author's words , but much fitter to have proceeded from a socinian , than from one professing a belief , and ( which is more ) a defence of the trinity . but in answer to them , i tell him , that the repeated attribution of [ the one true god , or only true god ] to each of the three persons is no corruption of that creed at all . forasmuch as these terms [ the one true god , and the only true god ] import , an attribute purely essential , and so equally , and in common belonging to all the three persons , and not an attribute properly personal , and so appropriate to some one or other of the said persons . and if this author would have duly distinguished between essential and personal attributes , he could not have discoursed of these matters at so odd a rate , as here he does . and therefore i deny it to be any contradiction ( let it sound in his ears how it will ) to conclude , that the said three persons ( notwithstanding this repetition ) are not three true gods , but only one true god. but he says , that such a repeated application implies as if each person considered as distinguished and separated from the other were the one true god , to which i answer , . that to imply as if a thing were so , and to imply that really it is so , makes a very great difference in the case ; indeed so great , that this author must not think from words implying only the former to conclude the latter ; which yet must be done , or what he here alledges is nothing to his purpose . but . i answer yet farther , that the forementioned words do indeed imply , and ( which is more ) plainly declare , that the three persons who are said to be [ the one , or only true god ] are , while they sustain that attribute , really distinct from one another , but it does not imply , that this is said of them under that peculiar formality , as they are distinct , and much less , as separated ; which latter they neither are , nor can be . the truth is , what he has said against the repeated application of this term to every one of the three persons , may be equally objected against all the repeated predications in the athanasian creed ; but to as little purpose , one as the other ; since , albeit all these predications do agree to persons really distinct , yet they agree not to them under that formal and precise consideration as distinct : for nothing but their respective personal relations agree to them under that capacity ; and this effectually clears off this objection . but here i cannot but wonder , that this man should jumble together these two terms [ distinguished and separated ] as he does twice here in the compass of eight lines ; when the signification of them , as applyed to the three divine persons , is so vastly different , that one of these terms [ viz. distinguished ] necessarily belongs to them , and the other which is [ separated ] neither does nor can take place amongst them : nay , and when this author himself has so earnestly and frequently contended for the difference of them ; as all along asserting the distinction of persons , and as often denying their separation . but he proceeds , and says , that this expression of [ the one [ or only ] true god ] is never ( that he knows of ) attributed to son , or holy ghost , either in scripture , or any catholick writer . which words , methinks , ( as i cannot but observe again ) do not look , as if a man were writing against the socinians . nevertheless admitting the truth of his allegation , that this term [ the one true god ] is not to be found expresly attributed to the son , or the holy ghost , will he infer from hence , that therefore it neither can , nor ought to be so ? for if that be attributed to them both in scripture and catholick writers , which necessarily and essentially implys [ the one true god ] and does , and must signifie the very same thing , is it not all one , as if in terminis it had been ascribed to them ? doubtless there are several other expressions in the athanasian creed , as hardly ( as this ) to be found elsewhere : however , the thing being certain from other words equivalent , this exception is of no force at all ; nor by any one , who understands these matters , is , or ought to be accounted so ; and much less can i see to what end it should be insisted upon by any one , while he is encountring the socinians : and therefore , whereas he says , this attribute , or title , viz. [ the one true god ] cannot so properly be ascribed to any one person , but only to the father ; ( whom , he tells us , the fathers call the fountain of the deity ) what he here designs by the words so properly ( which seem to import degrees of propriety ) i cannot well tell : but this i ask , in short , may it be properly attributed to the son , and to the holy ghost , or may it not ? if not ; then they are not properly [ the one true god ] nor consequently are they properly [ the true god : ] for whatsoever any one properly is , that he may be properly said to be . and as for [ the father 's being the fountain of the deity , ] i hope he looks upon this expression only as metaphorical , and such as ought not to be stretched to the utmost of its native sence , for fear the consequences of it may engage him too far , to be able to make an handsome retreat ; which i assure him , if he does not take heed , they certainly will. but , in a word , i demand of him , whether [ the father 's being the fountain of deity ] does appropriate and restrain the thing expressed by the [ one true god ] to the father in contra-distinction to the other two persons , or not ? if it does , then the same absurdity recurs , viz. [ that neither is the son , nor the holy ghost , the one true god ] and consequently , neither simply , really and essentially [ god. ] but on the other side , if [ the father 's being the fountain of the deity ] does not appropriate the thing signified by [ the one true god ] to the father , then it leaves it common to the other two persons with himself , and to each of them . and whatsoever is so , may with the same propriety and truth of speech be ascribed to , and affirmed of them , as it is often ascribed to , and affirmed of the father himself . the truth is , this man 's adventurous and unwary way of expressing himself in this sacred and arduous subject ( to give it no worse word , whatsoever it may deserve ) affords the arians and socinians no small advantages against this doctrine ; should it stand upon the strength of his defence , as ( thanks be to god ) it does not . but i must not here omit that passage , which , in the former part of this chapter , i promised more particularly to consider ; a passage , which indeed looks something strangely . it is that in p. . line . where he tells us , that he allows , that in the blessed trinity there are three holy spirits , but denys , that there are three holy ghosts ; so natural is it for false opinions to force men to absurd expressions . but my answer to him is short and positive , that neither are there three holy spirits nor three holy ghosts in the blessed trinity in any sense properly belonging to these words . however , the thing meant by him ( so far as it is reducible to truth and reason ) is , and must be this , viz. that when the third person of the trinity is called the holy ghost , there the word holy ghost ( which otherwise signifies the same with holy spirit ) must be taken personally , and consequently incommunicably ; but when the father , or son , is said to be a spirit , or holy spirit , there spirit must be understood essentially , for that immaterial , spiritual , and divine nature , which is common to , and predicable of all the divine persons . all which is most true . but then , for this very reason , i must tell our author withal , that as holy ghost taken personally is but numerically one ; so spirit , or holy spirit , as it is understood essentially , is but numerically one too . and therefore , though the father may be called a spirit , or holy spirit , and the two other persons may each of them be called so likewise , yet they are not therefore three distinct spirits , or holy spirits , nor can be truly so called ( as this author pretends they ought to be , and we have sufficiently disproved ) but they are all one and the same holy spirit essentially taken ; and which so taken , is as much as one and the same god. and moreover , though spirit understood personally distinguishes the third person from the other two , yet taken essentially , it speaks him one and the same spirit , as well as one and the same god with them , and can by no means distinguish him from them , any more than the divine essence , or nature , ( which spirit in this sence , is only another word for ) can discriminate the three persons from one another . so that upon the whole matter , it is equally false and impossible , that in the blessed trinity there should be three holy spirits , or holy ghosts , ( terms perfectly synonymous ) either upon a personal , or an essential account ; and consequently that there should be so at all . for , as the word spirit imports a peculiar mode of subsistence , by way of spiration from the father and the son , so it is personal and incommunicable ; but as it imports the immaterial substance of the deity , so indeed ( as being the same with the deity it self ) it is equally common to all the three persons ; but still , for all that , remains numerically one and no more ; as all must acknowledge the deity to be . and this is the true state of the case . but to state the difference between the holy ghost , and the other two persons , upon something signified by holy ghost , which is not signified by holy spirit , ( as the words of this author manifestly do ; while he affirms three holy spirits , but denies three holy ghosts ) this is not only a playing with words ( which he pretends to scorn ) but a taking of words for things ; which , i am sure , is very ridiculous . and now , before i conclude this chapter , ( having a debt upon me declared at the beginning of it ) i leave it to the impartial and discreet reader to judge , what is to be thought or said of that man , who in such an insolent , decretorious manner , shall in such a point as this before us , charge nonsense and heresie , ( two very vile words ) upon all that subscribe not to this his new ( and before unheard of ) opinion . i must profess , i never met with the like in any sober author , and hardly in the most licentious libeller : the nature of the subject , i have , according to my poor abilities , discussed , and finding my self thereupon extremely to dissent from this author , am yet by no means willing to pass for a nonsensical heretick for my pains . for must it be nonsence not to own contradictions ? viz. that one infinite spirit is three distinct infinite spirits ? or must it be heresie not to subscribe to tritheisme , as the best and most orthodox explication of the article of the trinity ? as for non-sence , it must certainly imply the asserting of something for true concerning the subject discoursed of , which yet in truth is contradictory to it ( since there can be no non-sence but what contradicts some truth . ) and whereas this author has elsewhere , viz. p. . declared it unreasonable to charge a contradiction in any thing , where the nature of the thing discoursed of is not throughly comprehended and understood , i desire to know of him , whether he throughly understands and comprehends the article and mystery of the trinity ? if he says , he does , i need no other demonstration of his unfitness to write about it . but if he owns that he does not , let him only stick to his own rule , and then he may keep the charge of non-sense to himself . but what shall we say to the charge of heresie , ( in which st. austin would have no person , who is so charged to be silent ? ) why , in the first place we must search and enquire , whether it be so , or no ? and here , if my life lay upon it , i cannot find either in irenaeus adversùs haereses , or in tertullian's prescriptions contra haereticos , cap. . nor in philastrius's catalogue , nor in epiphanius , nor in st. austin , nor in theodoret , nor in iohannes damascenus's book de haeresibus ; nor in the latter haeresiologists , such as alphonsus à castro & prateolus , with several others : i cannot , i say , find in all , or in any one of these the heresie of not asserting the three persons of the blessed trinity to be three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ; no , nor yet the heresie of denying them to be so . but where then may we find it ? why , in this author's book . and therefore look no further ; it is enough , that so great a master has said it ; whose authority in saying a thing , is as good as another man 's in proving it , at any time : and he says it ( as we see ) positively , and perhaps ( if need be ) will be ready to take his corporal oath upon it , that such as deny his hypothesis are hereticks . now in this case our condition is , in good earnest , very sad ; and i know nothing to comfort us , but that the statute de haeretico comburendo is repealed . and well is it for the poor clergy and church of england , that it is so ; for otherwise this man would have kindled such a fire for them , as would have torrified them with a vengeance . but as he has stocked the church with such plenty of new hereticks ( and all of his own making ) so could he , by a sway of power , as arbitrary as his divinity , provide for them also such a furnace as that of nebuchadnezzar ( whom in his imperious meen and humour he so much resembles ) yet he must not think that the sound and iingle of self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness ( how melodiously soever they may tinkle in his own ears ) will ever be able to charm me● over to the worship of his idol ; or make them sacrifice their reason and religion either to him , or to the new notions which he has set up . and indeed i cannot but here further declare , that to me it seems one of the most preposterous and unreasonable things in nature , for any one first to assert three gods , and when he has so wel furnished the world with deities , to expect that all mankind should fall down and worship him. chap. vi. in which is considered , what this author pretends to from the authority of the fathers and school men , in behalf of his hypothesis ; and shewn , in the first place , that neither do the fathers own the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds , nor self-consciousness to be the formal reason of their distinction . i have in the foregoing chapters debated the point with this author , upon the reason and nature of the thing it self . but that is not all , which he pretends to defend his cause by ; endeavouring to countenance it also with great authorities ; and that in these positive and remarkable words . this is no new notion ( says he ) but the constant doctrine both of the fathers and the schools , page . these are his very words ; and i desire the reader carefully to consider , and carry them along with him in his memory . for as they are as positive , as confidence can make them : so if they are not made good to the utmost , they ought severely to recoil upon any one , who shall presume to express himself at such a rate . and now , that we may do him all the right that may be , the way to know , whether this author's hypothesis be the constant doctrine of the fathers and schools , is in the first place truly and fairly to set down , what this author's doctrine is , and wherein it does consist ; as we shall declare , what the received doctrine of the fathers and schools is , in our eighth chapter . now we shall find , that the whole doctrine delivered by him concerning the blessed trinity , is comprehended under , and reducible to these four heads . first , that the three persons in the blessed trinity , are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . secondly , that self-consciousness is the formal reason of personality ; and consequently that each of the divine persons is such by a distinct self-consciousness properly and peculiarly belonging to him . thirdly , that the three divine persons being thus distinguished from one another by a distinct self-consciousness proper to each of them , are all united in one and the same nature by one mutual consciousness common to them all . and fourthly and lastly , that a trinity in unity , and an unity in trinity , by this explication and account given of it , is a very plain , easie and intelligible notion . these four heads , or particulars , i say , contain in them a full and fair representation of this author 's whole hypothesis concerning the oeconomy of the blessed trinity : and i am well assured , that the knowing and impartial reader , neither will , nor can deny , that they do so . in the next place therefore , that we may see how far our author makes good all the said particulars by the authority of the fathers , as he has peremptorily promised and undertook to do , i think it requisite to consider , how the fathers expressed themselves upon this subject , and how this author brings the said expressions to his purpose . for surely the natural way of knowing any writer's mind is by the words and expressions , which he pretends to deliver his mind by . but concerning these we have our author declaring , first , that he has not troubled his reader with the signification of essence , hypostasis , substance , subsistence , person , existence , nature , &c. pag. . and some of his readers could give him a very good reason why , though i fear too true for him to be pleased with . but the reasons which he himself alledges for his not troubling his readers either with these terms , or the explication of them , are , first , that they were very differently used by the fathers themselves , page . and be it so ; yet still for all that , used by them they were ; and that not so very differently neither ; the chief difference having been about the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which yet was fairly accorded , and well high setled between the greeks and the latines , before the end of the th century , as shall be further made to appear in our eighth chapter . and his next reason for his not troubling his reader ( forsooth ) with these terms , is , because they have ( as he tells us ) very much obscured the doctrine of the trinity , instead of explaining it , page . which being one of the chief things , which he might conclude , would assuredly be disputed with him ; for him thus to presume it , before he had proved it , is manifestly to beg the question . in the mean time , certain it is , that these , and these only were the terms which the father 's used in their disputes about the trinity , and by which they managed them ; and consequently , were they never so ambiguous , faulty , or improper , ( as they are much the contrary ) yet , whosoever will pretend to give the sence of the fathers , must have recourse to them , and do it by them ; and to do otherwise , would be to dispute at rovers , or ( as the word is ) to speak without book ; which may much better become our author in the pulpit , than in the management of such a controversie . and now let the reader ( whom he is so fearful of troubling with any thing that is to the purpose ) judge , whether this man has not took a most extraordinary way of proving his doctrine the very same with the fathers . for neither in the first place does he set down , what the doctrine of the fathers concerning the trinity was ; which yet , one would have thought was absolutely necessary for the shewing how his own doctrine agreed with it , which he professed to be his design : nor , in the next place , does he either use , or regard , or offer to explain those terms , which the fathers all along delivered that their doctrine in ; but is so far from it , that he reproaches , explodes , and utterly rejects them , as serving only to obscure this doctrine , instead of explaining it : which , in my poor judgment , is such a way of proving the fathers on his side , as perhaps the world never heard of before , and will be amazed at now . but it is his way , and it will not be long before we find him bestowing a like cast of his kindness upon the school-men too . but since , notwithstanding all this , he allows the fathers ( good men ) to have meant well , and taught right ; albeit , by reason of a certain infelicity and awkwardness they had in representing what they meant , by what they wrote , their meaning ought , by no means , to be gathered from their own words ( as , possibly also for the introducing a new and laudable custom amongst the fathers and sons of the church , that the sons must teach the fathers to speak ) our author has , for these and the like reasons , in great charity and compassion to their infirmities , provided two other and better words of his own invention , viz. self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness , by which alone the true sense and doctrine of the fathers , in all their writings about this article of the trinity , may , or can be understood . nevertheless how kind soever this design of his may be , yet to me it seems very unreasonable . for , in the first place , it is , ( upon the most allowed grounds of reason ) a just , and a sufficient presumption , that the fathers were wholly strangers to what our author intends by these two words , for that they never so much as mention , or make use of the words themselves : whereas , to be self-conscious , and mutually-conscious , were things ( no doubt ) easie enough , not only for the fathers , but for any man else of common sense to find out and understand ; and they might also , without much difficulty , have been applyed to the divine nature , as well as other acts of knowledge ; and therefore since the fathers never used them in this case , it is but too plain , that they never thought them fit , or proper for this purpose . for the arian controversie was then , viz. in the th and th centuries ( in which also the most eminent of the fathers wrote against it ) at the highest . among which writers , gregory nyssen ( whom this author so often quotes ) has a passage , which in this case , is to me very remarkable , and a rational ground to conclude , that he knew nothing of mutual-consciousness , as it is here applyed by this author . for that , speaking of the unity of the divine persons , in respect of one common ( though single ) nature , he expresses it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , instead of which , certainly he could not have chosen a more apposite and proper place to have expressed the same by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , had that father had the same notion of it , which this author so much contends for . but it seems , he was either less happy , or more judicious in this particular . and besides all this , it is most worthy to be noted , that the very terms in which the orthodox writers expressed themselves about the trinity , and whatsoever related to it , were severely canvased and examined , and some of them settled by councils ; which is a fair proof , that the said terms were fixed and authentick , and exclusive of all others , and consequently of those of this author , as well as of the notion signified by , and couched under them , which he would here with such confidence obtrude upon the world , by and from the credit of the fathers , though their writings demonstrate , that they were wholly unconcerned , both as to his doctrines and his expressions . nor can any want , or penury of words be here pleaded for their silence in this matter , since the greek being so happy , above all other languages , in joyning and compounding words together ; in all probability had the fortunes of greece ( as the word is ) been concerned in the case , we might have heard of some such words , as , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . or since most such words , as in english terminate in ness , usually in the greek terminate in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , possibly we might have met with some such made-words , as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , since these do more properly import consciousness than the former ; which rather signifie self-conscience and mutual-conscience , and so in strictness of speech , differ something from the other . but he who seeks in the greek fathers for these words , or any thing like them ( as applyed to the trinity ) may seek longer than his eyes can see . nor will his inquest succeed at all better amongst the latines . for although that language be extremely less copious than the other , and so affords no one latine word either for self-consciousness , or mutual consciousness , but what we must first make , and being made would sound very barbarously ; yet , no doubt , there were ways and words enough to have otherwise expressed the same thing , had they found it the fittest and best notion to have expressed this great article by . but no such thing or word occurs in any of their writings . but why do i speak of the greek and latine fathers ? when the very schoolmen , the boldest framers and inventors of words and terms , of all others , where they think them necessary to express their conceptions by , notwithstanding all their quiddities , hoecceities , and perseities , and the like , have yet no word for self-consciousness and mutual consciousness : which is a sufficient demonstration , that either the thing it self never came into their heads ; or ( which is most likely ) that they never thought it of any use for the explication of this mystery , which yet they venture further at , than any other writers whatsoever . but after all ; though this author is very much concerned to ward off the charge of novelty and singularity from his notions , ( for which i cannot blame him ; this being a charge sufficient to confound and crush any such notion applyed to so sacred and received an article as the trinity ) and for this cause is not a little desirous to shelter it with the authority of the fathers ; yet i assure the reader , that he is no less careful and concerned to keep the glory of the invention wholly to himself , and would take it very ill either of fathers , school-men , or any one else , should they offer to claim the least share in it . for he roundly tells us , that the fathers were not so happy as to hit upon his way of explaining this mystery , page . line . nay , and that , how right a judgement soever they might have of it , yet in down-right terms , that they knew not how to explain it , page . line . which , i confess , is no small complement passed upon himself ( a thing which he is seldom or never failing in ) but , in good earnest , a very course one upon the fathers . in short , he would appropriate the credit of the new invention entirely to himself , but with admirable , and more than metaphysical abstraction , at the same time clear himself of the novelty of it ; and so , in a word , prove it of at least or hundred years standing in the world ; when yet the author of it was born since conventicles began in england , as is well known . but i frankly yield him the invention , as perfectly his own ; and such an one too , as he is more like to be known by , than ever admired for ; and so , much happiness attend him with it . but as little success as we have had in seeking for his darling and peculiar notion of self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness , in the ancient writers of the church , we are like to find no more in seeking for his other equally espoused notion and opinion there , viz. that the three persons of the blessed trinity are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits : we find indeed the terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. but not one tittle of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 except where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( as i hinted before ) is sometimes used in the same sense and signification with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and in this case ( i am sure ) no difficulty of framing words , or terms ( as might possibly in some measure be pretended in the case of self-consciousness ) can with any colour of reason be alledged for our not finding this notion in the fathers , had the thing it self been at all there . for can there be any words more obvious , and familiar than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the greek , or than tres spiritus , or tres mentes , in the latine ? but neither one nor the other are to be met with any where amongst them , as applied to the subject now before us . but in answer to this , i expect that our author will reply , that they are not the words [ three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ] or those other [ of self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness ] but the things meant and signified by them , which he affirms to be found in the fathers . but this is the very thing which i insist upon against him , viz. that the non-usage of these words , ( nor any other equivalent to them ) in the works of those ancient writers , ( while they were so particularly , and nicely disputing this matter ) is a solid argument , that neither are the things themselves there . for that all those great and acute men should mean the very same thing with this author , and not one of them ever light upon the same words , is not rationally to be imagined . for what reason can be given of this ? was either the thing it self ( as i noted before ) of such deep , or sublime speculation , as not to be reached by them ? or the language , they wrote in , too scanty to express their speculations by ? or can we think that the fathers wrote things without words , as some do but too often write words without things ? so that to me it is evident to a demonstration , that the fathers never judged , nor held in this matter , as this author pretends they did : and besides all this , there is yet one consideration more , and that of greater weight with me , than all that has been , or can be objected against this man's pretensions , viz. that it seems to me , and i question not but to all sober persons else , ( and that upon good reason ) wholly unsuteable to the wise and good method of god's providence , that a clear discovery of such a principal mystery of the christian religion , as the trinity is , should now at length be owing to the invention , or lucky hit of any one man's single mind , or fancy ; which so many pious , humble , as well as excellently learned persons , with long and tedious search , and the hardest study , ( and these , no doubt , joyned with frequent and servent prayers to god , to enlighten and direct them in that search ) have been continually breathing after , but could never attain to for above sixteen hundred years together . this , i freely own and declare , that i judge it morally impossible for any serious , thinking person , ever to bring himself to the belief of ; and much less for any one , not intoxicated with intolerable pride , to arrogate to himself . to which sort of persons god never reveals any thing extraordinary for the good of the world , or of themselves either . but , since i am now upon disputation , which has its proper laws , and that this author may have no ground of exception , i will proceed to examine his quotations out of the fathers , and try whether his hypothesis may be found there , where it is certain , that we can find none of his terms . and here , he first begins with the distinction of the divine persons , where i must remind him , that it is not the bare proving a distinction of persons , ( which none , who acknowledges a trinity , either doubts of , or much less denies ) which will here serve his turn ; but he must prove also , that they stand distinguished as three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , and that this distinction is owing to three distinct self-consciousnesses belonging to them ; otherwise all his proofs will fall beside his hypothesis . this premised , i will consider what he alledges . and in the first place he positively tells us , page . that no man who acknowledges a trinity of persons , ever denied , that the son and holy spirit were intelligent minds , or beings . to which i answer , first , that it is not sufficient for him , who advances a controverted proposition , that none can be produced , who before denied it ; but it lies upon him the advancer of it , to produce some who have affirmed it . forasmuch as a bare non-denial of a thing , never before affirmed , can of it self neither prove nor disprove any thing . but secondly , i answer further , that if none of the ancient writers did ever , in express terms , deny this , it was because none had before in express terms asserted it . but then i add also , that the ancients have expresly asserted that , which irrefragably inferrs a negation of the said proposition : for they have affirmed , that the son and holy spirit are one single intelligent mind , and consequently that being so , they cannot possibly be more . and this is a full answer to this sorry shift ; for an argument , i am sure , it deserves not to be called . but he proceeds from negatives to positives , and tells us , page . that it is the constant language of the fathers ( for it seems he has read them all ) that the son is the substantial word and wisdom of the father , and that this can be nothing else , but to say , that he is an intelligent being , or infinite mind . and he is so , i confess . but does this inferr , that he is therefore a distinct intelligent mind , or being from the father ? this we deny , and it is the very thing , which he ought to prove . and it is not come to that pass yet , that we should take his bare affirmation for a proof of what he affirms . he comes now to particulars , and tells us , that gregory nyssen ( though , since he neither mentions book nor page , this ought not to pass for a quotation ) calls the son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which this author renders mind , or intellect : and i will not deny , but that it may , by consequence , import so much ; but i am sure it does not by direct signification . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifies properly , res quaedam intellectualls , or intellectu praedita : and since nothing is so , but a mind , or spirit , it may ( as i have said ) imply a mind , but it does not directly signifie it . but admitting that it does both ; does this expression prove , that the son is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , distinct from the father ? by no means : for not only the son , but the father may be called , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the holy ghost , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and yet they are not three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and the reason of this is , because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is an essential attribute following the divine nature , and therefore common to all the three persons , and not a personal attribute peculiar to any one of them . so that granting the son to be as truly and properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as this author would have him , yet we absolutely deny , that he is a distinct 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , from the father . and this expression , i am sure , is far enough from proving him to be so . from nyssen , he passes to st. athanasius , who ( he tells us ) observes out of these words of our saviour , john . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that our saviour does not say , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and that , by so speaking , he gave us a perfect duality of persons in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and an unity of nature in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . all which is very true , and that this distinction of persons overthrows the heresie of sabellius , and the unity of their nature , the heresie of arius ; but then this is also as true , that all this is nothing at all to our author's purpose , for how does this prove , either that the three divine persons are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ? or , that self-consciousness is the proper ground , or reason of their distinction ? why , yes , ( says he ) if the father be an eternal mind and wisdom , then the son is also an eternal , but begotten mind and wisdom : very true ; but still i deny , that it follows hence , that the eternal mind , or wisdom begetting , and the eternal mind , or wisdom begotten , are two distinct minds , or wisdoms , but only one and the same mind , or wisdom , under these two distinct modifications of begetting and being begot . but he pretends to explain and confirm his notion of a distinct mind , or wisdom , out of those words of the nicene creed , in which the son is said to be god of god , light of light , very god of very god. by which words , i cannot imagine , how this author thinks to serve his turn ; unless that by light must be meant infinite wisdom , or infinitely wise mind , and that this must also infer the father and son to be two distinct infinitely wise minds , or wisdoms , one issuing from the other . but if so , then the same words will , and must infer them also to be two distinct gods , and very gods : for all these words stand upon the same level in the same sentence ; and then , if we do but joyn the term [ distinct ] equally with every one of them , we shall see what monstrous blasphemous stuff will be drawn out of this creed . in the mean time let this author know once for all , that light of light imports not here two distinct lights , but one infinite light under two different ways of subsisting , viz. either by and from it self , as it does in the father , or of and from another , as it does in the son. all which is plainly and fully imported in and by the particle [ of ] signifying properly ( as here applyed ) derivation , or communication in the thing which it is applyed to . and this is the clear undoubted sense of the word , as it is used here . in the mean time , i hope the arians and socinians will joyn in a letter of thanks to this author , for making such an inference from the nicene creed . in the next place , he comes to st. austin ; where , though i am equally at a loss to find how he proves his point by him , any more than by those whom he has already produced ; yet i will transcribe the whole quotation into the margin , that so both the reader may have it under his eye , and the author have no cause to complain , that he is not fairly dealt with . now that which he would infer from thence , seems to be this , that god the father is infinitely wise , by a wisdom of his own , distinct from that wisdom by which the son is called the wisdom of the father ; and consequently , that they are two distinct infinite wisdoms , or infinitely wise minds . this , i say , is that which he would inferr , and argue from st. austin , or i know not what else it can be . but this is by no means deducible from his words : for the father is wise by one and the same infinite wisdom equally belonging both to the father and the son , but not by it under that peculiar formality , as it belongs to the son. for it belongs to the son , as communicated to him ; whereas it belongs to the father , as originally in and from himself . and whereas it is objected , that if the father should be wise by the wisdom which he begot , then he could not be said to be wise by a wisdom of his own , but only by a begotten wisdom proper to the son. i answer , that neither does this follow ; since it is but one and the same essential wisdom in both , viz. in him who begets , and in him who is begotten : though [ as ] it is in him who is begotten , it is not after the same way in him who begets : so that it is this determining particle [ as , or quatenus ] which by importing a distinction of the manner , causes a quite different application of the term , while the thing is still the same . for the father himself is not denominated wise , even by that very wisdom that is essential to him , considered as personally determined to the son ; for so it must be considered as derived and communicated , and no divine perfection can agree to the father under the formal consideration of [ derived and communicated ] albeit the thing it self , which is derived and communicated , absolutely considered , may and does . in a word , the father is wise by one and the same wisdom , which is both in himself and in his son , but not by it , as it is in the son. but , by the way , it is worth observing , that this man who here in the and pages denies the father to be wise by this begotten wisdom , which the son is here called ( and which , in the sense we have now given of it , is very true ) and alledges st. austin and lombard to abett him in it . this very man , i say , page . line . affirms , that the son is that wisdom and knowledge , wherewith his father knows himself : where , if for the father to be wise and to know himself be formally the same act , and as much the same as his wisdom and knowledge can be , as it is manifest , they are ; then i leave it to this author to tell us , which of these two assertions is false , for both of them , i am sure , cannot be true : but he who makes nothing to contradict himself within the compass of two or three pages ( and sometimes as many lines ) may do it cum privilegio at the distance of near thirty . and whereas it is urged again from the same place in st. austin , that if we say the father begets his own wisdom , we may as well say , that he begets his own goodness , greatness , eternity , &c. i answer , no doubt but we may say one as well as the other , but that in truth and propriety of speech , we can say neither : for god cannot properly be said to beget wisdom , and much less his own wisdom , nor indeed any of his other attributes , or perfections essentially taken and considered ; he may indeed be said to communicate them , and by such commmnication to beget a son. but still , though these are thus said to be communicated , it is the person only , who is , or can be properly said to be begotten . but our author tells us , page . out of the next chapter of st. austin ( the words of which he should have done well to have quoted ) that he there calls god the father , sapientia ingenita , and the son , sapientia genita , and are not these two distinct infinite wisdoms ? i answer , no : for that the wisdom here spoken of , is not taken absolutely and essentially , but only personally : that is , for wisdom under two several modifications ; which modifications , though they diversifie and distinguish the thing they belong to , yet do not multiply it . for still it is one and the same wisdom , which is both genita and ingenita , though as it is one , it is not the other . sapientia , or wisdom , considered absolutely and essentially in it self , belongs in common to all the three persons ; but with the term genita , or ingenita joyned with it , it imports a peculiar mode of subsistence , which determines it to a particular personality : so that sapientia quatenus genita properly and only denotes the person of the son. in like manner when the third person of the trinity is called the spirit , the term spirit is not there taken essentially for that infinite immaterial , incorporeal nature , absolutely considered ( for so it is common to all the three persons ) but for that infinite incorporeal nature , quatenus procedens aut spirata , and under that peculiar mode of subsistence , it belongs not to the other two persons , but stands appropriate only to the third . nevertheless this makes them not three distinct infinite spirits ( as we have already shewn ) but only one infinite spirit under three distinct modalities . accordingly , when the son is here called the wisdom of the father , that very term [ of the father ] imports a modification of it peculiar to the son , but yet this modification does not make it another wisdom , from that which is in the father ; since one and the same wisdom may sustain several determining modes . our author's next quotation is out of peter lombard , page . whom ( for the credit of what he quotes from him ) he styles the oracle of the schools ( though he , who shall read lambertus denoeus upon the first book of his sentences , will quickly find what a doughty oracle he is . ) the passage quoted , proceeds upon the same notion which we find in the foregoing citation out of st. austin , whom he also alledges for it . nevertheless , i shall transcribe this also , as i did the other , both for the choice stuff contained in it , as also that the reader may have it before him , and thereby see , what use our author is able to make of it for his purpose . first of all then , he tells us , that in god to be , and to be wise , is the same thing . and i grant it , with respect to the absolute simplicity of the divine nature : but , for all that , i must tell him , that to be , and to be wise , fall under two formally distinct conceptions , of which the former does not include the latter ; and that for this reason , such as treat scholastically of these matters , do always allow a formal difference between them , and never treat of them , but as so considered . and let me tell him also , that this consideration looks yet something further ; as inferring , that things formally distinct , must have formally distinct effects ; so that the formal effect of one cannot be ascribed to the other . and moreover , that it is a very gross absurdity to confound the formal cause with the efficient , and so , to argue from one , as you would do from the other . which observations being thus laid down , let us see how this man and his oracle argue in the case . and it is thus . if the wisdom which he [ viz. god the father ] begets , be the cause of his being wise , then it is the cause also of his very being . in answer to which , i deny the consequence . for that wisdom is the cause of one's being wise only by a formal causality , viz. by existing in him , and affecting him in such a particular way : and this it does without being the cause also of his existence , that being a thing formally distinct from his being wise : and therefore , though wisdom , i grant , must presuppose the existence of the subject , where it has this effect : yet it does not formally cause it ; or rather indeed , for this very reason , cannot possibly do so . but he proceeds and argues further , viz. that supposing the wisdom begotten by the father were the cause both of his being , and of his being wise , then it must be so either by begetting , or creating him , ( for so i interpret conditricem ) but for one to say , that wisdom is any way the begetter , or maker of the father , would be the height of madness . it would be so indeed . and so on the other side to attempt to prove the father and the son to be two distinct infinite minds by such strange , odd , uncouth notions as these , which st. austin himself ( particularly treating of them in his and books de trinitate ) confesses to be quoestiones inextricabiles , this , i say , ( whatsoever may be the height of madness ) is certainly not the height of discretion . nevertheless , as to the argument it self , i deny the consequence . and that because the begetting , or any otherwise producing a thing imports a cause operating by a proper efficiency , or causality ; whereas wisdom , being only the formal cause of one's being wise , ( as it would be no other , could it be the cause of one's very being also ) operates only by an internal , improper causality , viz. in a word , wisdom makes one wise , as whiteness makes a thing white , not by producing any thing in him , but by existing in him , and affecting him by it self , after such a certain manner , and thereby giving him such a certain denomination . now from hence let any one judge how foreibly and philosophically this man disputes ; the truth is , were the whole argument conclusive , it were nothing to his purpose . but i was willing to shew , that his way of arguing is as defective , as the thing he argues for is absurd . nevertheless let us see , what the main conclusion is , which he would draw from the premises . why , it is this , that the father is eternal wisdom , or mind , and the son eternal wisdom and mind . i give you his very terms . and who denies this ? or what does it conclude for him ? for still i ask , does he who says , that the father is eternal wisdom , or mind , and the son eternal wisdom and mind , by saying so , affirm , that the father and the son are two distinct eternal wisdoms , or minds ? any more than he who says , that the father is god , and the son god , affirms them to be two distinct gods ? let him say it if he can ; and he shall not fail of a through consutation as soon as it can be printed off . but to give the reader an account of the whole matter in short . this author has espoused a very heterodox and dangerous notion , viz. that the three persons of the blessed trinity are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ; and in order to the proof of this , would perswade us , that there are two distinct wisdoms , one in the father , and the other in the son ; and that for this reason : because the father , who is essentially wise , cannot be said to be wise by that begotten wisdom , which is in the son ( albeit the son be yet said to be the wisdom of the father ) but that the father must have one distinct wisdom of his own , and the son another distinct wisdom of his own . this , i am sure , is the full account of his argument from top to bottom . in answer to which , i have plainly and undeniably shewn , that the father is wise by one and the same essential wisdom , common to father , son and holy ghost , though not under that particular modification , as it subsists in the other two persons , but by that peculiar modification , by which it is appropriated to , and subsists in his own . and that those different modifications do not , for all that , make it any more than one single numerical wisdom , but only one and the same under so many distinct modes of subsistence , determining it to so many distinct personalities . this is the sum both of his opinion and of mine , and i referr it to the judicious reader to arbitrate the case between us , with this profession and promise , that if in all , or any one of the quotations alledged by him he can shew , that it is either expresly affirmed , or necessarily implyed , that the father and the son are two distinct infinite minds , i will , without further proof of any sort , forthwith yield him the cause , and withal renounce all my poor share in common sense and reason ; nay , and all belief of my own eyes for the future . but there is one clause more , which he brings in as one part of his main conclusion , page . line . viz. that if we confess this of the father and the son , to wit , that they are each of them eternal mind , or wisdom , there can be no dispute about the holy ghost who is eternal mind , and wisdom , distinct both from father and son. now this is perfectly gratis dictum , without either proof , or pretence of proof ; and that whether we respect the orthodox , or the heterodox and heretical . and , first , for the orthodox , they utterly deny the holy ghost to be an eternal mind , or wisdom distinct both from the father and the son ; and i challenge this author to produce me but one reputed orthodox writer , who affirms it . in the mean time , it argues no small confidence ( to give it the mildest term ) in this man to assert that as certain , and without dispute , which is neither granted on one side , nor so much as pretended to be proved on the other . but secondly , if we respect the heterodox and heretical , who ( no doubt ) can dispute as much as others , will this man say , that these also grant this his assertion about the holy ghost without any dispute ? no , it is certain , that they neither do , nor will. for this author may be pleased to observe , that as some in the primitive times , allowed the son to be only like the father ; so they made the holy ghost a downright creature , and an inferiour agent to both . such were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 under their head and leader macedonius ; as we see in st. austin de haeresibus , cap. . hereby placing him as much below the son , as they had placed the son below the father , or rather more . whereupon i appeal even to this author himself , whether those who did so , would without all dispute have allowed the holy ghost to be an eternal infinite mind , or wisdom , distinct both from the father and the son ; and upon that account , essentially and necessarily equal to them both ? let this author rub his fore-head , and affirm this if he can ; and for the future take notice , that it becomes a true and solid reasoner , where a thing is disputed , fairly to prove it , and not boldly and barely to presume it . in the last place he alledges the judgment of all the fathers indefinitely in the case . and truly where he cannot cite so much as one of them to the purpose , i think he does extremely well to make short work of it , and with one bold impertinent stroke to alledge them all together . his allegation is this , that it is usual with the fathers to represent the three persons in the blessed trinity as distinct as peter , james and john. well ; and what then ? why ; that then the said three persons are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits . i deny the consequence , and to give a particular answer to this general allegation , i tell him , that it is a fallacy of the homonymy of the word , and that the term [ as distinct ] is ambiguous : for it may either signifie , . as real . or , . as great a distinction . as for the first , i grant , that the three persons in the blessed trinity differ as really as peter , iames , and iohn ; forasmuch as they differ by something in the thing it self , or ex parte rei , antecedent to , and independent upon any apprehension , or operation of the mind about it ; which is a real difference , and whatsoever is so , is altogether as real as the difference between one man and another can be . but , secondly , if by real distinction be meant as great a distinction , so we utterly deny that the three divine persons differ as much as peter , and iames , and iohn do , or that the fathers ever thought they did so . for this would inferr a greater difference , or distinction between them , than even our author himself will allow of ; even such a difference , as reaches to a division , or separation of the persons so differing . and since it is impossible for the persons of the trinity to differ so , it is hard to imagine upon what bottom of reason our author should measure the distinction , or difference of the three divine persons , by the distinction , or difference , that is between , peter , iames , and iohn . for though the three divine persons differ as really , yet it is certain , that they do not differ as much . but what the fathers alledged only as an illustration of the case , this man is pleased to make a direct proof of his point , which by his favour , is to stretch it a little too far : for , if he would make the foregoing example a parallel instance to the thing which he applies it to , it would prove a great deal too much , ( as has been shewn ) and therefore as to the thing , which it is brought for , does indeed prove nothing at all . now the thing it is brought to prove , is , that the three divine persons are three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ; but since we have shewn , that a real difference , or distinction , may be much short of such an one as is between two or more minds , or spirits , ( which we own to be as great , as between two or more men ) it follows , that the real difference , which is between the three divine persons , cannot prove them to be so many distinct minds , or spirits . in short , our author 's whole argument amounts to no more but this ( which , though it may sound something jocularly , is really and strictly true ) viz. that because peter , iames , and iohn are so many men , therefore father , son , and holy ghost are so many minds . a pleasant way of arguing certainly . i have now examined all that this author has alledged about the distinction of the three divine persons , and i have done it particularly and exactly , not omitting any one of his quotations . but how comes it to pass all this while , that we have not so much as one syllable out of the fathers , or school-men , in behalf of self-consciousness ? which being , according to this author , the constituent reason of the personality and personal distinction of the three divine persons , will he pretend to prove the distinction it self from the fathers , and at the same time not speak one tittle of the principle , or reason of this distinction ? or will he profess to prove his whole hypothesis by the authority of the fathers , and yet be silent of self-consciousness , which he himself makes one grand and principal part of the said hypothesis ? certainly , one would think , that the very shame of the world , and that common awe and regard of truth , which nature has imprinted upon the minds of men , should keep any one from offering to impose upon men in so gross and shameless a manner , as to venture to call a notion or opinion , the constant doctrine both of the fathers and the schools ; nay , and to profess to make it out , and shew it to be so , and while he is so doing , not to to produce one father , or schoolman , i say again , not so much as one of either in behalf of that , which he so confidently and expresly avows to be the joynt sentiment of both. this surely is a way of proving , or rather of imposing peculiar to himself . but we have seen how extremely fond he is of this new invented term and notion : and therefore since he will needs have the reputation of being the sole father and begetter of the hopefull issue , there is no reason in the world that antiquity should find other fathers to maintain it . chap. vii . in which is shewn , that the passages alledged by this author out of the fathers do not prove mutual-consciousness to be that , wherein the unity of the divine nature in the three persons of the blessed trinity does consist : but that the fathers place it in something else . our author having undertook to make good his doctrine about the blessed trinity , from the fathers ; and that both as to the distinction of the divine persons , and also as to their unity in the same nature ; and having said what he could from those ancient writers , for that new sort of distinction which he ascribes to the said persons , in the former part of his th section , which i have confuted in the preceding chapter ; he proceeds now , in the following , and much longer part of the same section , to prove the unity of the three persons in one and the same nature , according to his own hypothesis . and the proofs of this we shall reduce under these two following heads , as containing all that is alledged by him upon this point of his discourse , viz. first , that it is one and the same numerical divine nature , which belongs to all the three divine persons . and , secondly , that the thing , wherein this numerical unity of the divine nature does consist , is that mutual-consciousness , by which all the three persons are intimately conscious to one another of all that is known by , or belongs to each of them in particular . and here the authority of the fathers is pleaded by him for both of these , and i readily grant it for the first , but however shall examine what this author produces for the one , as well as for the other . but before i do this , i must observe to him , that if that distinction asserted by him between the divine persons , whereby they stand distinguished as three infinite minds , or spirits , holds good , all his proofs of the unity of their nature will come much too late . for he has thereby already destroyed the very subject of his discourse ; and it is in vain to seek , wherein the numerical unity of the divine nature ( as it belongs to the three persons ) does consist , after he has affirmed that , which makes such an unity utterly impossible . and it has been sufficiently proved against him in our th chapter , that three infinite minds or spirits , can never be one numerical infinite mind , or spirit , nor consequently one god. three distinct spirits can never be otherwise one , than by being united into one compound , or collective being , which , ( could such a thing be admitted here ) might be called indeed an union , but an unity properly it could not . and hereupon i cannot but observe also , that this author very often uses these terms promiscuously , as if union and unity , being united into one , and being one , signified the very same thing ; whereas , in strictness and propriety of speech , whatsoever things are united into one , cannot be originally one ; and è converso , whatsoever is originally one , cannot be so , by being united into one : for as suidas explains the word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is to say , union is so called from the pressing [ or thrusting ] together several things into one . but our author , who with great profoundness , tells us of the same nature in three distinct persons being united into one numerical essence , or god-head , page . lines , . has certainly a different notion of union from all the world besides . for how one and the same nature ( though in never so many distinct persons : since it is still supposed the same in all ) can be said to be united into any one thing , i believe surpasses all humane apprehension to conceive ; union in the very nature of it , being of several things , not of one and the same . i desire the reader to consult the place , and to extract the best sense out of it that he can . and thus having presented our author with this preliminary observation , i shall now proceed to consider how he acquits himself in the first thing undertook by him , viz. the proving a numerical unity of nature in the three divine persons , out of the fathers ; which tho' i do as readily grant , and as firmly believe , as this author does , or can ; yet i think it worth while to shew , with what skill , decency , and respect he treats the fathers upon this subject . and here in the first place he tells his reader , that this being a mystery so great , and above all example in nature , it is no wonder if the fathers found it necessary to use several examples , and to allude to several kinds of union to form an adequate notion of the unity of the god-head . and withall , that they take several steps towards the explication of this great mystery , viz. of an unity of nature in a trinity of persons , page . in our examination of which passages ( reserving his former words to be considered elsewhere ) we will first consider the steps which ( he says ) the fathers made towards the explication of this mistery . and these , he tells us , are two. first , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( i. e. ) the coessentiality of the divine persons , whereby all the three persons of the god-head have the same nature , page . secondly the other is a numerical unity of the divine essence , or nature , page . line . which ( to answer one greek word with another ) we may call the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , st. cyril authorizing the expression , whom we find speaking of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as ammonius cites him in his catena upon iohn . , . now as this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or sameness of nature , and this numerical unity of nature , lying fifteen whole pages , in this author's book , distant from one another , must be confessed to make a very large stride ; so , for all that , they will be found to make but an insignificant step ; as setting a man not one jot further than he was before . for as touching those words and terms , which the fathers used to express the unity of the divine nature by , i do here , without any demurr , affirm to this author , that coessentiality , sameness of nature , and sameness of essence , all signified by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as also unity of nature , and unity of essence , expressed by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , do all of them , in the sense of the fathers denote but one and the same thing , viz. a numerical unity of the divine nature , only , i confess , with some circumstantial difference , as to the way , or manner of their signification . for , . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifies unity of nature , with a connotation of some things , or persons to whom it belongs . upon which account it is , that st. ambrose ( whom this author cites ) speaking of this word in his d book , chap. . tells us , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliud alii , non ipsum est sibi : nor indeed is any thing said to be the same , but with respect to some thing , or circumstance besides it self . and therefore no wonder if the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was anciently rejected , since the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , relating to the person , whom the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belongs to , must import a singularity of person as well as an unity of essence , which would be contrary to the catholick faith. but , . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifies unity of nature , or essence , without connotation of any to whom it belongs : not but that it does really and indeed belong to the three divine persons , but that according to the strict and proper signification and force of the word , it does not connote , or imply them , but abstracts , or prescinds from them . and this is a true account of these words , by which the fathers ( without making more steps than one ) intended and meant the same thing , viz. a numerical unity of the divine nature , belonging to all the three persons , only with this difference , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the unity of the divine nature , with a connotation of the persons in whom it is ; which also gives it the denomination of sameness ; and that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifies the unity of the same nature absolutely and abstractedly , without imploying , or co-signifying any respect to those in whom it is , and to whom it belongs . so that these words ( as much two as they are ) yet in the sense and meaning of the fathers , import but one and the same unity . but our author tells us , that though indeed the fathers own an unity of nature in the divine persons , yet , since there is a specifick , as well as a numerical unity , the dispute is here , which of these two unities we shall assign to the divine nature , with reference to the divine persons . and for this ; he tells us , that petavius and dr. cudworth have abundantly proved , that the nicene fathers did not understand the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a numerical , but of a specifical sameness of nature , or the agreement of things numerically different from one another in the same common nature , page . about the end . in answer to which , i must confess my self very unfit to take such great and truly learned persons to task , and that upon comparing this author and petavius together ( if there can be any comparison between them ) i find much more reason to believe that he mistook the meaning of petavius , than that petavius could mistake the meaning of the fathers . but however , i shall lay down this as a conclusion , which i take to be undoubtedly true , viz. that the ancient fathers , as well the nicene , as those after them , held only a numerical unity of the divine nature in the persons of the blessed trinity : that is , in other words , they held and acknowledged one numerical god , and no more . this conclusion i hold , and have good reason to believe , that neither petavius nor dr. cudworth shall be able to wrest it from me . for the chief reason of some men's charging the fathers with holding a specifick unity of nature amongst the divine persons , is drawn from this , that some of them , and particularly maximus and nyssen ( cited by this author ) seem to argue from that specifick unity of nature which is found in several individual men , to an unity of the divine nature in the persons of the blessed trinity . to which i answer , that the fathers never used the example of three or more individual men , agreeing in the same nature as a parallel instance of the same sort , or degree of unity with that which is in the three divine persons ; but always alledged it , one , or ( perhaps sometimes ) both of these two ways . first , by way of allusion , or illustration ( as i have already noted in the foregoing chapter ) and as it is the nearest resemblance of , and approach to this divine unity of any that could be found in created beings . for still their argument proceeds only by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the one side , and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the other , ( as appears from that place quoted out of maximus , p. . ) which terms surely do not of necessity import an identity of the case , but only some similitude in the parts of the comparison . secondly , the fathers used the forementioned example as an argument à minore ad majus , viz. that if several individual men could not properly be said to have more than one nature ( upon which nyssen's who le argument turns ) much less could this be said of the three divine persons . forasmuch as it is not only certain , but evident , that persons merely distinguished from one another and no more , must have a greater unity of nature , than such as are not only distinguished , but also divided from one another by a separate existence . and let any one stretch this argument of the fathers further if he can . i do not in the least deny , but several expressions may have dropped from the fathers , which , if we look'd no further , might be drawn to a very inconvenient sense . but then also it is as little to be denied , that the same fathers professedly and designedly treating of the same points , have declared themselves in such terms , as are very hardly , if at all reconcileable to those occasional and accidental expressions . and therefore since their meaning cannot be taken from both , it ought much rather to be taken from what was asserted by them designedly , than what was asserted only occasionally . to which i shall add this further remark , that a due consideration of the circumstances , under which those fathers wrote , may very well apologize for the dese●●s of some of their arguments . for the grand controversie which exercised the orthodox writers of the fourth and part of the fifth century , was that with the arians . so that we have the less cause to wonder if some of their reasonings about the trinity seem to look no further than the proof of a specifick unity of nature in the divine persons , while they had to deal with adversaries who would not allow so much as this between the father and the son , but instead of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or sameness , held only an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or likeness of nature between them ; which , together with the foregoing considerations , may serve as a key to let us into the true explication of several passages of the fathers ; about the meaning of which we might otherwise possibly be something at a loss . and the same likewise may serve to give a fair account of what has been alledged by petavius , and mistook by this author upon the present subject . for to traverse and examine all petavius's allegations particularly would require a full and distinct work by it self . but still our author seems extremely set upon making good his first step of a specifick unity of the divine nature from the fathers ; and to that purpose he tells us , page . line . that one thing wherein the fathers place the unity of the godhead is , that all the three persons have the same nature , by which he means ( as shall be shewn presently ) specifically the same nature ; and a few lines after , he tells us again , that some of the fathers went further than this , and plac'd the essential unity of the divine nature in the sameness of essence , lines , , , of the same page . now here i would desire this author to inform me of two things . first , by what rule of speaking , or upon what principle of divinity , logick , or philosophy , sameness of nature ought to signifie one thing , and sameness of essence to signifie another ; and withal to be so contra-distinguished to each other , that in the degrees of unity , this latter must be a step beyond the former ? for the fathers , i am sure , make no such distinction , but use the words sameness of nature , and sameness of essence , as well as the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 themselves promiscuously ; so that neither by their native signification , nor yet by their use , do they import any more than one sort of unity . secondly , whereas in page . lines , . he makes the first step towards this unity to consist in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or coessentiality , ( which also in the next page , line . &c. he explains by sameness of nature ; ) and whereas in page . he makes a numerical unity of the divine essence , the next step ( introducing it with the word secondly ) and telling us , that the fathers added it to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he had before made the first step ; and whereas , notwithstanding this , having in page . told us , that sameness of nature was one thing wherein the fathers placed the unity of the divine nature , within seven lines after , he tells us , that some of the fathers went further , and placed it in the sameness of essence , ( which , yet it is manifest all along , that he reckons not the same thing with numerical unity of essence ) i desire to know of him , whether there be two second steps in this unity ? or , whether there be one between the first and the second ? for he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or sameness of nature one step , page , . and sameness of essence a further step , page . line . &c. and then numerical unity of nature another step , calling it also the second , page . line . these things , i must confess , i am utterly unable to give any consistent account of , and i shrewdly suspect , that our author himself is not able to give a much better . but it is still his way to forget in one place what he has said in another ; and how kind soever he may be to himself , i should think it very hard for another man to forget himself so often , and to forgive himself too . nevertheless our author , without mincing the matter , roundly asserts a specifick unity of nature in the divine persons , telling us , line . &c. of the fore-cited page . that this is absolutely necessary to make the three persons one god , and that it is impossible that they should be so without it ; where it is evident , that he means a specifick unity , both from this , that it was the subject , which he had been there treating of , as also from this , that immediately after he mentions another sort , or degree of unity , as a step further than this ; which , since nothing can be but a numerical unity , it follows , that that which was one step short of a numerical , must needs be a specifical . and now is it not strange , that in page . which is but the next save one after this , this man should positively say , ( as he does ) that the fathers never so much as dream'd of a specifick unity of nature in the divine persons , having here in page . affirmed it to be no less than absolutely necessary to make the three persons one god ? and that certainly is a necessity with a witness . but he , who exacts of this author a consistency with himself for five pages together , deals very severely with him . and accordingly , the more i consider of this matter , i cannot but think , that what he says of the nicene fathers holding a specifick unity of nature in the divine persons , page . and his affirming that gregory nyssen , st. cyril , maximus and damascen never so much as dream'd of any such unity , page . line . will by no means consist together . for first , if by the nicene fathers be meant not only those who were present at that council , but those fathers also who about those times held the same faith which was established in that council , then his two fore-cited passages contain a gross , manifest , fulsome contradiction ; even as gross as the positive asserting of a thing , and the never so much as dreaming of it , can import . but if by the nicene fathers he means only those who sat and acted in that council , he will hardly however perswade any understanding man , that gregory nyssen , who wrote and flourished between fifty and sixty years after the council , and maximus about sixty , and st. cyril about ninety , could be so grosly ignorant of , and strangers to the sentiments of those fathers , as not so much as to dream of that wherein they had placed the unity of the god-head . this to me seems incredible and morally impossible : since it is not to be imagined , that nyssen , cyril , and maximus could so soon forget , or knowingly dare to relinquish the doctrine of the fore-mentioned fathers , whose authority was so great and sacred all the christian world over . and therefore since this author allows these fathers not to have dreamt of a specifick unity of the divine nature ; i conclude , that neither did the nicene fathers dream of it any more than they , howsoever they might express themselves upon some occasions . and thus having ( as well as he could ) made his first step , by asserting a specifick unity , or sameness of nature in the three divine persons from the fathers , that is to say , partly from what petavius and dr. cudworth had told him of the nicene fathers holding such a specifick unity between them , and partly from the other fathers never so much as dreaming of it , he proceeds now to his other step , or rather counter-step ; which is to shew , that the unity between the divine persons , held by the fathers , was no other than a numerical unity of nature , or essence belonging to them : for since to be one only specifically , and to be one only numerically , are by no means consistent with one another , in respect of the same persons , what can this be so truly and properly called as a counter-step to that which he had made before ? his method being plainly this . first he tells us , that the nicene fathers by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 understood only a specifick unity , or sameness of nature in the divine persons , page . and then , that the fathers [ mentioning them indefinitely ] held this sameness of nature absolutely necessary to make the said three persons one god , page . and now at length he tells us , page . lines , , . that though several of the fathers attempted several ways of explaining that unity of nature that is in the divine persons , yet they all agree in the thing , that father , son , and holy ghost , three distinct divine persons are united in one numerical nature and essence . so that the sum of all must be this ( as appears also from his own words in the latter end of page . and the four first lines of the . ) that according to him , the fathers held a specifick unity of nature necessary to make the three divine persons one god , but not sufficient without the completion of it by a numerical unity superadded to it . this , i say , is the sum of what he delivers ; and in direct opposition to which , i do here deny , that there is any such thing as a specifick unity of nature belonging to the divine persons , or that the fathers ever held , that there was . and to prove this , i shall premise this assertion both as certain in itself , and withall affirmed by this author in those forecited words , viz. that all the fathers held , that father , son , and holy ghost , three distinct persons are united in ( or rather are one , by ) one numerical nature and essence . which being so premised , i have these considerations to oppose to the admission of any specifick unity in the divine nature as it belongs to the divine persons . as , first , if a numerical unity in the same divine nature be sufficient to make the three divine persons to whom it belongs , one god , then a specifick unity of the same is not necessary ; but a numerical unity in the same divine nature is sufficient to make the said three persons one god , and therefore a specifick unity is not necessary . the consequence is evident , because nothing can be necessary to any thing , or effect , beyond , or beside what is sufficient for the same ; since this would imply a manifest contradiction , by making the same thing , in the same respect , both sufficient and not sufficient . and as for the minor , that an agreement in one and the same numerical divine nature is sufficient to make the persons so agreeing one god. i suppose this carries with it so much self-evidence , that no man of reason will pretend to doubt of , and much less to deny it . secondly , a greater degree of unity , and a less degree of unity are not to be admitted in the divine nature . but a numerical unity and a specifical unity , are a greater and a less degree of unity , and therefore they are not both to be admitted in the divine nature . the major is proved thus , because two such unities would overthrow the simplicity of the divine nature ; forasmuch as they must be either two degrees of the same kind of unity , or they must be two different kinds of unity : either of which would inferr a composition by no means to be endured in the divine nature . as for the minor , it is evident in it self , and needs no proof . thirdly , such a degree , or sort of unity of nature , as may agree to ten thousand individuals , neither can nor ought to be admitted in the divine nature , with reference to the divine persons . but a specifick unity of nature may agree to ten thousand individuals , as well as to two or three ; since ( upon a specifick account ) it has no stint , or limitation , but may be every whit as well and properly in the former number , as in the latter ; and therefore it neither can nor ought to be admitted in the divine nature . fourthly , such an unity as is principally , if not absolutely notional , and depends upon the operation of the intellect drawing one common notion from the agreement , which it observes in several individuals , is by no means necessary to make the three divine persons one god , nor can any way properly belong to them . but a specifick unity is such an one . and therefore it neither is , nor can be necessary to the making the three divine persons one god , as this author most absurdly asserts , p. . line , . the major is evident . for that , if such an unity could be necessary upon that account , then there would be some sort or degree of unity in the divine nature so depending upon the operation of some intellect , or other ( forming one common notion out of several particulars , ) that , had not such an operation passed upon the said particulars , such an unity could not have been , nor consequently could the three divine persons have been one god without it ; which to affirm , would certainly be both a monstrous and blasphemous assertion . fifthly and lastly , if a specifick unity of nature consists with , and indeed implies a multiplication of the said nature , in every one of the particulars , to which it belongs ; then such a specifick unity can by no means be admitted in the divine nature . but a specifick unity of nature imports a multiplication of the said nature in every one of the particulars to which it belongs ; and therefore such an unity cannot be admitted in the divine nature . the reason of the consequence is evident ; because the divine nature is uncapable of any multiplication : and herein consists the difference of the divine nature's belonging to the divine persons , and of any other nature's belonging to its proper individuals ; that this latter is by a multiplication of it self in them , and the other by a bare communication of it self to them , so as that the same numerical nature exists in , and becomes thereby common to all the three persons . as for the minor proposition , that a specifick unity of nature consists with and implies a multiplication of the said nature in the several individuals which it belongs to ; i referr him to all the logicians and metaphysicians who have wrote of species , and specifick unity , of idem , & diversum , whether they do not give this account of it . but i fancy this author has a reach of cunning ( tho' but a short one ) in the case . for that having made the three divine persons three distinct infinite minds , or spirits , which can never be one by a numerical unity ; he is willing to provide them a specifical unity , and to see whether that will serve the turn ; but as the nature of the thing unhappily falls out to be , that will not do it neither . these are the considerations which i thought fit to advance against the admission of a specifick unity in the divine nature , with reference to the divine persons . and the conclusion , which i draw from them all , is this , that since the fathers ( and that even by this authors own confession ) held a numerical unity of nature in the three divine persons , we can by no means grant that the said fathers admitted also a specifick unity in the same , without making them guilty of a gross absurdity and contradiction . forasmuch as these two sorts , or degrees of unity are utterly incompatible in the divine nature . i hope by this time the judicious reader sees how fit this man is to be trusted with the fathers , whose judgment about so weighty an article he dares misrepresent in such a manner . for to sum up briefly what he has said upon this point . first , he tells us , that the fathers agree very well in the account they give of a trinity in unity , page . and the four first lines . next he tells us , that the nicene fathers asserted a specifick unity of the divine nature in the persons of the blessed trinity , and understood the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only of such an unity , and not of a numerical , page . and the five last lines . and thirdly , that this specifick unity , or sameness of nature , was absolutely necessary to make the three divine persons one god , and that it was impossible they should be so without it , page . lines , . and fourthly , that the other fathers ( of which he there names four ) never so much as dream'd of a specifick unity of the divine nature , page . lines , . and lastly , that the fathers do not stop in this specifick unity and identity of nature , but proceed to shew how the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proves a true numerical and essential unity of the godhead in the three divine persons , page . lines , , , . from all which assertions , which lie plain and open in the forecited pages , i desire this author to resolve me these following queries . . whether those fathers who assert a specifick unity of the divine nature , and those who never dreamt of such an unity ; and those again , who by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 understood only a specifick , and not a numerical unity of nature ; and those who by the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proceed to prove a numerical unity of nature in the divine persons , can be said to agree so very well in the account they give of a trinity in unity ? . whether those could give a true and right account of a trinity in unity , who never so much as dreamt of that , which was so absolutely necessary to make the three divine persons one god , that they could not possibly be so without it ? . whether a specifick unity , or sameness of nature in several persons , is or can be a direct and proper proof of a numerical unity and identity of nature in the said persons ? these questions , i say , being the natural and immediate results of this author 's positions , i hope he will graciously vouchsafe , sometime or other , to give the world a satisfactory resolution of . in the mean time i will tell him what it was , that imposed upon him so , as to make him talk thus absurdly and unphilosophically of a specifick unity of the divine nature , and traduce the fathers also , as if they held the same . and that in one word is , that in the subject before us , he takes specifick nature and common nature to signifie one and the same thing ; whereas , though every specifick nature be a common nature , yet every common nature is not a specifick nature ( no nor a generical neither . ) and that this was his mistake , appears from those words of his in page . where he says , that petavius and dr. cudworth have abundantly proved , that the nicene fathers did not understand the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a numerical , but of a specifical sameness of nature , or the agreement of things numerically differing from one another in the same common nature . ] in which words it is evident , that he makes specifick sameness of nature , and the agreement of things numerically different , in one and the same common nature , to signifie convertibly the same thing ; and when he has done so , he opposes them both to a numerical sameness of nature , as appears from the adversative particle [ but ] placed between them . in which , let me tell him he is guilty of a very great mistake , both by making those things the same , which are not the same , and by making an opposition where there is a real coincidence . for , by his favour , one and the same numerical divine nature is a common nature too ; forasmuch as without any division , or multiplication of it self , it belongs in common to the three divine persons . the term [ deus ] indeed is neither a genus , nor a species . nevertheless all divines and school-men allow it to be a terminus communis , as properly predicable of , and common to father , son , and holy ghost ; and in this very thing consists the mystery of the trinity , that one and the same numerical nature should be common to , and exist in three numerically distinct persons . and therefore for one ( who pretends to teach the whole world divinity ) while he is discoursing of the divine nature and persons , to oppose common nature , to nature numerically one , and from the commonness of it , to make the fathers argue against its numericalness ( whereas the same divine nature may be , and really is both ) it is a shrewd sign of the want of something or other in that man , that must needs render him extremely unfit to prescribe , and dictate in these matters . in fine , the sole point driven at all along by the fathers , as to the question about the unity of the divine nature ( for their arguments to prove the coequality of the three divine persons against the arians are not now before us ) is an assertion of a real numerical existing unity of the said nature in the said persons . i say , a numerical unity , without making any more steps , or degrees in it than one , or owning any distinction between sameness of nature , and sameness of essence . and much less by making ( as this author does ) a specifick sameness of nature , one thing wherein they place the unity of the divine nature , and then making sameness of essence another and further degree in the unity of the said nature ; and when they have done so , by a return back explaining this sameness of essence , by the sameness of nature newly mentioned ; as he says , they do , in these words , immediately following ( by way of exegesis of the former ) viz. that there is but one god , because all the three divine persons have the same nature , page . and the two last lines . all which is a ridiculous circle , and a contradiction to boot , making sameness of nature one step , and sameness of essence another , and then making this sameness of essence no more than a sameness of nature , again ; so that according to him the fathers must be said to go further , by resting in the very same step which they first made : which way of reasoning , i confess , may serve well enough for one , who can forget in one page , what he had said in the other just before . but ( by his favour ) the fathers were a little more consistent , and understood themselves better than to run divisions in such a senseless manner upon a thing that admitted none . and thus having shewn how he has dealt with the fathers in the account given by him of their opinion about the unity of the divine nature in the persons of the blessed trinity , ( which was the first head , under which i reduced his allegations from them , ) i come now in the d place , to the other and principal head ; under which he undertakes to prove the chief and more peculiar part of his hypothesis from the said fathérs , viz. that the unity and identity of nature belonging to the three divine persons , consists in the mutual-consciousness which is between them , that is in truth , that they are therefore one god , because they are conscious to themselves , that they are so . and here i shall begin with shewing how this author overthrows the point undertook by him before he produces any arguments from the fathers for it . and to this purpose i shall resume those words of his before cited by me out of page . in which he reminds his reader , that trinity in unity being so great a mystery , and of which we have no example in nature , it is no wonder if it cannot be explained by any one kind of natural union , and that therefore it was necessary to use several examples , and to allude to several kinds of union , to form an adequate notion of the unity of the god-head . now here , since our author's notion , and the fathers too ( as he says ) of this unity is nothing else but mutual-consciousness , i desire to learn of him , what necessity there was or is of using several examples , and alluding to several kinds of union to explain , or form an adequate notion of that ? and i wonder what kind of thing he would make of his mutual-consciousness , should he come to explain and describe it by several examples , and several kinds of union ? but this is not all , for he tells us likewise ( as we also observed before that there are several steps to be taken towards the explication of this mystery . whereupon i would again learn of him how many steps are necessary to explain mutual-conciousness ? for one would imagine one single step sufficient to represent and declare a thing which every body understands . this author indeed confidently enough asserts , that the fathers give no other account of a trinity in unity , than the same which he gives of it , pag. . line . but certainly if the fathers thought several examples , steps and kinds of union absolutely necessary to explain the notion they had of this unity , and if these cannot be necessary to explain the notion of mutual-consciousness , then it must follow , that the fathers neither did , nor possibly could by that unity mean mutual-consciousness . and if this author doubts of the force of this reasoning , let him try his skill , and see what learned stuff he is like to make of it when he comes to explain his notion of mutual-consciousness by several examples , steps , and sorts of union , and out of them all to form one adequate notion of this so much admired thing . wherefore i conclude , and , i think , unanswerably , that the fathers by this unity between the divine persons , mean one thing , and this man quite another ; and consequently that they have given a very different account of it , from what he gives , contrary to his equally bold and false asseveration , affirming it to be the very same . and now i am ready to see what he has to offer us from the fathers in behalf of his mutual-consciousness ; but because i am extremely desirous , that the reader should keep him close to the point , and not suffer him to wander from it ( which , in dispute , he is as apt to do as any man living ) i shall presume to hint this to him , that the point to be proved by this author , is not that the three divine persons have one and the same numerical nature , or essence , nor that they are mutually conscious to one another of whatsoever each of them is , or knows ; no , nor yet that this mutual-consciousness inferrs an unity of nature in them , as a thing inseparable from it . but he is to prove , that this unity of nature , and this mutual-consciousness are convertibly one and the some thing , or that this latter is to the former what the essence or form of any thing is to that thing : that is to say , that the unity of the divine nature formally consists in , and is , what it is , by that mutual-consciousness which belongs to the three divine persons . this , i say , is the thing to be proved by him. and so i proceed to his arguments ( which i assure the reader , he shall find very strange ones ) nevertheless to give him as easie and distinct a view of them , as i can , i will set down the several heads of them before i particularly discuss them . . the first of them is from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ascribed , by the fathers , to all the three divine persons joyntly . . the second from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . the third from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or circumincession attributed likewise by the fathers to them . . the fourth from the representation , which st. austin makes of the trinity , by the mind , and its three distinct faculties of understanding , memory , and will. and , . the fifth and last from the unity of the original principle , or fountain of the deity , or rather ( say i ) of the second and third persons of the trinity . all which i shall examine distinctly , and in their order . but before i do so , i think fit to give the reader an account in one word of this author 's whole design in all the particulars above specified . and that is , to prove , that the unity of the divine nature consists in unity of operation , and then to suppose ( for he does not so much as to go about to prove it ) that this unity of operation is mutual-consciousness . this is the sum total of the business ; but i now come to particulars . and , first , for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quoted by him out of greg. nyssen . where , before we see how far it may be formed into an argument , i think it requisite to give some account how this author discourses of it . i must confess , i have sometimes wondred , what design he could have in so zealously exploding those commonly received terms of substance , essence and nature from any application of them to god : which here he does again afresh , telling us in page . lines , , , . that it confounds our minds when we talk of the numerical unity of the god-head to have the least conception or thought about the distinction and union of natures and essences . and that therefore we are to speak of god only in words importing energy or operation : and accordingly for this reason gr. nyssen expresses god by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , words not signifying nature or essence , but only sight and inspection ; nay and this author has gone a step much beyond this , plainly telling us , that the father and the son are energy or operation , page . line . and that nature and energy are the same in god , p. . l. . and consequently , that we are to entertain no other conception of god , but as of a pure simple operation . and thus , when we have degraded the divine nature from substance to operation , it is but one step more to degrade it to bare notion . this conceit of this author , i say , at first i could not but wonder at , but am since pretty well aware of what he drives at by it . and that is in short , that he thinks it a much easier matter to make action , or operation , than substance , essence , or nature pass for mutual consciousness : and this upon good reason , i am satisfied , is the thing he designs : but i believe he will fall short of fetching his mutual-consciousness out of either of them . and therefore first to correct that crude notion of his , that we must not speak of god in terms importing nature , but operation ; i desire this bold man ( as i urged before in chap. ) to tell me whether the names of iah and iehovah , and i am that i am , by which , god revealed himself to his people , were not names of nature and essence ? and whether god revealed them for any other purpose than that he might be known and understood by them ? but for all this he will have us to know from gr. nyssen , that the divine nature is quid 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a thing above name or expression . and it is so , i confess , as to an adequate complete conception or description of it . but then , i ask him , are not the divine operations so too ? are we able to comprehend them perfectly , and to the utmost of what , and how they are ? when the psalmist tells us , that god has put darkness under his feet , psal. . . and that his footsteps are not known , psal. . . and the apostle in rom. . . that his judgments are unsearchable , and his ways past finding out . and are not these passages an account of his dealings and operations in the government of the world ? and yet surely , notwithstanding all this , we may have some true , though imperfect conceptions both of his nature and of his operations also : and i desire this assuming man to inform me , what should hinder , but that so much as we conceive of god , we may likewise express , and ( what is more ) prove too ? for though gregory nyssen has told us , that the divine nature is unexpressible , yet , i hope , a thing may be proved , though the nature of it cannot always be throughly expressed . but the truth is , he makes this father argue at a very odd rate . for he tells us , page . that one way , by which gregory nyssen undertakes to prove , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or specifick sameness of nature , ( as this man understands it ) proves a numerical unity of nature in the divine persons , is , because the name [ god ] does not so properly signifie the divine nature as something relating to it : which is a rare proof indeed ; it being as much as to say , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or sameness of nature , proves one god , because [ god ] does not signifie nature . but st. gregory is far from arguing so ( which , besides the absurdity of it , is only denying instead of proving ) but he proves sameness and unity of nature , by sameness , or unity of operation ; and that surely he might very well do , without making unity of nature only an unity of operation . and no less absurd is it , to represent st. gregory making unity of operation one way whereby the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or specifick sameness of nature , proves a numerical unity of nature : for though unity of operation it self proves this , yet surely it is not a medium , whereby a specifick unity of the said nature , does , or can prove it . but to proceed , that assertion of this author , [ that god is properly energy , or operation ] contains in it more absurdities than one . for first he takes energy and operation for the same thing ; whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is properly vis activa , and operation is only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or actual exercise of that vis , or power . but whether it signifies one or both , it is certain , that god is properly neither of them . for ( as i have shewn before ) we must speak of god as we are able to conceive of him ; and we conceive of god not as of an action , but as of an agent ; that is , as of a substance acting , or exerting it self ; and upon this account i do here tell this author , that it is impossible for humane reason to conceive of action , or operation , but as founded in substance ; and that nothing would more confound and overturn all the methods , ways , and notions of men's minds , than to endeavour to conceive of it otherwise . and therefore if god is sometimes called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or action , it is by a metonymy of the adjunct for the subject , or the effect for the cause ; for truly and properly he is not so . and now , if this author shall think to take sanctuary in that known expression of god , that he is a pure simple act , he may please to take notice , that the term act is ambiguous ; and sometimes signifies an actus entitativus , which is no more than the entity , or being of a thing , and sometimes an actus physicus , which is the operation , or exertion of some active power . and it is in the former sense only in which god is said to be a pure simple act , and not in the latter . and , by this author's favour , every substance , essence , or nature is such an act ; which quite spoils all his fine notion about expressing god only by terms of energy and operation , in exclusion of those of nature , essence and substance . this i thought fit to premise , as throwing up the very foundation of all his arguments , and indeed of his whole hypothesis . and so i come to his argument , the sum of which , is this . that the divine nature is divine energy , or operation ; and therefore , that the unity of divine operation , is unity of divine nature ; and lastly , that this unity of divine nature is mutual-consciousness . now it is certain , that there is not one of all these three propositions true ; but that is no fault of mine : since if they were cast into a syllogism , that would not mend the matter ; for the syllogism must proceed thus . unity of divine energy , or operation , is mutual-consciousness . unity of divine nature is unity of divine energy , or operation . and therefore , unity of divine nature is mutual-consciousness . every one of which propositions is still salse . and yet i shall referr it to this author himself , or to any one , who has read and considered his book , to form a better argument from what he has said of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , with reference to the present subject , if he can . nevertheless whether it be an argument , or no argument , my answer to his allegation of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , with relation to the unity of the divine nature , and to mutual-consciousness , is thus . first , that it is one thing to be a proof of a thing , and another to be that wherein the nature of the thing proved , does consist . thus actual ratiocination is a certain proof of a principle of reason , yet nevertheless it is not that wherein a principle of reason does consist , since that may be and continue , when actual ratiocination ceases . in like manner i will allow the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to be a proof of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but i absolutely deny , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the energy , is that wherein the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the nature is , or ought to be placed ; or that the fathers ever accounted it so , how truly and strongly soever it might , in their judgment , inferrit . what the fathers designed to prove by unity of operation in the three divine persons , is evident from the following passages ; ( to which twenty times as many might be added ) gregory nyssen tells us , that those whose energy is the same , have their nature altogether the same . and st. basil , that those who have the same operations , have also the same essence [ or substance . ] but the operation [ orenergy ] of the father and the son is one , as appears in that expression , let us make man. and again , whatsoever the fatherdoes , that likewise does the son , and therefore there is but one essence of the father and the son. and again , the sameness of operation in the father , son , and holy ghost , evidently shews , that there is no difference in their essence , or substance : and accordingly st. austin , the operation cannot be diverse ; where the nature is not only equal , but also undivided . from all which , it is most clear , that the fathers alledge this unity of operation only as a proof or argument of this unity of nature , or essence : and therefore , since nothing can be a proof of it self , that they did not take unity of operation , and unity of nature for one and the same thing . but , secondly , supposing ( but not granting ) that it were so , viz. that unity of operation did not only prove , but really was it self this unity of nature , or essence ; yet how will this author prove , that unity of nature , or unity of operation is properly mutual-consciousness ? is there so much as one tittle in the fathers expressing , or necessarily implying , that it is so ? and as to the reason of the thing it self ; will any one say , that there is no other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belonging to the divine nature , but mutual-consciousness ? or that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the whole latitude and compass of it extends no further ? nay , on the contrary , does it not exert it self in infinite other acts ? and , what is yet more , does it not more properly belong to any other of the divine acts , than to an act of knowledge ? ( bare knowledge , as such being of it self unoperative ) and mutual-consciousness is but an act of knowledge . i protest i am ashamed to dispute seriously against such stuff . . his next argument to prove , that mutual-consciousness is formally that unity of nature which is in the three divine persons , is taken from another expression of the said gregory nyssen ; viz. that there is amongst the divine persons , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . concerning which , this author has the boldness to appeal to any one to judge , whether this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this single motion of the will , which at the same instant , is in father , son , and holy ghost , can signifie any thing but mutual consciousness , which makes them numerically one , page . lines , , , &c. and he adds , that it is impossible they should have such a single motion of will passing through them all , without this mutual consciousness , page . lines , . and this is the sum of his argument from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . in answer to which , before i address my self to his argument , i will give some account of the quotation . in which , by his favour , we are to take the sense of the father's words from the father himself , and not from the inferences which he who quotes them , thinks fit to draw from them ( how good soever he may be at that work. ) now , what st. gregory means by them , appears plainly by his manner of reasoning . the question before him was , whether the three divine persons were three gods ? which st. gregory denies , and amongst other proofs , says , that god is the name of energy , and from the unity of energy , proves the unity of the deity , and that three persons are but one god because the operation is the same in all . to this he raises an objection from the sameness of faculty , office or operation amongst men , as geometricians , husbandmen , orators , whose office , business and operations , ( in their respective way ) are the same ; which yet does not hinder , but that they are still three or more several men. to which he answers , that these act seperately and by themselves ; but that it is not so in the divine nature ; no person in the holy trinity , doing any thing by himself only , or acting separately from the other two , but that there is one and the same motion ond disposition of will passing from the father , through the son , to the holy ghost . this is the force of st. gregory's reasoning , and the plain meaning of it is no more but this , that three men acting the same thing , are still three men , because they act separately and by themselves : but that the three persons in the trinity , are but one god , because they do not act separately , but that there is the same motion and disposition of will in all the three persons ; as , on the contrary , three men's not having one and the same motion of will , equally proves , that they are not one , but three several men ; and accordingly makes a manifest difference between three men acting the same thing , and the operation of the three persons in the blessed trinity : which is the sum of st. gregory's answer to the forementioned objection . and now , what does all this prove ? why truly neither of those two things , which this author must prove , or he proves nothing , viz. that this unity of motion , and disposition of will , is properly and formally unity of divine nature : and next , that this unity of divine nature is properly mutual consciousness . these two things , i say , it is incumbent upon him to prove : but how it can be done from the fore-mentioned words , or argument of gregory nyssen , i believe , will pose the learned'st man alive to shew . the proper answer therefore to this argument will be much the same with that just before given to the argument drawn from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( of which this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is but a branch ) and it proceeds thus . first , i deny the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be any more than a proof of the unity of the divine nature ; just as either the effect , or the causality is a sure proof of the cause ; but for all that , is not the cause : or as a consequent proves its antecedent without being the antecedent , or that wherein the nature of the antecedent does consist . secondly , in the next place i deny that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is formally and properly the same with mutual-consciousness , any more than an act , or motion of the will , is formally the same with an act of the understanding : and before this author takes it for granted , ( which is his constant way of proving things ) i expect that he make it appear , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifie formally one and the same thing : and it was boldly done of him ( to say the least ) to appeal to his reader about a thing , in which , if he understood the difference between an act of volition , and an act of intellection , he must certainly judge against him . but it may be reply'd , that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , does at least inserr a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i grant it may : but affirm , that this is nothing to his purpose ; unless it could follow from hence , that that which inferrs , or proves a thing , is the very thing which it inferrs and proves ; which it neither is , nor , for that reason , can be . as for what he adds , that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be in the three divine persons , without such a mutual-consciousness : i do readily grant this also . but in the mean time is not this dictator yet old enough to distinguish between the causa sinè quâ non , or rather the condition of a thing , and the ratio formalis , or nature of that thing ? between that , without which a thing cannot be , and that , which that thing properly is ? there can be no such thing as sight , without a due circulation of the blood and spirits : but is such a circulation , therefore , properly an act of sight ? or an act of sight such a circulation ? to dispute this further , would be but to abuse the reader 's patience . and last of all , if this author should take advantage of those words from gregory nyssen , that god is the name of energy . besides , that it is not the bare notation , but use of the word , that must govern its signification : i would have this author know , that god may have many names , by which his nature is not signified ; as well as several others by which it is , and may be . but i must confess , it is a very pleasant thing ( as was in some measure hinted before ) to prove the divine nature to be energy , because the name [ god ] does not signifie nature , but energy , or operation ; whereas in truth ( if it proves any thing ) it proves that nature and energy ( applyed to god ) do by no means signifie the same thing . and so i have done with his argument from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and effectually demonstrated , that there is not so much as the least shew , or semblance of any proof from this , that mutual consciousness is properly that wherein the unity of the divine nature in the three persons of the blessed trinity does consist . . his third argument is from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , commonly translated circumincession , and signifying a mutual-inexistence , or in-dwelling of each person in the other two. the word was first used in this sence ( so far as i can find ) by damascen , a father of the th . century . but the thing meant by it , is contained in those words of our saviour in iohn . . . believe me that i am in the father , and the father in me ; which , i confess , are a solid and sufficient proof of the unity and identity of the divine nature , both in the father and the son ; and withal a very happy and significant expression of the same . but what is this to our author's purpose ? and how does he prove this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be mutual consciousness ? why truly , by no argument , or reason produced , or so much as offered at by him , but only by a confident , over-bearing affirmation , that there is no other account to be given of that mutual in-being of the divine persons in each other , ( which the fathers call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) but by mutual consciousness , page . lines , , . but , by his leave , i must debate the case a little with him , before he carries it off so . and in order to this , i must tell him in the first place , that the question is not whether mutual consciousness best explains this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but whether it be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it self , and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be the unity of the divine nature in the three persons ? and in the next place , i demand of him , whether our saviour's words do not plainly and expresly signifie the mutual in-being , or in existence of the persons in one another , without any signification of their mutual consciousness at all ? and if so , let me hear a reason , why we should not take our saviour's meaning from the native signification of his own words , rather than from those of this author . for will he venture to affirm , that the father cannot be in the son , and the son in the father by a mutual in-existence in one another , but only by a mutual knowledge of one another ? let him take heed what he says , and how he ventures beyond his depth . or will he say , that our saviour meant the same thing with himself , but was not so happy in expressing it ? for no other reason , but one of these two can be assigned , that when our saviour expresses himself in terms importing mutual in-existence , this man shall dare to say , that he means nothing by them but mutual consciousness . i referr it to the serious and impartial reader to judge of the horrible boldness of this man : and withal , to observe how extremely he varies from himself about this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and mutual consciousness . for , first , he sometimes says , that mutual consciousness is the only thing wherein both the unity of the divine nature , and this mutual in-dwelling of the three divine persons does consist , page . lines , . and , secondly , he says , that mutual consciousness is the only thing that can explain , or give an account of this mutual in-dwelling , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , page . lines , . to which i answer , that when he speaks of giving an account of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , if he means only an account that there is such a thing belonging to the divine persons , our saviour's words have given a sufficient account of that already . but , secondly , if he means such an account of it , as explains and makes clear to us the nature of it , by shewing what it is , and how it is , i deny that any such account can be given ( or perhaps understood ) by humane reason ; and much less , that his mutual consciousness does or can give it . concerning which , i shall ask him this one question , viz. whether the three persons of the blessed trinity are not mutually conscious to one another of their mutual in-existence in one another ? i suppose he will not ( because he dares not ) deny it . and if he grants it , then it manifestly follows , that their mutual in-existence in one another , is in order of nature before their mutual consciousness ; and consequently cannot be the same with it , nor consist in it . for certainly those divine persons must exist mutually in one another , before they can know , or be conscious to themselves that they do so . so that we see here , that nothing is , or can be concluded from this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for his mutual consciousness , whether we consider the use of the word , or the nature of the thing . but let us see , how he makes good his point from the authority of the fathers , which was the grand thing undertook by him in this his th . section . and here as for the fathers , he both despises and reproaches them , and that very grosly too . for first he tells us , that such an union amongst the divine persons ( as is expressed by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; ) they all agree in , but how to explain it they knew not , page . lines , . and why then , in the name of god , does he referr to the fathers to justifie his explanation of that , which in the very same breath he says , they knew not how to explain ? and the truth is , the fathers never owned themselves able to explain it ; and that for a very good reason , viz. because they held it unexplicable and unconceivable ; and not for that scandalous reason given by him , viz. that they had gross material conceptions of the deity , by conceiving of it as of a substance , page . lines , . for , says he , within two lines after , had they contemplated god as a pure mind , it had been easie to explain this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or indwelling of the divine persons in each other . good god! that any professor of divinity should call that easie to explain , which the reason of all mankind has hitherto bent under , as a thing too great , and mysterious for it to comprehend , or to grapple with ! so that if ever we have cause to cry out 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it is here : or that he should tax all those , who own themselves at a loss about it , for not contemplating god as a pure mind ! but to him , i confess , who can conceive of such a pure mind , as is no substance ; that is to say , in other words , no being ; ( for i am sure he will not so much as pretend it to be an accident ) to him , i say , i cannot wonder , if nothing seem difficult , or mysterious . in the mean time , it is shameless and insufferable in this man to say , as he does , page , . that his explication of the trinity is not new , but the same with that of the fathers ; and afterwards in pursuance of this assertion , to say , that the fathers knew not how to explain it ; and to give this as a reason of their not knowing how to do so , viz. that they had such gross notions of god , that they could not conceive rightly of this mystery . for this he has roundly affirmed ; and therefore ought in all reason , either to prove this charge upon the fathers , or to give the world , and the church of england in particular , satisfaction for speaking so falsely and scandalously of such glorious lights and principal pillars of the christian church ; and such as , i dare say , never preached nor prayed in any conventicle . but what the doctrine of the fathers is concerning this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and how they understood those words of our saviour ( expressed by this term ) is manifest from the testimony of two or three of them , which i shall set down , as ( in so known a case ) abundantly sufficient . st. cyril of alexandria , says expresly , christ's saying , that he is in the father , and the father in him , shews the indentity of the deity , and the unity of the substance , or essence . and so likewise athanasius : accordingly therefore ( says he ) christ having said before , i and my father are one : he adds , i am in the father , and the father in me , that he might shew both the identity of the divinity , and the unity of essence . and so again st. hilary : the father is in the son , and the son in the father , by the unity of an inseparable [ undivided ] nature . by which passages , i suppose any man of sense will perceive , that the thing which the fathers meant and gathered from those words of our saviour ( since expressed by this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) was no unity of mutual consciousness ( which they never mention ) but an unity of essence , or nature ( which they expresly and constantly do . ) nor does this very author deny it , as appears from his own words , though he quite perverts the sence of the fathers , by a very senceless remark upon them , page . lines , . this sameness [ or unity ] of nature ( says he ) might be the cause of this union [ in the divine persons , ] viz by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but not explain what this intimate union is . now this author has been already told , that the question here is not , what explains this union , but what this union is . but besides this his mistake of the question , i desire him to declare , what he means by the cause of this union , ( as he here expresses himself . ) for will he make an union ( as he calls an unity ) in the divine persons by sameness of nature , a cause of their intimate union by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or mutual in-being of them in each other , and affirm also this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the same thing with mutual consciousness ? if he does so , he makes the same thing the cause of it self . for the sameness of nature in the three persons , and their mutual in-being , or indwelling , are the very same thing , and the same unity , though differently expressed . but however , if we take him at his own word , it will effectually overthrow his hypothesis . for if the sameness of the divine nature in the three persons , be ( as he says ) the cause of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be the same with mutual consciousness ; it will and must follow , that this sameness , or unity of nature can no more consist in mutual consciousness , than the cause can consist in its effect , or the antecedent in its consequent . and this inference stands firm and unanswerable against him . but as to the truth of the thing it self , though we allow and grant the unity of the divine nature in the three persons , and the mutual in-being , or in-dwelling of the said persons in each other , to be the same thing , yet we deny , that this their mutual in-being is the same with their mutual consciousness . but that their mutual consciousness follows and results from it , and for that cause cannot be formally the same with it . and so i have done with his d. argument , which he has drawn from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and is indeed nothing else , but a bold down-right perversion of scripture , and a gross abuse of the fathers . . his fourth argument is from an allegation out of st. austin , who , though he does not ( as our author confesses ) name this mutual consciousness , yet he explains a trinity in unity ( as he would perswade us ) by examples of mutual consciousness ; particularly by the unity of three faculties of understanding , memory and will in the same soul , all of them mutually conscious to one another of the several acts belonging to each of them . and his th . book is spent upon this argument ; in which he makes the mind , considered with its knowledge of it self , and its love of it self ( all three of them ( as he says ) but one and the same thing ) a faint resemblance of the trinity in unity . and this is , what he argues from st. austin . to which i answer . first , that faint resemblances are far from being solid proofs of any thing ; and that , although similitudes may serve to illustrate a thing otherwise proved , yet they prove and conclude nothing . the fathers indeed are full of them both upon this and several other subjects , but still they use them for illustration only , and nothing else . and it is a scurvy sign that proofs and arguments run very low with this author , when he passes over those principal places in which the fathers have plainly , openly and professedly declared their judgment upon this great article , and endeavours to gather their sence of it only from similitudes and allusions ; which looks like a design of putting his reader off with something like an argument , and not an argument , and of which the tail stands where the head should : for according to the true method of proving things , the reason should always go first , and the similitude come after ; but by no means ought the similitude ever to be put instead of the reason . but , secondly , to make it yet clearer , how unconclusive this author's allegation from st. austin is , i shall demonstrate , that this father does not here make use of an example of mutual consciousness , by shewing the great disparity between the thing alledged , and the thing which it is applyed to , and that , as to the very case , which it is alledged for . for we must observe , that the mutual consciousness of the persons of the blessed trinity is such , as is fully and entirely in each person ; so that by virtue thereof every one of them is truly and properly conscious of all that belongs to the other two. but it is by no means so in those three faculties of the soul , understanding , memory , and will. for though the understanding indeed be conscious to all that passes in the will , yet i deny the will to be conscious to any thing , or act that passes either in the understanding , or the memory , and it is impossible it should be so , without exerting an act of knowledge , or intellection ; which to ascribe to the faculty of the will , would be infinitely absurd . it is true indeed . that one and the same soul is conscious to it self of the acts of all these three faculties : but still it is by virtue of its intellectual faculty alone , that it is so . and the like is to be said of its knowledge and of its love of it self : for though it be the same soul which both knows and loves it self , yet it neither knows it self by an act of love , nor loves it self by an act of knowledge any more , than it can will by an act of the memory , or remember by an act of the will , which is impossible : and amongst other proofs that it is so , it seems to me a very considerable one , that , if a man could remember by his will , this author in all likelyhood , would not forget himself so often as he does . it is clear therefore on the one side , that the acts of understanding , memory , and will , neither are nor can be acts of mutual consciousness ; and on the other , that father , son , and holy ghost do every one of them exert acts of mutual consciousness upon one another , and consequently , that , as to this thing , there is a total entire difference between both sides of the comparison . for which cause it is to be hoped , that this author himself will henceforth consult the credit of his own reason so far , as to give over proving , that the unity of the divine nature in the three blessed persons consists wholly and solely in the mutual consciousness of the said persons , by examples taken from such created things as are by no means mutually conscious to one another . but to manifest yet further the vanity of this his allegation out of st. austin , i shall plainly shew , wherein this father placed the unity of the three divine persons . and that , in short , is in the unity of their nature , essence , and substance . this is the catholick faith ( says he ) that we believe father , son , and holy ghost to be of one and the same substance . and again , let us believe in the father , son , and holy ghost . these are eternal and unchangeable , that is , one god , of one substance , the eternal trinity . and moreover , speaking of such as would have three gods to be worshipped , he adds , that they know not what is the meaning of one and the same substance , and are deceived by their own fancies ; and because they see three bodies separate in three places , they think the substance of god is so to be understood . i think it very needless to add the like testimonies from other fathers ( how numerous and full soever they may be ) for our author having here quoted only st. austin , i shall confine my answer to his quotation , and think it enough for me to over-rule an inference from a similitude taken out of st. austin , by a plain , literal , unexceptionable declaration of st. austin's opinion . the sum of the whole matter is this , that the thing to be proved by this author , is , that the three divine persons are one , only by an unity of mutual consciousness ; and to prove this , he produces only a similitude out of st. austin , and that also , a similitude taken from things , in which no such thing as mutual consciousness is to be found . by which it appears , that his argument is manifestly lame of both legs , and , as such , i leave it to shift for it self . . in the fifth and last place , he tells us , that the fathers also resolved the unity of the god head in the three divine persons into the unity of principle ; meaning thereby , that though there be three divine persons in the god-head , father , son and holy ghost ; yet the father is the original and fountain of the deity , who begets the son of his own substance ; and from whom , and the son , the holy ghost eternally proceeds of the same substance with the father and son ; so that there is but one principle and fountain of the deity , and therefore but one god , page . line . now all this is very true ; but how will our author bring it to his purpose ? why , thus , or not at all , viz. that the numerical unity of nature in the three divine persons , by being founded in , and resolved into this unity of principle , does therefore properly consist in mutual consciousness . this , i say , must be his inference , and it is a large step , i confess , and larger than any of the fathers ever made : nevertheless without making it , this author must sit down short of his point . and yet if he really thinks , that his point may be concluded from hence , why , in the name of sence and reason might he not as well have argued from gen. . . that god created the heavens and the earth , and that therefore the three divine persons are and must be one , only by an unity of mutual consciousness ? for it would have followed every whit as well from this as from the other . but , since the creation of both , i believe , never man disputed as this man does , while he pretends to prove his mutual consciousness from the unity of principle in the oeconomy of the divine persons : and yet , if he does not design to prove it from thence , to what purpose is this unity of principle here alledged , where the only point to be proved is , that the unity of the divine nature in the three persons is only an unity of mutual consciousness ? but to come a little closer to him . if this author can make it out , that the father communicates his substance to the son , and the father and the son together communicate the same to the holy ghost by one eternal act of mutual consciousness , common to all three persons , then his argument from unity of principle to an unity of nature , consisting in mutual consciousness , may signifie and conclude something ; but this he attempts not , nor if he should , would he or any man living be ever able to prove it . but he is for coming over this argument again , and tells us , that ( as petavius well observes ) it does not of it self prove the unity ( that is to say , the numerical unity ) of the god-head , but only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or sameness of nature , i. e. as he elsewhere explains himself , [ the specifick sameness of nature . ] and that therefore the fathers thought fit to add , that god begets a son , not without , but within himself , page . line , &c. in answer to which observation , though it affects the point of mutual consciousness ( the only thing now in hand ) no more than what he had alledged before ; yet in vindication both of the fathers and of petavius himself , i must needs tell this author , that it is equally an abuse to both . for as to the fathers , it has been sufficiently proved to him , that neither is there any such thing as a specifick unity , or sameness of nature in the divine persons , nor that the fathers ever owned any such , but still by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , held only a numerical unity of nature , and no other ; so that their saying , that god begot a son within himself , was rather a further explication of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , than any addition at all to it . and as for petavius , whereas this man says , that he has observed , that this argumentation of the fathers , does not of it self prove the numerical unity of the god-head in the three persons ; i averr , that petavius observes no such thing . he says indeed , if this reasoning ( viz. from unity of principle ) were considered absolutely and universally , it would prove rather a specifick than a numerical unity of nature , and gives a reason for it from humane generation : but then he does by no means say , that the fathers arguments in this case ought to be so considered , but plainly limits them to the divine generation , as of a peculiar kind , differing from all others . and thereupon no less plainly asserts , that when the father begets the son , he communicates to him the same numerical substance and nature , and says expresly , that the force and strength of the fathers argumentation is taken from the proper condition and nature of the divinity , and the divine generation , from whence they collect , not any kind of unity of essence , but only a singular and numerical unity in the three divine persons : which he makes good by instances from st. athanasius and st. hilary . and this is the true state of the case , and shews , that petavius understood the fathers ; whether he , who takes upon him to be his corrector and confuter , does or no. in the mean time it is shameless to insinuate in this manner , that petavius represented these arguments of the fathers , as proving only the [ specifick ] sameness of nature , and not the numerical unity of the god-head , when he plainly shews , that they designed thereby to prove a numerical unity of essence in the divine persons , and nothing else . but this author seems to assume to himself a peculiar privilege of saying what he will , and of whom he will. in which nevertheless i cannot but commend his conduct , as little as i like his arguing . for that , as he makes so bold with so learned and renowned a person as petavius ; so he wisely does it now that he is laid fast in his grave . for had petavius been living , and this man wrote his book in the same language in which petavius wrote his ( which , for a certain reason , i am pretty well satisfied he never would ) there is no doubt but petavius would have tossed him and his new notion of three distinct infinite spirits , long since , in a blanket , and effectually taught him the difference of insulting over a great man when his head is low , and when he is able to defend himself . we have seen how little our author has been able to serve himself of the fore mentioned resolution of the unity of the divine nature , into an unity of principle , by way of argument in behalf of his mutual consciousness . nevertheless , though it fails him , as an argument , yet , that he may not wholly lose it , he seems desirous to cultivate it as a notion ; and upon that score tells us , that it needs something further both to complete and explain it , ( which , with reference to his own apprehensions of it , i easily believe ) but however , i shall take some account of what he says , both as to the completion , and explication of it . and , first , for the completion . he tells us , that father , son , and holy ghost , are essential to one god , and that upon this account there must be necessarily three persons in the unity of the god-head , and can be no more . as to which last clause he must give me leave to tell him , that it is not the bare essentiality of the three persons to the god-head , which proves that there can be no more than three belonging to it : but it is the peculiar condition of the persons , which proves this ; without which the essentiality of the three , would no more hinder the essentiality of a fourth or fifth , than the essentiality of two could take away the essentiality of a third . and , therefore though the proposition laid down by him be true , yet his reason for it will not hold . but one choice passage quoted by him out of a great father , i must by no means omit , viz. that upon account of this unity of principle , st. austin calls the trinity , unam quandam summam rem , page . line . concerning which , i desire any man living ( except this author ) to declare freely , whether he thinks that st. austin , or any one else of sence and learning would call three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ( which are neither numerically , nor specificully , nor so much as collectively one ) unam quandam summam rem . but in the second place : as for his explication of the said notion , he tells us , that he shall proceed by several steps , and those ( as he would perswade us ) very plain , and universally acknowledged by all , page . lines , , &c. nevertheless , by his good leave , i shall and must demur to two of them , as by no means fit to be acknowledged by any , and much less such as are acknowledged by all . and they are the third and fourth . in which he tells us , that , in the first place , original mind and wisdom , and in the second , that knowledge of it self , and lastly , love of it self , are all of them distinct acts , and so distinct , that they can never be one simple individual act : and withal , that these acts being thus distinct , must be three substantial acts in god , that is to say , three subsisting persons : by which three substantial acts he must of necessity mean three such acts , as are three substances . forasmuch as he adds in the very next words , that there is nothing but essence and substance in god , page . line , , . to the middle of the page . now against these strange positions , i argue thus . first , if the three fore-mentioned acts are so distinct in god , that they can never be one simple individual act , then i inferr , that the said three acts cannot possibly be one god. forasmuch as to be one god , is to be one pure simple indivisible act. and thus we see how at one step , or stroke , he has ungodded the three persons of the blessed trinity . for these three acts ( he tells us ) are the three persons in the god head . though i believe no divine before him , ever affirmed a person to be an act , or an act a person , with how great confidence soever ( and something else ) this man affirms it here . secondly , if those three acts in the god-head are three distinct infinite substances ( as he plainly says they are , by telling us , page . line . that there is nothing but essence and substance in god ) then in the god-head there are and must be three distinct gods , or god-heads . forasmuch as an infinite substance being properly god , every distinct infinite substance , is and must be a distinct god. these i affirm to be the direct unavoidable consequences of those two short paragraphs in page . which he makes his third and fourth explanatory steps . but because he may here probably bear himself upon that maxim , that there is nothing but essence and substance in god , ( which yet by the way might better become any one to plead than himself ) let me tell him , that that proposition is not absolutely , and in all sences true . if indeed he means by it , that there is no being , whether substance , or accident in god , besides his own most pure , simple , indivisible substance , or essence , ( which is the commonly received sence of it ) it is most true . but if he therefore affirms , that neither are there any modes , or relations in god , this will not be granted him . for in god , besides essence , or substance , we assert , that there is that , which we call mode , habitude , and relation : and by one or other of these in conjunction with essence , or substance , we give account of all the acts , attributes , and personalities belonging to the divine nature , or god-head . this is the constant , unanimously received doctrine of divines , school-men , and metaphysicians , in their discourses upon god , and without which , it is impossible to discourse intelligibly of the divine acts , attributes , or persons . and as it stands upon a firm bottom , so it may well be defended : and if this author has ought to except against it , i shall be ready to undertake the defence of it against him at any time . but still , that he may keep up that glorious standing character of self-contradiction , ( which , one would think to be the very ratio formalis ; or , at least , the personal property of the man. ) having here , in page . made a very bold step , by asserting the three divine persons , to be three distinct acts , and so distinct , that they can never be one simple , individual act. in the very next page but one , viz. . line . he roundly affirms , that the father and the son are one single energy and operation . now , how safe and happy is this man , that no absurdities , or contradictions can ever hurt him ! or at least , that he never feels them , let them pinch never so close and hard . what remains , is chiefly a discourse about the different way of the son 's issuing from the father , and the holy ghost's issuing from both : as that the former is called generation , because the son issues from the father by a reflex act , and the latter termed procession , because the holy ghost issues from both by a direct act. but why a reflex act must needs be termed properly a generation , and a direct act not be capable of being properly so accounted , this our acute author very discreetly says nothing at all to ; though ( under favour ) all that he says besides , leaves us as much in the dark as we were before . and for my own part , i cannot think my self concerned to clear up a point wholly foreign to that , which alone i have undertook the discussion of . and thus i have finished my dispute with him , concerning the authorities of the fathers alledged in behalf of his notion of mutual consciousness , as that , wherein he places the unity of the divine nature belonging to the three blessed persons . the sum of which whole dispute is resolved into this single question , viz. in what the father 's placed the unity in trinity ? and if they placed it in the sameness , or unity of nature , substance , or essence , ( words applyed by them to this subject at least a thousand times , and still used to signifie one and the same thing ) then it is plain that they did not place it in an unity of mutual consciousness . for , i suppose , no man ( this author himself not excepted ) will say , that essence , or substance , and mutual consciousness are terms synonymous , and of the same signification . and as the whole dispute turns upon this single question ; so in the management of it , on my part , i have with great particularity gone over all the proofs by which this author pretends to have evinced his doctrine from the fathers . the utmost of which proofs amounts to this , that the fathers proved an unity of nature in the divine persons , from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 common to them all : and moreover , sometimes illustrated the said unity by the three faculties of the understanding , memory , and will being one with the soul which they belonged to . and lastly , that they resolved the unity of the trinity into an unity of principle ; the father being upon that account styled , principium & fons deitatis , as communicating the divine substance to the son , and together with the son to the holy ghost . and what of all this , i pray ? do all , or any of the fore-mentioned terms signifie mutual consciousness ? why , no : but this author with a non obstante both to the proper signification and common use of them all , by absolute prerogative declares them to mean mutual consciousness : and so his point is proved , viz that mutual consciousness is not only an argument inferring the unity of the divine nature in the three blessed persons , ( which yet was all , that the fathers used the fore-mentioned terms for ) but , ( which is more ) that it is that very thing wherein this unity does consist . this , i say , is a true , though a short account of all his arguments upon this subject ; and ( according to my custom ) i refer it to the judicious reader , to judge impartially , whether it be not so , and withall to improve and carry on the aforesaid arguments in his behalf to all further advantage that they may be capable of . but in the issue , methinks the author himself seems to review them with much less confidence of their puissance , than when at first he produced them . for if we look back upon the triumphant flag hung out by him at his entrance upon this part of his work ( the only proper time for him to triumph in ) and when he declared , that his explication of the trinity was the constant doctrine of the fathers and the schools , page . lines , . who could have imagined but that he then foresaw , that he should prove his point with all the strength and evidence which his own heart could desire ? and yet alas ! such , for the most part , is the vast distance between promises and performances , that we have him bringing up the rear of all with this sneaking conclusion , page . line , &c. it must be confessed , ( says he ) that the ancient fathers did not express their sence in the same terms that i have done . but i leave it to any indifferent and impartial reader , whether they do not seem to have intended the same explication which i have given of this venerable mystery . these are his words ; and i do very particularly recommend them to the reader , as deserving his peculiar notice . for is this now the upshot and result of so daring a boast , and so confident an undertaking , to prove his opinion the constant doctrine of the fathers ? viz. that though the fathers speak not one word of it ; nay , though they knew not how to express themselves about it , page . line . yet that to an indifferent reader ( and a very indifferent one indeed he must needs be in the worst sence ) they may seem to intend the same explication he had given of it ? so that the sum of his whole proof and argument amounts to this and no more , viz. that to some persons videtur quod sic , and to others , videtur quod non . for see , how low he sinks in the issue . first of all from the fathers positive saying , or holding what he does , it is brought down to their intending it ; and from their intending it , it falls at last to their seeming to intend it ; and that is all . and now , is not this a worthy proof of so high a point ; and may it not justly subject this author to the same sarcastical irony which he passed upon his socinian adversary ? page . line , &c. right , very right , sir , a plain demonstration ! but still there is one half of his promise to be yet accounted for , viz. the proving his opinion to have been the constant doctrine of the schools . and how does he acquit himself as to this ? why , in a very extraordinary manner too . for , first , instead of alledging the authority of the school-men , he tells us , page . that they are of no authority at all , but as they fall in with the fathers . and withall , that instead of doing so , they use to mistake and clog the sence of the fathers with some peculiar niceties and distinctions of their own . and that , the truth is , the vain endeavours of reducing this mystery to terms of art , such as nature , essence , substance , subsistence , hypostasis , person , and the like , ( which , he says ) some of the fathers used in a very different sence from each other ) have wholly confounded this mystery . and here i cannot but desire the reader to judge , whether this be not a new and wonderful way of procuring credit to an hypothesis , upon the score of its being the constant doctrine of the schools , by telling the world ( as this man here does ) that the school-men are a company of impertinent fellows , of little or no authority in themselves , and who have by their useless absurd niceties , consounded this whole mystery ? for if they are of no authority but what they derive from the fathers , ( as he avers ) why does he quote them upon the same level with the fathers , and plead them both as two distinct authorities ? and if they do nothing but pervert and confound this mystery , why , instead of alledging them , does he not earnestly caution his reader against them , and disswade him from having any thing to do with their dangerous and absurd writings ? this certainly is a way of proving a point by testimony and authority , so beyond all example ridiculous , that unless the reader will vouchsafe to read these passages in the author himself , and so take his conviction from his own eyes , i can hardly blame him , if he refuses to believe my bare affirmation in a thing so incredible . as for the terms essence , substance , subsistence , person , and the like , which he so explodes , i hope i have given my reader a satisfactory account both of their usefulness , and of the uselesness of such as this author would substitute in their room , in chap. . at large , to which i referr him . and whereas he says , page . line . &c. that the deity is above nature , and above terms of art ; and that there is nothing like this mysterious distinction and unity ; and therefore , no wonder , if we want proper words to express it by ; at least , that such names as signifie the distinction and unity of creatures , should not reach it . it by all this he means , that there are no terms of art comprehensive , and fully expressive of the divine nature , and the mysterious distinction and unity of the persons belonging to it , none that i know of thinks otherwise . but if he means that no terms of art can be of any use to aid us in our inadequate , imperfect conceptions of those great things , so as thereby we may conceive of them in some better degree , and clearer manner , than we could without such terms , pray then , of what use are his self-consciousness and mutual consciousness in this matter ? for i suppose he will allow these to be terms of art too ; and such ( i am sure ) as he has promised the world no small wonders from . but if he will allow any usefulness in those two terms of art ( of his own inventing ) towards our better apprehension of the divine nature and persons , the same and greater has the constant use of all church-writers proved to be in the terms essence , substance , hypostasis , person , &c. as the properest and most significant , the fittest and most accommodate to help and methodize men's thoughts in discoursing of god , and immaterial beings , of all or any other terms of art , which the wit of man ever yet invented , or pitched upon for that purpose . and i hope , the known avowed use and experience of such great men , and those in so great a number , is an abundant overpoise to the contrary affirmation of this , or any other novel author whatsoever . but all this ( it seems ) he endeavours to overthrow and dash with three terrible confounding questions , page . lines , , &c. which yet i can by no means think so very formidable , but that they may be very safely encountered , and fairly answered too . as , qu. . what ( says our author ) is the substance , or nature of god ? i answer . it is a being existing of , and by it self , incorporeal , infinite , eternal , omniscient , omnipotent , &c. qu. . how can three distinct persons have but one numerical substance ? i answer . every whit as well as they can be said to have but one numerical god-head , or divine nature ; or as they can have one numerical mutual consciousness common to them all . qu. . what is the distinction between essence , and personality , and subsistence ? i answer . the same that is between a thing , or being , and the modes of it . and he , who neither knows , nor admits of a difference between these , is much fitter to go to school himself , than to sit and pass judgment upon the schoolmen . and as for the terms subsistence and personality , they import the last and utmost completion of the existence of things , by vertue whereof , they exist by themselves so , as neither to be supported by , nor communicable to any subject . of which two modes , personality belongs only to intelligent beings , but subsistence to all others , to whom the aforesaid definition does agree . and this is the true , proper difference and distinction between these two. and this author may take notice of it , if he pleases . however , having thus answered his questions ( tho' to what purpose he proposed them , i cannot imagine ) yet that he may see how ambitious i am to follow his great example , i shall , in requital of his three questions , propose these four to him : as , first , since in page . he affirms the deity to be above nature , and all terms of art ; so that we want proper words and names to express the distinction and unity of the divine persons by , and that such , as signifie the distinction and unity of creatures , cannot reach it . i desire to know of him upon what ground of reason it is , that speaking of this same mysterious unity and distinction in page . lines , , &c. he says , that the fathers used several examples , and alluded to several kinds of union , thereby to form an adequate notion of the unity of the god-head ? for if the deity be so far above nature and all terms of art , that there is an utter want of words , or names to express the unity of it by , how could any examples , or allusions drawn from nature ( though never so many ) form in us an adequate notion thereof ? hitherto both divines and philosophers have judged the divine nature absolutely incomprehensible by any adequate , or complete conception of it . and for my own part , i account the unity of it in trinity , much less capable of having an adequate notion formed of it , than the deity considered barely in self is , and consequently that it is as much as humane reason can reach to , to have a true and certain notion of it , though very imperfect and inadequate . but as for an adequate notion of the unity of the god-head in three divine persons , if this author can form to himself such an one , let him enjoy it as a priviledge peculiar to himself , and not obtainable by any other mortal man whatsoever . and this is not the first instance of his misrepresenting the fathers . secondly , whereas this author in the latter end of page , and the beginning of page . explodes the terms essence , substance , subsistence , hypostasis , person , &c. as useless niceties , and serving only to confound the mystery of the trinity ; and yet nevertheless in line , &c. of page . acknowledges , that these very terms were found out and made use of to encounter the heresie of sabellius , who had turned this sacred mystery into a trinity of names , or , at most , of offices ; i desire to know of him , what greater proof he could have given of the exceeding usefulness and importance of these terms , than by thus deriving the invention and use of them from such an occasion ? and especially when , notwithstanding all the curious examination since passed upon them , whereby ( he says ) they were found in some respect or other defective ( as what terms are not when applyed to god ? ) experience yet shews , that they have maintained their use and credit from that age all along to this very day . certainly it is a great unhappiness , when a man can neither forbear writing , nor yet know when he writes for a thing , and when against it . thirdly , i desire to know of this author , whether in the very same place , viz. page . in which he professes to explain an unity in trinity by an unity of principle , he does well to tell us in line . of the said page , that there is nothing but essence and substance in god , having so often , and so positively declared , that these terms serve only to obscure and confound men's notions of god ? and whether he accounts such terms , as serve only thus to confound men's thoughts and notions about the god-head , and the unity thereof , the fittest to explain the unity of the said god-head , with reference to the divine persons ? which is the thing there promised and undertaken by him. fourthly and lastly , since this author has condemned all the fore-mentioned terms both as useless , and sit only to obscure and confound , instead of explaining , the doctrine of the trinity , i desire to know of him , why he tells us at the close of page . that he does not think it impossible ( which is only a figure called , a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifying , that it is very possible and easie ) to give a tolerable account of the said school-terms and distinctions ? for since by a tolerable he must mean ( if he means any thing to the purpose ) such an account of them , as shews them to have a rational sence and meaning under them , i desire him to tell me whether every rational sence is not ( as such ) also a true one ? and if true , whether one truth can any more obscure , perplex , and confound , than it can contradict another truth ? which being invincibly evident , as to the negative , i desire this author in the last place to tell me , whether it does , or can become a man consistent with himself , to pass so reproachful a character upon the terms of the schools , in the beginning of page , and afterwards to give so contrary and commendatory an account of the said terms in the latter end of the very same page ? i hope the reader will be pleased to take this notable instance also of this author's consistency with himself ( so far as self contradiction may be so called ) into his consideration . and so these are the four questions , or queries , which i would have him resolve me , or rather the world , in ; for i am sure it concerns him and his credit , so to do . having thus followed this author both in his reasonings and quotations , and found him equally impertinent in both , i must again desire my reader to joyn with me in admiring the strange confidence of the man. i have already noted , with what a daring assurance he vouched his new opinion for the constant doctrine both of the fathers and the schools , page . line . &c. after which peremptory asseveration , who could have expected , but that he would have appeared in the head of thirty , or twenty fathers at least ( greek and latin together ) to have rescued his beloved hypothesis from the imputation and charge of novelty , which he seems so desirous to ward off ? p. . l. . and that besides gr. nyssen , athanasius , maximus , nazianzen , damascen ( and these for the most part quoted upon an account not at all relating to his hypothesis ) and st. cyril ( who is not so much as quoted , but only named ) we should have had iustin martyr , irenaeus , origen , clemens alexandrinus , st. basil , theodoret , epiphanius , with several more , all alledged in his behalf ? and amongst the latins that we should besides st. austin , whom alone he quotes , and st. ambrose , whom he only mentions about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , page . line . have heard also of tertullian , lactantius , st. cyprian , st. ierom , and st. hilary , with a great many others ? and then lastly for the school-men , who could have expected fewer of them also , than ten , or twenty ? and that we should have seen alexander alensis ( the first who commented upon the oracle ) with durandus , aquinas , scotus , major , biel , soto , vasquez , cajetan , gr. de valentiâ , estius , and many more of the scholastick tribe . all drawn forth in rank and file , to have fought his battels ? but when after all , none but poor peter lombard comes forth like a doughty captain , with none to follow him , this methinks looks more like the despair of a cause , than the defence of it . for though our author calls peter lombard the oracle of the schools , and all know his sentences to be the text which the school-men undertake to explain and comment upon : yet experience has told us , that the responses of this oracle ( as well as of those heretofore ) are often found very dubious and ambiguous . witness thomas and his followers expounding them one way , and scotus and his disciples understanding them another ; and several ( amongst whom durandus and greg. ariminensis ) going a different way from both . so that sometimes there is but too much need of a good interpreter to fix the sence of this oracle , ( as great a veneration as the schools may have for him . ) and therefore since his text is not always so very plain and easie as to make an explication of it superfluous , this author having quoted peter lombard in such , or such a sence , ought in all reason to have produced the major and more eminent part of the school-men and writers upon him , and shewn their unanimous concurrence in the same sence and notion , which he took him in , and quoted him for . and this indeed would have been to his purpose , and look'd like proving his opinion to have been the doctrine of the schools . otherwise i cannot see how the master of the sentences can be called , or pass for all the school men , any more than the master of the temple can pass for all the divines of the church of england . unless we should imagine , that this peter lombard had by a kind of mutual consciousness gathered all his numerous brood into himself , and so united them all into one author . so that the sum of all is this , that this author , having declared his opinion , the constant doctrine both of the fathers and the schools , to make his words good , has produced for it three or four greek fathers , and two latin ( though even these no more to his purpose than if he had quoted dod and cleaver , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , out of homer ) and lastly , one sentence out of one school-man . which if it be allowed to pass for a good , just , and sufficient proof of any controverted conclusion , let it for the future , by all means , for this our author's sake , be an established rule in logick from a particular , to infer an universal . and now that i am bringing my reader towards a close of this long chapter , i must desire him to look a little back towards the beginning of the foregoing chapter , wherein , upon this man 's confident affirmation , that his opinion was the constant doctrine both of the fathers and the schools , i thought it necessary to state what his opinion was , and accordingly i shew'd , that it consisted of four heads . st . that the three persons of the blessed trinity were three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ; which how far he was from being able to prove from the authority of any of the fathers cited by him , was sufficiently shewn by us in the preceding chapter . the d . was , that self consciousness was the formal reason of personality in the said three persons , and consequently that , whereby they were distinguished from each other ; which ( in the same chapter ) i shew'd he was so far from proving from the authority of those ancient writers , that he did not alledge one tittle out of any of them for it , nor indeed so much as mention it in any of the quotations there made by him . and as for the d. member of his said hypothesis , viz. that the unity of the divine nature in the three blessed persons , consisted in the mutual consciousness belonging to them , this we have examined at large , and confuted in this chapter . but still there remains the th . and last to be spoken to , as completeing his whole hypothesis , and resulting , by direct consequence , from the other three , viz. that a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , explained by the three forementioned terms , or principles , is a very plain , easie , and intelligible notion ; which having been in a most confident , peremptory manner , affirmed by him all along ( as i shew in chap. . ) and upon that score , making so great a part of his hypothesis , ought in all reason to be proved to have been the sence and doctrine of the fathers concerning this article . but not one word does he produce upon this head neither . nor , for my own part , do i expect ever to find the least sentence or syllable in any ancient writer tending this way . and i challenge this author to produce so much as one to this purpose . in the mean time , how , and with what kind of words i find these ancient writers expressing themselves about this venerable mystery , i shall here set down . only i shall premise a sentence or two out of this author himself ; and which i have had occasion to quote more than once before , from page . line . viz. that the unity in trinity being ( as he confesses ) so great a mystery , that we have no example of it in nature , it is no wonder if it cannot be explained by any one kind of natural union ; and that therefore it was necessary to use several examples , and to allude to several kinds of union , to form an adequate notion of the god head ; and moreover , page . line . &c. that there is nothing like this mysterious distinction and unity , and that we want proper words to express it by . all which passages lying clear , open , and express in the fore-cited places of this author , i must needs ask him , whether all these are used by him to prove the unity in trinity a plain , easie and intelligible notion , as he has frequently elsewhere asserted it to be ? as , to go over each of the particulars , first , whether we must account it plain , because he says , it is a great mystery , of which we have no example in nature ? and , secondly , whether we must reckon it easie , because he says , that it cannot be explained by any one kind of natural union , but that several examples must be used , and several sorts of union alluded to for this purpose ? and , lastly , whether it must pass for intelligible , because he tells us , that we want proper words to express it by , that is , in other terms , to make it intelligible ? since to express a thing , and to make it intelligible , i take to be terms equivalent . in fine , i here appeal to the reader , whether we ought from the forementioned passages of this author , to take the unity in trinity , and trinity in unity for a plain , easie , intelligible notion , according to the same author's affirmation so frequently inculcated in so many parts of his book ? but i shall now proceed to shew , ( as i promised ) how the fathers speak and declare themselves upon this great point . and here we will begin first with iustin martyr . a singularity , or unity ( says he ) is understood by us , and a trinity in unity is acknowledged . but how it is thus , i am neither willing to ask others , nor can i perswade my self , with my muddy tongue and polluted flesh , to attempt a declaration of such ineffable matters . and again , speaking of the oeconomy of the blessed trinity , the nature and manner ( says he ) of this oeconomy is unutterable . and yet again , speaking of this mysterious oeconomy of the deity and the trinity , as one of the greatest mysteries of the christian faith : i cry out ( says he ) o wonderful ! for that the principles and articles of our religion surpass , and transcend the understanding , reason and comprehension of a created nature . in the next place , dionysius the areopagite ( or some very ancient writer under that name ) calls it the transcendent , superessential , and superlatively divine trinity . in like manner gregory nyssen , we apprehend ( says he ) in these ( viz. the three divine persons ) a certain inexpressible inconceivable unity ( or communication ) and distinction , &c. st. basil also , writing against such as would derogate from the equality of the divine persons , speaks of the trinity thus , either let these inexpressible things be silently reverenced , or religiously and becomingly represented . and again , in a discourse against such as used contumelious words of the trinity , speaking there of the holy ghost as essentially one with the father and the son , he says , the intimate conjunction between him and them is hereby declared ( viz. by the scripture there quoted by him , and applyed to them ) but the ineffable manner of his subsistence hereby inviolably preserved . so that still ( we see ) with this father the oeconomy of the three divine persons in the blessed trinity , is a thing ineffable , and above all description , or expression . nazianzen also speaks of the trinity under these epithetes , styling it the adorable trinity , above , and before the world , before all time , of the same majesty , of the same glory , increate , and invisible , above our reach , and incomprehensible . and the same epithetes are given it by nicephorus patriarch of constantinople , in the acts of the council of ephesus , declaring the trinity to be of one and the same essence , transcendent in its substance , invisible , and inconceivable . and lastly , eulogius , arch-bishop of alexandria , sets it forth thus . we divide not ( says he ) what is but one , we part not the singularity , nor distract the unity ; but so assert this unity , in an eternal singularity , as to ascribe the same to three distinct hypostases ; by no means subjecting things above our understanding , to human reasonings , nor by an over-curious search undervaluing things so much above all search , or discovery . having given this specimen of what the greek fathers and writers thought and spoke of the trinity , let us now pass to the latines . and amongst these , we have in the first place , st. hilary expressing himself thus . the mystery of the trinity is immense and incomprehensible , not to be express'd by words , nor reach'd by sence , imperceivable , it blinds our sight , it exceeds the capacity of our understanding . i understand it not . nevertheless , i will comfort my self in this , that neither do the angels know it , nor ages apprehend it , nor have the apostles enquired of it , nor the son himself declared it . let us therefore leave off complaining , &c. after him , let us hear st. ambrose , the divinity of the holy trinity ( says he ) is to be believed by us to be without beginning or end ; albeit , hardly possible to be comprehended by the mind of man. upon which account it may be not improperly said concerning it , that we comprehend this only of it , that in truth it cannot be comprehended . to st. ambrose succeeds st. austin . in this trinity ( says this learned father ) is but one god , which is indeed wonderfully unspeakable , and unspeakably wonderful . to the same purpose fulgentius . so far as i can judge , only the eternal and unchangeable trinity ought to be looked upon by us , as worthy to be esteemed incomprehensibly miraculous ; and as much exceeding all that we can think or imagine of it , as it surmounts all that we are . after him we shall produce hormisda bishop of rome , in a letter to iustinian the emperour , about the beginning of the sixth century , speaking thus . the holy trinity ( says he ) is but one , it is not multiplyed by number , nor grows by any addition , or encrease : nor can it either be comprehended by our understanding , nor in respect of its divinity be at all divided . and a little after , let us worship father , son , and holy ghost , distinct in themselves , but with one indistinct worship , that is to say , the incomprehensible and unutterable substance of the trinity . and presently again , great and incomprensible is the mystery of the holy trinity . in the last place st. bernard delivers himself upon the same subject thus . i confidently affirm ( says he ) that the eternal and blessed trinity , which i do not understand , i do yet believe , and embrace with my faith , what i cannot comprehend with my mind . i have here , as i said , given a specimen of what the ancient writers of the church , both greek and latin , thought and said of the blessed trinity , and it is , i confess , but a specimen ; since i think that enough for an universally acknowledged , and never before contradicted proposition : whereas , had it but in the least seemed a novelty , ( as this author's hypothesis not only seems , but unquestionably is ) i should have thought my self obliged to have brought as many quotations for it from antiquity , as would have filled a much larger book than i intend this shall be . but as for those which i have here produced , i do solemnly appeal to any man living , christian , or not christian ( who does but understand these languages ) whether the fathers now quoted by me ( and all the rest upon the same subject speak agreeably to them ) looked upon trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , as a plain , easie , and intelligible notion ? so that if the judgment of the fathers , and of this author , be in this point one and the same , it must unavoidably follow , that either the fathers have not yet declared their judgment and doctrine , or that this author has not yet declared his : since so much as has been declared on the one side , is a direct and gross contradiction to what has been asserted on the other . and moreover the fore alledged testimonies of the fathers are such , that we are not put to draw what we contend for , by remote , far fetched consequences from them , but it lies plain , open , and manifest in them ; in words too clear and full to be denyed , and too convincing to be evaded . so that we are sure both of their words and expressions , and of the common sence of all mankind to expound and understand them by . and will this bold over bearing man , after all this , claim their meaning to be the same with his ? what his meaning is , he has told us forty times over , viz. the unity in trinity , &c. is so far from being an unintelligible notion , that it is not so much as difficult , how much soever the dull mistaken world has for near years thought otherwise . and now if this be the true account and state of this matter , that when the fathers say of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or trinity , that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : that is to say , ineffable , inconceivable , unintelligible , incomprehensible , and ( if possible ) transcending the very notion of the deity it self , above all humane understanding and reason , discourse and scrutiny , i say , if by all this , he can prove that the fathers meant , that it was a very plain , easie , and intelligible notion ( as , by affirming that those ( who used all these expressions ) meant the same with himself , he does and must affirm ; or say , that they knew not their own meaning , or at least were not able to express it , but in words quite contrary to it ; ) i must needs own the fathers to have been not only less happy in expressing themselves about this mystery , than this author ( as with great modesty and deference to them , he often tells us they were ) but , which is yet much worse , that they were the most wretchedly unhappy in wording their own notions of all men , who ever yet set pen to paper . and as for this author , if unutterable , unconceivable and unintelligible can pass with him for plain , easie , and intelligible , it is high time for me to leave off disputing with him , and either to have no more to do with him , or without any further demurr , to profess my self as ready to believe and grant contradictions , as he is , or can be , to write them . chap. viii . in which is set down the ancient , and generally received doctrine of the church , concerning the article of the blessed trinity , as it is delivered and explained by councils , fathers , school-men , and other later divines ; together with a vindication of the said doctrine so explained from this author ▪ s exceptions . though i cannot think that the nature and design of the work undertook by me ( which was only to animadvert upon , and confute this author's novel , heterodox notions about the trinity ) does , or can directly engage me to proceed any further ; or lay any necessity upon me to give a positive account of the doctrine and sence of the church about this great article ; yet since this author in asserting his own opinion , could not be content to do it without reproaching and reflecting upon those ancient terms , which the church has been so long in possession of , and has still thought fit to use in declaring it self upon this subject , ( as if instead of explaining , they served only to perplex , obscure , and confound it ) and since the reasonableness , or unreasonableness of either hypothesis , is most likely to appear by fairly setting down one , as well as the other , and shewing what this opiniator is gone off from , as well as what he is gone over to , i judge it neither improper , nor unuseful to represent what the church has hitherto held and taught concerning this important article of the trinity , as i find it in councils , confessions , fathers , school-men , and other church-writers , ancient and modern . and in this also i must be again content to entertain my reader only with a tast , or specimen out of so vast a store ; which yet i do , with very good reason , judge both satisfactory and sufficient , in a point of divinity universally owned , received , and embraced ; and ( unless by such as reject and deny the trinity it self ) never impugned , or contradicted before . now the commonly received doctrine of the church and schools , concerning the blessed trinity ( so far as i can judge , but still with the humblest submission to the judgment of the church of england in the case ) is this , that the christian faith having laid this sure foundation , that there is but one god ; and that there is nothing ( i. e. no positive , real being , strictly and properly so called ) in god , but what is god , and lastly , that there can be no composition in the deity with any such positive real being distinct from the deity it self ; and yet the church finding in scripture mention of three , to whom distinctly the god-head does belong , it has by warrant of the same scripture , heb. . . expressed these three by the name of persons ; and stated their personalities upon three distinct modes of subsistence alloted to one and the same god-head , and these also distinguished from one another by three distinct relations . concerning which , we must observe , that albeit , according to the reality of the thing , the subsistence and relation of each person make but one single indivisible mode of being , yet according to the natural order of conceiving . things , we must conceive of the subsistence as precedent to the relation : forasmuch as humane reason considers things simply as subsisting , before it can consider them as relating to one another . but for the further explication of the point before us , it will here be necessary to premise what is properly a mode of being . and this the school . divines do not allow to be either a substance , or an accident ( which yet makes the adequate division of real beings ; since there is no such being but what is contained under one of them ) but a mode is properly a certain habitude of some being , essence , or thing , whereby the said essence , or being is determined to some particular state , or condition , which , barely of it self , it would not be determined to . and according to this account of it , a mode in things spiritual and immaterial seems to have much the like reference to such kind of beings , that a posture has to a body , to which it gives some difference , or distinction , without superadding any new entity , or being to it . in a word , a mode is not properly a being , either substance , or accident , but a certain affection cleaving to it , and determining it from its common general nature and indifference to something more particular , as we have just now explained . as for instance , in created beings , dependence is a mode determining the general nature of being to that particular state , or condition , by vertue whereof it proceeds from , and is supported by another ; and the like may be said of mutability , presence , absence , inherence , adherence , and such like , viz. that they are not beings , but modes , or affections of being , and inseparable from it so far , that they can have no existence of their own , after a separation , or division from the things , or beings to which they do belong . and thus having explained , in general , what a mode is , we are to know , that the personalities , by which the deity stands diversified into three distinct persons , are by the generality of divines , both ancient and modern , called and accounted modes , or at least something analogous to them ( since no one thing can agree both to god and the creature , by a perfect univocation . ) and moreover , as every mode essentially includes in it the thing , or being of which it is the mode , so every person of the blessed trinity , by vertue ofits proper mode of subsistence , includes in it the godhead it self , and is properly the godhead as subsisting with and under such a certain mode , or relation . and this i affirm to be the current doctrine both of the fathers and the schools , concerning the persons of the blessed trinity , and the constantly received account given by them of a divine person , so far as they pretend to explain what such a person is . and accordingly , as these relations are three , and but three , so the persons of the godhead , to whom they belong , are so too , viz. father , son , and holy ghost . but then we must observe also , that the relations which the godhead may sustain , are of two sorts . st . extrinsecal , and founded upon some external act issuing from god ; of which sort are the relations of creator , preserver , governour , and the like , to the things created , preserved , and governed by him . which , though they leave a real effect upon the things themselves , yet derive only an external habitude , and denomination consequent from it upon the deity it self . the d . sort of relation , is intrinsecal , and founded upon those internal acts , by which one person produces another , or proceeds from another : for to produce and to proceed ( whether by generation , or spiration ) is that which makes , or constitutes a plurality of persons in the godhead . from all which it follows , that the relation , by which god as a creator , or preserver , respects his creatures , is extremely different from that by which god as a father respects his son. the former adding only to the deity an extrinsecal denomination , but the latter leaving upon it an internal incommunicable character , essentially inseparable from the deity . so that although it may well enough be said , that god might never have been a creator , yet it cannot be said of him , that he might never have been a father ; the former being only an effect of his will , but this latter the necessary result of his nature . now these internal acts , upon which the divine relations are founded , and from which they flow , are , first , that eternal act , by which the father communicates his divine nature to the son , which accordingly is called generation . and that by which the son receives his divine nature from the father , which is called filiation . and. thirdly , the act of spiration , by which the father and the son together , eternally breath forth the holy spirit . and , lastly , the act of procession , by which the holy ghost proceeds , and receives his divine nature , joyntly from them both . these , i say , are those internal , incommunicable and distinguishing acts , from which the personal relations belonging to the three divine persons are derived . but you will say : does not this infer four persons in the godhead ? viz. that as generation and filiation make two , so spiration and procession should make two more ? i answer , no : because the same person may sustain several personal relations , and exert , and receive several personal acts , where those acts , or relations are not opposite to , or inconsistent with one another in the same subject . as for instance , the person of the father may exert both an act of generation and of spiration , and so sustain the relations resulting from both without any multiplication of his person ; and the son likewise may receive and sustain the act of filiation , and withal exert an act of spiration , without any multiplication of personality . and this , because neither are the acts of generation and spiration inconsistent in the father , nor the acts of filiation and spiration , incompatible in the son. though indeed the acts of generation and filiation , and the relations springing therefrom , would be utterly inconsistent ( because opposite ) in any one person , as likewise upon the same account would the acts of spiration and procession . from whence by plain and undeniable consequence it follows , that generation and filiation , spiration and procession constitute only three persons in the eternal godhead and no more . for relations merely disparate , do not constitute several distinct persons , unless they be opposite too . that maxime of the schools being most true , that sola oppositio multiplicat in divinis . so that albeit , filiation and spiration are terms opposite to their respective correlates , yet being only disparate with reference to one another , and as both of them meet and are lodged in one and the same subject , ( viz. the person of the son ) they neither cause , nor infer in him any more than one single personality . but now if any one should ask me , what this generation and filiation , this spiration and procession are ? i answer , that herein consists the mystery ; and since such mysteries exceed the comprehension of humane reason , i am not in the least ashamed , most readily to own my ignorance thereof , in that known anthem used in the church . quid sit gigni , quid processus , me nescire sum processus . for tho the author whom i have been disputing with , by the help and vertue of two wonder working words ( able to make one , who is no conjurer , do strange things ) undertakes to make this greatest of mysteries plain , easie , and intelligible ; and when he has done this , ( as he says he has ) owns it nevertheless for a mystery still : yet in the judgment of other mortals , to acknowledge a thing inexplicable , and in the same breath to offer an explication of it too , will be thought a little too much for one of an ordinary pitch of sence and reason to pretend to ; and therefore , for my own part , i dare not look so high . upon the whole matter , in discoursing of the trinity . two things are absolutely necessary to be held and insisted upon . one , that each , and every person of the blessed trinity , entirely contains and includes in himself the whole divine nature . the other , that each person is incommunicably different and distinct from the other . and here if it should be asked , how they differ , and whether it be by any real distinction between the persons ? i answer , yes : but for the better explaining of my answer , we must distinguish of two sorts of real distinctions . . the first greater , viz. when two things , or real beings , differ from one another . . the other lesser ; as when the difference is between a thing , or real being on the one side , and the mode of it on the other : or between two or more modes of the same being . and this distinction , or difference is called real , in opposition to that which is wholly founded upon the apprehension , or operation of the intellect , and has of it self no existence without it . but a being , and the mode adhering to it differ , whether the mind ever apprehends and thinks of them , or no. and thus we affirm , that the divine persons really differ , and are distinguished from one another , viz. by a modal , or lesser sort of real difference ; according to which , the divine nature subsisting under , and being determined by such a certain mode , personally differs from it self , as subsisting under , and determined by another . forasmuch as the divine nature , or godhead so subsisting and determined is properly a person . nor ought this smallness of difference between the divine persons to be any presumption against the truth of what we have delivered concerning the oeconomy of the blessed trinity , as shall be more particularly shewn in answer to one of this author's objections against it , before we come to a conclusion of this chapter . in the mean time to sum up the foregoing particulars , the reader may please to take what i aver to be the doctrine of the catholick church about this great article , in this following account of it , viz. that there is one , and but one self-existing , infinite , eternal , &c. being , nature , or substance , which we call god. and that this infinite , eternal , self-existing being , or nature , exists in , and is common to three distinct persons , father , son and holy ghost . of which the son eternally issues from the father by way of generation , and the holy ghost joyntly from both , by way of spiration ; which three divine persons superadd to this divine nature , or deity , three different modes of subsistence , founding so many different relations ; each of them belonging to each person in a peculiar uncommunicable manner ; so that by vertue thereof , each person respectively differs and stands distinguished from the other two : and yet by reason of one and the same numerical divine nature or godhead equally existing in , and common to all the three persons , they are all but one and the same god. who is blessed for ever . this i reckon to be a true and just representation of the doctrine of the catholick church , so far as it has thought fit to declare it self upon this great and sacred mystery . not that i think this sets the point clear from all difficulties and objections . for the nature and condition of the thing will not have it so , nor have the ablest divines ever thought it so , ( for where then were the mystery ? ) but that it gives us the fairest and most consistent account of this article , both with reference to scripture and reason , and liable to the fewest exceptions against it , of any other hypothesis , or explication of it whatsoever . and the same will appear yet further from those terms , which the writers of the church have all along used in expressing themselves upon this subject . and that both with respect , first , to the unity and agreement of the three divine persons in one and the same nature . and secondly , to their personal distinction from one another . and first , for their unity and agreement in one and the same nature . the greeks expressed this by the terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and the latines by consubstantialitas and coessentialitas . by all which i affirm , that they understood an agreement in one and the same numerical nature , or essence . for tho this author has affirmed , that the nicene fathers understood no more by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , than a specifick unity of nature , this matter has been sufficiently accounted for , and his assertion effectually confuted in the foregoing chapter . in the next place . as for the terms expressing the distinction and difference of the divine persons from one another , the greeks make use of these , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 trinity , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 persons , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subsistences . or persons , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 modes of subsistence . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properties , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 marks of distinction , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 distinguishing properties , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes of signification . and agreeably to them , the latines also make use of the following terms , trinitas , personae , subsistentiae , modi subsistendi , proprietates , relationes , and notiones seu notionalia . by which last the schoolmen mean such terms and expressions , as serve to notifie and declare to us the proper and peculiar distinction of the divine persons . and they reckon four of them , viz. the above mentioned paternitas , filiatio , spiratio & processio , all of them importing relation . to which some add a fifth , which the greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the latines , innascibilitas ; a term not importing in it any positive relation , but only a meer negation of all producibility , by any superiour principle , and upon that account peculiar to the father , who alone , of all the persons of the blessed trinity , is without production . touching all which terms , i cannot think it necessary to enlarge any further , in a particular and more distinct explication of them ; since , how differing soever they may be in their respective significations , they all concur in the same use and design ; which is to express something proper and peculiar to the divine persons , whereby they are rendred distinct from , and incommunicable to one another . but these few general remarks i think fit to lay down concerning them . as , . that albeit most of these terms , as to the form of the word , run abstractively , yet they are for the most part to be understood concretively , and not as simple forms , but as forms in conjunction with the subject , which they belong to . in the former abstracted sence they are properly personalities , or personal properties , viz. those modes , or forms by which the persons , whom they appertain to , are formally constituted and denominated what they are ; but in the latter and concrete sence , they signifie the persons themselves . . the second thing , which i would observe , is , that there has been in the first ages of the church some ambiguity in the use of the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or persona . for neither would the latines at first admit of three hypostases in god , as taking 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the same thing ; for that they had no other latin word , to translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by , but substantia by which also they translated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( the word subsistentia being then looked upon by them as barbarous , and not in use ) so that they refused the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for fear of admitting of three distinct substances , or essences in the trinity , which they knew would lead them into the errour of arius . nor on the other side would the greeks acquiesce in a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nor admit of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for fear of falling thereby into the contrary errour of sabellius ; for that they thought the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imported no real internal difference , but only a difference of name , or attribute , or at most of office ; and for them to allow no more than such an one amongst the divine persons , they knew was sabellianisme . and this controversie of words exercised the church for a considerable time ; to appease and compose which ( amongst other matters ) a council was called and held at alexandria about the year of christ , . in which amongst many other bishops convened from italy , arabia , aegypt and lybia , was present also athanasius himself . and in this council both sides having been fully heard , and found to agree in sence , though they differ'd in words , it was ordained , that they should thenceforth mutually acknowledg one another for orthodox , and for the future cease contending about these words to the disturbance of the church . by which means , and especially by the explication given of these words by athanasius , ( whereby ( as gregory nazianzen tells us in his panegyrick upon him ) he satisfied and reconciled both greeks and latines to the indifferent use of them , and indeed that oration made by nazianzen himself in the council of constantinople ( viz. the second general ) before bishops , not a little contributing to the same ; ) the sence of these terms from that time forward came generally to be fixed , and the ambiguity of them removed , and so the controversie by degrees ceased between the greeks and latines , and the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or personae , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or subsistentiae grew at length to be promiscuously used without any jealousie or suspicion , and to be accepted on all hands ( though not presently ) in the same signification . . the third thing which i would observe , is , that some of the forementioned terms signifie causally , and some only declaratively , that is to say , some import the ground and reason of the distinction of the divine persons , and some import only marks , notes , and signs of such a distinction . of the first sort amongst the greeks , are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and amongst the latines , subsistentiae , modi subsistendi , proprietates & relationes . of the latter sort amongst the greeks are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and amongst the latines , notiones . but for the fuller and further illustration and improvement of this note , i cannot but add the observation of the solid and exactly learned forbesius , viz. that of these modes called by the greeks , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , there is a four-fold use , or effect , as they sustain four several considerations , viz. that , first , as modes of subsistence , they constitute the persons . and secondly , that by the relations , which they imply and include , they cause the said persons to be referred to one another . and thirdly , that as they are properties they distinguish the persons from each other . and lastly , that , as notions , they are means , and ( as it were ) instruments whereby we are enabled in some measure to apprehend and conceive of the divine persons . forbesius instruct. hist. theolog. lib. . cap. . sect. . by all which it appears , that the several forementioned terms do really import but one and the same thing , differently considered , according to the several uses and effects ascribed to it , in respect of the oeconomy of the three divine persons amongst themselves . . in the fourth and last place , we may observe , that the words most commonly and frequently used by writers in treating of the divine persons , are the forementioned 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 amongst the greeks . and the terms personae , relationes , proprietates , and ( in the latter ages especially ) subsistentiae , and modi subsistendi amongst the latines . these observations i thought fit to lay down for our clearer and readier apprehension of the expressions used by the fathers , and other church-writers in their discourses about this great article of the christian faith. and so i proceed now to my authorities . shewing both from the aucient and modern use of the terms aforesaid , and more especially of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the subsistentiae & modi subsistendi , that the church has all along placed the respective personalities of the three divine persons in three distinct modes of subsistence , according to the doctrine asserted by us . and here i shall begin with the greek writers , setting them down according to the order and age in which they lived . and first with iustin martyr ; who in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or exposition of faith , speaks thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the son ( says he ) and the holy ghost , are not the same with the father ; for the terms unbegotten , begotten , and proceeding , are not the names of essence , but modes of subsistence , iustin. exposition . fidei . p. . colon. edition . . again , speaking of the same terms , he tells us , that they are not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is to say , not denoting the essence , but signifying the hypostases , or subsistences ; adding withal , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that they are sufficient for us to distinguish the persons , and to shew the proper and peculiar subsistence of father , son and holy ghost by . pag. . and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that is , we ought to own , or confess one god , expressed to us in father , son , and holy ghost , hereby acknowledging , as they are father , son and holy ghost , three subsistences of one and the same godhead ; but as they are god , understanding thereby one essence or substance common to all the subsistences . p. . ibid. by all which expressions we see personality stated upon subsistence . our next testimony shall be from athanasius , who in his treatise de sanctissimâ virgine deiparâ , gives this account of his faith , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that is , we believe in father , son , and holy ghost , a trinity of hypostases , or persons , having amongst them such a distinction , as admits of no division , and such an union , or unity , as is without all confusion . athan. tom. . p. . colon. edit . . the author called dionysius the areopagite ( tho by a false title , for the areopagite lived in the first century but this writer in the fourth ) in his book de divinis nominibus , cap. . sets forth the trinity thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the trinity ( so called ) because of its manifestation of a divine , or superlative fecundity shewn in three subsistences , or persons . epiphanius also in the d . heresie , and d. paragraph , gives the like account of the same , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the trinity is numbred by father , son and holy ghost , not as one thing called only by three names , but as being in truth three perfect subsistences , [ or persons ] as well as three perfect names . in like manner gregory nazianzen speaks much the same thing in his th oration . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . we ought ( says he ) to hold one god , and to confess three subsistences , or three persons , each with his respective property according to his subsistence , greg. nazianz. tom. . p. . edit . paris . . gregory nyssen , upon those words in the first of genesis , let us make man , expresses himself thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . god ( says he ) made man ( laying the stress upon the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the singular number ) that you may reckon , or account the godhead to be but one. but not so the subsistences ; for there is a proper subsistence of the father , a proper subsistence of the son , and a proper subsistence of the holy ghost . greg. nyssen , tom. . p. . edit , paris . . st. basil in his book de spiritu sancto , chap. . speaks thus of the second person of the trinity . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . we ( says he ) never to this day heard of a second god ; but worshipping the son as god of god , we both acknowledge the property of the hypostases [ or persons ] and insist upon one supreme governour , or lord of all things . bas. tom. . p. . edit . paris . . likewise st. cyrill of alexandria declares himself much the same way in his third dialogue de trinitate . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . we may observe ( says he ) in one deity , a ternary , or triplicity according to [ or in respect of ] subsistence . the same we find also in isidorus pelusiota , lib. . epist. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . there is ( says he ) one godhead , but three hypostases , or subsistences . this keep , this hold , &c. theodoret also speaks very fully upon the same subject , in his first dialogue contr . anomaeos . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that is to say , such things as belong properly to the [ divine ] essence , or substance , are in like manner common to father , son , and holy ghost . but the term [ father ] is not common to them ; and therefore [ father ] is no property of the essence , but of the subsistence , or person : but now , if one thing be proper to the hypostasis , or subsistence , and there be other properties of the essence , it follows , that essence and hypostasis do not signifie one and the same thing . and again , a little after : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that is , the essence , or substance of the father , and the son , and the holy ghost is common , being equally and alike immortal , incorruptible , holy and good. and for this reason we affirm one essence , and three hypostases , auctarium sive tom. . theodoret. p. . edit . paris . . certainly nothing could , with greater evidence , state the personalities of father , son , and holy ghost upon three several subsistences , than the words here quoted out of this father . and i quote them out of him , though i know the same dialogues are inserted into athanasius's works ; but i am convinced by the reasons given by garnerius the learned editor of this auctarium , that the said dialogues cannot belong to athanasius . next to him let us hear basilius seleuciensis speaking the same thing in his first oration , upon the first verse of the first chapter of genesis , where , upon these words , let us make man after our own image and likeness , he discourses thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that is to say , the image here formed is but one , but the mention here made is not of one hypostasis , or person only , but of three . for the thing formed being the common work of the whole deity , shews the trinity to have been the former thereof , and so gives us one image , or resemblance of the trinity : but if the image of the trinity be but one , the nature of the hypostases [ or persons ] must be one too . for the unity of the image , proclaims the unity of the substance , or essence . basil. seleuciens . orat. . p. . printed at paris with gregorius thaumaturgus , &c. anno dom. . zacharias sirnamed scholasticus , and sometime metropolitan of mitylene ( of the sixth century ) in his disputation against the philosophers who held the eternity of the world , to a certain philosopher , asking him , how the christians could acknowledg the same both a trinity and an unity too ? makes this answer . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ that is , we affirm a trinity in unity , and an unity in trinity , hereby affirming the subsistences [ or persons ] to be three , and the essence , or substance to be only one. johannes damascenus , a writer of the eighth century , in his third book de orthodoxâ fide , chap. . about the end of it speaks thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that is , the godhead declares the nature , but the term [ father ] the subsistence ; as humanity does the humane nature , but peter the subsistence , or person . for the term [ god ] denotes the divine nature in common , and equally denominates , or is ascribed to each of the hypostases , or subsistences . damascen . page . . edit . basil. . i shall close up these particular testimonies with some passages in the creed , commonly called the athanasian ; which i place so low , because it is manifest , that athanasius was not the author of it , it being not so much as mentioned in any antient writer ( as the very learned dr. cave affirms ) till it occurs in theodulphus aurelianensis , who lived about the latter end of the eighth century . now the passages are these , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( in some copies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. that is , neither confounding the hypostases [ or persons ] nor dividing the substance . for there is one hypostasis of the father , another of the son , and another of the holy ghost , but the godhead of the father , son , and holy ghost is one , &c. and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that is , the whole three hypostases [ or persons ] are coeternal together , and coequal . these passages are full and plain , and the creed it self may well claim the antiquity at least of the eighth century . my next authorities shall be those of the councils . but before i pass to them , i cannot but observe and own to the reader concerning some of the first of my quotations , viz. those out of justin martyr , and that out of st. athanasius , that it has been very much questioned by some learned men , whether those books , from whence they are taken , do really belong to the authors to whom they are ascribed , and among whose works they are inserted , or no. this i say , i was not ignorant of , nevertheless i thought fit to quote them by the names under which i found them placed ; since many very learned persons , and much more acquainted with the writings of the ancients than i pretend to be , have upon several occasions done so before me . and the said tracts are certainly of a very early date , and though the authors of them should fall a century or two lower , yet they still retain antiquity enough to make good the point for which i alledged them . nevertheless i must and do confess it very probable , that the more distinct and exact use of the terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as applyed to the divine persons , did not generally and commonly take place , but as by degrees the discussion of the arian and other the like controversies , through frequent disputes , grew to still a greater and greater maturity . and that the use of these terms did obtain then , and upon that account , i think a very considerable argument to authorize , and recommend them to all sober and judicious minds . and so i pass to the testimonies of councils concerning the same . amongst which , we have here , in the first place , the council of chalcedon , making a confession , or declaration of their faith , concerning the person of our saviour , and that , both as to the absolute undivided unity of his person , and as to the difference and distinction of his two natures , part of which confession runs thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that is , we confess one and the same lord jesus christ , the only begotten son of god in two natures , without confusion , &c. the difference of the said natures , being by no means destroyed by their union , but rather the property of each nature being thereby preserved , and both concurring to [ or meeting in ] one person , or hypostasis . this account of the chalcedon confession we have in the second book of evagrius , towards the latter end of the th chapter ; and a lively instance it is of the council's expressing the personality of christ by , and stating it upon , subsistence . in the next place , upon justinian's calling the second council of constantinople ( being the fifth general one ) in the year , for condemning of the tria capitula , we have a large and noble confession of faith made by that emperour , and owned and applauded by all the council , and inserted amongst the acts of it : and in this we have the three divine persons several times expressed by so many 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as a term equivalent to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and indeed importing withall the personality , or formal reason of the same ; and that so fully and plainly , that nothing could , or can be more so . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. that is , we profess to believe one father , son , and holy ghost , glorifying thereby a consubstantial trinity , one deity , or nature , or essence , and power and authority in three subsistences , or persons . and again to the same purpose , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . we worship ( says he ) an unity in trinity , and a trinity in unity , having both a strange and wonderful distinction and union , that is to say , an union , or singularity in respect of the substance or god-head , and a trinity in respect of properties , subsistences , or persons ; with several more such passages to the same purpose and signification . and then , as for the council it self the first canon of it speaks thus ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . that is , if any one confess not one nature , or substance , one power . and authority of father , son , and holy ghost , a coessential trinity , and one deity to be worshipped in three subsistences , or persons , let such an one be accursed . in the next place , we have the sixth general council , and the third of constantinople , called by constantinus pogonatus against the monothelites in the year . in the acts of which council , article . we have the council owning the same thing , and in the same words , which a little before we quoted out of the council of chalcedon : and moreover in the tenth article , the council declares it self thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. that is , we believing our lord iesus christ to be the true god , do affirm in him two distinct natures shining forth in one subsistence , or person . agreeably to this , the council immediately following called by the greeks , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and by the ●atines concilium quini sextum , consisting chiefly of the same persons with the former , and called by the same constantine about ten years after , for the making of canons about discipline , by way of supplement to the fifth and sixth councils , which had made none . this council , i say , in the first of its canons , which is as a kind of preface , owns and applauds the nicene fathers , for that , with an unanimous agreement and consent of faith , they had declared and cleared up one consubst antiality in the three hypostases , or subsistences of the divine nature . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. and lastly in the florentine council , held in the fif teenth century , in which the greeks , with their emperor iohannes palaeologus met the latines in order to an accord between them , touching that so much controverted article about the procession of the holy ghost . in this council , isay , we have the greeks also expressing the personality of the holy ghost , by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for whereas the latines affirmed , that the holy ghost the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say , stream , or flow from the son , the greeks desired them to explain what they meant by that expression , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and whether they understood , that he derived both his essence and personality from him , and that in these words very significant to our purpose , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . by which we see that even with these modern greeks also the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is all one with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifie essence and person , as applyed to the persons of the blessed trinity , hist. concil . florent . in the last chapter , and question . of section . pag. . set forth by dr. creyghton , . i cannot think it requisite to quote any thing more from the greeks upon this subject , it being as clear as the day , that both fathers and councils stated the personalities of father , son , and holy ghost , upon three distinct hypostases , or subsistences of one and the same god-head , essence , or substance , distinguished thereby into three persons . and so i pass from the greeks to the latines , whom we shall find giving an account of the same , partly by subsistences and modes of subsistence , and partly by relations . but not equally by both in all ages of the church . for we have before shewn , that there was a long and sharp contest between the greeks and the latines about the word hypostasis , and that the latines dreaded the use of it , as knowing no other latin word to render it by , but substantia , which they could by no means ascribe plurally to god ; and as for the word subsistentia , that was not then accounted properly latin ; and it was but upon this occasion , and to fence against the ambiguity of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it came at length into use amongst the latines . and even after all , it must be yet further confessed , that notwithstanding that fair foundation of accord between the greeks and latines laid by the forementioned council of alexandria , and the hearty endeavours both of athanasius and of gregory nazianzen after him , to accommodate the business between them , the latines were not so ready to come over to the greeks , in the free use of the word hypostasis , as the greeks were to comply withthe latines in the use of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , answering to their persona . and therefore in vain would any one seek for an explication of the divine persons in the trinity , by the terms subsistentiae , or modi subsistendi , in the earlier latin writers , such as tertullian about the latter end of the second century , and st. cyprian about themiddle of the third , and lactantius about the latter end of the same , and the beginning of the fourth . nevertheless find it we do , in the writers of the following ages ; and how , and in what sence it was used by them , shall be now considered . and here we will begin with st. ambrose , who is full and clear in the case , in his book in symbolum apostolicum , cap. . tom. . in these words . ità ergò rectum , & catholicum est , ut & unum deum secundùm unitatem substantiae fateamur , & patrem , & filium , & spiritum sanctum in suâ quemque subsistentiâ sentiamus . a passage so very plain , that nothing certainly could more effectually declare , that this father reckoned the personalities of the three divine persons to consist in their several and respective subsistences . the next whom we shall alledge , is st. hilary , who flourished in the fourth century , and wrote twelve books of the trinity , and some other tracts upon the same subject against the arians . he , i confess , frequently , and particularly in book . de trinit . p. . basil. edit . . calls the three divine persons , tres substantias ; but it is evident , that he took substantia , in the same sence with subsistentia , or hypostasis ; forasmuch as he else where often affirms that , which must of necessity infer this to be his meaning . as for instance , in his book de synodis contra arianos , page . he tells us , that nullam diversitatem aut dissimilitudinem admittit geniti & gignentis essentia . and again , that there is indifferens in patre & filio divinitatis substantia , p. and nulla differentis essentiae discreta natura , ibid. and nulla originalis substantiae diversitas , ibid. and that there is between them nulla diversitas essentiae , p. . none of all which propositions could possibly be true , if the divine persons were three distinct substances according to the proper sence and signification of the word substance . and therefore the learned forbesius in his historico-theological instructions ; book . chap. . quoting the aforesaid passage , after the words tres substantias , subjoyns these of his own , eo [ nempe ] sensu quo graeci dicebant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and accordingly st. hilary explaining himself further , in his fore-cited book de synodis contra arianos , p. . says , that though between the father and the son there was nulla diversitas essentiae , yet they did respuere personalium nominum unionem , ne unus subsistens sit , qui & pater dicatur & filius : which words manifestly infer , that the father is said to be a father , and the son to be a son , by a distinct subsistence proper to each of them . and again speaking of those fathers who opposed the heresie of sabellius , says of them : idcircò tres substantias esse dixerunt , subsistentium personas per substantias edocentes , non substantiam patris , & filii , & spiritus sancti , diversitate dissimilis essentiae separantes , p. . by which words , he speaks all that the greeks meant by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the latines of the following times , by subsistentia . for which reason it is , that the learned collator and editor of this father's works , uses , now and then , to such passages as these to add an explicatory marginal note to this purpose ; as in page . book . de trinitate , he puts in the margin , tres substantiae , id est , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and in this book de synodis , &c. p. . he remarks in the side , trina in divinis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; which manifestly shews , what the judgment of learned men was concerning st. hilary's sence in the use of the words tres substantioe with reference to the divine persons . from st. hilary we pass to st. ierome ; who indeed scrupled the use of the word hypostasis , ( as applyed to the divine persons ) in epistle . to pope damasus . but that he did only scruple it , and not absolutely refuse , or reject it , is evident from several other passages in that epistle ; which shewed his judgment to be , that there was nothing of it self ill and hurtful in the use of it . for , had he judged otherwise , surely he would not have told damasus , that he was ready to own the expression of tres personas subsistentes : and moreover , that if damasus would command the use of the term hypostasis , he would use it . but his exception against it ( for it was not the word person , as a great man mistakes it , but the word hypostasis , which st. ierome demurred to the use of ) was built upon these two grounds , both expressed in the same epistle . first , that hereticks abused , or made an ill use of this term , to deceive and impose upon the minds of weak , and unwary persons . and , in good earnest , that must be a very extraordinary word indeed , which is uncapable of being one way or other abused by some , and misunderstood by others . secondly , the other ground ( which , as there is great reason to believe , was the main and principal cause of st. ierome's dislike of this term ) was its being imposed by an incompetent authority , viz. that some of the greek church would needs command him ( and him a very warm man too ) who was of the latin communion , to the use of that , which the latin church had not obliged him to . and calvin , in lib. . chap . of his institutions , sect. . shrewdly intimates the peculiar pique , which st. ierome bore to the eastern bishops , to have been the chief , if not the sole cause of his exception against this word ; adding withal , that it was not fairly done of him ( which calvin was a very competent judge of ) to assert ( as in that epistle he does ) that in omnibus scholis , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was nihil aliud quàm hypostasis ; which calvin there says , communi tritóque usu passim refellitur . but after all , it seems , st. ierome could relent from his stiffness , and reconcile himself to this so much scrupled expression . for in his epistle , or discourse ad paulam & eustochium de assumptione beatoe marioe , speaking of our saviour's exercising two distinct kinds of operation , according to his two natures combining in one person , has these words , per hoc , quod audiérant , quod viderant , quod tractârant ( viz. apostoli ) verbam vitoe erat , & nihil aliud ex duabus naturis , quàm unum juxta subsistentiam vel personam . hieronym . tom. . p. . edit . paris . apud nivellium , . so that i am in good hopes , that for the future st. ierome's authority will not be alledged against expressing the divine persons by hypostases ; till it be proved , that there cannot be a greek and a latin word for one and the same thing : for , what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies in the greek , that , it is certain , subsistentia signifies and declares to us in the latin. as for st. austin , though he looks upon the word hypostasis , or subsistentia , as new and strange to the latines , in the sence , in which it was used by the greeks , yet he is so far from a bridging the greeks in their way of speaking , that he very amicably allows even of those latines also , who chose to follow the greek expression , as to this particular , in his th . book de trin. chap. , . where he tells us , qui hoec tractant groeco eloquio dicunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . latinè ista tractantes cùm alium modum aptiorem non invenirent , quo enuntiarent verbis , dicunt unam essentiam vel substantiam , tres autem personas , ibid. by which this father manifestly shews , that the latines indeed undestood the very same thing by persona , which the greeks did by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and that they really rendered one by the other , though they were not generally so ready to use the term. and here i suppose the reader will easily perceive , that my intent is not to establish the use of the words hitherto pleaded for , upon the authority of st. austin , ( for the case needs it not ) but only to shew , that albeit this father does both particularly consider , and expresly speak of the said terms , yet he does not in the least reject , or disallow of them . but however , in the same book he proceeds to another topick very much to our present purpose , viz. his stating the divine personalities upon relation , in these words , in deo nihil secundùm accidens dicitur , quia in eo nihil est mutabile . nec tamen omne quod dicitur , secundùm substantiam dicitur , sed secundùm relativum : quod tamen relativum non est accidens , quia non est mutabile ; ut filius dicitur relativè ad patrem , &c. whereby ( as we have said ) founding personality in , and upon something relative , he sufficiently proves , that the same neither is , nor can be placed in self-consciousness ; this being a term , in the import ' of it , perfectly absolute , and containing nothing relative in it at all . next to st. austin , we will produce ruffinus a writer of the th century , and flourishing about the latter end of it ; who , in the short account he gives us of what was done in the forementioned synod of alexandria , for the peace of the church , and the closing up the division between the greeks and the latines about the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in chap. . of the first book of his history , tells us , that although some thought that both these words were synonymous , and consequently that as three substances were by no means to be admitted in the trinity , so neither ought we to acknowledg three subsistences therein , yet that others , and those much the greater , and more prevailing part , judged quite otherwise ; in these words . alii verò quibus longè aliud substantia quàm subsistentia significare videbatur , dicebant quòd substantia rei alicujus naturam rationémque , quâ constat , designet ; subsistentia autem uniuscujusque personoe hoc ipsum quod extat & subsistit , ostendat ; ideóque propter sabellii hoeresin tres esse subsistentias confitendas , quòd quasi tres subsistentes personas significare viderentur , ne suspicionem daremus tanquam istius fidei sectatores essemus , quae trinitatem in nominibus tantùm , ac non in rebus , ac subsistentiis confitetur . so that we see here a full , and clear account both of the sence of this word , and of the reason , why the church thought fit to establish the use of it with reference to the persons of the blessed trinity . another testimony shall be from beotius who flourished about the beginning of the th century . he in chap. . of his book de duabus naturis in unâ personâ christi , first gives us this difinition of a person , that it is rationabilis naturae individua subsistentia , ( according to which , our author's warr-horse is like to fall from his personal dignity . ) and afterwards , having discoursed about the difference of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he concludes the said chapter thus . hoec omnia idcirco sunt dicta , ut differentiam naturae atque personoe , id est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 atque 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 monstraremus : quo verò nomine unumquodque oporteat appellari , ecclesiasticae sit locutionis arbitrium ; ut tamen hoc interim constet , quòd inter naturam personámque differre praediximus . by all which he gives us a very plain , rational , and scholastick account of this matter . the next , whom i shall produce to vouch the same thing , is rusticus diaconus , who lived and flourished about the middle of the sixth century . he in chap. . of his book contra acephalos ; tells the nestorian heretick , ( whom he is there by way of dialogue disputing with ) that subsistentia interdum personam significat , non nunquam verò substantiam . and accordingly , that the council of ephesus distinguished in our saviour , aliud & aliud , viz. in respect of his two natures , but not alium & alium in respect of his person , which was but one : and this quite contrary to what we observe in the trinity , illic enim alius & alius , ne subsistentias confundamus ; non verò aliud & aliud . unum enim tria & idem deitate . to which words of the synod , this author subjoyns these of his own . ecce manifestissimè synodi universalis authoritas subsistentias pro personis suscepit atque laudavit . this also , i think , is very full and satisfactory . i shall close these particular testimonies with two passages in the appendix to the breviary of liberatus the deacon , who also lived about the middle of the sixth century , as i find it in crabb's collection of the councils , tom. . p. . col. . and which the very learned dr. cave observes , is the only edition of the councils , where it is to be found . the first passage is this . idem natura & substantia , quod commune , non proprium significat , & idem persona & subsistentia , quod proprium , & non commune declarat . and the other follows about ten lines after in the same column . sanctae ergo trinitatis una quidem est natura atque substantia . communis est enim trium substantia , non autem una subsistentia , seu persona trium , viz. patris , & filii , & spiritûs sancti , sed tres subsistentiae sunt . in which certainly we have so very clear and pregnant a declaration of the thing contended for by us , that a clearer cannot possibly be given , nor reasonably desired . and therefore to add no more private , or single authorities , i shall conclude all with that of a council ; not a general one indeed , but that lateran held under pope martin the first of bishops about the year , or , and by way of preparation for the sixth general one , and of constantinople the third ; called ( as we have already shewn ) by constantinus pogonatus , and held the following year against the monothelites . the first decree of which said lateran synod , is this : siquis secundùm sanctos patres non confitetur propriè & veraciter patrem , filium , & spiritum sanctum , trinitarem in unitate & unitatem in trinitate , hoc est , unum deum in tribus subsistentiis consubstantialibus , aequalis gloriae , unam , eandémque trium deitatem , naturam , substantiam , & virtutem , &c. sit condemnatus . now this does as manifestly place the three divine persons in three distinct subsistences , as it is possible for words to express . for it is evident , that by subsistentiis cannot be here meant substantiis ; forasmuch as [ substantiis consubstantialibus ] would neither be truth , nor sence . and now , all that i pretend to from the foregoing testimonies and quotations , is not to prove , that the latin church has alway made use of the terms hypostases , subsistentiae , & modi subsistendi , about the explication of the trinity , ( for i own it to have been otherwise , ) but that from the fourth century downward , those of that communion were not strangers to , and unacquainted with these words ; many great and eminent writers having from time to time more or less applyed them to this purpose . but the main proof of the point driven at i state upon the latter ages of the catholick church . concerning which i dare and do affirm , that for the five or six last centuries , the said terms have been universally received and used by divines in their writings and discourses about the trinity ; all stating the personalities and distinction of the divine persons upon so many distinct subsistences , or modes of subsistence ; therein following the greek fathers , who were much more versed in this controversie , and managed it much better and more exactly than the ancient latines did . accordingly , i shall proceed now to the school-men ; amongst whom i shall begin with the father of them , viz. peter lombard , who in book . of his sentences , distinct. . and point . or sect. . speaks thus . cùm dicitur alia est persona patris , alia filii , alia spiritûs sancti , utique id sanè intelligi potest , ut sit sensus talis ; alia est subsistentia , vel hypostasis patris , alia subsistentia filii , alia subsistentia spiritûs sancti ; & alia subsistentia pater , alia filius , alia spiritus sanctus . by which surely it is plain , that he states the divine persons and their personalities upon subsistence , if any thing can be so . next to lombard , i shall produce alensis , who in vol. . and book . de divinis nominibus in speciali , has these passages . in divinis non dicitur una subsistentia , sicut una substantia . quaest. . memb. . and tres sunt hypostases unius essentiae , quaest. . memb. . and persona est hypostasis proprietate suâ distincta . quaest. . memb. . by all which he manifestly asserts the thing here contended for . after him , let us see what durandus says , who undertaking to give the signification of substantia , subsistentia , essentia and persona , with reference to god , in order to the explication of the term subsistentia , first tells us , what it is to subsist , in these words . subsistere dicit determinatum essendi modum , prout scilicet aliquid est ens per se , & non in alio . a little after which , he tells us , that nomen personoe dicit suppositum intellectualis naturae , cui omnia proedicta conveniunt , scil . essentia , substantia & subsistentia . by which he gives us a most exact account and definition of a person ; which ( in intelligent beings ) is nothing else but an essence , or substance ( terms synonymous in god ) under a subsistence peculiarly belonging to it . and in the end of this question , he further explains the personalities of the divine persons by so many distinct relations , in these words . persona , quoe multiplicatur in divinis , includit in eo , de quo dicitur , aliquid , quod non est omnino idem secundùm rem vel ex naturâ rei cum essentiâ vel substantiâ , scilicet relationem ; ratione cujus plurificatur persona in divinis , & non essentia . durandus lib. . distinct. . quaest. . thomas aquinas also we shall find giving his judgment to the same purpose , and that very fully and clearly . dicendum ( says he ) quòd quamvis hoc nomen [ substantia ] in latino respondere videatur huic nomini [ hypostasis ] in groeco , non tamen omninò idem significat secundùm usum utriusque linguoe . nam hoc nomen [ hypostasis ] apud groecos significat tantùm substantiam particularem quoe est substantia prima ; sed latini utuntur nomine substantiae tam pro primâ quàm pro secundâ . substantia autem particularis nihil aliud videtur , quàm quid distinctum subsistens . cùm ergo in divinis invenitur aliquid distinctum subsistens , rectè ibi nomen [ hypostasis ] dici potest , secundùm quod divina verbis humanis significari contingit . and again , dicendum quòd hoc nomen [ persona ] non differt ab hoc nomine [ hypostasis ] nisi quòd addit determinatam naturam ; quod patet ex hoc , quòd hypostasis est individua substantia . persona verò individua substantia rationalis naturoe . hypostasis ergo in rationali naturâ accepta nihil aliud est , quàm persona , sicut animal cum rationali actu nihil aliud est quàm homo . unde cùm divina natura sit rationalis , ( largo modo accipiendo rationale pro quolibet intellectuali ) oportet quòd hypostasis divina sit idem quod persona divina . and presently after , as to the relative nature of this hypostasis , he adds this at the end of the article . sicut ergo hoc nomen [ persona ] in divinis significat relationem per modum rei subsistentis , sic & hoc nomen [ hypostasis ] thomas in scripto . in sentent . lib. . distinct. . quaest. . artic. , . and again in his comment upon the epistle to the romans , cap. . nihil aliud est persona quàm hypostasis aut suppositum rationalis naturoe . next to thomas , let us hear cajetan , one of the most eminent commentators upon him , who defending bonaventure against scotus , speaks thus as to this particular . substantia dupliciter sumitur , & pro essentiâ & pro hypostasi ( i. e. ) subsistentiâ . atque hoc secundo modo substantia , id est , hypostasis dicitur formaliter de personâ divinâ , & quòd simul ac semel persona divina est hypostasis & tamen relatio . adding these words immediately hereupon . hoec omnia communia sant omnibus theologis . cajetan in m thomae , quaest. . artic. . from cajetan i shall pass to greg. de valentiâ , who discourses of the divine persons and personalities thus . ex hóc consequenter apparet , debere concedi in divinis tres subsistentias respectivas , non solùm ut subsistentia accipitur pro torâ personis , ut definitio ecclesioe declarat ; sed etiam ut accipitur pro gradu illo ultimo substantiali constituente personam & reddente illam incommunicabilem , quem theologi appellare solent subsistentiam , & est ipsa personalitas . g. de valentiâ tom. . disputat . generali . quaest. . artic. . p. . to gregory de valentiâ , we will subjoyn estius , who speaking of the words persona and hypostasis as they were used by the greeks and latines , and of the sence of the fathers about them , speaks thus . horum authoritatem posteriores groeci ità sunt secuti , ut hypostasim in divinis non aliud intelligant , quàm quod latini personam vocant , maximè cùm in promptu non esset aliud vocabulum , quo subsistentiam illam personalem , quâ inter se distinguuntur pater , & filius , & spiritus sanctus , commodè atque inoffensè exprimerent . estius in sentent . lib. . distinct. . articulo . by which words it appears , that according to this author , it is this personalis subsistentia , by which the three divine persons are distinguished , and consequently in which the proper personality of each of them does consist . after estius let us cast our eye upon suarez , speaking much the same thing with those before mentioned . advertendum est ( says he ) hoc nomen [ subsistentia ] apud antiquos patres frequentiùs accipi in vi concreti ad significandam hypostasim seu personam . in quo sensu nulla est quoestio inter catholicos , nam de fide est , dari in trinitate tres subsistentias realiter distinctas , id est tres hypostases . suarez in m thomae de trinitatis mysterio lib. . cap. . and then again for the relative nature of the said subsistences , he gives this account of the divine persons and their personalities . ex his quoe hactenus diximus , &c. concluditur relationem personalem esse etiam proprietatem constituentem personam [ seu quâ constituitur persona . ] de trinit . lib. . cap. . in the beginning . to all which i shall add , martinez ripalda , a short , but judicious writer upon the sentences , speaking of the term [ hypostasis ] in these words . hoeretici ( says he ) referente hieronymo , eâ voce abutebantur ad decipiendum fideles ; jam eâ significantes essentiam , jam personalitatem & incommunicabilem subsistentiam . by which last expression this author manifestly shews , that he takes personality and incommunicable subsistence for words synonymous ; and consequently that such a subsistence is and must be that , by which a divine person is constituted formally , what he is . i cannot think it necessary to quote any more of this sort of writers , nor am i sollicitous to alledge many of them , because i am well assured ( according to the forecited saying of cajetan ) that these are the terms , and this the language of them all upon this subject . only i think fit to remark this : that , whereas i have alledged some of the school-men ( and particularly durandus , thomas , and suarez ) expressing the divine personalities by relations , as well as by hypostases , or subsistences , as they do in both these mean but one and the same thing , viz. a relative subsistence , or a subsisting relation ; so by both of them they equally overthrow this author's hypothesis , deriving the divine personalities from self-consciousness . forasmuch as subsistence is in nature before it , and relation is opposite to it ; it having been demonstrated by me in chap. . that self-consciousness is a thing wholly absolute and irrelative , and therefore cannot possibly be the formal reason of that which is essentially relative . in a word , self consciousness is neither an hypostasis , nor a relation ; and therefore can have nothing to do here , whatsoever other employment this author may have for it . and now i shall at last descend to the testimony of several modern divines , and all of them men of note in the times in which they lived . and amongst these , let us first hear philip melancthon in his common places speaking thus upon this head. satis constat ( says he ) veteres scriptores ecclesiae solitos haec duo vocabula discernere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & dicere unam esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , id est , essentiam aeternam patris , & filii , & spiritùs sancti , sed tres 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . from him we will pass to chemnitius who wrote upon melancthon's common places : he in the first chapter of his book de duabus in christo naturis , gives his opinion thus . hypostases seu personae trinitatis omnes unum sunt propter identitatem essentiae suae , atque adeò non differunt essentialiter , nec separatim una extra aliam & sinè aliâ subsistit . and presently after this , relatione autem seu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , modo scilicet subsistendi realiter differunt . after chemnitius , let us consider what calvin says ; in book . of his institutions , chap. . sect. . filium dei apostolus characterem hypostaseos patris nominans , haud dubiè aliquam patri subsistentiam assignat in quâ differat à filio . nam pro essentià accipere ( sicuti fecerunt quidam interpretes , &c. ) non durum modò sed absurdum quoquè esset . and again in sect. . of the same chapter . personam voco subsistentiam in dei essentiâ , quae ad alios relata proprietate incommunicabili distinguitur . subsistentiae nomine aliud quiddam intelligi volumus quàm essentiam . in the next place peter martyr gives us the same account of the same subject . multò rectiùs ( says he ) & veriùs intelligemus ex isto loco ( nempe samuelis cap. . commate . ) tres personas in unâ naturâ divinâ , patrem , inquam , filium & spiritum sanctum , quae cùm sint tres hypostases , tamen concluduntur in unam essentiam . petrus martyr loc. com. p. . col . . loco de dei attributis & sacro-sanctâ trinitate . likewise wolfgangus musculus in his common places under the particular head or common place de deo , declares the matter thus . est itaque deus essentiâ unus quemadmodum & naturâ & divinitate , hypostasi verò trinus . and a little after , haec sunt manifestâ fide tenenda , deum , viz. esse unum essentiâ , naturâ , divinitate , sententiâ , motione , & operatione , trinum verò tribus personis , quarum singulis sua est hypostasis & proprietas . musc. loc. comm. cap. . p. . and a little before speaking of the difference of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and in what sence the ancients understood these words . voce essentiae ( says he ) id expresserunt ( nempe veteres ) quod commune est in sacrâ triade : per hypostasim verò quod unicuique personae proprium in illâ est , significârunt . p. . ibid. piscator also in his theological theses , speaks after the same manner . quum igitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 semper fuerit filius dei , quis non videt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de quo loquitur iohannes , semper fuisse personam seu hypostasim , rem scilicet per se subsistentem , loc. . de deo. p. , . agreeably to this , tilenus an eminent divine expresses himself in his body of divinity , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( says he ) sive personae sunt illa ipsa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quae in singulis personis est tota ; ipsae verò relationibus sive proprietatibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt distinctae . and again , simpliciter dicimus proprietates istas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse diversos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoc est , modos subsistendi . tilen . syntag. par . . cap. . p. . the learned ursinus in his theological treatises under the head de tribus personis in unâ deitate , declares the same . tenendum est , nequaquam eandem esse patris , filii & spiritûs sancti personam ; sed tres esse personas seu hypostases divinitatis reipsâ distinctas , nec plures nec pauciores . ursini oper. theol. quaest. . thesi . by which we see that this great divine reckons subsistence to be so much the ground and reason of personality , that he uses persona and hypostasis as terms perfectly equivalent . but there would be no end of particulars should i quote all that might be quoted , and therefore i shall conclude all these single testimonies with that of turretinus , late professor of divinity at geneva , who gives us this full and judicious account , in his common places , of the point here before us . fides orthodoxa haec est , in unicâ ac simplicissimâ dei essentiâ tres esse distinctas personas , quae proprietatibus incommunicabilibus sive modis subsistendi ità inter se distinguuntur , ut una non sit alia , licèt per ineffabilem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 maneant semper & existant in se invicem . turretinus part . loco . quaest. . in the last place to confirm the testimonies of particular persons , with the joynt suffrage and concurrence of whole churches in their publick confessions , i shall mention some of them . and amongst these , the augustan , or ausperg confession , gives this account of the trinity . ecclesiae ( scilicet reformatae ) magno consensu docent decretum synodi nicaenae credendum esse , viz. quòd sit una essentia divina , & tamen sint tres personae ejusdem essentiae , &c. et utuntur nomine personae eâ significatione quâ usi sunt scriptores ecclesiastici , ut significet non partem , aut qualitatem , sed quod propriè subsistit . confessio augustana in articulo fidei . next to this we have the wirtemberg confession declaring the same in the very beginning of it . credimus & confitemur unum solum deum , &c. et in hâc unâ & aeternâ deitate tres esse per se subsistentes proprietates seu personas , patrem , filium & spiritum sanctum . this confession was made and given forth in the year . likewise the gallican reformed churches in their confession made in the reign of charles the ix . and in the year . declare themselves much the same way upon this article . sancta scriptura nos docet in illâ singulari & simplice essentiâ divinâ subsistere tres personas , patrem , filium , & spiritum sanctum . add to these the belgick confession also , recognized , approved , and ratifyed in the synod of dort ; which in its eighth article speaks of the divine persons in the blessed trinity thus . haec distinctio [ viz. personarum ] non efficit ut deus in tres sit divisus , quandoquidem scriptura nos docet patrem , filium , & spiritum sanctum singulos distinctam habere suis proprietatibus hypostasim , which words are extremely expressive and full . but as touching these confessions , the reader ought not in reason to be dissatisfied that i produce no more of them to the present purpose , ( out of those many which are extant ) since it has been still the custom of most churches to draw up their confessions in terms as general and short as they well could . so that we are the less to wonder if we seldom meet with such words in them as are explicatory and particular . and now after all these authorities thus alledged by me , i would desire this confident man ( whom i am here disputing with ) to look back upon the fore-mentioned greek and latin fathers , councils , school-men , and all those eminent modern divines , together with the clergy of whole countreys and nations , solemnly and unanimously declaring themselves in their publick avowed confessions of faith , upon this great article and mystery ; i say , i desire him to look all these in the face , and to tell them , that they have hitherto abused the whole world with false notions of the trinity , by expressing the divine persons and personalities by hypostases , subsistences , and modes of subsistence , words ( as he says ) importing little better than sabellianism , and serving for nothing else but to obscure , perplex , and confound the minds and thoughts of men in conceiving , or discoursing of this weighty and sacred point of our christian faith. this , i require him , in defence of what he has so expresly , peremptorily , and magisterially affirmed all along in his book , to do ; if his heart and fore-head will serve him for it . in the mean time i have here delivered in all the testimonies both greek and latin , ancient and modern , which i think fit to offer in behalf of the point pleaded for : though , should i have represented all that occurrs in the fore-cited authors ( besides many others not mentioned ) to the same purpose , i should not so much have quoted , as ( upon the matter ) transcribed them . and now , if any one should ask me , whether i look upon these testimonies as sufficiently representing the doctrine of the catholick church upon this head of divinity ? i answer , that barely by way of induction they do not ; since an induction ought to consist of a greater collection of particulars . nevertheless i avouch this number of testimonies to be a full and sufficient representation of the sence of the church herein , if we consider them as joyned with , and supported by these three following considerations , as first , that it is morally impossible , that the persons above quoted , being of such eminent note in the church , both for orthodoxy and learning , and living ( most of them ) at such a great distance both of time and place , ( rendring all communication between them impracticable ) should , or could presume to express themselves upon so sacred an article , and so tender a point , but in such terms as were generally received , used , and approved of by the church . secondly , that these terms were never yet condemned , nor the users of them censured by any church , or council , accounted orthodox ; which in so great , and so revered an article they would infallibly have been , had they been judged unfit for , or unapplicable to , the things to which they were actually applyed , as this bold author with great confidence affirms them to be . thirdly and lastly , that hardly any church-writer of considerable remark and name can be produced , who ever treated of this great subject in any other terms than those expressed by us , or particularly made use of the terms self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness to explain it by . all being wholly silent of them in all those writings in which they do most particularly and exactly design a discussion of these matters . these three considerations , i say , added to the fore-alledged quotations irrefragably prove them to be a true , just , and sufficient representation of the sence and doctrine of the catholick church in this matter ; and that it is utterly inconsistent with the common reason , principles and practice of mankind , that it should be otherwise . and as for what concerns this author , whom i am disputing with , i dare affirm yet further , that any one or two of the passages quoted by me , are more full and clear to the purpose i quote them for , than all that he has produced from the several fathers alledged by him for his self consciousness and mutual-consciousness put together ; and much more than his forlorn 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cited out of gr. nyssen to prove the son an infinite mind distinct from the father , page . that is to say , than three vagrant words applyed by him , to he knows not what , and to be found ( for ought appears ) he knows not where . all which being manifestly so , i desire any sober person to shew me something but like a reason to prove , that the fathers and other church-writers ( from whom all these quotations were drawn ) placed the personal distinction of the divine persons in self consciousness , and their unity only in mutual-consciousness . on the contrary , as these words were never so much as mentioned by them , so i affirm , that , whensoever , in speaking of the trinity they proceed beyond the bare word and name of person , so as to give any account of the thing signified thereby , and the reason thereof , they do it constantly by subsistences , modes of subsistence , and relations . this i am positive in ; and withal , that , as they never mentioned the terms self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness upon this subject , so i avert moreover , that when they use the words subsistences , modes of subsistence and relations on the one side , and of unity , or identity of nature , essence , or substance on the other , ( which they always do ) they neither do , nor can mean self consciousness by the former , nor mutual-consciousness by the latter , nor yet the things signified by either of these terms . and that for these reasons . first , because all modes of being importing existence are in order of nature antecedent to the other attributes of being ; such as are knowledg , wisdom , power , and the like . and self-consciousness is no more ; as being but a branch , or sort of knowledg , and nothing else . and secondly , because nothing absolute can give distinction and incommunicability to the divine persons , the rule of the schools being undeniably true , non dari in divinis absolutum incommunicabile , gr. valent. tom. . pag. . but such a thing i affirm self-consciousness to be , and in chap. . have abundantly proved it so . so that it is evident , that all the fathers , and ancient writers , in all the terms which they used to express the trinity and divine persons by , had no regard to self-consciousness , either name or thing , and consequently that it is a term wholly foreign and unapplicable to this purpose . and what is said of their silence about self-consciousness extends to mutual-consciousness too . and the truth is , the other forementioned terms asserted by us against this innovator , are to be looked on by all sober intelligent men as a set of stated words , or forms of expression first pitched upon by the ablest divines and writers of the church , then countenanced and owned by councils , and lastly established by a kind of prescription founded upon a long continued use of the same throughout the several ages of the church , as the best and fittest helps to guide men in their conceptions of , and discourses about this great mystery ; and such as the church , in treating of so arduous a point , never yet would , nor durst go beyond . so that the question now is , whether they ought to be abandoned and made to give place to a new , mushrom , unheard of notion , set up by one confident man preferring himself before all antiquity ? a notion , ( no doubt ) long before he was born , throughly considered , canvased and laid aside , as not only insufficient , but impertinent to give any tolerable account of the trinity by . well ; but having declared this for the catholick , orthodox , and received doctrine about the blessed trinity , viz. that it is one and the same divine nature , essence , or substance diversified into three distinct persons by three distinct modes of subsistence , or relations , so that by vertue thereof god is truly and properly said to be three persons , and three persons to be one god. having , i say , vouched this for the doctrine of the church , let us in the last place see what this author has to object against it . and here his first reason ( to put it into form for him for once ) may run thus : whatsoever constitutes and distinguishes the divine persons , is really and truly in god , bu modes of subsistence are not really and truly in god , and therefore modes of subsistence do not constitute , or distinguish the divine persons . the major is evident , and shall be readily granted him . and the minor he positively asserts , by denying any modes to be in god , as particularly in page . in these words . all men grant ( says he ) that there are no accidents qualities , or modes in god. and again , pag. . there are no modes , no more than there are qualities and accidents , in the deity . so that we see here , what this author holds concerning all modes with reference to god. in answer to which argument , as i have formed it ( and i challenge him to shew that i have at all wronged him in it , if he can ) i deny the minor , viz. that modes of subsistence are not in god : and as for his two forecited general assertions : that modes are no more to be allowed in god than qualities and accidents ( which by the way are so put together , as if qualities were not accidents ) i have these two things to remark upon those two assertions so positively laid down by him . first , that it is a gross absurdity , and no small proof of ignorance , to reckon things so vastly different as modes and accidents are , upon the same range , or level , and then to argue and affirm the same thing of both . and therefore i do here with the same positiveness tell him , that modes and accidents do extremely differ ; and that none of any skill either in logick , or metaphysicks ever accounted them the same . for an accident affects the subject , it belongs to , so , that it is also a distinct being it self . but a mode affects it so , that it is not a distinct being it self . i will not deny but accidents may sometimes in a large and loose sence be called modes : but i deny , that modes are either accidents , or everso called , where they are particularly and distinctly treated of by themselves . school-men and metaphysicians may speak very differently of modes when they mention them occasionally , and when they discourse of them professedly , and under a certain and peculiar head. and whensoever they do so , if this author can bring me any one logician , metaphisician , or school-man who takes accidents and modes promiscuously for the same things , i dare undertake to forfeit to him a greater sum , than ever yet he received for copy-money in his life . secondly , my next remark upon his foregoing assertion is this : that as it is grosly absurd to confound modes of being with accidents ; so it is equally absurd to deny modes of being to belong to god. and this i shall prove both from the manifest reason of the thing , and from unquestionable authority . and first , for the reason of the thing . if modes of being should not be allowed in god , then i affirm it to be impossible for any distinction , and consequently for any persons to be in god. which i prove thus . if there be any distinction in god , or the deity , it must be either from some distinct substance , or some accident , or some mode of being , ( for i defie him or any mortal breathing to assign a fourth thing besides these . ) but it cannot be from any distinct substance , for that would make a manifest composition in the divine nature ; nor yet from any accident , for that would make a worse composition : and therefore it follows , that this distinction must unavoidably proceed from one or more distinct modes of being . this i affirm , and ( according to my promise made to this author in the foregoing chapter ) i shall be ready to defend the truth of this assertion against him , whensoever he shall think fit to engage in the dispute . secondly , in the next place , for the proof of this from authority , i affirm , that all metaphysicians , school-men and divines ( at least , all that i have yet met with ) do unanimously concurr in these two things . . that they utterly deny any accidents in god. and . that they do as universally affirm modes of being to be in god , and to belong to him . nay , and ( which is more ) that they do in these very modes state the ground and reason of the personalities , and the distinction thereof respectively belonging to the three persons of the godhead . and for a further proof of what i have here affirmed , and withal to shew how unable this man's memory is to keep pace with his confidence , whereas in the forementioned page . he affirms , that all men ( mark this word ) deny accidents , qualities and m●des to be in god. he himself afterwards , in page . owns , that the school-men hold these different modos subsistendi in the godhead , and accordingly there sets himself ( as well as he is able ) to confute them for it . now how shall we reconcile these blind assertions , that so cruelly bu●t and run their heads against one another ? for will he say , that the school-men do not grant such modes to be in god , after he himself has done his poor utmost to confute them for holding it ? or having said , that all men deny these modes to be in god , and yet that the school men grant and hold it , will he say , that the school-men are not men , and so come not under that universal appellative ? what the school-men hold and assert in this matter , has been sufficiently shewn already . but i must needs tell this author upon this occasion , that he seems to have something a bad memory , and withal to have more than ordinary need of a very good one . there is one thing more which i think fit to observe , and it is something pleasant , viz. that our author having exploded all modos subsistendi in god , and chastised the school-men for holding them , even to a forfeiture of their very humanity ; he yet vouchsafes afterwards , by a kind of correctory explication , to allow them in this sence , viz. that the same numerical essence is whole and entire in each divine person , but in a different manner , p. . lines , , . by which words it appearing that he grants that of the manner , which he had before denied of the modus , it is a shrewd temptation to me to think , that certainly this acute author takes modus for one thing , and manner for another . in fine , i appeal to the judicious and impartial reader , whether a man could well give a more convincing argument of his utter unacquaintance with the true principles of philosophy and theology , than by a confident assertion of these two positions . . that accidents and modes of being are the same things . and . that such modes are not at all to be allowed of , or admitted in god. secondly , his second objection against our stating the distinction of the divine persons upon three different modes of subsistence , is , that these modes are little better than three names of one god. which was the heresie of sabellius . p. . to which , i answer two things . first , in direct and absolute contradiction to what he asserts , i affirm , that the difference between three modes of subsistence in the godhead , and only three distinct names applyed to it , is very great . for names and words depend only upon the will and pleasure of the imposer , and not upon the nature of the thing it self , upon which they are imposed , and for that cause neither do nor can internally affect it . but on the contrary , all modes of subsistence spring from the nature of the thing , or being , which they affect , both antecedently to , and ( by consequence ) independently upon the apprehension , or will of any one . so that altho neither man nor angel had ever considered , or thought of , or so much as known that there were such or such things , yet the modes of subsistence proper to them , would have belonged to them , as really and as much as they do now . and if this author cannot by this see a vast difference between these , and so many bare names , ( thanks be to god ) others can both see and defend it too . but secondly , whereas he says , that these three modes are but little better than three names . i answer , that his very saying so is concession that they are something at least more and better . to which , i add further , that this something ( as small a difference as it makes ) is yet sufficient to discriminate things , which are only distinguishable , and no more . for separable , or divisible from one another , i am sure they are not . nay , this is so far from being a just and rational exception against placing the difference of the divine persons in so many different modes of subsistence , that , in the judgment of very great and learned men , it is no small argument for it : for st. cyril says , that the difference between the divine persons ( by reason of the perfect unity of their nature ( as it were ) blotting out , or taking away all diversity between them ) is so very small as but just to distinguish them , and no more ; and to cause that one of them cannot be called the other ; the father not the son , nor the son , upon any account , the father , &c. i thought fit to transcribe the whole passage , tho' the latter part , viz. from the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. is most immediately and directly to the purpose , which i here alledge the whole for . and thomas aquinas tells us , that the divine persons ought to be distinguished by that , which makes the least distinction . in like manner durandus affirms , that the first instance of plurality [ or remove from unity ] ought to be the least . and therefore that the distinction of the divine persons , since it is the first , ought to be by distinct relations compatible in the same essence : which for that cause , is a less distinction than any that can be made by things absolute . and lastly , bellarmine averrs pofitively , that the distinction of the divine persons ought to be the least that is possible . supposing all along , that it must still be real , and not barely nominal , or imaginary . this was the judgment of these learned men ; who as they were far from being sabellians , so they very well knew both what to assert and how to express themselves without giving any ground for their being thought so . from all which it follows , that for this very cause , that modes of subsistence import the least real difference that can be , they are therefore the fittest to state the distinction of the divine persons upon . so that our author here relapses into a fault which he has been guilty of more than once , viz. in alledging that as an argument against a thing , which is indeed a most effectual reason for it . and so i come to his third and last objection against our making these modes of subsistence the ground , or formal reason of the distinction between the persons of the blessed trinity , which is , that it makes the three divine persons only three modes of the deity , or only modally distinguished ; whereas ( according to his doctrine ) there are no modes in the deity , and much less can a mode be god. and that , as all must grant , that the father is not a mode of the deity , but essentially god ; so no man can think that the father begot only a modus , and called it his son ; whereas a son signifies a real person of the same nature , but distinct from the father . thus he discourses , pag. . . and is not this close and profound reasoning ? but as profound as it is , if it be at all to his purpose , his argument must lie in this , that all the forementioned absurdities unavoidably follow from deriving the distinction of the three divine persons from three distinct modes of subsistence belonging to one and the same divine nature . but this consequence i utterly deny , and to make out the reason of this denial , i shall consider what he has said particularly . and here , first of all , i would fain know , whether this man will never leave confounding things perfectly different , and taking them for the very same ? for to affirm the three divine persons to be only three modes of the deity , is one thing ; and to affirm them to be only modally distinguished , is quite another . the former we absolutely deny , and as positively hold the latter . and yet this wretched fallacy would he impose upon his reader all along , viz. that the assertors of these modes of subsistence in the trinity , make a person to be only a modus subsistendi . but that is his own blunder . for we do not say , that a person is only a modus , but that it is the divine nature , or godhead subsisting under such a modus , so that the godhead is still included in it , joyned to it , and distinguished by it . this is what we affirm and abide by , and what sufficiently overthrows his pitiful objection . and as for his absurd denial of all modes in god , that has been throughly confuted already ; so that we have nothing more to do , but to admire that invincible and glorious ratiocination of his in these words , p. . no man ( says he ) can think that the father begot only a modus , and called it his son. no , good sir , no ; none that i know of is in any danger of thinking or saying so ; no more , than that socrates begot only the shape and figure of a man , and then called it his son ; or ( to turn your own blunt weapon upon your self ) no more than god the father begot another self-consciousness besides his own , and called that his son. nevertheless i hope it will be granted me , that socrates might beget one of such a shape and figure , and ( by * xantippe's and this author 's good leave ) call that his son ; and that god the father might beget a person endued with such a self-consciousness ( amongst other attributes ) and call that his son too . but i perceive this author and the fallacy of the accident are such fast friends , that it is in vain to think of parting them . in the mean time , as i told him what we do not hold concerning the father's generation of the son , so for his better information i shall tell him , what the assertors of these modes of subsistence do hold concerning it , viz. we do hold and affirm , that the father communicates his nature under a different mode of subsisting , from what it has in himself , to another , and that such a communication of it , in such a peculiar way , is properly called his begetting of a son. in which we do not say , that the father begets a modus , no nor yet an essence , or nature , but that he communicates his own essence , or nature under such a distinct modus to another and by so doing begets a person , which person , is properly his son. this , sir , is the true account of what the assertors of the personal modes of subsistence hold concerning the eternal generation . and if you have any thing to except against it , produce your exceptions , and they shall not fail of an answer . i am now come to a close of this chapter , and indeed of the whole argument undertook by me against this author . in which i have asserted the commonly received doctrine about this great article of the trinity , both from the ancient writers of the church , and against this author's particular objections ; and in both fully shewn , that the three persons of the blessed trinity are one and the same undivided essence , nature , or godhead , diversified only by three distinct modes of subsistence , which are sometimes called properties , and sometimes relations . so that a divine person is formally and properly the divine nature , essence , or godhead with , and under such a distinct mode , property , or relation . and this i averr to be the common , current , generally received doctrine of the church concerning the trinity . for councils and fathers hold it , the school-men teach it , the confessions of churches ( where they are any thing particular upon this subject ) declare it ; and all divines both papist and protestant , in the several bodies of divinity wrote by them , do assert it ; only this author , who yet ( forsooth ) owns himself a protestant of the church of england , denies and explodes it . to whom therefore ( if he were not too great in his own eyes to be counselled and advised ) i would give this charitable piece of counsel for once , viz. that for the future he would not presume at such a rate to contradict the whole world , till he has learn'd not to contradict himself . chap. ix . in which this author's paradoxes , hoth philosophical and theological , as they occurr in this his discourse are drawn together , examined , and confuted . i am sensible , that i am now engaged in a subject that would threaten the reader with a very long chapter , should i follow it , as far as it would carry me : for i am entered into a large field , viz. this author 's paradoxical assertions : in the traversing of which , i shall observe no other method , but just to take them in that order in which they offer themselves throughout his book ; save only , that i shall give my reader this premonition , that such of them as i have particularly examined , and laid open in the foregoing animadversions , i shall now set down without any further descant , or enlargement upon them , or at least with very little . but as for those , which i there passed over without any notice , or remark , ( as i did it all along with full purpose to treat of them by themselves , so ) i shall particularly insist upon them now . and the reader may please to take them as they follow . paradox . it is a vain and arrogant presumption ( says this author ) to say , what is , or what is not a contradiction , when we confess we do not understand , or comprehend the thing we speak of , p. . and again , i know nothing in the world that we do perfectly understand , p. . line . answer . according to these two assertions taken together , i affirm , that though a man discourses never so falsly and inconsistently of god , or indeed of any thing in the world besides , yet he cannot justly be charged as guilty of a contradiction . and moreover , since this author affirms , page , that for any one to say , that three divine persons who are divided and separated from each other ; are each of them god , and yet that they are not three gods , but one god , is a direct contradiction ; i desire to know of him , whether he comprehends what the godhead and what the divine persons are ? and if not , whether ( according to his own rule ) it is not a vain and arrogant presumption in him to say what is a contradiction , when he professes himself not to comprehend the thing he is speaking of , and about which the contradiction is said to be ? paradox . this author having declared the intimate and essential unity between the father and the son from those words of our saviour , john th . chap. . ver. i am in the father , and the father in me : subjoyns , that this oneness between them is such an union , as there is nothing in nature like it ; and we cannot long doubt what kind of union this is , if we consider that there is but one possible way to be thus united , and that is by this mutual-consciousness , p. . answer . these words i charge with contradiction , and consequently with absurdity upon two accounts . first , because they contradict our saviour's words . and secondly , because they contradict the author 's own words . . and first concerning those of our saviour . whereas this author says , that this oneness between the father and the son , is such an union , as there is nothing in nature like it . our saviour in iohn ch. . ( where this whole passage is repeated twice ) affirms something to be like it ; viz. in ver . . where he prays to his father , that they ( viz. believers ) may be one , as we ( viz. his father and himself ) are one : and again , ver . . that they may be one , as thou father art in me , and i in thee . so that our saviour expresly asserts a likeness of something to this union on the one side ; and this author as expresly denies it on the other . in which ( according to his blundering , undistinguishing way ) he confounds [ likeness ] and [ sameness of kind ] as all one ; as shall presently be further shewn . in the next place , our saviour ( as plainly as words can express a thing ) says , that he and his father are one , by a mutual in-being , or in-existence in one another . and this man as expresly says , that there is no possible way for them to be one but by mutual-consciousness . but i on the contrary deny , that mutual-consciousness is mutual-inexistence , or mutual-inexistence mutual-consciousness , any more , than that being , or existence is properly consciousness , or knowledge ; and therefore if they cannot possibly be one , but by mutual consciousness , it is certain that they are not so by mutual-inexistence ; which yet our saviour , in words properly and naturally signifying inexistence , affirms that they are . and the more intolerable is this assertion in this author , for that in pag. . he affirms , that these words of our saviour ought to be understood properly ; and if so , i hope they do not only exclude metaphors , but all other tropes and figures also ; for [ proper ] is not , adequately opposed to metaphorical , but to figurative , whatsoever the figure be . and i do here affirm , that if our saviour's words be understood of mutual-consciousness , they do not signifie properly , but figuratively ; and the figure is a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct ; forasmuch as in god , being , or inexistence are to be look'd upon as the subject ; and knowledge , and the like attributes as the adjuncts . and therefore i do here tell this bold man again , that for him to say as he does , that the forementioned words of our saviour ought to be understood properly , and yet to interpret them to a sense not proper , but figurative ( which , by interpreting them of mutual-consciousness , he evidently does ) is both an absurdity and a presumption , equally insufferable . but in the d . place i charge the forecited passage of this author with the same absurdity , for being as contradictory to his own words , as it was to those of our saviour . for whereas he here says , first , that this oneness between the father and the son , expressed in those words , i am in the father , and the father in me , can be no other kind of union , than an union by mutual-consciousness . and secondly , that it is such an one , that there is nothing in nature like it . i desire him to turn to page . of his book , where he tells us , that the fathers use several examples , and allude to several sorts of union , thereby to form a notion of the unity of the godhead in the three divine persons . let him , i say , read this , and tell me , whether those examples and allusions could be of any use to form a notion of that unity to which they bore no resemblance at all ? for i , for my part , ever thought , that there can be no allusion of one thing to another without some similitude between them , and that a similitude is always on both sides ; it being not possible for peter to be like iohn , but iohn must be like peter too . and if this man does not yet blush at such contradictory assertions , let him turn a little farther to page , . where he tell us particularly , that st. austin explains this unity by examples of mutual-consciousness , and by several similitudes ( mark the words ) of which the unity of understanding , memory , and will with the soul of man is alledged by him for one ; and that a notable one too , for that these faculties ( as he there says ) are mutually in one another ; and the example of love and knowledge in the same mind , is alledged by him as another such a simile , affirming them in like manner to be mutually in one another . now , i say , after all this , ought not the reader to stand amazed , when he reads the man first affirming that the unity between the father and the son mutually existing in one another by virtue of the mutual-consciousness between them has nothing like it in nature , nor has any example , metaphor , or similitude , besides it self to allude to ; and yet afterwards producing several similitudes , allusions , and metaphors out of the fathers , to explain both this in-being , and this mutual-consciousness by ? god give him a better memory ; for as these things represent him , no man living ( would he but impart his skill ) could be so fit to teach the art of forgetfulness as himself . but after all , i must not omit to give the reader notice of another of his absurdities , though of a lower rate , viz. that all along page . he takes a pattern , or example , and a similitude , or metaphor for terms equivalent ; whereas a pattern , or example imports a perfect entire resemblance between it self and the thing of which it is the pattern , and indeed approaches next to a parallel instance ; while , on the other side , an agreement in any one respect , or degree , is sufficient to found a metaphor , or similitude upon . and therefore tho it may easily be granted this author , that there is no pattern , or example of such an union as is between the father and the son ; yet that does not infer , that there is nothing in nature that bears any similitude to it ; since this may very well be without the other , as that place in iohn . . and . has already proved . and now i should here have finished my remarks upon this particular head , but that there is a certain passage in order to his proving that there is nothing in nature like the unity between the father and the son , and it is this , that in substantial unions , that which comprehends , is greater than that which is comprehended : so that if two substances should be united by a mutual-comprehension of one another , the same would be both greater and lesser than the other , viz. greater as it comprehended it , and less , as it was comprehended by it , p. . now this proposition i will neither note as paradoxical , nor absolutely affirm to be false . but so much i will affirm , viz. that it is nothing at all to his purpose ; and that he can never prove it to be true. for besides , that he still confounds an example , or parallel case with a similitude , i would have him take notice , first , that this maxim , omne continens est majus contento , upon which he founds a majority of the thing comprehending to the thing comprehended , is wholly drawn from , and founded upon the observations made by the mind of man about corporeal substances , endued with quantity and dimensions ; in which the substance comprehending is , and must be of a greater dimension than the substance comprehended . but what is this to spiritual substances ? concerning which , i demand of this author a solid reason , why two such substances may not be intimately united by a mutual-permeation , or penetration of one another ? for all that can hinder such a penetration , or permeation ( as far as we know ) is quantity ; which in spiritual substances has no place ; and then , if such a mutual-penetration be admitted , these substances will be mutually in one another , and united to one another , not indeed by a comprehension of one another , ( of which there is no need , if such a thing could be ) but by a mutual-adequation , or exact coequation of one to the other ; so that nothing of one substance shall exist , or reach beyond , or without the other , but the whole of both by such a permeation , mutually exist in each other . this , i say , i neither do , nor will affirm to be actually so , but i challenge this author to prove that it cannot be so ; and till he can , it may become him to be less confident . in the next place , i have one thing more to suggest to him about substantial unions , which he talks so much of , viz. that the term is ambiguous , and may signifie either , first , the union of two or more substances together , and so the father and the son , who are not two substances , but only two persons ( as has been shewn in the foregoing chapter ) can never be substantially united . or , secondly , it may signifie the union of two , or more persons in one and the same substance ; which is truly and properly the union of the persons of the blessed trinity . and thus , though there is no instance in nature of persons so united , yet by way of allusion and similitude , the union of the three fore-mentioned faculties of understanding , memory and will , in one and the same soul , ( alledged by st. austin ) may pass for a small , or ( as this author himself calls it ) page . line . a faint resemblance of the union of the said three divine persons in the same nature , or substance ; which , according to his excellent talent of self-contradiction , he positively denies here in page . and as positively affirms in that other now pointed at . in fine , this assertion , that the father and the son cannot possibly be one , or in one another ( which is here the same ) but by mutual-consciousness , page . line , , . unavoidably infers , and implies , that they are not one by unity of substance , unity of essence , or unity of nature . for i am sure neither substance , essence , or nature , are mutual-consciousness . and if the church will endure a man asserting this , i can but deplore its condition . paradox . if we seek for any other essence , or substance in god , ( says this author ) but infinite wisdom , power and goodness , the essence of god , though considered but as one numerical person , is as perfectly unintelligible to us , as one numerical essence , or substance of three persons in the blessed trinity , page , . answer . this proposition is false and absurd , and to prove it so , i shall lay down these following assertions . first , that it is certainly much easier for humane reason to conceive one and the same divine nature , or deity , as subsisting in one single person , than in three distinct persons . secondly , that essence , substance , wisdom , power and goodness are in the divine nature ( which is a pure simple act ) all but one and the same thing , or being . thirdly , that , notwithstanding this , essence , or substance , and wisdom , power and goodness are formally distinct from one another . that is to say , the conceptus objectivus , or proper essential conception of one does not imply , or involve in it the proper conception of the other : upon which account one of them cannot properly be said to be the other . now these three things thus laid down , it is readily granted to this man , that essence , or substance , wisdom , power and goodness are really one and the same being , and that therefore it is vain and foolish to seek for any essence , or substance in god , which is not also wisdom , power and goodness . but this , by his favour , is not the point . for if he will nevertheless say , that the divine nature expressed by one infinite essence , or substance subsisting in one person , is as unintelligible , as the same subsisting in three distinct persons ; nay , that one and the same numerical wisdom , power and goodness consider'd , as subsisting only in one person , is not more intelligible than the same , as subsisting under three ; this is manifestly false , and contrary to common experience , and without any further arguing the case , i appeal to the reason of all mankind , whether it be not so ? paradox . what is intellectual love ( says this author ) but the true knowledge , or estimation of things ? what is iustice and goodness but an equal distribution of , or a true and wise proportion of rewards and punishments ? what is perfect power , but perfect truth and wisdom which can do whatsoever it knows ? page , . answer . we have here a whole knot , or cluster of paradoxes , but i shall take them a sunder , and consider them severally : and because they run all in the way of interrogations , i shall take them out of their interrogative form , and cast them into so many categorical assertions . the first of which is , that intellectual love is nothing else but the true knowledge and estimation of things . this is false and absurd . for love is one thing , and knowledge another ; each of them distinguished by essentially different acts and objects , knowledge importing no more than a bare speculation , or apprehension of the object ; whereas love is properly an adhesion to it : love essentially presupposes the knowledge of the thing loved ; but knowledge cannot presuppose it self . knowledge is the first act of an intelligent mind , love the second . and i would fain know , whether this man of paradox , will affirm , that god loves every thing which he has a true knowledge and estimation of ? but to give him one argument for all , are not the eternal distinguishing characters of two persons of the blessed trinity founded in the distinction of love and knowledge in god , the son issuing from the father by way of knowledge , and the spirit issuing from both by way of love ? in the next place he affirms iustice and goodness to be the same thing , and to consist both of them in a true and wise proportion of rewards and punishments . but this also is false . these two being as properly and formally distinguished by their acts and objects , as the two former . and i do here tell this author , that god's goodness is the proper qualification of his own actions , without referring necessarily to any other besides ; but that his justice bears an essential relation to the actions of others , viz. as rewardable , or punishable . and consequently god might have exerted innumerable acts of his goodness , though there had never been any object for him to have exerted so much as one act of his iustice upon . and to give him one instance that may convince any man of sense of the vast difference of these two attributes ; was that act of creation , by which god first created the world , an act of his justice ? or did that act consist in a wise proportion of rewards and punishments , before there was any act of the creature to be rewarded , or punished ? but i am sure it was an act of the divine goodness , whereby god communicated much of the perfection of being to something without himself . again , is pardon of sin an essential act of god's iustice ? but i am sure it is an act of his goodness . certainly this man neither knows , nor cares what he says . his third assertion is , that perfect power is nothing else , but perfect truth and wisdom . but this also is a gross paradox , and as false , as that omnipotence and omniscience are not two distinct attributes of god. god's power acts by and under the direction of god's wisdom , and therefore neither is , nor can be formally the same with it . and besides this , all acts of wisdom and truth proceed from god by a necessity of nature , but the acts and exercise of his power by a free determination of his will. for in speaking of god , no man says , that god is wise , knowing , or true , or acts according to these perfections , because he will do so ; for he can neither be , nor act otherwise ; but we truly and properly say , that god does this or that , because he will do it ; for if he had pleased , he might have chose , whether he would do it , or no. from all which , i conclude , that nothing could be more improperly and absurdly affirmed than , that the divine power is nothing else but the divine truth and wisdom . paradox . in men ( says he ) it is only knowledge that is power ; humane power , and humane knowledge , as that signifies a knowledge how to do any thing , are commensurate ; so that every man can do what he knows how to do : nay , knowledge , is not only the director of power , but it is that very power which we call force , page . answ. this is so gross a paradox , that , i think , it can need no other confutation than to oppose the sense of all mankind to it , nevertheless i shall offer this one consideration towards the disproving the identity of knowledge and power , viz. that a man's knowledge and skill about the doing any work of art , may increase , as his power of execution for the actual doing the said works may decrease , nay , wholly cease , and therefore they cannot be the same . for suppose a carpenter disabled by age , or accident , that he cannot strike a stroke towards the building an house ; does he therefore cease to know how to build it , while another shall build it wholly by the direction of his skill and knowledge ? this man may as well prove his head and his hands to be one and the same thing , as knowledge and power to be so . but i shall go no farther than this very author , to confute this author's assertion , who has told us in p. . l. , . that we understand nothing of the secrets and mysteries of nature ; nor are concerned to understand them , any more than it is our business to understand how to make either a body , or a spirit , which we have no power to do , ( mark that ) if we did understand it , and therefore it would be an useless piece of knowledge . now i beseech the reader to set these two assertions together , viz. that in pag. . that to know how to do a thing is to be able to do it , and that other in the pag. . viz. that though we understood how to make a body , or a spirit , yet we have no power to do it . i say let these two propositions be compar'd ; and then i hope that for the future , knowledge how to do a thing , and power to do it , ought not , even according to this very author , to pass for the same thing . in the mean time we see how one of his assertions contains a gross absurdity , and the other compleats it with as gross a contradiction . paradox . this word infinite ( says he ) confounds our notions of god , p. . answer . this is false . the thing indeed signified by the word infinite , exceeds and transcends our notions , but the word infinite does not confound them . and i would have this man take notice , that for an object to surpass and be above our thoughts , and to disorder and confound them , are very different things . and moreover , that it is the height of impudence and ignorance too , to say , that that word confounds our thoughts , notions and conceptions of god ; which all divines and philosophers in all places and ages have constantly express'd the nature of god by : and which , after the notion of his bare existence , does , next in order , offer it self to the mind of man , in its speculations of this great object . paradox . we know not ( says he ) how far infinite wisdom and goodness , and power reaches ; but then we certainly know , that they have their bounds , and that the divine nature is the utmost bounds of them , p. . to which i answer , that for an infinite wisdom to have bounds , and the bounds of it to be the divine nature ( which it self has no bounds ) is in ipsis terminis an express , downright , and shameless contradiction . see this further laid open in my second chapter . paradox . this creed ( says he , speaking of the athanastan ) does not speak of the three divine persons as distinguished from one another , p. . line . in reply to which , i am amazed to read an assertion so manifestly false , and yet so positively uttered . for will this author put out the eyes of his reader ? he tells us here that athanasius ( or whosoever else might be the author of this creed ) does not herein speak of the three divine persons as distinguish'd from one another . but i demand of him , does athanasius here speak of them as of three persons , or no ? if the first ; then he does and must speak of them as distinguished from one another , for that without such a distinction they are not so much as three . but if he does not speak of them as of three , and as of three thus distinguished . what then mean those words of the creed ? there is one person of the father , another of the son , and another of the holy ghost ? do these words speak of these persons as distinguished , or do they not ? if they do ; then what this man has here said of the creed , is shamelesly false ; and if they do not express the said persons as distinct , i defie all the wit of man to find out any words that can . paradox . he tells us , that the title of the one only true god cannot be so properly attributed to any one person , but only to the father , p. . answer . this i have already shewn in chap. . p. . to be both false and dangerous ; as by direct consequence either making several sorts of gods , or excluding both the son and the holy ghost from the one true godhead . at present i shall only say thus much , that [ the one only true god ] and [ the true god ] are terms perfectly equivalent , and not only commensurate but identical in their signification ; and withal , that this very author himself affirms page . line the last , that the son must be included in the character of the only true god ; which how he can be , without having this character properly affirmed and predicated of him , and his sustaining thereby the denomination of the only true god , let this confident , self-contradicting man declare if he can . in the mean time let me tell him further , that these terms [ the true god ] and [ the only true god ] do both of them import an attribute , or denomination purely essential , and by no means personal , or oeconomical : and moreover that every such attribute does and must agree to all the three persons equally , and whatsoever equally agrees to them all , may with equal propriety be affirmed of all and each of them , and consequently that the title of [ the one only true god ] may every whit as truly and properly be attributed to the son and holy ghost , as to the father himself . see more of this in my forementioned chapter . paradox . i affirm ( says he ) that the glory and majesty and all the other perfections of the three divine persons are as distinct as their persons are . and again , these perfections are as distinct as the persons , and yet as numerically one and the same as the godhead is , p. . answer . the first part of these assertions is utterly inconsistent with , and wholly overthrows the last . and it is indeed very horrid , as by inevitable consequence inferring a tritheisme . for if the essential perfections of god ( which in truth are only the divine essence under several conceptions and denominations ) are as distinct as the persons , whom the church acknowledges to be really distinct , then it will and must follow , that in the trinity there are three really distinct essences , or godheads , as well as three really distinct persons : and if they are thus distinct , it is impossible that the three persons should by virtue thereof , either be , or be truly said to be , really one ; so that this author , we see , has herein asserted a trinity with a witness ; but as for any unity in it , you may go look . but i perceive he was driven to this false and absurd assertion by that argument of his socinian adversary urging him , that if the essential glory and majesty in father , son and holy ghost be but one , then it cannot be said that their glory is equal , their majesty co-eternal ; forasmuch as unity is not capable of equality ; which must of necessity be between two or more . this , i say , no doubt , drove him to this inconvenience . in answer to which objection , ( though i owe not this author so much service ) as i shall readily grant , that where there is an equality , there must be also a plurality , of some sort or other , whatsoever it be : so i shall observe , that the divine essence , glory , or majesty , ( which i still affirm to be but different names of the same thing falling under divers conceptions ) and every other essential perfection of the godhead , may be considered two ways . first , absolutely and abstractedly in it self , and as prescinding from all personal determinations , in which sense the divine nature , essence ( and every essential attribute included in it ) is , and always must be taken , whensoever , in discourse , it is spoken of , either as compared with , or contra-distinguished to all , or any of the persons . and accordingly , in this sense being absolutely one , it is incapable of any relation of equality . forasmuch as one thing considered but as one , cannot be said to be equal to it self . or , secondly , this glory , majesty , or any other essential perfection of the godhead , may be considered as sustaining three several modes of subsistence in three distinct persons ; which said modes , as they found a plurality in this essential glory , or majesty , ( though by no means of it ) so this plurality founds a capacity of equality ; by virtue whereof , the same glory according to its peculiar way of subsisting in the father , may be said to be equal to it self as subsisting after another way in the son , and after a third in the holy ghost ; so that immediately and strictly this equality is between the three several modes of subsistence , which this essential glory , or majesty sustains , or ( if you will ) belongs to the said glory , for and by reason of them . and this is the true answer to this socinian objection , which by a manifest fallacy proceeds à dicto secundùm quid ad dictum simpliciter , viz. that because equality cannot belong to the essential glory , or majesty of the godhead considered abstractedly from the divine persons , therefore neither can it agree to the same glory , or majesty , upon any other account whatsoever , which is utterly false ; forasmuch as considered according to the three different ways of its subsistence in the three persons , it may , as subsisting under any one of them be said to be equal to it self , as subsisting under the other two. paradox . this author represents gregory nyssen as first asserting a specifick sameness , or unity of nature , in the divine persons ( which also he makes all along to be signified by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) and then asserting that this specifick sameness , or unity of nature , makes the said three persons numerically one , page . the latter end . answer . this is too great an absurdity for so learned a father to be guilty of , and therefore ought to lie at this author 's own door ; for that a specifick sameness , or unity of nature , should make any thing , or person , numerically one ( any more than a generical unity can make things specifically one ) is beyond measure senceless and illogical . paradox . though the fathers ( says he ) assert the singularity of the godhead , or the numerical unity of the divine essence ; yet they do not assert such a numerical unity , as where there is but one person as well as one essence , but such a numerical unity as there is between three , who are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the very same nature , but are not merely united by a specifick unity , but by an essential union ; and therefore are three and one , page line . answer . in these words there are several absurdities , which he falsly charges upon the fathers , but ought in all reason to take to himself . as , . he supposes a specifick unity , and an essential unity to be distinct unities : whereas every specifick unity , or union , ( call it , at present , which you will ) is also an essential unity , or union . for a specifick unity is one sort of an essential unity ( which in its whole compass contains the generical , the specifical , and the numerical ) and therefore thus to contra-distinguish a species to its genus , is fit for none but such a logician as this author ; it being all one , as if one should say of peter , that he is not only a man , but also a living creature . . the second absurdity is , that he owns a specifick unity of nature in the divine persons ( which sort of unity i have abundantly proved in chap. . the divine nature not to be capable of ) for he says here of the divine persons , that they are not merely united by a specifick unity : which words must imply , that however , so united they are . . he makes two sorts of numerical unity , contrary to all rules of logick , viz. one , where there are several persons of one nature , as here in the trinity ; and the other , where there is but one person , as well as one nature . but let me here tell him , that the divine nature is every whit as numerically one in the three persons , as if there were but one person in the godhead , and no more . and in this very thing ( as has been shewn ) does the mysteriousness of an unity in trinity consist . i say , the divine nature is as numerically one in the three persons , as the humane nature was numerically one in adam , while there was no other person in the world but himself ; nay , much more so , since it is not multiplicable , as that was . and to affirm , that the numerical unity of the godhead is not so perfect , or is not the very same , subsisting in three distinct persons , as if we could imagine it to subsist but in one , subverts and overthrows such an unity in trinity , as the church in all ages hitherto has maintained . paradox . having told us , that the fathers universally acknowledged , the operation of the whole trinity ad extra to be but one , and from thence concluded the unity of the divine nature and essence ; for that every nature has a virtue and energy of its own ; ( nature being a principle of action , ) and if the energy and operation be but one , there can be but one nature . he adds within four lines after , that this is certainly true , but gives no account , how three distinct persons come to have but one will , one energy , power and operation ; nor that any account ( that he knows of ) can be given of it but by mutual-consciousness , page . line , &c. answ. were i not acquainted with this man's way of writing , i should be amazed to see him in so small a compass so flatly contradict himself . for will he , in the first place , assert , in the three divine persons a numerical unity of nature ? and in the next , assert also , that this unity of nature is proved by unity of energy and operation ? and after this tell us , that this gives no account at all , how three distinct persons come to have but one will and energy , power and operation ? for does not unity of nature , in these three distinct persons prove this ? while the said unity of nature proves unity of operation , as the cause proves its effect , and unity of operation again proves unity of nature , as the effect proves its cause ? this , any one of sense would think , is a fair , full , and sufficient account how three distinct persons , having all but one nature , come thereby all to have but one will , energy and operation . and should any one else argue otherwise , i should think him beside himself ; but this author in this discourses like himself . paradox . knowledge , self-reflection and love , are distinct powers and faculties in men , and so distinct , that they can never be the same ; knowledge is not self-reflection ; nor love either knowledge , or self-reflection ; though they are inseparably united , they are distinct , p. . l. , , &c. answ. here also is another knot of absurdities . for , first , knowledge , self-reflection , and love are not in men distinct powers and faculties ( as this unfledged philosopher calls them ) but only distinct acts. secondly , admitting that knowledge were a faculty ( as it is not ) yet i deny that knowledge and self-reflection would make two distinct faculties , forasmuch as it is one and the same intellectual faculty , which both exerts an act of knowledge , and an act of reflection upon that act of knowledge , or upon it self as producing the said act. for which cause it is ( as has been observed before ) that philosophers hold that the understanding is facultas supra se reflexiva ; all of them allowing both the direct and the reflex acts of knowledge to issue from the same faculty . thirdly , he says , that albeit the forementioned acts are distinct , yet they are inseparably united . but this also is false ; for ( whether an act of knowledge may be without an act of self-reflection , as some , not without reason , think it may ) i am sure in men ( of whom alone we now speak ) both an act of knowledge and of self-reflection too may be without an act of love consequent thereupon : and if the former may be without the latter , then they are not inseparably united , as this author here says they are . paradox . he says , that love is a distinct act , and therefore in god must be a person , p. . answ. if this be a true and good consequence , then the ground and reason of it must be this , that every distinct act in god , is , and must be a distinct person . and if so , then every decree in god , whether it be his decree of election , or of reprobation ( if there be such an one ) or of creating the world , and sending christ into it , and at last of destroying it , and the like , are each of them so many persons . for every divine decree is an act of god , and an immanent act too , as resting within him , and ( as such ) not passing forth to any thing without him ; that maxim of the schools being most true , that decreta nihil ponunt in esse . nor is this all , but most of the divine acts are free also ; so that there was nothing in the nature of them to hinder , but that they equally might , or might not have been ; which applied to the divine persons , would make strange work in divinity . in the mean time if this author will maintain this doctrin , viz. that acts and persons , are the same in god , ( as , i think , he ought in all reason to maintain the immediate consequences of his own assertion ) i dare undertake that here he will stand alone again ; and that he is the only divine who ever owned , or defended such wretched stuff . paradox . these three powers of understanding , self-reflection , and self-love are one mind , viz. in created spirits ; of which alone he here speaks , adding in the very next words , what are mere faculties and powers in created spirits , are persons in the godhead , &c. pag. . at the latter end . answer . this is a very gross absurdity , and to make it appear so , i do here tell him , that the three foremention'd powers are no more one mind , than three qualities are one substance ; and that very term [ powers ] might have taught him as much ; potentia and impotentia making one species of quality ; under which all powers and faculties are placed . so that his three powers of understanding , self-reflection , and self-love are one only unitate subjecti , as being subjected in one and the same mind ; but not unitate essentiae , as essentially differing both from one another , and from the mind it self too , in which they are . certainly if this man did not look upon himself as above all rules of logick and philosophy , he would never venture upon such absurd assertions . paradox . he tells us , that the son and holy ghost will and act with the father ; not the father with the son and the holy ghost , pag. . line , , &c. answ. this is a direct contradiction : for if the son and holy ghost will and act with the father , the father must will and act with the son and the holy ghost . and he who can find a distinct sense in these two propositions , and much more , affirm the first and deny the latter , has a better faculty at distinguishing than any mortal man , using his sense and reason , will pretend to . it being all one , as if i should say , i saw thomas , william and john together ; of whom william and john were in the company of thomas , but thomas was not in the company of william and john. and i challenge any sensible thinking man to make better sense of this author 's fore-mention'd assertion if he can . but this must not go alone without a further cast of his nature , by heightning it with another contradiction too , which you shall find by comparing it with pag. . line . where he affirms , that father , son , and holy ghost act together , having before expresly told us here , that the father does not will and act with the son and holy ghost ; which very assertion also , ( to shew him the further fatal consequences of it ) absolutely blows up and destroys his whole hypothesis of mutual consciousness , by destroying that upon which he had built it . for if the father may and does will and act without the son and holy ghost , then farewel to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for they must never be alledged in this cause more . paradox . nothing can make god visible but a personal union to a visible nature , page . line , . answer . this is a most false assertion , and directly contrary to scripture . and to prove it so , i shall lay down these four conclusions . first , that the godhead , or divine nature , neither is nor can be visible to a corporeal eye , by an immediate sight , or intuition of the godhead it self . secondly , that god is visible to such an eye only by the special signs , or symbols of his presence . thirdly , that god is visible by a body personally united to him , only as the said body is such a sign , or symbol of his peculiar presence . and fourthly and lastly , that a body actually assumed by god for a time , is during that time as true , and visible a symbol of his presence , as a body , or nature personally united to him can be . and thus it was , that god appeared visibly to the patriarchs in old time , and particularly to abraham , to gideon , and to the father and mother of sampson , who thereupon thought that they should die for having seen god face to face . for generally all interpreters hold the person who thus appeared , to have been the second person of the blessed trinity , the eternal son of the father ; though sometimes called simply the angel , and sometimes the angel of the covenant , from the office he was then actually imployed in by his father , as the extraordinary messenger and reporter of his mind to holy men upon some great occasions . this supposed , i desire this bold author to tell me , whether the second person of the trinity ( god equal with the father ) was personally united to the body , which he then appeared in , or not ? if not ; then the forementioned assertion , that nothing can make god visible , but a personal union to a visible nature , falls shamefully to the ground , as utterly false . but if he was personally united to it , then these paradoxes must follow , . that he either laid down that assumed body afterwards , or he did not : if he did , then an hypostatical union with god may be dissolv'd ; and not only so , but there may be also a thousand personal unions one after another , ( if god shall think fit to assume a body , and appear in it so often ; ) which would be contrary to the sense of all divines , and to all principles of sound divinity , which own but one hypostatical union and no more . or , . he still retains an union to that assumed body , and then there is a double hypostatical union , viz. one to the visible body assumed by him , in which he appeared of old , and the other to that body which he was born with in the world. all which positions are horrid and monstrous , but unavoidably consequent from the foregoing assertion . but for the further illustration of the case i do here affirm to this author , that god is as visible in an assumed body , whether of air , or aether , or whatsoever other materials it might be formed of , as in a body of flesh and blood personally united to him : i say , as visible . for notwithstanding the great difference of these bodies , and the difference of their union and relation to god , one being by a temporary assumption , and the other by a personal incarnation ; yet no corporeal eye could discern this difference , during the appearance , but that one was , for the time , as visible as the other ; and therefore since both of them were truly symbols of god's peculiar presence ( the only way by which the divine nature becomes visible to a mortal eye ) it demonstratively overthrows that positive , false assertion of this author , that nothing can make god visible , but a personal union to a visible nature . paradox . all the circumstances of our saviour's birth , and life , and death , were so punctually foretold by the prophets , and so peremptorily decreed by god , that after he was come into the world , there was no place for his choice and election . and he could not shew either his love , or his humility by choosing poverty , death , &c. page . line . answer . this is false , absurd , and dangerous , and indeed next to blasphemous ; as overthrowing the whole oeconomy of man's redemption by the merits of christ. for that which leaves no place for choice , leaves no possibility for merit . for all merit is founded in freedom of action , and that in choice . and if christ , after his incarnation , had not this , he could not merit . and whereas the author says , that christ chose all this as the second person of the trinity antecedently to his incarnation . i answer , that this is indeed true , but reaches not the present case . for what he did before he was incarnate , was the act of him purely as god ; but a meritorious action must still be an humane action ; which could not proceed from the second person before his assumption of an humane nature . i readily grant and hold , that the actions of christ's humane nature received a peculiar worth and value from its union with his divine person , yet still i affirm , that this worth and value was subjected and inherent in his humane actions , as such ; and thereby qualified them with so high a degree of merit . so that , whencesoever this merit might flow , they were only his humane actions , viz. such as proceeded from him as a man , that were properly and formally meritorious . and whereas this author states the reason of this his horrid assertion upon the predictions of the prophets , and the peremptory decrees of god concerning all that belonged to , or befell christ , i do here tell him , that neither predictions nor decrees , though never so punctual and peremptory , do , or can infringe , or take away the freedom of man's choice , or election about the things so decreed , or foretold ; how difficult soever it may be for humane reason to reconcile them ; and if this man will affirm the contrary , he must either banish all choice and freedom of action , or all certain predictions and peremptory decrees out of the world ; let him choose which of these two rocks he will run himself against , for he will be assuredly split upon either . this vile assertion really deserves the censure of a convocation , and it is pity , for the church's sake , but in due time it should find it . paradox . concerning person and personality he has these following assertions , which i have here drawn together from several parts of his book , viz. the mind is a person , page . line , . a soul without a vital union to a body , is a person , page . line . and the soul is the person , because it is the superiour governing power , and constitutes the person , page . line . a beast which has no reasonable soul , but only an animal life , is a person , &c. page . line , , . and again , we may find the reasonable and animal life subsisting apart , and when they do so , they are two [ persons ] and but one [ person ] when united , page the same , at the end of it . and lastly , one agent is one person , page . line . answer . in all these propositions , so confidently laid down by this man , there are almost as many absurdities and falsities as there are words . i have already shewn this of some of them in chap. . and therefore i shall be the briefer in my remarks upon them here . and first for that assertion , that the mind is a person . to this i answer , that the mind may be taken two ways . first , either for that intellectual power , or faculty , by which the soul understands and reasons . or , secondly , for the rational soul it self . in the former sense , it is but an accident , and particularly a quality : in the second it is an essential part of the whole man ; and therefore upon neither of these accounts can be a person . for neither an accident , nor a part can be a person ; which ( as such ) must be both a substance , and a compleat substance too . and secondly , whereas , he says , that a soul without a vital union to the body is a person ; i tell him , that the soul without such an union , is still an incomplete being ; as being originally and naturally designed for the completion and composition of the whole man , and therefore for that reason , cannot be a person . and then thirdly , whereas he adds , that the soul is the person , because it is the superiour governing power , and constitutes the person . i answer , that it is the former , and does the latter , only as it is the prime essential part of the whole man ; and for that very cause is an incomplete being , ( as every part is and must be ) and consequently cannot be a person . in the next place , for an answer to his saying , that a beast is a person . i refer him to his own positive affirmation , pag. . line . that a person , and an intelligent substance , are reciprocal terms : and the same may serve for an answer to his next absurdity , that when the reasonable and the animal life subsist apart , they are two persons . for the animal life separate from the rational , is void of all reason , and the very definition of a person is , that it is suppositum rationale , aut intelligens . in the last place , by his saying , that one agent is one person , ( which , i am sure , he affirms universally of every single agent ) he makes every living creature under heaven , a person : for every such creature is endued with a principle of life and action , and accordingly acts by it , and by so acting , is properly an agent : from all which it follows , that this author ( as great as his retinue may be ) has many more persons in his family , than he is aware of ; there being not so much as a rat or a mouse within the walls of his deanry , but , according to this assertion of his , is as truly and properly a person as himself . so that although he seldom ( as he says ) makes visits , yet he is sure never to want company . paradox . he asserts , that every man has two distinct reasons , and two distinct wills , and those as distinct as if he had two souls , page . line , , . answer . this assertion , and the absurdity of it are perfectly his own . for certainly two reasons and two wills , and those as distinct in each man , as if he had two distinct souls , were never asserted to be in any one [ meer ] man , by any person of sense and learning before : it has indeed been disputed by philosophers , whether there be three souls in the same man , viz. a rational , a sensitive , and a vegetative ? and it has been generally concluded in the negative , and that the gradus intellectivus , sensitivus , & vegetativus were only three distinct powers , or faculties lodged in one and the same soul : but as for two distinct reasons and two distinct wills in one soul , none that i ever met with , affirmed it . and in answer to it , it were enough to overwhelm the asserter of it with the universal judgment of all philosophers holding the contrary , viz. that in each individual person there is only one individual reason and will , and no more . but i shall discourse the matter a little further with this author ; though yet as briefly as i can . and first of all , i lay down this as certainly true , that if one single reason , and one single will are sufficient to give an account of all the acts , offices , and operations belonging to the nature of man , then it is superfluous , and consequently absurd to assert any more . but the former is undoubtedly true . and to shew that it is so , we are to consider what human reason , and the offices of it properly are ; and so for the human will , and the proper acts and functions of that . now they are both of them intellectual faculties , and thereby distinguish'd from , and superiour to all acts of sensation , whether external , or internal , and all acts of desire and appetition , proceeding from the sensitive appetite . and as they are superiour to them , so it is the proper office of reason to arbitrate upon , judge of , and direct all the apprehensions and reports of the senses , and upon such a judgment passed upon them , to declare authoritatively , what ought , or ought not to be done ; and in the like manner the will is to govern and control all the inferiour appetites , desires , and inclinations , by an effectual disposal of them , to what shall , or shall not be done . and this is the order and oeconomy of all the rational and sensitive powers and faculties of the soul of man , and of the functions and operations respectively belonging to them . and now i desire any one to shew me , what use there is of a second reason , and a second will , and what are those particular , proper acts proceeding from them , which are neither intellectual , nor sensitive . for if they are either of these , all such acts have been fully accounted for , from the intellectual and sensitive principles already mentioned , and therefore must needs be superfluous . again , i would know , whether these two reasons are subordinate , so that one is subject to and governed by the other , or co-ordinate and equal , and neither of them subject to , or governed by the other ? if they are subordinate , the inferiour is useless , since the acts proceeding from both , being equally acts of reason , the superiour can and may dictate all that the inferiour can suggest immediately by it self , and without the subordinate operation of the other ; and what i have said of an human reason , will proportionably hold in an human will : but if , on the other side , there are two co-ordinate reasons , and two co-ordinate wills , neither of them subject to , or governed by the other , then , in the direction and disposal of mens actions , they either suggest the very same directions and commands , or such as are quite different , and sometimes perhaps contrary . if the very same , then one of the reasons and one of the wills are again superfluous : for what need can there be of two to suggest the very same things ? but if these two reasons suggest different , or contrary directions , and these two wills exert two different , or contrary influences upon the inferiour and sensitive part , then the soul must be distracted between both , and not able to proceed determinately to action ; but the two reasons must dispute the matter , and the two wills must fight it out . and this will be the admirable harmony and state of an human soul. if it be here objected , that we sometimes find mention in scripture of a sensual , or carnal reason , and of a sensual will : and that therefore two reasons , and two wills must be admitted in each man. i answer , that we read in scripture of the old man and the new man , in persons regenerate , and yet i cannot from hence infer , that two distinct men do , or can subsist in one person . and therefore as to that objection of a carnal , sensual will and reason , i answer , that reason is call'd sensual , when it directs and prescribes according to the exorbitant inclinations and desires of the sensitive part ; and the will is called so likewise , when it does not interpose its sway and authority , but suffers the sensitive appetites to take their own course without control : so that this term sensual , or carnal applied either to reason , or will , does not import , or infer another reason , or another will , but the same reason and will under different , and sometimes contrary qualifications , and otherwise acting and behaving themselves , than , according to their natural prerogative and office in the soul , they ought to do . it is indeed a division subjecti in accidentia . and this is all that can be drawn from thence . in fine , i think a stranger and a sillier paradox could not well be advanced ; and it is great pity but the author of it should be known by this glorious character , that this is that great philosopher and divine , who affirms and holds , that there are three distinct infinite minds in one god : and two distinct reasons , and two distinct wills in one and the same man. and long may he live to have the fame of such assertions ringing in both his ears ; and when he is dead , i doubt not but he will be remembred by them , though they be never writ upon his tomb : for certainly he who affirms two reasons in the same man , hardly discourses at the rate of one. paradox . he asserts , that the body moves at the command of the will , and is so far conscious to its commands , pag. . lin. , . in answer to which , i affirm it to be absolutely false , and extremely absurd ; to say , that the body is at all conscious to the commands of the will. forasmuch as consciousness is an act of intellection , and so must issue from an intellective faculty , which the body is not endued with , and therefore cannot act by ; and withal , every act of the will is only an intelligible , and not a sensible object ; and consequently cannot be otherwise apprehended and perceived than intellectually . and as for the commands of it ; a command operates and moves only by way of moral causation , viz. by being first known by the thing , or agent which it is directed to , which thereupon by such a knowledge of it , is induced to move , or act accordingly . but now , the will does not thus act upon the body , the body having no principle whereby to know , or understand what it commands . and therefore , when we say , that the will commands the body , in strictness of truth , it is only a metaphorical expression . for the will , or soul exerting an act of volition , moves the body , not by command , but by physical impulse : that is to say , it does by its native force , energy , and activity , first move and impell the spirits , and by the instrumental mediation of them so moved and impelled , it moves and impells the body ; and this , by as real an impulse , as when i push , or thrust a thing with my hand . for though indeed a material thing cannot actively , or efficiently move , or work upon an immaterial , yet philosophers grant that an immaterial ( as being of the nobler and more active nature ) can move , impell , or work upon a material ; and if we cannot form in our minds an idea of the mechanism of this motion , it is because neither can we form in our minds an idea of a spirit : but nevertheless reason and discourse will evince , that the thing must be so . paradox . he tells us , that the human nature of christ may be ignorant of some things , notwithstanding its personal union to the divine word ; because it is an inferiour and subject nature , page . line , , . answer . these words also are both absurd and false . and first , they are absurd , because no rules of speaking , or arguing , permit us to say of any thing , or person , that it may be so , or so ; when necessarily it is , and must be so . for the term [ may ] imports an indifference , or at least , a possibility to both sides of the contradiction : so that when a man says , that a thing [ may be thus , or thus ] he does by consequence say also , [ that it may not be thus , or thus . ] and therefore to say , that the human nature of christ , notwithstanding its personal union to the word , may be ignorant of some things , when it cannot but be ignorant of some ; nay , of very many things , is absurd . and in the next place also , to make the subjection of the human nature to the divine , the proper cause of this ignorance is false , and the assignation of a non causa pro causâ : it being all one , as if i should say , that such an one cannot be a good disputant , because he has a blemish in his eye . for it is not this subjection of it to the divine nature , that makes it ignorant of many things known by that nature ; but the vast disparity that is between these two natures , viz. that one of them is infinite , the other finite , which makes it impossible for the infinite to communicate its whole knowledge to the finite . forasmuch as such a knowledge exceeds its capacity , and cannot be received into it , so as to exist , or abide in it , any more than omnipotence , or omnipresence , or any other infinite divine perfection can be lodged in a finite being . and besides this , this very author , in the immediately foregoing page , had not only allowed but affirmed , that the body ( which certainly is both united to the soul , and of a nature subject and inferiour to it ) was yet conscious to the dictates and commands of the soul. wherefore where two natures are united , the bare subjection of one to the other , is not the proper cause , that the nature which is subject , is ignorant of what is known by the nature which it is subject to . for if subjection were the sole and proper cause of this ignorance , the inferiour nature would be equally ignorant of every thing known by the superiour ; which yet , according to this man 's own doctrine of the consciousness of the body to the soul , is not so . this consideration i alledge only as an argument ad hominem , having already , by the former argument , sufficiently proved the falseness of his assertion . but i shall detain my reader no longer upon this subject ; though i must assure him , that i have given him but a modicum , and ( as it were ) an handful or two out of that full heap which i had before me ; and from which i had actually collected several more particulars , which i have not here presented him with , being unwilling to swell my work to too great a bulk . nevertheless i look upon this head of discourse , as so very useful to place this author in a true light , that if i might be so bold with my reader , i could wish , that he would vouchsafe this chapter ( of all the rest ) a second perusal ; upon which i dare undertake , that it will leave in him such impressions concerning this man's fitness to write about the trinity , as will not wear out of his mind in haste . and yet after all this , i will not presume to derogate from this author's abilities , how insolently soever he has trampled upon other mens ; but content my self , that i have fairly laid that before the reader , by which he may take a just , and true measure of them . and so i shall conclude this chapter with an observation , which i have , upon several occasions , had cause to make , viz. that divinity and philosophy are certainly the worst things in the world , for any one to be magisterial in , who does not understand them . chap. x. in which the author 's grammatical , ( and such like ) mistakes , as they are found here , and there in his writings , are set down , and remarked upon . could this author have carried himself with any or dinary degree of candor and civility towards those , whom he wrote against , he had never had the least trouble given him by me upon this head of discourse . but when i find him treating learned men with so much disdain and insolence , and much liker a rough , ill-bred school-master domineering over his boys , than a fair opponent entring the lists with an ingenuous antagonist , i must confess , i cannot think my self obliged to treat him upon such terms , as i would an adversary of a contrary temper and behaviour . one man ( and a very learned one too ) he flirts at , as if he could not distinguish between conjunctive and disjunctive particles ; vindication of his case of allegiance , pag. . the two last lines . another he scoffs , or rather spits at , as neither understanding greek nor latine . vindic. trin. pag. . line . and thereby , i suppose , would bear himself to the world as no small critick in both . as for the socinians ( of which number this latter is ) i do from my heart condemn their opinions , as false , and destructive , not only of the christian , but ( in several instances ) even of natural theology and religion it self . nevertheless i do not find , that these men use to be reproached for want of greek , or latine , or for any notable defect of parts , either natural , or acquired . faustus socinus was a person undoubtedly of great wit and strength of mind , and of competent , though not very deep learning ; but his uncle laelius socinus before him , and crellius who lived some time after him , were persons very well stocked with both ; and so have been many more ( indeed too many ) besides these . and where the case stands thus , i think , what the poet said of probity and integrity , may very well be said of learning also , viz. that it is commendable even in an enemy , how much soever we may blame him for the ill use of it . but this author spares neither friend nor foe , but comes like a kind of hurricano upon his adversary , not vouchsafing him so much as one grain of allowance , wheresoever he finds ( or rather thinks he finds ) him tripping . and therefore , let him not , of all men , complain that he is hardly dealt with , if with the same measure , with which he has hitherto meted to others , it be measured to him again . accordingly , i shall in this chapter proceed to examine his grammatical , vocabular mistakes . and that i may do this justly , and without the least shadow of unfair dealing , i will first set down the table he gives us of the typographical errata , in the first edition of his book ; that so we may distinguish , what ought to be laid at the printer's door , and what at the author 's . the table of errata prefixed to the first edition of the vindication of the blessed trinity , &c. is as follows . page . line . read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . l. . for corinthus read cerinthus . p. . l. . for ss read is . p. . l. . for his read tres. p. . l. . for persons read personae , and l. . for the read three . p. . line . for whence read when . p. . line . for to read too . p. . l. . for we read he. p. . l. . for convict read convinc't . p. . l. . for world read word . p. . l. . dele it . p. . l. . read challenged . this is a true and exact transcript of the table of the errata prefixed to that book . ( whether the said table be true , or no ) concerning which , i cannot but observe , that most of these errata are much more easily corrigible by an ordinary reader ( without any admonition ) than those that i shall mention , and remark upon . and i shall add further , that , had he but said [ that these and the like errata the reader is desired to correct as he shall meet with them ] he should have heard of none of them from me ; though i am pretty well satisfied , and so will any judicious reader be too , that as none of them in any probability are , so some of them ( as they stand here placed in this book ) neither are , nor could be any one 's but his own . but since he has laid in no such salvo , and this stands as a full account of the errata ; and not only so , but since in the second edition some faults not mentioned in this table , are corrected , while others remain the same , or as bad , as in the first edition , there is all the reason in the world , that the author should be charged with that , from which he himself has thus discharged the printer . and besides , in the second edition of his book , the reader is desired to take notice , that there is no table of errata at all ; by which we may justly conclude , that he reckoned it so correct , as to need no further correction . so that what i find there , i judge my self , to have all the right that can be , to account with him for . and the rather , for that ten years ago he publickly declared in print , that he was resolved in what he should publish for the future , to correct the press himself ; though , on my conscience , it was one of the unfittest employments ( next to the writing of vindications ) that he could take to ; as , i doubt not , but this chapter will pretty well shew . now the words , which i intend to remark upon , shall be of these two sorts . first , such as may be considered singly in themselves . and secondly , such as must be considered in conjunction with other words , in sentences and forms of speaking . of the first sort the reader may please to take notice of these that follow . as in page . line . i find an extraordinary word called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : the meaning of which i would gladly know : for i can no more find it in any lexicon , than i can in the table of the errata : and yet certainly it must be some excellent word , as having stood its ground in both editions of his book . i confess i have been apt to think it stands for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; but why it should do so , the author ( who , no doubt , is a grecian in his heart ) may possibly give us a good reason ; but i , for my part , cannot . such another word we have cloathed indeed in greek characters , but , by no means , of greek extraction ; and that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , pag. . line . i have read , i confess , of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifying innominabile , or quod nominari non potest ; and i do not deny but that i find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 also ; and that not only in the place here cited out of greg. nyssen , but twice also in st. basil's hexaemeron ( from whence i quoted it so written , ch. . p. . ) but i very much question , whether the word be so wrote in other and ancienter copies of those father's works ; and that for these two reasons . first , because it must be derived from the preterperfect tense 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and if so , then according to the rule of grammar in such verbal derivatives , the augment must be thrown away , and the original letter retained ; as in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ab 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ab 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and consequently 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ab 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with an omicron is the regular and proper word , appears from those cognate words so common amongst the grammarians , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . nevertheless if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be admitted , it must be by the attick dialect ; which very often ( especially in compounds ) puts an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; as in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and several other like words . but my second reason , why i think the ancienter editions of st. basil have it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with an omicron , is , because i find those lexicographers who write it so , quote this word out of that very place of st. basil's hexaemeron , where now it stands wrote 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; which surely proves that they found it not there so wrote then , when they quoted it from thence . but admitting that it may be so wrote , viz. with an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as well as with an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , yet what does , or can this make for our author 's new-coined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ? for till there can be found such greek words as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to derive it from ( which none ever yet met with , nor ever will ) in vain shall we seek for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any where but in this author . in the next place , to pass from greek words to latine , or such at least as are latinized , i would gladly know , who those anti-nicene fathers were , who are mentioned by him , pag. . lin. . and whether they were arians , or novatians ; who ( as i take it ) were the great opposers of the nicene council . but that , i find , cannot be , since our author tells us , that th● p●●sons , spoken of by him , were of the same faith with th● ●●cene fathers . so that upon that account , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 think , it ought to be the ante-nicene fathers . and 〈◊〉 so , i think the author would do well to take notice , that there is a great difference between anti-nicene and ante-nicene , between such as lived before the council , and such as were against it . and the more particular and exact notice ought he to take of it here , since ( tho' the difference be only in an iota ) he yet knows what a disturbance this little letter made in the homoousian and homoiousian controversie , even so great as to occasion the convening of this famous council . nevertheless , that this word anti-nicene passed for good and current with this author , is evident from hence , that it is ( as well as some others ) free of both editions of this extraordinary book . again in page . line . we are told of the favourites of some opinions . as to which , i had thought , that men use to favour and countenance opinions , and not to be countenanced and favoured by them . and yet the word favourite signifies passively , and so must be taken for one who receives favour , and not actively for one who shews it . and therefore if to represent any one as the favourite of an opinion be not good sence , i know no way , but by striking it out , and putting favourer in the room of it , to make it better . in page . line . i read intension used in the same sence with intention , or purpose ; and i must declare , that i never found it so used before . and in page . line . i am told of the council of lateran ; and i wondered a good while , what council it should be ; for though i had heard of several lateran councils , yet i never heard of the council of lateran , till i met with it here . likewise i find an extraordinary person in page . line . named lucifer carolitanus , and was thereupon in some thoughts with my self , whether there might have been any place called in former times carolina , or by some name like it . but then out comes the second edition and alters it into caralitanus ; which ( in my poor opiniou ) looks very suspiciously , as if some body had a mind to correct it , but knew not how . as for lucifer calaritanus so called from calaris , now cagliari , the metropolis of sardinia , i have heard much of him ; but i will suppose our author had some body else in his eye . and upon this occasion , i cannot but take notice of some other writers quoted by him , whom the world seems as much unacquainted with , as with this carolitanus . as for instance st. hillary in his apol. p. . at the latter end . and albaspinus in his defence of dr. stillingfleet , pag. . line . and nonn●s in his knowledge of christ , page . now st. hilary indeed ; a famous father of the church , and bishop of poictiers , and albaspinaeus archbishop of orleans , eminent for his learned works , and nonnus who wrote a paraphrase upon st. iohn's gospel , in greek verse , are every one of them known and celebrated by all . but as for st. hillary , albaspinus and nonnas , i never heard of them till this author was pleased to bless the world with these new names . as for erronious instead of erroneous , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 instead of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , they are small things , and ought to make no difference amongst friends , though i have known many a poor school-boy forced to water his plants for a less mistake . but there is a word of singular note , which i have met with at least six or seven times in this book , and four times in one page , viz. . and it is prosopopaea , which also , as well as its companions has given the catalogue of errata the slip , and so , weathered it out in two editions : but what to make of it , i cannot tell . there is indeed a certain figure in rhetorick , called prosopopoeia , which i know well enough , but prosopopaea i am wholly a stranger to : and surely this author could not mean the figure 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; forasmuch as the strict literal signification of that is fictio personae . and i cannot imagine how this author should mistake about this word ( of all others ) having had so excellent an hand at the thing signified by it ; as having , i dare say , made more persons than ever god thought fit to furnish the world with . and to shew the reader that our author's store extends much further than one book , i will present him with some more of the like rarities out of some of his other pieces . as first in page . of his answer to the protestant reconciler , he makes mention of exorcisme , chrysom , unction , dipping , trine immersion , &c. as rejected by the church of england . and here i was extremely at a loss to learn what chrysom was ; and after all my search , no lexicon could inform me , till at last i hit upon a certain little lexicon , called , the bill of mortality , and there i found a word very near it , as differing from it but by one letter , which was chrisom , signifying a child that dies presently after it is born : but then considering again , that the church of england did not declare her self to reject such , i was as much at a loss as ever ; till at length setting my guessing faculty on work , i concluded , that certainly it should be chrisme , which is a greek word for unction , as immersion is a latine one for dipping . and this our author should have taken notice of , for though he quotes it out of the reconciler , yet since he neither rectifies it , nor reflects upon him for it , we may very reasonably suppose , that he took it for good payment ; and really thought , that it ought to be chrysom as he found it . otherwise he who had been so quick and sharp upon him at other turns , would , no doubt , have took him upon such an advantage , and well-favouredly exposed him for so foul a blunder . but to go on . in page . line . of the same book , i find mention of the quadrigesimal fast. and this put me as much to a stand , as the other , to imagine what kind of fast this should be . for the nearest and likest word i could derive it from , was quadriga , signifying a coach , cart , or waggon . and accordingly as the jews had their feast of weeks , and of tabernacles , so i did not know , but the papists , or some christians like them , might have some fast , called , the fast of coaches , or waggons ; and might possibly give it that name from its being carried on with the discipline of the whip and the lash , as coaches and waggons used to be . this conjecture , i say , i made with my self . for i concluded , that this author could not mean it of the lenten-fast ; for that is called quadragesima , or jejunium quadragesimale , and issues from the numeral quadraginta , and so is quite another thing from this quadrigesimal-fast ; which i cannot find in all the rubrick of our church ; though perhaps when those excellent persons spoken of , apology , p. . line . have finished their intended alterations of our rubrick , we shall find it there too . in the next place , let us pass to such of his words as stand conjoyned with others in sentences , or forms of speaking . and here let us first of all consider his absurd use of that form of expression [ as i may so speak ] which he has at least twenty times in this one book : now the proper use of these words , is to bespeak excuse for that which they are joyned to , as for something that is legendum cum veniâ , and containing in it a kind of catachresis , or at least some inequality , some defect or other in the expression , with reference to the thing designed to be expressed by it . and this , i am sure , is all the true and proper reason assignable for the use of these words [ as i may so speak . ] but this author applies and uses them , even when he pretends to give the properest and most literal account and explication of things , and such an one , as is not only better than all others , but even exclusive of them also , as the only true account that can be given of them . as for instance , where he affirms self-consciousness to be the true and only formal reason of personality , and mutual-consciousness to be the same of the unity of the divine nature in the three persons , he ushers it in with those words [ as i may so speak ] page . line , , , &c. which ( according to what he holds about these two terms ) is all one , as if i should say , god is an infinite , eternal , almighty being ( as i may so speak ) and god is the creator and governour of the world ( as i may so speak ) and man is a rational creature , having two eyes , two arms , and two legs ; i may so speak ) all which is egregiously absurd and ridiculous . and the more so ; for that this very author reproaches one of his adversaries ( whether owen , baxter , lobb , or the reconciler , i cannot at present remember , but the thing i perfectly do ) for using the like expression [ as i may so say , ] with great scoff and scorn , telling him thereupon , that certainly no man had ever more need of ( so says ) than he had . now for my own part , i think this author's [ so speaks ] are every whit as bad and contemptible as his adversary's [ so says ] unless he can perswade the world , that a man may speak an absurd thing much more excusably than he can say it . to this we may add some more such absurd expressions . as for instance , that in p. . line . where he says , that the three divine persons are so united to each other , as every man is to himself . in which words , besides the falseness of the proposition ; it being impossible for the three divine persons to be so united to each other , as to be but one person , which yet every man is , we ought to note also the absurdity of the expression . for all union , or unition , is essentially between two things at least ; so that unless the man be one thing , and himself another , he cannot be said to be united to himself . he may , perhaps , be properly enough said to be one with himself ; but to say , that he is united to himself , is unpardonable nonsence . again , in page . line . he tells us , that the infinite wisdom which is in the father , son , and holy ghost , is [ identically the same ] which is as much as to say , that a man is wisely wise , honestly honest , learnedly learned , and the like : for though i know what it is to be perfectly , or absolutely the same ; yet to affirm any thing , or person to be identically the same , is an idle , and a nauseous tautology . likewise in page . line . he tells us , that god intercedes with no body but himself . concerning which form of speaking , i must observe , that when the term [ but ] is used as a particle of exception , it implys the thing , or person excepted from others , to be of the same kind , or , at least , condition with the rest , from which it was excepted . and therefore , unless god were a body , it can with no congruity of speech be said , that god intercedes with no body but himself . so that this also must pass for another blunder . with the like absurdity he tells us in page . line . where there are two distinct and divided operations , if any of them can act alone without the other , there must be two divided natures . now it is a maxime in philosophy , and that such an one , as , i think , ought to take place in grammar too , that actionis non datur actio . and accordingly if the reason of things ought to be the rule of words , then to say , that an operation acts , or operates , is extremely senceless and ridiculous . but to proceed , he has a way of promiscuously applying such words to things as are properly applicable to persons only , such as are [ who ] and [ whose . ] as for instance , he tells us of the being of a thing [ whose ] nature we cannot conceive , page . line . and in the same page , line . we may know ( says he ) that there are a great many things [ whose ] nature and properties we cannot conceive . and in page . line . it is so far from being a wonder to meet with any thing [ whose nature ] we do not understand , &c. but is this sence , or grammar ? or does any man say , reach me that book , [ who lies there ] or that chair [ who stands there ? ] no , certainly , none who understands what proper speaking is , would express himself so . and moreover ( to shew that he can speak of persons in a dialect belonging only to bare things , as well as he did of bare things in words , proper only to persons ) he tells us of a son produced out of the substance of [ its parent ] instead of his parent , page . line . which is a way of speaking every whit as improper and absurd as the other . in the next place he has a custom of joyning a verb of the singular number with a noun of the plural , and so vice versâ . as there is three gods , instead of , there are three gods , page . line . and the nature of most things [ are ] very dark and obscure , instead of [ is so ] page . line . which also is so ungrammatical that it would not be endured in a school-boy ; it being as arrant a solecism in english , as homines currit , or socrates disputant would be in latine . likewise he often uses the particle [ then ] instead of [ than ] as , the scripture teaches more [ then ] natural reason does . pag. . line . and a more glorious authority [ then ] he exercises himself , page . line . this , i say , is familiar with him , but withal exceedingly absurd , improper , and not english. for [ then ] is a note of time , but [ than ] is a note of comparison , importing a greater or lesser degree of that thing wherein the comparison is made ; and is commonly joyned with the words sooner , or rather , but always with some word or other , denoting the comparative degree of a thing . as , such an one has more or less strength , or wisdom [ than ] another . and i will die sooner , or rather [ than ] i will do such a thing , or the like . but no man who speaks , or writes true english , will use these two words indifferently . but i must not omit that notable passage , page . line . where he tells us , that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . these are the very words , and as they stand ( though in conjunction with two or three english words to complete the sentence ) do in my opinion , carry much of the air of a solecisin upon them ; so that according to the construction of them here , if it had been for my life , instead of saying , there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i would have said , there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and so have joyned true greek and english together . but there is an extraordinary passage in his book of judgment , chap. . sect. . p. . of the last edition , ( which should be the most correct ) and i was doubting , whether i should charge it upon his ignorance , or his insolence ; but both of them play their parts very remarkably in it . for first he makes a most false , illiterate , and absurd translation of a verse , or rather part of a verse in the new testament , and then reproaches the received translation , as wrong , and very faulty , for rendring it otherwise . the place is in pet. c. . v. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . in which he considers only the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , dividing them from the rest of the sentence , viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and by that means from the verb in this latter part of it , which should govern the noun in the former ; thereby making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be governed not by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( as it ought to be ) but most falsely and ungrammatically by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and so he renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , casting them , viz. the apostate angels , down into chains of darkness . and this interpretation he builds partly upon the pretended reason of the thing here discoursed of , and partly upon the signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but upon both of them very absurdly . from the reason of the thing he argues , that if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should signifie the apostate angels being cast down into hell , how could they be said upon sentence passed upon them at the last judgment , to be then cast into hell , if they were there before ? to which the answer is very easie and obvious , that immediately upon their sin they were cast down into , and kept in those lower regions called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or hell locally , but not cast into hell-torments , till the last judgment has passed upon them ; so that with full accord both to scripture and reason we are to distinguish the place of hell , where they now are , from the judicial penal torments of hell , which they shall be adjudged to , and endure in that place hereafter ; as we distinguish the prison wherein malefactors are kept , from the execution which they are there kept for : as indeed this text with great significance alludes to both : so that his argument from hence falls to nothing . his other reason is from the signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he affirms to signifie only to cast down . but on the contrary , i must here tell him first , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does not only import the act of casting down , but ( being derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) signifies also the term ad quem , or the place , into which this casting down is . and i refer him to all the greek lexicographers ( not one of them excepted ) whether they do not render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by in tartarum detrudo , dejicio , or praecipito ; and if so , how can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 possibly here agree with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; for if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be the term ad quem of the act , how can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be so too ; since one single act can have but one ultimate term ad quem ? and even this man himself does not allow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be one and the same thing . and besides this , i must tell him further , that if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imported the term , thing , or place , into which god cast down the apostate angels , it ought not to have been 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; forasmuch as the motion of casting down , importing a local descent to something , the dative case cannot in true grammar answer it . and therefore the old latine version makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to import , not the term to which , but the instruments or means by which these angels were thus brought down , rendring the text thus , rudentibus inferni detractos in tartarum tradidit , &c. which , as it is not strictly a translation , but an arbitrary paraphrase , so it is a very forced and unnatural one too ; as importing not a casting but a drawing down these angels into hell. in which case , who must be the person drawing them ? for since god ( to whom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does and must here agree ) ought to be considered by us as in the highest heaven , how can this drawing down be applyed to him , which , in the nature of it , supposes the person drawing to be in that lower place , to which he is drawing others ? for all traction is a motion of the agent forcibly bringing something to himself , but trusion a motion by which he removes or forces something from himself . it is clear therefore , that according to all the rules of grammatical construction , and proper speaking , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be governed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and that , therefore something else must be sought for to govern it , which can be nothing besides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and then the whole sentence will be properly and plainly translated thus . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ god ] having cast or thrust them [ viz. the apostate angels ] down into hell [ or the lower regions ] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , delivered , or put them into chains of darkness , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , kept , or reserved to [ or for ] iudgement . and this is sence and propriety of speech , agreeable both to the natural signification , and the grammatical syntax of the words . but the translation so imperiously and ignorantly given by this man ( in correction of that of the church ) is agreeble to neither . for it both divides one part of the sentence from the other , from which it must not be devided , and then makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be governed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which cannot govern it , and quite cutting it off from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which alone can . and now , ought it not to be matter of amazement to all men of sense and sobriety , to see a puny , who is not able to master three words of greek , presume to controul such great masters of that language , as the translators of the new testament into english undoubtedly were ? nay , and thereby to reflect upon the church her self , which has received and owned this translation , and to whose judgment and authority ( if he be so nearly related to her , as he pretends ) he ows so great and filial a deference ? let him rather instead of correcting the english translation ( a work which he was never born for ) thank god , and the translators for it ; there being few men living more beholden to it than himself . and therefore leaving his forlorn criticisme ( as new every whit as his divinity ) to shift for it self ; i , for my part , like my english bible , for his dislike of any part of it , better than before . for i can by no means see any force or consequence in this argument , viz. that because this author is much better at quoting a greek sentence than at construing it ; therefore the english translation of this text in st. peter is a very bad translation : i say , i cannot admit , or yield to this consequence . and thus i have presented the reader with some of this author's ways and forms of expression , which grammarians call loquendi genera . from all which , according to the singular skill he has shewn in this sort of learning , it is to be hoped , that as he has already blest the world with a new divinity and philosophy , so he will in due time oblige it with a new grammar too . and great need ( as we shall presently see ) there seems to be of such an one . in order to which , i shall mention but one more of this author's pieces . and that is a book , intituled , a defence of dr. stillingfleet , &c. in the beginning of which , there is a table of errata prefixed , that fills almost a whole page ; so that i verily thought , that it had so clearly carried off the whole crop , as to leave no gleanings behind . nevertheless i shall present the reader with this small spicilegium of what i gathered up after it ; not mentioning any one word that stands corrected there . in page . therefore , and line . he tells us of a counterfeit epithite ; but what that is , i do not know . i have indeed often heard of an epithete from the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifying quid appositum aut adjectum , and imports properly , an adjective joyned to a substantive , and giving the substantive a denomination accordingly . but as for this author's epithite , it may , for ought appears , signifie something to stop bot●les . for as for any other signification ( that i know of ) it has none . in the next place , page , . he quotes baxter for an expression used by him , viz. of such people as talk through a window on the west-end of moore-fields ; and calls it mr. baxter's elegant paraphrases for madmen . but here ( besides the mistake of paraphrases for paraphrasis , which is only one number put for another ) our learned author must give me leave to tell him , that by this passage , he seems not to understand what a paraphrasis means . for a paraphrasis , or paraphrase ( to put it into english for his sake ) signifies properly a translation of some writing , with additions and enlargements to illustrate and explain the sence of it , and is therefore usually called liberior translatio . in which sence we read of this or that paraphrase upon the psalms , and erasmus's paraphrase upon the new-testament , and the like . so that unless the mad-men here spoken of , were a certain book , or writing , and mr. baxter's words concerning them , an explicatory translation of the said writing , this great-good man could not properly call them a paraphrase . but what must we call them then ? why truly the forementioned words might be properly enough called a periphrasis , or circumlocution ( which , being so like the word paraphrasis , might easily deceive a man who cares not what he writes ) and when it is so taken , it is a certain figure in speech , whereby we express a thing by several words , which otherwise might , and , for the most ' part , is expressed by one . as sophronisci filius , is a periphrasis for socrates , and the man who conquered pompey the great , is a periphrasis for iulius caesar ; and so to bring the matter home to mr. baxter's instance ; that forementioned expression of , men who talk through the windows at the west-end of moore-fields , is a proper periphrasis for mad-men . but as for a paraphrase upon madmen , i leave it to this wonderful person , to make a paraphrase upon any man , ( whether mad or sober ) if he can . likewise in page . and the last line , he tells us , out of calvin's epistles of a publica praecum formula . concerning which , though i must confess , that i do by no means aspire to be one of the number of this author 's excellent persons , who were for altering our liturgy , or publick form of prayer . yet , if it were expressed by publica praecum formula , i should be one of the foremost who should desire that praecum might be altered into precum . in the mean time , why should any one who had reàd but a page in calvin , quote him for such a word as could not possibly drop from so learned a pen ? but it would be endless to descant particularly upon all this author 's new-found latine , and proprieties of speech . and therefore to set them down briefly as they offer themselves . in page . in the quotation in the margin , the reader will find a most choice word , viz. conscionator , not to be met with in any such puny author as we commonly call classick , but cited by him instead of concionator out of the th canon of our church ; which , i must tell him , is not an ordinary slip , but a foul stumble , attended with two more in the same quotation , viz. sique for siqui , and a lesser one , which is utrum , for utrum ; for that is no greater than the difference of a noun from an adverb , which , we know , is below a person , paramount to all rule , to take notice of . though by his good leave the church of england both writes and teaches better latine to such as are disposed to learn it . again in page . in the quotation on the side , we have these words cited out of the third book of optatus milevitanus . recordamini quomodò à vobis jamdudum matris ecclesiae membra distracta sunt , non enim [ unumquamque demum ] semel seducere potuistis . of which passage i must confess i could make neither sence nor grammar , till consulting the author himself of albaspinaeus's edition , instead of unumquamque demum , i found it unamquamque domum ; which , no doubt , is an admirable various lection ( of which this author ought to have the glory ) upon the text of such a father . but this is not all the blunders which this fruitful sentence affords us ; there being yet another , viz. recedit for resedit ; and that such an one as utterly perverts the sence of the author , who speaks here of some who left , and some who remained in the communion of the church , opposing them in this respect to one another ; as , aut ivit uxor , aut resedit maritus , aut parentes seducti sunt & filii sequi noluerunt , aut stetit frater migrante sorore , &c. thus the father here speaks ; but , pray , what opposition could there be between aut ivit uxor aut recedit maritus , any more than there is between going away and departing ? besides , that all the rest of the verbs running in the preterperfect tense , this must needs do so too , or make a very gross fault in the construction : so that this is an illiterate perversion of the sence of this father . upon which , as well as upon other occasions , i look upon this as the only sure rule of dealing with this author's quotations , viz. to trust them no further than one can see them in their originals . in like manner , page . in the place there quoted in the margin out of st. cyprian's . epist. ( and not the d . as this author there mistakes it ) we meet with these words , à coepiscoporum suorum corpore & ab ecclesiae unitate [ discisserit : ] but the word in st. cyprian is ( as it ought to be ) descisceret , from descisco to fall off ; between which , and the other word used by this author , there is a wide difference , descisceret being a most proper latine word , but discisserit so far from proper , that it is not so much as latine . and in page . line the last , we find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which makes the whole period neither sence nor greek . again , page . line the last but one , we have this passage , videte annon dicantur martyres , sed aliquid [ alium ] dici mereantur ; which being there put for aliud , is a downright solecism . and lastly , in page . in the quotation in the margin , we have those remarkable words , simiarum more , [ qui ] cùm homines non sint , homines tamen imitantur ? which is another solecism every whit as bad and scandalous as the former . now all these words and passages , i assure the reader , as they stand in the authors , from whence they are quoted , carry a very different face , from what this writer has given them ; which shews , that whensoever the words of the fathers are transcribed into any of his books , they are quite out of their element . for amongst them ( as they stand here ) there are some such vile faults , or rather such clamorous sins in grammar , that should a school-boy tender an exercise to his master with but two or three such in it , he would soon find himself very roundly and severely took up for them ; and that perhaps more ways than one . but hands that can restore dispossessed princes , may write any thing , and authorize what they have wrote , by their very writing it . for otherwise , the truth is , the latine , which the forecited passages are dressed up in , seems a sort of providential latine , as being above all rules and laws of speaking and writing whatsoever . as for faults about accents , such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. vind. p. . line . and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , page . line . of the quotation in the margin , and the like , they are too numerous for me to trouble the reader with . but this i desire him to take notice of , upon the whole that has been produced by me , that as none of the forementioned faults are in the table of the errata ; so some of them in the first edition of his vind. trin. stand corrected in the second ; as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , page . line . of the quotation in the margin of the first is corrected into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the second : and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , page . line . in the former , is changed into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the latter . and therefore according to the old maxime , that exceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis , it is to me a sufficient proof , that since this author corrected some passages , and not others , which yet need correcting as much , if not more , it was , because his acuteness did not see , that these last needed any correction at all : and in such a case some are of opinion that where the words escape it , the author himself ought to have it . but because some perhaps will hardly be satisfied with so general a charge without an allegation of more particulars , i shall here give the reader a catalogue of this author's greek errata in the d edition of his vindication of the trinity ( which should in reason be thought the most correct ) together with their correction confronting them . greek errata . correction . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 punctum interrogationis post 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro semicol .   〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 punctum interrogationis post 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro semicol .   〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 punctum interrogationis post 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro semicol .   〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 now all these errata , one would think , make up a jolly company to rendezvous together in the compass of less than half a dozen pages of an english book ; a company fit for our author to march triumphantly in the head of . but i shall hold my reader no longer upon this subject , how diverting soever it may be ; this being enough to satisfie any rational person , how unfit this man is to upbraid any one with wars of greek , or latine : though had i in my first perusal of his several pieces foreseen this my engagement with him , i might and would have presented my reader with a more complete collection of his greek and latine elegancies . for i had not gone far in the reading of him , but i found the blows come so thick and fast upon poor priscian , that , to prevent downright blood-shed , still as i drew near to a latine quotation of any length , i presently advised him as a friend to get out of the way as fast as he could . and now , if either he , or any one else for him , shall pretend to slight and despise this charge , and tell me that the faults and mistakes here alledged by me , are small things ; so , say i , is the point of a dagger too ; but for all that , it may stab a man to the heart ; and , i think , it matters not how small the thing is , which wounds a man's credit , if it chance to bleed to death of the wound . but there are some things in the world , the knowledge of which seems but small , but the ignorance of them is not so . and certainly of all men living , such as will be writers , especially provoking , insulting writers , are concerned to tread tenderly , and to take every step with the utmost caution , where they do not find a grammatical bottom firm under them . for my own part , i dare account nothing small , or despicable , which may either do a man a great mischief , or is necessary to prevent one . the first step in any ascent may be reckoned but a low and a mean thing , nevertheless there is no getting to the top without it . as the great st. basil himself tells us , that nothing is to be slighted , or despised by such as are to be instructed and led into the knowledge of things . for if a man ( says he ) looks upon the first elements as [ small inconsiderable things ] ( the word by which some are pleased to call the rites and ceremonies of our church ) when will such a one be able to attain to the perfection of wisdom and learning ? and so i shall close up the present subject with this note , that st. paul's school is certainly an excellent school , and st. paul's church a most noble church ; and therefore , i think , that he directs his course very prudently , and happily too , who in his passage to such a cathedral , takes such a school in his way . chap. xi . in which is given some account of this author's temper and insolent way of writing , as well in extolling himself , as in depressing and scorning his adversaries ; in both which he has not his parallel . though in all contests and controversies , how sharp soever on both sides , and just on one , there is still a duty , which every man ows both to decency and to himself , always obliging him to utter only such things , as may become him to speak , whatsoever his adversary may deserve to hear ; yet , as to the adversary himself , it is , no doubt , a course justifiable beyond all exception , to take ones measures of treating him , from the measures he has allowed himself of dealing with others . and , as i hope , for my own , and the churches sake , to acquit my self as to the former part of the rule , so let my adversary take his lot as to the other . for i doubt not but to satisfie the world , ( were it not superabundantly , from his own writings , satisfied already ) that he is a person of such an insufferable insolence both of style and temper , that all , that he has met with in the foregoing chapters , has by no means paid off his scores . in all his expressions concerning his antagonists , he is infinitely scornful ; and not only so , but very often also , extremely spiteful and malicious . for what but the height of spight could make him in his vindication of his case of allegiance tax his learned adversary , as an epicurean and an atheistical ridiculer of providence , only for maintaining , that the passages and events of providence are not the rule , which god will have us govern our actions by ; but the precepts and prohibitions of his law ? and what , but the same malice , could make him insinuate that the same author was inclined to popery and an infallible interpreter , only for saying that one text of scripture was obscure and much controverted ? which yet st. peter had said of many passages of st. paul's epistles , pet. . . and yet without giving any wise man the least occasion from thence to think that he was then providing an argument for the infallibility of his supposed successor . and lastly , what but the bitterest rancour could make him charge his adversary , as if he had compared the swearing allegiance to k. w. and q. m. for the great and notorious impiety of it , with the villanies foretold by the prophet of hazael ; only , because he had told him , that as hazael had changed his mind ; ( notwithstanding his confident opinion of himself to the contrary ; ) so had this author too ? for who but one of equal virulence and ignorance would have stretched the comparison , which respected only the changing of minds , to a comparison as to the merits of the cause , which it had no relation to at all ? indeed no more than that reply of hazael , is thy servant a dog ? was design'd to convince the prophet , that he had not four legs , and not rather only to clear himself from such a currish and belluine temper of mind , as those actions foretold of him must needs imply ? and i suppose , when a certain person speaking of the new oath to a certain bishop , said , my lord , i will be crucified before i will take this oath , his meaning was not , that he thought the taking it more painful and tormenting than a crucifixion , but that he had a greater unwillingness to take the one , than to undergo the other . and yet this was this author's way of treating a very worthy man , an old acquaintance , and a fair adversary . i am not at all concern'd to espouse or abett the cause defended by that learned person . but this i do , and ever shall averr , that there is a ius belli , in these controversial , as well as in military conflicts , and consequently an obligation to truth and justice and common ingenuity even in the exercise of the greatest hostilities . but this man's usage of his forementioned adversary is not more senseless and illogical , than disingenuous , barbarous , and unchristian . and so let the reader take this as a specimen of his impotent spleen and malice . after which , let us shew him in his next good quality , his insolence ; and first in that branch of it , which concerns his wonderful opinion and applause of himself . as to which , we shall first of all see him ( as we have in some degree shewn him before ) preferring himself before all the fathers , as much happier in giving an explication of the trinity than they were ; and this , in such a fleering scoptical way , ( scoptical i mean as to the fathers , but highly commendatory of himself ) that it would even turn ones stomach to read his fulsom expressions . for he tells us , ( and that with the most profound humility , no doubt ) p. . l. . &c. if that explication which i have given , be very consistent with , nay , be the true interpretation of that account the antients give of a trinity in unity , i hope it will not be thought an unpardonable novelty , if i have expressed the same thing in other words , which give us a more clear and distinct apprehension of it , &c. and again , p. . l. . i hope this is no fault neither , to give an intelligible explication of that , which all the fathers taught , but were not equally happy in their explication of it . no ; for his comfort , no ; to excel and outdo all the fathers ( if a man can do it ) can be no fault at all . but before this be allow'd him , i do here require him to name and produce me but one ( who acknowledges a trinity ) in the whole world , besides his own modest self , who ever preferr'd his explication of the trinity for the happiness and intelligibility of it , before that given by the fathers . i say , let him produce me so much as one affirming this , if he can . so that , in short , the comparison here stands between the fathers , and this author : and we see the preheminence given him above all the fathers by the sole and single iudgment of one doctor , and that doctor is himself : nay , and ( which is more ) to put the matter past all comparison between him and them for the future , he tells us ( as was also observed before in my th . chapter ) that the fathers neither knew how to speak their own thoughts of the trinity , nor indeed so much as to conceive of it aright , by reason of the grossness of their imaginations : whereas , if they had ( as he adds ) but conceived of it , and expressed themselves about it , as he has done , all would have been plain , easie , and intelligible . and as for gregory nyssen , ( from whom he had quoted more than from all the rest of the fathers together ) he gives him a cast of his temper at last , p. . l. . and sends him away with this rap over the pate , that he could not tell what to make of him and his reasonings ; for that , in his judgment , he destroyed all principles of individuation . and in this manner we have him pluming himself , clapping his wings , and crowing over all the fathers ; for which , and his quarrelsome domineering nature together , most think , it is high time , that his comb were cut . in the next place , let us see what elogies he bestows upon himself for his atchievements in the socinian controversie . concerning which he tells the men of that persuasion , that after his vindication of the trinity he believes they will talk more sparingly of absurdities and contradictions for the future . pag. . but , why , i pray ? is it because this author has got the monopoly of them , and engrossed them all to himself ? and that therefore the laws will be very severe upon such as invade his property ? for , as for any other reason , they have none , that i know of , to talk more sparingly of absurdities and contradictions , than they used to do , having so many more , out of his writings , to talk of , than ever they had before . but he proceeds , and closes his work with this triumph over his antagonist ( and in him , i suppose , over all the rest of that tribe ) pag. . that he is pretty confident , that he will never be able to reason to any purpose in this cause again . as for his confidence , none doubts of it ; but as for his prediction , if he proves no better a prophet in what he here foretels of his socinian opponent , than in what he foretold of that learned person , who answered both his case of allegiance , and his vindication of it . viz. that if he would but well examine his arguments before he answered them , he should expect to hear no more from him : and if withal this socinian be but able to handle him at such a rate , as that close reasoner has done , i dare undertake for him , that he shall go out of the world the most baffled person , that ever lived in it . but why , ( for god's sake ) must the socinians reasoning abilities ( which his great lord and patron has given so high , so signal , and so peculiar an encomium of ) all of a suddain fail them , upon this author's publication of his book ? what can the meaning of this be ? why the meaning of it is this . hic vir , hic est , &c. according to the words by which virgil pointed out augustus caesar. this , this , is the man. this is that incomparable , mighty , and irrefragable divine , who has wrote more convincingly and effectually against the socinians , ( if you will believe him ) than all , that ever wrote against them before , put together . for notwithstanding all that has been wrote by those great men , who from time to time have appear'd in this controversie , the controversie is still alive , and the socinians continue writing and reasoning still : and even by this author's confession ( once at least ) to some purpose . for otherwise how could he say of his socinian adversary , that he would never be able to reason to any purpose in this cause again , if he had never reasoned so at all ? but so far are the socinians from being put out of countenance , and much less out of heart , by what this man has wrote against them , that i assure him , they look upon him as an opponent according to their hearts desire ; as having play'd a fairer game into their hands than ever was dealt into them before : so that next to their wishing all the world their friends , they wish they may always have such adversaries . and therefore if they should resolve to reason against him no more , he will have great cause to thank either their inadvertency for over-looking the great advantage given them , or their good nature for not taking it . for the book called by him , a vindication of the trinity , is certainly like a kind of pot or vessel with handles quite round it ; turn it which way you will , you are sure to find something to take hold of it by . and the truth is , upon a strict impartial comparing of things together , i cannot see any new advantage that he has got over the socinians , unless it be that he thinks his three gods will be too hard for their one. and perhaps it is upon presumption of this , that he discharges that clap of thunder at them in his preface , where he tells us , that having dipp'd his pen in the vindication of so glorious a cause , by the grace of god he will never desert it , while he can hold pen in hand . in which words , methinks i see him ready armed and mounted ( with his face towards the west ) and brandishing his sword aloft , all wreaking with socinian blood , and with the very darts of his eyes looking his poor forgotten friends through and through . for in good earnest the words sound very terribly to these men ; but most terribly of all to the article it self : ( which is like to suffer most by his vindication : ) for thus to threaten that he will never leave off vexing it as long as he can hold pen in hand , ( which , i dare say , will be as long as he can tell money with it ) this , i say again , sounds very dreadfully . nevertheless , as fierce and formidable as these words may represent him , he has yet , like a merciful enemy , very great reserves of compassion . for otherwise how come so many socinian pieces wrote against him to lie so long unanswered ? he has indeed lately wrote an apology for writing against the socinians ; but where is the apology for writing in such a prevaricating way against them at first , and for never writing against them since ? for has he lost his daring polemick pen ? or has he lost the use of his hand ? or has he run himself out of breath ? if this last be his case ( as by some asthmatick symptoms one would think it is ) he will do well to call in his old friend , and defender , the foot-man , to second him : especially since the contention , which now seems most likely to be , is , who shall run fastest from the enemy , and keep furthest from him. in the mean time i wonder that in the mannage of this disputation , he does not take the same course that other learned men in the like cases use to do . for he frequently taxes his adversary with fallacies ; telling him that this is a fallacy , and that is a fallacy : but why does he not express to his reader , what the particular fallacy is ? there being no sophism or fallacy incident to speech or argumentation , but what falls under one of the thirteen reckoned up by aristotle . moreover , while he is animadverting upon the history of the unitarians , he will , i believe , hardly get clear of a scurvy lapse in that history himself . for concerning the exposition given by the socinians of that text in the . iohn . where our saviour tells the iews , that he came down from heaven . he writes thus : did socinus find it so easie a thing to reconcile this text to his darling opinion , when he was forced to fast and pray for it , and to pretend revelation because he wanted reason to support it ? viz. that christ before he entred on his prophetick office , was taken into heaven to be instructed in the gospel , and then came down from heaven again to publish it to the world ; pag. . l. . &c. now , the person here spoken of , and intended by this author , must needs have been faustus socinus , and i believe he will not pretend that he meant any other ; which being supposed , this remark of his will appear to have been a very great mistake . for neither was this the text , about which this praying and pretence of revelation was , ( for fasting is a word of this author 's putting in : ) nor was faustus socinus the person who did any of these things upon this occasion . but the text was that in iohn . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and the person of whom this was pretended , was laelius socinus the unkle of faustus , who interpreted this text to this sence , antequàm abramus factus fuerit abrahamus ; that is , from the father of the faithful enclosed within the church of the iews , should become the father of the faithful diffused through many nations , christ was to preach his gospel to the world ; and by so doing enlarge the church from the limits of one people , to all nations throughout the world. so that to the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 you are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to supply the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , importing christ's enlightning the world by the publication of his doctrine . this was laelius's interpretation of this text , which together with the interpretation of the first chapter of st. iohn were the two scriptures , which he first set up with , for the founding of his new hypothesis . which explication of the text ( as it was indeed very forced and unnatural so ) erasmus iohannis , in his disputation with faustus , cryed shame of it in these words , fateor me per omnem vitam non magis contortam scripturae interpretationem audivisse ; ideóque eam penitus improbo . to which faustus , who had a much different opinion of it , replys . cùm primùm [ fatendi ] verbum in tuis scriptis animadverti , sperabam te potiùs fassurum nullam in tuâ vitâ scripturae interpretationem te audivisse , quae hâc sit aut acutior aut verior , quaequé magis divinum quid sapiat , & à deo ipso patefactam fuisse prae se ferat . ego quidem certè non leves conjecturas habeo , illum [ viz. laelium ] qui primus aetate nostrâ eam in lucem protulit ( hic autem is fuit , qui primus quoquè sententiam de christi origine , quam ego constanter defendo , renovavit ) precibus multis ab ipso christo impetrâsse . hoc profectò affirmare ausim , cùm deus illi viro permulta aliis tunc temporis incognita patefecerit , vix quicquam inter illa omnia esse , quod interpretatione hâc divinius videri queat . socinus in refutatione arg. . erasmi iohan. p. . col. . edit . fratrum polonor . tom. . but as this may satisfie the reader that the forementioned place in iohn . . was the text , for which this praying and pretence of revelation is said to have been , and consequently may suffice to shew this author's blunder ; so i shall yet further shew , that the other text in iohn . . concerning christ's coming down from heaven , was not accounted by socinus of so difficult an interpretation , as to need those peculiar methods of prayer and revelation for the discovery of it , as this author has been pleased to affirm . and this will appear from these words of socinus concerning it . postquàm ex mariâ natus est , in coelo , antequàm moreretur , rever à esse potuit ; nec solùm potuit , sed ( ut ita dicamus ) debuit . si enim homo ille paulus christi servus ad tertium usque coelum ante mortem raptus est , nullo pacto nobis verisimile est christum ipsum ante mortem in coelo non fuisse . and , a few lines after , speaking of the same again with reference to st. paul's having been taken up into the third heaven , he thus discourses . certè christus ( in quo sine ullâ mensurâ rerum omnium divinarum cognitio , ut fuit , sic esse debuit , quin ibi ( viz. in coelo ) per aliquod tempus antequàm munus coele sti doctrinâ homines imbuendi sibi à patre mandatum publicè susciperet , versatus fuerit , nullo modo dubitandum videtur . socinus in responsione priore ad paraenesim andreae volani , tomo do . fratrum polon . p. . col. . by all which we see , that socinus was so far from apprehending any difficulty in finding out this exposition of the text , that he affirms it was nullo pacto verisimile , there was no likelyhood that it should be otherwise , & nullo modo dubitandum , that no doubt could be made , but it was and ought to be so . which surely are not forms of expression , to shew the difficulty of conceiving , or finding out how the said thing could be so . so that this is a manifest mistake in this author ; and let him set it off with never so much brow and confidence , yet no doubt his socinian adversaries despise him for it sufficiently . and the truth is , one would in all reason imagine , that to the answering the history of the unitarians , a little more knowledge of their history would have done no hurt . but after the many ample and extraordinary elogies he has passed upon himself for his writings , methinks it is something pleasant to see him in his continuation of the defence of dr. stillingfleet , p. . l. the . &c. strutting himself in these words , i am no arch-bishop yet . which shews what his most early thoughts ran upon , and what his modesty would be at from the very first . for otherwise , the purpose of the place , where this comes in , had been fully served by saying , i for my part am no arch-bishop , nor expect to be one . but the addition of that little word yet was very significant , and shews , that out of the abundance of his heart his mouth spoke . for though indeed he presently adds , and i very much suspect i never shall be one , yet those words were put in only ad frangendam invidiam , and to qualifie the fulsome arrogance of the first expression . howbeit in that he spoke his mind , in this he fences against an inconvenience ; in that we have an account of his nature , in this only a copy of his countenance . and , i question not , but by this time his pretended suspicion is passed into a contrary expectation , and that the deanry of paul's begins to make him think himself heir apparent to canterbury . and therefore no wonder , if while big with such thoughts , speaking in his apology of dr. wallis and himself , he sets himself before him , p. . in these words . he ( viz. the melancholy stander-by ) concludes with an heavy charge upon my self , and dr. wallis . by which , i suppose , he would have dr. wallis know his proper place . though i must tell him , that not only common modesty , but also the common custom of the world , makes wise men whensoever they mention themselves with others , place themselves last . and so it might have become this author too , especially speaking of himself in conjunction with such an one , as dr. wallis , who was a person of fame and eminence , while this man was learning his grammar ; if ever he was so . but to proceed , and pass from his applauding himself to the other branch of his arrogance , in his scornful undervaluing all such as write against him , or differ from him , ( though yet no more , nor in any other thing , than in what his worship had differed from himself ) . we have him in the th . page of his preface to his case of allegiance , calling such as in their writings could not fall in with his last sentiments about the new oath , little writers . concerning whom i must tell him , that it is often with writers , as it is with books ; amongst which there are many little ones , that exceed the worth , and outlive the reputation of much greater . if indeed number of pamphlets makes a great writer , this author is in no danger of being accounted a little one. but as there is such a thing , as multum in parvo , so there is also parvum in multo ; and he who will digest the trouble of reading this authors writings , will need no other argument to prove it so . but as for those excellent persons , whom he first slights , then challenges , and afterwards flies from , by never replying upon them , i would have him know , that the world has already past it's judgment both upon them and him too : and therefore i would advise his haughtiness for the future to forbear calling his antagonists little writers , till by his answers he has made them so . a further discovery of his rude , undecent way of treating such as he writes against , is the language he has bestow'd upon a certain writer , a nonconformist indeed , but yet a man of learning ( as a much greater man than this author has found by experience ) whom he calls a trifling scribler , who understands little more than quibbles and iests ; charging him withal with pertness and folly to complete his character , p. . of his preface to his defence of dr. stillingfleet . and in the . page of the book it self , and the five first lines , he represents him under the name of the inquirer , as one , who cannot understand plain and familiar sense ; nor carry the connexion of three or four sentences together . very civil language indeed , becoming a scholar , a divine , and a well-bred man , to a person who had not in the least provok'd him. for my own part , i have no knowledge of the man , but from his writings ; and upon the stock of that knowledge have often wondred , that one so able to humble this reviler , would take such gross reproaches at his hands . but the truth is , when i consider ( as i noted first in my preface ) how patiently our whole clergy has hitherto suffered him to call them fools and hereticks , by charging all those , as such , who concur not with him in holding the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds , or spirits ( which , i dare say , not one of them held at the time of his uttering this lewd reproach ) i say , when i consider this , i have cause to surcease all wonder , that any private man should indure this insolent huff to insult over him in such a manner . but i shall insist no further upon this master-piece of his scurrility , having in some measure accounted with him for it already . only i shall add this , that as it is beyond example marvellous that any one single member of a church should presume to load all the rest with such a charge , so it is yet a greater marvel that all should bear it . it would be endless to set down all the dirty stuff that has flowed from his billingsgate pen. but to repeat and bring together so much as we have taken notice of , the reader may be pleased to bear away in his memory such expressions , and appellations as these , viz. epicurean , and ridiculer of providence , popishly inclined , and looking towards an infallible interpreter , disaffected to , and a slanderer of the government , little writers , fools and hereticks , errant fopp , trifling scribler , shamefully ignorant and impudent , fit to be sent to school again , one that understands little else but iests and quibbles , one that cannot understand plain and familiar sense , one that understands neither greek nor latine , and the like . these are the choice embellishments of his style . but above all , that beloved word , nonsense , is always ready at hand with him ; and out it flies at all persons and upon all occasions . and hardly can he write three or four pages together , but , right or wrong , he throws it in his adversary's face . one would think that he was born with the word in his mouth , and that it grew up with him from his infancy , and that in his very cradle he cryed nonsense , before he could speak it . but to check this ungovern'd humour of his , in thus using this word at all adventure ; let me tell him , that it is both a very rude , unmannerly word ; and most commonly , as applyed by him , a very false charge . as for the rudeness of it , since he owns himself a son of the church of england , i think he would be much his own friend , if he would remember the reprimand given him by his old acquaintance and antagonist dr. owen ; who in his vindication , &c. p. . having , upon occasion of some of his profane scoffs , called him goodly son of the church of england ! immediately subjoyns , that he intended it not as a reflexion upon the church it self , but only to remind this man of his relation to that church , which ( he there says ) to his knowledge , taught better learning and better manners . in the next place , as for the falseness of the charge in his usual application of this word , i would have him know , that the charge of nonsense does not properly lie against every one who asserts a false proposition , or is guilty of a mistake . for nonsense is not properly opposed to strict truth , but to such plain and manifest truth as is obvious to common sense . for truth oftentimes lies deep , and abstruse , and requires a more than ordinary sagacity to reach and fetch it out ; which that low pitch of reason , which we call common sense , cannot always do . for in discourse a man may be sometimes mistaken in laying his foundation or principle , and yet be very clear and rational in the consequences he draws from it ; and sometimes he may fail in drawing consequences from a true and well-laid principle ; in both which cases , the whole discourse is certainly false and inconsistent : nevertheless ( according to the common acception of the word ) this cannot be called nonsense . it may indeed be called error or mistake ; which is a weakness cleaving too close to humane nature , for any one of the same nature to reproach another for it . but on the contrary , if every thing , that is not strict demonstration and certain truth , must pass for nonsense , i fear , it would overlay whole volumes , and not only prevent the d . d. and th . editions of many books , but shrewdly also endanger the sale of the first : especially if d . and d. by the unlucky escape of some scattering copies , should chance all to appear in the space of three or four days , as in the first publication of a certain book entituled , the case of allegiance , &c. it fell out . but great , no doubt , is the art of bestowing several title-pages , importing divers editions , upon books of one and the same impression : and may serve to teach the world , what a fruitful thing the press is , when impregnated by the prolifick genius of some writers ; and that ( when it is for the credit of any extraordinary book and it's author ) it can bring forth four , five , or six editions of it at the same time . which certainly is a most ingenious contrivance ; but whether it were the author 's or the bookseller's , is a question ; though some think , it uses to be done by a kind of mutual-consciousness between both . but to return to the point in hand . according to the common use of the word nonsense , he , who discourses of things obvious to the ordinary apprehensions of men , with gross and palpable contradictions of one thing to another , or with a plain , manifest incoherence of one part of his discourse with the other , that man is properly and justly chargeable with nonsense . and let those ( in the name of sense and reason ) take it to themselves , who have most claim to it . but because the best way of illustrating things is by example . i shall also take this course here . thus for instance . for any one to own a thing for a great and sacred mystery ( the very notion and use of the word mystery importing something hidden and abstruse ) and at the same time to affirm it to be very plain , easie and intelligible , is nonsense . to say , that in men knowledge and power are commensurate ; nay , that knowledge is power ; so that whatsoever a man knows how to do , he is by vertue thereof also able to do it , is contrary to the common sense of all mankind , and consequently nonsense . to say , a beast is a person , and yet to say withal , that a person and an intelligent substance are terms reciprocal , is both nonsense , and contradiction too , with a witness . to affirm , that a specifical unity can make any thing or person numerically one , is nonsense . to affirm , that there are two distinct reasons and two distinct wills in each man , and those as really distinct , as if the same man had two distinct souls , is nonsense . and to affirm , that the body ( which is utterly void of any intellectual power or faculty ) is conscious to all the dictates and commands of the will , is gross and inexcusable nonsense . so that whereas this author ( according to his mannerly way ) charges his adversary with unintelligible nonsense , p. . l. . it must needs be granted , that he has much the advantage of him in this particular ; since all must acknowledge that his own nonsense is very intelligible . and here i could easily direct him where he may be supplyed with several more such instances , as those newly alledged ; but that i think these may suffice for the purpose they are produced for . in the mean time i would advise him for the future to use this rude word more sparingly , and cautiously ; and to apply it only where the generally received way of speaking applies it : and now and then also to cast his eye upon his own writings . these things , i say , i would advise him to ; and to consider withal , how unreasonable and unjust it is , for him to bestow about the word so freely upon others , while he keeps the thing to himself . chap. xii . containing a brief review , and conclusion of the whole work. i am at length come to a close of that work , which i should much more gladly have been prevented , than engag'd in , by being a reader , rather than the author of a reply to this man 's strange , unjustifiable innovations upon this great article of our religion . but it is now a considerable time that the book , here animadverted upon , has walked about the world , without any publick control ; and though in private discourse generally censur'd by all , yet , ( as to the point undertook by me ) hitherto answered by none ; which may well be matter of melancholy consideration to all hearty lovers of our church , and ancient christianity . whereas , i dare say , had this heterodox piece been wrote and published in a language understood by foreigners , we should long since have had several confutations of it sent us from abroad ; and probably not without some severe reflexions upon the english church , and clergy , for their silence in a cause , which so loudly called for their defence . to take off therefore this reproach from our church ( in some degree at least ) i have ( while others , far more able to defend it , chuse rather to sit still and enjoy it ) ventur'd to set my weak hand to the vindication of a principal article of her faith , against the rude attacks of this bold undertaker . in which , though i freely own , that all , that has been done by me in it , is extremely below the dignity of the subject , which i have employed my self in , yet i am well assured that i have fully and effectually answered this man ; and if it should prove otherwise , i must ascribe it to a peculiar misfortune attending me ; since none besides , has hitherto wrote against him , but has confuted him . in the work i have here presented the reader with , i have examined and gone over all that , i conceive , requires either answer or remark ; and that according to the following method and order , which i shall here briefly set down . i have , in the first place , laid my foundation in the explication and state of the sense of the word mystery ; which i shew , in general , signifies something concealed , hidden , or abstruse in religious matters ; and amongst christian writers not only that , but something also neither discoverable nor comprehensible by bare reason : according to which , i shew , that this author 's frequent affirming , that his hypothesis and explication of the trinity rendred the notion thereof very plain , easie , and intelligible , was utterly incompatible with the mysteriousness of the same . i shew also upon what absurd grounds he stated the nature of a contradiction ; according to which , joyned with another of his assertions , i shew , that no man could be justly charged with contradiction , though he discoursed never so incoherently and falsely upon any subject whatsoever . from hence i proceeded to consider the ancient terms constantly received and used by councils , fathers , and schoolmen , in speaking of the god-head and trinity , which this author in his book had confidently and avowedly condemned , as obscuring and confounding men's notions about these great matters ; and upon a distinct explication of each of them , i shew the propriety and singular usefulness of them , both against all his exceptions , and above those other terms , which he would needs substitute in their room : and under the same head , i laid open the contradiction of his vindication and his late apology to one another , as i had done before in my discourse about the nature of a mystery . from hence i passed to his new notions of self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness ; in the strength of which two terms he pretended to make a trinity in unity a plain , easie , and intelligible notion ; nay so very plain , as to solve all difficulties about it ; these being his very words . and as he pretended self-consciousness to be the formal constituent reason of personality universally , both in beings create and uncreate . i first demonstrated the contrary in created beings ; and that both from the general reason of things , and from two manifest instances ; and withal examined and confuted several extremely absurd propositions , and assertions advanced by him concerning personality . from this i passed on , and proved that neither could this self-consciousness be the formal reason of personality in the divine persons , shewing the impossibility thereof by several clear and unquestionable arguments . and in the next place , with the same evidence of reason i proved , that mutual-consciousness could not be the ground or reason of the unity or coalescence of the three divine persons in one and the same divine nature ; and all this upon known , allowed principles of philosophy , as well as divinity . and so i naturally went on to the examination of that monstrous assertion of his , by which he holds and affirms the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds or spirits ; which i shew unavoidably and irrefragably inferr'd them to be three gods ; it being impossible for the god-head , which is essentially one single infinite mind or spirit , to be multiplyed into three distinct infinite minds or spirits , without being multiplyed into as many gods. this opinion of his , i shew , was easie enough to be confuted ; but for all that , i must here add further , that for the insufferable scandal of it , it is much fitter to be censured by a convocation , though even he himself ( since john goodwin and hugh peters are gone off ) should be prolocutor of it . after this , since he had the confidence to vouch his hypothesis for the constant doctrine of the fathers and the schools , i first proved it quite otherwise in the point of self-consciousness , and in his assertion of three distinct infinite minds ; for the latter of which he quoted three or four fathers , and one sentence out of one schoolman , viz. p. lombard ( which , one would think , was far from proving it the constant doctrine either of the fathers , or the schools ) and yet even these very quotations , i shew were no more to his purpose , than if he had alledged them to prove that twice three makes twenty . and as for self-consciousness , which is one of the two main branches , or members of his hypothesis , he does not produce , nor so much as mention one father or school-man in the behalf of it ; so exact is he in proving his doctrine the very same with theirs . and then , in the next place , for the proof of his mutual-consciousness from the fathers and school-men , i have distinctly considered his allegations for it , and forming them into arguments ( such as the matter would afford ) found them the saddest wofullest things to be called by that name , that perhaps ever appeared in the world , since argumentation was in use . and to complete his excellent and peculiar way of arguing from the fathers ( for not so much as one school-man is cited in favour of mutual-consciousnsss ) his whole business , i shew , was to reproach the fathers as neither able to conceive rightly of the trinity , nor yet express themselves properly and intelligibly about the same ; and all this , because they neither conceived of it , nor expressed it , according to his terms and hypothesis , which yet he affirmed to be the constant avowed sentiments of those very fathers ; though ( god help them , poor men ) they were not so happy , as to know it . and this , i hope all the world will acknowledge , to be a most extraordinary way of proving a thing from the authority of the fathers , by thus representing them as a company of dolts , who neither knew how to think or speak , as they should , upon the subject which they were professedly treating of . upon which head , having finished my answer as to the main point i first engaged in , i proceeded to mark out , and animadvert upon several of his paradoxical absurd assertions , both in divinity and philosophy . and i did not only alledge them for such , but also by the most commonly received and current principles of both , effectually proved them such ; and i refer it to any man of clear and impartial sense , upon a survey of the particulars there distinctly examined and remarked upon , to pass as judge between this author and my self , whether the proof falls at all short of the charge . next to which , because of his insolent reflexions upon some learned men , i took into consideration also his vocabular sins , and manifold transgressions of the laws of grammar and philology : and whereas he had vilified his adversary as having neither greek nor latine , i shew , that albeit the charge had been never so true , yet that he was one of the unfittest persons living to make it , for some certain reasons fairly presented to him in that chapter . and lastly to bring up the rear of all , i thought it expedient to lay open the temper of the man , and his way of writing ; his immoderate applauses of himself above all before him , or about him , together with his disdainful treatment of all that come in his way , as if they were not worthy to carry his books after him . though ( by what some of them have wrote against him ) it appears , that they have made too good use of their own books , to be fit to carry his . in fine , i have in my perusal of this man's writings , with the utmost exactness i was able , observed his way of speaking both of himself , and others ; and upon the result of all do most seriously and sincerely affirm , that never did i ( nor perhaps any one else ) meet with so much confidence with so thin a bottom to support it ; and yet surely that man ought to stand upon a very broad and firm bottom indeed , who ventures to defie all the world. and thus , to relieve the reader 's memory , i have given him this brief draught or scheme of the whole work. in which , as it is this author alone , whom i have undertook , so i think fit to declare , that if any one besides him , shall attempt an answer to this discourse , i shall not in the least trouble or concern my self about him , whosoever he be ; but if this author himself shall be disposed to defend his new notions and hypothesis by a just and scholastick reply to what i have here offered against them , i will not fail ( god affording me such a measure of health and strength as may enable me for study ) to attend his motions upon this subject , as soon , and as often as he pleases . for i can hardly perswade my self that i have yet paid him all , that i owe him . nevertheless i must leave this admonition with him , that i neither can , nor shall account such a pamphlet , as his late apology , a just and sufficient answer to these animadversions . in the mean time , since the reverend dr. j. w. ( spoken of in the preceding chapter ) in his letters about the trinity , and w. i. another very learned person , in his d . letter to the said doctor , upon the same subject , have both of them been pleased to commend this author for several excellent things in this book , i do with the greatest earnestness of entreaty , as well as with the profoundest deference of respect to their great judgments beg of them , that they would by a kind of charitable benefaction to such low , and mean understandings as mine , vouchsafe to point out in particular , what those excellent things are , and in what part of his book they may be found ; and whether i have hit upon any of them in my three immediately foregoing chapters . for i have read the book over and over ; as ( after i had took up thoughts of answering it ) it concerned me , in all reason , to do . and i do thereupon solemnly profess , that , according to the best of my poor judgment , and that ordinary measure of learning which god has vouchsafed me , i can hardly find throughout the whole work ( unless perhaps , here and there a passage or two against the socinians ) so much as one true , through stroke either in divinity , or philosophy , or logick , or even in grammar ; and i confidently appeal to the ingenuous , and unbyass'd reader , whether i have not in the foregoing animadversions given very pregnant and particular instances of this author 's gross defects in every one of these . and therefore my poor opinion and advice is , that if these two learned men are resolved to persist in their commendations of this author ( as there is nothing by which they can oblige him more ) and withal to commend him upon sure , undeniable grounds , they would hereafter wave all the forementioned topicks of commendation , and pitch upon his true excellency by commending him for his preferment ; for that certainly is very commendable . and now , that i am taking my leave of my reader , ( for this time at least ) that i may not leave him with any just distaste or grudge in his mind against me , as if i had treated this man too severely , i do assure him , that nothing has been here utter'd by chance ; or in the heat of any present passion , but upon a due , calm , and sedate consideration of what he had said falsly of others , as a warrant for what was to be truly said of him . and i do further assure the reader , that i would by no means have treated a candid , civil , and well-bred adversary , at the rate , i have treated him , who has shewn no sign of any one of these qualifications , either in his writings or behaviour . and therefore tho' to accept persons be a fault in the sight of god and man , yet certainly to distinguish them is none . i have used him , as i found him ; and for what i found him , he may thank himself . the truth is , he has carried on an offensive war with most that have wrote ; and there are very few , whom he has not , one way or other , struck at and defied . so that the matter being in effect brought to this point , whether he shall be too hard for the world , or the world for him ? i hope it will not be long in deciding . he has for a great while , and in a very audacious manner been preying , and privateering upon many a worthy and good name , and as far as he was able made prize of the reputation of men better than himself : and therefore it is now high time for such to think of repaying the good turns done them , and for the injured world to retaliate upon the lawless aggressor . for this is , and has been the custom of nations ; and all must grant it to be a most just , equal , and allowed course ; and since it is so , 't is to be hop'd , that this is not the last reprisal that will be made upon him. to the most holy and blessed trinity , three glorious persons in one and the same undivided god-head , be rendred and ascribed all honour and praise , thanksgiving and adoration , now and for evermore . amen . the end . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e dr. owen , in his vindication of himself against this author , gives him the character of a scoffer , and a censurer of other mens labours , iudgments , and expressions . which witness of his is true , and since it is so , whether he , of whom it is true , deserves a rebuke , or no , is left to the world to judge . owen's vindic. p. . ch. justice scroggs . having first rejected the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in those words , to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . athanas de synodis arimini & seleuciae , tom. . p. . edit . colon. . in the next place , p. . they proceed to cashier the terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the following words . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for this see also socrat. hist. lib. . cap. . and theodoret histor. lib. . cap. . & . & sozomen's histor. lib. . cap. . * see his preface to his case of allegiance , p. . line . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . concil . . in actione . seu ultimà , circa sinem . owen's vindication against sh. p. , , &c. see a most virulent and blaspemous book wrote by these men , and entituled , praemonitiones christi & apostolorum de abolendo vero christo per antichristum . see the preface to his case of allegiance , p. . notes for div a -e see casaub. exer. . ad ann. baron . . p. , &c. an account of the word mystery , as it is taken in the holy scripture . bishop stillingfleet's sermon on the tim. . . printed . some remarks upon his apology . answer to the protestant reconciler , chap. . notes for div a -e see my preface . some further remarks upon his apology . see these empty questions distinctly answered in my th chapter . notes for div a -e see chapter ii. notes for div a -e — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyssen . de differentia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . tom. . p. . edit . paris . . quae ratiocinatio ad id cogit , ut dicamus deum patrem non esse sapientem nisi habendo sapientiam quam genuit , non existendo per se pater sapientia . deinde si ità est , filius quoque ipse , sicut dicitur , deus de deo , lumen de lumine , videndum est utrûm possit sapientia de sapientiâ dici , si non est deus pater ipsa sapientia , sed tantùm genitor sapientiae . quod si tenemus , cur non & magnitudinis suae , & bonitatis , & aeternitatis , & omnipotentiae suae generator sit ? ut non ipse sit sua magnitudo , & sua bonitas , & sua aeternitas , & sua omnipotentia , sed eâ magnitudine magnus sit , quam genuit , & eâ bonitate bonus , &c. aug. tom. . lib. . de trinitate . — sed absit ut ità sit ; [ viz. that the father should be wise only by the wisdom he begets ] quia si hoc est ibi esse quod sapere , non per illam sapientiam quam genuit sapiens dicitur pater , alioquin non ipsa ab illo sed ille ab ipsâ est . si enim sapientia quam genuit causa est illi ut sapiens sit , etiam ut sit ipsa illi causa est ; quod fieri non potest nisi gignendo eum aut faciendo : sed nec genetricem nec conditricem patris ullo modo quisquam dixerit sapientiam . quid enim insanius ? &c. lib. . dist. . cap. . notes for div a -e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyssen . in orat. dom. nat. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 basil . lib. . contra eunomium . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . basil epist. ad eustathium . non potest operatio esse diversa ubi non solùm aequalis , verùm etiam indiscreta natura . august . serm. de verbo dom. . cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , cyril . thesaur . lib. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , athanasius oratione quarta contra arianos . pater in filio est & filius in patre per inseparabilis naturae unitatem , hilarius de trinitate , lib. . patrem , filium & spiritum sanctum , unius ejusdémque substantiae , lib. . de trinitate , cap. . credamus ergo in patrem & filium & spiritum sanctum : haec aeterna sunt & incommutabilia , id est , unus deus , unius substantiae , trinitas aeterna . ibid. nesciunt enim quid sit una eadémque substantia , &c. lib. de agone christiano . ex propriâ divinitatis divinaeque generationis conditione ac naturâ vis & robur argumentationis istius petitur , quatenus non qualemcunque essentiae unitatem sed singularem & numeralem inesse tribus personis colligit . petav. dog. de trinitate . lib. . cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . iustin. martyr . exposit. fidei de rectâ confessione . pag. . edit . colon. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . iustin. mart. ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . iustin. mart. ibid. p. , . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . dionysius areopagita in mysticâ theologiâ , cap. . p. . paris . edit . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. greg. nyssen . pag. . tom. . edit . parisiens . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . basilius libro de spiritu sancto ad amphilochium , c. . p. . tom. . edit . paris . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. pag. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nazianzen . oratione . page . edition . parisiens . anno dom. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . nicephorus constantinopolitanus in actis synodi ephesinae , pag. . editionis commelianae . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . eulogius archiepiscopus alexandrinus in bibliothecâ photii . cod. . pag. . rothomagi anno dom. . trinitatis mysterium est immensum , & incomprehensibile , extra significantiam sermonis , extra sensûs intentionem , imperspicabile , lumen occaecat , intelligentiae capacitatem excedit . ego nescio ; sed consolabor me tamen : angeli nesciunt , saecula non tenent , apostolus non interrogavit , filius ipse non edidit . cesset ergo dolor querelarum , &c. sanctus hilarius libro secundo de trinitate . absque ullo principio aut fine credenda est sanctae trinitatis divinitas . licèt humanae sit menti ipsâ comprehensione difficilis . unde non incongruè dicitur quòd hoc solum ex-eâ comprehendimus , quia prorsus comprehendi non potest . ambrosius tract . in symbolum apostolicum . tom. . p. . col . edit . colon. . in illâ trinitate , trinitas est unus deus , quod sanè est mirabiliter ineffabile , vel ineffabiliter mirabile . aug. de trinitate lib. . sola ( quantùm arbitror ) immutabilis illa sempiternitas trinitatis reperietur incomprehensibilitatis digna miraculo , quaesic excedit omne quod cogitare vel sapere possumus , sicut superat omne quod sumus . fulgentius ad thrasymundum regem , lib. . c. . unum est sancta trinitas , non multiplicatur numero , non crescit augmento ; nec potest aut intelligentiâ comprehendi , aut hoc quod deus est discretione sejungi . ac paulò post . adoremus patrem & filium & spiritum sanctum , indistinctum distinctè , incomprehensibilem & inenarrabilem substantiam trinitatis . atque iterum , magnum est sanctae & incomprehensibile mysterium trinitatis . crabb . concil . tom. . pag. , . fidenter dixerim aeternam beatámque trinitatem , quam non intelligo , credo , & fide teneo , quod non capio mente , bernardus sermone . super cantic . notes for div a -e iustin martyr . athanasius . dionysius areopagita , epiphanius . gregory nazianzen . gregory nyssen . st. basil. st. cyrill of alexandria . isidorus pelusiota . theodoret. basilius seleuciensis . zacharias scholasticus damasce● . athanasian creed . histor. literar . p. . & . council of chalcedon . justinian's confession . fifth general council . the sixth general council . the council called quini-sextum . the council of florence . the latin church . st. ambrose . st. hilary , s. ierome see the four sermons on iohn . p. . printed . st. austin ruffinus . boetius . rusticus diaconus liberatus diaconus the lateran council under martin the first . lombard . alexander alensis . durandus . aquinas . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cajetan . greg. de valentiâ . estius . suarez . ripalda . melancthon . chemnitius . calvin . peter martyr . wolfg. musculus piscator . tilenus . ursinus . turretinus . the ausperg confession . wirtimberg confession . the gallican confession . the belgick confession . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. cyril . dial. . de trinit . p. . edit . lutet . . distinctio personarum non debet esse nisi per id , quod minimùm distinguit , hoc est , per relationem . aquin. primâ parte . quaest. . articulo . propefinem . prima pluralitas debet esse minima ; & ideo distinctio personarum , quae est prima , debet esse per relationes compossibiles in eâdem essentiâ : et ob hoc , est minor aliâ quâcunque distinctione , quae sit per absoluta . durandus lib. . distinct. . quaest. . in fine . distinctio inter divinas personas debet esse minima . bellarminus tom. . p. . lutetiae paris . qui personas in deo modos tantummodo existendi , sive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse dicunt , ipsam deitarem nequaquam excludunt , in quâ conveniunt ; sed nihil aliud esse volunt , quàm existendi modum , in quo differunt . quare pater non est modus tantùm existendi , sed deus est , quemadmodum & caeterae personae , verùm deus est cum certo modo existendi , qui neque silio convenit , neque spiritui sancto . sic et filius deus est , non modus tantùm existendi , sed deus est cum certo modo existendi , qualis neque patri convenit , neque spiritui sancto . ad eundem modum discriminis , et spiritus sanctus deus est , non modus existendi tantùm , sed deus est cum certo modo existendi , qualis nec patri convenit neque filio . summa est , personas in deo non differre essentiâ , quia sunt unus deus , sed proprietate & modo subsistendi . twissus in responsione ad arminii praefationem in extremâ pag. lin . . editionis amstelod●mensis apud janssonium anno . * socrates's incomparable lady , notes for div a -e a letter to anonymus , p. . printed . tusanue . constantine stephanus . pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . pag. . l. . pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . d quot . ibid. pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . pag. . l. . pag. . l. . l. . pag. . l. , . pag. . l. . ibid. pag. . quotat . pag. . quotat . pag. . l. . quotat . pag. . l. . pag. . l. . pag. . l. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; basilius in libro ad amphilochium de spiritu sancto , tom. . p. . edit . paris . . notes for div a -e vind. case , &c. p. . l. . vind. case p. . and the two last lines . vind. of the case , &c. p. . l. . b. k. vind. case p. the last . see his four sermons on the john . p. , . william giles sometime , of mark-lane , who wrote ( forsooth ) in defence of our author against the papists . see this learnedly confuted by bishop pearson upon the second article of the creed , p. , . &c. in to . mr. alsop . notes for div a -e ☞ an humble address to the learned doctor j. w. and w. i. the doctrine of the blessed trinity, briefly explained in a letter to a friend wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the doctrine of the blessed trinity, briefly explained in a letter to a friend wallis, john, - . p. printed for tho. parkhurst, [london : ] reproduction of original in huntington library. caption title. signed: john wallis. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the doctrine of the blessed trinity briefly explained , in a letter to a friend . sir , the doctrine of the arrians , socinians , or anti-trinitarians , ( call them as you please , provided you call them not orthodox christians ) in opposition to those who believe ( according to the word of god ) , that the sacred trinity , of father , son , and holy-ghost , are so distinguished each from other , as that the father is not the son , or holy-ghost ; the son not the father , or holy-ghost ; the holy-ghost not the father , or son ; yet so united , as that they are all one god ; ( which , in the athanasian creed , is called trinity in unity , and unity in trinity ; or , in common speaking , three persons and one god ; ) is what you were lately discoursing with me , and of which i shall give you some of my present thoughts . the scripture tells us plainly , there are three that bear record in heaven ; the father , the word , and the holy-ghost : and these three are one , joh. . . and the form of baptism ( matt. . . ) is , in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy-ghost . and the christian church , from the time of christ and his apostles downwards hitherto , as well before as since the council of nice , have ever held the divinity of those three persons ( as they are commonly called ; ) and that these three are but one god. and , that they have so held , hath been , by divers , sufficiently proved from the most ancient christian writers , which are now extant . which , therefore , i take for granted , as sufficiently proved by others , without spending time , at present , to prove it a-new . that these are three , distinguished each from other , is manifest : and , that this distinction amongst themselves , is wont to be called personality . by which word , we mean , that distinction ( what ever it be ) whereby they are distinguished each from other , and thence called three persons . if the word person do not please , we need not be fond of words , so the thing be agreed : yet is it a good word , and warranted by scripture , heb. . . where the son is called , the express image of his father's person : ( for so we render the word hypostasis , which is there used ; and mean by it , what i think to be there meant ) and we have no reason to wave the word , since we know no better to put in the place of it . if it be asked , what these personalities or characteristicks are , whereby each person is distinguished from other ; i think we have little more thereof in scripture , than that the father is said to beget ; the son , to be begotten ; and the holy-ghost , to proceed . if it be further asked , what is the full import of these words ( which are but metaphorical ) , and what is the adequate meaning of them ) i think we need not trouble our selves about it : for , since it is a matter purely of revelation ( not of natural knowledge , ) and we know no more of it than what is revealed in scripture , where the scripture is silent , we may be content to be ignorant . and we who know so little of the essence of any thing , especially of spiritual beings , though finite , need not think it strange that we are not able to comprehend all the particularities of what concerns that of god , and the blessed trinity . i know that the fathers , and school-men , and some after them , have imployed their wits to find out some faint resemblances , from natural things , whereby to express their imperfect conceptions of the sacred trinity : but they do not pretend to give an adequate account of it ; but only some conjectural hypotheses , rather of what may be , than of what certainly is. nor need we be concerned , to be curiously inquisitive into it , beyond what god hath been pleased to reveal concerning it . that the three persons are distinguished , is evident ; ( though we do not perfectly understand what those distinctions are : ) that to each of these , the scripture ascribes divinity , is abundantly shewed by those who have written on this subject : that there is but one god , is agreed on all hands : that the father is said to beget ; the son , to be begotten ; and the holy-ghost , to proceed ; is agreed also ; though we do not perfectly understand the full import of these words . and here we might quietly acquiesce ( without troubling our selves further , ) did not the clamorous socinians importunely suggest the impossibility and inconsistence of these things , insomuch as to tell us , that , how clear soever the expressions of scripture be , or can be , to this purpose , they will not believe it , as being inconsistent with natural reason . and therefore , though they do not yet think fit to give us a bare-fac'd rejection of scripture ; yet they do ( and must , they tell us , ) put such a forced sence on the words of it ( be they never so plain ) as to make them signify somewhat else . there is , therefore , in this doctrine of the trinity , as in that of the resurrection from the dead , a double inquiry : first , whether it be possible ; and then , whether it be true. and these to be argued ( in both cases ) from a very different topick : the one from natural reason ; the other from revelation . yet so , that this latter doth certainly conclude the former , if rightly understood . and though we should not be able to solve all difficulties ; yet must we believe the thing , if revealed ; unless we will deny the authority of such revelation . thus our saviour , against the sadducees , who denied the resurrection , matth. . . ye erre ( saith he ) not knowing the scriptures , nor the power of god. the power of god , if rightly understood , was enough ( from the light of reason ) to prove it not impossible : but , whether or no it will be so ( which natural reason could not determine , ) was to be argued from scripture-revelation . in like manner , st. paul before agrippa , act. . first argues the possibility of it ; why should it be thought a thing incredible with you , that god should raise the dead ? ver . . for if agrippa did believe the creation of the world , ( as many even of the heathen did , from the light of nature ) he could not think it impossible for that god ( who had at first made all things of nothing ) to recollect , out of its dust or ashes , a body which once had been . but whether or no he would do so , depended upon another question , to be after asked , ver . . king agrippa , believest thou the prophets ? for this was purely matter of revelation , and could not otherwise be known : for , as to the immortality of the sou● , and a future state hereafter , many of the heathens went very far , by the light of nature ; but as to the resurrection of the body , i do not find they had any sentiments about it ( or but very faint , if any : ) and if they had , it may well be supposed to be the remainder of some ancient tradition from the jews , or their predecessors . nor do i see any foundation in nature , which should make them think of it ( before it was revealed ) any more , than of the redemption of mankind by christ , ( which we should never have thought of , had not god himself contrived and declared it to us . ) but , when that of the resurrection was once suggested , there was no pretence of reason to think it a thing impossible , and therefore no reason to doubt the truth of it , when declared , if we believe the scriptures , wherein it is revealed ; especially those of the new testament . it is much the same as to the doctrine of the trinity . it is a thing we should not have thought of , if it had not been suggested by divine writers ; but , when suggested , there is nothing in natural reason ( that we know of , or can know of ) why it should be thought impossible ; but whether or no it be so , depends only upon revelation . and in this case the revelation seems so clear ( to those who believe the scriptures ) that we have not reason to doubt of it , unless the thing be found to be really impossible , and inconsistent with reason . nor do the anti-trinitarians insist on any other ground why they deny it , save only , that it seems to them absolutely impossible ; and therefore think themselves bound to put another sence on all places of scripture ( how clear soever they be , or can be ) which prove or favour it . so that the controversie is now reduced to this single point , whether it be possible or not possible : whether it be consistent or inconsistent with natural light or reason . ( and to that point therefore i shall confine my discourse . ) for it seems agreed on all hands ( as to those who believe the scriptures ) that , if it be not impossible , it is sufficiently revealed . now for us who understand so little of god's infinite essence , and which it is impossible for us fully to comprehend , who are our selves but finite , and mostly conversant with material objects ; in so much that we cannot pretend to understand the essence of our own souls ; and , when we attempt to explain it , must do it rather by saying what it is not , than what it is ; ( so hard a matter is it for us to fix in our mind or fancy , a notion , idea , or conception of a spiritual being , which falls not under our senses : ) 't is hard , i say , for us ( who understand so little of a spirit ) to determine ( of what god is pleased to reveal ) that it is impossible , or inconsistent with his essence , which essence we cannot understand . but what is it that is thus pretended to be impossible ? 't is but this , that there be three somewhats , which are but one god : ( and these somewhats we commonly call persons . ) now what inconsistence is there in all this ? that father , son , and holy-ghost are three , is manifest ; and are in scripture-language distinguished . that there is but one god is manifest also , and all those three are this god : that the name person is no incongruous word , is evident from heb. . . where it is used . if it be said , it doth not agree to them exactly in the same sence in which it is commonly used amongst men ; we say so too , nor doth any word , when applyed to god , signifie just the same as when applyed to men , but only somewhat analogous thereunto . what kind or degree of distinction ( according to our metaphysicks ) this is , we need not be very sollicitous to enquire ; or , whether in our metaphysicks ( accommodated to our notions of finite beings ) there be any name for it : 't is enough for us if these three may truly be so distinguished , as that one be not the other , and yet all but one god. now , that there is no inconsistence or impossibility , that , what in one regard are three , may in another regard be one , is very manifest from many instances that may be given even in finite beings , such as we converse with ; which , though they do not adequately agree with this of the sacred trinity , ( nor is it to be expected that they should ; finite , with what is infinite ; ) yet there is enough in them to shew , there is no such inconsistence as is pretended . i shall spare to instance in many resemblances which have been given long since by fathers and schoolmen , or by later writers . which though they are not pretended to be adequately the same with that of the sacred trinity , ( as neither will any thing else be that we can take from finite beings ; ) yet are they sufficient to shew that there is no inconsistence in it . ( which is all that is here incumbent on us to prove . ) i shall only name a few . i will begin with what concerns the most gross of finite beings , that is , material bodies . suppose we further , each of these dimensions infinitely continued ; the length infinitely eastward and westward , the breadth infinitely northward and southward , the heighth infinitely upward and downward : here are three infinite dimensions , and but one infinite cube ; and these three dimensions ( though distinct ) are equal each to other ( else it were not a cube ; ) and though we should allow , that a cube cannot be infinite ( because a body , and therefore a finite creature : ) yet a spirit may ; such as is the infinite god. and therefore no inconsistence ; that there be three personalities ( each infinite , and all equal ) , and yet but one infinite god , essentially the same with those three persons . i add further , that such infinite cube , can therefore be but one , and those three dimensions can be but three , ( not more nor fewer : ) for , if infinite as to its length ( eastward and westward ) , and as to its breadth ( northward and southward ) , and as to its heighth ( upward and downward ) ; it will take up all imaginary space possible , and leave no room either for more cubes or more dimensions : and if this infinite cube were ( and shall be ) eternally so , its dimensions also must be infinite and co-eternal . i say further , if in this ( supposed ) cube , ( we suppose in order , not in time ) its first dimension , that of length , as a. b. , and to this length be given an equal breadth ( which is the true generation of a square ) as c. d. , which compleats the square basis of this cube ; and to this basis ( of length and breadth ) be given ( as by a further procession from both ) an equal heighth e. f. , which compleats the cube ; and all this eternally , ( for such is the cube supposed to be , ) here is a fair resemblance ( if we may parvis componere magna ) of the father , ( as the fountain or original ; ) of the son , ( as generated of him from all eternity ; ) and of the holy-ghost , ( as eternally proceeding from both : ) and all this without any inconsistence . this longum , latum , profundum , ( long , broad , and tall , ) is but one cube ; of three dimensions , and yet but one body : and this father , son , and holy-ghost ; three persons , and yet but one god. and as , there , the dimensions are not ( in the abstract ) predicated or affirmed each of other , or the cube of either , ( the length is not the breadth or heighth , nor either of these a cube ; ) but ( in the concrete ) cube is affirmed of all ; this longum , latum , profundum , is a cube , and the same cube : so here , ( in the abstract ) the personality of the father is not that of the son , nor either of these that of the holy-ghost , nor the deity or godhead any of these ; but ( in the concrete ) though the personalities are not , yet the persons are , each of them god and the same god. if it be objected , that those concretes are affirmed or predicated each of other ; ( that longum is also latum and profundum , ( this long is broad and tall ; ) but not so here , the father is not the son or holy-ghost : i answer , that , if the words be rightly considered , the analogy holds here also : for when we say , this long is broad and tall ( where cube or body is understood ) the full meaning is plainly thus ; this body , which , as to one dimension ( that of length ) , is said to be a long body , is the same body , which , as to another dimension ( that of breadth ) , is said to be a broad body , and which , as to a third dimension ( that of heighth ) , is said to be a tall body . so here , that god , which ( as to one personality ) is god the father , is the same god , which ( as to another personality ) is god the son , and which ( as to a third personality ) is god the holy-ghost . so the analogy holds every way , nor is there any inconsistence in either case . i proceed to the consideration of somewhat more spiritual , and less material than that of a body locally extended . suppose we then a created angel , or humane soul : at least if those who deny the blessed trinity will allow that there are such beings ; but if they be sadducees , who do not acknowledge either angel or spirit , or that the holy scriptures are the word of god , which testifie both , ( which i doubt is the case of some of them ) let them speak out , that so we may know whom we have to deal with ; and not pretend to nibble only at the athanasian creed , or some expressions therein , while the quarrel is indeed at somewhat higher , ( though , ad amoliendam invidiam , they think fit to dissemble it , ) and that they do but faintly believe ( if at all ) that the holy scriptures ) are the word of god , or the doctrines therein contained to be such . and we have reason to suspect it , when they spare not to let us know , that , were this doctrine of the trinity therein delivered in words as express as could be , they would not believe it . but suppose we , ( what they would seem to grant , and what i am so charitable as to think divers of them do believe ) that there are spiritual beings , such as angels and the souls of men ; and that these spiritual beings are endued with knowledge ( or wisdom ) and force ( or an executive power ) to act according to that knowledge . that there is some such thing , at least in man , ( whether body or soul ) they cannot but acknowledge ; for themselves be , and know , and do . and though we cannot fully comprehend , much less express in words , how all this is so ; ( for we are here at a loss , as well as in higher things : ) yet , that it is , they cannot deny , though they do not know how. now , to be , and to know , and to do , are certainly distinct each from other , ( though perhaps we are not all agreed , of what kind , or in what degree this distinction is : ) to be is not the same as to know , for that may be were this is not ; and to do is ( for the same reason ) somewhat different from both those , for a man may be and may know what he doth not do ; yet 't is one and the same soul ( at least one and the same man ) which is , and knows , and does . there is therefore no impossibility or inconsistence in it , that what in one regard are three , may in another regard be one. thus in the sacred trinity , if we conceive of the father as the original or first person , who begets the son ; the son as the wisdom of the father , begotten of him ; and the holy-ghost as the spirit of the father and the son , as proceeding from both , and yet the same god with both ; ( or what other distinction there may be of these three persons , who are but one god , that we do not know ; ) there is no inconsistence in it , that these three may be one ; three in one regard , and one in another . i might shew the same as to the understanding , will , and meaning , which are all the same soul : and the known metaphysical terms of unum , verum , bonum , which are all but the same ens. and many other instances of like nature . but we hold ( it will be said ) a greater distinction ( than that of unum , verum , bonum ) between the three persons in the sacred trinity . be it so . ( but what that greater distinction is , we do not pretend to comprehend . ) however , it is from all these instances evident , that there is no impossibility , or inconsistence with reason , that what in one regard are three , may in another regard be one. which is what we undertook to shew . 't is true , that not any , nor all of these instances , nor any of those given by other learned mendo adequately express the distinction and unity of the persons in the sacred trinity , ( for neither hath god distinctly declared it to us , nor are we able fully to comprehend it , nor is it necessary for us to know . ) but because we do not know a how the bones grow in the womb of her that is with child , shall we therefore say they do not grow there ? or , because b we cannot by searching find out god , because we cannot find out the almighty to perfection , shall we therefore say , things cannot be , when god says they are , only because we know not how ? if god say , c these three are one ? shall we say , they are not ? if god say , d the word was god , and , the word was made flesh , shall we say , not so , only becaue we cannot tell how ? it is safer to say it is , when god says it is , though we know not ( in particular ) how it is . especially when there be so many instances in nature , to shew it not to be impossible or inconsistent with reason . the thing is sufficiently revealed to those who are willing to be taught , and e receive the truth in the love of it . ( nor is it denyed , by those who gainsay it , but that , if the thing be possible , it is sufficiently revealed ; there being no other exception made , as to the revelation , but the impossibility of the thing . ) f but if any man list to be contentious , and to g quarrel about words , it is no wonder if h hearing they do hear and not understand ; and that god i give them over to believe a lye , who do not love the truth . but k the humble he will teach his way . and , while we be so , we be safe . august . . yours , iohn wallis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e a eccles. ▪ . b job . . c joh. . . d joh. . , . e thess. . . f cor. . . rom. . . g tim. . . tit. . . h act. . . matth. . . i thess. . , . rom. . , . k psal. . . three sermons concerning the sacred trinity by john wallis. wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) three sermons concerning the sacred trinity by john wallis. wallis, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. advertisement: p. . created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity -- sermons. sermons, english -- th century. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - rachel losh sampled and proofread - rachel losh text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion three sermons concerning the sacred trinity . by john wallis , d. d. professor of geometry , in the university of oxford . london : printed for tho. parkhurst , at the bible and three crowns , in cheapside , . to the reader . the first of the three sermons here following , is printed according as it was preached in oxford , in the year . ( accommodated to that time and place ; ) but it was , for the substance of it , preached in london twenty years before that time . which i mention to shew , that the construction which i give of the words , is not a new forced notion , just now taken up to serve a turn ; or ( as somebody is pleased to call it ) equally new and cautious : but , what i did , so long ago , take to be a then received truth . and , i since find , it is at least as old as st. austin's epist. . the other two are lately added , in pursuance of some other discourses lately made publick , concerning the sacred trinity . wherein much of what was said before , scatteringly , ( as those who wrote against it gave occasion ; ) is now inlarged and put into a little better order . if what i have done may be serviceable to the truth , and to the church of god : i have what i did desire , and shall not think the labour ill bestowed . a sermon preached to the university of oxford . decemb. . . joh . xvij . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and this is life eternal , that they might know thee the onely true god , and jesus christ , whom thou hast sent . i need not apologize for the seasonableness of this text ; by telling you , that the subject matter of it , suites well with the great solemnity , which at this time we celebrate ; and the pen-man , with that of the day : because a discourse on such a subject , can never be unseasonable to a christian auditory . especially to such as , whose profession being to seek after knowledge , should not decline that of god and christ , the chief of all . nor will it be any exception hereunto : that it is no news , but well known already : not only because that there be many who pretend to know what they do not , or do in effect deny ; and that there be many things , which , though we know well , we have need enough to be minded of : but even because i do not find that many persons are wont to be displeased with being often minded of those things wherein they think that either their interest or excellency lies ; more than a good wit when commended , or a fair lady with being told she is handsome ; even though sometimes ( as we are wont to say ) they know it but too well already . and therefore , since to know god and christ is both our interest and our commendation ; it will not , i hope , seem grievous to any to hear it discoursed of ; to the end that those who know it not may be incited to learn it , and those who know it , may take content in it . and i shall as little apologize for a plain discourse on this subject : since it is both my profession and practice , to demonstrate or make things as plain as i can ; not to perplex or make them intricate ; which may amuse the auditors , or sometimes please or tickle them ; but is not wont either to teach , or perswade : like too much of ornament , which doth but disguise the native beauty ; or too much trimming , which hides the cloth. the words read , are our saviour's words ; addressed to his father in the behalf of his disciples : and are a part of that prayer with which he closeth his large exhortation , or farewel-sermon to his disciples , the night before he was to suffer ; of which we have a large rehearsal in the three foregoing chapters , the th , th , and th : which this th . closeth with a prayer . he begins his prayer , with a petition concerning eternal life , which he was to bestow ( according to the power his father had granted him ) to as many as he had given him ; that is , to as many as should effectually believe in him . to which petition he subjoins this exegetical epiphonema , and this is life eternal , that they may know thee the only true god , and jesus christ whom thou hast sent . we may consider the words either according to a synthetic or an analytic method , as the schools speak : the former of which they commonly follow in sciences theoretical ; the latter in practical . if considered synthetically ; they present us with , first , the cause , or principle ; the knowledge of god and christ : and , secondly , the effect , or consequent resulting from it ; eternal life . if analytically ; we have in them , first , a glorious end proposed ; eternal life : and , secondly , the means proportionate thereunto ; the knowledge of god and christ. in the former way , the result of them is to this purpose ; that the excellent knowledge of god and christ , is attended with this most glorious consequent , eternal life . in the latter way , it amounts to thus much : that the way or means to eternal life , is the knowledge of god and christ. nor is it much material , whether of the two ways we take them ; synthetically , or analytically : whether we take them as a theorem ; affirming this effect , of that cause : or as a problem ; directing to these means for such an end. yet i chuse rather to take them in the latter consideration , ( though not exclusive of the former ; ) because , this epiphonema taking its rise from the mention made of eternal life , in the former verse ; ( not from a former mention of the knowledge of god and christ ; ) it seems to be rather intended as a direction how to attain eternal life ; than , an account of the effect of such a knowledge . but , in doing the one , it doth the other also . i shall begin , first , with that which lies first in the order of the word ; the end proposed ; or the effect , or consequent of this knowledge ; the happiness which doth attend it : which , for its excellency , is called life , and , for its duration , eternal . this is life eternal . the word life i take to be here used in a figurative sense ; and to import good or happiness : like as , its contrary , death , especially death eternal , to import misery . there is indeed , at least , a threefold life commonly mentioned ; and , in proportion thereunto , a threefold death : natural , spiritual , and eternal . life natural , ( which is indeed the proper acceptation of the word life , or the first signification of it , ) is more easily apprehended , than expressed . it imports that active state or condition which ariseth from the union of the soul and body , as well in man , as in other animals ; ( not to mention that of plants : ) the destruction or want of which , upon the soul's departure , we call death . 't is that , according to which , in common speech , a man or beast is said to be alive or dead . now this life , is , of all natural goods , looked upon as the chiefest ; and consequently death the greatest of natural evils : because life is that foundation or first good , which makes us capable of what else is so : and with our life , we lose all the rest . hence that in job . . skin for skin , and all that a man hath , will he give for his life . and that of solomon ; a living dog is better than a dead lion , eccles. . . for , when life is gone , there succeeds an incapacity , not only of doing , but also of enjoying good. from this consideration it is , that the other significations of the word have their original . for life being looked upon as the greatest natural good , and death as the greatest natural evil ; the one ( by a synechdoche speciei ) is frequently used ( both in sacred and profane authours ) to signify good indefinitely , especially the greatest good ; and the other , in like manner , to signifie evil , especially the greatest evil. the one is put for happiness , and the other for misery . and then , again , ( by a synechdoche generis ) this general notion of good or evil , happiness or misery , implied in the words life and death , becomes applicable to this or that particular good and evil , as occasion serves . suppose the spiritual life of grace , or death in sin : and the eternal life of glory in heaven , or the eternal death of torment in hell. thus , deut. . . i have set before you ( saith moses to israel ) life and death , blessing and cursing : ( where life and death , are made equivalent to blessing and cursing ; ) therefore chuse life ( saith he ) that thou and thy seed may live ; that is , that you may be happy . so at ver . . of the same chapter ; i have set before you ( saith he ) life and good , death and evil . where life and good are put exegetical each of other , and so death and evil. and in the same sense it is the poet tells us , non est vivere , sed valere , vita . thus god to adam in paradise ( for 't is no new trope , nor of yesterday ) in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt die the death ; that is , thou shalt become miserable : for we know that adam did not the same day die a natural death ; but some hundreds of years after : but he did that day begin to be in a state of misery , whereof his natural death was but a part . so , rom. . . the wages of sin is death ; where the comprehension of all the evils or misery which sin deserves , or god inflicteth for it , is called death : like as on the contrary , all the happiness , which the saints enjoy , is , on the same account , called life ; the gift of god is eternal life , through jesus christ our lord. so here : by life we understand happiness ; contrary to which is the death of misery : and then ( by a metalepsis , or double trope , ) that happiness in special , which the saints enjoy in glory ( though not exclusive of what they have before ; ) and that misery which in hell attends the wicked . 't is true indeed , that the condition of the saints in glory , after the resurrection , may , even in a proper sense , be called life ; because of that union , which shall then be , of soul and body ; and the exercise of ( at least the most noble ) faculties of life . yet do not i take that to be the true import of the word here . for though it be true , that the saints in glory , have not only an union of soul and body , but likewise a knowledge or sense of that estate wherein they are , ( which may import not only a life , but even a rational life : ) yet as true it is , that the damned in hell have so too ; ( for their souls and bodies shall not be less united ; nor shall they be insensible of their woful condition : ) yet is not that estate of theirs called a life ( though naturally it be so , and it is their misery that it is so , ) but eternal death ; because a life of wo and misery ; not of bliss and happiness : a living misery , being , in this sense , the truest death . secondly , as it is called life for its excellency , so , for its duration , it is called eternal . it is very usual in scripture , in the use of allegories , or figurative expressions , to add some kind of epithet to distinguish the word so used from the same in its native signification : and , when the word is used so as to express figuratively somewhat more excellent than it self , the epithet hath somewhat of additional exellency in it . thus christ is said to be the spiritual rock , cor. . . the living bread , or manna that came down from heaven , joh. . . to distinguish the words , so metaphorically used , from the rock and manna literally spoken of , in the story of their travails in the wilderness . and the church of christ , as living stones , become a spiritual house , and a holy priesthood , to offer up spiritual sacrifices to god , pet. . . where the epithets serve both for distinction from the material stones and temple , the levitical priesthood , and corporeal sacrifices ; and for the commendation or preheminence of those before these . so the new heaven , and the new earth , and the new jerusalem , rev. . , . jerusalem that is above , gal. . . and matth. . . i will drink no more ( saith christ ) of the fruit of the vine , till i drink it new with you in my father's kingdom : not that christ did intend anew to drink of such wine in his father's kingdom ; but of a new wine , another sort of wine than that commonly so call●d ; to wit , those spiritual joys in his father's kingdom , which should more refresh their hearts and souls , than this wine did their bodies . so ; i am the true vine , and my father is the husbandman , joh. . . i am the good shepherd , joh. . . not that christ was more truly a vine , in propriety of speech , than that which we so call ; or indeed a shepherd , who took the care of sheep : but that there was in christ somewhat of another kind much more eminent , than that of the vine , which did yet in some measure resemble it ; and , a much greater care , but of another nature , of those he calls his flock , than a shepherd hath of his sheep . so here ; this is life eternal : not a natural life , ( such as is commonly meant by the word life , ) a life of the body , which after a short time is to be exchanged for death ; but a life , a happiness , of another nature ; a far more excellent good than what we call life , which doth but very imperfectly express it ; an eternal life . and this eternity , as it serves , in general , to distinguish this word life from the ordinary acceptation ; and doth import , for the kind of it , somewhat much more excellent : so it doth particularly point out that everlasting duration of this so great a happiness . 't is that which , though indeed it have a beginning , shall never have an end. and upon this account it is , that it is so often called eternal life , and life everlasting ; that it were endless to enumerate the places where it is so called . an eternal inheritance ; a house eternal in the heavens ; an inheritance incorruptible , and undefiled , which fadeth not away ; a kingdom which cannot be moved ; an eternal weight of glory ; when our mortal shall have put on immortality . and this consideration of eternity , added to that of life ; this everlasting duration , to that unspeakable , unimaginable happiness ; renders this eternal life , a perfect felicity and every way compleat . for that perfection of degree , imported in the word life , can admit of no addition , but that of perfect con●in●ance , which the word eternal assures us of . like as , on the other hand , that perfection of misery , which attends the wicked , is capable of no greater aggravation , than that of perpetuity : sealed up in that sad expression of a living misery , eternal death . you have them both paralleled in matth. . . these shall go into everlasting punishment , but the righteous into life eternal . i have now done with the first part , the happiness here proposed ; eternal life . before i come to the s●●ond , the knowledge of god and christ ; it will 〈◊〉 requisite to consider , a little , the conne●●●● of these together , in the word , is ; this is 〈◊〉 eternal . which is capable of a double ac●●ptation . for it may be understood either as a formal , or as a causal predication . this is life eternal ; that is , herein consisteth eternal life . or else thus ; this ●s life eternal , that is , this is is the way or means , to attain eternal life . the former of these is very agreeable to the doctrine of the schoolmen ; who generally place the happiness of heaven in the beatifick vision ; in the seeing or knowing of god. grounded on such places as that of matth. . . blessed are the pure in heart , for they shall see god. cor. . , , . we know but in part , and we prophesie but in part ; but when that which is perfect shall come , then that which is in part shall be done away : we now see through a glass darkely , but then face to face : now i know in part , but then shall i know even as also i am known . cor. . . we all with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the lord , are changed into the same image , from glory to glory . joh. . . beloved , now are we the sons of god , and it doth not yet appear what we shall be : but we know , that when he shall appear , ( or , when it shall appear ) we shall be like him : for we shall see him as he is . with others of the like import . and certainly that perfection of knowledge , shall be at least a great part of that happiness , which we expect in heaven ; as from these and other the like places is well collected . so that it is not improperly said , that eternal life doth , at least in part , consist in such a knowledge . nor is it any sufficient objection hereunto , to say , that , it is not by knowledge only , as an act of the understanding , that we enjoy god , wherein our happiness consists ; but by an act of the will also , chusing and closing with , and delighting in him . for though this be true ; yet neither is the knowledge here spoken of , a bare speculative , or notional knowledge , wherein the understanding is alone concerned : but an active , operative knowledge ; such as brings the will , affections , and all the faculties into a proportionate conformity thereunto . and in such a knowledge of god in the understanding , attended with such a conformity in the will and other faculties , it is not to be denyed that our happiness doth consist ; even that of eternal life . yet ( without excluding this sense ) i take the words here to be rather a causal predication : assigning the way or means whereby eternal life is attained . this is life eternal , that is , this is the way to attain eternal life ; to know thee the only true god , &c. the knowledge of god and christ , being the direct way to attain eternal life . parallel to which , is that of our saviour , joh. . . his commandment is life everlasting . and very frequent elsewhere are such metonymies of the effect for the cause . i am the resurrection , and the life , saith christ , joh. . . that is , the authour of it . so luk. . . man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth ; that is , it doth not depend upon it ; it is not secured by it : or a christ elsewhere , matth. . . ( out of deut. . . ) man liveth not by bread alone , &c. and moses , speaking of their diligent observing the commands of god , deut. . . this is your life , ( saith he ) and through this thing you shall prolong your days : ( where the latter clause is enegetical of the former : ) just in the same form with the words here , this is life eternal ; that is , hereby they shall attain eternal life . this therefore being the most plain and simple interpretation of the words : we are now to enquire particularly , what that is that christ here says to be eternal life , or rather the way thereunto . that they may know thee the only true god ; and , whom thou hast sent , jesus christ. which contains in brief the doctrine of the gospel , or christian religion : distinguished into two parts , the knowledge of god , and the knowledge of jesus christ. both which are necessary to bring us to eternal life . i shall speak , first , to the former of these two ; the knowledge of god ; that is , of god the creatour and lord of all ; as contradistinguished to that of christ the redeemer . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that they might know thee the only true god. by thee , or the person here spoken to , we are to understand god , the father of our lord jesus christ ; ( for to him it is manifest , that christ doth here direct his prayer : ) yet not so much in his personal as in his essential consideration . for it is not the personality , but the essence of the father , that determines him to be the only true god. we have therefore , in the object of this knowledge , at least , these three propositions : i. that there is a god. ii. that there is but one ( true ) god. iii. that god , the father of our lord jesus christ , is this god. i. the first of these strikes at atheism , or those that deny a god. and that we know thus much is necessary from that of heb. . . he that cometh unto god , must believe that god is , and that he is a rewarder of those that diligently seek him . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he must believe , that there is a god. nay , he must believe also somewhat of what he is : not fansie to himself somewhat under the name of god , which indeed is not a god ; or notions inconsistent with that of a deity ; as those , psal. . . thou thoughtest that i was altogether such a one as thy self : or the like . for to believe such a false notion of god , is not to believe a god , but to believe an idol . we are next to know , as that there is a god ; so , that there is but one god. i mean ; but one true god. for there are indeed , as the apostle tells us , cor. . , , . gods many , and lords many ; that is , there are that are called gods , ( for so he explains himself ) but to us there is but one god ; we know , ( saith he ) that there is no other god but one. and this indeed depends upon the former . for he that doth , according to a true notion of god , know that there is a god ; must needs know also that there is but one. for the true notion of god , including infinite , absolute , perfect , &c. must needs also include unity ; for it is inconsistent that there should be many such . so that , in a manner , polytheism includes atheism . he that believes many gods , doth , in effect , not believe any : that is , not any such being as of which it is impossible there should be more than one. we are , thirdly , to know , that this god , is that onely true god. i say , this god ; whom we have variously designed in scripture , by several characters . the god that made heaven and earth : the living god : the god of israel : the god whose name is jehovah : and ( as here , and elsewhere frequently in the new testament ) the father of our lord jesus christ. by which and other the like characters , he is distinguished from all false gods , from all pretended deities . this god we are to know to be the onely true god. but , when i say , that the father of our lord jesus christ is this onely true god ; i add , that this appertains not so much to his personality as to his essence . for though the three persons in the sacred trinity , be distinguished each from other by their personalities , ( the father is not the son , nor the son the father , &c. ) yet they all communicate in the common essence ; whereby the son as well as the father , and the holy ghost as either , is this onely true god. the person of the father is indeed true god , but not according to his personality , but according to his essence . and the person of the son is god also , and the true god ; yet not another , but the same true god. and the holy ghost likewise . according to that of joh. . . i and my father are one : that is , one mod , though not one person . and joh. . . there are three that bear record in heaven , the father , the word , and the holy ghost ; and these three are one. three , and yet one. three persons , yet but one god. they are all this one , this onely true god ; beside whom there is no god. i know there are some who would be glad to take advantage of this place , to the derogation of the divinity of christ , and of the holy ghost . as if it were here affirmed , that the father onely were true god : and therefore , not the son , nor the holy ghost . but the cavil is obvious , and the answer easie . it is not said that the father onely is true god ; but that the father is the onely true god ; he is that god beside whom there is no other true god : which may well enough be said , though the son also ( as indeed he is ) be that same true god ; and the holy ghost likewise . indeed should we say , that the son were also true god , and another god ; the father could not then be said to be the onely true god , since that there would be another true god beside this . ( and the like of the holy ghost . ) but to say that the son is the same true god , is well consistent with it . for though another person than the father be true god , yet , because not another god , this one god remains still the onely true god. and the original words are to this purpose very clear ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . where the article 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 coming before 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( not after it ) doth determine it to be a restriction of the praedicate , not of the subject . 't is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . not thee onely to be the true god ; but ( as we truly render it ) thee to be the onely true god. that is ; to know thee to be that god , beside which god there is no other true god ; though another beside thee be likewise this onely true god ; viz. the same god with thee , though not the same person . it excludes only a plurality of gods , not a plurality of persons in the same god-head . 't is true indeed , that this divinity , is not , in this place , so directly affirmed , either of the son , or the holy ghost : but , neither is it denyed : and therefore it is to receive its decision from other places where it is affirmed clearly . and thus much concerning the first branch of this knowledge , the knowledge of god. to know thee , the only true god. there is another piece of knowledge necessary to the attainment of eternal life ; the knowledge of christ. for so it follows , and jesus christ whom thou hast sent . 't is true , that had we continued in that estate wherein man was at first created , there had been no necessity of this second branch of knowledge . for , had there been no sin , there had been no need of a saviour : and consequently , not of this knowledge of jesus christ. a knowledge of god , the onely true god , with an obedience conformable thereunto , had then been enough to make us happy . but man , by his fall , having contracted an estate of misery ; there is now no restitution to our lost happiness , but by a redemption ; and there is no redemption , but by jesus christ. for as there is but one god ; so , but one mediator between god and man , the man christ jesus , tim. . . neither is there any other name given to men , whereby we must be saved , but that of jesus christ of nazareth ; whom they crucified , and god raised from the dead : ( act. . , . ) there is no salvation in any other . it is necessary therefore , to the attainment of eternal life , that we know him , in this capacity . what we are to know concerning him , though we cannot expect , in so few words , to have clearly set down , without a comment from other places to give light to them : yet at least three things seem in these words to be pointed at ; his divinity , his incarnation , and his mediatory office. . his divinity ; in that he is the son of god. for he calls him father , whom he says we must know to be the onely true god. indeed , were he onely the son of god in such a sense as adam is so called , luke . . or the angels thought to be , job . . that is , by creation ; for as saints are so called ( rom. . and elsewhere , ) that is , by adoption ; it would not iner a divinity . but to be ( as christ is ) the son of god by eternal generation , argues a communication in the same nature . as the apostle infers , heb. . . for to which of the angels said he at any time , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee ? this onely begotten of the father , must needs be also of the same nature with the father ; and therefore , god , as he is . and this argument , ( however now perhaps there are who endeavour to elude it ) the jews , his enemies , thought to be conclusive . for when they observed him to call god his father , or pretend himself to be the son of god ; especially , the christ the son of god ; they did not understand him to speak in such a sense as when themselves were commonly wont so to speak ( as joh. . . we are not born of fornication ; we have one father , even god ; ) but in such a sense as they judged blasphemous , ( and had been so indeed , had it not been true ; ) who therefore sought the more to kill him , ( joh. . . ) because he said , that god was his father ; making himself equal with god. and the high priest ( matth. . . ) rent his cloths , saying , he speaketh blasphemy , when our saviour affirmed before him , that he was the christ , the son of god. 't was manifest therefore , that he so spake , and they so understood him , of such a son-ship as argued a divinity , a being equal with god. . his humanity , or incarnation , is pointed at , in these words , whom thou hast sent . for by the fathers sending him , or his coming into the world , is clearly meant his being incarnate , or made man. as gal. . . god sent his son made of a woman . and joh. . . the word was made flesh , and dwelt amongst us . . his mediatory office , is implyed as well in the title christ , added to his name jesus ; as in that of his being sent by god. jesus the christ , or jesus the messiah , whom thou hast sent . for as his name jesus doth design the person ; so the title christ , that is messiah , ( that in greek , answering to this in hebrew , and both signifying the anointed ) doth import the office , to which he was designed , and for which he was sent . for god did not send him , to no purpose ; but sent him for this end , for this work , to be the mediator between god and man ; to reconcile us to the father ; to make an atonement or propitiation for us . to take away the sins of the world ; to obtain eternal redemption ; to procure an everlasting inheritance ; a purchased possession ; to make intercession for us ; to save to the uttermost those that come unto god by him . or , as joh. . , . ( where all the three particulars are likewise intimated ) god therefore sent his onely begotten son into the world , that whosoever believes in him should not perish , but have everlasting life . and now , having gone through the whole text , we might , if time would suffer , look back upon it to take a new survey thereof , and collect from thence some of those particular deductions which might concern our practice . for certainly , the knowledge which christ here declares necessary to eternal life , and the means conducing thereunto , is not a bare notional knowledge , or a pure speculative belief , ( such as the devils may have as well as we ; ) but an operative knowledge , a practical faith , a faith fruitful in good works ; without which those speculative notions will never bring us to heaven . and therefore , without ingaging in the nice disputes , of justification by faith alone , or works concurring thereunto ; this is on all hands agreed without dispute , that faith without good works will never justify us . whatever their influence be , in justification ; their presence at least is necessary . without doing , we cannot , in god's account , be reputed either to believe or know. those that obey him not , are reckoned , in god's account , amongst those that know not god : at least amongst those who profess they know god , but do in their works deny him . who shall be so far , by such a knowledge , from obtaining eternal life , that christ shall come in flaming fire to take vengeance on them , and to punish them with everlasting destruction , from the presence of the lord , and from the glory of his power . in particular : if we know god , to be the onely true god ; then must we love him , fear him , worship him , and obey him . nor doth the knowledge of christ , as mediator , abate any thing of this duty . for though he came to take away the curse of the law , by being made a curse for us ; yet not our obligation thereunto . he came not to destroy the law , or make it less obligatory to duty , but to fulfill it . i may add ; that , those , who will not acknowledge themselves under the obligation of it , have reason to fear , they be yet under the curse of it . again , if we know christ whom he hath sent ; it will be our duty then to believe in him ; ( for 't is , to those onely , that christ doth give eternal life . ) and , so to believe in him , as to obey him ; for , to those who obey not the gospel of his son , it is , that christ shall render vengeance in flaming fire . furthermore : if in this christ we hope to have eternal life ; how should this excite our rejoicing and thankfulness for so great salvation ! not by rioting and drunkenness ; by revelling , and debauchery ; ( which is the abuse , not the celebration , of this solemnity , in memory of christ's incarnation ; ) but by a pious remembrance and commemoration of that redemption obtained for us : such as may be to the honour , not the reproach , of him that came to redeem us from our vain conversation : that , denying ungodliness and worldly lusts , we should live godly , righteously , and soberly in this present world : looking for that blessed hope , and the glorious appearing of the great god , and our saviour jesus christ ; who gave himself for us , that he might redeem us from all iniquity , and purify unto himself , a peculiar people , zealous of good works . to whom with the father and the holy ghost , be glory for evermore . the end of the first sermon . a second sermon concerning the trinity : to the university of oxford . april . . joh . xvij . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and this is life eternal , that they might know thee the onely true god , and jesus christ , whom thou hast sent . it is now a great many years since , in this place ( if not to this auditory ) i did discourse of these words . i shall repeat very little of that discourse : but think fit to add somewhat to what was then said . our saviour , in the three chapters next foregoing ( the th , th , and th . chapters of s. john's gospel ) had made a large discourse to his disciples ( after his institution of the lord's supper ) the night before he was to die ; which ( in this th . chapter ) he closeth with a prayer , to his father , in their behalf . wherein having made mention of eternal life ( ver . . ) which he was to give , to as many as the father had given him , ( that is , to as many as should ●ffectually believe in him ; ) he subjoins this e●●phonema , and this is life eternal , that they might know thee , the only true god ; and , whom thou hast sent , jesus christ. in which words , we have two things proposed to us : the christian's happiness ; and , the m●ans w●ereby it is to be attained . i. the c●ristian's happiness , is called life , as to its exc●●●ency : and eternal , as to its duration . w●ich is begun here , in the kingdom of gra●● : and is to be perfected , and for ever con●inued , in that of glory . ii. the means to attain it , is the knowledge of god and christ. where , by knowledge , i do not understand a meer notional or speculative knowledge ; ( for such i presume the devils may have in as large a proportion as any of us , and yet never attain eternal life : ) but an active , practical knowledge : such a knowledge as is attended with faith and with practice suitable thereunto . as in that of isa. . . by his knowledge , ( that is , by the knowledge of him ) shall my righteous servant justifie many : that is , by faith in him , attended with a suitable practice to it . the object of this knowledge is declared to be twofold . . the knowledge of god ; and . the knowledge of christ. to know thee the onely true god ; that 's one part : and ( whom thou hast sent ) jesus christ ; that 's the other . and each of these contains several particulars . the former of them contains at least these three . . that there is a god. . that there is but one ( true ) god. . that the father of our lord jesus christ , is this onely true god. he is that god , besides which god , there is no other true god. and , though jesus christ be god also ; yet not another god , but the same true god. for he and the father are one. joh. . . in the latter of them ( the knowledge of christ ) are three things also . . his divinity . . his humanity . and . his mediatory office. which are here briefly insinuated ; and are elsewhere more fully expressed . . his divinity , in that he is the son of the father , who is the onely true god : not by creation , as adam and the angels are called the sons of god : nor by adoption , as are the righteous , who truly believe in christ : but by generation , as the onely begotten of the father , ( joh. . . ) and therefore of the same nature with the father . . his humanity ; implyed in these words , whom thou hast sent . that is , so sent as to be made of a woman : so sent as to be made flesh. gal. . . joh. . . . his mediatory office : implyed in the title christ , added to the name jesus , ( and , whom thou hast sent , jesus christ. ) he was so sent , as to be the christ , the messias . so sent , as that the world through him might be saved : so , as that whosoever believes in him should not perish , but have everlasting life . joh. . , . of all which points i did then discourse more largely ; and therefore do now but name them . but i did then further observe , from the order of the words , ( to obviate a cavil of the socinians , ) that the word onely ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) is here restrictive , not of ( the subject ) thee ; but of ( the predicate ) the true god. of which i intend ( with god's assistance , and your patience ) to speak further at this time . objection i. the first and great objection of the socinians , from this place , against the divinity of christ , and the doctrine of the trinity , is this if the father be the onely true god ; then the son , or holy-ghost , is not god , or not the true god ; but the father onely . to which i shall give three things in answer . . this argument is a plain fallacy ; which they put upon us , by a willful perverting the order of the words . for it is not said thee onely to be the true god , ( as if not the son also , or the holy-ghost , were the true god , but the father onely : ) but , to know thee ( not thee onely , or onely thee , ) to be the onely true god. nor is it so in our englis● translation onely ; but in the original greek : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . where the article 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 coming after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and before 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , doth determine the restrictive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not to be applied to the subject 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but to the predicate , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . just as , in our english , the article the , coming between thee and onely , doth confine the word onely , not to thee ( that went before , ) but to true god , which follows . to know thee ( not onely thee , ) the onely true god. that is , to know thee to be that god , beside which god , there is no other true god. which we readily acknowledge , and profess . and then the socinians argument will appear just in this form : the god of abraham is the onely true god ; and therefore not the god of isaac , nor the god of jacob. yes , say i ; the god of isaac is the same god with the god of abraham ; and therefore the true god as he is . and the god of jacob , likewise . and this one answer doth fully satisfy the objection , and there needs no more . yet i shall add two other things ( though they might here be spared ) because they may be of use elsewhere . . i say further : if it had been said ( as it is not ) thee onely ; yet even this would not exclude any who is the same with him. and therefore , not the son , nor the holy-ghost ; since they are one and the same god with him. ( i and the father are one , joh. . . these three are one , joh. . . ) to which purpose , consider we what we have jer. . , . and again jer. . , . behold the days come , saith the lord , that it shall no more be said , the lord liveth that brought up the children of israel out of the land of egypt ; but , the lord liveth that brought up the children of israel from the land of the north , or out of the north country . now we are told by god himself , exod. . , . i am the lord thy god , which brought thee out of the land of egypt , — thou shalt have no other god but me. shall we therefore argue thus ; the god who brought israel out of egypt , is the onely true god ; and we must have no other god but him . therefore , not him who brought israel out of the north-country ? yes , say i , him also . for the god who brought them out of the north-country , is the same god , with him who brought them out of egypt , ( not another god , though designed by another character , ) and therefore , in having him , we have not another god. so here ; to know thee onely ( if it had been so said , as it is not ; ) it had implied no more but thus , not any who is not the same god with thee . to know thee onely ( and not any other , who is not the same god with thee ) to be the true god. which therefore would not exclude the son nor holy ghost , who are the same god with the father . but of this answer , there is no need in this place , because it is not said thee onely , or onely thee . . i say further ; if it had been said ( as it is not ) thee onely , ( as the socinians would have it to be understood ; ) i would then say , this were an essential predication , rather than a personal . that is , that the predicate true god , is affirmed of him in regard of his essence , rather than of his personality . as belonging to the essence , which is common to the three persons , not as peculiar to the person of the father . like as if it were said , david the king of israel , or david the father of solomon , is a reasonable creature , or endued with reason ; this being endued with reason , doth not belong to him as king of israel , nor as father of solomon ; but , as he is a man ( though denominated by these relations , ) and is equivalent to this , the man ( who is father of solomon , and king of israel ) is endued with reason . so if it be said , that david king of israel , and he onely , was father of solomon : it is not intended , that he was so as king of israel ( much less , in that capacity onely , ) but rather , as the man who begot him ; though designed by that character . so here ; god the creator is the onely true god : and god the redeemer likewise ; ( thus saith the lord thy redeémer the holy one of israel , the lord of hosts , i am the first and i am the last , and beside me there is no god , isa. . . isa. . . applyed to christ , rev. . , . rev. . , . ) shall we therefore argue , that god the redeémer is the onely true god , and beside him there is no god , therefore not god the creator ? no , we must not so argue . for it is not as redeemer , or as creator , that he is the onely true god , but as god. ( it may be praedicatio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ) for he was the onely true god from all eternity ; but it was in time that he made the world , and was the redeemer of mankind . and this both the arian , and the socinian , must needs acknowledge as to the place before us . for when christ saith , to know thee ( father ) the onely true god ; it cannot ( according to their principles ) be said of him as father of our lord jesus christ , but as god. for if christ be onely a titular god , or a creature-god , ( as they would have it , ) there was a time , or moment , when he was not , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) and therefore , when god was not his father . but he was the onely true god from all eternity ; and therefore must be here so called , not as father of our lord jesus christ , but as god. not according to his personality , but according to his essence ; which , we say , is common to the three persons : who are the same god , though under different denominations . but these two latter answers , ( though they be true and solid , ) are not necessary to this place ; because it is not said thee onely . yet i here name them , because they may be of use to answer some like objection raised from some other place . the full import of the words , is this , that the father of our lord jesus christ , is that god , beside which god , there is no other true god. or , there is no other true god , beside that god , which is the father of our lord jesus christ. and this we do fully agree with , when we say , that the son and the holy-ghost , are not another god , but the same true god with the father . objection ii. it may perhaps be next objected , that though this place do not deny the son and holy ghost to be the true god , ( meaning thereby , the same god with the father : ) yet neither doth it prove them so to be . i answer . 't is true : this place alone , ( without the concurrence of others ) doth not prove the trinity . ( and it is much if it should , where there are but two mentioned . ) nor is it brought by us to that purpose . we only answer the objections brought against it by others , from this place : and leave the proof of it to be fetched from other places in concurrence with this . i have observed elsewhere ( lett. . ) that if we should read it thus , to know thee to be the onely true god ; and him also whom thou hast sent , jesus christ , ( as implying him also to be the same true god : ) or thus , to know thee , and ( whom thou hast sent ) jesus christ , the only true god : the words will well bear it , without any force put upon them . nor is this only a new notion of my own . for i ( since ) find , that s. austin had said the same long ago , in his epist. . ( speaking to pascentius , an arian , concerning this place ) de patre tantummodo vos vultis intelligi , quod ait , ut cognoscant te unum verum deum , & , quem misisti jesum christum ; ubi nos subaudimus , etiam jesum christum verum deum : ut haec sit sententia , te , & , quem misisti , jesum christum , cognoscant unum verum deum . ne illa consequatur absurditas , ut , si propterea non est verus deus jesus christus , quia dictum est patri , te unum verum deum : propterea non sit dominus pater , quia dictum est de christo , unus dominus . where he takes the meaning to be this , to know thee , and , whom thou hast sent , jesus christ , the onely true god ; which he backs with this argument ; because if we should here on this account exclude the son from being the true god ; we might , for the same reason , exclude the father from being the lord , because it is said ( cor. . . ) one lord , jesus christ. yet even this , though it might prove it , as to the son , it would not hence conclude it , as to the holy-ghost . but the concurrence of other places , will prove it more clearly as to both . i shall shew it of each . as to the son , we have it clearly affirmed , by the same s. john , ( who best understood the import of his own words ) that he is also the true god ; ( so that it was not intended here to exclude him . ) joh. . . we are in him that is true , even in his son jesus christ : this is the true god ▪ ( and therefore not onely the father . ) and he had before told us ( from christ's own words ) joh. . . i and my father are one. nor is it here meant of one in testimony , as the socinians would have it understood elsewhere , ( there being in the context here no mention of testimony at all : ) but it must be meant of one god. and this is manifest from the inference which the jews made from it . for they did thereupon take up stones to stone him , as for ( what they call ) blasphemy : because thou ( say they ) being a man , makest thy self god , ver . , , . for which inference there had been no pretence , if by one , they had not understood one god. and the high priest in like manner , matth. . , , . i adjure thee ( saith he ) by the living god , that thou tell us whether thou be the christ , the son of god ; to which when christ had answered , thou hast said , ( dicis quod res est , ) he rent his clothes , saying , he hath spoken blasphemy , what further need have we of witnesses ? for to say that he was the christ , the son of god ; or ( as it is in mark . . ) the christ , the son of the blessed ; was understood by them to be the same , as to call himself go● . which had been blasphemy , had it not been true. and what is said of christ , joh. . . i and the father are one ; is said of all three , by the same st. john , ( ● joh. . ) the father , the word , and the holy ghost ; th●se three are one. objection iii. it is objected , that these words , last cited , are said to have been wanting in some translations , or some ancient copies . answ. be it so . and so are some whole epistles wanting in some translations . and considerable parts of some other chapters . but we are not therefore to cast them away as not genuine . the ii d. and iii d. epistles of st. john , and that of jude , are said to have been wanting in the syriack and arabick translations : and the story of the woman taken in adultery , joh. . wanting in the gothick gospels : and part of the last chapter of st. mark 's gospel , is said to be wanting in some books : and the doxology in the close of the lord's prayer : and the like in divers others . but we must not thence conclude them not to be genuine , and put them out of our bibles , because they have chanced to be omitted in some books . and it is so far from being strange , that such omissions should sometimes happen ; that it is very strange ( if there were not a great providence of god to preserve the scriptures pure and entire ) that there should be no more such mistakes than what are found . for ( before the convenience of printing was found out ) when copies were to be singly transcribed one from another , and even those but in a few hands : 't was very possible , ( and hardly avoidable , ) even for a diligent transcriber , sometime to skip a line . especially , ( which is the case here ) when some of the same words do again recur after a line or two ; men are very subject , both in writing and printing , ( as those well know who are versed in either , ) to leap from one word , to the same recurring soon after . nor is such omission ( when it happens ) readily discerned , if ( as here ) the sense be not manifestly disturbed by it . now when such variety of copies happens ( that words be found in some , which are wanting in others , ) this must either happen by a casual mis-take , ( without any design of fraud : ) or by a willful falsification ; as to serve a particular turn ; ( which i take to be the case of the papists , indices expurgatorii . ) and , as to the words in question ; if the difference of copies happened at first by a casual mistake , ( as i am apt to think , ) 't is very easy for a transcriber ( unawares ) to leave out a line which was in his copy ( especially where such omission doth not manifestly disturb the sense ; ) but not to put in a line which was not there . and , in such case , the fuller copy is likelyest to be true , and the omission to be a fault . which happening ( as it seems it did ) some hundreds of years ago , in some one copy ; it might easily pass ( unobserved ) into many others transcribed thence ( and so to others derived from those transcripts . ) but an insertion ( of what was not in their copy ) must needs be willful , and not casual . on the other side ; if this variety of copies were at first from a willful falsification ; it is much more likely to be a willful omission of the arians , in some of their copies , ( which might be done silently , and unobserved ; ) than by a willful insertion of the orthodox . for the insertion of such a clause , if wholly new , and which had never before been heard of ; would have been presently detected by the arians , as soon as ever it should be urged against them . nor was any advantage to be made of it by the orthodox , since the divinity of christ ( which was the point then in question ) might be as strongly urged from that in st. john's gospel , i and the father are one , as from this in his epistle , these three are one. and therefore it is not likely that the orthodox should willfully make any such falsification , from whence they could promise themselves no advantage . nor do i find , it was ever charged upon them by the ancient arians in those days : though athanasius and others urged it against them . and in very ancient copies , in which it had been left out , it is found supplied in the margin , as having been faultily omitted . and it is the more likely to be genuine , because in this clause ( the father , the word , and the holy-ghost ) the second person is called sunpliciter , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the word ; which is st. john's language , both here , and in his gospel , joh. . and is ( i think ) peculiar to him ; and not so used by any other of the holy writers of the new testament . i do not deny but that this second person may be called the word of god , in heb. . . by faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of god. and pet. . , . by the word of god were the heavens of old , and the earth , &c. and by the same word they are kept in store . as he is by the same st. john , rev. . . his name is called , the word of god. but to call him the word absolutely ( without other addition ) i think is peculiar to st. john. and therefore much more likely in this place , to have proceeded from the same pen , and not to have been inserted by an interpolater some hundreds of years after . and that clause these three are one , in the epistle , agreeing so well with i and the father are one in the gospel , is a further confirmation of their being both from the same pen. add to this , that the antithesis which we find in the th and th verses , is so very natural ; that it is a great presumption to be genuine . there are three that bear record in heaven , the father , the word , and the holy-ghost , and these three are one : and there are three that bear witness in earth , the spirit , and the water , and the blood , and these three agree in one. which as it stands , is very natural ; but the latter clause would seem lame without the former : and the words in earth wholly redundant in the latter , if not by antithesis to answer to the words in heaven , in the former verse . and that it was anciently so read , appears from st. cyprian , by whom it is twice cited ( in his book de unitate ecclesiae , and in his epistle ad jubaianum ) before the arian controversy was on foot . in the former place , ( arguing for the church's unity , not to be broken by schisms ) he speaks thus . dicit dominus , ego & pater unum sumus . et iterum de patre & filio & spiritu sancto , scriptum est , et hi tres unum sunt . et quisquam credit hanc unitatem de divina firmitate venientem , sacramentis coelestibus cohaerentem , scindi in ecclesia posse ? that is , our lord saith , i and the father are one : and again , of the father , son and holy ghost , it is written , these three are one. and who can believe , that this unity of the church , proceeding from this firm union in god , and united by the heavenly sacraments , can be separated in the church ? where he argues for the unity of the church ( not to be divided by schism ) by two arguments from this place . one from the firm unity of god ; noted in ver . . the father , son , and holy ghost are one ; from whom this church proceeds , ( de divina firmitate venientem . ) the other , from their being united by the same sacraments ( sacramentis coelestibus cohaerentem ) which relates to ver . . the spirit , the water , and the bloud agree in one. which double argument , from the two verses , shew that , then , they were both read . and , as to the former of them ( which is that in question ) he cites it again , in his epistola ad jubaianum ; where , disputing against bapt●sm by hereticks , he thus argues ; si baptizari quis apud haereticos potuit ; utique & remissam peccatorum consequi potuit . si peccatorum remissam consecutus est ; & sanctifica●us est , & templum dei factus est . quaero , cujus dei ? si creatoris ; non potuit , qui in eum non credidit . si christi ; nec hujus potuit fieri templum , qui negat deum christum . si spiritus sancti ; [ cum tres unum sint , ] quomodo spiritus sanctus placatus esse ei potest , qui aut patris aut fi●ii inimicus est ? that is ; if by hereticks one could be baptized ; then he might obtain remission of sins : if he obtain remission of sins , then is he sanctified , and become the temple of god. i ask then , of what god ? of the creator ? that he cannot be , who did not in him believe . of christ ? neither can he be his temple , who denies christ to be god. of the holy ghost ? no. fo● , seeing these three are one , how can the holy ghost be at peace with him who is at enmity with either the father or the son ? 't is manifest therefore that , these three are one , was thus read in cyprian's time ; as being by him twice cited , before the arian controversie was on foot . and ( before him ) it is cited by tertullian , in his book adversus praxeam , cap. . connexus patris in filio , & filii in paracleto , tres efficit cohaerentes , alterum ex altero : qui tres unum sunt , ( non unus : ) quomodo dictum est , ego & pater unum sumus ; ad substantiae unitatem , non ad numeri singularitatem . where he doth not only cite the place , but doth likewise parallel and compare , these three are one , ( in this place ) with i and the father are one , ( in the other place ) as being of a like import . that is , the connexion of the father with the son , and of the son with the paraclete or holy ghost , makes these coherent one with the other : which three are one , ( unum not unus , one thing , not one person ; ) like as it is said , i and the father are one , ( one thing ) as to the unity of substance , though not as to singularity of number . they are one being , one substance , though otherwise they may be three . 't is therefore no new interpolation ; but was anciently so read by cyprian and tertullian ( the two most ancient of the latin fathers ) long before the arian controversie was on foot . and hath been urged by others afterward , against the arians . nor is there any prejudice ( that i know of ) against its being so read as now we read it , save that some of the fathers ( it is said ) have omitted to urge it against the arians , when there hath been occasion of so doing . but this ( beside that it is onely a negative argument , and i know not how well grounded ) might very well happen , if it chanced to be wanting in that particular copy which such father used . ( for we are not to suppose they had then such plenty of bibles as are now in our hands ; but some one manuscript copy was to serve many . ) and because that in st. john's gospel , i and the father are one , did fit their purpose as well , or rather better , than this in his epistle , these three are one. for the controversie , then on foot , was not so much that of the trinity , as that of the divinity of christ. to return , therefore , to the place which is before us ; from what hath been said , it is manifest enough , that st. john , in calling the father , the onely true god , did not intend to exclude the son , from being the same true god ; whom himself doth elsewhere call the true god also , joh. . . no more ( i say ) than what is said , by name , of god the redeemer ( isa. . , . ) is to be thought exclusive of god the creator , or god the father ; thus saith the lord , the redeemer , the lord of hosts , i am the first , and i am the last , and beside me there is no god. which is applied to christ in particular , rev. . ● , . but is not exclusive of the father ; because god the creator ( or god the father ) is the same god with god the redeemer , and therefore not another god beside him . and therefore both of them ( or rather , the same god under both considerations ) indifferently called ( especially in the old testament ) god indefinitely , the lord of hosts , the holy one of israel . nor is that which is said of christ , tim. . , , . our lord jesus christ , who onely hath immortality , intended to exclude the father ; as if the father were not also immortal , or were not ( what is there said of christ ) the blessed and onely potentate , the king of kings , and the lord of lords . but only , that our lord jesus christ , is that god , which ( god ) is the blessed and onely potentate , the king of kings , and lord of lords , and who only hath immortality . and ( as was before noted by s. austin . ) the father is not excluded from being lord , notwithstanding that of cor. . . to us there is but one god , the father ; and one lord jesus christ : or that of eph. . , . one lord , one faith , one baptism , one god and father of all . for the father , and the son , are the same god , the same lord. the same of whom it is said , isa. . . i am the lord and there is none else , there is no god beside me . and again , ver . . i am the lord and there is none else . where note , that the word father , in that phrase , god and father of all , is different from the sense of it , in the father of our lord jesus christ : that relating to the common nature ; this to the person . and as in these places , what is sa●d of the son , ( that he onely hath immortality , that he is the onely potentate , that he is the one lord , that beside him , the redeemer , there is no god , ) are not to be understood exclusive of the father ; so what is here said of the father , ( that he is the onely true god ) is not to be understood exclusive of the son ; who is not another , but the same true god. i thought here to have inserted ( as in a proper place ) a discourse of some other points relating to the trinity ; which i find it necessary here to omit ( or to defer it to some other occasion ) that i be not prevented by the time in what i have to say further . that there is a god the creator , a god the redeemer , and a god the sanctifier ; and that these are the same god ; i think cannot reasonably be denied . i shall shew it of each . as to god the creator , we are told , gen. . . in the beginning god created the heaven and the earth . ( and , to the same purpose , in many other places . ) and , i think , there is none doubts , but that this creator , is the true god , the supreme god. and in jer. . . god doth by this character distinguish himself from all other ( pretended ) gods , the gods that have not made the heavens and the earth , they shall perish from the earth , and from under these heavens . as to god the redeemer ; i know that my redeemer liveth , saith job , ch. . . by which redeemer doubtless he meant the living god , a god who did then live ; a god who was , then , in being , and not ( as the socinians would have us think ) who was not to be , till two thousand years after . and isa. . . thus saith the lord the redeemer , the lord of hosts , i am the first and i am the last , and beside me there is no god. which redeeme● , must needs be the same god , with god the creator , the lord of hosts . as to god the sanctifier ; purge me with hyssop ( saith david ) and i shall be clean ; wash me , and i shall be whiter than snow : create in me a clean heart , o god ; and renew a right spirit within me , ( psal. . , . ) which certainly are works of sanctification ; and the god , to whom david prayed , is doubtless the living god , a god then in being . and when god promiseth ●o israel , i will give them a hear● to k●ow me ; and they shall return unto me with their whole heart , jer. . . i will give them one heart , and one way , that they may fear me for ever ; i will put my fear in their hearts , that they shall not depart from me , jer. . , . i will give them one heart , and put a new spirit within them ; i will take away the heart of stone and give them a heart of flesh , ezek. . . and . . i will put my law in their inward parts , and write it in their hearts , jer. . . the lord thy god will circumcise thine heart , and the heart of thy seed , to love the lord thy god with all thine heart , and with all thy soul , that thou mayst live , deut. . . all these are sanctifying works ; and that god who doth them , is god the sanctifier and it is the same god , who doth thus sanctifie , that is the creator and the redeemer . now this god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier , i take to be the same with what we otherwise call , god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost . and our church doth so expound it in her catechism ; first , i learn to believe in god the father , who hath made me and all the world : secondly , in god the son , who hath redeemed me and all mankind : thirdly , in god the holy ghost , who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of god. and it is no more absurd or inconsistent , to say , that god the father , god the son , and god the holy-ghost , are the same god ; than to say , that god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier , are the same god. as they stand related to us , they are called god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier . as to the different oeconomy , amongst themselves , one is called the father , who is said to beget ; another the son , who is said to be begotten ; a third , the holy-ghost , who is said to proceed or come forth ; but are all the same god. objection iv. but then here i meet with another objection , on which the socinians lay great weight . if god the creator , god the redeemer , and god the sanctifier , or god the father , god the son , and god the holy-ghost , be the same god , they cannot then be three persons : and if they be three persons , they must be three gods. for like as three persons , amongst men , doth signifie three men ; so three persons , who are god , must be three gods. contrary to the first commandment , which allows us to have but one god. to which i answer ; first , this is only to cavil at a word , when they have nothing of moment against the thing . so that if in●●ead of saying ●hese three persons are one god , we say , these three are one god , or give them another name instead of persons , or say these three somewhats , without giving them a name , this objection is at an end . . i say further ; 't is very true , that , in our english tongue , by another person , we sometimes understand another man , ( because that other person is , very often , another man also . ) but it is not always so ; nor is that the proper signification of the word ; but an abusive sense put upon it . and the reason of using the word person in this abusive or improper sense ; is , for want of an english word to answer the latin word homo , or the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which might indifferently relate to both sexes . for the word man doth properly relate to the male , and woman to the female . and if the word man be sometimes so used as to imply the woman also ; it is ( by a synecdoche ) putting the name of one sex , to signifie both. and 't is for want of such a word ( which might indifferently relate to both sexes ) that we sometime make use of person in a borrowed sense , rather than to use a circumlocution of man and woman , by naming both sexes . and if we should use such circumlocution of man and woman ; yet even this would not reach the whole species . for we do not use to call them man and woman , till they be of a considerable age ; before which time they are called children ; and therefore to comprehend the whole species , we say , man , woman , and child . we do indeed , sometimes , to that purpose , make use of the word mankind , ( adding the word kind to that of man , to ampliate the signification of it . ) but this relates only to genus humanum in a collective sense ; not to homines taken distributively . for we do not say a mankind , two mankinds , &c , as we say homo , homines . we are fain , therefore , for want of a proper english word , to make use of person in a borrowed sense to answer the latin homo . but the ancient fathers , who first applied the word persona to the sacred trinity , did not speak english. and therefore we cannot , from the present use of the word person in our language , conclude in what sense they used the word persona . . again ; the schoolmen in later ages , have yet put another sense on the word persona , peculiar to themselves ; extending it indifferently to men and angels ; ( for want of a proper word of that extent ; ) so as to signifie ( with them ) what they call suppositum rationale , or what we call a reasonable creature . ( and , in imitation of them , some others have since so used it . ) but this is a new sense , of later ages , since the time of those fathers , ( nor do the schoolmen , in this sense , without a metaphor , apply it to the sacred trinity . ) we cannot therefore conclude from hence , what was the fathers sense of it . . to find out therefore the true sense of t●e word person as applied to the trinity ; we are not so much to consider , what now-a-days the word doth sometime signifie with us in english ; nor what sense the schoolmen have put upon it since the time of those fathers : as , what was the true sense of the word persona , at or before their times , in approved latin authours . which is quite another thing from either of these senses . for what in english we sometimes mean by three persons ( taken indifferently for men , women , and children , ) the latins would not have called tres personas , but tres homines : though , if considered in such relations , as father , mother , and child , they might so be called tres personae . nor do i find that in approved latin authours , the word persona was wont to be attributed by them ( as by the schoolmen it hath since been ) to angels ; nor to their genii , or heathen gods. but , . it did signifie the state , quality , or condition of a man , as he stands related to other men. ( and so i find the latin word persona englished in our dictionaries . ) suppose , as a king , a subject , a father , a son , a neighbour , a publick or private person , a person of honour , and the like . and so , as the condition varied , the person varied also , though the same man remained . as if an ordinary person , be first made a knight , and then a lord ; the person or condition is varied , but he is still the same man that he was before . and he that is this year , a lord mayor , may be , next year , but an alderman , or not so much . hence are those latin phrases , frequent in approved authours ; personam imponere ( to put a man into an office , or confer a dignity upon him ; ) induere personam ( to take upon him the office ; ) sustinere personam ( to bear an office , or execute an office ; ) deponere personam ( to resign the office , or lay it down ; ) so , agere personam ( to act a person , ) and many the like . so that there is nothing of contradiction , nothing of inconsistence , nothing absurd or strange in it , for the same man to sustain divers persons , ( either successively , or at the same time ; ) or divers persons to meet in the same man ; according to the true and proper notion of the word person . a man may , at the same time , sustain the person of a king , and of a father , if invested with regal and paternal authority ; ( and these authorities may be subordinate one to another ; ) and he may accordingly act sometime as a king , and sometime as a father . thus tully , ( who well understood the propriety of latin words ) sustineo unus tres personas ; meam , adversarii , judicis , ( i being one and the same man , sustain three persons ; that of my own , that of my adversary , and that of the judge . ) and david was , at the same time , son of jesse , father of solomon , and king of israel . and this takes away the very foundation of their objection ; which proceeds upon this mistake , as if three persons ( in a proper sense ) must needs imply three men. . now if three persons ( in the proper sense of the word person ) may be one man ; what hinders but that three divine persons ( in a sense metaphorical ) may be one god ? what hinders but that the same god , considered as the maker and sovereign of all the world , may be god the creator , or god the father ; and the same god considered , as to his special care of mankind , as the ruthour of our redemption , be god the redeemer , or god the son ; and the same god , as working effectually on the hearts of his elect , be god the sanctifier , or god the holy-ghost ? and what hinders but that the same god , distinguished according to these three considerations , may fitly be said to be three persons ? or ( if the word person do not please ) three somewhats that are but one god ? and this seems to me a full and clear solution of that objection , which they would have to be thought insuperable . objection v. it may perhaps be objected further , why must we needs make use of the word person ; and call them three persons , if three somewhats will serve as well ? i answer , first , we have no such need of the word person , but that we can spare it . hypostasis will serve our turn as well . and if they think the latin word persona , be not a good translation of the greek hypostasis ; let them retain the greek word . ( we mean the same by both . ) and then perhaps they will find themselves at a loss , to fasten some of their objections upon the word hypostasis , which they would fasten upon persona . . but , secondly , if the thing be thus far agreed , that these three somewhats ( thus considered ) may be one god : i see not why they should contend with us about the name person . for this is only to quarrel about a word , or name , when the notion is agreed . . if it were admitted ( which i see no reason for ) that the word person doth not fitly express that notion which it is intended to design ; the most that can be inferred from it , is but , that we have not given it so fit a name : and , to cavil at that , when the notion intended by it is understood ; were just as if one should argue , there never was such a man , as whom they called pope pius ; because the man , who was so called , was not a pious man. . but i see not why the word person should not be thought a very fit word for this purpose . for two of these three are represented to us in scripture under the names of father and son ; and this son as begotten of the father ; ( and therefore these names are not to be quarrelled with : ) but all this in a metaphorical sense ; ( for no man can suppose , that this father doth so beget this son , as these words do properly signifie amongst men ) . now the relations of father and son , in a proper sense , are such as are properly denoted by the word persona , in its proper acceptation . and consequently the father and son , in a metaphorical sense , may ( by a continuation of the same metaphor ) be fitly called persons , in that metaphorical sense . and in what sense they be father and son , in a like sense they be persons , according to the propriety of the latin word persona . for such relatives the latins called personas . and if the father and son may fitly be so called ; no doubt but the holy ghost may be so called also , as one proceeding or coming forth ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) from them . as in joh. . . the comforter , which is the holy ghost , whom the father will send in my name , he will teach you all things . and joh. . . the comforter , whom i will send you from the father , even the spirit of truth , which proceedeth from the father , he shall testifie of me. where it is manifest , that , in what sense the father and son are to be reputed persons ; the comforter or holy ghost , is , in the same sense , so to be reputed . so that ( i think ) i have clearly vindicated , not only the notion , that these three somewhats may be one god ; but the name also , that these somewhats , may fitly be called persons . objection vi. i shall name but one objection more , which when i have satisfied , i shall conclude for this time . that th . objection ( and 't is but a weak one ) is this . the trinitarians do not all agree , but differ among themselves , in expressing their notions in this matter . very well . and do not the antitrinitarians differ much more ? doth not the arian and the socinian differ as much from one another , as either of them do from us ; ( and declare that they so do ? ) and do not the arians among themselves , and the socinians amongst themselves , differ more than do the trinitarians ? certainly they do . it must be confessed , that different men , as well in the same as in different ages , have very differently expressed themselves , according to their different sentiments of personality ; and of the particular distinctions of the three persons among themselves . but so it is in all the most obvious things in the world . as , in time , place , space , motion , and the like . we are all apt to think , that we all know well enough , what we mean by those words , till we be asked . but if we be put to it , to express our selves concerning any of them , what it is , whether a thing , or nothing , or not a thing , or somewhat of a thing , and what that somewhat is ; it would be long enough before we should all agree to express our selves just in the same manner ; and , so clearly , as that no man who hath a mind to cavil , could find occasion so to do . i might say the like of heat and cold ; of light , sight , and colour ; of smells , and t●sts , and the different sorts of them . can we never be s●id to agree in this , that the fire doth burn and consume the woo● ; till we be all agreed what is the figure of those fiery atoms ( and what their motion , and from what impulse ) which enter the pores of ●he wood , and separate its parts , and convert some of them to smoak , some to flame , and ●●me to ashes ; and which to which ; and in what manner all this is done ? what a folly then is it to require that , in the things of god , we should all so agree as to express our thoughts just in the same manner ; as is not possible to do in the most obvious things we meet with ? and , in such a case as wherein to express our notions , we have no words but figurative , it is not to be thought strange , that one man should make use of one metaphor , and another of another , according as their several fansies serve . but thus far , i think , the orthodox are all agreed ; that between these three , which the scripture calls the father , the son , and the holy ghost , or the father , the word , and the spirit , there is a d●stinction , greater than that of ( what we call ) the divine attributes ; but not so as to be three gods. and this distinction , they have thought fit to denote by the word hypostasis , or person . they are also all agreed ; that one of these persons ( namely the son or the word ) was incarnate , or made flesh , and did take to himself our humane nature . but as to the particular modes , or manner how ; either how these two natures are united , or how these three persons are distinguished each from other : we may be content to be ignorant , farther than god hath been pleased to reveal to us . we know that our immortal soul is joined with an humane body , so as to make one man ( without ceasing , that to be a spirit , and this to be a body : ) but 't is hard for us to say how. and accordingly we say , that the man christ jesus , ( without ceasing to be man , ) and god manifested in the flesh , ( without ceasing to be god , ) are one christ : but what kind of union this is , which we call hypostatical , we do not throughly understand . we know also that the father is said to beget , the son to be begotten , the holy ghost to proceed : but neither do we fully understand the import of these words ; nor is it needful that we should . but , so far as was said before , we do all agree ; and we may safely rest there . now to god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost ; three persons , but one god ; be honour , and glory , and praise , now and for ever . the end of the second sermon . a third sermon concerning the trinity . joh . xvij . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and this is life eternal , that they might know thee the onely true god , and jesus christ , whom thou hast sent . i have , in a former discourse from this verse , entered upon the doctrine of the trinity ; not so much , as being contained in it , as occasioned by it . i have shewed that the word onely is here restrictive , not of the subject thee , but of the predicate true god. affirming the father to be the onely true god , though not the father onely . nor is it exclusive of the son , who is also the same true god ; and is so expresly called , by this same writer , joh. . . where ( speaking of jesus christ ) he says , this is the true god , and eternal life ; as if it were spoken with a direct aspect to the words before us . now that christ is often called god , neither the arians nor the socinians do deny . and it is so frequent , and so evident , as not to be denyed . not only in the place last cited , but in many others . thy throne , o god endureth for ever , heb. . . the word was with god , and the word was god. joh. . . my lord and my god. joh. . . the being over all , god blessed for ever , amen . ( or , the supreme being , the ever blessed god. rom. . . ) and elsewhere . objection vii . but to this they object , that though he be sometime called god ; yet by god is not there meant the supreme god : but either a mere titular god , as the socinians will have it ; ( as one of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , cor. . . one who is called god , but indeed is not , but a mere man however highly dignified . ) or ( as the arians will have it ) that he is god indeed , but not the supreme god , not the same god with the father , but an inferiour god , ( deus factus ) a made-god , a creature-god ; who was indeed before the world , but not from eternity , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , there was ( a time , a moment , a quando ) when he was not , when he had not a being . in answer to both which ; i shall endeavour to shew , ( by the most signal characters , whereby the supreme god , the onely true god , is set forth to us in scripture ; and by which he is therein distinguished from all false gods , or other pretended gods ; ) that christ is the true god , the supreme god , the same god with the father , and not another god. character i. the first character , which we meet with , of this god , is that of gen. . . in the beginning god created the heaven and the earth . which i think no man doubts but to be meant of the true god , the supreme god. and by virtue of this , he claims the sovereignty thereof ; the earth is the lord's , and the fulness thereof , psal. . . jehovah , the lord of all the earth , josh. . , . the god of the heaven , and the god of the earth , gen. . . the heaven is my throne , and the earth is my footstool , isa. . . behold the heaven , and the heaven of heavens , is the lord's , the earth also , and all that is therein , deut. . . the same character is applied to god very often , isa. . , . thus saith god the lord ( jehovah ) he that created the heavens and stretched them out ; he that spread forth the earth and that which cometh out of it ; he that giveth breath unto the people upon it , and spirit to them that walk therein . i am the lord ( jehovah ) that is my name , and my glory will i not give unto another . and isa. . . mine hand hath laid the foundation of the earth , and my right hand hath spanned ( or spread out ) the heavens . so psal. . . when i consider the heavens , the work of thy fingers ; the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained . psal. . . which made heaven and earth , the sea , and all that therein is . and many other places , not only in the old testament ; but in the new testament likewise ; as acts . . that ye should turn from these vanities unto the living god , who made heaven and earth , and the sea and all things that are therein . and acts . . god that made the world , and all things therein . so revel . . . thou hast created all things . chap. . . him that made heaven and earth , and the sea , and the fountains of water . and it is the distinctive character , whereby he doth distinguish himself from all other pretended gods , jer. . where he who at ver . . is called the lord , the true god , the living god , an everlasting king , at who 's wrath the earth shall tremble , and the nations shall not abide his indignation ; doth at ver . . give this defiance to all other gods , thus shall ye say to them ; the gods which have not made the heavens and the earth , they shall perish from the earth , and from under these heavens . now this character we find ascribed to christ. not only , where it is spoken as of god indefinitely , but to be understood of christ ; ( as are some of the places already mentioned : ) but even where it is particularly applied to him . i shall begin with that of joh. . , . where we have a large discourse of him , in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god. where , by the word is meant christ , as is evident from the further descriptions of him in the following verses ; 't is he of whom john the baptist came to bear witness , ver . , . he who came into the world , but the world knew him not . ver . . who came to his own , but his own received him not ; but to as many as received him , he gave power to become the sons of god. ver . . . who was made flesh , and dwelt amongst us , and we beheld his glory ; the glory as of the onely begotten of the father . ver . . he of whom john bare witness and cryed , saying , this is he of whom i spake , he that cometh after me is preferred ●efore 〈◊〉 ●or he was before me ; ( not as to his humane na●ure ; fo● so , john the baptist was older than he , by six months , luk. . . ) and of his fulness ( saith st. john ) we have all received grace for grace ; for the law was given by moses , but grace and truth came by jesus christ , ver . , , . 't was jesus christ therefore that is here called the word . now of this same word , it is said , the same was in the beginning with god ; all things were made by him , and without him was not any thing made which was made , ver . , . he was in the world , and the world was made by him , ver . . consonant to that of heb. . . the worlds we refrmed by the word of god : and pet. . . by the word of god the heavens were of old , and the earth standing in the water and out of the water . and by the same word , the heavens and earth are kept in store , or preserved , ver . . and to the same purpose , col. . , . by him were all things created , that are in heaven , and that are in earth . and he is before all things , and by him all things consist . and heb. . . by whom also he made the worlds . in psal. . we have a long prayer ( to the supreme god doubtless ) which bears this title , a prayer of the afflicted , when he is overwhelmed , and poureth out his complaint before the lord , ( the lord jehovah . ) it begins thus , hear my prayer , o lord , ( jehovah ) and let my cry come unto thee . and at the same rate he proceeds , addressing himself to the same god all along . and at ver . , , , . he speaks thus , o my god , thy years are throughout all generations ; thou of old hast laid the foundations of the earth , and the heavens are the work of thy hands ; ( who is the same god therefore of whom moses had before said , in the beginning god created the heaven and the earth , gen. . . ) they shall perish ( as the psalmist proceeds ) but thou shalt endure : yea all of them shall wax old as a garment , as a vesture shalt thou change them and they shall be changed : but thou art the same , and thy years shall have no end . and doubtless the psalmist , when he made this long prayer , thought not of addressing himself to any other than the supreme god. ( not to a god who had not , then , a being , nor was to have till a thousand years after , as the socinians would have us think of christ. ) he prays to god as his redeemer ; that is , to christ. and that christ is that god to whom he did thus address , we are expresly told , heb. . , , , . but unto the son he saith , — thou , lord , in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth , and the heavens are the works of thine hands ; they shall perish , but thou remainest : and they all shall wax old as doth a garment , and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up , and they shall be changed ; but thou art the same , and thy years shall not fail . all which is plainly cited from that psalm . christ therefore is that god to whom that prayer was made ; the same supreme god , who created the heaven and the earth : even jesus christ , the same yesterday and to day and for ever , heb. . . and it is very frequent in scripture , that what in one place is spoken of god indefinitly ( without specification of this or that person ) is elsewhere applied to one or other of the persons in particular , as that of the creation is here to christ , the redeemer ; as being the same god who is the creator also . and that of redemption , to god the creator ( who is the redeemer also ) isai. . . thus saith the lord ( jehovah ) that created thee , — fear not , for i have redeemed thee . so that god the creator , and god the redeemer , are the same god. character ii. the next character i shall insist upon , is that whereby god denotes himself to moses , exod. . , , . i am that i am ; and i am hath sent me unto you . when god was sending moses to the children of israel , in order to their deliverance out of egypt , moses puts this question , when i come to the children of israel , and shall say them , the god of your fathers hath sent me unto you ; and they shall say , what is his name ? what shall i say to them ? 't is certainly , therefore the true god , that is here spoken of : let us see what is the character that this god gives of himself . and god said unto moses , i am that i am : and he said , thus shalt thou say to the children of israel , i am hath sent me unto you . this therefore is a proper character of the true god. i am that i am , ( ehjeh asher ehjeh , ) or i am , who am ; or i am , he who am , so the vulgar latin ; ( ego sum qvi svm ; ) and ( qui est ) he that is , hath sent me : as if , what god says of himself ( in the first person ) i that am , were proper for moses to say of him ( in the third person ) he that is . and so the septuagint , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i am , he that am , or he that is ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( he that is ) hath sent me . where simply to be , is made a distinctive character of god , as he whose essence is to be ; and it is impossible for him not to be. who is of himself ( or rather himself is ) without deriving ought from any other ; and from whom all other beings , have their being . who giveth to all , life and breath and all things ; in whom we live and move and have our being , act. . , . who hath first given to him ? that is , none hath : he receives nothing ( aliunde ) from ought else ; but of him , and through him , and to him are all things , rom. . , . who is therefore called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the same notion the heathens also had of the supreme god. hence aristotle calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the being of beings ; and plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the self being ; who himself is , and gives being to all else . and ( being thus self-existent ) he must be also a necessary being ( ens necessarium ) and eternal , ( for if ever he had not been , it were impossible he should ever be ; for how could nothing make it self to be : ) and likewise infinite ( as the source of all being . ) all which the heathen acknowledged ( as consonant to natural light ) as well as we. now this same character i am , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( which is the word whereby the greek septuagint doth here render the hebrew word ehjeh , which we translate i am ) that is i who am , or he who is , we find signally applied to christ , rom. . . he that is . for what there we render , who is , in the greek is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he that is , or the being : with this addition , over all ; ( the being , over all , or the supreme being : ) with this further character , god blessed for ever ; ( or the ever blessed god. ) amen . where it is not amiss to note , that the blessed ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) was an usual title whereby they were wont to design the true god. and accordingly , that question which caiaphas the high priest , puts to our saviour , mat. . . i adjure thee by the living god , that thou tell us , whether thou be the christ , the son of god ; is in mark . . art thou the christ , the son of the blessed , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . where no man doubts but that by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is meant , the supreme god. and when christ is here called , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( the supreme being , the ever-blessed god ; ) with the solemn note of asseveration , amen : it is certainly too august a title for any less than the supreme god , the only god. the same character we have of him again , rev. . . where we have not only the title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , importing his being , but the additional intimation of his eternity , through all the variety of continued duration , past , present , and to come . where we are to observe , that at ver . . we have this character of god ●ndefinitely , without restriction to this or that person in the deity , ( as appears by its being contradistinct to christ personally considered , ver . . ) grace be unto you and peace , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) from him which is , and which was , and which is to come , — and from jesus christ , &c. where it is manifest from the unusual construction , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 &c. that the title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( who is and was , and shall be ) is taken , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as the grammarians speak , ( as one undeclined-substantive joined with the article 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) as being ( all together ) one joint title of god , indefinitely taken , ( because of that contradistinction which follows ; and from jesus christ ; ) and with particular respect ( as the margin of our bible directs ) to that of exod. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i am 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or he who am ; and can relate to none but the supreme god. now what is thus said of this god indefinitely , at ver . . is again repeated of christ in particular at ver . . ( with a further addition of omnipotence , ) i am alpha and omega , the beginning and the ending ( the first and the last ) saith the lord , which is , and which was , and which is to come ; the almighty . so that he is here design'd , not only by his absolute being ; but by his eternity also , through all variety of continued duration , ( past , present , and future ; ) who is , and was , and shall be ; who was the first ( before whom nothing was ) and the last ( after whom nothing shall be ; ) and , by his omnipotence , the almighty . the same title of alpha and omega , the first and the last , is given him in divers other places ; as at ver . , and . of the same chapter , i am alpha and omega , the first and the last ; i am he that liveth and was dead , and behold i am alive for evermore , amen . and rev. . . the first and the last , which was dead and is alive . and again , rev. . . and rev. . . all relating to isai. . . isai. . . isai. . . where the like had before been said , as a character ( no doubt ) of the true god. and isai. . . before me there was no god formed , neither shall there be after me . and what can this be other than the infinite , the eternal , the almighty god. the same yesterday , and to day , and for ever , as he is called , heb. . . the blessed , and only potentate , the king of kings , and lord of lords , who only hath immortality , &c. as he is described , tim. . , , . and again , the king of kings , and lord of lords , rev. . , and rev. . . the great god , and our saviour , tit. . . where , our saviour , is so contra-distinguished , not as another from the great god , but as another title of that same person : he that is our god and saviour , or god our saviour , as it is tit. . . ( like as god and the father , ephes. . . and again , col. . . giving thanks to god , and the father . ) for 't is manifest that here ( tit. . . ) it is spoken of christs coming to judgment ; which is here called , the glorious appearance of the great god , and our saviour jesus christ ; that is , the glorious appearance of jesus christ , who is the great god and our saviour ; the title that jeremy gives to god , jer. . . the great and mighty god , the lord of hosts is his name . christ therefore , our saviour , is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the great god. and the doxology there added , rev. . . to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever , amen ; is equivalent to that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rom. . . god blessed for ever . and the like , tim. . . to whom be honour and power everlasting , amen . and much more , that of rev. . , , . worthy is the lamb , that was slain , to receive power , and riches , and wisdom , and strength , and honour , and glory , and blessing : ( as high a doxology as that in the close of the lords-prayer ; ) to which we have the acclamation of every creature ( which is in heaven , and on the earth , and under the earth , and such as are in the sea , and all that are therein , ) saying , blessing , honour , glory , and power , be unto him that sitteth upon the throne , and unto the lamb for ever and ever . and the four beasts said , amen ; and the four and twenty elders fell down and worshipped him that liveth for ever and ever . too great things to be said of a mere creature , or a titular god ; but very agreeable to christ , being ( as he is ) the same god with the father , the only true god. i might here add a like remark , on that of isai. . . hearken o israel , i am he ; i am the first , i am also the last . and in like manner , isai. . . isai. . , , . deut. . . i , even i , am he ( hu ) and there is no other god with me , or beside me . ( and to the same purpose elsewhere . ) ani hu ; i am he ; so we render it . i am he ; what he ? 't is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 't is the he absolutely taken , and emphatically applied to god. which i take to be of like import with , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i am ; i that am , or that which is . * the greek septuagint ( in the places cited ) renders ani hu by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : and the vulgar latin ( indifferently ) by ego sum , ego ipse , ego sum ipse , ego ipse sum : that is , i am he , or i am. and christ , of himself , joh. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , before abraham was , i am. and i the rather take it so to signify ( in the places cited ) because i there find it attended ( exegetically ) with an intimation of his eternity ; he is , he is the first and he is the last ; before him none was , and after him none shall be : he is , and ever was , and ever shall be. character iii. the next character that i shall insist upon , is that of the two proper names of god , jah and jehovah ; which i take to be proper to god , and incommunicable to any other . i put them both together , because they be both of the same import ; and indeed , of the same with ehjeh , ( i am ) before-mentioned . the chief difference is , that ehjeh ( i am ) retains the form of the verb ; but jah and jehovah are nouns verbal , from hajah or havah which signifie to be : all denoting gods absolute being : and all peculiar to the supreme god , and no where applied in scripture ( that i know of ) to any other . i know the socinians would perswade us that jehovah is sometime given to an angel , which we do not deny ; but we say that angel is not a created angel , but the angel of the covenant , who is god himsel● . the name jah comes often in the old testament , but not so often as jehovah . particularly in psal. . . sing unto god , sing praises to his name , extol him that rideth upon the heavens by his name jah . so we find it in our bibles , and it agrees with the original . but in our psalters , ( by a continued mistake , ) instead of jah or ya , is printed yea. * . but this name is no where ( i think ) retained in the greek septuagint , ( the septuagint renders it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : ) nor in the new testament ( which frequently follows the septuagints form of speech , ) unless in the solemn form of praise hallelu-jah ( which the greek puts into one word alleluia ) that is , praise jah , or ( as it is usually rendred ) praise ye the lord. which is jointly applied to him that sits upon the throne and to the lamb , rev. . , , , . whom i take to be there meant by the lord our god , ver . . and the lord god omnipotent , ver . . and the great god , ver . . for the supper of the great god , ver . . is the same with the supper of the lamb , ver . , . the name jehovah is , in the old testament , much more frequent ; especially in the original hebrew . but in our translation is frequently rendered by the lord ; as in all those places ( if the printers have been careful ) where lord is printed in capital letters . the name jehovah , is at exod. . , ● . made equivalent to ehjeh , i am. for what is said at ver . . thus shalt thou say unto the children of israel , i am hath sent me unto you ; is thus repeated at ver . . thus shalt thou say unto the children of israel , jehovah ( the god of your fathers , the god of abraham , the god of isaac , and the god of jacob ) hath sent me unto you : with this addition , this is my name for ever , and this is my memorial unto all generations . and psal. . . that men may know , that thou , whose name alone is jehovah , art the most high over all the earth . in which place , the restrictive word alone , cannot be understood to affect the word name , as if it were thus to be construed , ( cujus nomen est jehovah solum , ) whose name is only jehovah ; ( for god we know had other names , whereby he is often called : ) but to the word whose , ( cujus solius nomen est jehovah , ) to whom alone ( or to whom only ) the name jehovah doth belong . so isai. . . i am jehovah and none else ; there is no god beside me . and deut. . , . jehovah he is god , and there is none else beside him : jehovah he is god in heaven above , and upon earth beneath , there is none else . and isai. . . i am jehovah that is my name ; and my glory will i not give unto another . and deut. . . hear , o israel , the lord thy god is one lord ; or , jehovah thy god is one jehovah ; there is no other jehovah but he . and deut. . . that thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful name , the lord thy god , or jehovah thy god. and to the same purpose , deut. . . sam. . . and in many other places . i will not despute , whether this name jehovah , were never made known , till god did thus declare it to moses , at exod. . . it might seem so to be by that of exod. . . i appeared unto abraham , and to isaac , and to jacob , by the name of god almighty , but by my name jehovah was i not known to them . 't is true , that god is often so called in the book of genesis : but that book was written by moses , after the time that moses speaks of , in exodus . and moses might so call him , by a name known at the time when he wrote , though it had not been known at the time whereof he wrote . as when abraham is said to go forth from vr of the chaldees , or of chasdim , gen. . . though chesed the son of nahor ( from whom , in likelihood , the chaldees were called chasdim ) was not born till afterwards , as appears gen. . . so exod. . . where the children of israel are said to have sojourned four hundred and thirty years ; it must be reckoned backward as far as abraham's coming forth from vr of the chaldees , at which time they could not be called , the children of israel , ( for israel was not then born , ) but it was that people , who were afterwards called the children of israel . and many such prolepses , or anticipations of names , there are in all historians . but , whether it be upon this account , or some other , that he is said , by his name jehovah not to have been known to them , is not material to our present business . 't is enough , that jehovah is now known to be the signal name of the true god ; and ( i think ) no where given to any other . now that our saviour christ is called jehovah , is not to be denied . and it is for this reason , that the socinians would have us think that this name is not peculiar to god. in jer. . , . he is called jehovah tzidkenu , the lord our righteousness . behold the days come saith the lord , that i will raise unto david a righteous branch ; and a king shall reign and prosper , and shall execute judgment and justice on the earth ; in his days judah shall be saved , and israel shall dwell in safety : ( which is agreed , by jews and christians , to be understood of the messias . ) and this is the name whereby he shall be called ( jehovah tzidkenu ) the lord our righteousn●●s , ( jehovah our righteousness . ) and to the same purpose , jer. . , . in psal. . which is called , a prayer of the afflicted , when he poureth out his complaint before the lord ( jehovah . ) it begins thus , hear my prayer o lord ( jehovah ) and let my cry come unto thee . and he to whom this prayer is made , is eight or nine times called the lord ( jehovah . ) now he to whom this prayer is made ( we are told , hebr. . , , , . ) is our lord christ ; vnto the son he saith , — thou lord in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth , and the heavens are the works of thy hands ; they shall perish , but thou remainest ; they all shall wax old as a garment , and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up , and they shall be changed ; but thou art the same , and thy years shall not fail . all which is cited out of that prayer , made to the lord jehovah . so i the lord ( jehovah ) the first and the last , isai. . . thus saith the lord ( jehovah ) before me there was no god , neither shall there be after me , isai. . . thus saith the lord ( jehovah , ) the king of israel , and his redeemer , ( jehovah ) the lord of hosts , i am the first and i am the last ; and beside me there is no god , isai. . . which are the characters applied to christ , rev. . , . & . . & . . & . . as was shewed before . 't is true , that in the greek septuagint of the old testament , the name jehovah is no where retained ; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( i think ) every where put for it . whether because of a jewish superstition , no where to pronounce that name ; or because it could not conveniently be expressed in greek letters ; i will not determine . and for that reason ( because the septuagints did not use it ) it is not used in the new testament ( which doth mostly comply with the language of the septuagints ; as being the greek translation then in use . ) and therefore we are not to look for the name jehovah there applied to christ. but divers places are in the new testament applied to christ , wherein the name jehovah was used in the old testament . and the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( the lord ) by which both the septuagints and the new testament do constantly render the hebrew name jehovah , is so frequently applied to christ in the new testament , as that ( throughout the new testament ) it is almost his constant character , the lord , the lord jesus christ , &c. one lord jesus christ , cor. . . our lord jesus christ , the lord of glory , jam. . . my lord and my god , joh. . . no man can say that jesus is the lord , but by the holy ghost , cor. . . and elsewhere so often , that none can be ignorant of it . character iv. the last character ( which i shall insist upon ) of the true god , the only god ; is that of the lord god of israel ; hear o israel , the lord our god is one lord. and thou shalt love the lord thy god with all thy heart , &c. deut. . . and the lord thy god , is almost the constant language of moses to the children of israel : and it is the character which god directs him to use ; thus shalt thou say unto the children of israel , the lord god of your fathers , the god of abraham , the god of isaac , and the god of jacob , hath sent me ; this is my name for ever , and this is my memorial unto all generations , exod. . . and the lord god of the hebrews , ver . . and elsewhere very often throughout the bible . and doubtless , he that was the lord god of israel , is the true god , the only god. 't is he who tells us , i am the lord thy god — thou shalt have no other god but me , exod. . . and , besides me , there is no other god , isai. . . and so often elsewhere , that it is needless to name the places . and this character , as well as the rest , is expresly given to christ also , luk. . , . where we are expresly told of john the baptist , that many of the children of israel shall he turn to the lord their god ( to the lord god of israel : ) for he shall go before him in the spirit and power of elias . now we all know , whose fore-runner john baptist was ; and before whom he was to go , in the power and spirit of elias . and he before whom he was thus to go , is the lord god of israel ; and therefore not only a titular god , or a creature god , but the true god , the supreme god , the same god with that god who is the lord god of israel ; whom no man doubts to be the true god , the supreme god , the only god. i might add many other characters given to christ , proving him to be the true god ; as that rev. . . i am he which searcheth the reins and hearts , and i will give unto every one according to his works , ( and to the same purpose , rev. . . and elsewhere : ) which god ( the true god ) claims as his peculiar prerogative , jer. . , . the heart is deceitful above all things , and desperately wicked , who can know it ? i the lord search the heart , i try the reins ; to give to every man according to his ways , and according to the fruit of his doings . and to the same purpose , jer. . . jer. . . chron. . . psal. . . psal. . . and in many other places . and that likewise of isai . . his name shall be called wonderful councellor , the mighty god , the everlasting father , the prince of peace , &c. with many other characters of like nature , which can never agree to any but the true god. but it is not my business , in this short discourse , to say all that might be said ; but what may be sufficient . he therefore that is ( as hath been shewed ) god , the true god ; the mighty god ; the everlasting father ; the eternal god ; the first and the last , ( before whom nothing was , and after whom nothing shall be ) that was , and is , and shall be ; the same yesterday , and to day , and for ever ; the almighty ; by whom the world was made ; by whom all things were made , and without whom nothing was made that was made ; who laid the foundations of the earth , and the heavens are the work of his hands ; who , when the heavens and the earth shall fail , his years endure for ever ; who searcheth the heart and the reins , to give to every one according to his works ; who is jehovah ; the lord god of israel ; the supreme being ; which is over all , god blessed for ever ; who is the blessed and only potentate , the king of kings and lord of lords , who only hath immortality , to whom be honour and power everlasting , amen . that god ( i say ) of whom all these great things are said , is ( certainly ) not a mere titular god , ( who is called god but is not , ) a creature god , or only a dignified man. for , if these be not characters of the true god , by what characters shall the true god be described ? i know , the socinians have imployed their wits to find out some tricks to evade or elude some of these plain places , which i shall not trouble my self , or you to repeat ; or to give an answer to them . for they are so weak , and so forced , that the plain words of scripture , read together with the forced senses they would put upon them , are answer enough ; nor do they need or deserve any further answer . objection viii . the last objection which i shall now take notice of , is this ; that the doctrine of the trinity was not known to the jewish church before christ. to which i answer , . if it were not made known to them , it was not necessary for them to know . for matters of pure revelation , are not necessary to be known , before they are revealed , ( nor farther than they are revealed : ) but may be so to us , to whom they are revealed . the whole doctrine of our redemption by christ , was ( doubtless ) unknown to adam before his fall ; and , had he not fallen , it would have been no fault in him not to have known it at all . and when ( after his fall ) it was first made known to him , ( in that first promise , that the seed of the woman should break the serpents head , gen. . . ) it was yet so dark , that he could know very little ( as to the particulars of it ) of what is now known to us . and as god by parcels ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) at sundry times , and in divers manners , declared more of it to abraham , to david , and the prophets , so were they obliged to know and believe more of it : and when in the last days he had declared the whole of it by his son ; heb. . , . it is now necessary for us to believe much more ; of which they might be safely ignorant . and , of the trinity likewise , if it were not then revealed . . but secondly , there were many things , which though not fully revealed , so as to be clearly understood by all ; were yet so insinuated , as to be in good measure understood by some ; and would more be so , when the veil should be taken off from moses's face , cor. . , , . thus the death and resurrection of christ , were not understood , even by his own disciples , till after his resurrection . yet we must not say that these things were not before intimated in the scriptures ( though covertly ; ) for when their understandings were opened , to understand the scriptures , and what had been written of him in the law of moses , and in the prophets , and in the psalms ; they then perceived that it was so written , and that it behooved christ to suffer and to rise from the dead the third day . yet this was therein so covertly contained , that they seem no more to have understood it , than that of the trinity . and st. paul in the epistle to the hebrews , declares a great deal to have been covered under the jewish rites and ceremonies ; which , certainly , most of the jewish church did not understand ; though , in good measure , it might be understood by some . i might say the like of the resurrection ; which was but darkly discovered till immortality was brought to light through the gospel , tim. . . we must not yet say , it was wholly unknown to the jewish church , ( of whom many , no doubt , did believe it : ) yet neither can we say , it was generally received ; for we know the pharisees and the sadduces were divided upon that point , act. . , , . and so little is said of it in the old testament , that those who had a mind to be captious , might have found much more specious pretence of cavilling against it then , than our adversaries now have against the doctrine of the trinity . . i say thirdly , as of the resurrection , there were then divers intimations , which are now better understood ( in a clearer light ) than at that time they were : so i think there were also of the doctrine of the trinity . i shall instance in some of them . . that there was , in the unity of the god-head , a plurality of somewhat ( which now we call persons ) seems fairly to be insinuated , even in that of elohim-bara , gen. . . ( in the beginning god created , ) where elohim ( god ) a nominative case plural , is joined with bara , a verb singular ; ( which is as if we should say in english , we am , or they doth ; which would to us sound odly , if somewhat of mystery be not intended in it . ) nor is it here only , but very frequently , that god is called elohim in the plural number , ( and much oftner than in the singular number eloah , ) as if , though jehovah be but one , yet elohim may be three : not three gods , but three somewhats in that one god. ( for though it be elohim , yet it is bara : it is so three , as yet to be one. ) nor is it elohajim ( in the dual number ) as spoken of two , or a couple ; but elohim ( in the plural number ) as of more than two. this may perhaps be called a criticism , ( and it is so . ) but i am loth to say , it is purely casual , and not designed . for many times little circumstances , and unheeded expressions ( as at first they may seem to be , ) may ( by the divine wisdom ) be fore-designed to some considerable purpose . as , that of , not a bone of it shall be broken , exod. . . numb . . . psal. . . and that of , they pierced my hands and my feet , psal. . . and , they shall look upon him whom they have pierced , zach. . . and that , they part my garment among them , and on my vesture they cast lots , psal. . . and , they gave me gall for my meat , and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink , psal. . . which are most of them , but poetical expressions ; and seemingly casual , and undesigned , as to their literal sense ; but were providentially ordered , as being literally to be fulfilled ; as we find in joh. . , , , , , . and in the places parallel of the other gospels . i might instance in a great many such , which at first might seem casual , but were providentially designed . i shall content my self at present with one more ; which is that of st. paul , ( which perhaps may be thought to look as like a criticism as what i mention ) gal. . . now to abraham and his seed were the promises made . he saith not , and to seeds , as of many ; but as of one , and to thy seed which is christ. now the promises made to abraham , to which he refers , are those gen. . , , . ( which , i think , is the only place , where , in promises made to abraham , such mention is made of his seed . ) by my self have i sworn , saith the lord ; for because , thou hast done this thing , and hast not withheld thy son , thine onely son ; that in blessing i will bless thee , and multiplying i will multiply thy seed , as the stars of the heaven , and as the sand which is upon the sea-shoar , and thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies ; and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed ; because thou hast obeyed my voice . by abraham's seed , here , is manifestly meant his children whom god promiseth to multiply . and it might seem to be very indifferent whether to say , thy seed , or thy children . but st. paul was so nice a critick , as to take advantage of his saying seed ( in the singular number ) and not seeds or children ( in the plural ) as thereby signally denoting ( as principally intended ) that one seed , which is christ. yet are not the rest of the seed to be quite excluded ( even in that last clause of it , in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed , ) as appears by act. . . and ye ( men of israel , ver . . ) are the children of the prophets , and of the covenant which god made with our fathers , saying unto abraham , and in thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed . whence 't is evident , that seemingly unheeded criticisms are sometimes providentially designed . and such i take this of bara elohim , to be . and it is taken notice of to this purpose , both by jewish and christian writers . the like plurality seems plainly intimated in the same chapter , gen. . . let vs make man in ovr image and after ovr likeness . yet even this plurality is no other than what in another consideration , is an vnity ; for so it follows , ver . . so god created man in his own image . these plural somewhats , therefore , are but one god. and 't is but a childish excuse to say , it is the stile of princes to speak in the plural , we and vs instead of i and me. 't is indeed a piece of courtship at this day , ( and perhaps hath been for some ages : ) but how long hath it been so ? 't is not so old as moses ; much less so old as the creation . king pharoah , and senacharib , and ahasuerus , were wont to say i , me , mine , ( not we , vs , ours . ) and nebuchadnezzar , even in the height of his pride , dan. . . is not this great babylon that i have built , by the might of my power , and for the honour of my majesty . here 's nothing of we and our . this was not stilus regius in those days . and if we should here expound it by such an equivalence ; and god said , let me make man in my image ; it would scarce sound like good sense . ( for 't is not usual to speak imperatively in the first person singular . ) it seems therefore to imply a plurality , though not a plurality of gods. the like we have gen. . . behold , the man is become like one of vs. is this also stilo regio , instead of , the man is become like one of me ? so , gen. . , . and the lord ( jehovah ) said , let vs go down , and confound their language . . and as these places intimate a plurality , so i know not but that of gen. . may intimate this plurality , to be a trinity . that the appearance there of three men to abraham , was a divine apparition ( though abraham did not at first apprehend it so to be ) is evident . for it is expresly said by moses , ver . the lord ( jehovah ) appeared unto him in the plains of mamre ; and he lift up his eyes , and lo three men stood by him . so that this appearance of three men , was an appearance of the lord jehovah . and though we do not find that abraham doth any where use the word jehovah in that discourse , ( but adonai all along : ) yet moses the relater ( where himself speaks ) says every where jehovah ; though when he recites abraham's words , it is adonai : but even adonai is a word plural ( as well as elohim ) that is , my lords , ( the singular is adoni , my lord ; but seldom said of god. ) whether it were , that the name jehovah were not then known to abraham ( according to that of exod. . . ) or that abraham was not at first aware who it was with whom he was then discoursing ; or for what other reason he did avoid using the name jehovah ; i shall not trouble my self curiously to enquire : but sure we are that moses tells us , this apparition of three men ( as at first they seemed to be ) was an apparition of the lord jehovah . we need not doubt therefore , but that god appeared there , in this apparition of three men ; which is therefore a fair intimation of a trinity of persons . it might perhaps be cavill'd at , if this were all : and so might that of jonah's being three days and three nights in the whale's belly , when brought as an argument to prove our saviour ought so long to lie in the grave . but st. paul tells us , cor. . , . that christ died for our sins according to the scriptures ; and that he rose again the third day , according to the scriptures . ( and christ in like manner , luk. . . ) yet i know not any thing more clear to that purpose in the scriptures ( of the old testament ) than either this of jonah's being so long in the whale's belly ( to which christ himself alludes , mat. . . ) or that of hos. . . after two days he will revive us , and the third day he will raise us up . which seems not to be more express ( for the resurrection of christ on the third day ) than this of jonah . but such covert intimations there are in the old testament ; of things afterward more clearly discovered in the new. nor was this unknown to the ancient jewish doctors , as appears by what ainsworth ( in his notes on gen. . ) cites from thence , ( out of r. simeon , ben jochai in zoar ; ) come see the mystery of the word elohim : there are three degrees , and every degree by it self distinct ; and yet notwithstanding they are all one , and joined together in one , and are not divided one from another , ( only , there he calls degrees what we now call persons . ) so that it was not unknown to the jews of old , whatever the present jews think of it . . what these three are , ( the father , the word , and the spirit , ) seems to be likewise intimated in the story of the creation , gen. . where they seem to be distinctly named . in the beginning ( elohim ) god created the heaven and the earth , ver . . where no man doubts but god the father is implied , though perhaps not he only . and ver . . the spirit of god moved upon the face of the waters . where ainsworth tells us from the ancient rabbines whom he cites , they call him , the spirit of mercies from before the lord : the spirit of wisdom , called , the spirit of the living god : and , the spirit of the messias . of the same spirit , we have elsewhere mention ; my spirit shall not always strive with man , gen. . . take not thine holy spirit from me , psal. . . the spirit of the lord is upon me , isai. . . they vexed his holy spirit , isai. . . and elsewhere . and if it be said , that by the spirit of god , is meant god himself : we say so too , for we do acknowledge , that the holy ghost , is god himself . and , of the word , there is a like intimation , ver . . god said ( or spake the word ) let there be light , and there was light. and in like manner , ver . , , . , . god said , let there be a firmament , &c. so psal. . , . by the word of the lord were the heavens made , &c. he spake and it was done , he commanded and it stood fast . and psal. . . he spake the word and they were made , he commanded and they were created . consonant to that of heb. . . by faith we understand that the worlds were made by the word of god. and pet. . , . by the word of god the heavens were of old , and the earth , &c. and by the same word they are kept in store , or preserved . in which places , by the word , so often mentioned , and with such emphasis put upon it ; seems to be meant , that word mentioned , joh. . , , . in the beginning was the word , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) all things were made by him : the world was made by him ; just as in heb. . . the worlds were made by the word of god. nor was this notion of the word ( personally taken ) unknown to the jewish doctors . for what we have psal. . . the lord said unto my lord , ( dixit jehova domino meo ) the chaldee paraphrase , renders by dixit jehova , ( bemeimreh ) in verbo suo meaning , by his word , the messias ; and of whom our saviour himself expounds it , mat. . . and it is frequent , in that paraphrase , by the word to design the messias ; * as s. joh. doth , joh. . . in the beginning was the word . and i put the more weight upon this , because ( as here , gen. . , . so ) we have in several other places , the word and spirit mentioned as concerned in the creation , psal. . . by the word of the lord ( jehovah ) were the heavens made , and all the hosts of them by the ( spirit , or ) breath of his mouth , ( berwach . ) where we have jehovah , his word , and spirit . job . , . he divideth the sea by his power , and by his ( wisdom , or ) vnderstanding he smiteth through the proud ; by his spirit he garnisheth the heavens , his hand hath formed the crooked serpent . where we have the power of god , the wisdom of god , and the spirit of god. and job . . ●he spirit of god hath made me , and the breath of t●e lord hath given me life . so , psal. . , . o lord ( jehovah ) how wonderful are thy works , in vvisdom thou hast made them all . thou sendest forth thy spirit , they are created , and thou renewest the face of the earth . and it is not amiss here to take notice , that as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies as well ratio as oratio ; so christ ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) is called the word of god , and the wisdom of god. and as in joh. . , , . it is said of the word , that in the beginning was the word , all things were made by him , and the world was made by him : and heb. . . the worlds were framed by the word of god. so the same is said of wisdom , prov. . . the lord by vvisdom hath formed the earth , by vnderstanding hath he established the heavens . and prov. . . &c. the lord possessed me ( wisdom ) in the beginning of his way , before his works of old ; i was set up from everlasting , from the beginning , ere ever the earth was ; — when he prepared the heavens i was there , — when he established the clouds above , — when he strengthened the fountains of the deep , — when he appointed the foundations of the earth , then was i by him , &c. and accordingly the holy ghost is called the power of god , luk. . . the holy ghost shall come upon thee , and the power of the highest shall over-shadow thee . and pet. . . who are kept by the power of god , through faith unto salvation ▪ which doubtless is not without the operation of the holy ghost , working and preserving faith in us . suitably hereunto , god's power and wisdom are oft conjoyned . he is wise in heart , and mighty in strength , job . , &c. he is excellent in power , and in judgment , job . . but , ( without laying too great a stress on every particular , ) there seems a foundation clear enough to consider the word of god , and the spirit of god , as clearly distinguishable , even in the great work of creation ; and that the holy writers , even in the old testament , have considered them as distinct ; and that even the jewish writers have owned them as such . i know very well that those who have a mind to be captious , may cavil at these places , as the sadduces of old did at those passages in the old testament tending to prove a resurrection . and not those only , but even some of our own ; who would have us think , that the fathers before christ had only promises of temporal blessings ( not of heavenly and eternal : ) though st. paul tells us , ( when , of the hope and resurrection of the dead he was called in question ; ) that he did so worship the god of his fathers , believing all things which were written in the law and the prophets , and had hope towards god ( which they also allowed ) that there should be a resurrection of the dead both of the just and vnjust ; and that it was a promise made of god to their fathers , to which their twelve tribes instantly serving god day and night , hoped to come ; which were no other things than what moses and the prophets had said should come to pass ; and which to king agrippa ( who if not a jew , was at least well acquainted with their doctrines ) should not seem strange , act. . . act. . , . act. . , , , , , . and heb. . . that all these died in faith , not having received the promises ; ( that is , they died in the belief of better things than what they had yet received : ) but saw them afar off , and were perswaded of them , and embraced them , and confessed , they were but strangers and pilgrims upon earth . and our saviour proves it out of the old testament , ( mat. . . ) by such an argument , as if one of us should have urged , it would perhaps have been ridiculed : i am the god of abraham , the god of isaac , and the god of jacob ; now god is not the god of the dead , but of the living . and the apostle pursues the same argument , heb. . , , , , . they sojourned in the land of promise , as in a strange land , dwelling in tabernacles ( movable from place to place ) for they looked for a city which hath foundations ( a fixed city , not flitting as were those tabernacles , ) whose builder and maker of god : declaring plainly that they did seek a country : not such as that from whence they came ; but a better country , that is , a heavenly : wherefore god is not ashamed to be called their god ; for he hath prepared for them a city ; where he directly argues , that god's promise , to be their god , was a promise of heaven . and no doubt but the prophets , and men of god , had taught them all along , to put a spiritual sense , upon those ( seemingly ) temporal promises , ( though the sadduces would not believe it , but cavilled at it ; ) in so much that not only the pharisees and doctors of the law ; but even the women embraced it ( even before christ's resurrection ; ) i know saith martha ( of her dead brother lazarus ) that he shall rise again in the resurrection , at the last day , joh. . . and , of such spiritual senses , we have copious instances , in the epistle to the hebrews , and elsewhere frequently . and as they did without any reluctances , readily embrace the doctrine of the resurrection , when more clearly declared by the apostles , ( as a thing not wholly new to them ; ) so neither do we find in them any reluctance to that of the trinity ( for which , in likelihood , they had in like manner been before prepared : ) but readily closed with the form of baptism , in the name ( not names ) of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost , mat. . . and that solemn benediction , cor. . . the grace of our lord jesus christ , and the love of god , and the communion of the holy ghost be with you all , amen . where we have all the three persons reckoned together ; as they are also in that celebrated place , joh. . . the father , the word , and the holy ghost ; these three are one. and as they had been before by christ himself , joh. . . the comforter , which is the holy ghost , whom the father will send in my name , he shall teach you all things . and joh. . . the comforter whom i will send unto you from the father , even the spirit of truth , which proceedeth from the father , he shall testify of me. and ( to name no more places ) mat. . , . jesus , when he was baptized , went straitway out of the water : and lo , the heav●ns were opened unto him , and he ( john the baptist ) saw the spirit of god descending like a dove , and lighting upon him : and lo , a voice from heaven saying , this is my beloved son , in whom i am well pleased . . there is yet another consideration which doth confirm this opinion , that the doctrine of the trinity was not unknown to the jewish church before christ : from the footsteps thereof yet extant in heathen writers . 't is well known ( to those conversant in such studies ) that much of the heathen learning ( their philosophy , theology , and mythology ) was borrowed from the jews ; though much disguised , and sometimes ridiculed by them . which things though they be fabulous , as disguised in a romantick dress : yet they are good evidence that there was a truth in history , which gave occasion to those fables . none doubts but ovid's fable of the chaos ( of which all things were made ) took its rise from moses's history of the creation : and deucalion's flood , from that of noah : and the titan's fighting against the gods , from the builders of babel's tower : and that of two-faced janus , from noah's looking backward & forward to the world before and since the flood . and many the like , of which we may see in natalis comes , in bochartus , and others : and of which we have a large collection in theophilus gale's court of the gentiles . and in dr. duport's gnomologia homerica ; wherein is a collection of homer's sayings , which look like allusions to like passages in sacred scripture ; and seem to be borrowed ( most of them ) from those books of it , which were written before homer's time ; who yet is one of the most ancient and most famed of heathen writers . plato hath borrowed so much of his philosophy , history , and theology , from the jewish learning , as that he hath obtained the title of ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) moses disguised in a greek dress . and , may seem , because the name of jews was odious , to cite them rather by the names of certain barbarians , syrians , phoenicians , egyptians &c. from that title of god in exodus , i am , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( or from the equivalent names of jah and jehovah ) he borrows his ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) the being , ( or that which is , ) the very being , the true being ; which are the titles he gives to the supreme god. for his immortality of the soul , he reckons the best argument to be ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ) a divine revelation , which he had by tradition from certain ancients , who lived ( as he speaks ) nearer to the gods , ( as if he had borrowed even this phrase from deut. . . what nation is so great , who hath god so nigh unto them ? ) and much more , as hath been noted by others . and i am so far from thinking ( as the socinians would have us ) that st. john did but platonize , and borrowed his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from plato's trinity ; that i rather think , that plato borrowed his trinity ( as he did many other things ) from the jewish doctrine , though by him disguised : and take it for a good evidence , that the doctrine of the trinity , was then not unknown to them . aristotle , in the last chapter of his book , de mundo ; which is de dei nominibus : he tells us that god , though he be but one , hath many names : and amongst those many , he reckons that of the tres parcae ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) or as we call them , the three destinies ( atropas , clotho , and lachesis ; whom he doth accommodate to the three diversities of time ; past , present , and future , ) to be one of these names . which , though numbred as three , are but this one god. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( and cites plato to the same purpose ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . so that it seems both plato and aristotle were of opinion , that three somewhats may be one god. and this , in likelihood , they derived from the jewish learning . i might say the like of their three judges in another world , minos , radamanthus and aeacus . which thing though it be fabulous , yet it implies thus much , that they had then a notion , not only of the soul's immortality , but also of a trinity of persons in another world , who should take account of mens actions in this world. and both these notions they had , no doubt , from the jewish learning ; from whence their most sublime notions were derived . to these i might add that of their three-shap'd chimaera ; which their poets feign to have been . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as is to be seen in homer one of their most ancient poets . and that of cerberus , their three-headed porter of the other world. which poetical fictions , though invented perhaps to ridicule the trinity ; do yet at last argue that they had then some notices of a trinity , ( of three somewhats which were yet but one. ) for , if they had no notice of it , they could not have ridiculed it . our adversaries , perhaps , may please themselves with the fansy , that chimaera and cerberus are brought in to prove the trinity . but they mistake the point : we are not now proving the trinity , ( which is already settled on a firmer foundation ; ) but inquiring , whether this doctrine were then known . and as we think it a good argument to prove the christian religion , to have been known in lucian's time , ( and known to him , ) because lucian doth scoff at it ; which he could not have done , if he had known nothing of it : so is it a good argument to prove the doctrine of the trinity to have been then known , when it was ridiculed . and it proves also , that there might be then prophane wits to ridicule it , as there are now to blaspheme the trinity , as a three-headed monster ; and , that this 〈◊〉 wit of theirs , is not their own , but stollen from wittier heathens . but , whether it were , or were not , known to the jewish church before christ , ( of which there be great presumptions that it was so known , as well as that of the resurrection : ) it is enough to us , that we are taught it now . and , if any will yet be so obstinate as not to believe , either the resurrection , or the trinity ; upon pretence that neither of them was known to the jewish church , ( or at least , not so clearly , but that they may be able to cavil at places from the old testament alledged to prove either ; ) we must leave them to the wisdom and judgment of god , till he shall think fit to instruct them better . now to god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost ; three persons , but one eternal and ever blessed god ; be praise , honour and glory , now and for evermore , amen . finis . advertisement . by reason of the authors absence from the press at so great a distance , some mistakes have happened , both in the letters and sermons ; and some things omitted , which should have been inserted in their proper places , but that they came so late to the printers hands , that it could not well be done without d●scomposing his affairs . of both which it is thought fit thus to direct . errata . let . i. p. . l. . for divisions read dimensions . p. . l . dele three . p . l. . for meaning read memory . let. ii. p. ● . l. . for that read shall . let. iii. p. . l. . as a separate existence . p l. . as to be . p. . l. ult . for those read these . p. . l. known p. . l. . for sure read save . let. iv. p. . l. . for toil read talk . p. . l. . as well as . let. v. p. . l. . dele of . p. . l. . for any read my . p. . l. . read joh. . . p. . l. . for israel read jacob. p. . l. . doth not well p. . l. . said so much . let. vi. p. . l. . for nor read now. p. . l. . for then read t●ere . p. . l. . for london read leyden . p. . l. . at least . p. . l. . for this read thus. p. . l. . for as read in l. . thee only , the. p. . l. . for railing read ranting . p. . l. . was not then . l. . beside that in . let. vii . p. . l . possibility . p. . l. . for fourt● read fault . p. . l. pen. all-comprehensive . p. . l. . father . p. . l. . afte● notion● , add further than they are revealed . l. pen. words . p. . l. . hands . p. . l. . to answer . l. . for one read me . serm. p. . l. . exegerical . p. l. . god. p. . l. . for for read or . l. . for er read fer . p. . l. . read author . p. . l. . read were framed . additions . let. i. p. . l. . after united , add or intimately one. p. . l. . after cube , add , ( there being no limits in nature , greater than which a cube cannot be ) . let. iii. p. . l. . add this marginal note , the saxon word hel or helle , ( whence comes the english word hell , ) doth not properly or necessarily import the place of the damned ; but may be indifferently taken for hell , hole , or hollow place : which are all words of the same original . helan ( to hide , or cover , ) hole ( cavitas , ) hol ( cavus ) hollow . and when it is used in a restrained sense ; it is metonymical , or synecdochical ; as when hole or pit , is put for the grave , and the like . p. . l. . add , so that i take the plain sense of the words to be this : he was ( for some time ) in that hell , or hades ( what ever by that word be meant ) ; wherein ( it is expresly said ) he was not left ; but was raised from it . p. . l. . add , beside this letter of thanks from his partner in the disputation ; there was another from sandius himself , ( not printed , but in manuscript , ) acknowledging a like conviction . of which wittichius recites an extract , in his causa spiritus sancti victrix demonstrata , à christophoro wittichio . lugduni batavorum , apud cornelium boutestein , . let. iv. p. . l. . after athanasius , add , ( 't is the same thing with me , whether it were written by him or some other , as long as i find it agreeable to scripture . at the end of the same line , add ( wherein yet i would not be thought to encourage dangerous errors : for the errors are equally dangerous , and equally fundamental ; whether i do , or do not anathematize them . ) p. . at the end ; add jan. . / . yours , john wallis . let. vi. p. . l. . add this marginal note . socinus 's words are these : velim autem scias , me duplici de causa ( praeter eam quam ipse commemoras ) ab ista quaestione , de animae immortalitate , abstinuisse . nam & mihi res erat cum homine qui me calumniandi , inque omnium invidiam vocandi , omnem occasionem quaerebat . necdum mihi , quid de quaestione ista statuendum sit , plane exploratum erat ; quemadmodum nec hodie quidem est . tantum id mihi videtur statui posse ; post hanc vitam , animam seu animum hominis non ita per se subsistere ut praemia utla poenasvé sentiat , vel etiam ista sentiendi sit capax . quae mea firma opinio facile potest ex disputatione ista colligi : cum ex multis quae identidem à me ibi dicuntur ; tum ex ea ipsa , de qua praecipuè agitur , sententia mea . nam quamvis , cum ipso puccio disputans , ( qui , ut immortalitatem primi hominis ante peccatum probaret , animi ipsius immortalitatem mihi objiciebat , ) ostendi , non propterea dici posse hominem immortalem quia anima ipsius non moriatur : tamen satis apparet me sentire , non ita vivere , post hominis ipsius mortem , animam ejus , ut per se praemiorum poenarúmve capax existat : cum in ipso primo homine , totius immortalitatis rationem uni gratiae divinae trib●o ; nec in ipsa creatione quidquam immortalis vitae agnosco . socini epist. . ad volkelium ; die . novembris , anno , . let. vi. p. . l. . add this marginal note : sandiru 's words are these ( cited by wittichius in his causa spiritus sancti victrix , pag. . ) jam finitis illis quae ad librum tuum regerenda duxi ( praeter ea quae satis à socio meo responsum puto , ) oro te ne graveris ulteriùs hoc argumentum prosequi ; quò tandem veritas , si fieri possit , patefiat ; & velut scintilla ex silice ad chalybem alliso prosiliat . nam ingenuè fateor , mihi conjecturam mean longè verisimiliorem visam , antequam librum tuum , quo me docere aggressus es , legissem . non parùm & contulit ad eam debilitandam , consideratio mea , joh. . , . & mat. . ● . nam postquam in baptismo spiritus sanctus super christum descendit , & super eum mansit , eumque in desertum duxit , nec ab eo recessit ; ( cum non verisimile sit christum tentationem satanae sine spiritus sancti auxilio superâsse ; ) finita demum tentatione dicuntur angeli accessisse & ministrâsse ei . quod si itaque conjectura mea consistere non possit , ut vix possit , perpendendum erit , an non spiritus sanctus possint esse septem spiritus principales ; vel , multitudo spirituum longè subtiliorum caeteris angelorum ordinibus , fortean naturâ ipsâ : et an per hanc hypothesin salvari possint omnes difficultates contra conjecturam meam hactenus product● . novi quendam qui sentit , spiritum sanctum quidem esse unam personam , camque creatam , sed totum vniversum essentia sua pervadentem . valdè autem dubito an haec sententia subsistere queat . illa de una persona spiritus sancti comprehensis sub eo angelis tanquam ejus ministris & satellitibus ; mihi non admodum arridet . si autem horum nihil verum comperiatur ; tum demum mihi verisimillimum videbitur , spiritum sanctum cum deo patre ejusque verbo , unum deum , unam substantiam , unum individuum esse . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e heb. . . cor. . . pet. . . heb. . . cor. . . cor. . . tim. . . col. . , . rom. . , . & alibi . joh. . . joh. . . heb. . , . eph. . . heb. . . jam. . thes. . . tit. . . gal. . . matth. . . joh. . . thes. . . pet. . . tit. . , , . notes for div a -e * for i take the hebrew pronouns hu and hi , ( which we commonly render by he , she , or it , according as the gender varies ) to be derivatives from the verb havah or hajah which signifies to be. not that i take hu to be a proper name of god ( as are jah and jehovah , from the same verbs , ) but an appellative w●rd , common to the creatures also ; but here emphatically appl●ed to god , ( as are the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . which are common to the creatures al●o ; for ●hey also are , in their kind , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ) and the latin p●onouns is , id , ( that is , he or it ) when relatively taken , are to be expounded of their antecedent to which t●●y relate : but when put a●solutely without an antecedent ; they are of alike import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quid taken substantively : ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) according ●o which we use to say ( even in our metaphys●cks ) ens & aliquid con●ertunt●r , ( he or it , so taken ar● of the same import , with a being , or what is. ) and the learned gat●ker ( than whom i do not know that we have a better critick ; more judicious or more acute ; ) though ( in his book de ●tylo novi instrumenti , contra pfochenium , ) he do n●t take hu to be a proper name of god ( but communicable to creatures , however here emphatic●ll● applied to him : ) yet doth allow , that in these places , and in many others ( o● which he gives divers instances ) it is used for the ve●b substantive ( sum , or est. ) which is the same wi●●●hat i say , that it imports a being , or to be , ( and therefore , when signally applied to g●d , ●is absolute , infinite , independent ▪ self-being . ) and so , it seems , the septuagi●ts did 〈◊〉 und●rstand it , who render ani hu , by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i am ; ( and the vu●gar latin b● 〈◊〉 sum ; ) and in the new t●stam●●t ( which commonly ●ollows the phrase o● the ●ept●●gints ) christ says it of himself , before abraham was ( not i was , but ) i am , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) importing ●hereby his permanent and ins●ccessive being : co-exis●ent to all the 〈…〉 ( successive ) duration ; past , present , and future : the same yes●erday , and to-da● ▪ and fo● e●er . the differe●ce between is or id relatively tak●n ( r●lating to what we call 〈◊〉 antecedent , ) and the same taken absolutely ( without such reference to other 〈◊〉 it selfe ; ) is much the same as between ( what the logi●ians call ) est secundi ●djecti ( which is but a copula to join the predicate with the ●ubject . ) and est ●●rr● adjecti ; where it self is ( or doth include ) the predicate . as when s●crat●● est , 〈◊〉 r●solved by socrates est ens , or est existens ; the word est , so taken , including 〈◊〉 the copula and the predicate : like as id or quid substantively taken , is not relative , 〈◊〉 absolute , and the same with ens. * in one great bible of this tr●nslation , ( amo●gst mr. selden's books in the bodleyan library ) appointed to be read in ●●urches ( as we are told in th● title page ) printed ( if i do not mis-remember t●e date ) abo●● the reign of king edw●rd the sixth , or the end of king henry the eig●th , i find the name ja. but in all other ( whether psalters or bibles , old or new ) of that translation ( that i have consulted ) it is yea. of which ( i suppose ) the occasion at first was this : the hebrew letter , by different persons , is differently called jod and yod ; and accordingly that name to be written in english ja or ya . which being ( it seems ) in some books written or printed ya ; some after-printer thinking it to be mis-printed for yea , did so ( as he thought ) correct it ; and the error hath thence been propagated eversince . yet this having ( it seems ) been discovered by some-body , some while since ; i find in divers late editions of the psalter , or psalms in our book of common-prayer , ( which follows that translation ) it is thus printed praise him in his name , yea , and rej●yce before him , ( with a comma before and after yea , ) leaving it indifferent , whether to refer yea ( or ya ) to the former clause , as the name of god ; or , to the latter clause as the affirmative particle yea . but in the original hebrew , and in all other translations ( that i have observed ) in any language , i find the name jah , or somewhat equivalent thereunto ; as doubtless it ought to be . * so in isa. . . fear not , i am with thee ; and ver . . fear not , i will help thee ; and ver . . fear not , i will help thee , saith the lord and thy redeemer ; and ver . . the wind ( or spirit , ruach ) shall carry them away , and the whirl-wind shall scatter them : is in the chaldee paraphrase ( rendred into latin ) ne timeas , quia in adjutorium tuum erit verbum meum . ne timeas , quia verbum meum erit in adjutorium tuum . ne t●meatis , — verbum meum est in auxilium vestrum , dicit dominus & redemptor vester . ventus ( seu spiritus ) abripiet eos , & verbum ejus disperget eos , quasi turbo stipulas . ( where we have god , his word , and spirit . ) so in isai. . . for my own sake , for my own sake will i do it : and ver . . hea●ken unto me : and ver . . my hand hath laid the foundation of the earth , and my right hand hath spanned the heavens : and ver . . i , even i have spoken , i have called him : and ver . . come ye near unto me , hear ye this : are in the chaldee paraphrase , propter nomen meum , propter verbum meum faci●m . obedite verbo meo . in verbo meo fundavi terram , & in potentia mea appendi coelos . ( where again we have god , his word , and power , or spirit . ) in verbo meo pepigi pactum cum abraham patre vestro , & vocavi eum . accedite ad verbum meum , audite haec . and , at the like rate , in many other places . an answer to dr. sherlock's examination of the oxford decree in a letter from a member of that university to his friend in london. wallis, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) an answer to dr. sherlock's examination of the oxford decree in a letter from a member of that university to his friend in london. wallis, john, - . the second edition, corrected and inlarged. p. s.n.], [s.l. : . reproduction of original in the university of illinois (urbana-champaign campus). library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng sherlock, william, ?- . -- modest examination of the authority and reasons of the late decree of the vice-chancellor of oxford. trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an answer to dr. sherlock's examination of the oxford decree : in a letter from a member of that university , to his friend in london . the second edition , corrected and inlarged . printed anno dom. . an answer to dr. sherlock's examination , &c. ian. . / . sir , as to what you ask , concerning dr. sherlock's modest examination of the oxford decree ( as he calls it : ) i have seen it ; and find he is very angry , and under great mistakes . he is set forth in the frontispice , with his titles at large , william sherlock , d. d. dean of st. paul 's , master of the temple , and chaplain in ordinary to his majesty : and thinks much , that what he says ( though without naming him ) should be censured , considering his profession , character , and station in the church , p. . the title he gives it , ( and at which he quarels ) decretum oxoniense , or the oxford decree , is ( for ought i know ) a title of his own . sure , 't is none of theirs who made it : who are therefore therein not concerned , whether it be , or be not , decretum oxoniense . nor was he named in it ; but onely a sermon censured , which was preached at oxford by another person . if dr. sherlock be of the same mind with that other person ; that is not our fault . 't was printed ( he says ) in latin in these words , &c. true ; but not with that spelling . for instance , prefectorum was not printed ( once and again ) with a single e , instead of praefectorum with an ae . and it was hoped , so great a critick as he would be thought ( pag. . ) might have been able to spell true , when he had a printed copy before him . he then fansies ( or would be thought to think ) that some malicious animadverter ( p. . . ) had translated this latin into english , for the benefit and edification of his english readers . but that is one of his great mistakes . 't was printed at oxford , both in latin and english , the same day ; and by the same authority ; ( and 't is believ'd , dr. sherlock knows it was ; ) and the english ( as there printed ) is as much an original as the latin ; ( how it is re-printed at london , i know not . ) and , i doubt , the animadverter ( if he had done it ) would rather have said , it was for the benefit and edification of dr. sherlock , for fear he should not have understood latin. for it is at this rate , they use to talk to one another . if the hawkers at london , have caused it to be re-printed , with a new title , and notes upon it , ( to make it fell the better , ) and put it into the weekly advertisements , for that purpose ; who can help it ? but the critick finds fault with the latin , as transgressing the plain rules of grammar , in using eorum fidei & curae commissis , for suae . of that , let the criticks judge . if committed to their care , had been meant of them iointly , i think the word suae might have been used ; but when to be understood of them respectively , i think eorum doth better . suae curae commissi , is , in plain english , committed to their own care : but it is here to be understood , of the care of others ; and , who those others were , eorum was to signify . and i would fain know , by what plain rule of dr. sherlock 's grammar ( if he have a grammar ) eorum may not be so used . but i would not advise dr. sherlock to venture too much at criticism . i doubt his talent doth not lie that way . in what cases we must use suae , and in what eorum , and in what we may indifferently use either ; better criticks , than dr. sherlock and i , will not take upon them to determine . the pretended false english in that remark ( whose ever it be ) it may be noted , that the propositions above-mentioned are dr. sherlock 's in his discourse of the trinity ; and the defender's of it ( of that discourse ; ) and wrote against by the animadverter ; i am yet to seek . i think it is true english. when dr. sherlock tells us , where the bad english lies , let the noter answer it . the vice-chancellor and heads of houses are not therein concerned . mean while , i think his two criticisms , to be two mistakes . he tells us , the decree of the oxford convocation , is indeed decretum oxoniense , or a decree of the university of oxford , ( be it so ; ) but , not that of the heads of colleges and halls . very true ; nor do they say it is . but , if that would do him a kindness , a vote of convocation might have been had as easily . for , as i do not hear , that any one dissented , in the meeting of heads ; so i believe there would have been as few in convocation , if it had been proposed there . some perhaps would rather have had it passed , not there only , but in convocation also ; but , if so , it was to pass there first , before it came to convocation . but he says , p. . the statutes refer such censures , not to the meeting of heads , but to the vice-chancellor , and six heads , doctors of divinity , and to one or both of the professors of divinity . the word heads in this last clause , is another of his mistakes . for it is not requisite , that the six doctors of divinity should all be heads of houses ; the vice-chancellor may as well advise with other doctors . but be it so ; there were at least six heads of houses , doctors of divinity , and one or both of the two professors of divinity . but is it there said , he may not advise with more than six ? if instead of calling six heads , he call them all , is there any hurt in this ? especially when they are all unanimous ? but , he says , p. . they were not all present . ( very good ! before we had too many , now we have too few . ) but all were warned ; and if some chanced to be out of town , it is but what would have been in a convocation . some of the wisest heads ( he says ) were absent , and some present dissented . that some were absent , is very like : but , that any present did dissent , i have not heard ; or , that any then absent did dislike the sentence when they heard it . but , if the meeting of the heads of houses be so venerable an authority ; he will ( he says ) undertake , any day in the year , to procure a meeting of twice as many , as wise and learned men , to censure their decree . ( very modestly spoken ! ) no doubt but he and his are wise and learned men ; at least , he thinks so . but what are those wise and learned men to do ? to censure their decree . very good ! perhaps they would ( some of them , not many , ) advise to put suae instead of eorum . but would those wise and learned men say ( as he doth ) that the three persons in the trinity , are three distinct infinite minds and spirits , and three individual substances ? i doubt , he would not find it so easy ( every day in the year ) to procure a meeting of twice so many wise and learned men , to say this. i do not find , that his new doctrine doth make so many proselites . but , supposing their authority , he asks , how far their authority extends ? i say , if it extend so far as to censure our own members ; 't is enough for our turn at present . dr. sherlock , if he please , may keep out of their reach . and the words of the statute be large enough , haereticos , schismaticos , & quoscunque alios minus recte de fide catholica , & doctrina vel disciplina ecclesiae anglicanae sentientes . — utque tam conciones quam libri , quibus male-sanae opiniones propagantur , cohibeantur . and this referred ( with dr. sherlock 's good leave ) vice-cancellarii judicio , assidentibus ipsi praefectis in ordinario ipsorum conventu ; ( in the chapter de authoritate & officio vice-cancellarii . ) and , as to sermons in particular , ( in the chapter de offensionis & dissensionis materia in concionibus evitanda , ) siquis pro concione aliqua , intra universitatem ejusve praecinctum habita , quicquam doctrinae vel disciplinae ecclesiae anglicanae publice receptae dissonum aut contrarium — protulerit ; sive protulisse ab ipso vice-cancellario suspectus , vel ab alio aliquo , rationabilem suspicionis causam afferente , delatus fuerit ; the vice-chancellor or his deputy is to proceed as is there directed , adhibito consilio sex aliorum s. theol. doctorum , quorum unus sit s. theologiae professor regius , si concioni interfuerit . but , because dr. sherlock ( tho' he pretend to cite them ) doth ( p. . ) confess he doth not know our statutes ; i shall admit this excuse of ignorance for his mistakes ; provided , he will forbear thus to talk of he knows not what . now , as to what the vice-chancellor is thus to censure ; it may be presum'd , that he ( with the advice afore-said ) is ( in some measure ) to make some judgement of it , in order to such censure . how far ( out of the present case ) they may declare and decree heresy , i shall not take upon me to determine . a judge , in his ordinary proceedings , tho' i think he is not to declare new treasons ( besides those enumerated in the statute of treasons ; ) yet , when a case is to be tried before him , i suppose , he may declare , whether he think the fact in question , to be treason within that statute . but , of this , let those judge , whose business it is to understand the law. i confess also , that i do not take our statutes , to be the law of the land , ( for the whole nation ; ) but they be our rule ( by which we are to proceed as to our own members : ) ratified to us by the arch-bishop of canterbury , under his archiepiscopal seal ; and by the king's majesty , under the great seal of england . the statute of . eliz. is , i suppose , to be understood of such legal conviction or definitive sentence ( in order to burning ) as upon which ( as the law then stood ) the writ de haeretico comburendo , was of course to issue . which is not the present case . that the paper of complaint was signed but by two ; i believe is true . but one had been enough . and the vice-chancellor was satisfied , there needed no more . and therefore did forbid the gathering of more hands : because he meant to proceed calmly , not tumultuously . ( and , in so doing , i think he did wisely . ) and it had been dispatched sooner ; but that the business of entertaining the king , did retard it till that solemnity was over . but a main business of these angry papers , is , a quarel between dr. sherlock , and , his malicious animadverter , dr. south . the vice-chancellor and heads of houses had said nothing of dr. sherlock ; but had onely censured an offensive sermon , which they could not approve of ; but might be supposed to do , if ( when preached to their faces ) they shewed no dislike of it . but dr. sherlock ( whose doctrine was the same ) brings himself into the quarel by a side-wind . he first supposeth , that the complaint was commenced by dr. south . which is a mistake ; for the sermon was complain'd of , the same day it was preached , or that following , before dr. south knew any thing of it ; being at that time far enough from oxford . then , that the person who preached it , was never summoned or questioned for it , or his name mentioned at the meeting . which is another mistake ; for , upon the first complaint , the person was summoned , and did appear , and did give his answer in writing , with his name subscribed ; owned the words ; and said , what he had to say , in excuse thereof : and this his answer was communicated to the heads of houses . next , that their censure was in latin only ; whereas it was originally in english also . then , that it was translated by his malicious animadverter : when as there was no such matter . that he caused it to be re-printed at london ; that , there , he gave it a notable title ; that he made the notable remarks in the postscript ; that , when he had railed himself out of breath , he called for a decretum oxoniense to help him ; which was the wisest thing he could do . that dr. south sollicited the cause with such zeal and importunity , as could not be resisted ; that he triumphs in it ; that he published it in one of the weekly prints ; and much more to the same purpose . now , if you ask , how he knows all this ? his proof is , it may be supposed , or it is easy to guess , p. . now , much of this we know to be false . and if we should add , it may be supposed , that the rest is so too ; would not this be as good a proof ? or , if it should be said , that dr. sherlock being baffled by dr. south , and having railed to no purpose , got a young man to preach his doctrine in the face of the university , ( which happened , for his purpose , as if it had been contrived ; ) that in case , as was hoped , the university had taken it patiently ; he might have gloried , that the university of oxford found no fault with his doctrine . which might furnish him with new topicks of railing and triumphing : would not , it may be supposed , do as well here ? only we cannot say , it happened luckily for his purpose ; but rather unluckily . but be this as it will : let the two doctors agree that point amongst themselves ; or let the animadverter and the defender fight it out . the decree ( as he calls it ) names neither ; but only censures a third person . that this person was not summoned , is not true . summoned he was ; and had given in his answer , in writing , under his hand ; and upon that answer the vice-chancellor and heads of houses did proceed . they did condemn the doctrine ; and forbid the preaching it ; by him or any other . why they were so kind as to proceed no farther against him ; many reasons may be alleged . he had ( while the business was depending ) quitted the university , and was gone ; and , 't was hoped ( being a young man ) he would be more wary ; and avoid the like , for the future . and if dr. sherlock would , in time , have done the like , i think he had done better : and i believe the best of his friends think so too . when he had let fall some unwary expressions , and not justifiable ; he might have retracted them , with as little discredit as he has done some other . and it would be the wisest thing he could do . what are the thousand iacobite stories he talks of ( p. . ) i know not : whether now he be or be not a jacobite ; whether he have or have not been ; or , whether sometime he have and sometime have not ; is nothing to this purpose ? if he will still insist upon it , that if a person be a mind , a spirit , a substance ; then three persons must be three distinct minds , spirits , and substances , p. . ( as distinct as adam and abel , though not separate , p. . ) he knows it will not be allow'd him : because mind , spirit , substance , are ( in their proper signification ) absolute ; but person ( in its proper signification ) is a relative term. if dr. sherlock were dean of paul s , dean of windsor , and dean of westminster ; should we thence argue , that , since a dean is a man , an animal , a substance ; therefore , because of three distinct , substantial deaneries , they be ( or he is ) three distinct men , three distinct animals , and three distinct substances ? i think not . because man , animal , substance , are terms absolute , but dean is relative . and the same absolute being , may admit ( without being multiplied ) many relative predicates . i should rather say , that dr. sherlock would ( in such case ) sustain three persons , without being three men , three animals , or three substances . yet this is not sabellianism ; for , though dean of paul's , be a relative name ; yet it is not merely an empty name ; but doth import a substantial dignity , as the ground of that relation ; and a substantial man as the subject of that , as well as of his other relations . and this hath been told him so often , that we cannot think the dean so dull , as not to apprehend the distinction ; but so wilful , as that he scorns to own it : but would still have us think , that mind , spirit , person , are terms equivalent ; ( and therefore jumbles them together as such ; ) which will not be admitted . or , if they be equivalent ; why cannot he content himself with ( what is generally received ) three persons , but must impose upon us his new terms of three distinct minds , three distinct spirits , and three distinct substances ? but scorn and flouncing will not carry it off . the consequence will hold more strongly , thus , if an infinite eternal mind or spirit be god ; then three distinct infinite eternal minds or spirits , are three gods. ( for , here , the terms are all absolute , not relative . ) and if to maintain ( obstinately ) that there be three gods ; ( that is , three eternal infinite minds or spirits ; ) be not heresy , what is ? it seems to me , but a new trick , to play the game into the socinian's hand ; by granting to them ( their darling notion ) that to affirm , the father , son , and holy-ghost , to be three persons of which each is god ; is the same as to affirm that they are three gods. which we must not allow . if st. hilary have sometime called them tres substantias ; he may know , that substantia was at that time an ambiguous term , and taken sometimes as the latin word for hypostasis , and sometimes for ousia . for which reason the latines were , for some time , shy of admitting the term hypostasis , least it should be thought to imply the same with substantia , in the same sense with ousia . and he might have understood from his own citation , p. . that , by substance , is there meant subsistence . tres substantias esse dixerunt ; subsistentium personas , per substantias , edocentes . that is , ( by his own translation ) they said there were three substances ; meaning thereby , three subsisting persons . but when as now ( for some ages ) it is agreed ( for prevention of ambiguity ) in the one sense , to say substance , and in the other subsistence ; it is not now the same to call them three substances ( in contradistinction to three subsistences ) as then it was , while the word was used ambiguously in both senses . this , i suppose , may satisfy you , ( so far as concerns the vice-chancellor and heads of houses ; ) if it will not satisfy dr. sherlock , let him and the animadverter dispute it out . yours , &c. an answer to a late dialogue between a new catholick convert and a protestant to prove the mystery of the trinity to be as absurd a doctrine as transubstantiation : by way of short notes on the said dialogue. sherlock, william, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) an answer to a late dialogue between a new catholick convert and a protestant to prove the mystery of the trinity to be as absurd a doctrine as transubstantiation : by way of short notes on the said dialogue. sherlock, william, ?- . [ ], p. printed for thomas bassett ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng catholic church -- controversial literature. trinity -- early works to . transubstantiation. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an answer to a late dialogue between a new catholick convert and a protestant , to prove the mystery of the trinity to be as absurd a doctrine as transubstantiation . by way of short notes on the said dialogue . licensed december th . . london , printed for thomas bassett at the george near st. dunstan's church in fleet-street . . a dialogue between a new catholick convert , and a protestant . concerning the doctrines of the trinity and transubstantiation . ( a ) this new catholick convert begins well , for the first thing he learns , is to believe the trinity to be a groundless , absurd , and unreasonable doctrine ; and then to believe whatever the church teaches , if it be not more absurd than the doctrine of the trinity ; this is a great improvement of faith , which we protestants can never attain to , for we cannot perswade our understandings or our faith to digest absurdities : but let us hear their dialogue . a. you cannot imagine how much i am overjoy'd to see you . i have been big with discourse these three days for want of utterance . you may remember , when we talk'd together last , ( b ) we parted in a dispute concerning transubstantiation and the holy trinity , of their equal reasonableness and authority . i must confess i was not at that time so thorowly arm'd with reasons to shew you the parallel : but since i have given my self a little leisure to consider of it , and i am perswaded i shall be able to give you satisfaction . ( b ) this is a little mistake , if we may guess at their last discourse by this dialogue ; for the design is not to prove , that transubstantiation and the holy trinity have equal reasonableness and authority , but that neither of them are reasonable , or have any authority . now though we may allow them to make as bold with transubstantiation as they please , yet we cannot but be sensible of that dishonour which is done to common christianity , by exposing the most sacred and venerable mystery of it to the scorn and derision of infidels and hereticks . for sure they cannot think it any great credit to the doctrine of the trinity ; that it cannot be proved , either by tradition , scripture , or reason , b. sir , you know i am always glad of any opportunity to gain your good company , but especially upon so good an occasion . i 'le assure you , i am not , nor ever was , an enemy to catholick communion ; and if i had not too just a cause , i should never suffer my self in that which without reasonable grounds might be call'd a wilful schism . a. i have no reason to doubt your integrity , and therefore shall not question that : i shall only desire the liberty to press my old argument , ( c ) that you would rely on the authority of the church . i must confess , you have often question'd the doing of it ; but i am sure , when you shall consider there are mysteries as well as doctrines in the christian religion , and when you know that ( d ) mysteries are not to be fathom'd by natural reason , you must needs conclude , that in some cases your ( e ) safest way is to trust tradition . now certainly no one can give us so good an account of that , as the church . ( c ) this opens the scene , and shews the whole design of this dialogue , to bring men to rely on the authority of the church ; and it is worth the while to consider , what a notable way this is . the new convert perswades his protestant friend to fling away sense , and reason , and scripture , and his own private judgment , and to rely wholly on the authority of the church ; for when these are out of the way , we may believe the church in any thing . no , saies the protestant , i can't believe that which is unreasonable and absurd , whoever tells it me . convert , don't you believe the doctrine of the trinity ? protest . yes , very heartily . convert . why then transubstantiation it self , which you protestants make such a noise about , is not more unreasonable , and has as good foundation in tradition and scripture , as the doctrine of the trinity . protest . say you so , my friend , then why must i believe the trinity ? conv. because the church teaches it , and for the same reason you must believe transubstantiation . protest . hold there , sir ! what if i will believe neither ? then i hope i need not rely upon the authority of the church . conv. but you confess you must believe the trinity . protest . yes , if it be founded on scripture and tradition , and do not contradict the reason of mankind , as i have thought hitherto ; but if you can perswade me otherwise , i will believe it no longer ; unless you can tell me for what reason i must believe that , which i have no reason to believe . wretched men ! who care not what becomes of christian religion , if they can but establish the authority of their church ! nay , care not how much they dishonour the church itself ; for it is no great commendation of church-authority in matters of faith , that the only use of it is to make men believe without reason , or in contradiction to it . for it seems , were the christian faith reasonable , there were no need of relying on the churches authority , at least they would want one of the best arguments to prove it . ( d ) there are some mysteries above reason , none contrary to it , as transubstantiation is . ( e ) the universal tradition of the church , in conjunction with scripture , i grant is a very good foundation for our faith ; but what shall we do , when there is no certain tradition , as he proves there is not for the doctrine of the trinity ; for though we should allow , that the safest way is to receive these traditions from the church , yet we cannot receive them from her , if she have them not ; and she cannot have them , if there be none ; and we must conclude there are none , if they be not visible . for the churches word ; whatever authority it have , is not tradition . b. but , sir , to be short , what relation has this to the present parallel of the trinity and transubstantiation ? the authority of the church is another point as disputable as that . a. very much : for as ( f ) these two doctrines have equal ground from scripture , reason , and tradition ; so ' is there the same obligation of your receiving one , as well as the other . and indeed i have since wonder'd at my own profession , ( g ) while a protestant , to think how blind and partial i was : but i must confess , because we are in a dispute , it is better laying by such aggravating circumstances ; and indeed i cannot but be sensible what prejudices such discourses always make , and therefore i shall speak nothing more of that nature . ( f ) that is none at all , as he attempts to prove ; and if the trinity have no better then transubstantiation it has none , and then let him show how we are obliged to believe either , as i observed before . ( g ) for what ? for not believing transubstantiation as well as the trinity ? did he then , while a protestant , believe the doctrine of the trinity to be as unreasonable , and to have no better foundation in scripture and tradition then transubstantiation ? for otherwise he was not partial in believing one and rejecting the other , and if he did , he never understood his religion , and then no wonder that he takes sanctuary in a church which requires no use of his understanding . b. but to return to the main point ; i must tell you , i do not think them equally grounded on scripture , reason , or tradition ; and indeed you may remember that was the old point in dispute with us . a. ( b ) well , sir , to shew you your error , i shall begin with the several particulars in their order ; and so , first , as to the tradition of transubstantiation . now 't is evident that has been deliver'd with less interruption than that of the holy trinity : that mystery was question'd in the very infancy of the church ; nay , not only so , but the arians prevail'd much against it about the beginning of the fourth age. on the other side , transubstantiation lay unquestion'd and quiet a long time ; and when it came to debate , there was no such opposition as that of arius , to call in question the authority of its tradition ; the church receiv'd it unanimously , and in that sense continu'd , till rash reason attempted to fathom the unlimited miracles and mysteries of god. ( h ) here is a great mixture of confidence and fallacy : confidence is asserting what is false , that transubstantiation has been delivered with less interruption than that of the holy trinity : for none of the ancient fathers make the least mention of it , neither the name nor the thing was known for many hunder'd years after christ. he himself modestly grants , that the fathers are not half so express in the doctrine of transubstantiation , as they are in the mystery of the holy trinity : and when he grants half , you may safely conclude they say nothing of it : but the fallacy consists in attributing this silence of the fathers about transubstantiation to the unquestionableness of the tradition , when it was wholly owing to the ignorance of the doctrine : it was not opposed in those days , because they never heard of transubstantiation , not because it was universally believed ; which is a reason indeed , why it should not be opposed , but not why it should never be mentioned . whereas from that opposition . arius and his followers made to the doctrine of the trinity , in the beginning of the fourth century , and that great alarum it gave immediately to the christian church ; it is evident that it was the received faith at and before that time ; for otherwise arius would not have opposed it , nor catholick bishops so zealously have defended it . b. but the fathers are not half so express in the doctrin of transubstantiation , as they are in the mystery of the holy trinity . a. that 's true , and there 's very good reason for it : transubstantiation has not been a doctrine so long in dispute , and 't is not customary for men to argue unquestionable truths . and whereas you may think that transubstantiation has of late receiv'd such shrewd repulses by your books , i 'le assure you , you forget how much the true catholick zeal destroys the seeds of heresies . do you think that so many bishops , not only of the eastern , but of the western church also , could be arians , and yet suppose that that opinion wanted ( i ) as plausible a pretence of tradition ? certainly if you consider that , you cannot think to establish the doctrine of the trinity by tradition more than transubstantiation ; especially considering the strong footsteps of that : sect even in the fathers now extant . i would cite you some of them , but that they are not so much to my main design , and indeed my aim is brevity . ( i ) arius did not set up upon tradition , but upon a pretence of scripture and reason , and if arianism had had so good a pretence to tradition , it is strange it should have been thought so new and surpizing a doctrine at that time . it was never heard of before arius , and that is proof enough that it was no tradition of the church , though afterwards they endeavoured to force some expressions in the writings of the antient fathers as well as of the scriptures , to countenance that heresie ▪ b. well , sir , 't is true , we cannot so well plead tradition to what you have urg'd ; and especially when i call to mind , ( k ) that arianism was confirm'd by a general council : but we alledge an higher ground ; we stand upon the authority of the scriptures , and indeed that is the true thuchtone of all doctrine . ( k ) i hope he does not mean the council of nice , which was the first general council ; and assembled on purpose to establish the catholick faith in this point , and to condemn arius , a●d does the church of rome own any for a general council , which confirmed arianism ? the council of syrmium indeed , where liberius bishop of rome subcribe● the arian confession , may bid fair for it , if a council of eastern and western bishops confirmed by the pope , may pass for a general council ; but what then becomes of the infallibility of popes , and councils , and tradition ? this is a desperate man , who will not spare the church of rome her self , nor general councils if they stand in his way , rather than allow any tradition for the doctrine of the trinity . a. 't is true , if you will follow the catholick church , ( l ) and take the scriptures literally , you may discover the mystery of the holy trinity in them ; but if you once yield to figurative allusions and interpretations , the arians will be as much too hard for you , as you imagin your selves to be for the catholick church . ( m ) in short , both doctrines will be at a loss , and both equally require the authority of the church to support them . ( l ) if the trinity can be prov'd by scripture , that is all we desire , for i am sure transubstantiation cannot ; and as for literal or figurative expositions of scripture , neither of them must be always used , but as the subject matter and circumstances of the place require . ( m ) i thought the christian church had been built upon the faith of the holy trinity , not that supported by the authority of the church , unless the church can support her own foundation ; if there can be no christian church without baptism in the name of the father , the son , and the holy ghost , that is , without professing the faith and worship of the ever blessed trinity ; this doctrine must be believ'd before there can be any church , on whose authority we must believe it ; and therefore he has chose the unfittest doctrine to build on church authority that he could have thought on . b. o no , surely the doctrine of the holy trinity is more express in scriptures than so . a. to satisfie you that what i say is truth , because i may represent the parallel the clearer , ( n ) i will personate an arian , that sect so often condemn'd by the ancient church , and you shall see his plea against the trinity is as fair as yours against transubstantiation . and because this is the main parallel , i shall be somewhat the longer , that i may give you the greater satisfaction . ( n ) an excellent part for a roman catholick to act . we read that the devil sometimes transforms himself into an angel of light , but never that an angel of light transformed himself into a devil . to dispute seriously , and in good earnest against the scripture proofs of the trinity , as he here does , though with no great understanding , i should think little better then blasphemy ; it is what would have never been endured in the primitive church , and which i think no christians of any communion ought to endure ; for this is not the concernment of any particular church , but of common christianity . but though he can personate an arian so well , he should consider how he can dispute against him . he yields him all the scripture proofs for the trinity , as not sufficient without the authority of the church ; the arian thanks him for giving the scripture on his side , and is contented he should make the best he can of his church authority , and so continues an arian still . b. i shall be very glad to hear what you can speak to the matter . a. ( o ) first then , i say , 't is highly unreasonable to interpret that text , john . . that there be three in heaven that bear record , and those three are one ; as likewise john . . i and my father are one , literally ; for if we do , we not only oppose sense and reason , but we make construction directly against the very scripture , john . , , , , , , , . and john . , , . cor. . . and what can be urg'd more against us in respect of transubstantiation ? b. very right , sir , that interpretation carries a forcible reasonableness , but the doctrine of the trinity do's not wholly depend upon those two proofs . a. right , it do's not ; but i can give you further demonstration in this parellel . a principal ground of the trinity is because the son is so often call'd god in scripture , as john . , . rom. . . &c. now if we did not comply with the catholick church , and make a literal construction in this case likewise , how strangely should we be confounded by those texts ( ) where this godhead in christ is declar'd to be no more than lordship , and subordinate to the father , as heb. . . . cor. . , . cor. . , . rev. . . and john . , . b. but , sir , our saviour forgave sins too . a. that 's true , but ( ) only by a deputed authority . you see when the sons of zebbedee petition'd him , he could not grant the final accomplishment of our spiritual warfare , that was the father's prerogative , matth. c . . and tho' he is to be our judge , yet he knows not the time , mark. . . tim. . . b. i must confess , these things a little surprize me ; but however , i cannot think these neither the only grounds that support that mystery of the trinity . a. no , you are in the right ; there is one strong proof more ; the making of all things visible and invisible is attributed to the son , and that expresly , john. . heb. . and particularly , col. . , , , . but yet for all that , if we do not adhere with the catholick church to the literal interpretation , we are at a loss there too : for , first , 't is plain by the rest of scripture , ( ) that the son is not our only maker , as appears by our creation attributed to the father ; and then if we compare those texts to heb. . , , . cor. . . eph. . . eph. . , . cor. . , . we cannot reasonably attribute more to the son , than his being god's instrument in the creation . b. but are these the true and only grounds of the doctrine of that holy mystery ? a. yes verily ; for , ( ) that we are baptiz'd in the name of the father , son , and holy ghost , is no argument . that were as reasonable , if understood of christ and the holy ghost , as our spiritual governours , as under the supposal of their being co-equal with the father , cor. . . cor. . , . ( o ) i do not think this a proper place , nor a just occasion to enter into the dispute of the trinity . what he here alledges , has been answered a hundred times over , both by the ancient fathers and modern writers , both romanist and protestants ; and if he dare say , when he has taken off his arian vizard , that they are not well , and sufficiently answered , i will be bound to defend catholick christianity against this new kind of liberian roman catholick . but it would move the indignation of any good christian , though a roman-catholick , to see so sacred a mystery made the subject of wit and criticism , and little better then drollery , ( ) that christ cannot be god , because he is lord , as if he could not be god and lord too ; that he is not the second person in the trinity , because he is not the first , and therefore as a son , especially as a mediator subordinate to his father . ( ) that he forgives sins only as priests do by a deputed authority . ( ) that he did not make the world , because the father made it , and therefore he is but gods instrument in the creation ; as if in creation , which is the immediate effect of divine and almighty power , there could be any created instrument . ( ) that we may be baptized into the name of the son and holy ghost , as spiritual governours , when the ancient church thought this form of baptism to be the foundation of the creed , and there is no other difference expressed in the form between baptising in the name of the father , and of the son and holy ghost , but the order of persons . b. but surely , sir , the arians should have other grounds to establish their opinions , besides those , or else your parellel with transubstantiation will not be so demonstrable as you conceive . pray inform me a little further , i have a mighty desire to understand a little better their fundamental principles . a. to satisfie you , i shall . ( p ) first , they alledge christ represented under the law altogether as an angel ; for eminency call'd the angel of the presence , isa. . . eccl. . . gen. . . num. . . exod. . , , . refer'd to cor. . , , . further , they collect him to be a created being , from col. . . rev. . . psal. . . isa. . . ecclus. . , . ecclus. . . sa● . . , . ( q ) and they interpret that scripture , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee , by acts . . and pet. . . as to ( r ) the h●ly ghost , they prove a vast distance between him a●d the son , by john . , , , . and john . . besides , they say , he is no where call'd god ; and urge for the probability of their opinion , rev. . . rev. . . cor. . . for as there is an universal tempting evil power , so we may reasonably conclude , there may be a good assisting power , without any necessity of his being god. and further , where-ever in the scriptures there is made any mention of the three persons , there is always declar'd an express gradation ; as cor. . , , . cor. . . gift and communion from the fellowship of the holy ghost , grace and administration from the lordship and kingship of christ , and love and operation from the father , the supreme god , the original fountain , according to ephes. . , , . ( p ) that christ is called in the old testament the angel of the presence , i grant , but affirm also , that the angel of the presence was no created angel , but the lord jehovah , who spake to moses in the bush , as the ancient fathers grant . ( q ) to be the first born of every creature , does not prove that he is a creature , but that he was begotten of god before any creatures were made , that is , before the creation of the world , and that signifies an eternal generation ; for nothing was before the creation of the world , but that which is eternal and uncreated , as is sufficiently intimated in this very text , col. . , . and then it is no injury to the eternal generation of christ ; though we grant that he was begotten again at his resurrection from the dead . ( r ) as for the holy spirit , he is indeed called the spirit of christ , and is said to be sent by christ , as he is by his father ; but this proves only that he is the third person in the trinity , and in the aeconomy of mans salvation , acts as a vicarious power to christ the redeemer . but his very office to inspire and sanctifie , and dwell in the whole christian church , and every christian proves him to be god ; not only because the christian church and christians are his temple , but because no created spirit can dwell in all christians . for what this convert alledges of an universal tempting evil power , is no better than manichism , or to assert an evil god. for an universal power is god ; and did one devil tempt and poss●ss all bad men , as one and the same holy spirit dwells in all good men , he would b● an omnipresent and infinite devil , which is what the manichees call an evil god , and sure this is not the doctrine of the church of rome , which is a sign that our author is but a new convert . b. i must confess , sir , these opinions seem to make it necessary for us in that doctrine too , to trust to the authority of the catholick church , and i shall take time to consider a little upon them : but pray , sir , what say you to the reasons of the two doctrines ▪ a. really , ( s ) sir , i must tell you , i think that parellel much the easiest . 't is strange new arithmetick to a man , to tell him , three distinct persons are one and the same individual nature , and then to call such a one the most pure and simple being ; and that especially when they are declar'd to have various intellectual powers , as appears by john . , , , . and mark . . tim. . . acts . . for my part , i cannot tell well how the prejudice of education could possibly digest a thing so unreasonable , were it not a divine mystery . i am sure , ( t ) to my carnal reason , there may be as well three hundred persons in the godhead , as three ; and i know not what can be said of transubstantiation , that is seemingly more absurd than that . b. i must confess , sir , i have had strange , confus'd , and surprizing thoughts of it my self ; but i always apprehended the christian church a sufficient guide . a. if you did , sir , pray consider who that catholick mother is you so obey'd ; and as you have receiv'd the trinity , so receive a doctrine equally as reasonable , and deliver'd by her , transubstantiation . i know the ingenuousness of your temper , and you promis'd me at first not to be a wilful schismatick ; and therefore i have hopes my reasons , and your consideration , will be sufficient to reduce you to catholick communion . b. sir , i shall consider of it ; but as yet you only talk'd to me at large : i shall desire one favour of you before we part ; pray state the parallel a little shorter , i shall the better remember it . a. well , sir , i shall . first , the tradition of one doctrine cannot be stronger than another , where both have been at least equally question'd . secondly , 't is as reasonable to take this is my body , literally , as it is to take these texts , i and my father are one god over all blessed for ever ; and by him all things were made , without reference to other scriptures , and a figurative interpretation . and lastly , i think to human reason 't is as equally unreasonable , and as seemingly repugnant , to say one is three , as it is to say a body is not what it appears . b. very well , i shall desire no more of you now : i 'le only takea little time to consider , and then you shall know my mind more freely . a. farewel ; and god give you his holy spirit to instruct you . ( s ) and now we are come to the main point , whether the doctrine of the trinity be as absurd and contradictious as the doctrine of transubstantiation , which god forbid it should be ▪ i am sure the arithmetick is very good ; for three persons and one nature , is no bad arithmetick . to say , that there are three persons and but one person , and but one nature , and yet three natures , had been no good arithmetick , but a plain contradiction , that three are one , and one three in the same respect , which god himself cannot make true ; but three persons and one nature is no contradiction , how incomprehensible soever it may be . he has made it a contradiction indeed by saying , that three distinct persons are one and the same individual nature ; but whoever before said , that the person is the nature , or that the divine nature is an individual nature , or a nature appropriated to one person , which is the signification of an individual nature . i suppose he had heard somewhere of individua trinitas , and this he mistook for an individual nature . these are indeed contradictions , and new invented heresies , but this is not the catholick doctrine of the trinity . ( t ) we cannot indeed comprehend how three distinct persons should subsist in one nature , for we see no example of it in nature ; for in finite creatures , one finite nature is confined to one person ; but a finite nature , i hope , is no rule for an infinite nature , and therefore an infinite nature may be common to more persons than one , though a finite nature cannot ; and it may be , it is as intelligible how three distinct persons may subsist in one infinite nature , as how three distinct faculties can be in the same finite soul ; by which comparison the ancients explain'd the doctrine of the trinity . the omnipresence , omniscience , omnipotence , eternity of god , are as much above our comprehension , as a plurality of persons in the deity ; and if men will but allow , that god is incomprehensible , this can be no objection against the doctrine of the trinity . natural reason indeed cannot discover the plurality of persons in the godhead , and therefore i can give no reason why there should be three persons , and neither more nor less ; as the plurality of persons , so the number of them depends wholly upon revelation ; and the scripture assures me , there are but three , and therefore i believe no more . and because there are no more , therefore i believe it is impious to say , that there may be as well three hundred persons in the godhead , as three . thus the doctrine of the trinity , tho it be above the comprehension of our finite minds , as every thing must be , which is infinite , yet it does not contradict any necessary principle of reason , as transubstantiation does , which is contrary to sense and reason . whether any body be bread or flesh , fall under the notice of sense , and therefore our senses must judg of it ; and all our senses tell us , that the consecrated bread and wine , is bread and wine still , not flesh and blood ; so that we have greater evidence against transubstantiation , than we can have against the trinity ; for we have the evidence of sense , that it is not flesh , but bread ; and no man can pretend to such evidence as this , that there are not three divine persons in the godhead , and this makes some difference between them . as for reason , if we cannot understand , what the properties of a body are , we can know nothing ; and therefore this is a proper object of human reason , though the trinity is not ; and if our reason discover a great many absurdities , and contradictions , and impossibilities in transubstantiation , we must confess , that it is absurd and impossible , as to take notice of some few . to say that the substance of the bread is turned into the natural flesh of christ , which suffered on the cross sixteen hundred years ago , is to say , that the body of christ is made to day , which was years ago , which is a contradiction ; for what was made years ago , cannot be made to day , unless it was years before it was made ; or was made years after it was made , and thus the same individual body must be , and not be at the same time . it is essential to the same body to be but in one place at a time , and yet all confess , that the body of christ is whole and intire in heaven , how then is the same body at the same time on the altar ? nay , on as many altars as there are in the christian world , at the same time . the body of christ in heaven has the just proportions and dimensions of a human body ; in the consecrated host it is without any extension or distinction of parts , whole and entire in the least crumb of bread : now for the same individual body to be extended , and not extended at the same time , is a contradiction ▪ and tho we could suppose that christ could bestow such a supernatural kind of existence on his body , as to subsist without extension of parts , yet how can the same body at the same time be extended and not extended , as it must be , if the same body be extended in heaven , and not extended in the host. the sacramental body of christ is cloathed with the species of bread , is it so in heaven too ? if not , how is the same body at the same time , with and without the species of bread ? the sacramental body of christ is his dead and broken body , the body of christ in heaven is a living , glorified body ; now if this be the same body , the same body must be dead and alive , broken and whole at the same time . the romanists tell us , that the consecrated bread is the whole body of christ , flesh and blood too , which must go together ; and yet that the consecrated cup is the natural blood of christ shed out of his body ; so that it seems , the same body on the altar is both broken and whole , and the same blood is in his veins , and poured out of them at the same time . now i would ask , whether christ in heaven have any blood , which is separated from his body ; if he have not , then how is the consecrated cup , which is his blood shed for us , and therefore out of his body , that natural blood which christ now has in heaven , where to be sure , he has no blood , which is out of his body , and therefore that blood , which is out of his body , cannot be his natural blood , which he now has in heaven . when our author has digested these absurdities and contradictions , i can easily furnish him with more ; and can there be a greater contempt of the ever blessed trinity , than to compare so sacred and venerable a mystery , to the most absurd doctrine , which was ever invented by men. it will be in vain to pray to god to give us his holy spirit to instruct us , till we first learn to believe our own sense and reason . the end . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e ( a ) the humble address of the corporation of trinity-house trinity house (london, england) approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing h b estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the humble address of the corporation of trinity-house trinity house (london, england) berkeley, george berkeley, earl of, - . charles ii, king of england, - . sheet ([ ] p.) printed for rich. royston, bookseller to his most sacred majesty, london : . dated may . with an introduction by george berkeley, earl of berkeley, and the response of charles ii. reproduction of the original in the henry e. huntington library and art gallery. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity house (london, england) -- early works to . merchant mariners -- england -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the humble address of the corporation of trinity-house . windsor , may . . this day the right honourable george earl of berkeley , master of the corporation of the trinity-house of deptford-strond ; in company with the wardens , assistants , and elder-brethren of the said corporation , attended his majesty here , with an address , introduced by his lordship , with a speech to the effect following . may it please your majesty , we your majesties most loyal and dutiful subjects , do in all humility acknowledge , that your majesty has been most gracious to all your subjects ; very particularly to traders , and to those who have had the honour to be employed in your maritime affairs . none of your predecessors ( sir , ) have ever been pleased to give us so much countenance and encouragement as your majesty has done ; and therefore we hope , you will please to pardon us , if we put some value upon our selves for having received such signal marks of your grace and favour to us . sir , your great goodness gives us the presumption of making this humble address to your majesty ; which we beg may be now read. the address was by his majesties command accordingly read , in the terms following , viz. to the king 's most excellent majesty . the humble address of the master , wardens , assistants and elder brethren of the corporation of the trinity-house of deptford-strond , sheweth , that we your majestie 's most loyal and dutiful subjects , the body corporate of the seamen and mariners of this your kingdom of england , having taken into serious consideration your majestie 's most gracious declaration , wherein you have been lately pleased to give to all your good subjects an assurance of your royal purposes of calling frequent parliaments , and employing your utmost endeavours ( both in and out of parliament ) towards the extirpation of popery , redressing and prevention of grievances , and governing in all things according to the laws of this your kingdom ; do with all humility return our most humble thanks to your most sacred majesty , for this your so gracious condescention to the just and ample satisfaction of all your loyal subjects ; acknowledging it likewise the especial duty of this corporation , to declare to the world your majestie 's royal and unwearied care , both in the general promotion of all matters conducing to the prosperity and improvement of the navigation and trade of this your kingdom ; and in the particular instance lately given thereof by your majesty , in your royal endeavours for the preservation of your city and port of tangier , in the midst of so many difficulties , and at so great expence . and we do most humbly beseech your majesty to accept of the assurances which we here in all duty tender you , of the utmost effects of our constant and sincere allegiance to your majesty , under your most gracious government , both in church and state , as it is now by law established : adding in all humility , that as it has already been the honour of very many your faithful subjects , members of this corporation , to have hazarded their lives in your majestie 's service on the seas , so do we ( according to our oaths ) unanimously tender to your most excellent majesty ( as to the best of princes ) the future command of our lives and fortunes , in the defence of your most sacred majesty , your heirs and successors ; zealously praying to almighty god , to grant your majesty a long and prosperous reign over us , with a lasting , peaceable and right succession to your royal throne , according to law. his majesty was pleased to express his gracious acceptance thereof to this effect . my lord , i thank you kindly and heartily for this address , and shall not be wanting to perform my part . and as i have always been a friend to the navigation and seamen of england , you may assure your selves i shall ever be so . london , printed for rich. royston , bookseller to his most sacred majesty . . a vindication of the unitarians, against a late reverend author on the trinity freke, william, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing f estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a vindication of the unitarians, against a late reverend author on the trinity freke, william, - . p. s.n., [london? : ?] reproduction of original in huntington library. caption title. on the question of allegiance to william and mary and on the doctrine of the trinity, - . attributed to william freke. cf. herbert mclachlan in his the story of a nonconformist library. . p. . created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng unitarians -- great britain -- early works to . trinity -- controversial literature. great britain -- history -- william and mary, - . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - robyn anspach sampled and proofread - robyn anspach text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a vindication of the unitarians , against a late reverend author on the trinity . entrance . sir , i dare not call you adversary , indeed , i rather believe we may be friends ; for tho' there may be a mistake between us , yet i hope we both agree in a sincere love , and search for truth ; and in what we differ therefore , i shall rather seek to melt you with gentleness , than to subdue you with opposition . page . you tell us , when we are ready , you hope to hear from us again : and you see you have your desire ; you seem to have a sincere good will to truth your self , and therefore you will be the less surpriz'd to see it in others ; for when you have given so bold a challenge to all unitarians , you must expect , that we have but little respect for the honour , and glory of god , if we do not answer you . 't is true , i come to dispute you , and am no socinian , and as an arrian my hypothesis distorts your argument a little ; but as we are both joyn'd in one common cause , and you attempt to deface the truth of both , so you must think , we expect you provide your self to give us both satisfactions , for tho' you conquer either of us , your work 's but half done . you must excuse me therefore , if i mind not your socinian quarrels , but leaving them to themselves , divert your argument a little , and bring in a third hypothesis ; you shall see i will deal fairly with you , state the matter truly , and proceed sincerely , and clearly ; whether you shall think your self obliged to reply to me , or not , upon it , is not my care , if i can but rescue the honour of god , and his unity by it , i am satisfied . method . it cannot be expected therefore , but that i have alter'd your method , but yet you shall see withal , that i have justly collected all your scattered reasons together , and dealt faithfully with you ; and tho' the change of the hypothesis necessitated this , yet in lieu of it , i shall present you with a method both shorter and clearer , to recompence it . 't is plain , large volumes destroy the edge of reasoning , and the vigour of sence is lost in the multitude of words ; i have chosen therefore , rather to be short and sinewy , than tedious and loose , if the foundation reasoning be bad , corollaries fall of course ; and therefore my chief care shall be , whether your leading and ground-work principles be strong , and to the purpose , or not . i thank god , i do not see my cause so weak , as to fly to colours , or that i should use undue arts for a shelter ; and therefore if i have omitted any thing material , i protest before the almighty , it has not been wilful ; and if i have any where reprov'd you , as god is my witness , 'thas been where truth has necessitated and forc'd me ; and if i have wrong'd you , i as heartily beg your pardon . in short , i have endeavour'd with the most serious respect , and the greatest christian charity and meekness , to shew you where you have err'd : indeed , i have not spar'd to advise and reprove you where i ought ; but if i have run that liberty into an extream , or been faulty in any thing , 'thas been my frailty , and not my guilt . all that i know farther to add in this place , is , that perhaps you may wonder how i came to answer you so soon ; but not to offend you , sir , the reason is obvious , though fallacies are difficult , and to be studied , yet truth is natural , and they are easily answer'd . advice . . boasting . but before i proceed further , i see a necessity , sir ▪ to advise you of two faults , boasting and uncharitableness ; not that i can blame you over-much neither , nor may be acquit myself of their guilts , but i see a necessity to level these two mountains in you , least by the ignorant , these fortresses of imagination may be taken for those of reality . first for boasting : in your preface , sir , you say , you have said too much for us to answer : and it may be so ; but if you have not , we shall seek for truth , and not to compare our selves with you . so p. , you call our reason carnal : and pag. , you tell us , we puzzle and confound our selves with gross and corporeal idea's of essence and substance : when indeed , if such upbraiding expressions were allowable , we might more justly reflect them upon the eternal generation you pretend to . so you conclude your book , pag. . you say , it looks like a judgment upon us , that while we talk of nothing less than the severest reason , we impose upon our selves , or hope to impose upon the world , by the most childish sophistry and nonsence ; and so pag. , your last words are , you will not envy us the satisfaction of such harangues , they being , you say , all the comfort we have ; but you are pretty confident we shall never le able to reason to any purpose in this cause again . and what , sir , is not this insolence ? pray , sir , what is it you mean by these triumphs ? is it that you think to storm and brave us out of our cause ; or that you are sure you only are in the right ? or that if you had the worst cause , you could defend it well ? sir , my charity shall speak the best for you , that you are sure you only are in the right ; but if you are , has not modesty more charms to recommend you by , than insolence . — excuse me , sir , i dislike not your zeal in your preface , to stick to your faith , i rather wish it more common ; for were it , truth had scarce been such a stranger among us ; nor do i question your ingenuity , and in charity i hope you are sincere too ; but these are expressions that your zeal has beguil'd you to , that want a christian modesty , and tho' such a confidence with a little more humanity , might become an apostle , yet how well they do a meaner christian , i leave to your self to judge , in cooler thoughts . . uncharitableness . the second thing i have to charge you with , is uncharitableness , that because we differ in judgment from you , in this speculation , you not only treat us like dogs , and deny us all hopes of salvation , but withal you manage your arguments for truth accordingly , and give us not so much as free reasoning . thus you not only abound with reflections on us , as in your preface you say of us , we are eminent for nothing but blasphemy and nonsence : and pag. . you reflect , it becomes the wit and vnderstanding of an heretick : but pag. , you write more freely of us , and tell us , you hope the disputes of hereticks against the catholick faith , shall not be be called controversies in the churches of god. now , if thus in the very beginning of your book , you shew we ought to be condemn'd before we are heard , to what purpose does your infallibility hold a controversie with us ; but i hope this is before you are aware ; indeed in a papist these expressions might be natural enough , but protestants methinks should be more ingenious , than to take errours and hercsies for granted . consider , sir , churches have err'd , and may err , yea , in matters of faith too ; if so , who is to be blam'd , he that by reasoning seeks for liberty , or he that unjustly with-holds it thro' imposition ? did we seek to impose our hypothesis's on the world , we were as much to be blam'd as you ; but if we only set up ours , to confute the uncharitableness of yours , wherein do we trespass ? you say , we are hereticks , and have no understanding : and whence come you to judge thus freely of us , and not we of you : so you say , we blaspheme ; but pray is not your charge precarious , and if retorted , falls it not as heavy on your self ? if we err , indeed , we blaspheme the son and holy ghost ; which we hope we do not ; but if you err , do not you both blaspheme and commit idolatry , in worshipping them as coequal to the father ? but , sir , we desire to have a charity for your misconstructions , and will give it you where possible , if so pray at least return our love , you see we stoop to make the first offer ; charge us not therefore , that we are only eminent for blasphemy and nonsence , for surely you may add in the other scale , that we have a courageable good will to truth , are some of us perverse , or do some of us revile ; and what , are such men wanting quite on your side ? reflections . if therefore you leave us but room to advise you , as much as the great moses left jethro , let us beg you for christ's sake to cut off all these offences ; remember 't is not generous , much less christianly , to discountenance a weaker brother : but what ? you believe not me ; yet at least believe my truths ; for surely christ's own argument will hold you . can you expect peace in christ's church , whilst you thus allarum and startle mens consciences , by so great and grievous impositions ; or what , do you expect men should have no conscience or resentment for truth ? if you do not , do not fetter them thus ; you know 't is no argument of errour to be singular ; nay , i am sure , you know very well , that truth is rarely popular , but rather suppressed and stifled through mens lusts . let us learn therefore , to let natural religion lead our revelation , else the curse of the holy ghost will fall upon us , and tho' we have eyes we shall not be able to see , nor were we turks should we be capable of being converted ; indeed , when we are bewitch'd to the fury of a prepossess'd zeal , will not all men say , we rather bafle , than love , or scearch for truth when we argue ? excuse me , sir , that i am thus free with you , which i should not have been , had it not been in justice to my cause ; but i durst not let these prepossessions ensnare my reader , and yet not that i think so heinously of you for them neither , for many that have wrote much worse then your self on the subject , have been more confident ; and i could wish myself , as well as you , out of harms way of error ; indeed , could i have had a fair hearing without , i had been very easily otherwise satisfied . precognita . i shall now only present you with a few precognita , to state duly the true idea of the controversie , between the trinitarians , and the arrians , and i shall then proceed to a particular answer ; and i hope you shall see too , to your satisfaction , and without the least needless cavil or objection whatever . the trinitarian believes , that there is one god , but that he exists in three persons , father , son , and holy ghost , and that these three persons are co-equal , and co-eternal , and by a joynt power created the heavens and earth , men and angels , and all things else , that any way exist . they believe , this trin-unity even now continues to rule the world by a joynt providence ; but that for orders-sake , they have distributed their dominions into several , and subordinate personal offices ; thus ▪ they make the father alone to personate the true god , the son to become incarnate , to redeem us to his mercy , and the holy ghost under the son , to assist us through grace in his trials . the arrian believes , that there is but one god , and that he exists but in one person ; that the son and holy ghost are neither co-equal , nor coeternal with him ; that he first made the son , and through him fram'd the holy ghost and angels ; that some of the angels falling with lucifer , he through the son , and by the holy ghost fram'd this world , and man within it . they believe there is no co-equal trinity to rule the world through a joint providence ; but that their dominions are subordinate , and adequate to their powers ; thus that the father alone is the true god , that the son became incarnate to satisfie god's justice , to redeem his creation , and to destroy the devils malice in adam ; that the son has deputed the holy ghost , to assist us through his grace in our trials . by this , sir , i hope i have given you a fair breviate of the two hypothesis's , i shall only beg your patience , whilst i add two or three principles to illustrate the controversie , and then after a few reflections on them , i shall desist my precognita , and proceed . principles . . nothing is more manifest , than that the jews in the idea of their first commandment , conceiv'd but one person to be in their one god. . could the jews , or judas have charg'd christ , with pretending himself to be the supream god , which the gospel tells us the false witnesses principally labour'd after , they would not only have made their acclamation , we have no king but caesar ; and their inscription on his cross , jesus of nazareth , the king of the jews , john . but they would have added , no god , no false god , too . . lastly , 't was near years after christ , e're tradition and scripture-interpretation were so much as urg'd to explain and bring forth a trinity . my reflections upon these principles , shall be only two , and they are as follows : first , that the doctrine of the trinity has alter'd the first and greatest commandment , as it were , by chance ; and whereas the goodness of god in such a case , would certainly allow us a solemn repeal ; the athanasian creed is so far from such mercy , that it makes this very catch poenal of salvation ; and that very trinity , that without doubt received their honour jointly before , can now be admitted on no pretence , to receive it otherwise than severally . secondly , you see hereby , this great mystery is not purposely requir'd , but accidentally enforc'd ; so that whether this inscrutable mystery , and incomprehensible hypothesis , be a divine truth or not , yet at least this is plain , the means of knowing it are humane , and consequently the whole mystery itsself disputable , and left to the understanding of man to examine . now , whether the little grounds men pretend to for the support of this mystery , be sufficient or not , is what i have undertaken to disprove , in answer to you , by this following treatise : and for my better method , i shall distribute my subject into three parts ; to wit , the proof of the trinity , from , . reason . . scripture . and . tradition . and herein i shall pursue your method , and begin with reason first . reason . know then sir , to avoid all needless arguments , i will grant you , that your creed may in a sence be rational , and very near agreeable to what you have wrote , in sect. . thus i will agree with you , as you ingeniously alledge , pag. , and . that three persons self-conscious and immaterial , may in a sence be called one : nay , and not improperly give the first commandment as one , as being inseperably united in will and wisdom ; indeed , sir , to do you right , what you have in this alledg'd , is the only thing that ever i saw like rational for the trinity yet . but then , as you say your self , as by natural religion there can be but one god , pag. . and tho' there be several persons , yet they cannot act apart , but always with one energy , pag. . so your own argument destroys itself ; for surely , where there are mean and under offices between persons , the energy is manifestly not one , nor the act simple . nor will your arguments , pag. , help you , for 't is manifest by the descent of the holy ghost on christ like a dove , that the three divine persons act separately , as well as think so ; so that if your own arguments be consistent , pag. , and god be a pure and simple act ; as you alledge , pag. , and , and alterity makes duality ; as you likewise affirm ▪ pag. , 't is plain , these three persons cannot make up such a deity as you would imagine ; indeed they might be one in a metaphor , and as in scripture sence , but to be really one is a jest . but you will say , 't is their self-consciousness which makes them one , and that you apprehend consistent with this personality : i answer , that is to run your self into as great absurdities , to avoid the present ; is it rational self-conscious , and absolute coequals , should take or impose servile and underling offices of each other ? besides , that the son and holy ghost are conscious to the father , is absolutely false , and groundless from scripture , as i shall shew you in order . st. austin's explication . but i see , sir , you are resolv'd not to be at a loss , you will rather have two strings to your bow , than fail of your mark , and therefore now , we must prepare our selves for st. austin's self-consciousness : and in this you say , the trinity are conscious to each other , as our memory , will , and vnderstanding are , which know and feel whatever is in each other , v. pag. . alas , sir , i wonder how that you who live in the fuller rays of humane learning , can brook the comparing of faculties to persons , or how you can repeat such inconsistencies as they produce , before you acknowledg'd each person compleat , and rational ; and now you make the father impotent , and only a speculation , pag. . and the reflex wisdom , or the son of god , only powerful to act and create : and again , by another turn , pag. , you make him impotent too . in short , sir , i shall forbear to offend you , with all those comments i could make in this place , did i rather study malice than truth ; but this you force me to declare , that if you take such liberty to prove your mystery , as to make persons faculties , and faculties persons , as you do , 't is impossible that any reasoning should hold you ; for by the same liberty , what may you not say ? and what , sir , do these wiles look as from god ? and that the reader may see , you have not treated of these faculty-gods by chance , pag. , you attribute the creation to them , pag. , , you make the father to have no mercy in himself ; indeed , pag. , you would seem to palliate the matter , by saying , the essential character of the holy ghost , in the like case , is love. but , sir , a running eye shews this to be all mystery indeed , and really such an one as confounds personality , trinity , and deity all at a stroke , v. pag. . besides , sir , you make love in the father to be the holy ghost , a person , and god , p. . and pray , sir , why is not hatred a person in god , as well as love ? the reason you give why love is a person , is because there can be no accident in god ; and therefore even an affection in him is real , and makes a person : but what , sir , may not this reason serve for hatred , and an hundred affections more ? reflections . i shall add no more at present concerning the reason of the two hypothesis's , because it will fall more naturally in our way , as we examine the scriptures ; and indeed , i have wrote nothing at all here of the arrian hypothesis , because the reasoning of it is so obvious , that it were to fire candles to enlighten the day , to illustrate it . give me leave therefore to advise you , sir , that for the future you be wary to reason more perfectly , or not at all ; 't is no light truth that you have oppos'd ; and i believe many a reader would have had less charity for what you have done , than i have ; and may be would condemn you for beguiling with the appearance of reasoning ; but i neither think so of you , nor believe otherwise , than that your paternal zeal has misguided you . as for the contradictions of this doctrine , i shall speak of them in their proper place ; in the mean time , i shall pass on to examine your scripture-interpretations : and by this time , i hope you are convinc'd , that you have jump'd out of the frying-pan into the fire , and instead of helping out an absurdity by a nicety , made it the more suspicious by defending it with a fallacy . scripture interpretation . before i descend into particulars , i shall write a little of the interpretation of scriptures in general ; and methinks here it grieves me to see , how to make out this mystery , men have not stopt at any arts , to force and wrest the scriptures to this imaginary truth . page , you say , we ought not to force the scriptures to preconceiv'd notions : but what ? is not this mystery such ? surely , were a pagan to read the scriptures , the first commandment would keep him so much as from ever dreaming of a trinity ; and i wonder really how it came into mens minds : i know the world would be apt enough to embrace it , when it once comes their , as their superstition has always enclin'd them to a polytheism ; but i should have thought there had been a sufficient guard , against every colour of it in christianity . but to maintain this hypothesis , now once up , let me beseech you to consider your own evasive constructions of scripture ; i am perswaded , if you err , as i have said , `t is because you have continued in your first faith with too little circumspection ; and that the socinian hypothesis has not appear'd natural to you ; for you seem to have much sincerity , to do otherwise , and therefore i presume this liberty with you . of the son . consider then , i say , is it not strange that you should make the son , know things as god , and not know them as man. p. , pray after what manner was the god head incarnate , and what kind of person was this , that by a kind of ventriloquy you make to speak something as divine , when the ordinary person knows nothing of them himself i ▪ p. . so , what an answer you have there , that the son was tempted as to his manhood , but not as to his godhead ; and pray then where was the godhead all the while , like baal's asleep ; or was the man christ now and then as it were possessed by fits ? methinks i am asham'd to handle the absurdities of this hypothesis , they make me giddy when i consider them . so in the same page , in interpreting , mark . . but of that day and that hour knoweth no man , no not the angels that are in heaven , neither the son but the father : do you not think you wrest and destroy the scripture sence , and in pretence of saying st. matthew has not what st. mark has , blemish the clearest text ? you had better write down-right , st. mark 's gospel is not true ; or that gradation , man , angel , or son is impertinent , and then you would answer something-like , as if you defended a mystery . but by the way , you must excuse me , sir , if for truth's-sake , i am forc'd thus to make such reflections on your words which tho' they may seem hard , yet are necessary ; and yet not that they belong so much unto you , as your cause , which i cannot otherwise set to a full light , which i believe you have hitherto embrac'd with too much inadvertency , and in following the corrupt interpretations of the church with too much zeal : but to return to my purpose : nor will your evasion of self-consciousness , make god and man one person here , as you would insinuate , pag. . for 't is plain , god and man are thus two persons , if they acted together , and god commanded the reason regularly , as the reason does the sence ; as you urge , pag. , . there might be some pretence for their being one person , but you see plainly , the godhead exerts itsself may be now and then as it lists , nay , ever and anon , as it did at christ's crucifixion and acclamation , left the man by himself , and crying out upon the godhead , my god , my god , why hast thou forsaken me . and what ? can here be any pretence then that the godhead suffer'd ? for shame , leave the blasphemy ; and for his being conscious to the man christ jesus , that that should make him incarnate , is such a shuffle , that you had as good say , god is personally united to us all , because he is conscious to all our thoughts ; as suppose a personal incarnation of god himself in christ , on that account . so that all that you alledge , of the incomprehensibility of the incarnation , will not salve your sores , for all that you urge of that kind , pag. , is but gratis dictum , and you ought to have more truth in your foundation , before you can justifie such profound mysteries in the building . of the father . so surely hereafter , sir , you will be asham'd to see how groundlesly , you have made the person of the father , signifie the whole trinity , as you have done ; i am perswaded , if god should mercifully open your eyes , once to a conviction , your own wrested allegations will settle and six you for ever from wavering . what you say , pag. , and . that the son calls the father the only true god , quatenus fons deitatis ; and that not in opposition to the persons in vnion with him ▪ but the false gods , pag. , . is so groundless , and withal so perverting a construction of scripture , and meerly on the presumption of your hypothesis , that i wonder how in fair argument you can use it ; nay , and when in the very text you cite , you have the father called the only true god , in opposition to the son himself . sir , give me leave to tell you , your church and self have by time and industry , given your selves such methods to blind your selves , like the ancient astronomers , with so many epicicles , and blind and precarious principles , in leading your interpreting scriptures , that without singular courage and integrity lead you , i may say , the peculiar grace of god do it , indeed 't is almost impossible to shew you truth , you are so clouded and maz'd from it , by your own corrupt subtleties in defending error . but yet , why do i accuse you so far , you have already granted one half of what i desire , that so many leading terms , as hypostasis , &c. are to be blam'd , pag. . be pleas'd but to move one step further , clap homo ousios among them , which you confess is not in scripture , pag. , and yield me , that our imposing explanations must at least mud , if not corrupt the stream of truth ; and you shall see after that , that you and i shall never disagree . i shall add no more in this place , but to shew you , how deep you are dipt by your zeal in this error , that pag. , you can tell us , we ought not to interpret scriptures by reason , the reason you assign us is , because we must observe the propriety of words and phrases , and the scope of the text : and what then ▪ sir , is not reason to enquire and rule those ? you had as good say , she has no concern in language ; and pray in what has she more ? but i shall forbear further reflections . incarnation . i have hitherto shewn you , how much you have err'd in your general interpretation of scripture , i shall now proceed to rectifie your errors in particulars , wherein i shall be the larger , that i may comprehend the objections of the late dr. s — , and others , on my subject : i shall begin first with the incarnation . now that i may the better shew the errors of the incarnation , as in your hypothesis , i shall state it , as it lies most natural in mine : know then , that tho' i do not violently acknowledge the son of god to be co-equal to the father , yet i freely grant him to be as great , and eminent as god could possibly make him . sir , i do not imagine a prosopopeia incarnate , as you suggest , p. . nor do i make the godhead carry about , and now and then possess a body , as i have shewn your trinity hypothesis will necessitate ; but i suppose the great god and angel , who under the father fram'd all things , to satisfie god's justice , and destroy the malice of satan , and to redeem his own , willingly condescended , that through the power of god , his being might be reduc'd as to a first semen , and so he might live with purity , and suffer under that trial , that no creature but himself could be able , besides , to accomplish with any certainty , for our redemption . this , sir , i conceive , is the great mystery of the incarnation ; and this , methinks , carries some semblance of rationality ; for if we from little semens , may hereafter grow to the most considerable degrees of glory , as the scriptures assures us , surely there can be no impossibility , nor difficulty , that god should be able to reduce the most glorious of his beings back again , and make them , as from the first seed of a soul , arrive to their ancient glory . but to this you say , pag. , that there is no greater nonsence in the world , than a made god , and a creature god : sir , the proposition is bold , but you have not stoop'd to a proof of it ; however ▪ i hope to shew you , 't is neither nonsence nor absurd ; i must confess , a creature god to be imagin'd the supream , were absurd ; but when i say a creature-god , i only mean a spirit of an ubiquitary presence , and multitudinary power ; or one that by a perfect self-consciousness , can reason with infinite beings at once . if then , sir , you will not deny it to be in the power of god to create such a spirit , which i hope , sir , you will not ; for i should be sorry to see my words draw you to blaspheme the power , which you can know no limits of , but vice , error , and weakness : if you 'll grant me , i say , that god can make such a power , i will add , he has ; for surely , to make such more glorious beings , is much more for his honour , than all little , single , and weak individuals , as you and i are . but you say , pag. , . what shall a meer man be exalted above angels ? yes surely , if he were first above them , and laid aside his being only for a time , and in obedience to his god : and what say you ? can any thing under infinite wisdom rule the world ? yes , sir , god's most glorious son , that is wiser than all men and angels besides , and that is in the bosome of the father , and so has his assistance , may rationally do it . and pray , sir , where are the absurdities and contradictions of these things ? methinks , sir , in this you should have been asham'd of your reasoning : you can allow god's begetting a son co-equal rational , pag. . but 't is with an horrour , that you detest an angel-god : but pray , sir , if the notion of god's begetting a son be not carnal , tell me why he has not more sons than one ? you dare not blaspheme him sure , to say he is not more fruitful ; or are you so niggardly , to think , he can multiply his glorious issue too fast . but to return to my subject : hence it was , if you would know , that the son says he could do nothing of himself , pag. . and hence it was , that whilst incarnate he had need of the help of the holy ghost : but the reasons that you have given in these things , are so shuffling , pag. , , that i blush to read them . platonicism objected . so that all the objections i know against this hypothesis , is but , that 't is the platonick philosophy made christian ; and as to that , i shall only say this : is truth the worse , because plato hapned to idea it ; or is christianity to be dis-esteem'd , because a philosopher chanc'd to be in some of her roads ? but least any one should think , that the doctrine of plato should have the least influence , in wresting the scriptures to this hypothesis , i do hereby in the presence of god declare , what it was that first mov'd my judgment , and turn'd me to be an arrian ; and if it did me , it should move us in charity to think it did others . an acquaintance of mine , speaking by chance of the trinity , told me , some thought it a breach of the first commandment ; and to convince me , 't was not reveal'd in the new testament , shew'd me that most notable chapter of the first of the hebrews : now he little thought what he had done , when he did this ; for tho' my zeal boyl'd against his blasphemy , as i thought it for a time , yet when i reflected again with myself , i thought at least , his discourse had rais'd such scruples in my mind , that the very considerableness of the first commandment would necessitate me to enquire of . now this was not only all the discourse i had with him , but i remember to this day , that i could never understand by his discourse , whether he were arrian or socinian , nor indeed what either hypothesis was ; tho' lately , i must confess , i have perceiv'd him rather enclin'd to the socinians . but thus it was , that shortly after going for london , where my doubt continuing upon me , i resolv'd to give myself satisfaction : i saught for books , but found none ; indeed i did not know what to enquire for ; whereupon resolving to know that by myself , which i could not by others , without either knowing of arrianism , socinianism , or platonism , i took this following course : i took the new testament , where i conceiv'd this truth was to be found reveal'd , if any where , and reading it with attention , i collected every text relating to father , son , and holy ghost , into an imperial sheet of paper ; for neither liking giddy tradition , nor the tricks of wresting single texts , i thought that this could be the only way to find the truth by , if any . now god is my witness , that when i i did thus , i could not but fall into arrianism ; not that i then knew what name my opinion had ; but some time after meeting with books , i saw the difference of arrianism and socinianism , and found that i was not singular in my sentiments , but that the world had thought the same before me . nor was this all , but before i knew that my hypothesis had been known to the world , thinking that i was singular in the truth , i resolv'd in charity to mankind to publish my discovery , till some friends hearing of it , advis'd me to consider first , that i might be as much blinded by my own pride of s●earch , as the world was by their corruption and traditions . upon this resolving to be resign'd to truth , and fearing lest my presumption might ruine me , i not only took all my papers and burnt them , but resolv'd to read all books for the trinity , and converse all persons , and if possible , satisfie myself to believe , and acquiesce in so great a mystery . but alas , sir , after all this care , you see i am forc'd to differ from you ; so that tho' i could willingly lay by my sentiments , the better to examine truth for a-while , yet when on s●earch i could still do no otherwise , than think my old opinion the best ; i durst not leave truth for ever ; and i hope the necessity of my case will at last induce you to a charity for me . of spirits , gods , &c. but that i may return from this digression , and the better evidence to you , that these god-angels are no novelties in scripture , let me add hereto an idea of the nature of spirits , as i have taken it even from the scriptures themselves ; and thus there are gods , cor. . , . cor. . . potentates , principalities , rulers , and dominions , col. . . eph. . — . , . and angels , &c. god , signifies a spirit of universal po●●…er , so that tho' there be but one supream god , the father , yet he has constituted the son and holy ghost , two deputies a under him , calling the son an angel in this deputation , in the old testament b . and on this foundation stand those expressions , let us make man , &c. c and thus , through the son it is that we are said to have access , by one spirit to the father d ; and thus it is , that the holy ghost , and s●tan the e●●l god e ; are in us like two contrary prompting and ruling powers f . thus it is , that the son , as governour under the father of these two lesser gods , administers the gifts of the one , g and restrains the temptations of the other , h whilst they are in a perpetual war in us ; that is , all mankind at once , i one helping us , the other tempting us , one comforting us , and the other accusing us , one having seven the number of perfection attributed to him , k as likewise has the other . and thus you are to understand the texts of a universal good angel , l and a universal evil one , m and tho' some have thought both satan and the holy ghost rather names of orders of spirits , than god-angels , citing n for it ; yet 't is plain by the whole course of scripture , that those places more rationally ought to be understood , that those gods have principalities , and angels , &c. which are sometimes employ'd by them in offices under them . if you desire to see this matter more amply argued , you must read mr. bidell's twelve arguments of the holy ghost , who when he had made the holy ghost so considerable as he did , i wonder how he could continue a socinian longer ; for the scriptures so plainly set the son above the holy ghost , and tell us , that all power is given to the son both in heaven and earth , which he cannot possibly otherwise manage , that i admire he did not turn arrian through-out . but to return , this order of god's administration through the son , and by the holy ghost , appears more plainly , when we consider , their gradative stiles in scripture , and the apostles creed ; thus the father only is called god in our creed , as only being so ; the son called lord , as he only really is so under him , cor. . , . and the holy ghost , or spirit , only stiled holy , in opposition to the evil one. and thus , the divine benefits we receive , as from the father , are called love and operation , from the son grace and administration ; but from the holy ghost and lesser power , only gift and fellowship , cor. . , , . cor. . . and hence it was , that all communication between the father and holy ghost , being through the son , prophecies ceas'd while the son was incarnate . next unto these , as i have said , succeed principalities , powers , and dominions : now these , by their very names shew themselves to be as lesser deputies ; that is , as governours of provinces , and kingdoms , under the gods of the world , the holy ghost and satan ; and for these and their offices you may see , dan. . , , , — . . acts . . lastly , as for angels , i need say nothing of them , seeing their names declare their offices , and the scriptures abound with examples of their performing them ; thus an angel came to the virgin mary , to cornelius , and several others ; so that of this enough : and if any thing remain , it must be to explain the reasonableness of there hierarchy . reflections . i say therefore , when we think to reason of spirits ; we must freely allow our selves an open and generous source of thought ; for as the air , and much more they are too fine for the gross casements of our eyes ; so if we design duly to examine their nature , we must be able to walk without sence a little , and not think to grope grosly after them , as if we would feel them . first then , i lay it down as a rule , that spirits are immortal , and have no need of any nourishment , nor do , nor need we doubt this , when we consider even how the sun has subsisted , how his unwearied rays impair him not , and how so many thousand years has not exhausted his source of glowing fuel . ly , to this i must add , that i cannot but believe , that like unto clouds in the air , they gradually subsist in each other , by the proportional purity of each others substances ; nor need this be strange to us , for this is evident , that god at least exists in all of them , and rules them as easily as they by his permission can us ; and if so , what hinders but that he may have deputy-gods to do the like under him . nor can it well be otherwise , than that they should rule one another thus , through their gradual purity , and inexistency ; for when we consider , that devils are entirely wicked , and are not to be ruled otherwise than through a real force , there remains no doubt , but that as they are in subjection to one another , so it is through such a real force as this , that neither art , nor conspiracy can destroy . but yet , after all this , methinks i hear hear you object , that this is difficult to conceive , that any creature should be of so extensive a power ; and yet why so ? does not the sun do the same thing in the sensible , and vegetable world ? and shall we think as general a power in a spirit , that as easily pierce the thickest bodies , as he does the air , impossible ; nay , or so much as difficult , in the rational world : but what ? we know not how it is done , no more we know not how god , and our own spirit exist within us . to conclude , i shall only add , that this being once granted , there remains no difficulty to imagine , how all our spiritual actions are perform'd , and how we are tempted ; thus only the supream god , and his son , possibly may see our thoughts , the lesser gods , the holy ghost and satan , may only have power of imagery , and prompting us , while potentates and angels , may only have power to rule and converse us . but of this enough , and i shall now proceed to handle those particular texts , that you , and others have cited against us . particular texts . [ john . . ] page , you tell us , in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god : and what , sir , can be more agreeable to an hypothesis than this to ours ? may i tell you more agreeable , than the trinitarian , for here is no mention of a union of these two , but that in the beginning of all things there was a god , which we beheld as the word on the earth , that existed with the supream god , that as his instrument made all things , and that coming to his own to redeem them , they knew him not : and here , sir , your charges against the socinians , not only vanish to air , but turn against you , when us'd by the arrians . now , that you may not take our idea of the son to be groundless , i shall give it you thus , from scripture itsself : he is the beginning of the creation of god , a for righteousness exalted to be god's son , b and yet as so wholly dependant on the father c . so he is likewise made our universal lord and ruler , d nay , even lord of all , with express eminence , e and judge , f who before his incarnation , was that word , by whom god made the worlds , and fram'd all things , g whether visible or invisible , h but yet so as an instrument only i : which texts i must agree with you , sir , i think the socinians wrongfully wrest to a new creature . further , tho' the son be often called god in scripture , as a ; yet that can give us no ground to equal him to the father , the supream god , because god is not only a title , as i have said often , bestow'd on creatures b , but is particularly intended to the son as such , as you may see c , where he is only declared to be lord by it , which is a title inferiour and subordinate to god. [ prov. . . ] your next text i shall shall speak to , is , prov. . . then i was by him , as one brought up with him , and i was daily his delight , rejoicing always before him . and what , sir , does this look , as if there was a coequality to be represented ? no , surely , the text aggrandizes the person of the father too much ; and when you consider it , i doubt not , but you will grant me so . nor need i give you other answer here , since you know i grant christ in his pre-existent state d , to be a spirit of a universal power e , who laying aside his blessed state f , was deputed into incarnation g , and rewarded for it h , being made our mediatour g , the lord of our temple and sabbath , and king and spouse to the universal church i . [ exod. . . ] page . you say , that there are many texts in the old testament , even by christ and his apostles , applied to himself , as then in being ; and i grant it you , thus zech. . . they shall look on me whom they have pierced , page , and in malacby , behold i will send my messenger , and he shall prepare the way before me , page , answering to mat. . . but what benefit will these texts do you ? nothing really , but confound your hypothesis . 't is true , christ did appear in-being in the old testament , but as but an angel , bearing the name of god k , once in eminence called , the angel of the presence l , and as he is sometimes called in the new testament too , m who taking flesh upon him , shew'd as much by the agonies he was in n . but to pretend , that there could be the union of two rationals , a god and a soul in a body , to make a person ; or that the godhead could possibly divest itself of power and knowledge , to possess the body of an infant ; or that it was otherwise in christ , who like others was a child , and grew in knowledge by degrees ; are such principles , that without men lay by their reason with their religion beyond retrieve , i wonder they are not asham'd of . besides , even the satisfaction of christ as god , seems irrational ; what must we make our creatour suffer for us , e're he can pardon us , and imaginarily manage the machine of a humane body , to attone to himself , and by himself ? what looks more impertinent and absurd ? but that christ the lord of all creatures , should attone their god for them , nothing seems more rational or just , if he design'd to satisfie god's justice , to destroy the works of the devil in adam , and bring us to glory , heb. . , . and upon this account it was , that for all christ's prayer , that if it were possible this cup should pass from him : god's justice would not let it , indeed he is too impartial even to spare his own son. [ heb. . ] next , i should speak of the text , heb. . quoted from psal . . , , . and mention'd in your book , pag. . how christ fram'd the world , which you know i deny not , however , give me leave to tell you , that that context utterly destroys your hypothesis , tho' it does not mine ; for how you will reconcile these words , being made so much better then the angels , v. . and thou hast lov'd righteousness , and hated iniquity , and therefore god , even thy god , has anointed thee with the oyl of gladness above thy fellows , viz. angels in the context , i know not ; and yet you see christ is called god , that it is mentioned in his highest degree , in the same context , v. . . so that i hope , sir , if our brother socinus cannot please you , as wresting too much the scriptures in his interpretations , as you complain , pag. , , yet the arrian may give you satisfaction , and shew you there is an hypothesis more apt , may i say , almost infinitely than the trinity . john . , page , you tell us , the fundamental mystery of christianity is , that god so loved the world , that he gave his only begotten son , that whosoever believeth in him should not perish , but have everlasting life : and i agree with you , sir , provided you will but take away your additional stretch of an eternal generation to the words , and let the scripture interpret them . now the ground upon which the scriptures say christ is called god's son , you may see plainly ; a and so for his resurrection , which god accomplish'd for him , b but where is it we are to find , he is his son through an eternal generation ? not surely because he is called god's son ; for that he was not , unless prophetically , before his incarnation , nor only begotten , for that might be only as he was god's eminentest , and only peculiar creature , indeed the texts before-cited , take away all other mystery from the word whatever . so , for his being without sin in the flesh , it might be , because , as i said , he was immediately god's creation , whereas all things else were made by him , and through him , and consequently more imperfect ; and for that cause too , he may properly be called his only begotten son , and his express image , as no one besides has , or is capable of managing an entire deputation under him . and upon this account indeed it was too , that he alone was able to bear the weight of the prophecies , and tryals incident to our redemption ; for if i may so say , not only the tryals were too hazardous to be ventur'd at by an ordinary angel , but no one , except the great lord of the creation , would be like to shew so great a love to it , in its redemption . heb. . , . besides , as god's justice is most impartial , so even tho' the son undertook the office , he was not favour'd in it ; thus when he became incarnate , he had no power of his own a , nor was he called to his office , till he had first sought to god with tears b , and when he was too , he was often left to the sharpest tryals alone , or else he could never have cry'd out , my god , my god , why hast thou forsaken me , when he was upon the cross , as he did . indeed , had he not then been wholly dependant on the father c , and directed by the holy ghost d , and as so dependant on god's grace d , he had been no apt pattern for us e , as he is now , when subject to like infirmities f , and yet not but that i grant , that after he was once rais'd again from the dead by god g , after his ascention he receiv'd his power again . mat. . . phil. . . another text you urge against us is , that 't is said of christ , phil. . . that he thought it not robbery to be equal to god , v. pag. , . but whatever you surmize , this text will do you but little benefit ; for what is this , but to require what i have granted , that jesus christ is absolute lord to all the glory of the father ; and indeed , sir , if you would have but look'd a little further , to v. . and , you would have seen the apostle himself , apply this my interpretation according to , cor. . , . so pag. , you tell us , he took upon him the form of a servant . and pag. . you say , that that proves his pre-existence : and i grant it you : and what , sir , is not this agreeable to my hypothesis ? but you add , pag. , that it was matter of free choice : and have i not said the same ? indeed , you have added , pag. , that there is not greater nonsence , than a creature-god : but , sir , then you should have prov'd it . john . . . page , you tell us , the temple was a type of christ : as you urge it more strongly , pag. , . and indeed , sir , you are in the right ; but i hope you weild this sword against the socinians , and not the arrians . so pag. , you tell us , of the types of sacrifice ; but in all these things we agree with you , sir ; and our cause ought to lose no reputation , by your imputations ; and therefore excuse me , if i put in thus a caveat here and there , least another reader , if not your self , may be misled by them . john . . but now i am come to your great charge , sir ; i and my father are one : and here you prepar'd your self before , with your self-consciousness , p. . but as to that , i think , i have answer'd you sufficiently already ; so that i hope , even your self will judge , that the text , john . , . alledg'd by you , p. , will be a sufficient answer to you , for all your sine-spun evasions , p. , , . john . . the same answer , i shall return you to the text : there are three that bear record in heaven , the father , the word , and the holy ghost , and those three are one : and indeed , sir , without questioning the authority of this place , what can we rationally mean by this text ; unless one in bearing record , according as , cor. . . and the context directs ? so pag. . you alledge , that because christ said , the father is in me , and i in him , that therefore they are essentially one ; as likewise , because christ is said to be in the bosome of the father : but alas , sir , your inference is so weak , and these expressions so much better suit my hypothesis than yours , that they deserve not an answer ; for pray , sir , let me ask you , who is to be cherish'd in the bosom ? what , a coequal ? and is not the other expression adequate to both hypothesis alike ? so pag. , you say , the son perfectly knows the father . and pag. , you alledge a scripture to prove it , which denies it , indeed , which shews you he knows but what the father sees good to tell him : besides , sir , in this matter you have us'd such a shuffling method of answering , as i shew'd you before , in treating about the hour of judgment , that christ knows not something as man , and yet all things on occasion as god , in the same person , that really till your hypothesis let you write better , you deserve no answer . john . . but as a strengthning to this , may be alledg'd , what you have wrote , pag. . that christ tells us , he knew what was in man : and no doubt of it , sir , he needed not that any man should testifie of man ; but does this therefore argue , he had not this knowledge from the father , by the holy ghost . besides , sir , if you mean ▪ that in his pre-existent state he sees our thoughts , as you seem to alledge , pag. , and , i answer you , i never denied it ; but if you think , he knew what was in man whilst incarnate , otherwise than by revelation , i must confess you make me dissent from you ; for if he had , he could never have ask'd men occasionally so many questions as he did : as when he ask'd his disciples , what john thought of him ? and what men said of him ? mat. . . page , you tell us , that christ had all power both in heaven and earth given him : but i wonder you will cite a text so much against you ; for if it was given him , was there not a time then , that he had it not ; that is , during his incarnation , according to john . and if so , what good will all your little arguings , p. , , and . do you . you know , sir , whatever the socinians do , our hypothesis supposes him eminently the son of god a , and the universal lord b , nor do we deny him properly to be called a god , provided it be expressed as in the scripture , in subordination to the father , heb. . , . for there in his highest glory and exaltation , he is always put under the father c . mat. . . but you say , pag. . that the son of man hath power on earth , to forgive sins : but what then ? that it was not his own power , appears by his answer to the sons of zebbedee ▪ mat. . . which he would not have given , had he been a supream and coequal god ; nay more , to confirm this , he declares he knows not the hour of judgment , mark . . tim. . . indeed , after his resurrection he tells us , the father hath put all times and seasons in his own power , acts . . and tells us , that god gave him even the revelations to shew unto his servants , rev. . . john . . the last text i shall write of in general of the son , is , that all men should honour the son , as they honour the father : and this p. , you say , ought to be equal to the honour we pay the father : and i prettily observe , that you put off , that god appointed that honour , on pretence , that 't is natural for the son to receive honour by the father . so pag. , , , you are upon a continuation of the same argument : but alas , how woodenly : no reader can peruse you , and not see . page , you can grant your self , that ( as ) signifies a likeness , and not always sameness in degree ; and if so , why cannot our brother socinian's answer serve you ? but however , that we may put this matter out of all doubt ; pray , sir , consider a little , is there no difference , between the great son of god our mediator , and every little creature , and is not there a difference , between a mediator appointed by god , and one set up meerly by the whimsie of man ? if these are not good reasons , for our giving to christ honour as a mediatour , i know not what are , i am sure they are better , than to make god stoop to such a petty honour , as to be absurdly mediator to himself . but you have a further argument , pag. , from phil. . , . that at the name of jesus , every knee shall bow — and that every tongue shall confess , ( but what ? ) that jesus christ is lord , to the glory of the father . and who shall deny you this honour ? not i : no , i will grant it you in confusion to your own hypothesis ; for 't is such a lord , and not a god , that i would have you think him to be . now , that we might the better understand what honour is due to the son , the scripture hath expresly called it , and appointed it to be mediation a , but yet not so as that we should pray to him for our mediation , no more than we are to pray to him for any thing else . nor ought any other worship to be paid him , unless personally present , and then as the only son of god , and lord of the world , he requires it , and such worship is what is given him , heb. . . where the following verses , , , . plainly shew it not to be intended of the supream worship , but as is mentioned , rev. . , , , , . because god for his excellency and worthiness has appointed him that honour . lastly , to account cor. . . for a a supream adoration , were to make gen. . . so too ; and as for the worship of the holy ghost , as you your self can as good as confess , pag. , there is no mention made of it in the whole scriptures : so that you may see on what a rotten foundation your faith stands ; and indeed , were not the truth i write for now , near as clear as the sun at noon , i should not be so zealous for it . mediatory kingdom . i proceed now to write of christ's mediatory kingdom , and here i cannot but observe , how the trinitarian hypothesis distorts the whole frame of truth , makes god a mediator to himself , and a coequal take as an honour an underling office , whereas christ in the arrian idea , as the great son of god , is fit to be our mediator between god and his handiwork , and may be deservedly honour'd with the title , that he alone can prevail with god for mercy for us . and here i cannot but let you see , sir , with what false colours you would magnifie this office , to make it rational for a coequal to accept of it ; thus , pag. , you make it nothing , that god exalted him to it : and so pag. , that he was forc'd first to suffer for it , and then receive it as a gift ; whereas indeed , if he were a coequal , it were both servile and degrading to him , even to accept it , tho' on any terms , and tho' with a reward . so pag. . i cannot but admire , to see how you [ glorious ] out this kingdom , how you would fain seem to make it command the father ; when alas , sir , you know your self , all the power of this kingdom , is but an humble intercession , p. . indeed your argument , p. , and . that no one but a god can administer it ; is somewhat forcible against the socinians , but can be of no force for you against the arrians . but why do i use more words , that all power in heaven and earth were given him after his death , mat. . . if a god coequal before , were nonsence , and as a creature-god , your self says he cannot exercise it ; so that prophecies should cease , as they did while he was incarnate , john . — . . , , . were absurd ; otherwise , indeed , you might as justly frame a mediatory kingdom , to interpret that great text of the holy ghost , john . , , , as build such a groundless one as this for christ . of the three persons together . having premised thus much in general of the son , and indeed on whom almost depends the whole hinge of the controversie , i shall now proceed , to shew you how the whole three persons are treated , when they are named together in scripture , that you may see even there our hypothesis prevails also . know then , that in such places , the father is represented as our god distinct and solely , the son our lord distinct and wholly , and the holy ghost only as our aiding spirit or comforter , eph. . , , . cor. . , . so in the revelations likewise , st. john makes the son and holy ghost , but as attendants on the throne of the father , rev. . . , , &c. whilst he only sits on the throne ; and the greatest honour even of the son is , that he has redeem'd us , and so is become worthy to open the book . but yet as i have formerly shewn you , as the father impowers the holy ghost through the son , in all acts of grace , so are their records one , john . . and yet not but that this record receives a stile agreeable to the excellency of the person giving it , where 't is distinguish'd , thus in the father 't is call'd operation , the son administration , and in the holy ghost gifts , cor. . , , . and the manner of gift in the father is called love , in the son grace , and the holy ghost fellowship ▪ cor. . . rom. . . so likewise , as all three being engaged in our salvation , they are put in as articles to our apostles creed , but yet with subordinate titles , as god , lord , and holy , to shew their distinction , and inferiority ; so that your argument you see , sir , that their being there , makes them coequal and god , is very weak , pag. . for by the same reason you might make every body , or the catholick church , god likewise . hence likewise , the ancient doxology before it was alter'd , was , glory be to the father , through the son , and by the holy ghost ; ( see sparks on the liturgy ) which shew'd plainly their subordination : indeed since , upon the prevailing of the doctrine of the trinity , it has been alter'd : but with what scripture-authority ? now i hope you see plainly . but i shall not dissent from you , that the socinians absurdly baptize in the name of the holy ghost , if there were none ; and they do worse than those disciples who never heard of him , for they acknowledg'd him when they did , which these , even now , do not : but what , are not they our brethren ? and are we not bound to have a charity for their errour ? and who shall condemn them in it , that they are wilfully blind . however , to return : this makes not but that we are baptiz'd in their names as our spiritual governours , mat. . . for so even the scripture plainly express themselves , cor. . , — . . where we are told , that we are baptiz'd by one spirit into one body , which is christ ; that is , into the church , by his minister , whereof he is the head , to the worship , honour , and glory of god : and what , sir , will you interpret against scripture ? and this consider'd , where stands any room for your calumnies , page , , , , , . is not the whole foundation of your argument rotten ? does baptism shew worship ? and if not , how can it be an open and barefac'd idolatry ? what may not there be a ceremony in it , to shew us , who under god , are our spiritual governour , as well as by water to imitate the cleansing of regeneration ? if so , why may not my construction of it , agreeable to scripture-interpretation , be as good as yours ? i protest before god , did not my hypothesis not only want absurdity , but suit most rationally , yea most naturally to truth and the scriptures , i would sooner dye than adhere to it . lastly , sir , to put your union in your hypothesis beyond all doubt , the scriptures have plainly shewn us , that these three persons have various and distinct intellectual powers , john . , , , . mark . . john . . and indeed , we might rationally have collected as much , from their being given and sent , did not our mysteries quite shut our eyes against reason . the father . nor do the scriptures cited of the son , and three persons , only agree to strengthen our hypothesis , and destroy yours , but even those that relate to the father and holy ghost likewise ; i shall give you short specimens of both , beginning with the first first , and then proceeding to the other , and after that , i shall conclude my scripture-proofs in this , and proceed . know then , that the scriptures plainly tell us , that the father is the one a , only true god b , only good c , only wise d , greater than the son e , only sitting on the throne , the son and holy ghost being as his attendants f , and his name is , i am g , in opposition to α and ω , the first and the last , one signifying a pure and infinite being , the other the first and great creature , rev. . . further the scriptures shew us , it is not agreeable with a due reverence , that we should confound the titles of the father with others ; thus christ gives us a particular charge , to remember not only that there is but one god , but that we have but one father , and one master , mat. . , . and st. paul , cor. . , , . tells us , that in truth there is but one god , and one lord ; to wit , the father , and his son christ jesus , according to phil. . . so they say , the father is the supream lord of all h , and greater than the son i , and really his god too k , and that he is the fountain of grace l , and only invisible m , whereas the son and holy ghost have been often seen , so he is only reveal'd by the son n . but what need i repeat more of these proofs ? the scriptures are full of them , and were not men blinded as they are , with the epicicles of their two natures in christ , and mediatory offices , &c. whereby they beg the thing in dispute , and anticipate all proofs , they would see the sun is not clearer than the proofs i have given them ; hereafter , i believe , men will admire at our blindness , as much as we do at the papists now ; but i see the hand of god is upon us , we are cursed to it , and only prayers can remove it . of the holy ghost . i come now to speak of the holy ghost , to shew you how much in every point your hypothesis straggles , and how you dissent from scripture , in every step you have made in your mystery ; while the arrian answers it , may i say to the most exact truth , and keeps a due mean between your coequal gods , and the socinians no less absurd meer man , and power of god. know then , the holy ghost , the spirit of truth a , called so in opposition to satan the lying spirit , is a great god or principally , and christ's universal deputy b , and as so the giver of all good gifts c . yet so , as he is subject to the son , and receives his authority from him d , and thence , i believe it peremptory to blaspheme his evidence e , for to lie to him , is to lie to god f , that is , through him , though he be but in reality an angel , rev. . . . . compar'd to acts , . luke . , . where he made the like visions ; and indeed blasphemy against him otherwise were absurd ; it should rather be against the father and son , especially the father , as fons deitatis , and whom the jews reverenc'd when they knew not the holy ghost . further , as god made the son his instrument in the angelical creation , so he sub-deputed the holy ghost in the formation of man g , and of the earth h , and upon this account , the spirit is called eminenter , the spirit of god ; that is , the greatest next to god the father , and the lord christ , and the most extraordinary gift of god in his assistance i . but yet he is absolutely christ's deputy , and sent by the son , from the father k , that till christ went , he could not come l , and yet 't is he that under christ bestows all variety of spiritual gists m , that dwells in us n , that spake by the prophets o , that helps our prayers p , and indeed , that assists our ordinary discourse q , by his grace , or holy anointing r . but to shut up all , he is in no place of the whole scripture , either dire●tly called god , or order'd to be worship'd ; which last thing you are so modest as to grant , page , ; so that upon the whole matter , to idea him in coequality to the father , as you see were so plain a violence to the scripture , he not having so much honour allow'd him , as even the son has , that i declare , i admire it . and by this time , i hope , sir , you see plainly , that your reasoning about the holy ghost , page , ▪ are meer shuffles , and that your texts , cor. . . quoted by you , page . that the spirit searcheth all things , yea the deep things of god : has no other sence ▪ than that the holy ghost co-operating with our spirit , reveals us the greatest knowledge we attain , and that is what agrees with the context , and the text you cite in the next page ; but if it does with your hypothesis , i am mistaken . as for your other reasons , page , . and , . brought to prove the self-consciousness of the father and holy ghost , they are as groundless as the rest of your mystery , and therefore i shall only shew you i take notice of them ; indeed , if the holy ghost knew all things thus of himself , what need the son shew them him . reflection . sir , i hope by this time , i have given you as ample satisfaction in your scripture-proof , as you can desire , you cannot but be so ingenious as to grant , that you have had all the advantages that a succession of commentators can give you ; whereas , i , you see , for all that , can heap you up the whole course of scripture against you , that have not so much as one arrian author to assist me . i have already inform'd you , what turn'd me to be an arrian , and now i shall add , that when i had once resolv'd nothing should be dearer to me than truth , and bethought me the corruption even of primitive tradition , and saw a necessity of sticking wholly to the scripture , the sun was not clearer to me than the doctrine which you call heretical , and arrianism . and give me leave to tell you , tho' you have popularity , and the temporal sword on your side , yet blaspheme it more , if you dare , if there be such a thing as blasphemy against the holy ghost , as we have christ's word there is ; to your peril be it , sir : i tell you , 't is to blaspheme the known evidences of his truth : and if these be such , i dare venture my truths with the sword of the spirit , against all your carnal weapons . remember , sir , there is a sin unto death , we may not so much as pray for , john . . and all our pretences and good works will be of none effect , while we blaspheme the most great and sincere truths of god ; beware , sir , of this great and fiery tryal ; i mean perversly to blaspheme god's truths , especially when so considerable as this , this is that that will make the tree good , and the fruit good , and the tree evil , or its fruit evil ; indeed , can you expect to be call'd or receiv'd as a son , when you openly and malitiously proclaim'd your self a rebel to the only and great means of government of the holy ghost . tradition . having now done with the two first heads of my discourse , the proof of the trinity by reason and scripture , i proceed to the last , viz. tradition , wherein would men but be content to believe as they pray , i should be satisfied ; for that they do almost wholly to the father ; and therein may i say , they give all their pretences to tradition , the greatest lye even the cause is capable of bearing ; but alas , the world is made too giddy by this mystery , to bear such , or any other reasoning . i know , sir , you are very confident that she is of your side , as you say , page . but your proofs and suggestions for it , are as few and inconsiderable as even i can wish for , pag. . thus , you would fain wheedle us , that men were arrians , and not arrians . and what , sir , was it out of charity that they forbore to call the trinitarians hereticks ? if it was , 't was a sign they were the better christians for it , not that their cause was the worse . so you asperse the great council of arminium , of bishops , of so seeming or wou'd-be an imputation , pag. , that i am asham'd to see 't : what , sir , do you think they would have called the greatest council that ever was , if they had design'd a tricking ? or are you resolv'd to trust more to the council of nice , because not so many ? methinks , sir , you should think it enough at least , that your tradition was disputable then , that you had such numbers against you , and not repose in forging rome for blemishing councils . you tell us , mr. bull has answer'd this matter throughly ▪ page . but i tell you sir , i have perus'd him , and he has not ; and were it worth my while , i would shew it you too : besides , sir , would you expect a fair and strict combat , after so many years , while rome has held the stakes ? what wont you make us no allowances in your thoughts ? not that we beg it neither : but is it generous , first to fetter a man , and then challenge him ? what shall i say ? is this the way to defend your catholick faith ! that faith which you say requires both forehead , and forgery to deny it , page , when you should say to maintain it ? reflection . give me leave to advise you a little , sir , if you are resolv'd to follow tradition : be not partial in it : why should you act by halves ? you would be a good papist , were you sincere , and follow'd it throughout : or if as a protestant you hate this course , why do you not pursue it more home , and to the root ? tradition was only of use till the scriptures were deliver'd ; and indeed 't is well if 't was contain'd pure till then ; as we may most justly censure , by st. john's advice to the churches , in the revelations . but to continue tradition further , what is it , but like the jews , to make the law of god of none effect , by our traditions . you must excuse me therefore , if i think tradition to be too much a nose of wax , to be alledg'd against scripture ; especially such express apparent and self-evident texts , as heb. . and john , i shall therefore leave you to jangle out your quoted inconsistencies , page , , , , , , . and tell you withal , such variances are no miracle in a traditionary mystery . in short , sir , if ever you design for truth , you must learn a new bravery , to be able to dare to be singular , think you that men that geld , suppress , and sorge books , are in the right , or they that persecute all that oppose them ? surely , i hope , you think better , that these are the engines of weaker error ; and yet this is even the present case ; and who dares even at this day , and in sull protestancy , to write or speak freely ; he is sure of being suppressed , at best . damnatory sentence . but before i leave this subject , there is another part of your discourse that deserves to be consider'd ; and that is , your damnatory sentence , wherein i wish i could spare you ; but your love for your mystery , has so inspir'd you , with such a furious and unchristian zeal , that 't would be an offence to the world , should i leave it unanswer'd under so great a name . thus , p. , you say , this faith is necessary to salvation : and p. . that no jew , turk or pagan can be sav'd without it . and that , whether he has us'd reasonable diligence , or not : or , whether it has been perplext with never so great controversies . the same you add , page , only you add this merciful apology , that men may understand it , if they will. and further , that i may give your argument the greatest force , you add , page . that to say , men can be sav'd by good works alone , without faith , is popery : and page . that if salvation were so common , christianity were but a better sect of philosophy ; and there would be too great a scope for infidelity , page . answer . alas , sir , i pity you ; had you regarded natural religion more , and your mystery less , you would not have abounded with such an envy and monopoly of salvation : what must we have no faith , but be sav'd by works , because we have not just this mystery ? and what is it nothing to christianity , that we have several degrees of glory as an encouragement , set in our prospect and search above the heathen ? or what , sir , is your eye evil , because god is good ? would you have god a devil , create men meerly for damnation ? or would you have him damn them to support your hypothesis ? see how your mystery has misled you , sir , that men should be sav'd , only by parrotting over a few unintelligible words : i might have expected this from some ignorant sectarist , but i never thought a a skilful doctor , should make god so hard a task-master , as to require men to believe so penally , what 't is plain , not one in a million understands : alas , sir ! you mistake the redemption of christ ! 't was to purchase us a new covenant , and not only teach us a new faith ! on adam's fall we chang'd our state , our tryal by a single precept for the law of nature , but had not the seed of the woman begun even then to have broke the serpent's head , at least through a covenant to be fulfill'd : can you blaspheme god , so as to say , he would let him be fruitful ? will not a prophet be able to vindicate his justice , that has declar'd long since , every man , and he alone should bear his own iniquity . i say , then christ has purchased us a new covenant , and since he is come , there is some reason for us to honour him , with the necessity of our faith through him , to lead us to salvation , and to obey his excellent precepts , to conduct us through the second covenant , the law of nature , to perfection : but where could be the necessity 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 i see , sir , your virtues have no extreams , you have faith , but allow no credulity ; if you did , you could never swallow these things ; you confirm the old sentence , credo quia impossibile est : but alas , sir , do you think to make your doctrine prevail by these means , by a dead anathematizing implicite faith , fitter for paganism than christianity . no , your uncharitableness cannot but blemish you , even among your own friends ; indeed the predestinarian does not exceed this ; and may be , men seeing thus , how one errour leads you into another so black , will be brought by it to see the truth they consider'd not before . besides , sir , had you consulted scripture in this , the apostle tells you plainly , that christ died for the sins of the whole world , john . , . and if not , think you god's mercy would have detain'd him till the latter ages of the world ; besides , sir , are we not charg'd not to judge them that are without , and are we not told , that where there is no law , there is no sin , john . . james . . and that they that have not been able to receive a law , or revelation , are to be tried by natural religion , and their conscience , as a law within themselves , rom. cap. . & . acts . . and indeed , which is the law improv'd by christ himself , and which is written in our heart , according to the apostle to the hebrews . alas , sir , had you judg'd of the wilfully ignorant , and perverse , you had left some colour for your censure to be true , and yet even then , were i in your case , i should be very unwilling to fling the first stone , especially since christ has told us , as we judge , we shall be judg'd ; i had rather let men be guilty , and god condemn them , then condemn my self by judging them . faith necessary . but methinks i hear you object to me , what faith is necessary then , if this be not ? i say , the faith of enoch , abraham , and moses , that god is a rewarder of the just in tender consciences , is enough , and that without idolizing works , as you reflect , page . i add also , that a particular faith of mercy through christ is necessary , where offer'd with conviction ; but whatever you do or say , god will never require consent , where he has not given evidence enough ; and what is it to me , if it can be had in a cause , if i cannot come at it . to these may be also added by consent the apostles creed , or any other , so it be not enforc'd ; but for your nice and speculative creeds , they are unnecessary , or else you accuse christ and his apostles , of a cowardly lukewarmness for omitting them , for all you insinuate , page . that we would be at creed-making too , sir ; but we beg your pardon , and have more charity ; for if we explain our hypothesis , 't is only to confute yours . consider therefore , sir , by your own reasoning , 't is popery , to judge of the catholick church by its multitude , page . so remember 't is our heat magnifies our zeal in this hypothesis above others ; for any other explain'd as nicely , would have as bad effects ; and give me leave to retort your argument : tho' i am modest , yet you have given me occasion to oppose you as popular ; and tho' i am cautious , yet truth bids me not fear , whether your mystery prove true , but warn you , that under protection of a mystery , you do not oppugn truth , v. page . to conclude , in charity i shall give you one advice more ; and that is , that you do not at every turn , like the papists , cap hereticks , and repeat catalogues of heresies , as you are apt to do , page . you are a protestant , sir , and you should rather lament , that church-impositions so long took away an innocent liberty of opinion from the world , and by an immoderate self-love of impos'd opinions and disciplines , rent the bond of peace and unity in sunder . conclvsion . i hope , sir , by this time you see , that we unitarians do understand what we write of ; for all what you charge us with , p. . nay , and more , i 'll add : we do it without mazing metaphysicks to help us ; indeed , we have not your breath of the populace , to encourage us into large and fair volumes ; but i hope we have truth , far better to recommend us to the sincere . i hope , sir , too , you see , we do not arrogate infinite knowledge , as you asperse us , page . but vindicate a truth , clear as the day : indeed , 't is plain , the first commandment , except to exclude persons is nonsence ; and who in this case must bear the reflection , you , or god ; surely we must acquit god ; and if we do , our faith must fling you into all the absurdities and contradictions of transubstantion . the case is not , whether in idea there may not be three self-conscious , coequal beings , but whether an interpreter of the first commandment can justifie such a thing : and that i am sure he cannot , for all your struggles after vindications , without absurdity and nonsence . but you 'll say , here is some colour for the trinity : and what , is there not then as much sor transubstantiation ? this is plain , our bodies are not two years together the same , and tho' differing thus twenty times in our lives , we call it still the same body : may not we on this , as justly salve transubstantiation , that the spirit of christ is able to dwell in infinite bodies at once ; and will not this make as properly the same body , as my body at twenty , is my body at thirty ; but you answer , you have scripture of your side ; and pray shew me half so strong a chapter for the trinity , as john the th is for transubstantiation . alas , sir , you see your fallacies do but divert your causes being expos'd for a time , till a nice refutation makes it look the blacker for its sophistry : and now you may see who 't is , that brings down the plain scriptures , to be wrested by the absurd reason of a mystery , page . and now men and angels may see , who are those absurd and senceless insidels , that reject what they have evidence for , v. page . in short , i dare appeal to all the world , tho' against me , whether suppression of books be not your best argument . you tell us , page , that our business is , to prove three persons three gods : and we do it by this , that if god be more than one person , when not particularly reveal'd , and contrary to his first commandment , his commandment is of no effect : but shall we grant that ? no , we 'll turn the havock of the first commandment justly , in contradictions upon you ; we need not ask with nicodemus , how can these things be ? page . but we 'll tell you , with the same reason , we may make three thousand gods , that you believe a lye , thess . . . and you had as good make all mankind one man , and destroy all plurality and numbers , &c. but for peace-sake , i shall forbear further reflections , page . hence , should you invent a thousand metaphysick strains more , this one plain truth would ruine them all ; indeed , did not mystery , the authority of the whore , rev. . and the great support of popery , bear up your hypothesis , her epitaph might have been wrote , i doubt not , many hundred years ago . mystery do i say , mystery and persecution are the devil's twins , and stand and fall both together ; persecution without mystery were too cruel , and mystery without blood too much nonsence to be born ; 't is these two are popery , and the worst of popery , transubstantiation without these were an innocent error : and what , are not protestants asham'd to weild the sword of antichrist ? yes surely ; but if they are , why do they stille us , and our books , is it not that they fear our truths ? are you not asham'd to rail at us for blasphemers and hereticks as you do , if i am not mistaken , we mean as sincerely , and interpret the scripture as well as you , for all your boasts , pag. . and you shall sind , god in the great day will shew which is the heretick : what , have we not as much reason to complain of the blemishes of the first and great commandment , as you have ; and cannot the controversie of elisha and baal , remember you , that 't is not numbers , but minds that god seeks . but you say , this is a mystery : and pray who has authoris'd it for one ? you be-ly god in his scriptures , if you say that he has ; no , 't is man's own invention , and that 't is that makes him idolize the uncharitable imposition so much : what , shall god bid us publish what none understand ? pray who can agree in this mystery ? or were the copy of it lost , who would be able exactly to hammer it out ? is this clear like a heavenly truth ? are we not asham'd to cast this stumbling-block in christianity , that has so justly offended all jews , turks , and pagans it ever came neer ; indeed , does not mahomet support his division by this very thing , and does he not complain above an hundred times against the abuse of the unity in his alchoran ? what shall i say , if we repent not this error , shall we not justly stand branded to all posterity , a race of pretended protestants , but really a philosophick sect of christian atheists : besides , what but the corruption of this unity in the godhead , can have so long prosper'd the mahometan above the christian , and the papists above the protestants . i shall add no more at present , but that were this mystery the greatest truth , yet considering mens weakness , 't were both hateful and seditious , to impose it on one another , in pain of salvation , to subscribe it only as an article of peace , in some cases might be tolerable , but to force their consciences to they know not what themselves , is in plain terms antichristian , uncharitable , and devilish . and alass ! now we see wherein our reformation is imperfect , that it has not preserv'd our eternal liberty of opinion , in things not expresly reveal'd , this is the root of all controversie , and this must be cur'd , if ever we hope for peace ; indeed , in a free remonstrancy , where all impositions are cut off , heresies of course pine and die with their authors , for want of room to be regarded . exhortation . and now , sir , i shall more particularly address my stile to yourself : and in the first place i beg you to pardon all my reprehensions , and if they are any where bitterer than they ought , reckon it my frailty , not my injustice , and at least you ought to thank me for my good intention ; but if you approve what i have wrote , return god the glory for your information , and i am satisfied . i assure you , sir , in myself i am griev'd to write against a good man ; nor would i , but that my love to god and truth commands me , nor do i write this , that i think you want either piety or ability , indeed you shine for both in your church ; but i would advise you , that you have mistook the truth ; nor wonder at it , for the greatest fathers in the church have done it before you . you have ventur'd to be singular once in conscience already , and your treatise of death shews you sincere ; dare once a deeper resignation , and a more singular truth , if you fall not back , you know not what service god may have for you to do . remember , sir , 't is constancy to follow truth in all changes of notions , and but obstinacy to remain stiff after conviction . besides , 't will be as much your glory as st. austin's , that you recant ; and if you are a christian indeed , you cannot hate your friend , or glass for shewing you your wrinkles , nor will your singularity be worse , if you see them ; unless in piety , that others are as bad , or worse than your self , and dare not see it . what tho' i am singular and contemptible , my truths if sincere are divine , and st. paul as well as you , had both zeal and popularity , and yet was in an error ; if you are in an error , pray god open your eyes ; and if i am , i beg him to grant me to be rectified by your instruction ; 't will be hard if a miracle be necessary to instruct and reconcile us . i cannot perswade myself , that you will continue to pervert this grand truth , and by reflections and niceties endeavour further to obscure and cloud it ; what you have hitherto done , i hope , nay believe you have done ignorantly , and because the socinian hypothesis was not sincere enough , you oppos'd it , but for the arrian , i almost dare promise myself more charity from you , if not conviction . at first i declin'd this book , as not thinking it proper to be wrote by an arrian , and as fearing least my own resentments might soyl the honour of god ; and i had done it still , had not i had more than humane motives to the contrary ; but whatever they were , they were to my self ; and my reader 's business is to mind my truths , and not my pretences . to conclude , if men are sincere , i think i have wrote enough to convince them , and if perverse to condemn them ; and charity engages me no further : but alas ! what avails it , if god will not vindicate his own honour , the attempts of his servants are otherwise in vain ; and yet at least i shall be content , tho' at any hazard , when i have done my duty . all glory to whom only due , to the one and only god , through his great and beloved son christ jesus . ☞ whoever answers this , is desir'd , to make his answer short , that he run not the world into labyrinths ; and that he repeat the whole body of the discourse verbatim , that he may not juggle the world out of substance , by snarling at trifles : these two conditions answer'd , i shall think i have a reply worth reading ; if not , i accuse it before-hand to the world for a cheat , and a deceit not worth taking notice of . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e a co● . . . ● . . r●● . ●● . , ● . j●● . . , , , . b e●●● . . , . e●●● . . ●ai . . c gen. . gen. . . gen. . , . d e●h . . ● . r●v . , . e cor. . ● . john ● . 〈◊〉 ●●h . . . r●● . . ●● . . 〈◊〉 . 〈…〉 . f john. . ●am . ● . ● . cor. ● . . g rom. . , . cor. . . , ▪ joh. . . h cor. . . i john . . ●or . . . ●●o . . — , — . . zech. . . n●h●m . ● . . rev . — . , ▪ ▪ . kin. . , . r●● . . . mark . . tim. . . k rev. . . - . . l e●●l . . p●●l . ● . ● . ●a . ● . ● . mat. ● . ● . ep● . . m z●●● . . . r●v . . . n rev. . — . . - . . - , . t●●it . . ze●● . . ● — . . a rev. . . col. . . eccl●s . . , — . . b h●b . . p●t . . . c john . . — . - . d cor. . , , , . phila. . dan . , . eph. . , , . , . e acts . — . . phil. . . luke . . john . , , — . . mat. . , . f john . . . mat. . , . mat. . . g john . heb. . , — . . eph. . . cor. . . h col. . , . i eph. . . heb. . , . cor. . — . , . a john . . acts . rom . . b exod. — . . isalm . . . cor. . . c john . , . cor. . , . d john . , . - . . phil. . , . cor. . , , . luke . , . e cor. . . mat. . — . . — , . eph. . . f john . . heb. . , , . eph. . . john . . g john . , . heb. . , , , , , , . h heb. . . phil. . . . eph. . . , , . pe● . . . g john . , . heb. . , , , , , , . i mat. . . . m●rk . . k gen. . — . , , — — . . i●ai . . . eze● . . . . esd . . , to . eccl. . . num. . . exod. . , , . refer'd to cor. . , . l isai . . m heb. . , . rev. . . n m●t. . — . . luk● . . a acts . , . heb. . , &c. ●uk● . . r m ▪ . . 〈◊〉 . . b acts . , - . , . a m●● . ● . . j hn . , . b heb. , . c john. . . to . heb. . . m●● . . , ● . john . . acts . ▪ ●● . ● . . ● . . 〈◊〉 . . . . john . . ▪ . ● . ▪ ▪ . , ▪ . . 〈◊〉 . ▪ . . d m●● . . ● ▪ d m●● . . ● ▪ e r●● . l●k ● . john . , ● . f m●● . . ▪ , . ●●k ● . . m●●k . — . . . g a●●s . — . ▪ . , ● . a john ▪ ● . . b acts . ▪ . . c cor. . , . rev. . . phil. . . j hn . . ep● . . , , , . a acts . , . john . . eph. . , . phil. . . rom. . ▪ . . col. . , . john ▪ . a exod . , . d●ut . . . mark . . to . b john . . tim. . . cor. . , , . john . . c luke . . mat. . . d rom. . . tim. . . e john . — . . f rev. . — , , . esdr . . . usque . g exod. . . h cor. . , . i john . - . - . . k eph. . , . rev. . . john . . cor. . . l john . , . m john . . tim. ▪ - . . acts . , . n john . - . . ma● . . . luke . . a john . — . . john . . b acts . . — . . luke . . cor. . . eph. . . c cor. . isai . . . rom. . . — . . acts . . — . . luke . . cor. . , . d john . , , , — . . rev. . . mat. . . mark . . e mat. . . mark . . luke . . f acts . , . g job . . h gen. . . job . . psal . . . i nehem. . . rom. . , . k john . , , — . . eph. . ▪ l john . , , — . ● - . . m cor. ▪ n cor . . cor. . . o acts . . luke . , p rom. . , . th●ss . . ▪ q mark . . luke . . r john ▪ . a vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity and the incarnation of the son of god occasioned by the brief notes on the creed of st. athanasius and the brief history of the unitarians or socinians and containing an answer to both / by william sherlock. sherlock, william, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity and the incarnation of the son of god occasioned by the brief notes on the creed of st. athanasius and the brief history of the unitarians or socinians and containing an answer to both / by william sherlock. sherlock, william, ?- . the second edition. 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should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng nye, stephen, ?- . -- brief history of the unitarians. brief notes on the creed of st. athanasius. trinity. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity , and the incarnation of the son of god. occasioned by the brief notes on the creed of st. athanasius , and the brief history of the vnitarians , or socinians , and containing an answer to both . by william sherlock , d. d. master of the temple . the second edition . imprimatur , z. isham , r. p. d. henrico episc. lond. à sacris . ian. . . london : printed for w. rogers , at the sun over against st. dunstans church in fleet-street . . to the reader . i will make no apology for publishing this vindication of the great and fundamental mysteries of our religion , for if ever it were necessary , it is now , when atheists and hereticks , some openly , some under a disguise , conspire together to ridicule the trinity , and the incarnation . i confess , the book is too big , could i have made it less , as at first i intended ; but when i was once engaged , i saw a necessity of going farther ; and i hope no man will have reason to complain , that i have said too much , but those , who will find a great deal too much said , for them to answer . my original design was to vindicate the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation , from those pretended absurdities and contradictions , which were so confidently charged on them : and this i 'm sure i have done ; for i have given a very easie and intelligible notion of a trinity in vnity , and if it be possible to explain this doctrine intelligibly , the charge of contradictions vanishes ; and whether men will believe this account or not , they can't deny , but that it is very possible and intelligible , and if we could go no farther , that is enough in matters of revelation . but i hope , i have done a great deal more than this , and proved , that it is the true scripture account of it , and agreeable to the doctrine of the ancient fathers ; and have vindicated the scripture proofs of a trinity and incarnation from the pitiful sophistries of the late socinian historian . i have not indeed answered particularly the whole book in order and method , as it lies , which was too tedious a work , and not necessary ; but i have considered whatever was most material in it , and have avoided nothing , because it was hard to answer , but because it needed no answer , as i am ready to satisfie the world , whenever a just occasion calls for it : for having dipt my pen in the vindication of so glorious a cause , by the grace of god , i will never desert it , while i can hold a pen in my hand . i must thankfully own , that the writing of this book has given me clearer and more distinct notions of this great mystery , then i had before , which is the reason , why the reader will find some things explained towards the end , which i spoke doubtfully of at first , as particularly the difference between the eternal generation of the son , and the procession of the holy ghost ; and i hope this is a pardonable fault . the writing this book has cost me many thoughts , and those who have a mind throughly to understand it , must not think much if it cost them some ; and if they cannot be contented to bestow some serious thoughts on it , it will be lost labour to read it . i pray god give success to it , and open the eyes of those men , before it be too late , who are so industrious to write or disperse such brief notes and brief histories , as are valuable for nothing but blasphemy and nonsense ; for i will be bold to say , that socinianism ( after all its pretences to reason ) is one of the most stupid sensless heresies , that ever infested the christian church . the contents . sect . i. concerning the nature of a contradiction , and how to know it . page . many contradictions pretended , where there are none , as in the notion of a spirit , and of god how to discover when a pretended contradiction is not real , but in our imperfect conception of things . it is absurd to dispute against the being of any thing from the difficulty of conceiving it . what the natural boundaries of humane knowledge are . sect . ii. the athanasian creed contains nothing but what is necessary to the true belief of the trinity and incarnation . the dispute between the greek and lat. church , about the filioque . sect . iii. concerning the necessity of the catholick faith to salvation , and a brief history of athanasius . that the catholick faith is necessary to salvation . what is meant by keeping the catholick faith whole and undefiled . the scriptures being a compleat rule of faith , do not make athanasius's creed an unnecessary rule . the great usefulness of ancient creeds . pope leo iii. would not deny salvation to those who disowned the filioque . what is meant by the catholick faith. the history of athanasius . sect . iv. the catholick doctrine of a trinity in unity , and unity and trinity , explained , and vindicated from all pretended absurdities and contradictions . what it is that makes any substance numerically one. the unity of a spirit nothing else but self-consciousness . ibid. and therefore mutual consciousness makes three persons essentially and numerically one. the unity of a mind or spirit reaches as far as its self-consciousness does . that this is the true scripture notion of the unity of the father , son , and holy ghost . ibid. the unity between father and son explained . the union of created spirits , an union in knowledge , will and love. the same union between father , son , and holy ghost . ibid. but this , which is only a moral union between creatures , is an essential union between father , son , and holy ghost , as it is the effect of mutual consciousness . this proved from scripture , as to the unity between father and son. this makes all three divine persons coessential and coequal . that the holy spirit is one with father and son by a mutual consciousness , proved from scripture . this notion contains the true orthodox faith of a trinity in unity . for it does not confound the persons , but makes them distinct . ibid. nor divide the substance , but makes them numerically one. this makes the doctrine of the trinity as intelligible as the notion of one god. ibid. the material images of substance confound our notions , both of one god , and of a trinity in unity . god must be considered as eternal truth and wisdom . wisdom and truth a pure and simple act , and contains all divine perfections . three infinite minds must necessarily be mutually conscious to each other . no positive notion of infinity , but only in a mind . no infinite extension . what the true notion of infinite is , that it is absolute perfection . that there are no absolute perfections , but those of a mind . extension is no perfection , nor to be omnipresent by extension . the same absolute perfections of a mind , by a mutual consciousness , may be entire and equal in three infinite minds . this reconciles the perfect equality and subordination of the divine persons . ibid. and shows , how each person is god , and all but one god. this gives an account of the different modi subsistendi , of which the schools speak . and how the operations of the trinity ad extra are common to all three persons . an answer to the absurdities and contradictions charged on the doctrine of the trinity by the brief notes . sect . v. the doctrine of the fathers and schools about a trinity in unity , reconciled to the foregoing explication of it . page that the fathers made the three divine persons three distinct infinite minds that father , son , and holy ghost are as distinct persons , as peter , james , and john , how to be understood . how the fathers explain the unity of the godhead . . by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or coessentiality of the divine persons . what they meant by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. how they proved the unity of essence from the sameness of nature . gregory nyssen's reasoning in this matter , and vindicated from the mesrepresentation of petavius and dr. cudworth . . &c. . to this the fathers added a numerical unity of the divine essence . concerning the unity of energy and power . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or circumincession is self-consciousness . st. austin explains the unity of the divine persons by examples of self-consciousness . the unity of the godhead consists in the unity of principle . how the three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost are essential to the notion of one god , explained at large . , &c. sect . vi. concerning expounding scripture by reason . the arguments against a trinity in the history of the unitarians , letter . particularly answered . , &c. his first argument . his second argument . coloss. . the first-born of every creature explained . the mediatory kingdom of christ explained at large . his third , fourth , and fifth arguments answered . his sixth argument . his seventh argument . his eighth argument from those texts , which declare that the father only is god. ibid. his ninth argument , that if christ were god , there was no need of giving the holy spirit to his human nature . his tenth and eleventh arguments . his arguments against the godhead of the holy ghost . ibid. concerning the personality of the holy ghost . that the spirit is obtained of god by our prayers , therefore it self is not god , answered . father , son , and holy ghost , the entire object of worship . page those who do not worship the trinity , do not worship the true god , if father , son , and holy ghost be god. no need of any new cammand to worship the holy ghost , when it is revealed , that he is one god with the father and son. ibid. that the scripture speaks of god as one person , answered . whether the socinian faith be a reasonable and accountable faith. the socinian faith ridicules the scriptures . this is particularly shown in the expositions of scripture , contained in the history of the unitarians . ibid. the form of baptism in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost , explained . john , . in the beginning was the word , &c. explained and vindicated . how this historian has represented grotius . socinianism makes the iewish oeconomy very unreasonable and unaccountable . socinianism ridicules the christian religion . sect . vii . an answer to what remains in the brief notes . concerning the generation of the son. ibid. the equality and coeternity of the persons in the trinity . concerning the incarnation . how an infinite and finite being may be united into one person . what makes a personal union . a vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity , and of the incarnation of the son of god , in answer to the brief notes on the greed of st. athanasius . sect . i. concerning the nature of a contradiction , and how to know it . before i particularly examine the brief notes on athanasius 's creed , which under a pretence of exposing that creed , charge the christian faith itself of three persons and one god , with the most monstrous absurdities and contradictions : i shall , . shew what a contradiction is , and in what cases we can judge of a contradiction . . i shall take a brief view of the athanasian creed , and shew that it signifies no more than that there are three persons and one god , or a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity ; and that if we own this , we must own the particular explications of the athanasian creed . first , as for the first : a contradiction is to deny and affirm the same thing in the same sense ; as to say , that a thing is , and is not at the same time ; that there is but one god , and that there is three gods ; that is , that there is , and that there is not , but one god ; for if there be three gods , then it is not true that there is only one god : things which are so contrary as to contradict each other , can never be both true , for all contradictions finally resolve into this : it is , and it is not ; which is absolutely impossible . but when we come to apply this to the nature of things , we may easily fancy contradictions where there are none : for a contradiction in the nature of things , is such a notion or idea of any thing as implies a contradiction ; and then it is impossible any such thing can be , as it is impossible , that such a proposition whose terms contradict each other should be true : but then before we can pronounce , that such a notion or idea is contradictions , we must be sure , that we perfectly understand and comprehend the nature of that being , otherwise the contradiction may not be in the thing , but in our manner of conceiving it : it is not enough in this case to say , we cannot understand it , and know not how to reconcile it ; but we must say , that we do perfectly understand it , and know that it cannot be reconciled . as for instance : some new philosophers will tell you , that the notion of a spirit , or an immaterial substance is a contradiction , for by substance they understand nothing but matter , and then an immaterial substance is immaterial matter , that is , matter and no matter , which is a contradiction : but yet this does not prove an immaterial substance to be a contradiction , unless they could first prove , that there is no substance , but matter ; and that they cannot conceive any other substance but matter , does not prove , that there is no other . thus the atheist discovers a great many contradictions or absurdities in the very notion and idea of a god , or of an eternal , omnipresent , omnipotent , omniscient being . for to be without a cause , and without a beginning , without time , and without succession ; to be present every-where , and to fill all places , and yet to have no parts , no extension ; to be able to create a world , and to annihilate it again , to make all things of nothing , and to reduce all things to nothing again ; to know all things , past , present , and to come , especially the most contingent futurities , the freest thoughts and counsels of men , before they think them , or some ages before they themselves are in being , without imposing a fatal necessity on humane actions ; i say , the notion of such a being is very much above our conception , and to an atheist , who is for believing nothing , but what he can fully comprehend , seems very absurd and contradictious . this shews , that men may easily mistake in charging the nature and notions of things with contradictions , and therefore we must enquire , how we may discover , when such an appearing contradiction is not real , but is wholly owing to our imperfect conception of things . i. now in the first place we have great reason to suspect this , when it relates to such things as all mankind agree , we do not , and cannot fully understand or comprehend ; for it is a vain and arrogant presumption to say what is , or what is not a contradiction , when we confess , we do not understand or comprehend the thing we speak of : a contradiction in the nature of things , is what is contrary to the nature of that being of which we speak : now so far as we understand the nature of any being , we can certainly tell what is contrary and contradictions to its nature : as that accidents should subsist without their subject , that a body should be without extension , or an organized body without any distinction of parts ; that the same individual body should be in heaven and on earth , and in a thousand distant places at the same time ; that flesh and blood should lie invisible under the species of bread and wine ; that a body , suppose of five or six foot long , should be concealed under the least crum of bread ; these and such like are the manifest absurdities and contradictions of transubstantiation ; and we know that they are so , because we know the nature of a body , and know that such things are a contradiction to the essential properties of a body : but now all men must confess , that they have not a clear and comprehensive notion of the nature and essential properties of a spirit , especially of an infinite spirit , as god is ; and it is impossible to know , what is contrary to the nature of a spirit , if we know not , what the nature of a spirit is ; and that man , who shall pretend to comprehend all that is possible in an infinite nature , is as contemptibly ridiculous , as if he should challenge to himself infinite knowledge , for without that , no man can comprehend what is infinite . ii. it is a sufficient proof , that such seeming contradictions are not in the nature of things , but in our imperfect manner of conceiving them , when we have other evident proofs , that the thing is , though we cannot comprehend it : for nothing can be , which involves a contradiction in its nature , and therefore if it is , the contradiction is not real , but imaginary . as for instance : as unconceivable as the notion of eternity is , yet all mankind , even atheists themselves , must confess , that something was from eternity ; for if ever there was nothing , it is impossible there ever should have been any thing ; for that which once was not , can never be without a cause , and therefore whatever difficulties there may be in the notion of an eternal being , we must acknowledge something eternal , and that is proof enough , that there is nothing absurd or contradictious in the notion , though we cannot comprehend it ; and i am sure the notion of a first eternal cause , is much more easie and natural , than to make either matter , or the world and all the creatures in it eternal . whatever we can certainly prove to be , either by sense , reason , or revelation , if there be any difficulty in conceiving it , we must attribute that to the imperfection of our own knowledge , not to any absurdity or contradiction in the thing itself . this shews how unreasonable that method is , which is taken by atheists , infidels , and hereticks , to dispute against the being of any thing from the difficulty of conceiving it , and some pretended absurdities and contradictions in it , when there are very plain proofs that the thing is , and such as it is impossible for them fairly to answer ; this is the fundamental miscarriage , which is not owing to a prudent caution , as is pretended , but to wilfulness and obstinacy , and pride of understanding , or to a fixed prejudice and aversion to the belief of such matters , and therefore i shall not only observe , but particularly prove the unreasonableness of it . the proof of this comes to this one point , that we may have sufficient evidence of the being of a thing , whose nature we cannot conceive and comprehend ; he who will not own this , contradicts the sense and experience of mankind ; and he who confesses this , and yet rejects the belief of that , which he has good evidence for , meerly because he cannot conceive it , is a very absurd and senseless infidel . and the reason of this is very plain , because all the ways whereby the being of any thing can be proved , are obvious and intelligible to all mankind , but the nature of most things are very dark and obscure , and such as the wisest men know little or nothing of : and therefore we may certainly know , that a great many things are , whose nature and essential properties we cannot conceive : as to shew this particularly . . the proofs that any thing is , are either from sense , from reason , or from revelation . what is evident to sense , is evident to all men , who have their senses ; what is plainly proved by reason ( and it is not a sufficient proof , if it be not plain ) is plain to all men , who can use their reason ; and what is plainly revealed every man may know , who can read and understand the scriptures ; the being and nature of things are known very different ways , and the being of things not only may , but most commonly is known without knowing their natures : any man may know the first , but few men in any measure can know the second : whoever has his senses about him , knows that there are such things , as he sees , hears , or feels , but the philosophy of nature is not learnt by sense : reason will convince us by some visible and sensible effects , that there are some invisible causes , without informing us distinctly , what the nature and powers of such causes are ; and god may and does reveal many things to us , which we either are not capable of fully comprehending , or the nature of which he does not think fit particularly to explain to us ; and in all these cases we may certainly know , that things are , without understanding the nature and philosophy of them . . it is so far from being a wonder to meet with any thing , whose nature we do not perfectly understand , that i know nothing in the world , which we do perfectly understand : it is agreed by all men , whoever considered this matter , that the essences of things cannot be known , but only their properties and qualities : the world is divided into matter , and spirit , and we know no more , what the substance of matter , than what the substance of a spirit is , though we think we know one , much better than the other : we know thus much of matter , that it is an extended substance , which fills a space , and has distinct parts , which may be separated from each other , that it is susceptible of very different qualities , that it is hot or cold , hard or soft , &c. but what the substance of matter is , we know not : and thus we know the essential properties of a spirit ; that it is a thinking substance , with the faculties of understanding and will , and is capable of different vertues or vices , as matter is of sensible qualities , but what the substance of a spirit is , we know no more than what the substance of matter is : thus as for the essential properties , operations , and powers , of matter , sense , experience , and observation will tell us what they are , and what causes constantly produce such effects , and this is all we do , or can know of it ; and he who will not believe that matter is extended , that the fire burns , that water may be condensed by frost into a firm and solid pavement , that seed sown in the earth will produce its own kind again , that a body can move from one place to another ; that a stone falls to the ground , and vapours ascend and thicken into clouds , and fall down again to the earth in gentle showers , &c. i say , he who will not believe these things till he can give a philosophical account of them , must deny his senses in complement to his understanding ; and he who thinks , that he does understand these matters , would make a man question , whether he has any sense . thus it is also with reference to a spirit : we feel within ourselves , that we can think and reason , that we can choose and refuse , that we can love and hate , and desire and fear , but what these natural powers and passions are , we know not ; how thoughts rise in our minds , and how one thought begets another ; how a thought can move our bodies , or fix them in their seat ; how the body can raise thoughts and passions in the soul , or the thoughts and passions of the soul can affect the body : the properties and operations both of bodies and spirits are great secrets and mysteries in nature , which we understand nothing of , nor are concerned to understand them , no more than it is our business to understand , how to make either a body or a spirit ; which we have no power to do , if we did understand it , and therefore it would be an useless piece of knowledge , which would serve no end but curiosity ; and that is reason enough why our wise maker should not communicate this knowledge to us , were we capable of it , because it does not belong to our natures ; as no knowledge does which we can make no use of : the perfect notions and idea's of things are proper only to that almighty mind , which can give being to them . now this plainly shews , what the natural boundaries of humane knowledge are ; how far we may attain to a certain knowledge , and where we must give off our enquiries , unless we have a mind to impose upon our understandings with some uncertain and fanciful conjectures , or to perplex our selves with inexplicable difficulties . . as first , we have certain ways of discovering the being of things , which fall within the compass of our knowledge ; this our senses , reason , or revelation , will acquaint us with , and therefore we may know what things there are in the world , as far as they fall under the notice of sense , or are discovered by reason or revelation . . we may know what things are , or what their essential properties , qualities , operations , and powers are , whereby we can distinguish one sort of beings from another ; as suppose , a body from a spirit , bread from flesh , and wine from blood ; and can reason from effects to causes , and from causes to effects , with as great certainty as we understand , what the causes or effects are . . but the essences of things , and the philosophy of their natures , the reasons of their essential properties and powers , which immediately result from their natures , the manner of their production , and the manner of their operations , are mysteries to us , and will be so , do what we can ; and therefore here our enquiries must cease , if we enquire wisely ; for it is vain and absurd to perplex ourselves with such questions , which we can no more answer , than we can make a world. the sum is this , when we charge any doctrine with absurdities and contradictions , we must be sure , that we understand the thing ; for if it be such a thing , as we do not , and cannot understand the nature of , we may imagine a thousand absurdities and contradictions , which are owing wholly to our ignorance of things . sect . ii. the athanasian creed contains nothing but what is necessary to the true belief of the trinity and incarnation . ii. let us now take a view of the athanasian creed , which this prophane author makes the subject of his drollery and ridicule ; and examine , whether there be any thing in it , which a good catholick christian can reject , without rejecting the catholick doctrines of the holy and ever blessed trinity , and the mysterious incarnation of the son of god ; for if this creed contains nothing but what is necessary to this belief , and what every christian who believes these doctrines must profess , then all these scoffs , which are cast upon the athanasian creed , do indeed belong to the christian faith itself , if the trinity and incarnation be christian doctrines . as to begin with the doctrine of the holy trinity . the athanasian creed tells us : the catholick faith is this , that we worship one god in trinity , and trinity in vnity : that is , that we worship one god , and three persons , father , son , and holy ghost ; and this all christians grant to be the catholick faith , except arians , macedonians , and socinians , and such like hereticks : and how we must worship one god in trinity , and trinity in unity , is explained in the next paragraph . neither confounding the persons , nor dividing the substance . which must be acknowledged , if there be three persons and one god : for if we confound the persons , by saying , that they are all but one person under three different names and titles , or denominations , then we destroy the distinction of persons ; if we divide the substance , by saying , that every person has a separate divine nature of his own , as every man has a separate humane nature , then we make three gods , as peter , iames , and iohn , are three men , which is to overthrow the doctrine of one god ; and therefore the creed adds , for there is one person of the father , another of the son , and another of the holy ghost . but the god-head of the father , of the son , and of the holy ghost is all one ; the glory equal , the majesty co-eternal . this is so far from being a nicity , that it is no less than a demonstration , if we confess three persons and one god ; for if there be three persons , then the person of the father , the person of the son , the person of the holy ghost , must be distinct persons , or they cannot be three ; if there be but one god , then the godhead of all the three persons is but one , for if the godhead were more than one , there must be more than one god ; for the godhead makes the god , and there must be as many gods , as there are godheads , as there must be as many men as there are particular humane natures : and if the godhead be but one , then with respect to the same one godhead , all three persons must have the same glory and majesty ; for there cannot be three different glories and majesties of the same one godhead ; and therefore as it follows : such as the father is , such is the son , and such is the holy ghost . the father vncreate , the son vncreate , and the holy ghost vncreate . the father incomprehensible , the son incomprehensible , the holy ghost incomprehensible . the father eternal , the son eternal , and the holy ghost eternal . and yet they are not three eternals , but one eternal . as also there are not three incomprehensibles , nor three vncreated ; but one vncreated , and one incomprehensible . so likewise the father is almighty , the son almighty , and the holy ghost almighty . and yet there are not three almighties , but one almighty . so the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god. and yet there are not three gods , but one god. so likewise the father is lord , the son lord , and the holy ghost lord. and yet not three lords , but one lord. for like as we are compelled by the christian verity , to acknowledge every person by himself to be god and lord. so are we forbidden by the catholick religion , to say , there are three gods , or three lords . this is the sum of all , that as the catholick religion , both natural , mosaical , and christian , requires us to believe , that there is but one god , so especially the christian religion teaches us , that there are three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost , who are this one god. now if each person with respect to the same divine nature be god , then all the essential attributes and perfections of a god must be allowed to each person ; that he is uncreated , infinite , or incomprehensible , eternal , almighty god and lord ; unless we will say , that there may be a created , finite , temporal , impotent god ; that is , a god , who is not in truth either god or lord : and yet though we must acknowledge each person to be god and lord , we must not assert three distinct uncreated , incomprehensible , eternal , almighty gods ( which is the true sence of the article , of which more anon ) for that is to make not one , but three gods and lords , which overthrows the unity of the godhead . now whatever difficulty there may be in conceiving this ( which i do not now dispute ) if that be any fault , it is no fault of the athanasian creed , but of the doctrine of the trinity itself ; the athanasian creed only tells us what we must believe , if we believe a trinity in unity , three persons and one god : and i challenge any man , who sincerely proffesses this faith , to tell me , what he can leave out o● this exposition , without destroying either the divinity of some of the three persons , or the unity of the godhead . if each person must be god and lord , must not each person be uncreated , incomprehensible , eternal , almighty ? if there be but one god , and one lord , can there be three separated uncreated , incomprehensible , eternal , almighty gods ! which must of necessity be three gods , and three lords : this creed does not pretend to explain , how there are three persons , each of which is god , and yet but one god , ( of which more hereafter ) but only asserts the thing , that thus it is , and thus it must be , if we believe a trinity in unity ; which should make all men , who would be thought neither arians , nor socinians , more cautious how they express the least dislike of the athanasian creed , which must either argue , that they condemn it , before they understand it , or that they have some secret dislike to the doctrine of the trinity . nor is this to make any additions to the christian faith , as some object , no more than to explain what we mean by god is an addition to the faith : this was all the christian fathers aimed at in their disputes against arius , and other enemies of the catholick faith , and in those creeds they framed in opposition to these heresies , to assert the true divinity of the son and holy spirit in such express terms , as would admit of no evasion : for this reason they insisted so immoveably upon the term homo-ousios , which signifies , that the son was of the same nature with the father , as he must be , if he be true and real god ; whereas had he been only like the father , as the arians asserted , he could not be one god with him ; for that which is only like something else , is not the same : now though the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is not in scripture , yet this is no unscriptural addition to the faith , because all that is signified by it is there ; that is , that christ is the eternal and only begotten son of god , a true and real , not a made , or created , or nominal god : and the athanasian creed , as far as it relates to this matter , is only a more particular explication of the homo-ousios , or in what sense the son is of the same nature with the father , and one god with him . in the next place , the athanasian creed having very explicitely declared the unity of the godhead in three persons , it proceeds to the distinct characters of each person , and their unity among themselves ; and here also it teaches nothing but what seems essential to the distinction and unity of the three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost . the father is made of none , neither created nor begotten . the son is of the father alone , not made , nor created , but begotten . the holy ghost is of the father , and of the son , neither made , nor created , nor begotten , but proceeding . so there is one father , not three fathers , one son , not three sons , one holy ghost , not three holy ghosts . the distinction then between these three divine persons , ( if i may so speak ) is in the manner of their subsistence : that the father is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , god of himself , the original fountain of the deity , not made , nor created , for then he would be a creature , not a god ; nor begotten , for then he would be a son , not the first father and origine of all . the son is of the father alone , which is essential to his being a son ; not made , nor created , for there was no time , when he was not , as all things made or created must have a beginning , but begotten ; which is the proper term , whereby we express generation , and whereby the eternal generation of the son is expressed in scripture : what it signifies we know not any further than this , that it is the eternal communication of the nature and image of the father to him ; as an earthly parent communicates his own nature and likeness to his son. the holy ghost is of the father and of the son , not made , nor created , for no creature , not begotten , for no son ; but proceeding , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the manner of which we understand no more , than the manner of the eternal generation ; but there is this plain difference between being begotten and proceeding , that though the holy spirit have the same nature with the father and the son , yet he represents the person of neither , as the son does the person of the father , as being the brightness of his father's glory , and the express image of his person : and therefore is said not to be begotten , but to proceed . but the difficulty of this is with reference to the dispute between the greek and latin church about the filioque , or the spirits proceeding from the father and from the son : the reason why the latin church insists on this , is to preserve the unity and subordination of the divine persons to each other : the son is united and subordinate to the father , as begotten by him : the holy ghost is united and subordinate to father and son , as proceeding both from the father and from the son ; but if the holy spirit proceeded only from the father , not from the son , there would be no union and subordination between the son and the spirit , and yet the spirit is the spirit of the son , as well as of the father , and that these three persons be one god , it is necessary , there should be an union of persons , as well as one nature : but then the greek church confesses , that the spirit proceedeth from the father by the son , though not from the son ; and by and from are such niceties , when we confess , we understand not the manner of this procession of the holy spirit , as ought to have made no dispute , much less a schism between the two churches : the greek church acknowledges the distinction of persons , and their unity and subordination ; that there is one father , not three fathers , one son , not three sons , one holy ghost , not three holy ghosts ; that the vnity in trinity , and the trinity in vnity is to be worshipped : which is all this creed requires as necessary to salvation : he therefore , that will be saved , must thus think of the trinity : that is , must acknowledge and worship a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity ; which the greek church does , and therefore are not excluded from salvation in this creed upon the nice dispute of the spirit 's proceeding from or by the son. that which seems to sound harshest in this creed is what follows : and in this trinity , none is afore or after other , none is greater or less than another . but the whole three persons are co-eternal and co-equal . and yet this we must acknowledge to be true , if we acknowledge all three persons to be eternal , for in eternity there can be no afore , or after other ; and that we cannot conceive an eternal generation or procession , is no great wonder , when we cannot conceive an eternal being , without any beginning or any cause : as for greater or less , and the equality of three persons , this we must confess also , if we believe all three persons to be one supream and soveraign god ; for in one supream deity , there cannot be greater or less ; but then we must distinguish between subordination and equality : persons who are equal may be subordinate to each other ; and though there be not a greater or less , yet there is order in the trinity : equality is owing to nature , subordination to relation and order , which is indeed a greater and less in relation and order without an inequality of nature , and it is the equality of persons with respect to their nature , not to their order and subordination , of which the creed speaks ; for in this sense the father is greater than the son , and the father and the son than the holy spirit , as being first in order , but their nature is the same , and their persons with respect to this same nature co-equal . and now i see no reason to make such exclamations , as some men do , against that damnatory sentence , that except every one do keep this faith whole and undefiled , without doubt he shall perish everlastingly , and that he that will be saved must thus think of the trinity ; which refers to no more than the belief of three persons and one god , or a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , which i take to be the true christian faith , and as necessary to salvation as any part of the christian faith is ; but of this more anon . thus much for the doctrine of the trinity ; as for the doctrine of the incarnation , no man can reasonably except against that explication , which is given of it in the athanasian creed , without rejecting the doctrine it self , and then we may as well part with the doctrine of the incarnation , as with the athanasian creed . as to shew this particularly : for the right faith is , that we believe and confess , that our lord iesus christ the son of god , is god and man : for otherwise the son of god is not incarnate , has not taken humane nature upon him . god of the substance of the father , begotten before the worlds : as he must be , if he be god : man of the substance of his mother , born in the world ; for he could not be true man , if he did not partake of humane flesh and blood. perfect god and perfect man ; for otherwise he were neither god , nor man : of a reasonable soul , and humane flesh subsisting : for a perfect man consists of soul and body , and unless he have both , he is not a man ; in opposition to those hereticks , who thought that the divine nature animated a humane body , instead of a soul , but that christ had no humane reasonable soul , though he had a humane body , and therefore was no more a man , than a humane body without a soul is a man , but a god cloathed with flesh and blood. equal to the father as touching his godhead ; for he is perfect god , of the same substance with the father ; and inferiour to his father as touching his manhood : for a man is inferiour to god and therefore inferiour to the father , though united in one person to the son. who although he be god and man , yet he is not two , but one christ. one , not by the conversion of the godhead into flesh , but by taking the manhood into god. one altogether , not by confusion of substance , but by vnity of person . for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man ; so god and man is one christ. all this is necessary to the belief of the incarnation , that the same jesus christ is both god and man ; for if he be but one christ , he must be god and man in one person ; for two persons make two christs ; and if the same one christ be both god and man , then the divine and humane nature continue distinct without any mixture or confusion , he is perfect god and perfect man , in opposition to the heresies of nestorius and eutyches , the first of whom divided the persons , the second confounded the natures ; the first made god and man two distinct persons , and two christs , the second swallowed up the humanity in god. this may serve for a brief vindication of the athanasian creed , that it teaches nothing , but what is necessary to the true belief of a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , and the incarnation of the son of god ; and i thought fit to premise this , to let the world see , that all the spight against athanasius's creed , is not so much intended against that creed , as against the doctrine of the trinity and incarnation , which are so fenced and guarded from all heretical senses and expositions in that creed , that there is no place left for tricks and evasions : and now i come to consider the brief notes , and to expose the venome and blasphemy of them , which deserves a sharper confutation than this : and that this author may not complain of unfair usage , i shall examine them paragraph by paragraph . sect . iii. concerning the necessity of the catholick faith to salvation , and a brief history of athanasius . whosoever will be saved , before all things , 't is necessary , that he hold the catholick faith. a good life is of absolute necessity to salvation ; but a right belief in these points , that have been always controverted in the churches of god , is in no degree necessary , much less necessary before all things . he that leads a profane and vicious life , sins against a plain acknowledged rule , and the plain and unquestioned word and letter of the divine law , and the dictates of natural conscience , he wilfully refuses to advert to these monitors , and therefore can no way palliate or excuse his wickedness : but he that errs in a matter of faith , after having used reasonable diligence to be rightly informed , is in no fault at all : his error is pure ignorance ; not a culpable ignorance ; for how can it be culpable not to know that , of which a man is ignorant , after a diligent and impartial enquiry . this , i must confess , is as artificial an introduction to these notes , as could have been invented ; for it makes faith a very useless , and heresie a very innocent and harmless thing ; and then men need not be much concerned what they believe , if they take care to live well : the creed affirms , that the catholick faith is before all things necessary to salvation ; if this be true , then how vertuously soever men live , they may be damned for heresie ; and this is a dangerous point , and will make men too much afraid of heresie to trade in such notes as these ; and therefore this must be confuted in the first place , to take off the dread and fear of heresie : now can we hope , that any thing should escape the censures of such a critick , who will not allow the catholick faith to be necessary to salvation ? for if the catholick faith is not necessary , no faith is , and then we may be saved without faith ; and yet the scripture tells us , that we are justified and saved by faith ; and if any faith saves us , i suppose , it must be the catholick faith , and then whoever does not hold this saving catholick faith must be damned . so that at best , he has placed this note wrong ; he should only have opposed the necessity of athanasius's catholick faith to salvation , not of the catholick faith in general ; and yet this seems not to be a mistake , but design , for his arguments equally hold against all faith , as well as against athanasius's creed , and will serve a turk , a iew , or a pagan , as well as a heretick . for if what he says is true ; he that errs in a question of faith , after having used reasonable diligence to be rightly informed , is in no fault at all : how comes an atheist , or an infidel , a turk , or a jew to be in any fault ? and if they be good moral men [ and many of them are , or may be so ] why should they be damned for their atheism or infidelity , for their not believing a god , or not believing in christ at all ? for are not these questions of faith , whether there be a god and a providence , and whether christ be that messias , who came from god ? or does our author think , that no atheist or infidel , no unbelieving jew , or heathen , ever used reasonable diligence to be rightly informed ? whatever he can say against their reasonable diligence , i doubt , will be as easily said against the reasonable diligence of socinians , and other hereticks . if you say , he confines this to such points as have always been controverted in the churches of god , i desire to know a reason , why he thus confines it ? for does not his reason equally extend to the christian faith it self , as to those points , which have been controverted in christian churches ? and why then should not infidels as well have the benefit of this principle , as hereticks ? but i desire to know , what articles of our faith have not been controverted by some hereticks or other ? and whether then this does not give sufficient scope to infidelity , to renounce all the articles of our creed , which have been denied or corrupted by some professed christians ? but what he would insinuate in this , that these points of the athanasian creed have always been matter of controversie in the christian church , is manifestly false , as appears from all the records of the church : the anti - nicene fathers were of the same faith , before the definition of the council of nice , as the learned dr. ball has abundantly proved ; this was always the faith of the christian church ; and those hereticks , who taught otherwise , either separated themselves from the church , or were flung out of it ; and i hope the disputes of hereticks against the catholick faith , shall not be called controversies in the churches of god. and yet i desire to know , why that may not be the catholick faith , and necessary to salvation , which has always been matter of controversie ? has the catholick faith any such priviledge as not to be controverted ? or is it a sufficient proof that nothing is a point of the catholick faith , which has been disputed and controverted by some or other in all ages of the church ? and if men of perverse minds may dispute the most necessary articles of faith , then if any faith be necessary , it may be of dangerous consequence to err with our reasonable diligence in such necessary and fundamental points , as are and have been disputed . but before i dismiss this point , it may be convenient to instruct this author ( if he can use any reasonable diligence to understand ) how necessary it is to salvation , and that before all other things , to hold the true catholick faith , and that the faith of the athanasian creed is that catholick faith which is necessary to salvation . . as for the first of these , i would desire him to consider , that though without holiness no man shall see god , yet no man is saved by his good works but by faith in christ : to say , that we shall be saved by holiness and good works without faith in christ , is to assert the merit of good works ten thousand times more than ever papists themselves did : the meritorious works of popery serve only instead of penance , to keep them out of purgatory , or to shorten their time there ; they serve instead of that temporal punishment , which absolved and penitent sinners must undergo for those sins , the eternal punishment of which is remitted , not for their own meritorious works , but for the merits and expiation of christ ; but he who expects to be saved for his good works without faith in christ , attributes such a merit to good works , as redeems him from the wrath of god , and the eternal punishments due to sin , and purchases eternal rewards for him , which is somewhat more than the church of rome pretends to ; especially since whatever merit they attribute to good works , they ascribe wholly to the merits of christ , whose merits alone have made our good works meritorious , which is very honourable to our saviour , and very orthodox divinity , in comparison with those , who think good works such meritorious things , whatever their faith be ; and if he considers this twice , i suppose , he will confess , that faith in christ , the true catholick faith , is necessary to salvation . . nay , it is necessary before all other things to our salvation , because it is necessary to baptism , which alone puts us into a state of salvation : for he that believes and is baptized , shall be saved , but he that believes not shall be damned : all christians must confess , that there is no other name given under heaven whereby men can be saved , but onely the name of christ ; that faith in christ in adult persons is necessary to baptism , that baptism alone incorporates us into the body of christ , and puts us into a state of salvation ; and therefore that neither jews , nor turks , nor heathens , none but believing and baptized christians are in a state of salvation , how morally vertuous soever their lives may be : whoever does not confess this , makes nothing of the covenant of grace in jesus christ , nothing of his sacrifice , priesthood and intercession ; makes the christian religion nothing but a new and more perfect sect of philosophy , than either jews or heathens taught before ; whose condition yet is as safe as the condition of christians , if they live according to the knowledge they have : our author then must either renounce the christian religion , or confess the true catholick faith , or a true faith in christ , is before all other things necessary to salvation , because this is that which puts us into a state of salvation by christ , without which no man can be saved according to the terms of the gospel . . if faith in christ be necessary to salvation , i suppose , all men will grant , it must be the true faith in christ , not a false and heretical faith ; for that is equivalent to infidelity ; there seems to be little difference between not believing in christ at all , and not believing what we ought to believe of him , and the belief of which is necessary to salvation ; for if we do not believe that of christ , which is necessary to salvation , we may as well believe nothing : and then to be sure it concerns us to hold the catholick faith , whatever that be . . that the faith of the holy trinity is that true christian faith , which is necessary to salvation , appears from the form of baptism itself ; for we are baptised in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost : that is , into the faith and worship of the trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , which is the substance of the athanasian creed : this is the baptismal faith , and that certainly is necessary to salvation , if any faith be : now when we consider , that baptism is our solemn dedication to god , and admission into covenant with him , to be dedicated to the son , and holy ghost , in the same manner , in the very same act , and same form of words , whereby we are dedicated to the father , were they not one supream and soveraign god with the father , would make any considering man abhor the christian religion , as the most open and bare-faced idolatry , as joyning creatures with god in the most solemn act of religion , that of dedicating men to his worship and service : but not to insist on that now , our author may hence learn , that to believe in father , son , and holy ghost , is necessary to salvation , because it is the faith of baptism , and if that exposition which the athanasian creed has given of this faith , be the true catholick doctrine , then that is necessary to salvation ; and therefore the creed begins very properly with asserting the necessity of holding the catholick faith , if we will be saved ; which must be as necessary to salvation , as it is to be christians . which faith except a man keep whole and undefiled , without doubt he shall perish everlastingly . by keeping this faith whole and undefiled must be meant , ( if any thing be meant ) that a man should believe and profess it , without adding to it , or taking from it : if we take from it , we do not keep it whole , if we add ought to it , we do not keep it undefiled , and either way we shall perish everlastingly . a man of ordinary sense and candor would have said , that to keep this faith whole and undefiled , signified not to corrupt the faith either by adding to it , or taking from it : for whatever we add , or whatever we take away , which does not alter the essentials of our faith , the faith remains whole and undefiled still : but this would have spoiled his notable remarks both as to adding and taking away . first for adding : what if an honest plain man , because he is a christian and a protestant , should think it necessary to add this article to the athanasian creed : i believe the holy scriptures of the old and new testament , to be a divine , infallible , and compleat rule , both for faith and manners ? i hope no protestant would think a man damned for such addition : and if so , then this creed of athanasius is at least an unnecessary rule of faith. that is to say , it is an addition to the catholick faith , to own the scriptures to be the rule of faith : as if it were an addition to the laws of england to own the original records of them in the tower : for the catholick faith is what we are to believe , the rule of faith is that book or writing wherein this catholick faith is to be found , and upon the authority of which we must believe it ; and therefore what the catholick faith is , and what is the rule of faith , are two very distinct questions ; and to apply what is said of the catholick faith , to the rule of faith , becomes the wit and understanding of an heretick : this is the very argument , which the papists use against our authors compleat and infallible rule of faith , the scriptures , that they do not contain all things necessary to salvation , because they do not prove the great fundamental of the protestant faith , that the canon of scripture , which we receive , is the word of god ; now what answer he would give to papists , with reference to the sufficiency of scripture , let him suppose , i give him the same answer in vindication of the catholick faith of the athanasian creed , and we are right again . but his parting blow is worth some little observation , that if the scriptures be a compleat rule of faith , then this creed of athanasius is at least an unnecessary rule of faith : but why did he not say the same thing of the apostles creed , or nicene creed , or any other creeds , as well as of the athanasian creed ? for it seems a creed , as a creed ( for there is no other sense to be made of it ) is a very unnecessary thing , if the scripture be a compleat rule of faith : and thus both catholicks and hereticks , even his dear arians and socinians , have troubled themselves and the world to no purpose , in drawing up creeds and confessions of faith. but this author ought to be sent to school to learn the difference between a creed , and a rule of faith : a rule of faith is a divinely inspired writing , which contains all matters to be believed , and upon the authority of which we do believe ; a creed is a summary of faith , or a collection of such articles , as we ought to believe , the truth of which we must examine by some other rule : the sum then of our author's argument is this : that because the scripture is the rule of faith , and contains all things necessary to be believed , therefore it is very unnecessary to collect out of the scripture such propositions , as are necessary for all christians explicitely to believe : he might as well have proved from the scriptures being a compleat rule of faith , that therefore there is no necessity of commentators , or sermons , or catechisms , as that there is no necessity of creeds . but as senseless as this is , there is a very deep fetch in it ; for he would have no other creed , but that the scripture is the divine , infallible , compleat rule of faith , which makes all other creeds unnecessary ; and then he can make what he pleases of scripture , as all other hereticks have done before him : but let me ask this author , whether to believe in general , that the scripture is the compleat rule of faith , without an explicite belief of what is contained in scripture , will carry a man to heaven ? there seems to me no great difference between this general faith in the scriptures , without particularly knowing and believing what they teach , and believing as the church believes . we suppose then , he will grant us the necessity of an explicite belief of all things contained in the scripture necessary to salvation ; and ought not the church then to instruct people , what these necessary articles of faith are , and what is the true sense of scripture about them ? especially when there are a great many damnable heresies taught in the church by men of perverse minds , who wrest the scriptures to their own destruction ; and does not this shew the necessity of orthodox creeds and formularies of faith ? and this puts me in mind of the great usefulness of ancient creeds , though the holy scripture be the only divine and infallible rule of faith , viz. that they are a kind of secondary rule , as containing the traditionary faith of the church : it is no hard matter for witty men to put very perverse senses on scripture to favour their heretical doctrines , and to defend them with such sophistry as shall easily impose upon unlearned and unthinking men ; and the best way in this case is , to have recourse to the ancient faith of the christian church , to learn from thence , how these articles were understood and professed by them : for we cannot but think , that those who conversed with the apostles , and did not only receive the scriptures , but the sense and interpretation of them from the apostles , or apostolical men , understood the true christian faith much better than those at a farther remove ; and therefore as long as we can reasonably suppose this tradition to be preserved in the church , their authority is very venerable ; and this gives so great and venerable authority to some of the first general councils ; and therefore we find tertullian himself confuting the hereticks of his days , by this argument from prescription , or the constant tradition of all apostolick churches , which was certain and unquestionable at that time ; and as much as papists pretend to tradition , we appeal to tradition for the first three or four centuries ? and if the doctrine of the athanasian creed have as good a tradition as this , as certainly it has , it is no unnecessary rule , though we do not make it a primary and uncontroulable rule , as the holy scripture is : where there are two different senses put on scripture , it is certainly the safest , to embrace that sense ( if the words will bear it ) which is most agreeable to the received doctrine of the primitive church , contained in the writings of her doctors , or ancient creeds , or such creeds , as are conformed to the doctrine of the primitive church . then for taking ought from this creed , the whole greek church ( diffused through so many provinces ) rejects as heretical that period of it , the holy ghost is of the father and of the son : contending that the holy spirit is from the father only ; which also they clearly and demonstratively prove , as we shall see in its proper place . and for the menace here of athanasius , that they shall perish everlastingly ; they laugh at it , and say , he was drunk , when he made that creed . gennad . schol. arch bishop of constantin . this addition of the filioque , or the holy ghost proceeding from the father and from the son , which was disputed between the greek and latin church , is no corruption of the essentials of the christian faith about the doctrine of the holy trinity , as i observed before ; nor does athanasius deny salvation to those , who do not believe it : for he that will be saved , must thus think of the trinity , does not relate to every particular word and phrase , but to that doctrine , which immediately proceeds ; that the trinity in vnity , and vnity in trinity , is to be worshipped , which the greeks acknowledged as well as the latins , and therefore agreed in the substantials of faith , necessary to salvation . and that i havereason for what i say , appears from this ; that after the latins were perswaded , that the holy ghost did proceed from the son they were far enough from denying salvation to those , who believed otherwise : pope leo iii ▪ assented to the definition of the council of aquisgrane , an. . concerning the procession of the holy ghost from the son and yet would by no means allow , that it should be added to the creed ; nor would he deny salvation to those who believed otherwise , but when that question was asked him , returned this answer ; that whosoever has subtilty enough to attain to the knowledge of this , or knowing it , will not believe it , cannot be saved ; but there are many , and this among the rest , deep misteries of the holy faith , which all cannot reach to , some by reason of age , others for want of understanding , and therefore as we said before , he that can , and won't , cannot be saved : and therefore at the same time he commanded the constantinopolitan creed to be hung up at rome in a silver table without the addition of the filioque : nor can any man tell when this was added to the creed ; however we never read the greeks were anathematized upon this account , till pope vrban ii. . and in the council of florence under eugenius iv. — . ioseph the patriarch of constantinople thought this controversie between the two churches might be reconciled , and the filioque added in a sense very consistent with the belief of the greek church . as for what he adds , that the greek church condemned this addition as heretical , i desire to know , what greek council did this ; vossius a very diligent observer , gives no account of it ; the quarrel of the greeks with the latins was , that they undertook without the authority of a general council , to add to the creed of a general council , when the council of ephesus and chalcedon had anathematized those , who did so ; and therefore for this reason the greeks anathematized the latin church , without declaring the filioque to be heretical , and as that learned man observes , this was the true cause of the schism , that the greeks thought , the pope of rome , and a western synod , took too much upon themselves , to add to the creed of a general council , by their own authority , without consulting the eastern church , which was equally concerned in matters of faith. but the comical part is still behind ; for he says , the greeks laugh at athanasius 's menace , and say he was drunk , when he made the creed ; and for this he refers us to georgius scholarius , or gennadius , who was made patriarch of constantinople by mahomet , when he had taken that city . i confess , i have not read all that gennadius has writ , and know not where to find this place , and he has not thought fit to direct us : but this i know , that whether gennadius says this himself , or only reports it as the saying of some foolish greeks ( for i cannot guess by our author , which it is ) whoever said it , said more then is true , for athanasius neither made the creed , drunk nor sober , for as most learned men agree , he never made it at all , though it bears his name ; but i wish i could see this place in gennadius , for i greatly suspect our author ; gennadius being a very unlikely man to say any ill thing of athanasius upon account of the filioque , who himself took the side of the latin church in this dispute , and as vossius relates , gives athanasius a very different , and more honourable character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the great athanasius the preacher and confessor of truth . but there is nothing smites me more than to hear this arian , or socinian , or whatever he is , affirm , that the greeks have clearly and demonstratively proved , that the holy spirit is from the father only ; for that which is proved clearly and demonstratively , i hope is true , and then this alone is a confutation of his brief notes , for the greeks taught , and proved demonstratively , as he says , that the holy spirit so proceeds from the father only as to be of the same substance , and one god with the father . and the catholick faith is this : catholick faith is as much as to say in plain english , the faith of the whole church ; now in what age was this , which here follows , the faith of the whole church ? the catholick faith , i grant , is so called with relation to the catholick church , whose faith it is , and the catholick church is the universal church , or all the true churches in the world , which are all but one whole church , united in christ their head : the profession of the true faith and worship of christ makes a true church , and all true churches are the one catholick church , whether they be spread over all the world , or shut up in any one corner of it , as at the first preaching of the gospel the catholick church was no where but in iudaea . now as no church is the catholick church of christ ; how far soever it has spread it self over the world , unless it profess the true faith of christ ; no more is any faith the catholick faith , how universally soever it be professed , unless it be the true faith of christ ; nor does the true christian faith cease to be catholick , how few soever there be , who sincerely profess it . it is down-right popery to judge of the catholick church by its multitudes or large extent , or to judge of the catholick faith by the vast numbers of its professors : were there but one true church in the world , that were the catholick church , because it would be the whole church of christ on earth ; and were the true christian faith professed but in one such church , it would be the catholick faith still ; for it is the faith of the whole true church of christ , the sincere belief and profession of which makes a catholick church . not in the age of athanasius himself , who for this faith , and for seditious practices , was banished from alexandria in aegypt ( where he was bishop ) no less than four times ; whereof the first was by constantine the great . what shall be done unto thee , thou lying tongue ? what impudence is this , to think to sham the world at this time a day , with such stories as these ? when the case of athanasius is so well known , or may be , even to english readers , who will take the pains to read his life , written with great exactness and fidelity by the learned dr. cave . but when he thinks a second time of it , will he say , that the church of god in athanasius's age , was not of the same faith with him ? what thinks he of the nicene fathers , who condemned arius ? in which council athanasius himself was present , and bore a considerable part , and so provoked the arian faction by his zeal for the catholick faith , and his great skill and dexterity in managing that cause , as laid the foundation of all his future troubles . will he say that constantine the great , who called the council at nice in the cause of arius , and was so zealous an asserter of the nicene faith , banished athanasius for this faith ? no , his greatest enemies durst not make his faith any part of their accusation , though it was the only reason of their malice against him ; but they charged him with a great many other crimes ; and that the reader may the better understand by what spirit these men were acted , which still appears in this author , i shall give a short account of the story . the arian faction headed by eusebius of nicomedia , perceiving how impossible it was to retrieve their lost cause , while athanasius was in credit , and so great authority in the church , having ripened their designs against him in their private cabals , prevail with constantine to call a council at caesarea in palestine , at which athanasius did not appear , suspecting , probably , the partiality of his judges , who were his declared enemies . this was represented at court as a contempt of the imperial orders , and another council was appointed at tyre , which met ann. . with a peremptory command for his appearance ; where he first excepted against the competency of his judges , but that being over-ruled , he was forced to plead . and first he was charged with oppression and cruelty , particularly towards ischyras , callinicus , and the miletian bishops , but this fell of it self , for want of proof . in the next place , he was accused for having ravished a woman , and one too who had vowed virginity : the woman was brought into the council , and there owned the fact ; but timotheus , one of athanasius's friends , personates athanasius , and asks the woman , whether he had ever offered such violence to her ; she supposing him to have been athanasius , roundly declared him to be the man ? who had done the fact ; and thus this cheat was discovered . his next accusation was , that he had murdered arsenius , a miletian bishop , whose hand he had cut off , and kept by him for some magical uses ; and the hand dried and salted was taken out of a box and shewn to the council : and to make this more credible , they had of a long time conveyed arsenius away , and kept him out of sight : but he having made his escape about this time , and being accidentally met by some friends of athanasius , was on a sudden brought into the council , where he shewed both his hands safe , to the shame and confusion of the malicious inventors of that lye. this failing , they accuse him of impiety , and profanation of holy things : that his ordination was tumultuary and irregular ; the contrary of which was evidently true : that macarius his presbyter , by his command , had broke into ischyras's chancel , while he was performing the holy offices , and overturned the communion-table , broke in pieces the sacramental chalice , and burnt the holy books ; all which ischyras was present to attest ; but the contrary in every branch of the accusation was made apparent , and the whole plot discovered by a writing under ischyras his own hand , sufficiently attested . after all these shameful baffles they would not give over , but sent commissioners from the synod to inquire into the matter of fact upon the place , and having raked together any thing , which they could make look like evidence , though gained by the most barbarous cruelties , and other vile arts , they return to the council , who without more ado condemn and depose athanasius from his bishoprick , and command him to go no more to alexandria ; upon this he withdrew himself and went to court , prays the emperor for a more fair and impartial tryal , who thereupon sent to the council , then adjourned to ierusalem , to come to constantinople , and make good their charge ; five commissioners appeared , who joyned with some others , whom they could get together , formed a small synod , but not daring to insist upon their former accusations , start up a new charge more like to take at court , viz. that he had threatned to stop the emperors fleet , that yearly transported corn from alexandria to constantinople ; which was as true and as probable a story as any of the rest : but they told this with such confidence , and urged the ill consequences of it so home upon the emperor , that they prevailed with him to banish athanasius to triers in germany . if this short story does not make our author blush , he is possessed with the true spirit of the tyrian fathers . but to proceed , he was also condemned in his own life time by six councils , as an heretick , and seditious person ; of these councils , that at milan consisted of three hundred bishops , and that of ariminum of five hundred and fifty , the greatest convention of bishops that ever was . this consent of the churches of god against him and his doctrine , occasioned that famous proverb , athanasius against all the world , and all the world against athanasius . this is all sham. i grant , athanasius was condemned by several arian conventicles ( which he prophanely calls the churches of god ) in his own life time , but i deny , that he was condemned as a heretick , or that he was condemned for his faith. we have seen the account of his condemnation by the council of tyre already , and for what pretended crimes he was condemned , without the least mention of his heresie ; for if this author understood any thing of the story of those times , he must know , that though the arian cause was vigorously and furiously promoted , yet it was done more covertly , since that fatal blow which was given it by the council of nice , whose authority was too sacred to be easily born down : and therefore they did not pretend to unsettle the nicene faith , nay pretended to own it , though they did not like the word homo-ousios , and therefore formed various creeds , as they pretended to the same sense without that litigious word : which shews that it was not time of day for them to accuse athanasius of heresie , but ▪ of such other crimes , as might condemn and depose him , and remove him out of the way , that he might not hinder their designs . thus in the council at antioch , in the reign of constantius , , the old calumnies are revived against athanasius , and he deposed again , after he had been restored by constantine the younger , and george the cappadocian , a man of mean birth , base education , and worse temper ( for they could find no better man , that would accept it ) was advanced to the patriarchal chair ; but all this while , he was charged with no heresie in faith : but that his return to alexandria had occasioned great trouble and sorrow there , and the effusion of much blood : that being condemned by a synod , and not restored again by the authority of a synod , he re-assumed his chair again , contrary to the canons , &c. upon this athanasius fled to rome , where in a synod of western bishops , he was absolved , and restored to communion , contrary to the earnest solicitations of the council of antioch . anno , a council of eastern and western bishops was called at sardica ; where the eastern bishops , ( who were most of them arians , or favourers of that party ) refused to joyn with them of the west , and acted in a seperate assembly , and had brought with them count musonianus , and hesychius an officer of the imperial palace , to countenance and promote their proceedings ; and having bespattered athanasius with all the ill things they had formerly charged him with , and tried in vain to delay the sentence of the western bishops , they proceeded synodically to condemn and depose him , together with several other principal bishops of the catholick party ; of all which they published an encyclical or decretal epistle wherein they gave a large account of their whole proceeding . the western bishops in the mean time , after a large and particular examination of athanasius's case , and all matters of fact relating to him , acquitted and restored him ; and having heard the complaints made to the synod from all parts concerning the grievances they lay under from the arian faction ; they particularly condemned and deposed the chief heads of that party , and banished them from the communion of the faithful , publishing an account of what they had done in several synodical letters : thus far it was pretty well with athanasius , for all the churches of god did not condemn him ; if he were condemned by the eastern bishops in a schismatical conventicle , he was absolved by the western council ; if he was condemned by the arians , he was absolved by the catholicks ; but still his faith was no matter of the dispute . but now the zeal of constantius reduced athanasius to greater extremity ; for he lying at arles in france anno , a synod was held there , where all arts were used to procure the condemnation of athanasius ; at least by refusing to hold communion with him , to which most of the bishops yielded , and vincentius of capua himself , the pope's chief legate , subscribed the condemnation ; paulinus of triers for his honest courage and constancy in refusing it , being driven into banishment . not contented with this , as if poor athanasius could never be often enough condemned , anno , constantius going to milan , another synod was called there , and the catholick bishops were strictly required to subscribe the condemnation of athanasius ; and the emperor himself being present in the synod , drew his sword , and fiercely told them , that it must be so , that he himself accused athanasius , and that his testimony ought to be believed : and for refusing to comply , eusebius vercellensis , lucifer caralitanus , and several others were sent into banishment . this is the council , which as our author tells us , consisted of three hundred bishops , but the emperor was more than all the rest , and it was he , that extorted the condemnation of athanasius ; and let him make his best of this . the like violence was used in other synods , as in that of syrmium , anno , where a confession of faith was drawn up , which hosius of corduba was forced to subscribe , and as some say , to condemn athanasius . anno ; was his other great council at ariminum , of five hundred and fifty bishops , where they were so managed by the subtilty and importunity of some few arian bishops , and so wearied out by taurus the prefect , and that by the command of the emperor , that they generally yielded , several of them being even starved into compliance : and this is the time of which st. ierom speaks , that the whole world wondered to see itself arian : by such councils , and by such arts as these athanasius was condemned , though he was never accused nor condemned for his faith : and that veneration the whole christian world has had ever since for the name of athasius , is a sufficient vindication of his person and faith , notwithstanding the ill usage he met with under an arian emperor . as for his next paragraph , wherein he appeals to the late arian historian , chr. sandius , i shall only refer the reader to dr. bull 's answer , and i think i am more than even with him ; and whoever will read and consider what that learned man has irrefragably proved , that those fathers , who lived before the council of nice , were yet of the same faith with the nicene fathers , as to the doctrine of the holy trinity , will see , that a very modest man may call this the catholick faith , even in his sense of the word catholick , as it signifies the common faith of christians in all ages , since the preaching of the gospel in the world : and that it requires both forehead and forgery to deny it . and if in that age athanasius were the only man who durst openly and boldly defend the catholick faith , against a prevailing faction , supported by a court interest , and grown formidable by lies and calumnies , and the most barbarous cruelties , it is for his immortal honour , and will always be thought so by the churches of christ. and now i come to answer his terrible objections against the several articles of this creed , which he has endeavoured to ridicule ; and when i have done so , i hope he will think it time to consider , what it is to ridicule the christian faith : a modest man would not affront the general faith of christians , at least of that church in which he lives ; and a cautious man , whatever his private opinion were , would not ridicule so venerable a mystery , lest it should prove true ; which is the same argument we use to make atheists modest , not to laugh at the notion of a god , lest he should find the god , whom he has so impudently affronted , when he comes into the other world. sect . iv. the catholick doctrine of a trinity in vnity , and vnity in trinity explained , and vindicated from all pretended absurdities and contradictions . the catholick faith is this , that we worship one god in trinity , and trinity in vnity . he means here , that we must so worship the one true god , as to remember he is three persons ; and so worship the three persons , as to bear in mind , they are but one substance , or godhead , or god : so the author explains himself in the three next articles , which are these : neither confounding the persons , nor dividing the substance : for there is one person of the father , another of the son , another of the holy ghost : but the godhead of the father , of the son , and of the holy ghost , is all one. therefore all these articles make indeed but one article , which is this ? the one true god is three distinct persons , and three distinct persons ( father , son , and holy ghost ) are the one true god. thus far i agree with this author ; and indeed this is the whole of the creed , as far as relates to the doctrine of the trinity , that there are three persons and one god , all the rest being only a more particular explication of this ; and therefore i would desire the reader to observe , for the understanding this creed , what belongs to the persons , and what to the one eternal undivided substance or godhead , which will answer all the seeming contradictions which are charged on this doctrine . but he proceeds : plainly as if a man should say , peter , iames , and iohn , being three persons , are one man ; and one man is these three persons , peter , iames , and iohn . is it not now a ridiculous attempt , as well as a barbarous indignity , to go about thus to make asses of all mankind , under a pretence of teaching them a creed , and things divine , to despoil them of their reason , the image of god , and the character of our nature ? but let us in two words , examine the parts of this monstrous proposition , as 't is laid down in the creed itself . neither confounding the persons , nor dividing the substance . but how can we not but confound the persons , that have ( say they ) but one numerical substance ; and how can we but divide the substance , which we find in three distinct divided persons . our author should have kept to athanasius's creed , which he undertook to expose , and then we had not heard of this objection : for the creed does not say , that there are three persons in one numerical substance , but in one undivided substance ; nor does it say , that there are three divided persons in this one undivided substance , but three persons , which may be three , and yet not divided , but intimately united to each other in one undivided substance : now tho' we should grant it unconceivable , how three distinct persons should have one numerical essence , that the essence of the father , of the son , and of the holy ghost should be numerically the same , and yet their persons distinct ; [ for it is not easie to distinguish the essence or substance from the person , and therefore not easie to tell , how there should be but one substance and three persons , ] yet it is no absurdity or contradiction to say , that three real substantial persons should subsist in one undivided substance , and then there is no necessity either to confound the persons , or divide the substance . we must allow the divine persons to be real substantial beings , if we allow each person to be god ; unless we will call any thing a god , which has no real being , as that has not , which has not a real nature and essence ; whereas all men grant there are no accidents , or qualities , or modes in god , but a pure and simple essence or pure act ; and therefore the three divine persons are substantially distinct , though in one undivided substance : which shews , that to say , that the one true god is three distinct persons , and three distinct persons are the one true god , is not plainly , as if a man should say , that peter , james , and john , being three persons are one man , and one man is three distinct persons , peter , james , and john : because peter , iames , and iohn , are not only distinct , but divided and separate persons , which have three divided and separate substances , which therefore cannot be one man , as three distinct persons in one undivided substance are one god. this is sufficient to vindicate the athanasian creed , which only asserts three distinct persons in one undivided substance , which has nothing absurd or contradictious in it ; but because this author founds his objection upon one numerical substance , let us briefly consider that too ; for the divine essence or substance is certainly numerically one , as there is but one god ; and the difficulty is , how three distinct substantial persons can subsist in one numerical essence : i will not pretend to fathom such a mystery as this , but only shew , that there is nothing absurd in it , and take down the confidence of this vain pretender to reason and demonstration . let us then enquire , what it is , that makes any substance numerically one , that if there be any absurdity in this , we may find out where it lies . now in unorganiz'd matter , it is nothing else but the union of parts , which hang all together , that makes such a body one ; whether it be simple or compounded of different kinds of matter , that is one numerical body , whose parts hang all together . in organical bodies , the union of all parts , which constitute such an organized body , makes it one entire numerical body , though the parts have very different natures and offices ; but this is of no use to explain the numerical oneness of the divine essence , because the divine substance has no extension , and no parts , and therefore cannot be one by an union of parts . in finite created spirits , which have no parts and no extension neither , that we know of , no more than a thought , or an idea , or a passion , have extension or parts ; their numerical oneness can be nothing else , but every spirit 's unity with itself , and distinct and separate subsistence from all other created spirits . now this self unity of the spirit , which has no parts to be united , can be nothing else but self-consciousness : that it is conscious to its own thoughts , reasonings , passions , which no other finite spirit is conscious to but itself : this makes a finite spirit numerically one , and seperates it from all other spirits ; that every spirit feels only its own thoughts and passions , but is not conscious to the thoughts and passions of any other spirit : and therefore if there were three created spirits so united as to be conscious to each others thoughts and passions , as they are to their own , i cannot see any reason , why we might not say , that three such persons were numerically one , for they are as much one with each other , as every spirit is one with itself ; unless we can find some other unity for a spirit than self-consciousness ; and , i think , this does help us to understand in some measure this great and venerable mystery of a trinity in vnity . for god being present every-where without parts , and without extension , we must strip our minds of all material images and figures , when we contemplate the unity of the divine nature . though we should suppose but one person in the godhead , as well as one god , ( as this author does ) yet we must consider his unity , not as the unity of an infinite body , but an infinite mind , which has no distinct parts to be united ; and let any man , who can , give me any other notion of the numerical oneness of an infinite mind , but self-consciousness : that though present every-where , it is still intimate with itself : and in the very same way , and for the very same reason , three divine persons , who are as intimate to each other , and if i may so speak , as mutually conscious to each other , as any one person can be to itself , are truly and properly numerically one. this , i suppose , is what several ancient fathers called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or circumincession , which i confess is an ill word , and apt to raise very material imaginations in us , as if the divine persons were united in one substance , as three bodies would be , could they touch in every point ; whereas we know not , what the substance of an infinite mind is , nor how such substances as have no parts or extension can touch each other , or be thus externally united ; but we know the unity of a mind or spirit , reaches as far as its self-consciousness does : for that is one spirit , which knows and feels itself , and its own thoughts and motions : and if we mean this by circumincession , three persons thus intimate to each other are numerically one : and therefore st. austin represents this much better by that self-consciousness which is between those distinct faculties in us , of memory , understanding and will , which know and feel whatever is in each other : we remember what we understand and will , we understand , what we remember and will , and what we will , we remember and understand ; and therefore these three faculties , which are thus intimate to each other , make one man , and if we can suppose three infinite minds and persons , thus conscious of whatever is in each other , as they are of themselves , they can be but one numerical god. but that this may not be thought a meer arbitrary and groundless conjecture , i shall shew you , that this is the true scripture notion of the unity of the godhead , or of three persons and one god. that the three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost , are three infinite minds , really distinct from each other ; that the father is not the son , nor the holy ghost either the father , or the son , is so very plain in scripture , that i shall not spend time to prove it , especially since it is supposed in this controversie ; for when we enquire , how these three infinite minds or persons are one god , it supposes , that they are distinct ; and if there were any dispute about it , what i shall say in explaining their unity , will prove their distinction , that they are three distinct infinite minds . . let us then consider , what the unity is between the father and the son , for so our saviour tells us , i and the father are one , iohn . and how they are one , we learn from several places in this gospel , which as the ancients tell us , was wrote on purpose in opposition to the heresie of carinthus , to prove , that christ was not meer man , but the eternal son of god , and one with his father : now iohn . the evangelists call him the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the word of god , the eternal wisdom and reason of god , and therefore as intimate to god as his own eternal word and wisdom ; as intimate as a man 's own wisdom and reason is to him ; and therefore he adds , that this word which was in the beginning , was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with god , as we translate it , which cannot signifie a local presence , but an essential union , or a being in god , as christ tells us , the father is in me , and i in him , iohn . for before place was made , or any thing to fill it , to be with god , could signifie nothing else but to subsist in him : and therefore , v. . the apostle expounds this being with god , by being in the bosome of the father ; which cannot signifie an external union , because god has no external bosom ; but bosom signifies the very essence of god , and if we could distinguish parts in god , the most inward and secret recesses of the divine nature : now this intimate union and in-being , when we speak of an essential union of pure and infinite minds , is a mutual consciousness , and if i may so speak , an inward sensation of each other , to know and feel each other , as they know and feel themselves . to represent this plainly and intelligibly , if it be possible , to the meanest understanding , i shall consider , wherein the most perfect union of created spirits consist , which are distinct and seperate beings from each other ; wherein the union of the divine persons in the ever blessed trinity answers this , and wherein it excels it . now created spirits , as angels and humane souls , are then most perfectly united to each other , when they most perfectly know one another , and know all , that each other knows , and perfectly agree in all they know , which is an union in knowledge : when they perfectly love one another , have the same will , the same affections , the same interests and designs ; when they are a kind of unisons which move and act a like , as if one soul animated them both : this is that perfect unity , which is so frequently and earnestly recommended to christians both by christ and his apostles ; as we may see every-where in scripture . and the very same union with this , there is between the persons of the ever blessed trinity ; an union in knowledge , in love , in will , in works . the son perfectly knows the father , and therefore knows all that the father knows ; this st. iohn means when he tells us , that he is in the bosom of the father : iohn . no man hath seen god at any time : that is , no man ever had a perfect knowledge of god , which is here called seeing , because sight gives us the most distinct and perfect knowledge of things : the only begotten son , which is in the bosom of the father , he hath declared him : where it is plain , to be in the bosom of the father , is put to signifie the most perfect and intimate knowledge of him ; as in ordinary speech to take any man into our bosom , signifies to impart all our secrets to him : but our saviour tells us this in plain words ; that the father perfectly knows the son , and the son the father , iohn . as the father knoweth me , so know i the father . thus the father loveth the son , joh. . . joh. . and the son loveth the father , iohn . thus the son has no will but his fathers , iohn . i can of my own self do nothing , as i hear , i judge , and my judgment is just ; because i seek not mine own will , but the will of the father , which hath sent me , john . for i came not to do my own will , but the will of him that sent me . john . my meat is to do the will of him that sent me and to finish his work : thus whatever christ did or spake , it was in conformity to his father , what he saw , and heard , and learnt of him . john . the son can do nothing of himself , but what he seeth the father do ; for whatsoever things he doth , these also doth the son likewise . john . i have not spoken of my self , but the father that sent me , he gave me a commandment , what i should say , and what i should speak . this is as perfect an union , as union signifies agreement and concord , as can possibly be between two minds and spirits . the like may be said of the holy ghost : he perfectly knows the father , and his most secret councels : for the spirit searcheth all things , yea the deep things of god , cor. . . he is the spirit of wisdom and revelation , who inspired the prophets and apostles , to declare god and his will to the world , and therefore is most intimately acquainted with it himself : thus our saviour comforts his apostles , when he was to leave them himself , with the promise of the spirit , who should guide them into all truth . ioh. , , . howbeit when he the spirit of truth is come , he shall guide you into all truth ; for he shall not speak of himself , but whatsoever he shall hear , that shall he speak , and he will shew you things to come . he shall glorifie me , for he shall receive of mine , and shall shew it unto you : all things that the father hath are mine , therefore said i , that he shall take of mine , and shall shew it unto you . of which words more hereafter ; at present i only observe , how intimately the holy spirit is acquainted with all the secrets both of father and son , whatever things the father knows , that the son knows , and what the son knows , that the holy spirit knows ; that is , whatever the father knows , which is first said to be the father's , then the son 's , and then the holy spirit 's , according to the order of persons in the adorable trinity . thus the holy spirit is the spirit of love , which inspires us with the love of god , and gives us the reciprocal testimonies of god's love to us : for the love of god is shed abroad in our hearts by the holy ghost , which is given unto us , rom. . and as some of the ancients represent it , he is that love , wherewith the father and the son love each other ; and therefore there is no question , but that he who unites father and son , and unites god to us , and us to god , by love , is united to father and son by love himself . he is that holy spirit , who renews and sanctifies us , and subdues our wills into a conformity and subjection to the will of god ; and therefore no doubt , but he has the same will with father and son. thus father , son , and holy ghost , are most intimately united in knowledge , will , and affection , but after all , this is no more , than what we call a moral union ; such as may be between created spirits , which remain separate beings still , and though they are morally , are not essentially one ; and therefore such an union as this cannot make father , son , and holy ghost one god , but three agreeing and consenting gods , as peter , iames , and iohn , though they should in the most perfect manner be united , in the same faith , and mutual love and affection , &c. yet would be three men still : and therefore i must now shew , that what is merely a moral union between creatures , is an essential union between the persons of the ever blessed trinity . and this i have already shewn in part . the three divine persons of the ever blessed trinity , are united in knowledge , in will , in love : but are not united as creatures are by an external likeness , conformity , agreement , consent , in knowledge , will , and affection ; but are so united to each other , as every man is to himself , not as one man is to another . as for instance : every man by an inward sensation feeels his own knowledge , will , and affections , but he does not know any other man's thoughts , or will , or passions , by feeling them in himself as he does his own , but by an external communication of thoughts ; and therefore though they may be morally one by an exact agreement and harmony of thoughts and passions , as far as by external communication they can know , what each others thoughts and passions are , yet they are essentially distinct and separate : but father , son , and holy ghost , are one not by an external agreement or consent , but by an internal consciousness , as every man is one with himself : if i may so speak , because we want proper words to express it , they feel each other in themselves , know the same thing by feeling each others knowledge , and will , and love a-like , by feeling what each other wills and loves , just as every man feels his own thoughts , knowledge , will , and passions ; that is , are as intimate to each other , and as essentially one , by a mutual self-consciousness , as every man is one with himself . and the phrases and expressions of scripture , whereby the unity or oneness of father , son , and holy ghost are expressed , require this sense . thus i observed before , that the son is the eternal word and wisdom of the father , and therefore as intimate to him , as every man's reason is to himself , and knows the father , not by external revelation , but as every man knows himself . but the most frequent expression , whereby christ represents this close and intimate and essential union between his father and him , is , i am in the father , and the father in me ; which he repeats several times in st. iohn's gospel . now if we will allow this to be a proper , not a metaphorical expression , it can signifie no other union , than what i have now described : that it is a proper , and not a metaphorical expression , appears from this , that there is no such union in nature between any two other beings , as this , to be in one another , and a metaphor is translated from something , that is real and natural , upon account of some likeness and similitude : and therefore that which is like to nothing else , which has no pattern and example , can be no metaphor , because it alludes to nothing : now if we speak of a substantial union , or a union of substances , what two substances can there be in the world , which can mutually be in each other , or can mutually comprehend each other ; which is indeed a palpable contradiction , as signifying at the same time to be greater and to be less than each other ; for in substantial unions , that which comprehends is greater than that which is comprehended , that which is within any thing else is less than that which contains it : and therefore for two beings mutually to comprehend , and to be comprehended by each other , is to be greater and less than each other , greater as they comprehend each other , and less as they are comprehended . so that this oneness between the father and the son , is such an union as there is nothing in nature like it , and we cannot long doubt , what kind of union this is , if we consider , that there is but one possible way to be thus united , and that is by this mutual consciousness , which i have now described . if the son be conscious in himself of all that the father is , as conscious to the knowledge , to the will , to the love of the father , as he is to his own , by an internal sensation , then the whole father is in the son ; if the father be thus conscious to all that the son is , then the whole son is in the father ; if the holy ghost be thus conscious to all that is in the father and in the son , then the father and the son are in the holy ghost , and the holy ghost in the father and the son , by this mutual consciousness to each other . this is very plain and intelligible , and makes them as much one , as every man is one with himself , by self-consciousness . and this is a plain demonstration , that all three divine persons are coessential and coequal with each other : we know nothing of god , but that he is an infinite mind ; that is , infinite knowledge , wisdom , power , goodness : and if these three divine persons are all internally conscious of all these perfections , which are in each other , they must all have the same perfections , the same knowledge , wisdom , power , goodness , that is the same nature , unless that knowledge , wisdom , goodness , which we are internally conscious of , and feel within ourselves , be not the perfections of our nature ; whereas we may externally know those perfections , which are not ours , but what we feel in ourselves is our own : and therefore this mutual consciousness , makes all that is the father 's the son 's , and all that is the son 's the holy spirit 's ; as our saviour speaks : all things that the father hath are mine : therefore said i , that he ( the spirit ) shall take of mine , and shall shew it unto you , iohn . and if these three persons be thus mutually in each other , as you have already heard , they must be all equal ; for if the father be in the son , how can the son be less than the father , if he comprehends the father , and all his infinite perfections ? if son and holy ghost are in the father , and father and holy ghost in the son , and father and son in the holy ghost , imagine what inequality you can between them ; if son and holy ghost are conscious to all the infinite perfections , which are in the father , and have all the perfections , they are conscious to , how can son and holy ghost be less perfect than the father , or then each other : i am sure our saviour attributes all his wisdom , and knowledge , and power to his intimate conscious knowledge of his father , which he calls seeing him , which is such a knowledge as creatures cannot have of god , iohn . . verily , verily , i say unto you , the son can do nothing of himself , but what he seeth the father do ; for whatsoever things he doth , those also doth the son likewise . for the father loveth the son , and sheweth him all things , that himself doeth , and he will shew him greater works than these , that ye may marvel . by this perfect conscious knowledge , which the son has of the father , he has all those perfections in himself , which are in the father : he can do whatever he sees the father do , and he sees whatever the father does , but can do nothing of himself , but what he seeth the father do ; he has all the perfections which are in the father , and therefore can do whatever he sees the father do ; but there is no knowledge , no perfection , no power in the son , which is not in the father , and which he does not receive from the father , and therefore he can do nothing of himself , but what he sees the father do ; which signifies the most perfect equality between the father and the son , founded on the son's seeing the father , and whatever he doth , or his intimate consciousness of all that the father is . and this is the true notion of the son 's being the image of his father : the brightness of his father's glory , and the express image of his person , heb. . for as a dead image and picture represents the external lineaments and features of the person , whose picture or image it is , that we can see the person in his picture ; so a living essential image , is the living essential perfections of the father , and with a conscious knowledge sees the father in himself . for this reason the son is said to hear of his father , to see what his father doth , and to do the same , to receive commandement from his fatber , to do the will of his father , and the works of his father , to finish the works , which his father gave him to do , to glorifie his father , &c. which must not be expounded after the manner of men , ( as the socinians expound such expressions , and thence conclude the great inferiority , inequality , subjection of the son to the father , such as there is between a prince , and the ministers he employs , and that therefore the son cannot be the supream god , for the supream god cann't be commanded , taught , sent on messages to fulfil the will and pleasure of another , and do nothing but what he sees done , and receives commission to do ; i say , we must not put such a mean and servile sense on these expressions ) but we must expound them only to signifie that the son receives all from the father , life , knowledge , will , power , by eternal generation , and whatever he does , he does with a consciousness of his father's will , and wisdom , as it were , feeling the will and wisdom and power of his father in himself ; and this he calls hearing and seeing the works of the father , receiving commands , and doing the works of the father , because his nature is that to him , which external teachings ' and verbal commands are to men : he hears , he sees , he does the works , and will , and commands of his father , by being the perfect , living , self-conscious image of his father's will and knowledge and infinite perfections . but there is one place more i must take notice of , by which the socinians think to overthrow all that i have now said ; that the union between the father and son is not such an essential unity , as we speak of , but a meer moral union , or a perfect agreement and consent in knowledge , will , and affection , such as is , or ought to be among christians ; and that our saviour himself has thus expounded it : iohn , . neither pray i for these alone , but for them also which shall believe on me through their word : that they all may be one , as thou father art in me , and i in thee , that they also may be one in us : which is the very expression i have so much insisted on , to prove this essential union , and self-consciousness between the father and the son , as thou father art in me , and i in thee : which , it seems , signifies no other kind of union , than what our saviour prays for among christians , that they also may be one , as thou father art in me , and i in thee : now the union of christians is only an union in faith and love , and one communion , and therefore thus the father and the son are one also by a consent and agreement in knowledge , will , and love. now this i readily grant , as i observed before , that father and son are one by a most perfect agreement in knowledge , will , and love , which we call a moral union between men ; and it is this unity or oneness for which our-saviour prays , that his disciples may be one , as the father and he are one ; that they may perfectly agree in the same faith and love , that they may speak the same things , and mind the same things : but then this perfect harmony and consent between the father and the son results from an essential unity , from their being in one another ; which is such an union as it is impossible there should be between christians ; but this moral union in the same faith , and mutual love , is called being one , as the father and son are one , because it is the nearest resemblance of this essential unity , that can be between creatures : and that is the only meaning of as , that they may be one , as thou father art in me , and i in thee : not that they may be one in the very same manner , but with such a kind of unity , as does most nearly resemble the unity between the father and the son ; that is , which produces the like consent and harmony in will and affections . for we must observe , that as very often signifies only some likeness and resemblance , not a sameness for kind or degree ; and thus it must of necessity signifie in all comparisons between god and creatures ; for though there is something in creatures like to what is in god , some faint shadows and images of it , yet nothing in creatures is the same , that is in god : st. peter exhorts christians , as he which hath called you is holy , so be ye holy in all manner of conversation , pet. . . and christ commands us to be perfect as our father , which is in heaven is perfect , matth. . but can any creature be holy and perfect as god is ? will you hence conclude , that holiness is not the immutable nature of god , but the free choice of his will ; not his nature , which is one pure simple act , but an habit of virtue , because so it is in us ; and yet we must be holy and perfect as god is , which cannot be , ( according to this way of reasoning ) unless holiness in god be the same holiness , which is in creatures ; and indeed we may as well conclude this , as that the oneness between the father and the son is only a moral union in will and affection , because there can be no other union between christians , and yet christ prays , that they may be one , as he and his father are one : since this phrase , as thou father art in me , and i in thee , does evidently signifie a great deal more , than such a moral union of will and affections , why should they not as well conclude , that christ prays for such an essential oneness between christians , as there is between him and his father ; as that the father and the son are one in no higher and more perfect sense , than what is applicable to the unity of christians with each other ? there may be such a likeness and resemblance between natural and moral unions , between the acts and perfections of nature , and the vertues of the will and choice , as may be a just foundation for a comparison ; but he is a very absurd reasoner , who from such a comparison will conclude , they are the same : we are required to love our neighbour as our selves ; but will any man hence conclude , that the love of our selves , and the love of our neighbour , are of the same kind ? which is manifestly false : self-love being a natural and necessary passion ; the love of our neighbour a christian vertue ; the first the effect of nature , the second of grace ; but the effects so like each other , that they may well be compared , and the natural principle , which acts most equally and necessarily and perfectly , may be made the rule and measure of brotherly love : thus this essential unity between the father and the son , produces the most perfect harmony and union of will and affections , and therefore is the most perfect pattern of that moral union , which ought to be among christians . for we may observe , that this oneness between the father and the son , is not the only natural and essential unity , which is made the pattern of unity among christians ; the unity of the natural body , and the vital sympathy and fellow-feeling , which all the members of the same natural body have for each other , is proposed as a pattern also of that mutual love and affection between christians , cor. . — . and yet no man will be so absurd as to say ; that either christians are as naturally and vitally united to each other , as the members of a natural body are ; or that the members of the natural body are united only by mutual love and affection , as christians are . this is sufficient to shew , how father and son are one , by a mutual consciousness , whereby they are as intimate to each other , as every man is to himself , who knows all that is in himself , and feels all the motions and workings of his own mind ; and we need not doubt , but the holy spirit is in the same manner one with father and son : but i must not expect , that the adversaries i have to deal with , will grant any thing , which is not proved , and therefore i shall not stand to their courtesie , but briefly prove this also . st. paul tells us , cor. . . that the spirit searcheth all things , yea the deep things of god : so that the holy spirit knows all that is in god , even his most deep and secret counsels , which is an argument , that he is very intimate with him ; but this is not all , it is the manner of knowing , which must prove this consciousness , of which i speak ; and that the apostle adds in the next verse , that the spirit of god knows all that is in god , just as the spirit of a man knows all that is in man ; that is , not by external revelation or communication of this knowledge , but by self-consciousness , by an internal sensation , which is owing to an essential unity : v. . for what man knoweth the things of a man , save the spirit of a man which is in him ; even so the things of god knoweth no man , but the spirit of god. so that the spirit of god is as much within god , and as intimate to him , as the spirit of man is in man ; that is , by an essential oneness , and self-consciousness . and as the spirit knoweth the deep things of god , so god who searcheth the hearts , knoweth the mind of the spirit too , rom. . so that the father and the holy ghost are mutually conscious to each other , as a man and his own spirit are ; and then we need not doubt , but the holy spirit , which is the spirit of the son , as well as of the father , is as intimate to the son also : and therefore christ tells us of the spirit ; he shall glorifie me , for he shall receive of mine , and shall shew it unto you , all things that the father hath are mine , therefore said i , he shall take of mine , and shall shew it unto you , john , . so that the holy spirit receives the things of christ ; but how does he receive them ? just as christ receives them of the father ; the same things , and the same way ; not by an external communication , but by an essential oneness and consciousness of all that is in the father , and in the son. this seems to me to be the true scripture-account of the numerical unity of the divine essence , and to make a trinity in unity as intelligible as the notion of one god is ; but because all that i have to say , turns upon this , i shall more particularly explain this notion : . by shewing that this contains the true orthodox faith of the holy trinity . . that it gives a plain and intelligible solution of all the difficulties and seeming contradictions in the doctine of the trinity . i. this contains the true orthodox faith of the holy trinity , or a trinity in unity ; for so the athanasian creed teaches us , to worship one god in trinity , and trinity in vnity , neither confounding the persons , nor dividing the substance , for there is one person of the father , another of the son , another of the holy ghost , but the godhead of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost is all one , the glory equal , the majesty co-eternal . there are two things then , which an orthodox christian must take care of , neither to confound the persons , nor to divide the substance ; that is , to acknowledge three distinct persons , and yet but one god ; and nothing can be more apparent than both these , in that account which i have given of the ever blessed trinity . . it is plain the persons are perfectly distinct , for they are three distinct and infinite minds , and therefore three distinct persons ; for a person is an intelligent being , and to say , they are three divine persons , and not three distinct infinite minds , is both heresie and nonsense : the scripture , i 'm sure , represents father , son , and holy ghost , as three intelligent beings , not as three powers or faculties of the same being , which is down-right sabellianism ; for faculties are not persons , no more than memory , will , and understanding , are three persons in one man : when we prove the holy ghost to be a person , against the socinians , who make him only a divine power , we prove , that all the properties of a person belong to him , such as understanding , will , affections , and actions ; which shews , what our notion of a person is : such a being as has understanding , and will , and power of action ; and it would be very strange , that we should own three persons , each of which persons is truly and properly god , and not own three infinite minds ; as if any thing could be a god , but an infinite mind . and the distinction between these three infinite minds is plain according to this notion ; for they are distinguished , just as three finite , and created minds are , by self-consciousness : they are united indeed into one ( as i have already discoursed ) by a mutual consciousness to each other , which no created spirits have , which are conscious only to the actings of their own minds , not to each others : and therefore these three divine persons are not separate minds , as created spirits are , but only distinct : each divine person has a self consciousness of its own , and knows and feels itself ( if i may so speak ) as distinct from the other divine persons ; the father has a self-consciousness of his own , whereby he knows and feels himself to be the father , and not the son , nor the holy ghost ; and the son in like manner feels himself to be the son , and not the father , nor the holy ghost ; and the holy ghost feels himself to be the holy ghost , and not the father , nor the son ; as iames feels himself to be iames , and not peter , nor iohn ? which proves them to be distinct persons : which is a very plain account , how these three divine persons are distinct , that there is one father , not three fathers , one son , not three sons , one holy ghost , not three holy ghosts . here is no confounding of persons . . nor do we divide the substance , but unite these three persons in one numerical essence : for we know nothing of the unity of the mind but self-consciousness , as i shewed before ; and therefore as the self-consciousness of every person to itself makes them distinct persons , so the mutual consciousness of all three divine persons to each other makes them all but one infinite god : as far as consciousness reaches , so far the unity of a spirit extends , for we know no other unity of a mind or spirit , but consciousness . in a created spirit this consciousness extends only to itself , and therefore self-consciousness makes it one with itself , and divides and separates it from all other spirits ; but could this consciousness extend to other spirits , as it does to itself , all these spirits , which were mutually conscious to each other , as they are to themselves , though they were distinct persons , would be essentially one : and this is that essential unity , which is between father , son , and holy ghost , who are essentially united by a mutual consciousness to whatever is in each other , and do by an internal sensation ( i want other words to express it ) feel each other , as they do themselves ; and therefore are as essentially one , as a mind and spirit is one with itself . . this is a very plain and intelligible account of this great and venerable mystery , as plain and intelligible as the notion of one god , or of one person in the godhead . the great difficulty of conceiving a trinity of persons in one infinite and undivided essence or substance , arises from those gross and material idea's we have of essence and substance , when we speak of the essence or substance of god , or created spirits : we can frame no idea of substance , but what we have from matter ; that it is something extended in a tripple dimension , in length , and breadth , and depth , which is the subject of those qualities , which inhere and subsist in it : and therefore as matter is the subject of all sensible qualities , so we conceive some such substance of a mind and spirit , which is the subject of will and understanding , of thoughts and passions : and then we find it impossible to conceive , how there should be three divine persons , which are all infinite , without three distinct infinite substances , each distinct infinite person having a distinct infinite substance of his own ; and if we grant this , it seems a plain contradiction to say , that these three distinct infinite substances , are but one numerical infinite substance ; which is to say , that three infinities are but one infinite , and that three persons are but one person ; for a person and an intelligent substance are reciprocal terms , and therefore three distinct persons are three distinct numerical substances , and one numerical intelligent substance is but one numerical person . but this is all carnal reason in a strict and proper sense , which conceives of an infinite mind after the manner of a body , and distinguishes between the matter or substance , and the powers and vertues of the divine essence , as it does between matter and qualities and accidents in bodies . we know nothing of the divine essence , but that god is an infinite mind , and if we seek for any other essence or substance in god , but an infinite minds ; that is , infinite wisdom , power , and goodness ; the essence of god , though considered but as one numerical person , is as perfectly unintelligible to us , as the one numerical essence or substance of three divine persons in the ever blessed trinity . it is this gross and material imagination about the essence and substance of the deity , which occasions all the difficulties about the notion of one god , as well as of a trinity in unity : for we cannot imagine , how any substance should be without a beginning ; how it should be present in all places without parts , and without extension ; how substance , essence , existence , and all divine attributes and powers , which are distinct things in created spirits , should be all the same , one simple act in god : and yet reason tells us we must allow of no composition , no qualities or accidents in the divine nature ; for a compounded being must have parts , and must be made ; for that which has parts must have some maker to join the parts together , and to endow it with such qualities and powers . but now if we consider god as wisdom and truth , which is his true nature and essence , without confounding our minds with some material conceptions of his substance , these things are plain and easie : for it is demonstrable , that truth is eternal , had no beginning , no maker ; for when we speak of original and essential truth and wisdom , what was not always truth and wisdom , could never begin to be so : and if truth be the only real thing , and necessarily eternal , there is an eternal mind , which is nothing else but eternal truth ; for he , who can imagine , truth and wisdom to be eternal , without an eternal mind , ought not to pretend to either , unless he can tell us , how truth can subsist without a mind . thus it is demonstrable , that truth and wisdom has no parts , no extension , no more than thought has ; truth and wisdom is confined to no place , fills no space , but is every-where the same without extension and parts , and therefore has a necessary and essential omnipresence : there is a faint resemblance of this in finite and created spirits ; even humane wisdom and reason , thoughts and passions , have no extension nor parts , which is a good argument that a created spirit has no extension nor parts neither ; for nothing which has extension and parts can be the subject of that which has none : all the qualities of bodies are extended as bodies are ; for the properties and qualities of all things must conform to the nature of the subject in which they are ; and therefore faculties , powers , and operations , which have no extension or parts , [ as the will , the understanding , the memory , the thoughts and passions have none , ] must be seated in a subject which has no parts nor extension neither . thus thought is confined to no place , but in a minute surrounds the earth , and ascends above the heavens , and visits all the empty capacities of infinite space ; which is an imperfect imitation of the omnipresence of an infinite mind . thus what can be a more pure and simple act than wisdom and truth ? now though we conceive the divine attributes and perfections under different notions and characters , such as wisdom , love , justice , goodness , power , they are indeed nothing else but infinite truth and wisdom , which receives several characters and denominations from its different effects ; as the same sea or river does different names from the countries by which it passes : for what is intellectual love , but the perfect idea's of truth , or the true knowledge and estimation of things ? what is justice and goodness , but an equal distribution of things , or a true and wise proportion of rewards and punishments ? what is perfect power , but perfect truth and wisdom , which can do , whatever it knows ? this last will not be so easily understood , because in men we find knowledge and power to be very different things , that men may know a great deal , which they cannot do : and yet if we consider this matter over again , we shall find it a mistake : for even among men it is only knowledge that is power . humane power , and humane knowledge , as that signifies a knowledge how to do any thing , are commensurate ; whatever humane skill extends to , humane power can effect ; nay , every man can do , what he knows how to do , if he have proper instruments and materials to do it with ; but what no humane power can do , no humane knowledge knows how to do : we know not what the substance or essence of any thing is , nor can we make any substance ; we cannot create any thing of nothing , nor do we know , how it is to be done ; which shews , that knowledge and power in creatures are equal , and that proves a very near relation between them ; especially when we add , that knowledge is not only the director of power , but is that very power which we call force : for it is nothing but thought which moves our bodies , and all the members of them , which are the immediate instruments of all humane force and power : excepting mechanical motions , which do not depend upon our wills , such as the motion of the heart , the circulation of the blood , the concoction of our meat , and the like ; all voluntary motions are not only directed , but caused by thought ; and so indeed it must be , or there could be no motion in the world , for matter cannot move it self , and therefore some mind must be the first mover : which makes it very plain , that infinite truth and wisdom is infinite and almighty power . so that if we set aside all material images of essence and substance , and contemplate god as eternal truth and wisdom , the notion of a god is very plain and easie , as far as we are concerned to know him in this state . the same cause has confounded and perplext the notion of a trinity in unity , and given occasion to some vain and arrogant pretenders to reason , profanely to deride and ridicule that most sacred and venerable mystery . they puzzle and confound themselves with some gross and corporeal idea's of essence and substance , and how three divine persons can subsist distinct in the same numerical substance : but would they but consider the three divine persons , as three infinite minds , distinguished from each other by a self-consciousness of their own , and essentially united by a mutual consciousness to each other , which is the only way of distinguishing and uniting minds and spirits , and then a trinity in unity is a very plain and intelligible notion . now certainly this is much the most reasonable way : for what the essence and substance of a spirit is , when we distinguish it from understanding and will , which we call the powers and faculties of a spirit , for my part , i know not , no more than i do , what the naked essence and substance of matter is , stript of all its qualities and accidents : as i observed before , the naked essences of things are not the objects of our knowledge , and therefore it is ridiculous to dispute about them , to say peremptorily what is , or what is not , in matters , which we know nothing of : and therefore as we frame the notion of bodies from their external and sensible qualities , so we must frame the notion of a spirit from its intellectual powers , of will , and understanding , &c. and when we dispute about the distinction or union of spirits , we must not dispute how their substances , which we know nothing of , can be distinguisht or united , but how two minds considered as intellectual beings , are distinguished and united , and then there will appear no difficulty or absurdity , in the essential union of three minds by a mutual consciousness to each other . that the essential unity of a spirit consists in self-consciousness , every man may feel in himself , for it is nothing else which makes a spirit one , and distinguishes it from all other spirits ; and therefore if two spirits were conscious to all that is in each other , as they are to what they feel in themselves , they would be united to each other by the same kind of unity , which makes every individual spirit one : and why then should not this be thought an essential unity between the divine persons of the ever blessed trinity . and is there any difficulty in conceiving this , that father , son , and holy ghost should be thus intimately conscious to each other : the scripture plainly asserts that it is so , as i have already proved , and there is no impossibility in the thing ; nay , if we will allow three infinite minds , it is impossible , it should be otherwise . a finite created spirit indeed is conscious only to itself , and not to any other created spirits ; but god , who is an infinite mind , is conscious to all created spirits , dwells within us , and sees all our thoughts and motions , and passions , as perfectly as we do our own ; how he does this we know not , that he does so , the scripture assures us , and that there is nothing impossible in it , our reason will tell us ; for certainly that infinite mind , which made all finite spirits , can see them too ; that is , see all the thoughts and passions of a spirit , which is the only way of seeing a spirit ; and that can be no infinite mind which does not ; for there is something , which it does not know , if it does not know our thoughts . if then it be essential to an infinite mind to be conscious to all spirits , if we allow , that there are three infinite minds , we must grant , that they are mutually conscious to each other : though an infinite mind is conscious to all that is in created spirits , yet there is not a mutual consciousness , and therefore no essential unity between them , for created spirits are not conscious to an infinite mind , as it is impossible they should , unless they were infinite themselves ; for a mind which is conscious to an infinite mind , that is , a mind which comprehends an infinite mind , must be infinite : but it is a contradiction to say , there are three infinite minds , unless they are mutually conscious to each other ; for if there be any thing in one , which is not in the other , they cannot both be infinite , unless one infinite can be greater than another . the truth is , we have no positive notion of infinity , but only in a mind , and it is impossible to conceive any three beings that are infinite , but only three infinite minds ; and three minds may be infinite , but then they must be mutually self-conscious , or they cannot all be infinite . when we think of an infinite being , we are presently confounded with the corporeal images of an infinite substance , or a substance infinitely extended ; and this we can make nothing of ; for indeed it is demonstrable , that there can be no such thing . we have an imagination of infinite space , which we can set no bounds to , but how far soever we extend our thoughts , we can still imagine something beyond that ; but then we have no notion , that space is any thing , but only a capacity to receive something ; nay , it seems to me , to be nothing else , but an imaginary idea of extension separated from body and matter ; as we conceive place to be distinct from the body , which fills the place , and therefore , that if the body were annihilated , place would remain still of the same dimensions , which the body had , that filled it ; and this is the conception of an imaginary space infinitely extended . but it is as plain as any demonstration , that no real being is infinitely extended ; for there is , and can be no actual extension infinite : the extension of a real being must really and actually be , and yet there is not a more self-evident proposition than this , that there is no extension so great but that it may be extended farther , and then there can be no such thing in being , as an infinite extension , for if there were , there would be such an extension , as could not be extended farther , unless we can extend that , which is actually infinite already . we may easily observe , what it is , that cheats us into the opinion of infinite extension , as if there were such a real thing : viz. that we cannot see to the end of all possible extension , we cannot extend our thoughts so far , but we can imagine something farther , and therefore we fancy , that there is something infinitely extended , though we cannot comprehend it , or see to the end of it , which would be a contradiction , to see to the end of that which has none : but we should observe , that it is not the defect of our imagination , that we cannot conceive an infinite extension , but reason tells us , that there neither is , nor can be , any such extension , but what may be extended farther : now what cannot be , cannot be a real thing , for whatever is real , is . it is exactly the same case in numbers : there neither is , nor can be an infinite number , because there is no number so great , nor can any number be so great , but it may be made greater by adding to it ; so that numbers , extension , and the same may be said of time and succession , are called infinite , not that they have any real and positive infinity , but because we can add to them without end , which is a demonstration , that they neither are , nor can be infinite , for what is infinite , is capable of no additions ; and there can be no number , extension , or successive duration , but what is capable of infinite additions , and therefore is at an infinite distance from being infinite . by this time , i suppose every one is convinc'd , that infinite extension does not belong to the idea of a god , because there is no such thing in nature ; and if infinite extension does not , no extension can ; for nothing is god , but what is infinite . though the truth is , this very word infinite confounds our notions of god , and makes the most perfect and excellent being , the most perfectly unknown to us : for infinite is only a negative term , and signifies that , which has no end , no bounds , no measure , and therefore no positive and determined nature , and therefore is nothing ; that an infinite being , had not use and custom reconciled us to that expression , would be thought nonsense and contradiction ; for every real being has a certain and determined nature ; and therefore is not infinite in this sense , which is so far from being a perfection , that it signifies nothing real . but since custom has made it necessary to use this word , it is necessary to explain what we mean by it : that an infinite being signifies a being absolutely perfect , or which has all possible perfections : which has no other end of its perfections , but perfection itself ; that is a finite imperfect being , that wants any perfections ; that is an infinite being , not which has no end of its perfections , but which actually has all perfections , and can be no more perfect than it is : for there is a measure of the most absolute , and in this sense infinite perfections , before which no being is absolutely perfect , and beyond which there are no new degrees of perfection ; for if we do not grant this , there can be no being absolutely perfect . as for instance : infinite wisdom , knowledge , goodness , justice , power , have fixt and set bounds to their perfections , beyond which they cannot go : infinite knowledge and wisdom knows all things , that are knowable , and that are wise ; infinite goodness can do all things which are good ; infinite justice is perfect justice , which observes the exact proportions of right and wrong ; infinite power can do all things which can be done ; to know , what is not to be known , to do what is not to be done , to be good or just beyond the perfect measures of goodness and justice , is a contradiction ; for it is neither wisdom , nor power , nor goodness , nor justice : the nature of wisdom , power , justice , and goodness , is fixt and determined , and the utmost bounds of them is absolute perfection : the divine nature is the original rule and standard , and utmost bounds of them , and therefore absolutely perfect . these perfections indeed may be called infinite in the negative sense , with respect to us , that we know not , what the utmost extent of them are : we know not how far infinite wisdom , and power , and goodness reaches , but then we certainly know , that they have their bounds , and that the divine nature is the utmost bounds of them ; for nothing can be a rule and measure of absolute perfections , but the divine nature itself : now this gives us a positive notion and idea of god , though we cannot comprehend his absolute perfections ; we as certainly know , what god is , as we know , what wisdom , knowledge , power , goodness , justice signifie ; but how wise , how good , how powerful god is , we know not , because we do not know the utmost extent of these perfections . i must now add , that there can be no absolute perfections , but those of a mind , such as i have so often mentioned , wisdom , power , goodness : as for matter , it is so imperfect a being itself , that it cannot be the subject of absolute perfections : nothing which belongs to matter is a perfection , considered in itself ; extension is no perfection , no more than the dimensions of a body are , to be long , or broad , or deep , to be little or great , which may be perfections or imperfections , as it happens , with relation to the just measures and proportions of different bodies ; for either greatness or littleness may make different things monstrous , and therefore neither of them are either beauties or perfections themselves ; for what is in itself a perfection , is always so . extension is of no use , but where there is a multitude or diversity of parts , and such a compound being can never be absolutely perfect , because it is made of parts , which are not absolutely perfect , as no part can be ; and ten thousand imperfect parts can never make up an absolute perfect being : and if what is infinitely perfect can have no parts , it needs no extension , and can have none ; for what is extended has assignable parts , whether they can be divided or not . omnipresence is a great and unquestionable perfection , but to be omnipresent by infinite extension , ( if such a thing could be ) would be no perfection at all ; for this would be to be present only by parts ▪ as a body might be , which is infinitely extended ; and a body is a capable of infinite extension , as any man can conceive a spirit to be ; and yet if a spirit be omnipresent only by infinite extension , the whole substance of that spirit is not present every where , but part of it in one place , and part in another , as many miles distant from each other as the places are , where such parts of the omnipresent spirit are . this all men will confess to be absurd ; and yet if the whole mind and spirit be present every where , it is certain , it is not present every where by way of extension ; for the whole extension of an infinitely extended spirit is not present every where : and if omnipresence itself cannot be owing to infinite extension , no man can tell me , why an infinite mind should be extended at all : for extension itself is no perfection . much less do any other vertues and qualities of bodies deserve the name of absolute perfections , and therefore we must seek for absolute perfection only in a mind ; perfect wisdom , knowledge , power , goodness , justice , make an absolute perfect mind ; there are no other absolute perfections but these , and therefore there can be no other absolutely perfect being , but an infinite mind . but besides this we may observe , that all these absolute perfections , by a mutual consciousness may be entire and equal in three distinct infinite minds : there is no contradiction , that three infinite minds should be absolutely perfect in wisdom , goodness , justice , and power ; for these are perfections , which may be in more than one , as three men may all know the same things , and be equally just and good : but three such minds cannot be absolutely perfect without being mutually conscious to each other , as they are to themselves ; for if they do not perfectly know each other , as they know themselves , their wisdom and knowledge is not absolutely perfect ; for they do not know all things , if they do not perfectly know one another ; and there can be no such perfect knowledge of each other , without a mutual consciousness . this shews not only the possibility of this notion , that three distinct infinite minds should be mutually conscious to each other , but the necessity of it , if there be three such infinitely perfect minds ; for they cannot be infinitely perfect , without being conscious to one another . thus to proceed : this notion plainly reconciles the perfect equality of all three persons , with the prerogative of the father , and the subordination of the son and holy spirit . that all three persons are perfectly equal in knowledge , wisdom , goodness , justice , power , is evident from their mutual consciousness , whereby they all know , love , and do the same things , which is a perfect equality : but this does not destroy the natural subordination of the son to the father , of a derivative to an original light , as christ is called in the nicene creed ; god of god , light of light : for though god has communicated his own nature to him , and received him into his bosom , to an intimate consciousness with himself , which makes him the perfect image of his father ; yet he receives all this from his father by eternal generation , he is a son still , though equal to his father in all divine perfections , and therefore subordinate to him as a son : and the like may be said of the holy spirit . this shews also , how these three distinct persons are each of them god , and yet are all but one god. each person is god , for each person has the whole and entire perfections of the godhead , having by this mutual consciousness , the other persons in himself , that each person is in some sense the whole trinity : the son is in the father , and the father in the son , and the holy spirit in father and son , and father and son in the holy spirit ; and therefore if the whole trinity be god , the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost god , they being all mutually in each other ; and yet this is a plain demonstration , that they are not three gods , but one god ; because neither of them are the one supreme god , but as thus intimately united to all the rest ; and then they can be all three , but one supreme god : this gives an intelligible account of one of the most difficult problems in all school-divinity , which the master of the sentences borrowed from st. austin as he has done most of his other distinctions ; that the whole trinity is not greater , than any one person in the trinity . this sounds very harshly at first hearing , and yet if we consider it , we must confess it to be true , unless we will say , that there is a greater and less in god , or that the three persons in the trinity make one god , as three parts make a whole , each of which parts must be less than the whole ; and yet i cannot see any possible way to understand this matter , but only this : that the whole trinity by a mutual consciousness is in each person , and therefore no person is less than the whole trinity . and this is the only possible way of understanding the different modi subsistendi , of which the schools speak : that the three divine persons have one numerical essence , and are one god , but are distinguished from each other by a distinct manner of subsistence proper to each person : it is plain , the schoolmen were no sabellians ; they did not think the three divine persons , to be only three names of the same infinite being ; but acknowledged each person to be really distinct from one another , and each of them to have the same numerical essence , and to be truly and properly god , and not to be three modes of the same infinite god , which is little better than three names of one god. and what are these modi subsistendi , by which the divine persons are distinguished from each other ? now they are no other , than the proper and distinguishing characters of each person ; that the father is of himself , or without any cause ; that the son is begotten of the father , that the holy ghost proceeds from father and son : which proves that by these modi subsistendi , they did not mean ( as some mistake them ) that the three divine persons are three modes of the deity , or only modally distinguished , for there are no modes , no more than there are qualities and accidents , in the deity , much less can a mode be a god : to be sure , all men must grant , that the father is not a mode of the deity , but essentially god , and yet he has his modus subsistendi , as well as the son , and the holy ghost ; and no man can think , that the father begat only a modus , and called it his son , whereas a son signifies a real person of the same nature , but distinct from his father . all then that can possibly be meant by these modes of subsistence is this , that the same numerical essence is whole and entire in each divine person , but in a different manner ; the son and holy ghost are in the father , as the one is begotten , the other proceeds from him , and yet both remain in him an intimate consciousness ; and thus you have often heard , all three persons are in each other , and therefore are numerically one ; the father has the son and holy ghost in himself as the fountain of the deity , the son begotten of the father , the holy ghost proceeding from father and son. that is , there are three infinite minds , which are distinguished from each other by the relations of father , son , and holy ghost , the father begets , the son is begotten , the holy ghost proceeds , which are there different modes of subsisting ; but each of these infinite minds has the other two in himself , by an intimate and mutual consciousness , and that makes all three persons numerically one divine essence , or one god ; for when the whole trinity is in each distinct person , each person is the same one numerical god , and all of them but one god ; if the father , for instance , have his own personal wisdom , and by an internal consciousness , all the wisdom of the son , and of the holy ghost ; and the son have his own personal wisdom , and by the same consciousness , all the wisdom of the father , and the holy ghost ; and in like manner , the holy ghost have his own personal wisdom , and all the wisdom of father , and son ; this infinite wisdom which is in father , son , and holy ghost , is identically the same : for from which person soever you begin to reckon this union , it is the same father , son , and holy ghost still , which are thus intimately united into one ; and therefore it is the same numerical and identical wisdom , which is in each of them , and the same in all . to add no more : this notion gives a plain account too of that maxim of the schools , that all the operations of the trinity , ad extra , are common to all three persons ; for it cannot possibly be otherwise , when they are thus intimately united by a mutual consciousness ; for they can no more act , than they can subsist separately ; when the wisdom , goodness , justice , power of the whole trinity is entire in each person , and the same in all , every person of the trinity must be equally concerned , saving the natural order , and subordination of persons , in all the external effects and operations of the divine wisdom , justice , goodness , and power . thus i have endeavoured to explain this great and venerable mystery of a trinity in unity ; and this i may say , that i have given not only a very possible and a very intelligible notion of it , but such also as is very agreeable to the phrase and expressions of scripture , such as preserves the majesty of the article , and solves all the difficulties of it ; there may be a great deal more in this mystery , than we can fathom , but thus much we can understand of it , and that is enough to reconcile us to this belief , and to shame and silence the profane scoffers at a trinity in unity ; as i have in part shewn already , and will do now more fully , by proceeding to answer those many absurdities and contradictions charged on it by the brief notes : to proceed then where i left off . there is one person of the father , another of the son , another of the holy ghost . then the son is not the father , nor is the father the son , nor the holy ghost either of them . i grant it : their persons are distinct , and therefore are not each other , but they are all essentially united by a mutual consciousness , whereby they are mutually in each other , and can be no more separated from each other , than every man 's own mind can be divided from itself . but if the father is not the son , and yet is ( by confession of all ) the one true god , then the son is not the one true god , because he is not the father : the reason is self-evident , for how can the son be the one true god , if he be not he , who is the one true god. after the same manner it may be proved , that ( on th●e athanasian principles ) neither the father , nor holy spirit , are , or can be god , or the one true god ; for neither of them is the son , who is the one true god , according to athanasius , and all trinitarians ; for they all say , the father is the one true god , the son is the one true god , and the holy ghost the one true god ; which is a threefold contradiction , because there is but one true god , and one of these persons is not the other . but if it be a contradiction it is certainly false , for every contradiction , being made up of inconsistencies , destroys itself , and is its own confutation . this is meer trick and fallacy , or misrepresentation . to have made his argument conclude , he should have said : the father is not the son , and yet the person of the father considered not only as distinguished , but as divided and separated from the person of the son , is the one true god , and then the son is not the one true god , because he is not the father : and then indeed his reason had been self-evident , that the person of the son , as separated from the person of the father , is not the one true god , because the person of the son is not the person of the father , who is the one true god : but neither athanasius , ' nor any of the trinitarians ever said this , that the person of the father , as separated from the persons for the son , and of the holy ghost , is the one true god ; or that the person of the son as separated from the persons of the father , and the holy ghost is the one true god ; or that the person of the holy ghost as separated from the persons of the father , and of the son , is the one true god ; for we constantly affirm , that father , son , and holy ghost , by an intimate and inseparable union to each other , are but one true god ; but as their persons can never be separated , so they must never be considered in a separate state , and if we will imagine such an impossible absurdity as this , neither of them are the one true god ; for whoever separates them , destroys the deity , and leaves neither father , son , nor holy ghost . and yet if we consider these three divine persons , as containing each other in themselves , and essentially one by a mutual consciousness , this pretended contradiction vanishes : for then the father is the one true god , because the father has the son , and the holy spirit in himself ; and the son may be called the one true god ( of which more presently ) because the son has the father , and the holy ghost in himself ; and the holy ghost the one true god , because he has the father and the son in himself , and yet all but one true god , because father , son , and holy ghost are united into one ; and then though one of these persons is not the other , yet each person by an essential unity contains both others in himself , and therefore if all three persons are the one true god , each person is god. and this is the true meaning of the athanasian creed , which this author has corrupted by adding , the one true god to every person ; that the father is the one true god , the son the one true god , the holy ghost the one true god , as if each person as distinguished and separated from the other , were the one true god ; and then it would indeed sound pretty like a contradiction to add , yet there is but one true god : but the athanasian creed only says , the father is god , the son god , the holy ghost god ; yet three are not three gods , but one god ; which plainly shews , that it does not speak of these three divine persons , as distinguished and separated from each other ; but as united into one god , not as three parts of the deity , but as three persons , who are essentially one god , as mutually containing each other , that is , by a mutual self-consciousness , as i have now explained it , which is the essential unity of a mind . as for this expression , the one true god , it is never attributed to son , or holy ghost , that i know of either in scripture , or any catholick writer ; tho' it is to the father , whom our saviour himself calls , the only true god ; for all three divine persons as in conjunction with each other , being the one only true god : this title cannot so properly be attributed to any one person , but only the father , who is the fountain of the deity : for though all three persons are in each other by a mutual consciousness , and therefore each person has all the perfections of the godhead ; yet the son is in the father , and the holy spirit in the father and the son , in such a manner as the father is not in the son , nor the father and son in the holy spirit , which the schools call the modi subsistendi ; that is , the son is in the father by eternal generation , and the holy spirit in father and son by eternal procession ; and this is the natural order of the trinity ; and therefore when this one god is to be signified by the name of any one person , it is proper to follow the order of nature , if i may so speak , and to signifie the whole sacred trinity by the name of the father , who is the eternal scource and fountain of it . the godhead of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost is all one , the glory equal , the majesty coeternal . the meaning of the last clause is , that the glory and majesty of the son and holy spirit is equal to the glory and majesty of the father , or the son and holy spirit are equally glorious and majestical with god the father . therefore i ask , whether the glory and majesty with which the son and spirit are glorious and majestical be the same in number ( that is , the very same ) with which the father is glorious and majestical , or only the same for kind or degree ? if it be not the same in number , then the godhead of the father , and of the son , is not ( as this creed teaches ) all one , and they are not one and the same god : for two infinite and distinct glories and majesties make two gods , and three make three gods ; as every one sees , and ( to say true ) the trinitarians themselves confess . it remains therefore that they say , that the glory and majesty of the son and spirit is the same in number and not for kind and degree only , with that of the father ; but then it follows , that the glory and majesty of these persons is neither equal , nor coeternal . not equal , for 't is the same , which equals never are . not coeternal , for this also plainly intimates , that they are distinct : for how coeternal , if not distinct ? do we say , a thing is coeternal and cotemperary with itself ? therefore also this article doth impugn and destroy itself : besides , if the glory and majesty of the three persons be numerically the same , then so are all their other attributes : from whence it follows , that there is not any real difference between the three persons , and they are only three several names of god , which is the heresie of the sabellians . what he says , that if the glory and majesty of the three persons be numerically the same , so are all their other attributes , is certainly true ; for their glory and majesty is nothing else , but the infinite perfections of their nature . and therefore to make short work with this , i affirm , that the glory and majesty , and all the other perfections of these three divine persons are as distinct as their persons are , and therefore may be coequal and coeternal , because they are distinct , and yet they are as numerically one and the same as the godhead is . they are three infinite minds , and therefore distinct as three minds are , but they are all mutually conscious to each other , and therefore as essentially one , as the same mind is one with itself by a self-consciousness ; this does not destroy the distinction of their persons , nor consequently of their majesty and glory : their glory and majesty is as distinct as their persons are , and united as their persons are , into one essential and numerical glory of one supreme god , a trinity in unity . but to expose the ridiculous sophistry of this , instead of their glory equal , their majesty coeternal , let us put in their persons equal and coeternal : for the equality of their glory , and coeternity of their majesty , is nothing else , but the equality and coeternity of their persons ; that the godhead of the father , of the son , and of the holy ghost is all one , their persons equal and coeternal . and then our note-makers argument runs thus : i ask , whether the persons of the son , and of the holy ghost , which are equal and coeternal with the person of the father , be the same in number ( that is , the very same ) with the person of the father , or only the same for kind and degree ? if they be not the same in number ( that is , if they be distinct persons , ( as the creed affirms ) then the godhead of the father , and of the son , is not all one , and they are not one and the same god , for two infinite and distinct persons make two gods , and three make three gods. is not this now , a self-evident proof , that there cannot be one godhead , if there be three persons , because three persons make three gods ! quod erat demonstrandum ; that is , it cannot be , because it cannot be : but to proceed with his argument . it remains therefore , that these trinitarians say , that the person of the son and spirit , is the same in number , and not in kind or degree only , with the person of the father . that is , because they affirm these divine persons to be distinct , therefore they must say , they are numerically the same ; and what then ? why then they are neither equal , nor coeternal , because they are the same without any real distinction , and the same thing is not equal , nor coeternal with itself : right ! very right sir ! a plain demonstration ! and thus the poor trinitarians are eternally confounded ! they teach , that there are three distinct persons , and one eternal and infinite god ; he plainly confutes this by saying , that if there be one godhead , there cannot be three distinct persons , for three distinct persons are three gods ; and if he had proved it , as well as said it , it had been a direct confutation . they affirm , that these three distinct persons are coequal and coeternal ; he proves , that they are not , because they must say , ( though they say the quite contrary ) that they are not three , but one numerical person , and then they cannot be coequal and coeternal : and thus they shamefully contradict themselves , and this article is felo de se : if this be the profound reason of hereticks , god deliver me from heresie , if it were for no other reason , but to keep my understanding : and yet as ridiculous as this looks , it is the whole of his reasoning ; for if there be three distinct coequal and coeternal persons , their majesty and glory must be as distinct , coequal , coeternal , as their persons are , and united into one numerical essential glory , as their persons are into one god ; and how three infinite minds , or the three divine persons , or , which is the same thing , three divine glories and majesties may be really distinct , and yet numerically one god , i have already explained at large . in the next place , this creed teaches , that , the father is incomprehensible , uncreate , eternal , almighty ; the holy ghost is incomprehensible , uncreate , eternal , almighty : also , that each of these persons is by himself god and lord ; so that the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god : yet there are not three gods , or lords , nor three incomprehensibles , nor three almighties , not three eternals , nor uncreated . now if in imitation of this , a man should have a mind to say : the father is a person , the son is a person , and the holy ghost is a person ; yet not three persons , but one person ; i would know , why this were not as good grammer and arithmetick , as when athanasius says , the father is god , the son is god , and the holy ghost is god , yet not three gods , but one god ; or when he says , the father vncreated , the son vncreated , the holy ghost vncreated , yet not three vncreated , but one vncreated . and so of the rest ? doth not a man contradict himself , when the term or terms in his negation , are the same with those in his affirmation ? if not , then it may be true , that the father is a person , the son is a person , the holy ghost is a person , yet there are not three persons , but one person : for all the fault here is only this , that in the last clause the term person is denied to belong to more than one , when in the first it had been affirmed of no fewer than three . for the same reason it must be a contradiction to say , the father is god , the son is god , the holy ghost is god , yet there are not three gods , but one god : for the term god is at last denied to belong to more than one , though in the first clause , it was affirmed of three : will they say , that in these words there are not three gods but one god , the term god is not denied to belong to more than one , or is not appropriated to one ? if so , then there are not three persons , but one person ; and again , there are not three men , but one man ; then i say , these propositions do not deny the terms person and men to belong to more than one , or appropriate them to one only , which yet every body confesses they do . this objection sounds very formidably too , but proves nothing but the shameful ignorance and impudence of this author , who undertakes to write notes upon creeds , and to ridicule the venerable mysteries of the christian faith , before he understands them . for let us begin with the adjectives first , such as vncreated , incomprehensible , eternal , almighty ; and we need take under consideration , but any one of these , and that will explain all the rest , for there is the same account to be given of them all . the father then is uncreated , the son uncreated , the holy ghost uncreated , and yet there are not three uncreated , but one uncreated : now to make this a contradiction , that there are three , father , son , and holy ghost , uncreated , and yet that there are not three uncreated , but one uncreated , this term vncreated must be applied to the same subject , and affirmed and denied in the same sense : now when father , son , and holy ghost , are said to be uncreated , this term vncreated is applied to the three divine persons , and if father , son , and holy ghost , are uncreated , it is certain , there are three divine persons vncreated ; and had it been said in the creed , that there are not three divine persons uncreated , it had been as plain a contradiction , as to say , that the father is a person , the son a person , and the holy ghost a person , and yet there are not three persons , but one person : thus far our author and i agree : but wherein then do we differ ? for is it not expresly said in the creed , that though the father is uncreated , the son uncreated , the holy ghost uncreated , which are plainly three uncreated , if father , son , and holy ghost , are three ; yet there are not three uncreated , but one uncreated ? i grant it ; but if our author had understood any greek or latin , he should have made a little use of it here , and then he would have found , that the creed of athanasius had not denied , that there were three uncreated persons , and therefore did not contradict , what it had before affirmed , that the three persons of the sacred trinity are all uncreated . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and tres increati , cannot signifie three uncreated persons , as it must do to make it a contradiction ; for though there is no substantive expressed , yet some must be understood , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and increati will not agree with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or personae , and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and dii must be understood ; that is , though there are three uncreated persons , father , son , and holy ghost ; yet there are not three uncreated gods , but one uncreated god , which is no more a contradiction , than to say , that though there are three divine persons , there are not three , but one god. and that this is the true meaning of the article , appears from the whole scope and design of it . i shall instance only in the conclusion , which contains the reason of the whole , why though all three persons are uncreated , incomprehensible , eternal , almighty , god , and lord ; yet we must not say , that there are three , but one eternal , incomprehensible , uncreated , almighty , god , and lord : for like as we are compelled by the christian verity ; to acknowledge every person by himself to be god and lord , and there is the same reason for eternal , uncreate , &c. so are we forbidden by the catholick religion , to say , there are three gods , or three lords , three eternals , incomprehensibles , uncreated , almighties . which plainly proves , that when the creed denies , that there are three eternals , or three uncreated , it does not deny , that there are three eternal and uncreated persons , but that there are three eternal and uncreated gods , which is not like saying , there are not three persons , but one person ; but these three eternal persons are not three eternal gods , but one eternal god. this is a sufficient answer with relation to the adjectives of eternal , uncreate , incomprehensible , almighty , that if you joyn them with person , there are three eternal , uncreated persons , but if you joyn them with god , there are not three eternal , uncreated gods , but one eternal uncreated god ; and this is no more a contradiction , than to say , there are three persons and but one god ; but what shall we say to the term god , which is ascribed to all three persons ; and yet the creed affirms , that though there are three persons , each of which is god , yet there are not three gods , but one god ? that is , the term god is affirmed of three , and yet denied to belong to more than one ; and is not this a contradiction ? i answer , no , unless this term god be attributed to three divided and separated persons ; for if three such separated persons be each of them god , they must be three gods , and it would be a contradiction to say , that three persons which are divided and separated from each other , are each of them god , and yet that there are not three gods , but one god : but if these three distinct persons are not separated , but essentially united into one , each of them may be god , and all three but one god : for if these three persons , each of whom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the creed , singly by himself , not seperately from the other divine persons , is god and lord , are essentially united into one , there can be but one god and one lord , and how each of these persons is god , and all of them but one god , by their mutual consciousness , i have already explained . that salvo he has found out for the trinitarians , of this pretended contradiction of three gods , and one god ; that there are three personal gods , and but one essential god , is so senseless , and the paragraph so long , that i shall not give my self the trouble of transcribing it : for the answer lies in a few words . we grant there are three persons , each of whom is god ; but we deny , that there are three personal gods : because though their persons are distinct , they never were , and never can be divided and separated ; and therefore can be but one god , being essentially united into one : by three gods all mankind understand , three distinct and separate beings , independent on one another , each of which is a supreme and soveraign god , as three seperate humane persons are three men ; but where the persons are not separated , but essentially united into one , there we must acknowledge but one god. but you 'll say : though the union of their persons will not allow us to say , that there are three separate personal gods , yet if all three persons are distinct , though not separated from each other , and each of them is god considered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as distinct , though not separate from the other divine persons , then at least the godhead of each person must be as distinct as their persons are , and we must acknowledge three distinct , though not separate gods. i answer , by no means . we must allow each person to be a god , but each distinct person is not a distinct god ; there is but one godhead , which can no more be distinguished , then it can be divided from it self . there is but one god , and each divine person is this one numerical god , has the whole entire godhead in himself , and the same one numerical godhead is in them all ; thus each divine person is god , and all of them but the same one god ; as i explained it before . this one supream god is father , son , and holy ghost , a trinity in unity , three persons , and one god : now father , son , and holy ghost , with all their divine attributes and perfections ( excepting their personal properties , which the schools call the modi subsistendi , that one is the father , the other the son , the other the holy ghost , which cannot be communicated to each other ) are whole and entire in each person by a mutual consciousness , each person feels the other persons in himself , all their essential wisdom , power , goodness , justice , as he feels himself , and this makes them essentially one , as i have proved at large . now if the whole trinity be in each divine person by such an intimate and essential union , we must confess each person to be god , if the whole trinity be god : and yet there being but one trinity , one father , son , and holy ghost , who are essentially one by a mutual consciousness , it is certain all these three divine persons can be but one god : for where-ever you begin to reckon , there are but three , and these three are one : if we consider the father and holy ghost in the son by this mutual consciousness ; we truly affirm the son to be god , as having all the divine perfections of the whole trinity in himself ; if we consider the father and the son in the holy ghost ; for the same reason we affirm the holy ghost to be god ; but the natural order of the trinity is to reckon from the father as the fountain of the deity : that father , son , and holy ghost are one god : for the son and holy spirit are in the father ; not only by a mutual consciousness , as the father and the son are in the holy ghost , but as in their cause , ( if i may so speak , and the ancient fathers were not afraid to speak so ) as in their root , their origine , their fountain , from whence they receive the communications of the divine essence , and godhead ; the son by eternal generation , being god of god , light of light ; the holy ghost by eternal procession from the father and the son. thus all these divine persons are naturally united in the father , who is the fountain of the deity , and all essentially in each other by a mutual consciousness , which makes each person god , and all one and the same god without any shew of contradiction . sect . v. the doctrine of the fathers , and of the schools , concerning the distinction of persons , and the vnity of essence in the ever blessed trinity , considered and reconciled to the foregoing explication of it . this notion of the union of the divine persons in one numerical essence , by a mutual consciousness to each other , is so very plain , and gives so easie and intelligible an account both of the phrases of scripture , and all other difficulties in the doctrine of the trinity , that this alone is sufficient to reconcile any man to it : but i am very sensible , how afraid men are ( and not without reason ) of any new explications of so venerable a mystery , and such a fundamental doctrine of christianity , as this is ; and therefore i must ward this blow , as well as i can , and remove the prejudice of novelty and innovation . now if it appear , that i have advanced no new proposition , but have confined myself to the received faith and doctrine of the catholick church ; if that explication i have given of it , contain nothing new , but what is universally acknowledged , though possibly not in express terms applied to that purpose i use it for ; if that explication i have given be very consistent with , nay , be the true interpretation of that account the ancients give of a trinity in unity , i hope it will not be thought an unpardonable novelty , if i have expressed the same thing in other words , which give us a more clear and distinct apprehension of it : and to satisfie all men , that it is so , i shall compare , what i have now said concerning the distinction of persons , and the unity of essence in the ever blessed trinity , with the doctrine of the fathers , and the schools . i. to begin then with the distinction of persons . i have not indeed troubled my readers with the different signification of essence , and hypostasis , substance , subsistence , person , existence , nature , &c. which are terms very differently used by greek and latin fathers in this dispute , and have very much obscured this doctrine instead of explaining it ; but i plainly assert , that as the father is an eternal and infinite mind , so the son is an eternal and infinite mind , distinct from the father , and the holy ghost is an eternal and infinite mind , distinct both from father and son ; which every body can understand without any skill in logick or metaphysicks : and this is no new notion , but the constant doctrine both of the fathers and schools . three persons signifie three , who are infinite in knowledge and wisdom , and all other perfections , which belong to a mind : now no man who acknowledges a trinity of persons , ever denied that the son and the holy spirit , were intelligent beings or minds . when they tell us , ( which is their common language ) that the son is the substantial word and wisdom of the father , what is this else but to say ▪ that he is an intelligent being , or infinite mind : greg. nyssen calls the son , or word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , mind , or intellect . athanasius observes from our saviour's words , i and my father are one ; that are signifies two , or the distinction of persons , as one signifies the unity of essence : for he does not say , i and my father am , but are one. and therefore if the father be an eternal mind and wisdom , the son also is an eternal , but begotten mind and wisdom ; as the nicene creed tells us , that he is god of god , light of light , very god of very god. st. austin in his sixth book of the trinity , takes notice of a common argument used by the orthodox fathers against the arians , to prove the coeternity of the son with the father ; that if the son be the wisdom and power of god , as st. paul teaches , cor. . and god was never without his wisdom and power , the son must be coeternal with the father ; for it is distraction to say , that the father was ever without his wisdom , or power , was neither wise nor powerful . but this acute father discovered a great inconvenience in this argument , for it forces us to say , that the father is not wise , but by that wisdom which he begot , not being himself wisdom as the father : and then we must consider , whether the son himself , as he is god of god , and light of light , may be said to be wisdom of wisdom , if god the father be not wisdom , but only begets wisdom ; and by the same reason we may say , that he begets his own greatness , and goodness , and eternity , and omnipotency , and is not himself his own greatness , or goodness , or eternity , or omnipotency , but is great , and good , eternal and omnipotent , by the greatness , goodness , eternity , omnipotency , which is born of him ; as he is not his own wisdom , but is wise with that wisdom , which he begets . the master of the sentences follows st. austin exactly in this point , and urges this unanswerable argument for it , which he grounds upon st. austin's principle , that in god , to be and to be wise is the same thing ; and if it be , he cannot be wise with the wisdom he begets , for then he would receive his being from this begotten wisdom , not wisdom from him : for if the wisdom he begets be the cause of his being wise , it is the cause also , that he is ; which must be either by begetting or by making him ; but no man will say , that wisdom is any way the begetter or maker of the father ? which is the heighth of madness . and in the next chapter he teaches , that the father is unbegotten , the son begotten wisdom ; so that according to st. austin and the master of the sentences , who is the oracle of the schools , the father is eternal wisdom , or an eternal mind , and the son eternal wisdom and mind , though both are united into one eternal wisdom : and if we confess this of father and son , there can be no dispute about the holy ghost , who is eternal mind and wisdom , distinct , both from father and son. nothing is more familiar with the ancient fathers , than to represent father , son , and holy ghost , to be three as distinct persons , as peter , iames , and iohn are , as every one knows , who is at all versed in this controversie ; and this is charged on them by some men , as little better than polytheism , or a trinity of gods , as peter , iames , and iohn are a trinity of men ; but this must be true with reference to distinction of persons , if we will acknowledge a real distinction between them ; for if the distinction be real , and not meerly nominal ( which was the heresie of sabellius ) their persons must be as distinct , as three humane persons , or three men are : the father is no more the son , or the holy ghost , than peter is iames or iohn : but then they are not separated or divided from each other , as peter , iames and iohn are ; for that indeed would make them three gods , as peter , iames and iohn are three men . there is no example in nature of such a distinction and unity , as is between the three persons in the godhead , and therefore the ancient fathers made use of several comparisons to different purposes , which must carefully be confined to what they applied them , for if we extend them farther , we make nonsense or heresie of them . there are three things to be considered in the ever blessed trinity ; the distinction of persons , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or sameness of nature , and their essential unity ; and the fathers make use of different comparisons to represent each of these by , because no one can represent them all ; but inconsidering persons seek for all in one , and because they cannot find it , they reject them all , as impertinent , dangerous , or heretical , and reproach the fathers , sometimes as ignorant of this great mystery , sometimes as bordering upon heresie , which i am sure does little service to the doctrine it self , and gives great countenance to false and corrupt notions of it ; whence the fathers themselves , even those who were the most zealous opposers of arianism , are thought favourites of such opinions . i shall have occasion to take notice of several instances of this , as i go on , at present i shall confine my self to the distinction of persons , which cannot be more truly and aptly represented than by the distinction between three men ; for father , son , and holy ghost are as really distinct persons , as peter , iames and iohn ; but whoever shall hence conclude , that these fathers thought , that father , son , and holy ghost are no otherwise one also , than peter , iames , and iohn are , greatly abuse them without any colourable pretence for it , as will appear more presently ; but this comparison of theirs shows what their sense was , that these three divine persons are three eternal and infinite minds ▪ as really distinct from each other , as three men are ; though essentially united into one infinite and eternal mind , or one god. but i need not insist on this , for the real distinction of persons is so plainly taught by the ancient fathers , especially after the rise of the sabellian heresie , that there is more difficulty to understand , how they unite them into one god , then that they make them distinct persons , and what they say about the unity of the godhead , abundantly proves this distinction of persons . secondly , let us therefore in the second place consider , how they explain this great mystery of a trinity in unity : they all agree , that there are three distinct persons , and that these three persons are but one god ; and they seem to me to agree very well in that account they give of it ; though some late writers are very free , and i think very unjust , in their censures of some of them as scarcely orthodox in this point : i shall only remind you , that this being so great a mystery , of which we have no example in nature ; it is no wonder , if it cannot be explained by any one kind of natural union : and therefore it was necessary to use several examples , and to allude to several kinds of union , to form an adequate notion of the unity of the godhead : and we must carefully apply what they say to those ends and purposes for which they said it ; and not extend it beyond their intension , as i observed before : and there are several steps they take towards the explication of this great mystery ; which i shall represent in short , and show , that taking them altogether , they give a plain and intelligible notion of this unity in trinity , and indeed no other than what i have already given of it . . the first thing then to be considered is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 orco-essentiallity of the divine persons . that all three persons in the god-head have the same nature , which they signified by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : now whereas the same nature may signifie the same numerical , or the same specifick nature , petavius , and after him dr. cudworth , have abundantly proved , that the nicene fathers did not understand this word of a numerical but specifick sameness of nature : or the agreement of things , numerically differing from one another in the same common nature . as maximus very plainly tell us , that that is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which has the same notion or definition of its essence ; as a man differs nothing from a man , as he is a man , nor an angel from an angel , as he is an angel : and therefore this word did equally overthrow the sabellian and the arian heresie ; as it affirms both a distinction of persons , and the sameness of nature , as st. ambrose and others observe ; for nothing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to it self , but to something else , distinct from it self , but of the same common nature : and therefore some , who owned the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rejected the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as savouring of sabellianism , and implying such a numerical unity of essence in the godhead , as destroyed all distinction of persons ; for which reason the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it self was rejected by some , as abused by the sabellians ; till the signification of that word was fixt and declared by the fathers at nice , as petavius observes . this is one thing wherein the fathers place the unity of the godhead ; that all three persons have the same nature ; and to be sure , this is absolutely necessary to make three persons one god : for it is impossible they should be one god , if they have not the same nature , unless three distinct and separate beings of divers natures can be one god ; that is , unless the divine nature be not one pure and simple act , but a compound being , and that of different natures too . but some of the fathers went farther than this , and placed the essential unity of the divine nature in the sameness of essence ; that there is but one god , because all the three divine persons have the same nature . and it will be necessary briefly to examine what they meant by it , to vindicate these fathers from the mis-representations , and hard censures of petavius and dr. cudworth , who ( as i hope to make appear ) have greatly mistaken their sense . the charge is , that they make the three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost , to be one god only upon account of the same specifical divine nature common to them all ; just as three men are one , by having the same common nature , or the same humanity : and being asked , why they may not then be called three gods , as well as we say , peter , iames , and iohn , are three men ; they answer , that this is owing to an ill custom , for they ought not to be called three men neither , which , is like saying , there are three human natures ; and though in inferiour matters we may bear with the abuse of words , and improper forms of speech , yet this is of dangerous consequence , when we speak of god ; and therefore though there is no great hurt in saying , there are three men ; though there is but one humanity common to them all ; yet we must not say there are three gods , since there is but one divine nature and essence common to all three persons : this , petavius says , is to deny the true and real unity of the divine substance and essence , and to make god only collectively one ; as a multitude of men are said to be one people , and a multitude of believers one church ; which was the error of abbot ioachim , for which he was condemned in the council of lateran . dr. cudworth represents it thus : these theologers supposed the three persons of their trinity to have really no other than a specifick vnity and identity , and because it seems plainly to follow from hence , that therefore they must needs be as much three gods , as three men are three men , these learned fathers endeavoured with their logick to prove , that three men are but abusively and improperly so called three , they being really and truly but one , because there is but one and the same specifick essence or substance of human nature in them all . — he adds , it seems plain that this trinity is no other than a kind of tritheism , and that of gods independent and co-ordinate too . this is a very high charge , and yet these theologers are no less men than gregory nyssen , and cyril of alexandria , and maximus , and damascen , men of note in their generation , and never charged with heresie before . but whatever the meaning of these fathers was , it is plain , that petavius and dr. cudworth have mistaken their meaning . for they did not think , that father , son , and holy ghost were one god , only as peter , iames , and iohn , are one man ; or that peter , iames , and iohn are one man , as father , son , and holy ghost are one god ; they neither dreamt of a collective nor specifick unity of the godhead , but asserted a real subsisting numerical unity of essence , as is obvious to every impartial reader , and therefore if they had not understood , how they explained this , yet they ought not to have put such a sense upon their words , as is directly contrary to what they affirm : i shall not need to transcribe much out of these fathers to justifie them in this point , but will only represent their argument as plainly as i can , and that will be their justification , whatever become of their argument . they affirm then , that father , son ; and holy ghost , are but one god , because there is , and can be , but one numerical divinity , or one divine nature and essence , though it subsist in three distinct persons : against this it was objected , that peter , iames , and iohn , though they have the same human nature , yet are called three men ; and there is no absurdity in it , when there are more than one , who have the same nature , to speak of them in the plural number , to call two two , and three three ; how then comes it to pass , that religion forbids this ; that when we acknowledge three persons , who have the same nature without any imaginable difference , we must in a manner contradict our selves , confessing the divinity of the father , son , and holy ghost to be one and the same , and denying that they are three gods. this gregory nyssen answers at large , and i shall chiefly confine my self to the answers he gives , which will abundantly show , how much these two learned men have mis-represented his sense . and first , he takes notice of the common form of speech , of calling three , who partake of the same human nature , three men ; which inclines us to call the three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost , who have all the same divine nature three gods ; and that naturally betrays men into the opinion of a trinity of gods , as well as of a trinity of persons , who are as much three gods , as peter , iames , and iohn , are three men : and therefore he tells us , that this is an improper way of speaking , even when applied to men , to say , that there are three men . for man is the name of nature , not of the person : to say that there is but one man , is no more than to say , there is but one humanity ; and to say there are three men , is to say , there are three humanities , or three human natures ; and the name of nature cannot be a proper name of distinction , and therefore ought not to be multiplied : for that which is the same in all , cannot distinguish one person from another . this he observes all men are very sensible of ; for when they would call any particular person out of a crowd ; they do not call him by the name of nature ; that is , they do not say , you man come hither ; for this being a common name , as the nature is common , no man could tell , who was meant : but they call him by the name of his person , peter , or iames ; for though there are many , who partake of the same human nature , yet there is but one man , or one humanity in them all : persons are distinguished and divided and multiplied by peculiar personal properties , and therefore may be numbred ; but nature is one , united with it self , a perfect indivisible unity , which neither increases by addition , nor is diminished by substraction , but though it be in a multitude of individuals , is whole , entire , and undivided , in all . and therefore as a people , an army , a church , are named in the single number , though they consist of multitudes : so in exactness and propriety of speech , man may be said to be one , though there are a multitude who partake of the same human nature . so that , hitherto all that the father hath said , tends only to justifie this form of speech , as having nothing absurd or incongruous in it ; to acknowledge , that the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , and yet that there is but one divinity or godhead , not three gods , for though this sounds as harsh , as to own , that peter is a man , and iames a man , and iohn a man , and yet there are not three men , but one man , which custom has made very absurd and contradictious to say , ( which is the objection he was to answer ) yet he observes , that according to strict propriety of speaking , this is no absurdity to say , there are not three men , but one man , nay , that it is an abuse of speech to say otherwise , because man is the name of nature , not of a person , and therefore there is but one man , as there is but one human nature in all those , who partake of it , for human nature is but one , whole , and indivisible in all ; and therefore cannot distinguish one person from another , and therefore not be a name of number . but what makes st. gregory dispute thus nicely about the use of words , and oppose the common and ordinary forms of speech ? did he in good earnest believe , that there is but one man in the world ? no! no! he acknowledged as many men , as we do ; a great multitude who had the same human nature , and that every one who had a human nature , was an individual man ; distinguished and divided from all other individuals of the same nature : what makes him so zealous then against saying , that peter , iames , and iohn , are three men ? only this ; that lie says man is the name of nature , and therefore to say there are three men , is the same as to say , there are three human natures of a different kind ; for if there are three human natures , they must differ from each other , or they can't be three ; and so you deny peter , iames , and iohn , to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or of the same nature ; and for the same reason , we must say , that though the father be god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , yet there are not three gods , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one godhead and divinity , lest we destroy their homoousiotes , or the sameness of their nature , and introduce three gods of a different nature , like the pagan polytheism : which is the first reason he gives , why we do not say there are three gods to avoid the suspicion of polytheism , in numbring and multiplying gods , as the heathens did , which he says is a sufficient answer for ignorant and unskilful people . but to say this in gross , will not satisfie more inquisitive men ; and therefore he assigns the reason for it , that individuals in strict propriety of speech , ought not to be numbred by the name of their nature , because that argues a diversity in their natures ; to say , three men , is to say , there are three different humanities , whereas humanity is one and the same in all ; and as men are not distinguished , so they ought not to be numbred by the name of nature ; and that this is all his meaning , appears from the reason he gives , why this improper way of speaking may be tolerated without any inconvenience , when we speak of men , that we may say , there are three men ; but it is very dangerous to apply this to the divinity , and say there are three gods ; because there is no danger , by this form of speech , that that there are three or more men , that any one should be betrayed into that conceit , that we mean a multitude of humanities , or many different human natures ; but there is danger , lest our naming more gods , or saying , that there are three gods , men should imagine , that there are divers and different natures in the divinity , that is , that the three persons in the godhead are not all of the same nature . here st. gregory lays his foundation , that we must not say , there are three gods , because there is but one divinity ; father , son , and holy ghost , being all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the same nature , whereas god being the name of nature , to say there are three gods , is to say , there are three different divinities , or divine natures , which destroys the homoousiotes of the godhead ; which is the sum of his argument against using the name of nature plurally , to say , there are three men , or three gods. there is nothing more plain than this in the dialogues of maximus , who all along explains this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the one divinity , and the one humanity , by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the sameness of nature , and therefore there can be but one nature , though it subsist in several persons , or individuals . now indeed had they gone no farther in explaining the unity of the godhead , than this specifick unity and identity of nature , there had been some reason to quarrel with them ; but they do not stop here , but proceed to show , how this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or sameness of nature in all three persons of the ever blessed trinity , proves a true numerical and essential unity of the godhead ; which it does not , and cannot do in created natures : without this it is evident , there can be no essential unity , unless we will allow of a composition of different natures in the godhead ; where the nature is the same it may be one , not only by a logical , but by a real and essential unity . gregory nyssen has two ways of doing this . . he observes , that the name god , and so those other names which are ascribed to the divinity , do not so properly signifie the divine nature , as declare something relating to it : for the divine nature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that which has no name , and which no words can express and signifie , as the scripture teaches : but the names given to god only teach us , either what we ought not to attribute to the divine nature , or what we ought , but not what the divine nature it self is . this is a fair introduction , such as becomes a wise man , who considers , how unknown the essences of all things are to us , much more the substance and essence of god ; and how it confounds our minds , when we talk of the numerical unity of the godhead , to have the least conception or thought about the distinction and union of natures and essences ; and therefore he tells us , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the inspector and governour of the world ; that is , it is a name of energie , operation , and power ; and if this vertue , energie , operation be the very same in all the persons of the trinity , father , son , and holy ghost , then they are but one god , but one power and energie ; and thus he proves it is , and that not as it is among men , who have the same power and skill , do the very same things , profess the same art , are philosophers or orators alike ; and yet are not all one philosopher , or one orator ; because though they do the same thing , yet they act apart , every one by himself , and have no communion nor share in what each other do ; but their operations are proper to themselves alone ; but in the divine nature it is not so ; the father does nothing by himself , nor the son by himself , nor the holy ghost by himself ; but the whole energie and operation of the deity relating to creatures , begins with the father , passes to the son , and from father and son to the holy spirit : the holy trinity does not act any thing separately ; there are not three distinct operations , as there are three persons , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but one motion and disposition of the good will , which passes through the whole trinity from father to son , and to the holy ghost , and this is done 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , without any distance of time , or propagating the motion from one to t'other , but by one thought , as it is in one numerical mind and spirit , and therefore though they are three persons , they are but one numerical power and energie . by this time i hope the reader is satisfied , that this father does not make the persons of the trinity three independent and coordinate gods , who are no otherwise one than three men are by a specifick unity and identity of nature ; but has found out such an unity for them , as he confesses cannot be between three men , even such an unity as there is in a spirit , which is numerically one with it self , and conscious to all its own motions ; for i leave any man to judge , whether this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this one single motion of will which is in the same instant in father , son , and holy ghost , can signifie any thing else but a mutual consciousness , which makes them numerically one , and as intimate to each other , as every man is to himself , as i have already explained it . petavius was aware of this , and therefore will not allow this to belong to the same argument , but to be a new and distinct argument by it self : now suppose this , yet methinks he should have suspected , he had mistaken the fathers sense , when he found him contradict , what he apprehended to be his sense , within the compass of two pages ; but indeed the mistake is his own ; for the father pursues his intended argument , to prove , that though the father is god , and the son god , and the holy ghost god , yet we ought not to say , that there are three gods , but one god. this he proves , first , because god is the name of nature , and the name of nature must not be expressed in the plural number , when the nature is the same without any the least conceivable difference ; for to say , there are three gods , is to say , that there are three different divine natures , which introduces polytheism ; as to say there are three men , is to say , there are three different human natures ; for if they be the same , they are not three ; and therefore the name of the nature must not be expressed plurally , how many persons soever there are , who have the same nature . this was to secure the homoousiotes of the divine nature , and if he had stopped here , petavius and dr. cudworth might have said , what they pleased of him ; but having secured the homoousiotes or sameness of nature , which was the great dispute of those days between the orthodox and the arians , he proceeds to show , how this same nature in three distinct persons is united into one numerical essence and godhead ; and this he does first by showing , that god signifies power and energie , and that all the three persons in the trinity have but one numerical energie and operation , and therefore are but one god ; which is only the improvement of his former argument ; for the sameness of nature is necessary to the sameness of operation ; for nature is the principle of action , especially in god , whose nature is a pure and simple act , and an unity and singularity of energie and operation is a demonstration of one numerical essence ; for the same single individual act cannot be done by two separate beings , who must act separately also . secondly , as for those , who are not contended to contemplate god as a pure and simple act or energie , which easily solves this difficulty , how three persons are one god , they having but one numerical energie and operation ; i say , as for those who not contented with this , inquire after the unity of the divine nature and essence , he asserts that this perfect homoousiotes or sameness of nature , without the least difference or alteration makes them numerically one ; and returns to what he had first said , that the name of nature should not be expressed plurally , it being one entire undivided unity , which is neither encreased nor diminished by subsisting in more or fewer persons . i confess , i do not understand his reasoning in this matter , he seems to destroy all principles of individuation , whereby one thing is distinguished from another , where there is no difference or diversity of nature ; for things , he says , must be distinguished by magnitude , place , figure , colour , or some other diversity in nature , before we can number them , and call them two or three : and therefore since the divine simple unalterable nature , admits of no essential diversity , that it may be one , it will not admit of any number in it self , but is but one god. whereas i confess , to my understanding , if the same pure unmixt nature , as suppose humanity , should subsist in twenty several persons , without the least variation , i should not doubt , notwithstanding the specifick unity of nature , to say , there are twenty subsisting human natures ; and three minds and spirits , which have no other difference , are yet distinguished by self-consciousness , and are three distinct spirits : and therefore to help this out , he sometimes adds , that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , no difference either of nature or energie in the deity ; and at other times , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the divine nature is invariable , and undivided ; which all the ancient fathers added to explain the unity of the trinity , that inseparate union of nature , which is between the divine persons , that they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inseparable from each other . but however he might be mistaken in his philosophy , he was not in his divinity : for he asserts a numerical unity of the divine nature ; not a meer specifick unity , which is nothing but a logical notion ; nor a collective unity , which is nothing but a company , who are naturally many ; but a true subsisting numerical unity of nature : and if the difficulty of explaining this , and his zeal to defend it , forced him upon some unintelligible niceties , to prove that the same numerical human nature too is but one in all men , it is hard to charge him with teaching , that there are three independant and coordinate gods , because we think he has not proved , that peter , iames , and iohn , are but one man. this will make very foul work with the fathers , if we charge them with all those erronious conceits about the trinity , which we can fancy in their inconvenient ways of explaining that venerable mystery , especially when they compare that mysterious unity with any natural unions . i am sure st. gregory was so far from suspecting that he should be charged with tritheism upon this account , that he fences against another charge of mixing and confounding the hypostases or persons , by denying any difference or diversity of nature , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which argues , that he thought he had so fully asserted the unity of the divine essence , that some might suspect , he had left but one person , as well as one nature , in god. but though the homoousiotes or coessentiality of the divine persons is not sufficient alone to prove this unity of the godhead , yet as i before observed , this is necessary to an essential unity , for they must all have the same nature , or they cannot be one , and therefore this was the first thing to be considered in the unity of the godhead . secondly , to this homo-ousiotes the fathers added a numerical unity of the divine essence . this petavius has proved at large by numerous testimonies , even from those very fathers , whom he before accused for making god only collectively one , as three men are one man ; such as gregory nyssen , st. cyril , maximus , damascen ; which is a demonstration , that however he might mistake their explication of it , from the unity of human nature , they were far enough from tritheism , or one collective god. for we must observe , though all the fathers assert , the singularity of the godhead , or the numerical unity of the divine essence , yet they do not assert such a numerical unity , as there is , where there is but one person as well as one essence ; but such a numerical unity , as there is between three , who are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the very same nature , but are not meerly united by a specifick unity , but by an essential union , and therefore are three and one. this as maximus truly says , is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , both a wonderful distinction and union , but though several fathers attempt several ways of explaining it , they all agree in the thing ; that father , son , and holy ghost , three distinct divine persons , are united in one numerical nature and essence . and i cannot but observe , that petavius greatly commends boethius's explication of this mystery , which is the very same he had before condemned in gregory nyssen , and those other fathers . that father , son , and holy ghost are one god , not three gods : cujus conjunctionis ratio est indifferentia : the reason or manner of which union and conjunction is their indifference ; that is , such a sameness of nature , as admits of no difference or variety , or an exact homo-ousiotes , as he explains it : eos enim differentia comitatur , qui vel augent vel minuunt , ut ariani qui gradibus meritorum trinitatem variantes distrahunt , atque in pluralitatem deducunt : those make a difference , who augment and diminish , as the arians do , who distinguish the trinity into different natures , as well as persons , of different worth and excellency , and thus divide and multiply the trinity into a plurality of gods. principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est : proeter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit intelligi potest : for the beginning of plurality is alterity ; for we know not what plurality is but alterity : that is , there must be some difference in the nature of things to make them two or three , but when the nature is exactly the same , they are but one : which is exactly the same account , which gregory gave of it , as i have already shewn ; and why this should be little better than heresie in him , and very good divinity in boethius , is a little mysterious ; for after all , this numerical unity of essence is nothing else , but an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , where there are no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as maximus speaks , such an invariable sameness of nature , as has no differences to distinguish it , and therefore must be one : for these fathers apprehended , that where there was such an exact sameness of nature , they did mutually exist in each other , and were but one power and energie , will and counsel , and therefore but one godhead and monarchy : this gregory nyssen insists on , as i shewed before ; and petavius has quoted a remarkable testimony from damascen to this purpose ; which shews also , that though they asserted but one humanity , yet they were far enough from thinking , that the three divine persons are one god , only as peter , iames , and iohn , are one man ; where he tells us , that the distinction and separation between peter and paul is real and visible , their union and community of nature only notional : for we conceive in our minds , that peter and paul are of the same kind , and have but one common nature : thus common nature is discerned by reason , but yet it subsists by parts , and separately by itself , and is distinguished from itself as it subsists in individuals by many things , some peculiar marks and properties : but especially that they do not subsist in each other , but separately , and therefore may be called two or three or many men ; ( and gregory nyssen says the same , as petavius himself owns ) but in the most sacred trinity it is otherwise ; for there the community of nature is not a logical notion , but is real ; from the same eternity , identity of substance , action , will , agreement of counsels , identity of authority , power , goodness ; i do not say likeness , but identity . the numerical unity then of the divine essence resolves itself into those two principles , the unity and identity , of power and energie , and that which they call the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or circumincession , or in-being of the three divine persons in each other , which preserves the distinction of persons , but makes the divine essence numerically one ; and indeed these two are but one , and both of them nothing more than what i have explained , i think , a little more intelligibly by a mutual consciousness , whereby all three divine persons are mutually in each other , and have but one energy and operation . that the fathers universally acknowledged , that the operation of the whole trinity , ad extra , is but one , petavius has proved beyond all contradiction ; and hence they conclude the unity of the divine nature and essence ; for every nature has a vertue and energy of its own ; for nature is a principle of action , and if the energy and operation be but one , there can be but one nature ; and if there be two distinct and divided operations , if either of them can act alone without the other , there must be two divided natures . this is certainly true , but yet it gives no account , how three distinct persons come to have but one will , one energy , power , and operation ; and there is no account to be given of it , that i know of , but what i have now given , viz. mutual consciousness ; and that is a very plain account of it : for if all three persons be conscious to each other , as every man is to himself , there can be but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as gregory nazianzen speaks , but one and the same motion and will of the deity ; they must move and act all together , according to the order and subordination of the divine persons ; and it is impossible they should do so without this mutual consciousness , as it is , that three men , who are not conscious to each other , should have but one single motion of will , in one single and undivided act : the fathers then and i agree in this , that the unity of the divine nature and essence consists in the singularity of operation ; i only add , how this energy and operation is , and must be one , by a mutual consciousness ; and if this be a reasonable and intelligible account , i hope it is no fault . and there is no other account to be given of that mutual in-being of the divine persons in each other , which they call the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as christ tells us , i am in the father , and the father in me : the necessity of this they saw , from what our saviour says , and because it is impossible they should be one without such an inseparable and intimate union and presence and inhabitation in each other : and therefore damascen tells us , that they cannot go out of each other , nor be separated ; but are united and mutually penetrate each other without confusion . such an union as this they all agreed in , as petavius largely shews , but how to explain it they know not ; sometimes they are thus intimately united by the sameness of nature , but this might be the cause of this union , but does not explain , what this intimate union is ; sometimes they represent it by corporeal similitudes , which raise gross and material images in the mind , unworthy of the pure and simple essence of god : as the mixture and union of the light of several candles in the same room , and of the colours of the rainbow , &c. which is owing to a material conception of the divine substance , and the union of substances , which we know nothing of ; but had they contemplated god as a pure mind , it had been easie to explain this perichoresis , or in-dwelling of the divine persons in each other : for there is , and can be no other union of minds but consciousness , and by a mutual consciousness they are as intimate to each other , as they are to themselves ; and are whatever each other is ; as i have explained it at large ; and i hope , this is no fault neither , to give an intelligible explication of that , which all the fathers taught , but were not always equally happy in their explications of it . but to do st. austin right , though he do not name this consciousness , yet he explains this trinity in unity by examples of mutual consciousness : i named one of his similitudes before , of the unity of our understanding , memory , and will , which are all conscious to each other ; that we remember what we understand and will ; we understand what we remember and will ; and what we will , we remember and understand ; and therefore all these three faculties do penetrate and comprehend each other . but his ninth book , de trinitate , is spent wholly upon this argument . it is very familiar with the ancient fathers to represent the father as the infinite original mind ; the son the wisdom of the father , his image , or reflex knowledge of himself ; and the holy spirit that divine love , wherewith father and son love each other ; st. austin takes this similitude of a mind , its knowledge of itsself , and love of itsself , and shews how these are three and one , which he makes a faint image of , and resemblance of a trinity in unity . now the mind , when it knows its whole self , its knowledge comprehends its whole self ; and when it perfectly loves itself , it loves its whole self , and its love comprehends its whole self ; and this proves them to be of the same substance ; for the mind knows itself , and loves itself , and these are so three , that the mind is known and loved by nothing else , and therefore it is necessary that these three have one nature and essence . he proceeds to shew , that this unity is without all manner of confusion and mixture , as it is in the sacred trinity , where the persons are united , but distinct ; for mixture of persons destroys the trinity : and shews , how each of them are distinct , and then how they are alternately in each other ; for the mind that loves is in the love , and love in the knowledge of the lover , and knowledge in the knowing mind ; and how each of them is in the other two ; for the mind , which knows and loves itself , is in its own knowledge and love ; and the love of the mind , which knows and loves itself , is in its own knowledge ; and the knowledge of the mind which knows and loves itself is in the mind , and in its love , because it loves itself knowing , and knows itself loving ; and thus also two are in each , for the mind which knows and loves itself , with its knowledge is in love , and with its love is in knowledge ; for love and knowledge are together in the mind , which loves and knows itself : and the whole is in the whole ; for the whole mind loves itself , and knows its whole self , and knows its whole love , and loves its whole knowledge . i need not tell any man , that this is the mutual consciousness which i have described , and by this st. austin represents the trinity in unity ; and i hope his authority will defend me from the charge of innovation ; and i am sure the reason of the thing will defend itself . but for the better understanding of this , we must further observe , that the fathers resolve the unity of the godhead into the unity of principle : that is , though there be three divine persons in the godhead , father , son , and holy ghost , yet the father is the original fountain of the deity , who begets the son of his own substance , and from whom , and the son , the holy ghost eternally proceeds , of the same substance with father and son : so that there is but one principle and fountain of the deity , and therefore but one god. but this , as petavius well observes , does not of itself prove the unity of the godhead , but only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or sameness of nature ; and therefore the fathers add , that god begets a son not without , but within himself , for the wisdom of god is within him , and inseparable from him : this they illustrated by the sun , its light and splendour , which are coaeval and inseparable ; by the fountain , and its streams ; by a tree , and its branches , which are united in one ; which comparisons must not be strained farther than they were intended , as if father , son , and holy ghost were one in the same manner , as the sun and its light , or the tree and its branches , or the fountain , river , and streams , but only that there is such a natural and essential union between the divine persons , as makes them one numerical god. but there is something still to be added to this to compleat this notion , that as the father is the fountain of the deity , and the son and holy ghost inseparably united to him , so father , son , and holy ghost are essential to one god , as st. austin calls the trinity , vnam quandam summam rem , one supreme thing : and as all acknowledge , that the three persons are one god , and since god is the most necessary being , all three persons are necessary and essential to one god : that there must necessarily be three divine persons in the unity of the godhead , and there can be no more . for the explication of this , i shall proceed by these steps , which are all plain , and universally acknowledged . . that there are no accidents , nor qualities , nor faculties in god , as there are in created spirits ; but whatever is in god is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , essence and substance , a pure and simple act. this is universally acknowledged by all christians : st. austin affirms , that there are no accidents in god : athanasius , that there is no composition in god , as between substance and accident , ( and it is much alike , as to mind and its different faculties and powers , which is a composition ) but that god is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a pure simple act : but there is no need of testimonies to prove that , which natural reason proves ; for nothing can be eternal and self-orginated , but a pure and simple act , for what is compounded is made ; for it wants a maker . . that it is essential to an eternal mind to know itself , and to love itself ; for this is essential to a mind ; no human mind can be without it , much less the most perfect and excellent mind ; and therefore god does know himself , and love himself and his own image . . that original mind and wisdom , and the knowledge of it self , and love of it self , and its own image , are distinct acts , and never can be one simple , individual act. they are distinct powers and faculties in men , knowledge , self-reflexion , and love , and are so distinct , that they can never be the same : knowledge is not self-reflection , nor love either knowledge or self-reflection , though they are inseparably united , they are distinct . . therefore these three acts , which are so distinct , that they can never be the same , must be three substantial acts in god , that is , three divine subsisting persons ; for there is nothing but essence and substance in god ; no accident , or faculties , as there are in creatures . . that these are the true and proper characters of the distinct persons in the ever blessed trinity . the father is original mind and wisdom ; the son the word and wisdom of the father ; that is , the reflex knowledge of himself , which is the perfect image of his own wisdom ; the holy ghost , that divine love which father and son have for each other : it would be very impertinent to confirm this by the authority of the ancient fathers , because all men , who know any thing of them , know that this is their constant language . i am sure this is very agreeable to the language of scripture , and answers all those characters we find there of the son and holy ghost . the son is expresly called the word and the wisdom of god. that word which was in the beginning , which was with god , and was god , iohn . for god did certainly always know himself , and therefore this word was always with god , intimately present with him , not as our transient and vanishing reflections are , but as a permanent and substantial word , the subsisting and living image of his fathers wisdom : as he is called the brightness of his fathers glory , and the express image of his person , heb. . his fathers glory and person is eternal and original wisdom ; he is his fathers begotten wisdom , or the bright reflexion of his wisdom ; which is as perfect and exact , as the fathers knowledge of himself . and therefore st. iohn might well say , no man hath seen god at any time , the only begotten son , who is in the bosom of the father , he hath declared him , iohn . and our saviour might well tell us , as the father knoweth me , even so know i the father , iohn . that he seeth all that the father doth : that he receiveth all his commands from the father , that he that seeth him , seeth the father ; and many such like expressions he uses to signifie his perfect knowledge of his father ; for he is that wisdom and knowledge wherewith his father knows himself ; and if the father perfectly knows himself , he is the perfect image and wisdom of the father . for this reason he is called the son , because he is the perfect image of the father , begotten of his own eternal wisdom , by a reflex act upon himself : for he begets his own son in his own likeness by knowing himself ; and therefore the son must be of the same nature , the very wisdom of the father , unless the father knows himself otherwise than he really is . this is the eternal son and word of god , whereby he made the worlds ; for it is this reflex knowledge and wisdom , which makes all things : the eternal ideas of truth and wisdom in the divine mind effect nothing no more than meer speculation does in us , till it is brought into act by reflexion ; for it was this reflex knowledge , which took the patterns of things for the new world , and gave being to them ; and therefore god made the world by his son and begotten wisdom ; who doth all things by seeing what the father doth , as the father doth all things by seeing himself in his reflex and begotten wisdom ; for the father and the son are one single energie and operation . this is that eternal word and reason , that true light , which lighteth every man that cometh into the world , which communicates the light of reason , and the eternal idea's of truth to mankind : this is that son , who reveals the father to us , and acquaints us with his secret counsels for the salvation of sinners . this is that word which became flesh , and dwelt among us , who hath undertaken the work of our redemption , and is become the wisdom of god , and the power of god to salvation to them that believe : for all the natural communications of wisdom and reason ; all the new discoveries of the divine wisdom ; whatever the divine wisdom immediately does , must be done by this begotten wisdom ; that is , by a reflex wisdom , which is the principle of action and execution : and therefore as god made the world by his word , so also he redeems the world by his incarnate word ; this being as immediate an effect of the divine wisdom and counsel , as his creation of the world : as for the holy ghost , whose nature is represented to be love , i do not indeed find in scripture , that it is any where said , that the holy ghost is that mutual love , wherewith father and son love each other : but this we know , that there is a mutual love between father and son : the father loveth the son , and hath given all things into his hands . and the father loveth the son , and sheweth him all things , that himself doth . and our saviour himself tells us , i love the father . and i shewed before , that love is a distinct act , and therefore in god must be a person ; for there are no accidents nor faculties in god. and that the holy spirit is a divine person is sufficiently evident in scripture : for he is the spirit of god , who knows what is in god , as the spirit of man knows what is in man , and he is the spirit of christ , who receiveth of the things of christ : and his peculiar character in scripture is love ; which shews us , what he is in his own nature , as well as what he is in his effects and operations , for nature and energy is the same in god. it is by the holy spirit , that the love of god is shed abroad in our hearts , rom. . the love of god is shed abroad in our hearts by the holy ghost which is given unto us . for this spirit is the essential love of god , and therefore both inspires us with the love of god , and gives us a feeling sense of god's love to us . he is the spirit of the son , the spirit of adoption , whereby we cry abba father , and which cries in our hearts abba father . the spirit of the son ; that is , of the eternal and only begotten son ; that very spirit , whereby the eternal son calls god father , whereby the father owns the son , and the son the father ; that is , that essential love , which is between father and son ; and therefore wherever this spirit of the son is , it will call god father , will cry abba father ; that is , is a spirit of adoption in us ; for the eternal spirit of the son , dwells only in sons ; by our union to christ , who is the eternal son of god , we become his adopted sons , and as such the spirit of the son dwells in us . and therefore the fruits and operations of the spirit answer this character . for the fruit of the spirit is love , joy , peace , long-suffering , gentleness , goodness , meekness , which are the communications of the spirit of love. this shews the difference between generation and procession , between being a son , and the spirit of god. generation , as i observed before , is a reflex act , whereby god begets his own image and likeness ; it is god's knowledge of himself , which to be sure is his own perfect image ; and the living essential image of god is his son : for to be a son , is to be begotten of his father's substance , in his own likeness and image : but the divine spirit , or this eternal love proceeds from god , is not a reflex but a direct act , as all thoughts and passions are said to proceed out of the heart : a reflex act turns upon it self , and begets its own likeness ; but love is a direct act , and comes out of the heart ; and thus does this eternal love proceed from god : besides , this eternal love is not the image of god , but his eternal complacency in himself and his own image , and therefore is not a son begotten of him , but the eternal spirit which proceeds from him . it is true , this eternal subsisting love , which is the third person of the trinity , has all the perfections of father and son in himself ; for love must have the perfect idea of what it loves , and therefore this subsisting love must have all those perfections in himself , which are the eternal object and cause of this eternal love ; but his essential character is love , and though love has the whole divine perfections in it self , yet it has them not as a son , not as the image of god. this gives a plain account also , how he is the spirit of the father , and the spirit of the son , and according to the profession of the latin church , proceeds both from father and son ; for this divine love eternally proceeds from god's reflex knowledge of himself , or seeing himself in his own image : he loves himself in his image , and therefore the spirit proceeds from father and son ; that is , from the original and the image , by one undivided act : as every man loves himself in that idea and image he has formed of himself in his own mind . and no man will wonder , that the creation of the world is ascribed to the holy spirit , as well as to the father and son ; for it is eternal love which gives being to all things , which is the author and giver of life , without which infinite wisdom and power produces no one effect : original wisdom contains the ideas of all things , and begotten wisdom can frame the natures of things according to the original ideas of the divine mind , but it is love which gives being to them . . from hence it is clear , that these three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost , are one god , as these three powers , of understanding , self-reflexion , and self-love are one mind : for what are meer faculties and powers in created spirits , are persons in the godhead , really distinct from each other , but as inseparably united into one , as three different powers are essentially united in one mind : there is a vast difference indeed between them , as there is between god and creatures ; the mind is but one , the faculties and powers more , but these being only faculties and powers , neither of them is a whole entire mind : the understanding alone is not the whole entire mind , nor reflexion , nor love , but the mind is whole and entire by the union of them all in one : but these being persons in the godhead , each person has the whole divine nature : the son has all that the father has , being his perfect and natural image ; and the holy spirit , is all that father and son is , comprehending all their infinite perfections in eternal love : and they are all the same , and all united into one god , as the several faculties and powers are in one mind . . for this proves , that these divine persons are intimately conscious to each other , which , as i before showed , makes them one numerical god : for as the same mind is conscious to all its own faculties and powers , and by that unites them into one ; so where there are divine and infinite persons instead of faculties and powers , they must be mutually conscious to each other , to make them all one god. . this proves also , that though there are three distinct persons , there can be but one energie and operation ; father , son , and holy ghost is the maker and governour of the world by one inseparable and undivided energie : neither of them do nor can act apart : as the several powers of the mind all concur to the same individual action ; knowledge , self-reflection , and will , do the same thing , which is the effect of knowledge brought into act by reflection and will : and yet the effect may be ascribed to knowledge , and ascribed to will , as the making of the world is to the father , and to the son , and to the holy ghost , not separately to either , but as they act in conjunction , and produce the same effect by one individual energie and power . . this proves also , that father , son , and holy ghost , must be co-eternal , as the several powers and faculties must be co-temporary , and co-exist in the same mind . understanding cannot be without a power of reflection , nor that without will and love. and i suppose , no man will say , that there could be any imaginable instant , wherein god did not know and love himself . this account is very agreeable to what st. austin has given us ; who represents the father to be original mind , the son his knowledge of himself , and the holy-spirit divine love , as i have done ; and gives the very same account of their union . cùm itaque se mens novit & amat , jungitur ei amore verbum ejus , & quoniam amat notitiam , & novit amorem , & verbum in amore est , & amor in verbo , & utrumque in amante & dicente . when the mind knows and loves it self , its word is united to it by love , and because it loves its knowledge , and knows its love ; its word is in love , and love in its word , and both in the loving , and speaking or knowing mind . this is the eternal generation of the son : itaque mens cùm seipsam cognoscit , sola parens est notitioe suoe , & cognitum enim & cognitor ipsa est ▪ when the mind knows it self , it is the sole parent of its own knowledge ; for its self is both the knower and the thing known ; that is , the son is begotten of the father by a reflex knowledge of himself ; and he gives us the same account of the difference between generation and procession ; that one is a new production ( if i may so express it ) inventum , partum , & repertum , that is the production of its own image , of its own wisdom and knowledge by self-reflexion ; the other comes out of the mind , as love does , and therefore the mind is the principle of it , but not its parent . cur itaque amando se non genuisse dicatur amorem suum , sicut cognoscendo se genuit notitiam suam : in eo quidem manifeste ostenditur , hoc amoris esse principium undè procedit : ab ipsa quidem mente procedit , quae sibi est amabilis antequam se amet : atque ita principium est amoris sui , quo se amat ; sed ideo non rectè dicitur genitus ab ea , sicut notitia sui , quâ se novit ; quia notitia jam inventum est , quod partum vel repertum dicitur , quod saepe praecedit inquisitio eo fine quietura . this i hope is sufficient both to explain and justifie this doctrine ( which is the great fundamental of the christian religion ) of a trinity in unity , and unity in trinity , and that account i have given of it . it must be confessed , that the ancient fathers did not express their sense in the same terms , that i have done , but i will leave any indifferent and impartial reader to judge , whether they do not seem to have intended the very same explication , which i have now given of this venerable mystery . as for the schoolmen , they generally pretend to follow the fathers , and have no authority , where they leave them : sometimes they seem to mistake their sense , or to clog it with some peculiar niceties and distinctions of their own . the truth is , that which has confounded this mystery , has been the vain endeavour of reducing it to terms of art : such as nature , essence , substance , subsistence , hypostasis , person , and the like , which some of the fathers used in a very different sense from each other ; which sometimes occasioned great disputes among them , not because they differed in the faith , but because they used words so differently , as not to understand each others meaning , as petavius has shewn at large . the more pure and simple age of the church contented themselves to profess the divinity of father , son , and holy ghost ; that there was but one god , and three , who were this one god ; which is all the scripture teaches of it . but when sabellius had turned this mystery only into a trinity of names , they thought themselves concerned to say , what these three are , who are one god : and then they nicely distinguished between person and hypostasis , and nature and essence , and substance , that they were three persons , but one nature , essence , and substance ; but then when men curiously examined the signification of these words , they found , that upon some account or other they were very unapplicable to this mystery : for what is the substance and nature of god ? how can three distinct persons have but one numerical substance ? what is the distinction between essence , and personality and subsistence ? the deity is above nature , and above terms of art ; there is nothing like this mysterious distinction and unity , and therefore no wonder , if we want proper words to express it by , at least that such names as signifie the distinction and unity of creatures , should not reach it . i do not think it impossible to give a tolerable account of the school-terms and distinctions , but that is a work of greater difficulty than use , especially to ordinary christians , and i have drawn this section to too great a length already to enter upon that now . sect . vi. concerning expounding scripture by reason . for like as we are compelled by the christian verity to acknowledge every person by himself to be god and lord. so are we forbidden by the catholick religion , to say , there be three gods and three lords . by the christian verity i suppose is meant , the sacred books which contain the christian religion , that is , the books of the old and new testament . but do these books , and does this verity compel us to the acknowledgment of three persons , each of which , is by himself supreme god , and lord , and yet all of them together but one god ? doth , i say , the holy scripture compel us to this contradictory acknowledgment ? is there any text alleadged from scripture , which all the vnitarians , and some or other of the most learned trinitarians , do not easily interpret in such sense , that the vnity of god is preserved , and no more than one person ( even the god and father of our lord iesus christ ) acknowledged to be god ? see the history of the vnitarians . but if there is no text of scripture , but what is in the opinion of some or other of their own learned men , fairly capable of a sense contrary to the faith delivered in this creed , then we are not compelled to acknowledge this faith. and the truth is , the contest between the vnitarians and trinitarians is not , as is commonly thought , a clash of reason with scripture ; but it layeth here , whether , when the holy scripture may be understood as teaching only one god , or but one who is god , which agrees with the rest of scripture , and with natural reason , we must notwithstanding prefer an interpretation of it that is absurd , and contrary to it self , to reason , and to the rest of scripture , such as the trinitarians interpretation ( exprest in this creed ) appears to be ! in a word , the question only is , whether we ought to interpret holy scripture , when it speaks of god , according to reason , or not , that is , like fools , or like wise men . there is nothing in this long paragraph to trouble an answerers thoughts , but a great deal to exercise his patience , if he be apt to be provoked by arrogance and folly. his first argument to prove , that the holy scriptures do not compel us to confess each person in the ever blessed trinity to be god and lord , and yet that there is but one god , is because it is a contradictory acknowledgment : so he says , and has endeavoured to prove it , and how vainly and impertinently , i leave the reader to judge ; but if a trinity in unity imply no contradiction , as i am perswaded , i have evidently proved ; then i hope the scripture may teach this doctrine , and require the belief of it : but this is an impudent argument , which brings revelation down in such sublime mysteries to the level of our understandings , to say , such a doctrine cannot be contained in scripture , because it implies a contradiction ; whereas a modest man would first inquire , whether it be in scripture or not , and if it be plainly contained there , he would conclude , how unintelligible soever it appeared to him , that yet there is no contradiction in it , because it is taught by scripture : we must not indeed expound scripture contrary to common sense , and to the common reason of mankind , in such matters as every man knows , and every man can judge of ; but in matters of pure revelation , which we have no natural idea of , and know nothing of but what is revealed , we must not pretend some imaginary contradictions to reject the plain and express authority of a revelation ; for it is impossible to know , what is a contradiction to the natures of things , whose natures we do not understand ; as i shewed before . his next proof , that the scripture does not compel us to this acknowledgment , is , that the unitarians , and some of the most learned trinitarians expound these texts of scripture , which are alledged for a trinity in unity to another sense , and easily reconcile them with the belief and acknowledgment of one only , who is god , as well as of one god ; and for this he refers us to that learned piece , the history of the unitarians . as for examining particular texts , which are alledged on both sides in this controversie , it is too voluminous a work at present , and besides my present undertaking , which is only to vindicate the athanasian creed , and the true christian doctrine of a trinity in unity , from the pretended absurdities and contradictions charged on it in these notes , and when that is done , ( and i hope , i have done it ) i dare trust any man of competent understanding to judge which is most agreeable to the scope and language of scripture . but as for what he says , that the unitarians or socinians can easily reconcile all the texts of scripture alledged for the proof of a trinity , to their notion of one god in opposition to three divine persons in the godhead , we must let him say so , because he will say it , as all other hereticks pretend scripture to be on their side ; but to say , that they can easily do this , is a little impudent , when all men , who understand this controversie , see what art they use , and what forced and arbitrary interpretations they put on scripture to reconcile it to their opinions ; especially when some of the most learned socinians stick not to confess , that they will expound scripture to any sense , rather than acknowledge such doctrines , as they think so contradictory to the reason and understanding of mankind ; which no modest man would own , were he not sensible of the harshness and uncouthness of his own expositions ; for things are come to a desperate pass , when they shall resolve upon any sense , or no sense , rather than that , which the words most aptly and properly signifie , but lies cross to their prejudices and pre-conceived opinions : but what thinks he of socinus's exposition of that text , where christ says , that he came down from heaven ; which he could not do , if he had no being , before he was born of the virgin mary ? did socinus find it so easie a thing to reconcile this text to his darling opinion ; when he was fain to fast and to pray for it , and to pretend revelation , because he wanted reason to support it ? viz. that christ before he entred on his prophetick office , was taken up into heaven to be instructed in the gospel , and then came down from heaven again to publish it to the world : whereas our saviour plainly speaks of his first coming into the world , when he was born of the virgin , and the whole history of the gospel takes no notice of his being taken up into heaven before his resurrection from the dead ; i think this was no easie exposition ; but of this more presently . that there are no texts of scripture alledged for the proof of a trinity , but what are rejected by one or other of the most learned trinitarians , is as true as the other : there are many texts , which all hearty trinitarians do , and must agree in , and whoever rejects them , whatever name he goes by , can be no better than a socinian in disguise ; but however there are no texts alledged by learned trinitarians , but are acknowledged by some or other of his learned trinitarians , and thus it is as broad as long ; but it is not the authority of any modern expositors , which we rely on , but their reason ; and if a learned trinitarian should reject any text without reason or learning , it signifies no more to us , than the expositions of a learned socinian : when we seek for authority we go higher , to the primitive fathers of the catholick church , and there we find it . they not only delivered to us the traditionary doctrines of a trinity , which had always been taught in the catholick church , but the traditionary exposition of those scriptures too , whereon this doctrine is founded ; and they being so near the head and fountain of tradition , the apostolick age , their authority is venerable ; and a modest and prudent man will not reject any interpretation of scripture , which relates to articles of faith , and is unanimously delivered by the ancient fathers , if the words in any tolerable construction will bear the sense : for though a text should fairly bear two different interpretations , that is most likely to be true , which has been from the beginning taught by the catholick church : and i challenge this author to name any text , which is alledged for the proof of a trinity by learned trinitarians , which has not been used to the same purpose by many , or most , or all the ancient fathers , who have alleadged those texts . but his conclusion from hence , that therefore the scripture does not compel us to acknowledge a trinity in unity , because the unitarians , and some or other of the most learned trinitarians , expound these texts to another sense , is very pleasant , and shows what a great master of reason he is : for his argument is this ; the scripture does not compel us to believe any thing , while there are other men , who expound the scripture to a contrary sense ; and thus i am sure the scripture compels us to believe nothing ; for it will be hard to name any text , which concerns any article of faith , how plain and express soever it be , but what has been expounded to a contrary sense by one heretick or other . i would ask this author , whether the scripture compels him to believe but one god , in his sense of it , that is , but one who is god ? if it does not , why does he believe it , and insist so peremptorily on it , in defiance of the whole catholick church ? and yet how can the scripture compel him to this , when the catholick church , and the catholick doctors in all ages , have expounded scripture to a contrary sense , that there are three divine persons , who are this one god ? at this rate , when men differ in their expositions of scripture , the scripture does not compel us to believe either ; and thus notwithstanding the scripture , we may believe nothing . if the scripture have a determined sense , we are bound to believe that sense , and must answer it to god , and to our saviour , if we do not , whoever expounds it otherwise ; and therefore when it is said in the creed , that we are compelled ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are under a necessity ) by the christian verity to acknowledge each person by himself to be god and lord ; the meaning is , not that men are under any force to believe or acknowledge it , or to expound scripture to this sense ; but that the true sense and exposition of scripture does make this acknowledgment necessary , if we will believe as the scripture teaches ; and this may be true , whatever the unitarians , or any learned trinitarians teach . he adds ; that the contest between the vnitarians and trinitarians , is not a clash of reason , with scripture ; but whether we ought to interpret holy scripture , when it speaks of god according to reason , or not , that is , like fools , or like wise men . now this is all sham , and falacy : for to expound scripture by reason , may signifie two very differeent things . . to use our own reason to find out the true sense and interpretation of scripture . . to expound scripture in conformity to the principles and maxims of natural reason . in the first sense he expounds scripture according to reason , who considers the use and propriety of words , the scope and design of the place , what goes before , and what follows , and how one place of scripture is consistent with another , just in the same way as we find out the sense of any humane writing ; and he who does not thus expound scripture by reason , expounds it like a fool ; that is , if he put such a sense upon it , as the words will not bear , or the scope and design of the text will not admit , and as no man would think of , who were not prepossessed and prejudiced against what appears to be the plain and obvious sense of the text , and whether they , or we , in this sense , expound scripture according , or contrary , to reason , like fools , or like wise men , shall be examined presently . as for the other sense of expounding scripture according to reason , that is , in conformity to the principles and maxims of natural reason ; we allow this too so far , that we must not expound scripture to such a sense , as contradicts the plain and express maxims of natural reason ; for though god reveals such things to us , as natural reason could not discover , and cannot comprehend , yet revelation cannot contradict plain reason ; for truth can never contradict it self ; what is true in revelation , can never be false in reason ; and what is true by natural reason , can never be false in revelation ; but then as i observed before , we must be sure that there is such a contradiction ; it must be evident and express , and not made out of uncertain consequences , which many times are not owing to the nature of things , but to the imperfection of our own knowledge : as to keep to the matter of our present dispute : natural reason tells us , that there is , and can be , but one supreme god , the soveraign lord of the world , and should any man pretend to prove from scripture , that there are three gods , this would be an express contradiction to the natural belief of one god , and therefore we must reject this sense of scripture , as contrary to reason : but to prove from scripture , that there is but one god , and that there are three , who are this one god , this is no contradiction to reason , which teaches but one god ; for scripture teaches the same , and all trinitarians acknowledge the same , and must do so , if they believe the athanasian creed ; and therefore the belief of the trinity does not contradict the natural belief of one god. yes , you 'l say , that there should be three persons , each of which is god , and yet but one god , is a contradiction : but what principle of natural reason does it contradict ? reason tells us , that three gods cannot be one god , but does reason tell us , that three divine persons cannot be one god ? if my reason be like other mens , i am sure , my reason says nothing at all about it , does neither affirm , nor deny it ; and therefore when the scripture assures us , that there is but one god , as natural reason teaches , and that this one god is three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost , this contradicts nothing which reason teaches , but adds something , which natural reason could not discover , which is the proper use of revelation . scripture teaches , that there is but one god , and that there are three divine persons , who are this one god : reason teaches , that there is but one god , but does not teach that there are three divine persons in the unity of the godhead , nor does it teach that there are not ; and therefore though the scripture teaches more then natural reason does ( which i suppose may be allowed by these adorers of reason ) yet it teaches nothing contrary to what natural reason teaches ; nay , these men can not graft any contradiction upon it , without perverting the faith of the ever blessed trinity , as it is taught in scripture , and has always been taught in the catholick church : that is , to find a contradiction , their business is to prove , that these three divine persons , each of which is god , must be three distinct gods , and then three distinct gods cannot be one god : this i grant , and their argument is unanswerable to those , who own these three divine persons , to be three distinct gods , but what is that to us , who teach , that they are not three distinct gods , but one god , as the scripture teaches , and the catholick church always taught , and as of necessity we must teach , if we believe a trinity in unity ? so that there is no contradiction is not our faith , for that which they make a contradiction is not our faith , but a contradiction to our faith , as well as to common sense and reason . well! but if we believe three distinct divine persons , each of which is god , we must believe three distinct gods : i hope not , when we profess to believe but one god ; yes , whatever we profess to believe , three such distinct persons , must be three gods ; now this we deny , and challenge them to produce any plain principle of reason to prove , that it must be so ; natural reason teaches nothing about the personality of the godhead ; it teaches one god , but whether this one god , be one or three persons , it says not , and therefore it may be either , without contradicting the natural notions we have of one god ; and then here is free scope for revelation , and if revelation teaches , that there is but one god , and that there are three divine persons , each of which in scripture have not only the title , but the nature and attributes of god ascribed to them , then we must of necessity believe a trinity in unity ; three persons and one god ; for what the scripture affirms , and reason does not deny , is a proper object of our faith : and then their objection against this faith , that these three divine persons , must be three distinct gods , if each of them be god , is sensless and ridiculous ; for it is demonstrable , that if there be three persons and one god , each person must be god , and yet there cannot be three distinct gods , but one. for if each person be not god , all three cannot be god , unless the godhead have persons in it , which are not god ; and if all three are but one god , they cannot be three distinct gods : so that whoever believes the three divine persons to be three distinct gods , does not believe a trinity in unity ; and whoever believes a trinity in unity , cannot believe three distinct gods ▪ and if there be a trinity in unity , each person must be god , and yet there cannot be three gods , but one god ; and now let him go look for his contradiction in the belief of three persons , and one god , and when he has found it , let me hear from him again . so that all his absurdities and contradictions are vanished only into nicodemus his question , how can these things be ? and if i could give him no other answer , i should think it a very good one to say , god knows . must we deny every thing that we can't conceive and comprehend , though it be expresly taught by god himself ; must we deny what we read in the bible to be there , because reason does not teach it , and cannot frame an adequate idea of it ? but i have not done with our author thus , but must give him a little more about expounding scripture according to reason : for i affirm , that natural reason is not the rule and measure of expounding scripture , no more than it is of expounding any other writing . the true and only way to interpret any writing , even the scriptures themselves , is to examine the use and propriety of words and phrases , the connexion , scope , and design of the text , its allusion to ancient customs and usages , or disputes , &c. for there is no other good reason to be given for any exposition , but that the words signifie so , and the circumstances of the place , and the apparent scope of the writer requires it . but our author ( as many others do ) seems to confound the reasons of believing any doctrine , with the rules of expounding a writing . we must believe nothing that contradicts the plain and express dictates of natural reason , which all mankind agree in , whatever pretence of revelation there be for it ; well , say they , then you must expound scripture so as to make it agree with the necessary principles and dictates of reason : no , say i , that does not follow ; i must expound scripture according to the use and signification of the words , and must not force my own sense on it , if it will not bear it . but suppose then , that the natural construction of the words import such a sense , as is contrary to some evident principle of reason ? then i won't believe it . how ? not believe scripture ? no , no , i will believe no pretended revelation , which contradicts the plain dictates of reason , which all mankind agree in , and were i perswaded , that those books , which we call the holy scriptures did so , i would not believe them ; and this is a fairer and honester way , than to force them to speak , what they never intended , and what every impartial man , who reads them , must think was never intended , that we may believe them : to put our own sense on scripture , without respect to the use of words , and to the reason and scope of the text , is not to believe scripture , but to make it ; is not to learn from scripture , but to teach it to speak our language ; is not to submit to the authority of scripture , but to make scripture submit to our reason , even in such matters as are confessedly above reason , as the infinite nature and essence of god is . though i am never so well assured of the divine authority of any book , yet i must expound it , as i do other writings ; for when god vouchsafes to speak to us in our own language , we must understand his words just as we do , when they are spoke by men : indeed when i am sure that it is an inspired writing , i lay it down for a principle , that it contains nothing absurd and contradictious , or repugnant to the received principles of natural reason ; but this does not give me authority to expound the words of scripture to any other sense , than what they will naturally bear , to reconcile them with such notions , as i call reason ; for if one man has this liberty , another may take it , and the scripture will be tuned to every mans private conceits ; and therefore in case the plain sense of scripture contradicts those notions i have of things , if it be possible to be true , i submit to the authority of scripture ; if it seems to include a contradiction and impossibility , if that contradiction be not plain and notorious , and in such matters , as i am sure , i perfectly understand , there i submit again , and conclude it is no contradiction , though i cannot comprehend how it is ; if i can by no means reconcile it , i will confess , i do not understand it , and will not pretend to give any sense of it , much less to give such a sense of it , as the words will not bear . this shows , that men may pretend to expound scripture according to reason , when the dispute is nothing else , but a clash of reason with scripture , as this author phrases it : for so it is , when the usual signification of the words , and the scope and circumstances of the place require one sense , and men force another sense on it , upon pretence of expounding scripture by reason , that is , to reconcile scripture to their pre-conceived notions and opinions of things : for what the words signifie , that is the sense of scripture ; and when they will not admit this sense , because they apprehend it contrary to reason , though most agreeable to the words and scope of the place , that is nothing else but a controversie between scripture and reason . my present undertaking does not oblige me to examine all the scriptures , which are alleadged by the socinians against the doctrine of the trinity , or by others for it ; this is a voluminous work , and has often been done by others , and if there were any just occasion of doing it again , it deserves a treatise by it self : but indeed it is the doctrine it self , which the socinians dislike , more then our expositions , which they cannot deny to be reasonable enough , were the doctrine so ; but they must not expound scripture contrary to reason , and therefore must never allow , that the scripture teaches such a doctrine , which they think contradicts the plain and self-evident reason of mankind ; reconcile men to the doctrine , and the scripture is plain without any farther comment ; this i have now endeavoured , and i believe our adversaries will talk more sparingly of absurdities and contradictions for the future , and then they will loose the best argument they have against the orthodox expositions of scripture : but yet i am unwilling to dismiss this argument , without some few observations about the sense of scripture . this author refers us to the history of the vnitarians , which though it be but a little book in all senses , is too large to be particularly examined now ; but however i shall give some taste of it in the first letter the author marshals those texts , which he thinks overthrow the doctrine of the trinity , and because this may be most dangerous to unskilful readers , i shall more particularly examine that . he reduces the scriptures under several topicks , or heads of arguments . . if our lord christ were himself god , there could be no person greater than he , none that might be called his head or god , none that could in any respect command him . now this argument is fallacious , for though christ be god himself , yet if there be three persons in the godhead , the equality and sameness of nature does not destroy the subordination of persons : a son is equal to his father by nature , but inferiour to him as his son : if the father , as i have explained it , be original mind and wisdom , the son a personal , subsisting , but reflex image of his fathers wisdom , though their eternal wisdom be equal and the same , yet the original is superior to the image , the father to the son : and therefore though i know such texts as he alleadges , my father is greater than i. the head of christ is god. i ascend to my father and your father , to my god and your god ; are both by ancient and modern expositors applied to christ's human nature ; yet i see no inconvenience in owning this to be true with respect to his divine person , and his relation to his father : for the father is the head and fountain of the deity , and the son is god of god , and therefore the father may be called his god. as for christ's receiving commands from the father , though this relates to the execution of his mediatory office , and so concerns him as god incarnate , as by the dispensation of the gospel , he is the minister of god's will and pleasure , yet i grant even as god , he receives commands from his father , but it is no otherwise than as he receives his nature from him : by nature he is the word ▪ the wisdom , the command of the father ; his reflex image , whereby he produces all the designs of his own wisdom , and counsel into act . thus st. austin answered the arrian objection , that christ was but god's instrument , and made the world by god's command . let them consider with what other words the father commanded his only word . but they frame to themselves an imagination of two , near one another , but separated by their distinct places , one commanding , another obeying . nor do they understand , that the fathers command it self , that all things should be made , is no other word of the father , but that by which all things are made ; that is , the substantial word and wisdom , and command of the father , his only begotten son. . if our lord christ were indeed god , it could not , without blasphemy , be ( absolutely and without restriction ) affirmed of him , that he is the creature , the possession , the servant , and subject of god. it is well he added , absolutely and without restriction , but he had done better , if he had remembred it in his proofs : that christ is called a creature , he proves , because he is the first-born of every creature , but here he should have remembred his absolutely and without restriction , for he is so to the first-born of every creature , that he is the image of the invisible god , and therefore no creature ; so born before all creatures , as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 also signifies , that by him were all things created , that are in heaven , and that are in earth visible and invisible , whether they be thrones , or dominions , or principalities , or powers ; all things were created by him and for him , and he is before all things , ( which is the explication of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , begotten before the whole creation , and therefore no part of the creation himself ) and by him all things consist , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , all things were not only made by him , but have their subsistence in him ; as the apostle tells us , in god we live and move and have our being , that this does not relate to the new creation , as the socinians would have it , is very plain : for . in this sense christ ( if he were meer man ) was not the first-born of every new creature ; for i hope there were a great many new creatures , that is , truly good and pious men , before christ was born of his virgin mother . . nor in this sense were all things in heaven and earth visible and invisible , thrones , dominions ; principalities , and powers , that is , all the orders of angels created by him : for the greatest part of visible things , ( especially in the apostles days , when so little part of the world was converted to the christian faith ) were not new made by him ; and none of the invisible things were new made by him : good angels did not need it , and he came not to convert fallen angels , but to destroy the visible kingdom of the devil in this world , and to judge them in the next . . nor in this sense were all things made for him ; for he is a mediator for god , to reduce mankind to their obedience and subjection to him ; and therefore when he has accomplished his work of mediation , and destroyed all enemies , in the final judgment of the world ; he shall deliver up his kingdom to his father , that god may be all in all ; of which more presently . . and therefore the apostle proceeds from his creation of the natural world , to his mediatory kingdom , which proves , that he did not speak of that before : and he is the head of the body the church , who is the beginning , the first-born from the dead , that in all things he might have the preheminence : as the maker of all things visible and invisible , he is said to be before all things , begotten of his father before the creation of the world ; as head of the church , he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 also , the beginning , the first who rose from the dead , that he might be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the first upon all accounts ; before the worlds , and the first-born from the dead . that he was god's minister and servant , he proves by several texts : as that he was appointed or made ( which has the same sense ) by god , the apostle and high-priest of our profession : but here is a restriction to his being high-priest , and therefore no danger of blasphemy , though he be god : for we may observe , that though the jewish high-priest were but a man , yet he was a type of a high-priest , who is more than man , even the eternal son and word of god , as some of the learned jews acknowledge ; for the son of god is the only proper mediator and advocate with the father , as philo iudoeus often calls the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or word , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or high-priest ; and shows that the garments of the high-priest were figures of heaven and earth , which seems to signifie , that the eternal word , which made the world , is the true high-priest . and the story iosephus tells of alexander looks this way ; that when iaddus the high-priest went out to meet him , dressed in all his pontifical attire , he approached him with great reverence and veneration , and his captains wondering at it , he told them , that that god , who appeared to him , and sent him upon that expedition , and promised him victory and success , appeared to him in that very habit. i am sure the apostle distinguishes christ from high-priests taken from among men ; and makes his sonship the foundation of his priesthood . christ glorified not himself to be made an high-priest ( which shows that it is no servile ministry ) but he that said unto him , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee . as he saith also in another place , thou art a priest for ever after the order of melchizedec . and what the mystery of this melchizedecian priesthood was , he explains hebrews , that melchizedec was first by interpretation king of righteousness , and after that also , king of salem , which is king of peace . without father , without mother , without descent , having neither beginning of days , nor end of life , but made like unto the son of god , which is a priest continually . as for his next quotation , that christ is gods , i know not what he means by it ; for there is no doubt but christ is god's son , god's christ , god's high-priest , serves the ends and designs of god's glory ; and what then ? therefore he is not god ? by no means ! he may conclude , that therefore he is not god the father , because he acts subordinately , not that therefore he is not god the son. his next proof is , that god calls him his servant by the prophet isaiah ; but it is his servant in whom his soul is well-pleased , which is the peculiar character of his son ; and is that very testimony which god gave to christ at his baptism by a voice from heaven ; this is my beloved son , in whom i am well pleased . his next proof is , that he humbled himself , and became obedient , which is all he cites ; but what does he prove from this ? that obedience is part of his humiliation ? and what then ? therefore he is not god ? because he voluntarily condescends below the dignity of his nature , does he forfeit the dignity of his nature ? and yet this is the plain case , as the apostle tells us in that place : that he being in the form of god , thought it not robbery to be equal with god , but made himself of no reputation , and took upon him the form of a servant , and was made in the likeness of men , and being found in fashion as a man , he humbled himself , and became obedient unto death , even the death of the cross. and this is a wonderful proof , that he is not god , because being in the form of god , that is , being god , he voluntarily condescended to the meanest and most servile state of human nature for the salvation of sinners . but the sting of all is behind , that for this submission and obedience he was rewarded and exalted by god , and a god is not capable of a reward or exaltation , being supreme himself , and yet as it follows , for this god hath highly exalted him , and given him a name above every name . now it seems very strange to me , that christ's advancement to the supreme government of the world , should be made an argument against his being god , or the eternal son of god : for is it fitting and congruous for god to make a meer creature the universal lord and soveraign of the world ? to advance a meer man above the most glorious angels , to be the head of all principalities and powers , which would be an indignity to the angelical nature ? is a meer creature a fit lieutenant or representative of god in personal or prerogative acts of government and power ? must not every being be represented by one of his own kind , a man by a man , an angel by an angel , in such acts as are proper to their natures ? and must not god then be represented by one , who is god ? is any creature capable of the government of the world ? does not this require infinite wisdom and infinite power ? and can god communicate infinite wisdom and infinite power to a creature , or a finite nature ? that is , can a creature be made a true and essential god ? if our adorers of reason can digest such contradictions as these , i hope they will never complain of absurdities and contradictions more . a god without infinite perfections , is only a titular and nominal god , and to say , that creatures may have all the perfections of god , is to say , that god can make an infinite creature , which has a thousand times greater contradictions , than the most absurd explication of the trinity can be charged with ; for then a true and real god may be a creature ; then the divine nature is not eternal , but may be created ; then the divine nature is not numerically one , but if the first god so pleased , he could make a world of gods , as well as of angels , or men. if then this kingdom to which christ is advanced , cannot be administred without infinite wisdom and power , then he is by nature a god ; for otherwise all power in heaven and earth could not have been committed to him , because he was not capable of it , could not administer it : and would god choose a king , who could not administer the government of the world , nor do any thing towards it ? and yet the difficulty remains ; if he be by nature the son of god , and the natural lord of the world , how is he said to be exalted by god , and to receive a kingdom from him as the reward of his sufferings ? when he was already possessed of it , ever since the foundations of the world , being the natural lord of all creatures ; and therefore had no need to receive that which was his own , or purchase what was his natural right , by such mean and vile condescensions , as suffering death upon the cross. and therefore rightly to understand this , we must consider the nature of christ's kingdom ; that it is not meerly the natural government of the world , but a mediatory kingdom . god is the supreme and natural lord of the world , king of kings , and lord of lords , and the only ruler of princes : and while god governed the world only as its natural lord , the son had no distinct kingdom of his own , but in conjunction with his father . for though there always were three divine persons in the godhead , yet the father being the fountain of the deity , the government of the world was administred in his name . but mankind quickly apostatized from god , forfeited immortal life , corrupted their manners , and defaced the image of god upon their souls , and the government of god considered only as our maker and soveraign lord could give no hope nor security to guilty sinners ; and this made a mediatory kingdom necessary , to reconcile god and men , and to restore man to the integrity of his nature : and this power and dignity god bestowed upon his own son , who had the most right to it , and was best qualified for it , being the begotten word and wisdom of the father : but he must first become man , and publish the will of god to the world , and make expiation for sin , and then he should rise again from the dead , and set down at the right hand of god. and therefore we may observe , that all this power christ is invested with , is as head of the church . god hath put all things under his feet , and given him to be head over all things to the church , which is his body , the fulness of him , which filleth all in all . that is , he has made him the governour of the whole world , as head of the church . for the salvation of mankind required the government of the world to be put into his hands , that he might restrain the power and malice of wicked spirits , and destroy the kingdom of darkness , and imploy good angels in the service and ministeries of his church , as the apostle tells us , they are ministring spirits , sent forth to minister for them , who shall be heirs of salvation . that the government of this lower world might be administred by him with a peculiar regard and subserviency to the great ends of his spiritual kingdom . for the church of rome is so far in the right , that the supreme head of the church must be supreme in temporals too in ordine ad spiritualia ; but their fault is , they give this power to a vicarious head , which is due only , and can be administred only by christ , who is the true supreme head of all things to his church . the government of israel was a type of this . the kingdom of israel was originally a pure theocracy ; god was their king , and governed them almost as visibly by his priest , his oracles , his judges , whom he extraordinarily raised up , as a temporal king governs his subjects . but in time they grew weary of the government of god , and desired a king like other nations : upon which god tells samuel , they have not rejected thee , but rejected me , that i should not reign over them . but yet he complies with their desires in giving them a king ; and their king was peculiarly god's anointed , and god's king , who ruled god's people and inheritance by god's peculiar and delegated authority : for the government of israel did not cease to be a theocracy , when they had a king ; for they were god's people and inheritance still ; but now the king was between god and the people , whereas god governed them more immediately before . and therefore as david was a type of christ , so his kingdom was typical of the kingdom of christ ; yet have i set my king upon my holy hill of sion ; which seems to have some aspect on david ; though it received its just acomplishment in christ : and hence the kingdom of the messias is called the throne of his father david ; not that temporal kingdom which david governed , for his kingdom was not of this world ; but that of which david's kingdom was a type and figure , the government of the church , who are god's people , of whom the carnal israel was a type , which he rules by a vicarious , but a soveraign authority , for god , and in his name and stead . this gives a plain account , how god may give this kingdom to his son , and that as the reward of his sufferings . it may be a gift , because it is not a natural right ; for it is not a natural kingdom , but erected by the wisdom and counsel of god , for the salvation of sinners ; and it must be the reward of his sufferings , because it is a sacerdotal kingdom , which is founded in the expiation of his blood. and though christ be the eternal son of god , and the natural lord and heir of all things , yet god hath in this highly exalted him , and given him a name which is above every name , that at ( or in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) the name of iesus every knee should bow , of things in heaven , and things in earth , and things under the earth , and that every tongue , ( some of all nations , languages , and tongues ) shall confess , that iesus christ is lord to the glory of god the father . for when god exalts and magnifies himself , or exalts his son , it does not , and cannot signifie any addition or increase of their essential greatness and glory , for neither the father nor the son can be greater than they are ; but yet god is exalted , when his greatness and power is more visible , and more universally acknowledged and adored : and thus god has highly exalted his son too , by conferring the mediatory power and kingdom on him ; as to shew this particularly , but briefly . this makes the son more universally known , acknowledged , and adored . the notion and belief of one god is natural to mankind ; that there are three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost , in the unity of the godhead , is not known by nature , but by revelation : there are some obscure hints and intimations of this even in the history of the creation ; more plain in the types and prophesies of the jewish law , which relate to the messias ; and possibly this was more particularly explained in their cabala , which some learned men industriously prove contained this mystery of the trinity : but all this while , this mystery was very obscure , and the glory of the son little known in the world : for though now we certainly know from the exposition of christ and his apostles , that the prophets spake of christ under the name of lord , and god , and jehovah , yet all went in the name of god. but when christ appeared in the world , then god owned him for his son ; this is my beloved son , in whom i am well pleased ; christ owned himself for the son of god , his only begotten son : and upon all occasions calls god his father , and that in such a distinguishing manner , that the jews understood him to mean , that he was the son of god by nature , and charge him with blasphemy for making himself god. he appealed to those mighty works he did in his father's name , to prove the truth of what he taught them , that he was indeed the son of god. but then god visibly owned him for his son , when he raised him from the dead , and bestowed a kingdom on him , a name which is above every name , as st. paul tells us , that he was declared to be the son of god with power according to the spirit of holiness , by the resurrection from the dead . and for this reason , that of the psalmist , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee , is applied to the resurrection of christ from the dead . we deliver unto you glad tydings , how that the promise that was made to the fathers , god hath fulfilled the same to us their children , in that he hath raised up iesus again , as it is also written in the second psalm , thou art my son , this day have i begotten thee . which it is plain does not signifie , that god then first begot him ; for he owned him for his beloved son long before , at his baptism ; and christ calls himself his only begotten son long before ; and the socinians themselves attribute his sonship to his miraculous conception in the womb of the virgin ; and st. paul , we see , expounds god's begetting him at his resurrection , by his being declared the son of god by the resurrection from the dead , which supposes he was his son before , and that not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the flesh , for so he was the seed of david , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the spirit of holiness , or his divine nature , for so its opposition to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proves it must signifie . he was the only begotten son of god from eternal ages , but the world did not fully know him to be so , till god declared this by his resurrection from the dead , and by bestowing a kingdom on him ; and then he visibly appeared in the glory and majesty of the son of god , as if he had been begotten by him that day : and this seems to be the meaning of our saviour's prayer ; and now , o father glorifie thou me with thine own self , with that glory which i had with thee , before the world was ; that is , now publickly own me to be thy son , which i always was , but was never yet sufficiently declared so to the world. and therefore when he was raised from the dead , and advanced into his kingdom , which he was to administer , not by human force and power , but by the power of the divine spirit , it was time to let the world know this great mystery of a trinity in unity , because each divine person has his distinct and proper part in this mysterious oeconomy : and therefore he commands his disciples to baptize in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost , that is , into the belief and worship of one god , father , son , and holy ghost : of which more presently . but this is not all ; the son is not only now made known and manifest to the world , and publickly owned by his father , but he has a peculiar authority invested in him , distinct both from the father and the holy spirit , as he is a mediatory king. there being but one supreme and soveraign god , father , son , and holy ghost , who are but one energy and power , but one monarchy , but one maker , and one lord of the world ; in the natural government of the world there is no distinction of the divine persons , no peculiar offices and administrations to distinguish them ; not one thing done by the father , another by the son , and a third by the holy ghost , but the whole trinity made and governs the world by one individual operation : and therefore the creation and government of the world is the work of one god , and therefore peculiarly attributed to the father , who is the fountain of the deity , who is that original mind and wisdom , who made , and who governs the world by his son and holy spirit ; so that in the natural government of the world , the son has no kingdom of his own , but reigns as one supreme god with the father and the holy spirit , and all attributed to the father as the beginning of energy and power . but in the oeconomy of man's salvation , the son has a kingdom of his own , which is peculiarly his , administred in his name , and by his soveraign authority . the father is atoned by him , and has committed to him all power both in heaven and in earth : he is made the head of all principalities and powers , which are now immediately subjected to him , and must receive their commands and orders from him ; as the apostle to the hebrews tells us , when god bringeth in the first begotten into the world , that is , when god raised him from the dead , and received him into heaven , to sit at his right hand ; he saith , and let all the angels of god worship him : obey his commands , and be his ministers and servants . the holy spirit is given by him , he sends the spirit to dwell in his church , which is his body , and to animate all the true and sincere members of it ; he governs this lower world , disposes of kingdoms and empires in subserviency to the ends of his spiritual kingdom : he has the power of pardoning sins , of judging the world , of raising the dead ; whom he pardons , god pardons ; whom he condemns , god condemns ; for the father judgeth no man , but hath committed all judgment to the son. should the father judge the world , he must judge as the maker and soveraign lord of the world , by the strict rules of righteousness and justice , and then how could any sinner be saved ? but he has committed judgment to the son , as a mediatory king , who judges by the equity and chancery of the gospel . the power indeed whereby he administers his kingdom , is the power of the whole trinity , of father , son , and holy ghost ; for they being essentially one god , have but one energy and power , and therefore can never act separately : and therefore the resurrection of christ from the dead is ascribed to god the father , god raised him from the dead : to christ himself , as he tells the jews , destroy this temple , and in three days i will raise it up . and , i lay down my life , that i may take it again . i have power to lay it down , and i have power to take it again . and to the holy spirit , if the spirit of him that raised up christ from the dead dwell in you ; he that raised up christ from the dead , shall also quicken your mortal bodies by the spirit that dwelleth in you . where god indeed is said to raise up christ from the dead , but it was by his spirit , and by the same spirit he will raise us . but yet this is the kingdom of christ , because now the administration and exercise of this power is committed to him , and is as it were under his direction and influence . the natural kingdom and government of the world is peculiarly attributed to god the father , though the son and holy ghost reign with him as one god : because the father is original mind and wisdom , and therefore the beginning of all power and energy . as the father begets the son , not the son the father , and the holy ghost proceeds from father and son , not father and son from the holy ghost ; so the son and holy ghost will and act with the father , not the father with the son and the holy ghost ; that is , if we may so speak where there is but one individual act and energy , the father is the first mover in the sacred trinity : for reflex wisdom , that is the son , who is begotten wisdom , moves and acts , at it is begotten , by original mind and wisdom , who is the eternal father , as christ himself tells us ; the son can do nothing of himself , but what he seeth the father do ; for whatsoever things he doth , these also doth the son likewise . and my father worketh hitherto , and i work : but the father is the principle and beginning of action ; and therefore the government and monarchy must receive its denomination from him ; that it is the kingdom of the father . but now in the mediatory kingdom , the exercise of the divine power is committed into the hands of the mediator , and is administred by the measures and terms of his mediation . the power is not taken out of god's hands , for that is impossible ; father , son , and holy ghost govern the world still by one individual act and power , but as in the natural government of the world the exercise of this power begins with the father , so in this mediatory kingdom it begins with the son , and is directed by his mediation : that is , god governs the world now , not meerly as a natural lord , by the rules of natural justice , but with respect to the mediatory power and authority of his son , and to serve the ends of his mediatory kingdom . now the father judgeth no man , but hath committed all iudgment to the son ; he hath power to save and to destroy ; whom he pardons , god pardons ; whom he condemns , god condemns ; all petitions are put up to god in his name ; all blessings , both temporal and spiritual , are obtained from god in his name : that is , it is the name and authority of christ by which god now governs the world. this is the name god has given him , which is above every name , that at the name of iesus every knee should bow , both of things in heaven , and things on earth , and things under the earth : and that every tongue should confess , that iesus christ is lord , to the glory of god the father . that angels in heaven move at his command , and obey his power ; that men on earth worship god , and expect all from him in his name ; that evil spirits tremble at his name , and yield to his power ; and that all the world confess the supreme and soveraign authority of the son , to the glory of the father , who hath thus highly exalted him . there can be no other meaning but this , in what christ tells his disciples after his resurrection from the dead ; all power is given unto me both in heaven and earth . for unless it be some power , which he had not before as the eternal son of god , how can it be said to be now given unto him : and yet before , in conjunction with , and subordination to his father , he had all power both in heaven and earth ; but then this power was not in his own name , nor seated immediately in himself , as his own personal authority ; but now the son is immediately invested with this power and authority as a mediatory king. and this is the meaning of what he tells us ; as the father hath life in himself , so hath he given to the son to have life in himself . to have life in himself , is to have the power and authority of bestowing life , as appears both from what goes before , and from what follows : as the father raiseth up the dead and quickneth them , so the son quickneth whom he will. verily , verily , i say unto you , the hour is coming , and now is , when the dead shall hear the voice of the son of god , and they that hear shall live . marvel not at this , for the hour is coming , in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice , and shall come forth ; they-that have done good to the resurrection of life , and they that have done evil , unto the resurrection of damnation . this power the son always had as begotten of his father , from all eternity , and one god with him ; but he here speaks of a personal authority , which is given him as the son of man , as an incarnate and mediatory king , and hath given him authority to execute iudgment also , because he is the son of man. and therefore now it is given him to have life in himself , as the father hath life in himself : the father hath life in himself , as the original fountain of all life , by whom the son himself lives ; all life is derived from god , either by eternal generation , or procession , or creation ; and thus christ hath life in himself also , in the new creation he is the fountain of life ; he quickeneth whom he will ; he is the bread of life ; that came down from heaven ; if any man eat of this bread , he shall live for ever . as the living father hath sent me , and i live by the father , so , he that eateth me , even he shall live by me . i am the resurrection and the life ; he that believeth in me , though he were dead , yet shall he live ; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me , shall never dye . this is the authority of his mediatory kingdom , which he hath received from his father , that he hath life in himself , and hath authority and power to give life to the world. this is a kingdom in a kingdom , the mediatory kingdom of the son in the natural kingdom of the father , which restrains the father's justice , dispenses his grace , and directs the exercise of his power in the government of the world , which though it be upon these accounts a superiour authority , and therefore a high exaltation of the son , yet it is no diminution to the father : the confessing iesus christ to be lord , is to the glory of god the father . . because this mediatory kingdom is erected by the father , and by the father given to the son ; it is he , who gave him this authority , because he is the son of man. and therefore christ every where owns , that he was sent by god. i am not come of my self ; i am come in my fathers name . i proceeded forth , and came from god , neither came i of my self , but he sent me , i seek not my own will. i seek not my own glory . i came not to do my own will , but the will of him that sent me . which scriptures make up the fourth argument in the history of the vnitarians against christ's being god ; because almighty god doth all things in his own name , and by his own authority ; but christ comes in the father's name , and does his will , and seeks his glory . which proves indeed , that he receives this power from the father , that he fulfils his will , and serves his glory in it ; but if he receive this kingdom , he has it , and a very glorious kingdom it is , in some respects superiour to the natural government of god , as it sets bounds to it . but this only proves , that he is not the father , but the son , and the king of god ; and this authority being given him of the father , to reduce mankind to their obedience , it is no lessening of the fathers authority , from whom he receives this mediatory power . . this can be no diminution to the father , because he is his only begotten son ; one god with himself , the brightness of his glory , and the express image of his person , the natural heir of his power and greatness , and the natural lord of the world. as a son , he is by nature equal to his father , but yet subordinate , and therefore cannot be his rival ; as a son , his advancement is the glory of the father , that all men should honour the son , as they honour the father ; and therefore it is no derogation to the father , though he commit to the son a more glorious authority , then he exercises himself ; the authority of a mediatory kingdom , or soveraign grace , which is a more glorious authority to sinners , then natural justice and dominion : for all men know , a son must receive all from his father , and if the father , for wise reasons , of which more presently , give the son the more glorious power , it is the father , who is glorified in it : as he is god , the eternal son of god , and one with the father , he is the proper object of religious worship ; and therefore all those divine honours and adorations , which are paid him upon account of his mediatory kingdom and power , are no injury to the divine nature , as they would have been , had god conferred this power on a creature ; which had been to give his glory to another , which god detests , and declares his abhorrence of , and which all arians and socinians do , who worship christ , believing him to be only a creature , or a meer man. the command in scripture to worship him , and pay divine honours to him , is a much better argument to prove that he is god , then to justifie the worship of any creature ; which god universally prohibits , and is a much greater contradiction to the principles of natural religion , than a trinity in unity is to natural reason . . to this we must add , that his kingdom is the reward of his obedience and sufferings , that is , it is founded in the expiation of his blood : is an authority to dispence that grace and mercy which he has purchased with his blood : so that his kingdom and power is founded in the most perfect submission to his father , is the reward of his obedience , whereby he glorified his father on earth ; and therefore let his power be never so great and glorious , his receiving it from god , as the reward of his obedience , secures the prerogative and glory of the father . . especially when we add , that the exercise and administration of this kingdom , is not by way of any direct authority and power over god ( which would necessarily eclipse the glory of the father , and make him subject to the son ) but by way of mediation and intercession , as an advocate and high-priest . he first makes atonement to god , and reconciles him to sinners , does not command or over-rule , but propitiate the divine justice , and then exercises a soveraign authority in forgiving sins , in destroying his enemies , in governing kingdoms and empires , in subserviency to his spiritual kingdom , and at the last day in judging the world. . and therefore the time shall come , when christ shall deliver up this kingdom again to the father : for it is not a natural kingdom , and therefore must not last always ; no longer then till it has attained the ends for which it was erected ; when mankind are reduced into obedience to god ; when the kingdom of the devil is destroyed , and the devil and his angels , and all bad men cast into the lake of fire , which is the second death , and good men raised out of their graves , and rewarded with eternal life ; that is , when christ has accomplished the work of his mediation , that there is no longer any need of a mediator , then the mediatory kingdom ceases . then cometh the end , when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to god even the father , when he shall have put down all rule , and all authority and power . — and when all things shall be subdued unto him , then shall the son also be subject unto him , that put all things under him , that god may be all in all . that is , the son shall no longer have a distinct kingdom of his own , but shall return to his natural subordination to his father , and reign with father and the holy spirit one god blessed for evermore : there shall no longer be any distinction between god and a mediator , but god shall be all in all . this is the best account i can give of that kingdom which the son receives from the father , and which he delivers up to the father again ; and these socinians must think themselves very great wits , or the rest of mankind very great fools , who hope to prove that christ is not god , because he received a kingdom , when it is such a kingdom , as none but a god can receive or administer . but to proceed : . his next argument is , that christ it not god , because he is a mediator between god and men : a priest that appeareth in the presence of god , and intercedeth with him for men . this he needed not have proved , because all christians own it ; only the socinians make him a metaphorical priest , which indeed is no priest. but this i have answered already . he is a priest after the order of melchizedec king of salem and priest of god ; that is , he is a sacerdotal king , and this sacerdotal or mediatory kingdom proves him to be god , not a meer creature advocate or intercessor . . his next argument is , that he receives authority from god , is sent by god , came to do the will of god : and this i have also already answered . . his next argument consists in applying such things to the divinity of our saviour , as belong to his humanity : that he increased in wisdom — ( he should have added stature too , but that had been ridiculous , because it had discovered the fallacy , for to be sure stature does not belong to a god ) and in favour with god and men : and why did he not add , that he was born , and was an infant and child , and by degrees grew up to be a man ? that he knows not the day of iudgment , which he evidently speaks of himself as man ; as all the ancient fathers confess . in st. mark it is said , but of that day , and that hour , knoweth no man , no not the angels that are in heaven , neither the son , but the father . st. matthew does not mention the son : of that day and hour knoweth no man , not the angels of heaven , but my father only . which shews that the son in st. matthew is included in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 none , or no man , and therefore concerns him only as a man : for the father includes the whole trinity , and therefore includes the son , who seeth , whatever his father doth . but of this more hereafter . that he knew not where lazarus was laid , because he asks , where have ye laid him ? and yet this very jesus knew without asking , at a distance , and some days before , that lazarus was dead ; which would tempt one to guess , that he might know where they laid him too , though it was decent to ask . what his next text refers to i know not . for how the father , being always present with him to confirm that testimony he gave of himself by miraculous powers , proves that he is not god , i cannot tell : that he was tempted by the devil , proves that he was a man , but does not prove that he was not god : and that he would not be called good by those , who thought him no more than a man ; or that he took this occasion to instruct them , what an infinite distance there is between the essential goodness of the divine nature , and the goodness of creatures , i think does not prove that he is not god. . his sixth argument is to the same purpose ; that god giveth what and to whom he pleaseth ; he needs not the aid of any other ; he entreateth not for himself and his people ; he cannot die ; and deriveth his power from none but himself . but 't is certain that the lord christ could not himself , without the praevious ordination of the father , confer the prime dignities of heaven or of the church ( or any thing else , if he pleases , for he does nothing but what he sees his father do ) he placed his safety in his fathers presence and help : he prayed often and fervently to the father , both for himself , and for his disciples . he died , and was raised from the dead by the father . after his resurrection he had received of another that great power , which he now enjoyeth . now all this we grant , and have answered already , which partly refers to the oeconomy of the incarnation , and partly to his natural subordination to his father . but to give a more full and plain answer , and to prevent all such objections for the future , it will be necessary briefly to state this matter also . now this author is certainly so far in the right , that the one supreme god has all authority and power , can need no help from any other , can receive no commands , no power from another , has no need to pray to any other , to intercede for himself or others ; can dispose of all things , as he pleases , and to whom he pleases : accordingly this one supreme god , father , son , and holy ghost , receives no power or authority from any other being , intercedes with no other being , stands not in need of the help of any other , neither prays for himself or others to any other being . well! but the son prays to the father , interceeds with the father , receives authority from the father , disposes of all things by his father's will. what then ? then the son is not the one supreme god. why so ? he interceeds with no creature , receives authority from no creature , &c. nor from any god neither separated from himself , for he is one god with the father and the holy ghost : that he interceeds with the father , proves indeed that he is a distinct person from the father , not that he is not one god with him . if each divine person be god , none of them can interceed with , or receive authority from any separate being , for then there must be some separate god above them ; and then they are not the supreme god ; but if there be three distinct divine persons in the godhead , and an order and subordination between these divine persons ; i see nothing to hinder , why one person may not interceed with another , and receive from another . to show the fallacy of this , i will frame another argument exactly like it , which may do our socinians a kindness in helping them to a new argument , and who knows but that such great wits as they are , may make it a good one : and it is this . the one supreme god is not , and cannot be begotten of any other , nor proceed from any other , and therefore the son , who is begotten of the father , is not the one supreme god , and the holy ghost , who proceeds from father and son , is not the one supreme god. the major is as self-evident as any proposition in euclide ; whoever understands the terms , must confess it to be true , that the one supreme god cannot be begotten , nor proceed from any other ; the minor is confessed by trinitarians , that the son is begotten of the father , and the holy ghost proceeds from father and son ; how then shall we avoid the conclusion , that the son is not the one supreme god , nor the holy ghost the one supreme god ? indeed no way , that i know of , for the thing is true : the son is not the one supreme god , nor the holy ghost the one supreme god , nay nor the father the one supreme god , considered separately from each other , but father , son , and holy ghost , or a trinity in unity is the one supreme god : now of this one supreme god , it is certainly true , that he is not begotten , nor proceeds from any other ; for then there must be a god above this one supreme god : but if there be three persons in this one supreme god , this does not hinder , but the father may beget the son , and the holy spirit proceed from father and son , and yet the one supreme god neither be begotten nor proceed ; for it is not the one supreme god , that is begotten , but the divine person of the son , who is god , and with the father and holy spirit , one supreme god ; nor is it the one supreme god that proceeds , but the divine person of the holy ghost , who also is god , and together with father and son one supreme god. this is plain , and what every one may understand at first sight ; and the fallacy of the argument consists in this , that whatever may be affirmed of the one supreme god , is applied to each divine person in their personal capacities , as if each person considered separate from the other divine persons , were the one supreme god : now this is false , for the one supreme god is not any one person distinct and separate from the rest , but all three persons essentially united into one god ; and therefore the application must be false too ; when what is true of the one supreme god , is applied to every distinct person in the godhead . it is certain , the one supreme god can neither be father , son , nor holy ghost : if he be a father , he must beget a son , who is not one with him , and yet is god : for the son of god , who is begotten of his father's substance , and has the same nature with him ( which is the proper notion of a begotten son ) must be god ; as the son of a man is a man : and if the father himself in his own proper person , as begetting the son , be the one supreme god , the whole entire deity , then he must beget a son without , not within himself , who is not , and cannot be that one supreme god , that the father is . the one supreme god is one in himself , and separate from all other beings : and therefore if the one supreme god be a father , he must beget a son separate from himself ; if he be a son , he must have a father separate from himself ; and so of the holy ghost . in the one supreme god , there may and must be a trinity of divine persons ; within the unity of the godhead there is a father , a son , and a holy ghost , but the one supreme god is neither ; neither begets , nor is begotten , nor proceeds ; for all three persons are the one supreme god , and what belongs to the godhead , belongs to them all as considered in the unity of the same godhead , but not as considered in their distinct personal capacities , as one is the father , the other the son , and the third the holy spirit . and thus it is in the present case : the one supreme god can no more be sent , then he can be begotten , can receive no commands from any other , cannot be given by any other ; cannot be subject to any other will but his own , &c. but the divine persons may send and be sent , and interceed with each other ; for though in the unity of the godhead they are all the one supreme god , yet there is a mutual relation and subordination between the divine persons , as i have already explained it . as to instance in intercession or prayer for himself or others , which is a contradiction to the notion of a supreme god , as it is to the notion of an absolute and soveraign prince : but yet a soveraign prince may interceed with himself ; his own wisdom , his own mercy , clemency , and compassion , may interceed with him , and prevail too , without any diminution to his own soveraign power . thus though the supreme god can interceed with no other being , yet the son may interceed with the father ; his own eternal and begotten wisdom may interceed with him , and make atonement and expiation for sinners : and thus god interceeds with no body but himself ; for it is his own wisdom which interceeds with him , and makes the atonement . and if we will consider things aright , we shall find that there can be no other advocate with the father but the son , but his own eternal and begotten wisdom . when a man interceeds with himself , it is done by reflecting on his own mind , and examining the reasons and motives he finds there to pity and spare , and to do good ; that is , by his reflex wisdom and knowledge of himself , which in the godhead is the son , god's reflex knowledge of himself , or his begotten wisdom , that divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or word , which philo calls the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or high priest : for let us consider , what it is to interceed with god , and what kind of intercession is consistent both with the soveraign authority , and soveraign goodness of god. an infinitely wise and just and good being cannot be moved by meer entreaties , nor by the bare interest and favour of the advocate , for this is weakness in men , and therefore cannot be incident to the divine nature : now if you set aside entreaties and importunities and favour , there can be no other advocate with the father , but his own eternal wisdom . it is his own wisdom that must atone him , that must reconcile him to sinners , that must obtain pardon and all other blessings for them ; for if this cannot be done wisely , god cannot do it ; and therefore his own wisdom must do all this ; for no created wisdom can . but god loves his own wisdom , his only begotten son , and therefore wisdom is a powerful advocate , and must prevail with the father . so that the son's intercession with the father is so far from being incongruous , or inconsistent with his being god , that the divine nature can admit of no other advocate or intercessor , properly so called . to intercede with a never-failing effect and success , is an act of power and authority , and for god to make a creature-advocate and mediator , is to give a creature authority over himself , which cannot be ; for it is a debasement of the divine nature , and a reproach to the divine wisdom , as if god did not better know , how to dispose of his grace and mercy , than any creature does . for creatures to pray to god for themselves or others , as humble supplicants , is part of the worship which creatures owe to god ; but to intercede with the authority of a mediator , is above the nature and order of creatures ; and god can no more give this to any creature , than he can commit his own soveraign power and authority to them : but his own eternal wisdom can intercede with authority ; for original mind and wisdom must yield to the intercessions of his own eternal wisdom : which is not to submit to any foreign authority , but to his own . to proceed ; . his next argument to prove that christ is not god , is this ; that iesus christ is in holy scripture always spoken of , as a distinct and different person from god ; and described to be the son of god , and the image of god. this we own , and he has no need to prove it : and this is a wonderful argument to convince those who acknowledge three distinct persons in the godhead , to prove that christ is not god , because he is a distinct person from the father ; for so according to the language of scripture , god signifies god the father , when he is distinguished from the son and the holy spirit , as all men grant : and to say , 't is as impossible that the son or image of the one true god should himself be that one true god , as that the son should be the father , and the image that very thing whose image it is , is meer sophistry ; for if the father and the son and the holy ghost be the one true god , they are the same one true god , and yet the father is not the son , nor the son the father . . his next argument is , from many texts , which expresly declare that only the father is god. now this , i confess , would be a demonstration , could he produce any one text , which asserts the father only to be god , in opposition to the son , and to the holy ghost ; for then the father must signifie the person of the father , in opposition to the person of the son , and to the person of the holy ghost ; but when the father is called the only true god , only in opposition to all the false gods , which the world then worshipped , there father does not signifie personally , but that one godhead or divinity , of which the father is the source and fountain and original ; he being that eternal and original mind , which begets his own image or eternal son , and from whom and the son the holy spirit proceeds in the unity of the same godhead . when the father is said to be the only true god , and the one god , that the son and holy ghost are not hereby excluded from the unity of the same godhead , is evident from those other texts of scripture , which plainly teach the divinity of the son and holy ghost ; for if the scripture teaches , that the son is god , and the holy ghost god , it can never separate the father from his only begotten son and eternal spirit ; and therefore the dispute will issue here , whether the scripture does teach the divinity of the son and the holy spirit . when the father is called the only true god , it must be in opposition to all those who were at that time worshipped for gods in the world , but were not true gods , and therefore when christ calls his father the only true god , it could not be in contradistinction to himself and the holy spirit , for they were not then distinctly worshipped . and when st. paul calls the father the one god , he expresly opposes it to the many gods of the heathens . for though there be that are called gods , whether in heaven ( the sun and moon and planets , and deified men ) or in the earth ( the several elements , birds , beasts , &c. ) ( as there be gods many and lords many ) but to us , there is but one god the father , of whom are all things , and we in him ; and one lord iesus christ , by whom are all things , and we by him ; where the one god and one lord and mediator is opposed to the many gods and many lords or mediators , which were worshipped by the heathens . these texts indeed do plainly distinguish between the father , and christ : this is life eternal to know thee the only true god , and iesus christ whom thou hast sent . and to us there is but one god the father , and one lord iesus christ ; which is no more than what st. paul teaches ; there is one god , and one mediator between god and men , the man christ iesus . the one god and the one mediator ought to be distinguished ; for the whole christian religion , and the salvation of sinners , depends upon this distinction ; but this does not exclude christ from being one god with the father , though he have a distinct additional glory of a mediatory kingdom . i consider farther , when the father is called the one god , and the only true god , it can be understood only of those , who are distinct and separated gods from the father , and are not one god with him ; but it cannot exclude those , who are united in the unity of the same godhead ; for they are but one god with the father . and this is plainly signified in the title of the father , and the father of our lord jesus , which is god's peculiar name under the gospel , as the maker of heaven and earth was before : for the title of the father does not exclude , but includes the son ; and therefore if it appears from scripture , that this son is true and real god , begotten of his father from eternity , the son at least must be included in this character of the only true god. his other texts , which he cites under this head , prove no more but that the father of christ is god , not that christ is not one god with the father . . he adds ; if christ were indeed god , as well as man , or ( as trinitarians speak ) god the son incarnate in an human nature , it had been altogether superfluous to give the holy spirit to his said human nature as a director and guide ; for what other help could that nature need , which was one person with ( as they speak ) god the son , and in which god the son did personally dwell . now the account of this is plain and short ; for the whole trinity is but one energy and power , and the divine persons cannot act separately ad extra ; what the father does , that the son does , and that the holy ghost does by one individual act , as i have shown at large ; but the sanctification of all creatures ( and such the human nature of christ is ) is peculiarly attributed to the holy spirit ; and he might as well have asked , why the sanctification of the church is ascribed to the holy spirit ; for the church is the body of christ , and christ the head from . whence all influences of grace are derived into the body ; and though this be not a personal union , it is next degree to it ; for we are flesh of his flesh , and bone of his bone : and a personal union makes no difference in the manner of operation , though it does in the measures and degrees : the divine word acts by and in conjunction with the holy spirit , and therefore sanctifies his own human nature , as he does his mystical body the church by the operations and influenences of the holy ghost . . and this answers his next argument , that the miracles of christ are attributed to the holy ghost , or to the father dwelling in him : for father , son , and holy ghost act together , as christ tells us , my father worketh hitherto , and i work . . his next argument is ; had our lord been more than a man , the prophesies of the old testament in which he is promised , would not describe him barely as the seed of the woman ; the seed of abraham ; a prophet like unto moses , the servant and missionary of god , on whom god's spirit should rest . that our saviour ought to have been thus described , though he had been more than a man , is plain enough , because he was to be all this : the seed of the woman , the seed of abraham , a prophet like unto moses , but a much greater prophet : for moses was faithful in all his house as a servant , but christ as a son over his own house . but what he insinuates , that he is barely thus described , shews , that this author will never loose a cause by over-much modesty ; for we with all the christian church , and we have the authority of christ and his apostles for it too , say , that he is described in the old testament also , not only as the seed of abraham , but as the son of god. of which more presently . his next attempt is against the divinity of the holy ghost , but here is little that requires a distinct answer , it being only the repetion of his old fallacies . . that the holy ghost or spirit , and the power of god , are spoken of as one and the same thing . and what then ? his intended conclusion , i suppose , is that the holy ghost is not a person , which is the intention of his second argument ; but this is so novel and ridiculous a conceit , ( too sensless for any of the ancient hereticks ) that it ought not to be seriously confuted , but despised : for it is as easie to prove the father and the son to be no persons , as the holy spirit . he is the spirit of god , which searcheth the deep things of god , and he who knows all that is in god , is a knowing mind : but to dream of power and inspiration in god , distinct as he confesses from god , and no person ; is to attribute such powers and faculties to an infinite mind , as there are in created minds ; to compound god of mind and intellectual powers and faculties , which all men of sense have scorned the thoughts of : what are faculties in us , are persons in god , or else god is not a pure and simple act , as i showed above . which shows the vanity of his pretence , that the holy spirit is spoken of as a person , by the same figure of speech that charity is described as a person , cor. . , . and wisdom , prov. . for these natural or acquired powers and habits are said to do that which the person who has them , and acts by them , does : as charity suffereth long , and is kind , because a charitable man does so , &c. and if we will allow such habits and powers in god , the case may be somewhat parallel ; for when we have compounded god of substance or essence , or faculties or powers , we may then find figurative persons in god , as there are in men. this is certain , all personal acts belong to a person , and therefore whatever has any personal acts ascribed to it , we must conclude is a person , unless we know by some other means , that it is no person , and then that proves the expression to be figurative . thus we know charity is no person , but a grace or vertue , and therefore when personal acts are attributed to charity , as to suffer long , and be kind , &c. we know this is a figure ; but it is ridiculous hence to conclude , that the holy ghost , who has personal acts ascribed to him , to work miracles , to raise the dead , to comfort , to convince , to sanctifie the church , to dwell in the church , as in his temple , &c. is yet no person , because charity , which we know to be no person , has personal acts ascribed to it : which is as much as to say , that because personal acts are sometimes used figuratively , therefore they must never be properly expounded ; whereas on the other hand , we must never expound any thing figuratively , but where the subject will not admit of a proper sense . if it were as known and certain , that the holy ghost is no person , as that charity is none , then there would be reason to allow a figure ; but to prove that the holy ghost is no person , only because personal acts are sometimes figuratively attributed to that which is no person , is a maxim only in the socinian logick , which is nothing else but a system of absurd and ridiculous fallacies . . his second argument against the spirit 's being god , is this ; a manifest distinction is made , as between god and christ , so also between god and the holy spirit , or power and inspiration of god ; so that 't is impossible the spirit should be god himself . this has been answered already , as to the distinction between god and christ , and the same answer will serve for the holy spirit . but this confession of the socinian confutes his whole hypothesis , and proves the holy spirit to be a person , and a god. he says the holy spirit is distinct from god , so distinct that 't is impossible he should be god himself ; then say i , this holy spirit is either a divine subsisting person , or nothing but a name . if this spirit were a divine vertue and power , as he would have it , then it is not distinct from god , but is god himself , as the powers and faculties of the mind , though they may be distinguished from each other , yet they can't be any thing distinct from the mind , but are the mind it self ; and therefore if the spirit , as he says , be represented in scripture , as so distinct from god , that 't is impossible he should be god himself , then he must be a distinct divine person , and not the meer power of god , which is not distinct from god himself . if the spirit be distinct from god , and not god himself , and yet have personal acts ascribed to him , then he must be a distinct person ; for faculties , vertues , and powers , have personal acts and offices ascribed to them , only upon account of their unity and sameness with the mind in which they are , which is a person , and acts by these powers ; but a power which is distinct from god , and is not god himself , ( as he says the holy spirit is ) if it have any personal acts , must be a distinct person ; and if these personal acts are such , as are proper only to god , it must be a distinct divine person . he says , this holy spirit is the inspiration of god ; be it so : this inspiration then is either within god himself , or without him , in creatures , who have this inspiration . if it be within god himself , it must be a person , or else it cannot be distinct from god ; and a divine person unless any thing be in god , which is not god. if this inspiration be without god , in creatures , who are inspired by him ; how is it the spirit of god ? for the spirit of god must be in god , as the spirit of man is in man : how does this inspiration in creatures search all things , yea the deep things of god ? and knoweth the things of god , as the spirit of a man knoweth the things of a man ? for the inspiration in creatures searcheth nothing of god , and knoweth nothing of god , but what god is pleased to reveal . the inspiration knows nothing of god , but the inspired mind knows as much , as it is inspired with the knowledge of . so that according to this account , the spirit of god is nothing but the inspired knowledge in creatures ; and therefore no personal acts can be attributed to it , but what creatures can do by such inspiration ; and let any man consider , whether this answers those characters we have of the spirit of god in scripture . if this be so , i desire to know , how the spirit of god differs from his gifts and graces ? for if the spirit be nothing but god's inspiration in creatures , the spirit is either a gift or a grace , and is not one in all , but as many as those creatures are , that are inspired ; and as different as the gifts and graces are , with which they are inspired : whereas st. paul tells us , there are diversities of gifts , but the same spirit ; and there are differences of administrations , but the same lord , and there are diversities of operations , but it is the same god , which worketh all in all . so that the spirit is distinguished from his gifts , as the lord is from his administrations , and god from his operations ; and is the same spirit in all , as it is the same lord , and the same god. . his next argument is , the spirit is obtained for us of god by our prayers ; therefore itself is not god. but this has been answered already ; for though the one supreme god cannot be sent , nor given ( which i suppose is the force of his argument ) yet in the ever blessed trinity , one divine person may send and give another ; the father may send the son , and give the holy spirit . and yet since they like that better , we will allow , that the holy spirit does give himself , and is asked of himself ; for the divine persons in the trinity , as i have often observed and proved , do not act separately , but as the father and the son give the holy spirit , so the holy spirit gives himself in the same individual act. and when we pray to god for his holy spirit , we pray to father , son , and holy ghost , who are this one god , and one entire object of worship : it is the ever blessed trinity we invoke , when we pray our father , which art in heaven . for as they are inseparably one god , so they are the inseparable object of our worship ; since this great mystery of a trinity in unity is so plainly revealed to us , we cannot worship this one supreme god , but we must direct our worship to all three divine persons in the unity of the same godhead ; for we do not worship this one supreme god , unless we worship , father , son , and holy ghost : and therefore whether we invoke each person distinctly , as our church does in the beginning of the litany ; or pray only to god by the name of the most high god , or by the name of father ; or the father of our lord jesus christ , it is all one , for father , son , and holy ghost is the one supreme god , and the entire object of our worship : and whoever worships one god , but not father , son , and holy ghost , does not worship the true god , not the god of the christians . before this was so plainly revealed , it was sufficient to worship one supreme god , without any conception of the distinct persons in the godhead ; but when it is plainly revealed to us , that this one supreme god is father , son , and holy ghost , whoever does not worship father , son , and holy ghost , does not worship the true god ; for the true god is father , son , and holy ghost , and there is no god besides him : which i would desire our vnitarians ( as they falsly call themselves ) and our deists carefully to consider : if any thing be fundamental in religion , it is the worship of the one true god , and if father , son , and holy ghost be this one true god , those who worship a god , who is not father , son , and holy ghost , do not worship the true god , and that i think is the true notion of idolatry . so that these men are so far from being christians , that i cannot see , how they are worshippers of the true god : which should at least make them concerned to examine this matter with more care and less prejudice than they have yet done . so that when we worship one god , we worship father , son , and holy ghost , and when the glory of these divine persons was made known to the world , there was no need of any new command to worship these three divine persons ; for when it is revealed , that they are the one eternal god , the command of worshipping this one god must include them all . which gives a sufficient answer to what he adds , that there is neither precept nor example in all holy scripture , of prayer made to the spirit , on this or any other occasion : which on the trinitarian supposition , that the holy spirit is a person and god , no less than the father , is very surprizing , nay utterly unaccountable . but i hope this will satisfie any man , that it is not unaccountable ; for though the spirit be god , he is but one god , with father and son , and therefore not a distinct and separate object of worship , but is worshipped with the father and the son , in the unity of the same godhead , and this required no new command , nor any separate worship of the holy spirit . there is indeed a distinct worship paid to christ : all men must honour the son , as they honour the father . when god brought his first begotten into the world , that is , when he raised him from the dead , and exalted him to his own right hand , he said , and let all the angels of god worship him : god hath highly exalted him , and given him a name , which is above every name , that at the name of iesus every knee should bow , of things in heaven , and things in earth , and things under the earth . but this is not meerly as he is the son of god , the second person in the trinity , for so he is worshipped as one god with the father and the holy ghost ; but as he is a mediator or a mediatory king ; as he has a kingdom distinct from the natural kingdom of the father , as i have already shown , so there is a worship proper to him as mediator ; but the holy spirit has no distinct kingdom , and therefore no distinct worship , but is worshipped in the unity of the godhead , and this required no new command ; for he who knows , that father , son , and holy ghost are one supreme god , must worship father , son , and holy ghost as one supreme god. . his next argument is against a trinity of persons in the godhead , which , he says , is contrary to the whole scripture , which speaks of god but as one person , and speaks of him , and to him , by singular pronouns , such as i , thou , me , him. his proofs that the scripture speaks of god as but one person , are very wonderful . his first is , that of iob ; will ye speak wickedly for god ? and talk deceitfully for him ? will ye accept his person ? will ye contend for god ? but surely to accept god's person , no more signifies the personality of the godhead , than to accept the person of a man , signifies his human person : the hebrew is his face , which is far from signifying a person in the sense we say , there are three persons in the godhead . to respect the person of a man is to do something for him , which neither law , nor justice , nor equity required , not because he is a person , which every man is , but from some partial respect we have to his particular person ; and therefore to accept the person of god here signifies to speak wickedly for god ; which is an absurd and sensless thing , as iob represents it , whether the supreme god be one person , or three ; for in this sense of person , one god can be but one person . the other text that christ is the express image of god's person , is as little to the purpose ; for it is plain , the person of whom the son is the express image , is the person of god the father ; and the father indeed is but one person . as for his singular pronouns , they prove indeed that there is but one god , as we all own , not that there are not three persons in the godhead . for when the scripture speaks of god without any particular respect to the distinction of the persons , it must speak but of one god , because god is but one , and singular pronouns are most properly applied to one god. as for what he objects , that no instance can be given in any language of three persons whoever spoke of themselves , or were spoken to , by the singular pronouns , i , thou , me , him , thee ; it were sufficient to answer , that there is no other example in nature neither , of three persons who are essentially one ; and if the manner of speaking must be conformed to the nature of things , there can be no other instance of this way of speaking , because there is no other example of this unity ; but all languages speak of one in the singular number , and so the scripture uses singular pronouns of one god. but this is not the case ; for when god speaks of himself , he does not speak of himself , as three persons , but as one god , and therefore may say i and me : and when the prophets speak of god , or pray to him , they pray to him as one god , and therefore may say , thou , and him , and thee . when three persons are one god , god may speak of himself , or we may speak of , or to god ; either considered as three persons , or as one god ; and though three persons require the plural number , yet one god may speak of himself , or be spoken to , by singular pronouns . . he says , had the son or holy ghost been god , this would not have been omitted in the apostles creed . and i say , had not the son been god , and the holy ghost god , they would not have been put into the apostles creed , no more than into the form of baptism , which is the original of the apostles creed . that the primitive christians did believe the divinity of the son , and of the holy ghost , we are sufficiently , assured from all the ancient records of their faith ; but there was no reason to express this in so short a creed , before the arian and socinian heresies had disturbed the church ; and indeed there was no need of it , for the only son of god must be by nature god , and the spirit of god is as essentially god , as the spirit of a man is essential to a man. he concludes ; that theirs ( the socinians ) is an accountable and reasonable faith ; but that of the trinitarians is absurd , and contrary both to reason and to it self , and therefore not only false , but impossible . the faith of a trinity in unity , i hope , i have sufficiently vindicated already from absurdity and contradiction . but it will be worth the while briefly to consider , how accountable and reasonable the socinian faith is . the socinian doctrine is , that christ , who is called the son , the only begotten son of god , the brightness of his glory , and the express image of his person , is no more than a meer man , who had no being , till he was conceived in the womb of the virgin mary , and is called the son of god , because god formed him by an immediate power in the virgins womb , and raised him from the dead , and exalted him to his own right hand in heaven ; and that the holy spirit is only the power and inspiration of god , that is , is either god himself , or the operation of his power in creatures . this is their accountable and reasonable doctrine , and to show how very accountable and reasonable it is , i come now to draw up my charge against it . . that it ridicules the scriptures . . that it ridicules the whole jewish oeconomy . . that it ridicules the christian religion . . that it justifies , or at least excuses both pagan and popish idolatries . the charge is full enough , and i am contented it should pass only for big huffing words , till i have proved it ; and then i hope , it may pass for a just return to the ridiculous blasphemies of the brief notes , and brief history . . that it ridicules the scripture , by putting either an absurd , or a very mean trifling sense on it , unworthy of the wisdom of god , by whom it was inspired ; and this i shall give some instances of , in their expositions of scripture , which i find in the brief history of the vnitarians . in the second letter he takes notice of some texts in the old testament , which speak of god , and in the new testament are applied to christ , which we think a very good argument to prove , that christ is that god , to whom those texts belong in the old testament ; for though possibly without such an application we could not certainly have known , that these texts were spoken of christ , yet the authority of christ and his apostles who have made this application , is as good a reason to believe , that they were meant of christ , as to believe any other part of the gospel : let us then consider , how he answers such texts . what the psalmist says , thy throne , o god , is for ever and ever , a scepter of righteousness is the scepter of thy kingdom . thou hast loved righteousness , and hated iniquity , therefore god , even thy god hath anointed thee with the oyl of gladness above thy fellows ; the apostle to the hebrews applies to christ ; but unto the son he saith , thy throne , o god , &c. to this he answers , in the hebrew , and in the greek , 't is god is thy throne ( i. e. thy seat , resting place , establishment ) for ever ; if he had only said , it may be so , he had said right ; but it is false , to say , it is so . for the hebrew elohim may be either the nominative or the vocative case , and so the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is an attick vocative , and so is used by the septuagint , psalm . ' o 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , my god , my god , why hast thou forsaken me . and it is evident , the septuagint , the vulgar latine , the chaldee paraphrase , the syriack and arabick versions , took it for the vocative case , and thus the christian church has always understood it ; and this is the most natural construction , when it immediately follows a pronoun , which has no other immediate relative ; thy throne , o god , that is , o god , thy throne is for ever and ever . and thus the apostle must understand it ; to the son he saith , thy throne , o god ; where , o god , must be referred to the son , and thy to god : and the sense he gives of it , is absurd , and what we have no example of in scripture , that god is a throne : god indeed is called a rock , a fortress , a high tower , which is expounded by a deliverer ; but a throne here signifies a kingdom , as is evident from the following words ; and to say , that god is the throne , and the kingdom of christ , is to subject the father to the son ; for a king sits upon his throne , and governs his kingdom . the apostle in the next verse cites another glorious testimony which god hath given to his son ; and , thou lord in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth , and the heavens are the work of thine hands ; they shall perish , but thou remainest ; and they all shall wax old as doth a garment , and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up , and they shall be changed ; but thou art the same , and thy years shall not fail . this is so plain a testimony to the divinity of our saviour , if these words be allowed to be applied by the apostle to christ , that our author is forced to deny it . he says , the context has this sense , and thou lord , ( that is , and in another text of the psalms , it is said , thou lord ) which is certainly true , if he had added but one word more , viz. to the son. and in another text of the psalms , it is said to the son , and thou lord hast laid the foundations of the earth ; for so the context requires us to supply it , if we will make sense of it ; for the apostle observes in what different language god speaks of the angels , and to the son : of the angels he saith , who maketh his angels spirits , and his ministers a flaming fire ; but to the son , he saith , thy throne , o god , is for ever and ever — and to the son he saith , thou lord in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth . — but to which of the angels said he at any time , sit on my right hand until i make thine enemies thy footstool . this is easie and natural ; but to apply those words to the father , thou lord in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth , &c. is to break the whole context , is contrary to the apostles design , and no good sense can be made of it ; and this i think is to ridicule scripture , to make it nonsense , or very bad , disturbed , and incoherent sense , when there is no need of it , but to serve an hypothesis which the text was designed to confute . he says , tho. aquinas rightly acknowledged , that the words of both these texts may be understood of god only , not of christ ; but this is false ( as indeed he seldom cites any author , but he corrupts him ) for thomas says , this text may be understood of either ; but if you understand it of the father , then by in the beginning you must understand the son , who , he says , is called the beginning : thou lord in the beginning , that is , in or by the son , hast laid the foundations of the earth ; for he saw the context required , that these words should be applied to christ , but he thought it indifferent , whether they were applied to him in whole or in part , since both ways he is made the creator of the world , which answers the apostles design ; and though i think thomas was mistaken , yet this makes nothing to our authors purpose . thus what the psalmist says of god , thou hast ascended on high , thou hast led captivity captive , thou hast received gifts for men ; st. paul attributes to christ. here our historian spends a great many words to no purpose , about christ's discent into the grave and into hell , and his ascending into heaven to fill all things ; or , as he says , it might be better rendred to fulfil all things , that is , all the prophesies of himself , and others concerning his death , and ascension into the highest heavens : but how does 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie all prophesies , or how does his ascension into heaven fulfil all prophesies ? as for the gifts given to men , he says , in the psalms , they are literally meant of god , and of christ , only by way of prophesie , or rather of emblem , or accommodation ; which he learnedly proves , because the gifts the apostle speaks of , were not given or received till about one thousand years after david 's time . now what of all this ? we readily grant , that ascending on high , the leading captivity captive , the receiving gifts for men , which the psalmist speaks of , were not the same , with the ascension of christ into heaven , his leading captivity captive , and giving gifts to men , but were types and figures of it ; but the single question is , whether christ be that god , of whom the psalmist says , that he ascended on high , &c. if he be not , st. paul has abus'd us , for he applies that to christ , which was not said of him ; if he be , we have what we desire , that christ is god : but this , which was the only question , he says not one word to . men may be types and figures , as david and others were of christ ; and in this case , what was said of david , as a typical person , may be applied to the person of christ : but god himself can be no type , for the type is always less perfect than the antitype ; and therefore whatever is said of god , must belong to his person , and cannot belong to any other . what god did under the typical state of the law , may be a type and figure of those more glorious things , which we would do in human nature ; and thus his triumphs and victories over the enemies of his church , which is by a metaphor called his ascending on high , ( since god , who fills all places , neither locally ascends nor descends ) was a type and figure of his real ascension into heaven , after he had first descended into the lowermost parts of the earth , as the apostle argues ; but if what the psalmist says , that god ascended on high , &c. received its accomplishment in the ascension of christ into heaven , christ must be the god of whom the psalmist speaks . thus what the psalmist says of god , worship him all ye gods , or angels , the apostle attributes to christ ; when he bringeth in the first begotten into the world , he saith , and let all the angels of god worship him . to this our author answers , 't is uncertain whether st. paul had any respect to the words in the psalm . what ? when he cites the very words , as a prophesie of christ ? how shall we then know , when the apostle has respect to the words he quotes ? but if he had , he doth not quote the words of the psalmist as if they were spoken of christ , but only declareth the decree of god ( known to him by the spirit ) for subjecting the angels to christ , in the same words that the psalmist had used upon another occasion . but he proves this decree of god by no other revelation , but the words of the psalmist , nor pretends any other ; and if that do'nt prove it , we have no other . but his reason for this is admirable , because they are words most proper to express that decree , for the writers of the new testament generally affect to speak in scripture language : which is an effectual answer to all the texts of scripture quoted out of the old testament ; that the apostles did not intend to prove any thing by them , but only affected to speak in scripture language ; but when the apostle says this was spoken of christ , if it were not spoken of him , i doubt he affected something worse than speaking in scripture language ; this is either to ridicule scripture , or give the lie to it , let him choose which he likes best . st. paul applies that of the prophet isaiah , i have sworn by my self , ( which all acknowledge to be spoken by god ) unto me every knee shall bow , to christ. this our historian says , is , because christ then and there ( at the last iudgment ) holdeth the place of god , representeth him , and acteth by his commission . so men are said to appear before our soveraign lord the king , when they appear at the bar of his iudges , because the iudges act in the king's stead , and by his commission . but why does he confine this bowing the knee to the last iudgment ? st. paul indeed gives this as one instance of it , but does not confine it to this , but in the epistle to the philippians makes it as large as the exaltation of our saviour ; wherefore god hath highly exalted him , and given him a name , which is above every name , that at the name of iesus every knee should bow , — and that every tongue should confess that iesus christ is lord , to the glory of god the father . this is what god says by the prophet , every tongue shall swear to me ; and st. paul to the romans , every tongue shall confess to god. and this shows , that it is the person of christ to whom we must bow the knee : it is the name of iesus at which every knee must bow ; and every tongue must confess , that iesus christ is the lord. now i suppose he will not say , that we must confess the judges to be the king , or that we must bow to their persons , but to their commission ; or that they represent the king , wherever they are , but only in the king 's court. if then we must bow to the person of christ , and confess him to be the lord , and this be an accomplishment of god's oath , unto me every knee shall bow , and every tongue shall swear ; then christ is that god , who in the prophet isaiah swore , that every knee should bow to him : and the prophet plainly describes , who this god is to whom every knee shall bow ; surely shall one say , in the lord have i righteousness and strength ; even to him shall men come , and all that are incensed against him shall be ashamed ; in the lord shall the seed of israel be justified , and shall glory ; and i suppose all christians know , who that lord is , who is made unto us wisdom , and righteousness , sanctification and redemption ; by whom we are justified through faith in his blood : and this is that god , to whom every knee must bow . but he is a little mistaken also in his law ; we are not said to appear before our soveraign lord the king , because we appear before the judges , who act by the king's commission ; for this is true only of the court of king's bench , which is peculiarly the king's court ; though other judges act by the king's commission also : in the kings court we are said to appear before the king. but now though christ receive his kingdom and power from god , and god is said to judge the world by him , yet it is properly christ's iudgment seat : so st. paul here calls it ; we shall all stand before the iudgment-seat of christ ; and we must all appear before the iudgment-seat of christ ; for the father judgeth no man , but hath committed all iudgment to the son , that all men should honour the son even as they honour the father ; which i explained before . and therefore this being christ's court , of which he is the supream and soveraign judge , to him we must bow our knee ; that is , he is that lord , of whom the prophet isaiah speaks . the same prophet tells us , sanctifie the lord of hosts himself , and let him be your fear , and let him be your dread . and he shall be for a sanctuary ; but for a stone of stumbling , and for a rock of offence to both the houses of israel , for a gin , and for a snare to the inhabitants of jerusalem . this is evidently spoken of the lord of hosts , the god of israel . and this st. paul applies to christ , that the jews did stumble and fall , and were broken , as the prophet foretold at this stumbling stone : israel , which followed after the law of righteousness , hath not attained to the law of righteousness . wherefore ? because they sought it , not by faith ( the faith of christ ) but as it were by the works of the law , for they stumbled at the stumbling-stone ; as it is written , behold i lay in sion a stumbling-stone , and rock of offence ; and whosoever believeth on him shall not be ashamed . where the apostle joyns two prophesies together ; the first , that which i have already quoted , where the lord of hosts is said to be a stumbling-stone , and rock of offence : and another of the same prophet ; behold , i lay in zion for a foundation a stone , a tried stone , a precious corner-stone , a sure foundation : he that believeth shall not make haste ; which both st. paul and st. peter render with the septuagint shall not be ashamed . now from hence we learn , that the prophet speaks of the same stone , that the stumbling-stone and rock of offence , is the foundation stone , the precious corner-stone : and therefore the lord of hosts , who is the stumbling-stone , is the precious corner-stone also : and st. paul and st. peter tells us , that christ is the stumbling-stone , and that precious corner-stone , of which the prophets speaks , that is , that christ is the lord of hosts . to whom ( to christ ) coming as unto a living stone , disallowed indeed of men , but chosen of god and precious , ye also as lively stones are built up a spiritual house — wherefore also it is contained in scripture , behold , i lay in sion a chief corner-stone , elect , precious , and he that believeth on him shall not be confounded , or ashamed . all that our historian says to this , is , that neither st. paul , nor st. peter cite the words of the prophet as spoken of christ , but only as in some sense applicable to him , namely as christ was to many a stone of stumbling ; which is nothing else but to out-face the world with down-right impudence ; and to charge the apostles with abusing scripture , and producing proofs , which are no proofs . st. paul alleadges this prophesie to prove , that the infidelity of the jews , and that offence they should take at christ , was foretold in scripture ; which answers that objection against his being the messias , that the great body of israel , to whom the messias was peculiarly promised , should reject him when he came ; which had it not been foretold , had been a very unanswerable prejudice ; and yet if christ be not the prophets stumbling stone , this prophesie does not foretel it . st. peter urges this prophesie to prove , that christ is the foundation , corner stone , elect , and precious , on which the church was to be built ; but he abuses us also with a sham proof , if this prophesie were not meant of christ. and thus these men , rather than they will allow the scripture proofs , that christ is god , destroy all the old testament proofs of the truth of christianity ; and i am afraid they are able to give us no good proofs of christianity without them ; and yet if such texts as these must pass only for accommodations and allusions , i know not where they will find any proofs . st. iohn curiously observes the several circumstances of our saviour's death , and shows that they were the accomplishment of ancient prophesies ; and among others , that of piercing his side with the souldier's spear , which was foretold by the prophet zechary , they shall look on me , whom they have pierced , which is confessed to be spoken of god ; and here he tells us again , that the words in the prophet are not by st. john interpreted of christ , but accommodated to christ and his sufferings . and thus , as fast as he can , one after another , he accommodates away all the proofs of christianity : for we may as well prove the gospel out of homer , by accommodating homer's words and phrases to it , and turning it into an homerical poem , as we know has been done , as prove it by accommodating the phrases and language of the old testament to it , which were never intended to signifie any such thing ; this i think is to ridicule and profane both the old and new testament , and to overthrow the authority of both . but i am quite tired with this work , and therefore shall pass over his other old testament proofs ; for what can we say to convince these men , that such old testament texts speak of christ , who will not believe the apostles themselves ? and to conclude this , i shall only give you a specimen , how they deal with the new testament also , in two or three instances . i shall begin with the form of baptism ; go ye therefore and teach all nations , baptizing them in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost . all the fathers have made this an argument , that father , son , and holy ghost are one god , because we are baptized in their name , and we must not be baptized in the name of any creature ; for to be baptized in their name , signifies to be devoted and consecrated by a sacred and religious rite to the faith , worship , and obedience of father , son , and holy ghost ; and it is idolatry to joyn creatures with god in so solemn an act of religion ; in the same act whereby we give up our selves to god , to give up our selves to creatures , in the same form of words , without making any other difference between them , but the order of persons . and it is to no purpose to dispute , what is meant by baptizing in the name , for whatever that be , it signifies the very same to be baptized in the name of the father , and to be baptized in the name of the son , and in the name of the holy ghost ; our saviour makes no distinction , and we must make none ; and if father , son , and holy ghost be not one god , this form of baptism destroys the distinction between god and creatures , and devotes us as intirely to creatures as to god. we must consider baptism , as the sacrament of our initiation into the christian religion , and our admission into the gospel-covenant , and therefore the persons in whose name we are baptized is that god , who receives us into covenant , and to whose worship and obedience we consecrate our selves . our historian says , that to be baptized in the name of a person or persons , is a rite by which one delivers himself to the institution , instruction , and obedience of such person or persons : so that to be baptized in the name of the father , son , and holy ghost , is to profess to be led or guided by them , or ( as grotius expresses this matter ) 't is to declare we will admit of no other thing , as a part of our religion , but what proceeds from these , that is , nothing but what is commanded by god or the father , and has been delivered by his son , the lord christ , and confirmed externally by miracles , and internally with the witness and testimony of the spirit , that is by the power and inspiration of god. this is a very false account of grotius , and therefore i shall consider it , as his own . now i readily grant , that baptism does include our profession of believing the gospel , and making that the sole rule of our faith and worship ; those who are baptized do own , as grotius speaks , tres dogmatis sui auctores , three authors of their doctrine or religion , father , son , and holy ghost ; but then baptism being a religious rite , it is a religious profession of this , a religious devoting our selves to them , and therefore we give up our selves to their institution and guidance , not as to creatures , but as to god , who is both the author , and the object of our faith and worship . no man must religiously consecrate himself to a creature , for that is idolatry : even among the pagans , their mysteries terminated on their gods , and they were initiated by them into the worship of that god , whose mysteries they were ; and it was never known yet , that men devoted themselves to the institution and guidance of any human doctors or masters by religious ceremonies . now if baptism be a religious rite , god and creatures can never be made the joynt object of religion , and therefore the son and the holy ghost , must be one god with the father . i desire to know what is meant by being baptized in the name of the father ? is it only to take him for our instructor and guide ? or is it to worship and obey him for our god ? and why then do not the same words in the same religious act signifie the same thing , when applied to the son and holy ghost , as they do , when applied to the father ? let them shew me any one instance in scripture , where a creature is joyned with god in any act of worship , much less in the fundamental contract of worship ( if i may so speak ) wherein we devote and consecrate our selves to god. our author with his usual assurance adds ; 't is in vain , not to say ridiculously pretended , that a person or thing is god , because we are baptized into it , or in the name of it ; for then moses and john baptist also would be gods : our fathers were — all baptized unto moses : unto what then were you baptized ? and they said unto john 's baptism . that is ( saith the generality of interpreters ) unto john , and the doctrine by him delivered . but in the first place he mis-represents the argument , which is , that the son , and holy ghost are god , because we are baptized in their name , as we are in the name of the father ; and together with him ; in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost ; and i confess , he had answered this argument , could he have shewn us , that the jews were baptized in the name of god , and in the name of moses , for that had joyned moses with god , as our saviour joyns the son and the holy ghost with the father in the form of baptism . but he is so far from doing this , that in the next place i observe , that the jews never were literally baptized in the name of moses , or in the name of iohn , as christians are by our saviour's institution in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost . moses did not baptize the jews at all , much less in his own name , though st. paul observes , that they had a kind of mystical baptism under moses in the cloud , and in the sea. and therefore it is plain , that to baptize into moses is a figurative and allusive expression , and does not , and cannot signifie , that they were baptized in the name of moses , because it is not true ; for though we should grant , as he argues , that to be baptized into christ , and baptized in the name of christ , signifies the same thing , when men are literally baptized in the name of christ , yet it is a demonstration , that to be baptized into moses , and baptized in the name of moses , cannot signifie the same thing ; because those who were mystically baptized into moses , never were baptized in the name of moses ; and it is burlesquing scripture to make any phrase and expression signifie that which never was . i will only ask this author , whether the jews were baptized in the name of moses ? if they were not , let him tell me , how their being baptized into moses comes to signifie their being baptized in the name of moses ? could the apostle mean by this phrase , that they were baptized in the name of moses ? that is , could the apostle mean , what he knew was not true ? and yet i deny , that to be baptized into christ , and baptized in the name of christ , signifie the same thing ; for to be baptized into iesus christ , does not relate to the form of administring baptism in the name of christ , but to the effect of it , in uniting us to christ , and incorporating us with him , as members of his body , which induces an obligation of a spiritual conformity to his death , in dying to sin , and living to god. and thus the israelites were baptized into moses , or into the mosaical covenant , not by being baptized in the name of moses , but by mystical sacraments ; the cloud , which over-shadowed and guided them , and the red-sea , which divided and gave them safe passage , but drowned the aegyptians , being types and figures of the christian baptism ; but i shall not spend time in explaining this now ; it is enough to shew , that it is nothing to our present argument . thus it is evident , that to be baptized into john 's baptism , does not signifie to be baptized in the name of iohn , for iohn did not baptize in his own name , but made proselytes to the messias , as the apostle adds ; iohn verily baptized with the baptism of repentance , saying unto the people , that they should believe on him , who should come after him , that is , on christ iesus . are not these now admirable proofs , that we may be baptized in the name of creatures , because the israelites were mystically baptized into moses , who never literally baptized any , much less in his own name ; and that the disciples of iohn were baptized into iohn's baptism , that is into iohn , and that is , in the name of iohn , which we know he never did . and yet the socinians , who deny the personality of the holy ghost , make this form of baptism infinitely more absurd still : the holy ghost , they say , is not a person , but the power and inspiration of god. now is it not very absurd , that the power and inspiration of god , which is not a person , should be joyned in the same form with father and son , who are persons ? is not this like swearing allegiance to the king , and to his son , and to his power , or to his wisdom ? the holy spirit is plainly distinguished from the father , and from the son ; and it seems , has a distinct name of its own , into which we are baptized ; now if the holy spirit be not a person , i desire to know , how the power and inspiration of god is so distinct from the father , as to justifie our being distinctly baptized in the name of the father , and in the name of the holy spirit , or of his power or inspiration : to be baptized into the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost , is sufficient to convince any man , who is not resolved against being convinct , that the holy ghost is a person , as father and son are persons ; otherwise it were very absurd to joyn the holy ghost with father and son , in such a religious dedication as baptism is . in the next place let us consider the first chapter of st. iohn's gospel , which gives a glorious testimony to the divinity of christ ; and a plain demonstration of the incurable perverseness of hereticks . in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god , the same was in the beginning with god. our historian tells us , the trinitarian exposition of this chapter is absurd and contradictory . 't is this ; in the beginning ; i. e. from all eternity . answ. from all eternity , is before the beginning , or without beginning , not in the beginning . reply . this is false . no man expounds in the beginning of eternity : but when st. iohn tells us , in the beginning was the word , we say this proves the eternity of the word : for that which was , when all things began , which had a beginning , was it self before the beginning , and without beginning : especially when it was so in the beginning , that it gave beginning to every thing else ; that all things were made by him , and without him was not any thing made , that was made . was the word ; i. e. was god the son. answ. but where in scripture is the word called god the son ? reply . this word indeed is god the son , but we do not paraphrase it so in this place , in the beginning was god the son ; but in the beginning was that divine person ; who is called the word . the word was with god ; i. e. the son was with the father . answ. it seems then that god in this clause is the father . but was not the son also with the holy ghost , and is not he too ( according to the trinitarians ) god , or a god ? if he is , why doth st. john only say , the son was with the father ; and how comes the father to engross here the title of god to the exclusion of the holy ghost ? rep. this is true also ; the god with whom the word was , is the father , but that is not his character here neither , no more than the character of the word is the son. but by god , the apostle here means that original mind and wisdom , that supreme and soveraign being , whom all men called god , without making a distinction of persons in the god-head . and therefore , whereas he thinks , that he has got the trinitarians at an advantage , when the apostle adds , and the word was god , his triumph is vain . what ( says he ) shall we do here ? was the word the father ? for so they interpreted god in the foregoing clause . no! no! neither so , nor so . the word was god , signifies the word was a divine person in the godhead : and the verse is very plain ; in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , intimately and inseparably united to him , and that not as a faculty or power , as reason is in human minds , but as a divine subsisting person , for the word was god. god is the name of a being absolutely perfect , and the light of nature teaches us , that there is but one such supreme being , or but one god ; but nature does not teach us , that there are three divine persons , who are this one god ; though when revelation has discovered this mystery , natural reason is able in some measure to understand it , and see the necessity of it , as i have already shewn ; and if there be three divine persons in the godhead , reason will tell us , that each person is god , though all three persons are but one god : this is the trinitarian hypothesis , and if the words of the evangelist do easily and naturally agree with this hypothesis , and cannot reasonably signifie any thing else ; that is a sufficient argument to me , that this is the true interpretation of the text : in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god. that is , in the beginning of all things was the divine person , whose name and character is the word , this word was inseparably united to that supreme being , whom we call god , and was himself god , a divine person subsisting in the vnity of the godhead ; not a power and faculty , as reason is in man. can any thing be more easie and obvious , and more agreeable to the doctrine of the trinity ? or if you change the subject and the praedicate , as others will have it , and read , god was the word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it makes no difference at all ; for this supreme being , whom we call god , was , and is the word , though not only the word : for god is the father , and god is the son , and god is the holy ghost , though god is not only the father , nor only the son , nor only the holy ghost ; but the supreme god is father , son , and holy ghost . now when the evangelist had said , that the word was god , or god was the word , there was great reason to repeat , the same was in the beginning with god , which our historian thinks a meer tautology : for the intention of it is plain , to inculcate more expresly on us , that though the word be god , yet the word is not all that god is , as grotius well observes ; for the word was with god , and therefore a distinct person from some other person , who is call●d god , that is , that eternal and original mind and wisdom , who is the father of the word : and why the name of god should peculiarly be appropriated to the father , as the fountain of the deity , i have often observed . but yet the evangelist does in this verse say something more than he said before , and therefore this is no tautology : he had said , that the word was in the beginning , that it was with god , that it was god : now he adds , the same word was in the beginning with god ; that is , was always with him , never separated from him : and this is added for the sake of what follows , that the word was so with god in the beginning , that god made the world by his word : for all things were made by him , and without him was not any thing made , which was made ; which is another very mysterious repetition , which nothing can give so plain an account of as our hypothesis . all things were made by him ; this is full enough , without the following addition , nay indeed signifies more , than what follows , in strictness and propriety of speech , seems to do : for that nothing was made without him , of it self does not signifie , that he made all things , but that he had something to do in it ; as he may have , who is not the principal actor . but our doctrine gives a plain account of this addition : when the evangelist had said , that this word , who was with god in the beginning , made all things , there was an obvious objection : viz. then it seems , that god with whom the word was , did not make the world ; if all things were made by the word : to have attributed the creation of the world to the word , so as to have excluded god from making the world , had been very absurd , and contrary to the sense of mankind ; god made the world by his word ; the word made all things , not so as to exclude god from making the world ; and god made all things , but not so as to exclude the word ; for without him was not any thing made , that was made : which is exactly what we teach , that father , son , and holy ghost , as they are one god , so they are one creator , who made the world by one individual act and operation . god the father made the world , and the creation of all things may eminently be attributed to him , as the fountain of the deity , and of all energy and power ; but he did not make the world without his word and spirit : all things were made by the word , and without him was not any thing made , that was made . this account is very far from containing any thing absurd or contradictious ; but to have as little dispute as may be with this author , let us take it in that sense he would have us take it in ; instead of word put the son , and instead of god put god the father , and i can find none of the contradictions he talks of : for then the words run thus ; in the beginning of all things was the word the son of god , and this son of god was inseparably united to god the father , and the son was one god with the father ; this same son was in the beginning with the father ; for the father made all things by him , and without him was not any thing made , that was made . but let us consider what account our socinian historian gives of this chapter : he appeals to grotius's interpretation of it , but has misrepresented grotius ; that did an action of forgery lie in these cases , many men have lost their ears for less matters . the account he gives of it in short is this : briefly , the word ( according to grotius ) is not an eternal son of god , but is here the power and wisdom of god ; which word abiding without measure on the lord christ , — 't is therefore spoken of as a person , and as one person with christ , and he with that . whoever will be at the pains to consult grotius , will soon see , what credit is to be given to this socinian ; but it is no wonder , that those men pervert human writings , who having nothing else to value themselves upon but perverting the scriptures . but what agreement there is between this socinian and grotius , i shall show in some few particulars , by comparing their expositions with each other ; by comparing grotius , as he is represented by this historian , with grotius himself . brief history : in the beginning ] that is , when god created the heavens and the earth . was the word ] the hebrews call , that power and wisdom of god , by which he made the world , and does all other his extraordinary works , the word , psal. . hebr. . pet. . . they borrowed this expression from moses ; god said let their be light , gen. . — undoubtedly moses is not to be understood of a word orally spoken ; for god is a spirit ; but his meaning is , god put forth his power & wisdom , and thereby created light and the firmament , &c. this is a direct opposition to grotius , whom he pretends to follow , and his reason is as silly , as his authority is counterfeit : for why could not an infinite mind , beget a substantial word , the substantial image of his own power and wisdom ; and by this word make the world ? and why may not this be represented by his saying , let there be light ? for since he confesses , this was not an oral word , why should it be represented by speaking , or saying , if god have not an eternal , substantial word , by which he made the world ? there must be some foundation for such forms of speech , and since it is evident , god did not create all things by an oral word or command , there is no pretence for this expression , god said , let there be light , unless there be a divine person , who is the word and wisdom of god , by whom he made the world ; especially since this phrase of moses is thus expounded both in the old and new testament , that god made the world by his word , which is every where represented as a divine subsisting person . the word was with god ] i. e. it was not yet in the world , or not yet made flesh ; but with god. so that to be with god signifies nothing but not to be in the world . the word was god ] i. e. the word ( or divine wisdom and power , ) ( that is , not a substantial personal wisdom and power , but such a faculty , as reason and wisdom is in man ) is not something different from god , but being his wisdom and power is god ( as the wisdom of man is man ) 't is the common maxim of divines , that the attributes and properties of god are god : which is in some sense true . the meaning of that maxim is , that there are no powers or faculties in god , as there are in created minds , but god is a pure and simple act , and therefore what are and must be distinct powers and faculties in created minds , must be distinct persons in the godhead . and thus whatever is in god is god , as each divine person is . but if there be distinct powers and faculties in god , as there are in men , then the wisdom of god is not god , nor the power of god , god ; no more than the understanding is the man , or the will the man , or the memory the man. he adds , that those persons ( whether angels or men ) to whom the divine word hath been in an extraordinary degreecommunicated , have also had the names of iehovah and god communicated to them . vers. . the same was in the beginning with god ] this is here repeated by the evangelist to teach us that the word is so god , that it is not all , that god is ; there being other properties and attributes communicable , as well as the word . so that the word is but an attribute of god , and a communicable attribute , and but one of god's communicable attributes . so that there may be many words , for the word , as he just now said , may be communicated to angels and men , in such a degree that the name iehovah may belong to them ; and then why does st. iohn call the word the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the only begotten of the father . grotius . so also grotius . but adds was ; jam tum erat , was when all things began ; and shows , that among the hebrews , this was a popular description of eternity to be before the world , iohn . and to this purpose applies the words of iustin martyr concerning the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he was before the worlds . the word ] he owns , it is called the word in allusion to what moses says , that god said let there be light. but he calls this word , vim , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , power , efflux , emanation , in the same sense as the ancient christians used them , to signifie a substantial word , power , emanation . in this sense he shows , that it is used in the ancient books of the chaldoeans , and by the writer of the orphicks ; by heraclitus and zeno , as tertullian and lactantius affirm . nay , that the stoicks , and platonists , and especially philo iudaeus uses it in the same sense ; who attributes the making of the world to the word , which he calls the name , the image , the son of god. to which purpose he before cited rabbi eliezel , that god , and his name , were before the world was made : and explains this by the sayings of some fathers , as all meaning the same thing , and we know , they meant by it a divine person . the wor d was with god ] grotius does say , that this is opposed to the words being made flesh , and appearing in the world : but he was far enough from thinking , that these words have only a negative sense , that to be with god , signifies only not to be in the world : for he tells us , what the positive sense is , that with god is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , with the father ( the very sense which our historian before rejected as absurd ) and explains it by what wisdom says , prov. . then i was by him , as one brought up with him , and i was daily his delight , rejoycing alway before him ; which he does not think a prosopopoea , but spoken of a subsisting person . the word was god ] here grotius produces numerous testimonies to prove that that divine person , who is called the word , not the faculty of wisdom and power in god , is god. he says indeed , that the ancient hebrews , and primitive christians teach , that when an angel is in scripture called iehovah , it is not a meer angel , sed cui adfuerit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , such an angel , to whom the word is joyned or united , ( not as the historian says to whom the divine wisdom has been in an extraordinary degree communicated ; that is an extraordinary wise angel , for there is no other sense in it ) but i know not what grotius meant by the union or presence of the word with the angel ; but i know the primitive christians asserted , that the angel called iehovah , was the word . grotius assigns this reason of the repetition , that because the evangelist had called the word god , he would have us understand , that he is so god , that he is also with god ; that is , that the word is not all that god is , but only one person in the godhead : which he observes that origen , and others after him , called the distinction of hipostasis , tho' the primitive christians , and athanasius himself , used that word hipostases in a different sense ; and the christians seemed to take up this sense of it from the platonists : but whatever becomes of the phrase , this is plainly what grotius meant by the word 's not being all , that is god , that is , that he is but one person in the godhead , not that he is but one communicable attribute in god. this is sufficient to show how our historian has abus'd this great man , when he represents him , as making the word only the divine wisdom and power , not a divine person ; and all his other mis-representations depend on this , and need not be particularly examined . but i perceive our socinian historian is ashamed of that exposition which socinus , and his genuine disciples , give of this chapter , which had been a sign of some understanding and modesty , had he not invented as foolish and sensless an interpretation himself , for it is not grotius's , but his own . socinus was sensible that the word must signifie a person , but would allow it to be no more than a man , called the word , not with respect to his nature , but office , as the greatest and most excellent prophet , who reveals god's will to the world . our historian was convinced , that the word must be something divine , which was with god from the beginning of the world , and was not different from god , but is god , and did create all things at first , and was in a sense incarnate ; was made flesh , did abide on , and inhabit an human person , the person of iesus : so far is very well . but then he will not allow the word to be a person , but a divine quality or accident , the wisdom or power of god ; and the fault of this is , that it is unintelligible nonsense , to describe the word so pompously , as distinct from god , but with god in the beginning , and himself god , and to ascribe the making of the world to him , and tell us , that he was made flesh ; and all this while the world is only a communicable attribute in god , what we call the faculty of reason in men : this is a new way of making a god of a prosopopoea , and incarnating a prosopopoea , which must be a very figurative god , and incarnation . but i observed before , that when any vertue or power or faculty is spoken of as a person , what is said of the vertue or power belongs to the person in whom that vertue and power is : and what that is said to do , is done by the person , or else it is not a figurative but a false and absurd form of speech : as when charity is said to suffer long , and is kind ; the meaning is , a charitable man is so ; a prosopopoea is easily understood , and conveys its sense clearly and elegantly to our minds ; but where there is nothing but nonsense at the bottom , it must not be made a figure , for a figurative speech is good sense : let us then examine his prosopopoea by this rule . in the beginning was the word , that is , the wisdom and power of god ; and this wisdom and power of god was with god , that is , god was with himself ; and this wisdom and power of god , was god , that is , god was god : what sense i beseech you is there in this ? that the wisdom and power of god made the world , i grant is sense , because god did make the world ; but if there be any sense in the words being made flesh , it is certain , that god is incarnate . for the wisdom and power of god , which is with god , and is god , cannot be incarnate , unless god be incarnate . unless we can divide god from his wisdom , and separate the wisdom of god , [ which was with him from the beginning , ] from god , to be incarnate in man. the wisdom of god can no more be incarnate , unless god can be incarnate , then the wisdom of an angel can be incarnate , without the incarnation of the angel : and thus this socinian is turned sabellian , and patropassian . however , i confess , we are beholden to this historian , for he has given up this place to us , which is one of the most express places for the divinity of our saviour . he allows , that the beginning is the beginning of all things ; that word signifies something divine ; even the wisdom and power of god ; that to be with god , is to be intimately present with him ; that to be god , is to be god himself : that all things were made by him , is meant of the first creation of the world ; that this divine word was made flesh , and did abide on the human person of christ jesus ; the only difference between us is , whether this word , of whom all these things are said , be a divine person , or only the communicable attribute of wisdom and power in god ; and this after what i have said , i leave to any man of common understanding to determine . but what becomes of his beloved socinus all this while ? when the very master-piece of his wit and invention is rejected by his own disciples ; for if this socinian be in the right , his master was greatly in the wrong . by the word he understands a person , but one who is the word , not by nature , but office : by the beginning he understands the beginning of iohn the baptist's preaching ; in this beginning the word was ; that is , christ was in being , was in the world , when iohn the baptist began to preach ; a great discovery ! but he was with god , known to god only at that time ; which is very hardly true ; and was god , by dignity and office , not by nature . all things were made by him , not created ; the world was not made by him ; but all things are new made by him ; that is , all who believe in him , are made new creatures ; and after a great many great things said of this word , at last the evangelist discovers this great mystery , the word was made flesh , that is , the word was a man. if this be not ridiculing scripture nothing is ; i am sure it represents the evangelist very ridiculously , to tell the world , that christ , who was half a year younger than iohn , was in the world when iohn began to preach ; but how great a person he was , and what his office was , was then known only to god. which if it were true , is no great mystery ; and to say this in such a mysterious pomp of words , as there is nothing like it in all the scripture , is such a vain affectation , as no school master , but an arrant fop , would endure in a school-boy . i shall not go about industriously to confute that , which they themselves begin to be ashamed of , but shall only lay down one rule of expounding scripture , and all other writings , which is a very reasonable one , and will easily answer all the art and fallacy which is used in this cause ; and that is this , to expound all words and phrases to a proper and literal sense , and to the utmost extent of their signification , where the circumstances of the place do not require a figurative and limited sense ; if we do not allow this , there is no certain rule of expounding , but men may interpret , according to their own fancies and imaginations , to any sense that the word was ever used in ; and then we may make any thing of any thing , even a good catholick of socinus himself . now according to this rule , in the beginning must signifie the first beginning of all things ; for that is beginning in its utmost latitude , and that is the proper signification of beginning , when there is nothing to limit it , and there is nothing here . was the word must signifie the word did subsist , and therefore is a person ; god must signifie god by nature , which is the first and proper signification of the word , not a metaphorical god by dignity and office , for there is nothing to incline it to that sense : all things were made by him , and without him was nothing made that was made , must signifie the first creation of all things , when god made the world by his word ; for that is the proper notion of making all things , to give being to them , and as there is nothing in the text to require any other sense , so its relation to in the beginning , when god made all things by his word , determines it to this sense : this is all true and certain , if it be a good rule to expound words in a proper sense , when there is nothing that requires an improper and metaphorical sense : and then it is nothing to the purpose to show , that in the beginning sometimes signifies the beginning of the gospel , that god sometimes signifies a metaphorical god , that making all things , sometimes signifies new making all things , for all this i allow , when the circumstances of the place require it , when there is any thing added to determine these words to this sense , but will never allow it , where there is not , and therefore cannot allow it here ; and if we must expound these words properly in this place , there is an end of this controversie . but i must hasten to a conclusion , and therefore this shall serve at present as a specimen , how these men pervert scripture , and impose forced and ridiculous senses on it ; and by the help of what i have now discoursed , it will be easie to detect all their other fallacies , and rescue the scriptures from their perverse comments ; as i shall be ready at any time to shew , when i find a just occasion for it . secondly , socinianism , as reasonable and accountable a doctrine as our historian says it is , makes the jewish oeconomy very unreasonable and unaccountable . the jewish worship was external and ritual , but very pompous and mysterious , and had there not been something very divine and mysterious praefigured by it , it had been no better than a childish piece of pageantry , unworthy of the wisdom of god , unworthy of the nature of man. but the new testament assures us , that all these mysterious ceremonies were types of christ , and were accomplished in him ; in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge ; or in whom are all the hidden treasures ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) of wisdom and knowledge ; that is , all those treasures of wisdom and knowledge , which were formerly hid and concealed under the types of the jewish law ; for they were but a shadow of things to come , but the body is of christ. and yet if christ were no more than a meer man , the antitype falls very short of the types ; i shall instance at present only in the temple , and its worship and ministers . the tabernacle and temple was god's house , where he chose to dwell by the visible symbols of his presence ; and was so contrived as to be a figure both of heaven and earth ; for so the apostle to the hebrews expresly tells us , that the holy of holies was a figure of heaven , into which the high priest only entred , and that but once a year , to make expiation ; and therefore the other courts of the temple , which were for their daily worship , did represent the earth , on which men worship god : for god being the maker and soveraign lord of the world , who has heaven for his throne , and earth for his footstool , it was fitting the house where he dwelt should be an emblem and figure of the whole world . but we must all confess , that this was a very unaccountable and insignificant ceremony , for god , who fills heaven and earth with his presence , to dwell in a house made with hands ; to appoint this the peculiar place of his worship , ordinarily to accept no sacrifices , but what were offered there , &c. had it not praefigured something more divine and mysterious , solomon in his prayer of dedication might well say , but will god indeed dwell on the earth ? behold the heaven , and heaven of heavens cannot contain thee , how much less this house that i have built . the temple then was a figure , and we must enquire what it was a figure of . now a typical presence can be a figure of nothing , but a real presence , and god's personal dwelling among men : for presence and habitation can signifie nothing but presence , and a figure must be a figure of something that is real : and nothing can answer to a figurative visible presence of god , but a personal visible presence . now our saviour calls his body the temple , destroy this temple , and in three days i will raise it up : which st. iohn tells us , he spake of the temple of his body . the temple then , which was god's house , where he dwelt , was but a figure of christ's body ; christ's body then was that in truth and reality , which the temple was but a figure of ; that is , god's visible presence on earth . but god was not visibly present on earth , unless he were personally united to human nature ; that the body of christ was the body of god , or of the divine word , by as true and real an union , as any man's body is his . thus god may be personally and visibly present among men , as a man , though his soul be as invisible as the deity , is yet visibly present by his union to a visible body : but if christ be not god incarnate , if the divine word be not personally united to human nature , the body of christ is but as figurative a temple , as the temple at ierusalem was , and then one figure is made a type of another , which is as great an absurdity in types , as a metaphor of a metaphor is in speech . god was as really present in the temple , as he was in christ without a personal union : for god fills all places , and is really present every where , but yet was peculiarly present in the temple to peculiar ends ▪ and purposes ; to hear prayers , to accept their sacrifices and oblations , to give forth his oracles and responses ; and if christ be but a meer man , he dwells no otherwise in him , but by inspiration ; and though christ was more perfectly inspired than the jewish oracle , this does not alter the nature of god's presence , does not make one a typical and figurative , the other a real presence ; for god is really present in both , but not personally united to either . the typical presence of god in the tabernacle and temple is not opposed to a real presence , by real and sensible effects , but to a visible presence . god is present every where , but he is invisibly present , but as he had chosen israel for his peculiar people and inheritance , so he would dwell visibly among them ; but this could be done no other way , but either by taking a visible body , or by some instituted signs of his visible presence ; the first he would not do yet , but intended to do in the fulness of time , which his own infinite wisdom had appointed for it ; and in the mean time did praefigure this visible appearance of god on earth in human nature by some visible symbols of his presence ; by a visible house , wherein he dwelt , by a visible throne , or mercy-seat ; and by placing a visible oracle among them : so that the temple , as a type , was a type and figure of god's visible appearance and dwelling upon earth ; and therefore if it was a type of christ's body , as christ himself tells us it was , god did visibly dwell in christ by a personal union ; for nothing else can make god visible , but a personal union to a visible nature . to this st. iohn plainly alludes , when he tells us , the word was made flesh , and dwelt among us , and we beheld his glory , the glory as of the only begotten of the father , full of grace and truth ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , tabernacled among us , fulfilled that type of god's dwelling in the tabernacle , and temple at ierusalem , by his dwelling personally in human nature : and we beheld his glory ; that is , says our historian , the glory of the man , on whom the word did abide and inhabit in him : but st. iohn says , it is the glory of the word made flesh ; the glory of the word , as of the only begotten of the father , did shine in human nature ; there were visible signs of the glory of the incarnate word : this glory he says , was beheld in his miracles , and in his transfiguration , and on many other occasions : very many indeed ; in his life and doctrine especially ; for how would they have the glory of the incarnate word seen , but by the visible operations of it in human nature ? how does a human soul discover its glory but by visible actions ? thus our saviour tells us , that he is greater than the temple ; i say unto you , in this place is one greater than the temple : now the temple was god's house and figurative presence , and if he were greater than the temple , god dwelt in a more perfect manner in him : that is , he was not a symbolical visible presence of god , which was all he could be , had he been no more than a man , but a visible god ; even the lord of the temple , as the prophet malachi assures us : behold i will send my messenger , and he shall prepare the way before me ; and the lord whom ye seek , shall suddenly come into his temple : even the messenger of the covenant , whom ye delight in , behold he shall come , saith the lord of hosts . this messenger , all men own , was iohn the baptist , the voice of one crying in the wilderness , prepare ye the way of the lord , make his paths straight . now our historian confesses , he prepared the way for christ : and god says , he shall prepare the way before me , which proves that christ is this lord of hosts for whom iohn was to prepare the way ; but that i at present intend is , that he for whom iohn was to prepare the way , is the lord of the temple , for it is called his temple . now we know , the lord jehovah was the lord of the temple : for the temple was god's house , dedicated to his name and worship ; he dwelt in his temple before by types and figures , but now he was to come visibly and personally into his temple , and therefore he might well say , he was greater than the temple , since he was the lord of it ; that incarnate god , of whom god's dwelling in the temple was a figure : and which had been a very empty and insignificant figure , unworthy of the wisdom and majesty of god , had it not praefigured the mysterious incarnation of the son of god. thus as god had a typical house , so he had a typical high priest , and typical sacrifices . that the high priest , who once a year entred into the typical holy of holies , was a type of christ , who entred into heaven . the apostle teaches us , hebr. that the jewish sacrifices were typical of the sacrifice of christ's death ; and the several kinds of them typical of the various effects and vertues of christ's death , we learn every where in the new testament ; which , i believe , is the true meaning , of the lamb slain from the foundation of the world : not meerly slain in god's decree , for what god has decreed , shall be done , is not therefore said to be done before it is done : but this lamb was slain in types and figures from the foundation of the world ; ever since the fall of adam , in those early sacrifices , which were offered after the fall , which were typical of the sacrifice of christ ; for god had then promised , that the seed of the woman should break the serpents head ; and for my part , i must profess , i know no principle of natural reason , that teaches us to offer the blood of beasts in sacrifice to god ; and therefore must think the sacrifices of beasts to be an institution . now that a human priesthood , and the sacrifices of beasts were not acceptable to god in themselves , the apostle to the hebrews sufficiently proves ; and i would desire some of our learned , reasoning socinians ( as they think themselves ) honestly to tell me , what account they can give of this jewish priesthood , and sacrifices , which is becoming god : why should god be propitiated by a man , subject to the same sins and infirmities , and very often guilty of them , that other men are ? why innocent beasts must die to expiate the sins of men ? when the apostle tells us , that it is not possible , that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin . and yet if there were no more in it , then god's meer appointment and institution , i do not see , but the jewish priesthood and sacrifices might have been as effectual as any other : i think , they are so far in the right , and consistent with their own principles , that as they own christ to be no more than a man , so they make him only a metaphorical priest , and his death a metaphorical sacrifice ; for a meer man can be no more than a metaphorical or typical priest and sacrifice : but then the difficulty is , how christ is the antitype to the typical priests , and sacrifices of the law , if he be but a metaphorical priest and sacrifice himself ; for the antitype ought to be that in truth and reality , which the type is a figure of : and though they were typical , yet they were true and proper priests and sacrifices , and made a true and proper expiation for sin , as far as they reached , and therefore one would think should typifie not a metaphorical , but a true priest and sacrifice , though of a more excellent and perfect nature . this is easily accounted for , if we allow the divine word to be incarnate , and to be our priest and sacrifice , but without this the jewish oeconomy is a most absurd and unaccountable institution . thirdly , socinianism ridicules the christian religion , that is , makes it a very mean and contemptible institution ; which i shall shew in a few words . the fundamental mystery of the christian religion is the stupendious love of god in giving his own son , his only begotten son , for the redemption of mankind . this our saviour lays great stress on ; god so loved the world , that he gave his only begotten son , that whosoever believeth in him should not perish , but have everlasting life . by this one would have thought , that christ had been the son , the only begotten son of god , before he gave him : as isaac , who was a type of christ , was abraham's son , before he offered him at god's command : for that it is the argument of love , when we part with what we have , and what is dear to us ; but this is not the case , if socinianism be true ; god did not give us any son he had before , but made an excellent man , whom he was pleased to call his only begotten son , ( though he might have made as many such only begotten sons as he pleased ) and him he gave for us ; that is , made a man on purpose to be our saviour . god's love indeed in redeeming sinners is very great , be the means what they will ; but his love in giving his only begotten son for our redemption , which our saviour fixes on as the great demonstration of god's love , is not so wonderful , if this giving his son signifies no more than making a man on purpose to be our saviour . in the next place , the apostles mightily insist on the great love of christ in dying for us , and his great humility in submitting to the condition of human nature , and suffering a shameful and accursed death , even the death of the cross. ye know the grace of our lord iesus christ , that for your sakes he became poor , that ye through his poverty might be rich : for the love of christ constraineth us , because we thus judge , that if one died for all , then were all dead . let this mind be in you , which was in christ iesus , who being in the form of god , thought it not robbery to be equal with god , but made himself of no reputation , and took upon him the form of a servant , and was made in the likeness of men , and being found in fashion as a man , be humbled himself , and became obedient unto death , even the death of the cross. now supposing christ to be but a meer man , who had no being before he was born of the virgin , who knew nothing of his own coming into the world , nor for what end he came ; whose undertaking was not his own voluntary choice , but god's appointment ; where is the great love , where is the great humility of this ? how did he become poor for our sakes , who was never rich ? yes , says our historian , he could have lived in the greatest splendor , dignity , and plenty . he that could multiply the loaves and fishes , and the wine at the wedding of cana , need not have wanted any comforts of life . right ! if he can prove that god would have enabled him to work miracles , to have made himself rich and great , and to have ministred to secular pomp and luxury , if he had so minded ; but he being a meer creature , could work no miracles , nor to any other ends or purposes than god pleased ; and therefore if by god's decree he was to live a mean life here , and dye an accursed death , and he was made for this purpose , he neither ever was rich , nor ever could be rich , and therefore did not make himself poor for our sakes . he could not by the constitution of god have done otherwise than he did , if he would be the saviour of mankind , and therefore if he was not rich before he came into the world , and voluntarily chose his poverty for us , i do not understand the great grace of his becoming poor , for he never was rich , nor ever could be in this world. thus what is that humility our apostle so highly commends in our saviour : for suppose his being in the form of god , signifies no more than being made like to god , ( as our historian will have it ) by a communication of power over diseases , devils , the grave , the winds , the seas , &c. which dwindles the form of god into just nothing ; for according to them he had no inherent power to do this , but god did it at his word , as he did for other prophets ; and therefore this is no form , no likeness of god at all , for he did not work miracles , as god does , by an inherent power , but god wrought miracles for him ; yet suppose this , how is it an argument of his humility , that he committed not robbery by equalling himself to god , ( as he renders the words , which our translators render , and which the ancient fathers expound to the same sense , he thought it not robbery to be equal to god ) that is , says he , did not rob god of his honour , by arrogating to himself to be god , or equal to god ; though if this were robbery , both christ and his apostles were guilty of it , for christ declared , i and my father are one , which the jews understood ( and they did not mistake him in it ) was to make himself god ; and the apostles do this frequently in express terms , as i have already shown : but to allow his interpretation , i only ask , whether christ , if he would , could have committed this robbery ? whether upon their supposition of his being a meer man , if he had arrogated to himself to be god , god would have permitted this ? and suffered him to have wrought miracles , to cheat the world into this belief ? if he could not , it is ridiculous to talk of his humility in not doing it ; and i am sure it is ridiculous upon their hypothesis , to say , that he could . but he took upon him the form of a servant ; i. e. became like a servant , possessing nothing of his own , and suffering injuries and reproaches , &c. but how did he take this form upon him , [ which must signifie his own free and voluntary choice , ] when he did not take it , but was made so ? this was the condition , which he did not choose , but was made for : and what humility was this , for a meer man , to be a minister and servant of god , and so great a minister , as to be in the form of god , as he says , to be glorious for miracles , and admired as the great power of god , especially when he was to be exalted into heaven for it , and advanced above all principalites and powers ? this is such humility , as would have been pride and ambition in the most glorious angel. but he was made in the likeness of men , and being found in fashion as a man , humbled himself , &c. that is , says this historian , being made like other men , in the common similitude of man ( and i pray , how should a man be made , but like a man ) he humbled himself , and became obedient unto death ; i. e. notwithstanding that he could have delivered himself from them , yet was he obedient even to evil magistrates , and without resistance under-went that death , which their wickedness and malice prepared for him ; or rather , which god had decred for him ; which his hand and counsel determined before to be done : and therefore which he could not , which he ought not to avoid . the plain case is this : all the circumstances of our saviour's birth , and life , and death , were so punctually foretold by the prophets , and so peremtorily decreed by god , that after he was come into the world , there was no place for his choice and election ; he could not shew either his love or his humility in choosing poverty or death , and therefore if it were matter of his free choice , and a demonstration of his great humility and love , as the apostles says it was , he chose it before he came into the world : he was in the form of god , equal to god , rich , before , and chose to become man , a minister , a servant , and to submit to a mean life , and an infamous death for our sakes , and this indeed was a mighty love and stupendious humility in the son of god : this we can all understand ; it is a venerable mystery , and a powerful argument of our religion ; but socinianism makes nonsense of it . the faith and worship of christ is the distinguishing character of the christian religion , and if christ be no more than a man , as the socinians teach , it is a direct contradiction , both to natural and to the mosaical religion , which condemn the worship of any creature , and all religious trust and affiance in them . it is a religion without a priest , and without a sacrifice , or which is much the same , retains the name of a priest and a sacrifice , without any proper atonement or expiation ; which is a very unfit religion for sinners : but that which is most to my present purpose is , that it makes a god of a meer creature , and makes a mediator and king without any inherent power , to save sinners , to protect his church , to govern or to judge the world , which is a meer pageant and shadow of a king. to make a mediator or mediatory king , who shall be a fit object of religious hope and trust and worship ( as i have already explained it at large ) he must have a personal knowledge of all our particular wants , and an inherent power to help us ; and though his humane nature is confined to heaven , his knowledge and power must extend to all the world ; as he himself tells us after his resurrection , all power is given unto me , both in heaven and in earth : particularly , he must have power to protect his church on earth from all her enemies , to restrain and govern the malice of men and devils , to forgive sins , to give the fresh supplies of grace , to raise the dead , to judge the world , to condemn bad men to hell , and to bestow heaven upon his sincere disciples . let us then consider , what account our socinian historian gives of this matter , and what a kind of mediator and king he makes of christ. sometimes to abuse the world , he tells us , the socinians generally not only grant , but earnestly contend , that christ is to be worshipped and prayed to ; because god hath ( they say ) by his inhabiting word or power given to the lord christ , a faculty of knowing all things , and an ability to relieve all our wants . now if they mean honestly , that christ has an inherent personal knowledge and power , whereby he knows , and can do all things , this is to ascribe true divine perfections to him , for such are infinite knowledge , and infinite power ; and that is to make him a true and real god ; and i think , there is not greater nonsense in the world , than a made-god , than a creature-god , as i showed before : but it is plain our historian is none of these socinians , for all his expositions lean another way , and in the same place he disputes earnestly against praying to christ , and says , that those gentlemen ( he must mean the socinian gentlemen , who are for praying to christ , especially the polonian zealots ) say , that christ's mediation and intercession for us , is not to be understood of a verbal or personal mediation , proceeding from a particular knowledge of our wants and prayers ( and thus we have already lost this faculty in christ of knowing all things ) but he mediates by his merits ; that is ( not by his expiation and sacrifice , but ) by the perfect obedience and most acceptable services , that he has performed to god. so that these socinians are all of a mind as to this matter , that whatever they seem to talk of christ's faculty of knowing all things , and ability to relieve all our wants , his knowledge is only by inspiration , as the knowledge of other prophets is , not an abiding , inherent faculty ; and does not extend to all things , not to the present and particular wants and necessities of his church , much less of every particular christian , nay , not to the prayers that are made to him ; and then i confess , i see no reason to pray to him ; and his ability to help is not an inherent power to do those things for us , which we need , and which we pray for , but only to intercede for us with god , and that not particularly neither , but only in general , for he does not always know our particular wants . christian ears know not how to bear such talk as this , which makes a mediator and mediatory kingdom an empty insignificant name and title , without any other power but prayers : and that this is the mind and belief of our historian , i shall now briefly show , and will leave all men to judge , whether this be not to ridicule the scriptures and christianity together . . first then let us consider , what the knowledge of our saviour is : and two or three places will suffice for this purpose , for they are very full and express . st. iohn tells of christ , he knew what was in man. to which he answers , the knowledge which the lord christ had , or now in his state of exaltation hath , of the secrets of mens hearts , is the pure gift of god , and revelation from god , and the divine word abiding on him : that is , divine inspiration , for he means no more by the divine word abiding on him : this is a plain abuse of the text , and the reason of it , he knew what was in man , is the reason assigned , why he needed no external information or testimony of man , needed not that any one should testifie of man , for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he himself knew what was in man , and knew all men ; which , according to the propriety of words , signifies an inherent personal knowledge , in opposition to any external manifestation , and therefore to revelation it self : for he always knew all men , which cannot be done by revelation , which is particular and occasional . but this is not our dispute at present , but only to show , what this socinian thinks of it . the same he tells us with reference to the last judgment , when christ shall judge the secrets of men , the knowledge christ hath , or at the last iudgment shall have of the secrets of hearts , is purely by revelation from god , and the divine word communicated to him . this he repeats again in answer to what christ saith in the revelations , i am he which searcheth the reins and heart . the knowledge which the lord christ had , or hath , of any ones secret thoughts , is a revelation made to him by god , as it was also sometimes to former prophets , — prophets search the heart , ( which was never said of any prophet , for to search the heart is to look into the heart , and see the secrets there , not to know them by revelation ) that is , know the thoughts and propensions of the heart , by the spirit or inspiration of god in them . but the lord christ hath a far greater measure of that spirit , than any of the former prophets ever had : that is , god reveals more to christ , than ever he did to any former prophets , but it is only revelation still , not an inherent knowledge . in all these places to prove that christ's knowing what is in man , judging the secrets of men , searching the reins and heart , can signifie no more , then that christ has this knowledge by inspiration , he proves from the first words of st. iohn's revelations ; the revelation of iesus christ , which god gave to him , to shew unto his servants things which must shortly come to pass . which does not signifie , that this was a revelation made to christ , but that revelation which christ made ; for though god is said to give it to him , it is to shew unto his servants , that is , by the appointment of god christ shewed this revelation to iohn . thus when st. iohn saw a lamb , having seven horns , and seven eyes , which are the seven spirits of god , sent forth into all the earth : he says , this text confirms what has been often said , namely , that the knowledge which our lord christ now hath of affairs on earth , is ( partly ) by means of those ministring spirits which are sent forth into all the earth , as his eyes , to see and relate the state of things : for what other reason can they be here called his eyes . i shall ●ot now dispute , what the meaning of this is , it is enough that we know his opinion , that christ now in heaven knows nothing of the affairs on earth , but either by the revelation of god , or the ministry of angels ; and it seems , notwithstanding the divine word abiding on him , god does not reveal all things to him , but he is fain to use the ministry of angels to be more perfectly acquanted with the affairs of his church . and thus much for his knowledge ; and i confess , i desire a mediator who knows more , and in a more perfect manner . . let us now consider his power , which the scripture speaks so magnificently of , and which christ himself calls all power both in heaven and earth : and yet our socinian tells us , that this all power is no other power but intercession ; that christ has no inherent power in himself , can do nothing at all , but intercedes with god to do it . he expresly tells us , and lays it down as a principle , that christ's intercession is inconsistent with an inherent power in him , to hear and help us himself . for if he doth hear our prayers , and can and doth ( by a power constantly resident in him ) relieve our wants , to what purpose is he our mediator with god — what can be more evident then that here ( hebr. . ) christ's saving us from the evils we either fear , or labour under , is ascribed not to his own inherent power , but to his intercession with the almighty . thus christ promises to be always with his church , and a very comfortable promise it is ; for we may expect a constant protection from him ; but our historian tells us , that christ is neither present with us , nor can help us himself ; b●t christ is in the midst of , and is with his people , not by an immediate presence , as god is , but by his most powerful aid and help , which he affords , partly by his continual and successful mediation with god for them all in general ; partly by the angels who are under his directions , and by him engaged in the defence of the faithful . so that christ's promise to be always with us , does not signifie , that he will be with us , but that he intercedes for us with god , not particularly for you and me , for he knows not what our particular condition is , but for all in general ; and directs the angels to take care of all the faithful , and leaves it to their discretion , how to do this , for he can only direct , as he intercedes , in general , being ignorant of our particular condition . christ promises , if you ask any thing in my name , i will do it ; and for my part i always believed our saviour could do it , as he promised ; but he tells us , the obvious meaning is , if you pray for any thing to god , using my name , i will cause it to be done for you , by my intercession . well! but will he particularly intercede for us ? no ; but the general intercession i will make for all good christians . nothing is a greater support to christians under all their temptations and sufferings , than to remember , that they have a merciful and compassionate high priest , who is touched with a feeling of our infirmities , being in all things tempted as we are , which the apostle urges as a great incouragement to us , to come boldly to the throne of grace , that we may obtain mercy , and find grace to help in time of need : but this argument is lost , if our high priest does not particularly know what our wants are , nor when we want help , and does not intercede in particular for us , but only generally for all : and they who are not sensible of this , do not consider the state of human nature ; for the hope of sinners is in their advocate and mediator , and in his compassion for them ; but if he know not their wants , his general intercession gives them less hope . and yet this great consolation of sinners is destroyed by this socinian , who resolves all only into a general intercession , that our high priest having been in our very circumstances , is touched with a true feeling of our infirmities , and therefore doth with great earnestness intercede for us all in general . but let us consider the particular exercise of this mediatory power . one glorious act of power is to forgive sins , but this is wholly taken away by our historian . our saviour challeng'd this power , while he was on earth ; the son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins : and because our saviour challenges it , he dares not deny it in plain terms , but expounds it away . he says , god gave this authority to the lord christ , because he gave to him also to know what was in mens hearts : namely , whether their repentance and outward professions were sincere and lasting : that is , christ had not a direct authority to forgive sins , but a declarative authority , that their sins were forgiven upon a certain knowledge of the sincerity of their repentance . nay , christ is so far from forgiving sins , that our author will not allow that they are forgiven in his name , or for his sake , as appears from his paraphrase on what our saviour says ; that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name . the sense ( says he ) is , christ commanded the disciples to require men to repent , and on their so doing to assure them in his name ( or from him ) that god would forgive them . god deliver us from such expositors , who expound away the whole gospel of our saviour . another act of mediatory power , which is absolutely necessary to the christian church , is to give the fresh supplies of grace according to the needs and necessities of christians ; but though christ represents himself as a vine , and christians as branches in the vine , who derive their spiritual life and nourishment from him ; yet our historian will not allow that he can do any thing in this neither , but only intercede with god to give his grace to us . thus when the apostles said unto the lord , increase our faith ; his comment is , by thy prayers to god , which are always heard for us . when st. paul besought the lord thrice , that it ( the thorn in the flesh , the messenger of satan to buffet him ) might depart from him , and received an answer , my grace is sufficient for thee ; for my strength is made perfect in weakness . his comment is , he besought the lord , that is , he besought god ; though we know in st. paul's epistles , the lord , without any other addition , is commonly used for the lord christ. and so it is here ; where my strength is immediately interpreted to be the power of christ , and therefore he adds , the power of christ here is the strength or power which christ procures by his general mediation ( for all his church , and every member of it ) with god. so afraid is he to own , that christ can bestow strength and power on us himself to conquer temptations . but still he was sensible , this was to offer force to the words , and therefore says , that the socinians , for the most part of them do grant , that the word or power of god abiding on christ , doth qualifie him to hear our prayers , and to succour us in all distresses . but of this above . nay , he will not allow that christ could direct or prosper st. paul's journey , but only by his general intercession : and that he causeth us to abound in love , and all other graces , partly by his gospel , partly by his intercession . he denies that christ raised himself from the dead by his own proper power ; and though he shall raise and change our bodies at the last day , yet it is by the divine word and power communicated to him , and abiding on him , by which he raised lazarus , which he says , christ himself intimates was not his own proper power , but god's , that is , the fathers . and left this should be thought too much that christ should raise the dead , though by his fathers power , not his own , he adds , almighty god can lodge even in dry bones , a power of restoring the dead , kings . . which is a very honourable comparison for our saviour , and shows what a mighty opinion he has of his power ; which is only lodged in him , as it was in the prophets dry bones , and is no more his own power . but this lodging power in dry bones , is a new kind of philosophy , and in great request at rome . to conclude ; one would think , that he should leave christ the full power of judging the world , since god hath made him iudge both of the quick and of the dead . but this must be expounded away to nothing too . we heard before , that at the day of judgment , when he is to judge the secrets of hearts , he knows them only by revelation from god ; and therefore he has no personal qualifications to judge the world , but only bears the name , when god the father does the thing : but thus much he allows him ; that christ is said to judge the world , because he shall pronounce the decree and sentence of god , and order the angels to execute it . and now , has not this socinian made a glorious king and mediator of christ , without the least power to do any thing , but intercede by prayers and supplications with god , and that without knowing the particular condition of those , for whom he intercedes . if this be christianity , sit anima mea cum philosophis : if this be to expound scripture by reason , it is plain that scripture and reason spoil one another ; for no man would reason so foolishly , but to pervert scripture ; nor expound scripture so absurdly , but to comply with what he calls reason . . socinianism justifies , or at least excuses , both pagan and popish idolatries ; at least as it is taught by those men , who allow of the worship of christ , which it is certain , the christian religion teaches : now if christ be no more than a man , this is creature worship , and then creature worship is not idolatry ; and this goes a great way in justifying or excusing pagans and papists . if the worship of a creature be natural idolatry , god would not have permitted the worship of christ ; if it be not , then pagans and papists are no idolaters : though they worship creatures , whatever their fault be in it , ( if it be so much a fault , as a mistake ) yet it is a fault of a much less nature than idolatry , and more easily pardoned . especially when they do not worship these creatures as the supreme god , but as their mediators , and patrons , and advocates with the supreme god ; for there is a worship due to a mediator , distinct from the worship of the supreme god , as the worship of christ proves , who is not god , but a creature-mediator ; and thus the heathens worshipped their inferior deities , and thus the papists worship their saints : and if they do mistake , and worship those for mediators , who are none , and can do them no service ; the greatest hurt seems to be , that they loose their labour , but according to these principles , they do no injury to god. for as they tell us , when it is said , that all men should honour the son , even as they honour the father ; the meaning only is , as we honour god or the father , so we must not forget to honour also the son of god — an equality of honour is no more intended here , than an equality of perfection in those words , be ye therefore perfect , as your father , which is in heaven is perfect . so the heathens did not intend the same degree of worship to their mediators and inferior deities , as to the supreme god ; and we know the papists distinguish between the worship of latria and dulia , or that soveraign worship which is due to the supreme god , and that inferior honour to saints and angels ; and it is plain , this is not an arbitrary , but real distinction , as is evident in the worship of god , and the man christ jesus , who are worshipped with different degrees of honour , as these socinians assert . and whereas the papists are charged with making gods and goddesses of dead men and women , by paying religious worship to them , they no more make them gods , than the socinians make christ a god. and as for the worship of the virgin mary , they have in reason as much to say for it , as the socinians have for the worship of christ : they make christ the son of god , only because he was formed by a divine power in the womb of the virgin ; but papists , who believe christ to be god , own her for the mother of god ; and i cannot see , why it is not as great an honour to be the mother of god , as to be born of a virgin by the power of god , and it may be more . and in reason i cannot see ( allowing of the intercession of a creature ) why the virgin mother of god , should not intercede as powerfully for us , as a man born of a virgin by the power of god ; and i am apt to think , our saviour will account it a less fault to worship his mother , than to make himself a meer creature . and though the blessed virgin do not particularly know our condition , yet she may help us by her general intercession as christ does , and pray particularly for her peculiar devotoes , and therefore at least we may pray to god in the name of the virgin , and other saints , as socinians do in the name of christ , who knows as little of them . and yet the virgin , and other saints , may understand our condition and affairs the same way , that the socinians say christ does , viz. by revelation from god , and by the ministry of angels , who are sent into the world , and carry the news of this world to heaven , though we should not allow of their glass of the trinity , wherein they see and know all things . so that here is nothing wanting but the appointment and allowance of god , to make the blessed virgin and other saints as proper advocates for us , as the socinians make christ to be ; for they are as well qualified for it , or might be , if god so pleased , according to their principles ; and this the papists think they have too , that god has appointed , or at least allows the worship of such favourite saints ; and though they are mistaken in it , it is certainly a much more innocent and pardonable mistake , to make a mediator , whom god has not made , than to make the eternal son of god a creature . in a word , whatever evil there is in creature worship , that the socinians are guilty of in worshipping a meer man ; but this is not the worst of their case , for they overthrow the whole christian religion by it ; which popery does not overthrow , though it greatly and dangerously corrupts it . sect . vii . an answer to what remains in the brief notes . i am now hastening to a conclusion , and there is little behind to stop me ; for though half the sheet be yet untouched , it is answered before i come to it ; and therefore both to save paper and pains , i shall not transcribe his long impertinent harangues , as i have hitherto done , but only give the reader a view of those passages which he intends for argument or drollery , i know not whether . the son is of the father alone , not made , nor created , but begotten . our note-maker has discovered a contradiction between the beginning and the end of this article ; for either the son is not of the father alone , or he is not begotten ; for every novice in grammar , and proper speaking , knows , that begotten , when it is distinguished from made and created , always supposes two parents , a mother as well as a father . he will allow the son to be begotten , if you speak of the generation of the son by the divine power on the virgin mary ; for then it would have been true , that the son is neither made , nor created , but begotten ; for then he has both father and mother ; god is his father , and the virgin mary his mother ; and thus , though they will not allow the virgin to be the mother , they will allow her to be the wife of god , which is as honourable . these are very fit men to make addresses to a morocco ambassador , for they are so far of mahomet's mind , that god cannot have a son , unless he have a wife ; but mahomet was the better divine in this , that he never dreamt of god's having a woman for his wife . i am afraid this is blasphemy ; i 'm sure , we have always thought it so from the mouth of a scoffing atheist or infidel ; for this is not his own , but borrowed wit. for does our author in earnest think , that god cannot have a son , unless he begets him , as one man begets another ? this is to dispute against god's begetting a son , as the epicurean in tully did against god's making a world , that he wanted ministers and instruments for such a work , as if god made a world , as a carpenter builds a house . does a son necessarily signifie one who is begotten of two parents ? i thought the true notion of a son had been , one who is produced out of the substance of its parent , ( not out of nothing , which we call creation , nor formed of any other praeexistent matter which we call making ) and that the true notion of begetting , is to produce its own image and likeness out of its own substance , by what means soever this is done ; and if one parent can thus beget a son of his own substance , this argues greater perfection in the father , and is a more perfect manner of production than by two ; and methinks he might allow the most perfect being to beget a son in the most perfect manner . and that an infinite mind can and must beget his own likeness and image , that is , an eternal son , by a reflex knowledge of himself , i have already shewn . the holy ghost is of the father and the son , neither made , nor created , nor begotten , but proceeding . his first quarrel against this , is the procession of the holy ghost , from father and son : the next is about the distinction between being begotten and proceeding , which he says are the same thing , and are now confessed to be so , by the most learned trinitarians ; who these are , i know not , but be they who they will , it was no argument of their prudence or learning to reject a distinction , which both the reason of the thing requires , and the christian church has always owned : but this i have accounted for before , and plainly shewn the distinction between generation and procession , the first is a reflex act , whereby god knows himself , and begets his own likeness and image ; procession is a direct act , that eternal love , whereby god loves himself and his own image , which proceeds from god , as all thoughts and passions proceed out of the heart . and therefore there is but one father , not three fathers , one son , not three sons , one holy ghost , not three holy ghosts . the second person , is indeed the son of the first , but the third person , who proceeds from father and son , is not the son of either ; for to proceed is not to be begotten , and therefore there are not two sons , nor two fathers , as this author affirms ; much less are they three holy ghosts , though i grant , as he says , that they are three holy spirits . but this is a meer childish fallacy , and playing with words : as as there is but one god , so he is a holy being , and a pure mind and spirit , as spirit is opposed to matter ; and thus all three divine persons are holy minds and spirits , essentially united into one infinite mind and spirit ; but the holy ghost , who is the spirit of the father and the son , and a distinct person in the trinity , is but one. in this trinity none is before or after other , none is greater or less than another . yet the son himself saith the father is greater than i , joh. . and the son himself saith , i and the father are one , joh. . and therefore there can be no greater inequality between them , than what is consistent with an oneness and identity of essence : that is , not an inequality of nature , but order , as a father is greater than the son , who is naturally subordinate to him , though their nature be equal and the same . though we know , the ancient fathers understood this of christ as man , as it is also expressed in this creed , equal to the father , as touching his godhead , inferiour to the father , as touching his manhood . he proceeds . as for the other clause , none is afore or after other ; 't is just as true , as that there is no difference between afore and after . i ask , whether the son doth not , as he is a son , derive both life and godhead from the father ? all trinitarians grant he does ; grounding themselves on the nicene creed , which expresly calls the son , god of god , light of light , very god of very god , begotten , not made . but if the father gave to the son life and godhead , he must have both , before he could communicate , or give either of them to the son , and consequently was afore the son was . no effect is so early as its cause ; for if it were , it should not have needed , or had that for its cause . no proposition in euclid is more certain , or evident than this . i hope , he will abate a little of his mathematical certainty , before i have done with him ; and yet i shall quickly have done with him too . i will begin with his philosophy of causes and effects . no effect , he says , is so early as its cause . did he never then hear of what we call emanative effects , which coexist with their causes ? is not the sun the cause of light , and fire of heat ? and can he conceive a sun without light , or fire without heat ? and if he cannot so much as in thought , without absurdity and contradiction , separate these causes and effects , is it possible to separate them in time , that the cause should be before its effect ? that is , that the sun should be without light , and the fire without heat ? and yet , can light be without the sun , or heat without fire ? what becomes then of his reason , which is as certain and evident as any proposition in euclid ? that if the effect were as early as its cause , it should not have needed , or had that for its cause . for light needs the sun , and heat the fire , for their causes , and yet are as early as their causes . but i perceive he is but a young mathematician or philosopher , and therefore i would desire him to remember against the next time , that plain matter of fact is as certain and evident as any proposition in euclid . in all other causes and effects , which subsist distinctly and separately , his maxim is good , that the cause must be before the effect ; but when the effect is essential to the cause , and the cause cannot be without it , there the effect is as early as its cause , because the cause cannot subsist without its effect , as the sun cannot be a sun without light , and fire cannot be fire without heat . and this is the case here ; the son is begotten by the father , and is god of god , light of light , the holy ghost proceeds from father and son ; but father , son , and holy ghost , are essentially but one god , and therefore unless the same one god can be afore and after himself in the trinity , there can be no afore or after , but all three persons are coeternal , because they are essentially one eternal god : and it is in vain to confound our minds with conceiving an eternal generation , for that is as intelligible as an eternal being ; we can see the necessity of both , but cannot comprehend either , no more than we can eternity . it is demonstrable , something must be eternal , and it is as certain , that an eternal mind eternally knows it self , and loves it self ; for there can be no infinite mind without a reflex knowledge of himself , which is his eternal son , nor without the love of himself and his one image , which is the holy spirit : of which i have sufficiently discoursed already . and thus we are come to the last part of our task , what concerns the incarnation of christ , which after all that has been said to prove christ to be the eternal son of god incarnate , will take up no great time ; for what ever difficulties there may be in the philosophy of the incarnation , or how god and man is ; united into one person , it will not shake my faith , who see a thousand things every day which i can give no philosophical account of , and which a little philosophy would teach considering men not to pretend to give any account of ; and yet we believe our eyes without understanding the philosophy of things ; and why we should not believe a divine revelation to , without it , i know not . but let 's hear what he has to say . the right faith is , that we believe and confess , that our lord iesus christ , the son of god , is both god and man. then the lord christ is two persons , for as he is god , he is a person . very right ! and as he is a man , he is a person ; that we deny , that he is a distinct person from the godhead , when united to god. but a rational soul vitally united to a human body is a person . right ! when it is by it self ; and so a soul without a vital union to a human body is a person ; and a beast , which has no reasonable soul , but only an animal life , as a man has together with a human soul , is a person , or a suppositum , or what he will please to call it , but it is a distinct living subsisting being by it self , but when the rational and the animal life are united in man , he is not two persons , a rational , and an animal person , but one person : and therefore we neither need own christ to be two persons with nestorius , ( which yet is much more innocent than to deny his godhead ) nor deny him either to be god or man ; for he is god-man in one person ; as a man is a reasonable and animal creature united into one person ; though we may find the reasonable and animal life subsisting apart , and when they do so , they are two , and but one , when united . this is explained in the creed by the union of soul and body ; for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man , so god and man is one christ : which he says vainly enough , is the only offer at reason , that is to be found in the whole creed . well! we are glad any thing will pass with him , though it be but for an offer at reason , and let us hear how he confutes it . . he says , in the personal vnion of a soul with a body , the vnion is between two finite things : but in the ( pretended ) personal vnion of god to man , and man to god , the vnion is between finite and infinite , which ( on the principles of the trinitarians , i wish he had told us , what those principles are ) is impossible : for we must either suppose , that finite and infinite are commensurate , that is , equal , which every one knows is false ; or that the finite is united but to some part of the infinite , and is disjoyned from the rest , which all trinitarians deny and abhor . i beg your pardon sir ! they were never so silly , as to think of it ; but they abhor to see such sacred mysteries treated with so much ignorance and impudence . since he is for confuting the doctrine of the trinity by raising difficulties about the manner of this union , how god and man are united into one person ; i desire , he would first try his skill in inferior things , and tell me , how the parts of matter hang together ? which though every body thinks , he knows , i doubt no body does . then i would desire to know , how soul and body are united , how a spirit can be fastened to a body , that it can no way release it self , though never so desirous of it , till the vital union ( which no body knows , what it is ) is dissolved ? why the soul can leave the body , when the body is disabled to perform the offices of life , but cannot leave it before ? the soul , i say , which we trinitarians believe to be a spirit , which can pass through matter , which cannot be touched , or handled , or held , by matter , and yet feels the impressions of matter , is pleased , or afflicted with them , and sympathizes with the body , as if it could be cut by a knife , or burnt with a fever , or torn by wild beasts , as the body is . and since he apprehends , there can be no union without commensuration , and therefore a finite and infinite being cannot be united , because they are not commensurate ; i desire to know , whether he thinks the soul and body are commensurate ? whether the soul have parts , as the body has , which answer to every part of the body , and touch in every point ? these will be very new discoveries , if he can say any thing to them ; if he can't , it is his best way to deny the union of soul and body , because he cannot understand it ; to assert that man has no soul , but only a body , because it is impossible , that matter and spirit should ever be united into one person and life ; which is to the full as unreasonable , as to deny the personal union of god and man , because he cannot understand how finite and infinite ( which are not commensurate , nor can be , because neither a finite , nor infinite spirit , have any parts to be measured ) can be united . but in great good nature , he has found out a salvo for the trinitarians ; that god indeed is infinite , and every soul and body ( even that of christ ) finite , yet the whole god , and the whole man are united ; because , as the whole eternity of god doth coexist to a moment of time , so the whole immensity of god is in every mathematical point of place : and adds , the very truth is , they cannot otherwise defend the incarnation , or personal vnion of an infinite god to a finite man. this is gibberish which i do not understand ; but this i do understand , ( which i suppose is the meaning of it , if it have any meaning ) that an eternal being , who has no beginning , and no succession of being , may coexist with time ; and that an infinite mind , who has no parts , or extension , is present every where , without extension : this i have sufficiently discoursed already , and refer my reader to it . but he has a thundring argument against this : but withal it must be owned , that then the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation do infer , imply , and suppose all the contradictions that mr. johnson has objected to the doctrine of transubstantiation ? i hope not all , for that is a very good discourse , and i only wish for the author's sake , si sic omnia ; but pray , what is the matter ? his whole book , and all his demonstrations , are founded upon these two suppositions , that a longer time doth not all of it coexist in a shorter ; nor is a greater extension constipated , or contained in a less . suppose this , ( for i have forgot what his demonstrations are , and have not the book now by me ) what is this to the trinity and incarnation ? though a longer time cannot all of it coexist in a shorter , ( which i hope is not so loosly expressed by mr. iohnson , because it is not sense , for time is in a perpetual flux , and nothing of it exists but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) but what is this to an eternal being's coexisting with time without time or succession ? though a greater extension cannot be contained in a less , what is this to an infinite mind's being present every where without extension ? for here is no comparison between a longer and shorter time , but between time and eternity , which is not time nor succession ; nor between a greater and less extension , but between a finite and infinite mind , neither of which have any extension . but suppose the worst , how does this concern the doctrine of the incarnation ? if he could tell how to apply all the demonstrations of mr. iohnson , ( which he tells us in print , he forbears to do , because the press is not open to them ) these absurdities and contradictions would not fall upon the doctrine of the incarnation , but upon the notion of an omnipresent god , who has no parts , nor extension , which was not invented to salve the difficulties of the incarnation ; but is the true notion of god , and his omnipresence , who is not omnipresent by parts , but is every where a perfect and infinite mind ; and if he can ridicule god out of the world , we will quarrel no more about the incarnation : i do not at all wonder , that he boasts so much , what follies and contradictions he could discover in the athanasian creed ; for a man who cannot understand common sense , can never fail of finding follies and contradictions . . he proves , that the vnion between god and man cannot make one person , as the vnion of body and soul does , because the vnion of soul and body is not the vnion of two persons , but only of one person ( the soul ) to a thing otherways without life , reason , memory , or free-will . but in the ( pretended ) vnion of god with man , there are two distinct and very different lives , memories , reasons , and free-wills , which utterly destroys a personal vnion , for that supposes but one life , one reason , one memory , one free-will . now this is false as to matter of fact : for though we will allow the soul to be the person , yet by its union to the body , it has two sorts of different lives , wills , affections , appetites , reasons ; the animal and sensual , and the rational life , will , appetites , a carnal , and a spiritual reason , that is , two different principles of flesh and spirit , as much as if every man had two souls . so that there may be two lives , two wills , &c. in the same person , and it makes no difference in this case , whether these two wills be seated in two different subjects , or the same soul by its vital union to matter , have two distinct wills and reasons ; and therefore we must find out some other notion of a personal union than this , that one person can have but one will , one reason , &c. for it is plain , one person may have two wills and reasons , and if he may have two , he may have three , according to the number and diversity of natures , which are united into one person . now when i inquire what it is that unites different natures into one person , i do not mean , what it is that naturally unites them ; neither what the natural union is between soul and body in the person of man , nor of god and man in the person of christ , for this we know nothing of , and therefore no pretended contradictions and impossibilities in this , shall hinder my belief of it ; as i discoursed in the first section : but how two different natures may be so united , as to make but one agent ; for one agent is one person . now there are but two things necessary to this : . that these different natures be so united , that the superior nature have the government of the whole person ; unless there be one governing principle , there cannot be one agent , and therefore not one person , and the superior nature must be the governour and the person : as this author tells us , the soul is the person in man , as being the superior governing principle ; and in the soul , reason has the natural government of sense , as being the superior faculty , proper to a spirit , whereas sense results from its union to matter : and thus in christ , the divine word is the person , and in this personal union of god and man , has such a government of humane nature , as reason has over sense in man : and therefore st. iohn tells us , that the word was made flesh , or was incarnate : for the person of the word , took humane nature into a personal union with himself . and this is the reason , why all the actions and passions of humane nature are attributed to christ , as the son of god , because the word is the person , to whom humane nature is united , and who has the sole government of it ; as all the sufferings and actions of the body are attributed to the man , though the soul is the person , because it is the superior and governing power , and constitutes the person . . to compleat a personal union , it is necessary there be one consciousness in the whole : as a man has a conscious sensation of every thing , which is done or suffered either by body or soul ; feels its own reasonings and passions , and all the pains and pleasures of the body ; and in this sense there must be but one life in one person , and this own consciousness to the whole , is the one life . but then we must observe , that where different natures are united into one person , this universal consciousness to the whole person , is seated only in the superior and governing nature , as it ought to be ; because in that the natures are united into one person , and that must govern and take care of the whole . thus the mind in man is conscious to the whole man , and to all that is in man , to all the motions of reason and sense ; but sense is not conscious to all the actings of reason , which is the superior faculty , though it is conscious , as far as is necessary to receive the commands and directions of reason ; for the body moves at the command of the will , and it is so far conscious to its commands . thus in the person of christ , who is god-man , the divine word is conscious to his whole person ; not only to himself , as the divine word , but to his whole humane nature ; not by such knowledge as god knows all men , and all things , but by such a consciousness , as every person has of himself : but it does not hence follow , that the humane nature is conscious to all that is in the word ; for that destroys humane nature by making it omniscient , which humane nature cannot be ; and its being united to the person of the word , does not require it should be ; for an inferior nature is not conscious to all , that is in the superior nature , in the same person . this union of natures does require , that the inferior nature be conscious to the superior , as far as its nature is capable , and as far as the personal union requires ; for so sense is in some degree conscious to reason , and it cannot be one person without it . and therefore the human nature in christ is in some measure , [ in such a degree , as human nature can be , ] conscious to the word , feels its union to god , and knows the mind of the word , not by external revelations , as prophets do , but by an inward sensation , as every man feels his own thoughts and reason ; but yet the human nature of christ may be ignorant of some things , notwithstanding its personal union to the divine word , because it is an inferior , and subject nature . and this i take to be the true account of what our saviour speaks about the day of judgment ; of that day and hour knoweth no man , no not the angels in heaven , but my father only : where our saviour speaks of himself as a man ; and as a man he did not at that time know the day of judgment , though personally united to the divine word , who did know it ; for as he is the divine word , so our saviour tells us , that he seeth all that the father doth , and therefore what the father knows , the eternal word and wisdom of the father must know also . but yet the human nature of christ was conscious to all the actings of the divine word in it ; as we may see in the story of the woman , having an issue of blood twelve years , who in the midst of a great crowd of people , came behind him , and touched his garment , and was immediately healed ; our saviour presently asked who touched him , and when all denied it , and peter wondered he should ask that question , when the multitude thronged him , and pressed him ; iesus said , some body hath touched me , for i perceive that virtue is gone out of me ; he felt the miraculous power of the divine word working in him , as a man feels what is done in himself . this i think gives some account , how god and man may be united into one person , which though it be a great mystery , which we cannot fully comprehend , yet is not wholly unintelligible , much less so absurd and contradictious , as this author pretends . as for what he adds about believing and professing this faith , let him apply it to christ's being the messias , or any other article of the creed , and see what answer he will give to it ; for what if men can't believe it ? are we obliged under the penalty of the loss of salvation to believe it , whether we can or no ? doth god require of any man an impossible condition in order to salvation ? no! but if it be credible , and what a wise man may believe , and what he has sufficient evidence to believe , he shall be damned , not because he can't , but won't believe it . but what if it be against a mans conscience to profess it ? — if he profess against his conscience , he sins ; and if notwithstanding this a man must either profess or be damned , then god requires some men to sin in order to their salvation . god requires no man to profess against his conscience , but he shall be damned for not believing it , not for not professing what he does not believe : it looks like a judgment upon these men , that while they can talk of nothing less than the severest reason , they impose upon themselves , or hope to impose upon the world by the most childish sophistry and nonsense . and now i shall leave our note-maker to harangue by himself , and perswade fools , if he can , that the doctrine of the trinity and incarnation is nothing but popery , or must be parted with for the sake of iews , or be made a complement to the morocco ambassador , and his admired mahomet ; or must be sacrificed to peace and unity , and to secure men from damnation , who will not believe . i will not envy him the satisfaction of such harangues , it being all the comfort he has ; for i am pretty confident he will never be able to reason to any purpose in this cause again . glory be to the father , and to the son , and to the holy ghost . as it was in the beginning , is now , and ever shall be , world without end . amen . the end . advertisement . a preservative against popery , in two parts ; with a vindication , in answer to the cavils of lewis sabran a jesuit . o. a discourse concerning the nature , unity , and communion of the catholick church . o. a sermon preached before the lord mayor , novemb. . . o. a practical discourse concerning death . the fifth edition . o. the case of the allegiance due to soveraign powers , stated and resolved , according scripture and reason , and the principles of the church of england , with a more particular respect to the oath , lately enjoyned , of allegiance to their present majesties , k. william and q. mary . the fifth edition . o. by william sherlock , d. d. master of the temple . printed for w. rogers . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e the creed . brief notes . answer . notes . answer . notes . answer . notes . answer . vossius de tribus symbel . dissert . cap. , . cap. . ibid. cap. . ibid. ibid. cap. . dissert . . c. . creed . notes . answer . notes . answer . answer . creed . notes . answer . notes . answer . aug. lib. contra serm. arrian , c. . creed . notes . answer . notes . answer . creed . notes . answer . creed . notes answer . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . athanas. cont. arium . disput. tom. . p. . paris . quae ratiocinatio ad id cogit , ut dicamus deum patrem non esse sapientem , nisi habendo sapientiam quam genuit , non existendo per se pater sapientia . deinde si ita est , filius quoque ipse sicut dicitur deus de deo , lumen de lumine , videndum est utrum possit sapientia de sapientia dici , si non est deus pater ipsa sapientia , sed tantum genitor sapientiae . quod si tenemus , cur non & magnitudinis suae , & bonitatis , & aeternitatis , & omnipotentiae suae generator sit ; ut non ipse sit sua magnitudo , & sua bonitas , & sua aeternitas , & sua omnipotentia , sed eâ magnitudine magnus sit , quaem genuit , & ea bonitate bonus , &c. s. aug. tom. . l. . de trinitate . si hoc est ibi esse quod sapere , non per illam sapientiam quam genuit , sapiens dicitur pater , alioquin non ipsa ab illo , sed ille ab ipsa est . si enim sapientia ; quam genuit , causa est illi ut sapiens sit , etiam ut sit , ipsa illi causa est , - quod fieri non potest nisi gignendo eum , aut faciendo : sed nec genetricem nec couditricem patris ullo modo quisquam dixerit sapientiam ; quid enim est insanius lib. . dist. . cap. praeterea . petavius de trin. l. . c. . cudworth's intellectual system , p. . &c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . maximi dial. . de trinit . inter opera athanasij vol. . p. . edit . paris . ambros. l. de fide , c. . petav. de trin. l. . c. . ubi supra . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyss. tom. . p. . quod non sint tres dij . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. p. . athanasij vol. . dial. . de trin. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyss. vol. . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — ibid. p. . ibid. p. , . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nysl. ibid. p. . ibid. p. . petavii vol. . l. . c. , . ibid. p. . ibid. p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . damasc. de fide orthod . l. . c. . de trinitate , l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . dam. l. . c. . de trin. l. . c. . supra p. . st. aug. t. . de trin. l. . igitur ipsa mens , amor , & notitia ejus , tria quaedam sunt , & haec tria anum sunt , & cùm perfecta sunt aequalia sunt . mens autem cùm se totam novit , hoc est , perfectè novit , per totum ejus est notitia ejus ; & cùm se perfectè amat , totum se amat , & per totum est amor ejus . — quomodo autem ista tria non sint ejusdem substantiae non video , cùm mens ipsa se amet , & ipsa se noverit . atque ita sunt haec tria , ut non alteri alicui rerum mens vel amata vel nota sit . vnius ergò ejusdemque essentiae necesse est haec tria sint . in alternis autem ita sunt quia mens amans in amore est , & amor in amantis notitia , & notitia in mente noscente . singula in binis ita sunt , quia mens quae se novit & amat , in amore & notitia sua est : & amor amantis mentis , feseque scientis in mente notitiaque ejus est ; & notitia mentis se scientis & amantis in mente atque amore ejus est , quia scientem se amat , & amantem se novit . ac per hoc & bina in singulis , quia mens quae se novit & amat , cum sua notitia est in amore , & cum suo amore in notitia ; amor quippe ipse & notitia simul sunt in mente quae se amat & novit . tota verò in totis quemadmodum sint jam supra oftendimus , cùm se tota mens amat , & totam novit . & totum amorem suum novit , totamque amat notitiam suam . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . athan. syn. nic. decret . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . aug. l. . de doct. christ. c . aug. de trin. l. . c. . athan. syn. nicaenae decr. p. . john . v. . v. . . cor. . . john . john . john . cor. . . john . . rom. . gal. . gal. . st. aug. tom. de trin. l. . creed . notes . answer . history of vnitarians , p , . john . cor. . . john . john . . . cogitent quibus aliis verbis jusserit pater unico verbo : formant enim sibi in phantasmate cordis sui , quasi duos aliquos , etsi juxta invicem , in suis tamen locis constitutos , unum jubentem , alterum obtemperantem . nec intelligunt ipsam jussionem patris ut fierent omnia , non esse nisi verbum patris , per quod facta sunt omnia . aug. contr . serm. arrianorum , lib. . page . col. . col. . verse . page . hebr. , . hebr. . , . hebr. . . cor. . . matth. , . matth. . phil. . . eph , . heb. . sam. . . psalm . luke . john . matth. . john , . joh. , , , , . rom. . psalm . acts , . john . matth. . matth. hebr. . acts . . . john . . , . rom. . john . phil. , , . matth. . john . john . john , john . . . john . . . . . . . . page . john . cor. . . — . history vnit. p. , . page . luke . mark . matth. . john . john , . luke . page . page . page . john . cor. . . cor. . . james . rom. . page . page . hebr. , . page . . page . cor. . , . cor. . , , . hebr. . phil. , . page . job , . hebr. , . page . page . page . page . . psalm . . hebr. . . psalm . psalm , , . page . psalm . eph. . page . psalm . hebr. . page . isai. . rom. , . phil. , , isai. , cor. . . cor. . . rom. . cor. . . isai. , . rom. , , . isai. . pet. . , , . page . zech. . john . page . matth. . page ● . cor. . , . acts . rom. . gal. . rom. , . acts . john , . page . page . page . john . col. . . kings , . john . . john . page . matth. . mal. . matth. . rev. . hebr. . & . ch . hebr. . john . cor. . . . . phil. . , , . page . page . acts . page . page . john . ● page . rom. . cor. . . page . rev. . page . rev. . rev. . page . page , . matth. . . . page . john . page . hebr. , . page . matth. . page . luke . john. luke . page . cor. . , . page . thess. , . page . page . page . page . john . page . creed . quae molitio , quae ferramenta , qui vectes , quae machinae , qui ministri , tanti muneris suerunt ? de nat. deor. l. . supra p. creed . supra page , . creed . creed . notes . answ. creed . notes . vide supra p. , . john . matth. . luke , . a defence of dr. sherlock's notion of a trinity in unity in answer to the animadversions upon his vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity : with a post-script relating to the calm discourse of a trinity in the godhead : in a letter to a friend. sherlock, william, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a defence of dr. sherlock's notion of a trinity in unity in answer to the animadversions upon his vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity : with a post-script relating to the calm discourse of a trinity in the godhead : in a letter to a friend. sherlock, william, ?- . [ ], p. printed for w. rogers ..., london : mdcxciv [ ] half title reads: a defence of dr. sherlock's notion of a trinity in unity, &c. errata on p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion licens'd . errata . page . line . for usual , r. unusual , p. . l. . f. any r. an . l. . f. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . marg. l. . r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , p. . p. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a defence of dr. sherlock's notion of a trinity in unity , in answer to the animadversions upon his vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed trinity . with a post-script relating to the calm discourse of a trinity in the godhead . in a letter to a friend . london , printed for w. rogers , at the sun , over-against st. dunstan's church in fleet-street , mdcxciv . a defence of dr. sherlock's notion of a trinity in unity , &c. sir , i had heard very often , and very much of the animadversions upon dr. sherlock's vindication of the doctrine of the trinity ; but i had also heard such a character of it , which both friends and foes agreed in , that i could not perswade my self to read it ; for a satyrical wit is no diversion to a wise man , except in a play , and where it hurts no body ; and i could never think , that true divine wisdom rests on an ill-natured and perverse spirit . but your late letter awakened me ; for i could not but think that book , whatever other faults it had , must be worth reading , which you could think worth answering , and seem so impatiently to expect , when the dean , or some body for him , should answer it . as for the dean , he has given testimony to the world , that he has not been idle all this while , but much better employed : and , to speak my mind freely , i don't see how he is obliged to answer , unless you think a man bound to answer ballads and lampoons ; for he is as little concerned in it as you are ; that , had it not been for the title page , and some particular expressions , which the dean uses , and the animadverter furiously opposes , without understanding them , i could never have guessed against whom he had writ . i had , a little before , read over the vindication , and the notions lay fresh and easie in my mind , but as soon as i dipt into the animadversions they were all on a sudden confounded , and put into disorder . the animadverter disputes earnestly , subtilly , and triumphantly , opens his whole armory of metaphysicks , and because they are thin , airy weapons , which do no great execution , he points them with wit and satyr , to make them pierce the deeper . it was the saying of a very witty man , that he who writes lies down , but it is to be supposed , he forgot it when he made the experiment himself : but i must say this for the animadverter , that he is as fair an adversary , upon this account as one would desire ; as he spares not those who lie down before him , so he very civilly takes his turn , and lays himself as fairly open to satyrical wit , if the dean , or any of his friends , would condescend to exercise it upon him . when he ventures upon any thing like wit , he always makes himself a jest , and never so much insults and triumphs over an enemy , as where he is certainly himself in the wrong : i will not entertain you with particular remarks of this nature ; read over his book again , if you have the patience , and see if this be not true . but , sir , as well as i love you , i 'm resolved to humble you , for giving me the trouble of reading this book , not by giving a particular answer to the whole , which would be too unmerciful , but by convincing you , that it needed no answer ; and to let you see what a trifling author you have either admired or feared , will prove some little humiliation to you : but i shall do it in short , to save my self , as much as i can , the pains of writing , and you of reading , and therefore shall consider only the main points of dispute between the animadverter and the dean , concerning self-consciousness , mutual-consciousness , and three eternal and infinite minds . he rages furiously against the dean , according to his custom , in a whole long chapter , for discarding those good old terms of essence , substance , nature , &c. for his own new-invented terms of self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness ; that any one who reads it , would believe , that the dean would not allow god to be a real substantial being , or to have any nature or essence ; whereas he no where denies , that these are very good words , and not only useful but necessary in some cases , but yet very apt to confound us with material and sensible images , when we go about to form a notion and idea of god. we know not the naked substance or essence of any thing , not of matter , much less of spirit , and much less of an infinite and eternal spirit ; and therefore , as we can form no other idea of matter , but by its sensible qualities , so we can form no idea of a spirit , but by such attributes and powers as are proper and essential to a spirit ; which is so far from being a novelty , that it is to think and speak with all the considering part of mankind ; but let this pass , which the dean is no more concerned in , were his words and sence truly and candidly represented , than the best christian writers , both ancient and modern , as were easily shewn , did i not fear the animadverter , should he know it , would rail at them all for his sake ; for there is not a more capital crime , than to speak any thing well of the dean , or to say any thing that he says . that which the dean is more immediately concerned in , is the idea he has endeavour'd to give us of a trinity in unity ; and all that he positively asserts of it is , that it is a possible and intelligible notion , and no other in sence and substance , than what the ancient fathers made use of to represent this great mystery by , though expressed in other terms . to prepare you to judge equally in this cause , you must remember , that the substance of the article is not concerned in it ; here is no dispute about a trinity in unity : this the dean asserts in as full and ample words as the athanasian creed it self , which some trinitarians themselves boggle at , but without reason as he thinks ; for whoever will acknowledge three persons in the godhead , each of which distinctly considered is god , and has all the perfections of the divine nature , and yet are all three but one god , must , as he undertakes to prove , own the terms and explications of that creed . he has been careful to preserve a real , not a meerly nominal , distinction of persons , and yet asserts the unity of the godhead in as high terms , as ever the schools did , even a natural numerical unity ; and there is no reason to suspect he dissembles his sence , for then he might have concealed it too , having no other obligation to engage in this cause , but a zeal for this truly ancient , catholick , and apostolick faith. since then here is no innovation made in the faith , nor any alteration of the least term in it , what is the fault ? truly no other than what the best writers , both ancient and modern , have been equally guilty of , if it can be called a fault . those who are acquainted with this controversie , know , that the great objection against the catholick faith of the trinity in unity , is not its contradiction to any plain and express principle of reason , but the unconceiveabless of it : it is certain , that three should be one , and one three , upon different accounts , is no contradiction , and then what principle of reason does a trinity in unity contradict ? but we must grant , that we have no perfect example of any such union in nature , and therefore cannot frame a compleat and positive notion and idea of such an union : and this some men miscall contradicting reason ; but if every thing , which we have no positive idea of , must be allowed to contradict reason , we shall find contradictions enow ; and which is worse , must be forced to believe contradictions ; for we must confess a great many things to be true , which we have no idea of , and cannot conceive how they should be . but yet since the unconceivableness of this union is the great difficulty , and great objection ( though in truth it is no objection at all to any one , who considers , how unconceivable and incomprehensible the divine nature is ) the ancient fathers endeavoured to help our conception and imagination of this by some sensible images : such as the co-essentiality and union of the sun , its light and splendor , of a fountain and its streams , a tree and its branches , as the dean has observed , and as every one knows , whoever looked into the fathers . but these are material images , and may serve for allusions , and to render the notion of a trinity in unity possible and credible ; when we see some faint resemblances of it in the material world ; but they cannot help us to conceive , what kind of union there is between the divine persons , the union of matter and spirit differing as much as matter and spirit do , which have no likeness or resemblance to each other . and therefore the dean was certainly so far in the right , to seek for some image and resemblance of this mysterious union in the unity of a spirit : for a mind and spirit is the truest image of god , that is in nature ; for god is a spirit , and therefore it is more likely to find some image of the unity of the godhead in a spirit , than in matter , and yet we know nothing of a spirit , but what we feel in our selves , and can philosophize no farther about it ; for as mr. lock has truly observed , we can form no idea but either from external impressions , or internal sensations ; and therefore we can know no more of the unity of a spirit neither , than what we feel . now whoever considers , how he knows himself to be a distinct and separate person from all other men , will be able to resolve it into nothing else but internal sensation , which the dean , not improperly ; calls self-consciousness . the unity of matter consists in the unity of its parts , and we can see , how far its unity extends , and where it ends ; for its unity extends , as far as the continuity of its parts extends , and ends , where that ends : but we know of no extension or parts in a spirit , and therefore the very nature of a spirit consisting in internal and vital sensation , the unity of a spirit consists in the continuity ( if i may so speak ) of its sensation : so far as a man feels himself , or is self-conscious , so far he is one entire person ; where this self-conscious sensation ends , he becomes a distinct and separate person : for it is a self-evident proposition , that in an intelligent self-conscious being , self can reach no farther than he feels himself . and i would desire any thinking man to tell me , how he knows himself to be a distinct and separate person from all other men , but only by this , that he feels his own thoughts , volitions and passions , pains and pleasures , but feels nothing of all this in other men. i have been forced to explain this more at large , to help the animadverter to some conception of it , who i find understood not one word of it , as will appear presently . but to proceed . the dean having thus observed , that the unity of a single mind or spirit consists in such a natural self conscious sensation , this led him on to that other notion of a mutual-consciousness , which may be between three distinct spirits , and make them naturally one , as much as three can be one. for if a natural self-conscious sensation makes a spirit one with it self , why should not a natural mutual-conscious sensation unite three into one ? for if natural unity extends as far as conscious sensation , then if conscious sensation extends to three , why should not these three be acknowledged to be naturally one ? that as a natural self-consciousness makes one natural person , so natural mutual-consciousness should make a naral trinity in unity ? for my part , i believe it is much easier to cry down this representation as a novelty , than to offer one word of sence against it , or to make any other representation of this mystery , with so fair and natural an appearance of truth and reason : for this mutual-consciousness being a natural sensation , is not a meer moral , but a natural union , not a cabal of gods , as a socinian writer prophanely speaks , but one supream natural deity . this indeed forced the dean to speak of the three infinite and eternal persons in the godhead , under the character of three infinite and eternal minds , for this conscious sensation , whether self-consciousness or mutual-consciousness , can belong only to minds ; and if every person in the trinity , considered as a distinct person , be not a distinct , infinite , and eternal mind , there is , i confess , an end of the dean's notion , but then , i doubt , there will be an end of a trinity of persons also , and we shall have nothing left but a trinity of modes and postures , and names , not in the unity of the godhead , but in the unity of one person who is the whole deity and godhead . but if every distinct person in the godhead considered as distinct , be an infinite and eternal mind , as it must be , if every distinct person be god , unless any thing else than an infinite mind can be god , though it be an usual way of speaking to call them three eternal minds , yet there is no heresie in it , nor any intended by it , as will appear before we part . nor ought this to pass for meer fancy and invention ; for as the dean has shewn the phrases and expressions of scripture , whereby the union between father , son , and holy ghost is described , do naturally represent this conscious union , and cannot well be understood without it ; for that the father should be in the son , and the son in the father , so as perfectly to comprehend and be comprehended , with several like expressions , is made very possible and intelligible by a mutual conscious sensation , but nothing else will afford us any conception of it . now suppose , that after all these fair appearances , a spiteful wit could start some difficulties in this notion , ( as it is not to be expected , that in a matter of so high a nature , we should have such a perfect comprehension of it , as to leave no difficulties unexplained ) ought not the dean to have met with as fair quarter , as other writers have done in the same cause ? has he not given us as intelligible a representation ( and it is intended for no more ) of a trinity in unity , as the sun , its light and splendor , a tree and its branches , a fountain and its streams , or a mathematical cube ? are not all these accounts , much more chargeable with tritheism or sabellianism ? are not the sun , its light and splendor , as much three , but not so much one , as three conscious minds ? can there be a trinity in unity , unless there be a real and substantial trinity ? what work could our animadverter have made with the ancient fathers , and some late writers , had he thought fit to have treated them as he has done dr. sherlock ? but it is in vain to expostulate , when the man , not his notions , is in fault ; and the only comfort in such cases is , that malice is as blind as love , and so it has happened to the animadverter , as i shall make appear . but before i particularly answer the animadverter's arguments against self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness , and three eternal minds , it will be necessary to discourse something in general concerning a trinity in unity , and the words whereby to express it . for a trinity in unity is such a distinction , and such an union , as is peculiar to the godhead ; and though there are some faint resemblances of it in nature , yet nature has nothing like it , and then it is impossible we should have any words that can adaequately express it . it may help to allay the heat and virulence of disputation among those who heartily believe a trinity in unity , ( as i hope the animadverter does ) to discourse this matter plainly and briefly . the scriptures , both of the old and new testament , every where assure us , that there is but one god ; and not to take notice now of the more obscure intimations of a trinity in the old testament , christ in his gospel , and his apostles after him , have ascribed the name and character and incommunicable attributes of god to three , father , son , and holy ghost ; we are by the command of christ baptized in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost , and we are blessed in their name , the grace of our lord iesus christ , and the love of god , and the communion of the holy ghost , be with you all amen . christ declares himself to be the son of god , and to be one with his father ; and st. iohn tells us , that he is that word , which was in the beginning , and was with god , and was god. that by him all things were made , and without him was not any thing made , that was made . and the like divine attributes are ascribed to the holy spirit ; and therefore , though there be one god , we must acknowledge , if we believe the gospel , that there are three , father , son , and holy ghost in the unity of the godhead . this is the true simplicity of the christian faith , to believe father , son , and holy ghost to be one god ; that the father is not the son , nor the holy ghost ; that the son is not the father , nor the holy ghost ; that the holy ghost is not the father nor the son ; but that the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god ; and all three but one god. now one would have thought , that the authority of christ and his apostles , had been a sufficient foundation for this faith , without any farther enquiries ; but the devil very well knew , that the whole oeconomy of our salvation by christ , and consequently the whole christian religion , depended on this faith ; and that the curiosity of mankind , the weakness of their understandings , and their vain presumption in measuring god himself by their narrow conceits , might easily be managed to unsettle these foundations ; and therefore here he made some of his earliest attempts . the ancient christians , before this was made a matter of dispute , contented themselves with professing their faith , in one god , father , son , and holy ghost ; but when heresies in several ages of the church were broached , and some , to secure the unity of the godhead , made father , son , and holy ghost no more than three different names , belonging to three different appearances and manifestations of the same one god ; others ( if they were not misunderstood or misrepresented ) did not only distinguish , but separate father , son , and holy ghost , and made three absolute independent gods of them , and others denied the divinity of the son , and of the holy ghost , which preserved the unity of the godhead , by reducing the only begotten son , and the holy spirit of god into the rank of creatures : this forced the orthodox fathers into a dispute , where they wanted words adaequately to express their sence . the doctrine , which they constantly affirmed and defended against hereticks of all sorts , was this ; that father , son , and holy ghost , were three , as really distinct from one another , as three humane persons are , and that each of them is true and perfect god , and has all divine perfections in himself , and yet that all three are essentially one , and the same eternal and infinite god. but when they came to say , what these three are , and how they are one , by what name to call this wonderful distinction and unity , here words failed them , as of necessity they must , because there is no such distinction and unity in nature , and therefore no name for it . for the names of distinction in ordinary use do not only distinguish , but divide and separate their subjects , and the names of unity signifie singularity also , which admits no number . and this has occasioned most of our cavilling disputes , and raised all the noise and clamour about absurdities and contradictions in the doctrine of the trinity ; and there is no help for this , if men will ask such questions , as the proper and natural signification of words cannot reach the mystery of , and not allow such a theological use of words , as a little alters their natural signification , to accommodate them to represent some divine and supernatural mysteries . thus for example : a person signifies a reasonable understanding being , which actually subsists , and is distinguished from all other beings of the same kind ; but then it signifies more than this , not only a distinct , but a separate subsistence ; for so all created persons are , not only distinct , but separate beings , who have a compleat , absolute , independant subsistence of their own . but when we use this word person in a theological sense , as applied to father , son , and holy ghost in the ever-blessed trinity , we only use it in the sense of distinction , not of separation , to signifie , that each of these holy three has all the perfections of infinite mind and understanding , distinctly , as other persons have , but not separately , as created persons have . and since there are three in the unity of the godhead thus really distinguished from each other without a separation , i know no reason why we may not use this word person in this limited sence , to signifie three , who are as really distinct from each other , but not separated , as other persons are : for when it is known in what sence we use the word , when applied to the trinity , it is trifling to dispute against three persons in the godhead , from the signification of the word person , when applied to creatures ; and yet this is the sum total of all the socinian arguments against three persons , and one god , and of all the contradictions they pretend to find in it . three divine persons , they say , must be three absolute , compleat , independent gods , because three humane persons are three compleat , absolute men , who subsist independently on each other ; and therefore it is as manifest a contradiction , that three divine persons should be but one god , as it is , that three humane persons should be but one man ; which signifies nothing , if we do not use the word person in the same sense ( and all the world knows we do not ) when applied to the holy trinity , as when applied to men : for it is meer trifling to dispute against us from such a sense of the word , as we reject , and declare to all men that we do reject . the most that can be made of this is , that we use an improper word , and ought not to call father , son , and holy ghost three persons , because that is to make three gods of them , as peter , iames , and iohn are three men : but when the importunity of hereticks forces us to find names for that , which nothing in created nature can answer , if they will not give us leave , we must take leave to use the properest names we can find , though not every way proper ; and such the name of person is , when applied to the persons of the trinity : for all that this word person signifies , except a separate subsistence , belongs to the persons of the holy trinity . an intelligent nature , and all personal acts of understanding , volition , &c. do as distinctly belong to each person , as to any humane persons ; and it is this makes a person , not a separate subsistence , which belongs only to finite and created , not to infinite and eternal persons : and therefore the word person is properly enough applied to the three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost , because all that is essential to the notion of a person , belongs to each of them , though they do not subsist separately , as humane persons do . but yet men are very apt to judge of the divine persons , by what they see in humane persons , and to fancy these three persons in the deity to be like three men , who have the same humane nature , but subsist and act separately , and are one only by a moral consent and unity : and therefore to prevent this imagination , which betrays men to down right tritheism , others , without rejecting the name person , have thought fit more expresly to signifie what kind of persons they are , by calling them three subsistences ; that is , three who have all the perfections of the godhead , and do really and distinctly subsist ; for else they could not be three subsistences , but yet do not subsist as separate persons , but are essentially one god : for subsistence does not necessarily infer separation , for three may distinctly subsist , though essentially and inseparably united . and this is the difference between person and subsistence , that according to the most usual acceptation of the word person , which it is hard to correct , ( for that idea which in common use belongs to a word , is apt to stick close to it , ) three persons , signifie three who subsist apart , and as separately as three men do : but three subsistences are three persons who subsist distinctly without separation : for subsistence necessarily signifies a distinct and real , but not a separate subsistence ; for if three really subsist without a separation , they are three real subsistences ; and therefore it is in vain for the socinians to dispute against three persons , that they must be three separate persons , unless they can prove that they cannot really subsist without a separation , which none of them ever yet undertook ; and yet all their talk of contradictions and three gods , vanishes without it . what i have said of the word person , is with equal reason applicable to the word mind . the animadverter objects against the dean , that a mind or spirit is an absolute being , nature , or substance ; and i grant it is so in the common use of the word , as apapplied to created minds and spirits ; but so is person also , as much as mind ; and if we allow of a theological use of the word person , why not of mind too ? to signifie an intelligent subsistence , which is a mind too , but not a separate mind , and therefore not such an absolute being , nature , and substance , as a created mind is . and when the dean speaks of three distinct infinite minds , which are essentially and inseparably one , he could mean nothing more than three distinct intelligent , but not separate subsistences : and he needs ask no other pardon , but for the use of a word , which the schools have not consecrated . but there is greater want of words to express the unity and oneness of the divine nature and essence , than the distinction of persons . the nicene fathers in their controversie with arius , of which , ( if there be occasion more hereafter , ) who denied the divinity of christ , and made him no more than a creature , though as perfect , and as like to god as a creature could be , used the word homoousion , which was not first invented by them to serve that turn , but was used either in words or sence by the anti-nicene fathers , as the learned dr. bull has proved . but what is this homoousion , or sameness of nature ? this is the difficulty ; for there is not any one word to explain it by , which adequately answers the full notion of the divine unity ; and that is no great wonder , because there is no perfect example in nature of any such unity . they very often explain this by examples of a specifick unity : that the father and son have the same nature , as abraham and isaac have ; and therefore they call men , who have the same specifick nature , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and so they do the sun , its light , and splendor , the tree and its branches , &c. and this is in part a true representation of the homoousiotes , or sameness of nature in the persons of the holy trinity ; for if there be not that which perfectly answers , though it much out-does also a specifick sameness and unity , their nature cannot be the same , and accordingly they prove against the arians , that christ cannot be the son of god , if he be not homoousios to his father , because every father begets a son in his own nature . but yet we must not say , nor did they intend it so , that the unity of nature between father , and son , and holy spirit , is a meer specifick sameness . for we must not make the divine nature a species , which is common to more individuals ; for then the unity of the divine nature is no more than a logical notion , which is the only unity of a specifick nature ; whereas god is essentially and numerically one . the three divine persons are not individuals of the same nature ; for then they must have three individual subsisting divine natures , which would as much make three gods , as three individual subsisting humane natures make three men : the divine nature would then be communicated by multiplication , as humane nature is , which must multiply gods as well as men. is this sameness of nature then one single or singular nature , which has but one single subsistence ? this the fathers utterly deny , as being the heresie of sabellius , and leaving no other trinity of persons in the godhead , but a trinity of names . the divine nature is one individual nature ( as you shall hear presently ) but not one single nature ; for one single nature can be but one person , whether in god or man. i shall not dispute this at large now ; i may find a properer place for it , but i shall only observe at present , that if there be but one only single nature in god , the whole trinity must be incarnate in the incarnation of christ , as sabellius asserted : for the divine nature was incarnate in christ , he was perfect god , and perfect man , and if there was but one single subsisting nature in all three persons , this one single divine nature was incarnate ; and therefore the father and the holy ghost , who are this one single divine nature , as well as the son , must be as much incarnate as the son was ; for though it were possible to conceive three divine persons in one single divine nature , yet it is absolutely impossible , that this one single nature should be incarnate , and not the divine nature of all the three persons be incarnate , when it is but one single nature in all : and it is absurd to say , that the one divine nature of father , son , and holy ghost is incarnate , and yet none but the son incarnate . this is what victorinus afer teaches : non oportet dicere , nec fas est dicere , unam esse substantiam , tres esse personas ; si enim ista ipsa substantia & egit omnia , & passa est , patripassiani & nos ; absit . bibl. patr. tom. . we ought not , says he , to say , nor is it lawful to say , that there is but one substance , ( that is , one single subsisting nature , ) and three persons ; for if this same substance did and suffered all , we also must be patripassians ; which god forbid ; that is , we must say , that the father suffered as well as the son , as sabellius taught . it is such animadversions , and such unintelligible notions , which make the christian faith ridiculed by atheists and hereticks . but the great difficulty is , how to conceive one individual nature , which is numerically one , but is not one single nature : and yet thus it must be , if there be a trinity in unity , three real hypostases and subsistences in one divine nature ; which the counterfeit areopagite , but an ancient and learned writer , calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a monad or unite , which thrice subsists , or has three subsistences ; whereas it is demonstrable , that one single nature can subsist but once , or have but one subsistence : and therefore the ancient fathers owned , that father and son is alius & alius , and that god is solus , but non solitarius . that i may be the better understood , and give you some imperfect conception of this great and venerable mystery , let us contemplate this individual identity and sameness of nature , in a man and his image . a man sees his own image in a glass , the exact proportion of his body , all the lines and features in his face , all his own motions , and postures , whether he smiles or cries , sits or stands . now suppose this were a real , living image , as exactly himself , both in body and mind , as the image in the glass represents his external shape and features : that this living image was coeval with himself , and did subsist as necessarily as he did , and yet as much depend upon him , as the image in the glass does on his face and presence : that this living image did understand and will in the same act with himself , and repeat all his motions and passions , and sensations , as his face in the glass does : that this living image knew himself to be but an image , distinct from the original , but the same with him ; and that the man whose image it is , knew himself to be distinct from his image , but yet the same ; and that the man and his living image felt each other , and all that is in each other , in themselves . now i desire to know by what name you would call such a living image ? you cannot deny him to be a man , because he has humane nature in himself , and distinctly in himself , as compleatly and perfectly as the man has , whose image he is , or else he were not a compleat and perfect image : and yet you cannot say that he is a distinct man , or another man , a second man , for he is but an image , and the very same with the original , and therefore they are both but one man ; naturally one , not as two other men are , who may be morally one , by a consent and agreement of understanding and will , but by an individual unity and sameness of nature and will : and yet you must confess them to be two , though not two men , not two humane natures ; for the man is not his image , nor the image the man , whose image he is : but if you will call the man a person , as certainly every man is a person , then his image , which is the same with himself , must be a person too , and not the same person : so that here are two distinct persons subsisting in one individual nature , not multiplied , but repeated in its image . there is indeed no such living image as this in created nature ; but yet this is the true nature of any image , and gives us an intelligible conception of the unity of nature in a plurality of persons . and this is the plain account of the essential unity between god the father , and god the son. christ is expresly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the image of god , cor. . . and col. . . and said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the form of god , phil. . . and to be the brightness of his glory , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the express character and image of his person . and because there are several sorts of images , the ancient fathers declare what kind of image christ is of god the father ; that he is not a dead picture , nor a meer reflection in a glass , but is a living image of the living god. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as gregory nazianzen speaks . deum viventis dei vivam imaginem , as st. hilary tells us , that christ is god , the living image of the living god. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as damascen speaks , that the son is the living , natural , invariable image of the invisible god ; having the whole father in himself , and being upon all accounts identically the same with him , excepting the principle and cause of being ; that is , that he is begotten eternally of the father , but the father is unbegotten . but then , though he be the son , and the begotten image of the father , he is not his image meerly as other sons are the images of their fathers , who , though they partake of the same specifick nature , may be very unlike them , and are not the same ; but as gregory nazianzen tells us in the place above-cited , christ is the living image of the living father , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : but a more invariable image than seth is of adam , or any child of his father ; for the nature of such simple and unmixt things , as an image is , is not to be partly like , and partly unlike , ( as children are to their parents , ) but that the whole represents the whole , as the impression does the seal , and rather to be the same , than to be like . but st. gregory nyssen gives us the most exact description of christ's being * the living image of his father , of his will , and of his goodness , which , he says , is just as if a man saw himself in a glass ; for the image in the glass does in every thing conform it self to its prototype ; the face which looks in the glass , being the cause of the face which is seen there ; and therefore the image in the glass neither moves , nor inclines it self of its own accord , but as its prototype moves or inclines , but always moves with it . thus we say , the lord christ , the image of the invisible god , is immediately and instantly affected together with his father . does the father will any thing ? the son also , who is in the father , knows the father's will , or rather , is the father's will. whether this be not the dean's mutual consciousness , which must of necessity be between a living image and its prototype , or that whereof it is the image , and is the most natural and inseparable union of all , let any man judge . it were easie to fill the margin with such quotations as these , as you who are conversant in the fathers , very well know ; but i shall only farther observe at present , that the fathers made use of this notion of the son 's being the living image of god his father , both in their disputes against the arians and sabellians . they proved from hence against the arians , that the son was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of the same nature with his father , which is a plain and necessary consequence , and needs no proof ; for if the father and the son be the same , as a prototype and his image , there can be no diversity of nature between them . thus st. hilary , st. basil , st. cyril , st. ambrose , st. athanasius , greg. nyssen , st. austin , and all the fathers who were concerned in the arian controversie , reason at large . and thus they proved against the sabellians , that god was not one single person , distinguished only by three names ; because the son is the living subsisting image of the father , and the image and the prototype cannot be the same , but must be two ; no man is his own image , nor is an image the image of it self . this is so self-evident , and so frequently occurs in the ancient writers , that i shall not detain you with particular quotations at present . this real distinction of three in the same individual numerical nature , the ancients expressed by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : that the same one individual nature subsists thrice , in three real subsistences , not by multiplying , but only by repeating it self . as a man and his living image would be two real subsistences , but not two men , nor two humane natures , but the same man and the same nature subsisting twice in two different manners , not like two men , but as the prototype and the image , which are really and distinctly two , and yet but one man. thus father , son , and holy ghost are really three , but have the same individual nature , and are the same one god , and differ only in their manner of subsisting ; that the same divine nature subsists originally in the father , and subsists again in the son , as in a living image of the father , and subsists a third time in the holy ghost by an eternal procession from father and son , in eternal , living substantial love. in this sence the ancients understood the word subsistence , not in the abstract , as some modern school-men do , and as the animadverter seems to do , if i understand him , or he understands himself ; but in the concrete , for that which does really and actually subsist ; which does éxstare , and is called by them extantia and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : and this is very intelligible , that there are three real subsistences , or three that really subsist in the numerical and individual unity of the divine nature . but to talk of three subsistences in the abstract without three that subsist , or of one single nature , which has three subsistences , when it is impossible , that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence , is too fine and metaphysical for me , and i envy no man that can understand it . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the greeks is , res subsistens & substantiva , as petavius proves ; a subsisting and substantial thing : and st. ambrose abhors the thoughts , that the son should not be a substantial son , who gives substance to other things ; non esse filium insubstantivum , qui aliis dedit habere substantiam : and facundus tells us , that these words , person , and subsistence , were used by the fathers in opposition to the sabellian heresie ; and therefore must signifie three that did really and substantially subsist ; as st. hilary teaches , non unum esse subsistentem , sed unam substantiam non differentem ; that there is not one who subsists , but one substance without any diversity ; that is , in three different subsistencies . there could not have been more proper words thought on to represent a trinity in unity , than three subsistencies in one individual nature , which differ in nothing from each other , but in their different manner of subsistence . for it is certain here are three different kinds of subsistence , which are not to be found in any one thing in the world besides . nothing else has any more than one real subsistence ; for every being in nature besides is singular , or has but one single subsistence . every man and angel is a single particular creature , subsists singly and separately by it self , and is singly one ; but if there be a trinity in unity , the same divine nature must subsist wholly , entirely , and substantially in three , but in a different manner to make them three . and it is as certain , that the father and the son , though they have the very same nature , yet subsist in a very different manner , the father as original mind , the son as the perfect , living , substantial image of the father , which is as different as the subsistence of the prototype and the image ; and every one will grant , that a man and his image , though it were a living substantial image , have a very different subsistence ; for the image has its whole subsistence in dependance on its prototype ; the man subsists by himself , and gives subsistence to his image ; and the same we must conceive of the subsistence of the holy spirit , though we have not so apt a similitude to represent it by . and if we must call the three in the holy trinity , by any other name than father , son , and holy ghost , three subsistences is liable to the least cavil , and does most properly express their general character ; for they are but one divinity , or one divine nature subsisting wholly and entirely three times , without multiplication , as a man is not multiplied but repeated in his image . all other names in their proper and usual sence , signifie an absolute , compleat , independent being , such as nature , essence , substance , god : and therefore though each divine person have a natural , essential , substantial subsistence , and be true and real god ; yet we must not say , that there are three divine natures , essences , substances , or three gods ; because though the whole divine nature , essence , subsists in three , yet it is but one and the same in all ; and tho' god be the most absolute , compleat , independant being , and the son be god , and the holy ghost god , yet neither the son , nor the holy ghost can be said to be an absolute , compleat , independant god , because father , son , and holy ghost are but one god ; neither of which subsist absolutely , compleatly , independently ; that is , without each other ; which is all that is meant by an absolute , compleat , independent subsistence , that they can subsist apart without each other ; but the father can no more subsist without the son , than the son without the father ; nor the holy spirit without father and son ; nor father and son without the holy spirit ; as a natural and necessary image cannot subsist without its prototype , nor the prototype without its image , which is essential to it ; so that they are but one absolute , compleat , independent deity , though the three divine subsistences in the godhead subsist in a mutual respect , and a relative dependance on each other . and this , i suppose , is what the schools mean , when they call the three divine persons , three relations , or three relatives ; for there must be three real subsisting relatives , if there be three relations ; for one subsistence cannot be the subject of three relations , no more than one and the same man can be related to himself as father and son. but then the father , and son , and holy spirit are such relations , as there is no example of in created nature ; for their relation to each other is not a meer external respect and denomination , such as absolute independant beings have to each other , but their very nature and subsistence , as father , son , and holy ghost , is relative . though the father be eternal original mind , yet it is essential to this eternal mind to beget his own living substantial image ; and therefore this eternal mind is naturally and essentially related to his image : and i need not tell you , that the very nature and subsistence of an image is wholly relative ; a natural and essential image subsists as necessarily as the prototype , but its nature is wholly relative . thus father , son , and holy ghost have the same common nature ; not common as a generical or specifick nature , which is only a logical notion , but as one individual nature , really and actually subsisting in each , without any other difference than their different manner of subsistence , and their different relations , as a man and his living image , have the same individual nature common to both , and differ only in their manner of subsistence and relations ; that is , as the prototype and its living image differ . and this i think gives us an intelligible account of a trinity in unity in the most orthodox language of fathers and schools . this shews us , that the son , and holy spirit , are not divine emanations from the father , as is represented in the platonick triad : for though the eternal generation and procession be such mysteries , as we cannot comprehend , nor frame any idea or conception of , yet we know that an image is not an emanation , but a reflextion ; and therefore is wholly and entirely the same with the prototype , which no emanation can be ; for the whole cannot be an emanation : an emanation indeed is of the same substance , and is specifically the same ; and in this sence homoousios ; but it multiplies natures and substances , and is not individually and identically the same as the prototype and its image ; and therefore the fathers declare , that the eternal generation of the son is not by abscission and passion , but think the aptest representation of it in nature , ( though that is very different ) is by splendor and brightness , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the out-shining of the deity ; and when they call the holy spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it is not in the sence of emanation , but of the mysterious procession . this also shews us , that this holy trinity is not three divine attributes , such as wisdom , power , and goodness ; for they are all three the very same with each other , the same wisdom , goodness , and power , and therefore not three parts or attributes of the same deity , but each is the whole , as a prototype , and its living image is . and this shews , that though the son be true and perfect god , as the father is , yet the son can never be a father , because his nature and subsistence as a son is wholly relative ; and a son , whose nature and subsistence is relative , is necessarily and essentially a son , but can never be a father , no more than the image can beget its prototype . and this gives a plain account , why our saviour calls god , not only his father , but his god , and the only true god , and acknowledges , that he receives all from his father , and , that his father is greater than he is ; though he have the very same nature , and with respect to his nature is equal in power and glory ; for this is the true difference between the prototype and the image , though their nature be the same . had a man a living substantial image , perfectly the same with himself , as god has , the image must thus speak of his prototype , as the son of god speaks of his father . he must acknowledge that the prototype is his man , for he is only the image of the man ; and were there only one man in the world , as there is but one god , he must acknowledge the prototype to be the only true man ; for though the living image would be a true man also , yet he is not originally man , but man of man , a man only by relation and participation with its prototype ; and therefore the prototype is greater than its image , and the image receives all from the prototype , depends on it , and subsists and lives in and by it , as the son acknowledges , that he lives by the father , iohn . . this is manifestly the language of scripture and fathers concerning the son of god , his living and substantial image ; and i hope you see , that this is proper and peculiar only to a living subsisting image ; and can be applied to nothing else , but is the only proper way that we can speak of such an image , or that such an image can speak of it self ; this is intelligible , though the mystery of this eternal living image is inconceivable . this i suppose is what the dean meant ; when he said , that some tolerable account might be given of the terms and distinctions of the schools ; and i believe you begin to see , that this representation i have now made of this venerable mystery , will contribute very much to the better understanding both of the fathers and of the schools , as may appear more hereafter ; but at present i shall only shew you , that this is the true representation of the dean's notion of a trinity in unity . the dean does professedly teach , that the three persons or subsistences in the ever blessed trinity , are three real substantial subsistences , each of which has entirely all the perfections of the divine nature ; divine wisdom , power , and goodness ; and therefore each of them is eternal , infinite mind , as distinct from each other , as any other three persons ; and this i believe he will no more recant , than he will renounce a trinity ; for all the wit of man can't find a medium between a substantial trinity , and a trinity of names , or a trinity of meer modes , respects , and relations in the same single essence , which is no trinity at all . and if the son , as you heard , be the living image of his father's nature , essence and perfections , the divine nature , though it be not multiplied , yet is repeated in the son , and does as really and distinctly subsist in the son , as it does in the father ; as had a man a living image , his image would be as substantially and really man , as the prototype is , or as the man himself , whose image it is , though the man and his image , which are really and substantially two , are not two men , but one man. and thus the dean might very safely say , that there are three in the godhead , each of which is a distinct , infinite , eternal mind ; and though custom has not made the form of expression orthodox , yet there is no heretical sence in it , to call them three infinite and eternal minds , with respect to their nature and real subsistence , to distinguish them from meer names , and logical notions , if at the same time it be declared , that they are individually and numerically one : as it would be no mortal crime against logick and common sence to say , that a man and his living image are two distinct men , with respect to the real and actual subsistence of humane nature distinctly in each of them , though the image is not another man , but the same with its prototype . this is the distinction which the dean makes between the three divine persons , which yet could not be three , were they not three self-conscious subsistencies ; for there cannot be three in a knowing and intelligent nature , without knowing themselves and their distinction from each other ; that the father knows himself to be the father , and not the son , and the son knows himself to be the son , and not the father . this every man feels in himself to be a real and natural distinction of one person from another , and the scripture is express in it , that father , son , and holy ghost are thus distinguished ; and this the dean thought , and as far as i can yet see , with great reason , to be the most easie and sensible representation of a real and natural trinity . as for the unity of these three divine persons , the dean expresly teaches , that they are essentially and numerically one. and as the most sensible representation of this , he places their unity in mutual consciousness , that they have as conscious a sensation of each other in themselves as they have of themselves : and he is certainly so far in the right , that this is essential to their unity ; that three intelligent subsistences cannot be one without this mutual consciousness , and that this mutual consciousness cannot be in three , which are not essentially and numerically one. the scripture plainly enough teaches this very unity between father , son , and holy ghost , as he has proved at large ; and if this either be , or prove , or necessarily supposes an essential unity , as inseparable from it , and essential to it , here is an intelligible notion of a natural trinity in unity , without any contradiction , absurdity , or confusion of subsistences , which is all the dean intended . but the animadverter and his socinian seconds , or rather leaders , represent the dean's notion , as if he made the three divine persons , as absolute , compleat , independent persons , as three men are , and that they are united only by mutual consciousness , and then they can fansie nothing but an unity of knowledge , or a moral unity and consent of wills : but this is either a mistake , or a wilful misrepresentation , as every one may see with half an eye , who considers the whole notion together . the dean indeed , the better to convey this notion of the natural unity of mutual consciousness to our minds , supposes a case , which he knew very well , never was , nor ever could be , which is very allowable in all writers , within the compass of decency , when we want some sensible images to frame our conceptions by : and therefore says , that if there were three created spirits so united , as to be conscious to each others thoughts and passions , as they are to their own , he can see no reason why we might not say , that three such persons are numerically one. though he knew , that three such particular , separate natures never could be thus united , but in them we might the better conceive , what kind of union it was he meant . but from hence to conclude , that the dean owns no other unity in the divine nature , than what mutual-consciousness would make between three particular , absolute , compleat , separate natures , is , i 'm sure , false-reasoning , and looks like very foul play. the dean asserts , that these three divine persons are thus mutually conscious to each other , and that this mutual-consciousness is an essential unity , and that those , who are thus mutually conscious are numerically one ; but then he teaches , that there are no other three in the world that are thus mutually conscious , and that these three are not , and cannot be for this very reason , three particular , separate , subsisting natures , but three subsistences in one individual , numerical nature : an unity of nature , and mutual consciousness may be distinguished , but are inseparable : there can be no unity of nature between three intelligent subsistences without mutual-consciousness ; and there can be no mutual-consciousness but in the same individual nature ; but yet , if we must distinguish as far as we can apprehend these matters , mutual-consciousness is much more essential to the unity of three intelligent subsistences than any other notion of unity : for i cannot see , but that if it were possible , that three created spirits , who are not only three distinct subsistences , but have three particular , separate natures , should be thus united by mutual-consciousness , it would destroy the individuation of their natures , though the individuation of their subsistences or persons would be preserved by self-consciousness : and , were it possible , the same individual nature should be repeated in its image , without this mutual-consciousness , it would divide this one nature , and make the man and his living image , as much two men , as any two men in the world ; but then the image would cease to be an image , how exact soever , upon other accounts , the likeness or sameness were ; for the image does not only represent and resemble the prototype , but moves and acts with it . and this is that very mutual-consciousness wherein the dean places the essential and numerical unity of the holy trinity ; such a mutual-consciousness as must be between the prototype and its living image . i shall not trouble you with transcribing out of the vindication , but referr you to some places to consult at your leisure . he always represents the son , as the living substantial image of god the father ; and the eternal generation by god's reflex knowledge of himself ; and in this places the numerical identity and sameness of nature between father and son , as there is between the prototype and its image ; and the holy spirit , whom the fathers represent , as god's eternal love of himself in his own image , has all the same divine perfections repeated in eternal and substanstial love : that yet this numerical identity and unity of nature cannot be understood without this mutual-consciousness , which makes them one energy and power , and is their mutual in-being in each other . that this mutual-consciousness proves the perfect equality of all three persons in the unity of the godhead , as having the very same perfections , without destroying the prerogative of the father , or the subordination of the son , and the holy spirit : as a living image is in nature equal with the prototype , but subordinate . that this gives an account of the modi subsistendi , or of the real and actual subsistence of the same individual , numerical nature in three , but in a different manner ; had these things been duly considered and compared , we should not have heard so much noise and clamour about mutual-consciousness , as if it made three absolute , compleat , independent gods , when it is impossible to conceive a more close and intimate union in nature . but there is one formidable objection against all this , or rather against the dean for it , that he pretends by this means to make the notion of a trinity in unity as intelligible as the notion of god : which is intolerable vanity and presumption to pretend to explain mysteries . but does the dean pretend , that his explication leaves nothing mysterious in the doctrine of the trinity in unity ? nothing , which we cannot comprehend ? that , as the ancients used to speak , this is no longer a wonderful distinction , and a wonderful union ? this i confess had been very vain and presumptuous : but are there no mysteries in the divine nature , because the notion of one god is an intelligible notion ? if there be , there may be mysteries , very incomprehensible mysteries in the trinity still , how intelligible soever the notion be : the intelligibleness of any notion , whether it be true or false , consists in the terms in which it is conceived ; that they convey a distinct idea to our minds of something possible , not which we can fully comprehend , but which we can understand without confusion or contradiction ; and this does great service to religion to deliver mysteries from absurdity and contradiction , though they are very incomprehensible still . the notion of eternity ( for example ) is very intelligible , to be without any cause , without beginning , and without end ; there is no contradiction in this , and it is demonstrable , that something must be eternal ; and yet nothing can be more incomprehensible than eternity : our thoughts are presently lost , when we endeavour to conceive an eternal being : and thus an eternal image of an eternal being , begotten without beginning , is as intelligible , as an eternal being is ; for if it be necessary and essential to an eternal being , to have a living , substantial image , thought can't divide their existence ; and it is as certain , if there be such an eternal living image , that this eternal being , and his eternal image are two , as the prototype and the image ; and yet as essentially one , and as intimately conscious to each other , as you have heard , they must necessarily be ; this is intelligible , but yet a very incomprehensible mystery ; for who can conceive an eternal generation , which has no beginning ? the divine nature repeated in its image without multiplication ? a distinction without separation , and an unity without singularity , and without confusion ? if these be not mysteries enow for the animadverter , though the dean's intelligible notion were admitted , he is as much too fond of mysteries , as other men are too much afraid of them ; for whether he knows it or no , there is a very great difference between a mystery , and contradiction or nonsence . i believe by this time you are less fond than you were , of an answer to the animadverter's arguments , which some men , who have despised his wit and railery , have yet thought unanswerable ; but i will be as good as my word , especially since a short answer will serve . in his third chapter he attacks the dean's notion of self-consciousness , but he stumbles at the threshold , and runs on furiously as a man does who runs headlong , and is never able to recover himself . he says , it is evident , the dean assigns self-consciousness as the formal reason of personality , in all persons universally , whether finite or infinite , create or uncreate ; and therefore he undertakes to prove , that self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality , either in finite or infinite persons . the dean says not one word about the formal reason of personality , nor is at all concern'd what it is . he only says , that the unity of a spirit with it self , and its distinct and separate subsistence from all oher created spirits , consists in self-consciousness . so that if that be one distinct , separate mind , which is conscious only to it self , which feels all that is in it self , and nothing else , and those be two distinct separate minds , each of which is thus conscious to it self , but not to each other , the dean has gained his point , and the animadverter has lost all his arguments and wit , whatever becomes of the formal reason of personality . the dean did not enquire what makes a mind , or spirit , or if you please a person , but what makes a mind or spirit , or person one , and either distinguishes , or separates it from all other minds , and spirits , and persons ; and if this be what he means by the formal reason of personality , i do affirm , that self-consciousness is this formal reason ; and that for the very reason he urges against it , that wheresoever the formal reason of personality is , there is personality , and wheresoever personality is , there is the formal reason of personality : for wheresoever there is a person , there is self-consciousness ; that is , every person is conscious to it self , and there can be no person without it ; and wheresoever there is self-consciousness , there is by nature a person , unless its natural personality be swallowed up in a supernatural union to a superior person , of which more presently . and yet to see what meer mortals the nicest scholastick wits are , who can spend days and years in picking straws , and splitting hairs , this great leviathan , the witty , the subtle , the good-natur'd animadverter , knows not the difference between the formal reason and such a natural property as the logicians call proprium quarto modo , which belongs to the whole kind , only to the kind , and always to the kind ; for such properties do exist convertibly , and one mutually and essentially infers the other , which is his account of the formal reason ; and thus risibility is the formal reason of humanity , which makes well for the animadverter to prove him to be a man , though he is seldom in so good a humour as to laugh without grinning , which belongs to another species . but since he is pleased to let that pass for the formal reason of personality , which is convertible with it , i hope self-consciousness may escape pretty well , and pass for the formal reason of personality . but let us hear his arguments against it . . the first is worth its weight in gold , and yet will not much enrich the buyer , that according to the natural order of things , self-consciousness in persons pre-supposes their personality , and therefore is not , cannot be the reason of it . now suppose a man should reason thus : actual knowledge pre-supposes a mind , and therefore knowledge in its principle is not , and cannot be the formal reason of a mind ; would the animadverter for this reason deny , that the principle of knowledge is the formal reason of a mind , that which makes and constitutes a mind , because there can be no actual knowledge before there is a mind ? and yet the argument is the very same ; for if knowledge in its principle , may be the nature or formal reason of a knowing being , or of a mind , though there can be no one act of knowledge , till there is a mind , then self-knowledge , or self-sensation , or self-consciousness , may be the formal reason of personality , though there must be a person , before there can be any actual self-consciousness ; that is to say , there must be a self ( which in this dispute is all that can be meant by person ) before this self can feel it self , and by this self-feeling distinguish himself from all other selfs . i could not but smile to see how gravely this wise animadverter proves , that there must be a person , before there can be any action proceeding from a person , and summons the whole posse of metaphysicks to prove it : but i hope notwithstanding this , that self-consciousness in the abstract ( as the dean uses it , and as every one but such an animadverter would understand it ) is as capable of being the formal reason of a person , as rationality is of a reasonable nature , though there must be a reasonable creature before he can reason , as there must be a self-conscious nature before there can be actual self-consciousness . but i have something more to say to our animadverter before i leave his demonstration , as he calls it ; for as sophistical as his argument is , the foundation of it is false , and absurdly unphilosophical : he says , that personality is the ground and principle of all action , wheresoever it is . for where there is a suppositum , whether it be rational ( which is another word for person ) or not , still it is the whole suppositum , that acts. that it is the person that acts is certain ; but where did he learn , that personality is the principle of all action ? i was always taught otherwise , that natura est principium motus & quietis : nature is the principle of motion and rest , and therefore of all action : and is there no difference between nature and personality ? is there no difference between being a reasonable creature , and being peter or iohn ? or do peter or iohn perform the actions of a reasonable creature , by vertue of their being such distinct and particular persons , or by their being men , by the powers of humane nature , which are common to all ? men are not distinguished from each other , nor act and subsist separately by humane nature ; and therefore neither humane nature , nor any of the powers or actions of humane nature distinguish men into particular persons , or are the reason of personality ; but that which limits nature , makes it particular , and a particular subsisting rational nature is a person , is one with it self , and distinguished and separated from all others : so that we must not seek for any formal constituent principle of personality ( in a strict and proper notion ) as we do of nature , but see in finite beings , where nature ends , and what are the utmost bounds of it , and that distinguishes a common nature into persons . now a rational nature extends as far as sensation and consciousness , and where that ends , there are the bounds of nature , and that makes a particular person , which feels all that is in himself , and nothing else ; and this is the dean's self-consciousness , which sets bounds to nature , and by that makes a person , which is one with it self , and separated from all others , and therefore in this dispute is neither to be considered as a power , nor as an action of nature , neither direct nor reflex , but as the bounds of it , which makes a particular subsisting rational nature , which we call a person . for it is plain , that as far as sensation and consciousness extends , a spirit is one , where that ends , common nature divides , and subsists in particulars . i cannot but think how this animadverter must look , when he reads over this argument again , especially his triumphant conclusion : this i look upon as a demonstration of the point ; and i leave it to our author ( who is better a great deal at scorning the schools , than at confuting them ) to answer and overthrow it at his leisure . . his second argument , i confess , looks like something solid and substantial , but proves a meer airy vanishing spectrum , when you come near to handle it . it is this : the humanity , or humane nature of christ is perfectly conscious to its self of all the internal acts , whether of knowledge , volition , passion , or desire , ( which is one of the passions ) that pass in it , or belong to it ; and yet the humanity , or humane nature of christ is not a person , and consequently self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality ; for as much as it may be in that , which is no person . now indeed had the dean expresly taught . that self-consciousness is the formal reason of personality , here had been one supernatural exception against it , which does not alter the reason of natural unions ; and yet is no greater objection against self-consoiousness , than against the most approved definition of a person : for if with boethius , you define a person to be substantia individua naturae rationabilis ; an individual substance of a rational nature , the humane nature of christ , which is an individual substance of a rational nature , and yet no person is an equal objection against it ; and let the animadverter try , how , according to this definition , he can keep off the assertion of nestorius , that there are two distinct persons in christ : and if self-consciousness escape as well as any other formal reason of personality , i believe the dean desires no more ; and yet he needs not this , for he no where makes self-consciousness the formal reason of personality , but only of the unity and distinction of a mind or spirit ; and i hope he will grant the humane nature of christ to be one , and to be distinct and separated by self-consciousness , from all other particular humane natures , or persons . the short answer is this : that self-consciousness makes a mind or spirit one with it self , and distinguishes or separates it from all other minds or spirits , and such a distinct and separate self-conscious mind is a natural person , unless its own natural personality be swallowed up in a personal union to a superiour mind . for this is the account the dean gives of a personal union , when two natures are united into one person , they must be so united , that the superiour nature have the government of the whole person , which is necessary to make them one agent , without which there cannot be one person ; and that there be one consciousness in the whole : of which more presently . . his third argument is draw out to a great length , but may be answered in a few words , becuse it proceeds upon the same mistake , and is nothing to the purpose . it is taken from the soul of man in a state of separation from the body ; that the soul in a separate state is conscious to it self of all its own internal acts or motions — and yet the soul in such a state is not a person . and therefore self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality . but whether the soul be a person or no person , in the body or out of the body , is nothing at all to the present controversie : if the soul and all other spirits are naturally one with themselves , and separated from all other souls and spirits by self-consciousness ; this is all the dean desires , and all that his hypothesis needs . and the animadverter may philosophize as he pleases about personalities . the truth is , to do him right , he is a very notable man , if he can draw you into a school-question , for he can make a shift to read and transcribe , but he hates a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - men at his heart , which is none of his talent , for it requires thinking ; put him out of his way , and he is undone , which makes him so angry at the dean for not speaking the school-language , nor confining himself to known terms of art , which he has a great deal to say of , whether he understands them or not : and because the dean would not do this himself , he has done it for him , and put his notions into school-terms , and made self-consciousness the formal reason of personality , and on my word has disputed very notably against it , and it is pity three such dead-doing arguments should be lost for want of the formal reason of personality ; and yet there is no help for it , he must begin all again , and try how he can prove , that the unity of a mind , and its distinction from all other minds , does not consist in self-consciousness ; and if he can prove this , then the dean is a lost man for ever , and must be contented to follow his triumphant chariot . but yet , whether this question of the soul 's being a person , or no person , serve the purpose of the present dispute or not , it abundantly serves the animadverter's charitable purpose ( which is the only purpose of his writing this book ) to expose the dean ; and therefore though the matter is not worth disputing , i shall make some short reflections on it . the dean has upon another occasion asserted , that a soul without a vital union to a humane body is a person : in opposition to this the animadverter asserts , that the soul of man is not a person , neither in its conjunction with the body , nor its separation from it . the foundation of his arguments , such as they are , is a very unphilosophical and senceless mistake , that because man consists of soul and body ( which he very undeniably proves from the athanasian creed ) therefore the personality too must be divided between the soul and body , that the soul is but part of the person , as it is part of the man , and then the soul neither in nor out of the body , can be the person , because a part can't be the whole , quod erat demonstrandum . now i readily grant , that the person of a man , as it is used in common speech to signifie a man , must include both soul and body , as the constituent parts of a humane person ; but when we enquire into the strict notion of personality , that must be a simple uncompounded thing , as indivisible as self is , which cannot consist of parts , which may be separated from each other , that one part of the person may live and the other die ; for though there are two natures , there is but one person , and the same one person cannot both live and die at the same time . this is a very pleasant notion , if well considered , of the two parts of personality , as there are two parts of a man , soul and body ; for unless there be two personalities as well as two natures , the two natures cannot be two parts of the one humane personality , as they are the parts of a man : it is impossible to prove from two natures , that there are two parts of personality , unless each nature has a personality of its own , the personality of the body , and the personality of the soul , united into the one personality of the man ; for nothing can be a part of personality , which has nothing of personality it self . will the animadverter then venture to attribute any personality to the body , as he must do , if he makes it part of the personality ? this will be a little worse than ( what he so rares the dean for ) calling a beast a person , tho ▪ the dean gave notice of the impropriety of the expression , and used it only by way of allusion and accommodation , the better to represent the union of two natures into one person , which are two persons , or something as like two persons as their natures will permit , when they subsist apart . and i should have thought such a severe censurer should have been more cautious than to have attributed any part of personality to the body in the same chapter , wherein he so civilly schools the dean for seeming to attribute personality to a beast , when personality belongs only to a reasonable nature , and beasts have no reason ; which is more than he knows , ( for why may not beasts have some reason , as well as some men have such brutish passions ) and more than as wise men as himself think to be true ; for there are various degrees of reason ; and where ever there is a conscious life , there must be some degree of it , and that entitles them to as much share in personality as they have in reason ; but no man will pretend , that a humane body , though united to a reasonable soul , has any reason , or any sence either , though , by its vital union to the soul , the soul feels all the impressions made on the body . and this brings us to a fair state , and an easie decision of this question ; for if personality belongs only to a reasonable nature , it is certain , that the soul makes or constitutes the person ; or , if i may so speak , is the center of personality , whatever else be vitally united to it , and by such a vital union is incorporated into the same person . if there be but one principle of reason , sensation , and a conscious life , that is the person ; for a person is the individual substance of a rational nature . but is not a humane body part of the person to whom it belongs ? answ. it is part of the man , and in that sence part of the person , but no part of the personality ; that is , it does not make the person , but is taken into the person by a vital union , and so becomes part of the man , and part of the person , as belonging to it . i am of opinion , notwithstanding the animadverter's animus & anima , that there is but one soul or mind , or spirit in man , which performs all the offices of a rational and animal life , which understands , reasons , wills , and feels all the impressions of the body , whether pain or pleasure , though with respect to such different offices and powers , it may be of some use , both in philosophy and divinity , to call it by different names . now , if all life , reason , sensation , be only in the soul , there must be the whole personality , though the soul , when united to a body , is not the whole person ; for the person reaches as far as the self-conscious life does by a vital union , but the personality is whole and entire in the principle of a rational life , and is neither more nor less a person , though by vital unions , or a dissolution of them , more or less may belong to the person : we may find some resemblance of this in works of art : whether you add or take away some wheels from a clock , it is the same clock still , while there is the same spring of motion , though it communicates motion to more or fewer wheels . and thus the body becomes one person with the soul , neither by an hypostatical union , which is the swallowing up a natural personality in its union with a superior person , which can never be between two beings , one of which by nature is no person , as the body it self is not , and cannot be : nor by the body being joyned with the soul , as one part , joyntly concurring with another , to the composition of the whole person ; which is the animadverter's way , and a very absurd one , as you have already heard , to talk of a compounded personality ; but there is another way which he never thought of , and that is , by a vital union , which makes the body part of it self , without adding to its own personality , by making all bodily sensations its own . and thus , though the soul be an entire person , a man , when united to a body is not an imperfect , accidental compound , which , he says , philosophy calls unum per accidens , a thing made up of two such beings as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into one ; for his own beloved philosophy never called things vitally united , unum per accidens , and i would desire him to inform us , how two things can more perfectly coalesce than in one life . however , by the power of metaphysicks he can prove , that if the soul be an entire person , a man must be an imperfect accidental compound : for a compleat being ( as every person essentially is ) having received the utmost degree of subsistence , which its nature can give it , if it comes afterward to be compounded with another being , whether compleat or incompleat , it must necessarily make such a loose unnatural union and composition . i do not wonder he is so fond of school-terms , for they serve him very often instead of sence ; but before i particularly consider them , by his good leave , i must ask him a question or two : whether the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or word before the incarnation were a compleat being , as he must be , if he be the second person in the trinity , for every person , he says , is essentially a compleat being ; and then , whether he will have the humane nature a compleat or incompleat being , the question is , whether the personal union of the humane nature to the divine word , be necessarily such a loose unnatural union and composition . to say , that this is not a natural union , is to say , that the divine and humane nature are not united into one person in christ ; for i take a union of natures to be a natural union , by what power soever it be done ; at least so far , that there is no natural repugnancy to such an union , for then no power could do it ; and therefore , according to this bold assertion , either the hypostatical union must be loose and unnatural , or if the divine and humane nature be perfectly united into one person , then the union of two compleat beings does not necessarily make such a loose unnatural union and composition . but to quit these school-terms , and to speak what we understand our selves , and what others may understand ; the soul may be a compleat and perfect person , and not a perfect man ; and therefore , notwithstanding it is a compleat being , may require a vital union to a humane body , to perfect its nature : that is a perfect humane person , which has entirely in it self all the powers which are essential to a humane person , such as understanding , will , and sensation , which are as entire and perfect in the soul without the body , as with it , though some of them either cannot act at all , or at least not so perfectly , without a vital union to the body , which conveys external impressions , and by them excites internal sensations in the soul. to represent this plainly , let us consider a soul vitally united to a body , but to such a body whose organs are so indisposed for sensation , that the man can neither see nor hear , nor taste , nor smell ; but only just lives and breathes , you will not say , this is a perfect man ; but the animadverter himself will acknowledge him to be a perfect person , compounded of body and soul ; but if a compleat person may not be a compleat and perfect man , then the formal reason of personality , and the natural perfection of a man are two things ; and though the vital union of soul and body make a perfect man , yet the whole entire personality must be in the soul , if a man be a perfect person , who is united to a body , which is worse than none : for where there is a perfect humane person , there must be the radical principle of all humane actions , which can be no where but in the soul , when the body is unfit for all the actions of a rational or sensitive life , which is a much more imperfect state than to be out of the body , if we believe , that the soul lives and acts when separated from the body . something in the shape and figure of a man , without the natural powers of reason and sensation , would very improperly be called a man , or a humane person ; and therefore we must confess , that the soul , which under all these natural impediments of acting , has still these natural powers to be the person , or there can be none . the soul is the person , the body only the organ or instrument , which , at least in this state of union , is necessary to the exercise of our natural powers , both of reason and sensation ; but whatever change there be in the body , the person is the same still , which could not be , were the body part of the person , for then the change of the body would be a partial change of the person too ; and yet our bodies are in a perpetual flux , and change every day ; some atoms fly away , and others are united to us ; that we are no more the same for a month or a year , than a river is , whose waters perpetually flow and change their place ; and yet we feel our selves to be the same persons still ; and therefore certainly these fluid atoms , of which our bodies are composed , are no part of our personality , though they belong to our persons , while they are vitally united to our souls . suppose it were possible , that the souls of iohn and peter could change bodies , that the soul of iohn should be vitally united to the body of peter , and the soul of peter vitally united to the body of iohn , i would ask the animadverter , whether he thinks , that such a change of bodies would make any change in their persons ? whether iohn would not as much feel himself to be iohn , and peter to be peter as ever they did ? i believe , indeed , an innocent , good-natured soul would not be willing to venture a change of bodies with every body , for fear of some moral infection , but the natural person would be the same ; for nothing makes any body ours , but a vital union , and whose body soever it was before , it becomes our own , when our soul informs it , and feels the impressions of it . now , if the soul be the person , when united to the body , it can't lose its personality by going out of it ; nay , if the soul can subsist in separation from the body , and live , and perform all the actions of a rational nature , it must be a person , if an individual subsisting rational nature is a person , and if it be not , i would know what to call it . but this animadverter is a very wagg , and banters the poor dean most unmercifully , and demonstrates beyond all contradiction , that the soul , in a state of separation , can't be a person , because it is neither the same person , which the man himself was while he was living , and in the body , nor another person ; and therefore it can be no person . the wording of this is very observable , and worthy of the wit and subtilty of its author : if the soul in such a state ( of separation ) be a person , it is either the same person which the man himself was , while he was living , and in the body : pray , what is this person , which he calls the man himself , which lives in the body ? i hope , it is not the body that lives in the body , and then i know no man himself , nor person , that lives in the body , but only the soul ; and if it be the same soul that lives out of the body , that lives in it , it is the same person , the same man himself in a state of separation , which lived in the body . and what does he mean by the same person , which the man himself was , while living ? for does the man and his person die ? then the man is not immortal , and if the man and his person live , when the body dies , then the soul is the man and the person , and the very same person out of the body that it was in it . so st. paul thought , when , speaking of himself , and his being taken up into the third heavens , he thus expresses it . i knew a man in christ fourteen years ago , ( whether in the body , i cannot tell , or whether out of the body , i cannot tell , god knoweth ) such an one caught up into the third heavens , cor. . . but whether in the body , or out of the body , which he did not know , yet he knew himself to be the same man , and the same person that ever he was . but the animadverter very learnedly proves , that the soul out of the body cannot be the same person with the man , because the soul is not the soul and body too , as the man is when the soul and body are united ; which is well observed , that the soul is not the body , nor a part the whole : but yet if the personality be not compounded of soul and body , the soul may be the whole and same person in the body , and out of it . there is no need then to say , that the soul in a state of separation is another person , than the man himself is while soul and body are united ; though this would serve the dean's purpose as well , if the soul be but a person , and be a distinct person by self-consciousness : and should the dean prove cross , and say this , the animadverter could not help himself ; for as for his absurd consequence , viz. that it is one person that lives well or ill in this world , to wit , the man himself while he was personally in the body , which ( by the way ) is down-right nonsence , if the person of the man be soul and body , though we confess the body belongs to his person , when united to his soul , for the personal presence of the man in the body , must distinguish the person of the man from the body , in which he is personally present , and supposes , that the same man at other times may not be personally present in the body ; however he thinks it a great absurdity , that one person should live well or ill in this world and another person pass out of the body into heaven or hell , there to be rewarded or punished , ( at least till the resurrection ) ( and i suppose at longest too , unless it can be another person when reunited to the body , as well as when separated from it ) for what that other person had done well or ill upon earth . well , let this be as absurd as it will , the animadverter must say it , or say something as absurd , unless he will allow a soul in a state of separation to be the same person that it was in the body , or deny the intermediate rewards and punishments of good and bad men till the resurrection . for if the soul be a person , and not the same , then one person sins and another suffers . if a man be a person , and the soul no person , then the person sins , and that which is no person suffers : if a man be a whole person ; and the soul only part of the person , then the whole sins , and a part suffers for the whole . let him choose which he thinks looks most agreeable to the principles of reason and divinity . but does this profound philosopher indeed think , that the body either sins or suffers ? the soul sins in and by the body , and feels pain or pleasure from bodily impressions ; and therefore as the body may be made the instrument of vertue or vice , so it may be the instrument of rewards and punishments ; but vertue or vice is seated only in the soul , and it is the soul only that can be happy or miserable , rewarded or punished , in or out of the body , and therefore there is no danger , that one should sin , and another suffer , though the soul sins in the body , and suffers out of it . but it is worth observing how notably he winds up his argument . if it be intolerably absurd ( as no doubt it is ) that the soul in the other world should not be responsible for what the man himself in person had done in this : what then ? one would expect the conclusion should be , then the soul is the man himself in person . but this he durst not say , because it was to un-say all he had said ; and he durst not say the contrary , for that is the absurdity he is exposing , that one , who is not the man himself , should suffer for what the man himself did : and therefore he lets them both slip , and is very glad to get rid of them , and concludes safely ; then it is altogether as absurd and intolerable , for any one to represent and speak of these things under such terms and notions , as must necessarily throw all discourse and reasoning about them into paradox and confusion ; which is to bilk a conclusion , and to pay a reckoning by running out at the back-door . he adds : and indeed to me the soul 's thus changing its state forwards and backwards from one manner of subsisting to another , looks very odd and unnatural . what does he mean by this ? that it is odd and unnatural , that the soul should live in the body and out of the body , and then return into the body again ? and is not this so ? does not the soul first live in the body , and after what we call death , live out of the body , and shall it not be reunited to the body again at the resurrection ? and how does this change the soul's manner of subsisting , any more than the body changes its manner of subsisting , when it is naked and cloathed ? to live in the body and out of the body , are two different states of life , but the soul subsists still in the same manner , for it owes not its subsistence to the body , and can neither subsist more nor less in or out of the body ; for i know no degrees of subsistence in the soul , though there are of life and action ; what is , is , and what subsists continues to be . but that which is so odd and unnatural is , that from an incompleat state in the body , it should pass to a personal and compleat state out of the body ( which state is yet praeternatural to it ) and then fall back into an incompleat state again by its re-union to the body at the resurrection ( which yet one would think , should rather improve our principal parts , in all respects , not meerly relating to the animal life , as the bare subsistence of them , i am sure , does not . ) it is hard to guess the meaning of such gypsie-cant , and therefore i hope you and he will pardon me if i mistake , for i will do my best . by the soul 's incompleat state in the body , i suppose , he means , that the soul in the body is an incompleat person , and by the personal compleat state out of the body , that the soul is a compleat person out of the body ; this indeed sounds somewhat odd and unnatural ; but does he know any man who says , that the soul is an incompleat person in the body , and a compleat person out of the body ? or who calls this the incompleat and the compleat state of the soul ? those who affirm the soul to be the person , say , that it is the same person in the body , and out of it , but that it lives in different states in the body and out of it ; and that its state in this mortal body , is the most imperfect state a reasonable soul can live in ; that the state of the soul in separation from the body , is to good men a more perfect and compleat , because a more happy state , and therefore not praeternatural , which can never be a more happy state ; and that the re-union of the soul to an immortal spiritual body at the resurrection , is the most compleat and perfect state of all : so that here is no such unnatural change as he dreams of , from an incompleat to a compleat praeternatural state ( which is nonsence ) and then back again to an incompleat state at the resurrection , which so turned his own stomach , ( though not very squeamish ) that he was glad to qualifie it with a parenthesis , which i defie any man to make sence of : but the natural progress of the soul in this lapsed state is from a less perfect to a more perfect , and from that to the most perfect state of life ; which to me is proof enough that the soul is the person , and fitted by nature to live in all these different states , or it is impossible to prove peter or iohn to be the same men in these different states . at length the animadverter grew sensible , that it sounds very absurdly to say , that the soul in a state of separation is but part of the person , when it subsists by it self , not in any compound , and feels it self to be the same , and lives and acts in a more perfect and happy state , than when it lived in a mortal body , and therefore he fences against these two objections ( which are stronger , when they are put into one ) as well as he can . he says , the soul in a state of separation is but part of the person , the whole of which is a compound of soul and body , because of its essential relation to a compound . but what is this compound which the soul is essentially related to ? not the body i hope , for the body is no more the compound , than the soul : is it then the man ? and where is this man that the soul is essentially related to ? does he then mean , that it is essential to the soul to live in an earthly body ? then it cannot live in a state of separation . if it be of the essence of the soul to live in the body , it is evident , that it can never live out of it ; and if it be not essential , then the soul may be a whole entire person , when it subsists separate from the body . but the soul by its original designation is related to the body ; what ? so that it cannot live without it , and never should live without it ? if not , this original designation , does not prove an essential relation : but it has a natural aptitude to be an ingredient in the constitution of a compound . what does he mean by the soul 's being an ingredient in a compound ? is the soul and body mixed and blended together to make a man ? is it the same thing to be a part of the whole , and to be an ingredient in a compound ? well , but the soul has a natural aptitude to live in a body ; and so it has to live out of the body ; and what then ? then the soul , which is the same person still , is naturally fitted to live in different states ; and then its relation to an earthly body is not essential to it , whatever strong appetite and inclination , as he says , it retains to return and be re-united to the body ; which , whoever says it , no man can know ; and if it be true of sensual souls , who were wholly immersed in sense , is demonstratively false of all holy and pure spirits , who are in a great measure weaned from this body , while they live in it , and rejoyce at their deliverance when they escape safe out of it , who , with st. paul , desire to be absent from the body , and to be present with the lord. holy souls indeed in a state of separation do earnestly desire the completion of their happiness in the resurrection of their bodies , but not to be re-united to these vile , earthly , corruptible bodies , but to glorified , immortal , incorruptible bodies , when christ shall at his appearance change our vile bodies , and make them like to his own most glorious body ; which though they had every individual atome , which belonged to them before , are yet in their nature and constitution no more the same bodies , than earth and heaven are the same . but the spirits of just men made perfect are in a more perfect state of life and happiness out of these bodies than they enjoyed in them , and therefore are more perfect persons too , are more perfectly themselves , and enjoy themselves more perfectly , and therefore are in a state more agreeable to the perfection of their natures ( and that i take to be a natural state ) than living in these bodies . the animadverter will not allow this to be a natural , but supernatural perfection , which relates only to the consummation of their graces , and not to the manner of their subsistence . but is not the perfection of our graces , the perfection of humane nature ? and is not the perfection of nature , a natural perfection ? and if the soul be more perfect in a state of separation , is not this a more perfect manner of subsistence ? this might have shamed the animadverter had he had a little more consideration and less confidence , to deny the personality of the soul , which can subsist and act , and be more perfect and happy out of the body ; which shews , that to be in the body , or out of it , does not concern the personality , but the different states wherein the same person lives . to proceed ▪ the dean had upon another occasion said , that all the sufferings and actions of the body are attributed to the man , though the soul is the person , because it is the superiour and governing power , and constitutes the person . this i should have thought very true and safe , but the animadverter has made very tragical work with it . he says , that this proves the quite contrary , that the man himself , to whom these personal acts are ascribed , must indeed be the person , and that for the same reason also the soul cannot be so . but does the dean any where deny , that the man , as consisting of soul and body , is a humane person ? or , when united to a body , affirm , that the soul is the whole person ? he says indeed , that the soul is the seat of personality , the only principle of reason , sensation , and a conscious life , which consequently in a state of separation is the person , and when united to the body constitutes the person , and therefore may both be the person , and constitute the person . when a body is vitally united to a soul , soul and body are but one person , because they are but one voluntary agent , and have but one conscious life ; but it is the soul constitutes the person , as being the principle of all personal acts , sensations and passions which the body is only the instrument of , but being a vital instrument is united to the person , and becomes one person with the soul ; for the person reaches as far as the same conscious life does ; but it is only this vital union to the soul , which receives the body into the unity of the same person , not as part of the person , but as an animated instrument of life and action , which as it were , cements soul and body into one person . a soul vitally united to a body , is an embodied person , in a state of separation it is the same person still , but without a body , which makes a great change in its sensations , and manner of acting , but no more changes the person , than the man would be changed cloathed or uncloathed , were his cloths as vitally united to his body , as his body is to his soul. this is plain sence ; and if the animadverter knows not how to reduce it to terms of art , i cannot help it . the soul , i grant , as he wisely observes , cannot constitute the person efficiently , by creation or generation , nor formally as a constituent part , for the soul is not properly part of the person , but the soul constitutes an embodied person , by living and acting in the body , which unites soul and body into one life , and that makes one embodied person , or soul and body one man. and now , as for those questions , which , with so much triumph and scorn he asks the dean , i leave to himself to answer them , and to you to laugh at them . the rest of this chapter is nothing but ignorance and raving , and has been answered already . if you will pardon this long excursion about the personality of the soul , which is nothing at all to the present controversie , having given you this one sufficient taste of the wit and philosophy of the animadverter and his great exactness in speaking and reasoning , i promise you to let pass an hundred other absurdities and fooleries , and to make shorter work with him , without letting slip any argument , when i can find it . the title of his fourth chapter is an answer to it self , and proves , that it is nothing to the purpose . for he undertakes to prove , that self-consciousness is not the formal reason of personality in the three persons of the blessed trinity , nor does the dean say it is . the question is only this , whether three self-consciousnesses do not prove three persons , each of which is thus self-conscious to himself , to be really distinct from each other ? whether three persons who feel themselves to be themselves , and not to be each other , are not three really distinct persons ? this mistake has been so fully exposed already , that i need say no more of it ; for the mistake is the same , and the answer is the same , when applied to finite or infinite persons . to keep my word with you , i shall take no notice at present of his nine considerations , which are ushered in with a kind of mathematical pomp , as if we were to expect nothing less than demonstration ; when i see what end they serve , they shall be examined . but now for his arguments , which will be answered in almost as few lines , as they take up pages in the animadversions ; for when the question is mistaken , all arguments are lost . arg. . no personal act can be the formal reason of personality in the person whose act it is ( nor , i suppose , in the person whose act it is not ) but self-consciousness is a personal act , and therefore cannot be the formal reason , &c. this argument we have met with , and answered before ; the dean neither considered self-consciousness as a personal act , nor assigned it as the formal reason of personality ; and yet if we consider self-consciousness as a personal act , though it cannot make the person , yet it distinguishes one person from another ; by this actual self-consciousness every person feels himself to be himself , and not to be another . arg. . proceeds upon the same mistake , as to the formal reason of personality , but has some peculiar absurdities of its own ; for he proves , that self-consciousness can't make a person , because it can't make the relations , which distinct persons stand in to each other . that self consciousness can't make a father , because it can't beget a son : for this is the summ of his argument , that the three persons in the trinity are related to each other , as father , son , and holy ghost ; and therefore self-consciousness , which is an absolute and irrelative thing cannot be the formal reason of personality , because it is not the formal reason of these relations : as if ( let the formal reason of personality be what it will ) the fundamentum relationis , or the foundation of the relation between persons , and the formal reason of personality were the same thing : does that which makes iohn a person , make him a father , or that which makes peter a person , make him a son ? this , i suppose , will be acknowledged very absurd in humane persons , where every person has a distinct absolute nature to be the subject of these relations , for then the personality and the relation must differ ; but it is otherwise with the persons of the trinity , whose personalities are meer relations . but with the animadverter's good leave , this makes no difference : in what sence the divine persons are relatives or relations , i have already explained ; that they subsist relatively to each other , as the whole subsistence of the image is relative to its prototype ; but the same divine nature which subsists distinctly in each of them , is a compleat , absolute nature , and self-consciousness may distinguish the same nature into different persons , though they subsist in relation to each other : for has the person and his relation the same notion and formal reason ? is the father his paternity , the son his filiation , and the holy ghost his procession ? if not , then the formal reason of personality in the father and son , differs from the foundation of the relation between father and son ; and self-consciousness might be the formal reason of the personality , though not of the relation . but , have each of these three persons , who , as he says , are purely relative , a self-consciousness of their own , that the father knows himself to be the father , and not the son ; and the son knows himself to be the son , and not the father , &c. this distinguishes the persons , and proves them to be really distinct , which is all the dean desires . arg. . his next argument is just as much to the purpose as the former . if self-consciousness be the formal reason of personality in the three divine persons , then there is no repugnancy in the nature and reason of the thing it self , but that there might be three thousand persons in the deity , as well as three . now , had the dean said , that self-consciousness made the trinity , this had been a notable argument , but , i hope , self-consciousness may distinguish the three persons in the trinity , and prove them to be three really distinct persons , though there be but three , and not three thousand persons in the godhead . though it be not repugnant to the nature of self-consciousness , it may be repugnant to the nature of the deity , that there should be more than three persons in the godhead . self-consciousness proves the distinction , though it does not limit the number of persons , which no man ever dreamt of , and none but an ingenious blunderer , whose subtilty is too great for his understanding , could ever have thought of . and yet this argument is as very a non-sequitur as ever i met with ; for suppose self-consciousness were the formal reason of personality , how does it follow , that there may be three thousand persons in the deity ; for does the formal reason of personality make or limit the number of persons ? the nature of the thing , and the will of the maker may , but whatever be the formal reason of personality , there can be no more persons than nature will admit ; and if the eternal , uncreated nature will admit but of three persons , it is impossible that self-consciousness , tho' it were the formal reason of personality could make more ; for there can be no more when the divine nature will admit but of three self-conscious persons , though a created nature will admit of as many as god pleases to make . in short , that which naturally distinguishes three persons from each other , would distinguish three thousand , if there were so many ; but does not prove , that there may be three thousand persons in the godhead ; for though it is no contradiction to the distinction of persons , by self-consciousness , that there should be three thousand , yet it may be a contradiction to the perfection of the divine nature , because every divine person is eternal , and whatever is eternal doth necessarily exist ; and therefore if there be but three divine persons , father , son and holy ghost , there never can be , nor ever could have been more . arg. . his fourth and last argument is a great master-piece of profound reason and judgment . if three distinct self-consciousnesses formally constitute three distinct personalities , then three distinct self-complacencies will constitute three distinct personalities too . he might as well have added self-love , and self-displeasure , and self-condemnation , and as many selfs as he could think of , only the danger then was , that the personality should alter with the judgment or passion , that the person should not be the same , when he is pleased and displeased , when he applauds and acquits , or condemns himself . had he added self-conscious to all this ; as a self-conscious complacency ( for then it is the same thing , whether self or any other being be the object of the complacency ) a self-conscious love , or fear , or hatred , or desire , every one of these acts would prove a distinct person , because they are the acts of self-consciousness , which distinguish one person from another , as every act of reason proves a reasonable creature , because it is the exercise of rationality ; but yet no man will say , that it is every act , but the principle of reason , which makes a reasonable creature ; and no more does any particular act , but the principle of self-consciousness , distinguish between self-conscious persons , much less such acts as may be separated from the person , as , i doubt , self-complacency is from damned spirits , or if he will not allow souls to be persons , as it will be from damned men. he has drawn this argument out to such a length , and has so many pretty remarks , that i have much ado to keep my word with you , but let him go like a wrangling wit as he is , and i 'll go on . as self-consciousness makes a person one with it self , and distinguishes it from all other persons , so the dean apprehends , that a natural mutual-consciousness makes three persons as naturally one , as it is possible for three to be one ; and that is the unity of the godhead , not the unity of one person , but the unity of three , or a trinity in unity : and this is his next attempt , to prove , that the unity of three divine persons in the godhead can't consist in mutual-consciousness . he proceeds upon the same mistake , and therefore the same answer will serve : by self-consciousness he understood , as you have seen , the acts of self-consciousness , and then the act supposing a person could not be the formal reason of personality ; and thus by mutual-consciousness he understands the acts of mutual-consciousness , which supposes the unity of nature , and therefore cannot be the cause or reason of it ; now , though i know not of what use that dispute is , about the priority of being , and the first modes and affections of it to any act of knowledge , or any other acts ; especially when we speak of the divine nature , which we know has no modes and affections , no priority so much as in conception , if we conceive aright of him , between his being , and a pure and simple act ; yet i will not put the animadverter out of his way , when there is no need of it , an easie obvious distinction between the principle and the act answers all : a self-conscious principle , without which we can't conceive a mind , makes a mind one with it self , and distinguishes it from all other minds , and by the acts of self-consciousness , which suppose the principle , every mind feels it self to be one , and distinguished from all others : and thus the natural principle of mutual-consciousness between three persons unites them inseparably in one nature , and the acts of mutual-consciousness are the acts of unity , whereby they know and feel themselves to be essentially in each other , and therefore to be essentially one : just as we consider reason , either as the principle or as the act , the first constitutes a reasonable nature , the second is the actual exercise of reason ; and thus all his arguments vanish like smoak , rise in a dark cloud , but immediately disperse and are seen no more , till they return , as such vapours use to do , in thunder and lightning , or some threatning storm . . his first argument is this . no act of knowledge can be the formal reason of an unity of nature in the persons of the blessed trinity : but an act of mutual-consciousness is an act of knowledge . ergo. nothing will satisfie the animadverter but formal reasons , whereas the dean no where asserts , that mutual-consciousness is the formal reason of this unity , but that three persons , who are thus mutually-conscious to each other , must be essentially one ; nor does the dean place this unity in an act of mutual-consciousness , which signifies the principle as well as the act , and then mutual-consciousness ( if it were no more than knowledge , of which presently ) must not be considered as an act of knowledge . arg. . if unity of nature in the divine persons be the cause , reason , or principle of mutual-consciousness in the said persons , then their mutual-consciousness is not the cause or reason of the unity of their nature ; but the former is true , and therefore the latter is so too . if by this he means , that these divine persons could not be thus mutually conscious , except they were essentially one , it is true , but nothing to the purpose , for they may be thus essentially one by mutual-consciousness , or mutual-consciousness may be essential to this unity , though they could not be thus actually conscious to each other , unless they were thus united , as to have and to feel each other in themselves . if by the unity of nature in the divine persons , he means the sameness and homoousiotes of nature ; this i grant is a necessary foundation for mutual-consciousness , without which they could not be one , nor mutually conscious to each other ; but i deny that it is the immediate cause , reason , or principle of mutual-consciousness : the ancient fathers were very sensible , that when the same nature subsisted distinctly in three distinct persons , the meer sameness and homoousiotes of nature could not make this essential unity ; and therefore they added , their perichoresis or the mutual in-being of these divine persons in each other , which the dean calls mutual-consciousness , which is the only natural union and in-being of minds . he proves , that unity of nature is the cause and principle of mutual-consciousness , because mutual-consciousness is an essential property equally belonging to all the three persons , and therefore as all properties and internal attributes do , must issue and result from the essence and nature , and therefore can have no antecedent causal influx upon the same nature , so as to constitute either the being or the unity of it . now , i grant , that mutual-consciousness does equally belong to all three persons , for they are all mutually-conscious to each other , and i grant , that it is essential to the divine nature , as to subsist in three distinct persons , so in three mutually-conscious persons ; but yet mutual-consciousness belongs not immediately to nature but to persons , and is that intimate union of persons which consists in feeling each other in themselves . the dean will leave the animadverter to philosophize by himself concerning antecedent causal influxes on the divine nature , to constitute the being or the unity of it ; he pretends to no such knowledge of created nature , much less of an eternal , self-originated , simple , uncompounded nature : it contents him to know what is essential , not absolutely to the unity of the divine nature , but to the unity in trinity , and if mutual-consciousness be essential to this unity , that the three divine persons are thus united , and cannot be one without it , he will contend no farther with any man about it . and it is certain , this is essential to his notion of an identical and numerical unity of nature in the divine persons , when the same individual nature is repeated in its living image , for it is essential to the notion of a living image , not only perfectly to represent the nature , but to feel all the motions of the prototype , to live , and move , and act with it , as the face in the glass answers all the features and motions of the face it represents . but the animadverter mistakes the whole matter , as is evident from what follows : the divine nature or essence being one and the same in all the three persons , there is upon this account , one and the same knowledge in them also ; and they are not one in nature , by vertue of their mutual-consciousness ; but are therefore mutually-conscious , because the perfect unity and identity of their nature makes them so . if by one and the same knowledge , he means knowing the same things , this i grant is owing to the sameness of nature , but is not mutual-consciousness ; for three persons , who have the same nature , may know the same things , without feeling each others thoughts and knowledge in themselves : if by one and the same knowledge he means , that the knowledge of the divine nature in three persons , is but one individual act , as the knowledge of one single person is , this destroys the distinction of persons , which cannot be distinct without distinct personal acts , as knowledge is , and destroys mutual-consciousness ; for there is no place for mutual-consciousness , or mutual-knowledge , where there is but one single act of knowledge : if by one and the same knowledge he means what gregory nyssen calls , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , one motion and disposition of the good will , which passes through the whole trinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , without any distance of time , or propagating the motion from one to t'other , but is distinctly in them all by one sensation , like one thought in one numerical mind ; this is that very mutual-consciousness the dean means , and is essential , not to the unity of the divine nature absolutely considered , but as repeated in its image : three such distinct subsistences of the same individual nature , are by mutual-consciousness essentially one ; and thus he may take his risibility again ; for he is undone if he parts with it . . arg. to affirm mutual-consciousness to be the cause of the union of the three divine persons in the same nature , is to confound the union and communion of the said persons together . to affirm , that the three divine persons are essentially one by mutual-consciousness is not to affirm , that mutual-consciousness is the cause of the union , but that persons thus united , whatever makes this union , are essentially one : the union of the father and son in the same nature , is by eternal generation , or the father's begetting a son in his own likeness , not without but within himself , and the union of the holy ghost , with father and son , is by his eternal procession from father and son , without separation , or going out of either ; but this in-being of these divine persons in each other is their mutual-consciousness ; for they are in one another , as minds , not as bodies , and we know no other natural union or in being of minds , but this natural intimate consciousness to each other . but his argument consists in confounding the union and communion of these divine persons ; for it seems their communion consists in this mutual-consciousness ; and if their union consists in it too , then their union and communion is the same : and what if it be ? can he tell of any communion between persons essentially one ( excepting such personal acts as are peculiarly ascribed to each in the oeconomy of our salvation , which are not the communion of mutual-consciousness ) distinct from their essential unity . in separate persons , who have no natural union , unity and communion are two things ; for where there is no natural union , communion can only signifie a moral or political union ; but all communion is union ; and where the union is natural , union and communion must be the same : for persons which are essentially one , which is the most perfect union , can admit of no lower degrees of union , which are only imitations of nature , to supply the want of natural unity . so that the animadverter has unawares proved the essential union of the divine persons to consist in mutual-consciousness ; for if their communion consists in it , as he grants , then their union must . but he has made a very false representation both of mutual-consciousness , and of the communion of the divine persons with each other . for to prove mutual-consciousness to be communion , he says , that all acts of several persons upon one another ( as all that are mutual must be ) are properly acts of communion , by which the said persons have an intercourse amongst themselves , as acting interchangeably one upon the other ; which may be true of separate persons , and of all other mutual acts , excepting mutual-consciousness : but persons , though distinct , yet not separate , but essentially one by mutual-consciousness , do not act upon each other ( which must signifie an external impression , which one person makes upon the other , and that supposes them to be separate persons ) but see , and know , and feel each other in themselves , as every single individual mind feels its own thoughts and passions . had the dean made such a separation between the divine persons , as this loose description of communion infers , what tragical exclamations should we have heard ? but this severe censurer of other men ought to have been more cautious than to have said , that all acts of several persons upon one another , are acts of communion , which makes boys in a state of communion with each other at boxing ; and a match at scolding another state of communion ; that had the dean but been pleased to have returned mutual acts , he and the animadverter might long before this , have been in very strict communion with each other . after all this huffing and swaggering , this notable dispute issues in a meer metaphysical subtlety about the natural order of our conceptions of things . the animadverter grants all that the dean says , and all that he has need to say in order to form a notion of a trinity in unity . in the dispute about self-consciousness , he no where denies , but in all his arguments supposes , that every individual person has a self-consciousness of its own , and that every such self-conscious person is thereby one with it self , and distinguish'd from all other persons ; but he will not allow self-consciousness to be the formal reason of personality , which the dean no where says it is ; and as for mutual-consciousness , he allows the three divine persons , to be thus mutually-conscious ; and that this mutual-consciousness may suppose an union of nature ( the dean would have said unity of nature , though an union of persons ; for unity is oneness , union is a conjunction of more than one ; and therefore there can be no union of nature , unless there be a number of natures united into one , but there is an union of persons in the unity of nature ) and that mutual-consciousness may result from this union , and upon the same account may infer and prove it , but it can never give or cause it ; for their essence and personality ( what but one personality , as one essence in three ? ) must still go before their mutual-consciousness , since the three persons must be really one in nature before they can know themselves to be so . to be so ? how is that ? to be one ? that they must be one , before they can know themselves to be one ? what is that to the purpose ? can they be one before they are mutually-conscious , even in the order of conceiving it ? can they be one before they are in one another ? or is there any other mutual in-being of minds , but mutual-consciousness ? but what confounded work does this make with the pure , simple , uncompounded , eternal nature of god to prove a priority or posteriority of being , or causality in the divine nature from the order of our conceptions ? when we certainly know , that the divine nature is eternal , and therefore has nothing before , nor after in it ; that it has no parts or composition , and therefore nothing in order of nature before or after , nothing that can be conceived as a cause or effect , is it not demonstrable , that all such conceptions , reduced into such exact order and method , are false , because there is nothing in the divine nature , that answers to them ? and though the imperfection of our knowledge makes it necessary to distinguish the divine nature into different conceptions , as far as we can know any thing of god , and can form distinct notions , which we can view by parts ; is this a reason to frame ideas of priority and posteriority , of causes and effects , of formal reasons and essential properties , when we know there is no such thing in god , and can form no distinct conceptions of them ? is it not a wise dispute , whether essence , subsistence , personality , the distinction of persons , or the unity of nature , self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness , be first or last , which is the cause , and which the effect ; when we know that the divine nature did eternally subsist in three self-conscious , and mutually-conscious persons , and have no other conception of their distinction and unity ? but let those distinguish and methodize their conceptions into unconceivable confusion , that please ; if self-consciousness necessarily results from , and infers and proves a distinction of persons , and mutual-consciousness supposes , results from , infers , and proves , the union of the divine persons in the essential unity of the godhead , it will satisfie the dean without disputing the formal reasons of personality and union : for this proves a trinity in unity , and gives us as intelligible a notion of it , as we have of three distinct self-conscious persons , which are mutually conscious to each other , which either makes or proves an essential distinction and unity ; and to dispute about the cause of self-consciousness or mutual-consciousness , is to dispute about the naked essences , or essential properties of things , which the dean rejected from the beginning , as without the compass of humane knowledge . . his fourth and last argument discards the notion of self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness , not only as new and suspicious , but as wholly needless in this subject . why so ? pray what hurt have these seemingly innocent words done ? are they not english ? do they signifie nothing ? or can't he understand them ? the last is the truth of the case , and it is a hard case , that the dean must be bound , at the peril of having a great scolding book writ against him , to furnish the animadverter with understanding , if he venture upon any terms , which he can't find in some orthodox schoolmen , for peter lombard will not pass muster with him . but the sum of all is , that nothing can be signified by these words ( self-consciousness and mutual consciousness ) which is not fully , clearly , and abundantly signified by that one plain word , and known attribute , the divine omniscience . now suppose this ; why may not that one comprehensive attribute of omniscience very properly receive different names , according to its different objects , as the several arts and sciences do ? if , as he says , by this omniscience every divine person knows himself , and the same person , by the very same omniscience knows all that is known by the other two persons , and the other two persons by the same knows all that is known by him ; yet to know himself and to know whatever others know , though it may belong to the same omniscience is not the same knowledge , because it has not the same object ; for self and others , are as distinct objects as father , son , and holy ghost , are distinct persons ; and therefore this knowledge may be distinguished by different names , as it is by different objects . and since , as he confesses , the general notion of omniscience does not distinguish persons as self-consciousness does , nor unite them into one , as mutual-consciousness does , these terms were necessary to express something , which omniscience does not express , viz. wherein these divine persons are distinguished , and wherein they are one. but , after all , this is a mistake ; for though self-consciousness and mutual consciousness may in some sence be called knowledge , yet they are of a different kind and species from what we strictly call knowledge , that is , they differ as speculation and sensation . self-knowledge properly signifies to contemplate our own natures in their idea , to draw our own image and picture as like the original as we can , and to view our selves in it : but self-consciousness is an intellectual self-sensation , when we feel our selves , and all the thoughts , knowledge , volitions , passions of our minds , and know what is self , and what belongs to self by feeling it : he , who knows not the difference between intellectual sence and knowledge , is as unfit to meddle in this controversie , as a blind-man is to dispute of colours . thus the mutual-consciousness of three persons is not their mutual knowledge of each other , though they know each other as perfectly as they know themselves , but their mutual-sensation and feeling each other in themselves , which makes them naturally one. an omniscient being knows all things , but feels himself ; and omniscience , as the animadverter observes , belongs to nature , but mutual-consciousness to persons , which might have satisfied him , that there is a great difference between omniscience , and self-consciousness , and mutual-consciousness ; between knowing all things , whether the object be self , or any other being , and feeling himself and other persons in himself . this is sufficient to justifie the dean's notion of self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness , and a little more fully to explain it , which , it seems , he thought , that every one , who was acquainted with the workings of his own mind , must have understood without a comment : and , i hope , if the animadverter think fit to try his skill again , we shall hear no more of his formal reasons of personality and union , but that he will be pleased to speak to the true point , whether a self-conscious person be not one with himself , and distinguished from all other persons , and whether he does not feel himself to be thus one , and thus distinguished by self-consciousness ; and whether three divine persons , who are thus mutually-conscious to each other , be not naturally and essentially united into one supream being , or one god. all other disputes are beside the question ; for if this hold true , then we have a natural distinction , and a natural unity between these three divine persons , father , son , and holy ghost ; and that is a natural trinity in unity , without the least appearance of absurdity or contradiction , or impossibility in its notion . hitherto , though the assault has been furious and insulting , we have met with no heavier charge , ( excepting some usual complements ) than ignorance in philosophy and metaphysicks , and scholastick terms , and where that charge falls , i will now leave you to judge ; but this is but the beginning of sorrow : tritheism follows next , which is a terrible accusation , though i do heartily thank the animadverter , that he has been so civil to the dean , as not to charge this upon him , as his opinion , but as the consequence of his principles , which i believe will prove no more than the animadverter's ignorance , not the dean's heresie . before i answer his arguments , it will be necessary briefly to state this matter in controversie ; for the sting of all his arguments consists in forcing such a sence on the dean's words , as he never intended . the only thing that needs any excuse or apology is the phrase of three eternal and infinite minds ; the fault of which is , that it is an unusual way of speaking , and gives advantage to an ignorant or cavilling adversary to affix some uncouth and heretical sence on it . what led the dean to this , i observed before , viz. his explication of the distinction of the three divine persons by self-consciousness , and of their essential unity by mutual-consciousness ; now since self-consciousness and mutual-consciousness can be in nothing but minds , he thought the fairest and easiest representation of this matter , was to consider them under the notion and character of minds ; for every man can feel in himself , that a mind is distinguished from all other minds by self-consciousness , and if there may be , and is , such a mutual-consciousness between three , as the dean describes , they must be as naturally and essentially one , as three can be one , and we must seek for no other unity in trinity , than what is reconcilable with a real trinity , or a real distinction between three . but had the dean been aware , what kind of men he should have had to do with , such as have no regard to the plain and manifest sence of an author , if they can but pick a quarrel with his words , he might easily have prevented all this , without having injured his main argument : if instead of three eternal and infinite minds , he had but said , three eternal , infinite , knowing , intelligent persons , he had kept the orthodox language , and yet expressed all that he intended by three minds ; for a knowing intelligent person is a mind , if knowledge can be only in a mind ; and then three such intelligent persons may be distinguished from each other by self-consciousness , and united in one godhead by mutual-consciousness . this is the account the dean himself gives , what he means by a mind , that a mind is an intelligent person , and that every intelligent person is a mind , and therefore thought it as innocent in this sence , to say , that there are three eternal and infinite minds , as to say , that there are three eternal and infinite persons ; and i believe it will appear , that excepting the unusualness of the expression , the objection of tritheism will equally lie against both , with this difference , that it is more easily answered by considering the powers and properties of a mind . and in this sence only he affirms , that to say , they are three persons , and not three distinct infinite minds , that is , not three distinct intelligent persons , is both heresie and nonsence ; it is nonsence to talk of a person , who is not an intelligent person , that is , as he explains it , a mind , which contradicts the notion both of a person and mind ; and to say , that there are three persons , but not three intelligent persons , is heresie , even the heresie of sabellius ; for there is no medium between a trinity of intelligent persons , and a trinity of names ; for powers and faculties , and modes , will prove no more , when distinguished from intelligent persons : and it is evident , that this is all he intended by it , by the opposition he makes between three minds and three intelligent persons , and three powers and faculties of the same being ; for faculties are not persons , no more than memory , will , and understanding , are three persons in one man : and he proves , that the received catholick notion of a person is such a being as has understanding , and will , and power of action , from the arguments universally urged against the socinians , to prove the holy ghost to be a person , and not meerly a divine power , because all the properties of a person belong to him , such as understanding , will , affections and actions . so that the dean does not charge those with heresie and nonsence , who barely refuse to use these terms of three eternal and infinite minds , which , it may be , no body ever so expresly used before him , and which he will not contend about ; but the heresie and nonsence is to assert three distinct divine persons , who are not three distinct , eternal , infinite , intelligent persons , and he has authority and reason enough to call this both heresie and nonsence . this is a sufficient answer to that charge the animadverter draws up against the dean , that he calls the three divine persons three eternal and infinite minds , by which he understands no more than three intelligent persons ; and if he thinks an intelligent person to be a mind , let the animadverter confute him , if he can ; and if he means no more by three minds than three intelligent persons , ( as it is evident he could mean no more ) how inconvenient soever this expression may be thought , let the animadverter try his skill to make tritheism of three minds , and excuse three intelligent persons from the same charge . and now let us consider his arguments , which he shews with great pomp in mode and figure . arg. . three distinct infinite minds or spirits , are three distinct gods. but the three persons of the blessed trinity are not three distinct gods. and therefore the three persons of the blessed trinity , are not three distinct infinite minds or spirits . now let us but change the term of minds into intelligent persons , and it is the very argument the socinians urge to confute the doctrine of three divine persons , or to charge it with tritheism , and runs thus : three distinct , infinite , intelligent persons , are three distinct gods. but there are not three distinct gods. and therefore there are not three distinct , infinite , intelligent persons in the godhead ; and consequently to assert three such distinct persons is to assert three gods. his proof of the major proposition will serve as well for an eternal , infinite , intelligent person , as for an eternal infinite mind . for god and eternal , infinite , intelligent person , are terms as equipollent and convertible , as god and infinite mind or spirit . god being as truly and properly an infinite , intelligent person , as an infinite mind or spirit , and an infinite , intelligent person being as truly and properly god , as an infinite mind . if the animadverter think fit to answer , that one god , and one infinite mind are convertible terms , but one god , and one infinite , intelligent person are not convertible terms , because there are three such infinite persons in the godhead , and but one infinite mind ; the reply is easie , that the bare terms , from which he argues , do not prove this distinction ; for though in the doctrine of the trinity , custom has more reconciled us to the term person than mind ; yet , setting aside this dispute , all mankind understand the same thing by an infinite mind , and an infinite intelligent person ; it is plain the socinians do , and hence conclude , that there is but one person in the godhead , because god is but one infinite mind . whether there be one or three infinite minds , or infinite intelligent persons in the unity of the godhead , is a dispute of a higher nature , and can't be determined by convertible terms ; for though the ancient philosophers and poets ( as he learnedly proves , what every school-boy knows ) did acknolwedge god to be a mind or spirit , that is , an understanding , intelligent , immaterial being , yet most of them by mind understood no more than one single mind , or one single intelligent person , and he might have known , that plato , to whom he appeals , though he acknowledged god to be a mind , yet he owned three such minds in the unity of the godhead . and therefore could not think , that one god , and one infinite mind , were equipollent and convertible terms ; because he asserted three infinite minds to be but one god. but since the animadverter has only made god , and infinite mind or spirit , equipollent and convertible terms , we may allow him this , and still deny his major proposition , that therefore three distinct infinite minds or spirits , are three distinct gods ; for though god is an infinite mind , and an infinite mind is god , it does not follow that three infinite minds are three distinct gods , no more than three infinite intelligent persons are three distinct gods ; but only as it is expressed in the athanasian creed , that we are compelled by the christian verity to acknowledge every person by himself ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , singly , distinctly ) to be god and lord , and yet are forbidden by the catholick religion to say , there be three gods or three lords . if god be an infinite mind , and there be three infinite minds , it must follow , that each of these three infinite minds , distinctly , and by himself considered , is god , not that these three are three distinct gods , but one god. indeed the animadverter's argument from convertibility and commensuration , that whatsoever may be affirmed or denied of the one , may with equal truth and propriety be affirmed and denied of the other , proves all that the dean would desire , viz. that every distinct person in the godhead is distinctly by himself an infinite mind , because he is distinctly by himself god , and god is infinite mind , and therefore every person , who is god , is infinite mind ; for no person can , by himself be god , who has not by himself all the perfections that belong to the idea of god : so that here are three persons in the godhead , each of which by himself is infinite mind . and therefore , though it may be improper , in an absolute sence to say , there are three eternal and infinite minds , when we acknowledge this infinite mind is , and eternally was essentially and inseparably one ; yet we must say , that this one infinite mind is essentially distinguished into three infinite intelligent persons , whom , in any other case , we should call three minds , and are as much three as is consistent with the essential unity of the godhead ; and this is reason enough to consider the distinction of persons , and the unity of the godhead , as we would the distinction and unity of three minds ; and then this one eternal infinite mind , may be distinguished into three intelligent persons ▪ by three self consciousnesses , and be essentially one by a natural mutual-consciousness , which is all the dean intended , or had occasion to assert . and if this be all he means by the godhead , and infinite mind , which is common to all three persons , the dean readily agrees with him , and in this sence will no more say , that there are three infinite minds , than that there are three gods. the animadverter was aware of this , that the same objection of three gods , would as well lie against three persons as against three minds ; and let us consider how he avoids the blow . the difference he makes between them is this , that three infinite minds or spirits are three absolute , simple beings , or essences , and so stand distinguished from one another by their whole beings or natures . the sum of which is no more but this , that three distinct minds are three distinct gods , because they are distinguished ; but if notwithstanding their distinction , they are essentially and inseparably one , they are not three distinct gods , but a real trinity of divine persons in the unity of the godhead , which all men must own , who believe a trinity in unity . but are not three infinite intelligent persons , as much three absolute , simple beings and essences , as three minds ? no! by no means ! the divine persons are three relatives , ( or one simple being or essence under three distinct relations ) and consequently differ from one another , not wholly , and by all that is in them , but only by some mode or respect peculiar to each , and upon that account causing their destinction . this is perfect gibberish , which i am certain he understands not one word of himself ; but let us examine it . the divine persons , he says , are three relatives ; very right ; for father , son , and holy ghost , are three , and are related to each other . but what are three relatives ? that comes in by way of parenthesis , one simple being , or essence under three distinct relations . that these three persons , thus related to each other , are one simple being , or essence we readily grant , for they were from eternity inseparably united in one infinite essence , or one supream god ; but the question still remains , what these three persons are , into which this one being , or essence , is distinguished by these three distinct relations ? three relatives are not three relations , but three things related to each other ; what then , are these three persons in the unity of the divine essence ? three relations , three modes , three respects , without some being , which tho' essentially one , is really and substantially three , is nonsence in logick ; for there must be as many real , substantial relatives and correlates , as there are relations , unless the relation between father and son can subsist without a real father and son. the person then of the father , the person of the son , and the person of the holy ghost , are not the relations between father , son , and holy ghost , but real , substantial persons , thus related to each other : and if these are three intelligent persons , let him make , if he can , three gods of three minds , and excuse three real intelligent persons from the same charge . but the truth is , to prevent the charge of making three gods , he distinguishes the three divine persons , into three logical relations , or modes of subsistence ; and if we will be contented with a trinity of modes , he is for us ; but this looks very like renouncing a trinity of persons , to secure the unity of the godhead ; and i fear will prove no better when thoroughly examined . in what sence the three divine persons are three relatives , or three relations , i have explained above ; their nature is compleat and absolute , if the divine nature be so , but their subsistence is relative , as it must of necessity be , when the same individual nature is repeated , and subsists distinctly in three , if it be essential to the father to be a father , he subsists with a necessary relation to his son ; if it be essential to the son to be a son , the perfect living image of the father , his subsistence is wholly relative , as the subsistence of an image is , which depends upon the prototype . and therefore though each divine person be eternal and infinite mind , and with respect to their three real subsistences , may be called three infinite eternal minds , ( as the dean ventured to call them ) yet these three are not three absolute simple beings or essences , which stand distinguished from one another by their whole beings or natures , but one absolute eternal mind repeated in three relative subsistences without multiplication : as a man and his living image , though each of them have distinctly humane nature , and upon that account might be called two men , yet they have but one compleat , absolute humane nature , though it be repeated in the image , and are but one man in two persons , or two humane subsistences . had the dean indeed made three compleat , absolute , eternal minds , he had been justly chargeable with making three gods , but the same eternal and infinite mind repeated in three subsistences , necessarily and essentially related to each other , are but one eternal god. . his second argument is this . three distinct minds or spirits , are three distinct substances . but the three persons in the blessed trinity , are not three distinct substances . and therefore they are not three distinct minds or spirits . the dean does not pretend to know any thing of the substance of a mind , much less of god , who is an infinite mind : he is contented to know , that a mind is a thinking and understanding being ; and though understanding , and being , and nature , or substance , may be distinguished in finite , created minds , yet st. austin has taught him , that in god , * to be is not one thing , and to understand another , or whatever else can be said of the divine nature , and therefore not substance neither . so that if in the unity of the godhead there be but three such distinct understandings , or minds or intelligent persons , who are not each other , and do not understand by each other , but distinctly by themselves , as st. austin expresly observes , † that no man will say , that the father does not understand by himself , but by his son , he is not concerned about distinct substances , which are the same with to be , and to understand in god. but his proofs of both propositions are entertaining . his major , that three distinct minds are three distinct substances , he proves from the definition of a mind or spirit , that it is substantia incorporea intelligens ; an intelligent , incorporeal ( or immaterial ) substance ; and therefore three distinct minds or spirits must be three such distinct substances . now if a man should deny his definition , and say , that a mind is res cogitans , a thinking being , he would be undone for want of his substances ; but i shall only cap definitions with him at present , that a person is substantia individua naturae rationabilis , the individual substance of a rational nature : and therefore if there be three distinct persons , there are three such distinct substances in the godhead , and let us see how he will bring off three persons from being three distinct substances , and i will undertake the dean shall do as much , and do it as well , for three minds . but if a mind were not a substance , what could it be else ? let us know first , what substance is , and then we 'll tell him . not quod substat accidentibus i hope , for then he immediately proves , that god is no substance , because no accident can be in god , nor need he fear , that the dean will make a mind a mode of subsistence in his sence of it , but a true and real mind , which does really and actually subsist , though these three eternal minds are but three eternal subsistences of the same one individual eternal mind . as for the minor , viz. that the three divine persons in the blessed trinity are not three distinct substances , he proves first from authority ; and he is as dangerous a man at authorities , as ever i met with . he cites tertullian , st. ierom , st. austin , and some others , and he might have produced the authority of all the ancient fathers , to prove , that there is but one substance in god ; but this is nothing to his purpose , for by one substance they plainly meant the homoousion , that father , son , and holy ghost , were of the same nature , and by denying three substances , they principally rejected three divers natures , of different kinds and species , in opposition to arianism , which denied the son to be of the same nature with his father ; this he might have learnt from what he cites from his orthodox father , bellarmine , that to assert , that the father and the son differ in substance is arianism ; for the difference the arians made , and the catholicks opposed , was not in the real distinction of their persons , but in the diversity of their natures ; and the reason he adds , will not help it out : and yet ( he adds ) if they were two distinct substances , for them not to differ in substance would be impossible ; as if to be distinct , and to differ in substance were the same thing : as if two men were not unius substantiae , of one and the same substance , as st. austin and all the fathers assert , because they are two distinct men , and each of them has a distinct nature of his own ? or if he will call this a difference , as if to differ in number and in substance or nature were the same thing ? or as if to differ in number proved a diversity of nature too . it is a tedious thing to dispute with men , who must be taught to construe the fathers , and to understand common sence . but if authority will not do this , he is resolved reason shall , and he has as peculiar a talent at reason as he has at authorities . he proves , that the three persons can't be three distinct minds , because they are not three distinct substances . now the dean may very safely deny this consequence , and try how the animadverter will prove it ; that if three minds are three intelligent persons , and a mind is a substance , therefore three distinct minds , or persons , are three distinct substances ; for three distinct minds may subsist distinctly , and yet inseparably in one eternal and infinite substance , as three intelligent persons do . though the true and short answer is , that the same substance repeated in three distinct subsistences , is not three substances , but one , as i have often observed in the case of the man and his image . but suppose three persons were three distinct substances , inseparably united in one : what then ? what then ? it is a terrible then : for then two substances will concur in , and belong to each person ; to wit that substance , which is the divine essence , and so is communicable or common to all the persons , and the substance , which constitutes each person , and thereby is so peculiar to him , as to distinguish him from the other , and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him , to whom it belongs . i am heartily ashamed and sorry to see such stuff , as must necessarily expose our holy faith to the scorn of atheists and infidels , and that i may not contribute to it , all this nonsence shall escape the lash of my pen. in short , the dean knows no divine substance or essence distinct from the three divine persons , nor knows any distinction between the divine essence , and a divine person , but that the essence makes the person . that the whole divine essence or nature is originally in god the father , that this same whole divine nature and essence was by eternal generation , communicated by the father to the son , and subsists distinctly in him ; that this same whole divine nature by eternal procession , is communicated by the father and the son , to the holy ghost , and subsists distinctly in him ; and these three divine persons by an inseparable union , dwelling in each other , is that supream and sovereign being , who is the one god , or a trinity in unity . it is amazing to think what strange conceits this man must have of a trinity of persons , and unity of essence or substance : for i am sure no man has any idea of an intelligent nature and essence distinguished from a person , or of persons distinguished from a rational nature ; of a divine essence and substance , which is no person ; and of divine persons , which are no substances , as it seems , they cannot be in the animadverter's way , unless he also will compound every person of two substances . what is the divine essence and substance , but an infinite and eternal mind ? and is not an infinite and eternal mind a person ? the divine essence then must be acknowledged to be a person , and to be a substantial person , or the divine substance ; so that there is a person , that is a substance , and if there be but one such single and solitary divine essence , there can be but one such single and solitary person : will he then make four persons in the godhead ; the divine essence , which is a substantial person , and three persons , which are no substances ? or will he own god to be , what pascentius objected to st. austin , and he rejected with scorn ; triformis persona , one divine person under three forms : this or something more senceless is the truth of the case , as may appear more hereafter : but i will now proceed . . his third argument is this . if it be truly said , that one and the same infinite mind or spirit is father , son , and holy ghost ( i mean all three taken together ) and it cannot be truly said , that one and the same infinite mind or spirit is three distinct infinite minds or spirits , then it follows , that father , son , and holy ghost , are not three distinct infinite minds or spirits . this logick is a very troublesome thing , when men want sence . the whole of this argument is this , that one infinite mind can't be three infinite minds , nor three infinite minds one infinite mind , and that three persons , who are one infinite mind , can't be three infinite minds ; that is , that three can't be one , nor one three ; which if it be universally true , there is an end of a trinity in unity ; if it be not universally true , that is , if three may be one , and one three , the meer opposition between three and one , which is the whole force of his argument , is childish sophistry : for if they be three and one in different respects , this is no contradiction . every divine person is an infinite mind , and as distinctly so , as he is a distinct person , and yet by their essential and inseparable union to each other , all three are but one eternal infinite mind , as they are but one god. but when these three divine persons , are said to be three , and to be one eternal and infinite mind , they are three and one mind upon different respects ; every person by himself , as a distinct person , is an eternal infinite mind , that is , is a knowing intelligent being , and has all the perfections of an infinite understanding , distinguished from the other persons by self-consciousness ; and all three persons by their inseparable union to each other , are but one eternal infinite mind , as having each other in themselves by mutual-consciousness ; and let the animadverter shew where the contradiction is , that there should be three self-conscious infinite minds , as there are three infinite persons , united into one mutualconscious mind , as three distinct persons are united in the unity of the godhead : especially when this one eternal mind is entirely and perfectly repeated without the least change in three eternal intelligent subsistences ; each of which is distinctly an eternal mind , but the same one individual eternal mind . . his fourth and last argument is this : whatsoever attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the divine persons in the athanasian form , so belongs to them all in common , that it can belong to none of them under any term of distinction from the rest . but the attribute ( infinite mind or spirit ) may be truly predicated of all and each of the divine persons in and according to the athanasian form. and therefore it can belong to none of them under any term of distinction from the rest . this is a wonderful argument , if it be well considered . for , . infinite mind or spirit is no attribute , but the divine nature and essence it self , and our metaphysical animadverter uses to distinguish between essence and attributes in god ; and disputes earnestly without an opponent , that infinite mind is god ; and therefore , that there is but one infinite mind , as there is but one god ; is god himself then an attribute ? what will he make of god at last , when the divine essence is an attribute , and a divine person a meer mode ? . but let infinite mind or spirit be an attribute or the divine essence , since it may be truly predicated of all and each of the divine persons , it must so belong to them all in common , that it can belong to none of them under any term of distinction from the rest . if by this term of distinction from the rest , he means it cannot belong to each of them considered distinctly as such distinct persons , then it cannot be predicated distinctly of them neither ; for nothing can , without manifest absurdity , be distinctly predicated of three distinct persons , if it do not distinctly belong to each of them : if the father , considered as the father , and as a distinct person from the son , and from the holy ghost , be not an infinite mind , it cannot be truly said , that the father is an infinite mind ; and if the son , as a distinct person from the father and the holy ghost is not an infinite mind , it cannot be truly affirmed distinctly of the son , that he is an infinite mind . predication , if it be true , must follow nature , and therefore nothing can be particularly and distinctly predicated of any person , which does not distinctly belong to him . what is common to three , cannot be so peculiarly appropriated to any one , as to exclude either of the other two ; for it is not common , if it be not common to all ; and no more is it common , if each of them have it not as distinctly as they subsist : for distinct persons , that subsist distinctly , must distinctly have what they have , or they cannot have it at all ; though humane nature is common to all mankind , yet every distinct man , distinctly enjoys humane nature ; for there is no other way of distinction of persons in a common nature : there is indeed a great difference between the distinction of humane persons , and of the divine persons in the sacred trinity , and between the divine nature , being common to all three divine persons , and humane nature , being common to all mankind , as i have often observed ; but there is so much likeness and analogy between them , as to make it very absurd to say , that what is common to three distinct persons , does not belong distinctly to each . . nor does the form of the athanasian creed forbid us distinctly to attribute to each distinct person of the trinity , what is common to all three ; for the creed it self does this expresly in every point ; the father uncreate , the son uncreate , the holy ghost uncreate . the father incomprehensible , eternal , almighty , god and lord ; and the son incomprehensible , eternal , almighty , god and lord ; and the holy ghost incomprehensible , eternal , almighty , god and lord. and that the christian verity compels us to acknowledge every person by himself ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which , i think , is distinctly ) god and lord. well! but the creed expresly denies , that therefore there are three uncreate , or three incomprehensibles , or three eternals , or three almighties , or three gods , or three lords : i grant it , but not for the animadverter's reason , because what is common to all three , does not distinctly belong to each , or to all of them , for the creed expresly affirms , that it does ; but because these three divine persons , each of which have distinctly all these perfections of the divine nature , and the whole divine nature in them are so inseparably united , as to be essentially one : and therefore , though there are three eternal , incomprehensible , almighty persons , each of which is god and lord , yet there is but one eternal , incomprehensible , almighty god and lord ; and thus it must be , if we will maintain with the athanasian creed , the real distinction of persons , and the unity of the godhead : if there be three persons , each of which is by himself , uncreate , eternal , incomprehensible , almighty , i will venture any man , who can understand plain sence , and dares own it , to deny , if he can , that there are three uncreate , eternal , incomprehensible , almighty persons . and in this sence the dean has not transgressed the form of the athanasian creed , by three infinite minds , if we understand them of three infinite , intelligent , persons ; and it is certain he could understand nothing else by them , when he unites these three infinite minds into one infinite mind , which can signifie nothing else but three persons and one god. this is enough in answer to the animadverter's arguments , and i belive you are sensible by this time , what a profound reasoner he is ; in the next place we should consider his authorities , but i am very weary of this work , and i guess , you think it a pretty long letter already , but if you desire it , and will have a little patience , neither you nor the animadverter shall long complain for want of an answer , though i can't but think it a needless undertaking ; for no man , who ever lookt into the fathers , can want an answer , and those who cannot consult the fathers themselves , will believe as their inclinations and affections lead them . i will undertake , the fathers shall absolve the dean from the imputation of tritheism , let the animadverter fence as well as he can against sabellianism . his socinian friends and admirers declare , they will not dispute with him about a trinity of meer modes and postures in the singularity of the divine essence ; for though they have too much sence to own and profess such a trinity , yet they think it not worth disputing : it is a real , substantial , subsisting trinity they are afraid of , and dispute against ; such a trinity the dean asserts , and has vindicated from absurdity and contradiction , and this is the trinity , which both the scripture teaches , and the ancient catholick church always taught ; and this i undertake to prove . there is indeed a third part of the animadversions , if that may be called a part , which runs through and inspires the whole , in which the animadverter is by much an over-match for any man who is a christian ; i mean his scolding part , for it would prophane the name of wit to give it that title . this i don't pretend to answer , and you your self confess it should be despised , not answered : let him then here securely triumph , and receive the reward of such heroical actions ; ut pueris placeas , & declamatio sias . and therefore i shall only add , that if you want an answer to the preface , you should read the dean's defence of the knowledge of iesus christ and our union and communion with him , which was published many years since , and silenced all his adversaries then , that he heard no more of that till the animadverter revived the quarrel , who could have given you the dean's answers to his own objections , if he had so pleased ; for they are not new , but borrowed from such wits as mr. alsop , without any new strength given to them . where the animadverter charges the dean with absurdities and contradictions , turn to the place , and read it with it s context , and tell me what you can't answer , and i will. but if you , or any body else , can be perswaded by the animadverter , that the dean understands neither english , latin , nor greek ; neither logicks , metaphysicks , or common sence ; i need wish you no other punishment , than when ever you write to fall into the hands of such an adversary ; for , i believe , there are very few writers , but might be exposed in the same manner by a spiteful critick , not the animadverter himself excepted , who begins his animadversions with a notorious blunder in deriving a mystery from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; whereas a mystery does not signifie in english the word mystery , but the thing signified by that word ; and therefore , though the word mystery may be derived , a mystery is derived from no word ; and to talk of deriving a mystery is neither english nor sence . but though it were justice to return some of his complements to the dean upon himself , yet his example is too scandalous to be imitated , and there is no need to expose him , more than his own pen has done . i am , sir , your very faithful friend . a post-script , concerning the calm-discourse of the trinity in the godhead . sir , since my writing this letter , i have met with a book , entituled , a calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a trinity in the godhead , written , as is said , by a man of great reputation among the dissenters : i do not intend to examine the book , nor to approve , or disapprove it , though there seem to be very obnoxious passages in it , should he fall into such hands as our animadverter : he has taken great care , that no man should suspect that he favours the dean in his notions ; and i believe , the dean will thank him for that , for if i understand him , he would never have said , and would be as unwilling that any man should think he has said , what the enquirer has . but all i design by this post-script , is only this , to let you see , that though the enquirer does not in every particular say what the dean says , yet he says what will justifie the dean against the heaviest charge the animadverter himself could frame against his hypothesis , and that is tritheism . the pretence of this is , what the dean says concerning three distinct , eternal , infinite minds , and the objections and answers you have already heard ; and if i can understand the enquirer , he says this as plainly , and in more obnoxious terms than the dean has done . to prove the possibility of a trinity in the godhead , he argues from the possibility of god's uniting two spirits by as close an union , as he has united spirit and body , which make one man ; and if it were possible to him ( god ) to unite two , would it not be as possible to unite three : so that he represents the trinity in unity , by the union of three spirits ; which are distinguished by their own individual essences , and remain distinct by their singular essences ; so as to be everlastingly united , but not identified , and by vertue of that union be some one thing , as much , and as truly as our soul and body united do constitute one man. now from the possibility of such an union with such a distinction in created spirits , he concludes the possibility of such an union unmade ; or that is original and eternal , in an unmade or uncreated being ; that is , that three eternal , unmade , uncreated spirits may be thus united in one godhead ; that is , that there are , or may be ( for whatever he thinks , which may be easily guessed at , he will not positively assert it ) three eternal , uncreated minds in the unity of the godhead . this he proves from the incarnation , that the union of the two natures , the humane ( made up of an humane body and humane soul , which are two exceedingly different natures ) with the divine ( which is a third , and infinitely more different from both the other ) in one person , viz. of the son of god , cannot certainly appear to any considering person , more conceivable or possible , than that which we now suppose ( but assert not ) of three distinct essences united in the one godhead . and that father , son , and holy ghost have their distinct essences , he proves also from the doctrine of the incarnation , since the man christ is confessed to be in hypostatical union with the uncreated spiritual being of god , not as that being is in the person of the father , nor as in the person of the holy ghost ; for then they should have become man too ; but as it was in the person of the son only , why should it be thought less possible , that three uncreated spiritual beings ( which the animadverter will no more allow of them of three eternal minds ) may be in so near an union with each other , as to be one god , as that a created spirit ( and body too ) should be in so near an union with one of the persons in the godhead only , as therewith to be one person ? will it not hereby be much more apprehensible , how one of the persons ( as the common way of speaking is ) should be incarnate , and not the other two ? will not the notion of person it self be much more unexceptionable , when it shall be supposed to have its own individual nature ? — will it be tritheism and inconsistent with the acknowledged invioluble unity of the godhead ? a great deal more to this purpose you may find in his first letter to dr. wallis , p. , &c. and whether this be tritheism or not , he had best ask the animadverter , who charged the dean's hypothesis with tritheism , with much less reason : and , i confess , i am amazed , that after all this he should so industriously vindicate himself from dr. sherlock's notion of three infinite minds or spirits , for three distinct substances the dean does not assert ; and if the enquirer has not all this while been proving , three spirits , three distinct essences , three individual natures in the godhead , no man living can guess what he means ; for my part , i cannot tell where the difference is , unless it be in the term of infinite ; for his three spirits , and essences , and individual natures , which make up his unity of the godhead , as he has represented it , do not seem to be infinite . but he shelters himself from the animadverter , whom he seems to be terribly afraid of , in academick uncertainty , and thinks he may safely dispute as he pleases , and all on one side , so long as he asserts nothing ; though i cannot see how the dean was more dogmatical than the enquirer , who proposed his hypothesis only as a possible and intelligible notion ; every body indeed might guess , what the dean's private opinion was , and so they may , what the enquirer conceives about it , but he was far enough from imposing upon other men , by asserting , that thus it must be , and it cannot be otherwise : he was only concerned to represent a possible and intelligible notion ; and that the enquirer pretends to as much as he , and therefore falls under the same condemnation : nay , the enquirer is much more exposed to the charge of tritheism , by asserting , three distinct essences , three individual natures , and three spiritual beings , than the dean was , who never said any such thing , and the animadverter charges him with it only by consequence , that three minds are three distinct substances and essences , which he may deny , and i deny for him ; but the enquirer says it in express words . the dean allows but one divine essence , and one individual nature in the godhead , repeated in three persons , but without multiplication , as i have already explained it ; and how to own three essences , and three individual divine natures in the godhead , without making three gods , seems to have some difficulty in it . for three individual natures in the deity , seem to sound very like three individual natures in humanity , which make three men. but though the enquirer has distinguished father , son , and holy ghost by their singular essences , much more than the dean has , yet he thinks he has also made a more close union between them , and therefore is not so liable to the charge of tritheism . for as he says , reflecting upon the dean's notion , an hypothesis in this affair , which leaves out the very nexus , the natural and eternal union , or leaves it out of its proper place , and insists upon mutual-consciousness , which , at the most , is but a consequence thereof , wants the principal thing requisite to the salving the unity of the godhead . if two or three created spirits had never so perfect a mutual perspection of one another , that would not constitute them one thing , tho' it probably argue them to be so , and but probably . this is all a mistake of the dean's notion of mutual-consciousness , as i have sufficiently shown , which is not a mutual-perspection , or mutual-insight into one another , but a feeling each other in themselves ; and if such an internal vital sensation be not an essential union , i believe no man can tell me what it is . it is certain , the dean took it to be so ; and therefore he did not leave out a natural , eternal union . whatever the nexus , as he calls it , be , if they are united into a mutual-conscious life , they are essentially one , and i am sure he can never form any notion of the union of spiritual essences without it . but i have said enough of this already , and therefore shall now briefly consider , how the enquirer unites these three distinct essences , three spiritual beings , three individual natures in the unity of the godhead . and i believe the dean will like his unity of the godhead , as little as his distinction . he represents this by the union of soul and body , which makes one man ; and by the union of the divine and humane nature , which makes one christ , as you see by what i have already cited : but these are personal unions , and therefore cannot be the unity of the godhead , in which is a trinity of distinct persons . and yet , as far as i can possibly understand him ( and if i mistake him , i shall be glad for many reasons to be better informed ) no other unity will satisfie him , but such an union of three spiritual beings , and individual natures , as by their composition constitute the godhead , as the composition of soul and body make the man. for this reason he disputes earnestly against the universal , absolute , omnimodous simplicity of the divine nature , and will not allow , that wisdom , power , and goodness , are the same thing in god , and distinguished into different conceptions by us , only through the weakness of our understandings , which cannot comprehend an infinite being in one thought , and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by parts . this prepared his way to make three spiritual necessary beings of these three divine attributes , goodness , wisdom , and power , the natural union of which make one god , and a natural trinity in unity . if you object , that this gives us the notion of a compounded deity , or of a composition in it ; he answers this difficulty , by giving us a new notion of a compositum ; which , he says , seems to imply a praeexisting component , that brings such things together , and supposes such and such more simple things to have praeexisted apart , or separate , and to be brought afterwards together into an united state : that is to say , that how many parts soever any thing consists of , you must not say it is a compound being , unless its parts were once asunder , and put together by some other being : that if a man suppose , who consists of body and soul , had been from eternity without a maker , and his soul and body had never subsisted apart , he could not have been said to have been a compound creature , though he would have had the same parts then that he has now , that is , soul and body ; and therefore , though god does consist of parts , of those three spiritual beings , and individual natures , the union of which makes the godhead , yet he is not a compounded deity , because he eternally and necessarily is , what he is , without a maker ; and these three spiritual beings , never did praeexist apart , but were eternally united to each other : the summ of which is no more but this , that god is not a made compound , but an eternal unmade compound ; but a compound he is , as a compound signifies a being , which consists of distinct parts , united to each other . but i always thought , that the whole christian world , who have always denied any parts or composition in god , did not by this mean , that he was not made , but that he had no parts ; and one principal argument against all parts and composition in god , is , that he is eternal and unmade , and whatever has parts must have a maker . there can be but one eternal nature , and yet if there be three eternal parts of the deity , there must be three eternal natures , not only distinct , but different natures , or else they could not be parts in the composition , for they would be the same : three spiritual beings , one of which is goodness , another wisdom , and a third power , are three different eternal natures , how closely soever they are united ; for , as he argues , goodness is not wisdom , nor wisdom power , nor power wisdom or goodness , and three different eternal natures is a new notion among christians . and though we have a natural notion of an eternal being , we have no notion of an eternal union of eternal parts , or of three eternal parts in the deity , which necessarily coexist in an eternal union . once more , we have no notion of an eternal and necessary existence , but in an absolutely perfect and infinite nature ; but if there be three parts in the deity , three spiritual beings of distinst and different natures , neither of them can be absolutely perfect and infinite , ( though we could suppose their union to make such a perfect being ) because they are not the same , and neither of them is the whole ; and therefore they cannot necessarily exist , and yet a deity , which consists of parts , cannot necessarily exist , unless its parts necessarily exist ; for a compounded being can exist no otherwise than its parts exist . but there is something in this , which seems to have a very ill aspect upon the trinity it self , as well as on the unity and simplicity of the divine nature . he professes , indeed , not to iudge , that we are under the precise notions of power , wisdom , and goodness , to conceive of the father , son , and holy ghost ; though he has been for several pages together vindicating such a representation of the trinity , and teaching us thus to conceive of father , son , and holy ghost , and thinks that this gives ease to our minds , by their being disentangled from any apprehended necessity of thinking these ( power , wisdom , and goodness ) to be the very same things , and if they be not the same thing , but three really distinct spiritual beings , we must thus conceive of father , son , and holy ghost ; and then the difficulty is in a compounded deity , by what name to call the three parts of the composition , father , son , and holy ghost , whether , as we are taught in the athanasian creed , we must own each of them by himself , to be god and lord ? for if all three , by this composition are but one god , neither of them by himself is true and perfect god ; no more than a part can be the whole : this might be thought a very invidious consequence , had not he himself expresly owned it . the father , son , and spirit , being supposed necessarily existent in this united state , they cannot but be god , and the godhead by reason of this necessary union cannot but be one. yet so , as that when you predicate godhead , or the name of god , of any one of them , you herein express a true , but inadaequate conception of god , i. e. the father is god , not excluding the son and holy ghost ; the son is god , not excluding the father and the holy ghost ; the holy ghost is god , not excluding the father and the son. as our body is the man , not excluding the soul , our soul is the man , not excluding the body . this comparison of the soul and body , which are the parts of a man , and whose union makes a compleat and perfect man , explains what he means by the inadaequate conception of god , when we apply the name god distinctly to father son and holy ghost , and in what sence he says , the father is god , but not so as to exclude the son , &c. all orthodox christians own , that the father is god , not excluding the son , and the holy ghost ; and that the son is god , not excluding the father , and the holy ghost , &c. but then by this they mean , that the father is true and perfect god , has the whole entire divinity in himself , but yet the same whole entire divinity distinctly and inseparably subsists in the person of the son , and of the holy ghost , that the same whole undivided divine nature subsists entirely in three distinct persons , father , son , and holy ghost , and therefore each of them by himself in the most proper and adaequate conception is true and perfect god , tho' all three are but one and the same god. but the inquirers notion of god , as applied to each person , is a very inadaequate notion , for it signifies only a part of the deity , that the father is god , because he is a part of the godhead , and the son , and the holy ghost , god , as parts also of the same one godhead ; as the soul is the man , because part of the man ; and the body also the man , as part of the man ; and therefore father , son , and holy ghost , are each of them god , but so as not to exclude each other , as no one essential part can exclude the rest . this is such a notion of the unity of the godhead , as neither the scriptures , nor the ancient church knew any thing of ; and i think there is little need to confute it . in short , as it makes a compounded deity , so it makes but one compounded person ; for if the godhead be but one by composition , as the man is by the union of soul and body , if god be a person he can be but one : for if you call the three parts of the godhead ▪ three persons , yet neither of them is god , but in a very improper and figurative sence , as a part is called by the name of the whole ; so that either there is no person in the godhead , who is true and perfect god , or there must be but one compounded person , as there is one compounded godhead , and there is an end of the christian trinity . some late socinian writers have been willing to compound this dispute of a tinity of divine persons , for the three attributes of power , wisdom , and goodness ; and if you have a mind to call these three spiritual beings , i believe , they will not contend much about it ; for they are not so much afraid of three parts of a deity , as of three divine persons , each of which is true and perfect god. this also necessarily destroys the homoousion , or sameness of nature , which the ancient church asserted in the persons of the holy trinity ; for three spiritual beings , which are the parts of this compounded deity , cannot be the same , no more than soul and body are ; for the parts of a compound , how closely soever they are united , cannot be the same ; for three same 's , are not ▪ three parts , but three wholes . as to take his own representation of it : if power , wisdom , and goodness ▪ be father ▪ son , and holy ghost , it is certain ▪ and he ow●● , that power is not the same with wisdom ▪ and goodness ; nor wisdom the same with power and goodness ; and therefore the son is not of the same nature with his father . which is another thing to be considered in the enquirer's notion , that it destroys the relations of the ever-blessed trinity ; for if father , son , and holy ghost , be three parts of a compounded deity , though we should grant , that their union might make one god , yet these parts could neither beget , nor be begotten , nor proceed from each other , and therefore could not be related to each other , as father , and son , and spirit , but only as three parts of the same compositum . if power be the father , and wisdom the son , how comes ▪ wisdom to be the son of power , and not to be power ▪ as the father is , since a father begets his own likeness ? this destroys the natural order and subordination of the persons in the trinity ; if power , wisdom and goodness be three real distinct things , and three spiritual beings , which compleatly constitute the godhead , let any man tell me , which of these three in order of nature is the first , second , or third ; why one is the father , the other the son , and the third the holy ghost . this makes me wonder to hear him talk of promanations ; for an emanative cause never produces any thing but of its own nature , as light naturally flows from the sun. but i will not 〈◊〉 this postscript into another long letter ; this is sufficient to my present design , to give you a 〈◊〉 and plain representation of the 〈…〉 , and leave you ●o judge of 〈◊〉 ▪ sir , yours . finis ▪ advertisement . a commentary on the five books of moses : with a dissertation concerning the author or writer of the said books ; and a general argument to each of them . by the right reverend father in god , richard , lord bishop of bath and wells . in two volumes . octavo . reason and religion : in some useful reflections on the most eminent hypothesis concerning the first principles and nature of things ; with advice suitable to the subject , and seasonable for these times , twelves . a defence of the dean of st. paul's apology for writing against the socinians , in answer to the antapologist . quarto . printed for william rogers . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e greg. naz. orat. . hil. l. . de trinit . damasc. l. . deimaginibus . * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . greg. nyss. contra eunom . orat. . p. . petav. de trin. p. . & alibi . ambr. l. . de fide , c. . facundus pro defensione trium capit , c. . p . hil. l. de synod . vindic. of trin. p. . vindic. p. , , &c. p. , , &c. p. . p. . animad . c. . pag. . vindic. p. . page . vindic. p. . anim. p. ▪ anim. p. . animad . p. . animad . p. . animad . p. . pag. . pag. . anim. chap. . p. . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . vindic. p. . pag. . anim. chap. . p. . vindic. p. . pag. . * ideo ipsa mirabilis simplicitas commendatur quia non ibi , ( in trinitate ) aliud est esse , aliud intelligere , vel siquid aliud de dei natura dicitur . anima verò quia est , etiam dum non intelligit , aliud est quidem esse , aliud est quod intelligit . aug. evod. ep. . proinde in unum deum patrem & filium & spiritum sanctum credamus , ita ut nec filius credatur esse qui pater est , nec pater qui filius est , nec pater nec filius , qui utriusque spiritus est — sed haec tria aequalia esse , & coaeterna , & omnino esse una natura . ibid. † deinde quis audeat dicere patrem non intelligere per semetipsum , sed per filium ? ibid. pag. . ep. , . notes for div a -e calm discourse p. , , . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. , &c. pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . an answer to dr. wallis's three letters concerning the doctrine of the trinity nye, stephen, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing n estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) an answer to dr. wallis's three letters concerning the doctrine of the trinity nye, stephen, ?- . wallis, john, - . doctrine of the blessed trinity briefly explained. wallis, john, - . second letter concerning the holy trinity. wallis, john, - . explication and vindication of the athanasian creed. p. s.n., [s.l. : ] caption title. attributed to stephen nye. cf. halkett & laing ( nd ed.). reproduction of original in harvard university libraries. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng trinity -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - olivia bottum text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an answer to dr. wallis's three letters concerning the doctrine of the trinity . seeing our adversaries the trinitarians , cannot be content , modestly to acknowledge their doctrine as a meer mystery , and to rely upon the authority of the church , and tradition for the same ; but have of late also ventur'd , even to prove the same agreeable to the common notions of humane reasoning , it may not be amiss to shew them their errour , and to humble them a little more in their pretences for the future . i must confess , 'thas been but of late , that any have presum'd to this confidence ; but as it now happens , a unitarian is the absurdest creature in the world. dr wallis , and dr. s — together , have undertaken even to demonstrate their weakness ; but whether their endeavours may not be more likely to reflect on themselves , than the unitarians , i dare trust to the issue of this ensuing treatise . to put the case therefore , the unitarian having taken the scriptures in hand , and examining thereby how he ought to address his worship , streight concludes himself to be directed , by the first commandment , viz. thou shalt have none other gods but me : but the more subtle trinitarian , tho' in several places of the old and new testament , he find that one to be intended , as that we ought to acknowledge and worship but one god : yet streight he has an evasion , says he , there may be many persons in that one god , and therefore the commandment , that we should have but oue god , shall not debar me of deifying and eqalling my saviour christ jesus to his father ; and after that , to compleat a trinity , flings in the holy ghost also . the case then of the unitarian is thus , he dreading the guilt of idolatry , thinks this evasion , of saying , that this one god can have several persons in it , but frivolous and weak ; especially when he considers , that he never met with such direction or construction , neither in the old or new testament . no , says the trinitarian , there is no such thing expressed ; but the grounds for the inferences of it are so clear , that it needs not . the unitarian upon this , jealous of a juggle ; especially when this inference is not to be rais'd , till several hundred years after christ , reflects , whether such a thing can be put upon the first commandment , and whether 't is within the nature of that precept to bear it . he argues thus therefore , with himself : what was that commandment made for ? what ? to prevent polytheism . why how , says he , is that to be done ? by denying many ; that is , several personal gods , surely it must , if it is not made to deny personal gods , 't is made to no purpose ; and if therefore we can admit a man afterwards to be a co-equal to this god , this commandment seems to be made but to little effect . and i pray then , may not a unitarian upon this very well conclude , a trinity in unity is absurd ; surely he may , without any manner of contempt to the scripture . what ? is the divinity of christ implied in the new testament ? 't is denied in the first commandment , and i that thus regard that solemn and set precept of the first commandment that was delivered even by god himself , may surely in such case , be allow'd to submit my reasoning entirely to the scripture , and yet deny this implied co equal divinity of christ. 't is true indeed , i cannot say , that there is a contradiction , in holding , that there may be three persons in god ; because i have not the definition of the word god so exact , as to be assur'd , it cannot admit many persons in it ; but this i am sure , that when god has ordered me to acknowledge him but as one , and i know i cannot rationally make him more , but by many persons , i vitiate the commandment by an inconsistent absurdity , to bring in new persons after in co equality with him . methinks this reasoning is so obvious , that i wonder our great doctors can pore it over : and yet whether i wonder or not , they do : they think , because they can tell us , that a thing can be unum , and tres diverso respectu ; that is , one and three in several respects : that therefore it is consistent with the first commandment , to add several persons to their one god ; tho' they are particularly prohibited it by it , and yet not break it . nor does this errour end here neither , for our adversaries are not always so lucky , as to see consequences ; for should a lying revelation , ( which is not impossible , ) deifie more men then ever the heathens did , here is no fence left . is there three persons in god ? why but three ? no ; god , you say , reveal'd but three by christ. yes , since in a fuller manifestation he has been pleas'd to acquaint us of a thousand more . and 't is in vain , in such case , to pretend that the number would be of offence to us ; for if we consider it aright , there is no more reason for one number then another : indeed , if we once destroy the unity of the personality of god , i think it were more honourable to think the godhead consisted in infinite personalities , then one ; all between one and infinite's imperfect . but yet after all this , we unitarians are more fair , then to press our adversaries with this one argument only , tho' this alone were enough too , to a sincere man , but we have gone on further , even to let go this principle with them , and to fight them at their own weapons , to shew them no such trinity is reveal'd in the new testament , and granting it were not absurd and inconsistent to the first commandment , yet that it is unscriptural . and herein , would dr. wallis but examine , whatever he has gloried , that dr. sherlock has answered the history of the unitarians , letter , p. . dr. sherlock has such an answer ; by the vindication of the arrian , and the acts of athanasius , that neither dr. sherlock , nor dr. wallis neither will be able to answer , whatever they may do by suppression and reproaches . but least dr. wallis should think i tell him of an answer , and have none to give him my self , i shall give my self that trouble , as to enquire more particularly into his reasoning , and to shew him , that for all he deals in cubes , all he alledges is not demonstration . the doctors reasoning therefore , as i take it is this , he endeavours to illustrate the trinity , by an example in a cube , where three sides , he says , make one cube , ( pag. . letter . ) and which cube , he says , is not to be made without all three sides , and yet all three make but one cube , ( page . letter . ) and to compleat the parallel , he tell us , ( page . letter . ) that that broad thing is a cube , that long thing is a cube , in answer to the father , is god , and the son is god , &c. nor doth he stop here neither , for ( page . of the first letter ) he tells us , that that long thing begets the broad thing , and the long and broad thing , has that deep thing proceeding from them , exactly conforming it , to the generation and procession of the son and holy ghost . and his reasoning upon this parallel in his letter , page . ) is this , if such a trinity can be form'd in gross corporeals , much more may we expect it possible in spirituals . now i say , not to suppose this simile altogether impertinent , as i have shewn it is in our case ; for our debate is not whether there may not be three persons in god ; but whether many personal gods will not necessarily break the first commandment ? i say therefore , to suppose the first commandment is not broke by many personal gods , yet this simile is most absurd ; for it is of commensuration or relation , and not of a body , as he would insinuate ; 't is of a meer chymera or idea , not a quality , and much less a corporiety or substance . but to state his cube therefore more to his purpose for him , to wit , a cube of marble generating hardness , and both producing coldness ; i say in this case , there were three cubes more for him , and those real ones too , that is , of substance and quality , and yet in such case they would all be distinct cubes , and yet but one cube , that is , a cube of hardness , another of coldness , and another of corporiety , and yet all three but one cube of marble ; i say , to put his similes from chymera's to beings , yet , what parity can we make between the unity of substances with qualities , and the unities of persons together . the doctor forgets , that personation is the greatest perfection of being , and that different personation is answerably the greatest perfection of quality ; i am sure , i never could apprehend any other real unity than personation , and the higher this personation arose , the more distinct i always apprehended it ; thus one man , one angel , and one god , and if the doctor has found a more perfect , real , and proper unity than that , let him discover it , and not cite a meaner to prove it . the doctor should rather therefore have propos'd some monster , born with three heads , but that , i conceive he would have seen , to have been too gross to have impos'd upon the world , not i mean , that i think he sought to impose the other neither , for i am perswaded of his sincerity , in what he has done , but i take the freedom to represent my argument so for its more perfect illustration . nor is my answer , to his simile of memory , will , and understanding , and of our powers , to be to do and to know ; much otherwise , ( letter , p. , . ) for to my mind , 't is a strange illustration of a most perfect union of persons , even perfecter than personality itself , to tell us of the union of parts to the mind , faculties to the soul , &c. so for his unum verum & bonum , wherein indeed the doctor is so modest , as to confess , that the distinction is not equal to that of the trinity , ( p. . . letter ) so for his three groats in a shilling , and three nobles in twenty ( p. . . letter . ) similes indeed that the doctor himself seems asham'd of , and methinks alledged to a strange purpose , he had near as good have wrote , that because a man has two hands and an head , therefore a trinity in unity is necessary to the perfection of the godhead . 't has been a general rule with me , always where i have brought a simile , to illustrate any thing , that i have formed it of something adequate , and that may really prove the matter i design'd , if urg'd by way of argument , but these are such similes , that my adversary had as good urge , that there are three personal gods , because they have three letters in their name , or because that three times three makes nine . in short , these are such similes , that to repeat them is to answer them . nor are his arguments , drawn from sustineo tres personas mei iudicis & adversarii ; that is , i personate three men , my self the iudge and my adversary ; and from a man's having three names , or titles , as william henry nassau , king of england , scotland , and france , or a noble duke , marquess , and earl , iess ridiculous ( p. . letter . ) i would fain ask doctor wallis , what it is to personate a man , surely but to compose ones actions as near as one can in likeness or favour of him ; is it so ? then a man may as well personate three hundred men as three , for one cannot personate three together , and one may three hundred one after another : in short , the doctor had as good have said , there must be three personal gods , because a man can walk three ways , for 't is the same that he represents by his personating in his mind , as walking in the body , and is not this a pretty simile then , to prove that there must be three personally distinct gods , and for the doctor to conclude upon it as he does , ( p. . third letter ) what , shall a man bear three persons , and shall not god be able to do it ? well may the doctor as he has done , quite undermine the very idea of the word person , for if he had not , he could never have forc'd himself to such absurd conclusions , but when as he has done , he has quite destroy'd all the distinction of the idea of that word , 't is no difficulty for him , to conclude as he has done , p. . letter . that there may be three somewhats in one god , diverso respectu . after all therefore , i say , granting that the being of three personal gods , were not repugnant to the very precept of the first and greatest commandment ; yet has the doctor been able by simile , or otherwise to make out , that there may be rationally three persons in one god ? laying aside even the first commandment , yet surely he has not , for these examples and illustrations are as foreign from his purpose , as even his enemies can wish , and therefore , i hope for the future the doctor will learn more modesty , than to set up such trumpery , to give us similes of unions , of chimerical relations , of measure , of faculties , of parts , and titles , for the probability , that the most compleat unity in the godhead may be in an unheard of manner , and not of persons . the doctor must needs have been more successful , as well as ingenuous , had he taken a plainer method ; thus for instance , had he said god is as a name of office , and may receive therefore many persons into the idea of it ; and the foundations of the unitarians error is this , they apprehend the word to signifie the office or supreme power , to be confin'd to personality in its unity . now i say , had the doctor fairly done thus , we should have known how to have attack'd him , but at present , having touched his subject so warily as he has done , we are put to the trouble to undermine his reasonings , to buffet at him in the dark , through similes , wary doubts , and twenty other little blinds . i say this , because had the doctor fairly told us that god signified an office , we should not have been so weak , as to have quarrelled at him for distorting the signification of the word , but we should have turn'd to arguments , to prove the thing ; we should only have desired him , to have thrust in iupiter , bacchus , venus , &c. into the office with them , and we should have been content , and let him take the idea as he pleases . nor does this very notion fail of opening my eyes more neither , for now methinks , i understand why it is we say , that we have but one god in natural religion , that is , we have but one council of gods personal , who having all power among them , and always agreeing , never contradict one another , and consequently manage all things with the same rule of providence , and there is no power besides sufficient to oppose them . but if this be our adversaries idea , as it must be , if they make the word god to signifie an office , and not a person , as is necessarily inferr'd , from saying there are many persons in the godhead : i say , if this be our adversaries idea , they would do well to speak it out more plainly , that the world may no longer remain in darkness , and that we may have the fairer occasion given us , to set them in a better way if this be wrong . nor shall my adversaries confused notion of the word person obstruct my reasoning in this case , by his artful falling from the proper signification of the word , to call it a somewhat ; for if there be any regard to be had to scripture , i shall shew by and by , that the trinity are persons as really , as properly , and as fully personally distinct as three angels ; and if so , i hope the doctor will not therefore leave his rule of faith because it turns unitarian against him . but before i proceed further , there seems to be two objections , that present themselves from the doctor , and 't is fit we should make our way plain , says he , p. . first letter , 't is hard to conclude an impossibility in the nature of god ; right , so it is ; but the doctor is mistaken , that is not what we pretend to ; we endeavour to make his first commandment and his unity sense , and methinks a sincere man , till he is able to do that , will have but little reason to value the rest and less material subsequent revelation . and methinks here our adversaries should be ashamed to charge us as they do , that we stick to chymera idea's of impossibility , and disregard scripture , for pray , what scripture shall we regard , in competition with this commandment , written by the finger of god , and one of the only precepts he himself immediately delivered ? did our adversaries deal ingenuously with us , they would shew us where this commandment is solemnly abrogated or explained , and not by blind implications , thus tear up the very roots of revelation ; methinks i cannot but blush for them , when i read their charging us thus unjustly ; but i hope 't is in their ignorance , and god forgive them for it . the second objection is , that our absurdity in denying the trinity , is like theirs who deny the resurrection , ( page . letter . ) alas , what will not mistaken zeal alledge , we neither deny the scriptures , nor the power of god , which they that deny the resurrection must ; indeed we can rather believe that god can make us almost infinitely more glorious . and what we deny , is neither the power of god , nor the scriptures ; our case is , we are afraid of idolatry , we only beg the priviledge of understanding how to keep the commandments ; and surely , if we are jealous that we are in any errour about them , we may have leave innocently to examine it , till we either have , or give satisfaction . in short , dr. wallis might as well have compar'd us to man-eaters ; for if there is any thing common in our offences , 't is perversness , and a blindness against conscience , and in that the man-eaters are as much guilty as the unitarians , and therefore i think he had done as well if he had compared us to them ; only indeed in this the man-eaters would not serve his turn , they would not cast so black a reflection , as the other does by their false and unjust inferences . nor is this the first time , that even the best of our adversaries have shewn their uncharitableness to us ; nor is this the least footsteep of it that i find even in dr. wallis ; thus he seems to insinuate a general aspersion upon us , that we believe not angels , letter , page . so that the socinians reject the scriptures , tho' not barefac'd , yet on the slight inference of their impossibilities , ( page , . letter . ) indeed he would seem to insinuate , he has a little more charity for some unitarians ; but i would fain know , whether that general imputation , be not a ground for a particular offence ? for is it not to begin with calumnies ? i shall not say the doctor has no better arguments then such topicks of prejudice , but methinks if he has , he might let those alone , which are more likely to harden then convince us . i cannot presume he has so mean a design , as to set up our opinions like a scarecrow , and then make sport by pelting of them ; and yet whether he designs so or no , that must be the effect of the basis of an opinion so expos'd . i am not concern'd that he cannot think us orthodox christians , page . letter . or that he can say , socinus , or any other author , has dropt imprudent words ; tho' i must confess , some of those he has quoted against him , no protestant i should think should be angry with him , for page . letter . but i am concern'd at his general uncharitable charges page . letter . that he should say , that we will not believe even what god says , letter . page . i am sure a refiection , he would very unwillingly bear , if flung upon the trinitarians , in destroying the first commandment . and just such another answer , i think , i may justly pass on those passages of his , where he as good as declares us reprobates , as , where he tell us , if any man list to be contentious , &c. but the humble god will teach , page . letter . so , bearing ye shall not hear , &c. page . letter . so page . letter . that our bottom reason against the trinity , is because it is nonsense . i should be unwilling , i say , to retort all this upon dr. wallis , and yet if i should , have i not as just a cause for it as ever he had , yes surely i have ; but my charity forces to hope the best , to think the best , that truth has not yet approach'd him in full light , that otherwise certainly he would have embrac'd it , and that if he is in any errour , whether he , or his fellow trinitarians , i say , 't is through ignorance or mistake . not that i write this , that god doth not harden some neither ; but who shall judge who they are ; who shall say , just such a sect ? when we condemn just such a principle , we know not what we do , and we are in a capacity honourably to make it out when we are call'd to it , but to condemn the methods of whole sects , we know not what we do . the next thing i shall take notice of to the doctor , is , the incarnation , which he says he that believes not must be damn'd ; but the doctor forgets here , that he writes against arrians as well as socinians , and that they own an incarnation as well as he , ( vide page . letter . and of the third letter ) if the doctor give me leave therefore to tell him , the arrian incarnation hath some sense , and possibility in it , but the trinitarian is impossible . the doctor does very well ( page . letter . ) to acquaint us of our ignorance , and to shew us that we know not all things , and that even in those things we do know , we are not infallible . a very good argument indeed , if applied ; we know not something , therefore we know nothing ; methinks this does not become a master in geometry and demonstration : or if it does , why did he argue further after it . i say then , for since he has reasoned on , i hope i may , that tho' a god in the arrian idea may become incarnate , according as is urged in the late vindication against dr. sherlock ; yet , for the supream god to become incarnate , is impossible , absurd , and blasphemy to say . pray sir , what do you make of god , a variable , changeable , dying thing ? in short , if such be your god , 't is not only against your own attributes of him , which call him immortal , but against all the known and acknowledg'd principles of the light of nature . forsooth , you can allow one side of your cube to be foil'd , ( page . letter . ) that is , one of your god 's to dye ; and if you can one , why not all ? and what a world we shall have then . no , but you say all can't ; and why not ? that which is mortal in the parts , is mortal in the whole ; and till you degrade the son's coequality , you will make me afraid that one time or other the whole god may dye too . in short , sir , you must excuse me ; that i do not search further into these reasonings , but refer you to that answer , i mention'd before to dr. sherlock . i must confess , 't is not pleasant to me , to unravel into continual absurdities , and tho' in charity i would not omit to give you and the world due information in such case ; yet my own sense bids me me put your self and others to this further referrence , that i might be the better spar'd pains , and you satisfied . but lest i should seem pretendedly to refer my reader , and to leave the doctor 's objections unanswer'd , i shall at least descend a lsttle further after them , and then i am sure i shall have done enough , when i can honestly think to my self i have omitted nothing in his book considerable . you say then , ( pag. . third letter ) the soul moves the body , and we know not how ; and what say you , can there be so heterogenous or disagreeable a union , as of soul and body ; material and immaterial possible , and should this be impossible with god ? a formidable objection indeed ; we do not doubt that god cannot move matter ; but we doubt whether god can die , or suffer , join'd with matter ; we doubt whether that man could be a god too , that could cry out , my god , my god , why hast thou forsaken me upon the cross. just thus , as it were at cross purposes , our adversaries assault us , we insist on one thing , they alledge another ; they tell us of the suffering , death , and merits of a god to redeem them ; and when we tell them , to say , that the supream god can be alter'd , much less suffer or die , 't is blasphemy : they answer us , what cannot god move a body or matter , as well as a soul ? no ; dr. wallis knows no impossibility , to have one side of his infinite cube or godhead foil'd , ( pag. , . third letter ) . he knows no absurdity , in reducing infinite power to the weakness of an infant ; and that too , in an infinite power , that another time he sholl say is immortal . good god! how happy should i be , had i but a pair of spectacles to see these things too . a second objection of the doctor 's in this , i take to be , that an atheist can puzzle us in the same manner , with an , ex nihilo , nihil fit : and the manner of god's making the world , as how it was possible , first to make something out of nothing : and thus by a likeness of difficulty , he thinks to get of by a problem , a real absurdity . pag. , . letter . alas , the doctor forgets , that the meer extent of the power of god , is what we have no adequate idea of , and that it is quite another thing , then for us to have an idea of some things that may dishonour god ; i may very well say , god cannot die , tho' i know not the extent of his power or wisdom ; so i may well say , he is prudenter than i , tho' i never heard him speak , nor never receiv'd any notion immediately from him ; and yet never by that , limit how far the wisdom of his providence may possibly extend . and methinks these illustrations might make the doctor ashamed , when they shew him how much he has abus'd truth by them . but what ? may be dr. wallis doth not think , that god in christ was tempted , suffered , or dyed , but only the man ? does he not ? how then will he found the merits on the godhead , in plain terms , if christ were only a man extraordinarily assisted by god , and thereupon merited by his sufferings and death , 't was the man redeem'd us by his blood , and not god , who was no more concern'd in him than one of us . by this time i presume , i have sufficiently examined into the doctor 's force in meer reasoning ; and now it will rest upon me , to shew what a slender pretence he has even in revelation also ; indeed , at first he seem'd to take it for granted , as if he was sure of christ's revelation against the first commandment ; but i dare promise him to prove , that the new testament is doubly more agreeable to the arrians , if not the socinian , than the trinitarians ; and whenever he shall undertake this challenge , he shall not want an abstract in print , to make it good ; and in the mean time , i shall content my self to shew , that all that he has hitherto cited , does not make to his purpose . and first , to shew him that his idea of the word person is heterodox , and unscriptural , i shall repeat but one text , which if duly considered , were not only enough to make him leave that opinion , but turn unitarian also ; but i shall leave it to take what effect it can ; it is iohn . , &c. howbeit , when he , the spirit of truth is come , he will guide you into all truth ; for he shall not speak of himself : but whatsoever he shall hear , that shall he speak : and he will shew you things to come : he shall glorifie me , for he shall receive of mine , and shall shew it unto you . all things that the father hath are mine : therefore said i , that he shall take of mine , and shall shew it unto you , a little while , &c. now would i fain appeal to any man whatever , with what words can a compleat distinction of personation , i mean of such a personation as is in men and angels , more plainly be set forth , and that both in the son and holy ghost ? for first : doth not this text demonstrate each person to be compleat and entire in himself . and secondly : does it not shew them so distinct , and separate also , that they plainly rely upon one another for information . i say , after this , what colour can there be for any man , as my adversary has done , to destroy as good as the very personality of the trinity , under pretence of not defining , i say , does not this look shrewdly suspicious , that he twisted this idea , to support the unaccountable illustrations of his simile . besides this , i might add many other texts , but as this is sufficient , and as scripture-proof is not the main argument , so i shall pass them by at present ; only this i must tell the doctor , that whenever he shall please to command them , they shall be ready , and at his service . having therefore clear'd this general difficulty of his , i shall now proceed to his particular texts , but yet not without this previous observation : 't is strange that so known a truth , as the mystery of the trinity is presumed to be , should be necessitated at every turn , to be thus supported by a new quirk , as it is ; dr. s — finds a loop-hole in self-consciousness , and dr. wallis having destroy'd the distinction of personation , thunders in upon us by the three sides of a cube ; but to leave their dreadful machines , and to return to the particular texts . one text the doctor alledges against us is , that we are baptized in the name of christ , ( pag. . third letter ) . but as to that , methinks he has been so often answered , that it has been only as our spiritual governours , and that even by the very scripture interpretation of it , cor. . that i admire how he can insist on it . a second text is , iohn . . to which may be added also , iohn . . but whatever the doctor pretends , these texts so wholly tend to a unity in harmony , and not in essence , which is so contrary to the same phrase in like case in scripture , iohn . that that doctor must excuse me , if i tell him he can require no better answer ; and he must farther give me leave to tell him , that what he writes in apology for the genuineness of the latter text , is by no means sufficient ; for however he may asperse the arrians , with that forgery , that has been the sole prerogative of their enemies , yet there is no ground for it , that text ha ving been all along so supicious , that many copies have had it only in the margent , and not in the text , which is no sign , the transcribers should ever have omitted it in forgetfulness or negligence . another text he cites , is rom. . . god over all blessed for ever . right , and did the doctor ever know a unitarian , especially an arrian , deny him that character ? indeed , we are apt to clog the title with that limitation the scriptures themselves have given it , to wit ; but unto the son he saith , thy throne , o god , is for ever and ever , a scepter of righteousness is the scepter of thy kingdom , thou hast loved righteousness , and hated iniquity , and therefore god , even thy god , has anointed thee with the oyl of gladness above thy fellows ; viz. angels in the context , heb. . but under that restriction , we can be as liberal of the title of god to christ , as any trinitarian whatever . nor will all the art the doctor has , be able to bring him over this rub , for surely scripture must interpret scripture , and if it must , this great chapter , which is purposely writ to declare the superiour nature of christ , must needs confound him , and set up arrianism in his stead ; nor in this case , will it excuse him to pretend the humanity of christ here is spoke of , for what , is the humanity of christ called god ? is the humanity preferred before angels ? or , did the humanity frame the worlds ? surely the orthodox cannot dote so , if they can't , let them ingenuously acknowledge , that this is an over-ruling text for the whole divinity of christ , till they shall instance a plainer to illustrate it . another text is , matth. . . to shew we ought to worship christ , and that from the words of christ to satan , when he tempted him , thou shalt worship the lord thy god , and him only shalt thou serve ; whereas that text alas , was design'd quite for another purpose , that is , it was an answer , whereby christ signified to satan , that he did know his duty to be , to worship the lord his god only , and not satan . to be short , there is no other text he has alledg'd , but what deserves no answer , unless it be his excellent art of turning , iohn . . and cor. . , , . ( p. . & . third letter ) viz. this is life eternal , to know thee , the only true god , and iesus christ whom thou hast sent . wherein , the doctor by his criticism , as well as in the other text , would fain perswade us , that the sole deity of the father is not contain'd in it , but alas , his allegations are such , that he might as well say , neither father nor son , are the true god , and pretend that to know thee , viz. the father , is one person , the only true god , a second , and jesus christ , whom he hath sent , a third . in short , this is so plain an artifice , that methinks when the doctor considers it , he will not for shame for the future , think that we abuse scripture more than himself . but before i quite leave this subject , there is another text that my adversary insists upon , to wit , the first of st. iohn , in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the word was god. now i say , though the doctor in this case may think hard of the socinians , yet as he writes against the arrians too , he ought to leave a little room for their sense , which is , may i say , doubly more rational , and agreeable to scripture too , than the doctor 's . i would fain ask the doctor , does this text insinuate that these two gods , to wit , the father and the word , are one ? or does it not rather acquaint us , they are two , and separate ? if so , does not the text i have already repeated in the first of the hebrews , plainly declare the difference between these two gods , to wit , that the first is the original fountain of power and all things , that the other , is but by him exalted , but yet as preferr'd before the very angels , that god , and son , by whom the god of all , not only fram'd all things , as by an instrument , but redeem'd them also , as 't is plainly insinuated by the text , and the rest of the chapter . i shall trace no further into these scripture-proofs , because i have no further occasion from the doctor , and as for any body else , i dare presume to say , whatever the doctor has done , in taking it for granted , that the trinity is sufficiently proved by scripture , that there are unitarian books , even lately extant , that have sufficiently evidenced the falsity of his pretences , and that not by means of wresting and forcing of scripture-words and phrases , but in construing them with all the integrity and fairness imaginable . and the reason i have not troubled my self to repeat those things over again , is , that i am asham'd to see they have so little effect upon our adversaries ; for to what end is it , to run out into nice controversies , when men have the face to deny the most manifest first principles ? however , i hope that this reign and tyranny of blindness will not last always ; i hope in time we shall meet with some men of that courage and sincerity , as may countenance our cause , and rescue distressed truth from her suppressors . i shall now draw towards a conclusion , and as i have hitherto taken care to avoid the errors of my adversary , in refuting them , so i now shall do him that justice , as to acknowledge , he writes with a charity like a divine , and though he is in an error , yet 't is with so much softness , generosity , and charity , that his very enemies cannot rebuke him for want of it . i cannot say , whether the first composers of the athanasian creed were of his mind or not , and whether they intended the damnatory sentences with his limitations ; but whether they did or no , which i must confess i am very apt to question , they ought to have done so , and wherein they did otherwise , they were to blame . indeed 't is an enthusiastick doctrine , to damn unbaptized infants , the invincibly ignorant , all before christ , fools , madmen , as our rigid trinitarians have too often done ; i think dr. wallis has done what ought ever to be reverenced . in short , the doctor in this , has shewn himself so good a man , that methinks i cannot but envy his party , that he is against us . but it may be questioned possibly , why have i wrote against him then , if i had such a respect for him ? i say not in resentment to him so much , for he has the charity of an angel , but least , that others relying on his strength of reasoning , should embrace his argument without his charity , or else i could be content , that the doctor , or any man , should enjoy opinions so innocent to themselves . for my part , i am glad to hear such healing words , as that men have abused the damnatory sentences , as that there is no anathema to the greek church , or the sincere of any perswasion , let it be as he says , in an extraordinary way , or as he pleases , in short , the principle , on whatever it is grounded , is heavenly , and breaths the true method to peace , unity , and concord , whereas the contrary censures , as he himself excellently observes , were enough to make the creed too formidable to be approv'd of , ( p. . third letter . ) therefore , without examining further into this matter , for i shall never discourage charity , and therefore i say , let the damnatory sentences be annexed to the generals of the creed , or otherwise , for it shall never concern me : i say , there is but one thing herein wherein i have reason to be concerned in at what he says , and that is , that he should tack his damnatory sentence to an explanation of the church , and not rather to the scriptures themselves . nor do i write this , that even in this case too , he has not left room for the invincibly ignorant ; but only that i am sorry to see him , so much to countenance a meer humane imposition , in forreign and unscriptural words , as trinity in unity , whatever they signifie , plainly are . and therefore hence it is , that i desire to be excus'd to put a difference , between he that believeth not shall be damn'd in the scripture , and he that believeth not a trinity in unity shall be damn'd , by the athanasian creed ; for surely , any man may be justly excus'd , that puts a difference between the direct word of god , and the traditions and interpretations of men ; and if so , there may be just cause to disallow the parallel ; and as long as we stick cordially and sincerely to the scripture , not to confine our selves to any particular man's , i may say church's interpretation whatever . indeed this slip or oversight in the doctor , almost makes me admire at it ; for when a man has reason'd so candidly and fairly as he has done , rejected the little prejudices of quotations , acknowledg'd our uncertainty in understanding the idea's of scripture words ; nay , granted us that disputableness that there has been , whether the creed itself were athanasius ' s , or not ? i say , when a man can be so candid , generous , and charitable in his reasoning , as to grant us , that the word person , the hinge of the controversie , is at least to us uncertain , and at best but metaphorical , and that it is no guilty ignorance not to define it , and that 't is the harshness of the idea of it , that confounds us ; p. . third letter . i say , when a man has gone so much further , as even to blame the fathers , for not admitting these words without adequate idea's , and defining them as he has done , ( p. first letter ) . i say , when he has done thus , methinks i wonder , how he can justifie their enforcement , and plead for what he himself at the same time , by an oversight condemns . these in short are my sentiments of the doctor 's book , and if the world think them fair and honest , let them cherish them accordingly , and in the mean time , let us all be ready and willing , not to let these controversies be lost upon us , but endeavour by them to recover or vindicate the truth , as she shall appear to us . i must confess , some men make light and sport of this dispute , as if it were but of a trifle , or a ceremony ; but when they come into another world , they may know , that this is a controversie of weight , that god is jealous of his honour , and that he does not love his creatures to be set up , to rival him , and tho' in his mercy , he may bear with us in such things , the better to draw us , if possible , to him any other way ; yet then we shall know , 't is not trifling to vilifie the god of heaven , to rob him of his honour , and to give it to his dependants , thô never so excellent . the god of all grace grant therefore , that these things may so sink into mens minds , that they may no longer persist in such evils , and that they may , let us all with one accord , address our selves to his almighty throne ; i say , let us never cease to sollicite him with our prayers and tears , thro' his dearest son christ jesus . amen . glory be to the father , thro' the son , and by the holy ghost . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e nota , these quotations and the texts , as they relate to the socinians , i do not meddle with , out leave them to his learned adversary before the socinian to handle them . a letter to the reverend the clergy of both universities, concerning the trinity and the athanasian creed with reflections on all the late hypotheses, particularly dr. w's, dr. s--th's, the trinity placed in its due light, the propositions, the calm discourse of a trinity in the godhead, and the defence of dr. sherlock's notions : with a short discourse concerning mysteries. tindal, matthew, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing t estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a letter to the reverend the clergy of both universities, concerning the trinity and the athanasian creed with reflections on all the late hypotheses, particularly dr. w's, dr. s--th's, the trinity placed in its due light, the propositions, the calm discourse of a trinity in the godhead, and the defence of dr. sherlock's notions : with a short discourse concerning mysteries. tindal, matthew, ?- . p. s.n.], [london : . attributed to matthew tindal. cf. halkett & laing ( nd ed.). errata: p. . "dr. w" is john wallis, "dr. s--th" is robert south, "the propositions" was written by edward fowler; "the calm discourse of a trinity in the godhead" was written by john howe. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng wallis, john, - . south, robert, - . fowler, edward, - . -- reflections on the xxviii propositions. howe, john, - . -- calm discourse of a trinity in the godhead. athanasian creed. trinity. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a letter to the reverend the clergy of both universities , concerning the trinity and the athanasian creed . with reflections on all the late hypotheses , particularly dr. w's , dr. s — th's ; the trinity placed in its due light ; the propositions ; the calm discourse of a trinity in the godhead , and the defence of dr. sherlock's notions . with a short discourse concerning mysteries . non quis , sed quid . printed in the year , mdcxciv . the contents . chap. i. the introduction . ii. reasonings upon the athanasian creed . iii. of the nominal trinitarians . iv. of the animadverter's opinion . v. of dr. w's hypothesis , and the trinity plac'd in its due light , and the rest of the nominal trinitarians . vi. of the real trinitarians . vii . of the propositions . viii . of the calm discourse of the trinity in the godhead . ix . of the defence of the dean of st. paul's notions . x. of mystery . the conclusion . a letter concerning the trinity , and the athanasian creed . chap. i. the introduction . gentlemen ; . i shall make no apology for proposing these difficulties to you : for as it is my duty to get the best light and information i can , to promote my eternal happiness ; so it is yours ( who are best able ) to give me all the help and assistance you can . could i have satisfied my self by reading what our divines ( who so extreamly clash with one another ) have written on this subject , i should not have given you nor my self this trouble . . to engage you the more freely to comply with my desires , you will have an opportunity not only to satisfy me , but also a great number of pious men , who are affected with the same doubts , which are occasioned in a great measure by the great difference and divisions that are amongst the clergy about the doctrine of the trinity ; who ( it is true ) agree in affirming that doctrine is a fundamental article , and that mens salvation depends upon believing aright concerning the persons , yet they extreamly differ about the meaning of the word person , without the knowing of which it is impossible to apprehend what the three are . . a man that is obliged to believe a thing , must first know what it is before he can believe it , otherwise he may be obliged to believe he knows not what ; it being impossible to believe any thing concerning empty sounds , or words that have no idea's fix'd to them . one can neither affirm or deny , believe or disbelieve a proposition that he does not understand ; it is impossible to assert somewhat of nothing , and what he has no idea of is nothing to him : one may as well be obliged to do a thing when he knows not what he is to do , as to believe when he cannot apprehend what he is to believe . to this it may be said , we are obliged to believe there is a god , tho he is infinitely above our apprehension . i answer , we are not required to believe more of god than we can conceive of him , nor is it possible , because belief is nothing else but the supposing the idea's we have of any thing are true ; and where we have no idea's , there is no subject for us to exercise our belief upon . if we did not apprehend what he is , how could we say that he is an all-good , all-powerful , all-wise being ? if any thing be so far a mystery as to be hid from human understanding , it is impossible to believe it : a man may believe there are mysteries , or hidden things , but he cannot believe those very mysteries , as long as they continue such . if belief could be had without knowledg , beasts might be as capable of it as men : from whence it is evident , that a man that has no idea at all , nor no true one of the three persons , is no more capable of believing aright concerning them , than a blind man is of colours . and if we will believe some of our eminent church-men , the utmost knowledg we can have of them , is like that of a blind man , who may believe there is somewhat called colours , tho he knows not what ; so may we believe that the persons are not meer nothings , but three somethings , tho what we can no wise conceive . . but is not this to ridicule the christian religion , and render it most absurd and irrational , in obliging people to put their trust in three they know not what , and to pay divine worship to each of them , when the meer light of nature obligeth man not to adore for god any thing , but what he believes to be an omniscient and an omnipotent being , both able to know and relieve his wants , and accept his thanksgivings ? to pay divine worship to any thing else is idolatry ; but to worship they know not what , or can frame no idea of , is the worst of all idolatries . to oblige people to worship three , and not to let them know what the three are , is hantering instead of instructing them , tho in a matter of infinite concern ; it is to give them a liberty to take what they please ( provided they stick to the number three ) for the objects of their worship . but if the three have any determinate sense , ( as there can be no doubt if there are three but they have ) it must be idolatry to take them in any other sense , because it is directing our worship to wrong objects , and adoring three that we ought not to adore , and consequently the mistake can be nothing less than idolatry . . and the danger of falling into it cannot but be very great since there are so many wrong trinities , and more every day encreasing , authors having such different idea's of them , that there are almost as many trinities as writers , each having a new one of his own ; and their trinities are not only divers , but opposite , as properties and essences , modes and minds , external denomination and real beings , &c. . they agree only in the same words , by which they make their party and number appear the more considerable ; but on the account of their divisions and subdivisions , they are the most inconsiderable of all sects ; and their differences had been much greater , had the generality but explained what they mean by persons , which they say must not be taken in its ordinary sense , but what other they should take it in , they are so far from agreeing , that they are infinitely divided amongst themselves , scarce three that venture to explain themselves , being of the same mind ; and they that have published what they supposed the three are , have fallen into gross contradictions , plain polytheism or sabellianism : and this has not been made apparent by the unitarians only , but by our own writers themselves , who have sufficiently shown the absurdities and contradictions of one another ; and he that has the good luck to write last , is sure to expose those who had the misfortune to handle this subject before him . . whilst each condemns the several explications of the rest as either inconsistent with the unity or the trinity , do they not all in their turns ( say the unitarians ) bear witness that our opposition to the trinitarian doctrine is well grounded and reasonable ? and is it not a grand presumption that their adversaries are in the wrong , since they destroy one another's hypotheses , but raise none but what are liable to the like exceptions ? and ought not each sect be less assuming , since not only the unitarians , but all the other trinitarians condemn them as guilty of paying divine worship to three to whom they ought not ? and ought not the unitarians to be treated with more moderation , at least , until their adversaries agree whether it be a trinity of minds , essences , somewhats , attributes , faculties , modes , external denominations , &c. they must adore ? to punish them before we can tell or agree what it is they ought to be punished for ( to say no worse of it ) is very odd , and yet in prosecuting them is the only thing the trinitarians agree in . in their explanations they differ more and wider with one another than they do with the unitarians themselves . but of that more hereafter . chap. ii. reasonings upon the athanasian creed . . there is nothing , with submission to these learned writers who have so much vexed this controversy , more unaccountable and absurd , than their jangling and wrangling about the meaning of the word person : it is a great argument they have forgot , or do not believe the athanasian creed , which saith , we are compelled by the christian verity to acknowledg every person to be by himself god. and if a person was any thing but god , or not the same with god , it would be idolatry to worship him . is it not a demonstration that those that pay the highest adoration to a person , have no different idea's of god and a divine person , but by adoring him do acknowledg him to be god ? and is not a divine person an uncreate , eternal , incomprehensible , almighty being ? and what is god but such a being ? we cannot have an higher idea of god than that he is such a person ; and to frame any other , it must be one that is lower , and consequently blasphemy against god. were there any thing more in god than in a divine person , he could not be god , because there would be somewhat wanting in him to make him god. in a word , if a person be god , there can be no real difference or distinction between them ; for no being can be but it self , it is the same with it self , and distinct and different from all others . and it is evident the scripture makes them the same : for heb. . . the apostle calls christ the express image of god's person : and col. . ● . he calls him the image of the invisible god : which two places shew there is no more difference between the person of god and god , than there is between the person of a man and a man. . if a man is an animal , all that is in the idea of animal must be contained in that of man , otherwise he could not be an animal . there is ( it is true ) more in the man , as rationality , which is wanting in the animal : but i suppose they will not say the same concerning a person , that he is god , and somewhat more than god ; especially when they say , that in the idea of god is contain'd that of three persons . but to speak properly , truly and naturally , man is no other animal than that which is rational , a man is a rational animal , and a rational animal is a man , they are convertible terms , and are only different words to express the same being . so a divine person and god are convertible terms ; for there cannot be more in the idea of god than of a divine person , because he is god : and it is as evident that there is nothing contained in the idea of a divine person that is not contained in that of god : to affirm the contrary , would be so far from making god three persons , that there would be something wanting to make him one person . person is a term which we give to all intelligent beings , either man , angel or god : and as we have no different idea's of man , and a human person , or of angel or angelical person , so we have the same idea of god , and a divine person ; and god is in holy writ described as a person : and as the father ( who is a person ) is god ; so god , as appears by a great number of texts , is a person , viz. the father . so that it is evident , there is nothing more in the idea of one than of the other , and that they are predicated of one another , and are convertible terms , and only different words , which signify the self-same all-perfect being . from whence it is evident , how absurd it is to say a divine person is a mode , an attribute , a property , or a somewhat , &c. . having , according to my weak ability , vindicated the honour of a divine person , and cleared the athanasian creed from speaking so contemptibly of him : i must desire of you to inform me how it is possible , since god and a divine person are the very same being , that there should be three persons and but one god ; is it not saying that there are three gods , and but one ? or at least three dei and but one god ? since there is no more difference between a divine person and god , than there is between god and deus . to say that each person by himself , that is singly and distinct from others , is god , and yet all three together are but one god , is to say a single person is and is not god : it is to say the persons are three and one in the same respect , viz. god , because the three and the one are the self-same god. in affirming god is three persons , and yet one person is god , the very same god that is three persons , you affirm that there are three and not three persons contained in the idea of god. and does not the creed make it damnation to believe any difference or distinction between god and a single person , because that must be denying each person is god ? and does it not also make it damnation not to believe a difference , nay so great a one as that three of the first are but one of the last ? so that this good , charitable creed only damns all those that cannot believe a divine person is , and is not the same with god. in a word , god , except at the same time he is three and not three persons , must either be three or not three persons . if he be not three persons , then there is an end of the trinity ; and if he be three , then a single person is not god , because god is three persons . a divine person is either an entire god , or a part , or an attribute , or property of god , or somewhat that is neither god , nor part , nor property of god. if a person be an entire god , then there must be as many gods as persons ; but if but a part or attribute or property of god , then each person is not god , because only a part or property of god ; but if he is neither god , nor a part nor property of god , no number of persons whatever can be god. but if the first person , and that god who is called the father , are the same numerical being , and if the second person is that god which is called the son , and the third person be the same with that god which is called the spirit , are there not as many gods as persons , since they are convertible terms , and signify the same beings ? how do you prove that there are three almighty incomprehensible persons , but because there are three , each of whom is an almighty incomprehensible person ? does not the same argument prove that there are three gods , since there are three , each of whom is god ? is not god predicated of each of the three as well as person ? if there are three almighty and divine persons , there must be three divinities , for the divinities must be as different , as the divine persons are to whom they belong , and three divinities necessarily infer three gods. i humbly desire to know the difference between three gods , and three , each of whom is god : if one is one god , will it not follow that three that are distinct from one another , each by himself god , are three gods ? to number three divine persons , and to say each is god , or to say they are three gods , is it not only a different way of expressing the same things , and equally inconsistent with both , to say there is but one god ? if one eternal almighty person , as for instance the father , be one all-perfect god , to whom nothing at all can be added , is it not down right effrontry to deny three such persons are three gods ? if an almighty person be multiplied , must not god be so too , except there are two almighty persons , and neither of them god ? to affirm the father is god , the son is god , and the spirit is god , and yet there is but one god , is it not to affirm there are three gods in number , and yet but one in number . . if these things must not be called contradictions , they must at least be allowed to be unintelligible , and consequently can never be the subject-matter of belief : and do not people , like parrots , repeat these propositions without apprehending them ? is it not saying a thing , and then unsaying it again , which is saying nothing at all ? if the last clause is to be believed , the first cannot , because the last is a negation of the first ; and if the first is to be believ'd , for that very reason the last cannot . the parts of any of these articles , when considered by themselves , it is easy to apprehend ; as for instance , when i say the father is god , the son is god , the spirit is god , or that there are three persons each of whom is god , these words are very intelligible , so are these , there is but one god ; but when i join these together i only contradict my self , and in so doing say nothing at all . i then can apprehend no sense or meaning in them , and consequently they cannot be the subject of my belief , or of god's revelation . . for that can never be revealed unto man , which he is not capable of understanding ; and if all must be damned that do not believe the athanasian creed , the compiler himself cannot avoid that fate . . in short , can there be a more absurd attempt than to endeavour to prove there are three divine persons , each of whom is god , and yet but one god ? because the arguments that prove there is but one god , must prove that there is but one divine person , because god and a divine person are the same : and on the contrary , the arguments that prove three persons , must prove three gods , because a person is god. as to the last , all the answer i ever met with is , that you do not say each is a god ; if we affirmed that each is a god , it would be , say you , a manifest contradiction to say there is but one god. but why may we not say of several divine persons , that each is a god , as say of several humane persons , that each is a man ; since god and man are universals , and predicated of more persons than one ? and each divine person is as much of himself god , as each humane person is man. to speak improperly will by no means solve the contradictions . . if the father is an infinite all-perfect being , and if the son is distinct from the father , he must , if he be a god , be a distinct infinite , all-perfect being : for the same being can be no ways distinct from himself , and certainly two distinct all-perfect beings are two distinct gods. . are not the father and the son relatives , and consequently cannot subsist but in different subjects , and what subject has each but god ? the father is god , the son is god , and consequently different gods , because different divine subjects . . if the son is the same god , as he is that begot a son , he must beget a son too , except the same god did , and did not beget a son ; but if he begot a son , he begot himself , which is begetting nothing at all , because he himself must be before he could act , that is beget himself . . to suppose the persons the self-same god , is wholly to confound them : because then there could be no more distinction between them , than between the self-same god and himself ; and it would be as impossible to pray to one , and not to the others , as to pray and not to pray to the self-same god. . if god be three persons , and each person is god , there must be nine persons ; because each single person must be three persons , otherwise he could not be god , who is three persons ; yet all these persons no ways differ from one person , one person is one god , and the several persons are but the self-same god , and can be no more distinguished from one person , than the self-same god can be distinguished from himself , because the several persons , and the single person and god , are the self-same being . . let the terms person and god signify whatever men please , yet as long as they say that each of the persons is one god , and that the three persons are the same god , there can be no difference between three persons and one , nor between first , second and third person . . for those things , according to the common sense of mankind , are the same with themselves , that are the same with a third ; and all knowledg , but intuitive , depends upon the truth of it : for when by comparing of two ideas together , their agreement cannot be discovered , if they , by comparing them with a third , are found to be the same with it , it is an evident demonstration that they are the same amongst themselves ; so that if the three persons , and one person , and the first , second and third person are the same with god , ( otherwise none of them could be god ) they are the same with one another , only different words to signify the same being . to deny this is to deny as certain a demonstration as can be , and to affirm it would be to destroy all intuitive knowledg , because by comparing , without the intervention of any third , the idea's of one and three , of first , second and third , their difference is most evidently seen . . on the contrary , if the persons are really distinct , and each is god , must not each be god distinct from the others ? for nothing without manifest absurdity can be distinctly predicated of three distinct persons , if it do not distinctly belong to each : and if the father is god , considered as distinct from the other two , and if each of the other two is distinct from him , and one another , will there not be three distinct gods , and consequently three divers and different gods ? for all distinction , that is more than nominal , supposeth at least a numerical difference and diversity ; and if god the father be not god the son , nor god the son god the spirit , there must be a numerical difference between them ; which every one that can number three must needs know are three gods ; for one god , and one god , and one god , none of which are the other , are three gods. . to say they are three persons and but one god , is a senseless evasion ; because god is contained in the idea of a divine person , a divine person is god : if a person is not god , but a somewhat distinct and different from god , no number of persons whatever can be god. . is it not equally as absurd to suppose three infinite persons as three gods ? and the same arguments that demonstrate the impossibility of the one , equally demonstrate the impossibility of the other . i desire to know but any one argument that holds in one case , that does not in the other . where is the difference between one god , and one divine person with all the divine perfections inhering in him , and so between three such persons and three gods ? . to suppose three all-sufficient persons , is it not to suppose two persons to no end or purpose , because one all-sufficient person as well as one god , is sufficient for all things whatever ? the truth of this is so very evident , that our clergy are forced to confess it ; yet they on pain of damnation require that we must believe three such persons , ( for which of the persons is not all-sufficient ? ) an all-sufficient father , and an all-sufficient son , and an all-sufficient spirit . whatsoever is necessarily in god , must contain some perfection ; but what perfection is it for god to be more than one all-sufficient person ? for if one is all-sufficient , the rest must be useless and superfluous , and consequently there cannot be a greater affront to the divine nature , than to suppose two such persons in it . but if it be a perfection in god to be more persons than one , the more persons he is , the greater his perfections are ; and god who has infinity of perfections , would be infinite in persons ; and an infinite number will no more destroy the unity of god than three . . there cannot be supposed in god more persons than one , without supposing an infinite number ; for what reason soever moved the first person to beget two persons equal to himself , the same reason ( because their nature is the same ) must move the others to beget their equals , and so on to infinity . . if the first person produced two equal to himself , it was no doubt an essential perfection of his nature , otherwise he might have chosen whether he would have produced them , and they , when produced , would have had but a precarious dependent being , since they must depend upon his will and pleasure for their continuance in being , as well as for their being . but if it be not essential to the nature of the son and spirit to produce more persons equal to themselves , their nature is not the same with the father's , and they want perfections that he has , or rather had ; who since he now produceth no persons equal to himself , has lost a perfection that is essential to his nature , and consequently ceases to be all perfect : so that the nature of the thing demonstrates that there is not , nor can there be more than one all-sufficient person . . to suppose three all-sufficient persons in god , is to suppose god more than all-sufficient ; for if there be in god three such persons , there must be in him three all-sufficiencies , which is sufficiently absurd : for how can there be an addition to all , or how can god be more than all-sufficient ? . is it not a contradiction to suppose three infinites of the same sort , because it is supposing infinite addition to infinite ? if it is absurd to suppose more than one infinite space , why is it not as absurd to suppose more than one infinite person ? . by what has been said , it is evident that three divine persons can no more exist than three gods , and that there is no real difference between a divine person and god ; and it is as evident that the church in her liturgy and creeds owns them to be the same : yet when the unitarians affirm you are guilty of gross impiety of adoring three gods , in paying divine worship to three persons , then you contradict your selves , and deny that god and a divine person are the same , and say that by person you mean a je ne scay quoi , somewhat that is inconceiveable , as well as inexpressible . nothing can be more disingenuous , than to say you do not apprehend what a person is , when you constantly say that the father , whom you mean by the first person , is god , and say the same of the second and third person . . but this prevaricating can serve to no purpose ; for either a divine person and god are , or are not the same : if they are not the same , it is idolatry to pay divine worship to a person , because you pay divine worship to a somewhat that is not god : but if god and person are the same , the paying divine worship to the three persons is the worshipping of three gods , because three gods and three persons are the same . . the same argument will hold whatever name you give the three ; nay , tho you are so very cautious as only to say the three , yet as long as you pay divine worship to each , you own three gods ; because the three are three objects of divine worship : for when you worship one , you do not worship the other two , but each by himself ; and you your selves own that nothing but god , without idolatry , can be an object of divine worship , and consequently three objects of divine worship are three gods. chap. iii. of the nominal trinitarians . . the next thing that in this creed seems to be as difficult to be apprehended , as three persons and one god , is , that not only a father and a son ( which all mankind agree do signify not only two distinct , but two opposite substantial beings ) but also a spirit proceeding from both , ( which demonstrates that he is a substance distinct from both ) are the self-same substantial being ; or in other words , three persons , and one substance . but this is only the opinion of the nominal trinitarians , such as dr. s — th , dr. w — s. &c. but the real trinitarians , who hold three real natural persons , such as dr. sh. the author of the propositions , &c. tho they solemnly damn all that do not believe this creed , do themselves assert as many substances as persons ; but of the difference between them , i shall have occasion to speak hereafter . . if one person be not a substance , no number of persons ( that are not substantial ) can be a substance . but if a person be a substance , there must be three substances , because substance is contained in the idea of person , and consequently as many substances as persons . all that we apprehend of a divine person is , that he is the subject in which ●ll the divine attributes exist , that he is ( as the creed declares ) almighty , eternal , &c. which is the same we a●prehend of the divine substance : tho we use the word person rather than substance ; yet all we perceive by either of them , or of the divine nature , essence , god , or any other word we call the supream being by , is ▪ that they are the subject in which the divine attributes inhere , and are only diff●rent words to express the divine being by . . but it is said , tho a person is a substance , yet there is but one substance , because each person is this one substance . but if the father is this one substance , how can the son , who is not the father , and consequently not that substantial being which is the father , be this substance ? or how can the spirit , who is neither of these substantial beings , be it ? is it not to say the first person is the divine substance , then to deny it by saying the second is , and to deny that too , by saying the third is , which is nothing less than a trinity of contradictions ? . they confess it is a contradiction to say , that the same substance is in three created beings , but they say it may be otherwise in uncreated or infinite beings , because the reason is not the same between finite and infinite beings ; and let the socinians ( say they ) prove , if they can , that the self-same infinite substance cannot be in three persons : so far i am of their mind , that it is a hard thing to prove it , so it is any self-evident proposition . it contradicts our clearest idea's , to suppose the same numerical substance that is in one person to be at the same time in another ; and we can as little apprehend what we mean , when we say the same numerical substance constitutes three infinite persons , as when we say the same substance constitutes three finite persons : is not the reason the same between an infinite person and an infinite substance , as between a finite person and a finite substance ? does not the idea of an infinite person comprehend the idea of an infinite substance , as well as the idea of a finite person that of a finite substance ? if by reason of the difference between finite and infinite , there is a difference between the number of persons that the substance is in , it would follow that the difference of number is infinite ; for the infinite distance which is between a finite and infinite substance , which they say causeth the difference of number , necessarily supposeth this . for the same substance to be wholly in one , and at the same time wholly in another , is in it self inconsistent , and consequently must be so , whatsoever subjects it is predicated of . for , . if those idea's that are in their own nature inconsistent , are not so when spoken of infinite beings , we cannot deny any thing absolutely of an infinite being . would it not be very ridiculous to say , that tho it is impossible for a finite being to be , and not to be , yet it may be otherwise in infinite beings ? for the reason is not the same , &c. the rule ( it is true ) of arguing from one to the other does not always hold : but that , which according to the idea's we have of either , appears to be a contradiction we cannot believe , because a contradiction is an affirming and denying the same thing of the same subject at the same time , which we are sure can never be predicated of any subject whatsoever nature it is of . but it may be said , that they perhaps are no contradictions in themselves , but only according to our idea's of things ; which granting to be true , yet it is impossible to believe what appears to us an affirmation and a negation of the same thing . we cannot believe that three beings , whether finite or infinite , each of which is a substantial being , have the same substance , because it is saying they are three and not three , but only one substantial being ; because , according to those idea's we have of things , the substance of any being , and the properties that belong to it , are noways different from the being it self ; so that if they are the same substance , they have the same properties , and are the self-same person , without any manner of difference between them . if one is not the other , and each is a substance , the substance of one can be no more the substance of another , than the being of one can be the being of another . by what has been said , i think it is very evident , that according to those idea's we have of substance and person , it is a flat contradiction to say , there are three of the one , and but one of the other . if you change your idea's of them , and not tell what idea's you have , it is impossible to be for or against that opinion . if you say you have no idea's of a divine person , you talk like parrots when you affirm or deny any thing concerning what you have no idea of . . if the persons are the same substance , then the same substance is begotten , and unbegotten ; and yet the substance that is begotten and unbegotten , is neither begotten nor unbegotten , but proceeding . so the same substance is self-existent and not self-existent from all eternity ; self-existent as it is the father's , but doubly not self-existent as it is the son 's and spirit 's ; so the same substance is incarnate and not incarnate : but if the divine substance is incarnate , must not the three persons be incarnate , because the persons are noway distinct from the divine substance , and the properties that are in it ? in a word , to suppose but one substance , is really to destroy the son and spirit ; because the divine substance could not beget any new substance , because that would be to suppose ( contrary to the creed ) two substances ; nor could any attributes or modes , or any thing that inheres in a substance be begot , because they cannot subsist by themselves ; nor can any thing that is in the self-existent substance , be said to be begot or proceed from the divine substance , because they are as self-existent as the divine substance it self : so that it is evident , nothing did proceed , or was begotten ; which does necessarily destroy the trinity , and the doctrines depending upon it . . the last evasion is , that tho the persons are the same numerical substance ▪ yet there is a difference between them , because they are three different ways the same . but supposing the divine substance to be three different ways the same , yet this would not make any difference or distinction between the ( supposed ) persons , because every person is the divine substance , which is three different ways the same , and consequently must have the same attributes , modes , and every thing else the same , that is in , or appertains to the divine substance . the same substance necessarily supposes the same attributes , properties , qualities or modes , which cannot exist but in a substance ; so that if the substance be three different ways the same , a person must be three different ways the same . to be different , and yet the same , is a contradiction ; nor is the matter mended by three different ways the same : for the same substance can be no ways different from it self , which it must be if it makes three different persons , each of whom is the same substance . to be , is common to all things , it is the different ways of being that makes the difference between things ; and three different ways of being makes three different things . in short , none but a metaphysician could have found out this distinction of the same substance having three different modes of subsisting , or being three different ways the same , which is wholly unintelligible , and consequently impossible to be believed : it is a multiplication without an addition , for to be three , or three thousand ways the same , adds nothing to a being ; for if it did , it would not be the same : so to substract from a being all the different ways of being the same , nothing is diminished from the being which is still the same ; so that as one is a multiplication without any addition , the other is a substraction without any diminution . chap. iv. of the animadverter's hypothesis . . the common opinion of the trinitarians , even from the beginning ( if we may believe the animadverter ) has been , that the three persons are not three substances , attributes , properties , or any real , but only incompleat beings , viz. three modes , which he saith have no existence of their own , such as absence , presence , dependence , change , ( which by the animadverter's leave are not modes , but relations ) or which will ( as he saith ) make one have a clearer idea of them ; they are the same in divine , as posture in human beings . if the persons are no more than three such modes , the difference between the unitarians and trinitarians is only , whether the divine substance or person ( taking person in the proper sense ) has three modes , or but one belonging to him , which even according to him , is but an immaterial and trifling difference , because the modes being but incompleat and not real things , can cause no real distinction : two at least of which may be absent without the least alteration in the divine substance or properties . besides , we cannot apprehend any thing in the divine nature analogous to posture , and three modes of the same sort ( as the three persons are ) are wholly unintelligible : how can we apprehend three presences or three absences ( for these are his modes ) of the same substance ? it is as impossible to distinguish three such modes , as it is three attributes of the same sort ; as for instance , three infinite wisdoms in the same divine substance . but it is said , a person is not a meer mode , but the divine substance with a peculiar mode ; but if each person is the divine substance , he must have in him all the modes , because he is the divine substance , in which the modes subsist . to suppose any manner of distinction between them , is to suppose a distinction between the same substance and it self , and that the same substance has modes in it which the same substance has not . . but can three modes ( supposing they did really exist ) cause so great a difference in the divine substance , that it at the same time shall be and shall not be incarnate , shall give satisfaction to it self and receive it from it self , can be both the sender and the sent , & c ? . if there be any thought , word , or any of those actions that are proper to intelligent beings , that belongs to one and not to the other , it shows that they are more than distinct modes , they are distinct , intelligent , substantial beings . and are not the father and the son in scripture frequently opposed to one another as intelligent beings ? the father knowing and loving the son , is not the son 's knowing and loving the father ; but each has a numerically distinct knowledg and affection , and consequently each his essence must be as distinct as his properties are . to deny that they are substantial beings , is not only to ungod them , and to deny that they are the subjects in which any of the divine attributes exist , but to deny they have any power to understand , to will , of which only substantial beings are capable . . they may as well say , several men are but one man with different modes of subsisting , as say , god the father , and god the son are different modes of one god , or one divine substance . they call them distinct modes , but by paying divine worship to each , and by giving to each , distinct from the other , divine titles and attributes , they own them to be distinct gods. they are most admirable modes , that have all the divine perfections inhering in each of them . . the animadverter sufficiently proves this has been the opinion of the orthodox for above years . but this must be said for them , they were in a manner forced into it , because they had no other way to keep up some face of a trinity , and avoid professing the apparent and open tritheism of the nicene fathers , who held the three almighty substantial persons , were no otherwise one god , than because they had the same common nature : and for the same reason they supposed three men , as having the same human nature , to be but one man. it had been impossible to have made that question intelligible , ( about which the eastern and western bishops so fiercely contended ) viz. whether the spirit proceeded from the father alone , or from the father and son , had they believed them the self-same substantial being . but this tritheistical notion was held ( as the bishop of sarum observes ) until after the fifth century , but curcellaeus proves it prevailed much longer ; but at last the clergy having found out ( a wonderful discovery indeed ! ) that three infinite , almighty , substantial beings are three gods , and fearing there was no way of disguising to self-evident a truth from the most ordinary capacities , yet not daring to call in question what the authority of so many fathers and councils had made sacred , they pretended that the fathers ( when in opposition to the arians , who held the persons are of an unlike substance ) said , they are of the same substance , that they meant the same numerical substance . and which is most unaccountable , tho the moderns said there is no other trinity than of three modes subsisting in one divine substance , yet they continued the old way of worshipping them as three distinct almighty beings . . in a word , that one almighty being should have three modes or manners of being the same almighty being , is a piece of jargonry that cannot be apprehended , and consequently not believed ; and it is no less than a contradiction , to say that one almighty being , by having three manners of being , should be three persons , each of whom is an almighty being : it is in plain english to say , that one almighty being does so subsist as to be three almighty beings . . but granting there are never so many modes , yet if each person has the divine substance , he must necessarily have all the modes , because they are modes of the divine substance ; except the self-same substance has modes that the sel● same substance has not , or that they are not modes but substances , and subsist by themselves and not in the divine substance . nor can modes ( if there are any such in god ) be less self-existent than the substance , since they are modes of the substance , which is self-existent . chap. v. of the hypothesis of dr. w — s. of the author of the trinity placed in its due light . and the rest of the nominal trinitarians . . besides the abett●rs of this opinion , there are a great many trinitarians who no otherwise differ from the unitarians than in name , whose trinities they not only allow but contend for . some of them say , ( and dr. w. has writ in defence of it ) that the three persons are only three external denominations of god , according to the different operations of his goodness towards his creatures , in creating , redeeming and sanctifying them ; which actions ( it is true ) can only belong to a person , but they noways suppose different persons : it is purely a nominal distinction in calling the same person by different names , according as his actions are different . what unitarian ever denied that god is our creator , redeemer and sanctifier ? others say that the persons are the same in god , as faculties in man , viz. understanding , will , and memory : but these are not persons , but powers and abilities belonging to a person , as the understanding is that ability a person has to perceive and compare idea's together ; the will the power to prefer thinking of one thing before another , &c. the memory the power of recollecting idea's . others say the three persons are the three attributes of god , power , wisdom and goodness ; ( and in defence of that opinion there is a book lately written , called , the doctrine of the trinity placed in its due light ) : but if there are no other trinities but these , none but an atheist , who denies the being of a god , denies that god has an understanding and will ; and , tho not properly speaking , a memory or power of recollecting idea's , because the idea's of all things are always present to him ; or denies that god is infinitely good , wise and powerful . if there be no other trinity but of infinite goodness , wisdom and power in one divine being , is it not idolatry to pay divine worship to three beings , each of which ( since each is god ) has infinite wisdom , power and goodness ? or if there is but one being with infinite understanding , is it not unlawful to adore three such beings , each of which has an unlimited understanding ? or if there is but one , that is our creator , redeemer and sanctifier , is it not polytheism to adore three , each of whom is a supream creator , redeemer and sanctifier ? do not these men the more they prove their hypotheses , the clearer demonstrate themselves guilty of idolatry ? against whom do they write but against themselves , and practice of mother-church ? not against the unitarians , who are really as zealous as they pretend to be , to defend the sacred truth of only one divine being or person , with infinite wisdom , power and goodness , who created , redeemed and sanctified mankind : yet these are the champions of the trinitarian cause . with what applause were the sabellian notions of dr. w's three respects or relations , preach'd before the university of oxford ? how has dr. s — th been admired for making the three almighty persons three modes or postures ? it must be a strange unaccountable doctrine that they pretend to vindicate , since they have no better way of defending it but by betraying it and writing against it . . do not the unitarians owe these men their utmost acknowledgments for vindicating their way of worship , and for joining with them against the polytheists and disguised pagans ? for so , according to their principles , they must look on all those that adore three all-knowing substances , minds or spirits , as dr. s — th does dr. she●● . is it not very strange , that they that pretend to believe but one almighty being , mind or spirit , can join with them , and use the very same words and expressions as they do who adore three almighty essences , spirits or minds ? it is very evident one party must grosly prevaricate with god and man. i would willingly know of the nominal trinitarians , which of their modes , attributes , faculties , external denominations , &c. is god the father , which is god the son , and which is god the spirit , and how they beget and proceed from one another ? must not these notions be very uncouth when they are applied to the incarnation and satisfaction ? but when they speak of these , then they are real trinitarians ; so a●e they when they endeavour to prove the spirit and logos to be persons ; then they take person in the same sense as the real trinitarians do , and say they are not the power and wisdom of god , because the scripture relates such actions of them as can belong to none but substantial beings , or which is all one , to beings that subsist by themselves , and in whom all the divine attributes do subsist . . it is a very difficult matter to know under what head to rank the generality of trinitarians , who will be thought to be neither real nor nominal trinitarians , and i think cannot properly be said to believe any trinity , since they themselves do not know what they believe , but are forced to confess in adoring the trinity , they adore an inconceivable mystery , which is only worshipping of words and sounds , since they cannot ( it being inconceiveable ) frame any idea of it , and the utmost they will venture to say of this most profound mystery is , that the scripture requires of us to beli●ve on pain of damnation , that there are three , without telling us what the three are , which at the most is but a trinity of cyphers , since they have no idea's further than the number three ( which it seems to them the scripture is very curious of . ) i think it cannot be presumed that men of so great sense , ( to mention no other than sarum and wo●cester ) would assert so absurd a thing , but that they knew if they declared what they suppose the three to be , that they must inevitably run into polytheism or unitarianism . if they really know not what they are , why do they pay divine worship to each , which demonstrates that they ( except they are guilty of wilful idolatry ) suppose each to be an omnipotent being ? and do not these men , for all their pretended ignorance , say , that it is blasphemy to deny that every one of the three is god , and that the first is god the father , the second god the son , and the third is god the spirit ? so that at last they do not make them three they know not what in god , but three gods whom they equally adore . if there were a law enacted , that on pain of forfeiting their lives , all must with an unfeigned assent and consent believe there are t●ree in the king , without declaring what the thre● are , would not such an absurd ●aw suppose the enacters of it out of their senses ? yet this is what these men suppose the infinite wisdom of god has done , in requiring man on pain of damnation , to believe there are three in him ; but what the three are that is too sacred for us to know . which is ( since all our ideas are terminated in three ) to believe in and adore the number three : but they say we have farther ideas than the number three , because they are called in scripture , father , son , and spirit : but the question will return , what three are the father , son , and spirit ? are they three gods ? no : are they three parts of god ? no : are they three attributes , or properties , or powers of god ? no : three names only ? no : what manner or sort of three are they then ? that , they say , is impossible to be known : so that it is evident our idea's can reach no further than the number three . but is not father in scripture the name of the most high god , and ( as they say ) so is son and also spirit ? so that it is evident they are names either of three gods , or else three names of one god : if they are names of three gods , then there are three gods ; if only of one god , then there is no more than a nominal difference between father , son , and spirit ; they are only three different names to express the same god. these men , as well as the rest of the trinitarians , can readily tell what every one of the three is , that he is god ; yet what the three are , or how they relate to god , they say it is impossible to discover : so that it seems the whole mystery of the trinity lieth in this , that tho every one can tell what each of the three is , yet none can tell what three they are , or how they are three . chap. vi. of the real trinitarians . . it is , i suppose , by what has been said , evident , that the hypothesis of but one divine substance , wholly confounds the persons ; and that they that believe it , were they consistent with their principles , could not be trinitarians : therefore a late author justly calls them nominal trinitarians , and the others that hold three real natural persons real trinitarians ; who yet , as well as the nominal , confound the persons , by saying they are the self-same god , because then they can no more be distinguished from one another , than the self-same god can be from himself . each must have the same substance , personality , and every thing else that god has , because each is god ; and they all must have the same that one another has , because they all are the same god. to suppose any difference between them , is to suppose a difference between the same god and himself ; and that the same god has somewhat in him that the same god has not . if they that are the same with a third , can never ( as hath been proved ) differ from one another ; for the same reason they that differ from one another , can never be the same with a third , and consequently different persons can never be the same god. to suppose god to be the same with each of the three persons , is to suppose him the same and not the same with each . for if god be the same with the first person , which he must be if the first person is god , he can be no ways different from him ; and yet he must be different from him , because he is the same with the second person , who is different from the first ; and he must be different from the second too , because he is the same with the third , who is different from both the other two . so that nothing can be more evident , if each has any property or any thing else to distinguish him from the others , it necessarily supposeth different gods , for the same god can be no ways distinct from himself , or have any property that he has not . . this supposition that each person is the same god , carries with it an innumerable company of most obvious contradictions , of which i shall instance but in one or two ; as the same god is , and is not self-existent from all eternity , self-existent as he is the father , but doubly not self-existent , as he is supposed to be the son and the spirit ; so the same god is both unbegotten and begotten , and yet this unbegotten begotten god , is neither unbegotten nor begotten , but proceeding from himself , as he is both father and son of himself . . if god the son was incarnate , and not god the father , do we not affirm the incarnation of one god , and deny it of another ? if you say they are the same god , then you affirm and deny at the same time the same thing of the same god. the modalists , to evade this , say , that the same numerical god was incarnate with one mode , and not incarnate with another , which is adding but a new contradiction , by supposing a mode to be , and not to be in the same god ; for if god is incarnate , all the modes that exist in him must be so too . if they are the self-same god , no thoughts , words , actions , operations , can any more proceed from one , and not from the other , than they can and cannot proceed from the same god ; nor can they any more beget or be begotten from one another , or send or be sent by one another , or give or receive satisfaction , than the same god can be the begetter , and the begotten ; the giver and receiver of the same satisfaction , the sender and the sent ; and tho he is all these , yet he is none of these , for the holy ghost is none of them . if the persons are the self-same god , how can their majesty and glory be ( as the creed saith ) equal and co-eternal ? is the same god equal and co-eternal with himself ? in a word , if god begot god , either he begot another or the same god ; if another , then undoubtedly there are two gods ; if the same , then god begot himself , tho at the same time he was in being and unbegotten . nothing can be a greater contradiction , than to suppose the same god begot the same god , because it is to suppose him to be , before he is , and it must necessarily destroy a trinity , because to beget ones self , is to beget nothing , because what is pretended to be begotten , was in being before . to say god begot a different person is a very weak evasion , for what is a divine person but god ? so that the objection will return , for this person that is begot , either is the same , or a different god. how can you condemn the unitarians when you cannot deny but that they worship the self-same god as you do ? for you cannot ( without introducing more than one ) deny that he that is only the first person is the self-same god , as he that is only the second ; and he that is only one is the self-same god , as they are that are three persons . if this be true , two persons are really nothing at all : for abstract in your mind two persons from god , there is nothing diminished from him ; for the single person that remains is the self-same god without any manner of alteration . so add to one person that is god , not only two , but two thousand persons , there is ( if they are but the self-same god ) really nothing added to him . yet when you add and abstract a person , you add and abstract god himself , because a divine person is god ; if their one person and your three persons are the self-same god , there can be but a nominal difference between their one and your three persons : so that nothing can be more evident upon supposition that the son and spirit are the self-same god with the father , that the difference between the unitarians and trinitarians ( were the last consistent with themselves ) is only about words ; they agree in the thing , both worship the self-same divine being , or god , only with this difference , one party calls him the father , the other calls him father , son , and spirit . . and the trinitarians , when they are not writing against the unitarians , give the same definition , or description of god , as they do , viz. that god is a simple self-existent being , which is a description that all men of sense and reason , in all times , have unanimously agreed in , which yet wholly excludes the son and spirit from being god , because neither of them is self-existent , nor would god be a simple being , if he is compounded ( or what other softer term you please to call it ) of father , son , and spirit . if you would give a description of god that included both son and spirit , you ought to say , that the supream being , is compounded of three supream beings , whereof only one is self-existent , yet these three supream beings are but the self-same supream being , or god , as any one of them is singly . . but how can either son or spirit be god , who is a being absolutely perfect , when they want the greatest of perfections , self-existence ? for whosoever has his being ( as they have ) from another , cannot be self-existent , because to be self-existent , or from none , are the same . . nor can the son and spirit be god , because they are not ( as god certainly is ) from eternity ; for whosoever has his being ( as they have ) from another , must ( except he can be before he begins to be ) have his beginning from another , and therefore cannot be from eternity , which supposeth no beginning . generation , procession , ( or what other term you use ) must be giving a being to that which always was in being , or from eternity , which is sufficiently absurd or else it must be a change from no being to being ; which supposeth nothing , or the ●egation of being to precede being , and consequently the beginning of being . so that to be generated from eternity , is the same as to have and not to have a beginning . but the contradiction is most notorious in asserting the spirit ( supposing him a person ) to be from eternity , because he owes his beginning ( or at least part of it ) to the son , who himself had his beginning from another . to evade this , they make use of a distinction of time and nature , and say , that the father was first in nature but not in time. . we cannot conceive any thing really first , but what is first in time. first in nature is purely a metaphysical notion , and relates not to the existence or duration of real beings , but only to the way of considering them , or rather external denominations , than beings themselves . as for instance , a man tho he must be first in time , before he begets a son , yet he cannot be a father before he has a son , because it is having a son that makes him a father , they being relatives cannot exist but at the same time ; yet the metaphysicians when they consider the relation , say , that the father , quatenus father , is first in nature , but their reason of saying it , is , because the person that is the father , is first in time. but these gentlemen when they speak of god , and his son , apply the distinction to the beings themselves , and say , that the person that is the father , was not really , or in time before the person he gave a being to . but what plainer contradiction can there be than to say that the son , who had his origin or beginning from the father , has had as long a duration as the father who had no beginning ? why may they not as well say , that a being that shall have an end , shall continue as long in time , tho not in nature , as a being that never shall have an end ? the truth of this is at first sight so clear , that tho some to uphold an hypothesis ( they find themselves obliged to maintain ) are forced to deny it , yet it can hardly be presumed they are in earnest ; and whatever zeal they may pretend to have for religion , they take the right way to make men scepticks and atheists , since even the existence of a god cannot be more evident than what they deny . and it is as evident , that if the son and spirit are not self-existent , that they are but made gods , that is , god the father is their efficient cause , who from no being gave them their beings , and consequently from no gods , made them gods ; and a made god ( taking god in the highest sense ) especially from all eternity , is a pretty odd notion . he that is not god of himself , as he cannot be that is not self-existent , because he has every thing that he has , his very being from another , must be a made god. chap. vii . of the propositions . . but to evade this ( and which seems to be the opinion most in vogue ) it is said the son and spirit are necessary emanations from the father , and that therefore they are from eternity : and this opinion is strongly defended by the most ingenious author of the propositions , by which he endeavours so to explain the doctrine of the trinity as not to make it contradictory to the light of nature . he saith , that three men or angels are not more expresly distinguished as different persons or substances by our saviour and his apostles , than the father , son and spirit are ; and he allows it to be a contradiction to affirm , that the three persons are but one numerical being or substance . the father only is self-existent , and that it is no less than a flat contradiction to say , the son and spirit are self-existent , but that they necessarily emaned or issued forth from him from all eternity . . that two infinite substances should emane from one infinite substance , is so gross a notion , that i wonder any man of sense ( especially so judicious a person ) should be guilty of it : and my reason is , because all infinites , of what sort or nature soever , are equal ; for if one infinite be less than another , there must be some terminus , bound or end of it , and consequently it cannot be infinite , of which there can be no bound or end ; or if one infinite were any ways more than another , there would be somewhat more than infinite , which is evidently absurd : therefore to suppose two infinites to emane from one , is to suppose two to emane from one when each is equal to the one from which it emanes . to suppose one infinite substance to emane from another , is to suppose the whole intire substance to emane from it self . and what makes it stranger is , that tho two infinite substances emaned from the father's single substance , yet there was no diminution in the substance of the father , it is as infinite as it was at first . but it may be said , why may not one infinite as well as one finite proceed from another ? nothing can be more absurd , than to suppose one finite ( much more two ) to proceed from one but of the same bigness . in a word , whether a being be finite or infinite , or of whatever sort or nature it is , to have two beings of the same sort to proceed from it , each of which is equ●l to it , is to suppose twice as much to come from a being as was in it . so that it is evident that an infinite can no ways come from an infinite , and consequently that the son and spirit are but finite beings , and that they , since they are not self-existent , were like all other beings created out of nothing . for a being must either be self-existent or produced of nothing ; to come from a self-existent being , is the same as to be self-existent . . for whatever emanes , or any way proceeds from a self-existent substance , must ( except it were created and then joined to it ) be as self-existent as the substance from whence it proceeded , because before its emanation it was a part of the self-existent substance ; it is only dividing one self-existent substance into three ( either bigger or less ) self-existent substances . . upon supposition that the son and spirit are necessary emanations , i cannot see how they owe their origin more to the father , than the father owes his to them , since they are all three of a substance that is self-existent ; nor could the father more than they be the cause of the separation , since they necessarily separated from one another ; that is , this infinite substance was divided into three infinite parts , and that too from all eternity , which is another contradiction , tho he supposeth the contrary to be so , because whatever proceeds from a thing must first be it , except it can be in it and proceed from it at the same time . . in short , the belief of emanations had been somewhat tolerable in those that worshipped the sun , a material god , to have supposed him divisible , and have parts continually flow from him . they might have fancied the rays to be their little gods , as they supposed the sun to be their great god. but it had even in them been most intolerable , to have believed those rays that came from the sun to be the sun it self , as each of the emanations is the very same god ( for there is but one ) that they flow from . . what he farther adds are direct contradictions : for , first , he supposeth the father alone the most absolute perfect being , and has several perfections that the others are incapable of , as all those perfections which relate to absolute independence and self-existence , which is the highest and greatest of perfections ; and the father alone is the only true god , the only good , and of himself god , and he is the first original of son and spirit , as well as all other beings ; and that the godhead in the highest sense can be but one numerically , of which the best philosophers were satisfied by their reason , and therefore the oneness so frequently affirmed of him in scripture is a numerical oneness . . but after all , this seeming exaltation of the father above the other two ( which one would think is sufficiently ungodding them . ) is only words , and gives him no real perfection or preheminence above them , since he allows them all divine perfections but self-existence and absolute independence , but he makes them amends in giving them necessary existence from all eternity , which certainly is ( if there be any difference ) as great a perfection as self-existence it self , which is for no other reason so great a perfection , but because it includes necessary existence , which can belong to none but him that is self-existent , because all other beings that owe their existence to him ( as all beings whatever do ) must wholly depend upon him for their continuance in being as well as for their being : for the same power that was able to give them their beings , must be able ( tho perhaps it may never be his will to do it ) to take them away , because no greater power is required to destroy a being , than there was to make it exist ; and if the father has given existence to any being , which he cannot take away , but it must as necessarily exist as he , he would lose some of his power , and consequently would cease to be almighty . self existence , sep●rate from those powers and abilities which can only belong to a self-existent being , is no perfection ; and any being , tho from yesterday , yet if it had all these perfections a self-existent being has , would be as absolutely perfect as it . if the persons have the same unlimited perfections , yet if their manner of getting them was different , that would not cause any inequality between them ; yet is not the manner of having them the same , had they not them as well as the father necessarily from all eternity ? wherein consists the intire dependence of the son and spirit , not only for their being , but for ( as he saith pag. ) their continuance in being ? since they as necessarily exist , and that from all eternity , as the father , who , tho he gave them their perfections , yet if he gave them the same he himself enjoys , and which he cannot deprive them of , why is he more absolutely perfect than they ? if a human father had two sons , who had the same perfections as he , and did as necessarily exist as he , nay , were as old as he , who too could not help giving them their being , why would they not be as equally perfect as he ? tho after all , what can be more absurd , supposing they are from eternity , that they have a father , or that any one can be ( as he saith the father is ) their original , since they had no origin , or beginning , but were from all eternity ? . how can the father be greater than the son and spirit , or be the only good , when they have the same unlimited power and goodness , as well as all other divine attributes ? what greater absurdity can there be , than that beings that have infinite unlimited perfections , should want some perfections ? a being cannot be partly infinite and partly not ; and if it has any , it has certainly all infinite perfections , and the father himself cannot have more than infinite perfections ; and since it is evident there can be no inequality between infinite beings , if there is any between the father and his two sons , it is evident the two latter are not infinite . . this hypothesis more openly than any other , asserts more than one god ; for the more he distinguisheth the son and spirit , the more he makes it impossible they should be the same god ; nay , he saith that god , when applied to the father , is taken in a different sense than when applied to the son , and yet he would have us believe them but one god , and consequently the same god , which is to believe them different , and yet the same ; we must have different idea's of them , because each is god in a different sense , and yet we must have the same idea's , because they are the same god. if each is god , nothing can be more evident than they are not the same god : for he that is a most absolutely perfect god , the only true , the only good , and of himself god , can never be the same god with him that is not absolutely perfect , nor a true god , nor a good , nor of himself god. he that is an independent god , can never be the same god with him that is a dependent god , except you say the same god is both dependent and independent . can he that is god in the highest sense , be the same god with him that has only a right to the name of god in a sense next to that which is appropriated to the father , as he saith ( § . . ) the son only has ? . that the son is a dependent god both for his being and his continuance in being , and has a right to the name of god next to that which is appropriated to the father , no unitarian ever denied ; but then they supposed it proved he was no infinite being , because all infinites being equal , he , if infinite , must have an equal right ; and because the father is greater than the son , they conclude the son's greatness was finite and limited , it being impossible to be greater than he that has unlimited infinite greatness : and since he has but finite perfections , they were so weak as to conclude there is an infinite distance between the father and him . what can be more absurd than to say , a being that depends upon another for his being and continuance in being , has necessarily unlimited power , wisdom , goodness ? such a being is a meer creature , and has only a precarious being , and of him it may be said , as of all other creatures , that in god he lives and mo●es , and has his being . . if god is ( as he saith the scripture affirms ) numerically one , and the father is this numerically one god , is it not directly contrary to the whole tenour of scripture to pay divine worship to any other ? the lord your god is but one , and him alone shalt thou serve ; there is no other to be adored ; or , which is all one , thou shalt have no other gods but him . i say ▪ is it not strange , that any that owns this , should rob his god , who requires him to serve him with all the faculties of his soul and body , of that honour which he is so jealous of , and which he expresly forbids to be given to another , and give it to two dependent , and not true gods ? but he supposeth they are but one god by an unconceiveably close union both in will and nature , which unconceiveably close union , he ( § . . ) saith is much more easily conceived than that between body and soul : and in another place he saith they are substantially united . . if there is but one god absolutely perfect , and the father is this one god , nothing can be added to him , because if there can , he is not of himself absolutely perfect ; therefore it is absurd to tack two persons to him , who of himself is an all-sufficient , and an absolutely perfect god. but , upon supposition they are as entirely united as can be , yet whilst they remain distinct , each with his own personal unlimited power , &c. each is a distinct , nay an absolute independent god ; and the most that can be said is , that they are three united gods. if the union of their substances , or any thing else make them but one god , why do you say each is god , and pay divine worship to each by himself ? which is to say there is but one god , and yet worship three gods : what can be more absurd than to say , they are one god by union , and yet each is god distinct from the others ? for he saith , god the father is as distinct from god the son , as any man and his son can be , they are substantially distinct . if union was the cause of their being one god , each must either be this one , that is , the same god , which i have already shown is impossible , or else they must be but parts of god , as body and soul are parts of man , and by their union compose one god. . i think the real trinitarians do very wisely in supposing their three infinite substances to be as close together as can be , lest otherwise there should not be room enough for them in but one infinite space : but if they are more than one , they cannot be infinite , because being substances of the same sort , they must be bounded and limited by one another . if the substance of the father be every-where , how can the substance of the son be every-where too at the same time , and after the same manner ? for if beings can be in the same place at the same time after the same manner , as they must be if they are of the same sort , it is impossible to distinguish them , because we have no other mark of distinction between beings , but that they cannot be at the same place in the same manner at the same time . . they illustrate the union that they suppose is between the persons with several similies , as for instance ; they say the persons are one god , as the body and soul are one man : if the body had been a man , and the soul a man , and whilst they remained so but one man , as each of the three is god , and yet there is but one god ; this i confess had been to the purpose . another simily they lay a great stress on , is of the close union of the sun with its light and heat . but if there were no more a trinity in god than there is light and heat in the sun , there could be no such thing as a trinity ; because tho there is in the sun a power to produce heat and light , as well as pleasure and pain in sensible beings , yet there are no such perceptions , as we call heat and light , in any being , but those that are capable of feeling and seeing ; this every common system demonstrates , and it is obvious to all but children and metaphysicians . in a word , nothing is more unlike than theological similies . is the union of the stream to the fountain from which it is perpetually running , a fit ( tho it is a very frequent one ) simily to express an eternal close union ? the same may be said of the rest . but to return . . this hypothesis is only rational , as far as it is heretical ; that is , as far as it contradicts the doctrine of the church and the athanasian creed , in supposing so great an inequality between the persons , as that one is the greater , and the other two lesser gods , who can no more be the same god , than great and little can be the same . and therefore the trinitarians that are of this opinion are to blame in paying the same divine worship to the two inferior gods as they do to the superior ; for whilst they make no difference in their manner of worshipping them , but pay the same honour to each of the three , they in the most criminal manner that can be own them to be three equal , that is , three supream gods. but as there can be no inequality between infinite beings , so we cannot pay a lower degree of honour to the son and spirit , without supposing an infinite distance between them ; for as long as we pray to each , as having inherent in himself infinite goodness , power and wisdom , and our devotion terminates in each , we give each the same divine honour ; we cannot alter those idea's , and pay less worship to the sun and spirit without supposing that the power or greatness they have is not inherent in them from all eternity , but that it is the free gift of the father ; and tho we bow to them , it is to the honour , and for the sake of god the father , so that the worship ultimately terminates in him . chap. viii . of the calm discourse of the trinity in the godhead . . the next hypothesis i should have examined is that of the inquirer's , concerning a possibility of a trinity in the godhead : but because it has been done so fully by an abler hand , i shall only observe that he , to avoid having three gods , has invented ( for the notion is wholly his own ) an hypothesis that makes none of them god ; for he supposeth father , son and spirit to be three single essences , and that they joined together do constitute the entire , individual essence of god , which is in effect saying that each is but the third of god , because god being three essences , and each person being but a single essence , he must want two essences , that is , two parts of three to make him god. this is most certain , three persons must be either three entire gods , or three parts of god , or else neither gods nor parts of god. the first cannot be ass●rted without directly owning three gods , and by the last , all three could not be god , therefore i suppose he made them three parts , or three inadequate gods : and that makes him ( p. . ) say neither father , son nor spirit sejunctly taken is god , and every where up and down his book a great deal to this purpose , tho at the same time he contradicts himself , and saith , each is the only true god. . this notion of three inadequate , imperfect , incompleat gods , destroys the eternity of god , because whatever is imperfect in its kind ( as an inadequate god is ) can never ( as all allow ) be from eternity . nor can three inadequate gods or persons by their union make one adequate one● beings of a different nature ( it is true ) upon their union may make a being more perfect than when they were separate ; as a man has more perfections than body and soul have in a state of separation . but it is otherwise when beings of the same nature are joined , because their perfections being of one and the same sort or nature , there cannot arise upon their union any new or different perfections from what they had when ununited , as it is evident in all mixtures of the same sort ; so three spirits if they were united , would be so far from being more perfect , that they would only be a clog and hinderance to one another . but it is evident for another reason too , that three divine spirits or persons can acquire no perfection by being united , because each has of himself , and by himself , infinite perfections , and all three together can have but infinite perfections . but it may be said that the enquirer's notion supposeth that each being god in an inadequate sense , each has not infinite perfections . . but if each has not infinite , each has but finite perfections , and any number of beings with finite , will never make one with infinite perfections . and if each is a being infinitely perfect , each is as much god in the most adequate sense , as all three together , because all can have but the same ( that is , infinite ) perfections , as each has by himself , which not only proves the union , but two of the persons wholly useless and needless . for to what end should there be three persons in god , when all three are no more wise , good and powerful than any one is singly ? the three have but the same attributes as each singly has . . tho this notion of three inadequate gods is strangely absurd , yet none of the trinitarians , besides the author of the propositions , can say that any of their persons is a most perfect god , because there are two others as perfect ; nor can they say that any of them is a most high god , because there are two that equal him , which none can the most high god ; nor can they say any is the only true god , since there are two others as truly god as he ; nor can they say each is supream , because supremacy admits of no equality . . tho he supposeth a more close and inconceiveable union between them than any between finite beings , yet by making them a club or cabal of gods he destroys this intimate union , and makes them as separate as so many men ; for ( p. . ) he saith , they are delicious society to one another , and is so fond of this notion , that he spends several pages to show how they entertain one another with mutual complacency and everlasting harmony . but can any thing be more senseless than this ? society , it 's true , is a happiness to men , because they want the assistance of one another , and conversation serves to instruct and divert them , who would be otherwise oppressed with their own thoughts . but what assistance can be given an omnipotent being ? or , what can be discovered to an omniscient one ? but i beg his pardon for forgetting his gods are but inadequate , and therefore may be ignorant of several things , and want each others company to pass the time away most deliciously . . as gross as this notion is , yet i can see no reason why it should seem absurd to any trinitarian , when they suppose their three divine persons so distinct as that they discourse with one another ; and when man was made , they imagine there was a consult of the whole trinity about that weighty affair , and that one said to the others , let us make man : nay , they do not only suppose that they discoursed with one another , but that the son as god really wanted glory , and prayed to the father ( joh. . . ) to give it him ; it is strange that a most high god should want and beg of another to supply him . . i shall make but one remark more on my enquirer , and then take my leave of him ; he ( p. . ) saith , if it be asked what we do conceive under the notion of god but a necessary spiritual being ? i answer , this is a true notion of god , and may be passable enough even among pagans . but if this be a true notion , the other must be a false one , for god cannot be but one , and yet three necessary spiritual beings , or essences ; and if he be three such beings , the pagans had a false notion of god : but if the pagans know no other , it is impossible we should , because the apostle ( rom. . , . ) speaking of the pagans , saith , what may be known of god is manifest in them ; for god hath showed it them . for the invisible things of him from the creation are clearly seen , being understood by the things that are made , even his eternal power and godhead . therefore if there are three divine persons each of eternal power and godhead , equally creators and protectors of mankind , the creation and things that are made would have discovered them ; but they are so far from that , that they demonstrate that there is but one person that created the world. it is impossible that the same numerical act or acts of creation could be done by three persons , because the self-same act cannot be done three times ; and if one person does an act , no other can do the self-same . consequently there could not be three supream creators of man , except you suppose they divided the work between them , and one created the head , another the limbs , and the third the body : but if one person created the whole man , how could two other persons create him , except the same man was three times created ? it contradicts our clearest idea's to suppose that one person does an action not of the same sort , but the very numerical action another does . but supposing it possible , can it be presumed , that the creation of the world , and the things that are made , which show the infinite wisdom as well as power of god , and which demonstrates that whatever he has made is not in vain and to no purpose , should teach men that there are two needless and useless persons in god himself , whose actings are to no manner of purpose , only to do what the first person is , not only all-sufficient to do , but actually and wholly does ? the father , it is certain , has both a free will and power to do and not to do whatever he pleaseth ; but if the son and spirit must necessarily do the same act , they are no other than necessary agents , and all the power must be in him , with whom they cannot help doing the same acts he wholly does : but if each has a distinct will of his own , ( as it is evident they have ) wh●t necessity is there that they must will and act , especially in indifferent matters , the same things ? besides , it is apparently false that all three do , or concur to the doing the same actions ; the scripture being full of actions , especially those they do to one another , as one being sent by another , their going from and returning to one another , which is impossible to suppose they all equally concurr'd in . nay , do not the trinitarians say that opera trinitatis ad intra sunt divisa ? and what greater argument can there be that they are separate gods , than that they act separately ? the father acted when the son and spirit did not , nor could not act , because they were not in being , it being the father's act of generation that gave them their being . so that it is evident one can act separately from the others , and consequently they cannot be one but in a civil , political or moral , and not in a natural sense . but they say they are one in a natural sense ad extra , that is , in relation to the creatures . but can the divine beings be one and not one in a natural sense , or be and not be at the same time naturally united ? but they cannot deny that they act separately ad extra , even with respect to the creatures : did not god the son take the man christ into his godhead , when neither of the others took him into theirs , or were united to him ? nay , they are so far from being one in a natural sense , that there is not so much as a moral union between them , they have different wills and inclinations ; as for instance , the first person will not forgive mankind without having satisfaction given him even by a divine person ; nay , they say his justice could not be satisfied without it . but why could not the justice of the first person be satisfied without infinite satisfaction , as well as that of the second person , who is the self-same god , and consequently samely offended ? yet he is so far from being of the same mind with the father in requiring satisfaction to be given him by a divine person , or by any other , that he freely offered himself to suffer , even to death , to appease the wrath of the first person ; and still interceeds for us to the father , of which there could be no need if they were of the same mind concerning mankind . as to the third person , tho he is equally or rather samely offended , he seems to be of a different mind from both , and neither gives nor receives satisfaction . . by what has been said ( tho a great many more instances might be brought ) it is evident , that they are not one either ad intra , or ad extra in a natural sense , and that the trinitarians ( were they consistent with themselves ) can but suppose them a council or committee of gods , where sometimes one is president , and sometimes another is in the chair , and accordingly things run in each of their names , as the works of the creation in the father's name , tho each is equally a creator , so the son redeems , and the spirit sanctifieth mankind , tho they are all three equally redeemers and sanctifiers . . as the creation evidently proves that there is but one divine person , so the protection and preservation of the world suppose but one supream governour , even that person that created all things . three , each of whom is a supream governour , ( supream power being indivisible ) is a contradiction , because it supposeth each to be and not to be supream . the heather● dividing the supream government of the universe between the three brethren jupiter , neptune and pluto , was intelligible , because each had supream power , not over the whole , but only a part of the universe . i wonder under what form of government the trinitarians reckon that of the universe ! monarchy it cannot be , because there is in that but one person that is supream , but here are three , each of whom is supream . . as the creation , preservation and supream government of the universe demonstrate that there is but one divine person , so that adoration , love and gratitude , that by the light of nature as well as god's revealed will , is due for our creation and preservation , can be paid but to one divine person , whom we are to love and adore above all other persons and things ; which is impossible to be done if we must pay equal love , gratitude and adoration to two others , because that would be robbing him , by giving that to others which is his due , in which consists the crime of polytheism : it can no ways allay the crime to call them persons instead of gods , since paying divine worship to them does as much rob the only one of his due , as if you had called them so many gods. if it be our duty ( which i suppose none will deny ) to love god with all our hearts and souls above all other things and persons , and to adore him with all the faculties of our souls and bodies to the utmost of our power , it must be our duty to love the father so ; but then how is it possible to love two other persons as much as him , and to pay them equal adoration ? we can then give him but a third of our devotion , of our love , or of our hearts and souls , except we have a trinity of hearts and souls . in short , it is impossible to pay that duty which we owe to the supream governour of the universe ( who requires the whole man ) to more divine persons than one , as it is to pay allegiance to more than one supream human person . . in a word , it is so very evident by the light of nature , ( which revelation never contradicts ) that there is but one divine being , call him god , person , mind , spirit , or what else you please , with a power to know and do all things ; that the heathens were without excuse in worshipping of several . and if their crime was so great , how much greater must theirs be , who not only sin against the light of nature , but also express revelation , in paying divine worship to more than one necessary spiritual being ? if paying divine worship to one being or person is in the highest sense that can be the acknowledging one god , why is not paying the same worship to another person the owning of another god ? if adoring several beings , each singly and by himself , is not the worshipping more gods than one , it is impossible to be guilty of polytheism , it is but calling them divine almighty persons ; and tho you say each is god , and pay divine worship to each , you are out of danger of committing idolatry ? . not only the unitarians , but all mankind that worship but one divine being , are greatly scandalized at those christians that pay divine worship to several , and demand of them why that which they account the greatest of crimes in the heathens should be the greatest of vertues in themselves . i beseech you ( for it is a thing of infinite consequence ) to let me understand how the heathens in their devotions did , or could do more to distinguish their divine beings than you , by praying to each by himself ? that is , when they prayed to one they did not pray to the other , but their devotion terminated on each : do we not do the same thing ? as when we pray to the father , we do not pray to the son , but to each by himself : and do we not give to each the titles and attributes of a most high god , and in our prayers make as great distinction between the father and son , as ever the heathens did between father jupiter and son hercules ? do we not desire one to be kind to us for the sake of the other , and one to mediate to the other , and an hundred more instances , even where we oppose one to the other ? and do we not in our creeds expresly say , the son is god of god , very god of very god ? how can we after that pretend to say they are the same god ? in a word , it is impossible for the heathens to relate more different or more opposite actions of jupiter and hercules , than you do of god the father and god the son , which demonstrates that you make as great a distinction or difference between objects of your devotion as they did , or as it is possible to do . nay , it is impossible for men to conceive them the same god , when such different actions are reported of them , as god the father sending god the son , and then again , both sending the spirit ; god the son descending from heaven and assuming flesh , when neither of the others did : again , god the spirit descended in a bodily shape , god the father or god the son not descending , and an hundred other actions which the scripture relates of one god , and denies of the other two gods. in short , all the difference between you and the pagans ( as all mankind besides your selves agree in ) is , that tho you alike worship more beings than one , yet they do not increase their guilt by denying their polytheism , nor are they so cruel in persecuting them that differ from them , nor do they so much sin against their own reason , in framing so many absurd inconsistent notions , and contradictory articles of belief . . these things are so frequently objected , and so little care is taken to answer them by our writers , who , for the most part are only fond of venting absurd and silly hypotheses inconsistent with their manner of worship , that i thought i could not do better than to represent these things to you , that we may ( if it be possible ) receive a full and satisfactory answer . as to the authors of the propositions , and of the enquiry , their notions are much more tolerable than what has been urged by others , and they avoid a great many contradictions others are full of : chap. ix . of the defence of dr. sherlock's notions . but none so much as the author of the defence of the dean of pauls against the animadverter , in which one might after so long a silence of the dean , reasonably expect all that can be said to clear him from the imputation of tritheism , so much and so home charged on him by his own party . . the design of his book seems to be , to prove that those that pay divine worship to three persons , are as much guilty of idolatry , as they that worship three minds , because mind and person are the same ; and he proves they are the same with one another , because they are the same with god ; and ( p. . ) every person is by himself god , and god is an infinite mind ; and ( p. . ) god and infinite mind are convertible terms , and that god is an infinite mind , and an infinite mind is god ; and that the socinians therefore conclude , that god is but one person , because god is but one infinite mind . if god , infinite mind , and person , are convertible terms , there is nothing more contained in the idea of one than of the others , they are only different words to express the same being . how can he then , without contradicting himself , say , that there are three persons or minds , and not three gods ; or say three minds by mutual consciousness are one mind , without saying three persons are by the same but one person ? and ( p. . ) tho he makes no distinction between essence , or substance and person ; the divine essence he saith is a substantial person , or the divine substance , yet he will by no means allow as many substances as persons . but to avoid the contradiction of three persons and but one essence , since he makes person and essence the same , he saith the essence is repeated without being multiplied , nay , without the least change or alteration in three distinct persons : but must not then a person , since person and essence are the same , be repeated in three essences without the least change or alteration ? but what can repetition be , or what can it cause , when it makes no manner of change or alteration ? is not repetition a numerical multiplication ? if it be not that , it is nothing at all , and he useth distinctions without any manner of difference ; so he does when he saith the divine essence is not a single , but an individual essence : if he knew any difference between single and individual , or between repetition or multiplication , why had he not shown it ? if the divine essence is but one , it is single ; if it be not single , it must be double or treble , and consequently a double or treble god : but how can he help making three essences , when ( p. . ) the substantial persons are as distinct as any three men whatsoever ? and three men who are essentially , substantially distinct , are certainly three distinct essences . what he saith ( p. . ) is a whole troop of contradictions , that the whole divine essence is originally in god the father , that this same essence was by eternal generation communicated to the son , and subsists distinctly in him , and that the same essence is by eternal procession communicated by the father and son to the spirit , and subsists distinctly in him . . if the father communicated his essence to the son , he communicated himself , who is no ways distinct from his essence ; or could he give his numerical essence to his son , and yet keep it himself ? which is to keep it and yet part with it , to give it and not to give it . did the father and son communicate each a whole essence , or but each a part to the spirit ? if each a whole , then he has two essences ; if each a part , then the divine essence is divisible . if each has the same numerical essence , and consequently the same properties ; and if there are such things in the divine essence as modes , the same modes , because they are the modes of the divine essence , which is the same in each person ; what difference or what distinction is there between them ? and what makes the absurdity the more palpable is , that each enjoys the essence distinctly , and yet it is in common ; but what is it to enjoy a thing distinctly , but to have it to ones self distinct from all others , and consequently not in common ? it 's true , several things are said to be in common , that is , undivided , as a field , where each person enjoys his share of it by feeding his proportion of cattel , but no two can have the same , the same thing , or a right to the same thing , except dr. sherlock's two kings , who in his case of allegiance have at the same time a right to the same crown . but these absurdities are not at all strange in a man that can assert a thing is distinct , and yet the same , as ( p. . ) he saith an image-man is distinct from the original man , and yet the same with him . . he saith the three persons are not three gods , because they have not separate existence ; but if the persons have ( as he saith , p. . ) all divine perfections as distinct from each other as any three persons whatsoever , they are , tho not separate , yet diverse and different gods , and the worshipping three different and diverse gods is certainly as much polytheism as the worshipping three separate gods. but as long as each has a power to know and do every thing , without the help and assistance of the others ; and there are a great many examples where one acts when the others do not , it is an evident demonstration they are as separate to all intents and purposes , as we can imagine spiritual beings to be . but of this i have sufficiently spoken already . . yet if there were need of any other argument to prove they have a separate existence , he according to his usual method of pulling down what he designs to build up , affords us a demonstration ; for ( p. . ) he saith , that self-consciousness makes a mind or spirit one with it-self , and distinguisheth and separates it from all other minds and spirits . and consequently the three divine minds or persons who are self-conscious beings , are three separate minds , because each's self-consciousness makes him a distinct and separate mind from the rest . but he saith , they are unseparate by mutual-consciousness : but can those beings , who are always separate by self-consciousness , because always self-conscious , be unseparate by mutual-consciousness ; which is to be , and not to be separate at the same time ? . after all the stir he makes about mutual-consciousness , it is evident all consciousness must be self-consciousness : for what-ever knowledg several beings may have of one another , yet each is conscious of this knowledg , by his own self-consciousness , because a being can only be conscious of what he himself knows ; and whatever subject his knowledg is conversant about , it must be his own knowledg he is conscious of . and if the persons are conscious that one is not the other , and that each is god , they must be conscious that they are three gods. it is impossible to suppose them three gods , without supposing each to be conscious of all that is in the others ; otherwise it would ( since they cannot but be conscious of what they know ) argue ignorance in them ; and the more they are thus conscious , the more they apprehend themselves to be three gods ; the same god can never be mutually conscious with himself . if minds or spirits have no other ways of being one , but by mutual consciousness , ( which he affirms in several places ) they can never be one ; for they must be one , before they can be conscious that they are one , which he cannot deny : and ( p. . ) he saith , to affirm they are one by mutual-consciousness , is not to affirm that mutual-consciousness is the cause of their being one : but is not that by which they are one , the cause of their being one ? . i am afraid i have tired my reader with the repetition of so much nauseous stuff ; therefore i shall say no more of this profound author , but that it is no wonder that his whole book ( where we have idea's of what he saith ) is nothing else but saying and unsaying things , since he has a mind to keep his old tritheistical notion of three infinite substances , as distinct as any beings whatever ; and yet to assert with his good friend the animadverter , that there is but one infinite substance . . i think it is not strange that a man , who could so perversly maintain a doctrine so opposite to the good of mankind , as absolute passive obedience is , and had the assurance to preach up slavery to be jure divino , should openly promote another so directly contrary to the honour of one god , as the paying divine worship to three infinite almighty spirits ; ( who no more differ from three gods , than repetition and multiplication do differ from one another ; ) by which he has done his utmost ( and no more can be expected ) to destroy the two grand commandments , ( of which the other are but so many branches ) the honour of god , and the good of mankind ; both which subjects he has handled alike , that is , he has not writ a page without contradicting himself . but i shall say no more of him , though less i ought not to say of a man that so abominably prevaricates , and banters in a subject of infinite concern ; and he that gives no quarter , but treats all his adversaries with scorn , contempt , and billingsgate , can hardly expect panegyricks : but i leave him to the animadverter , against whom his book is chiefly designed , to do mankind and himself justice on the most self-inconsistent , and ( he would not scruple to add ) the most self-conceited of all self-conscious animals . . but to return , there are none of these hypotheses but what the heathens as well as the orthodox , might have made use of to justify their polytheism , and yet continued to have their several objects of divine worship , and their usual manners of worshipping them . might they not have said they were but one god , because they had but one common nature ? or one god , because there was an inconceiveable close union between them ? or might they not have said , that father saturn communicated his numerical essence to a multitude of sons and daughters ? or said , that tho each is god , they were several modes of one god ? or said that they were but one god by mutual consciousness ? or , what if they had said they were several persons and but one god , tho each person was god ? what answer would be made to a heathen that would be so poor spirited as to banter after a trinitarian manner , but only , if you believe them but one god , why do you worship them as several , each by himself ? would not such an answer equally affect a trinitarian as well as a heathen , since the persons he adores are as much distinct objects of divine worship , as those the heathens worshipped ? and if such pretences would not excuse the heathens from being guilty of polytheism , why should it the trinitarians ? if having three objects of divine worship , a divine person that is called the father , another divine person that is called the son , and a third that is called the spirit , who are adored each by himself , be not owning more gods than one , why is a thousand objects of divine worship owning more gods , since thousands as well as three are but unites multiplied ? and if having one divine person for an object of the highest worship is adoring one god , the having three will be as much the having three gods , as the having a thousand will be a thousand gods. but the trinitarians think they cannot be guilty of polytheism , except they call their three objects of divine worship three gods , as if the names they call them by would alter the matter . if one call them three gods , and another three persons , if they agree in the idea's , and one means the same by person as the other does by god , viz. an infinite almighty being , as they say each of the three persons is , they are equally guilty of polytheism . it is not barely affirming that there are several gods , if people do not pay divine worship to them , that makes them guilty of idolatry ; so on the contrary , if they say there is but one god , and yet have several objects of divine worship , and give to each severally , separately and apart from the other , all divine titles and attributes , tho they called them , when they pretend to vindicate themselves from polytheism , modes , faculties , &c. that would not hinder them from being guilty of idolatry . is it not the design both of the old and new testament , to forbid people having several objects of divine worship ? and if oneness , when applied to god , is not to be taken in the same sense as when applied to other beings , men could never distinguish between polytheism and theism . is not one god one infinite spirit , as one angel is a finite one ? does not christ declare god is a spirit , how then dare people say that god is three minds , spirits , intelligent persons ? . besides , what can be more ridiculous than the attempt of the real trinitarians , in endeavouring to prove that three uncreate , eternal , almighty , all-knowing spirits , minds , intelligent essences , each of whom is god , are but one uncreate , eternal , almighty , all-knowing mind , spirit , essence or god ? which is to say , that not only three spirits , essences , gods , are but one spirit , essence or god , but that three uncreate , three eternals , three almighties , three all-knowing , are but one uncreate , one eternal , one almighty , one all-knowing ? is it not absurd in it self to say , one god is compounded ( or what other term you make use of ) of three gods , or three almighty persons ? but is it not much more absurd to pay divine worship to every one of the three ? which is acting contrary to your words ; and it demonstrates that you do not take god to be compounded of three , but that they are three gods : the more you say they are but one god , the more you contradict your selves in saying each is god. each god , since they are all three numerically distinct essences , must be essentially different from the rest , and consequently a different god ; for the same god can never be essentially different from himself . . but the nominal trinitarians most grosly prevaricate in pretending that the three are three modes , three faculties , three attributes of god , when they , by paying the highest adoration to each by himself , own them to be three gods : nothing can be at a greater distance than their actions and their words ; yet this much must be said for them , that they evidently demonstrate the real or substantial trinitarians are direct polytheists , and on the contrary , the real prove the nominals no other , i mean in their writings , than disguised unitarians , and that they really destroy the persons and confound the trinity . and indeed as long as both own there is no more in the idea of god , than there is in every one of the three , which they cannot deny as long as they say every one of them is god , it is impossible not to confound the three , or else not to set up three gods. it is not saying there are three modes , attributes , essences , somewhats in god , that makes the unitarians oppose you , they would not give themselves nor you the trouble to confute such ridiculous notions , if you did not make that a pretence to pay divine worship to each of the three , now to one , and then to another , and straight to a third , which ( as i have already proved ) can never be done without idolatry . . it would be much more generous as well as honest , ( say the unitarians ) to own your worshipping of three gods , than to shuffle backward and forward , say and unsay , and stuff a creed with more contradictions than there are lines in it , and invent so many absurd and senseless distinctions , which none would do , but to hide and disguise what is most absurd polytheism , which yet in your publick worship ( where there is no room for such distinctions ) is as evident as that of the heathens , because you as much distinguish god the father from god the son , or god the spirit , as ever they did god jupiter from god neptune , or god pluto . and it is evident that in scripture god the father is as much distinguished from the son , as two men or angels can be ; and mankind that are incapable of apprehending these metaphysical niceties and subtile distinctions , cannot but conceive them so . chap. x. of mystery . . the chief artifice by which the doctrine of the trinity has so long prevailed is , by perswading people that they must not examine into the reasonableness of it , because it is a mystery which they say is above reason , and which we ought to believe whether we apprehend it or not . children , like white paper , are capable of any impression , and if they must not when men examine into the reasonableness of what they have been taught , because it is pretended to be a mystery , they may be obliged to assert the most absurd and senseless things as well as the most rational . . a few words concerning what we are , and what we are not capable of believing , will , i hope , put an end to this long and tedious controversy concerning mysteries . the subject of any man's belief are those idea's he has in his mind concerning any thing ; and he believes a thing to be true , when he supposeth those idea's he has of it are agreeable to , or do represent the thing as it is : we can have no belief when we have no idea's to exercise our belief about ; and if we have but a few , or imperfect idea's , our belief can be extended no farther than those few or imperfect idea's . . as we cannot believe where we have no idea's , so we cannot believe those idea's that are contradictory to be true , because they contain an affirmation and a negation of the same thing . if it were possible to believe either a mystery , or a contradiction , it seems more easy to believe the latter , because in a contradiction we have idea's and those too so clear and distinct , that we know it is impossible to predicate them at the same time of any one subject , whether divine or human. but in a mystery we have no idea's at all : by this any one may judg of this grand dispute between the trinitarians and unitarians concerning mysteries in general , and particularly the deepest of all mysteries , those of the trinity , which the latter say they are incapable of believing , because they have no idea's concerning them , or none but contradictory ones . they do not disbelieve them , because they cannot ( as their adversaries most disingenuously object against them ) apprehend the manner how they are done , but because they do not apprehend what the things are that are to be believed . on the contrary , the orthodox upon all occasions thunder it from their pulpits , that matters of faith are above reason , and that god has a right to require of us to believe on his word what we do not apprehend or understand ; that is , we must believe those idea's we have of a mystery to be true , tho by its being a mystery we have no idea's at all concerning it ; and they pretend to give instances in several things which they say we are to believe , tho we do not understand them ; and that god's eternity , infinity , omnipresence can be no more apprehended than the trinity . . the idea's we have of god's eternity , infinity , omnipresence , omniscience , and all that we are required to believe concerning them , are so clear and distinct , that an ordinary capacity apprehends what we mean when we say that god is eternal , infinite , omniscient , omnipresent . tho these things themselves are intelligible , yet the manner of them is impossible to be apprehended , and as we are now framed , we are not capable of having it revealed to us ; and none but a blind metaphysician who pretends to know all things , but really knows nothing , would be so vain as to attempt to explain the manner of god's omnipresence , or his omniscience . it is no wonder there are insuperable difficulties about the manner of things of this nature , when there are as great difficulties in apprehending the manner of nature's operating in the most common things , which things none disbelieveth , because he does not apprehend how they are done . who disbelieveth there is such a creature as man , tho he does not know how he was formed ? but it is quite otherwise when we cannot apprehend the things themselves , there is then an absolute impossibility of believing them ; none can believe that god is three persons , and yet one person is god , the very same god that is three persons ; so none can believe that the idea of god is contained in the idea of person , and yet there are not as many gods as persons : nor can we believe that god is three ways the same god. the schools make use of this cant for no other reason , but because it being unintelligible , they thought it could not be confuted : but the same unintelligibleness that hinders it from being confuted , hinders it from being believed . and we can as little believe that there are three infinite wisdoms , powers , &c. in one god , which is adding infinite additions to what is already infinite , which yet must be , if there are , as the real trinitarians say , three infinitely wise , powerful minds , spirits , essences , intelligent persons in one god. in a word , there never was or ever can be a trinitarian , because it is impossible to believe so plain a contradiction , as that all three are but one god , and yet every one of the three is a god. but it is generally said our idea's are gross and material , and therefore we must not believe of infinite and immaterial things as they represent them to us . . whatsoever god has designed we should believe , he has made us capable of having clear and distinct idea's of : but tho it should be granted that we may have false conceptions and idea's of things , yet the utmost we can do , is to believe or not believe those idea's ; where they fail , there our belief must end . god has set the same limits to our belief as to our perceptions ; and belief belongs to us as we are rational creatures : what is above our reason to apprehend , is also above our belief : without the bounds of our reason we are but upon the same level with beasts , and are no more than they capable of belief , or of having any thing revealed to us . . as we are not capable of believing where we have no idea's , or none but contradictory , so where we have clear and distinct idea's we cannot be mistaken , without destroying the principles and foundation of all knowledg and all evidence , even of the existence of a god and of all religion , as well natural as revealed : for what other motive have i to believe there is a god , but because my reason gives me clear and distinct idea's of the truth of it ? and it is by reason alone that we can judg whether god has any revealed will , or which is his revealed will ; and if there should be any thing in that which is said to be his revealed will contrary to reason , it would destroy the only argument we have to believe it the word of god. reason is as much the word , the will , and revelation of god as the written word it self , and without which the written word would be wholly useless . . we cannot be as sure of any thing we receive by tradition , as we are of those things god has discovered to us by original revelation , i mean those things of which he has given us clear and distinct idea's : we cannot be so certain as we are of these , that god so long since revealed his will to such persons , or that they did not mistake their fancies and dreams for revelation , or that they did rightly apprehend what was spoken to them , and that it has been exactly and religiously delivered down to us at so great a distance without any alterations or additions ; or that we apprehend it in the right sense , considering moral things are capable of receiving vastly different interpretations , and the divine speech as well as human is subject to divers senses ; especially since we are so little acquainted with the particular phrases and peculiar idioms of the tongues the scripture was written in , and those customs among the eastern nations it so much alludes to . to which an hundred things might be added , as the different readings , the different significations of the same words , and even the different pointings , which alone may strangely vary the sense . but the innumerable sects of christians that so widely differ about the meaning of the plainest texts , sufficiently shew how subject we are to mistake ; therefore to prefer tradition before our clearest idea's , is to prefer probable before certain , belief before knowledg , that which we possibly may be mistaken in , before what we are most certain of ; which would leave no difference between truth and falshood , no means of credible and incredible ; which would destroy all the principles and foundation of that knowledg god has given us , and render all our faculties useless , and wholly confound the most excellent part of his workmanship , our understanding . in short , if we admit not that there is a due capacity in the soul of man to judg soundly concerning matters of religion , we do entirely root out the grounds of all religion , we make our selves meer machines , uncapable of vertue and vice , of good and evil. and if , on the other side , we admit the adequateness of our capacities , and the rectitude of our judgments in these matters , and at the same time pretend to maintain the truth of the christian religion , we must allow there is an exact conformity between the principles of the one and of the other , for there can be no disagreement in truth ; and if christianity were found contradictory to any thing the light of nature makes manifest , or should require of us to believe any thing of which we could form no idea's , or none but contradictory ones , we should be forced so far to acknowledg it faulty and false ; and therefore if any expression in scripture seems to require the belief of any such , we must interpret such expressions in a figurative sense . . it is indeed impossible , as we are now made , to have any thing which we clearly apprehend is a contradiction to be revealed to us , and we cannot have clearer idea's of any thing than of numbers ; we perfectly apprehend the difference of three and one : therefore , if it should be pretended to be revealed that three and one are the same , which they must be if three persons and one are the same numerical god , because there is no more in the three persons than in one ; so that three and one , and person and persons , which are the subjects of three and one , are the same numerical being ; all that is in this case really revealed , is the letters and words without any other meaning , than that three , which is one thrice multiplied , by being the same with one , is not thrice multiplied . to say three persons and one person are the same god , is as great a contradiction , as to say three persons and one person are the same , because ( as i have already proved ) god and person are the same ; which instead of being a rational faith , destroys both our reason and faith. but because mystery has been the pretence , by which some men for so many ages have solemnly repeated propositions as necessary to salvation , which they could no more apprehend than a round square , or a mountain without a valley : i shall add one word or two more concerning it , and then conclude . . mystery can never be a part of religion , because it cannot tend to the honour of god , since it is what we know of god , not what we do not know , that makes us honour him : the more we know of him the more we honour him , and the less there is of mystery in religion , the brighter and clearer it appears . and it would be inconsistent with the goodness of god , who would have all men come to the knowledg of his truth , not to give us clear and distinct idea's of what we are to believe or practise . his laws are a trial of ( what is in our power ) our obedience , but not of ( what is not ) our understanding . and how difficult soever they are in their practice , they are plain and easy in their theory , and suted to the capacity of the unlearned and simple , far the greatest part of mankind . as mystery can no ways tend to the honour of god , so it can no ways promote ( tho the mystery of iniquity may the gain of some particular persons ) the good of man. mysteries are so far from being a part of religion , that it was the chief end of christ's coming to destroy them , that is , by revealing them , which is the only way a mystery or secret can be destroyed ; and the end of the apostles mission was to make known those things which until then were mysteries , and to bring to light to those that sat in darkness , the hidden things of god. . in short , if christ and antichrist are diametrically opposite , the signs and characters that belong to each must be as opposite . can mystery , to which may be added persecution ( the only arts by which popery has prevail'd ) which are the chief signs and characters of antichrist , and are written on the forehead of the mighty whore , by pretence of which she displays her horrid blasphemies , be signs and tokens to discover christ and his doctrine by ? what has christ to do with antichrist ? or is the faith our saviour taught , so near akin to the idolatrous blasphemies of the man of sin , that both should have the same marks , the same characters , the same tokens ? the conclusion . . but i must beg your pardon for having exceeded the usual length of a letter ; therefore i shall only add , that you ( if any ) who are as numerous , and i think as learned as ever any council was , are the most capable to free the doctrine of the trinity from these ( at least seeming ) contradictions ; which if you undertake to solve , i desire you will tell us what you mean by person and god. and that no deceit may lie in obscure , doubtful or ambiguous terms , if you make use of any such , or put an uncommon sense ( which some call a theological sense ) on common words , that you will explain them , and in short , write so intelligibly , that you may make it appear , that what you write , is only for the sake of truth , and not for any sinister ends ; by which means all unprejudiced christians may know whether the doctrine of the trinity is consistent with it self , and the light of nature , which will be a great obligation on all those that love the honour of the only true god , but especially on , sirs , yours , &c. dec. . . the end . errata . page . col . . line antepenult . for or , read and. p. . c. . l. . r. self it· p. . c. . l. . r. be in it . p. . c. . l. . r. most true .