Objection 1: It would seem that the human body was not produced by God
immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal
things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was
made of corporeal matter, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it
was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately
by God.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not
necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be
produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain
animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a
heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat
and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the
human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some
material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of
a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the
human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a
heavenly body had part in its production.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's
body was made during the work of the six days, according to the
causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that
afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the
corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by
some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some
created power, and not immediately by God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): "God created man out
of the earth."

_I answer that,_ The first formation of the human body could not be
by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from
God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal
matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher
refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot
be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have
explained (Q. 65, A. 4); and because the agent must be like its
effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter,
should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made
by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter
can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as
composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely
immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation:
wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of
any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot
transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a
seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no
pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same
species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity
made immediately by God.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as
regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies
beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or
giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of
the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels
could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man,
in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by
collecting the dust.

Reply Obj. 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by
the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the
power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of
natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), "man and
the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate
temperature is required for the production of man and other animals.
But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some
imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that
more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect
thing.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but
not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the
Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the
blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime
of the earth.

Reply Obj. 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal
virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in
passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of
pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can
produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out
of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense,
according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous
work in their causal virtues.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 3]

Whether the Body of Man Was Given an Apt Disposition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt
disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought
to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in
sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker
movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter
flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.

Obj. 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body
lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided
with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking.
Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.

Obj. 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the
brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in
stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right."

_I answer that,_ All natural things were produced by the Divine art,
and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to
give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but
the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some
defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes
himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which
is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it
of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very
beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God
gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so,
but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for
each one's substance."

Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its
operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments
are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned
the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to
such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the
disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect
arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions
required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to
the soul and its operations.

Reply Obj. 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the
other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and
for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all
animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior
sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 78, A.
4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals
in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least
sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the
body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers
required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Q.
84, A. 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may
modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for
him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason
of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires
dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals
have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on
account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the
perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to
explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since
this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the
human temperament.

Reply Obj. 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals,
and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the
clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly
element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the
human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of
man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make
himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite
variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8),
"the organ of organs." Moreover this was more becoming to the
rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of
things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments.

Reply Obj. 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four
reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the
purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed
on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence,
whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses
only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the
beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses
are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned
to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and
procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that
by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and
penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely
survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so
as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the
greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain,
wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down,
but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if
man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands
as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease.
Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he
used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his
food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with
thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from
being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover,
such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper
operation.

Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For
man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of
the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior
world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general
situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards
the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their
inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a
middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by
which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids
itself of the surplus.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 4]

Whether the Production of the Human Body Is Fittingly Described in
Scripture?

Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is
not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made
by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other
works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and it was made."
Therefore the same should have been said of man.

Obj. 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as
explained above (A. 2). Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let us
make man."

Obj. 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which
is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man of the
slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed into
him the breath of life."

Obj. 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the
whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly
said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life."

Obj. 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while
the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore
having said: "To His image He made them," he should not have added,
"male and female He created them."

_On the contrary,_ Is the authority of Scripture.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man
surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man,
as though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps.
101:26), "The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere (Ps.
94:5), "His hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is
made to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture
uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made
for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation
and care what we have chiefly in mind.

Reply Obj. 2: We must not imagine that when God said "Let us make
man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think.
But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person,
Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.

Reply Obj. 3: Some have thought that man's body was formed first in
priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the
formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the
production of things, that God should have made either the body
without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part
of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body,
for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.

To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made
man," must be understood of the production of the body with the soul;
and that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the
breath of life," should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord
breathed on His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (John
20:22). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii,
24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther
on, "And man was made a living soul"; which words the Apostle (1 Cor.
15:45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore,
by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, "He
breathed into his face the breath of life," are a sort of exposition
of what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 4: Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's
face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore
Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face.

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works
of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him
man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not
made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the
first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But
other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man
were actually made.
_______________________

QUESTION 92

THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production
of things?

(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?

(3) Whether of man's rib?

(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 1]

Whether the Woman Should Have Been Made in the First Production of
Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made
in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De
Gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing
misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of
things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first
production.

Obj. 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for
to the woman was it said after sin (Gen. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under
the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin,
there is no inequality." But woman is naturally of less strength and
dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the
patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman
should not have been made in the first production of things before
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw
that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He
should not have made woman.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:18): "It is not good for man
to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."

_I answer that,_ It was necessary for woman to be made, as the
Scripture says, as a _helper_ to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in
other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped
by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of
generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of
generation carried out in various living things. Some living things
do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are
generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and
animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting
matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive
generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated
from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation.
Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation
invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the
active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive
power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation
nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed;
therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the
female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that
we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in
plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them
preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered
to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation.
Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two
forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from
the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore
directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall
be two in one flesh" (Gen. 2:24).

Reply Obj. 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is defective
and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the
production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the
production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from
some material indisposition, or even from some external influence;
such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher
observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards
human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included
in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the
general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal
Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not
only the male but also the female.

Reply Obj. 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of
which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and
this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of
subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior
makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this
kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have
been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others
wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is
naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason
predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of
innocence, as we shall prove (Q. 96, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: If God had deprived the world of all those things which
proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect.
Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that
individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful
that He can direct any evil to a good end.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 2]

Whether Woman Should Have Been Made from Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from
man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals
the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it
have been so with man.

Obj. 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same matter.
But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was
made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the
same, and not from man.

Obj. 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work
of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that
office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is
written (Lev. 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from
man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): "He created of him,"
that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman.

_I answer that,_ When all things were first formed, it was more
suitable for the woman to be made from man than (for the female to
be from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the
first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the
principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to
God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says
that "God made the whole human race from one" (Acts 17:26). Secondly,
that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more
closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is
written (Gen. 2:23, 24): "She was taken out of man, wherefore a man
shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." This
was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and
female live together for life; which is not the case with other
animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12),
the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as
with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in
which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is
the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be
made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a
sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church
takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32):
"This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

Reply Obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing.

Reply Obj. 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now
created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is
determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of
proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something
in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being
infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter,
such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of
man.

Reply Obj. 3: A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and
this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced
from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone.
Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this
argument does not prove.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 3]

Whether the Woman Was Fittingly Made from the Rib of Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed
from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's
body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made
only--either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been
described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the
rib itself)--or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. x): "A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction." But
the woman's body is not more rarefied than man's--at least, not in
the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed
from a rib of Adam.

Obj. 2: Further, in those things which were first created there was
nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the
integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained
imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.

Obj. 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But
there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib
to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:22): "God built the rib,
which He took from Adam, into a woman."

_I answer that,_ It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of
man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the
woman should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not
made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's
contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet.
Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of
Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed--namely, blood
and water--on which the Church was established.

Reply Obj. 1: Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material
increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord
multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an
increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance
of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change
of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in
itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence,
and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and
size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore
multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the
matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless
it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is
for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher
says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged,
without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories--viz. the
definition with the absence of the thing defined.

Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of
matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or
which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
xxiv in Joan.) that "Christ filled five thousand men with five
loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest
of corn"--that is, by transformation of the nourishment.
Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or
that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to
the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.

Reply Obj. 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam,
not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as
the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released
by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it
possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be
produced from the man's rib.

From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 4]

Whether the Woman Was Formed Immediately by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately
by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another
individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is
of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal
things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body
was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the
ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.

Obj. 3: Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to
their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and
not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its
causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to
Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman
from the man's rib."

_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 2, ad 2), the natural
generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the
matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or
woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human
species cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of
nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary
course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man
from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is verified when an individual is
begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the
same species.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not
know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the
woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by
the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of
the woman formed by them from the man's rib.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first
creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it
made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the
woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things
first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a
potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the
Creator.
_______________________

QUESTION 93

THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN
(In Nine Articles)

We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is
said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." There are under
this head nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the image of God is in man?

(2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?

(3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?

(4) Whether the image of God is in every man?

(5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence,
or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?

(6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?

(7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and
acts?

(8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every
object?

(9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness."
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 1]

Whether the Image of God Is in Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it
is written (Isa. 40:18): "To whom have you likened God? or what image
will you make for Him?"

Obj. 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the
First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): "Who is the
image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature."
Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man.

Obj. 3: Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can]. Synod.
Ancyr.) that "an image is of the same species as that which it
represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and
united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But
there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a
comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no
image of God in man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): "Let Us make man to Our
own image and likeness."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image
exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness,
there is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness
is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to
likeness--namely, that it is copied from something else. For an
"image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of
something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like
and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg,
because it is not copied from it.

But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is
not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in
a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a
perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which
it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness
to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not
one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy.
Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect
likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says
that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to"
signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.

Reply Obj. 1: The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man.
Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But
God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.

Reply Obj. 2: The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of
God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is
said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to
be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by
reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to
God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists
in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is
of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an
alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as
Augustine says explains in _De decem Chordis_ (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De
Tempore).

Reply Obj. 3: As unity means absence of division, a species is said
to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not
only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to
a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with
God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which
adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect
image.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 2]

Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in Irrational Creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in
irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are
contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of
rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of
God is to be found in irrational creatures.

Obj. 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it
approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine
goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God.

Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more
it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness
than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things
together are called "very good" (Gen. 1:31). Therefore the whole
universe is to the image of God, and not only man.

Obj. 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the
world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the
whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational
creature.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's
excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by
giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of
the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's
image.

_I answer that,_ Not every likeness, not even what is copied from
something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be
only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does
not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a
worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image,
merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white
like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing;
for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature
of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king
exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and
chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper.
Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species."

Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate
difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly
because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because
they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83,
qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all
creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that
intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's
image.

Reply Obj. 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what is
perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image,
so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in
some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects
are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they
happen (_contingit_) to be so, but not absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as
regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is
involved in the idea of an image.

Reply Obj. 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the
intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but
intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is
found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for
the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly
divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore,
when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of
God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's
image, but that the other parts are excluded.

Reply Obj. 4: Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the
likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species
in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the
exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using
the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in
nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the
First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent,
like to the Supreme Wisdom.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Are More to the Image of God Than Man Is?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image
of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon _de Imagine_ xliii
(de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature
besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that
the angels are more than man to the image of God.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so
much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between
Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a
creature is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore
the angels are not more to the image of God than man.

Obj. 3: Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it
is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not
admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing,
since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the
image of God than man.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is
called a "seal of resemblance" (Ezech. 28:12) because in him the
resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression.

_I answer that,_ We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we
may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is,
the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the
angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more
perfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A.
8). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its
accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation
of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God
from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the
whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the
whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more
perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of
themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we
presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature;
otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as
in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God
than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are
more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man
is more like to God.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of
reason from the image of God; but not the angels.

Reply Obj. 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of
bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than
another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human
soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had
said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in
likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." Wherefore this does
not mean that the angels are not more to God's image.

Reply Obj. 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more or
less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more
perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not
participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another;
nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different
individuals in a greater or lesser degree.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 4]

Whether the Image of God Is Found in Every Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in every
man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman is
the image [Vulg. glory] of man" (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is
an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual
is not an image of God.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom God foreknew, He
also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." But
all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the
conformity of image.

Obj. 3: Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as
above explained (A. 1). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore
he loses the image of God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 38:7): "Surely man passeth as
an image."

_I answer that,_ Since man is said to be the image of God by reason
of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God
according to that in which he can best imitate God in his
intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly
in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see
that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man
possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and
this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is
common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually
knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in
the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God
perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory.
Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is
signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image
of "creation," of "re-creation," and of "likeness." The first is
found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the
blessed.

Reply Obj. 1: The image of God, in its principal signification,
namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman.
Hence after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is
added, "Male and female He created them" (Gen. 1:27). Moreover it is
said "them" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22)
remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one
individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in
man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as
God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle
had said that "man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the
glory of man," he adds his reason for saying this: "For man is not of
woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman
for man."

Reply Obj. 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in
the conformity of grace and glory.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 5]

Whether the Image of God Is in Man According to the Trinity of
Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man
as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide
ad Petrum i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and
one is the image to which man was made." And Hilary (De Trin. v) says:
"Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity."
Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of
the Trinity of Persons.

Obj. 2: Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God
in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an
intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." Gregory
of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture
says that "man was made to the image of God, it means that human
nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the
fulness of goodness." Now all these things belong more to the unity
of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the
image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the
unity of the Essence.

Obj. 3: Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it
is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to
the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural
reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the
Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above
(Q. 32, A. 1).

Obj. 4: Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the
Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi,
2) that "the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in
man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not
be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the
Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been
made to the image of God."

_I answer that,_ as we have seen (Q. 40, A. 2), the distinction of
the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations
of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but
in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being
produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way,
and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction
of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore
to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not
exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine
Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore,
say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the
Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God
Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.

Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument would avail if the image of God in man
represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within
ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: "We
see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas
we believe rather than see that God is Trinity."

Reply Obj. 4: Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son
only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First,
because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it
would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son,
that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if
man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have
said, "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness"; but "to Thy
image." When, therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image of
God," the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the
Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine
Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it
is said that God "made man to His image," this can be understood in
two ways: first, so that this preposition "to" points to the term of
the making, and then the sense is, "Let Us make man in such a way
that Our image may be in him." Secondly, this preposition 'to' may
point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book is made
(like) to that one." Thus the image of God is the very Essence of
God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put
for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an
image because thereby one Person imitates another.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 6]

Whether the Image of God Is in Man As Regards the Mind Only?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in
man's mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7) that "the man is the
image . . . of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image
of God is to be observed not only in his mind.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Gen. 1:27): "God created man to His
own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He
created them." But the distinction of male and female is in the body.
Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the
mind.

Obj. 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of
a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God
is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24)
there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or
imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual
vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by
reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like
reason there must be another trinity in the others.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): "Be renewed in
the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given
to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new
man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): "Putting on the
new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to
the image of Him that created him," where the renewal which consists
in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore
to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.

_I answer that,_ While in all creatures there is some kind of
likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness
of "image" as we have explained above (AA. 1,2); whereas in other
creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect
or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures;
wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational
creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the
rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a
"trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts,
the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the
reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the
way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents
something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace"
represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause
in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For
imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called
"traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the
land a trace of a hostile army.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures
and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the
Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of
the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature,
rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the
representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only
in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A.
2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in
them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we
consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is
distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of
Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say
that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word
in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there
exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation
of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the
principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a
certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced
them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite
nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species
points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a
house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the
maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end;
as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So
we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind;
but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."

Reply Obj. 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that he is
essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his
mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the
king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as
existing in every part of man.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought
that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally.
They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those
born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a
third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded
from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly
absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the
principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's
offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one
Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have
mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the
offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said,
"to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He
created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the
distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes,
since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction.
Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after saying, "According to the
image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male
nor female" [*these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] (Vulg.
"neither Gentile nor Jew").

Reply Obj. 3: Although the image of God in man is not to be found in
his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among
terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is
adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say
that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies
of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is
not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body;
but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the
image of God in the soul by way of a trace.

Reply Obj. 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we
may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in
corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body;
secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the
sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the
intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what
is seen.

Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in
the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the
penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination,
informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the
will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short
of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is
extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the
memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and
thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the
connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal
vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external
body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer;
in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is
preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these
reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not
suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the
two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or
spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from
the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 7]

Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in the Acts of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the
acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man
was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist,
and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify
an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's
acts.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in
the soul to these three things--mind, knowledge, and love. But mind
does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the
intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the
acts of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the
Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these
three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the
Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the
powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Obj. 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul.
But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does
not extend to the acts.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the
trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual
vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity
in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be
referred to actual vision.

_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation
of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image
of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it
where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the
species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct
from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the
Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul
word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De
Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity
is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the
knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal
word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of
acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in
its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of
the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still
more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

Reply Obj. 1: Our being bears the image of God so far as it is proper
to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so
far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the
same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which
consists in mind, knowledge, and love.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in
the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a
certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself--namely, as
being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as
Augustine subsequently proves--De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though
knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things
in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory,
understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing;
and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as
though the first assignation were in part deficient.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said
to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we
actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they
are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our
memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual
retention of knowledge and love [*Cf. Q. 79, A. 7, ad 1]. "But
since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought
(for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that
interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly
consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And
by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual
thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites
this child with its parent." From which it is clear that he places
the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and
will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the
memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the
soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is
clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as
stated in the Sentences.

Reply Obj. 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's
statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself,
ever understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean
that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he
excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think
of itself as actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear
that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but
habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it
understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is
not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must
say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever
exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore,
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to
the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and
intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was
in the soul from the beginning of its existence."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 8]

Whether the Image of the Divine Trinity Is in the Soul Only by
Comparison with God As Its Object?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in
the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image
of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (A.
7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love
from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object.
Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards
any object.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek
trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without
separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the
consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of the Trinity
is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.

Obj. 3: Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If,
therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of
the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not
in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.

Obj. 4: Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to
the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2
Cor. 3:18): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory
to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision.
Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal
things.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of
God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself,
loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also
remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less,
therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other
objects.

_I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 2, 7), image means a
likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a
representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image
of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of
species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a
creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated (AA. 6, 7), are
distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word
from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the
Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love
proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that
diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in
the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from
that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is
specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the
verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived
therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as
the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn
to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly
and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when
anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be
turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), that
"the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If
we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but,
nevertheless, rightly called the image of God." But this is due to
the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that
thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority
quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).

Reply Obj. 1: For the notion of an image it is not enough that
something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe
what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of
God proceeds from knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 2: In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity,
not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the
contemplation of eternal things, "any third thing should be required
to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that
part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although
a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there,"
as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things
is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal
things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are
actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they
begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which
comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life
faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.

Reply Obj. 3: The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be
in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love
as seen above (Q. 12, A. 12; Q. 56, A. 3; Q. 60, A. 5).
This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can
make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image
of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be so
obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in
those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as
in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine
says (De Trin. xiv, 6).

Reply Obj. 4: By the vision of glory temporal things will be
seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong
to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6),
when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully
adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the
Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 9]

Whether "Likeness" Is Properly Distinguished from "Image"?

Objection 1: It would seem that "likeness" is not properly
distinguished from "image." For genus is not properly distinguished
from species. Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species:
because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not
conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness"
is not properly to be distinguished from "image."

Obj. 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the
representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation
of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and
indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the
essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is
in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi).

Obj. 3: Further, the image of God in man is threefold--the image of
nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (A. 4). But
innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is
incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the
memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from
innocence and righteousness."

Obj. 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and
love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image.
Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image
consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of
virtue."

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider
that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and
"likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed."

_I answer that,_ Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality
causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15).
Now, since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and
adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true.
Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both
as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some
perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of
comparison between "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble
to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good
is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he
is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness
may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it
is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1):
and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as
it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image
is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation
is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from
image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things,
and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than
the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be
seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit"
(namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. "But
the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties,
or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's
likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the
likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for
corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings.
But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the
expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being,
endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a
likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the
same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for
there is no virtue without love of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general
notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far
as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects
the idea of "image."

Reply Obj. 2: The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as
representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the
intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to
general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.

Reply Obj. 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least,
in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural
"likeness" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term
"image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness."

Reply Obj. 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to
the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as
virtue itself belongs to likeness.
_______________________

QUESTION 94

OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT
(In Four Articles)

We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as
regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first
there are two things to be considered:

(1) The condition of man as to his intellect;

(2) the condition of man as to his will.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?

(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?

(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?

(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 1]

Whether the First Man Saw God Through His Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man saw God through His
Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine
Essence. But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a
life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If
man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have
been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the
first man in paradise saw God through His Essence.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that
"the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." But
our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine
Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence.

Obj. 3: Further, the vision of God in His Essence is whereby God is
seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence
"saw God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent.
iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies
obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity
resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God
through His Essence.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not
first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God
through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the
primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His
Essence.

_I answer that,_ The first man did not see God through His Essence if
we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be
said that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon
Adam" (Gen. 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence
is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine
Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now
it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude,
since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness.
Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away
from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His
Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for
eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear
that he did not see God through His Essence.

Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now.
Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the
present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see
God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the
vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the
vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is,
and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it;
for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his
image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more
perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those
which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is
impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible
creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible
things. Now, it is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right." And
man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers
were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not
to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by
exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the
intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first
truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak
to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a
ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the
experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the
Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God,
man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now.

Reply Obj. 1: Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect
happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of
the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of
happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi,
18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the
first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in
the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.

Reply Obj. 3: A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which,
and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example,
a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another
kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of
something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was
seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first
kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the
knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we
need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in
the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must
remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be
of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure
when compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam
saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect:
secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is
impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being
preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God
in an enigma.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 2]

Whether Adam in the State of Innocence Saw the Angels Through Their
Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw
the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1):
"In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by
purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the
good angels."

Obj. 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the
knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body
which "is a load upon the soul," as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore
the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained
(Q. 89, A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his
soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to
see separate substances.

Obj. 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate
substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the
first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.

_On the contrary,_ The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours.
But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore
neither could Adam's soul.

_I answer that,_ The state of the human soul may be distinguished in
two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence;
and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished
from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of
the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption,
the state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state
of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's
soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern
the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a
"living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body--namely animal
life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the
body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we
have said above (A. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already
said (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1; Q. 89, A. 1) that since the soul is
adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is
fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by
turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was
becoming to the soul of the first man also.

Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees
of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first
is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its
powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be
associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the
third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good,"
that is, to God.

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to
itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the
intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external
things, as we have said above (Q. 87, A. 3): and so by the knowledge
thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act
through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself,
the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its
proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect
knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to
phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above
(Q. 55, A. 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the
soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of
an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect
knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know
themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine
Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul
of the first man could not see the angels in their essence.
Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the
angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things
within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was
on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he
enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."

This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply Obj. 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the
knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact
that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural
object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in
our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.

Reply Obj. 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at
knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as
we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others
in its own measure.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 3]

Whether the First Man Knew All Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all
things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired
species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not,
however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired
by experience, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1; and the first man had not
then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species,
because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as
Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which
nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it
would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from
things themselves.

Obj. 2: Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of
arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning,
knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time
according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all
things when he was first created.

Obj. 3: Further, the present state of life is given to man in order
that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul
seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have
advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge.
Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.

_On the contrary,_ Man named the animals (Gen. 2:20). But names
should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the
animals' natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the
knowledge of all other things.

_I answer that,_ In the natural order, perfection comes before
imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in
potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God
created things not only for their own existence, but also that they
might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in
their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man
can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the
body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man
was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work
of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to
instruct and govern others.

Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the
first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge
of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are
whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles,
that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in
order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not
only those things which can be naturally known, but also things
surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a
supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of
faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was
endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was
necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those
things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not
necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first
man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some
individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream;
and the like.

Reply Obj. 1: The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely
infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as
the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different
from those given by nature.

Reply Obj. 2: To Adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of
perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is
above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in
the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because
what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by
experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have
advanced as regards the number of things known, by further
revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover
there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in
merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another,
although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 4]

Whether Man in His First State Could Be Deceived?

Objection 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could have
been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14) that "the woman
being seduced was in the transgression."

Obj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman
was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that
he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue.
Therefore before sin the woman was deceived.

Obj. 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from
us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not
changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state
of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of
what he saw, just as he is deceived now.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep
the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things
themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and
consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been
deceived, adhering to images as to realities.

Obj. 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other
men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above
(A. 3). So if anyone had told him what was false about these things,
he would have been deceived.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard
what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a
punishment of man condemned."

_I answer that,_ in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things;
namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as
though it were true, but without the assent of belief--or it may mean
a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of
these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended;
but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might
have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term
for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with
the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion
in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is
not to be blamed.

Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of
the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and
while it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is clear that as
truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of
innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to
assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such
as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man,
though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect
the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.

This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by
virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower
faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment
to their action. And from what has preceded (Q. 85, A. 6), it is
clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true;
and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception
occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the
imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of
judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it
is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the
rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of
the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in
deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride.
For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not
have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already
acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of
self-conceit."

Reply Obj. 2: The woman thought that the serpent had received this
faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of
some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master
of the Sentences in this point.

Reply Obj. 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of
the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would
not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to
judge the truth.

Reply Obj. 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep;
as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's
proper action.

Reply Obj. 5: If anyone had said something untrue as regards future
contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive
state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed
that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to
entertain a false opinion.

It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from
above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge
did not extend.

If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted,
though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had
already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to
the Divine aid.
_______________________

QUESTION 95

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL--NAMELY, GRACE AND
RIGHTEOUSNESS
(In Four Articles)

We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning
which there are two points of treatment:

(1) the grace and righteousness of the first man;

(2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the first man was created in grace?

(2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?

(3) Whether he had all virtues?

(4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 1]

Whether the First Man Was Created in Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in
grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says
(1 Cor. 15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last
Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace.
Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123)
[*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever
possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in
grace.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so
ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they
could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by
the discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and
angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards
bestowed grace on them.

Obj. 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was
created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to
advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the
first man was not created in grace.

Obj. 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the
recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place
between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence.
Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his
creation.

Obj. 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from
glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes
glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.

_On the contrary,_ Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the
angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9):
"God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with
grace." Therefore man also was created in grace.

_I answer that,_ Some say that man was not created in grace; but that
it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of
the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.

But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was
endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created
in grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, "God made man right." For this
rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower
powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection
was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was
subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as
Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.
i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul
and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it
would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural
gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence
it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which
reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a
supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the
effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the
Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their
nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as
though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience."
Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the
soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the
soul through grace existing therein.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that there
is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the
spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn
of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the
Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no
spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as
regards the body.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not
disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted
with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the
faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness
directly after death.

Reply Obj. 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels
or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed
grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before
being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being
so confirmed.

Reply Obj. 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of
those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state
of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet
it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he
could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.

Reply Obj. 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is
nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the
first moment of his existence.

Reply Obj. 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit
grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 2]

Whether Passions Existed in the Soul of the First Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions.
For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit"
(Gal. 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence.
Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the
soul.

Obj. 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body
was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.

Obj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral
virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the
passions were entirely excluded from him.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our
first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions
of the soul.

_I answer that,_ The passions of the soul are in the sensual
appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some
passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy;
others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the
primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any
good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion
with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither
had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed
then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard
present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had
at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed
in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in
ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is
not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall
and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's
judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some
extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was
wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the
soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of
the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of
innocence.

Reply Obj. 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence
as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as
will be explained later on (Q. 97, A. 2); likewise the soul was
impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of
reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away
the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he
ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in _Ethic._
iii, 11.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 3]

Whether Adam Had All the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For
some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate
concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by
fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed
in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.

Obj. 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which
have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with
fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as
stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.

Obj. 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed.
Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state
of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither
did those virtues exist.

Obj. 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not;
as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every
virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state
of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to
be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra
Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the
slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty,
restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness."

_I answer that,_ in the state of innocence man in a certain sense
possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes.
For it was shown above (A. 1) that such was the rectitude of the
primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers
to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby
reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according
to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the
Virtues (I-II, Q. 63, A. 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the
primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every
virtue.

It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do
not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these
virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit
and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply
imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If
such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive
state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which
is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed.
For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the
Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final
beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state,
both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies
imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state,
could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for
instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which
is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and
unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive
state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but
not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if
there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his
neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in
accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards what
is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally;
as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic.
iv, 9).

Reply Obj. 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue
superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which
happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are
_per se_ competent to moderate the passions.

Reply Obj. 2: Passions which have evil for their object were
incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil
be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But
passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with
the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could
hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the
virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive
state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions
which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions
only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in
habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other
virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but
to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but
also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also
to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the
primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner,
fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating
sorrow and fear.

Reply Obj. 3: appears from what has been said above.

Reply Obj. 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as
a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice
of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In
another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a
certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did
not possess perseverance.

Reply Obj. 5: appears from what has been said above.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 4]

Whether the Actions of the First Man Were Less Meritorious Than Ours
Are?

Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were
less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the
mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are
more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence.
Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace
is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.

Obj. 2: Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for
it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive
lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of
virtue is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and
difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.

Obj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would
not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now,
when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in
the primitive state.

_On the contrary,_ if such were the case, man would be better off
after sinning.

_I answer that,_ Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways.
First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured
corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the
enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions
proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree
of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree
is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two
mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree
than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate
degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in
proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit
corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for
created good.

We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were
more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the
degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more
copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like
manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because,
as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater
works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason
for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a
small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with
difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.

Reply Obj. 1: After sin man requires grace for more things than
before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even
before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief
reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also
for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.

Reply Obj. 2: Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit
according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above
explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after
what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is
caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person
performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an
arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to
him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the
deed to satisfy for sin.

Reply Obj. 3: The first man would not have gained merit in resisting
temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not
possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not
grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the
primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our
present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist
temptation even without grace.
_______________________

QUESTION 96

OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE
(In Four Articles)

We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of
innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?

(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?

(3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?

(4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 1]

Whether Adam in the State of Innocence Had Mastership Over the
Animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had
no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix,
14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of
the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not
have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals.
Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the
animals.

Obj. 2: Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another
should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are
hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all
animals were not brought under the mastership of man.

Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St.
Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as
quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gen. 1:26]: "God gave man
mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of
them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to
man." Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to
make use of his mastership.

Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command
is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no
mastership over the irrational animals.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): "Let him have dominion
over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts
of the earth" [Vulg."and the whole earth"].

_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 95, A. 1) for his disobedience
to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which
should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before
man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject
to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be
proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for
just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of
procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the
sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect),
so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the
imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of
the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and
man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping
with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals.
Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild
animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural
right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence
which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as
man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these
are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, this is proved from a
property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a
certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to
certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence
as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is
subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection
of other animals to man is proved to be natural.

Reply Obj. 1: A higher power can do many things that an inferior
power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is
naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to
animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for
instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.

Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are
fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not
only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this
is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by
man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of
others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor
does Bede's gloss on Gen. 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given
as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have
been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not,
however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of
man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the
mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this
Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in
regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to
the trained falcon.

Reply Obj. 3: In the state of innocence man would not have had any
bodily need of animals--neither for clothing, since then they were
naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of
concupiscence--nor for food, since they fed on the trees of
paradise--nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for
that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental
knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God
led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of
their respective natures.

Reply Obj. 4: All animals by their natural instinct have a certain
participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact
that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all
animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present
state some domestic animals obey him.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 2]

Whether Man Had Mastership Over All Other Creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would
not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel
naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 8), "corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy
angels." Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state
of innocence.

Obj. 2: Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are
nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these do not naturally
obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore,
since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership,
it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over
plants.

Obj. 3: Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But
man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for
this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii).
Therefore man had no dominion over them.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): "That he may have
dominion over . . . every creature."

_I answer that,_ Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so
according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way
he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four
things in man: his _reason,_ which makes him like to the angels; his
_sensitive powers,_ whereby he is like the animals; his _natural
forces,_ which liken him to the plants; and _the body itself,_ wherein
he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of
a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over
the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all creatures," we
must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over
the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey
reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in
the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by
commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is
master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of
innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted
not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them
without hindrance.

The answers to the objections appear from the above.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 3]

Whether Men Were Equal in the State of Innocence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would
have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no
sin, there is no inequality." But in the state of innocence there
was no sin. Therefore all were equal.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love,
according to Ecclus. 13:19, "Every beast loveth its like; so also
every man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there
was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace.
Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence.

Obj. 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the
cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of
God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on
the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of
nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which
would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 13:1): "The things which are
of God, are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of
God"]. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in
their proper place." Therefore in the primitive state, which was
most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.

_I answer that,_ We must needs admit that in the primitive state there
would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because
generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age;
for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have
been sterile.

Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to
righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of
his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or
less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a
greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.

There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was
not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from
exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was
dependent on food wherewith to sustain life.

So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the
stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and
also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so
that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been
no defect or fault either in soul or body.

Reply Obj. 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality
as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some
are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.

Reply Obj. 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet
between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than
between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father
naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother;
although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by
him.

Reply Obj. 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of God;
not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He
would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the
more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part
of nature as above described, without any defect of nature.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 4]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Master Over Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would
not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
15): "God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His
image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men,
but over cattle."

Obj. 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would
not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject
to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Gen.
3:16): "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power." Therefore in the
state of innocence man would not have been subject to man.

Obj. 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one
of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state
of innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could
desire," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would
not have been master over man in the state of innocence.

_On the contrary,_ The condition of man in the state of innocence was
not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the
angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of
"Dominations." Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state
of innocence that one man should be subject to another.

_I answer that,_ Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed
to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is
subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a
general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who
has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a
master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of
men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is
founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that
the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning
of the _Metaphysics,_ whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that
one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one
whose master he is, to his own--namely the master's use. And since
every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it
is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be
one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain
inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence
such a mastership could not have existed between man and man.

But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either
towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of
mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man
and man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social
being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social
life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless
under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many,
as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore
the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the _Politics,_ that
wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at
the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in
knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these
gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4:10,
"As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to
another." Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): "Just men
command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of
counsel": and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The natural order of things
requires this; and thus did God make man."

From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on
the first-mentioned mode of mastership.
_______________________

QUESTION 97

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE
(In Four Articles)

We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man:
first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as
regards the preservation of the species.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?

(2) Whether he was impassible?

(3) Whether he stood in need of food?

(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Immortal?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not
immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But
if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined.
Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.

Obj. 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically
distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there
can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first
man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present
state.

Obj. 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence,
this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature,
for since nature does not change within the same species, he would
also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to
grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to
Wis. 10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have
regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore
man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

Obj. 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward,
according to Apoc. 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not
created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward.
Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:12): "By sin death came into
the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.

_I answer that,_ A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First,
on the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses
no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in
potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things
as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is
incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible,
yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from
corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as
Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul of such a
powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds
to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption."
Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient
cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state
of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19
[*Work of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that
he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was
indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but
by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby
it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it
remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for
since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter,
as above explained (Q. 76, A. 1), it was most properly endowed at
the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner
surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.

Reply Obj. 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural
incorruptibility and immortality.

Reply Obj. 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to
the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace
as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not
recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this
was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature
was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further
on (III, Q. 14, A. 4, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs
from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of
innocence.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 2]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Passible?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was
passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of
innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been
passible.

Obj. 2: Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the
state of innocence, according to Gen. 2:21, "God cast a deep sleep
upon Adam." Therefore he would have been passible.

Obj. 3: Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib
out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the
cutting out of part of his body.

Obj. 4: Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally
passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in
contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have
suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.

_On the contrary,_ Had man been passible, he would have been also
corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive
suffering wastes the very substance."

_I answer that,_ "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its
proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from
its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in
nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one
thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly,
"passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change,
even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus
understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second
sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive
both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both
in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his
passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.

Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since
sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition,
but are ordered to his natural welfare.

Reply Obj. 3: As already explained (Q. 92, A. 3, ad 2), the rib was
in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who
is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any
natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the
separation of the rib.

Reply Obj. 4: Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved
from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his
reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by
Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful
nature could come upon him unawares.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 3]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Had Need of Food?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not
require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has
lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible.
Therefore he had no need of food.

Obj. 2: Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment
involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does
not appear how food could be needful to him.

Obj. 3: Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam
could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would
not have died. Therefore he did not require food.

Obj. 4: Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the
surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore
it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:16): "Of every tree in
paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat."

_I answer that,_ In the state of innocence man had an animal life
requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual
life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe
that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul
by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is,
as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Gen. 2:7): "Man was
made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body.
But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to
itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual
immaterial power.

Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the
body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called
"animal" [*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq.], through
having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in
these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is
the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food,
generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the
state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection,
the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what
properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone,
impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be
called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require
food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19
[*Works of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine): "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained
by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." For
we have explained (A. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state
was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any
intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the
body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the
entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food.

Reply Obj. 2: A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on
the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing
nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible,
but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion
conduced to the perfection of the nature.

Reply Obj. 3: If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he
also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the
same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil,
and to eat of every other tree of Paradise.

Reply Obj. 4: Some say that in the state of innocence man would not
have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been
nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as
implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there
was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be
decorous and suitable to the state.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 4]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Acquired Immortality
by the Tree of Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the
cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as
an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was
corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is
changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree
of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality.

Obj. 2: Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other
natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused
immortality, this would have been natural immortality.

Obj. 3: Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable,
that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the
Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 3:22): "Lest perhaps he put
forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for
ever." Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work
of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine): "A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the
body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he
been allowed to eat of the tree of life."

_I answer that,_ The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of
immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe
that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of
life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the
lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the
soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with
food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided
with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect,
as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that
the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the
humor already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water
added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is
added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes
watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force
of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of
the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what
suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not
suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in
old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body
declines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect
man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was
to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting
from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to
slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of
old age"; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous
author], among the supposititious works of St. Augustine) "The tree of
life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption."

Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the
soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life,
nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to
immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from
the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree
of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of
living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is
manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect;
therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life
was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and
when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a
spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.

From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first
proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality;
while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off
corruption, according to the explanation above given.
_______________________

QUESTION 98

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES
(In Two Articles)

We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and,
first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under
the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been
generation?

(2) Whether generation would have been through coition?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [Q. 98, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Generation Existed?

Objection 1: It would seem there would have been no generation in the
state of innocence. For, as stated in _Phys._ v, 5, "corruption is
contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also
there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence.
Therefore neither would there have been generation.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the
species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore
there is no generation in those individual things which last for
ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever.
Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no
generation.

Obj. 3: Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the
multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid
confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the
animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights
when the human race increased by generation. This is against the
natural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore
says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in
the state of innocence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:28): "Increase and multiply,
and fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by
generation, since the original number of mankind was two only.
Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence.

_I answer that,_ In the state of innocence there would have been
generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race;
otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great
blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by
his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and
incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while
his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's
purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and
incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of
nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a
time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were,
subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist,
nature's purpose would become void.

Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and
permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of
nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which
natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible
substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the
individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief
purpose of nature.

Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the
naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is
incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should
be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature,
Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for
the multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of
offspring even in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence the human body was in itself
corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul.
Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was
not to be deprived thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: Although generation in the state of innocence might not
have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would
have been required for the multiplication of the individual.

Reply Obj. 3: In our present state a division of possessions is
necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as
community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher
says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will
of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife
they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those
things of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed
even now among many good men.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 98, Art. 2]

Whether in the State of Innocence There Would Have Been Generation by
Coition?

Objection 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have
existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was
"like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, when men
will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as
is written Matt. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have
been generation by coition.

Obj. 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect
development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before
sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which
was not the case according to Scripture (Gen. 4:1).

Obj. 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time,
man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which
he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man
refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason
of sin, according to Ps. 48:13: "Man, when he was in honor, did not
understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to
them." Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such
intercourse of man and woman.

Obj. 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no
corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse.
Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of
innocence.

_On the contrary,_ God made man and woman before sin (Gen. 1, 2). But
nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned,
there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of
sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a
help to man (Gen. 2:18, 20). But she is not fitted to help man except
in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective
help in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation
also in the state of innocence.

_I answer that,_ Some of the earlier doctors, considering the
nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state,
concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have
been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom.
Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been
multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without
coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made
man male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of
generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But
this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired
nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is
natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even
before sin, as above explained (Q. 97, A. 3), just as it is natural
to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So
we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use,
as other members had, before sin.

Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present
state of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from
nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation
there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever
there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the
passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose
of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The
second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive
concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have
existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from
supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence.
All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will,
without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body."

Reply Obj. 1: In paradise man would have been like an angel in his
spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the
resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and
body. Wherefore there is no parallel.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first
parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin
they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the
woman; or because, having received the general Divine command
relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to
time.

Reply Obj. 3: Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as
it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate
concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would
have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight
of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight
have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature
and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of
concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such
pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen
sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from
cleaving to it immoderately. By "immoderately" I mean going beyond
the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure
in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence
lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the
words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the
state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind.
Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of
innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not
because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate
desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust.

Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state
"intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity;
this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just
as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of
pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the
union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action."
_______________________

QUESTION 99

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the condition of the offspring--first, as
regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full
powers of the body immediately after birth?

(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Had Perfect
Strength of Body As to the Use of Its Members Immediately After Birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its
members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit.
et Remiss. i, 38): "This weakness of the body befits their weakness
of mind." But in the state of innocence there would have been no
weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of
body in infants.

Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to
use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore
much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at
birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not
that strength.

Obj. 3: Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes
affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their
limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something
pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted,
which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of
innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their
limbs.

Obj. 4: Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that
of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no
weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such
weakness in infancy.

_On the contrary,_ Everything generated is first imperfect. But in
the state of innocence children would have been begotten by
generation. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect
in bodily size and power.

_I answer that,_ By faith alone do we hold truths which are above
nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making
any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in
those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by
Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is
befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not
have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after
birth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a
larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable
humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are
instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On
the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by
Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth.

Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that "God made man right"
(Eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As,
therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the
human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it
impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands.
Now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are
befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every
season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not
have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the
purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts
befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe
in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of
infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that "even when close
to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to
suckle."

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs
immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more
perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain,
and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that
a small amount of strength suffices them.

Reply Obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that
they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and
only what was befitting to their state of life.

Reply Obj. 4: In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet
not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have
been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not
senile defects leading to corruption.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 2]

Whether, in the Primitive State, Women Would Have Been Born?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the primitive state woman would
not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,
3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product
outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have
been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women
would not have been born.

Obj. 2: Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by
insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot
burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male.
Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was
not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the
woman, it seems that males would always have been born.

Obj. 3: Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to
the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been
sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact
that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of
innocence, there was no need for women to be born.

_On the contrary,_ Nature's process in generation would have been in
harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But God
established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gen.
1, 2). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would
have been born.

_I answer that,_ Nothing belonging to the completeness of human
nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as
different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also
diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore
in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.

Reply Obj. 1: Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a
product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual
case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above
explained (Q. 92, A. 1, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 2: The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a
defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection
proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the
Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind
favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of
females": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the
parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the
child). Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when
the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of
the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified.

Reply Obj. 3: The offspring would have been begotten to an animal
life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that
all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it
seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal
number.
_______________________

QUESTION 100

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS
(In Two Articles)

We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to
righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?

(2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 100, Art. 1]

Whether Men Would Have Been Born in a State of Righteousness?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence men would
not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St.
Victor says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have
begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's
righteousness."

Obj. 2: Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle
says (Rom. 5:16, 21). Now grace is not transfused from one to
another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone.
Therefore children would not have been born righteous.

Obj. 3: Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not
transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness
have been transmitted from parents, to the children.

_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man
did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with
righteousness together with the rational soul."

_I answer that,_ Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself.
Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the
species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in
its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of
innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in
parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man
was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species,
not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift
conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the
fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is
opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature,
wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for
this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their
parents as regards original righteousness.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring,
not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act
thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: Some say that children would have been born, not with
the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with
original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness,
which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made,
consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which
subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q. 95,
A. 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original
righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have
said above that the first man was created in grace (Q. 95, A. 1).
This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not
have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been
conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the
same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent,
is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.

From this the reply to the third objection is clear.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 100, Art. 2]

Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born
Confirmed in Righteousness?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says
(Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: "For now I should have been
asleep, etc.": "If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent,
he would not have begotten 'children of hell'; no children would have
been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the
Redeemer." Therefore all would have been born confirmed in
righteousness.

Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first
parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have
been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have
been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been
born confirmed in righteousness.

Obj. 3: Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the
first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin.
Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his
descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving
righteousness.

Obj. 4: Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the
others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable
henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been
confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten
children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born
confirmed in righteousness.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would
have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first
parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their
descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which
they would have been condemned." From which words we gather that even
if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might
have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed
in righteousness.

_I answer that,_ It does not seem possible that in the state of
innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater
perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the
parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed
in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in
righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God;
and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the
essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is
desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to
the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special
privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God.
And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in
His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his
animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation.
Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in
righteousness.

Reply Obj. 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten
"children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin
which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will
they could have become "children of hell." If, however, they did not
become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have
been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine
Providence preserving them free from sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only
as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows:
"It seems that if they had lived, etc."

Reply Obj. 3: This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to
have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted.
For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have
been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the
case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have
transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which
is only in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 4: There is no comparison between man and the angels; for
man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas
the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of
the angels (Q. 64, A. 2).
_______________________

QUESTION 101

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE
(In Two Articles)

We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge.
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born
with perfect knowledge?

(2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment
of birth?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born with
Perfect Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have
begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect
knowledge (Q. 94, A. 3). Therefore children would have been born
of him with perfect knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf.
I-II, Q. 85, A. 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge.
Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as
soon as they were born.

Obj. 3: Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness
from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it
directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with
knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet
on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been
in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have
been without knowledge at birth.

_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 99, A. 1), as regards belief in
matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so,
when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course
of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the
senses, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6); and for this
reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its
proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed
at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We
must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would
not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they
would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or
learning.

Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident
of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and
instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like
himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were
natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some
particular time; and this would not have been in children from their
birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at
that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only
nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in
the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).

Reply Obj. 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct
them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal
principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been
much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise
their knowledge of other universal principles.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 2]

Whether Children Would Have Had Perfect Use of Reason at Birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use
of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason
in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the
body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written,
"The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15).
Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom,
children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.

Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural
powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more,
therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use
of reason at birth.

_On the contrary,_ In all things produced by generation nature
proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would
not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.

_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 84, A. 7), the use of reason
depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers;
wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive
powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in
those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are
situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are
hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and
likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered
in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain;
wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of
reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have
had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on
in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have
now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained
above regarding the use of their limbs (Q. 99, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because
it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to
man at all ages.

Reply Obj. 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use
of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the
fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be
observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in
man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q. 99, A.
1).
_______________________

QUESTION 102

OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE
(In Four Articles)

We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?

(2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?

(3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?

(4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 1]

Whether Paradise Is a Corporeal Place?

Objection 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place.
For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on Gen. 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to
the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description,
both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised
up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which
would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise
(Gen. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources
elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore
paradise is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 3: Further, although men have explored the entire habitable
world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore
apparently it is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 4: Further, the tree of life is described as growing in
paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is
written of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold
on her" (Prov. 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but
a spiritual place.

Obj. 5: Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of
paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal
trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees
of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore
paradise was not a corporeal place.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three
general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place
merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others,
whose opinion, I confess, pleases me, hold that paradise was both
corporeal and spiritual."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing
prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise;
so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having
there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set
down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this
method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a
foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so
paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the
east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting that it
should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated
in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right
hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and
the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God
should place the earthly paradise in the east.

Reply Obj. 1: Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious
sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to
the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says
(Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually even
temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies,
which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of
the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly
bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to
the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to
be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the
moon--that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind,
and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on
such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human
dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the
human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of
the earth.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable
that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose
sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground,
and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the
case with some other streams?"

Reply Obj. 3: The situation of paradise is shut off from the
habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which
cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography
make no mention of it.

Reply Obj. 4: The tree of life is a material tree, and so called
because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above
stated (Q. 97, A. 4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the
rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified
Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was
a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after
eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent
punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil
of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the
free-will as some say.

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3),
the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their
seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants,
both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to
other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually
produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what
is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the
six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation.
Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted a paradise of
pleasure from the beginning" (Gen. 2:8).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 2]

Whether Paradise Was a Place Adapted to Be the Abode of Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to
be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to
beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence
were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed--that is, the empyrean
heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been
there also.

Obj. 2: Further, if some definite place were required for man's
abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of
the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven,
which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of
heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no
need for any other place than the one provided for other animals.
Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man.

Obj. 3: Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after
sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted
as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no
purpose.

Obj. 4: Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place
for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an
even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator--a
situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes
vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was
not a fit dwelling-place for man.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise
was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to
God's image."

_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 97, A. 1), Man was incorruptible
and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to
incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power
preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be
corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is
corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above
explained (Q. 97, A. 4), and man was able to ward off such corruption
by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the
chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such
corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In
paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading
brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked
with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise was
most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his
original state of immortality.

Reply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places,
and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two
conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as
Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through
spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature
should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding
over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state
of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability.
Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the
angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's
nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal
creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his
beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the
empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the
state of his final beatitude.

Reply Obj. 2: It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place
is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some
particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual
substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as
regards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his soul
was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This
could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise";
although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither
by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the
complicity of the devil.

Reply Obj. 3: Paradise did not become useless through being
unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred
on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's
kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that
Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.

Reply Obj. 4: Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line
are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of
the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold
there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot,
because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants,
it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle
distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable
on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even
those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are
extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But
whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was
situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or
elsewhere.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 3]

Whether Man Was Placed in Paradise to Dress It and Keep It?

Objection 1: It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to
dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin
would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the
cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gen. 3:17).
Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear
of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of
trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep
paradise.

Obj. 3: Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it,
man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not
contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in
paradise to dress and keep it.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2: 15): "The Lord God took man
and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these
words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense
that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and
keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once
relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases
to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly,
that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have
involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on
account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor
would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have
striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin.
All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to
man's benefit, and not conversely.

Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 4]

Whether Man Was Created in Paradise?

Objection 1: It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the
angel was created in his dwelling-place--namely, the empyrean heaven.
But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it
seems that man was created in paradise.

Obj. 2: Further, other animals remain in the place where they are
produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth
from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise
after he was created (Q. 97, A. 4). Therefore he was created in
paradise.

Obj. 3: Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than
woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:15): "God took man and
placed him in paradise."

_I answer that,_ Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the
incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility
was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God.
Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human
nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him
there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having
attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.

Reply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels
as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there.

In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places
befit those animals in their nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own
dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which
her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been
born in paradise, where their parents were already.
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ. 103-119)
_______________________

QUESTION 103

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL
(In Eight Articles)

Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we
now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the
government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of
this government. Under the first head there are eight points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?

(2) What is the end of this government?

(3) Whether the world is governed by one?

(4) Of the effects of this government?

(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?

(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?

(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 1]

Whether the World Is Governed by Anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone.
For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for
an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world
do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their
end. Therefore the world is not governed.

Obj. 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards
an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has
stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.

Obj. 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature
to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of
government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain
necessity determined to something particular in their actions and
movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, O Father,
governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De
Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal."

_I answer that,_ Certain ancient philosophers denied the government
of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an
opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by
observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature
things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not
be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards
good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we
observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if
we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of
him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii),
quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a
consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (Q.
44, A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), was the cause of the production of things in
existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is
not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things
without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate
perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it
belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence,
so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two
ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational
creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the
means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an
end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow
directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the
arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end
shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the
unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows
clearly that the world is governed by some reason.

Reply Obj. 2: In all created things there is a stable element,
at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under
movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both:
because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing,
would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand,
as will be explained later (Q. 104, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings
which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression
from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an
arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression
from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference,
inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature,
while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their
nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the
movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural
necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 2]

Whether the End of the Government of the World Is Something Outside
the World?

Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the
world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the
government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought.
But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself;
thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in
him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not
outside, but within the things themselves.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are
an operation; some are a work"--i.e. produced by an operation. But
nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and
operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the
end of the government of things.

Obj. 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order,
and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of
things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the
peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the
government of the world is not an extrinsic good.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made
all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the
universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to
them.

_I answer that,_ As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning,
it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know
their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is
something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what
has been expounded above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that we must conclude
that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved
by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end;
wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular
good; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good;
Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very
essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by
participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe
there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore
that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good
outside the universe.

Reply Obj. 1: We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form
existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something
done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house;
thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer
of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore
nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to
which it is directed.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various
arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as
the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other
arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not
the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that
something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as
possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say
that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him.
Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the
end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and
represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to
an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.

Reply Obj. 3: A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of
the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate
end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the
order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in _Metaph._
xii, Did. xi, 10.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 3]

Whether the World Is Governed by One?

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For
we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the
universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but
some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways.
Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Obj. 2: Further, things which are governed by one do not act against
each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler;
which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and
act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries.
Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Obj. 3: Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it
"is better that two should be together than one" (Eccles. 4:9).
Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.

_On the contrary,_ We confess our belief in one God and one Lord,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 8:6): "To us there is
but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain
to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the
name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (Q. 13,
A. 8). Therefore the world is governed by one.

_I answer that,_ We must of necessity say that the world is governed
by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that
which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government
of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best
government is the government by one. The reason of this is that
government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the
end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of
goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as
all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they
would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence
we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the
dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the
intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the
proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be
the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united.
Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause
of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better
governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the
government of the world, being the best form of government, must be
by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi,
10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of
authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."

Reply Obj. 1: Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the
mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity
of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of
the universe (Q. 47, AA. 1,2; Q. 48, A. 2), and not by a diversity of
governors.

Reply Obj. 2: Although contraries do not agree with each other in
their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so
far as they are included in the one order of the universe.

Reply Obj. 3: If we consider individual goods, then two are better
than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is
possible.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 4]

Whether the Effect of Government Is One or Many?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one effect of the
government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is
that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the
good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an
army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.

Obj. 2: Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the
world is governed by one as we have proved (A. 3). Therefore also the
effect of this government is but one.

Obj. 3: Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of
the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many
things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore
we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all
and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government
belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of
the Divine government.

_I answer that,_ The effect of any action may be judged from its end;
because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected.
Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to
the participation and similarity of which all things tend.
Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken
in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way
there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good.
Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered
on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made
like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the
government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things;
first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature
becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this,
that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature
becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two
effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness,
and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the
individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this
way they are without number.

Reply Obj. 1: The order of the universe includes both the
preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards
these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better
than another; and one is moved by another.

From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other
two objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 5]

Whether All Things Are Subject to the Divine Government?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all things are subject to the
Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. 9:11): "I saw that
under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the
strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor
to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to
the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things
which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God hath no care
for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs.
Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

Obj. 3: Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by
another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is
master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by
another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore
all things are not subject to the Divine government.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only
heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the
lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant,
the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of
their nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government.

_I answer that,_ For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He
is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection;
and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only
of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being,
as proved above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing
which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not
subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of
the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those
things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the
Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (A. 2).
Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine
goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 44,
A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from
the Divine government.

Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the
corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human
affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are
represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth" (Ezech. 9:9).

Reply Obj. 1: These things are said to be under the sun which are
generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such
things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in
such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And
the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things
proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless
corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend
to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of
knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes
the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance
and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say
absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and
chance," that is to say, that defects may be found in these things
according to some order of time.

Reply Obj. 2: Government implies a certain change effected by the
governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a
movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down
_Phys._ iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is
an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously,
even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one
art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed
according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of
themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are
governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God
Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they
are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and
prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which
do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence,
when the Apostle says that "God hath no care for oxen," he does not
wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards
the way in which rational creatures are governed.

Reply Obj. 3: The rational creature governs itself by its intellect
and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the
Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby
the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it
requires to be governed by God.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 6]

Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that all things are governed by God
immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves
the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The
first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly
things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to
the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over
generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to
certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions.
Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.

Obj. 2: Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if
possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But
God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause.
Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.

Obj. 3: Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it
seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus
an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything
himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time,
requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all
things immediately.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower
and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of
greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational
spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the
good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."

_I answer that,_ In government there are two things to be considered;
the design of government, which is providence itself; and the
execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs
all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some
things by means of others.

The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness,
so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of
goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order,
design or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists
in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not
the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but
who can consider the least details; and so on in other things.
Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of
all things, even of the very least.

But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection
by government, this government will be so much the better in the
degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a
greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the
cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself.
Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be
causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts
knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching
others.

Reply Obj. 1: Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that
God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of
government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence,
which is the design of government, into three parts.

Reply Obj. 2: If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the
perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would
not be accomplished by one.

Reply Obj. 3: That an earthly king should have ministers to execute
his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his
dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is
brought into greater evidence.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 7]

Whether Anything Can Happen Outside the Order of the Divine
Government?

Objection 1: It would seem possible that something may occur outside
the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol.
iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens
outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no
evil exists.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is in accordance with the
pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing
occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that
there is nothing fortuitous and casual.

Obj. 3: Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and
unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design.
Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine
government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and
nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for
something to occur outside the order of the Divine government.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Esther 13:9): "O Lord, Lord,
almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that
can resist Thy will."

_I answer that,_ It is possible for an effect to result outside the
order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the
universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside
the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding
cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first
universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the
nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the
food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on
till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the
first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in
general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of
the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of
view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence
considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily
come back to that order as regards some other cause.

Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is
ever founded on good, as shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). Therefore
something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of
some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the
Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.

Reply Obj. 2: Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some
particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the
order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance,"
as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).

Reply Obj. 3: Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared
to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not
as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine
government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of
some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to
the Divine government.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 8]

Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?

Objection 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made
to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Isa. 3:8):
"Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."

Obj. 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel
against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's
commands, no one would be justly punished by God.

Obj. 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine
government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things
rebel against the order of the Divine government.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing
that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this
sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all
sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.

_I answer that,_ We may consider the order of Divine providence in
two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing
cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some
particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.

Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the
Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the
fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to
good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good
only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 3;
A. 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or
voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover;
as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but
an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether
natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of
its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things
sweetly."

Reply Obj. 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against
God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government;
for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but
because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their
nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.

Reply Obj. 2 is clear from the above.

Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it
follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular
cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all
things.
_______________________

QUESTION 104

THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT
(In Four Articles)

We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular;
concerning which four points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?

(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?

(3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?

(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 1]

Whether Creatures Need to Be Kept in Being by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in
being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in
being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept
from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot
not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God.
The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the
nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary
cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and
cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself,
because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But
some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels
(Q. 50, AA. 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same
reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality
to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (Q. 66, A.
2). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be
necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to
not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter
existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in
potentiality to any other form.

Obj. 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a
created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be
preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the
builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time
after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God
cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create
it.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some
active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and
violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be.
Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some
active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature
that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances
and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to
not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.

Obj. 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by
some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be
efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the
preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But
this is not so; because this action does not give being to the
creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does
it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not
keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually
adding something new to the creature; either of which is
unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 1:3): "Upholding all things by
the word of His power."

_I answer that,_ Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures
are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a
thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and
accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing
the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a
child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God
preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such
a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary
to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve
another _per se_ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends
on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In
this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being
of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it
subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by
the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).

This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so
far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the
cause of the _becoming_ of its effect, but not directly of its
_being._ This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings:
for the builder causes the house in its _becoming,_ but he is not the
direct cause of its _being._ For it is clear that the _being_ of the
house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together
and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural
qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying
the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by
making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put
together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the _being_
of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its
_becoming_ depends on the action of the builder. The same principle
applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form
as such, neither will it be directly the cause of _being_ which
results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in
its _becoming_ only.

Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot
directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the
cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of
the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is
in matter--in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter"
receives _this form._ And this is to be the cause of _becoming,_ as
when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural
effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active
cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause,
then the _becoming_ of the effect, but not its _being,_ depends on
the agent.

Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the
impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent:
as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect
of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the
generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such
an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as
existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of
_becoming_ but also the cause of _being._

Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action
of the agent ceases which causes the _becoming_ of the effect: so
neither can the _being_ of a thing continue after that action of the
agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in
_becoming_ but also in _being._ This is why hot water retains heat
after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the
air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun
ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the
fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it
were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that
form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and
inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the
imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand,
air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it
exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since
it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the
sun.

Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun
which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and
as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is
Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His
existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that
its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His
creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would
collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: "As the
air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by
the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness."

Reply Obj. 1: _Being_ naturally results from the form of a creature,
given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from
the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun.
Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and
heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His
influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being
after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make
it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature
needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect
depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison
with an agent that is not the cause of _being_ but only of _becoming._

Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation
which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not
need to be preserved thus, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 4: The preservation of things by God is a continuation of
that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without
either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air
is by the continual influence of the sun.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 2]

Whether God Preserves Every Creature Immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature
immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action,
as above stated (A. 1, ad 4). But God created all things immediately.
Therefore He preserves all things immediately.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it
cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore
can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God
preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.

Obj. 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of
its _becoming,_ but also of its being. But all created causes do not
seem to cause their effects except in their _becoming,_ for they
cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they
do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.

_On the contrary,_ A thing is kept in being by that which gives it
being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes.
Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in
being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or
hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and
_per se,_ by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as
the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a
created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in
corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of
corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just
as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many
other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as
to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one
another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first
and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way
on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal
cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the
middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle
cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.

For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and
continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the
diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated;
whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of
diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner
astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those
things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps
certain things in being, by means of certain causes.

Reply Obj. 1: God created all things immediately, but in the
creation itself He established an order among things, so that some
depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He
remains the principal cause of their preservation.

Reply Obj. 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause
on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can
only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the
power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving
another.

Reply Obj. 3: No created nature can be the cause of another,
as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by
virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something
presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect,
without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form
or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow
some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light
is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the
source of light.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 3]

Whether God Can Annihilate Anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything
tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to
annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.

Obj. 2: Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist,
since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because God is
good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot
cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to
annihilate anything.

Obj. 3: Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by
His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is
existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term
in something generated; for when one thing is generated another
undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord,
but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to
nothing."

_I answer that,_ Some have held that God, in giving existence to
creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could
not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we
have said above (Q. 19, A. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and
absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God
created things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6:
"Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done." Therefore that God gives
existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve
things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out
existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before
things existed, God was free not to give them existence, and not to
make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their
existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to
annihilate them.

Reply Obj. 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a
cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as
such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a
thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency
of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can
be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing
His action therefrom.

Reply Obj. 2: God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by
natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on
creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to
His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so,
without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in
existence.

Reply Obj. 3: If God were to annihilate anything, this would not
imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 4]

Whether Anything Is Annihilated?

Objection 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end
corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing
but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall
be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.

Obj. 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite
power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time."
Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at
some time it will be reduced to nothing.

Obj. 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of
themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are
reduced to nothing.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that
all the works that God hath made continue for ever."

_I answer that,_ Some of those things which God does in creatures
occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen
miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will
be explained (Q. 105, A. 6). Now whatever God wills to do according
to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but
those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the
manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To each one is
given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" (1 Cor. 12:7);
and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.

Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated.
For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality
to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to
exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the
subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of
things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather
the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of
things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely
that anything at all will be annihilated.

Reply Obj. 1: That things are brought into existence from a state of
non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that
they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation,
since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all
things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things
by the word of His power" (Heb. 1:3).

Reply Obj. 2: A creature's potentiality to existence is merely
receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom
existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a
consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things,
however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time,
so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving
the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot
resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which
have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to
exist for ever.

Reply Obj. 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they
do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for
it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their
mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to
nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain
in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.
_______________________

QUESTION 105

OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD
(In Eight Articles)

We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the
change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God;
secondly, the change of one creature by another.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?

(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?

(3) Whether He can move the intellect?

(4) Whether He can move the will?

(5) Whether God works in every worker?

(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?

(7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?

(8) Of the diversity of miracles.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 1]

Whether God Can Move the Matter Immediately to the Form?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately
to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did.
vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except
that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is
not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.

Obj. 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce
none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some
other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a
general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some
particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause
of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form,
except by means of a particular agent.

Obj. 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so
determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we
have seen above (Q. 104, A. 2). But the determinate being of a
particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things
are produced by God, only by means of particular causes.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7): "God formed man of the
slime of the earth."

_I answer that,_ God can move matter immediately to form; because
whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the
active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since
the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be
reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by
matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the
act of matter.

Reply Obj. 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two
ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by
man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the
cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause:
thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are
like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way
the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which
the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both
matter and form; as we have said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 44, A. 2);
wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by
way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite
generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite
generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing
like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in
matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance
extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible
matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of
corporeal seeds.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument would hold if God were to act of natural
necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows
the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it
follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to
determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other
causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by
Himself without any other cause.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 2]

Whether God Can Move a Body Immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately.
For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some
contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact
between God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is
no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

Obj. 2: Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the
desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object
of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the
intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore
God cannot move a body immediately.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an
infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body
to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between
opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the
same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved
immediately by an infinite power. But God's power is infinite, as we
have explained (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore God cannot move a body
immediately.

_On the contrary,_ God produced the works of the six days immediately
among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen.
1:9 "Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore
God alone can move a body immediately.

_I answer that,_ It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself
produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created
cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created
causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any
bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated (A.
1). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a
form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form
which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the
generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating
tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to
imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement
which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but
it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint
form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body
whatever in respect of any movement whatever.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when
two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of
sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first
kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is
touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by
moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no
creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the
words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself
be touched.

Reply Obj. 2: God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but
it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and
apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by
Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to
prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first
mover _of bulk,_ by the following argument. The power of the first
mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover
can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power
_of bulk,_ would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the
infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not
measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved
without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason
is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by
the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of
all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the
mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a
finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite
power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other
time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not
in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its
effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it
cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not
follow that it moves without time.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 3]

Whether God Moves the Created Intellect Immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not immediately move the
created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its
own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated
in _Metaph._ ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by
another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover.
Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently
God cannot move the created intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle
of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the
intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say
that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which
is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding.
Therefore it is not moved by another.

Obj. 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the
intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible
to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God
cannot move our intellect.

_On the contrary,_ The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught.
But it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God "teaches man knowledge."
Therefore God moves the human intellect.

_I answer that,_ As in corporeal movement that is called the mover
which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is
said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is
the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of
the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual
operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual
power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in
potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual
understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the
one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect,
whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding;
or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.

Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First
immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality,
it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in
each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must
conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like
manner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in
Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly
in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible
types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from
Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand;
so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore
God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the
intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on
the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and
preserves both power and species in existence.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the
intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds
from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand
is given to the one who understands.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of
the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but
it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.

Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so
far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of
which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses
which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to
enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence,
as we have seen above (Q. 12, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 3). Hence He moves the
created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we
have explained (Q. 12, A. 4).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 4]

Whether God Can Move the Created Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For
whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be
forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot
be moved by God.

Obj. 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at
the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be
voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another.
Therefore God cannot move the will.

Obj. 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to
the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but
to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that
voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But
this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God who worketh
in us [Vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish."

_I answer that,_ As the intellect is moved by the object and by the
Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the
will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the
power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object,
but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move
a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover
surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable.
Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for
its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect
is the universal being. But every created good is some particular
good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the
capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In
like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will
is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which
is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs
to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just
as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs
the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both
ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second
way by an interior inclination of the will.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its
natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the
proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is
made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not
forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it,
because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within,
that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be
caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is
not repugnant to being moved by another.

Reply Obj. 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be
moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed
for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not
prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2),
it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 5]

Whether God Works in Every Agent?

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For
we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works
in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be
superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

Obj. 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from
two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two
movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God
operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from
the creature; and so no creature works at all.

Obj. 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing
made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is
the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be
inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the
beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not
operate any further in the operating creature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast
wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."

_I answer that,_ Some have understood God to work in every agent in
such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that
God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance,
that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so
forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and
effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply
lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the
cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because
the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be
bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through
them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be
purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the
purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is
always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the
matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first
act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and
thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore
understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have
their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few
kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the
subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the
end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a
certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which
moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of
that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts
through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.
For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing
wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the
axe which cuts through its being sharp.

Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three
things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake
of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or
apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the
Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause
of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where
there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue
of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus
all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the
cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not
only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and
powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who
nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also
gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being.
Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which
is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause
of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the
forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause
of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves
the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a
thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer
to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God
Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost
in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately.
For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are
attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11:
"Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together
with bones and sinews."

Reply Obj. 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it
does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is
superfluous.

Reply Obj. 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same
order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a
primary and a secondary agent.

Reply Obj. 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also
preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover
the end of every action, as above explained.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 6]

Whether God Can Do Anything Outside the Established Order of Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the
established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)
says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against
nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be
against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural
order.

Obj. 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order
of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice;
for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do
anything outside the order of nature.

Obj. 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it
God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He
is changeable; which cannot be said.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God
sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of
nature."

_I answer that,_ From each cause there results a certain order to its
effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders,
subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore
a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but
conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the
father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is
contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the
ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king,
by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first
cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so,
He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness.
But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary
cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not
subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this
order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural
necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have
created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something
outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by
producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by
producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts against the wonted
course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme
law; because He does not act against Himself."

Reply Obj. 1: In natural things something may happen outside this
natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent
which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example,
when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its
natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against
nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the
natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is
clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature;
although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward
direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on
which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore
since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does
anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each
thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and
order in nature."

Reply Obj. 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First
Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do
nothing against such order.

Reply Obj. 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that
at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do
otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this
order, He does not change.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 7]

Whether Whatever God Does Outside the Natural Order Is Miraculous?

Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside
the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the
world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are
done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by
the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called
miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural
order is a miracle.

Obj. 2: Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom
occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our
hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate
credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of nature are not
arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and
healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they
happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be
healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the
faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they
beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead,
which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore
not all things are outside the course of nature are miraculous.

Obj. 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now
admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes
things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to
the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without
studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs
outside the order of nature is miraculous.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where
God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are
accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."

_I answer that,_ The word miracle is derived from admiration, which
arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as
when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the
Philosopher says in the beginning of his _Metaphysics._ Now the cause
of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others.
Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others:
as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle
is so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely
hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which
God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.

Reply Obj. 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous,
though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles,
because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so
they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not
belong to that order.

Reply Obj. 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of
the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it
surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual,
not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the
usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be
above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of
the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which
it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of
nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith,
whereby we believe in the future resurrection.

Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in
itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown
to be wonderful.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 8]

Whether One Miracle Is Greater Than Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than
another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In
miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the
doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore
one miracle is not greater than another.

Obj. 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite
exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more
reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another.
Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

_On the contrary,_ The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (John
14:12): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than
these shall he do."

_I answer that,_ Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the
Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the
power of God, according to Isa. 40:15: "Behold the Gentiles are as a
drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a
balance." But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the
power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature
is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is
surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for
instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes
backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is
absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among
miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the
deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and
giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life,
but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles.
Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in
which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without
treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is
suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural
cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold
the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has
various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power
of nature is surpassed.

From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do
from the Divine power.
_______________________

QUESTION 106

HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER
(In Four Articles)

We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration
will be threefold:

(1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures;

(2) How bodies move;

(3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal
nature.

Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered:

(1) How an angel acts on an angel;

(2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature;

(3) How an angel acts on man.

The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and
speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the
good and of the bad angels.

Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?

(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?

(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?

(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that
he knows himself?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 1]

Whether One Angel Enlightens Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another.
For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain.
But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34:
"They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his
brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.

Obj. 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of
grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of
nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in
the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God.
Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.

Obj. 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational
mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not
enlighten the mind of another.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels
of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by
the angels of the first hierarchy."

_I answer that,_ One angel enlightens another. To make this clear,
we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a
manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: "All that is made
manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to
communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according
to the Apostle (Eph. 3:8): "To me the least of all the saints is
given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what
is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from
eternity in God." Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by
manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. vii): "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the
heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds."

Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we
have said (Q. 105, A. 3), namely, the intellectual power, and the
likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can
notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his
intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is
strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body--for
instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is
hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened
by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for
one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal
things. Secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards
the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives
the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive
which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for
it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner.
Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which
he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior
angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us
that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into
many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This
is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual
substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform
knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its
inferiors upwards by analogy."

Reply Obj. 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the
Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach
another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he
adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know
the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the
greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in
God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends
Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types,
the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more
about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and
concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by
the types of existing things."

Reply Obj. 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the
light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural
light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of
nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either
as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image
of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for
the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it
adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment
that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to
this ultimate form.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 2]

Whether one angel moves another angel's will?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel's
will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A. 1), as one
angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But
cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former
seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to
be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will.
Therefore an angel can move another angel's will.

Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of
the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are so
called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love
which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's
will.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the
higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior
angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the
superior angel can change the will of another angel.

_On the contrary,_ To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it
belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness
of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel
cannot change another angel's will.

_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 105, A. 4), the will is
changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of
the power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is
the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the
appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one
who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (Q. 105,
A. 4), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing
sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God.
And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed,
Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show
thee all good" (Ex. 33:18, 19). Therefore an angel does not move the
will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But
he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some
created good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the
will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.

But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by
God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the
willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination,
Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent
alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to
which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the
creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the
intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's
will.

Reply Obj. 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according
to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing
the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect
and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But
the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as
explained above (A. 1); therefore an angel is to be understood as
cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as
perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the
knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in
the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an
enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect
knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is
cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of
light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the
colored object.

Reply Obj. 2: One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion
as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite
which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it
belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior
appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to
the angels.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 3]

Whether an Inferior Angel Can Enlighten a Superior Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a
superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and
represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is
called "our mother" (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are
enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
14:31): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all
may be exhorted." Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the
superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.

Obj. 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the
will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as
was said above (Q. 105, A. 6), God sometimes acts outside the order
of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the
order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise
than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors
enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.

Obj. 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as
was above explained (A. 1). But since this turning to another is
voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the
others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the
latter can enlighten his superiors.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says that "this is the Divine
unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior"
(Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v).

_I answer that,_ The inferior angels never enlighten the superior,
but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above
explained (Q. 105, A. 6), one order is under another, as cause is
under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to
order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is
done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the
superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is
passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God
works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men
may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the
order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the
ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made
known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order
which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so
that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not
conversely.

Reply Obj. 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in
some degree, but not by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly
hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its
nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more
sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account
the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God
in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for
science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail
in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.

Reply Obj. 2: As above explained, there is no similarity between what
God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual
nature. Hence the argument does not hold.

Reply Obj. 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel,
but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made
the order in the angels.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 4]

Whether the Superior Angel Enlightens the Inferior As Regards All He
Himself Knows?

Objection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten
the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal
knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual
knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than
under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior
angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being
enlightened by the former.

Obj. 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that
the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation,
whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was
accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as
it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who
knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory," as
Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the
superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know
themselves. Therefore they do not do so.

Obj. 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about
all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown
to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could
communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to
objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in
all things.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf.
Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though
there are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually."
And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the
inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as
quoted above (A. 1).

_I answer that,_ Every creature participates in the Divine goodness,
so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the
nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal
agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more
an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much
the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far
as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace
share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received
grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the
manifold grace of God" (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy
angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine
goodness, impart the same to those below them.

Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior
as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in
a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master
understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.

Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more
universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: The Master's words are not to be understood as if the
inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the
Incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior
angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards
when the Mystery was accomplished.

Reply Obj. 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being
revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the
world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is
always something for the superior angels to make known to the
inferior.
_______________________

QUESTION 107

THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS
(In Five Articles)

We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel speaks to another?

(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?

(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?

(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?

(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 1]

Whether One Angel Speaks to Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another.
For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection
"each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less,
therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech
manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not
necessary that one angel should speak to another.

Obj. 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to
oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior
speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or
some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot
apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

Obj. 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he
says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to
listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore
one angel does not speak to another.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): "If I speak with
the tongues of men and of angels."

_I answer that,_ The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory
says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the
properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and
unknown methods of interior speech."

To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that,
as we explained above (Q. 82, A. 4), when treating of the actions and
powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation.
Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways;
first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
6, 7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as
related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible
object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of
the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur,
"which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible
object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by
the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as,
for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made
known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual
consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to
himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior word."
And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be
made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept
of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel
speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known
the mental concept to another.

Reply Obj. 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The
first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or
can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of
another, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: "What man knoweth the things of a
man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle
whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge,
comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will
directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at
once make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used.
Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes
we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and
when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the
door of the tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under
no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at
once.

Reply Obj. 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for
us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an
angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not
only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being
ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel
is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his
mental concept.

Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the good
angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as
one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself.
But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and
even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the
intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is
affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by
the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to
attention by some intelligible power.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 2]

Whether the Inferior Angel Speaks to the Superior?

Objection 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to
the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. 13:1), "If I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the
angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the
inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was
above explained (Q. 106, A. 3). Therefore neither do the inferior
speak to the superior.

Obj. 2: Further, as was said above (Q. 106, A. 1), to enlighten means
merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is
to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the
same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels
by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and
invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever
God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an
enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a
superior angel.

_On the contrary,_ According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel.
Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this
King of Glory?"

_I answer that,_ The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To
make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is
an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an
enlightening; because, as we have said (A. 1), for one angel to speak
to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he
directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to
the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold
principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will
of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything.
But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is
the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the
mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and
enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was
created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however,
of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be
called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one
says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that."
The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of
truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes
from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know
what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the
perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.

Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by
comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment,
which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the
superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the
principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the
manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by
the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to
the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.

From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second
   objections.

Reply Obj. 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening;
because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the
perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what
God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as
was explained above.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel Speaks to God?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For
speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make
known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does
not speak to God.

Obj. 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference
to another, as was shown above (A. 1). But an angel ever orders his
mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks
to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel
sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel
never speaks to God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Zech. 1:12): "The angel of the Lord
answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy
on Jerusalem." Therefore an angel speaks to God.

_I answer that,_ As was said above (AA. 1, 2), the angel speaks by
ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is
ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of
giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is
ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to
the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God
either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the
created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth
and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to
receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the
agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this
way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of
what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he
can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they
rise to emotions of admiration."

Reply Obj. 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making
something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the
purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the
disciples ask instruction from the master.

Reply Obj. 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of
praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by
consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to
perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 4]

Whether Local Distance Influences the Angelic Speech?

Objection 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic
speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works
where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an
angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is
limited by the bounds of that place.

Obj. 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of
the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one to
another" (Isa. 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance
has some effect.

_On the contrary,_ It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to
Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Luke 16:24). Much less
therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to
another.

_I answer that,_ The angelic speech consists in an intellectual
operation, as explained above (AA. 1, 2, 3). And the intellectual
operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our
own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the "here
and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do
not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted
from "here and now," neither difference of time nor local distance has
any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is
no impediment.

Reply Obj. 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A. 1, ad 2), is
interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it
exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is
who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing
another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is
ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his
speech.

Reply Obj. 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by
reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude
of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what
Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less one cries
out."
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 5]

Whether All the Angels Know What One Speaks to Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks
to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do
not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech
local distance has no effect, as above explained (A. 4). Therefore
all the angels know what one speaks to another.

Obj. 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in
common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known
by one, it is for the same reason known by all.

Obj. 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the
enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels,
because, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the
heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore
the speech of one angel to another extends to all.

_On the contrary,_ One man can speak to another alone; much more can
this be the case among the angels.

_I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 1, 2), the mental concept of
one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses
the concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be
ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another;
consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not
by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one
angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of
local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained
above.

From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3: Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the
first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels;
and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may
be of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which
is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that
these speeches should be common to all.
_______________________

QUESTION 108

OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS
(In Eight Articles)

We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and
orders; for it was said above (Q. 106, A. 3), that the superior
angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.

Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?

(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?

(3) Whether in one order there are many angels?

(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?

(5) Of the names and properties of each order.

(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.

(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?

(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 1]

Whether All the Angels Are of One Hierarchy?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one
hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is
evident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of
a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the
Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4).
Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it
seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is
order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one order
towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are
ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Obj. 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be
found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy.
Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three
hierarchies of angels.

_I answer that,_ Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above
explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself
and the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there
is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and
all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels,
but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of
sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There
are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and
men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality on
the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality
is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude can be subject in
_one_ way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be
governed in the same way by a prince belong to different
principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities,
which are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is
evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same
way as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their
intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs,
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a
distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same
manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown
above (Q. 55, A. 3), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the
superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the
inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the
angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are
enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as
preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of
knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with
God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius
says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on
the universal created causes which in some way are already
multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly,
forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as
depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest
hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of
the orders (A. 6). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on
the part of the multitude of subjects.

Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of
Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it
the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there
exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order,
for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is
so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and
that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from
us to apply to the Divine Persons.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers principality on the part of
the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as
the Philosopher asserts in those passages.

Reply Obj. 2: As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one
way--that is, in His essence--there is no hierarchical distinction
among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the
types of created things, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: All men are of one species, and have one connatural
mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and
hence the same argument does not apply to both.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Several Orders in One Hierarchy?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not
several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined
is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one
hierarchy only, but many.

Obj. 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades
among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among
the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is
possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not
different orders of angels.

Obj. 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are
distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing,"
"enlightening," and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is
"cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops
"perfecting," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the
angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no
distinction of orders among the angels.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that "God has set
the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and
dominion": which are the various orders of the angels, and some of
them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (A. 6).

_I answer that,_ As explained above, one hierarchy is one
principality--that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the
rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but
confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of
a hierarchy requires diversity of orders.

This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and
actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders
according to the different actions; for there is one order of those
who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who
labor in the fields, and so forth.

But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be
reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order
of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others
are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between
these, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the same way we
find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to
their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to
three--namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in
every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).

Reply Obj. 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order
comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy
is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and
in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.

Reply Obj. 2: All things are possessed in common by the angelic
society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some
than by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who
can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the
hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is
unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a
gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect
grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this
similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the
angels, according to their different offices and actions.

Reply Obj. 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of
our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the
kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"--namely, John the Baptist,
than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of
women" (Matt. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly
hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and
in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the
heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by
reason of other different acts.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 3]

Whether There Are Many Angels in One Order?

Objection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order.
For it was shown above (Q. 50, A. 4), that all the angels are
unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many
angels in one order.

Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many,
which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one
angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more
sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the
sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If,
therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated
above (A. 2), several angels in one order would be superfluous.

Obj. 3: Further, it was said above (Obj. 1) that all the angels are
unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four),
are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more
akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of
his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with
the latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels
of one order.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another"
(Isa. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the
Seraphim.

_I answer that,_ Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to
distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest
details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only
distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points.
Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their
orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order,
inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals
in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to
distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and
in each of the other orders.

Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and
orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But
if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we
should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own
order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be
hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a
common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but
absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who
are first, middle, and last.

Reply Obj. 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein
each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black,
the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as
regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less
akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders
are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to
the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for
similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 4]

Whether the Distinction of Hierarchies and Orders Comes from the
Angelic Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of
orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a
sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it
"approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. Hier. iii).
But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not
by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the
angels is by grace, and not by nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes
not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts
by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5): "which is said not
only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but
from grace.

Obj. 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the
heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the
gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop,
and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the
angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.

_On the contrary,_ The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order
is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by
some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of
natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels
is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.

_I answer that,_ The order of government, which is the order of a
multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of
the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the
faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural
knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the
orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly,
the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above
their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine
Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which
end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the
orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of
grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels
are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural
gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q. 62, A.
6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the
gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.

From the above the replies to the objections are evident.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 5]

Whether the Orders of the Angels Are Properly Named?

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not
properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and
heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to
individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are
ineptly named.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the
words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one
order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations."

Obj. 3: Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and
likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore these
three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.

Obj. 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore
this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the
"Principalities."

Obj. 5: Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which
pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But
charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore
they ought not to be names of any particular orders.

Obj. 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows
and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it.
Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the
"Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the orders of
angels are not properly styled.

On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are
so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in Isa. 6:2; the name
"Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in Col. 1:16;
"Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are
mentioned in Eph. 1:21; the name "Archangels" in the canonical
epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many
places of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of
the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of
each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of
each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something
may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of
excess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another
by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its
nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is
attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have
stated (Q. 13, A. 2) concerning all the names which are attributed to
God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something
not fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by
participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name
designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it
participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess,
but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we
wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational
substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter is the
proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an
angel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him
a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because
sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a
more excellent way than to other animals.

So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual
perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more
excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as
in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs
to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the
inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection
belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by
way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the
superior perfection.

So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the
orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they
signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom.
xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for
he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and
the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought;
by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities
preside over the good spirits themselves."

Reply Obj. 1: Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits,
so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But
the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this
manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The
lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common
manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation
only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the
lowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that
the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels,"
forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.

"Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the
medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all
the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly
essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and
thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. viii) that the "name 'virtues' signifies a certain
virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine
operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine
gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine
behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.

Reply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is
attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the
Divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of
Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the
Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that
the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free from
servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians,
and from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great.
Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy
which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act of those who
are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies "the
desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God."
Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what
belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of
the Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest.

Reply Obj. 3: The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality"
belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only
to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in
Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are
subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name
"Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle
says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God"
(Rom. 13:2). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name
"Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception
of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by
superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above.
Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to
be done by those who are subject to them. To preside [principari] as
Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as
being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities"
signifies "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead
others, being first among them, are properly called "princes,"
according to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers"
(Ps. 67:26).

Reply Obj. 4: The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier.
ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium
compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the
nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and
hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel
princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the "Angels," and
angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom.
xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over
the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing greater things:
and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the
heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine commands.

Reply Obj. 5: The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only,
but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire.
Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim"
according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat.
Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which
is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne
inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat,"
which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain
sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to
the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor;
whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully
upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor,
and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we consider in fire
the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these
angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they
also perfectly enlighten others.

In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of
knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," which
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the
perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their
contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard
to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth
copiously upon others.

Reply Obj. 6: The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders
as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works;
whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the
"Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent
attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones"
does not include the other two; and so the order of the "Thrones" is
distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the "Seraphim."
For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the
inferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its
relation to material seats, in which we may consider four things.
First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to
the angels who are called "Thrones" are raised up to the immediate
knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in
material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits
firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels
themselves are made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives
him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the
angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to
the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is
open on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels
promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 6]

Whether the Grades of the Orders Are Properly Assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not
properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the
names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves
imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme.

Obj. 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But
the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer
to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is
the highest.

Obj. 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher
than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher than
the "Seraphim."

Obj. 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the
"Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed
immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest
hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle,
the "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the
"Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the
"Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first,
then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels."

_I answer that,_ The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by
Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree
as regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For
Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above
the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the
"Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" between
the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the
"Powers" and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim
authority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21)
enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that
"God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the heavenly places
above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he
places "Virtues" between "Powers" and "Dominations," according to the
placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16),
numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: "Whether
Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things
were created by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities"
between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory.

Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius,
in which we see, that, as said above (A. 1), the highest hierarchy
contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the
universal causes; and third in their application to particular
effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic
ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first
hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal
disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the
application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying
out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in
every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of
the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy
those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God,
the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle
hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common
government or disposition--the "Dominations," "Virtues," and
"Powers"; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names
denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels," and
"Archangels."

As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we
consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end;
thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an
addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because
God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as
the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar
order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the
dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader;
others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others
above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this
similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the
first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the
familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing
immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the
whole of the first hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets
supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme
excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in
such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the
"Thrones"; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits
together, they are all called "Angels."

As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first
of which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this
belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of
carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the "Virtues"; the
third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done
can be carried out by others, which belongs to the "Powers."

The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing
Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners
and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and
officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." There are others who
simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others
hold a middle place; and these are the "Archangels," as above
explained.

This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the
highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the
higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the
first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the
Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the
first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of
love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the
"Thrones," who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for
the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called
"because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are
enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening
of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the
Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers" is akin to the order
of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose
order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once
in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government
of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place
in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof;
"for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man"
(Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of the kingdom of
the Persians resisted me" (Dan. 10:13).

The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also
reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order what belongs
to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged
according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine
ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii),
"bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior;
and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the
good spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called
that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then the
"Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced
by earthly powers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come
the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working
of miracles; after these are the "Angels" and the "Archangels," who
announce to men either great things above reason, or small things
within the purview of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The angels' subjection to God is greater than their
presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the
former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are
not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name
from their nearness and relation to God.

Reply Obj. 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the
"Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a
more excellent way, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 27, A. 3), knowledge takes place
accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the
lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a
nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things
are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves.
Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to
love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them.

Reply Obj. 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no
difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders
according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name
"Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also
agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a
certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the
execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory,
the "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius.
For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine
ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the
announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 7]

Whether the Orders Will Outlast the Day of Judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast
the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ
will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have
delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father," and this will be in
the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will
be abolished in that state.

Obj. 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to
cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one
angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they
will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders
would remain for no purpose.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. 1:14), that
"they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall
receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence it appears that the
angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to
salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the
Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not
outlast the Day of Judgment.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Judges 5:20): "Stars remaining in
their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore
the angels will ever remain in their orders.

_I answer that,_ In the angelic orders we may consider two things;
the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The
distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the
difference of grace and nature, as above explained (A. 4); and these
differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of
natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be
corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them
according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution
of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the
Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease
accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to
their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the
attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have
different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.

Reply Obj. 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end in
that final consummation as regards their office of leading others
to their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer
necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of
the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God
and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to the
enjoyment of God Himself.

Reply Obj. 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are to be
considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions.
In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered
according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually
arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest
that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding
middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also
as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is
that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can
have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he
is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels
know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior
angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels
not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards
the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the
Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of
some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by
the superior angels.

Reply Obj. 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led
any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who
are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 8]

Whether Men Are Taken Up into the Angelic Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders
of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest
heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the
middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are
never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are
men transferred to the angelic orders.

Obj. 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels,
as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like;
which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore
they are not transferred to the angelic orders.

Obj. 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons
to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men
are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in
Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will
be transferred to the orders of angels.

_On the contrary,_ The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as
the angels of God" (Matt. 22:30). _I answer that,_ As above explained
(AA. 4,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to
the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.
Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be
assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will
always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men
can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this
is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying
that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in
heaven (Luke 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material
part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which
depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature.
Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree
as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this
implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some,
however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic
orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will
constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole
society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies of men and
angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to
God alone."

Reply Obj. 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their
natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above
explained (A. 4; Q. 62, A. 6). So, as the inferior angels cannot be
transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be
transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to
the grade of grace, but not of nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The angels according to the order of nature are between
us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human
affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But
holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves;
and hence according to the common law they do not administer human
affairs, "nor do they interfere in the things of the living," as
Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain
special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to
exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons,
or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro
mortuis xvi).

Reply Obj. 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to
the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons
are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom
rejects.
_______________________

QUESTION 109

THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS
(In Four Articles)

We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there
are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?

(2) Whether among them there is precedence?

(3) Whether one enlightens another?

(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 1]

Whether There Are Orders Among the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons.
For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine
says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to
evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore
in the bad angels there are no orders.

Obj. 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy.
But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy
principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the
demons there are no orders.

Obj. 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic
orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said
to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem
necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we
never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or
"Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed
in any other order.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling . . .
is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world
of this darkness."

_I answer that,_ As explained above (Q. 108, AA. 4, 7, 8), order in
the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and
according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the
imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of
consummate glory.

If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the
perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders,
and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect
grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of
angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above
(Q. 62, A. 3), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we
consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in
those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Reply Obj. 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist
without good (Q. 49, A. 3); so there is order in the demons, as
possessing a good nature.

Reply Obj. 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part
of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for
Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred
thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.

Reply Obj. 3: The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity;
and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name
"Dominations" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to
sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 2]

Whether among the demons there is precedence?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the
demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice.
But the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no
precedence among them.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and
subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which
is not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among
the proud there are always contentions" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore
there is no precedence among the demons.

Obj. 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according to
nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not
according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come
from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin
or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have
sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior.
Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

_On the contrary,_ On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world
lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over
demons."

_I answer that,_ Since action follows the nature of a thing, where
natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each
other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by
natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and
movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly
bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said (A. 1), that the
demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions
are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we
mean by precedence--that the action of the subject should be under
the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the
demons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees
too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which
"reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly"
(Wis. 8:1).

Reply Obj. 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on
their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.

Reply Obj. 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey
others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common
wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For
it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom
they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.

Reply Obj. 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among
them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with
men, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the
superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their
detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to
unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 3]

Whether There Is Enlightenment in the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For
enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can
manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural
knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

Obj. 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body
deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior
demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it
seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

_On the contrary,_ Enlightenment is not without cleansing and
perfecting, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 1). But to cleanse does
not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean
by the unclean?" (Ecclus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.

_I answer that,_ There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among
the demons. For, as above explained (Q. 107, A. 2), enlightenment
properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to
God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of
the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to
another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another
to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one
demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental
concept to another by way of speech.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is
enlightenment, but only that which is above described.

Reply Obj. 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there
is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or
in the demons, because, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 58, A. 2;
Q. 79, A. 2), they know from the first all that belongs to their
natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the
superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 4]

Whether the Good Angels Have Precedence Over the Bad Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence
over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially
connected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are
not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not
rule over the bad.

Obj. 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence
for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.
Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that
negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be
admitted.

Obj. 3: Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of
nature, as above explained (A. 2). But if the demons fell from every
order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many
good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no
precedence over all the bad angels.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the
treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational,
pious, and just spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that
"the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile
powers."

_I answer that,_ The whole order of precedence is first and
originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they
are the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect
and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest
perfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the
creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the
demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence
over the bad, and these are ruled by them.

Reply Obj. 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known
by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice
requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or
for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors
make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if
compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment,
forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on
the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the
fulfilment of their own wickedness.

Reply Obj. 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom.
Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels
or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good
angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.

Reply Obj. 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides
over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the
power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger
than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, "the
spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15), and the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and
measure of all human acts."
_______________________

QUESTION 110

HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES
(In Four Articles)

We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?

(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?

(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies
locally?

(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 1]

Whether the Corporeal Creature Is Governed by the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not
governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of
action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we
require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal
things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed
upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.

Obj. 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But
some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior.
Therefore they need not be governed by the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished
by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the
angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species
of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there
are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (Q.
108, A. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by
angels.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies
are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial.
iv, 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the
agency of the invisible creature."

_I answer that,_ It is generally found both in human affairs and in
natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by
the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed
by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above
(Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 108, A. 1), the superior angels who preside over the
inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that
the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of
any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form
individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now";
whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as
the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by
the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This
is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all
philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.

Reply Obj. 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they
exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it
belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature
must be moved by a spiritual creature.

Reply Obj. 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of
Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are
moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to
assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly
bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances
with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human
souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations
were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for
which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we
assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the
natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly
bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert
that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the
heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.

Reply Obj. 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about
immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances
were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more
universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over
different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are
not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more
universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate
presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the
heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed
with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside
immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as
Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are
derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato
because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all
inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence."

The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual
substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ.
83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power
placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): "The devil
was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial
order"; and Origen says on the text, "When the ass saw the angel"
(Num. 22:23), that "the world has need of angels who preside over
beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and
over the increase of all other things" (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason
of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature
to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even
the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of
corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine
wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does
it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as
above expounded (Q. 108, A. 2), the orders are distinguished by their
general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose
proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of
the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem
to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their
ministration miracles are sometimes performed.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 2]

Whether Corporeal Matter Obeys the Mere Will of an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will
of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul.
But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of
man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold,
and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much
more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be
done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to
corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform
corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much
more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal
matter.

Obj. 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic
administration, as appears above (A. 1), and thus it appears that
bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is
essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is
due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due
to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the
principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the
force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul:
but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the
soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it
assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the
[joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the
principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic
power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this
visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."

_I answer that,_ The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii,
p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by
immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are
participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this
opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in
matter proceed from the concept of the _intellect;_ and that
corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to
have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be
something made _per se,_ so that it would be the effect of a formal
principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8),
what is made, properly speaking, is the _composite:_ for this
properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is
called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something
is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for
that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to
existence.

Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch
as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has
a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself,
as when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both
matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone.
Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God,
or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.

Reply Obj. 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it
is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's
concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which
is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the
command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection
with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior
power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for
example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way
than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a
more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the
corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.

Reply Obj. 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking
place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would
not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as
neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating
the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish
that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce
matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power
of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 3]

Whether Bodies Obey the Angels As Regards Local Motion?

Objection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local
motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms.
But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated
above (A. 2). Therefore neither can they cause in them local
motion.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local
motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause
other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither
can they cause local motion.

Obj. 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul
as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of
life. In natural bodies, however, there is no vital principle.
Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels
use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do
this without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in
local motion.

_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom
has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second."
Hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in
conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the
spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect
is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The
reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in
potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something
extrinsic--that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a
natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as
regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme
bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see
that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion.

Reply Obj. 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides those
which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the
sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from
the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result
from the power of spiritual substances.

Reply Obj. 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first
motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing
corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire
to soften iron.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power
of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the
body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move
other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence
it can move locally bodies not joined to it.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 4]

Whether Angels Can Work Miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For
Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues
by whom signs and miracles are usually done."

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work
miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, bad
Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work
miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere
in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the
supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work
miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi,
Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen
may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our
atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside
the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for
instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of
nature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.

Obj. 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an
inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel.
Therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents;
which is to work miracles.

_On the contrary,_ It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): "Who alone doth
great wonders."

_I answer that,_ A miracle properly so called is when something is
done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle
if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for
otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards,
as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a
miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created
nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any
other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of
created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can
work miracles.

Reply Obj. 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either because
God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are
said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in
the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the
general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.

Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those
things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature.
But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows
that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a
power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So
when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things
are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to
ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the
demons; and these are said to be done by "private contracts,"
forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be
compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a
magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it
were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in
the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good
Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said
to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the
"signs of public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by
making use of other sacred signs.

Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in
this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside
the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside
the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above
explained.
_______________________

QUESTION 111

THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN
(In Four Articles)

We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire:

(1) How far they can change them by their own natural power;

(2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men;

(3) How they guard and protect men.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?

(2) Whether he can change man's will?

(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?

(4) Whether he can change man's senses?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 1]

Whether an Angel Can Enlighten Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For
man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii)
attributes enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But
faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you
are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the
gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but
immediately by God.

Obj. 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (Rom.
1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for
the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them
by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from
God--that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God
enlightens man immediately.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being
enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
Therefore he is not enlightened by them.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the
revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the
angels. But such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated
(Q. 106, A. 1; Q. 107, A. 2). Therefore men are enlightened by the
angels.

_I answer that,_ Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that
lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above
(Q. 109, A. 2); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the
superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by
them.

The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way
alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q. 106, A.
1), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has
two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is
strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according
as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are
proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes
place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal
concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel,
as explained above (Q. 106, A. 1).

The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself
unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to
the phantasms, as above explained (Q. 84, A. 7). So the angels
propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of
sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i),
that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise
than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils." On the other hand,
the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of
the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an
angel.

Reply Obj. 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first,
the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will
tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of
faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will;
hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this
respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that
what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is
accomplished by man, according to Rom. 10:17, "Faith cometh by
hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things
are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the
enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels
not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what
is to be done.

Reply Obj. 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be
strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the
human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth
can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is
assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more
perfect knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be
understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood;
thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands
or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to
him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not
follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is,
which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner
not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is
enlightened by him.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Can Change the Will of Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of
man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His
ministers a flame of fire" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are
fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices."
This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore
the angels can change the will.

Obj. 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil
does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however,
says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious
act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men"
(De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce
and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the
will. Therefore the will is changed by them.

Obj. 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human
intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which
serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive
appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a
corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can
he change the will.

_On the contrary,_ To change the will belongs to God alone, according
to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord,
whithersoever He will He shall turn it."

_I answer that,_ The will can be changed in two ways. First, from
within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but
the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus
change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to
the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God
alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from
God alone, Who causes the will.

Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this
can be only in one way--by the good apprehended by the intellect.
Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended
as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also
God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move
the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Q. 106, A. 2).

In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in
another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive
appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will
something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these
passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will
ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.

Reply Obj. 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels,
are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of
persuasion.

Reply Obj. 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing
them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject
to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of
thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the
things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions.
Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is
accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher
principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry
of the angels.

Reply Obj. 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand
only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will
something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of
the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel Can Change Man's Imagination?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's
imagination. For the phantasy, as is said _De Anima_ iii, is "a motion
caused by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an
angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is
contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the
imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.

Obj. 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual,
they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an
angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (Q. 110, A. 2).
Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he
cannot change it.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit
by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the
other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands
it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." But it does
not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor
that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore
it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.

Obj. 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the
similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this
there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of
deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by
changing the imagination.

_On the contrary,_ Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by
imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as
appears from Matt. 1:20; 2:13, 19 in regard to the angel who appeared
to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.

_I answer that,_ Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural
power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as
follows. For it was said above (Q. 110, A. 3), that corporeal nature
obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be
caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural
power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions
are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits
and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis
iii], when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that "when an
animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive
principle, and movements descend with it," that is, the impressions
left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and
move the sensitive principle"; so that a certain appearance ensues,
as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external
objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors
may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are
awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by
a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will
of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so
also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel,
sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without
such alienation.

Reply Obj. 1: The first principle of the imagination is from the
sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by
the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot
imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in
such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the
impressions preserved within.

Reply Obj. 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the
impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from
the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but
by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human
imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect
which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that
he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows.

Reply Obj. 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes
enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what
these images signify; and then there is no deception. But sometimes
by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the
imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but
by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus
neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to
the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 4]

Whether an Angel Can Change the Human Senses?

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses.
For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an
operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the
sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.

Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the
nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other
natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.

Obj. 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible
objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Q. 110, A.
4). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are
changed always by the sensible object.

_On the contrary,_ The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the
people of Sodom with blindness or _aorasia_, so that they could not
find the door" (Gen. 19:11). [*It is worth noting that these are the
only two passages in the Greek version where the word _aorasia_
appears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of
Sodom--namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the
Latin "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily imply.] The same is
recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kings 6:18).

_I answer that,_ The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from
without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within,
for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors
are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with
choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the
other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change
in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible
object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as
when he assumes a body, as we have said above (Q. 51, A. 2). Likewise
he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked,
whereby the senses are changed in various ways.

Reply Obj. 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be
without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this
interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior
principle, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an
angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive
power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any
other power using a corporeal organ.

Reply Obj. 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of
creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since
he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel
can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.
_______________________

QUESTION 112

THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS
(In Four Articles)

We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?

(2) Whether all are sent?

(3) Whether those who are sent, assist?

(4) From what orders they are sent.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Are Sent on Works of Ministry?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of
ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But
intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect
abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic
actions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to
perform their own actions.

Obj. 2: Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the
angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it
seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is
unseemly.

Obj. 3: Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of
wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive
wisdom" (Ecclus. 38:25). So if some angels are sent on external
ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation.
But the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of
God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which
is unfitting.

Obj. 4: Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is
written (Luke 22:27): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at
table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the
angels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent
to administer to us.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 23:20): "Behold I will send My
angels who shall go before thee."

_I answer that,_ From what has been said above (Q. 108, A. 6), it may
be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we
have already stated (Q. 43, A. 1), in treating of the mission of the
Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from
another so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another
way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to
be sent as proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in
a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by
the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present
everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power
reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (Q. 8, A. 1).
An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to
the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to
reach another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be
"there." But it is clear from what was above stated (Q. 110, A. 1),
that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence,
whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal
creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power;
and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this takes place
by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.

Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God
as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the
angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is
what is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent
instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action
is ordered to another. Hence angels' actions are called "ministries";
and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.

Reply Obj. 1: An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one
way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an
operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine
says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting
something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action
is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by
some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently
have sometimes a determinate place.

Reply Obj. 2: The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by
way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body
should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above
bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean
heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of
his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when
not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity.

Reply Obj. 3: In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by
exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the
sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the
action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary,
regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence
it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his
contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule
and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other.
Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels do not go abroad
in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation."

Reply Obj. 4: In their external actions the angels chiefly minister
to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them,
absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by
cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior
to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): "Esteeming
others better than themselves."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 2]

Whether All the Angels Are Sent in Ministry?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry.
For the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14): "All are ministering spirits, sent
to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].

Obj. 2: Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the
Seraphim, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 6). But a Seraph was sent to
purify the lips of the prophet (Isa. 6:6, 7). Therefore much more are
the inferior orders sent.

Obj. 3: Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic
orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even
the highest angels sent.

Obj. 4: Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external
ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the
Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the
angels are unequal, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 4), each angel has an
angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the
last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words,
"Thousands of thousands ministered to Him" (Dan. 7:10).

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the
statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks
fulfil no exterior service."

_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (Q. 106, A.
3; Q. 110, A. 1), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not
only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior
things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation,
however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal
things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is
suitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was
enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished
immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies.
Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these
bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of
the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can
anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without
the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior.
From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law
the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that
sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.

It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is
greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law;
in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old
law. Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides
those who were sent to give the law.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel
who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior
order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an
equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet.
It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own
proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of
the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as
purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so
immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as
the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means
of someone else.

Reply Obj. 3: The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are
said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been
said (Q. 43, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 4: A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence
there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent
immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior
are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior
ministries.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 3]

Whether All the Angels Who Are Sent, Assist?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist.
For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent, and
assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme
Spirit, God, is not limited."

Obj. 2: Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he
said, "I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the
Lord" (Tob. 12:15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.

Obj. 3: Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet
Satan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: "When the sons of God came
to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them."
Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.

Obj. 4: Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is
because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but
through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine
enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all.
Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to
the text of Dan. 7:10: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood
before Him." Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says, on Job 25:3: "Is there any numbering
of His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go
forth as messengers to men." Therefore those who are sent in ministry
do not assist.

_I answer that,_ The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and
"administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king;
some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately;
while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by
those who are in attendance--for instance, those who are placed at
the head of the administration of various cities; these are said to
administer, not to assist.

We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine
Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister,
are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who
are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist
and see the face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive
the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the
Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the
inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to
the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative
it is to be enlightened immediately by God.

From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second
objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.

Reply Obj. 3: Satan is not described as having assisted, but as
present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii),
"though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to
the angels."

Reply Obj. 4: All the assistants see some things immediately in the
glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the
prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately
enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is
seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among
those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than
another.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 4]

Whether All the Angels of the Second Hierarchy Are Sent?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels of the second
hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister,
according to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do
not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first
hierarchy, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the
angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who
minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the angels
of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the
angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the
"Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies
subjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister.

_I answer that,_ As above stated (A. 1), to be sent to external
ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine
command in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the
execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are
manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and
therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry
whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name
"dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only
disposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the
names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels"
and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the "Virtues" and
"Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that
the "Prince," according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.),
"be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders
to be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders.

Reply Obj. 1: The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering
angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to
be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the
production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are
to do.

Reply Obj. 2: A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number
of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those
who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he
takes the words (Dan. 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to
Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands
out of thousands"; thus the number of those who minister is
indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is
finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred
thousand assisted Him." This explanation rests on the opinion of the
Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first
principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is
to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified
as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.

Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of
angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the
superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable
degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal
natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and
more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the
ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way,
the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication,
to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because ten times a
hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand"
it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but
since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are
given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than
the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise
number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it
exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the
multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a
hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
_______________________

QUESTION 113

OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS
(In Eight Articles)

We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and
their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight
points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?

(2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?

(3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of
angels?

(4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?

(5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?

(6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?

(7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?

(8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their
guardianship?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 1]

Whether Men Are Guarded by the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels.
For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how,
or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But
man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his
natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an
angel.

Obj. 2: Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But
men are guarded by God, according to Ps. 120:4: "He shall neither
slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need
to be guarded by an angel.

Obj. 3: Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence
of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this man;
and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (3 Kings
20:39). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the
angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some
such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are
given to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore
the angels are not the guardians of men.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 90:11): "He hath given His
angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."

_I answer that,_ According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find
that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated
by the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable
spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which
are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as
regards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the
principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover
manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and
affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was
necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men,
in order to regulate them and move them to good.

Reply Obj. 1: By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree,
but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in
affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the
soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by
nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but
not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the
universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be
deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): "The
thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain."
Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things are required for a good action; first, that
the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the
habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the
proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the
Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first,
God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as
regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose
precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q.
111, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by
reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the
instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they
enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is
not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice
of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the
ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as
likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 2]

Whether Each Man Is Guarded by an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel.
For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard
many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.

Obj. 2: Further, the lower things are brought to God through the
medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But
as all the angels are unequal (Q. 50, A. 4), there is only one angel
between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one
angel who immediately keeps men.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater
offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than
another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all
the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different
angels.

_On the contrary,_ On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (Matt.
8:10), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to
have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."

_I answer that,_ Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him.
This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to
the execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's
providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other
corruptible creatures, for they are related differently to
incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common
species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are
the rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible
things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly
exercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards things
which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their
existence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of
God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of
things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.),
the different orders are deputed to the different genera of things,
for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to
work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the
different species are presided over by different angels of the same
order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels
are appointed to the guardianship of different men.

Reply Obj. 1: A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons:
first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one
guardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one.
Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man
is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to
provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community,
such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to
others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards
invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in
his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard
individual men.

Reply Obj. 2: As above stated (Q. 112, A. 3, ad 4), all the angels of
the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God
directly; but as to other things, only the superior are directly
enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the
same also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is
enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other
respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that
some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels
beneath him whom he enlightens.

Reply Obj. 3: Although men are equal in nature, still inequality
exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the
greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11,
12: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified
their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of
them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to
guard one man than another.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 3]

Whether to Guard Men Belongs Only to the Lowest Order of Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the guardianship of men does not
belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says
that the text (Matt. 18:10), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be
understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the
superior angels guard men.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to
minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"
(Heb. 1:14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is
directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in
external ministry (Q. 112, A. 4). Therefore all the angels of the
five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.

Obj. 3: Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially
necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the
Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work
miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are
also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest
order.

_On the contrary,_ In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is
attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according
to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix).

_I answer that,_ As above stated (A. 2), man is guarded in two ways;
in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an
angel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the
lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory,
to announce the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the
angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one
man. The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied
according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent
is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs
to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels,"
whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an
archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (Dan. 10:13). Moreover
all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise
the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits by the
"Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).

Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the
lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in
each order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however,
probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by
God for the higher degree of glory.

Reply Obj. 2: Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of
individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship,
greater or less, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: Even inferior angels exercise the office of the
superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the
superiors' power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order
can coerce the demons, and work miracles.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 4]

Whether Angels Are Appointed to the Guardianship of All Men?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels are not appointed to the
guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that
"He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If
therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ
also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for
Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not
appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Obj. 2: Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not
fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state
of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore
angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Obj. 3: Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men,
that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life,
encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults
of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain
to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good
works, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention:
for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps.
31). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the
working of Satan," as it is written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels
are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.

_On the contrary,_ is the authority of Jerome quoted above (A. 2),
for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it."

_I answer that,_ Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on
a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is
threatened by many dangers both from within and from without,
according to Ps. 159:4: "In this way wherein I walked, they have
hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for
men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is
assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, however, he
arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in
the kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon
to punish him.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of
God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards
His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible
body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right that He
should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a
ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Matt.
4:11) that "angels came and ministered to Him."

Reply Obj. 2: In the state of innocence man was not threatened
by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as
we have said above (Q. 95, AA. 1, 3). But peril threatened from
without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the
event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even
Antichrist, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason;
so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to
the whole human race--namely the guardianship of the angels. And
although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in
their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless
conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt
both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the
good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner
Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 5]

Whether an Angel Is Appointed to Guard a Man from His Birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard
a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who
shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says
(Heb. 1:14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation,
when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a
man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.

Obj. 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels
enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of
instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of
reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as
soon as they are born.

Obj. 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before
birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is
appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then
admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not
appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (_vide_ A. 4) that "each soul has an
angel appointed to guard it from its birth."

_I answer that,_ as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there
are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel
guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is
appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves
(loc. cit.), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred
by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as
receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred
by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth,
for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter
benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said
above (AA. 1, 4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man
has an angel guardian appointed to him.

Reply Obj. 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously
indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if
we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the
realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic
ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so
efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless,
they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.

Reply Obj. 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by
instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it
has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to
ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.

Reply Obj. 3: As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not
entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still
part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of
the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of
probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child
while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from
the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above
quoted, says.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 6]

Whether the Angel Guardian Ever Forsakes a Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes
the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in
the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not
healed: let us forsake her." And (Isa. 5:5) it is written: "I will
take away the hedge"--that is, "the guardianship of the angels"
[gloss]--"and it shall be wasted."

Obj. 2: Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But
God forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: "O God, my God,
look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does
an angel guardian forsake man.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When
the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes
they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.

_On the contrary,_ The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1
Pet. 5:8: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about,
seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good angels
ever guard us.

_I answer that,_ As appears above (A. 2), the guardianship of the
angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is
evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn
from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates
being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all
being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering
of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some
defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that
the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he
leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him
from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin,
according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon
and the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels,
because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject
to tribulation.

From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3: Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally,
he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his
guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is
happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he
can be with man in an instant.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 7]

Whether Angels Grieve for the Ills of Those Whom They Guard?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those
whom they guard. For it is written (Isa. 33:7): "The angels of peace
shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow.
Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15),
"sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the
loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's
will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.

Obj. 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary
to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are
told, Luke 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls
into sin.

Obj. 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: "Whatsoever first-fruits they
offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to
judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or
through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve
for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels
grieve for men's sins.

_On the contrary,_ Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not
perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 21:4): "Death shall
be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are
perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.

_I answer that,_ Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the
pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our
will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the
angels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to
the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world
save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore
simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the
blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called
simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a
particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although
universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the
sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea,
considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the
threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is
voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage.
Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will
sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the
fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in
respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall
into sin.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels,
i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of
Rabsaces, as related Isa. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal
sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are
the apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to
the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels,
then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally
speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense
we attribute passions to God and the angels.

The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one
reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of
the Divine Providence.

Reply Obj. 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of
men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 8]

Whether There Can Be Strife or Discord Among the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be [no] strife or discord among
the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): "Who maketh peace in His
high places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high
angels there is no strife.

Obj. 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just
authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the
angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they
guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the
opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in
the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder
of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good
angels.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 10:13): "The prince of the
kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this
prince of the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of
the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the
others; and thus there is strife among them.

_I answer that,_ The raising of this question is occasioned by this
passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the
kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of
the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being
offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been
caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in
Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the
prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.

But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of
Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom.
To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must
note that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and
various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the
angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in
various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits,
so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what
is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot
know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult
Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult the
Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are
said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition,
since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine
decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in
opposition.

From this the answers to the objections are clear.
_______________________

QUESTION 114

OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS
(In Five Articles)

We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are
five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?

(2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?

(3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or
temptations of the demons?

(4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading
men astray?

(5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from
making further assaults?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 1]

Whether Men Are Assailed by the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons.
For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by
God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is
the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail
man.

Obj. 2: Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set
against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are
weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not
therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men
should be assailed by demons.

Obj. 3: Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are
enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed
that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be
assailed by the demons.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling is
not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers,
against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits
of wickedness in the high places."

_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the assault of the
demons--the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault
itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor
to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of
Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the
angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation.
But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make
orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in
regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering
thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.

Reply Obj. 1: The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by
instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail
us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just
judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and
thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish
Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For punishment
is referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who
are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which
they are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are
sent by God on account of His justice.

Reply Obj. 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not
unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be
gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the
guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to
his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."

Reply Obj. 3: The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice
for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the
demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men.
But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 2]

Whether to Tempt Is Proper to the Devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil.
For God is said to tempt, according to Gen. 22:1, "God tempted
Abraham." Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again,
man is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not
proper to the devil to tempt.

Obj. 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know
what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.

Obj. 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the
will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears
from what has been said above (Q. 111, A. 2), it seems that it is not
in their province to tempt.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): "Lest perhaps he
that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds,
"that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt."

_I answer that,_ To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of
something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something
about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But
sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired
through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires
to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or
virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge
is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.

From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in
various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for
the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to
tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an
experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help,
sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in
order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be
his proper office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he
does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may
know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to
know. Hence it is written (Deut. 13:3): "The Lord your God trieth
you, that it may appear whether you love him."

The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or
matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man
someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the
flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity:
of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.

Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but
the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher of
spirits" (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more
prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order
to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him
to that vice to which he is most prone.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated
above (Q. 111, A. 3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a
certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it
can nevertheless be inclined.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 3]

Whether All Sins Are Due to the Temptation of the Devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of
the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude of
demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."
And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all malice and all
uncleanness have been devised by the devil."

Obj. 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of
the Jews (John 8:44): "You are of your father the devil." But this
was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation.
Therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.

Obj. 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are
deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the
suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne
to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the
instigation of the devil.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all
our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they
arise from the movement of our free-will."

_I answer that,_ One thing can be the cause of another in two ways;
directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of
a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional
and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he
who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we
must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it
was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there
resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this
sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.

But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its
action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the
cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's
instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of
the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were
no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like
pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those
desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the
corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to
curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need
for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins
which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the
same blandishments as were our first parents," as Isidore says (De
Summo Bono ii).

Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: When man commits sin without being thereto instigated
by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby,
in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot
advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man
by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part
in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the
demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is
not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 4]

Whether Demons Can Lead Men Astray by Means of Real Miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by
means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show
itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says
(2 Thess. 2:9), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in
all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at
other times do the demons perform lying wonders.

Obj. 2: Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change.
But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body
can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power."
Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.

Obj. 3: Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If
therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of
what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the
faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): "The Lord
working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83) [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4,
among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]: "Often by means of
the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by
the servants of God."

_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said above (Q. 110,
A. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot
work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the
strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the
entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is
contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for
whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can
work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by
reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of
knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and
knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so
that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.

It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which
appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes
nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the
demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And "when fire came
down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep;
when the storm struck down his house and with it his children--these
were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xx, 19).

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of
Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will
deceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really
do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies,
they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him."

Reply Obj. 2: As we have said above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter
does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons
be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another;
but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the
world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin.
iii, 8, 9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation
of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers,
to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be
produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these
seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or
frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those
transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature,
cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for
instance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or
that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something
of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is
not real but a mere semblance of reality.

Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a
demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses,
so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (Q.
111, AA. 3,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by
the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as he
can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so
as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can clothe any
corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein.
This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "Man's
imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of
an innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as
it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be
understood as though the imagination itself or the images formed
therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the
senses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a
man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's
senses.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do
what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different
right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the
glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by
the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is
subject."
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 5]

Whether a Demon Who Is Overcome by Man, Is for This Reason Hindered
from Making Further Assaults?

Objection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is
not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ
overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon
assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is
not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.

Obj. 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted
in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not
befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not
prevented from further assaults.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 4:11): "Then the devil left
Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame.

_I answer that,_ Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he
can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any
other sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same
man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so
for a certain definite time: wherefore (Luke 4:13) it is written:
"All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time."
There are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency;
for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus
Imperfectum, among his supposititious works], "the devil does not
tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God
allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He
orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken
from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Luke
4:13: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from
frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return
to the assault, is apparent from Matt. 12:44: "I will return into my
house from whence I came out."

From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.
_______________________

QUESTION 115

OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE
(In Six Articles)

We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and
fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal
actions there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a body can be active?

(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?

(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here
by the inferior bodies?

(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?

(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?

(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things
which are subject to their influence?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 1]

Whether a Body Can Be Active?

Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but
do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted
upon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon;
these are the spiritual substances."

Obj. 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its
work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance
below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the
latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings.
Therefore corporeal substance is not active.

Obj. 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity.
But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it
surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from
receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in
quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore
no corporeal substance is active.

Obj. 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to
its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most
composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most
simple. Therefore no bodies are active.

Obj. 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is
either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a
substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any
principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident;
and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the
cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is
it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its
subject," as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are
active.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other
qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action
and power on that of which it lays hold."

_I answer that,_ It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are
active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three
errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of
Avicebron in his book on _The Fount of Life,_ where, by the arguments
mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that
all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the
actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that,
according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power
which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be
derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in
corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited
thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were
universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes
of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which
is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by
quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and
imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to
be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the
spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by
quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else.

But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but
that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is
participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is
proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is
the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else
than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act
as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the
fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to
quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and
universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it
owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form
of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a
fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is
in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes
from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the
contact of two bodies.

But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For
Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred
accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the
small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others
considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both
Plato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that
corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing
matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection
attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an
immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the
action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of
the creation (Q. 45, A. 8).

The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes
place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while
passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the
passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,
9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole,
and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its
action; which things are manifestly untrue.

We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on
a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the
whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, which thus has no
nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature
acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.
Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in
potentiality to that which the other has in act.

From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must
be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not
moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand,
there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is
to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure
potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of
potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.

Reply Obj. 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form
from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent,
forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject
to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the
purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight;
as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that
weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the
greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto.
Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as
Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to
act.

Reply Obj. 4: A body is not that which is most distant from God; for
it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being,
forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is
primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure
potentiality.

Reply Obj. 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form
and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat,
although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the
substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can
terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument
of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh.
But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the
nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to
surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an
accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient;
thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Any Seminal Virtues in Corporeal Matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in
corporeal matter. For virtue (_ratio_) implies something of a
spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually,
but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which
it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons
produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain
seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues,
can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to
say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active
principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter
is not competent to act (A. 1, ad 2, 4). Therefore there are no
seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues"
(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the
production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for
miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal
virtues in corporeal matter.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the
things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion,
certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."

_I answer that,_ It is customary to name things after what is more
perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole
corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the
word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural
things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation
of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living
things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a
tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united,
consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of
movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the
active and passive principles of the generation of living things are
the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine
fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to
all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of
natural generation and movement.

These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders.
For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they
are principally and originally in the Word of God, as _typal ideas._
Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were
produced altogether at the beginning, as in _universal causes._
Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time,
are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in
that animal, as in _particular causes._ Fourthly, they are in the
_seeds_ produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared
to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to
the first effects produced.

Reply Obj. 1: These active and passive virtues of natural things,
though not called "virtues" (rationes) by reason of their being in
corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their
origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes
ideales].

Reply Obj. 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain parts
of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement
for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as
employing seeds.

Reply Obj. 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the
generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the
female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed"
covers both active and passive principles.

Reply Obj. 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these
seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal
virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii,
9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is
the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things."
Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but
not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a
separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the
scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought
outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the
creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God
commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of
the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are
ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we
say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 3]

Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of What Is Produced in
Bodies Here Below?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause
of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"--namely, the heavenly bodies--"are
not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of
storms and atmospheric changes."

Obj. 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter
suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there
are contrary agents--heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the
production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe
causality to the heavenly bodies.

Obj. 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be
observed that everything which is produced here below is produced
through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other
such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the
heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more
corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a
sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one
may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not
the cause of things produced in bodies here below.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a
grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of
a more subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says
that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible
bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and
perfection."

_I answer that,_ Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since
what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is
moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the
whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore
the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of
those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of
all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally.
Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and
multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies,
as to their cause.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as
denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation
and corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held
that the heavenly bodies are gods.

Reply Obj. 2: The active principles of bodies here below are only the
active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like.
If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not
diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles
of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the
"dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these
inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act.
But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those
accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the
substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself
sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some
active principle above these material dispositions.

This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate
species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their
substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate
species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have
the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in
the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly
false.

Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10),
to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or
absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates
here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument
of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man
and the sun generate man."

Reply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the
bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of
their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is
contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like
God.

Reply Obj. 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received
in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter.
Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is
not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes
into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an
argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the
stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various
dispositions of matter.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 4]

Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of Human Actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of
human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
substances, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 3), they act by virtue
thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are
superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause
impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.

Obj. 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle.
But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that
they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to
their principles.

Obj. 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the
outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and
will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the
heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions.
Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."

_I answer that,_ The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves
act on bodies, as stated above (A. 3). They can act directly indeed
on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs,
but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be
hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot
see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to
corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not
differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly
bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow
that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other
animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed
to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the
action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore
follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate
actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false,
and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that
indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can
reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and
will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to
corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently
situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior
apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or
memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of
necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of
necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for
although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a
certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains
the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the
impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior
powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the
proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.

To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human
actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ
from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of
men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on"
(Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect
and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that
heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.

Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly
bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly
bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by
enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will,
as stated above (Q. 111, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is
reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause:
so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the
will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect
and will.

Reply Obj. 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are
movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the
heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist
these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the
truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not
in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions
by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to
say that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy,
Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 5]

Whether Heavenly Bodies Can Act on the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons.
For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass
men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Matt.
4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.

Obj. 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order
to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the
heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are
subject to them.

Obj. 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior
bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies,
namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words,
forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ.
Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action
of heavenly bodies.

_On the contrary,_ The demons are superior in the order of nature, to
the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not
subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

_I answer that,_ There have been three opinions about the demons. In
the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and
held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the
necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies.
This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been
held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain powers
useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion
is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are
done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no
way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should
speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no
previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move,
and other like things.

For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are
"animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says,
quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of
the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said
that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have
said man is subject thereto (A. 4). But this opinion is proved to be
false from what we have said above (Q. 51, A. 1): for we hold that
demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is
clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither
essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.

Reply Obj. 1: That demons harass men, according to certain phases
of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to
"defame God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv,
24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as
they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural
forces, as stated above (Q. 114, A. 4, ad 2) they take into account
the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest
that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as
Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De
Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action
of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it
is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore
the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's
imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.

Reply Obj. 2: Demons when summoned through certain constellations,
come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error
of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly,
because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal
matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are
enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals,
songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by
signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them
in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 6]

Whether Heavenly Bodies Impose Necessity on Things Subject to Their
Action?

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on
things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient
cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their
movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their
effects follow of necessity.

Obj. 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter,
when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to
itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject
to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than
theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity
received in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow
of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal
cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must
of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the
heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.
Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it
follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below
happens of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De
Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs
observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and
wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of
heavenly bodies take place of necessity.

_I answer that,_ This question is partly solved by what was said
above (A. 4); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown
that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain
inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of
necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of
the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
human action extends.

But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with
freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by
heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least,
everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some
of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause;
and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded
that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by
Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.

For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered
to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the
majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But
that such causes do fail in the minority of cases is due to some
hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems
not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of
necessity.

Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is
a being _per se,_ has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a
cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one.
For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is)
"musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has
not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it
is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so
ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases,
clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of
these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause.
Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be
reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of
necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the
higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some
heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some
combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that
the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is
not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not
all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.

Reply Obj. 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take
place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes,
which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.

Reply Obj. 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore
it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local
distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect.
Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body
(for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in
Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or
other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of another
cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless
the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the
causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
_______________________

ON FATE
(In Four Articles)

We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Is there such a thing as fate?

(2) Where is it?

(3) Is it unchangeable?

(4) Are all things subject to fate?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 1]

Whether There Be Such a Thing As Fate?

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a
homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the hearts
of the faithful to think that fate is anything real."

Obj. 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said
to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If
therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance
in the world.

_On the contrary,_ What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius
(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
proper order."

_I answer that,_ In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or
chance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some
higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are
sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two
servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the
master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.

So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De
Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about
Providence (Q. 22, A. 2).

On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or
in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
[*Cf. St. Augustine , loc. cit., v, 1, 8, 9]. But this will not hold.
First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (Q. 115, A.
4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly
bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate,
since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of
necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place.
Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been
said (Q. 115, A. 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking
neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates
in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is
accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No
natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man
intending to dig a grave finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a
acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects
in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active
power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident
here below, whether by luck or by chance.

We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect:
otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger
of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend
this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place
where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of
this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what
happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some
ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine
intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q. 105,
A. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of
which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.

So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were
"fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy
doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted
its application to a certain force in the position of the stars.
Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human
affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him
keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue." For this reason Gregory
denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's
solution is manifest.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by
chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to
Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world,"
as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 2]

Whether Fate Is in Created Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but
in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.

Obj. 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as
their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,
is God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and
not in creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or
an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to
the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing
only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a
disposition inherent to changeable things."

_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been stated above (Q. 22,
A. 3; Q. 103, A. 6), Divine Providence produces effects through
mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects
in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering
of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering
as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of
certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine
Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by
all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements
of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of
the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is
forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above (A. 1; Q. 104,
A. 2; Q. 110, A. 1; Q. 113; Q. 114). It is therefore manifest that
fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the
production of their effects.

Reply Obj. 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine
(De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature
of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or
will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially
fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second
causes.

Reply Obj. 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the
second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.

Reply Obj. 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition
which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies
order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be
considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is
one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the
mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote:
"Thy fate draws thee."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 3]

Whether Fate Is Unchangeable?

Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is
to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so
is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of
Providence."

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be
moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent
to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore
fate is changeable.

Obj. 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate
happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate
seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no
contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
unchangeable disposition.

_I answer that,_ The disposition of second causes which we call fate,
can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second
causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to
the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some,
therefore, have held that the series itself o[f] dispositions of
causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of
necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a
cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as
proved above (Q. 115, A. 6).

Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as
dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that
fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says
(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the
reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.

We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second
causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it
derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of
conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is
true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will
happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is
fickle, shortly afterwards adds--"which, since it is derived from an
unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable."

From this the answers to the objections are clear.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 4]

Whether All Things Are Subject to Fate?

Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven
and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them
by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born
into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of
offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from
the domain of fate.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is
something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says
(De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.

Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a
disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are
changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above
(Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things
subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of
second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is
subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is
done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes,
neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification
of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a
state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence
it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the
more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it
is bound up with second causes.

Reply Obj. 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by
God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as
to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever
is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as
already stated.

Reply Obj. 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet
some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And
these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
_______________________

QUESTION 117

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN
(In Four Articles)

We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of
man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In
the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and
secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the
first, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his
knowledge?

(2) Whether man can teach an angel?

(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?

(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local
movement?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 1]

Whether One Man Can Teach Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the
Lord says (Matt. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss
of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God."
Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it
belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is
proper to God.

Obj. 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as
he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the
other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his
like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an
active quality just as heat is.

Obj. 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the
species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of
these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause
knowledge in another man.

Obj. 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple
save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by
words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to
cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are
signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know.
If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is
already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from
the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can
learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to
a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore
in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): "Whereunto I am
appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles
in faith and truth."

_I answer that,_ On this question there have been various opinions.
For Averroes, commenting on _De Anima_ iii, maintains that all men
have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).
From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all
men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have
a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he
communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving
him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be
rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true
so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we
consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective
truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all
men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible
species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is
false, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).

Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that
our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through
the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 3,
4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body,
from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According
to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his
master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to
learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they
held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms,
which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But
against this we have proved above (Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 3) that the
passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to
intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).

We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the
teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from
potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In
order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding
from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle
alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone:
whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle,
sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick
man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art,
sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the
force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed.
First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals
a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused
the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior
principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the
principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the
interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with
instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use
in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and
employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended
end.

Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as
is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from
an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by
instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of
knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which
certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally
understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone
applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the
memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by
his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains
knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches,
leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge
of things previously unknown to him; according to what the
Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning
proceed from previous knowledge."

Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of
the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him
certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use
for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him
certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the
disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose
to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of
opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the
learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown.
Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed,
by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q.
106, A. 1; Q. 111, A. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all
human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch
as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to
conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power
to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the
Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism
that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer
to know.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help
as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the
principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the
intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are
from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy
diseases" (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man
knowledge" (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is
signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown
to us.

Reply Obj. 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause
knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause.
Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the
principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the
principle by which one is directed in working.

Reply Obj. 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light in the
disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he
moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of
his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are
proposed to him from without.

Reply Obj. 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of
things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in
detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by
himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own
master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is
required in a master.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 2]

Whether Man Can Teach the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says
(Eph. 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the
principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church."
But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things
are made known to angels through men.

Obj. 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately
concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as
stated above (Q. 116, A. 1; Q. 112, A. 3). But some men are
instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God;
as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1, 2: "Last of
all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore
some men have been able to teach the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior.
But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up
to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom.
xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be
instructed by men concerning Divine things.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine
enlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels.
Therefore angels are not instructed by men concerning Divine things.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 107, A. 2), the inferior angels
can indeed speak to the superior angels, by making their thoughts
known to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never
enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same
way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men
are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's
words (Matt. 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born
of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in
the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." Therefore angels are never
enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of
speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it
belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this
passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the
least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all
men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which
hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the
multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and
powers in the heavenly places--that is, through the Church." As
though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from
the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and
powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because
the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this
Church composed of men will be gathered together."

It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by
the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place
and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v,
19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled
by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became
apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this
way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad
Eph.)--that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned
certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the
apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus
by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which
mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.

Reply Obj. 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of
God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His
human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater than
certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have
such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude
than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say
that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree,
though actually it is much smaller.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 3]

Whether Man by the Power of His Soul Can Change Corporeal Matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can
change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints
work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus
Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof
delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working
of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men,
by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.

Obj. 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): "Who hath bewitched you,
that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have
blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially
children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could
change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by
the power of his soul.

Obj. 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies.
But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed
to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed
this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death.
Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal
matter.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal
matter obeys God alone at will."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter is
not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent
composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter
and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both.
Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (Q. 110, A. 2) that they
cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by
employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects.
Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change
corporeal matter, except by means of bodies.

Reply Obj. 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power of
grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the
same place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says--what
wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"

Reply Obj. 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact
that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual
substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the
soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This
he says is the cause of the "evil eye."

But it has been shown above (Q. 110, A. 2) that corporeal matter
does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone.
Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the
(corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed,
which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to
which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air
which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way
as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a
"menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; [*De Insomniis
ii]).

Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs
mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the
countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who
have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that
by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons
co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.

Reply Obj. 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and the
sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as
stated above (Q. 81, A. 3), it is the act of a corporeal organ.
Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive
appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal
operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice
to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in
the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 4]

Whether the Separate Human Soul Can Move Bodies at Least Locally?

Objection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at
least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to
local motion, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 5). But the separate
soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies
by its command.

Obj. 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the
narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained
power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through
this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been
without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the
separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.

_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul
cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.

_I answer that,_ The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a
body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the
body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that
if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as
to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by
the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power
the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by
the power of God, it can exceed those limits.

Reply Obj. 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are
not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are
naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey
them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance
is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will
not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower
degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven
cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its
nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it
cannot by its natural power move any other body.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom.
xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the
dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is
therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who
pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
_______________________

QUESTION 118

OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL
(In Three Articles)

We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the
soul; secondly, as to the body.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?

(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?

(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 1]

Whether the Sensitive Soul Is Transmitted with the Semen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted
with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not
composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence
not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save
from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise
it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is
not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by
generation but by creation.

Obj. 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is the
generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the
vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now
nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot
be caused by the animal's generating power.

Obj. 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of
the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But
neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in
the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in
some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a
particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body
which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore
the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.

Obj. 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of
the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is
begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it
would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal;
which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between
begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct
therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above
(Q. 76, A. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle,
which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does
not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent
would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the
sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.

_On the contrary,_ The power in the semen is to the animal seminally
generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals
produced from these elements--for instance by putrefaction. But in
the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power,
according to Gen. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping
creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally
generated are produced by the seminal power.

_I answer that,_ Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals
are created by God (Q. 65, A. 4). This opinion would hold if the
sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself.
For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would
needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot
be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul
would arrive at existence by creation.

But this principle is false--namely, that being and operation are
proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q. 75,
A. 3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since,
therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is
that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as
proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the
subsistent composites exist through them.

Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator
is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the
sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into
existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from
potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are
possessed.

Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for
instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its
heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the
lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some
medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But
living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their
like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium--in the work
of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium--in the
act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives
a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the
instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent.
And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the
instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter
whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul
of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.

Reply Obj. 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent
substance. We have said enough (Q. 25, A. 3) on this point, nor need
we repeat it here.

Reply Obj. 2: The generating power begets not only by its own virtue
but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the
generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal
begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more
perfect effect is its generating power ordained.

Reply Obj. 3: This active force which is in the semen, and which is
derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain
movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the
soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the
axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is
no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is
based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is
attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a
certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue
of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the
species as stated above (Q. 115, A. 3, ad 2). And since in this
(vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of
a heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate
man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the
soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii,
4).

Reply Obj. 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active
force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In
this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not
as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul
is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract
nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore
is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until
it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the
force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for
thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical;
moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than
generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by
the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in
one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that
the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the
perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the
active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the
semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is
there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the
principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an
instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 2]

Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Produced from the Semen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced
from the semen. For it is written (Gen. 46:26): "All the souls that
came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from
the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual
soul is produced from the semen.

Obj. 2: Further, as shown above (Q. 76, A. 3), the intellectual,
sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man.
But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in
other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,
3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but
first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore
also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

Obj. 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is
directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and
the form there would not result something simply one. But the
intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced
by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is
produced by the power of the semen.

Obj. 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human
species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational
soul is from the begetter.

Obj. 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if
the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the
sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit
intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the
rational soul is not engendered by coition."

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for an active power existing in
matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial
effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man
transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no
part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to
produce the intellectual principle.

Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter
according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making
use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever
to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the
intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows
that the intellect alone comes from without."

Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of
the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q. 75, A. 2): therefore
to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an
immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only
through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul
is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to
be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is
therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted
with the semen.

Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the
whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.

Reply Obj. 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the
embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or
from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are
false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth
cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said
that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the
beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.

Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which
existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in
addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus
there would be in man three souls of which one would be in
potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Q. 76,
A. 3).

Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely
vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power,
becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes
intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by
the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from
without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect
comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no
substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of
greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition
of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not
possible for the same identical form to belong to different species.
Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal
would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the
imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because
it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not
generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in
act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter
of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection;
this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of
the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of
generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is
caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must
needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was
non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those
who held the existence of several souls in the body--or else it is
not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from
this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with
the body, which cannot be admitted.

There is again another explanation, according to those who held that
all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved
above (Q. 76, A. 2).

We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and
in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous
form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the
perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in
this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at
the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This
indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from
putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is
created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at
the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being
corrupted.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not
ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to
one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from
reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior
agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the
generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but
the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what
has been said above (Q. 105, A. 5; Q. 110, A. 1) that the whole of
corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power,
especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the
body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul
is from God alone.

Reply Obj. 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power
the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.

Reply Obj. 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is
good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is
evil; in this God does not concur.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 3]

Whether Human Souls Were Created Together at the Beginning of the
World?

Objection 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at
the beginning of the world. For it is written (Gen. 2:2): "God rested
Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He
created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the
same time.

Obj. 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the
perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the
bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to
the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the
universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gen. 2:2,
where it is said that "God ended" all "His work."

Obj. 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But
the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it
began to exist before the body.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the
soul is created together with the body."

_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that it is accidental to the
intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul
is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not
united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were
created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement
is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if
it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would
follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident;
or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q. 75, A.
4). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the
angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown
above (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 85, A. 1): for man understands through
receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above
(Q. 84, AA. 6, 7; Q. 85, A. 1). For this reason the soul needs to be
united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the
sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if
it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural
to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is
deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God
should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did
not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a
man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.

But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to
the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the
reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other
reason. If because the soul willed it--this seems incongruous. First,
because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to
the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would
be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in
what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why,
having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should,
after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a
spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly
revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united
to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills
would have to concur--to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of
the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural
on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent
cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting
nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that
souls were embodied in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these
opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not
created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are
infused into them.

Reply Obj. 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from
all work, since we read (John 5:17): "My Father worketh until now";
but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not
have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls
which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the
species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's
soul.

Reply Obj. 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of
the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the
number of species.

Reply Obj. 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the
corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it
was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from
the beginning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not
death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to
them."
_______________________

QUESTION 119

OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY
(In Two Articles)

We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning
this there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?

(2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation,
is produced from the surplus food?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 119, Art. 1]

Whether Some Part of the Food Is Changed into True Human Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true
human nature. For it is written (Matt. 15:17): "Whatsoever entereth
into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy."
But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature.
Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh
belonging to the species from flesh belonging to "matter"; and says
that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes
and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to
matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature
belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true
human nature.

Obj. 3: Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality
of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according
to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed
into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.

Obj. 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature,
whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due
only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking
food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.

Obj. 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there
is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is
generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If
therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end
nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the
beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man
throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same,
identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore
the food is not changed into true human nature.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily
food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into
the texture of the members." But the texture of the members belongs
to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality
of human nature.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The
relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being."
Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters
into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in
two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as
in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong
to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate
matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true
nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body
belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human
nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.

Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one
individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the
matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that
the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which,
they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man.
So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by
posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human
nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.

But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject
of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the
multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man.
According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we
take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action
of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor";
just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed
by fire.

But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to
the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it
can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can
be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that
the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which
is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible.
Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that
something else be changed into true human nature. Secondly, because
in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual
there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case
with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one
individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of
matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of
quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter
increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the
matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it
cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the
addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result
from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to
matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into
it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by
rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some
other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or
lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of
matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the
body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of
a child. Nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter: for,
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were created
together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific
form." Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be
the result of the food being changed into the true human nature.
Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants
in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of
animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment
into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication.
Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot
naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does
anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change
of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of
generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would
be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.

Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to
exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in
general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the
individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter,
on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual,
so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of
the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the
true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the
requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the
change of food into the substance of the individual partaking
thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required.
And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human
nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the
individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further
is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature,
properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because
this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in
which, although there be a power of generating their like in species,
there is not the power of generating their like in the individual;
which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing,
therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power,
if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly,
because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from
the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Q. 118, A. 1). Hence it
cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is
derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly
assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the
nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food
which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for
growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer;
but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat.
But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food,
took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was
there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that
which is formed from the food.

Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is
really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming
the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what
the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as
it is potentially flesh."

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters
into the mouth, but "all"--because something from every kind of food
is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is
generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast
aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.

Reply Obj. 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood
that which first receives the human species, which is derived from
the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does.
By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated
from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it
comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For
he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in
matter"--for instance, wood or stone--"so in flesh, there is
something belonging to the species, and something belonging to
matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in
inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished.
Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing
with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the
Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and
that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they
are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no
reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the
other remains.

It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is
not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered
from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according
to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein,
thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains
together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh
according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually
destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of
fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter
is substituted in its place.

Reply Obj. 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the
virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot
be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the
"nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the
specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and
the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species
remains in its root, which is not destroyed.

Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by
continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore
the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to
transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also
for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of
what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this;
and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether,
the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water
added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to
become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example
(De Gener. i, 5).

Reply Obj. 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a
certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said
to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire
already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the
entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter
transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if,
while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on
until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire
will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into
what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by
means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural
heat.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 119, Art. 2]

Whether the Semen Is Produced from Surplus Food?

Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the
surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature,
producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is
begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen.
Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.

Obj. 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which
he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is
generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive
nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never
existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or
ancestors, than to any other men.

Obj. 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of
cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from
surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to
the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in
Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of
the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from
surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener.
Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."

_I answer that,_ This question depends in some way on what has been
stated above (A. 1; Q. 118, A. 1). For if human nature has a virtue
for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in
another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which
at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form
communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing
should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things
generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is
afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the
proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see
that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first,
then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a
certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which
virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.

Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what
is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this
solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken
from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would
be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have
the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that
nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from,
then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not
have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature,
but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the
solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains
the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in
act; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as
mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after
being cut in two: which is inadmissible.

It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something
separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the
whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of
the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (A. 1; Q.
108, A. 1). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that
which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the
substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In
this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power:
because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as
semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the
Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food,
have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and
generate seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in
animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the
form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the
substance.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on
account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that
generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his
grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter
should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a
virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.
In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in
relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.

Reply Obj. 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as
though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from
which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that
both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter,
which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal
substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active
seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue
(in the production) of this man.

But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal
substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter
from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin
Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not
derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal
virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a
birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary,
O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.